

Modernizing Muscovy

Reform and social change in
seventeenth-century Russia

Edited by

Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe

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Eastern Europe

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MODERNIZING MUSCOVY

Modernizing Muscovy is a comprehensive account of seventeenth-century Russian history. It rejects the traditional interpretation of this era as the twilight of the Russian Middle Ages. By revealing important instances of dynamic change in the late Muscovite state, economy, and society, the book demonstrates the crucial importance of pre-Petrine reform in Russia's transition to one of the great powers of the world. The book's broad scope makes it a veritable encyclopaedia of late Muscovite history. It both synthesizes previous scholarship and breaks new ground in many important areas.

Jarmo Kotilaine a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. He is the author of several books and articles on Russian, Eastern European, and Scandinavian economic history.

Marshall Poe has taught history at Harvard, Columbia and New York University. Dr Poe is currently an editorial analyst for *The Atlantic Monthly* and lives in Washington, DC. He is the author of several books on early modern Russia, including *The Russian Moment in World History* (Princeton University Press, 2003).

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INTRODUCTION

MODERNIZATION IN THE EARLY MODERN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF MUSCOVY

Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe

This collection of essays seeks to present a comprehensive analysis of pivotal developments in Russian political, economic, and cultural life in the course of the seventeenth century. By undertaking this thorough examination of the “anatomy” of late Muscovite society and state, the papers included here reveal several important aspects of Russian history that have, to this day, been either unknown or misunderstood. We hope and believe that these findings will contribute to a more fundamental reassessment of seventeenth-century Russia in the minds of regional specialists and those looking at Russia in a broader European, Eurasian, or global context.

Modernization is a word seldom heard in the context of seventeenth-century Muscovy. Early modern Russian historiography, especially works devoted to reform and change (however defined) is dominated by the greatest of Russian “great men”—Peter I. The stereotypical view of Peter as the father of “modern,” “European” Russia is deeply engrained in the Russian collective consciousness, but no less influential in the West, even among professional historians. What this Petrine cult has done, among other things, is generate a vast literature which has completely overshadowed scholarship on his predecessors. Peter’s victory in this popularity contest has given us a highly simplified understanding of Russia’s road from the Middle Ages to great power status. One of the central goals of this book is to lift that Petrine veil and offer a fresh look at the pre-Petrine century.

While this collection does not set out to disparage Peter the Great’s contribution to Russian history, it does seek to place him in a historical context. We show that a striking continuity exists between reform efforts by the early Romanovs and Peter’s own programs. Moreover, several of the articles make it abundantly clear that, by the time Peter took over the reins of government, Russia already had a culture of reform and innovation which had grown out of an awareness of Russia’s weakness *vis-à-vis* her Western neighbors and a growing interaction with foreign merchants and other visitors. Peter’s historical contribution was to build on this tradition and intensify reform efforts in several areas. However, it is quite clear that Peter was not a Messianic innovator who crafted a brave new Russia from nothing.

Any account of modernization in Russia naturally has to take as its starting point the country’s lack of “modernity.” Russia’s relative backwardness in the Middle Ages was in large part due to unfavorable geography. The short growing season, a relative lack of good farmland, and an absence of agricultural innovation made for much lower yield ratios than in Western Europe. This, in

turn, meant that subsistence-level agriculture—supplemented by berries, mushrooms, fishing, and hunting—became the basic mode of existence for everyone but a very small elite. This precarious life on the verge of starvation meant that the countryside was unable to generate a large enough surplus to sustain a network of thriving cities. Instead, Russia ended up with a limited number of relatively small market towns scattered over a vast area, separated by great distances, and often connected only by waterways or bad roads which were unusable for much of the year. Geographically speaking, medieval Muscovy still had the appearance of a peripheral colony which—in a very real sense—it was, having been settled by the Slavs only centuries earlier and previously inhabited by small numbers of Balts, Finns, and other usually nomadic groups.

The lack of economic dynamism had its counterpart in exceptional political and cultural conservatism. Instead of innovating, the Russians chose to make do with what they had, lest sudden changes unduly perturb the “safe” equilibrium of Muscovite life. Dependent on limited and precarious sources of sustenance, Russians avoided anything that might prove risky, even for a short time. What allowed this highly static culture to survive was a combination of poverty and isolation. Russia’s lack of valuable resources and peripheral location meant that serious external competition did not become a major concern for several centuries.

The early modern era, however, posed a new and profound challenge to this Muscovite traditionalism. This was due to two main developments: (i) Russia’s isolation from the rest of Europe came to an end and (ii) the country was confronted by enemies which had successfully modernized many of their key institutions and possessed military strength superior to Russia’s.

In the Middle Ages, Russia’s external conflicts had been localized, in most cases more or less glorified border skirmishes with Swedes, Lithuanians, Ottomans, and various nomadic Tatar Hordes. Starting especially in the sixteenth century, Russia was drawn into international conflicts, most notably due to its desire to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Livonian Order. In these encounters, Russia was increasingly forced to fight “modern” wars with a new kind of adversary that was fundamentally different from the mounted horseman of the Eurasian steppe. Russia was faced with the unprecedented challenge of standing armies and the latest the gunpowder revolution had to offer. Moreover, once involved in pan-European conflicts, Russia could no longer exit from this arena. It became a potential partner for anyone seeking to shake the prevailing balance of power in Northern or Eastern Europe and an enemy in the opposition coalition.

The other main fact contributing to the end of Russia’s isolation was the fact that the relative value of Russia’s resource endowments changed as naval stores became the main fuel of the European Commercial Revolution. In addition, the economic focus of the European economy had shifted from the Mediterranean to the Baltic-North Sea area and made Russia’s location much less peripheral than it had been. Commercial and colonial expansion by the Dutch, the English, and others required large and growing quantities of timber and other naval stores. The demographic expansion brought about by this new wealth throughout Western Europe led to an urgent need for new sources of grain. The vast forests and fields that had allowed medieval Muscovy to slumber in relative isolation now became the bridge that tied Russia into an elaborate network of markets

extending across the European continent. Just as importantly, they made the once-remote Baltic basin a fiercely contested terrain at Russia's doorstep.

The early modern period marks for Russia the beginning of a long game of catch-up with Western Europe. Russia's natural endowments, institutions, and risk-averse culture had tended to generate very low rates of economic growth. Indeed, what little growth materialized tended translated primarily into demographic expansion and did little to improve living standards. In contrast, to the west of the Dvina (Daugava/Düna) agricultural innovation paved the way for a commercial expansion which was further facilitated by the emergence of new institutions: banking, capital markets, etc. Related to this was a culture of innovation which gave the world the Renaissance, the Reformation, and eventually the Enlightenment and put a decisive end to medieval traditionalism. For many European countries, the sixteenth-seventeenth century marks a crucial turning point, the beginning of modern economic growth. Suddenly, a growing wedge opened up between Muscovy and her European neighbors, the former continuing its age-old pattern of stagnation while the latter were speeding on an ever-accelerating course toward modern economic growth and state-building.

But what then is *modernization*? It should be made very clear that this book does *not* seek to involve itself with what is known as "modernization theory," although it can naturally not detach itself from the nexus of issues that theory deals with. But even as we seek to avoid becoming entangled in theoretical constructs, we need to appreciate the difficulties of settling on an unequivocal and universally acceptable definition of a highly complex concept.

Modernization can be understood in a number of different ways. At the most basic level, modernization is *change*, leaving behind the "old" and embracing the "new." But clearly not all change qualifies and "old" and "new" are hardly precise enough categories for our purposes. The definition can be narrowed until we reach the other extreme of a teleological and essentially normative interpretation of modernization as continuous and linear change toward a clearly defined goal or set of goals. The problem with this definition is that it ultimately assumes a bounded notion of history and effectively equates modernity with the "end of history." While this view has its advocates, it is highly problematic in positing that at some point change ceases to be modernizing and becomes "post-modern." Alas, there is—again—no universally accepted definition of what or where that point is, nor is this something that early modern Russian historians in fact need to preoccupy themselves with.

For our purposes in this volume, we have adopted a dual definition which is hopefully both concrete and flexible enough to allow for new insights on modernizing change in Russia. In essence, modernization can be viewed in *absolute* or *relative* terms. For our purposes, we will view absolute modernization as the adoption of new institutions that are more efficient than their predecessors, or are at least perceived to be more efficient. In most cases, although not necessarily always, this modernization grows out of an active reform effort. The notion of relative modernization is premised on the fact of international interdependency and competition. Relative modernization involves some degree of emulation and/or borrowing from other nations. Again, some normative sense of superiority has to be presupposed. This kind of borrowing is unlikely to occur unless foreign institutions or practices are viewed as better or

more desirable. This process ideally serves to reduce the gap between the “leader” and the “follower,” to use Gerschenkron’s terminology.

Quite obviously, these two categories of modernization are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, borrowing can be—and often is—efficiency-oriented. On the other hand, there are foreign influences which have nothing to do with efficiency, take for instance, the adoption of perspective painting or secularism in art. This can be called “efficiency-oriented” at best in the sense that it allows for more accurate depictions of real life, but efficiency seems to be an irrelevant consideration here. Naturally, the focus on efficiency in the first definition has its problems. However, while it makes the definition narrower than it might be, it hopefully also makes it more robust, concrete, and useful in discussing changes that left a lasting and important impact on Russian life.

It is important to appreciate the fact that, while many of the reforms undertaken in the seventeenth century were rational responses to serious crises under the prevailing circumstances, they did not necessarily serve to modernize Russia on a more lasting basis, not are they necessarily reforms that modernization theorists would feel comfortable with. In fact, one could claim that some of the reforms adopted over time contributed to Russia’s uniqueness and relative backwardness, instead of eliminating them. It can be argued, for example, that the creation of Russian absolutism served the country well by facilitating a difficult task of mobilizing very limited resources. Ultimately, however, Russian autocracy became something that stifled initiative and competition in a number of areas and prevented the emergence of a more pluralistic social structure. Similarly, the establishment of a carefully codified social stratification—including the establishment of serfdom—promoted efficiency by resolving serious distributional questions and giving many producers greater incentives to invest by strengthening their claims to particular productive resources. On the other hand, however, the stratification undermined Russia’s future growth potential by severely curbing the normal operation of land and labor markets and thus placing enormous obstacles on resource re-allocation, something that is an absolute precondition of sustained economic growth.

Can we then speak of modernization when we describe these key developments in late Muscovite history? We would argue yes. These were not merely instances of institutional innovation but, very definitely, efficiency-oriented reforms. They made eminent sense in situations where the state had to assume a leading role in defending Russia against foreign competition or where peasant flight and disputes over taxation had imposed a terrible toll on the Russian economy. The fact that their short-term benefits over the ensuing decades did not outweigh their long-term costs over centuries is an important point, but not sufficient to invalidate the energy and determination of late Muscovite state-makers. Rather, they speak to more fundamental problems in Russia’s historical evolution: a risk-averse culture and a traditionalist mindset that no reformer to this day has been able to fully overcome. Moreover, reforms that appear *ad hoc* with the benefit of hindsight did not necessarily appear as ill-advised at the time. Indeed, in some cases, *ad hoc* reforms may have been the only course of action available.

We would do well to remember Alexander Gerschenkron’s contributions on Russia’s history of backwardness which has repeatedly forced the country to

adopt various measure in order to catch up with its European neighbors. As Gerschenkron noted, each bout of reform—while bridging the gap with the West—also served to differentiate Russia from the West. By compressing decades, if not centuries, of organic development into relatively short campaigns, Russia had to adopt methods and means that were to varying degrees unique. To wit, had Russia had what it took to bring about economic and social development in the West, it would have developed along the same lines as Western Europe. The lack of these critical preconditions forced the Muscovite, and subsequent Russian, rulers to look for substitutes. Perhaps not surprisingly, “modernization” in Russia was never simply Westernization but a curious progression of *ad hoc* policies which often proved to be of limited utility in the long run, but all jointly contributed to Russia’s uniqueness among European nations.¹

AN OVERVIEW

This book begins with Janet Martin’s assessment of Russia in sixteenth century. She argues that Muscovy in that era was still a late medieval society having little in common with contemporaneous European states. More important, sixteenth-century Russia was a largely stagnant society with little evidence of systematic and sustained change. Russia in the era of Ivan the Terrible, therefore, provides a natural baseline against which modernization in the seventeenth century can be measured.

The first major section of this book analyses the evolution of the state in the seventeenth century. Richard Hellie describes the state’s sphere of legitimate and actual authority. What, Hellie asks, did the Muscovite court think it could do and what did it actually do? His answer, in a word, is quite a lot: the Muscovite state intervened in almost every area of early Russian life, though its effective reach was limited. Peter Brown examines the state’s primary administrative instrument—the Muscovite chancellery system. Brown demonstrates that the central bureaucracy, in efficiently mobilizing the very limited resources of the country, played a key role in Russia’s emergence as a great power in the early modern period. George Weickhardt shows how the state used law to regulate society and effect social change. The seventeenth century, he argues, was an era of important legal expansion (there was more law) and development (the law changes in character). Muscovite law codified a universe of obligations in which the European idea of “right” remained found no place. Marshall Poe explores the changing Muscovite political system in the seventeenth century. He notes that a variety of factors (increasing royal authority, changing attitudes toward merit, political infighting) led to a tremendous inflation of honors. The arrival of “new men” dramatically altered the “ancient” political system well before Peter. In the final contribution to this section, Donald Ostrowski offers a novel assessment of the origins and demise of the so-called “Assembly of the Land.” This representative institution, Ostrowski argues, was borrowed from the Tatars and implanted in Muscovy in the mid-sixteenth century. In the first half of the

¹ For more on Russia’s historical uniqueness, see Marshall T. Poe, *The Russian Moment in World History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

seventeenth century, it grew in importance. By the reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich (and the first inkling of Russian absolutism), the court abandoned it.

The second section of this book deals with the Muscovite economy. Jarmo Kotilaine explores the appearance and application of mercantilism in Russia. He demonstrates that Muscovite administrators such as Ordin-Nashchokin attempted to use mercantilistic theory to reform both economic institutions and government policies. These progressive administrators enjoyed, he says, some success: the Muscovite economy, though relatively primitive, was growing rapidly in the second half of the seventeenth century. Maria Solomon Arel takes this analysis a further step by examining an important aspect of institutional innovation in Russian foreign trade: the monopolization of lucrative commodity trades—tar, caviar, and potash. Monopolization of foreign trade was one of the key methods employed by the court to help finance the expansion of the Muscovite state and to fund the numerous governmental reforms.

The third thematic section of this book treats the seventeenth-century Muscovite military. Paul Dukes examines Muscovite foreign policy during the Thirty Year's War. He points out that Russian foreign policy was narrowly self-interested: the Muscovites made a bid to regain territories lost earlier to Poland-Lithuania, but stubbornly refused to be drawn into alliances with Western powers or the Ottomans. William Reger then turns to the important question of the modernization of the Russian army in the seventeenth century. His article discusses the introduction of the "new-formation regiments." Reger concludes that military reform grew out of a coordinated effort between the Russian state and the European mercenaries, the result being a hybrid force that was at once Russian and Western. Carol Stevens extends Reger's analysis into the later seventeenth century. She examines the impact of mid-seventeenth-century military reform on Peter the Great's own military policies. Stevens shows that while Peter built on earlier initiatives, he more thoroughly integrated ideas and organizational forms from Western Europe and from the Ottoman Empire. Finally, Graeme Herd addresses the role the military played in late Muscovite politics by exploring the Musketeers' Rebellion of 1698. The militarily obsolete Musketeers revolted, he says, precisely because they were being neglected by the modernizing state. In confronting their master, the Musketeers appealed to a kind of "paradise lost," which was essentially the kernel of an evolving Muscovite traditionalism.

The fourth section of this book explores religion and the church in seventeenth-century Muscovy. In a detailed piece, Debra Coulter examines clerical reforms of the secular or "white" clergy (married priests, deacons, and minor clerics) in the second half of the seventeenth century. Responding to complaints of the white clergymen themselves, Church hierarchs embarked on a thorough-going program to eradicate malpractice and inefficiencies in liturgical practice and clerical conduct. They met with mixed success. Georg Michels then discusses the political fallout of such reform efforts during the *Raskol*, or "Schism," of the Muscovite church. Michels analyses the Schism in terms of the institutional fragmentation of Muscovite church power. State-sponsored efforts to centralize church affairs and to unify religious practice failed and local areas remained beyond the reach of church. Michel's essay sheds a critical light on the limits of modernization in early modern Muscovy.

The fifth section of this book turns to the arts and sciences in Muscovy. Lindsey Hughes examines the gradual introduction of secular and Western elements into Russian art, which was entirely dominated by Byzantine forms well into the seventeenth century. The author demonstrates that a close study of paintings and buildings of the time reveals many Western-looking features, a development which accelerated under Peter the Great and in many ways became the norm after 1700. Eve Levin then turns to the introduction of Western medicine in late Muscovy. She describes how the seventeenth-century Muscovite state endorsed Western medicine as its privileged therapeutic system. The tsar's court imported Western medical personnel, equipment, and pharmaceutical supplies in large quantities. Nikos Chrissidis then traces the history of the introduction of Western learning by foreign scholars in seventeenth-century Russia. Specifically, Chrissidis explores the teaching of cosmological and astronomical subjects by the Greek Leichoudes brothers in the Slavo-Greek-Latin Academy in Moscow in the 1680s and 1690s. The paper argues that instruction in these subjects was based on contemporary Jesuit Aristotelian doctrines.

The sixth section of this book addresses the question of self and society in Muscovy. Nancy Shields Kollmann offers an overview of Muscovite society, inquires into the ways in which subjects viewed themselves, and asks whether Muscovites were becoming "modern" in the seventeenth century. Though the Muscovite state was rapidly modernizing in the seventeenth century, she argues, Muscovite identity and society remained fundamentally traditional. In the final substantive essay in this collection, Daniel Kaiser uses novel methods to investigate the ways Muscovites conceived of the self. Analyzing the evolution of biographical data on gravestones, Kaiser proposes that "individuality"—a consciousness of the unique identity of the self—began to emerge in Muscovy in the seventeenth century.

In the conclusion, the editors explore how this volume contributes to our understanding of seventeenth-century Russia, the reforms of Peter the Great, and the general course of Russian history. Arguing for a new chronology for Russian history, they suggest that the beginning of the transition to a European-style "modernity" occurred in the mid-seventeenth century rather than in the Petrine epoch.

THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY LEGACY

Janet Martin

Through the sixteenth century Muscovy developed into a major eastern European power. Its sovereign headed a political system that was able to organize armies sufficient to expand the realm territorially and to construct a bureaucratic apparatus capable of imposing the sovereign's will, laws, and taxes throughout his domain. At least five factors contributed to Muscovy's political success: a stable dynasty; the Church that contributed an ideology that defined and legitimized the sovereign's powers and justified his elevation above other princes and aristocrats; the cooperation of members of the court and administration; a military force subordinate and loyal to the sovereign; and a socio-economic base with the capacity to sustain the political and military elites. These institutions and structures developed in response to and account for the growth of Muscovy in size, power, and stature during the sixteenth century. They also comprise the legacy left by sixteenth-century Muscovites to their seventeenth-century heirs. But by the end of the century they were in disarray. Conditions developing during the second half of the century strained them to the limits, and in some cases beyond the limits, of their capabilities. The modernizing tendencies of the seventeenth century, which will be explored in this volume, developed from Muscovy's reactions to its sixteenth-century crises. Its attempts to build upon and compensate for its flawed legacy, its efforts to blend and balance tradition and innovation as it addressed inherited and new challenges thus contributed to the dynamic processes of modernization. This essay will review Muscovy's sixteenth-century political, military, and socio-economic institutions and structures. It will highlight the multiple crises that Muscovy faced at the end of the century and that generated the motivations for change and, ultimately, modernization during the seventeenth century.

THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: TSAR AND DYNASTY

The simplest aspect of the crisis faced by Muscovy at the end of the sixteenth century was political, and it was occasioned by the death of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich in 1598. Fedor had been the last member of the ruling branch of the Muscovite line of the Riurikid dynasty. With his death the ruling branch of the dynasty thus also died out. Boris Godunov, Fedor's brother-in-law and the virtual ruler during his reign, succeeded to the throne, but he lacked the legitimacy of a dynast.

Although he was able to place his own relatives in key court and military positions, he encountered difficulties gaining the allegiance and loyalty of his former peers, bureaucratic leaders, and the army. Thus, despite his efforts to address pressing political and social challenges, his governance was ultimately ineffective and neither he nor any of his immediate successors was able to found a lasting dynasty.

The legitimacy enjoyed by the Muscovite rulers during the sixteenth century but denied Boris Godunov and his successors rested upon an assertion of dynastic seniority recognized by court elites and on a political ideology crafted by the Church. The acquisition of legitimacy by Moscow's princes had involved a centuries-long struggle, first to gain dynastic acceptance of their seniority and their right to hold the seat of the Grand Prince of Vladimir and then to confine succession to the eldest son of the ruling prince. The Muscovite princes' efforts to achieve seniority, which defied dynastic tradition, began in the early fourteenth century. At that time succession to the position of Grand Prince of Vladimir followed patterns established during the Kievan Rus' era. The senior princely seat passed laterally from one member of the senior generation of the dynasty to the next, and only after the last eligible member of the elder generation died, did the position pass to the next generation. Tradition also limited succession to sons of grand princes. For almost a century after the Mongols established their suzerainty over the lands of Rus', the khans' choice of princes tended to be consistent with Riurikid custom.

In the early fourteenth century, however, the sons of Daniil (d. 1303), a prince of Moscow who had not held the position of Grand Prince of Vladimir, refused to recognize the legitimate heir and maneuvered and manipulated the khans to name them to the position. Having narrowed succession to the House of Moscow, the princes engaged in additional contests among themselves during the fifteenth century to transform the lateral pattern of succession into a vertical one. Vasilii II (ruled 1425–62) confirmed the revised pattern of succession by defeating his uncle and cousins in a civil war that lasted a quarter century. His son Ivan III (ruled 1462–1505) refined the system by determining that his eldest surviving, but second son would inherit his throne rather than his grandson, who represented the line of his disceased eldest son.

Even then, however, the succession system was neither perfected nor secure. Although there were no challenges to the right of heirs within the ruling Muscovite branch to inherit the throne, the system had not taken into account all contingencies. When Vasilii III (ruled 1505–33) was unable to produce an heir, he risked alienating the church and his boyars to divorce his wife of twenty years, Solomoniia Saburova, and marry Elena Glinskaia rather than allow the throne to pass to his brother and the system of lateral succession to be restored. When Elena then produced two sons, Ivan and Fedor, and Ivan IV "the Terrible" duly inherited the throne, it appeared that the future of the ruling line was secure. But Ivan's eldest son, Ivan, predeceased him as a result, it is broadly reported, of a lethal blow inflicted by his father. Fedor, who succeeded Ivan IV in 1584, produced no heir. The elevation of the vertical line of princes within the ruling branch of the House of Moscow to the exclusion of their lateral relatives and cadet branches of the dynasty successfully monopolized the throne. But it left the realm without a legitimate dynastic heir when that line died out.

The Moscow princes began the process of gaining the grand princely throne with the support of their Mongol suzerains. But the Orthodox Church provided domestic, ideological support that both legitimized their claims to the throne and defined their broad and exclusive powers. During the same period that the Muscovite princes were consolidating their political position, Church hierarchs were developing theories that asserted the grand prince (later tsar) was chosen by God as His designated agent to carry out His works on earth. By the sixteenth century official Church literature was enunciating an ideology that depicted the Muscovites, like the Israelites of the Old Testament, as God's chosen people and its tsar, descended from St. Vladimir, the Riurikid prince who had converted Kievan Rus' to Christianity in 988, as His chosen vicar on earth. The tsar was to strive to create a state that emulated the heavenly order on earth, to protect his realm, and to defend the true faith, Orthodox Christianity. Although expected to heed wise counsel, the tsar, deriving his legitimacy and authority from God, was unassailable. The authority he required to fulfill his obligations to maintain order and, when necessary, to punish the wayward was correspondingly unlimited. The tsar, the senior member of the dynasty selected to carry out these functions in the Rus' lands, was alone responsible for these tasks. He, thus, had no equal and must be obeyed. Although the Church's ideological theses imposed the threat of God's punishment on an impious or unjust ruler, they nevertheless also endowed the sovereign with exclusive, autocratic powers and elevated him above all others.¹

This ideology also offered the notion that a good prince sought and heeded wise counsel. Church hierarchs as well as boyars, princely and untitled, served in the capacity of counsellors. A sign that the prince was indeed fulfilling God's will was the smooth, successful implementation of policy devised through a consultative process, during which the prince heeded the wise counsel of his advisers. The harmonious functioning of the political system, the cooperation between prince and advisors, thus not only fostered smooth operation of political affairs, but demonstrated that the prince was acting in accord with God's will.²

Although the prince's courtiers, advisors, military officers, and bureaucratic administrators were functionally important and exercised real power, they could not within this conceptual framework acquire the stature accorded the tsar. Thus, when the dynastic line, descended from Ivan III, Vasilii III, and Ivan IV, ended with Fedor, no one, not even Boris Godunov, could be considered a legitimate heir according to the prevailing ideology. When Dmitrii, Fedor's half-brother

¹ For variant discussions of these ideological premises, see, *inter alia*, Daniel Rowland, "Biblical Military Imagery in the Political Culture of Early Modern Russia," in *Medieval Russian Culture*, v. 2, eds. Michael S. Flier and Daniel Rowland (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1994), 182–212; idem, "Moscow—The Third Rome or the New Israel?" *Russian Review* 55 (October 1966), 598–99, 606, 613; Gail D. Lenhoff, "The 'Stikhiri Ivana Groznogo' as a Cultural Myth," in *Poetika Istoriiia Literary Lingvistika* (Moscow: OGI, 1999), 46–47; Joel Raba, "Moscow—The Third Rome or the New Jerusalem?" *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (1995), 299–307; Sergei Bogatyrev, *The Sovereign and His Counsellors: Ritualised Consultations in Muscovite Political Culture, 1350s–1570s* (Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 2000), 67–68, 219–22.

and the canonically illegitimate son of Ivan IV, died at Uglich in 1591, rumors, encouraged by his rivals, blamed Boris. Godunov's attempts to establish his own regime after Fedor's death were thus stymied by his failure to meet the ideologically determined requirements to become tsar. Not only did he lack the required lineage, but his alleged murder of Dmitrii had disqualified him as a righteous tsar.³ The issue of legitimacy would plague all those who sought to replace the Moscow princes, including the Romanovs, well into the seventeenth century.

THE COURT AND ADMINISTRATION

Although ideology vested all political power in the Muscovite princes, practical necessity and tradition demanded that the tsar seek advise and share functional responsibility with others. Such responsibility for civic and military affairs fell to members of his court as well as officials in his expanding administrative apparatus. Servicemen who held the two highest court ranks, boyar and *okol'nichii*, formed the Boyar Duma, the tsar's advisory body which helped design policy, oversaw administration, and supervised military operations.

The Boyar Duma evolved from at least the fourteenth century, when Moscow was a small principality.⁴ Relations between the prince and his boyars, who rarely numbered more than twelve to fifteen, were personal, intimate, and informal.⁵ Through the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries the princes of Moscow relied heavily on their chief advisors and military comrades-in-arms, who achieved boyar rank and secured positions in the Duma for their relatives and heirs. These boyar families obtained a near monopoly over their own positions of influence and power as well as over appointments of new members. The admission of individuals from new families into the Duma was thus gradual and carefully controlled.

As described by ideology, this system appeared to produce harmony within the governing circles that designed and implemented just and righteous policies. Beneath the appearance of harmony, however, rivalries among the boyar clans and competing interests between the sovereign and his chief advisors placed strains on the system. These fissures were exacerbated by the consequences of territorial expansion, which occurred at relatively rapid pace in late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The increasing size and complexity of Muscovy required both the court and administration to make adjustments. The sixteenth century was a period of transition for both.

After gaining control of many of the principalities associated with the Grand Principality of Vladimir, the Muscovite princes extended their authority over

² Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 37, 39, 45, 97; Bogatyrev, *The Sovereign and His Counsellors*, 68, 88.

³ Rowland, "Moscow-The Third Rome or the New Israel?" 604–05; Robert O. Crummey, *The Formation of Muscovy, 1304–1613* (London and New York: 1987), 210.

⁴ Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 26–27.

neighboring Rus' lands within the principalities of Rostov and Suzdal'. By the end of the fifteenth century they had incorporated Novgorod and Tver', and during the first decades of the sixteenth century they added Pskov and Riazan' and also seized Smolensk from Lithuania. In the 1550s, they conquered the Tatar Khanates of Kazan' and Astrakhan' on the Volga river as well.

Territorial expansion not only involved the subordination of previously autonomous principalities, but also the cooption of their princes and servitors into the Muscovite prince's court. The political advantages of accomodating these new courtiers, some of whom held princely titles, at court and securing their loyalty to Muscovy and its sovereign clashed, however, with the interests of the established, yet untitled boyar families, which jealously protected their exclusive relationship with the grand prince.⁶ Overt confrontations were avoided during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries by honoring the traditions surrounding admission of new families to the Boyar Duma. The custom of requiring many years of service, during which candidates proved their loyalty and acquired experience, in particular, delayed the elevation of the new arrivals to дума rank, sometimes for decades.⁷ As these princes did, however, become boyars, the size of the Duma was enlarged for them and the rank of *okol'nichii* was also introduced. Although most of the important princes entered the Duma directly as boyars, lesser princes as well as members of the old, untitled Duma families typically were *okol'nichie* before achieving boyar rank.⁸ It was only in the 1520s and 1530s, however, that members of the princely families achieved дума rank in significant numbers.⁹

These techniques, manipulation of the size of the Duma and the introduction of new дума ranks, continued to be employed through the sixteenth century to achieve approval for specific actions, to adjust the balance of power among the

⁵ Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 28–30, 33; Gustave Alef, "Reflections on the Boyar Duma in the Reign of Ivan III," *Slavonic and East European Review* 45 (1967), reprint in *Rulers and Nobles in Fifteenth-Century Muscovy* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1987), 107.

⁶ Kolmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 110; Alef, "Reflections on the Boyar Duma" 102–03; Gustave Alef, "The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocracy: A Factor in the Growth of Monarchical Power," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 15 (1970), reprint in *Rulers and Nobles in Fifteenth-Century Muscovy*, 18.

⁷ Ann M. Kleimola, "Kto kogo: Patterns of Duma Recruitment, 1547–1564," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 38 (1986), 211. Prince Semen Romanovich from Iaroslavl', for example, entered Muscovite service in 1467, but achieved boyar rank only 28 years later in 1495; Alef, "The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocracy," 49. Prince Dmitrii Bel'skii, whose family had entered Muscovite service in 1481, became its first boyar in 1527; Gustave Alef, "Bel'skiis and Shuiskiis in the XVI Century," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 38 (1986), 230. Prince Mikhail Glinskii, who had joined the grand prince's service in 1508, became a boyar in 1533 after his niece's marriage to Vasilii III; Gustave Alef, "Aristocratic Politics and Royal Policy in Muscovy in the Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 27 (1980), reprint in *Rulers and Nobles in Fifteenth-Century Muscovy*, 92. See also Alef, "Reflections on the Boyar Duma," 104; Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 111.

⁸ Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 98–99; Kleimola, "Kto kogo," 207.

boyar clans, and to reshape the Duma to meet the changing demands for military and administrative leadership.

Thus, Vasilii III, who was intent upon reducing opposition to his planned divorce, allowed the number of boyars in his Duma to dwindle to five. After his marriage to Elena Glinskaia, the Duma once again enlarged.¹⁰ Having assumed the throne in 1547, Ivan IV also manipulated the size of his Duma. During the first half of his reign he increased its size. Although a few new princely families were admitted, particularly in the period immediately following his marriage, most of the increase in size resulted from the elevation of members of untitled families to the rank of *okol'nichii*.¹¹ During the era of the *Oprichnina* disgrace, exile, and execution took its toll on members of the Duma. By 1572, only eight of the 52 who had been members in 1564, continued to hold their positions.¹² After the *Oprichnina*, there was a marked decrease in the numbers of appointments made to the Boyar Duma. By the end of Ivan's reign the council consisted of eighteen boyars and *okol'niche*. This number contrasts with sixty, which had made up the Duma at its peak and was about half of the number at the end of the reign of Vasilii III.¹³

In addition to manipulating the size of the Duma, Ivan IV also authorized the admission of individuals with lower ranks into this elite body. Familial bonds with previous members of the Boyar Duma, both princely and untitled, continued to be the most important factor determining eligibility for new appointments.¹⁴ But courtiers drawn from the provincial servicemen rather than the families that had traditionally dominated the central government also began to be admitted to the Duma after 1565. They held the rank of *dumnye dvoriane*. Their appearance represented a means of bringing individuals, selected for their merit, talent, and trustworthiness, into the advisory circle without directly challenging the highly ranked families.¹⁵ The boyars and the *okol'niche* who remained in the smaller Duma were losing their exclusive association with the tsar in decision-making and in the supervision of government affairs.

Another consequence of Muscovy's territorial expansion was a need for a larger and more complex administrative apparatus. Newly annexed territories required governors. Taxes had to be assessed and collected throughout the expanding realm. Records of military appointments and assignments, of landed estates issued to cavalrymen and retained by the court, of diplomatic missions and exchanges with new neighbors all had to be kept. Whereas the small coterie of Duma members had been able to oversee the relatively simple administrative

⁹ Alef, "Reflections on the Boyar Duma," 107; Kleimola, "Kto kogo," 207.

¹⁰ Alef, "Aristocratic Politics," 93; Ann M. Kleimola, "Reliance on the Tried and True: Ivan IV and Appointments to the Boyar Duma, 1565–1584," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46 (1992), 52, 57; Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 113.

¹¹ Kleimola, "Kto kogo," 207–09, 212; Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 113.

¹² Kleimola, "Kto kogo," 214; Robert O. Crummey, "The Fate of the Boyar Clans, 1565–1613," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 38 (1986), 244.

¹³ Kleimola, "Reliance on the Tried and True," 52, 53, 57; Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 104–5.

tasks of the principality when it was small, the multiplication of administrative tasks that accompanied territorial expansion strained the capacity of the Duma members to carry out their functions. Through the first half of the sixteenth century *okol'nichie* concentrated on administrative and court duties.¹⁶ But during the second half of the century administrative responsibilities were increasingly undertaken by state secretaries (*d'iaki*) and scribes (*podiachie*) in the growing number of bureaucratic chanceries (*prikazy*). Their status correspondingly rose, and during Ivan's reign, the Duma was also opened to another new rank of servitors, *dumnye d'iaki*, the most influential of the administrative state secretaries.¹⁷

Changes in the size and composition of the Duma were accompanied by changes in the roles of its members. As *d'iaki* assumed greater control over administration, both boyars and *okol'nichie* were increasingly charged with military duties, just when the lengthy Livonian War combined with uprisings among the recently conquered mid-Volga populations and defense of the southern border demanded large numbers of personnel for command positions.¹⁸ But, in contrast to the late fifteenth century, when boyars were based in Moscow after their appointments to the Duma,¹⁹ the new allocation of responsibilities required the military commanders to be away from court for lengthy periods of time. Personal and political strains associated with long absences from the capital contributed to mounting tensions among boyar families at the same time that their opportunities for exercising influence were diminishing.

As the Duma expanded to hold new ranks and as boyars and *okol'nichie* were increasingly away from court, it appeared even more critical for individual Duma members, through marriages and other alliances, to secure their family's position in relation to the tsar. Chronic rivalries among competing clans intensified as the size of the Duma and the roles of its members evolved through the century.

Despite these factors the Duma functioned reliably as long as the presence of grand prince was sufficient to maintain a balance among its rival factions, each of which sought to establish a more advantageous position in relation to him. It proved to be less functional when a vacuum developed at the center of the political system because the sovereign was too young or otherwise too weak to keep the aggressive ambitions of his favorites in check. Under such circumstances competition among factions within the court became acute. This was the case during the minority of Ivan IV, when clashes between opposing clans became violent and punitive and shattered the harmonious governance of the realm.²⁰

¹⁴ Kleimola, "Kto kogo," 209, 213.

¹⁵ Kleimola, "Reliance on the Tried and True," 55–57.

¹⁶ Kleimola, "Kto kogo," 210.

¹⁷ Robert O. Crummey, "Crown and Boiars Under Fedor Ivanovich and Michael Romanov," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 6:4 (Winter 1972), 562; Bogatyrev, *The Sovereign and His Counsellors*, 185, 189, 200, 202, 211.

¹⁸ Kleimola, "Kto kogo," 210; idem, "Reliance on the Tried and True," 53–54; Crummey, "Crown and Boiars," 556.

The apparent balance realized by the restoration of the Duma during the post-*oprichnina* period of the reign of Ivan IV was similarly precarious. Although one-half of the duma-ranking families from the mid-sixteenth century continued to be represented in the Duma decades later, even those families had lost numerous individuals, including Duma members, as a result of political disgrace and/or execution.²¹ The smaller Duma consisted of fewer boyars and *okol'nicie* and also contained *dumnye dvoriane* and *dumnye d'iaki*. The monopoly on positions close to tsar, long held and jealously guarded by the boyar clans, was eroding; their secure and exclusive status, marked by close, personal relations to the sovereign, was diluted; for the surviving duma-ranked families rivalry and competition for positions of influence and power remained sharp.

The sixteenth century closed with the strains within the Duma once again reaching critical levels. When the feeble-minded Fedor succeeded his father Ivan IV in 1584, his brother-in-law Boris Godunov assumed control over the government. Forming alliances with prominent boyar and other influential families, Godunov consolidated his position by once again increasing the size of the Duma, but also, in a series of episodes, by removing rival boyars, including members of the Nagoi, Bel'skii, and Shuiskii families. After being selected tsar in 1598, Boris resumed the purge of his competitors, most significantly his former allies from the Romanov clan.²² Although temporarily securing his position, Boris Godunov's efforts to eliminate his competitors from positions of influence exacerbated rivalries among boyar clans. The sovereign not only lacked ideological legitimacy, but also the firm support of the duma elite.

During the sixteenth century the Duma, the pinnacle of the court and administration, remained in a state of transition and internal division. Its transformation from a group of a few trusted advisors assisting their sovereign in a small principality into a body whose members had the skills and performed the functions commensurate with the enlarged autocracy of Muscovy was incomplete. Elite families, thus, continued to compete to secure close bonds with the tsar. But this pattern was complicated by the selection of a non-Riurikid tsar, who sought to remove his own rivals from the political arena. Under these circumstances the Duma was unable to produce the image of harmony that would testify to the just and righteous rule of the new tsar and affirm that the political order was functioning in accordance with God's will.

¹⁹ Alef, "Reflections on the Boyar Duma," 85, 87, 95.

²⁰ Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 167–72; Alef, "Bel'skiis and Shuiskiis," 232–35; Alef, "Aristocratic Politics," 94–95.

²¹ Crummey, "The Fate of the Boyar Clans," 244, 245; Kleimola, "Reliance on the Tried and True," 57.

²² Sergei F. Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii Smuty v Moskovskom gosudarstve XVI–XVII vv.*, 5th ed. (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 1995), 127–28, 149–51, 156–59; Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 159; Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, *Rossia posle oprichniny* (Leningrad: Leningradskii universitet, 1975), 108; idem, *Rossia nakanune smutnogo vremeni* (Moscow: Mysl', 1985), 19; Crummey, *The Formation of Muscovy*, 206, 215.

THE MILITARY CRISIS

Muscovy's successful political development and territorial expansion through the middle of the sixteenth century had also been dependent upon its military strength. The army organized by the Muscovite sovereign to defend his realm and conduct his expansionist foreign policy was by the sixteenth century built around a *pomest'e*-based cavalry. After the conquest of Novgorod in 1478, Grand Prince Ivan III had confiscated the landed estates belonging to the Novgorodian boyars and some of the lands belonging to the Novgorodian archbishop and monasteries. He then distributed parcels of land to military servicemen attracted to the region from districts in central Muscovy. With incomes derived from their landed estates *pomeshchiki* supplied themselves with the arms and equipment necessary for service in the grand prince's army. Through the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the *pomest'e* system spread to other areas of Muscovy. By the middle of the century (1556) military service was standardized, based on the amount and quality of land, both for owners of landed estates and for *pomeshchiki* whose land tenure was conditional.

For approximately the first two-thirds of the sixteenth century the *pomest'e*-based army, well-suited for seasonal warfare, was successful. Eventually supplemented by musketeers, artillerymen, and irregular Volga Tatar, Nogai, Cossack, and other units, it was responsible for the subordination of the last northern Rus' principalities (Pskov, Riazan') to Muscovy. It fought the Lithuanians in the early decades of the sixteenth century, and acquired lands, including Smolensk, along Muscovy's western border. In the east it conquered the Tatar Khanates of Kazan' (1552) and Astrakhan' (1556). It defended Muscovy's southern frontier against the Crimean Khanate. It also engaged the Livonian Knights, Lithuanians, Poles, and Swedes in the Livonian War (1558–83) and, although it would ultimately lose them, brought the territories of eastern Estonia as well as Polotsk into the Muscovite realm.

These successes brought strategic and commercial advantages to Muscovy. Territorial acquisitions along the Lithuanian border placed the local Orthodox population firmly within the Muscovite metropolitanate. Local princes entered Muscovite service, adding their retainers to the Muscovite military forces. The acquisition of the port of Narva (Rugodiv) in Livonia, together with control over the Volga initiated by conquests of the Tatar Khanates and later consolidated by Tsar Fedor and Boris Gudonov, extended Muscovy's control over the entire system of commercially vital waterways linking the Baltic and Caspian Seas. The conquest of Kazan', furthermore, laid the groundwork for further ventures eastward across the Urals mountains into Siberia.

Muscovy's military successes and rapid growth posed challenges not only for its administrative system, observed above, but also for its military system. The mid-Volga peoples, for example, did not readily accept their status as subjects of the Muscovite tsar. Recurring uprisings and resistance that lasted for decades obliged the Muscovite regime to deploy significant military forces on its eastern frontier.²³ The Crimean Khanate, furthermore, supported Kazan' resistance, while the Ottoman Turks, previously a friendly trading partner of the Muscovites, vehemently objected to the tsar's annexation of Astrakhan' and Muscovy's subsequent penetration into the Caucasus mountains to the Terek river. The

result was hostile encounters with both. In 1569, the Ottoman Turks in cooperation with the Crimean Khan launched a campaign that involved an unsuccessful attempt to build a canal between the Don and Volga rivers. Its intention was to use the canal to transport an army and navy with artillery to liberate Astrakhan'. The Turkish plan failed, but subsequent negotiations obliged Muscovy to retreat from the Terek.²⁴ The Crimean Khanate, more concerned about Kazan', staged its own campaign that resulted in the burning of Moscow in 1571. Muscovite forces repulsed the Tatar army that approached its borders in 1572. But the successful expansion of Muscovy had aroused the hostility of its neighbors, compelling it to deploy armed forces on a regular basis along its eastern and southern frontiers even as it was engaged in the long Livonian War.

That factor, which has been interpreted as an overextension of Muscovy's military forces, has been cited as one of the reasons for Muscovy's ultimate loss of the Livonian War.²⁵ The Livonian War was initiated by Ivan IV in 1558 against the Livonian Knights, who were accused of breaking their pledge to pay tribute to the tsar. The Muscovite armies captured the port of Narva and Dorpat (Iur'ev, Tartu). During the campaign of 1559–60, they defeated the Knights at Fellin (the residence of the Master of the Order) and brought eastern Livonia under Muscovite control.²⁶

But these early successes provoked Lithuania (later Poland-Lithuania), Denmark, and Sweden to place other sectors of Livonia under their own protection. The local conflict was quickly transformed into a regional conflagration. Lithuania's entrance into the war, in particular, gave Muscovy an opportunity to capture Polotsk in 1563. In Livonia itself Muscovy's control peaked in the mid-1570s, although it was unable to capture Riga and Reval.²⁷

During the twenty years Muscovy controlled portions of Livonia it introduced the *pomest'e* system into the region, settled military servicemen in the region²⁸ and garrisoned forts throughout the territory it occupied. Nevertheless, the local agricultural estates were insufficient to feed the army, which had to receive

²³ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei (PSRL)*, 13 (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi literatury, 2000), 523, 528; Evgeniia I. Kolycheva, *Agrarnyi stroi Rossii XVI veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 193; V. Novodvorskiĭ, *Bor'ba za Livoniu mezhdu Moskoviu i Rech'iu Pospolitoiu (1570–1582)* (St. Petersburg: I.N. Skorokhodov, 1904), 20.

²⁴ Halil Inalcik, "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)," *Annales de l'Université d'Ankara*, 1 (1947), 47–110; Akdes N. Kurat, "The Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan in 1569 and the Problem of the Don-Volga Canal," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 40 (1961), 7–23; Alexandre Bennigsen, "L'Expédition Turque contre Astrakhan en 1569," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 8:3 (1967), 427–46.

²⁵ Skrynnikov, *Rossia posle oprichniny*, 46.

²⁶ *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, ed. V.I. Buganov (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 184–92; George Vernadsky, *The Tsardom of Moscow 1547–1682*, pt. 1 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969), 87, 96, 98; Artur Attman, *The Struggle for Baltic Markets: Powers in Conflict 1558–1618* (Göteborg: Vetenskaps-och Vitterhets-Samhället, 1979), 12–13; Walther Kirchner, *The Rise of the Baltic Question* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1954), 106–07.

provisions from Muscovy.²⁹ Not all servicemen engaged in Livonia, furthermore, held Livonian *pomest'ia*. Their ability to provide their supplies and equipment from their landed estates in other regions of Muscovy was declining, in part due to the prolonged absences of the *pomeshchiki*, and made service increasingly difficult.

Failures to appear for military service as well as desertions, which had been a matter of concern throughout the war,³⁰ mounted by the late 1570s. By that time commanders were complaining to officials in Moscow that deserters were not being recovered and returned, while those officials were issuing special orders, accompanied by threats of serious consequences, to local officials to capture, punish, and return deserters to the front.³¹

Death, capture, overextension, and exhaustion had depleted Muscovy's traditional, *pomest'e*-based army and seriously reduced its military capabilities. The numbers of *pomeshchiki* Muscovite officials were able to gather diminished. Khan Devlet-Girey reported to his Ottoman suzerains that in 1571 he had faced a Muscovite army consisting of thirty thousand cavalymen and six thousand musketeers. The following year the Muscovites mounted a force of twenty thousand.³² In the late campaigns of the Livonian war there were also noticeably fewer cavalymen than in earlier campaigns. When the Muscovites captured Polotsk in 1563, their army consisted of over 31, 500 men, of which over 57 percent were regular cavalymen. By the late 1570s, not only were the armies mounted by the Muscovites smaller (c. 20,000–23,000), but the regular cavalry units made up only 37–45 percent of them.³³ Muscovy was relying more heavily

²⁷ Novodvorskii, *Bor'ba*, 42–64; Skrynnikov, *Rossiiia posle oprichniny*, 42–44; Vernadsky, *The Tsardom of Moscow*, 99.

²⁸ Georgii A. Novitskii, "Novye dannye o russkom feodal'nom zemlevladienii v pribaltike v period Livonskoi voyny (1558–1582)," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1956), 134–38; Boris N. Fionia, "K istorii russkogo pomestnogo zemlevladieniia v Livonii," in *Russkii diplomatarii*, 5 (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 1999), 114–17; "Stolbtsy del moskovskikh prikazov (Gorodovogo, Pomestnogo, Razriadnogo) po upravleniiu Livonskimi gorodami 1577–1579 gg.," ed. N. F. Demidova in *Pamiatniki istorii vostochnoi Evropy (PIVE)*, vol. 3: *Dokumenty Livonskoi voyny (podlinnoe deloproizvodstvo prikazov i voevod) 1571–1580 gg.* (Moscow and Warsaw: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1998), 122–96.

²⁹ *PIVE*, 94–121.

³⁰ Stepan B. Veselovskii, *Issledovaniia po istorii oprichnina* (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1963), 121–22.

³¹ *PIVE*, 57–58; Viktor I. Buganov, "Dokumenty o Livonskoi voine," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1960 god* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 266–67; Boris N. Floria, "Voina mezhdru Rossiei i Rech'iu Pospolitoi na zakliuchitel'nom etape Livonskoi voyny i vnutrenniaia politika pravitel'stva Ivana IV," in *Voprosy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia Slaviano-Germanskikh otnoshenii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 179.

³² Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "Les expéditions de Devlet Giray centre Moscou en 1571 et 1572," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 13 (1972), 442; Viktor I. Buganov, "Dokumenty o srazhenii pri Molodiakh v 1572 g.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 4 (1959), 167, 177.

on supplementary units, salaried musketeers and irregular non-Russian forces, than on the *pomest'e*-based core of its army.

Although Muscovy repulsed the Crimean Tatars in 1572, its reduced forces lost the Livonian War. During the final campaigns Poland-Lithuania recovered Polotsk, and their armies as well as the Swedish forces invaded Muscovy. By 1582–83, Muscovy was obliged to conclude peace with Poland-Lithuania and Sweden, ceding not only its gains in Livonia and Lithuania but also northwestern lands within its pre-war borders to the victors.

Muscovy's losses set its foreign policy agenda for the next century. To recover its territories and regain its status, however, its new rulers would have to rebuild and reform its armed forces as well as the administration that oversaw military affairs and collected the taxes to pay for them. But by the end of the century Muscovite society and the economy were also in crisis.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS

The capacity of Muscovy's military was undermined in part by a socio-economic decline that the country was experiencing during the second half of the century. By the late 1570s and 1580s, that decline had become a depression, marked by high prices and inflation, depopulation of towns and rural districts, a corresponding reduction in production, and decrease in state revenues. The crisis had not abated by the turn of the century.

The population of Muscovy in the sixteenth century was not unfamiliar with hardship. In the best conditions life was harsh. Most of the population farmed the land in a northern climate, where the growing season was short and yields were low. Log cabins provided shelter during the long, cold winters. Cereal grains provided the basic food stock; the breads and gruels prepared from them constituted the basic diet. A few types of cultivated fruits and vegetables as well as wild berries, mushrooms, and other items that grew in nearby forests and fallow fields, as well as meat, fish and dairy products obtained from hunting, fishing, and raising livestock supplemented the grain-based diet. Optimally, these products supplied enough food to maintain the peasant population as well as a surplus sufficient to feed the urban population and also enable the peasants to pay rents to their landlords and taxes to their tsar.

But the balance among the factors necessary to create optimum conditions was fragile. Aware that even minor fluctuations in weather conditions could reduce the size of a crop, peasants held a portion of each harvest in reserve. But several years of poor crops in succession could deplete those reserves, create food shortages, cause food prices to rise, and in the worst cases contribute to famine conditions.³⁴ The populace, as well as their livestock, was also vulnerable to disease. Epidemics, including bouts of the Black plague, periodically afflicted Muscovites, while epizootic epidemics similarly destroyed livestock.

³³ Skrynnikov, *Rossii posle oprichniny*, 46.

³⁴ Arcadius Kahan, "Natural Calamities and Their Effect upon the Food Supply in Russia," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 16 (1968), 357.

During the first half of the sixteenth century Muscovy had experienced short-term, local economic problems, but in general its peasants managed to supply themselves adequately for subsistence and to transfer surplus wealth in the form of rents and taxes to members of the social elite. As late as the 1550s and 1560s foreign visitors not only described the grandeur and splendor of the Muscovite court, but also the prosperous rural economy that sustained it.³⁵ The economy had been strong enough to mount the successful conquests of Kazan' and Astrakhan'. The confidence derived from these successes evidently made a greater impression than their high costs and gave the government of Ivan IV the determination to continue its expansionist drive, this time to the west, against Livonia.

By the end of that war in 1583, however, most of Muscovy was in the midst of an economic crisis. The ongoing situation was witnessed by the Englishman Giles Fletcher, who visited Muscovy in 1588. The emergent empire that had just decades earlier felled the Khanate of Kazan' and had challenged Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden to gain control over Livonia and become a Baltic power had been reduced, as Fletcher observed it, to a land "with vacant and desolate" villages, abandoned workshops, limited production, and a population prone to "much...idleness and drinking."³⁶

There is no consensus among scholars on when local, temporary calamities, such as those experienced in past decades and centuries, combined to create a more pervasive disaster that seemed to be insurmountable and permanent.³⁷ But most concur that by the 1570s an economic and demographic decline had become discernible not only in the northwestern portion of the realm, where it began earlier than elsewhere, but had spread to its center. A decade later the decline had become a crisis that engulfed the entire country.³⁸ Although the causes of the crisis are also a source of scholarly debate, there is consensus that it resulted from an accumulation of disasters that occurred with such frequency, rapidity, and severity that normal opportunities for recovery were precluded. The disasters included natural catastrophes: fires, droughts, cold spells, famines and

³⁵ E.g., Richard Chancellor, Anthony Jenkinson, and Sir Thomas Randolph in *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom*, eds. Lloyd E. Berry and Robert O. Crummey (Madison, Milwaukee, and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 26–27, 30–33, 54–56, 66–67.

³⁶ Giles Fletcher, "Of the Russe Commonwealth," in *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom*, 125, 170.

³⁷ The beginning of the crisis has been dated from the 1550s to the early 1570s. For various views and summaries of the debate, see Kolycheva, *Agrarnyi stroi*, 169–71; *Agrarnaia istoriia severo-zapada Rossii XVI veka*, ed. Aleksandr L. Shapiro (Leningrad: Nauka, 1974), 246–47, 294–95; Aleksandr A. Zimin, "'Khoziaistvennyi krizis' 60–70-kh godov XVI v. i russkoe krest'ianstvo," in *Materialy po istorii sel'skogo khoziaistva i krest'ianstva SSSR* (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1962), vol. 5, 19–20; idem, *Oprichnina* (Moscow: Territoriiia, 2001), 241–42; Skrynnikov, *Tragediia Novgoroda*, 49, 101–2, 127; Kashtanov, "K izucheniiu oprichniny Ivana Groznogo," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 2 (1963), 114; Aleksandr I. Kopanov, "Naselenie russkogo gosudarstva XVI v." *Istoricheskie zapiski* 64 (1959), 246.

³⁸ Kolycheva, *Agrarnyi stroi*, 176, 178, 195; Skrynnikov, *Tragediia Novgoroda*, 127.

epidemics. Some of them were particularly virulent and widespread. In mid-1566, for example, an epidemic broke out in the region southwest of Novgorod. Within a month it had reached the city as well as other towns, including Polotsk, Velikie Luki, and Toropets. A chronicler commented that in the latter three towns the epidemic was so fierce that it killed the priests, leaving no one to officiate at the funerals and give the dead a proper Christian burial. Priests from other towns risked their lives to perform the sacraments. Within months the epidemic had spread to Smolensk and also to Mozhaïsk. It had become so threatening that the government in Moscow posted guards around the affected Mozhaïsk districts, effectively quarantining them and specifically preventing anyone from travelling from that zone to Moscow. With the onset of winter the epidemic calmed in the region around Mozhaïsk. But in Novgorod it continued to rage for eight months, and waned only in May 1567.³⁹ It was followed, however, by others, one of which may have been plague. They were accompanied by a cold wave, poor harvests, and famine, which lasted into the early 1570s and afflicted “Moscow and all the Rus’ land.”⁴⁰

The effects of these natural disasters were compounded by the *Oprichnina*. The division of the Muscovite court into the private *Oprichnina* of Ivan IV and the *Zemshchina* in 1565 was accompanied by the designation of large segments of Muscovite territories as *Oprichnina* lands.⁴¹ Landed proprietors who were not associated with the *Oprichnina* were evicted from their estates, which were turned over to *oprichniki*, and relocated to *Zemshchina* lands. The disruptions had devastating effects in both sectors. Management of *Oprichnina* estates was chaotic; peasants, subjected to arbitrary rents and abusive treatment, fled; production levels fell.⁴² Parallel disruptions in the *Zemshchina* lands resulted from the influx of those evicted from the *Oprichnina* lands and the exile of those who fell into disgrace and whose estates were confiscated.⁴³ Although the *Oprichnina* was dissolved in 1572, restoration of property and recovery of their economic productivity was not immediate or complete.

³⁹ PSRL 5:2 (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury, 2000), 249; PSRL, vol. 13, 403, 404; *Novgorodskii letopisi* (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1879), 336 (NL); Mikhail N. Tikhomirov, “Maloizvestnye letopisnye pamiatniki,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 7 (1951), 224; Kolycheva, *Agrarnyi stroi*, 174; Skrynnikov, *Tragediia Novgoroda*, 101; Zimin, *Oprichnina*, 237–38.

⁴⁰ Tikhomirov, “Maloizvestnye letopisnye pamiatniki,” 224, 225; idem, “Maloizvestnye letopisnye pamiatniki XVI v.,” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 10 (1941), 89; Aleksandr A. Zimin, “Kratkie letopisty XV–XVI vv.” *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 5 (1950), 21; Vladimir B. Kobrin, “Novaia tsarskaia gramota 1571 g. o bor'be s chumoi,” *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 14 (1958), 267; Skrynnikov, *Tragediia Novgoroda*, 101, 127–28; John T. Alexander, “Reconsiderations on Plague in Early Modern Russia, 1500–1800,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 34:2 (1986), 246, 248; Zimin, *Oprichnina*, 238–40, 392 n. 25; Kahan, “Natural Calamities,” 371; Kolycheva, *Agrarnyi stroi*, 178–80.

⁴¹ Zimin, *Oprichnina*, 192–212; P. A. Sadikov, *Ocherki po istorii oprichniny* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1950), 157–91.

⁴² Sadikov, *Ocherki*, 111, 113–47; Dmitrii Ia. Samokvasov, *Arkhivnyi material*, 2:2 (Moscow: 1909), 48–50.

Towns were not immune to the demographic dislocations and consequent economic disruptions. In addition to disease and famine, they too suffered the effects of the Oprichnina. In 1570, Ivan and his *oprichniki* attacked the city of Novgorod and its environs. They pillaged the region, tortured some residents for ransom, and murdered others.⁴⁴ In 1569 and again in 1571, Ivan IV ordered the eviction of hundreds of merchants and tradesmen and their families from Novgorod and Pskov.⁴⁵ The results were striking. Novgorod's population in the middle of the century has been estimated to have been over 25,000, including artisans and merchants engaged in dozens of different crafts and trades. By the mid-1580s, according to one calculation, it had declined by 80 percent. Even after officials had begun to recruit residents in order to stimulate economic recovery, shops lining entire streets remained vacant.⁴⁶ Although Novgorod's experience was, perhaps, the most extreme, it was not unique. Artisans and merchants from towns throughout Muscovy were relocated to Moscow, particularly after the devastating fire of 1571, to Kazan', and to other selected centers, leaving the populations of their towns of origin depleted and their manufacturing and commercial activities diminished.⁴⁷

The effects of Muscovy's wars compounded difficulties caused by natural calamities and the Oprichnina. Moscow burned as a result of the Crimean Tatar invasion in 1571, but smaller towns and villages also were burned by Swedish soldiers, who from the late 1560s staged raids throughout the north, destroyed shops, warehouses, and villages, captured or killed villagers, and prompted others to flee.⁴⁸ During 1579–81, Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish armies in separate and successive campaigns recaptured the towns of Livonia as well as Polotsk, Toropets, and Velikie Luki, subjected Pskov to a six-month siege, and burned numerous villages in their paths as they approached the city of

⁴³ Among the latter were princes from Rostov, Iaroslavl', and Starodub, and Suzdal' who were removed from their ancestral lands to Kazan' and Sviiazhsk in 1565. Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, "Oprichnaia zemel'naia reforma Groznogo 1565 g.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 70 (1961), 223–50.

⁴⁴ Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, "Oprichnyi razgrom Novgoroda," in *Krest'ianstvo i klassovaia bor'ba v feodal'noi Rossii: Sbornik statei pamiati Ivana Ivanovicha Smirnova* (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), 157–71; idem, *Tragediia Novgoroda*, 76–105; Vladimir A. Varentsov and Gennadii M. Kovalenko, *V sostave Moskovskogo gosudarstva: Ocherki istorii Velikogo Novgoroda kontsa XV-nachala XVI v.* (St. Petersburg: Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr, 1999), 20–25; Zimin, "Khoziaistvennyi krizis, 14–15.

⁴⁵ *NL*, 110–11, 129; Boris N. Floria, "Privilegirovannoe kupechestvo i gorodskaiia obshchina v russkom gosudarstve (vtoria polovina XV-nachalo XVII v.)," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 5 (1977), 155.

⁴⁶ Floria, "Privilegirovannoe kupechestvo," 150; Kopan'ev, "Naselenie," 240, 248; Pronshtein, *Velikii Novgorod v XVI veke* (Khar'kov: Khar'kovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1957), 31, 84–88, 120–21; "1586 g. Dozornaia kniga Sofiiskoi storony Velikogo Novgoroda dozora kniazia Vasiliia Kropotkina" in *Velikii Novgorod vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.*, ed. Konstantin V. Baranov (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001), 70, 75.

⁴⁷ Floria, "Privilegirovannoe kupechestvo," 150, 153–55; Skrynnikov, *Tragediia Novgoroda*, 130.

Novgorod. But even before Muscovy's foes brought the conflict into its territories, the lengthy Livonian War had taken its toll. Mobilization of commoners to provide support services for the armies had depleted the labor supply in the villages and exposed recruits to dangerous situations and death. Muscovite armies proceeding westward to the frontlines in Livonia also caused damage to villages along the roadways and, thus, prompted additional peasant flight.⁴⁹

The Livonian War coupled with the constant need to defend southern borders and suppress uprisings on the eastern frontier had additional consequences. Military servicemen were required to be on active duty for extended periods of time; they were, therefore, unable to manage their landed estates personally. Their absence was another of the main reasons for the deterioration of those estates and the flight of their peasant inhabitants.⁵⁰ The estates, however, were the main source of the cavalrymen's incomes, the means they used to keep themselves supplied with the horses and equipment necessary for military duty. Their economic decline of their landed estates thus reduced their ability to fulfill their military functions and provided them with an incentive to desert their military posts. The costs of war, furthermore, prompted sharp increases in taxes, assessed on peasants and the urban population. Calculations indicate tax rates rose 75 percent between 1561 and 1584.⁵¹ But high taxes were another of the major causes of peasant flight.⁵² The overall results was massive depopulation. Records of eleven districts in the vicinity of Moscow in 1584–85 show that only one-quarter of the rural settlements were populated. The remainder had been deserted.⁵³ In the Novgorod lands 80 percent of the villages had similarly been vacated.⁵⁴ To stem peasant flight and stabilize the labor force, the government began in 1581 to declare "forbidden years," denying peasants the right to leave their villages even during the traditional St. George's Day period of departure. The destitute, however, not only continued to flee, but increasing numbers of them sold themselves into bondage.

These conditions not only describe extreme social distress, but point as well to a fiscal crisis. Despite the increases in tax rates, the reduction in the size and level

⁴⁸ E.g., Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (RGADA), f. 1209, No. 963, II. 938–38 ob.; *Istoriia Karelii XVI–XVII vv. v dokumentakh*, 3 (Petrozavodsk and Joensuu: Institut iazyka, literatury, i istorii Karel'skogo Nauchnogo Tsentra and Karel'skii nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut, 1993), 35–39, 47–48, 132, 265; Zimin, "Khoziaistvennyi krizis," 14.

⁴⁹ Zimin, "Khoziaistvennyi krizis," 14, 15, 18; Samokvasov, *Arkhivnyi material*, 307, 316.

⁵⁰ E.g., RGADA f. 1209, No. 958, II. 48–63 ob.

⁵¹ Marc Zlotnik, "Muscovite Fiscal Policy," *Russian History*, 6:2 (1979), 253. See also Skrynnikov, *Tragediia Novgoroda*, 122–23, 128–29.

⁵² Samokvasov, *Arkhivnyi material*, 307–11, 342; Zimin, "Khoziaistvennyi krizis," 12, 14, 18, 20.

⁵³ Kopanev, "Naselenie," 247.

⁵⁴ Kopanev, "Naselenie," 248.

of prosperity of the tax-paying population caused a decrease in state revenues. The Novgorod lands exemplify the steady decline. In contrast to the 13,000 roubles they paid to Moscow in the mid-1560s, they paid 9,150 roubles in the early 1570s and 6,500 in 1576. In 1583, Moscow received only 1,110 roubles; five years later the amount had dropped to 895 roubles, less than 7 percent of the revenues from the same region just two decades previously.⁵⁵

But as revenues declined, expenses, especially for military ventures, rose. The reduction in the numbers of *pomest'e*-based cavalymen appearing for military duty forced the government to rely more heavily on other units. In an army assembled in 1581, when Polish-Lithuanian troops were besieging Pskov, between 69 percent and 83 percent of the troops in each of the five Muscovite regiments were Tatars. The Muscovite regime was obliged to pay such irregular and other supplementary troops, upon which it increasingly depended, either in the form of expensive gifts to their leaders or of salaries to the troops. The need to purchase horses and other supplies added to the mounting costs of the long war.⁵⁶

The commercial sector of the Muscovite economy provided an alternate source of revenue. During the second half of the sixteenth century Muscovy cultivated an oriental trade through the Volga towns of Kazan' and Astrakhan' as well as with the Ottoman Turks, who purchased Muscovy's luxury furs for silver and gold valued at thousands of roubles. But that trade was interrupted in 1568, just before the Turks launched their campaign to force a Muscovites withdrawal from Astrakhan'. The Ottomans did not resume their annual commercial caravans to Moscow until 1578.⁵⁷

Muscovy also traded with western Europeans. The English, who were interested particularly in the purchase of timber, rope fibers, tallow, and tar, traded goods using the White Sea route, which they discovered in 1553, as well as at Narva, after the Muscovites captured it in 1558. Despite the ongoing Livonian War, calls for embargoes on the sale of military goods to Muscovy, and Swedish interference, Dutch and German trading vessels also sailed to Narva. Muscovy collected commercial fees on transactions at that port until it fell to the Swedes in 1581. This sector of the economy was, nevertheless, insufficient to compensate for the losses in revenue generated by the economic declines in towns and villages throughout Muscovy.

By the end of the century there were a few signs of social and economic improvement. Some landed proprietors, taking advantage of the greater availability of slave labor, were able to reorganize their estates successfully and lucratively.⁵⁸ State secretaries and scribes repeatedly conducted land surveys and investigations to determine on the one hand which estates were inhabited and productive and which were vacant and available for redistribution and, on the

⁵⁵ G.V.Abramovich, "Gosudarstvennye povinnosti vladel'cheskikh krest'ian severo-zapadnoi Rusi v XVI-pervoi chetverti XVII veka," *Istoriia SSSR* no. 3 (1972), 81.

⁵⁶ *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, 3 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaia komissiia, 1876), 245–46, 270, 293; Buganov, "Dokumenty o Livonskoi voine," 268–71; Ann M.Kleimola, "Good Breeding, Muscovite Style: 'Horse Culture' in Early Modern Rus," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (1995), 205–6.

other hand, to revise tax assessments. Some regions and towns, most particularly in southern Muscovy, benefitted from an influx of population, which had run away from their more northerly homes, and were beginning to stabilize and even to show signs of recovery.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, when Tsar Fedor died leaving his realm with neither a legitimate Riurikid heir nor a cohesive court elite, Muscovy also suffered from a diminished economy, a dislocated and impoverished population, and a depleted treasury.

CONCLUSION

Muscovy's political, military, and socio-economic institutions had enabled it to become a formidable eastern European power by the middle of the sixteenth century. But by the end of the century, under combined pressures resulting from rapid territorial and administrative expansion, natural calamities, the excesses of Ivan the Terrible, war and high taxes, those institutions had virtually collapsed. The long and widespread economic decline had involved massive demographic shifts with large regions, urban and rural, depopulated. The economic and demographic crisis undermined the military and fiscal strength of the realm. Under these conditions, when Fedor died leaving the realm with a tsar who lacked legitimacy resting on either dynastic tradition or on contemporary ideological concepts and with a *duma* ill-equipped to provide necessary compensating political support, the stability of the political system was placed in jeopardy and the integrity of the state became vulnerable.

Attempts in the seventeenth century to address the problems underlying the compound crises of the sixteenth century took a variety of forms. In some instances, as the selection of Michael Romanov as tsar in a political system headed by a monarch with unlimited authority, tradition determined the solution. Precedent similarly guided attempts to solve the ongoing problem of labor shortages on the landed estates of cavalymen by further curtailing peasant mobility. In other instances, such as the plans to reform the army by supplanting the *pomest'e*-based cavalry with infantry and other salaried units, the solution was the product of new influences. Frequently, however, the attempted solutions for inherited problems created new dilemmas. Restrictions on peasant mobility resulted in 1649 in the complete legal enserfment of the peasantry. Military reform created new fiscal pressures. And, early attempts to restore the *Duma* that allowed boyars to remain in the capital also enabled a few to gain control over

⁵⁷ Alexandra Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "Les marchands de la Cour ottomane et le commerce des fourrures moscovites dan la seconde moitié du XVI siècle," *Cabiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 11 (1970), 383–85.

⁵⁸ G.V.Abramovich, "Novgorodskoe pomest'e v gody ekonomicheskogo krizisa poslednei treti XVI v.," in *Materialy po istorii sel'skogo khoziaistva i krest'ianstva SSSR*, vol. 8 (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 5–26.

selected administrative chanceries to their personal political and financial benefit.

Nevertheless, responses to the crises of the sixteenth century, in which innovation both blended with and also challenged tradition, generated the changes and reforms that formed the modernizing trends of the seventeenth century.

⁵⁹ Daniel H.Kaiser, "Urban Identities in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy: The Case of Tula," in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584*, ed. A.M.Kleimola and G.D.Lenhoff (Moscow: ITZ-Garant, 1997), 203–26; Kolycheva, *Agrarnyi stroi*, 195–201.

THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE STATE IN RUSSIA

Richard Hellie

This essay concerns the role of the state in Muscovy, late medieval and early modern Russia between 1450 and 1700. Before we begin, we must define several key concepts. First, what do I mean by the “state” here? As used in this essay, “the state” consisted of those organs in Moscow that could issue decrees in the name of the grand prince and/or tsar and had the authority to try to effect them, to make them binding on the rest of society. The state consisted of those organs which could collect taxes and exercise legal violence. A second question might be “who was the state?” In brief, it was the sovereign and his elite servitors, the boyars and other members of the upper upper service class, including some leading chancellery figures. They were the policy-making “power elite” of Muscovy. Numerically, they were perhaps thirty men in 1500, perhaps a couple of hundred or so two centuries later, out of a population that was perhaps 2 million at the former date and 10 million at the latter. To them one might add some of the members of the middle upper service class, the *stol’niki* and *striapchie*, another 1,300 men in the mid-seventeenth century, some of whose number were irrelevant to our consideration because of their youth.¹ I doubt that anyone would want to extend a personnel-cadre definition of “the state” much beyond that. Additional people worked for the state, of course: bureaucrats in Moscow and functionaries in the provinces, members of the lower upper service class, the middle service class, the lower service class, at times some of the merchants, but those people almost never made laws and they almost as infrequently made policy.

One might want to stop to dwell on the role of the grand prince-tsar in this specifically, but I personally do not think that is very fruitful. Everyone knows Louis XIV’s statement “L’état c’est moi,” a remark that would have found considerable resonance (for several different reasons) in Muscovy. Obviously some sovereigns were ciphers, rulers in name only, such as Vasilii II, Ivan IV, Aleksei Mikhailovich, and Petr Alekseevich during their minorities; Fedor “the Bellringer” Ivanovich all the time, probably Mikhail Fedorovich and Fedor Alekseevich most of the time. Other rulers, such as Ivan III, Vasilii III, Boris Godunov, the adults Vasilii II, Ivan IV, Aleksei Mikhailovich, and Petr Alekseevich seem to have governed with full authority, tempered by advice.

That is not my concern here, however, but rather the question that has been of central historiographical concern since at least the days of the State Historical School (of Kavelin, Chicherin, Solov’ev, and Kliuchevskii),² what could the state do, what could it not do, and why? (I should also point out that this is not an

exercise in intellectual history, for I am not concerned very much here with what contemporaries thought about these issues, about which there is little information in any case.)

I should point out here that it is not my contention that the Muscovite state was “an supra-class state” that acted only in its own interests, for that was clearly not always the case, but rather that, once action had been decided upon, it had extraordinary latitude to issue orders in its name and to try to carry them out. The topic of what the state conceived it could do and did do might be considered under the following rubrics: 1) perpetuate itself and serve its leading figures; 2) declare war and peace; 3) preserve and regulate the social order through law; 4) create social groups; 5) create and regulate commerce, industry, and the arts; 6) establish religion; 7) regulate social behavior. I shall discuss each of these areas in turn.

SELF-PERPETUATION

There can be no question that the Muscovite state, like all others, first thought of its own perpetuation. Moreover, there can be no question that it was imaginative, flexible, and successful in maintaining itself. What was solely a palace administration in 1450 evolved to a differentiated system based on “proto-Weberian” functional chancelleries a century or so later. The Muscovite chancelleries between the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century were staffed by a permanent, life-time-service professional bureaucracy which did not depend on personal relations.³

In these centuries under review Muscovy expanded at one of the fastest rates in history, and adapted brilliantly to its growth from an area of 430,000 square kilometers in 1450 to 15,280,000 square kilometers in 1700. The methods of provincial control changed from one of governors (sometimes called “lieutenants” in English, for “*namestniki*, *kormlenshchiki*”) sent out from Moscow with their own slave retinues in 1450 to one of considerable local self-administration on a short leash (the systems run by the “fortifications,” “felony,” and “civil administration” officials) in the 1550s, which then became submerged under a system of governors sent out by the Moscow chancelleries after 1613.⁴ All of those systems were the result of experimentation and careful trial and error. The hallmark of all of them was a high degree of centralization with little room for local initiative or control over much besides varying degrees of choice of the provincial instruments of “self-administration.” To defend the paramount status

¹ Natal'ia F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absolutizma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987); Richard Hellie, *Muscovite Society* (Chicago: The College of the University of Chicago, 1967 and 1970), 216–18.

² Nikolai L. Rubinshtein, *Russkaia istoriografiia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1941), 289–342, 441–69.

³ Peter B. Brown, “Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy: The Evolution of the Chancellery System from Ivan III to Peter the Great 1478–1717” (PhD diss., Univ. of Chicago, 1978); Sergei K. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i XVII veka* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1946).

of the ruler, states are expected to impose sanctions to maintain procedures. In the seventeenth century, Muscovy engaged in an absolute orgy of sanctions to maintain procedures. The chancellery clerk Grigorii Kotoshikhin, for example, was forced to flee Muscovy in 1660 because, *inter alia*, he had made a mistake in writing the tsar's title.

The only risk to the state's perpetuation came during the Time of Troubles, after the legitimate Tsar Fedor Ivanovich died in 1598 and thus the Riurikid dynasty became extinct. This showed like nothing else the centrality of the sovereign in the Muscovite state, and only after a new one, Mikhail Romanov, had been installed in 1613 was it possible to restore order.⁵

The state was constantly on the lookout for treason, as manifested best in the "sovereign's word and deed" (*gosudarevo slovo i delo*) cases; every drunk peasant who shot off his mouth about the tsar was liable to be hauled to Moscow and tortured to learn what he was talking about. Hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals had such experiences.⁶

A major role of most governmental bodies related to self-perpetuation is the self-service (maximization of rents) of those who control it. Muscovy differed little from any other state in that regard. This was most apparent in organs such as the *Aptekarskii prikaz*, the Pharmacy Chancellery (1594–1720), whose sole purpose was tending to the health of the palace elite.⁷ (Its archive perished in the BAN fire in Leningrad on February 14–15, 1988.) One might also cite the enormous salaries paid and amounts of land granted to members of the upper upper service class, detailed in chapter 20 of my *Economy and Material Culture of Russia 1600–1725*. Such remunerations were analogous to those given to American elite corporation and university heads. Aside from those few examples, however, Muscovite administration was relatively inexpensive, and meritocratic principles were applied in determining who would get them.⁸

Although the Muscovite state unquestionably existed at least partially, if not primarily, for the benefit of those who ran it, a comparative perspective indicates that normally there were restraints on the "greed feature" of "statecraft" in

⁴ Brian L. Davies, "The Town Governors in the Reign of Ivan IV," *Russian History* 14 (1987), 77–143; Nikolai E. Nosov, *Ocherki po istorii mestnogo upravleniia russkogo gosudarstva pervoi poloviny XVI veka* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1957); Aleksandr Barsukov, *Spiski gorodovykh voevod i drugikh lits voevodskago upravleniia Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVII stoletii* (St. Petersburg: M.M. Stasiulevich, 1902); Boris N. Chicherin, *Oblastnye uchrezhdeniia Rossii v XVII-m veke* (Moscow: Aleksandr Semen, 1856).

⁵ Sergei F. Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii smuty v Moskovskom gosudarsve XVI–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1937); Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, *The Time of Troubles: Russia in Crisis 1604–1618*, ed. and trans. Hugh F. Graham (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1988). Chester S. L. Dunning has just completed a manuscript, *Russia's First Civil War: A New Interpretation of the Time of Troubles and the Bolotnikov Rebellion*, which, when published, will tell anyone all he ever wanted to know about the Time of Troubles.

⁶ Nikolai Ia. Novombergskii, *Slovo i delo gosudarevy. (Protsessy do izdaniia Ulozheniia Alekseia Mikhailovicha 1649 goda)* (Tomsk: S.P. Iakovlev, 1911).

⁷ Brown, "Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy," 583.

Muscovy that did not prevail elsewhere. As a negative example, in the dozen years between the death of Patriarch Filaret in 1633 and that of his near-cipher son Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov in 1645, there was an orgy of corruption in which the ruling Cherkasskii-Sheremetev clique did its best to apportion to itself whatever it could of the state's resources.⁹ The point to be made is that such examples were relatively rare and restricted to a small number of individuals. There is no literature on why Muscovite corruption was so limited, but I would be inclined to attribute it to the facts of the service state ethos, the lack of rights and pretensions of those not actually in control of the levers of power, and the lack of a national debt structure under which the elite could steal today at the expense of tomorrow.

The state's tax system fueled the entire enterprise. It became increasingly sophisticated (and probably burdensome as well) as the Muscovite era progressed. A dozen of the central chancelleries became concerned with taxation in one form or another. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, something resembling a consolidated budget appeared. There were customs duties, taxes on salt, and scores of direct taxes. Direct taxes were collectively assessed, a fact which led to the concealment of assets and discouraged the accumulation of capital and wealth.¹⁰ Regardless, Muscovy was one of only twenty-five European states in 1900 surviving from the five hundred independent political entities of the fifteenth century, and its creative and efficient raising of taxes was a major reason for its survival.¹¹

The Muscovite state also resorted to extraordinary taxes. The most famous of them were the seventeenth-century "fifth taxes" collected in the years after the Time of Troubles (1613–19). They were also collected twice during the Smolensk War (1632–34) and twice during the Thirteen Years' War (1654–67).¹² That there were not more such extraordinary levies indicates that the state probably learned that they were counter-productive. Universally, resort to such revenues stimulates taxpayers to hold their assets in mobile and concealable form. This in turn not only promotes economic inefficiency, but also makes the collection of regular taxes much more difficult. The interesting fact is not that such taxes were levied, however, but that they did not provoke the ratepayers to demand privileges restricting the increasing strength of the state power in

⁸ Natal'ia F. Demidova, "Biurokratizatsiia gosudarstvennogo apparata absoliutizma v XVII–XVIII v.," in *Absoliutizm v Rossii (XVII–XVIII vv.)*, ed. Nikolai M. Druzhinin (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 206–42. See also Richard Hellie, *The Economy and Material Culture of Russia 1600–1725* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), ch. 20.

⁹ Pavel P. Smirnov, *Posadskie liudi i ikh klassovaia bor'ba do serediny XVII veka*, 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1947), vol. 1, 411; Sergei F. Platonov, "Moskovskoe pravitel'stvo pri pervykh Romanovykh," in *idem*, *Sochineniia*, 2 vols. (Petrograd: Tip. M.A. Aleksandrova, 1919), vol. 1, 383–86.

¹⁰ Aleksandr S. Lappo-Danilevskii, *Organizatsiia priamogo oblozheniia v Moskovskom gosudarstve so vremën smuty do epokhi preobrazovaniia* (St. Petersburg: I.N. Skorokhodov, 1890); Hellie, *Economy*, ch. 23. See also Richard Hellie, "Russia, 1200–1815," in *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, 1200–1815*, ed. Richard Bonney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 481–505.

exchange for the revenues, as occurred in Western Europe. The fifth taxes were not collected in a situation in which the Muscovites were unconscious of autocratic abuses, could not conceive of limitations on the arbitrariness of the monarch, or could not formulate demands to the government. As is well known, Ivan IV had abused his subjects terribly. In 1607 Tsar Vasiliï Shuiskii agreed not to repeat Ivan's abuse of the elite, and in 1610 the Muscovites laid down terms which would have limited Polish Grand Prince Wladyslaw's authority as ruler, and throughout the first half of the seventeenth century demands were constantly being made on the government.¹³ No connections were made, however, between the state's needs for funds and the possibility of using that situation as a lever to pry politically limiting concessions out of the state.

The Muscovite state did not overcome its need for taxes in times of crisis by borrowing, at least very much or very often, either at home or abroad. There is some talk in the sources about borrowing from monasteries, but I am aware of no repayments and this seems to have been a codeword for confiscations. If Muscovy borrowed abroad in the early seventeenth century, it did so rarely. There were no bankers to borrow from in Muscovy. Wealthy merchants did not make loans to the government, but rather their assets were drained by compulsory service.¹⁴ One can be ambivalent about the utility or virtue of national debt, but its absence in Muscovy meant that the country never developed the efficient long-term capital markets with their low interest rates that grew out of Western European states' borrowing practices in the early modern period.

WAR AND DIPLOMACY

War and peace were major concerns of the Muscovite state. Expansion from 430,000 square kilometers to 15,280,000 square kilometers did not occur peacefully. Although Siberia after 1582 was taken away from the aborigines, annexed, and held at relatively low cost (considering the fur tribute paid by the aborigine Siberians, probably even a profit which then was paid to the Crimean Tatars to try to induce them to stop raiding), the story was much different for European Muscovy. Warfare with Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, the Crimean Tatars, and others was almost constant. Although Muscovy ultimately won a great deal and almost never lost anything, its enemies were constantly attacking, trying to nibble away either at Muscovite territory or its population (by slave raiding). Muscovy's subjects were probably protected about as well as could have been

¹¹ Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 15.

¹² Stepan B. Veselovskii, *Sem' sborov zaprosnykh i piatinnykh deneg v pervye gody tsarstvovaniia Mikhaila Fedorovicha* (Moscow: Sinodal'naia Tipografiia, 1909).

expected under the circumstances. The outcome, ultimately, was the garrison state. I have detailed the processes of acquiring sufficient military personnel and financial support elsewhere, but suffice it to say that, although contemporaries believed that there was never enough, in fact both were adequate if one's judgment is based on Muscovy's continuous expansion at the expense of its neighbors and the growth of its population.¹⁵

Equally interesting is the fact that Muscovite practices were definitely "Asiatic," rather than "European," when it came to fulfilling military needs. The state resorted to requisitioning needed funds rather than relying on money lenders or proto-banks. The state itself manufactured matériel, in preference to relying on the private sector, and imported what it had to.

At crucial junctures, perhaps in 1471, certainly in 1566, 1614–16, 1632, 1634, 1641–42, and 1653, the state consulted parts of society about military ventures and related issues of taxation through the proto-parliamentary institution known as the Assembly of the Land (fl. 1566–1653).¹⁶ Throughout most of the period, however, the government acted unilaterally, and certainly the major wars of the period (that against Lithuania in the 1490s–1500s, the Livonian War of 1558–83, and the Thirteen Years War of 1654–67) were initiated and stopped with nothing other than state input, as far as is known.

The state tended to the most trivial details of military security. If the gate of an unused fortress would not close, the state had to tell the local commander to fix it. For example, in 1655 a storm in Tver' damaged the fortress so that the gates would not lock. The local governor wrote to Moscow with the observation that he was awaiting orders about what he should do.¹⁷ As far as I can tell, local or individual initiative was never allowed in these matters in the seventeenth century. To take another example, throughout the middle of the seventeenth century the populace on the southern frontier was trying to escape intense governmental surveillance and control. The Slavs on the frontier were willing to take risks, their rulers in Moscow were constantly ordering the frontier commanders to force the area residents to live inside official fortifications. Sometimes the local inhabitants built fortifications to protect themselves from

¹³ *Khrestomatiia po istorii SSSR. XVI–XVII vv.*, ed. Aleksandr A. Zimin (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1962), 255, 320–22; Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, *Boris Godunov. Tsar of Russia*, trans. L. Rex Pyles (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1973), 83–84; Pavel P. Smirnov, "Chelobitnye dvorian i deti boiarskikh vsekhorodov v pervoi polovine XVII v.," *ChOIDR* 254 (1915), no. 3, pt. 2, 1–73; Hellie, *Muscovite Society*, 167–75, 178–96, 198–205.

¹⁴ Richard Hellie, "The Stratification of Muscovite Society: The Townsman," *Russian History* 5:2 (1978), 119–75; Grigorii Khilkov, *Sbornik kniazia Khilkova* (St. Petersburg: Brat. Penteleevy, 1879), 238–54, no. 82.

¹⁵ Richard Hellie, "Warfare, Changing Military Technology, and the Evolution of Muscovite Society," in *Tools of War. Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare, 1445–1871*, ed. John A. Lynn (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1990), 74–99.

Tatar raids and Moscow would then order that they be torn down so that the rural inhabitants would seek refuge in government fortifications.¹⁸

Not only did the state tend to trivial details, but the most essential. This has become graphically illustrated in the work of Brian Davies in Russian archives. He has shown how the state authorities planned frontier expansion in minute detail. Using essentially Byzantine town models, Moscow bureaucrats planned exactly how new frontier town garrisons should be built in every dimension: the walls, the streets, the churches, houses, secret water supply, and everything else. Then the state authorities arranged for all the manpower and materials to be brought to the site, when needed and usually on time. Delays might be caused by unexpected weather conditions, such as an early frost which would make earth excavations more difficult, but otherwise construction went usually as planned. This was remarkable, considering that the Moscow designers never visited the sites a thousand miles away, that all supplies had to be imported into the uninhabited steppe, and there was a tremendous struggle for scarce manpower throughout the entire Muscovite state.¹⁹

THE REGULATION OF THE SOCIAL ORDER THROUGH LAW

The Muscovite state's capacity to execute police power changed most dramatically in this period. It evolved from the dyadic social structure to regulate social conflicts brilliantly outlined by Daniel H. Kaiser in his *The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia* to Peter the Great's "well ordered police state" with its grandiose pretensions.²⁰ In 1450 the state's statements about law were in the form of what fees should be collected if litigants chose to utilise official mediating processes; two centuries later the state itself was looking not only for felons, but for fugitive slaves and peasants as well.²¹ The role of the state expanded extraordinarily in this sphere, as the maintenance of public order increasingly came to depend on the concentration of coercive powers in the hands of a single authority, the Muscovite state headquartered in the Kremlin.

The state's major effort in the legal sphere was the Law Code (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649, which consists of 967 articles organized in 25 chapters on topics ranging from civil and criminal law to how society should be stratified and the trouble-cases ensuing from that stratification should be dealt with.²² It was based on Old

¹⁶ Richard Hellie, "Zemskii sobor," *The Modern Encyclopaedia of Russian and Soviet History* 45 (1987), 226–34; Lev V. Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory russkogo gosudarstva v XVI–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).

¹⁷ Nikolai A. Popov, ed. *Akty moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Akademiia nauk, 1890–1901), vol. 2, 454, no. 741. (Hereafter *AMG*.) For a case in which a major had taken down the iron doors in a wall during the Kovna military governor's illness and the latter's need to have orders (which he was given) from Moscow to put them back up, see *AMG*, vol. 2, 529–30 (no. 877).

Russian law, Byzantine law (via the Russian Orthodox church canon law), West Russian law (from the Lithuanian Statute of 1588), and recent Muscovite chancellery practice. The *Ulozhenie* was a grandiose monument of codification which in many ways rivals the Austrian, Prussia, and French codes of a century and more later.²³ The *Ulozhenie's* proclaimed goal was justice and legality for all, and it probably marked the low ebb in the amount of official arbitrariness and perhaps unofficial corruption in the entire history of the Russian and Soviet legal systems.

Although many other examples of judicial centralization could be adduced, my favorite comes from the criminal sphere. On April 29, 1661, in remote Alatyř' (about 400 miles east of Moscow) a psychopath seized a house slave in a field and took him to a forest, where he slaughtered him. At night the psychopath took the corpse home, cut off its head off, and ate the brain raw. Then he hacked the body into small pieces and salted them in large earthenware pots. The accused was brought in, tortured, and confessed. He was then tortured additionally to learn whether he had killed anyone else. The local governor decided that the killer had not murdered anyone else, and that he was insane. He wrote to Moscow to ask what to do, for the *Ulozhenie* of 1649 and the Byzantine *Procheiros Nomos* did not have instructions on how to handle such a case.²⁴ The Western "logical" mind would suggest that the governor simply consult chapters 21 and 22 of the *Ulozhenie* and resolve the case, but the state simply did not allow that much initiative and analogizing. The name of the game was monopolization of coercive power, and really until the judicial reforms of 1864 no one did it more grandiosely than did the state authorities in Moscow and their heirs in St. Petersburg. The state was the sole locus of power from which regular sanctions emanated.

¹⁸ Some examples from *AMG*: Oskol in 1629 (vol. 1, 237–40, no. 210); Sevsk in 1630 (vol. 1, 323–24, no. 297); Sevsk and Briansk in 1631 (vol. 1, 327, no. 304); Shatsk in 1652 (vol. 2, 295–96, no. 475); Sevsk in 1658 (vol. 2, 618, no. 1040); Valuika in 1658 (vol. 2, 633, no. 1073); Karachev in 1659 (vol. 2, 674, no. 1149); Serpeisk in 1659 (vol. 2, 675, no. 1151); Kaluga in 1660 (vol. 3, 14, no. 4); Valuika in 1661 (vol. 3, 300–01, no. 310); *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, 45 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. II Otd. e. i. v. Kantseliarii), vol. 1, 247–48, no. 49. (Hereafter *PSZ*.)

¹⁹ Brian L. Davies, "The Role of the Town Governors in the Defense and Military Colonization of Muscovy's Southern Frontier: The Case of Kozlov, 1635–1638" (Doctoral Diss., Univ. of Chicago, 1983). For other places with similarly detailed instructions, see 1650 instructions to Khotmyshsk (*AMG*, vol. 2, 264, no. 425) and 1656 instructions to Dinaburg (*AMG*, vol. 2, 528, no. 874).

²⁰ Daniel H. Kaiser, *The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, vol. 8, ed. K. A. Sofronenko, *Zakonodatel'nye akty Petra I: Pervaia chetvert' XVIII v.* (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1961), 126–63.

²¹ Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 141–47; idem, *Slavery in Russia, 1450–1725* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), 239–40; *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, vol. 7, ed. Lev V. Cherepnin, *Pamiatniki prava perioda sozdaniia absolutnoi monarkhii: Vtoraia polovina XVII v.* (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1963), 185–201.

The diminution and increasing stifling of local initiative is one of the major characteristics of Muscovite reality. This tradition probably had its origins in the nature of the expansion of Muscovy in the post-1300 period. Areas that Muscovy annexed had their own traditions ranging from, we know, styles of art and architecture to, we may assume, criminal sanctions and religious practices. Initially governors of annexed areas were thankful for obedience and payment of taxes and interfered little with local practices. With the passage of time, however, Moscow always became nervous about provincial deviations and tried to make local religion and legal practices, for example, conform to the central, Moscow norms. This seems to have enhanced the center's developing sense of infallibility, with its concomitant sense that the provincial could do nothing right, if left to his own devices. In time this worked its way out, as has been shown, so that locals were allowed as little initiative as possible in everything. The government became aware of the absence of local initiative, but never has been able to repair the situation. Intermittently, from Ivan IV to Khrushchev the government has tried to compel local initiative without ever realizing the oxymoronic essence of such projects. Local authorities have always been kept on a very short leash, with the result that the compulsory local initiative has never been very effective. Inevitably, increased direct control from the center has followed every failed local initiative project.²⁵

A word might be said about the role of the state in social welfare at this point. In Kievan Rus' the Orthodox Church concerned itself with social welfare and charity, but that potential function of organized religion was essentially forgotten by 1450. The major form of welfare in Muscovy was self-sale into slavery. Nevertheless, the state opened its first almshouse in Novgorod in 1618 (well over a century behind Western Europe) with a capacity of seven people where the need was for thousands. That was a small start, but in the second half of the seventeenth century a few additional alms houses were built.²⁶ In no way, however, did they begin to cope with the enormous problems of the dispossessed, the poor, and the bereaved.

THE CREATION OF SOCIAL GROUPS

In the social sphere, the expansion of the state's pretensions and real power was positively breath-taking. In 1450 Muscovy was relatively a free country where the only significant social limitations were placed on slaves; everyone else could come and go, rise and fall. (One should not form visions of great mobility, however. The social pyramid was very flat, and mobility was very slow, when it existed at all.) Two centuries later, Muscovy was a society of ascribed castes in

²² Richard Hellie, trans. and ed., *The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649* (Irvine, CA: Charles Schlacks Jr., Publisher, 1988).

²³ Richard Hellie, "The Ulozhenie of 1649," *The Modern Encyclopaedia of Russian and Soviet History* 40 (1985), 192–98; idem, "Ulozhenie Commentary," *Russian History* 15 (1988), 181–224.

²⁴ *AMG*, vol. 3, 545, no. 650.

which birth legally determined social status and often geographical residence as well. In the process, the peasants were enserfed. The townsmen were bound to their towns and given monopolies on trade and industry and exclusive control over the ownership of urban property. In 1690 the Bohemian Jesuit Jirí David was awestruck by the fact that Moscow was divided into curias whose officials had lists of all the people and kept them all in view so that it was difficult for anyone to flee. "This is amazing, considering the number of people," he wrote. Lest anyone consider David's statement an exaggeration, consider the following: in late September 1652 a former provincial cavalryman from Elets showed up in Moscow. He had just escaped from 43 years' captivity as a slave in the Turkish galleys. He petitioned the tsar for permission to stay a bit in Moscow and observed that no one would allow him to lodge for one night without a royal decree. The palace court was ordered to put him up for a week.²⁷

The enserfment process began toward the end of the great civil war of the reign of Vasillii II, in the 1450s, when a handful of monasteries, concerned about the collection of debts from their peasants, got the state to agree that such peasants could move only on St. George's Day (November 26), after the harvest was in.²⁸ For Russia, this was the first meaningful interference in the matter of peasant freedom. For our purposes here, however, what is important is the fact that the process leading to enserfment that lasted until 1906 was initiated in a very small way by the state. In 1497 St. George's Day was extended to all peasants. No one knows why, but I suspect that it was an infection inherited from places further west (Pskov and Poland) that seemed rather harmless, or even rational, to all concerned at the time.

The next step involved the notorious change in the documents given to peasants when the lands on which they lived were transferred to the possession of new servicemen (*poslushnye gramoty*). Early sixteenth century *poslushnye* simply told the peasants that they had a new lord and that they were to continue to pay him the customary rents nothing striking. But in the reign of Ivan IV the formula was changed to add the phrase that the peasants had to "obey their new lords in everything," which, inter alia, gave the latter carte blanche to raise rents.²⁹ During the Oprichnina (1565–72), as the mercenary Heinrich von Staden observed, the *oprichniki*, took advantage of the new formula to collect as much rent in one year as formerly was collected in ten.³⁰ Moreover, the obedience formula probably was the major instrument in granting lords the right to try their peasants in small non-felony matters.

The Forbidden Years followed logically from the obedience formula. Again, as when St. George's Day was introduced, labor shortage was the issue. This time, instead of the monasteries, it was members of the provincial middle service class cavalry who began to complain in the 1580s that they could not function without peasant rents. In response, the government forbade some peasants to move on St. George's Day. The move was to be temporary (*do gosudareva ukazu*). Probably in response to middle service class cavalry petitions, the

²⁵ Nikolai E. Nosov, *Ocherki po istorii mestnogo upravleniia russkago gosudarstva pervoi poloviny XVI veka* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1957).

²⁶ Hellie, *Slavery*, 378, 692, 704.

Forbidden Years in 1592 were “temporarily” (not until 1906!) extended to all peasants. That was combined with the five-year statute of limitations on filing suits for the recovery of fugitives.³¹

The middle service class cavalry found that the five-year statute of limitations on the recovery of fugitive peasants intolerably inhibited recovery of runaways. After the dust had settled from the Time of Troubles and the Smolensk War, the middle service class cavalymen began a petition campaign to force the government to repeal the statute of limitations. It is totally obvious that the government, run by the upper service class elite, did not want to complete the enserfment by repealing the statute of limitations. Thus it took petitions of 1637, 1641, 1645, and 1648 to get the time limit extended from five to nine to fifteen years, then a promise of repeal which was not kept, and finally the repeal in the Ulozhenie of 1649 after the riots in the summer of 1648.³² By government fiat, the peasants and their lateral relatives were irrevocably bound to the land, enserfed. In a remarkable display of state power, the government ran dragnets through much of the country and returned thousands of fugitive serfs (and slaves as well).³³ To my knowledge, no one questioned the legitimacy of the dragnets.

As I argued in my *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* volume, the ruling elite learned to live with enserfment.³⁴ Although serfdom inhibited recruiting other lords’ peasants, the elite learned that the institution had other, compensating virtues. Inter alia, it enhanced the legitimacy of the state power (and thus the ruling elite) in the eyes of the serf-holding monasteries and the provincial middle service class cavalry. Prior to 1649 each of those institutions had been on its own and as much opposed to each other as to any other social configuration. The uprisings led by Vasilii Us and Stepan Razin (1667–71) had as one of their constituent elements fugitive serfs, whose opposition to serfdom and its supporting state apparatus compelled cavalry and church landholders alike to realize that not only their lands and labor forces, but their very lives, depended upon the viable coercive power of the state.³⁵ This diminished landholder/serfholder opposition to the state and concomitant demands on it while it also contributed to the gradual development of absolutism in Russia after 1650.³⁶ Serfdom also contributed to the impoverishment of all concerned by raising the peasants’ value of leisure above its true social value, but that is a fact that few if any Russians understood either then or now.

²⁷ Jiri David, “Sovremennoe sostoianie Velikoi Rossii, ili Moskovii,” *Voprosy istorii* 43:3 (March 1968), 94; Georgius David, *Status Modernus Magnae Russiae Seu Moscoviae* (1690), ed. Antonij V. Florovskij (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), 90; *AMG*, vol. 2, 301, no. 487.

²⁸ Anatolii D. Gorskii, “Ob ogranichenii krest’ianskikh perekhodov na Rusi v XV v. (K voprosu o Iur’eve dne),” *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii vostochnoi Evropy* 1963 g. (Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), 132–44; Hellie, *Muscovite Society*, 94–104.

²⁹ *Materialy po istorii SSSR*, vol. 2: *Russkaia feodal’naia derevnia XI–XVI v.*, ed. Anatolii D. Gorskii (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1987), 195, no. 30.

³⁰ Heinrich von Staden, *The Land and Government of Muscovy. A Sixteenth-Century Account*, trans. Thomas Esper (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 31–36.

The institution of slavery was juridically remade in the sixteenth century and then set on the road to abolition in 1679 (to be completely abolished in 1723).³⁷ Muscovy knew a number of legal varieties of slavery, but one major form throughout the period was hereditary or inherited slavery, *starinnoe kholopstvo*. The major evolution was from full slavery (*polnoe kholopstvo*) through the third quarter of the sixteenth century to limited service contract slavery (*kabal'noe kholopstvo*) from that time until 1723. All of those institutions of slavery, as well as the other forms, adhered to the age-old formula of “a free man who marries a slave woman becomes a slave, a free woman who marries a slave man becomes a slave” (*po rabe kholop, po kholopu raba*), and were seemingly initially self-generating and almost self-regulating. With the exception of elite reported slaves (*dokladnye kholopy*), whom the government insisted on registering early in the sixteenth century, the institution of slavery in Muscovy through the first half of the sixteenth century administratively looked like similar institutions in comparable societies. State officials were available to resolve disputes over slaves, and not much more. All actions were initiated by interested parties. But this began to change with the creation of the Slavery Chancellery (*Kholopu prikaz*) in 1571, itself possibly a unique event in world history, for I am aware of no other country whose central government had a special office to handle slavery matters. (As is well known, in the USA, where the South was one of the world's major slave societies [Muscovy was only a slave-owning society], the central government hardly recognized the institution of slavery, and certainly had no institutions to deal with it.)

After 1571, the state's meddling in the institution of slavery continued apace. Between 1586 and 1597 the institution of limited service contract slavery was fundamentally altered.³⁸ The slave was denied the right to pay off the initial loan that had commenced the transaction, and the owner was compelled to release the slave upon his death and could not will or otherwise alienate the slave to another owner. In 1607 the government got into the business of guaranteeing slaves the right to marry, imposed a fifteen-year statute of limitations on suing for the recovery of fugitive slaves, and imposed sanctions for receiving runaways. Until

³¹ Vadim I. Koretskii, “Novgorodskie dela 90-kh godov XVI v. so ssylkami na neizvestnye ukazy tsaria Fedora Ivanovicha o krest'ianakh,” *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1966 god* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1968), 306–30; Hellie, *Muscovite Society*, 110–18; idem, *Enserfment*, 93–122.

³² Hellie, *Muscovite Society*, 206–32; Smirnov, *Posadskie liudi*, vol. 2, 238 et passim.

³³ Aleksei A. Novosel'skii, “Otdatochnye knigi beglykh, kak istochnik dlia izucheniiia narodnoi kolonizatsii na Rusi v XVII veke,” *Trudy Istoriko-arkhivnogo instituta* 2 (1946), 124–52.

³⁴ Hellie, *Enserfment*, 246–54.

³⁵ *Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina*, ed. Aleksei A. Novosel'skii et al. (4 vols. in 5 books; Moscow: AN SSSR-Nauka, 1954–76); Richard Hellie, “Patterns of Instability in Russian and Soviet History,” *The Chicago Review of International Affairs* 1:3 (1989), 12–17.

³⁶ Paul Dukes, *The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613–1801* (Hong Kong: Longman, 1982).

the middle of the seventeenth century, it was the duty of each owner to find his own fugitives, but then the government got into that business, too, as part of the hunting for fugitive serfs. The transformation of the state's role in the institution of slavery in the space of a century was nothing short of remarkable.

Three elite merchant corporations were created by the state, regulated by it, and new members regularly dragooned into them, whether they wanted to be there or not. Probably nothing did more to inhibit commerce than the existence of those corporations, for their members were compelled to perform onerous government tasks that took them away from their businesses and dissipated their wealth. As a consequence, the members of the corporations were constantly trying to flee from them and to "shirk" the tasks imposed upon them.³⁹ Outsiders did what they could to avoid being conscripted into them. The government did little to improve or raise the level of the human capital of its merchants. There was no state schooling, and (aside from printing large numbers of textbooks after 1650 see below) generally did little to facilitate education in the private sector. In general, the metaphorical attitude expressed by Ivan the Terrible prevailed: "The more often you shear the sheep, the more thickly the wool will grow." Were it not for the demonstration effect provided by a handful of wealthy merchants, one would be surprised that there was any commerce at all in Muscovy. One should also not be surprised that the elite Muscovite merchants could not compete in 1649 with Western merchants (see below).⁴⁰

New groups of military servitors were regularly made, given the land of the state (which was often usurped from its peasant owners, or sometimes confiscated from its monastic or magnate owners) and told to serve from the income its peasant tillers produced, or else given government cash and grain stipends to live on in exchange for lifetime service. The male children of the military servitors were expected to follow their progenitors in military service, whether they wanted to or not. In 1640, even chancellery clerks became a closed caste, and by a law of October 4, 1652, foreigners were restricted to the Foreign Quarter (*Nemetskaia sloboda*).⁴¹ After 1652, by government fiat, about the only free person in Muscovy was the manumitted slave, the freedman.

Political science theory holds that one of the primary functions of the state is to maintain a specific social order. Although the Muscovite state decreed/enacted no social revolution, one can hardly say that the Muscovite state ever maintained the social status quo for long. In a crude Marxist sense, of course, the social order was maintained in that the ruling elite always remained precisely that.

The creation of a semi-caste society in Muscovy in the middle of the seventeenth century must have been the most dramatic, the most complete, and the most total change of any society, effected by state fiat, in human history up to that time. The fact that society was remade by governmental edict was remarkable. Although there was leakage into the towns, to Siberia, and to the southern frontier, the fact was that the peasants were enserfed in the second half of the seventeenth century. Although some children of servicemen may have sold

³⁷ Hellie, *Slavery*.

³⁸ Hellie, *Muscovite Society*, 247–S4.

themselves into slavery, most of them apparently followed in their fathers' footsteps, as the law proclaimed that they should. This semi-caste system almost certainly diminished the efficiency of one of the major factor markets (labor) and came to be one of the primary causes of Russian backwardness down to the present day.

THE REGULATION OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

The ideal purpose of the state in this sphere is to reduce transactions costs and encourage economic growth.⁴² Both are hard to achieve and the Muscovite state's record was certainly mixed.

In commerce and in economic life in general the overt pretensions of the state were less than in some other spheres, and one might be tempted to term its position less than a commanding one. Arcadius Kahan observed that the state did not control the economy in the eighteenth century, and it did so even less in the seventeenth century.⁴³ Yet one cannot ignore the fact that the late Muscovite state played a major role in the factor markets (land, labor, capital), but a much smaller role in the product market (individual commodities). Except for some imported luxury items and war matériel, the state was not a monopolist of any commodities. Except for the crucial labor supply factor, most farming went on without any state intervention, including the structure of farm labor relations. The enserfment of the peasantry reduced the efficiency of agriculture by binding the peasants to the poor podzolic soils of the Volga-Oka mesopotamia and inhibiting movement to the richer *chernozëm* soils south of the Oka and along the Volga.

The state intervened critically in the agricultural sector by essentially prohibiting a market in land. This was true to such an extent that it is extremely difficult for the late-twentieth century historian to find prices of land, one of the major factors of production. The absence of a land market in Muscovy resulted from several factors. The legal customs inhibiting land mobilization as a market factor in the feudal West did not operate in Muscovy. To begin, say in 1450, land was so abundant and population density was so low that most land had little value. Labor was the factor of value, not land, and that was what the enserfment story was all about. A century later population density had increased to the point that land had value, but its juridical nature was such that mobilizing land as a commodity was difficult. Property rights in some types of land were essentially

³⁹ Khilkov, 238–54; Hellie, “Stratification.”

⁴⁰ Hellie, *Muscovite Society*, 63–91.

⁴¹ Nikolai E. Nosov and Raisa B. Miuller, eds., *Zakonodatel'nye akty russkogo gosudarstva vtoroi poloviny XVI pervoi poloviny XVII veka. Teksty* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1986), 191–92, no. 280. (Hereafter cited as ZARG 1986.) PSZ, vol. 1, 264, no. 8S (October 4, 1652).

⁴² Douglas C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World. A New Economic History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Nathan Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell, Jr. *How the West Grew Rich. The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

over-protected, in others non-existent, and all lands were subject to arbitrary state confiscation, which maximized uncertainty about property rights.

Legally, there were a number of types of land. Private land, called a *votchina* (patrimony), that had been in a family for awhile could be redeemed by any member of the clan for up to forty years after alienation, a fact which effectively prohibited its commoditization and hindered the efficient allocation of landed resources.⁴⁴ After 1556, military service had to be rendered by all owners of *votchina* land, which probably lessened its attractiveness as an investment choice to monied individuals who lacked a desire to spend six months to a year annually in military service.⁴⁵

Another type of land tenure was the military service estate (*pomest'e*).⁴⁶ This appeared in the 1480s, and a century later the smart money well might have bet that soon this would be the sole form of land tenure in Muscovy as a consequence of Ivan the Terrible's confiscations of *votchina* estates. The *pomest'e* was similar to the Byzantine *pronoia* and the Persian *ikhta*. With the *pomest'e* the state short-circuited its own underdeveloped tax-collection and revenue-disbursement systems by assigning land (with the peasants on it) to a cavalryman for his service-maintenance. Such land could not be alienated by its holder in any way and, upon a serviceman's ceasing to render cavalry service, was returned to the state's land fund for redistribution to another cavalymen. Although the state, under pressure from the provincial cavalymen, weakened and gradually violated the strict principles of the *pomest'e* system by allowing it to be inherited, and also permitted unequal exchanges that may have been sales in disguise, in general the authorities were adamantly opposed to the commoditization of service landholdings. An unintended consequence of the *pomest'e* system (aggravated by serfdom) was a minimal willingness to invest in agriculture and a desire by each holder to plunder both the land and its labor force to the maximum, with no concern for the future. The Muscovite state was aware that its life-tenure-or-less landholding cavalymen would be tempted to plunder their service estates, issued preemptive decrees against such conduct, but probably succeeded little in saving either the land or the peasantry from excessive exploitation.⁴⁷

Except for statements about who could and who could not, most handicraft work was also untouched by the state's hands.⁴⁸ The same was true of most trade, local, inter-regional, and long distance. The minimal state intervention in the domestic product economy had its minuses as well as its pluses. Certainly the absence of guilds (backed by state power) and all that they represented in Western Europe (monopoly power and supply limitations) enhanced economic efficiency in Muscovy, for there were few formal barriers to economic competition or production output throughout most of the Muscovite period. The product market was open to all competitors, both urban and rural, church, civil,

⁴³ Arcadius Kahan, *The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout. An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia*, ed. Richard Hellie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

⁴⁴ Stepan B. Veselovskii, *Feodal'noe zemlevladienie v severovostochnoi Rusi* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1947); Hellie, *The Muscovite Law Code*, ch. 17.

and military, until 1649. (This did not mean that there was a level playing field, however, for some social elements had the advantage of tax privileges which others did not.) The stratification of society removed this efficiency as the *Ulozhenie* gave official monopolies over trade and handicraft to townsmen.⁴⁹ The possible advantage of guilds was that their autonomy often permitted them to experiment both economically and politically. Lacking guilds, Muscovy lacked that potential source of autonomous creativity in both economics and politics, as will be discussed further at the end of this essay. When the state ceded privileges to the towns in the *Ulozhenie*, the townsmen did not view this as an opportunity to be creative either economically or politically, but viewed it as a monopoly to be exploited in a very conservative sense.

Paralleling the absence of guilds in Muscovy was the absence of any institution resembling the French industrial officials, who regulated manufacturing in detail. This meant that Muscovites were free to produce whatever they wanted of whatever quality they were able and suited them and their customers. As far as one can tell, however, this did not unleash any inventive or tinkering impulses or otherwise liberate Muscovite craftsmen, who generally produced unimaginative, poor quality items of limited assortment that would not have fared well had Muscovy been competitively integrated into the world market.

Another plus in the business sphere was the fact that the state was not very concerned about the matter of interest rates. In the Roman Catholic West, Pope Clement V had forbidden lending at interest in 1312; Emperor Charles V had approved it in 1543. With the typical diffusion lag one finds throughout Russian history, the Muscovite Court Handbook (*Sudebnik*) of 1589 allowed a 20 percent interest rate.⁵⁰ This, as far as is known, was never enforced, thus permitting and probably encouraging the mobilization and commoditization of capital. The *Ulozhenie* of 1649, however, forbade the charging of interest although it is not known that this was ever enforced, either.⁵¹

The matter of interest charges was probably of minor significance because of other institutional features of Muscovy. One of the most important was the fact that Russian law conspicuously ignored the contract aspect of the Roman law heritage. As late as the end of the imperial period Russians resolved contract

⁴⁵ Gorskii, *Materialy*, 197, no. 33.

⁴⁶ Hellie, *The Muscovite Law Code*, ch. 16.

⁴⁷ Hellie, *Enserfment*, 27–28.

⁴⁸ Hellie, *The Muscovite Law Code*, ch. 19.

⁴⁹ Hellie, “Stratification.”

⁵⁰ Boris D. Grekov, et al., eds., *Sudebniki XV–XVI vekov* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1952), 378, art. 23. Interest was still legal in the 1620s, for the Statute Book of the Moscow Administrative Chancellery in a section dated February, 1629, quoting a document dated November 21, 1628, noted that the common interest rate was 20 percent and decreed that anyone owed documented principal and interest could automatically collect it without a trial (Mikhail A. Vladimirovskii-Budanov, *Khristomatiia po istorii russkogo prava* [Iaroslavl’: G.Fal’k, 1875], vol. 3, 147).

disputes according to their sense of social justice, not the contract itself, and there is no evidence that the Muscovite state was any more willing to enforce contracts among its subjects. The consequences were that risk aversion and enforcement costs were high and certainty and private capital accumulation were low.

Although the absence of state intervention in the realm of contracts was deleterious to the efficiency of the Russian economy, transactions costs were reduced by other state actions. Central was the creation of a uniform system of weights and measures in the 1530s.⁵² The creation of an enormous market (both ever-increasing area and increasing population density in the core areas) with few internal customs barriers, low (and relatively rare) toll road charges, passable and safe major roads and rivers, and a generally stable currency (see below) were all institutional measures that must have appreciably lower transactions costs and enhanced overall market efficiency. The extraordinary state post road system (the best in Europe) certainly must have lowered information costs along those routes.⁵³ On the negative side once again, however, the absence of bills of exchange, any form of banking system, and any type of insurance must have been due in one form or another at least partially to direct or indirect state policies or measures and increased transactions costs.

There was no *laissez-faire* operating in the international trade arena. No one could engage in international trade without state permission in the seventeenth century; this was the subject of most of chapter 6 of the *Ulozhenie* of 1649, which was borrowed from the Lithuanian Statute of 1588, translated from West Russian into Muscovite Middle Russian in the 1630s. (The Muscovites dramatically altered the substance of the law: the Lithuanians celebrated the individual's right to travel, the Russians celebrated the state's right to control individual travel.)⁵⁴ For an even longer time the state had regulated trade by foreigners in Muscovy. In the second half of the sixteenth century trading privileges were granted to the English. Reflecting the rise of Holland in the

⁵¹ Hellie, *The Muscovite Law Code*, 79 (10:255), "...they shall not exact any interest on this loaned money because, by the canons of the Holy Apostles and the Holy Fathers, it is ordered that interest not be collected on loaned money." According to a marginal notation on the scroll copy of the *Ulozhenie*, this reflected legislation of 1626/27 (the Muscovite year 7135), which has never been found. Loose precedents for this can be found in the fifth canon of the Carthaginian Council of 419, which commands clerics not to charge interest and notes that laymen also should not (Denver Cummings, *The Rudder...of the Orthodox Christians or All the Sacred and Divine Canons* [Chicago: The Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1957], 607–08), and the Procheiros Nomos of 867–879, 16: 14, which forbids the taking of interest and prescribes reduction of the capital sum due for any interest collected (Edwin Hanson Freshfield, *A Manual of Eastern Roman Law. The Procheiros Nomos* [Cambridge: University Press, 1928], 96–97). These measures circulated since the end of the thirteenth century in the statute book of the Russian Orthodox Church, the *Kormchaia kniga* (N.I. Tiktin, *Vizantiiskoe pravo, kak istochnik Ulozheniia 1648* [sic] *goda i novoukaznykh statei* [Odessa: Tip. Shtaba Okrug, 1898], 144–45, 206). For Old and Middle Russian notions on interest and usury, see the entry "*Likhva*" *Slovar' russkago iazyka XI–XVII vv.*, ed. Sergei G. Barkhudarov (Moscow: Nauka, 1975-), vol. 8, 245–46.

seventeenth century, privileges were issued to Dutch merchants, as well. The Muscovite merchants could not compete with the Westerners, and in late 1648 delegates to the Assembly of the Land petitioned Tsar Aleksei to forbid the foreigners to trade any wares in Muscovy. They also requested the tsar to order the foreigners confined to the White Sea port of Arkhangel'sk. The petitioners observed that the foreigners were much better merchants than were the Muscovites, who were being ruined by them. In response, the state forbade foreigners to trade within Muscovy, but did insist that they be compensated for losses.⁵² The point I would like to stress here is not only the fact that the state could and did restrict foreigners' access to the Muscovite market, but also the fact about why it happened: it was a response to a petition by delegates to the Assembly of the Land. In the international trade sector, as well as in the sectors of domestic trade and handicraft and the allocation of peasant labor, the merchants, townsmen, and provincial cavalrymen all found it easier to rely on the coercive powers of the state to organize economic activity and to redistribute resources in their favor than to seek ways of increasing productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness. The government, buffeted in the first half of the seventeenth century by the Time of Troubles, threats in the international security sphere, and civil disorders, found itself unable to resist.

The state was a major purchaser of many items, but I have yet been unable to determine definitively whether it bought at "market price" or at a "fair price," with all the discouragement to the private sector that would naturally have entailed. My general impression, however, from my study of seventeenth-century prices (which now has 107,600 entries) is that the state ordinarily paid market prices. Its unique position as a consumer did, however, apparently save it from some of the severe buffeting ordinary consumers suffered from episodes of state-generated inflation, such as during the copper crisis of 1663 that led to the "Copper Riots" of that year. Thus, although prices were generally stable throughout the seventeenth century, they were probably somewhat more stable for the state than for other consumers. I do not know how this influenced

⁵² The German mercenary Heinrich von Staden reported in the 1570s that the Muscovites had the advantage of one faith, one weight, and one measure" (Elena I. Kamentseva and Nikolai V. Ustiugov, *Russkaia metrologiia* [Moscow: Vysshiaia shkola, 1965], 69). Ivan IV tried to set uniform standards, as von Staden observed, but there were in fact some regional variations in the seventeenth century (Lev V. Cherepnin, *Russkaia metrologiia* [Moscow: Transizdat, 1944], 56; Stanislav G. Strumilin, *Ocherki ekonomicheskoi istorii Rossii* [Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1960], 27).

⁵³ Ilia Ia. Gurliand, *Iamskaia gon'ba v Moskovskom gosudarstve do kontsa XVII v.* (Iaroslavl': Tip. Gubernskago pravleniia, 1900; Gustave Alef, "The Origin and Early Development of the Muscovite Postal System," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 15: 1 (1967), 1–15.

⁵⁴ Hellie, *The Muscovite Law Code*, 10; the Lithuanian Statute of 1588, 3:16 (I. Beliaev, ed., "Statut velikogo kniaz'stva litovskogo 1588 goda," *Vremennik* 19 [1854], 58–59; Ivan I. Lappo, *Litovskii statut v moskovskom perevode-redaktsii* [Iur'ev: Tipografiia K. Mattisena, 1916], 87–88; Ivan P. Shamiakin et al., eds., *Statut Vialikaga kniastva litouskago 1588: Teksty, Davednik, Kamantar'ii* [Minsk: Belarускаia savetskaiia entsyklopediia, 1989], 119–20, 366–67).

merchants' enthusiasm to sell to state customers, but it hardly can have been positive. On the other hand, a preliminary glance at some of the prices that state organs paid indicates that they were by no means always constant. Thus the price of paper rose in 1654, ink rose from 1655 to mid 1657, the price of inkpots rose in 1663, and the cost of bookbinding rose in 1665–66 and 1673. Most of those price increases were probably caused by traceable events, such as the beginning of the Thirteen Years' War and the copper inflation.

I would aver that the general price stability of Muscovy in the seventeenth century tells us quite a bit about the role of the state in the period. For one, the currency was significantly and permanently debased only once, approximately a third, between 1600 and 1613: 300 kopeks were minted out of a *grivenka* (204 grams) of silver in the sixteenth century, but 400 kopeks in 1613. This was slightly debased by 6 percent, to 425 kopeks, in 1628, and perhaps a bit more by using poorer silver in 1648. The next debasement was in the later 1650s, when the government began to issue copper coins to pay for the Thirteen Years' War.⁵⁶ Miraculously, in my opinion, the public accepted the copper coins for half a decade. Only when the government itself refused to accept the copper currency for payments to it and the public learned that high government officials were counterfeiting coins (called *korelki* by the populace) for their own use did suspicions arise. The prices of goods skyrocketed, people of Moscow rioted, and the government withdrew the bogus currency in September 1663. This shows, in my opinion, that the government ordinarily handled its role as the issuer of the currency well, that the public generally had confidence in the government and its currency, and that general responsible management of the currency by the government was one of the stabilizing elements on the late Muscovite scene.

In the law, the state directed its servitors on military or other missions to pay market prices. An exception was made for instances when momentary inflation made it impossible for them to buy essential commodities. These ideas were borrowed from the Lithuanian Statute of 1588.⁵⁷

In summary, the Muscovite state saw little role for itself in the setting of prices. It is unlikely that the Western Christian doctrine of "just price" ever penetrated into Russia. No attempt was ever made to control the price of textiles or any other manufactured goods. The attempts of 1589 and 1649 to regulate interest rates were feeble and pro forma, as far as one can tell. There is a suspicion that the government would have liked to control the price of fables. Rather than do this by edict or some other form of price control, however, prices were held down by the state's hoarding huge stocks in Moscow which could be released when market prices began to rise.⁵⁸

At times of famine, the government had a number of measures at its disposal. It preferred to order (ineffectually) the release of privately hoarded stocks of rye and to hand out money to the starving rather than to attempt to police the price level. This was probably done because of awareness of the state's lack of

⁵⁵ Hellie, *Muscovite Society*, 63–91; PSZ 1, 167–69, no. 9; Konstantin V. Bazilevich, "Kollektivnye chelobit'ia torgovykh liudei i bor'ba za russkii rynek v pervoi polovine XVII veka," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR, VII seriia: otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk* (1932), no. 2, 91–123.

coercive personnel rather than because of awareness that price controls rarely work and usually are counter-productive. (Doling out money did not work either, for during the famine of 1601–3, the roads to Moscow were littered with the corpses of those who had succumbed en route to the capital to get a cash handout.) As a last resort, such as in November 1601, after a dreadfully bad harvest, the government did resort to price controls.⁵⁹ (Their effectiveness is unknown. What is known is that they did nothing to alleviate the famine, and probably just made it worse.) No attempts were made in Muscovy to control wages by law.

The sole exception to this story of *laissez faire* in the price sector was the slave market. In the 1620s the government decreed that limited service contract slaves should cost 2 roubles apiece, and in the 1630s this was raised to 3 roubles apiece, which was codified in the *Ulozhenie* of 1649.⁶⁰ The government was able to do this because of its insistence on registering slave transactions and the recognition by slaveowners that title to slaves was contingent on registration. No one knows why the government chose to regulate slave prices, but we do know that the price of 3 roubles was chosen because it approximated the average market price. As might be expected, however, some slaves were worth less than 3 roubles, others more. Setting a price dried up the market for those deemed worth less than the official price.⁶¹ The state authorities probably were not aware of this, however, as they (unconsciously, I believe) concentrated on gradually reducing the status of peasantserfs to slaves and ultimately abolishing slavery altogether.

The state and the tsar were the biggest merchants in Muscovy with monopoly rights to trade in a few luxury commodities such as the best sables and rhubarb. The merchants of the three leading merchant corporations were required to conduct that business without compensation. That was one of the reasons why being a member of the elite corporations was a burden to be eschewed, not a privilege or honor to be sought.

The state was the prime innovator. This was probably not by desire or design, but by default. The state not only initiated bronze casting and the manufacture of gun barrels, gunpowder, and cannon.⁶² It also initiated the technology transfers for the manufacture of iron, glass, paper, books, silk, copper, and a host of other items. (The consequence seems to have been that the prices of iron and steel, gunpowder, silk, and many products made of these commodities declined in the seventeenth century.) The technology transfers were arranged in the classical

⁵⁶ German A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Monety svideteli proshlogo* (Moscow: MGU, 1985), 154. See also *AMG*, vol. 2, 523 (no. 861); vol. 3, 318 (no. 338); vol. 3, 349–50 (no. 383); vol. 3, 540 (no. 644).

⁵⁷ “Hellie, *Muscovite Law Code*, 12, 15 (7:3, from an edict of 1641, and 7:7, 21); Beliaev, 36–37, 42–43; Lappo, *Litovskii statut*, 64, 70; Shamiakin, *Statut Vialikaga kniastva litouskago 1588*, 104–05, 108–09, 360–61, 362. For the operation of these set prices, and the fact that they invariably drove all commodities from the market, see *AMG*, vol. 1, 377 (no. 375); vol. 2, 340–41 (no. 546); vol. 3, 113–15 (no. 77); vol. 2, 256 (no. 235); vol. 3, 463 (no. 541); vol. 3, 491 (no. 582); vol. 3, 494 (no. 583).

⁵⁸ Richard Hellie, “Furs in Seventeenth-Century Muscovy,” *Russian History* 16 (1989), 189.

way: temporary monopolies were granted to foreigners, who were obliged to train the Muscovites how to produce the new products. Regrettably, however, the spinoffs from the new state-sponsored industries were remarkably few and the rate of transfer of new industries to private ownership painfully slow, often not until after the reign of Peter the Great.

The state did not seem to have much faith that its own people could do anything without compulsion. Creativity rarely can be compelled, and it rarely occurred to the Muscovite state to offer its own subjects incentives to do anything. For example, only the modernizing Tsar Aleksei (father of Peter the Great) offered prizes and other incentives to foreigners (and occasionally native Muscovites) to invent solutions to problems or to create anything. Only in the 1680s did the government offer rewards for reporting the whereabouts of ore deposits in a country whose Volga-Oka mesopotamian homeland had (and still has) none.⁶³ This, however, was vitiated by refusal to grant landowners ownership rights to subsurface minerals, with the result that landowners feared they would lose their land entirely to miners if they reported deposits. Only Peter the Great took measures to remedy this situation at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Throughout the seventeenth century the state itself engaged in various exercises to prospect for minerals.

It is certainly ahistorical to expect all peoples to be inventive, to do much other than run in fear in the face of change. But nevertheless the historian can hardly escape coming away from a study of the Muscovite era without gaining the impression that the state stifled or crushed rather than encouraged whatever latent striving for innovation was inherent among the Muscovites. This was especially the case because the stratification of society made it nearly pointless for the more than four-fifths of the population engaged in agriculture to attempt to do more than farm at the subsistence level. For the rest of the population, property rights of any kind were insecure and often marginal, thus creating marked disincentives to innovation, initiative, saving, and work in general.

One of the "truisms" of U.S. studies of "the state" is that the development of the state parallels the development of semi-independent sectors of economic and political action.⁶⁴ In the Muscovite case, that certainly was not true for politics, and only marginally so for economics.

The Muscovite government was also active in the arts, and became increasingly so as the period progressed. It is probably fair to generalize that in the sixteenth century what we now call "the arts" were patronized primarily by the church and a handful of wealthy patrons such as the Stroganovs. In the seventeenth century, however, state institutions and figures became increasingly involved in the arts. Thus both the tsar and his wife had their own workshops which manufactured gold and silver items, and also icons. This patronage of such arts and crafts was very important in supporting a critical mass of artisans.

⁵⁹ Khilkov, 168, no. 62.

⁶⁰ Hellie, *Slavery*, 319, 343.

⁶¹ Ibid, 458.

⁶² Hellie, *Enserfment*, part 3, passim.

Laymen around the court were critical in bringing Western theater/drama to Muscovy in the mid-seventeenth century, and court patronage was central in the introduction of poetry from Belorussia in the mid-1660s.⁶⁵

The role of the state in the development of music was central. In the Middle Ages, all Russian music was vocal. In the 1490s an organist (with his instrument) was imported from Italy. At the same time, the palace court founded a special choir called the Sovereign's Singing Clerks, which became in time the Choir of the Imperial Chapel. This initiated the so-called "Golden Age of Russian music," the sixteenth century. Ivan the Terrible composed a number of pieces. A state chorister I.A.Shaidurov made innovations in traditional Muscovite musical notation which were important for preparing the way to the Western five-line staff notation. In the second half of the seventeenth century, Tsar Aleksei's court had organs and introduced an instrumental ensemble. Aleksei also issued edicts on how church music should be sung and appointed a commission to examine and correct all church singers' books.⁶⁶ Certainly this amount of state involvement in music must be rare.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION

The Orthodox Church was the state's primary vehicle for inculcating religious beliefs and ethical norms, but not the sole one. Of course the church was always the handmaiden of the state throughout this period, and any figure who dissented, be he Metropolitan Kolychëv (in the 1560s) or Patriarch Nikon (in the 1650s), was soon deposed.⁶⁷ The state sovereign presided over church councils and made the major personnel decisions. This tradition was enhanced by the early sixteenth-century adoption of the Agapetus formula declaring that the ruler of the state was God's vicegerent on earth, and thus responsible for the purity of the church as well as for that of the state.⁶⁸ In the mid-sixteenth century Ivan IV deposed the head of the church, his successor introduced the Patriarchate.⁶⁹ In the seventeenth century the state constantly tended to the morals of the church,

⁶³ Aleksandr I.Zaozerskii, *Tsarskaia votchina XVII veka* (Moscow: Gossotsekizdat, 1937), 105, 143; I.Ia.Gurliand, *Prikaz velikago gosudaria tainykh del* (Iaroslavl': Tip. Gurberskogo Pravleniia, 1902), 199–202; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 153; Pavel G.Liubomirov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi promyshlennosti: XVII, XVIII i nachalo XIX veka* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1947), 270; *AMG*, vol. 2, 445 (no. 728); vol. 3, 485–86 (no. 574).

⁶⁴ Morton H.Fried and Frederick Watkins, "State," *The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L.Sills (New York: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), vol. 15, 143–57.

⁶⁵ Andrei N.Robinson, et al., eds., *Russkaia staropechatnaia literature (XVI pervaiia chetvert' XVIII v.)*, 4 vols., (Moscow: Nauka, 1978) vol. 3: *Simeon Polotskii i ego knigoizdatel'skaia deiatel'nost'* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982); *idem*, ed., et al. *Ranniaia russkaia dramaturgiia (XVII pervoi poloviny XVIII v.)*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1972–76), vol. 1: *Pervye p'esy russkogo teatra* (Moscow: Nauka, 1972).

⁶⁶ Iurii V.Keldysh, *Istoriia russkoi muzyki*, vol. 1: *Drevniaia Rus' XI–XVII veka* (Moscow: Muzyka, 1983), 122 et passim.

be it a besotted sexton or a corrupt monastery, be it a priest who was too poor to buy a new required prayer book or the Patriarch who was having treasonous relations with the enemy. The state concerned itself with the issue of whether a priest in Karpov in 1650 illegally conducted five weddings on one day, whether a priest in Dubrovenskii province in 1655 could fish in lakes given to a monastery, and whether a burned-down church in Voronezh could be rebuilt in 1629.⁷⁰

One of the most remarkable exhibitions of state power in the seventeenth century was the semi-secularization of the church during the years 1649–76. This was done with the creation of the Monastery Chancellery in chapter 13 of the *Ulozhenie* of 1649. As that document says, “in response to a petition by *stol'niki*, and *striapchie*, and Moscow *dvoriane*, and provincial *dvoriane*, and *deti boiarskie*, and merchants of the first, and second, and third corporations, and [townsmen of] various other hundreds and settlements, and ordinary merchants, and townsmen,” Tsar Aleksei created the Monastery Chancellery by decree.⁷¹ The delegates to the great Assembly of the Land, the proto-parliament of 1648–49, demanded that the church be reined in, and so it was done. Chapter 13 prescribed how suits between clerical personnel, their agents and tenants, and laymen were to be conducted in the Monastery Chancellery. The usual hyper-centralization was called for: all suits for over 20 roubles or involving land or slaves had to be tried in Moscow or the few provincial towns that had both governors and state secretaries. The *Ulozhenie* even went into the matter of disputes between clergymen: they had to be resolved by the casting of lots (a form of divine justice), not the taking of an oath. Chapter 12 of the *Ulozhenie* reveals that even the Patriarch's employees were summarily treated by the state. It is no wonder that only thirteen of the clergymen attending the Assembly of the Land signed the *Ulozhenie* scroll copy, against which Nikon was to rage so furiously a decade and a half later.⁷² The Byzantine Epanogoge “harmony” formula was even more out of balance than usual, with much of the church merely a department of state. The state occasionally called upon the church to pay its bills, but certainly no one was surprised when in September 1663 the state “borrowed” 50,000 roubles from the Solovetskii monastery to pay its troops.⁷³

The enormous power and authority of the state was also revealed in the great church schism (*raskol*) of the 1650s–80s. Although Tsar Aleksei initially tried to be a moderating influence (itself an interesting manifestation of state power)

⁶⁷ George P. Fedotov, *St. Filipp, Metropolitan of Moscow Encounter with Ivan the Terrible* (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1978); William Palmer, *The Patriarch and the Tsar*, 4 vols. (London: Truhner and Co., 1871–76).

⁶⁸ Iosif Volotskii, *Poslaniia Iosifa Volotskogo*, ed. Aleksandr A. Zimin and Iakov S. Lur'e (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1959), 90; Isaak U. Budovnits, *Russkaia publistika XVI veka* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1947), 97–100; Iakov S. Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaiia bor'ba v russkoi publistike kontsa XV nachala XVI veka* (Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1960), 475–80.

⁶⁹ Anton V. Kartashev, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi tserkvi*, 2 vols. (Paris: YMCA Press, 1959), vol. 2, 10–46.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 133–219; *AAE*, vol. 4 (1836), 482 (no. 322); *AMG*, vol. 1, 241 (no. 212); vol. 2, 277 (no. 444); 450 (no. 737).

between the zealots (*revniteli*) Avvakum and Nikon and their respective forces, it was he who was in the chair during the two councils of 1666 and 1667 that formally split the church and purged Nikon. Earlier, it had been Aleksei who forced Nikon from the patriarchate in 1658, it was his agents who persecuted priests who were too poor to buy the new books and it was his agents who martyred the Old Ritualists (Believers).⁷⁴

THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

As far as I know, the state relied on the church to handle problems such as cross-cousin marriages and pederasty, but its secular edicts in the seventeenth century increasingly became concerned with matters ranging from snuffing tobacco to the excessive consumption of alcohol. For example, the number of state edicts on drunkenness in monasteries and elsewhere is quite amazing.⁷⁵ The state also concerned itself with whoring and gambling anywhere in Muscovy.⁷⁶

Literacy and reading became relatively widespread in the seventeenth century, thanks in no small part to official state measures. In 1550, most law was little beyond the oral stage, but a century later the *Ulozhenie* insisted that everything be written down. The premier form of evidence was written documents. In my opinion, it is hardly accidental that beginning in 1650 the government printing house began to publish primers on a comparatively massive scale. How could people be expected to comply with the stated and unstated literacy requirements in the *Ulozhenie* if they could not read and write? How could they learn to read and write without textbooks? Given the absence of private publishing houses, how could Muscovites have access to textbooks (other than by more expensive imports) if the state did not print them? Be that as it may, one-third million primers were printed in the second half of the seventeenth century.⁷⁷ Calculating the population at about ten million in 1678, the state printed enough primers for nearly three percent of the population (the townsmen comprised two percent of the population) to have a new one. If the primers were used more than once (a fair assumption, in my opinion, considering that they were printed on cotton rag paper and that the few still extant are well worn), the percentage of those exposed to an elementary literacy text increases by a corresponding amount. We know from other evidence (signatures for salaries, for one) that an increasingly large portion of the population was literate to that extent in Muscovy.

Literacy not only enables subjects to know the law and sign for salaries, but also facilitates familiarity with alien ideas. As a result, the Muscovite state

⁷¹ Hellie, *The Muscovite Law Code*, 95.

⁷² Idem, "The Church and the Law in Late Muscovy: chapters 12 and 13 of the *Ulozhenie* of 1649," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 25 (1991), 179–99; Valerie A. Tumins and George Vernadsky, *Patriarch Nikon on Church and State: Nikon's Refutation* (Amsterdam: Mouton, 1982).

⁷³ *AMG*, vol. 3, 537 (no. 641).

⁷⁴ Sergei A. Zen'kovskii, *Russkoe staroobriadchestvo* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1970), 258–339.

became increasingly concerned about what we might term “mental pollution.” Metropolitan Makarii in the middle of the sixteenth century laid down the proposition that literature could be divided into “useful” and “non-useful” categories, a premonition of 1934, some think. Not only did the state’s presses print what it felt the populace should read, its customs agents inspected peddlers’ wares and confiscated books that should not be read.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, in the second half of the seventeenth century some aspects of literature “got out of hand,” as the availability of paper permitted translators and writers to pen things outside the government’s purview, a premonition of the taping phenomenon of the last decade in the USSR and what might happen soon in China if unregulated e-mail and/or microcomputer printing is permitted.

In spite of some exceptions, it is hard to imagine an area of “morals” into which the Muscovite state did not venture if it knew about it.

Lastly, the issue of public health should be raised. The Muscovites were intensely afraid of plague. They knew what it was, but of course they did not understand what caused it. In the 1650s, for example, plague was a concern almost annually at some time between June and November. The Muscovites sometimes seem to have associated plague with witches, but in general they associated it with travel and the movement of goods. Whenever plague would break out, the government would immediately swing into action and quarantine the ill individual or region afflicted. Barriers were set up, through which no individual or no thing could pass. Even communications to and from the tsar had to be recopied several times and passed through fire.⁷⁹

CONCLUSION

One might raise the issue of the “intensity” or “quality” of state involvement in the spheres I have discussed during the quarter millennium under review. Although I am fond of quantification, I have difficulty conceiving how the measurement would be undertaken. I would surmise that the state involvement increased regularly through the period, but I cannot prove it. Nor can I competently discuss, for example, whether state involvement was greater during Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich’s Thirteen Years’ War or during his son Peter the Great’s Northern War. As I have suggested elsewhere, the nod would probably go to Peter’s time, but probably not by much.⁸⁰

The hypertrophic development of Muscovite state power was possible because of the lack of institutional restraints on the power of the state. The church had

⁷⁵ *AAE*, vol. 4 (1836), 482 (no. 322); *PSZ*, vol. 1, 271 (no. 82); *AMG*, vol. 1, 219–20 (no. 199); 557 (no. 599); vol. 2, 399 (no. 640); 419 (no. 684); 431–32 (no. 706); 456 (no. 746); 588 (no. 997); vol. 3, 160–63 (no. 185); Aleksandr I. Zaozerskii, *Tsarskaia votchina XVII veka* (Moscow: Gossotsekizdat, 1937), 59.

⁷⁶ *AMG*, vol. 2, 450–53 (no. 739).

⁷⁷ Gary Marker, “Literacy and Literacy Texts in Muscovy: A Reconsideration,” *Slavic Review* 49:1 (1990), 81.

⁷⁸ *PSZ*, vol. 1, 239–41 (no. 40); *AMG*, vol. 1, 224–25 (no. 201); 311 (no. 279).

been the state's handmaiden since 988. There was no serfdom in medieval Russia, and thus nothing set off the towns from the countryside. Town air made no one free because everyone (except the slave, of course) was already free. Thus there was no sense of urban exclusiveness or prerogatives until they were developed as a by-product of the Muscovite caste society. There were no small landowners, and thus no gentry. Finally, the potential aristocrats were the princes from other jurisdictions, but their pretensions were liquidated upon joining the Muscovite fold, and the Moscow boyars (four in 1350, ten in 1500) never had independent, aristocratic strivings, for they were the state.⁸¹ The institutional restraints I have mentioned all coalesced in the West to create what we think of as our liberal freedoms. That was a unique human experience. The fact that the Russians did not share this experience means not only that they were not Western, but also that they were like the rest of humanity. This helps to explain why the hypertrophic development of state power was possible.

It should be apparent that the "Mongol-Tatar Yoke" plays little role in this conception of the origins of Muscovite autocracy. Those aware of the ancient debate on this issue and the reality of Mediaeval Russia can hardly be surprised by this determination. Most of Russia was outside the Golden Horde and developed largely autonomously of parasitic Sarai on the Lower Volga. Not accidentally, the theory of Muscovite autocracy began to be created some considerable time after the formal casting off of the "Tatar Yoke" in 1480 (in reality, Muscovy had been independent for a considerable time before that and only retained the nominal subordination to legitimize certain tax collections), and then the source for rhetoric was Byzantium, not the Golden Horde.⁸²

One also needs to contemplate why the possibility was taken advantage of. The following metaphor should help sum up this presentation. In the sphere of international relations, a metaphor exists which likens Russia to a hotel burglar going around rattling doors until he finds one that is unlocked which he can open and enter unchallenged. I would say that the Muscovite state enjoyed roughly the same experience, but with one major exception: the hotel burglar is presumably never invited in, whereas the Muscovite state often was. Sometimes it perceived virgin areas to penetrate by itself, but frequently, as in the issues of enserfment, town prerogatives, foreigners trading inside Muscovy, and the secularization of the church, for example, the state was invited, even forced, to intervene. Obviously it rarely met any opposition as it rattled the doors, with the consequence that by 1700 it had a role in a surprising number of the rooms of Muscovy. If "power" is the ability to make and carry out decisions that are

⁷⁹ See the following documents in *AMG*, vol. 1, 188 (no. 167); vol. 2, 290 (no. 468); 291 (no. 470); 344 (no. 550); 346 (no. 553); 382–84 (nos. 607–9); 417 (no. 678); 425 (no. 695); 427 (no. 698); 575–78 (nos. 976–77); 587 (no. 992); 592–93 (no. 1003); 619–20 (no. 1044); 625 (no. 1055).

⁸⁰ Richard Hellie, "The Petrine Army: Continuity, Change, and Impact," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 8:2 (1974), 253.

⁸¹ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics. The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).

binding on the rest of society, there can be no question that the Muscovite state had lots of it by 1700.

What kind of a state was this? An oriental despotism? A garrison state? A service state? Something unique, for which no suitable name has yet been conceived? Regardless of what we call it, it is clear that it was created in the Muscovite period. It did not exist prior to 1450, its role in nearly all spheres was enormous, and its legacy persists down to the present day.

⁸² Ihor Ševcenko, "A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology," *Harvard Slavic Studies* 2 (1954), 141–80.

BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIA

Peter B. Brown

INTRODUCTION

Historians overwhelmingly concur that the development of bureaucratic administration underlay the rise of early modern Eurasian states and empires and ultimately the modern state with its accoutrements and processes. In contrast to the tiny, royal household administrations so characteristic of the medieval epoch, the burgeoning bureaucratic administrations of the sixteenth century and after became powerful agents of change in numerous social arenas. Early modern bureaucratic administrations categorized and regulated estates; mobilized and extracted resources, especially for the military; and in other ways, provided monarchs with important tools to extend power at home and abroad.

Russia marks no exception to this Eurasian phenomenon. Starting in the late fifteenth century, new demands began to impinge upon the Muscovite court, forcing its variously named scribes and those few of its officials who were literate to expand in number, specialize and become jurisdictionally distinct, and ultimately obtain separate office spaces. In the course of the sixteenth century, these evolved into discrete departments, chancelleries (*izby*, later *prikazy*), that in turn were to generate their own desiderata, and became a significant element in Muscovite government, even shaping the dynamics of the court and the autocracy itself.

From the 1530s to 1700, the “chancellery system” (*prikaznaia sistema*), as it is known to historians, grew into a full fledged early modern state bureaucracy, replete with a host of differentiated offices and a large staff of career administrators. Under less favorable conditions the Russian central administration accomplished much of what its early modern counterparts did and even went further in certain areas. The impact of state bureaucratization in Muscovy, however, was greater than in most contemporaneous European cases. In the latter, civil governmental bureaucracy took its place among a number of pre-existing, well-codified social elements, i.e., estates, incorporated towns, churches, and parliamentary organs. In Muscovy the governmental bureaucracy, under varying degrees of control by the court elite, was in a sense the only major organized element in society. It is, therefore, in the rise of Muscovite central administration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that we witness the

origins of one of the basic continuities in early modern, Imperial and even Soviet history—the dominance of “society” by bureaucracy.

Pre-Revolutionary Russian and, to a lesser degree, Soviet historians ably chronicled various aspects of pre-Petrine bureaucracy.¹ Nonetheless, until fairly recently this important chapter in Russian history remained virtually unknown to most early modernists and particularly those in the West. Only in the late 1970s and 1980s did Western scholars begin to turn their attention to the analysis Muscovite bureaucratization.²

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Whatever practices and legacies the Kievan and Appanage experiences may have bequeathed to the Muscovites, they did not serve as catalysts or models for later

¹ Major works include: Nikolai P.Likhachev, *Razriadnye d'iaki XVI veka: opyt istoricheskogo issledovaniia* (St. Petersburg: V.S.Balashev, 1888); I.I.Verner, *O vremeni i prichinakh obrazovaniia moskovskikh prikazov*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Univ. tip., 1907–08); Aleksandr A.Zimin, “O slozhenii prikaznoi sistemy na Rusi,” *Doklady i soobshcheniia instituta istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR*, fasc. 3 (Moscow, 1945), 164–76; Sergei K.Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i XVII veka* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1946); Aleksei K.Leont'ev, *Obrazovanie prikaznoi sistemy upravleniia v moskovskom gosudarstve* (Moscow: MGU, 1961); Anatolii V.Chernov, “O zarozhdenii prikaznogo upravleniia v protsesse obrazovaniia Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva,” *Trudy MGIAI* 19 (1965), 275–93; Nataliia F.Demidova, “Biurokratizatsiia gosudarstvennogo apparata absoliutizma v XVII–XVIII vv.,” in *Absoliutizm v Rossii (XVII–XVIII vv.)*. *Sbornik statei k semidesiatiletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia i sorokapiatiletiiu nauchnoi i pedagogicheskoi deiatel'nosti B.B.Kafengauza*, ed. Nikolai M.Druzhinin (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 206–42; *ibid.*, “Prikaznye liudi XVII v. (Sotsial'nyi sostav i istochniki formirovaniia),” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 90 (1972), 332–54; Stepan B.Veselovskii, *D'iaki i pod'iachie XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); Nataliia F.Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absoliutizma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987); Sergei K.Bogoiavlenskii, “Prikaznye d'iaki XVII v.,” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 1 (1937), 220–39; *id.*, *Prikaznye sud'i XVII veka* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1946); Nikolai N.Debol'skii, *Istoriia prikaznogo stroia moskovskogo gosudarstva: Posobie k lektsiiam chitannym v s. peterburgskom arkhologicheskome institute v 1900–1901* (St. Petersburg, 1901); Nataliia F.Demidova, “Gosudarstvennyi apparat Rossii v XVII veke,” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 108 (1982), 109–54; Gerard F.Miller, “Moskovskie i drugie starinnye prikazy,” in *Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika*, 2d ed., 20 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1788–91), 20 (1791), 277, 420; Konstantin Nevolin, *Obrazovanie upravleniia v Rossii ot Ioanna III do Petra Velikogo*, 3 pts. (St. Petersburg, 1844); Mikhail N.Tikhomirov, “Prikaznoe deloproizvodstvo v XVII veke,” in *Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo XV–XVII vekov*, 348–83 (Moscow: Nauka, 1973); Nikolai V. Ustiugov, “Evolutsiia prikaznogo stroia Russkogo gosudarstva v XVII v.,” in *Absoliutizm v Rossii, (XVII–XVIII vv.)*, 134–67 (Moscow: Nauka, 1964); *id.*, “Tsentral'noe upravlenie: Prikazy” in *Ocherki istorii SSSR: Period feodalizma XVII v.*, ed. Aleksei A.Novosel'skii and Nikolai V.Ustiugov, 366–84 (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1955); Stepan B.Veselovskii, *D'iaki i pod'iachie XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); Sigurd O.Shmidt and Sergei E.Kniaz'kov, *Dokumenty deloproizvodstva pravitel'stvennykh uchrezhdenii Rossii xvi–xvii vv.* (Moscow: Minvuz, 1985); A.P.Pavlov, “Prikazy i prikaznaia biurokratiia (1584–1605 gg.).” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 116 (1988), 187–227.

central administrative growth in Moscow. Thus, Muscovy's central administration, when it matured, was destined to be unique.

The Muscovites and their East Slavic predecessors knew basically nothing of Roman or Islamic law, and so they did not partake of medieval Latin or Islamic administrative experience or benefit from it. The Muscovites did know something of Byzantine civil and clerical law and, somewhat later, Lithuanian law,³ but neither of these sources provided them a model for institutions and advanced administrative techniques. There is good evidence that the medieval Rus' and Muscovites borrowed certain administrative practices from the Mongols, above all in the realm of paperwork, fiscal terminology, and diplomatic practice, but beyond this the extent of this assimilation is by no means certain and remains the subject of heated debate in the scholarly literature.⁴

The uniqueness of Muscovite central administration can be seen in the very language of early modern Russian governance. There we find almost no trace of Latinate words.⁵ Muscovite administrators did absorb Mongol-Tatar fiscal and diplomatic terminology, but borrowed Steppe terms amounted to a small percentage of the mature Muscovite administrative lexicon.⁶ Moreover, Rus' and Muscovite administrative language was a variant of the vernacular, i.e., of plain-

² Peter Bowman Brown, "Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy: the Evolution of the Chancellery System from Ivan III to Peter the Great, 1478–1717" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1978); *ibid.*, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," *Russian History* 10, pt. 3 (1983), 269–330; Borivoj Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and Their Staffs," in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, ed. Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 19–45; Hans-Joachim Torke, "Gab es im Moskauer Reich des 17. Jahrhunderts eine Bürokratie?," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 38 (1986), 276–98; Fritz T. Epstein, "Die Hof- und Zentralverwaltung im Moskauer Staat und die Bedeutung von G.K. Kotosichins zeitgenössischen Werk Über Russland unter der Herrschaft des Zaren Aleksej Michajlovic' für die russische Verwaltungsgeschichte," *Hamburger Historische Studien*, 7(1978), i–xxi, 1–228; Bickford O'Brien, "Muscovite Prikaz Administration of the Seventeenth Century: The Quality of Leadership," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 24(1978), 223–35; Marshall Poe, "Muscovite Personnel Records, 1475–1550: New Light on the Early Evolution of Russian Bureaucracy," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45 (1997), 361–77.

³ On Byzantine law and its influence upon early East Slavic, later, Russian law, see E. Chernousov, "K voprosu o vliianii vizantiiskogo prava na drevneishee russkoe," *Vizantiiskoe obozrenie*, 2 (1916), 303–22; E.E. Lipshits, *Ekloga* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965); *ibid.*, *Pravo i sud v Vizantii v IV–VIII vv.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1976). On Lithuanian law and its influence upon Muscovite law, see Fedor I. Leon'tovich, *Ocherki istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, vol. 1: *Obrazovanie territorii litovskogo gosudarstva* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V.S. Balasheva, 1893); *ibid.*, *Spornye voprosy po istorii russko-litovskogo prava* (St. Petersburg: M.M. Stasiulevich, 1893). For analysis of how Byzantine and Lithuanian laws affected the 1649 Conciliar Code (*Sobornoe Ulozhenie*), see Richard Hellie, "Muscovite Law and Society. The *Ulozhenie* of 1649 as a Reflection of the Political and Social Development of Russia Since the *Sudebnik* of 1589" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1965), *passim*.

style East Slavic registers, and for the most part was devoid of Old Church Slavonicisms in grammar and vocabulary.

The country's relative poverty hindered the ability of the Muscovite grand prince, later tsar, and his top people to muster resources to invest in administrative development. Muscovy's comparatively large, dispersed, and impoverished population, 10.5 million in 1678,⁷ conferred no decisive advantages. The commercial classes—the traditional and often the sole suppliers of funds for medieval and early modern states—in the Muscovite context were small, dependent upon state initiative if not control, in general far from rich. Muscovy had no banks, so loans to the state were out of the question.⁸

A second difficulty was military, for it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Muscovite state was beset from nearly every side by hostile and powerful neighbors. Even before Peter became co-tsar in 1682, seventeenth-century Russia already had fought five wars, totaling 42 years, against fairly militarily-advanced opponents: Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire,⁹ above all, the debilitating and sanguinary—but little-known—Thirteen Years' War (1654–67), Muscovy's equivalent of the Thirty Years' War.¹⁰

⁴ For contrasting perspectives in recent American scholarship on Muscovite borrowing from the Mongols and Tatars—part of the ongoing Eurasianist School debate since the early twentieth century—see Brown, “Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy,” 613–34; Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 89–103, 107, 116–18; *ibid.*, *The Tatar Yoke* (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 1985), 15–28; Donald Ostrowski, “The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions,” *Slavic Review* 49, no. 4 (Winter 1990), 525–42; Elena Pavlova, “Private Land Ownership in Northeastern Rus’ and Mongol Land Laws,” *Russian History* 26, no. 2:125–44; Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1598* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also the exchange between Halperin and Ostrowski (with a contribution by David Goldfrank) in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1:2 (2000), 237–304. For earlier works on this subject, see Fedor I. Leontovich, *K istorii prava russkikh inorodtsev: Drevnii mongolo-kalmytskii ili oiratskii ustav vzyskanii (Tsaadzhin-bichik)* (Odessa, 1879), 251–54 and George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1953). See also Vladimir G. Tizengauzen, *Materialy po istorii zolotoi ordy*, 2 vols. (SPb., Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1884, 1941), 1:357–58; Dmitrii Ia. Samokvasov, *Russkie arkhivy i tsarskii kontrol’ prikaznoi sluzhby v XVII v.* (Moscow, 1902), 3.

⁵ Fedor P. Sergeev, *Formirovanie russkogo diplomaticheskogo iazyka* (L’vov: Vysshcha shkola, 1978). See Peter B. Brown’s review of it in *The Russian Review* 40:4 (October 1981), 445–46.

⁶ On Altaic (Tatar and Turkic) terms in Middle Russian, see: Mikhail N. Tikhomirov, “Prikaznoe deloproizvodstvo v xvii veke,” in *Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo XV–XVII vekov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 358; Max Fasmer, *Etimologicheskii slovar’ russkogo iazyka*, trans. Oleg N. Trubachev, ed. Boris A. Larin, 4 vols. (Moscow: Progress, 1963–73), vol. 4:18, 25, 425, 489, 555; George Vernadsky, *History of Russia*, 5 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943–69), vol. 3, 357–58; Nikolai I. Veselovskii, *Tatarskoe vlianie na posol’skii tseremonial v moskovskii period russkoi istorii* (St. Petersburg: Tip. B.M. Volfa, 1911).

Constant warfare was the primary impetus to the chancellery system, yet other factors came to play a role in its elaboration during the 1540s and after. Constant warfare distorted and perhaps stunted the nascent administration in the relative absence of competing demands, though this factor curiously preordained it to a relatively small size. Even in its infancy, the Muscovite central chancelleries were first and foremost tools to extract resources from the subject population, and funnel them into military enterprises. To be sure, this phenomenon in kind, but not in degree, was familiar enough in other Eurasian polities of the day, with debatably the one exception of Prussia, Muscovy's closest phenotype in terms of military-administrative organization.¹¹

The government (tsar/grand prince, court elite, and increasingly the central administration) had limited resources to disburse for the administration to begin with, and it had even fewer resources for extra-military administration. But the post-Time of Troubles capital elite opportunistically spawned a panoply of court (palace) chancelleries possessing no functional utility in terms of *raison d'être* other than catering to the needs and whims of this continuously enlarging stratum. On the other hand a dearth of resources in a sense benefited Muscovite governmental administration and arguably even social health by sharply curtailing the lopsided growth of non-functional central and provincial administrative offices and positions occurring in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France and in other European countries to a lesser extent.

From its late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century inception, until the early eighteenth century, the governing elite time and time again exhibited conceptual grasp of the possibilities for macro-organizational activity; this caste *ad hoc* fashioned chancelleries tailor-made to discharge tasks encompassing the range of Muscovite and early Petrine social existence. The tsar and Boyar Duma (which would include those of its members operating chancelleries) initiated discussion on the formation and termination of chancelleries and any decision to mandate either course of action. To this should be included the various assemblies of the land and "near" assemblies of the land convened from the 1610s into the early 1650s that, too, would make demands for creation of chancelleries, typically to

⁷ Carsten Goehrke, "Zum Problem von Bevölkerungsziffer und Bevölkerungsdichte des Moskauer Reiches im 16. Jahrhundert," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 24 (1978), 84–85; Iaroslav E. Vodarskii, *Naselenie Rossii za 400 let XVI-nachalo XX vv.* (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1973), 27, 29; Aleksandr V. Dulov, *Geograficheskaiia sreda i istoriia Rossii konets XV-seredina XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), 244.

⁸ Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation and Capitalism fifteenth-eighteenth Centuries*, 3 vols., trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1979, 1984), vol. 1, 472–73, vol. 2, 393–95, vol. 3, 184, 376; Samuel H. Baron, "Vasilii Shorin: Seventeenth Century Russian Merchant Extraordinary," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 6:4 (1972), 503–48.

⁹ The "National Phase" of the Time of Troubles and after, 1609–18; Smolensk War, 1632–34; Thirteen Years' War, 1654–67; Russo-Turkish War, 1676–81; and Russo-Turkish War, 1686–99. See John L.H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar. Army and Society in Russia 1462–1874* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 19–20; *Sovetskaiia istoricheskaiia entsiklopediia*, 16 vols. (Moscow: Sovetskaiia entsiklopediia, 1961–76), 12: 368–72, 374–75.

benefit the middle service class and townspeople.¹² The chancelleries' creators, one may infer, took into account the magnitude of the tasks to be discharged and whether they warranted a temporary or permanent institution; knowingly limited the new organization's competence; and designated an appropriate level of managerial, staff, and material support. Though the Muscovite government did not discernibly engage in forecasting anticipated administrative needs, the authorities with alacrity furnished chancelleries as needed. Of the 153 chancelleries, 136 of them—or 90 percent—operated during the seventeenth century and encompassed well nigh the gamut of Muscovite preoccupations.

A second advantage afforded the institutionally minded Russian court elite was relative political and economic stability, particularly after 1613—even the turbulent early 1680s—when both the elite and the chancellery system actually attained their largest size. Muscovy experienced its share of civil unrest, as can be seen in the Moscow Riot of July 1648, urban riots elsewhere at this time, the Copper Revolt of 1662, the Vasilii Us' and Stepan Razin rebellions from 1667 to 1677, the Solovetskii Monastery rising of 1668–76, and the 1682 and 1698 *strel'tsy* (musketeers') revolts. None of these rebellions threatened to overturn or redefine the government and political system.

THE RISE OF THE MUSCOVITE CHANCELLERY SYSTEM TO 1613

Prior to the 1470s, the Muscovite court required little in the way of central administration or documentation. Thereafter, a newly emerging official, the Treasury state secretary, though his Russian name, *d'iak*, is of early Appanage lineage, starts to take organizational charge, stimulate new approaches to government administration, and usher in-to borrow G.R.Elton's venerable but apt expression—a “revolution in government administration.”¹³

In connection with the rise of Muscovite power under Ivan III, the administrative needs of the growing court expanded, forcing it to differentiate, introduce new tasks, and effect an intelligent division of labor. The grand prince's scribal core, during Ivan III's and his son Vasilii III's (1505–30) reigns, expanded from approximately a dozen to two dozen state secretaries.

This multiplication of types of record-keeping and modest increase in the appropriate personnel was paralleled by and stimulated the development of what can be termed by the reign of Ivan's successor, Vasilii III (1505–33), proto-chancelleries, i.e., specific tasks devolved to state secretaries, as yet without their

¹⁰ See Aleksandr N.Mal'tsev, *Rossiiia i Belorussiiia v seredine XVII veka* (Moscow: MGU, 1974) and Henadz' Sahanovich, *Neviadomaia vaina* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1995). An English-language sketch of the Thirteen Years' War is in Robert I.Frost, *The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (Harlow, Great Britain: Longman-Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 164–69, 171, 173, 176–78, 181–87.

¹¹ The Prussian *Kriegskommissariat* organizationally and functionally resembled the Russian Military Chancellery (*Razriad*), to be discussed below (Otto Hintze, *Staat und Verfassung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte* [Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1941], 232–38, 256, 261).

own designated working chambers.¹⁴ Only from the late 1530s and into the mid-1540s, did the state secretaries' activities start to acquire institutional shape and afixed, physical domain, initially called *izba* on the eve of Ivan the Terrible's 1547 coronation and *prikaz* by the 1570s.¹⁵

The steady movement toward administrative development was accelerated by the reforms of Ivan IV. Genuine specialized administrative departments now began to flourish, and handled such matters as military service registration, service land registration and disbursement, diplomacy, petitioning, the post, and criminal affairs.

Each chancellery had, in principle, a distinct jurisdiction, and the Russian word for chancellery, *prikaz*, had come to mean by the late sixteenth century "institution" or "department." Before this, *prikaz* had meant "command," "order," or "detail," reflecting the reality that designated officials, the *d'iaki*, had carried out specific requests at the Moscow grand prince's behest.¹⁶

The "bad period" of Ivan the Terrible's reign was the next notable epoch in the early history of the chancellery system. The *Oprichnina* affected the chancelleries deleteriously, albeit temporarily. At the very start of the *Oprichnina*, Ivan set up a separate regime of *Oprichnina* chancelleries, three in all, that mimicked the functions of some of the regular state bureaus (during the *Oprichnina* they belonged to the *Zemshchina* or regular domain) and that he staffed with officials removed from the *Zemshchina*. At times these men simultaneously functioned in both sectors. Ivan eventually purged the *Zemshchina* chancelleries, killing significant numbers of state secretaries and clerks in 1570 and even massacring the premier administrator, counselor state secretary (*dumnyi d'iak*), Ivan Viskovatyi.¹⁷

The nominal abolition of the *Oprichnina* in 1572 restored some semblance of order to the chancellery system as it went about reconstituting cadres and work order, although psychological scarring for the surviving administrators must have been enormous. The remaining 25 years before the Time of Troubles, 1598–1613, saw more of the same along the lines of the 1550s and then some.

The Time of Troubles (1598–1613), like the *Oprichnina*, delivered a heavy blow to the chancelleries, although nine new ones were formed during the Time of Troubles. Rival claimants to the throne led to factionalism amongst the administrators themselves, and in addition to the Moscow organs, separate

¹² Lev V. Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory russkogo gosudarstva v XVI–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 216–337. See article reviews of Cherepnin's work in Edward L. Keenan, "L.V. Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory russkogo gosudarstva v XVI–XVII vv.*," *Kritika* 16:2 (Spring 1980), 82–94 and in Peter B. Brown, "The Zemskii Sobor in Recent Soviet Historiography," *Russian History*, 10:1 (1983), 77–90.

¹³ Kolycheva, *Kholopstvo*, 60. See G.R. Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government. Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry VIII* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 30; W.C. Richardson, *Tudor Chamber Administration* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 1, 11, 94, 98. Zimin chronicles the unfolding administrative subdivision the Treasury state secretaries introduced in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and how this affected Muscovy's Eltonian counterpart (Zimin, "O slozhenii," passim).

“chancellery systems” for the Second False Dmitrii and the First and Second National Levies appeared. Opportunism was rife, and state secretaries and clerks alike, taking their lead from their social superiors, not infrequently shifted allegiances when convenient. But what hurt the central administration even more was attrition of competence and income as the capital increasingly lost control over the countryside. The nadir for the bureaucracy was the Polish occupation of Moscow from 1610 to 1612 that effectively shut down the chancelleries. Reconstituting the chancellery system, both its central offices and its provincial sway (to be accomplished under the aegis of the military governors [*voevody*]), accordingly became a primary task of the new Romanov dynasty, elected to rule in 1613.¹⁸

THE CHANCELLERY SYSTEM, 1613–1700

After the Time of Troubles, the chancellery system entered its mature phase, significantly expanding its size in terms of numbers of institutions and officials, above all the latter. Not to be overlooked were the enormous growth in administrative paperwork (especially in the second half of the seventeenth century), the domination of the countryside by the growing bureaucracy, and the intrusion of this remarkable phenomenon into social life in general.

That the 87 years from 1613 to 1700 marked the apogee of the Moscow chancelleries is evident from the fact that over 130 of them existed in this time period. Most chancelleries had their quarters located within the Kremlin. In 1670, the government ordered the chancelleries to relocate to Kitai-Gorod and to other locations, as the Kremlin dwellings were decrepit and falling apart.¹⁹ A chancellery could have as many as several rooms for tribunal hearings, the clerks, and for document storage, though the larger chancelleries (Military, Foreign Affairs, Service Land) possessed their own buildings. Chancellery interiors were probably sooty (stoves burned throughout the winter months) and dim (windows, if any, were small), conditions that no doubt contributed to bad eyesight and possibly even respiratory ailments among administrators.²⁰

Statistical analysis of the chancelleries provides many insights into Muscovite bureaucracy as the discussion to follow will illustrate. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries more than three-quarters of all chancelleries (153) were

¹⁴ See Viktor I. Buganov, *Razriadnye knigi poslednei chetverti XV-nachala XVII v.* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1962), 111; Verner, *O vremeni*, 55–56; Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” 324; Zimin, “O slozhenii,” 169; and Likhachev, *Razriadnye d’iaki*, 80.

¹⁵ Leont’ev, *Obrazovanie prikaznoi sistemy*, 84–116.

¹⁶ *Slovar’ russkogo iazyka XI–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 19:168–70; Brown, “Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy,” 3–61.)

¹⁷ S.B. Veselovskii, *Issledovaniia po istorii oprichniny* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1963), 158, 163; Sergei F. Platonov, *Lektsii po russkoi istorii*, 9th ed. (Petrograd, 1915), 206; A.I. Kopanev, “Ukreplenie i rasshirenie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva,” in *Ocherki istorii SSSR. konets XV-nachalo XVII vv.*, ed. I.I. Smirnov (Leningrad: Gosuchbepeizdat, 1957), 136.

concerned with civil administration (117 “chancelleries of the realm,” 76 percent of the total). Here we find such imposing, stable chancelleries as the Military, Service Land, Foreign Affairs, and Felony Chancelleries. Together they comprised much of the civil administration, and increasingly became the center of the hereditary magnate’s interests. Only slightly more than one-tenth of the chancelleries administered the royal court and its affairs (18 “palace chancelleries” or 12 percent). With the exception of the parent organization, the Chancellery of the Grand Court—rivaling in size the Military and Service Land Chancelleries—these other court administrative bodies tended to be medium- or small-sized and ephemeral for a modern, logic-of-state mentality. Less than one-tenth of the chancelleries handled personal matters of the tsar (12 “privy chancelleries of the tsar” or 8 percent), and not even one-twentieth operated under the Orthodox Church’s control (6 “chancelleries of the Patriarchate” or 4 percent).²¹ Table 1.1 (“Number of Chancelleries Per Decade, 1610s–90s”) conveys the bureaucracy’s preoccupations, by listing the different categories of chancelleries and how their numbers varied per decade.

The first few years of a new monarch’s rule typically witnessed a burst of chancellery formation activity as new tsars and their cliques, having no choice but to wield bureaucratic agency and become acculturated in bureaucratic norms, implemented reform projects, indulged in political intrigue, and in other respects made their administrative imprint. Following Mikhail’s 1613 coronation, the years from 1614 through 1619 heralded the appearance of many court chancelleries, *ad hoc* bodies fielding social grievances, and temporary military chancelleries. Aleksei’s 1645 ascension stimulated the formation of several military chancelleries, thanks to his advisor B.I. Morozov’s military reform projects. Fedor’s 1676 enthronement was the catalyst, over the next four years,

¹⁸ Ibid., 297–98, 300–03, 305, 309, 328; Verner, *O vremeni*, 45–47; Sergei F. Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii smuty v moskovskom gosudarstve XVI–XVII vv.*, 2d ed. (SPb., 1899), 420, 422, 471–73, 495–96, 499, 506–07, 540; Pavel G. Liubomirov, “Ocherk istorii nizhegorodskogo opolcheniia,” *Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo fakul’teta imperatorskogo s.-peterburgskogo universiteta*, 141 (1917), 63–65, 103, 106, 110–12, 171.

¹⁹ Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii*, 4th ed., 117; Nikolai P. Eroshkin, *Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii* (Moscow: Vysshiaia shkola, 1968), 69; *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (St. Petersburg, Tip. II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830–), vol. 1, no. 466, 833.

²⁰ Veselovskii, “Prikaznoi stroi,” 186–87; Benjamin P. Uroff, “Grigorii Karpovich Kotoshikhin, On Russia in the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich: an Annotated Translation,” 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970), vol. 2, 532–34.

²¹ Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” 269–330. For works on the Foreign Affairs Chancellery, see Sergei A. Belokurov, “O posol’skom prikaze,” *Chteniiia obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri moskovskom universitete*, no. 3 (1906), i–ii and 1–170. Published in book form the same year. See *O posol’skom prikaze* (Moscow, 1906); Elena V. Chistiakova, *Oko vsei velikoi Rossii: Ob istorii russkoi diplomaticheskoi sluzhby XVI–XVII vekov*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1989; Nikolai M. Rogozhin and Elena V. Chistiakova, “Posol’skii prikaz.” *Voprosy istorii*, July 1988, 113–23.

TABLE 1.1. NUMBERS OF CHANCELLERIES PER DECADE, 1610s–90s

	1610s	1620s	1630s	1640s	1650s	1660s	1670s	1680s	1690s
CHANCELLERIES OF THE REALM	44	50	48	47	50	54	51	40	46
Military	12	9	17	15	15	17	15	11	15
Manpower Mobilization	3	4	5	7	7	4	4	4	5
Weapons Production	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	5
Fortification	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
Finance and Supply	4	1	5	2	3	5	6	3	3
Prisoner of War Redemption	0	0	2	0	0	2	1	0	0
Military Administration	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
Finance	12	12	10	11	11	12	12	9	11
Taxation	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	9	10
Treasuries	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2
Minting	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0
Natural Resource Exploration	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Land	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Felony Prosecution	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Foreign and Colonial Affairs	2	2	3	5	7	9	6	5	5
Diplomacy	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1
Western and Southern Territories	0	0	0	0	2	3	2	2	2
Colonial (Remote Areas) Administration	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2
Judicial Instance for Foreigners	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	1	1
Postal Service	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Urban Affairs	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	1	1
Townsmen	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0
Moscow	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Health Statistics	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Social Welfare	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Litigation	7	10	6	5	5	7	7	7	8
Petitioning	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0
Upper and Middle Service Classes	11	13	9	9	9	11	11	11	11
Documents and Printed Matter	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2
Civil Administration of Ecclesiastical Affairs	3	2	0	1	2	1	1	0	0
Miscellaneous	1	8	5	2	2	1	2	1	1
PALACE	10	14	14	13	12	7	8	9	8
CHANCELLERIES									
Royal Court and Lands	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	3	2
Recreation and Personal Care of the Tsar	5	5	5	5	3	2	3	2	2
Precious Metals and Objects	2	5	5	5	6	3	3	3	3
Memorial Services and Royal History	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
PRIVY CHANCELLERIES OF THE TSAR	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	3
Aleksei Mikhailovich	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Peter the Great	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
PATRIARCHAL CHANCELLERIES	3	4	3	3	3	4	5	4	4
TOTAL	57	68	65	63	66	66	65	56	61
	1610s	1620s	1630s	1640s	1650s	1660s	1670s	1680s	1690s

for the creation, thanks to his gifted courtiers Iu.A.Dolgorukii and I.M.Miloslavskii, of a few financial and publication chancelleries and for the May and November 1680 financial and military administrative reforms that did so much to streamline the chancellery system.

The landmark 1680 legislation consolidated the chancellery system by the outright merging of several subordinate chancelleries into the Military and Foreign Affairs Chancelleries and into the Chancellery of the Grand Treasury. As a result of this, Muscovy now possessed one national defense department coordinating subordinate, kindred agencies and governing large swaths of territory arched about the western, southern, and eastern peripheries of European Russia, and came close to having one national treasury department. It bears mentioning that 1680 was a culmination of a gradual pyramiding of bureaucratic authority, principally revolving about the Military and Foreign Affairs Chancelleries, stretching back into the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and speaks as much to tribunal directors' ambitions as it does to complex organizational evolution.

But politics was a decisive arbiter in chancellery affairs. The May 1682 Musketeers' Revolt and its aftershocks over the next few months unraveled some of the 1680 mergers. The precarious Sophia-Golitsyn regency from 1682 to 1689

generated no wave of chancellery-installation. However, the new regime's sharply expanding the influx into the chancellery officialdom and Duma ranks and thereby packing the bureaucracy and Boyar Duma (by the late seventeenth century arguably an extension of the bureaucracy) with would-be allies and passive supporters more than made up for this. Finally, Peter's early reign, dating to 1689, commenced in earnest in 1695 when he became sole ruler after the death of his half-brother Ivan. In the half decade from then until 1700, his regime sired six chancelleries, three of which were landmark events, inaugurating the Petrine navy. Thereafter, the chancelleries were cut back and replaced by other institutions, the culmination to this process being Peter's college reform of 1717.

Though comprised of a seemingly enormous number of organizations, the chancellery system contained discrete hierarchies of superior and subordinate bureaus that facilitated day-to-day and longer-term operation. The chancelleries of the realm possessed at least three such hierarchies. The Military Chancellery, during interims when no major wars were being fought, directed a small galaxy of military-related bodies overseeing manpower mobilization, weapons production, fortification, finance and supply, prisoner of war redemption, and military administration. These subordinate military agencies comprised between 12 percent and 25 percent of all chancelleries existing per decade, from the 1610s through the 1690s, with a median figure of 22 percent.²² During major conflicts such as the Smolensk (1632–34), Thirteen Years', and the Russo-Turkish (1676–81) Wars, the Military Chancellery intervened to order all other chancelleries to direct men, money, and other resources as it deemed appropriate for the war effort.

Within the chancelleries of the realm, the Foreign Affairs Chancellery generated yet another such vertical arrangement by overseeing bureaus in the main involved with diplomacy, newly-conquered western and southern frontier areas in European Russia, prisoner of war redemption, and increasingly, various territorial tax collection chancelleries.²³ But some measure of the relative influence of the Military and Foreign Affairs Chancelleries is obtainable through comparing the Military Chancellery's share of bureaus to that of the Foreign Affairs Chancellery; the latter's control over other chancelleries between 1613 and 1700 ranged from 0 percent to 11 percent, with a median of 9 percent, a distinctly lower set of figures. The two major state treasuries for much of the seventeenth century, the Chancellery of the Grand Revenue and the Chancellery of the Grand Treasury (established in the 1620s)—the latter formally absorbing the former in 1680—each in varying degrees, depending upon time segment, directed and collected the revenues from subordinate financial organs and then dispersed the funds elsewhere; eventually, the Chancellery of the Grand Treasury, ever chipping away at the competence of the older Chancellery of the Grand Revenue, absorbed the latter in 1680.²⁴

The Chancellery of the Grand Court controlled the not well-understood palace chancellery sector by dominating the numerous administrative organs handling the administration of the royal court and its lands, recreation and personal care of the tsar, administration of lands belonging to the royal court, production of

²² Brown, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," 323–24.

precious metals and objects for royal consumption, and memorial services and compilations of dynastic history. This imposing bureau's share of chancelleries varied from 9 percent to 20 percent per decade with a median of 16 percent, and placed it midway between the Military and Foreign Affairs Chancelleries.

Discrete, inter-organizational chains of command existed within the chancellery system. Their lack of prominent visibility misled contemporaneous foreign onlookers and later historians into the alluring and persistent error of portraying chancelleries as incapable of coordinating themselves with one another.

The installation of the Romanov dynasty, the ensconcing of new favorites and opportunists into central administration in the aftermath of the Time of Troubles, and the obtrusion of new state tasks catalyzed heady chancellery formation growth. If in the 1550s there were nine chancelleries in existence, 26 in the 1580s, and 35 in the first decade of the seventeenth century, by the 1610s there were 57 and 68 different chancelleries in existence in the 1620s. Particularly arresting is the increase in the quantity of palace chancelleries. The court sector functioned like a magnet, attracting holders of Duma hereditary ranks (boyars, *okol'nichie*, and a few counselor *dvoriane*), who saw the royal court's bureaucratization as a process simultaneously that they might extend and benefit from.

Chancelleries could differ significantly, if not enormously, in size and the best way of ascertaining this is to scrutinize the clerking registers for individual chancelleries as tribunal sizes tended to be uniform and consequently are virtually useless in researching this matter. The Service Land Chancellery multiplied its staff by a factor of over 12 in 60 years, jumping from 36 clerks in 1627/28 to 446 in 1686/87, unquestionably the steepest rate of increase for the century, though lesser increases of varying magnitude were very common but not universal.

The sheer number of chancelleries inaccurately gauges the gross size or degree of bureaucratization in Muscovy, because chancelleries varied radically in size and in the number of years they existed. But how long did chancelleries survive? One hundred thirty-six chancelleries functioned from 1613 to 1700, and functioned they did for a total of 4,469 years. The greatest number (32) of chancelleries had lifespans from 81 to 87 years, although over half (70) of all chancelleries operated for twenty years or less. That is to say, fully 102 bureaus or 75 percent existed either two decades and less or for at least eight decades, highlighting both the short-term versatility and perennial "matters of state" preoccupations of the Muscovite leadership. Mean longevity was 33 years per chancellery, but the median was 84 years, this last figure testifying to the stalwart presence of many bureaus functioning the better part of a century (if not more) to discharge long-term, steady responsibilities.²³

Chancellery jurisdiction tended to be either territorial or functional. A chancellery would either discharge: (1) all or many responsibilities for a given

²³ Brown, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," 305–06.

²⁴ Brown, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," 308.

region, such as Siberia (the Siberian Chancellery), the mid- and lower-Volga (the Kazan' Chancellery), or one of the northern districts in European Russia (Ustiug Tax Collection Chancellery); or (2) ostensibly one function, such as felony administration (the Felony Chancellery) or collection of prisoner of war ransom monies (the Prisoner Ransom Money Chancellery) throughout much or all of Muscovy.²⁶ Historians have greatly exaggerated in criticizing the chancellery system for its profusion of bureaus and its inability to allegedly prevent their muddle-headed interference into one another's jurisdiction.²⁷ In fact, individual chancelleries had discrete jurisdictional boundaries, their head officials understood what they were, and subjects wishing to contact a chancellery generally knew whither they should forward their petitions and other missives.

The vital interests of those with decision-making influence in the Muscovite government, both those outside the chancelleries and those working within them, understandably were reflected in the administrative tasking they devolved to the chancellery system, on what it should administer and what it should not. As to be expected in an early modern polity, these interests were primarily (though not exclusively) limited to military affairs, diplomacy, taxation, and justice. Virtually absent were education and broad-based social welfare. These activities were either unimaginable to the Muscovites or understood to be beyond the legitimate purview of the state. A "well-ordered police state" Muscovy was not.²⁸ There were no "schools" *per se* in Muscovy before the end of the seventeenth century, and Duma magnates, with the exception of the counselor state secretaries, were often illiterate and certainly had little if any concept of formal as opposed to experiential education. Not unsurprisingly, the Muscovite power elite, with very few exceptions and at that found in the Foreign Affairs Chancellery, were not educationally minded and could not and did not pursue education as a matter of state policy. Muscovy had no serious Roman law tradition and nothing comparable to any body of pedagogical knowledge comparable to the Medieval trivium with its emphasis upon grammar, law, and rhetoric. Thus, the chancellery officialdom, regardless of its scribal and paper-pushing virtuosity, fell far short of the lawyers, jurists, and others staffing European chambers and well-educated in a speculative tradition of law and philosophy. Charity (alms and sick relief) for the most part were left to the monasteries. Only in the early eighteenth century, after Peter and many state officials had become enthralled with European (and

²⁵ Brown, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," *passim*.

²⁶ The mid nineteenth-century historians Konstantin D.Kavelin and Konstantin A. Nevolin first divided *prikazy* into territorial and functional, and virtually all subsequent historians have accepted this division. See Konstantin D.Kavelin, *Sochineniia*, 4 vols. (Moscow: K.Soldatenkov and N.Shchepkin, 1859), vol. 1, 69–73 and Konstantin A. Nevolin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii K.A.Nevolina*, 6 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Eduarda Pratsa, 1857–59), vol. 6, 143–44.

²⁷ Mikhail N.Pokrovskii, *Russkaia istoriia s drevneishikh vremen*, 2d ed. (5 vols.; Moscow, 1911), 3:136–37; *ibid.*, 2d ed, rev. (4 vols.; Moscow: GSEI, OGIZ, 1933–34), 2:103; *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (4 vols.; Moscow: Mysl', Nauka, 1965–66), 1:442; Anatolii M.Sakharov, *Obrazovanie i razvitie rossiiskogo gosudarstva v XIV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Vysshiaia shkola, 1969), 101, 173.

especially Swedish) administrative practice, did the state support education and social welfare. The government did so from the angle of strengthening the military, an approach the Muscovites would have understood clearly.²⁹

The people in power understood the arrangement and operation of the “system” in terms of everyday experience and perhaps as a matter of concept as well. This elite guarded such knowledge on the assumption that no one else needed or need be allowed to know. No doubt the rigorous oaths, that all officials from boyar to clerk were obliged to take, concerning conduct on the job and secrecy about it while off the job, along with the *neglasnost*’ (compulsive rectitude) tradition in Muscovite political culture, impelled the officialdom to adopt this stance. Regardless, the great bulk of the citizenry had no direct, personal contact with the Moscow chancelleries, although it felt their mandates as carried out by the center’s obedient tools, the military governors (sing., *voevoda*).³⁰

THE PLACE OF CHANCELLERY OFFICIALS IN SOCIETY

Seventeenth-century Russia had evolved for its central offices an intricate and well-codified hierarchy of officials who performed ably in formulating and discharging the policies and tasks that established Muscovy as a rising Eurasian power. Its officials (see Table 1.2 “Chancellery Officials and Staff”) ranged from Boyar Duma men consisting of avocational bureaucrats (boyars, *okol’niche*, and occasional counselor *dvoriane* [*dumnye dvoriane*])—respectively the first, second, and third ranking members of the Boyar Duma and hereditary ranks) and administrative specialist counselor state secretaries (*dumnye d’iaki*—the fourth ranking Boyar Duma members); a middle group of officials, the state secretaries, who belonged to the sub-Duma Moscow ranks; and their assistants, the clerks (*pod’iachie*).³¹

The chancellery officialdom, for the most part, fit into the service categories of the Moscow civil elite (Russ., *gosudarev dvor* [Sovereign’s Court], *spisok moskovskikh liudei* [List of Moscow People]), also known in English-language scholarship as the upper service class, the Moscow servitor group, and the court. The upper service class consisted of two groups, the Duma and sub-Duma ranks. The Duma ranks in the 1620s amounted to no more than 2 percent of the total for

²⁸ See Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

²⁹ Brown, “Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy,” 568.

³⁰ Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” 286; Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” 145. This kind of “insider’s” knowledge can be clearly seen in the former Foreign Affairs Chancellery clerk Grigorii Kotoshikhin’s detailed description, at the prompting of his Swedish hosts, of the chancellery system, and composed from memory while in Stockholm exile. (Gregorii Karpovich Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, 4th ed. (SPb: Tipografiia glavnogo upravleniia udelov, 1906), 85–123).

TABLE 1.2. CHANCELLERY OFFICIALS AND STAFF

Tribunal (<i>sud'i</i>) members
BOYAR DUMA UPPER RANKS
Boyars
<i>Okol'niche</i>
Counselor <i>dvoriane</i>
BOYAR DUMA ADMINISTRATIVE RANKS
Counselor state secretaries
Sub-Duma administrative rank
State secretaries
CLERICAL STAFF
Senior clerks
Middle clerks
Junior clerks
ANCILLARY STAFF
Wardens, bailiffs, watchmen, guards, furnace-men, janitors

the upper service class, and this statistic appears to have stayed constant, more or less, for the remainder of the century, which is to say the Duma ranks were both disproportionately small and powerful.³² The sub-Duma ranks consisted of *stol'niki* (table-servers), *striapchie* (stiruppers), *moskovskie dvoriane* (Moscow dvoriane), state secretaries (*d'iaki*), and *zhil'tsy* (apprentice Moscow servitors). By the seventeenth century titles such as *striapchii* and *stol'nik* had long lost their literal denotation, and those now holding such ranks had become involved in a range of newer governmental and other duties.³³

The tiny central officialdom, at most between one and three ten-thousandths (.0001–.0003 percent), though its members varied enormously in social origins, rank, power, expertise, responsibilities, and remuneration, collectively formed, along with the provincial officialdom, the governing stratum, which presided over everyone else, with the exception of the tsar. The professional chancellery bureaucrats (counselor state secretaries, secretaries, and clerks), by virtue of their induction into a lifelong, meritocratic occupation, can even be regarded as a discrete social group, cutting across other strata.³⁴

In contrast to the upper three Duma ranks, the counselor state secretaries were of less exalted birth and invariably the scions of state secretaries and clerks. With the exception of the first three, who typically split their service careers among a variety of state, court, military, diplomatic, and other service postings, the last three officials were strictly bureaucrats and had to pass through an administrative, meritocratic *cursus honorum*, starting with the rank of junior clerk. Only 3.3–9.8 percent of all clerks ever achieved promotion to state secretary and only 6 percent of the chancellery state secretaries became counselor state secretaries.³⁵ The counselor state secretaries, whose Duma

³¹ Tribunals, usually in the palace chancellery sector, sometimes included officials of purely royal court servitor background, who possessed titles of varying honoric degree and did not necessarily have administrative training. Their Duma or sub-Duma Moscow servitor group ascribed rank is not always apparent. These men would include bearer of the seal (*pechatnik*), master of the bedchamber (*postel'nicii*), armorer (*oruzheinicii*), treasurer (*kaznachei*), master of horses (*koniushennyi*, *koniushai*), master of horses (*koniushennyi*, *koniushai*), server (*kravchii*), equerry (*iasel'nicii*), and master of the hunt (*lovchii*) (*Sud'i*, 233, 238–39, 244–45, 247, 256, 262–63, 273, 284, 286, 292, 299, 308 312; *Opisanie MAMlu*, 19, no. 311, iii:20–22). Sometimes, Moscow *dvoriane* and even clerks, though rarely, would serve as tribunal judges (*Sud'i*, 233, 238, 245, 256, 262, 284, 312).

expertise rested upon deep, professional knowledge garnered from their lifelong administrative careers, were a distinct minority within the Duma ranks.

There were 47 counselor state secretaries during the seventeenth century, from two to fourteen in any given year; in contrast, the upper three Duma ranks numbered approximately 450 in the seventeenth century and between about 30 and 150 in any given year. Promotion of counselor state secretaries into the three upper ranks was commonplace; of the 47 seventeenth-century counselor state secretaries, thirteen achieved the rank of counselor *dvorianin*; four, *okol'nichii*; and one, boyar.³⁶

Belonging to the sub-Duma ranks that immediately followed the Duma ranks, the state secretaries, like other members of the Moscow service group, by the seventeenth century were, for all practical purposes, of hereditary, even respectable birth. Yet, the state secretaries' non-military origins and permanent, professional association with recordkeeping was a social handicap. The state secretaries were the backbone of the chancellery system. They functioned as junior officers for the chancelleries, and ensured that they operated on a day-to-day basis. Engaging in tribunal decision-making, overseeing the performance of the subordinate clerks, and undertaking special assignments (as did clerks) in the provinces and abroad comprised their duties.

Below the state secretaries were the clerks. They were, one can say, the "non-commissioned officers" and "enlisted men" of the chancellery system; varied considerably in their age, experience, responsibility, and salary; and were very numerous. They enjoyed significant secular growth for in 1626 there were 575 of them but by 1698 there were 2,762 clerks in the capital.³⁷ The clerks were subdivided into three main categories, senior (*starshii*, including the highest ranking of the lot, the signatory clerk [*pod'iachii s pripis'iu*] and the document clerk [*pod'iachii so spravoi*]), middle (*srednii*), and junior (*mladshii*) clerks. In addition to chancellery officials, one would expect to find on the chancellery

³² *Boiarskaia kniga 1627g.*, 19–144.

³³ The evidence seems to suggest that the sub-Duma ranks of the upper service class had at least three discernible functions: (1) to provide a pool of middle-echelon administrators and military commanders and middle- and low-level courtiers, (2) to act as a recruiting base for the Duma ranks, and (3) simultaneously, to act as a "catch basin" for members of elite families denied admittance into the Duma (Peter B. Brown, "Social Mobility and the Moscow Service Class" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, D.C., October 1995), 13. A large number of recent scholars, e.g., M.E. Bychkova, Robert O. Crummey, N.F. Demidova, Richard Hellie, Ann M. Kleimola, O.E. Kosheleva, N.P. Lukichev, and Marshall Poe, concur on the importance of heredity, good birth, service record, the military ethos, and regime political maneuverings in the maintenance and expansion of the seventeenth-century Duma and sub-Duma ranks.

³⁴ Mikhail S. Aleksandrov forcefully advocates this position, even going so far as to claim that in the very act of joining a chancellery, the administrator became a *declassé* and lost sense of prior class or group affiliation (M.S. Aleksandrov [M.S. Ol'minskii], *Gosudarstvo, biurokratiia i absoliutizm* [SPb., 1910], 94).

³⁵ Bogoiavlenskii, "Prikaznye d'iaki," 229–30; Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia*, 23–24.

premises assorted staff such as wardens (*nedel'shchiki*), bailiffs (*pristavy*), watchmen (*storozhi*), guards (*razsyl'shchiki/razsyl'nye*), and janitors (*istopniki*).

The clerks formally did not belong to the upper service class, and, not surprisingly, the clerk's social status was ambiguous. They were rarely registered in the boyar books or boyar lists. In truth, the chancellery clerks, were a caste apart, albeit a respected one. They were valued solely for their expertise, and possessed their own hierarchy.

To sum up, the capital administrators wrote for the tsar; they did not fight for him, although occasionally the government organized the clerks into military formations.³⁸ Second, the ethos of administrative service contrasted to that which existed among other members of the upper service class, whose ethos despite modifications in the seventeenth century, was predominantly military. For them lineage was the primary, though not the only, determinant of a servitor's status and career pattern;³⁹ in fact, the "wash out" rate for Moscow service class scions, who—for whatever reason—failed to perform was substantial.⁴⁰

The administrators' prestige and career seem to have been determined largely, though not entirely, by concerns of merit;⁴¹ merit, as a criterion for advancement, mattered more than it did for the rest of the Moscow service class overall.

Administrators' careers commonly moved through a series of stages, each marking additional skill and responsibility. Apparently, able workers advanced, while the unqualified were left behind or fired. Birth and station nevertheless did not guarantee career advancement in the chancelleries. Father-son lineages among the *d'iaki* families were infrequent, implying a policy of exclusion.⁴² In the chancellery system, one had to work, and work well to succeed.

Despite their proximity to the royal court, knowledge of affairs of state, and even control over the same, the administrators were in essence an apolitical class. In Kievan and Appanage Rus', court officials had often been slaves. In late Muscovy they were servitors, not slaves, and, not unsurprisingly, remained passive. As far as is known, administrators played almost no active role in Muscovite politics. As has been seen, very few of them were ever promoted to the upper three Duma ranks, which at times carried with them military command responsibility.

In stark contrast to the European and Ottoman cases⁴³, Muscovite officials did not engage in venality, the sale of office. This is not to say that Muscovite officials did not abuse their offices. In the 1630s and 1640s, provincial military servitors and townsmen alike complained of the rapaciousness of the state secretaries' social pretensions and inordinate consumption as evident from their building costly stone-houses.⁴⁴ Bribe-taking and its associated influence-peddling were a

³⁶ See Marshall Poe, *The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century: A Quantitative Analysis of the "Duma Ranks," 1613–1713* (Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Sciences, 2002).

³⁷ Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia*, 23.

³⁸ *Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh rossiiskoi imperii arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsieiu imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (4 vols.+index; St. Petersburg, 1836, 1858), 4, no. 12:13–14; Demidova, "Prikaznye liudi," 339.

fact of life in the chancelleries,⁴⁵ but their extent varied. These abuses cropped up more in the judicial bureaus, where one might expect them to, but apparently did not surface—or if they did, on a small scale—in the military bureaus, where the work ethic was strongly entrenched and the national stakes were much higher.⁴⁶

CHANCELLERY STRUCTURE AND EVERYDAY OPERATION

By the late seventeenth century an imposing tradition of bureaucratic procedure was in place and government policy-makers were inextricably tied to it. The incursion of non-administrative ranks into administrative work likely brought a shift in the operation of the chancelleries themselves; earlier traditions of collegiality among tribunal members, i.e., equal say in deliberations, started to be outweighed by greater deference to social superiors. Finally, government edicts in the late 1670s and in 1680 ruled that only the chief tribunal member, invariably a boyar or an *okol'nichii*, could have his name listed in the heading of chancellery documents.⁴⁷ This development surely must be viewed as one outcome of what had begun under Boris Godunov. By the late seventeenth century there were few chancelleries not under the dominion of boyars and *okol'nichie*, not excluding the Military and Foreign Affairs Chancelleries, for so long managed by the counselor state secretaries. The shift towards insertion of avocational and administratively untutored hereditary Duma magnates into executive posts in the central offices at the expense of the professional administrators, who previously had wielded supreme authority within individual

³⁹ The importance of lineage to the warrior elite is demonstrated in Nancy S.Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Robert O.Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors. The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Poe, *The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century* (forthcoming).

⁴⁰ Peter B.Brown, “Social Mobility and the Moscow Service Class,” paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 27th Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., 26 October 1996.

⁴¹ The role of merit in compensation and advancement has been emphasized by most experts on the chancellery system. See, for example, Bogoiavlenskii, “Prikaznye d'iaki XVII veka,” *passim*; Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia*, 76–79, 86–89, 90–147, and 153–65; and Plavsic, “Seventeenth-Century Chanceries,” 27.

⁴² *Sud'i*, *passim*.

⁴³ Koenraad W.Swart, *Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1949), 7–8, 11, 13, 45, 47, 49, 51, 62, 66–67, 96, 98–101, 113–14, 117, 120, 123.

⁴⁴ Sergei F.Platonov, “Moskovskoe pravitel'stvo pri pervykh Romanovykh,” in *Stat'i po russkoi istorii (1883–1912)*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: M.A.Aleksandrov, 1912), 403; Pavel P. Smirnov, “Chelobitnyia dvorian i detei boiarskikh vsekh gorodov v pervoi polovine xvii veka,” *ChOIDR* (1915), no. 3,53; *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov khraniashchiesia v gosudarstvennoi kollegii inostrannykh del*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Tipografiia N.S.Vsevolozhskago, 1813–94), 3:390.

chancelleries, signified the appropriation of bureaucratic service by the top two hereditary Duma ranks. However, this movement—it is incumbent to stress—did not inherently denature the service commitment of counselor state secretaries, state secretaries, and clerks. Indeed, there is a plenitude of evidence to demonstrate that boyars and *okol'niche* over a period of several decades became acculturated into bureaucratic routine and more competent in its execution.⁴⁸ Many of the larger chancelleries were subdivided into territorially or functionally specific desks (*stoly*).⁴⁹ The Military Service Chancellery had as many as twelve such sub-units in the seventeenth century.⁵⁰ These desks were sometimes further broken down into *povyrt'ia* (“sections”).

Though most chancelleries were headed by single groups of judges, it was sometimes the case that particularly powerful or accomplished men headed groups of chancelleries. This happened with particular frequency in the reign of relatively weak monarchs, for example under Mikhail Fedorovich (1613–45) and Fedor Alekseevich (1676–82). The occasional concentration of administrative power was not necessarily dysfunctional, for some seventeenth-century magnates over time became acculturated to bureaucratic norms. Boyars I.M. Miloslavskii and Iu.A. Dolgorukii, who among themselves amassed eighteen chancelleries during Fedor's reign, displayed definite talent in conceptualizing and in promoting financial and military reform. They did not engage in the blatant, rapacious behavior of I.P. Sheremetev and F.I. Sheremetev from the mid-1630s until Mikhail's death.⁵¹

Government decrees and oaths prescribed administrative routines, detailed the functions and obligations of officials, and identified and spelled out the penalties

⁴⁵ P.V. Sedov, “Podnosheniia v moskovskikh prikazakh XVII veka,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia* (1996) no. 1 (January-February), 139–50.

⁴⁶ Peter B. Brown, “Neither Fish nor Fowl: Administrative Legality in mid- and late-seventeenth-century Russia,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (forthcoming 2002).

⁴⁷ *PSZ*, vol. 2, no. 820, 264; Sergei A. Shumakov, “K istorii moskovskikh prikazov,” *Iuridicheskie zapiski* 2–3 (1911), 511–13.

⁴⁸ Peter B. Brown, “Peering Into a Muscovite Turf-War (How Do We Know It's There?): Boyar Miloslavskii and the Auditing Chancellery,” *Russian History*, 25:1–2 (Spring-Summer 1998), 141–53.

⁴⁹ Veselovskii, “Prikaznoi stroi upravleniia moskovskogo gosudarstva,” vol. 1, 185; Ustiugov, “Prikazy,” 353, 380; Tikhomirov, “Prikaznoe deloproizvodstvo,” 353.

⁵⁰ They were the *moskovskii* (“Moscow”), *vladimirskii* (“Vladimir”), *novgorodskii* (“Novgorod”), *sevskii* (“Sevsk”), *belgorodskii* (“Belgorod”), *kievskii* (“Kiev”), *kazanskii* (“Kazan”), *smolenskii* (“Smolensk”), *denezhnyi* (“Monetary”), *pomestnyi* (“service land”) and *prikaznyi* (“chancellery”) *stoly*. On the desks of the *Razriad*, see Nikolai P. Zagoskin, *Stoly razriadnogo prikaza* (Kazan': Tipografiia Imp. un-ta, 1878); Aleksandr A. Golombievskii, “Stoly razriadnogo prikaza,” *Zhurnal Ministersfva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (hereafter *ZhMNP*), 1890, no. 6:1–17; Sergei K. Bogoiavlenskii, “K voprosu o stolakh razriadnogo prikaza,” *ZhMNP*, 1894, no. 6:401–03; Peter B. Brown, “With All Deliberate Speed: the Officialdom and Departments of the Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Military Chancellery (*Razriad*),” *Russian History* 28:1–4 (2001), 144–52.

for various administrative abuses. According to government regulations, state secretaries ran the chancellery premises, authorized document compilation, sometimes even wrote documents, and would verify and sign them. The clerks took care of everyday case processing and correspondence, always under the supervision of a senior clerk.⁵²

Knowledge of these documentary types was essential to the work of the chancellery; mistakes in form (and particularly in titles and names) were harshly punished. Chancellery officials wrote up most of their documents on scrolls (*stol'bitsy*). Scroll sheet ends were overlapped, glued together, and signed across the edges as a "fail-safe" measure should the sheets become separated. Books for storing records were used sparingly. Fire, precipitation, and rodents took a great toll of both central and provincial administrative documents, above all the 1626 Moscow fire that mostly wiped out existing chancellery records stored in the capital.⁵³

THE CAREER OF A MUSCOVITE ADMINISTRATOR

Typically boys from ten to fifteen years of age, after petitioning, were apprenticed into chancelleries.⁵⁴ Most learned the preliminaries of the scribe's craft by direct instruction on the job from senior administrators. In the second half of the seventeenth century, however, schools of sort were organized to train clerks within larger chancelleries.⁵⁵ Attrition was high, but after a bruising initiation period of a few years, the survivors were eligible to apply for *verstan'e*, that is, the assignment of service rank or capacity and corresponding entitlement (*oklad*), which could constitute money, service land, and kind. The newly-minted clerks were designated "junior clerks." They could hope for further promotion along the administrative ladder, through the ranks of middle and senior clerks, each of which entailed more responsibility and better and more secure compensation.

Horizontal mobility was more common in administrative careers than vertical mobility. State secretaries served on average 3.5 years per bureau before moving on to another, though this figure was somewhat greater for state secretaries working in the court chancelleries. A state secretary's job performance and personal relations with his tribunal superior invariably influenced the length of his tenure in any chancellery, but so did what clearly appears to be the government's policy of rotating fairly rapidly its tribunal members through the

⁵¹ Pavel P. Smirnov, *Posadskie liudi i ikh klassovaia bor'ba do serediny XVII veka*, 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1947–48), 1:486; Aleksei I. Iakovlev, *Prikaz sbora ratnykh liudei, 1637–1653 gg.* (Moscow: Tipografiia A.I. Mamontova, 1917).

⁵² Maurice Bloch, ed. *Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Society* (London: Academic Press, 1975), 12–13, 15–16, 18–19, 23.

⁵³ For an accounting of what perished and survived, see the "fire" archival description of 1626 (RGADA f. 210, opis' 6, "knigi moskovskogo stola," no. 19, published in Likhachev, *Razriadnye d'iaki XVI v.*, prilozhenie 4).

chancelleries. Yet nearly half of the 799 Moscow chancellery state secretaries served in only one chancellery,⁵⁶ suggesting that these men received appointments as state secretaries fairly late in their working lives.

Administrators were reasonably well paid in Muscovy. During the seventeenth century, clerks were entitled to anywhere from one-half to 50 roubles, with a mean of about 10 roubles.⁵⁷ The mean entitlement for state secretaries was ten times higher, though it decreased by slightly from 100 roubles in the mid-1620s to less than 90 roubles 60 years later. The mean cash entitlement for councilor state secretaries steadily increased from a little over 200 roubles in the mid-1620s to almost 400 roubles by the mid-1680s. *Okol'niche* received from their base salary entitlement and composite salary entitlement (*oklad s pridachei*) between 760 and 300 roubles, with a mean of 385 roubles, and boyars received from their composite salary entitlements between 1,200 and 265 roubles, with a mean of 617 roubles.⁵⁸

Despite the fact that scribes were in great demand and hard-working administrators could reasonably expect permanent service, the life of a bureaucratic officials was not a completely secure one, primarily for two reasons. First, a surprising number of administrators died in government service: nearly 80 percent of all chancellery workers expired due to plague alone in the mid-1650s.⁵⁹ Second, and more importantly, the government was free to revoke an administrator's rank and salary, effectively firing him.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF BUREAUCRACY IN MUSCOVY

Seventeenth-century Russia's bureaucratic processes, expectations, and conduct were a learned behavior, and at that a learned behavior encountering practically no resistance. This behavior became a ubiquitous cultural phenomenon, much like computerization in late twentieth-century life. Through inculcation and repetition bureaucratic *mentalite* and procedure metastasized, and almost no one

⁵⁴ Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," 29.

⁵⁵ Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia*, 43. Schools were also formed in the provinces. See Galina A. Leont'eva, "Organizatsiia prikaznogo deloproizvodstva v Sibiri i professional'naia podgotovka sibirskikh pod'iachikh v XVII v.," *Razvitie kul'tury sibirskoi derevni v XVII-nachala XX vv.*, ed. E.I. Solov'eva (Novosibirsk: Novosibirskii gos. ped. in-ta, 1986), 10.

⁵⁶ Bogoiavlenskii, "Prikaznye d'iaki xvii v.," 229–30.

⁵⁷ RGADA f. 210, moskovskii stol, d. 103, ll. 428–36; d. 470, ll. 19–20; Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia*, 126.

⁵⁸ Mikhail P. Lukichev, *Boiarskaia kniga 1627 g.* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1986), 19–22; RGADA f. 210, *boiarskie knigi*, *kniga*, 5:1–17; *kniga*, 7, *chast' 1*:17–22 *ob.*, 38–40 *ob.*; *kniga*, 11: 24–28 *ob.*, 33–37. The key word here is "entitled," for administrative work did not necessarily connote regular payment. Any official, as was true for other servitors, desiring initial appointment or subsequent promotion to higher rank and issuance of compensation due him for his present or future rank, had to petition for these privileges.

had any choice but to conform to bureaucracy's rhythm, be that person a serf, Duma member, or tsar. The power of the chancellery system to socialize all who came into contact with its norms is perhaps this institution's most durable achievement; without it the post-Muscovite bureaucratic drift of Russian history is inconceivable. Names such as *d'iak*, *prikaz* and *chelobit'e* may not have long survived, in their original meanings or at all, the nominal transformation of seventeenth-century Muscovy, but the novel, structured way of life they signified did.

The Russians' bureaucratic accomplishment four centuries ago is all the more remarkable as it transpired in a physical environment where no civilization could be expected to unfold. That environment imposed unique constraints upon Muscovy's northern Eurasian civilization, and makes intelligible the particular contours of pre-Petrine Russia's bureaucratizing experiences. Muscovite bureaucracy was inherently neither modern nor "unmodern," inasmuch as so much of it mirrored the institutions and practices of prominent bureaucracies of Antiquity and recent times; perhaps, bureaucratization can best be understood as an intrinsically atemporal process. To be sure, the chancellery system's successes can be conceived as having come putatively at the expense of other forms of institutions and approaches towards government, ones that were never present after 1613 as alternatives to the top-heaviness of Muscovite government, a phenomenon in large part traceable to the chancellery bureaucracy itself. Thus it was that the Muscovite bureaucracy made an indelible mark upon its nation's history, and one that is discernible yet in the twenty-first century.

⁵⁹ Brown, "Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy," 361.

MODERNIZATION OF LAW IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY MUSCOVY

George Weickhardt

In such areas as industrial technology (e.g., the Winius ironworks), printing technology, military technology and technique, education or visual arts, the term “modernization” in seventeenth century Muscovy is often synonymous with Westernization. To use the term “modernization” to describe what was happening in the Muscovite tsardom thus often seems to imply that Muscovy shared a common historical pattern of development with other nations and that Russian history borrowed processes that, in the West, developed according to their own logic, like the Gunpowder Revolution and the printing revolution.

In the realm of law, there was also “modernization” in the seventeenth century. The law became more rational, predictable and efficient. There is, however, no evidence whatsoever that Muscovite law was influenced by the law of Western Europe. The Law Code (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649 was one of the most comprehensive and ambitious codifications attempted anywhere to date, but it was a distinctly homegrown development and it retained and even strengthened many of the “backward” institutions of Muscovy. While hardly any scholar would dispute that such a vast codification is a form of modernization, the Law Code nonetheless codified and solidified the imposition of serfdom, the service state and a highly stratified social system. The Code also reflected the weak development of individual rights.

Legal modernization in Muscovy thus bore a uniquely Muscovite stamp. Posing questions about how “Western” Muscovite law was, leads to many false issues, and it is thus important to find some other standard by which to evaluate legal modernization in Muscovy. It is indeed possible to delineate and analyze ways in which a nation followed common or typical paths of legal development and modernization without using the West as the sole standard and without implying that it was subject to general patterns or “laws” of development. That was the point of Max Weber’s use of “models” to describe the development of political, social, economic, religious and legal institutions. The Weberian model is not an iron law of development. Rather, Weber used terms like “rationalization” and “bureaucratization” to describe typical paths of development that he perceived in societies as different as Western Europe, China, India and the Islamic world. The model is an ideal type that may apply more or less or not at all to a particular nation. When it does apply, it helps us to look for the various patterns or features associated with the model. It does not necessarily exist in its “pure” form in any real historical situation. In other words, the model

is only a benchmark for comparative analysis of societies and their development.

Weber posited several useful paradigms or models for the stages of legal development or modernization.¹ To Weber modernization of law was a process of “rationalization” and systematization that tended toward making the functioning of the legal process calculable and predictable. Such a rational system was to Weber a prerequisite to the functioning of a modern capitalist economy. While Weber’s models and theories are highly complex and nuanced, we might distill from them some typical (but not necessarily universally applicable) stages of legal development that he perceived in a wide variety of states and societies.

Primitive or tribal society is usually characterized by the blood vendetta. Legal modernization begins when the prince intervenes to impose, through a codification, the “composition” of clan feuds through the bloodwite or *wergild*. This phase, sometimes called the “archaic” phase by other scholars of legal history, was associated with the “barbarian codes” (*leges barbarorum*), such as the Salic Law and the Rus’ Law (*Russkaia Pravda*). In the archaic phase, a legal system usually continues to rely on magical or other non-rational modes of proof, such as ordeal, oracles, casting lots or trial by battle. For such modes of proof, judges are unnecessary: the two parties or clans resolve their disputes by non-rational means or in a “dyadic” process where the elders of the two clans involved “compose” their differences.

In another typical phase, which Weber calls patriarchal, the state or prince supplies judges, who resolve disputes between the parties in what is called elsewhere a “triadic” process. The judges apply rational modes of proof, such as eyewitness testimony or documentary evidence. While the judges in the patriarchal stage are keen to determine “the truth,” they have few formally binding rules to guide them and instead employ, Solomon-like, general principles of fairness and equity, in much the way a patriarch would govern his own family or clan.

Another typically later phase of modernization is “patrimonial codification” where the substantive rules of law are codified, so that there are published rules to govern most important relationships and to resolve most disputes. Because the judge is supposed to apply the published rules, law becomes predictable and thus modern. Weber gives as examples the Danish Law of 1683, The Law of the Realm of Sweden of 1736 and the Prussian Code of 1794.

The driving force behind such codifications, according to Weber, is often an alliance between the crown, which wants to displace local law and to control the substantive rules for resolving cases (versus leaving the outcome to the discretion of the judge), and the bourgeoisie, which demands a predictable legal system which protects contract and property. Such codification may also, however, arise from an interest in legal security following social conflict between the bourgeoisie, aristocracy and peasantry. In the West, for example, the merchants and aristocracy wanted to protect their property from each other and from the state. Over time law emerged as a compromise and unbiased set of rules to resolve such disputes. Patrimonial codification often did not favor any particular element of society, but provided a means for promoting the security of all elements and in particular providing a rational and unbiased procedure for resolving competing claims to property.

This essay will attempt to analyze legal development in seventeenth century Muscovy in these terms. The thesis will be that the patriarchal phase had been, in general, achieved by the end of the sixteenth century and that the seventeenth century corresponded in many ways to Weber's phase of patrimonial codification.

In order to assess the extent and degree of modernization by this paradigm, one must first define where Muscovite law was at the beginning of the seventeenth century. For purposes of the present study the 1550 Code and legal development as of 1550 in general is a good starting place from which to measure the extent or degree of modernization of law in the seventeenth century. This is because the remainder of the sixteenth century was characterized by extreme political, legal and dynastic disorder: the reign of Grozny, the *Oprichnina*, and the Time of Troubles.

As Daniel Kaiser has demonstrated in his pioneering work on the evolution of Russian law,² the archaic system of law associated with the Rus' Law had already largely evolved into a "triadic" system by the time of the 1497 Code (*Sudebnik*). Although this evolution was not yet complete, the Code did contain references to judges and some references to rational modes of proof. This evolution continued and deepened in the sixteenth century, particularly with the promulgation of new Codes. The 1550 Code, however, still contained numerous provisions relating to trial by battle.

We must however look beyond the 1550 Code to truly gauge the extent to which the Muscovite legal system had moved beyond the archaic phase. The law as applied very seldom resembled the law as proclaimed in the 1550 Code. The Code, as noted above, contains numerous provisions dealing with judicial duels,³ and by contrast relatively few provisions describing the procedure to be used to resolve a civil dispute by testimony and documentary evidence.⁴ Nevertheless, there is little evidence from the law as practiced in the sixteenth century that trial by battle was used to any substantial extent. The judgment charters we have from the sixteenth century hardly ever show the litigants resorting to it. Only very occasionally do we find a challenge to a duel, which is sometimes accepted and sometimes not accepted. Even if the challenge is accepted, the lawsuit proceeds and is generally resolved by some more rational means, such as testimony and

¹ Max Rheinstein, trans. and ed., *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 256–83, 301–21.

² Daniel Kaiser, *The Growth of Law in Medieval Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

³ *Pamiatniki russkogo prava* (PRP) 8 vols. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1952–59), vol. 3, 227–61. See articles 719–21. 89

⁴ Ibid. See articles 15, 16, 28, 29 and 73. While there are numerous provisions on judicial officials and particular on bribery or other misconduct of judicial officials (see articles 1–7, 23–24, 32, 63, 64, 66–70), fees to be paid to judicial officials (see articles 8, 31, 33–42, 44–46, 62, 65), default judgments, the summoning of parties and witnesses and failures of witnesses to appear (articles 18, 20, 21, 22, 42, 47–50, 74–5), these articles do not indicate how witnesses, documents or other evidence is to be presented and handled in the courtroom.

documentary evidence.⁵ While the fact that a party did not accept a challenge to a duel could be a factor weighed against him by the judge, even the cases where this happened appear to have been decided primarily on the basis of testimony or documents.⁶

Thus we see in the judgment charters⁷, which are our best gauge of the law as applied (versus the law as proclaimed in the 1497 and 1550 Codes), a legal process where disputes are resolved by examining legal documents, such as deeds, wills, and previous judgment charters, and listening to the testimony of witnesses. In the typical judgment charter of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, one party, often a monastery, claims certain land on the basis of a written charter or deed. The claim to the land based on the deed is challenged by peasants, sometimes backed by the prince on whose land they reside, who produce as witnesses longtime residents (*starozhil'tsy*), who claim to know who has used or been in possession of the land in question many decades back. Usually the decision is in favor of the side with the best documentation. In other words, the judge tends to give greater weight to deeds and other written evidence of title than to the incantations of the local population.⁸ This is of course a rational way to resolve a dispute concerning title to land. The judges seem to be keen to determine "the truth" and often root out evidence that deeds were either forged or extorted.⁹

Thus, in practice, trial by battle appears to have been abandoned long before the seventeenth century, and perhaps even long before the 1550 Code. It should be an interesting and challenging task for future research to determine why the 1550 Code incorporated so many provisions on trial by battle when in fact the procedure was seldom if ever used. That inquiry is beyond the scope of this study. The principal point here is only that it would be erroneous to posit that the abandonment of trial by battle was a seventeenth century innovation.

But what the fifteenth and sixteenth century judgment charters virtually all lack is reference to published law to provide the rules to resolve the dispute before the court. Often these judgment charters even fail to mention the reason or reasons why the judge came to the decision he did. The judgment charters of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries hardly ever cite to provisions in the 1497 or 1550 Codes or even to unpublished legal rules. For example, as noted above, many judgment charters dealing with disputes over the ownership or possession of land appear to be resolved on the basis of giving preference to the party that can produce a credible deed or deeds showing the chain of title by which they acquired the property. But one does not find the principle stated as a general rule

⁵ See for example, *Akty sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severo-vostochnoi Rusi kontsa XIV-nachala XVI*, 3 vols. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1952–64) [hereafter *ASEI*], vol. 2, no. 334, 375, 409.

⁶ Ann M. Kleimola, "Justice in Medieval Russia: Muscovite Judgment Charters (*pravye gramoty*) of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 65:6 (1975), 58–68.

⁷ *Ibid.*, passim.

⁸ See, for example, *ASEI*, vol. 2, no. 229, 368, 375, and 493; vol. 3, no. 105.

of customary law in any of the judgment charters themselves. Instead the judges in sixteenth century judgment charters apply a type of “rough justice” that rarely looks to published or formal legal rules or principles. Their decisions are almost always in accord with the evidence as reported. As the sixteenth century progressed, they began more frequently to state the reason for their decision. But even when stated, the reasons are seldom general statements of legal principle. They are rather commonsense observations, such as the observation that one side did not produce any deed or that one side’s witnesses did not support his case.¹⁰

This lack of reference to published or general legal rules is completely understandable, because there were no published or even well recognized principles of law to which the judges could look to resolve disputes even as to such frequently litigated issues as the ownership of land. The 1497 and 1550 Codes contain few if any statements of the substantive law governing such issues as title to land, contractual disputes or disputes over inheritance. For example, one searches in vain for any statement in either the 1497 or 1550 Code (or any other pre-1600 compilation of law) that the rule by which title to land should be resolved is to give preference to a credible deed, as the judgment charters seem to do in practice. These two codes refer largely to judicial fees, appeals, prevention of bribes etc. The absence of codified rules governing disputes over title to land is striking in view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of judgment charters involve such disputes.

Indeed, in the 1550 Code there is, in general, a paucity of provisions dealing with substantive law, in other words, the law that governs legal relations outside the courtroom in matters such as contracts, property, and inheritance. Of the one hundred articles in the 1550 Code, there are six relating to slavery, one concerning hired laborers, five concerning landed property, one concerning the right of peasants to move, five concerning merchants and trade, and one on inheritance.¹¹ In all probability, therefore, judges in civil disputes could not find governing rules of substantive law within the available codifications even if they had wanted to apply a legal “rule.”

In summary, while the process of civil adjudication in the fifteenth and sixteenth century judgment charters seems in general to be fair and was based on rational modes of proof (documents and eyewitness testimony), the actual substantive rules of decision seem to have been left to the judge’s general sense of fairness. In fact, we might even say that litigants and judicial personnel in the sixteenth century did not look upon litigation as a way of resolving disputes by measuring them against some published or generally accepted substantive legal norm or rule. The judge’s role was not to “apply the law to the facts” but simply to resolve the dispute fairly. In other words, the judgment charters of the fifteen and sixteenth centuries appear to correspond almost exactly to Weber’s patriarchal phase.

⁹ See, for example, Horace W. Dewey and Ann M. Kleimola, eds. and trans., *Russian Private Law XIV–XVII Centuries* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literature, 1975), items 55 and 58.

¹⁰ Kleimola, “Justice,” 82–91; *PRP*, vol. 3:227–61. 1550 Code articles 76–96.

From the 1550 Code it also appears that criminals were punished by penalties administered by the state. While the provisions for civil procedure in the courtroom (versus on the dueling field) are meager in the 1550 Code, there are numerous provisions on criminal procedure and penalties. By the time of the 1550 Code it was apparent that criminal matters were handled by an entirely different set of procedures than civil matters. This is in contrast to the law of most Western states and contemporary American law where a civil trial and a criminal trial developed along much the same lines: the rules of evidence are the same and the process is adversarial. In other words two sides present evidence according to certain rules of admissibility to a trier of fact (a judge or a jury).

By contrast, in sixteenth century Muscovy, criminal "trials" were not adversarial. Instead, criminal procedure had become "inquisitorial," where the facts were determined not by competing presentations by the parties to a judge, but by an inquiry conducted by an official who acted as both prosecutor and judge. The more serious offenses such as theft, robbery and murder were investigated by means of the general inquest (*poval'nyi obysk*) and torture.¹² The inquest involved an inquiry in the community among "ten or fifteen petty boiar good men or fifteen or twenty peasant good men or wardens"¹³ The penalties in the event of a finding of guilt included flogging, prison and death.

If the sixteenth century was the culmination of the patriarchal phase, then the seventeenth century was plainly the inception of the phase of patrimonial codification. One simple way of measuring legal evolution or modernization over the next one hundred years would be to compare the 1550 Code with the 1649 Law Code. The 1649 Code is first of all remarkable in its length and breadth of coverage as compared to the 1550 Code. The 1550 Code consists of one hundred articles and in a modern printed edition covers less than thirty pages. The 1649 Law Code (*Sobornoe ulozhenie*) consists of 967 articles and in a modern printed edition covers over two hundred pages. It provides substantive rules of law for virtually every important state interest as well as private property or contractual rights.¹⁴

The first five chapters concern the protection of the sovereign and the church from sedition, blasphemy, and counterfeiting. Chapters 7 and 8 contain thirty nine articles on various aspects of military service. Chapter 10 contains 287 articles on civil disputes, including both procedure and substantive law.¹⁵ They incorporate many if not most of the Byzantine rules on evidence and witnesses.¹⁶ Chapter 10 contains no provision for trial by battle. Instead, it contains many elaborate provisions relating to testimony of knowledgeable witnesses,

¹² Ibid. 1550 Code articles 52–61.

¹³ Ibid. 1550 Code article 58.

¹⁴ For a published version, see: *Sobornoe ulozhenie 1649/The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649*, trans. and ed. Richard Hellie. Irvine, Calif.: C.Schacks Jr., 1988.

¹⁵ The provisions on civil procedure have been described at length elsewhere. George G. Weickhardt, "Due Process and Equal Justice in the Muscovite Codes," *The Russian Review* 51 (1992), 463–80.

documentary proof and inquests among members of the community. It makes public and explicit a universally applicable system of civil adjudication.

A substantial portion of the Code is devoted to rights in property. Chapter 11 contains thirty-four articles relating to peasants, and particularly to actions for the recovery of escaped serfs. It abolished the statute of limitations on such actions. Chapter 20 contains 119 articles regulating slavery. Chapters 16 and 17 contain together one hundred twenty four articles regulating hereditary estates and service lands, including their transfer by sale and inheritance. These provisions have been described at length by the author elsewhere.¹⁷ Not only is a comprehensive set of rules for inheritance established. Deeds were also required to be recorded in the Service Land Chancellery, and disputes between rival claimants were to be resolved by determining who first recorded a deed. Forgery of deeds was to be punished severely. Chapters 16 and 17 contain rules to govern nearly every type of dispute over ownership of land, including the types of disputes that are the subject of the vast body of judgment charters from the fifteenth and sixteenth century. When the latter two chapters are considered together with the chapters on peasants (Chapter 11) and slaves (Chapter 20), one sees that one of the primary focuses of the Code was the publication of an evenhanded set of rules for resolving disputes over the possession and ownership of land, peasants and slaves, which together represented the primary forms of wealth.

Chapter 19 contains forty articles regulating townsmen, and particularly their liability for taxes. Its thrust was to confiscate the lands of non-taxpaying elements of society who competed in trade with the townsmen and to give the townsmen a virtually monopoly of urban trade. For their part, however, the townsmen were bound to their urban taxpaying collectives (*posad*).

Chapters 21 and 22 contain a total of 130 articles dealing with criminal procedure, definition of crimes and criminal penalties. The criminal investigation (*sysk*) is described in detail and is confirmed as a procedure different and separate from the adversarial trial of civil disputes. Criminal procedure is instead inquisitorial in nature. As the author has argued elsewhere, criminal procedure makes liberal use of torture, but nonetheless Chapter 20 contains provisions that would prevent the use of torture where there is not sufficient extrinsic evidence of guilt. For example, the defendant has the right to request a public inquest in certain circumstances. In this respect, there are at least some elements of due process.

In sum, the 1649 Law Code is a vast codification of not only procedural law (both civil and criminal), but also of substantive law. The various chapters of substantive law regulate in detail virtually every estate (service class, clerical personnel, townsmen, peasants, slaves) and their relations with each other and with the state. Comprehensive rules of property, service and servitude are likewise established.

¹⁶ See George G. Weickhardt, "Pre-Petrine Law and Western Law: The Influence of Roman and Canon Law," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995), 756–83.

¹⁷ See George G. Weickhardt, "The Pre-Petrine Law of Property," *Slavic Review* 52:4 (1993), 663–79.

The 1649 Code appears to correspond exactly with Weber's concept of patrimonial codification. The more difficult question is what policies and goals of the state and of society in general drove such a detailed codification of most important social, economic and even political relations. Did it in any way resemble the process suggested by Weber's model? And, finally, were the goals and purposes to be served by such detailed legal regulation of society in any way modern in the sense that they promoted individual rights?

Codification can both serve and frustrate the goals of autocratic or absolutist states. On the one hand it can shackle the subjects of the realm with a universe of obligations and duties. Thus the 1649 Law Code shackled the service class with service and with restrictions on the transfer of their hereditary estates and service lands. The townsmen were bound to their taxpaying collectives and were shackled with taxes. And the peasants were bound to the land.¹⁸

On the other hand, a codification of civil and criminal procedure and the detailed definition of crimes and criminal penalties are likely to limit the power of the tsar and his officials. The prologue of the 1649 Code proclaims that "all cases be conducted according to the laws in that Law Code" and that "law and justice will be equal for all in all cases." If the rules of civil and criminal procedure are published and they are to be followed in all cases, they may serve to prevent arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of judicial officials. Such codifications may even imply rights. To say that a criminal defendant may request a public inquest prior to being subjected to torture implies that he has a right to such an inquest. Likewise, to codify the substantive rules of property and recovery of escaped serfs may limit the discretion of officials to apply any other rules. Once the rules are published, it would become difficult for judges not to follow them when deciding cases. But did the draftsmen of the Code and the various estates that attended the council (*sobor*) of 1648–9, which adopted the Law Code, have such goals? More broadly, did the adoption of the code resemble in any respect Weber's model for the driving social and political forces behind patrimonial codification, such as an alliance between the crown and the bourgeoisie?

The answer to this last question is that there was no alliance between the crown and the bourgeoisie (nor was there a true bourgeoisie), but the draftsmen of the Code and certain of the estates probably had the goal of publishing and standardizing legal rules and circumscribing the discretion of judicial officials. While it is not the purpose of this essay to provide a comprehensive history of the events that led up to the enactment and promulgation of the 1649 Law Code, a brief summary is in order. There are two facets to this story: the creation in the chancelleries over the course of the previous one hundred years of the "rule books" on which most of the Code was based and the political agitation which led up to the summoning of the council which adopted the Code.

While we have a fragment of the Robbery Chancellery's rule book from the mid-sixteenth century, most of the extant rule books come from the first half of the seventeenth century.¹⁹ In all likelihood the process of compiling the

¹⁸ For a more detailed treatment, see: Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and military change in Muscovy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.

chancelleries' rule books was a long term and continuous one, i.e. the books were constantly being revised and updated. The books were compiled by the staff of the chancelleries, the so-called *d'iachestvo* or *prikaznye liudi*. This cadre of bureaucrats performed many legal functions. While in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the judges who heard particular disputes seem to have been appointed from the upper service class on an ad hoc basis, trials gradually came to be held in the chancelleries. In the typical trial, three or four clerks would serve as judges, while other clerks would record the testimony, keep the records from which disputes could be resolved, copy summonses, collect fees, etc. While the judges in the fifteen and early sixteenth centuries were not legal specialists and usually had little legal training (they were often members of the upper service class whose careers were primarily devoted to military service and local administration), the chancery personnel in the seventeenth century seem to have developed considerable legal expertise, probably through specialization and lifelong "on-the-job" training. The rule books themselves are the best evidence of this. Like all good bureaucrats, the chancery personnel gradually wrote down the rules that were to govern their work. These men were not lawyers or legal theorists, but practical men who applied common sense and precedent to resolving disputes. The chancelleries became the central law courts where all of the most important civil disputes and criminal cases were tried, and it is probable that some the chancery personnel served primarily as judges.

They would often search out precedents within the memory of their colleagues or in their files. There were also two possible compendia of written law they could consult. The Pilot's Book, or *Kormchaia kniga*, contained two Byzantine law manuals, the *Procheiros nomos* (roughly "Law Handbook") and the *Ecloga* (roughly "Selections"), which were quite comprehensive in their coverage. The two Byzantine manuals conveniently summarized the principles of Roman law. The Lithuanian Statute of 1588²⁰ also enjoyed wide acceptance as a source for rules and precedents, and was itself heavily indebted to Byzantine law.

The chancery clerks who served as judges in the first half of the seventeenth century began to refer more frequently to Byzantine and other precedents in their judgment charter. Two judgment charters that survive from the 1621 and 1642²¹ are notable for their extensive rumination over what rule or precedent to apply.

While the chancelleries were undoubtedly becoming more specialized and professional in their legal work in the mid-seventeenth century, there nonetheless arose a popular perception that the chancelleries were corrupt, and that bribery rather than Byzantine precedents determined the outcome of lawsuits. This public discontent with the legal system in fact led directly to promulgation of the 1649 Law Code. Corruption and favoritism in the judicial system was a frequent subject of complaint at the councils of the land of the first half of the seventeenth

¹⁹ *PRP*, vol. 44, 353–405 and vol. 5, 185–556.

²⁰ I.I.Lappov, *Litovskii statut v Moskovskom perevode-redaktsii* (Moscow, 1909).

²¹ Aleksandr A.Fedotov-Chekhovskii, ed., *Akty otnosiashchiesia do grazhdanskoi raspravy drevnei Rossii* (hereafter *AGR*), 2 vols. (Kiev: Tip. I.A.Davidenko, 1860–84), I: nos. 94 and 110.

century.²² The owners of escaped serfs complained that justice was expensive and seemed to favor powerful and rich landowners who harbored the escaped serfs. L.S.Pleshcheev, a crony of the tsar's favorite B.I.Morozov, was notorious for winning large judgments in meritless lawsuits. One of the specific complaints was that the rule books used to decide cases in the tsar's chancelleries were not published and it was therefore difficult for the parties to know what rules would be applied and whether the correct rules were being applied.

Dissatisfaction with the legal system dovetailed with other grievances. Townsmen complained that they faced competition from peasants and others who paid no taxes. High taxes to support military modernization also contributed to popular unrest. Public unrest boiled over in the summer of 1648, when riots broke out in Moscow and numerous other important towns. Much of the violence was directed at chancellery clerks, two of whom were murdered. On June 10, 1648 a petition was submitted voicing various complaints and seeking a codification of the law. In response to these disturbances, the young tsar temporarily removed B.I. Morozov was from his key positions in the chancelleries. Aleksei replaced Morozov's clique with another clique headed by Ia.K.Cherkasskii and N.I. Romanov. The Cherkasskii-Romanov administration appointed a five-man commission to codify the laws on July 16, 1648.

The commission was headed by N.I.Odoevskii. Odoevskii had served in the court and the army for over thirty years. Odoevskii had initiated and lost a precedence lawsuit in 1633, and spent time in jail as a result. He had been elevated to the rank of boiar in 1640 and thereafter served as governor of Astrakhan'. He was then appointed director of two chancelleries, the Kazan' Court and the Siberian Chancellery, which were in charge of administering lands seized in the sixteenth century from khanates of the same names. In 1646–7 he was in charge of constructing a portion of the Belgorod defense line. It is not known exactly what role he played in drafting the Law Code, but his previous service admirably equipped him to understand the needs of the state and of the upper service class. Two other boiars with similarly distinguished careers, F.F.Volkonskii and S.V. Prozorovskii also served on the commission.

The other two members of the commission were professional bureaucrats, i.e., lifelong members of the *d'iachestvo*. Fedor Griboedov, an ancestor of the famous playwright, is considered by some to be the actual draftsman of the Law Code. Griboedov had served as a scribe in the Kazan' Regional Administrative Chancellery. He had also worked in Belgorod in 1647, and perhaps came to Odoevskii's attention there. Gavril Levont'ev, the other professional civil servant on the commission, had served for over fifty years in various chancelleries, including the Vladimir Administrative Chancellery, the Patriarch Judicial Chancellery, Musketeers Chancellery and Moscow Administrative Chancellery. This service was likely to have involved judicial experience and

²² The following account is based on Hellie, "Early Modern Russian Law: The Ulozhenie of 1649," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 5:2–4 (1988), 158–59 and Sergei V.Bakhrushin, "Moskovskoe vosstanie v 1648 g.," *Nauchnye trudy*, 4 vols. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1952–59), vol. 2, 50.

given him familiarity with the Church's Pilot's book, which contained the two Byzantine law manuals mentioned above.

The initial drafting work of the commission obviously involved gathering, organizing and extracting materials from the chancellery rule books. A draft was produced within approximately three months, between July and October of 1648. The reason that the commission was able to complete this vast drafting project relatively quickly was because the rule books became in large part the basis of the first draft of Law Code

An Assembly of the Land was elected and gathered in October to approve the draft Law Code. Two men each were chosen from the four upper service class ranks that resided in the capital. The members of the middle service class elected two delegates from each large town, one from each small town and five from Novgorod. Each of the three merchant corporations sent two delegates, and each collective of townsmen one delegate each. The leading clergy also attended. Peasants, slaves and the lower service classes were not represented. The composition of this Assembly obviously reflects what the Muscovites of the mid-seventeenth century believed was necessary to legitimate a comprehensive codification of the law.

At some point, as Richard Hellie suggests, the draft compiled by the drafting commission was read to the assembly, and at this point the representatives at the assembly were probably able to present their own proposals and suggestions for changes. These changes included the binding of the townsmen to the urban collectives (*posad*) and the provisions for recovering escaped serfs.²³ The final product nonetheless bore a close resemblance to the rule books. The entire project was ratified by the assembly. All but a few of the delegates signed the document.

Thus most of the real process of drafting the Law Code had occurred over the prior eight or so decades, when the chancellery personnel drafted their rule books. From the rule books the Law Code incorporated many "modern" concepts, including for example reliance on eyewitness testimony and documents as evidence and the concept of punishing intentional crimes more severely than unintentional crimes. As noted above, these general concepts probably owed their origin to the two Byzantine law manuals that had been incorporated into the Church's Pilot Book. Many specific provisions were also modeled on the Lithuanian Statute of 1588.²⁴ These various sources were, however, assembled into a unique combination of elements quite different from any of the individual sources and incorporating many innovations and rules of Muscovite origin.

The social and political process by which the rule books were transformed into the 1649 Law Code was thus a complex one. While the political pressure for a codification (or publication of the existing rule books) was largely a product of popular dissatisfaction with the legal system, the actual drafting of the rule books was a top-down process, in that they were drafted by professional bureaucrats serving the tsar.

²³ Hellie, "Early Modern Russian Law," 162–3, 201.

Most of the provisions they drafted for the Law Code were not major political issues. While the provisions for recovery of escaped serfs and eliminating the non-taxpaying competitors of the townsmen were controversial political issues (which were proposed and perhaps even drafted in the public meetings of the assembly) and while the concept of publishing the procedural rules was a political issue, most particular provisions on subjects like criminal and civil procedure, the law of landed property, etc. were probably not. For many if not most technical legal rules, the drafters of the Law Code were probably given a great deal of discretion or were simply allowed to incorporate the existing rule books. In other words, while it was important for the various political forces in the council that the rules for civil procedure be published, there was probably no evident political pressure for particular rules as long as the procedure as a whole appeared fair. For example, the rule in the Law Code giving priority of title to he who recorded his deed first in the chancelleries was not likely to benefit any particular class. The more important thing for the representative of the estates attending the council of 1648–9 was that the rule be clear and public.

While the 1649 Law Code is a remarkably comprehensive document, the final product lacked the theoretical consistency and clarity of draftsmanship that we might expect had it been drafted by professional lawyers, which Russia did not yet have. The application of the collective skills and experience of the tsar's bureaucracy to the drafting was, nevertheless, impressive. Their legal skills produced one of the most comprehensive law codes in Europe at the time.

This entire process bears some resemblance to Max Weber's model of the driving force driving force for patrimonial codification. As explained above, the fairness of the litigation process for the recovery of escaped serfs had become a contentious issue between members of the service class. We also know from the pre-1649 judgment charters that Muscovites were frequently at loggerheads over the title to land, which was the most frequent subject of litigation. Bias, bribery and favoritism in the tsar's legal machinery for resolving these and other disputes had become a major issue. The service classes' sense of security in land ownership must also have come under considerable threat during the previous one hundred years with the upheavals of the *Oprichnina* and Time of Troubles.

The codification of 1649 was obviously a means of resolving the grievances of several the estates over the unfairness of the legal system. While the demand of the bourgeoisie for security in contract (posited by Weber as a typical driving force behind patrimonial codification) was not a significant factor behind the demand for codification in Muscovy, a large part of the 1649 Code was nonetheless directed at creating security and predictability as to the rights of a landholder, the serfowner and the slaveholder.

The rules for deciding who had the better right, title and interest to landed property, which had been the subject of hundreds of judgment charters over the previous two centuries, were resolved on the basis of a simple and fair formula, namely, who recorded his deed first. The recovery of escaped serfs, which had provoked much rancor between various elements of the service class (the largest landholders seemed to end up with the escaped serfs), was to be resolved on the

²⁴ *Litovskii statut*.

basis of procedural rules that were public and evenhanded. The townsmen, as part of the great compromise, were able to eliminate non-taxpaying competitors in the towns. The codification was in other words a method of compromising many conflicting political goals of several classes. These goals were compromised not on the basis of awarding particular lands or peasants to particular estates, but on the basis of providing a procedure by which all future individual disputes could be resolved fairly.

In Western Europe this process by which the bourgeoisie gradually achieved codification of similar rules took centuries to develop. In Muscovy it was compressed into a dramatic political confrontation in 1648 followed by a vast codification completed in less than six months.

We thus see in sum two aspects to the codification of 1649, both of which are in many ways “modern”: on the one hand, a set of rule books which formed the basis for most of the codification had been previously drafted by professional bureaucrats who had developed considerable legal expertise. On the other hand, there was political pressure from a wide spectrum of the privileged classes to make these rules public and to ensure that common disputes, such as recovery of escaped serfs, were adjudicated fairly. The way in which the Code was adopted was also “modern”: the Code was not adopted by a decree of the tsar or even by the boiars, but by groups obviously thought to represent the entire middle and upper service classes, the merchants, the townsmen and the clergy. In some respects the document represented various compromises between these groups, as noted above.

The idea that the rules governing important relationships should be published and followed by the judges in the chancelleries also had some support in the political thought of the seventeenth century. Kotoshikhin saw the government as a bureaucracy that governed in accordance with the provisions of the law, with little intervention by the tsar. Iurii Krizhanich likewise saw a need for a society regulated by laws that would state the privileges of various classes.²⁵ While it would be an overstatement to call either Kotoshikhin or Krizhanich a political theorist supporting the rule of law, the idea of a well ordered police state at least had some precursors in seventeenth century thought.

If the Law Code was intended by the estates who attended the 1648–9 council to curb arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of the chancellery judges and to achieve security and predictability in the law relating to property, is there any evidence that it succeeded? While we do have some published judgment charters from the second half of the seventeenth century that indicate that the chancellery judges were correctly applying the Law Code, this is an area requiring extensive further research, especially in the unpublished cases in the archives.

The Law Code (Article 17:36) provided that one who falsely signed another’s name to a mortgage document was to be beaten mercilessly with the knout and that the mortgaged estate was to be forfeited. In *Blokhin v. Artemev*, decided in 1658, Blokhin alleged that his father had borrowed 38 roubles from Artemev secured by a mortgage on property that the parties agreed could be redeemed for 70 roubles (the additional sum was probably disguised interest). When Blokhin sought redemption for 70 roubles, Artemev produced a mortgage document purportedly signed by Blokhin’s father stating that the property could be redeemed only for a payment of 900 roubles. This document was determined to

have been fraudulently altered. The note on record with the Service Land Chancellery was only for 70 roubles. Artemev was ordered to return the land, collect nothing on the note and pay a penalty of 194 roubles. While no flogging was ordered, the punishment was plainly severe.²⁶

In a case decided in 1672, the Troitskii Monastery complained that Sitka Sintsov sowed and harvested rye on its land in Orlovskaiia *volost'* with a value of 12 roubles. Sintsov answered that he did not sow the grain on the monastery's land, but on his own land in Shaskaia *volost'*. The monastery produced a deed for its land and referred the matter to general inquest in Orlovskaiia *volost'*. Sintsov disputed the need for such an inquest. The judgment charter quotes a portion of Law Code Chapter 10, article 161, which specifies how a general inquest is to be conducted, including such details as the requirement that all statements taken from witnesses are to be recorded in writing. The quoted portion specifies that if one party refers the matter to general inquest and the other party challenges it, the inquest is to proceed. The record of the inquest indicated that numerous witnesses had seen Sintsov sow the grain on the monastery's land, not on his own land. On this basis, judgment was entered in favor of the monastery.²⁷

In a case decided in 1676, Ivan Ol'ferev had died childless, leaving only his widow Vasilisa and no clan relative. Vasilisa received his purchased hereditary estates and a "maintenance allotment" from Ivan's service land. She petitioned for Ivan's inherited hereditary estates, which had escheated. This petition was denied, as it should have been under the Law Code, which provided that a widow was to receive a maintenance allotment from her husband's service lands and his purchased hereditary estates. Inherited hereditary estates were to go to sons, to daughters if there were no sons, and to clan relatives if there were no daughters. Because Ivan was survived by no clan relatives, it was apparently correct that these lands had escheated.²⁸

In 1696, a judgment dealt with the peasant woman Parashko who resided at the Spasov Monastery. Her parents had escaped from their owner Dem'ianov prior to the enactment of the Law Code, but then she had married Ivashko after the enactment of the Code. The decision quotes Chapter 11, Articles 2, 3, 15, 17 and 18, which are to the effect that when an escaped peasant is returned to his owner, families should not be split up. For example, if an escaped woman marries, she should be returned with her husband. Because, however, Parashko's parents had escaped prior to the enactment of the Law Code, the court applied a slightly differently rule. Parashko was allowed to remain on the monastery with Ivashko, and the monastery was ordered to pay Dem'ianov ten roubles as compensation (*vyvod*).²⁹

²⁵ George G. Weickhardt, "Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Russia," *Russian History* 21:3 (Fall 1994), 316–38.

²⁶ *AGR*, vol. 2, no. 121.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, no. 135. In an earlier case the same principle was invoked but article 161 was not quoted or specifically referred to. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, no. 127.

In 1696, during the reign of Peter the Great, a dispute over empty lands between the Tikhvin Monastery and one Mikhail Mordvinov was decided in accordance with Chapter 17, Article 63 of the Law Code. That article provided that the cadastral books are to determine the right to service land, even if the testimony at an inquest is to the contrary.³⁰ Also involved were decrees of 1640/1, 1667/8, and 1685/6 as well as the so-called *novoukzhnyye stat'i* of 1674/5 and 1675/6. These decrees and articles provided that the old cadastral books should be disregarded and rights to service land should be determined by the 1581/2 books.

Nancy Kollmann notes in her recent study of dishonor litigation that, after 1649, the damage awards and punishments meted out were generally in line with those provided in the Law Code. She notes that when judges strayed from those guidelines, they did not stray far.³¹

While this fragmentary evidence suggests that the Law Code was usually applied correctly, it is hardly enough from which to make any generalizations with confidence, and much future research must be done in this area.

Kollmann's study of honor is also important for the perspective it gives on the role of law and litigation in seventeenth century Muscovy in general. Kollmann's survey of dishonor litigation is one of the few studies of any type of seventeenth century litigation in practice, and is thus valuable for that purpose alone.³² Of her data base of 621 lawsuits, only 168 or 27.1 percent were resolved with a judgment. Slightly over ten percent were settled, and only a partial record exists of the remainder. The overwhelming majority of cases were between litigants of roughly the same rank, and generally between people who knew each other.³³ The real thrust of Kollmann's study, however, is to show how the protection of honor by the state (in the sense that the law provided sanctions for dishonor to virtually all classes or estate) and its legal systematization played a key role in cementing social cohesion in Muscovy. By providing a legal means for protecting honor through litigation, the state, according to Kollman, avoided private vendettas, reinforced the social status quo, deterred disruptive behavior, and promoted an idealized vision of the state as a protector of the security and status of its subjects.³⁴

This same argument might be expanded to the other areas where the Law Code protected security and public order. Because the Law Code afforded effective remedies and universal access to the courts to redress or prevent a large variety of socially or economically undesirable behavior, one suspects that Kollmann's argument about social cohesion may be expanded to include the Law Code's protection of property, contracts and public order. Published legal norms were established for virtually all important areas of economic activity. The tsar's subjects were given at least the proclaimed principle that these areas would be

²⁸ Ibid., vol. 2, no. 139.

²⁹ Ibid., vol. 2, no. 175.

³⁰ Ibid., vol. 2, no. 180.

³¹ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *By Honor Bound, State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 123.

³² Ibid., see in particular Chapter 3.

regulated according to the published rules and not according to the caprice of some official or judge operating with a secret rule book or operating merely out of favoritism. However completely or incompletely the norms of the Law Code were applied in practice, the promulgation of such a Code was likely to promote the image of the state as the protector of the security of its subjects. It also promoted social cohesion by the minute regulation and/or prohibition of conduct detrimental to the society, economy and polity. It also promoted the image of the state as the guarantor of order and harmony.

The most prominent aspect of modernization in seventeenth century law was thus a transition from a system where it was doubtful that litigation was a process of applying a particular legal rule or norm to resolve a dispute to a system where a rule for virtually every important relationship was codified and litigation was thought of as resolving disputes according to those rules. Whatever one thinks of Weber's model, this process can be readily labeled modernization and as a change that improved the fairness and consistency of the legal system.

Lest we be too fulsome in our evaluation of seventeenth century law, we must note several aspects in which seventeenth century law was not modern, and, indeed, some respects in which it showed retrogression.

The 1649 Law Code prohibited interest. It is obvious from the Rus' Law that interest, even at extremely high rates was accepted during the Kievan period. Notes and mortgages from the fifteenth and sixteenth century also typically provide for interest. Without interest, there is little incentive to lend money, and without credit economic progress and growth is inhibited. Why a society which had accepted interest for many centuries should in the seventeenth century prohibit it is an important area for future research. Suffice it to say here that it was a legal retrogression.

As noted above, criminal law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries took a different path from civil law. As also noted above, the 1550 code had already suggested that an inquisitorial system was developing in criminal procedure. The process was confirmed, deepened and strengthened in the seventeenth century. In a criminal proceeding, the defendant stood alone against a state official who was both judge and prosecutor. Whatever rights the defendant had on paper, such an inquisitorial system was not likely to promote their strict observance.

Finally, and most importantly, the 1649 Law Code consistently applied the principle that one was either bound to perform state service, was bound to tax paying collective like the *posad* or was bound to the land. It confirmed and strengthened both serfdom and slavery. It was thus more of a universe of duties and bondage than it was an affirmation of rights. Whatever positive effects codification had in Western Europe in affirming individual rights, in Russia the principal result of codification was the solidification of the service state and of

³³ Ibid., 115, 96.

³⁴ Ibid., 248.

serfdom.

Despite these ways in which there was a retrogression in law, the present essay indicates that Russian legal development followed the Weberian model of modernization in many important ways, and that in these ways it resembled legal development in Western Europe.

ABSOLUTISM AND THE NEW MEN OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIA*

Marshall Poe

In his renowned description of Russia, the Muscovite bureaucrat Grigorii Kotoshikhin described the boyar дума as royal council composed of the representatives of four groups of families, each of which possessed the hereditary right to place their sons in the body.¹ At the pinnacle of power were families whose members served exclusively as boyars, the highest rank in the council. They were followed by lesser families whose sons served as *okol'niche* and less often as boyars. Below them Kotoshikhin identified clans of middling status whose scions entered the дума as *dumnye dvoriane* and occasionally progressed to Familiar. Finally, Kotoshikhin pointed to the undistinguished families that provided the council with *dumnye d'iaki*, the fourth rank in the body. Kotoshikhin's depiction, as we might expect given his many years in chancellery service, is quite accurate: a host of sources confirm that the дума had long been composed of four hereditary groups, each more distinguished than the next. However his account of the дума is deficient in one important respect: he offers only the slightest hint of the fundamental changes in the composition of the council that were occurring in the mid-seventeenth century. "Of the former great clans of princes and boyars," he wrote laconically, "many have died out."² And indeed this was true, the old families were in slow decline. But the waning

* The author would like to thank the participants in the Historians' Seminar at the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University, and particularly David Kerans, for useful commentary. All errors are my own.

¹ Grigorii Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, text and commentary by Ann E. Pennington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 36–37.

² *Ibid.*, 36.

³ See, for example, Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, "Istoriia soslovii v Rossii" [1886], in *idem, Sochineniia v deviat' tomakh* (Moscow: Mysl', 1989), vol. 6, 321–23 and especially 382; *idem, Boiarskaia дума drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Tip. T. Malinskago i A. Ivanova, 1883), 387–92; Aleksei I. Markevich, *Istoriia mestnichestva v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XV–XVII v.* (Odessa: Tip. Odesskago vestnika, 1888), 559–60 and 582; Nikolai P. Pavlov-Sil'vanskii, *Gosudarevy sluzhilye liudi* (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tip., 1898), 163–64; Evgenii D. Stashevskii, "Sluzhiloe soslovie," in *Russkaia istoriia v ocherkakh i stat'iakh*, ed. by Mitrofan V. Dovnar-Zapol'skii (Kiev, 1912), 32; V. N. Storozheva, "Boiarsstvo i dvorianstvo XVII veka," *Tri veka. Rossia ot Smuty do nashego vremeni* (Moscow: Tip. I. D. Sytina, 1912; Reprint Moscow: Izd. "GIS," 1991), 201–31.

of the traditional elite was only half the story. The regime of Aleksei Mikhailovich had opened the *duma* to servitors of relatively undistinguished birth and, even as Kotoshikhin wrote in 1666, they were flooding the lower ranks of the once exclusive council. These “new men,” as I will call them, were transforming both the ancient culture of the *duma* and its social profile.

The influx of the new men was first explored by historians of the late-nineteenth century, who attached cardinal significance to it.³ They suggested that the crown promoted the parvenu cohort in order to produce a counterweight to a recalcitrant and conservative aristocracy. The new men, so their argument continued, were unflinching supporters of the monarch who disdained the privileges afforded aristocrats. The conflict between the old and new elements was resolved in favor of the latter in 1682 when *mestnichestvo*—the ancient system of appointments that privileged the distinguished clans—was destroyed and a new “table of ranks” was proposed. Later scholars rightly called this interpretation into question. They point out that the entire argument is built on circumstantial evidence: there is no direct indication in the historical record of political struggle between the old and new families. Rather, the evidence suggests that politics in the late Muscovite court was based on competition among clans, and that it was this struggle that led to the influx of the new men. The clans used influence at court, gained through strategic marriages, partnership, and patronage, to advance their members and allies into the royal body.⁴

In what follows I would like to suggest an explanation for the rise of the new men that strikes a balance between these contrasting interpretations and sheds new light on the character of the late Muscovite state. I will argue that the crown promoted the new men because many of them had *de facto* become leaders in the growing absolutist state. Most of the new men had achieved positions of importance through a combination of connections and service. Less often, they were pure courtiers brought to power by patronage. In either case, however, they were important men who the court believed belonged in the *duma*. The influx of the new men, in turn, had two consequences: the decline of the boyar *duma* as a ruling body and a shift in the basis of elite status towards service and away from hereditary right. The effect of both of these developments can be seen in the abolition of *mestnichestvo* and the rank project of 1682. These conclusions are suggested by an analysis of the careers of the 192 new men who were promoted to the *duma* between 1645 to 1713.⁵ These servitors were distinguished from all other *duma* members in three ways. First, they had no patrilineal kinsmen in the *duma* of Mikhail Fedorovich, the first Romanov tsar who ruled from 1613 to 1645. Second, they were untitled, that is, not members of the Riurikid, Gedimin, or Chingisid aristocracies that supplied early modern Russia with virtually all of its princely families. Finally, they were not royal in-laws, at least at the time of their appointment. Members of these three groups were traditionally given

⁴ See Hans-Joachim Torke, “Oligarchie in der Autokratie—Der Machtverfall der Bojarduma im 17. Jahrhundert,” *Forschungen zur Geschichte Osteuropas* 24 (1978), 197 and Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors. The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 29–31.

preferment in duma appointments, whereas the new men—bereft of rank-holding ancestors, titles, and royal status—must have found some other road to the council.

Before we proceed, a word about the sources. The nature of Muscovite documentation makes analysis of the new men and the policy that created them quite difficult. In stark contrast to notables elsewhere in early modern Europe, the new men—and the entire service elite—left us very few sources with which we might reconstruct their world. They wrote no diaries, few letters, and almost nothing in the way of literature. Government records are similarly laconic. Among them we find few plans, position papers, political treatises, and, most important for our purposes, no discussion of policies regarding promotion to the boyar duma. What we have, in a word, is lists: lists of members of the duma (*boiarskie knigi* and *spiski*)⁶; chronological lists of court appointments (*razriadnye knigi*)⁷; and lists of administrative personnel.⁸ With the aid of these documents we can roughly sketch the course of a servitor's career—when he entered service, what sorts of offices he held, when he was advanced to the duma, and the nature of his activities thereafter. Once such dossiers are compiled, a collective biography can be outlined, and on the basis of this biography, the government's rationale in altering its duma recruitment policy can be inferred.⁹

In section one I will place the boyar duma in the context of Muscovite society generally and describe the rise of the new men in statistical terms. In section two I will analyze the career patterns of the new men. In section three I will try to reconstruct the logic behind the governments shift in duma recruitment policy and discuss the consequences of the rise of the new men for the culture of elite service in Muscovy.

⁵ Though this is the first prosopographical study devoted to the new men, it is not the first to discuss them. Robert Crummey treats them *en passant* in his history of the boyar elite and the rise of the "noble official." See Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, 29–33 and *idem*, "The Origins of the Noble Official: The Boyar Elite, 1613–1689," in *Russian Officialdom*, eds. Walter M. Pintner and Donald K. Rowney (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980), 46–75. Many of the theses developed here were first suggested by Crummey.

⁶ On the *boiarskie knigi*, Mikhail P. Lukichev and Mikhail N. Rogozhin, "Boiarskaia kniga 1627 g. i ee mesto v deloproizvodstve Razriadnogo prikaza," in *Boiarskaia kniga 1627 g.*, ed. Viktor I. Buganov (Moscow: In-t istorii AN SSSR, 1986). On the *boiarskie spiski*, see Andrei L. Stanislavskii, "Boiarskie spiski v deloproizvodstve Razriadnogo prikaza," in *Aktovoe istochnikovedenie. Sbornik statei*, ed. by Viktor I. Buganov (Moscow: Nauka, 1979).

⁷ On the *razriadnye knigi*, see Viktor I. Buganov, *Razriadnye knigi poslednei chetverti XV-nachala XVII v.* (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1962).

⁸ On lists of administrative personnel, see Natal'ia F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absoliutizma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 9–16.


THE BOYAR DUMA AND THE RISE OF THE NEW MEN

The boyar дума was Muscovy's royal council. Like similar institutions in medieval and early modern Europe, it was a consultative body without strictly defined competence or power. Its composition, however, was well regulated, a fact that will be important in our consideration of its history in the later seventeenth century. The дума was traditionally made up of representatives of about 20 great clans. These clans held the right to place their senior members in one of the three top ranks in the дума—Boyar, Familiar, and Conciliar Noble. The дума clans constituted the highest level in Muscovite society, which itself was composed, particularly in the seventeenth century, of nearly closed social classes. This can be seen in [Figure 1](#), which offers a schematic depiction of Old Russian Society.

On the left side of the schema the hierarchy of major classes is depicted, each defined by the service it provided to the monarch. The top three classes were all composed of military servitors. The highest class, labeled “Moscow Ranks,” was divided into conciliar ranks—those in the дума—and sub-conciliar ranks, elites serving in Moscow though outside the council. The latter were in turn divided into two further classes, each containing several thousand servitors in the later seventeenth century—the Moscow gentry in the upper box and administrative personnel in the lower box. Though both groups were basically hereditary castes, movement out of them was sometimes possible. This is indicated by the arrows on the schema. Members of the Moscow gentry were in some cases recruited into the upper three ranks of the дума, and administrators occasionally made *dumnye d'iaki* in the council.

From the founding of the Muscovite principality in the fourteenth century, membership in the boyar council had been restricted to a small set of pedigreed

⁹ All of graphs, tables, and figures relating to the composition of the дума and the careers of the new men in it that follow were constructed on the basis of examination of data in Ol'ga. Kosheleva, Boris Morozov, Russell Martin, Marshall Poe, *The Muscovite Biographical Database. Version 1.1* (“MBD”). The MBD comprises biographical information on all members of the дума in the seventeenth century. It is based, in the main, on twelve boyar books, 1626/7–1691/92 (Russkii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (“RGADA”), fond 210 (Razriadnyi prikaz), opis' 1 “boiarskie knigi” and opis' 9a “stolbtsy Moskovskogo stola”) and eighty boyar lists, 1610/11–1713 (RGADA fond 210 (Razriadnyi prikaz), opis' 2 “boiarskie spiski” and opis' 9a “stolbtsy Moskovskogo stola”). Additional information on the careers of new men was gathered from: Aleksandr V. Barsukov, *Spiski gorodovykh voevod i drugikh lits voevodskago upravleniia moskovskago gosudarstva XVII stoletii* (St. Petersburg: Tip. M. M. Stasiulevicha, 1902); Sergei K. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i XVII veka* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1946); Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, 178–214; Nikolai N. Golitsyn, *Ukazatel' k dvorstovym razriadam* (St. Peterburg: Senatskaia tip., 1911); Petr I. Ivanov, ed., *Alfavitnyi ukazatel' familii i lits, upominaemykh v boiarskikh knigakh* (Moscow: Tip. S. Selivanovskogo, 1853); Stepan B. Veselovskii, *D'iaki i pod'iachie XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); *Dvortsovie razriady*, 4 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. II otdeleniia Sobstvenoi E.I.V. kantseliarii, 1850–55); *Knigi razriadnye*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. II otdeleniia Sobstvenoi E. I.V. kantseliarii, 1853–55).

FIGURE 1: MUSCOVITE SOCIETY AND THE TSAR'S COURT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY


families who passed the ranks of Boyar and Familiar by collateral succession in the male line.¹⁰ As older families died out, the court exercised considerable restraint in granting new families the right to hold the highest ranks. The number of such families rose gradually in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as did the number of men holding the top two ranks, who totaled about fifty under Ivan IV in the mid-sixteenth century.¹¹ When the court was reconstituted after the accession of Mikhail, it was even smaller than it had been in the second-half of the sixteenth century. From 1613 to 1645 an average of thirty-five men sat on the council. And there was considerable continuity in the composition of the pre- and post-Time of Troubles council. In fact, the vast majority of those who sat on the Duma in Mikhail's reign had ancestors who had been Boyars or *okol'niche* in the mid sixteenth century.¹²

The traditional policy regarding Duma appointments began to change in the mid-seventeenth century, when the court lowered the hereditary requirements for entry into the Duma. In the last year of Mikhail's reign, thirty men held positions on the council; in the first year of Aleksei's rule fifty-one servitors sat in the Duma. Aleksei continued to make new appointments throughout the fifties, sixties, and seventies, and his successors (or, better put, their handlers) continued this trend. The Duma reached its maximum size in 1690 at about 182 members, that is, it was six times as large as it had been under Mikhail. Thereafter the number of men in the council steadily diminished as Peter ceased making appointments to the body. The expansion and contraction of the Duma is indicated on the upper line in [Graph 1](#).

Though many different groups profited from the court's new policy, the greatest beneficiaries were the new men. They made up over half of all servitors

¹⁰ Nancy S. Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics. The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1987), 55–89.


¹¹ *Ibid.*, 104–20.

Graph 1: The Size of the Boyar Duma, 1613–1713

appointed to the Duma from the accession of Aleksei in 1645 to the abolition of the council in 1713. In what must have been a conscious effort on the part of Aleksei's regime to alter the composition of the Duma, the proportion of new men in the body increased from 6 percent in 1645 to 51 percent in 1676. Thereafter the percentage of new men in the Duma stabilized. The rise of the new men can be seen on the lower line in [Graph 1](#).

The new men made their most rapid progress in the Duma's two lower ranks. By mid-century they had completely colonized the rank of Conciliar Secretary, making up 100 percent of its composition for the remainder the century. The rank of Conciliar Noble was in essence re-created in the reign of Aleksei as a conduit for new men into the Duma. Men had held this rank in the court of Mikhail, but they had been very few, never more than three in any year, and usually just one. In the 1650s, Aleksei began to increase the number of Conciliar Nobles, and he did so almost exclusively with new men. His successors continued this policy and the number of new men holding the rank of Conciliar Noble rose rapidly for the remainder of the century. Movement into the upper ranks, the long-time preserve of the old and titled families, proved much more difficult for the new men. Over the course of Aleksei's reign, the proportion of new men among *okol'nichie* rose to about one third. It then increased to a bit over half in the first year of Fedor Alekseevich's reign and remained at roughly that level through 1713. Moreover, new men reached positions of seniority within the rank of Familiar. In 1664, B.M. Khitrovo became the first new man to become the senior Familiar in the Duma. He was followed by the new men H.M. Boborykin, P.D. Skuratov, I.S. Khitrovo, V. S. Narbekov, each of whom held the senior place among *okol'nichie* at one time or another in the last quarter of the century. The success of the new men in achieving Boyar was much more limited. For the first twenty years of his reign, Aleksei proved unwilling or perhaps unable to appoint a new man Boyar. Thereafter between one and four new men held that dignity through the end of Fedor's reign, never making up more than 11 percent of Boyars. Neither did the new men gain much seniority among the Boyars. B.M. Khitrovo reached the sixteenth place before he died in 1680. B.G. Iushkov reached the same position in 1697/98, and by 1713 had advanced to fourth in seniority, but by that time the Duma was powerless.

¹² On the social continuity of the duma in this period, see Robert O. Crummey, "The Reconstitution of the Boiar Aristocracy, 1613–45," *Forschungen für Osteuropäische Geschichte* 18 (1973), 187–220 and Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, 26.

Graph 2: Years in Service Prior to First Duma Appointment


THE CAREER PATTERNS OF THE NEW MEN

Having traced the demographic growth of the new men, let us turn to their career patterns. The first thing to note is that the new men entered the Duma at a lower level than their aristocratic counter-parts. The parvenus were almost never immediately promoted into the Duma with the rank of Boyar, as was commonly the case with pedigreed aristocrats. In only two instances did new men receive this status on their first Duma appointment. More frequently (in thirty-six instances) the new men entered the Duma as *okol'nichie*. However the overwhelming majority of new men began their Duma service in the third rank, as *dumnye dvoriane* (119 instances). To round out our survey, thirty-five new men—all career bureaucrats—entered the Duma as *dumnye d'iaki*.

If the new men were not promoted into the Duma by hereditary right, how did they gain access? An analysis of their dossiers suggests five factors were important for Duma promotion: 1) length of service; 2) holding high offices outside Moscow, usually as an ambassador, military commander, or provincial governor; 3) holding distinguished offices in the central administration; 4) work in the privy administration of the tsar; 5) finally, sponsorship by a relative already in the Duma. I will review each of these factors in turn, beginning with length of service.

It had long been the case even among the distinguished families that only men of a certain age and experience were promoted to the Duma. The same seems to have been true of the new men. This is suggested by [Graph 2](#), which distributes the new men according to the length of time they spent in service before they were promoted to the Duma.

The vast majority of new men served between eleven and thirty years before they were appointed to the council, the average span for all new men being twenty-one years. This average varies little by reign: in Aleksei's time the average span before first Duma appointment was twenty-one years, in Fedor's twenty-one years, and in Ivan/Peter's nineteen years. Certainly there was room for discretion: royal favorites such as I.T.Kondyrev might be promoted soon after they entered service, while others such as S.S.Koltovskii would be compelled to languish for many decades before the tsar' honored them with a Duma rank. Poor Koltovskii in fact waited over fifty years before he was promoted. Yet the consistency of the average years before appointment across reigns suggests that the court observed a reasonably constant policy regarding the age at which a new man might be appointed to the Duma.

Graph 3: Percentage of New Men in Field Service prior to Duma Appointment


Service outside Moscow in the diplomatic corp, military, and provincial administration (what we will call “field service”) was traditionally a means by which elite servitors achieved status at court and won Duma promotions. This is reflected in the fact that offices in these branches of state were routinely recorded in the court service registers (*razriadnye knigi*), books used to calculate status within the context of *mestnichestvo*. For the new men, without ancestors in the Duma of Mikhail, field service was still more important in gaining access to the Duma. This is suggested by [Graph 3](#), which offers the percentage of new men who performed field service prior to their appointment to the council, by reign.

Fully 69 percent of the new men who first entered the Duma as Boyars, *okol'niche*, and *dumnye dvoriane* had held major field assignments prior to their appointment. Among those who did, we find some of the most noteworthy men of the century. For example, A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin, a provincial soldier who went on to become Russia's effective prime minister from 1667 to 1671; A.S. Matveev, a former commander of the musketeers who succeeded Ordin-Nashchokin as government head from 1671 to 1676; and, finally, A.A. Shepelev, a military man who pioneered the introduction of Western-style forces in Russia during the Turkish War of 1667–81. Interestingly, the percentage of new appointees who had held a field assignment prior to appointment declines as the century progressed, suggesting a slow tendency toward the relaxation of service requirements for new appointees.

Service in the chancelleries was also important for promotion to the Duma. The seventeenth century was an era of rapid bureaucratization in Muscovy. The number of chancelleries (*prikazy*) grew significantly, as did the number of administrative specialists (*prikaznye liudi*) who staffed them. As the administration became more important to the operation of the court, Duma members began to serve in the chancelleries and, conversely, chancellery personnel began to attain Duma rank.¹³ Both processes are visible among the new men, as is indicated in [Graph 4](#), which shows the percentage of new men who performed chancellery service prior to their appointment to the council, by reign.

Slightly over half all new men appointed to the Duma had directed a chancellery before to their entry into the council. For military servitors—those holding the ranks of Steward or Moscow Noble before their appointment—such service was one of a number of ways they demonstrated their worth. I.B. Kamynin, for example, was a governor in Simbirsk in 1649, head of the Vladimir Judicial Chancellery in 1651, an ambassador in 1652, governor of Verkhotur'e in 1659, and head of the Masonry Chancellery in 1664—all before he was made Conciliar Noble in 1676. In contrast, service was the only path to the Duma for chancellery

Graph 4: Percentage of New Men in Chancellery Service prior to Duma Appointment




personnel administrators, since they were not permitted to hold important field offices. Thus all of the administrators who were made Conciliar Secretary had served in high positions in the chancellery system before their accession to the Duma. More often than not, at the time of their appointment they had been or were being made director of one the major chancelleries. Apparently the directorship of the Military Service, Service Land, and Ambassadorial Chancelleries were considered so important that they carried with them automatic appointment to the Duma. As with field service, the percentage of those serving as chancellery directors prior to appointment declined over the course of the century, consistent with a general relaxation of service requirements in Fedor's reign and there after.

Large numbers of new men also worked in the court administration before they entered the Duma. The household of the Muscovite grand prince had traditionally been administered by a staff of dependent servants—major-domos (*dvoretskie*), keepers of the seal (*pechatniki*), treasurers (*kaznacheia*) and so on.¹⁴ The men who held these positions rarely gained access to the Duma. However in the seventeenth century court offices rose in status: they began to be included in canonical lists of Duma ranks and to be held by distinguished military servitors. In essence, a stable set of palace offices developed in the midst of the traditional Duma ranks. In the reign of Aleksei the court began to use the palace administration as a training ground for men of undistinguished lineage who would one day be Duma members. This is suggested by [Graph 5](#), which shows the percentage of new men who held court offices prior to their appointment to the Duma.


Slightly under half of the new men who were appointed to the Duma from 1645 to 1696 held a court rank or served as the director of a court chancellery

¹³ There is a sizable literature concerning the rising importance of chancellery service in the careers of duma members. See Natal'ia F. Demidova, "Biurokratizatsiia gosudarstvennogo apparata absoliutizma v XVII–XVIII vv.," in *Absoliutizm v Rossii*, ed. by Nikolai M. Druzhinin et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 206–42; Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII*; B. Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and their Staffs," in *Russian Officialdom*, 19–45; George G. Weickhardt, "Bureaucrats and Boiars in the Muscovite Tsardom," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 10:3 (1983), 331–56; and Bickford O'Brian, "Muscovite Prikaz Administration of the Seventeenth Century: the Quality of Leadership," *Forschungen zur Geschichte Osteuropas* 38 (1986), 223–35; Crummey, "The Origins of the Noble Official," 46–75.

Graph 5: Percentage of New Men in Court Service prior to Duma Appointment




Graph 6: Percentage of New Men with Ancestors in the Duma prior to Appointment



prior to their accession. These men had access to the tsar and many of them could justifiably be called favorites. They used their influence to gain a foothold in the Duma. For example, A.I.Matiushkin, Aleksei's childhood friend, was Huntsman (*lovchii*), Privy Steward (*komnatnyi stol'nik*), and director of the Equerry Chancellery (*Koniushennyi prikaz*) in the royal household before he was made Conciliar Noble in 1672. The percentage of those serving as court officers before their advance into the Duma declined slightly over the course of the century, again confirming the general trend toward a relaxation of service requirements for new entrants. The effect of this tendency can be seen in the gradual appearance of a small class of men who do not seem to have served in any formal office prior to appointment. In Aleksei's reign, all new men served before they were appointed; in Fedor's reign, approximately twelve (27 percent) were appointed without previous service; and in Ivan/Peter's reign, twenty-two (26 percent) are not recorded as having occupied any office before appointment. It is not surprising that these men disproportionately held ranks in the royal household and had kin in the Duma at the time of their entrance. They were favorites or, at the very least, clients.

Finally, kinship. The first new men to enter the Duma had no family in the council to support their candidacy, at least in the male line. However as these pioneers moved into the Duma, they likely sponsored their relatives, in effect attempting to recreate the traditional pattern of hereditary membership for clans in the Duma. [Graph 6](#) hints at the importance of kinship in the appointment of new men to the Duma.

¹⁴ See Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 94–96 and, more generally, Uwe Halbach, *Der russische Fürstenhof vor dem 16. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: F.Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1985).

Graph 7: Percentage of New Men Holding Offices after Duma Accession


Over one-third of all new men appointed to the council had at least one blood relative in the Duma at the time of their accession. Though most families in this class succeeded in placing only two or three members in the Duma, seven families had four or more members on the council. The most successful were the Khitrovos, with eight members on the council, a veritable dynasty. As might be expected, the number of new appointees with relatives in the Duma increased over time, as does the percentage of appointees with relatives among all new entrants.

Summing up, we can distinguish two pre-Duma career patterns among the new men. Military personnel, who made up the majority of the new men, were most often generalists. They usually served for about twenty years as military commanders, chancellery directors, or court officers, and only then, sometimes with the aid of a kinsman, received a seat on the Duma. Chancellery personnel, in contrast, were specialists. Their typical career pattern involved approximately fifteen-years work as an Under-Secretary and Secretary, appointment to the directorship of a chancellery, and then appointment to the Duma.

How did the new men fare after they were appointed to the Duma? Most continued to serve in offices of one sort or another, however they did so less and less as the century progressed. This is indicated in [Graph 7](#), which illustrates the percentage of new men who held one or more offices after they were appointed to the Duma.

Here again we see evidence of the gradual rise of parvenu Duma members who seem to have performed no tangible service in the army, chancelleries, or court administration. It should not necessarily be concluded, however, that these men were do-nothings: they may have performed unrecorded work of a more informal nature, such as counseling the tsar, which was in theory one of the primary tasks of a Duma member.

Traditionally once a servitor entered a Duma rank, he remained in it for the rest of his career. The ranks were largely hereditary, and there was little movement between them. There were exceptions to this rule: as an analysis of career patterns in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries demonstrates, servitors occasionally advanced from Conciliar Noble to Familiar and a few more from Familiar to Boyar, but such instances were relatively rare.¹⁵ In the second half of the seventeenth century this situation changed dramatically, as is suggested by [Graph 8](#), which shows the percentage of regular succession in Duma among all members.

Graph 8: Percentage of Regular Succession among All Duma Appointments

Regular succession occurred when a servitor was promoted into a rank from the rank immediately preceding it in the hierarchy, that is, when ranks were not “skipped” by appointees. In the reign of Mikhail, regular succession was rare, consistent with the hereditary character of the Duma ranks.

However as the century progressed the percentage of regular succession increased rapidly, until one third of all appointments proceeded in rank order. Actually the percentage of regular succession was higher than this in the second half of the century. For the purposes of [Graph 8](#), Conciliar Secretary was considered the predecessor to Conciliar Noble, as it appeared in Muscovite rank lists. But in fact the rank preceding Conciliar Noble was not really Conciliar Secretary, but Steward or Moscow Noble, as can be seen in [Figure 1](#) above (p. 100). Almost all of the men who became *dumnye dvoriane* in the second half of the century were Stewards or Moscow Nobles before appointment. Moreover, virtually all chancellery personnel had been Secretaries before being promoted to the Duma as *dumnye d'iaki*, a pattern also indicated in [Figure 1](#). Thus regular succession into both the ranks of Moscow Noble and Conciliar Secretary approached 100 percent, a fact which raises the total percentage of regular succession for all ranks. The conclusion to be drawn from these data is clear: the Duma ranks were being transformed from relatively closed groups to steps in a *cursus honorum* through which particularly lucky or hard working servitors might pass in the course of their careers.

Closer examination of those who progressed through ranks suggests that this *cursus honorum* was created expressly to accommodate the arrival of the new


¹⁵ Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, 97–104.

¹⁶ Torke, “Oligarchic in der Autokratie,” 190–93.

¹⁷ See Anatolii V. Chernov, *Vooruzhennye sily Russkogo gosudarstva v XV–XVII v.* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1954), 133–98 and Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 151–201.

TABLE 1: REGULAR SUCCESSION vs. REGULAR SUCCESSION AMONG NEW MEN, 1646–1713

<i>Progression</i>	<i>Total Servitors Succeeding</i>	<i>New Men</i>
DD > DDv > Ok > B	1	1 (100 percent)
DD > DDv > Ok	3	3 (100 percent)
DD > DDv	6	6 (100 percent)
DDv > Ok	36	36 (100 percent)
DDv > Ok > B	12	11 (92 percent)
Ok > B	57	7 (12 percent)
Total	115	64 (56 percent)


Graph 9: Years Between Promotions within the Duma

men. This can be seen in [Table 1](#), which compares total regular succession among all Duma members with regular succession among the new men.

If promotions from Familiar to Boyar are set aside, it becomes clear that nearly all of the servitors who progressed regularly through ranks were new men. It is true that even among the parvenus, movement of any sort was the exception: 64 percent of the new men remained in their original Duma rank for the remainder of their career. Nonetheless they were more likely to progress than pedigreed servitors, and when they did, they did so through regular succession. In short, the evidence on advancement within the Duma suggests the evolution of a bifurcated system of promotion into the upper reaches of the Duma. The sons of the most distinguished families were promoted directly to Boyar or to Familiar, as Kotoshikhin suggested. However the new men normally entered as *dumnye d'iaki* (in the case of chancellery personnel) and *dumnye dvoriane* (in the case of military personnel) and then progressed into the upper reaches of the Duma by regular succession. Unlike their aristocratic counterparts, they never skipped ranks.

Why did certain men receive promotions in the Duma, and others did not? Was the *cursus honorum* linked to service? The evidence is mixed. In contrast to the case of accession to the Duma, servitors do not seem to have been required to hold a rank for a certain number of years before promotion, as is suggested by [Graph 9](#), which distributes the new men by the amount of time they spent between ranks.

Graph 10: Average Years Between Promotions within the Duma



As is apparent, it was not uncommon to spend very little time in a rank before being promoted, a fact which suggests that advancement was contingent on factors other than time spent in a rank. If the data is broken down by reign, however, a different conclusion presents itself, as can be seen in [Graph 10](#), which describes the average amount of time a new man spent in a given rank before his promotion, by reign.

In Aleksei's reign new men served an average of 10.5 years between ranks, whereas in Fedor's and Ivan/Peter's they served an average of 5.2 and 4.8 years respectively. Consistent with the reduction in average years between ranks, the percentage of those promoted who served in offices after accession declines slightly as well: under Aleksei, 100 percent of those who advanced performed some kind of service, while under Fedor and Ivan/Peter the corresponding figure is 73 percent and 61 percent respectively. Aleksei insisted that his new men earn their promotions, while his successor (or, better, his successor's handlers) were perhaps more interested in promoting their clients than in cracking the whip.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISE OF THE NEW MEN

Having described the entry of the new men into the Duma and their career patterns, let us ask why the court of Aleksei altered the traditional appointment policy. The answer, I think, is that he did so in order to acknowledge that the new men had become leaders in his growing absolutist apparatus. Prior to the seventeenth century, the central Muscovite state consisted of three components — the tsar's household, which was staffed by dependent servants and administered the royal domain; a tiny military elite, the chief representatives of which sat on the boyar council and served as military commanders; and a small group of bureaucrats, who tended to administrative affairs. In the reign of Aleksei, predominantly in response to Western military pressure, these structures began to change. The tsar's household was becoming a privy council outside the Duma, replete with its own hierarchy of councilors who went by misleadingly archaic names such as "cupbearer" and "chamberlain."¹⁶ The army was being transformed by the import of new model military reforms, an episode in the ongoing military revolution.¹⁷ The chancelleries were expanding, largely in

response to the demands of the new military, and they were becoming more important in the everyday administration of the state.¹⁸ The dynasty demanded leaders, however the old aristocracy was too small to fill all the new positions and, moreover, not fit to occupy many of them, particularly in the administrative realm. Therefore the government began to recruit personnel from the Moscow gentry and administrative class. The new men, as we have seen, rose to prominence by serving in the new offices of the palace, military, and chancelleries. Their promotion to the Duma was in essence acknowledgment that they had become important leaders in the state.

The change in promotion policy may be seen as a very preliminary attempt to open careers to talent. The new men had indeed proven themselves to be more valuable than their peers, and in this sense had been rewarded for their superior merit with social advancement. However this tentative shift in policy must be put in the proper context. First of all, most of the high offices were still reserved for aristocrats who held them, together with seats in the upper ranks of the Duma, by hereditary right. Second, the basis for recruitment was still very restricted: only members of the Moscow military ranks and Moscow administrative class were considered for introductory offices in the administration. Finally, the notion of “talent” was much broader and more loosely defined than is implied by the modern phrase “careers open to talent.” As Hans Rosenberg argued long ago in his important study of Prussian absolutism, from the point of view of the king looking for valuable servitors, “talent” might include anything from technical skill to the possession of important patrons.¹⁹ And indeed we see both highly skilled functionaries and what appear to be professional courtiers among the new men. In raising up the new men, Aleksei and his successors were not interested in competence narrowly construed, but the capacity for leadership in his revamped state.

Let us finally consider the legacy of the new men. Their movement into the Duma had two consequences that ultimately transformed the culture of elite service in Muscovy. First of all, the influx of the new men contributed the decline of boyar Duma as a ruling political body. Prior to the mid-seventeenth century the Duma was small enough to serve in the capacity implied by its name—a council in which important affairs were discussed by the tsar and representatives of the elite military clans, his “Boyars.” However Aleksei seems to have intentionally altered the character of the council. He showed a marked tendency to rule without the old Duma, creating in its place a series of *ad hoc* privy councils that went under names such as the “familiar duma” (*blizhnaia*

¹⁸ See the items cited in note 13, as well as Peter B. Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 10 (1983), 269–330.

¹⁹ Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy. The Prussian Experience 1660–1815* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 76–77.

duma), “chamber *duma*” (*komnatnaia duma*), and, most famously, the “Chancellery of Privy affairs” (*prikaz tainykh del*).²⁰ And it is perhaps not a coincidence that at just this time the new men begin to pour into the Duma. By the end of Aleksei’s reign the Duma had reached unmanageable proportions. It is certainly difficult to imagine Fedor and his mentor V.V. Golitsyn running the daily affairs of state in a council of over 150 servitors. And in fact the body does not seem to have met regularly. But Aleksei and those who followed him were adjusters, not reformers. It never occurred to them to do away with the Duma. But they clearly began to use the body to different ends. Two come to mind. First, Duma could be useful for propagandistic purposes, for example during ambassadorial receptions and great holidays, occasions in which the unity of the state and the authority of the autocrat needed forceful demonstration. Judging by the accounts of foreigners, the ceremonial presentation of the Duma was an important part of late Muscovite spectacles of power. Second, the Duma was also useful as well-spring of honor that could be distributed by the monarch. We can see this in the experience of the new men, who were given status commensurate with their importance by the very fact of their inclusion in the body. In short, the administrative functions of the Duma had been squeezed out under the pressure of the new men until all that remained was its ceremonial form and honorific essence.

The second major consequence of the new appointment policy was the reconstitution of the basic principle of elite service, and more specifically the relation between office and rank. Under the *mestnichestvo*, the possession of high offices was in large measure dependent upon rank, and rank was determined by lineage. Thus the fundamental hierarchy for purposes of office distribution was the hierarchy of families as it appeared in the official court genealogical records. In contrast, under the principle used to promote the new men possession of rank seemed to be dependent on service in high offices. This suggested a different status hierarchy, a hierarchy of offices with commensurate ranks. And in the dissonance between these two status systems we can see the outline of a difficulty commonly faced by European monarchs in the course of absolutist state-building. The dynasts generally wanted to make their administrations more efficient, usually with an eye to increasing revenue so as to build bigger and better armies. Yet it was often the case that crucial offices in the existing administration were in the hands of some vested social group, typically aristocrats, who were not particularly interested in offering up their privileges in the name of a more refined state-apparatus. In cases of successful state-building, as in France and Prussia, this dilemma was resolved by a compromise between the monarch and office-holders. The former would be allowed to open offices in a limited fashion to talent, and even to impose qualifications and a *cursus honorum* on existing office-holders. The old elites, in turn, would be assured that the recruitment policy for the revamped administration would be socially restrictive. In France the tangible result of this absolutist compromise can be seen in the evolution of the *noblesse de robe* and in Prussia in the rise of the bureaucratic nobility.²¹

²⁰ Torke, “Oligarchic in der Autokratie,” 192.

In Russia the result was less socially distinct, but nonetheless can be glimpsed in the formation of the late Muscovite service elite. All the basic components that we see in the general European schema can be seen, albeit in mutated form, in the Muscovite case. Aleksei and Golitsyn were manifestly interested in reforming the Muscovite central administration so as to field more effective armies. The setbacks of the Thirteen Years and the Turkish Wars put great pressure on them to do so, and the West provided them with clear models. As in France and Prussia, the hands of the monarch in making appointments to important offices were tied, though to a lesser degree, by an entitled aristocratic element—the old pedigreed elite under the protection of *mestnichestvo*. And there was clearly friction between the monarchy and its highest servitors. Aleksei and Golitsyn made no secret of the fact that they did not like *mestnichestvo*. They repeatedly removed important offices in the army and administration from *mestnichestvo* considerations and appointed whomever they pleased. Moreover Aleksei apparently refused to entertain most precedence suits when they arose.²² It is not surprising that the number of *mestnichestvo* cases declined precipitously in Aleksei's reign. In Mikhail's time there had been an average of thirteen cases a year. Over the entire course of Aleksei's reign there were seven disputes annually, and in the period from 1662 to 1675 only four.²³ Yet Aleksei made no frontal assault on his aristocracy, and in all ways was much more moderate than his counterparts Richelieu and the Great Elector. In fact he engineered a compromise, tailored to the unique conditions of Muscovy, that appeased all parties. Aleksei used his discretion to reward important though undistinguished servitors—the new men—with duties and positions on the Duma, acknowledging that talent would win office, and office would win status. Simultaneously, he co-opted the aristocracy by bringing them into the new expanded and transformed state apparatus at a very high level. In the second half of the seventeenth century members of the old elite often became the directors of important chancelleries and commanders of new model military units.²⁴ Gradually the two sections of the elite blended into a new type service class, one that balanced the principles of aristocracy and offices open to “talent,” in our special sense of the word.

The effect of this transformation can be seen in two events, the abolition of *mestnichestvo* and the formulation of a project to reform the Duma in 1682. Historians have often wondered how it could be that the ancient institution of aristocratic preferment, the bulwark of the old elite, could be scotched by Fedor and Golitsyn without so much as a whimper on the part of the pedigreed clans. However if we place the abolition in the context of the amalgamation of the traditional elite and new men, and the principle of compromise this blending

²¹ See W. Fischer and Peter Lundgreen, “The Recruitment and Training of Administrative and Technical Personnel,” in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 456–561.

²² Robert O. Crummey, “Reflections on *Mestnichestvo* in the Seventeenth Century,” *Forschungen zur Geschichte Osteuropas* 27 (1980), 269–81.

²³ See Iurii M. Eskin, *Mestnichestvo v Rossii XVI–XVII vv. Khronologicheskii reestr* (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1994).

embodied, then the reason for the quiescence of the aristocrats becomes clear: by 1682 *mestnichestvo* was an archaic institution that served no one's needs.²⁵ The monarchy was glad to be rid of a fetter on its ability to make appointments. The new men had risen, in a sense, in spite of it. And the pedigreed elites had successfully ensconced themselves in the offices of the growing absolutist apparatus. As *mestnichestvo* was being abandoned, the court, under Golitsyn's direction, was moving to restructure the boyar Duma and the aristocracy as a whole. According to the Duma reform project of 1682, the institution was to be transformed into a modern executive body. In it, a council of ministers would direct thirty-five offices, each with discrete competencies in the realms of court, military, and civil affairs. Each office entailed a corresponding rank, reaffirming the new principle that office would confer rank, not rank office, as before.²⁶ Yet the court never conceived of opening offices generally: recruitment would be restricted to a newly constituted aristocracy. This new estate was to be formed on the basis of genealogical registers submitted by all the elite service families old and new.²⁷

Alas, Fedor died and the resolve of the court to reform itself was broken by the infighting that came of having two sovereigns on a single autocratic throne. But the achievements of Aleksei, Fedor, and Golitsyn remained. They had successfully brought a new class of leaders into the ancient Duma and thereby initiated the process of transformation that would come to fruition under Peter in the form of the Imperial Russian nobility, an absolutist aristocracy of service.

²⁴ This has been abundantly demonstrated in Crummey, "The Origins of the Noble Official."

²⁵ See Crummey, "Reflections on *Mestnichestvo*," 279–81.

²⁶ The project is reproduced in Mikhail A. Obolenskii, "Proekt ustava o sluzhebno-m starshinstve boiar, okol'nichikh i dumnykh liudei," *Arkhiv istoriko-iuridicheskikh svedenii otnosiashchikhsia do Rossii, izdavaemyi Nikolaem Kalachovym* (Moscow: Tip. Aleksandra Semena, 1850), 21–40. It is admirably analyzed in Georg Ostrogorsky, "Das Projekt einer Rangtabelle aus der Zeit des Caren Fedor Alekseevich," *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven* 9 (1933), 86–138. Also see Mikhail Ia. Volkov, "Ob otmene mestnichestva v Rossii," *Istoriia SSSR* (1977), no. 2, 53–67.

²⁷ See Margarita E. Bychkova, "Iz istorii sozdaniia rodoslovnykh rospisei kontsa XVII v. i Barkhatnoi knigi," *Vospomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny* 12 (1981), 90–109.

THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LAND (*ZEMSKII SOBOR*) AS A REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTION

Donald Ostrowski

A significant aspect of “modernization” has been the development of representative institutions, such as the English Parliament and the American Congress, that make laws and act as a check on the executive and judicial branches of government. From 1906 to 1917, a representative institution such as this called the Duma convened in Russia. But earlier, in the nineteenth century, Russian intellectuals, seeking evidence of representative institutions in Russian history, focused on the activities of the Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii sobor*).¹ Their aim was to show that Russia previously had a representative assembly similar to those of European countries of the time and that Russia should once again have one to bring its government closer in form to the contemporary governments of western Europe and the United States. The hypothesis of this paper is that the Assembly of the Land was a representative institution but not of the European type contemporaneous with it. Furthermore, trying to interpret the conduct and composition of the Assembly of the Land in European terms has led to a distortion of the historical understanding of its role and function in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In discussing the Assembly of the Land, we need to settle on a precise definition to distinguish it from other assemblies and councils of the time in Muscovy. To do so, we can profitably use Ellerd Hulbert’s discussion of the issue as a starting point. He defined the composition of an Assembly of the Land as having at least three components present: 1) the Holy Synod; 2) the Boyar Council; and 3) “representatives of some other group.”² Hulbert initially considered Platonov’s definition that the Assembly of the Land consisted of three elements: the Holy Synod, the Boyar Council, and “land people (*zemskie*

¹ The term “*Zemskii sobor*” was coined by the Slavophil writer Konstantin Aksakov in an unpublished work dated to ca. 1850, where he wrote: “tsar’ sozyval Zemskuiu Dumu ili Zemskii Sobor.” Konstantin S. Aksakov, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii K.S. Aksakova*, 3 vols. (Moscow: P. Bakhmetev, 1861–80), 1:11. Previously, in 1846, he merely used Karamzin’s phrase “*Zemskaiia Duma*” (Ibid., 599 and “Semisotletie Moskvyy,” *Moskovskoi vedomosti*, no. 39, 1846). In the sources of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it is referred to variously, when given any designation at all, as the “Land” (*zemlia*), the “Council of All the Land” (*sovet vseia zemli*), or simply as the “Council” (*sobor* or *sovet*) with the understanding that it was an assemblage of certain notable people who represented the “land” as a whole. Despite reservations that have been expressed to the term (see below), I will use “Assembly of the Land” when referring to these gatherings.

liudi) who represented their own various groups of the population and various regions of the polity.”³ Hulbert pointed out that “[s]tandard Soviet definitions closely parallel that of Platonov.” Then he cited two examples. One is Iushkov who stated that the third element must be “an assembly of representatives from people of every rank, i.e., the landed servitors (*pomestnoe dvorianstvo*) and the merchants.”⁴ The other is Eroshkin, who stated that the third element consisted of “representatives of the landed servitors (*pomestnoe dvorianstvo*) and the higher townspeople (*posadskie verkhy*).”⁵ It is clear that the difference between Platonov’s definition and those of Soviet historians is the matter of whether regional representation was a consideration. Although an attempt was made in the case of some Assemblies of the Land to get a wide selection of lower ruling-class participation, there is no stipulation or apparent regulation that such wide regional participation was required. Nor have I seen sufficient evidence that selection by region was a consideration in general for choosing members to participate in the Assembly of the Land.

Cherepnin proposed that we think of the participants of an Assembly of the Land in terms of four categories: 1) Holy Synod; 2) Boyar Council; 3) “chosen people from the *dvorianstvo* and 4) from the urban (*posadskikh*) people.”⁶ Other historians have also argued that representatives of townsfolk needed to be present for a “complete” Assembly of the Land to exist. Otherwise, those historians call it an “incomplete” Assembly.⁷ Vladimirskii-Budanov argued that a gathering lacking any of the “necessary and organic” (*sushchestvennyia i organicheskiia*) elements of an Assembly of the Land was “not incomplete, but impossible.”⁸ Such a formulation takes a dogmatically structural approach to determining what an Assembly of the Land was, whereas function was also important. Moreover, although townspeople often were present, we do not have any stipulation in the sources that they had to attend for an Assembly of the Land

² Ellerd Hulbert, “Sixteenth-Century Russian Assemblies of the Land: Their Composition, Organization, and Competence” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1970), 3. Zaozerskii had suggested that precise definition of the Assembly of the Land is not possible since those gatherings have such a wide diversity of composition and function. Aleksandr I. Zaozerskii, “K voprosu o sostave i znachenii zemskikh soborov,” *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia*, June (1909):299–301. As Hulbert remarked, if we leave it undefined, then “we might end up writing the history of all meetings in which two or more people participated” (3).

³ See Sergei F. Platonov, *K istorii moskovskikh zemskikh soborov* (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo Putei soobshcheniia, I.N. Kushnerev, 1905), 8–9.

⁴ Serafim V. Iushkov, *Istoriia gosudarstva i pravda SSSR*, vol. 1, 3rd. ed. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1950), 273.

⁵ Nikolai P. Eroshkin, *Ocherki istorii gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva prosveshcheniia RSFSR, 1960), 29.

⁶ Lev V. Cherepnin, “Zemskie sobory i utverzhenie absoliutizma v Rossii,” in *Absoliutizm v Rossii (XVII–XVIII vv.): Sbornik statei k semidesiatiletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia i sorokapiatiletiiu nauchnoi i pedagogicheskoi deiatel'nosti B.B. Kafengauza*, ed. N.M. Druzhinin, N.I. Pavlenko, and L.V. Cherepnin (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 93.

to be considered legitimate. In contrast, we do have ample documentation that members of the middle and lower service ranks were required to be present. Therefore, instead of accepting Cherepnin's classification of four categories of participants, I propose that we accept Hulbert's definition and consider there to have been three categories, of which the third category had to include representatives from the service ranks but could also, and often did, include representatives from the townspeople. While accepting the gist of Hulbert's definition, we can make it a bit more specific by adding the corollary that this "other group" did not include peasants, serfs, slaves, or women—that is, it did not include representatives from the mass of the population. This fact, however, did not prevent the Assembly of the Land from being considered somehow "representative" of the entire country.⁹

Hulbert goes on to add two other criteria for determining whether a gathering can be classified as an Assembly of the Land: "the assembly [must] be summoned by the tsar, and...the business of the gathering [must] be national in scope and importance" (4). We can adopt Hulbert's second criterion—that the tsar summoned the Assembly—but again with a corollary: the summoning could be solely by the Boyar Council or the Patriarch when there was no tsar (as, for example, in times of choosing a new tsar) or to depose a sitting tsar. I will return to the question of the specific business of the Assembly of the Land below, but for the time being we can accept the criterion that the issues the Assembly advised upon were significant matters of policy for the government that affected "the land" in general.¹⁰ With these criteria and corollaries established as our working definition, we can now begin to discuss why historians have been so disappointed in the operations of the Assembly of the Land.

In the opinion of Aksakov, as well as other conservative writers, the Assembly of the Land represented the popular will. Although Aksakov emphasized the "originality" (*samobytnost'*) of the Assembly of the Land, in contrast to Western assemblies, because of its harmonious relationship with the tsarist governments,¹¹ the most common approach since then has been to find similarities with European parliaments. The Assembly of the Land almost always suffers in this comparison. B. N. Chicherin, a nineteenth-century liberal historian who emphasized the role of the state in the historical process, dismissed the Assembly of the Land as an insignificant phenomenon. According to Chicherin, none of the Assemblies represented estates because the concept of estates had not developed in Russia at that time. Nor did members of the Assemblies lobby for political rights for those non-existent estates.¹²

⁹ P. Zagoskin, *Istoriia prava Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 2 vols. (Kazan': V Universitetskoi tipografii, 1877–1879), 1:311–12; see also *Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma konets XV v.-nachalo XVII v.*, ed. A. N. Nasonov, L. V. Cherepnin, and A. A. Zimin (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1955), 321: "byli eshche nedostatochno shirokimi po sostavu"; and Eroshkin, *Gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii*, 30. Hellie describes a "full zemskii sobor" as one that "consisted of two chambers, an upper and a lower." Richard Hellie, "Zemskii Sobor," in *Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, 60 vols., ed. Joseph L. Wiczyński (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1976–2000), 45:227.

Marxist historians have seen in the Assembly of the Land an estate-representative institution that could have limited the ruler's activities. Its failure to do so as well as its demise in the second half of the seventeenth century contributed, in their view, to the rise of absolutism in Russia.¹³ Although conservative historians have tended to stress the uniqueness of the Assembly of the Land, liberal and radical historians have stressed the perceived similarities with European assemblies.¹⁴ And the views of liberal and radical historians have dominated the historiography. The general consensus, then, has been that the Assembly of the Land did not meet expectations; that instead of developing into a British-style Parliament it merely approved the decisions of the tsar; and that, as a result, it did not act *in opposition to* "the government." In that sense, historians have decided that the Assembly of the Land left its potential unfulfilled. Although writers have differed over the degree of similarity of the Assembly of the Land to European parliaments, few scholars have seen a positive or significant political role for the Assembly (except possibly during the Time of Troubles in the early seventeenth century and in the compilation of the *Ulozhenie* of 1649). My contention is that, precisely because the starting point of scholars' analyses and evaluations of the Assembly of the Land has been a

⁸ Mikhail F. Vladimirkii-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg: N. Ia. Ogloblin, 1900), 194–95.

⁹ Torke pointed out that the term "*zemlia*" did not have the meaning of "the people" (*narod*) at that time. Instead, such a meeting should, in his view, be considered a "State Assembly" (*Reichsversammlung*). But, because of the post-Petrine meaning of "state," Torke proposed we call them "Moscow gatherings" (*moskovskie sobraniia*). Hans-Joachim Torke, *Die staatsbedingte Gesellschaft im Moskauer Reich. Zar und Zemlia in der altrussischen Herrschaftsverfassung, 1613–1689* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1974), 135–36; idem, "Tak nazyvaemye zemskie sobory v Rossii," *Voprosy istorii* (1991) no. 11, pp. 4–5.

¹⁰ Some scholars have looked to gatherings that Ivan III held in 1471 and 1478 before his attacks on Novgorod and that Ivan IV held in 1550 before an attack on Kazan' as "incomplete" or "ancestor to the" Assemblies of the Land. But each of these gatherings, in my opinion, was what has been termed *razriadnyi shater*, or war council (lit. "military tent"), to discuss strategic and tactical issues of a specific campaign, not the general policy question of whether to embark upon or continue a war. For the 1471 and 1478 gatherings, see *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (PSRL), 41 vols. (St. Petersburg/Petrograd/Leningrad and Moscow, 1841–2002), 25:286, 310; for the 1550 gathering, see PSRL, 29:57–58.

¹¹ Aksakov, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1, 296

¹² Boris N. Chicherin, *O narodnom predstavitel'stve* (Moscow: Grachev, 1866), 355–82. For discussions of whether there were estates in Russia, see Gunther Stökl, "Gab es im Moskauer Staat 'Stände'?" *Jahrbücher für Osteuropas* 11 (1963), 321–42; and Boris N. Mironov, with Ben Eklof, *The Social History of Imperial Russia 1700–1917*, 2 vols. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 1:198–203.

¹³ Cherepnin, "Zemskie sobory i utverzhdenie absoliutizma v Rossii," 92–133; Serafim V. Iushkov, "K voprosu o soslovno-predstavitel'noi monarkhii v Rossii," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (1950) no. 10, 39–51; Liudmila A. Steshenko, "O predposylkakh absoliutizma v Rossii," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta: Pravo* (1965), no. 3, 46–54; and Aleksandr L. Shapiro, "Ob absoliutizme v Rossii," *Istoriia SSSR* (1968), no. 5, p. 74.

comparison with European representative assemblies, their conclusions are adversely affected.

To show more specifically what I mean I selected for critique a well-known article published by John Keep in 1957, which attempts to synthesize aspects of and to improve upon the various historiographical views.¹⁵ Keep asserts that “[f]undamentally the same historical process was at work” in Russia as in western Europe. Both areas had “absolute monarchies” and the Assembly of the Land, despite being “a much more primitive institution than its contemporaries in other countries...in its way...represented a threat to the absolutist order” (122). The government had “to put a stop to the assembly before it became too dangerous” by not convening it after 1653 (121). He finds “the similarities between the... [Assembly of the Land] and the early representative assemblies of other European countries...[to be] far more striking than the differences.” Nonetheless the Assembly of the Land “as an institution was still at a primitive stage of development” because “in Russia the state power developed earlier and more rapidly than the social ‘estates’ (*sosloviya*)....” The primary indication of the Assembly of the Land’s being “primitive” is the absence of “any clearly-defined division into chambers, each with its spirit of corporate solidarity.” Keep then states that “the election of deputies took place separately, by estates” and quotes from Latkin that, “in this respect, there exists between our Sobors and the European assemblies not only an analogy but even complete identity.”¹⁶ Keep points out that in both Russian and Western assemblies “the higher-ranking members attended *ex officio*, while others were elected.” He sees “[t]he parallels, especially with regard to procedure at elections and in the assembly itself...[as being] numerous and often impressive” (102).

Keep goes on to make a distinction between Assemblies of the Land in the sixteenth century (he recognizes only two—that of 1566 and of 1598), which he “regard[s] as entirely non-elective” (102, fn. 15), and those of the seventeenth

¹⁴ Latkin’s 1885 study of the Assembly of the Land is more of an attempt to find parallels with assemblies in early England, France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, and Sweden than it is an analysis of the evidence for the characteristics specific to the Assembly of the Land itself. Vasilii N. Latkin, *Zemskie sobory drevnei Rusi: Ikh istoriia i organizatsiia sravnitel’no s zapadno-evropeiskimi predstavitel’nymi uchrezhdeniiami* (St. Petersburg: L.F. Panteleev, 1885).

¹⁵ John L.H. Keep, “The Decline of the Zemsky Sobor,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 36 (1957–58), 100–22; reprinted without footnotes in *Readings in Russian History*, ed. Sidney Harcave, 2 vols. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1962), vol. 1: *From Ancient Times to the Abolition of Serfdom*, 195–211; reprinted in its entirety in John L.H. Keep, *Power and the People: Essays on Russian History* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995), 51–72. Keep presents a brief historiographical survey (100–01), but for more extensive surveys, see Lev V. Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory russkogo gosudarstva v XVI–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 7–47; and Ira Lynn Campbell, “The Composition, Character and Competence of the Assembly of the Land in Seventeenth Century Russia” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1984), 5–40.

¹⁶ Latkin, *Zemskie sobory*, 407. Latkin perceived a sense of unity among members of the Western estates against the government that he felt to be lacking in Muscovy.

century, “which aspired to give effect to the popular will” (103). He declares that “[t]he Sobor in its present [seventeenth-century] form was the child of chaos, a stranger to the Muscovite political scene, and a phenomenon that accorded ill with absolutist traditions” (104–05), but that “the threat to the monarchy came, not from the Sobor, which continued to act in the most loyal manner, but from the leading boyar families” (105). The problem was that “the clumsy Muscovite autocracy could not collaborate with any representative institution, even one of such proven loyalty” (107). Some of the Assemblies of the Land, in particular that of 1639, which was convened to discuss the response to Crimean Tatar treatment of Moscovite envoys, “genuinely express[ed] the popular mood” (111). By the middle of the seventeenth century, according to Keep, “active elements came to realise the opportunities which the Sobors presented for the exertion of pressure upon the government” (112). Keep sees in the Assembly of the Land of 1648–49, which framed the Law Code (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649, “a sign that the Sobor was maturing as an institution” because it had “two chambers: an ‘upper house’ of clergy and boyars...and a ‘lower house’ of elected delegates.” He quotes favorably the opinion of the Slavophil writer A.P.Shchapov that there was extensive “popular influence” on the *Ulozhenie* (115).¹⁷ In Keep’s view, the Assembly of 1648–49 “did not consolidate its position of authority, and its moment of greatness was followed by a rapid decline.” He sees the reason for calling an Assembly of the Land in 1650 was “not to take a decision on policy, but mainly for propaganda effect—to pacify the population in Moscow....” Furthermore, he claims that “[t]he moderate line taken by the assembly in 1650 may well have added to the government’s distrust of the Sobor, particularly when it dealt with domestic affairs” (116). For Keep, the Assembly of 1653 “was the last consultation with popular representatives to which the title of Zemsky Sobor can properly be attached” (118).

In 1985, Keep wrote an “Afterword” to his article.¹⁸ In the “Afterword,” he discussed mainly the studies on the Assembly of the Land of L.V.Cherepnin and Hans Torke that had appeared since the first publication of his article. Keep’s discussion of changes and corrections are limited to details of specific Assemblies, as he reaffirmed his main themes. These main themes are: the Assembly of the Land was like Western representative assemblies but only in a primitive form; the Assembly of the Land represented the popular will; it was perceived at times to be a threat to the government or at least to the absolutist monarchy although it acted in the most loyal way; and it failed to develop after 1650 along the lines it had been developing before then—that is, as an institution in opposition to the government. We can discuss each of these themes in turn.

The notion that the Assembly of the Land was like Western representative assemblies is based on two points: (1) certain similarities in election and procedure

¹⁷ Afanasii P.Shchapov, *Sochineniia*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: M.V.Pirozhkov, 1906–08), vol. 4 (Irkutsk: Vostochnosibirskoe oblastnoe izdatel'stvo, 1937), vol. 1, 720. Shchapov does not use the term “popular influence,” but “general advice (*obshchii soviet*)...from all the ranked people.”

¹⁸ John L.H.Keep, “The Decline of the Zemskii Sobor: An Afterword,” in *Power and the People*, 73–85. My thanks to Paul Dukes for bringing this item to my attention.

and (2) the same historical process that was operating in Europe was also operating in Russia. As for the first point, despite Keep's claim of numerous and impressive parallels, there are virtually no procedures or election practices that are similar or "parallel" in any way among the various European assemblies, on the one hand, and the Muscovite Assembly of the Land, on the other. In Muscovy, the *ex officio* members of the Assembly of the Land were made up of the entire Boyar Council and the entire Church Synod. In no European country did the entire State Council and all the prelates sit in the assembly. In addition, the members of the Assembly of the Land were not elected by the members of the "estate" that they supposedly represented but were either drawn from whichever members of the service ranks happened to be in Moscow at the time or chosen by local government officials. In selecting delegates, provincial governors had to take into consideration not only who was of the appropriate service rank as well as who did not have other service obligations at the moment but also who had sufficient wherewithal to afford the expenses involved with travel to and from Moscow, not to mention living there for the duration of the Assembly sessions. It is little wonder these governors had difficulty finding delegates and often encountered resistance from the pool of potential candidates.

¹⁹ In any case, it is unclear in what sense "estates" existed in Muscovy if there was no corporate identity. Keep seems to accept Latkin's claim that selection was by estate when he is discussing supposed similarities between the Assembly of the Land and European representative institutions, but then draws back from that claim when he discusses the reasons for its primitiveness in relation to those same institutions.

In regard to historical process, Keep has to argue that it was the same in both Muscovy and Europe because there is no evidence of direct influence of Western representative assemblies on the Assembly of the Land. That is, the founding, conduct, and functions of the Muscovite representative assembly cannot be traced to any Western assemblies. The only way then to explain perceived parallels and similarities is by a deep-structural common historical process. And because the founding, conduct, and functions of the Assemblies of the Land did not exactly match those of the Western representative assemblies, it must, according to this line of argument, be because Muscovy was behind the West in terms of its political development. Such an argument assumes that Muscovy was on the same track of political development as the West. It is a decidedly Eurocentric view if only because it does not allow for the possibility that Russia was on its own track of political development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries separate from that of the West. Once we cast aside the assumption that Muscovy was part of the same historical process as Europe at this time, then we can jettison the characterization of the Assembly of the Land as a "primitive" version or "poor relation" of Western representative assemblies.²⁰ Finally, the apprehension that a two-chambered assembly is in a state of more mature

¹⁹ Campbell, "Composition, Character and Competence," 43–70. See also Gr.Shmelev, "Otnoshenie naseleniia i oblastnoi administratsii k vyboram na zemskie sobory v XVII v.," in *Sbornik statei, posviashchennykh Vasiliu Osipovichu Kliuchevskomu* (Moscow: S.P.Iakovlev, 1909), 492–502.

development than a one-chambered assembly confuses structure with function. The current British Parliament, for example, is, in terms of political power, a one-chambered assembly, but that does not signify in itself any primitiveness or lack of maturity.

The second theme in Keep's discussion—that the Assembly of the Land represented the popular will—requires a substantiation that Keep and the Slavophil historians do not give it. To say that the Assemblies of the Land somehow represented the popular will or “popular mood” in a country in which the population was around 90 percent peasant and in which the peasantry was not represented in any of the Assemblies of the Land is, to say the least, a stretch. Keep asserts that 11 or 12 peasants participated in the Assembly of 1613 to choose a tsar (104 and fn. 22). Yet the term *uezdnye liudi*, which is used to describe these delegates, does not mean “peasants,” but “provincials” (lit. “district people”). Keep does mention Platonov's determination that they were probably members of the lower service class,²¹ but then dismisses it with the statement: “Some who were actually peasants may have attended this and later Sobors as representatives of the urban communities (*posady*), for there was no clearly marked division between town and country” (104, fn. 22). Later, Keep returned to this question of peasant participation (“Afterword,” 76) since such participation would help support the notion that the Assembly represented the popular will. Yet, even if peasants participated in one or more Assemblies of the Land, a claim for which the evidence is ambiguous at best, Keep acknowledges both in his original article and in his “Afterword” that their representation would have been indistinguishable from that of the townsfolk. Many decades previously, Kliuchevskii, in response to those who asserted the Assemblies of the Land represented the popular will, stated that the Assembly of the Land “served not the recognition of the popular will” but only the power it supported.²² Furthermore, he had argued that the Assembly of the Land was isolated from the general popular opinion and reflected the narrow views of the service and urban elements.²³ At most, we can say that the Assemblies of the Land brought to the attention of the upper ruling class the opinions of members of the lower ruling class as well as of representatives from the residents of Moscow and on occasion from other towns as well.

A third theme in Keep's study is the idea that the Assembly of the Land was perceived at times to be a threat to the government or at least to the absolutist monarchy. This notion of a representative assembly's developing in opposition to the monarch corresponds to the development of Parliament in England during the seventeenth century and to the breaking off from the Estates General of the National Assembly in France in 1789.²⁴ Although Keep characterizes the

²⁰ Keep uses the term “poor relation” in his “Afterword,” 85.

²¹ Platonov, *K istorii moskovskikh zemskikh soborov*, 56–57.

²² Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs Russkoi istorii*, vol. 3 in his *Sochineniia*, 8 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi literatury, 1956–59), vol. 3, 200.

²³ Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, “Sostav predstavitel'stva na zemskikh soborakh drevnei Rusi,” in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 8, 9.

Assembly of the Land as a perceived threat by the monarchy, he does not provide any direct evidence of the monarchy's perceiving it this way. The evidence he cites is indirect-Tsar Aleksei did not convene any Assemblies of the Land after a certain date, and, therefore, he must have perceived it as a threat. In seeming contradiction to the view that the Assembly posed or could potentially pose a threat to the tsar's government, Keep wrote:

The whole perspective changes when we consider the Sobors, not as regularly constituted assemblies of deputies specially elected for the purpose, but as *ad hoc* consultations between the government, the ecclesiastical and secular hierarchy, and men chosen by such provincial gentry as chanced to be in the capital at the time, and by the Moscow townspeople (111).

Such a consideration does indeed substantially change the perspective. A consultative assembly convened by the tsar and members of the upper ruling class to include the opinions of members of the lower ruling class and Moscow townspeople in the decision-making process and thereby to enlist their support for those decisions was a smart move. We see throughout Europe, Asia, and northern Africa during the course of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries strong ruling classes dependent on consultation between their upper and lower strata.²⁵ When that communication broke down, so too did the strength of the ruling class as a whole. In the process of consultation, the tsar and boyars could also acquire information. At the 1642 Assembly, for example, the delegates were asked "to think hard...and make their thoughts known in writing" in order for the tsar to be "informed concerning all these matters."²⁶ Other Assemblies of the Land that conveyed information to the government about conditions in the provinces and whether sufficient resources were available to wage war include those that met in 1616, 1621, 1639, 1651, and 1653.²⁷ In this respect, the "Muscovite autocracy" appears decidedly less "clumsy" than Keep declares it to be.

The fourth theme—that the Assembly of the Land failed to develop after 1650 along the lines it had been developing before then as an institution in opposition to the government—is a difficult one to demonstrate. Indeed, Keep has to resort to speculation and unsupported assertions: "The relations between the government and the assembly, it is now clear, were characterised by suspicion

²⁴ In his "Afterword," Keep points out that he was not asserting the Assembly of the Land "was, or could have become, a Western-style parliament," but that he did imply its "inadequacies, its failure to develop into a viable legislative institution with clearly defined juridical powers, were a misfortune for Russia" (74).

²⁵ See my article "The Façade of Legitimacy: Exchange of Power and Authority in Early Modern Russia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44 (2002), 534–63.

²⁶ Iurii V. Got'e, *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii zemskikh soborov* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1920), 39.

²⁷ Campbell, "Composition, Character and Competence," 148

rather than confidence, by conflict rather than collaboration.” He goes on to cite the Assembly of 1648–49 as “an almost revolutionary body” and that the “recommendations [of the Assemblies of 1650 and 1651] did not accord with official policy” (121). Yet, these Assemblies were convened by Tsar Aleksei, included his own Council of State and most trusted advisors,²⁸ and the “almost revolutionary body” of 1648–49 passed a law code that he personally approved.²⁹ Beyond speculation as to why Aleksei did not call any Assembly of the Land into session after 1653, there is no direct evidence that he or any member of the ruling class saw it as in any way a threat. Any imagined similarity with, say, Charles I’s not calling Parliament into session between 1629 and 1640 is a false one. These were two very different situations and two very different institutions, for open antagonism prevailed between the English Parliament and the monarch, a circumstance lacking in relations between the Assembly of the Land and Tsar Aleksei. As well received and influential as Keep’s article has been, we have to find fault, in the end, with its interpretation and lack of sufficient supporting evidence for its main conclusions.

If the Assembly of the Land did not originate in Western institutions or from the Western historical process, then in what and from where did it originate? Some writers have looked to earlier Rus’ history for the origins of the Assembly of the Land. Cherepnin, one of the main proponents of the indigenous-origin theory, sees the roots of the Assembly of the Land in the institutions that had formed in Rus’ by the fourteenth century.³⁰ As antecedents for the Assembly of the Land, he eyes the *snem* (meetings [*s’ezdy*] of independent Rus’ princes with each other); the *duma* (prince’s consultations with their boyars in council); the princely-boyar courts of arbitration (which resolved disputes between independent princes); and the *veche* (town assembly). Although Cherepnin acknowledges that the *snem* had different characteristics and was of a different time from the Assembly of the Land, he declares that the demise of one was the precondition “for the birth of the other” (57). And although he acknowledges that the composition of the *duma* was “more or less narrow,” he states that “the *duma* became the nucleus of the new representative organ—the *zemskii sobor*” (59).

But none of these indigenous institutions had the same components or functioned in the same way as the Assembly of the Land did. Besides, the Assembly of the Land convened in Moscow, but Moscow does not seem to have

²⁸ Sergeevich claimed that, similar to their western European counterparts’ summoning of popular assemblies to weaken the power of their nobility, Muscovite rulers summoned Assemblies of the Land to weaken the power of the boyars by appealing to the people (*narod*). Vasilii I. Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovanii po drevnei istorii russkogo prava*, 4th ed. (St. Petersburg: M.M. Stasiulevich, 1910), 175–81. This claim fails for the same reason—that is, it is not likely the tsars would have used a council so well stocked with boyars to overcome that same group.

²⁹ One can contrast Keep’s view with that of Kliuchevskii, who has argued that the *Ulozhenie* of 1649 granted greater central authority to the government through standardization of administration practices. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia*, 3:141–42.

³⁰ Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory*, 55–63.

ever had a *veche*.³¹ How and why the *veche* traditions would suddenly show up in Muscovite governmental practice in the mid-sixteenth century have not been adequately explained. Nor does an indigenous-origin model provide an explanation for why the first Assembly of the Land was convened under Ivan IV, and not before. The notion that Ivan wanted to use the lower ruling class as a kind of counterweight to the boyars fails because of the large amount of direct evidence against it. Even less likely is the notion that he looked to merchants and craftsmen in the towns through introduction of a *veche* to counter his own ruling class. Indeed, Ivan III, the grandfather of Ivan IV, had ended the *veche* meetings in Novgorod in order to limit the independence of the townspeople when he annexed the city in 1478. So, postulating his grandson's reinstituting them in Moscow over 70 years later is somewhat paradoxical. Likewise, the *snem* and princely-boyar courts of arbitration were phenomena of an age when the Muscovite prince was little more than one among a number of Rus' princes. There is no lucid reason why the Muscovite tsar would want to revive such institutions in the middle of the sixteenth century when he had become the sovereign over these other princes.

Finally, none of these "antecedent" institutions performed all the same functions of later Assemblies of the Land. In Novgorod and other towns, the *veche* could choose a prince-ruler for the city but could not advise the grand prince of Vladimir (Rus') or the tsar. The Boyar Council could advise the grand prince and tsar but could not choose a prince-ruler. Church synods dealt with the grand prince on matters of the external Church but could not advise the ruler on secular issues. It may be possible to consider the Assembly of the Land as some kind of combination of the functions of these separate gatherings. And it certainly could be argued that its composition and structure drew on indigenous antecedents. Yet, the drawback to this indigenous-origin interpretation is the absence of motive for the tsar or Boyar Council to want to dilute or share their power with another group. When one considers that the first Assemblies of the Land met in the middle and late sixteenth century when the central government was formalizing its administration, the rationale for calling in representatives

³¹ Vernadsky considered the temporary seizing of power by Muscovite townspeople as described in the *Tale of Tokhtamysh* to be "a typical example of the revival of the *veche* in times of crises...." George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953), 346. I am reluctant to take this highly fictionalized *Tale* as sound evidence for Muscovite governmental institutions, especially when no evidence exists to show that there had previously been a *veche* in Moscow to be revived, and no corroborative evidence exists that such a seizure of power took place in 1382. For the *Tale of Tokhtamysh*, see *Pamiatniki literatury drevnei Rusi*, 11 vols. (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1978–87), *XIV—seredina XV veka*, 190–207. Cherepnin claimed that an uprising of townspeople in 1445 was a *veche* on the basis that it was against the Tatars, occurred without a prince present, and, therefore, was like the 1382 "*veche*" mentioned above. Lev V. Cherepnin, *Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV–XV vekakh: Ocherki sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i poKticheskoi istorii Rusi* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960), 779–83. If any uprising of townspeople against the Tatars when the prince was absent can be called a *veche*, then it could hardly be considered a precursor of the Assembly of the Land.

from the service ranks and townsfolk becomes even more tenuous. Although the effect of the Assemblies of the Land was to increase communication between the upper and lower strata of the ruling class and townspeople, that does not seem to have been the main motivation for calling them, especially in the absence of any demand on the part of the lower ruling class and townspeople for such a gathering. Instead, something else was going on here.

Another way to look at the activities of the Assembly of the Land, I suggest, is as the Muscovite version of the steppe *quriltai*. When examining the evidence we have for the *quriltai* from the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries, we find a representative institution that, besides advising the khan on serious issues that required a broad consensus to carry out effectively, could choose a khan after the previous khan had died and could depose a reigning khan.³² Since a *quriltai* was an institution with specific functions relating to the advising, choosing, and deposing of a khan, then we would not expect to find such an institution in Muscovy before 1547—that is, before the Muscovite grand prince formally adopted the title of tsar, which was equivalent in rank to the steppe khan. Even if one wants to hold on to the notion that the Assembly of the Land was entirely an indigenous institution, one has to admit the absence in the indigenous sources of any rationale for its coming to fruition in the middle of the sixteenth century. In contrast, the steppe *quriltai*, with which Muscovite leaders were familiar as the result of their dealings with Tatar khanates, provides a ready explanation for the setting up of a similar institution in Muscovy. The indigenous-origin explanation asks us to accept the twin propositions that not only did the Assembly of the Land arise in the middle of the sixteenth century for an-as-yet-undetermined reason, but also the founders of it managed to select exactly those functions from previously existing gatherings in various parts of Rus' that just happened to coincide with the functions of the *quriltai*. Such a complex explanation is dependent on an extraordinary and highly unlikely concomitance of circumstances. Instead, looking to the existence of the *quriltai* as a catalyst provides a simpler and, for now, more likely explanation for the establishment of the Assembly of the Land than trying to manufacture out of whole cloth some kind of internal Muscovite scenario exclusive of any outside influence.

A likely model for the Assembly of the Land was the *quriltai* of Kazan', as Jaroslaw Pelenski has proposed.³³ If the Muscovite government's adoption of a political body that performed the same functions as the Kazan' *quriltai* was more situational than institutional,³⁴ then we can see that the time of the calling of the first Assembly of the Land (1549) was crucial—that is, after Ivan IV was crowned tsar but before the Khanate of Kazan' was taken by Muscovite forces (1552) and placed under the rule of the Muscovite tsar. By adopting the title

³² Myers claimed "that representative assemblies, as vigorous, established and organized institutions, with important powers, were unique to western civilization." Alec R. Myers, *Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 47. He does not, however, consider the *quriltai*, which although differing from Western assemblies in terms of vigor, establishment, and organization, was a representative assembly that provided advice and rendered determinations on important matters of policy.

“tsar,” Ivan IV was declaring himself a khan in steppe terms so that he could legitimately lay claim to being the ruler of a khanate—in this case, the Khanate of Kazan’ and, shortly after, the Khanate of Astrakhan’ (1556). To enhance the claim that he was a khan, he had to have a *quriltai*-type institution because, quite simply, khans had *quriltais*. The situational argument also helps to explain why 17 years elapsed between the calling of the first and second Assemblies, and an additional 14 years between the second and third Assemblies. Once the initial Assembly of the Land was convened in 1549 to advise on matters concerning provincial administration, it had also served its function to help legitimate Ivan IV as tsar. The Assemblies of 1566 and 1580, on the other hand, discussed the question of whether to continue the Livonian War, which required a broad consensus among the ruling class. Neither the Assembly of the Land nor the *quriltai* was meant to be a check on or balance of the tsar’s or khan’s power, but both did act as consulting assemblies, the advice of which the tsar or khan was free to accept or reject. To be sure, he ignored that advice at the risk of the policies he wished to have carried out.

As a Muscovite adaptation and modification of the steppe *quriltai*, the Assembly of the Land performed its duties well. For it to develop, however, from a *quriltai*-type institution to a National Assembly-type institution would have required the existence of a literate group of lawyers and civil servants such as those who resided in France in 1789. But this was lacking in Muscovy. Western representative assemblies were fundamentally financial assemblies, whose approval was needed for new taxes to be imposed. Subsequently, their approval was sought for important laws and they often acted as courts of justice.³⁵ Neither the Assembly of the Land nor the *quriltai*, in contrast, had specific financial or legislative responsibilities. Although an Assembly of the Land helped formulate the *Ulozhenie* of 1649, its approval was not required for any particular laws to be issued. A number of Assemblies of the Land did discuss financial levies, especially during and immediately after the Time of Troubles. But once the government re-established financial stability, regular discussion of these matters at Assemblies of the Land ceased. Moreover, the official approval of the Assembly of the Land was never required for instituting new taxes. That responsibility,

³³ Jaroslaw Pelenski, “State and Society in Muscovite Russia and the Mongol-Turkic System in the Sixteenth Century,” in *Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern*, ed. Abraham Ascher, Tibor Halasi-Kun, and Béla K. Király (Brooklyn: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), 98; reprinted in *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 27 (1980), 156–67. See also my discussion of Pelenski’s suggestion in *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier 1304–1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 185–86.

³⁴ This point was proposed by Leslie McGann in an unpublished paper. I am accepting the arguments of Hulbert and Cherepnin in favor of the conclusion that the first Assembly of the Land was 1549. See Hulbert, “Sixteenth-Century Russian Assemblies of the Land,” 81–101; Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory*, 68–78. The *Continuation of the Chronograph of 1512* is our source of evidence for this Assembly. See Sigurd O. Shmidt, “Prodolzhenie Khronografa redaktsii 1512 g.,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 7 (1951), 295–96.

³⁵ Myers, *Parliaments and Estates*, 29–34.

along with legislative powers, lay with the Boyar Council. This division of responsibility in Muscovy between the Boyar Council and the Assembly of the Land paralleled the division of responsibilities in steppe khanates between the diwan of *qaraçi beys* and the *quriltai*.³⁶

A closer parallel to the Assembly of the Land in western Europe than the English Parliament or even French Estates General might be the French Council of Notables (although the Council of Notables did not choose the monarch or formulate law codes). Just as French monarchs avoided convening the Council of Notables after 1627 or Estates General after 1614, so too Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich did not convene an Assembly of the Land after 1653, but not because he feared it. Instead, he broadened the representation in the Boyar Council,³⁷ which in turn seems to have allowed him to better obtain consensus within the ruling class. This result is shown especially in the gathering of the Boyar Council in 1674 when Aleksei announced his son Fedor as his legal heir without consulting an Assembly of the Land. Likewise, Keep has suggested that the infrequent calling of the Assembly of the Land during the reign of Mikhail Romanov after 1622 was due to a substitute means that Mikhail and his father, Patriarch Filaret, had developed for consultation with members of the lower ruling class and townspeople. From 1621 on, Mikhail and Filaret began having daily receptions in their separate courts, which members of various social groups (other than peasants) attended.³⁸ Perhaps, as Keep argued, these receptions “provided an adequate substitute for the Sobor, at least in the eyes of the government” (109).

Fedor II, however, did convene an Assembly of the Land in 1681 to discuss military, financial, and land reforms. When Fedor died in 1682, an Assembly of the Land was called into session by the patriarch to decide Fedor’s successor. The choice of Peter, a Naryshkin, in April was not entirely acceptable to the strong Miloslavskii-led faction, so a second Assembly of the Land was called into session (or perhaps the first was reconvened) in May 1682, which decided on co-tsars, Peter and his half-brother Ivan, who was a Miloslavskii. Although in

³⁶ On the relationship of the Boyar Council to the diwan of *qaraçi beys*, see Donald Ostrowski, “The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions,” *Slavic Review* 49 (1990), 531, 533; idem, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, 46; as well as the exchange of views: Charles Halperin, “Muscovite Political Institutions in the Fourteenth Century,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1 (2000), 239–47; and Donald Ostrowski, “Muscovite Adaptation of Mongol/Tatar Political Institutions: A Reply to Halperin’s Objections,” *Kritika* 1 (2000), 268–83, 288–89.

³⁷ For the latest data on Aleksei’s augmenting the size of the Boyar Council, see Marshall T. Poe, *The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century: A Quantitative Analysis of the “Duma Ranks,” 1613–1713* and idem, *The Consular and Ceremonial Ranks of the Russian “Sovereign’s Court,” 1613–1713* (Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Sciences, 2001), as well as idem, “Absolutism and the New Men of Seventeenth-Century Russia,” above in this volume.

³⁸ For a discussion of these receptions, see Marius L. Cybulski, “Political, Religious and Intellectual Life in Muscovy in the Age of Boyar Fedor Nikitich Iur’ev-Romanov a.k.a. The Grand Sovereign The Most Holy Filaret Nikitich, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’ (ca. 1550–1633)” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998), 427–33.

1683 one final Assembly was convened (to advise on peace with Poland), no Assembly of the Land to choose a tsar was convened after that. But the notion that the tsar was somehow chosen continued on into the eighteenth century with the idea that has been dubbed the “elected monarch.” Catherine I, Anna Ioannovna, Elizabeth Petrovna, and Catherine II all made use of the idea that they had been chosen by some wider representative group (which, however, never met),³⁹ and this can be seen as a carryover from the by-then defunct Assembly of the Land.

Those historians who have downplayed the importance of the Assembly of the Land as an institution tend to dismiss claims about the occurrence of certain meetings of it on the basis that, with the exception of some years (such as 1566 and 1598), no formal procedures were involved in choosing delegates. Thus, they question whether the meetings that occurred in 1584 and 1682, for example, can rightfully be called meetings of an Assembly of the Land. Yet, the evidence we have does not stipulate that any formal procedures for choosing delegates for meetings of the Assembly needed to be followed. Even the absence of official stipulations for selection has led some historians to claim that the Assembly of the Land was, therefore, not a formal institution. Such a claim, however, may simply be the result of applying present-day Western concepts to an earlier time and different place.

In some years, it is true a more or less formal request was issued instructing provincial governors to choose delegates from among the men of the province (e.g., in 1612,⁴⁰ 1619,⁴¹ and 1648⁴²). In other years, no such formal request seems to have been made. In those years, delegates were taken from people who happened to be in Moscow at the time (e.g., in 1614, 1621, 1634, 1639, and 1642). Even in 1648, nonetheless, those chosen delegates were made up largely of *dvoriane* who had been gathering in Moscow for a campaign. In 1682, those chosen delegates were made up mostly of people who lived in Moscow. But this practice of choosing delegates from outside the highest levels of government provides a key for understanding what constitutes an Assembly of the Land. In a number of Assemblies, including those of 1566, 1598, 1642, 1651, and 1653, representatives from the service ranks (*dvoriane*, *deti boyarskie*, and *pomeshchiki*) alone made up more than 50 percent of the known delegates.⁴³ This need for a “third” socio-political group helps us to understand why it was sufficient on occasion to pull in people off the streets of Moscow for an Assembly of the Land to be constituted. It was not enough just to have the boyars and Church prelates meet. In those years when time and inclination

³⁹ Cynthia Hyla Whittaker, “Chosen by ‘All the Russian People’: The Idea of an Elected Monarchy in Eighteenth-Century Russia,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 18 (2001), 10, 12, 14, and 16.

⁴⁰ “Akty podmoskovnykh opolchenii i zemskogo sobora 1611–1613 gg.,” ed. Stepan B. Veselovskii, in *Chteniiia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete (ChOIDR)*, 1911, bk. 4, p. 99, no. 82.

⁴¹ Got’e, *Akty*, 23–24.

⁴² Pavel P. Smirnov, “Neskol’ko dokumentov iz istorii Sobornogo Ulozheniia i Zemskogo sobora 1648–1649 gg.,” in *ChOIDR*, 1913, bk. 4, pp. 6–7.

allowed, a choosing of delegates from the provinces occurred. Otherwise, the third group could apparently be assembled through other means.

Differences in terminology, social composition, and political roles need to be resolved before we can establish a connection between the Assembly of the Land and the *quriltai*.⁴⁴ In both gatherings, we find an assembly of notable people who seem to have been considered representative of the larger society. The social composition most likely varied according to place and time. Neither gathering was a “constitutional” body as such, since each was convened on an *ad hoc* basis to perform one of three functions: (1) choose the tsar/khan, (2) depose a reigning tsar/khan, and (3) advise the tsar/khan on important issues. In other words, whenever a consensus of the larger society was needed, then a *quriltai/zemskii sobor* was called. So those who are looking for a regularly convened Western-style parliament or democratic institution are disappointed and then dismiss the Assembly of the Land out of hand because it did not act like these European institutions. When, however, we compare the actions of the *quriltais* and Assemblies of the Land and see what they actually did, we find a similarity in function that cannot be so easily dismissed.

MONGOL QURILTAIS⁴⁵

- 1155(?)—chose Qutula as khan of Mongols
- 1187—chose Temujin as khan of Mongols
- 1200—advised Temujin and Ong Khan on attack against the Taiji’ud
- 1206—chose Chingiz Khan as leader of the confederation
- 1206—advised on setting up of the confederation
- 1211—advised on war against northern China
- 1218—advised on campaign against the Qwarezm Shah
- 1229—chose Ögödei as Qayan (Khaghan)
- 1229—advised on a campaign in western Steppe
- 1234—advised on campaign against Qipchaqs, Magyars, and others⁴⁶
- 1237—advised on campaigns against the Rus’
- 1241—convened to choose a successor to Ögödei
- 1246—chose Güyük as Qayan

⁴³ Hulbert, “Sixteenth-Century Russian Assemblies of the Land,” 123, 201–02; Campbell, “Composition, Character and Competence,” 79–82.

⁴⁴ Observation made by Charles Halperin to me in a private communication.

⁴⁵ I know of no monographic study of *quriltais* as such. The most comprehensive treatment of its antecedents and functions that I am aware of is Elizabeth Endicott-West, “Imperial Governance in Yüan Times,” *Harvard journal of Asiatic Studies* 46 (1986), 525–41. The following list represents only those Mongol *quriltais* mentioned in the sources familiar to me.

- 1251—chose Möngke as Qayan; advised on campaigns in west Asia, Korea, and southwestern China
- 1259—advised on campaign against the Southern Song
- 1260—chose Ariq-böke as Qayan
- 1260—rival *quriltai* chose Qubilai as Qayan
- 1264—advised Qubilai on fate of Ariq-böke
- 1269—convened by Qaidu to discuss the fate of Transoxiana⁴⁷
- 1294—chose Temür Öljeitu as Qayan
- 1307—chose Qaishan as Qayan
- 1307/8—deposed Chapar as khan of the *ulus* of Ögödei and chose Yangichar in his place⁴⁸
- 1311—chose Buyantu as Qayan
- 1640—codified Oirad law⁴⁹

After the fall of the Yuan Dynasty in 1368, *quriltais* do not seem to have been called to choose or depose khans. In 1911, a *qural* was held to declare Mongolia's independence from China and to declare the Eighth Jebtsundamba Living Buddha of Urga as ruler.⁵⁰ The *qural* draws its inspiration from the earlier Mongol *quriltai* and is the name given to the present-day Mongolian representative assembly.

In addition, Khudiakov pointed out fourteen instances of the Rus' chroniclers' using the term "all the Kazan' land" [*vsia Kazanskaia zemlia*] or "all the people of the Kazan' land" [*vse liudi Kazanskoi zemli*] between 1497 and 1551. He identified these references with the *quriltai* of Kazan'.⁵¹

⁴⁶ 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, *The History of the World Conqueror*, trans. John Andrew Boyle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 196–200; and Rashīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, trans. John Andrew Boyle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 53–54. Boyle, following Muhammad Qazvini, dated this *quriltai* to 1235 on the basis that Rashīd al-Dīn placed it in "the Year of the Sheep" i.e., 1235. But Endicott suggested a more likely date is the one that appears in the *Yüan shih*: May 30–June 27, 1234; see Endicott-West, "Imperial Governance," 537, citing *YS* 2.33. Cf. *Istoriia pervykh chetyrekh khanov iz dom Chingisova*, trans. Iakinf (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Karla Kraiia, 1829), 230.

⁴⁷ On this *quriltai*, see Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), 25–29. Wassāf dates this *quriltai* in the year 1267 and places it on a plain south of Samarkand, but I am accepting the conclusions of Biran's analysis that Rashīd al-Dīn is correct in dating it to 1269 and placing it in Talas (Biran, *Qaidu*, 144, n. 80).

⁴⁸ Biran, *Qaidu*, 76–77.

⁴⁹ See Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 341, 358.

⁵⁰ Jagchid and Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture*, 338–39.

⁵¹ Mikhail G. Khudiakov, *Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo khanstva* (Kazan': Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1923), 191–95.

KAZAN' QURILTAIS

1496—chose Abdüllâtif as khan.⁵²

1516—chose Abdüllâtif as khan.⁵³

1518—sent an embassy to Moscow about the choice of a khan.⁵⁴

1519—chose Şah All as khan.⁵⁵

1524—discussed peace with Muscovy.⁵⁶

1530—discussed peace with Muscovy.⁵⁷

1531—deposed Sefa Girey as khan.⁵⁸

1531—chose Can Ali as khan.⁵⁹

1535—deposed Can Ali as khan.⁶⁰

1541—discussed deposing Sefa Girey as khan.⁶¹

1546—chose Şah Ali as khan.⁶²

1546—discussed relations with Muscovy.⁶³

1551—deposed Ötemis Girey and chose Şah Ali as khan.⁶⁴

1551—gave an oath to Muscovy that Kazan' would not intercede on behalf of the "Mountain side" (*Gorniaia storona*)—that is, the Mountain Cheremis (Chuvash) to the west as well as the Mordvinians to the southwest of Kazan'.⁶⁵

If we do not accept Khudiakov's conclusion that these references are to the *quriltai*, then we have no adequate explanation for what they do refer to.

The following list of Muscovite Assemblies of the Land, I am basing, with some modifications, on Cherepnin's list provided in his monographic study of these Assemblies.⁶⁶ I have eliminated from his list Assemblies in 1615 and 1618 (220, 227–29). There is no direct evidence for the meeting of the Assembly of the Land in either year. Cherepnin was extrapolating from the fact that a monetary levy was imposed in 1615 and in 1618 and from the direct evidence that the Assembly of the Land met in other years that a monetary levy was imposed. But this extrapolation tries to make the Assembly of the Land into a legislative institution that always had to approve monetary levies, which it surely was not.

⁵² *PSRL*, vol. 6, 41; vol. 8, 232; vol. 12, 243; vol. 20, 364; vol. 24, 213; vol. 26, 290; vol. 28, 328; vol. 39, 171; and *Ioasafovskaia letopis'*, 131–32.

⁵³ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 260; vol. 13, 25; vol. 28, 351.

⁵⁴ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 266; vol. 13, 31.

⁵⁵ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 267; vol. 13, 32.

⁵⁶ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 271; vol. 13, 44.

⁵⁷ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 274; vol. 13, 47.

⁵⁸ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 276; vol. 13, 54–55.

⁵⁹ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 277; vol. 13, 57.

⁶⁰ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 291; vol. 13, 88, 424; vol. 29, 20.

⁶¹ *PSRL*, vol. 8, 295; vol. 13, 100.

⁶² *PSRL*, vol. 13, 148–49, 447–48; vol. 29, 47–48.

⁶³ *PSRL*, vol. 13, 149, 450.

Likewise, I am rejecting claims that gatherings in 1575, 1576, 1579 (115–20) and 1636 (253–54) were Assemblies of the Land, at least until such time as more reliable evidence and better arguments can be made in their behalf.

MUSCOVITE ASSEMBLIES OF THE LAND

1549—advised on administrative reforms in relation to the composition of a law code (*Sudebnik*)

1566—advised on continuation of Livonian War with Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

1580—advised on continuation of war with Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

1584—chose Fedor as tsar

1598—chose Boris Godunov as tsar (February 17—March 9)⁶⁷

1598—discussed approach of Crimean Khan Gazi Girey to Serpukhov (April 20)

1604—advised on organizing an attack on forces of Gazi Girey

1606—chose Vasilii Shuiskii as tsar

1607—advised what to do following the ouster of first False Dmitrii

1610—discussed possible negotiations with Sigismund (Zygmunt) III (not later than January 18)

1610—discussed Sigismund III's answer (February 14)

1610—deposed Vasilii Shuiskii as tsar and placed the government under a boyar committee headed by F.I.Mstislavskii (July 17)

1610—chose Władysław as tsar (August 17)

1611—chose Gustavus Adolphus as tsar (June 23)⁶⁸; recommended administrative reforms (June 30)

1611—discussed activities of “Council of all the land” (*sovet vseia zemli*)

1612—discussed siege of Moscow

1613—chose Mikhail as tsar

1614—advised on stopping movements of Zarutskii and the Cossacks

1616—discussed conditions of peace with Sweden and a monetary levy

1617—advised on a monetary levy

1619—advised on raising of Filaret to the patriarchal throne

1621—advised on war with Poland

1622—advised on war with Poland

1632—advised on the collection of money for the Polish campaign

⁶⁴ *PSRL*, vol. 13, 167, 468; vol. 29, 64.

⁶⁵ *PSRL*, vol. 13, 169, 470; vol. 29, 65. On the significance of this concession, see my “Ruling Structures of the Kazan’ Khanate,” in *The Turks*, 6 vols., ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Tükiye, 2002), vol. 2: *Middle Ages*, 844–45.

⁶⁶ Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory*, 382–84.

- 1634—advised on the collection of money and on the Polish campaign
 1637—advised on an invasion of the Crimean Khan Sefat Girey and the collection of money
 1639—advised on response to Crimean treatment of 2 Muscovite envoys
 1642—recommended support of Don Cossacks in relation to the taking of Azov (Mikhail ordered it abandoned)
 1645—chose Aleksei as tsar
 1648—advised the composition of a new law code
 1648–49—*Ulozhenie sobor*
 1650—advised on the movement of people into Pskov
 1651—advised on Russo-Polish relations and Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi
 1653—advised on war with Poland and support of Zaporozhian Cossacks
 1681–82—advised on military, financial, and land reforms.
 1682—chose Peter as tsar (April 27); chose Peter and Ivan as co-tsars (May 26)
 1683–1684—advised on peace with Poland

There has been some doubt expressed about the existence of the Assembly of the Land of 1645 to choose Aleksei as tsar. For example, Longworth, in his biography of Aleksei, states: "There was no question of Alexis being elected Muscovy's Tsar by a parliamentary Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii sobor*), as wishful-thinking historians trying to trace Russia's chance of a democratic evolution have sometimes imagined."⁶⁹ Cherepnin wrote in his study of the Assemblies of the Land that whether one thinks an Assembly was convened in 1645 depends on how one understands the term "*izbiratel'nyi*" (elected) in regard to the tsar. His point is that it was clearly not an election among a number of candidates but a choice of whether to approve the single candidate, Aleksei. As with all the other cases where the Assembly of the Land "chose" the tsar, they could, of course, decide to reject the single candidate. The seventeenth-century

⁶⁷ Skrynnikov raised doubts about the authenticity and accuracy of the sources for the Assembly of 1598 a number of times. See, e.g., Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, "Zemskii sobor 1598 i izbranie Borisa Godunova na tron," *Istoriia SSSR* (1977) no. 3, pp. 141–57; idem, "Boris Godunov's Struggle for the Throne," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 11 (1977), 325–53; idem, *Boris Godunov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 103–30; and idem, *Rossiiia nakanune "smutnogo vremeni"* (Moscow: Mysl', 1980), 120–50, 197–201. Skrynnikov concluded that Godunov dismissed the Assembly before receiving approval for his accession. But see the response of Aleksandr A. Zimin in his *V kanun groznykh potriasiatii* (Moscow: Mysl', 1986), 212–33, 287–92. Also compare the common sense explanation in Hulbert, "Sixteenth-Century Russian Assemblies of the Land," 183–88.

⁶⁸ The original document for the June 23 decision is no longer extant. A seventeenth-century Swedish historian quoted extensively from it before it was lost. See Johannes Widekindi, *Thet Swenska i Russland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie* (Stockholm: Niclas Wankijff, 1671), 361–65; Latin trans.: *Historia belli Sueco-Moscovitici decennial* (Stockholm: Niclas Wankijff, 1672), 292–96. Chester Dunning asserted that the Riazan' dvorianin Prokofii Petrovich Liapunov forged this document. Early Slavic Studies Listserv (ESSL), <mpoe@fas.harvard.edu> April 25, 2001. But Alexander Pereswetoff-Morath asked if "there is any direct evidence of the document's being forged" (ESSL, April 27, 2001, May 11, 2001), to which Dunning responded no (ESSL, May 14, 2001).

chancellery official Grigorii Kotoshikhin seems to think there was a gathering of precisely those elements that made up an Assembly of the Land, and that Aleksei was “elected to the tsardom” [*obrali na tsarstvo*] by them.⁷⁰ It is unlikely Kotoshikhin is carelessly using the phrase here to mean the oath of allegiance to the new tsar because he adopts a similar phrasing when he writes that all the tsars after Ivan IV “were elected (*obirany*) to the tsardom.”⁷¹ In addition, Adam Olearius, a German scholar who visited the Muscovite court four times between 1634 and 1643, mentions “unanimous consent of the boyars, the magnates, and the whole community.”⁷² One criticism of Olearius’ testimony is that, if Aleksei was crowned tsar on the day after his father’s death (as Olearius states), then there would not have been enough time to call an Assembly of the Land. Since Mikhail had been sick for some time, the convening of the Assembly of the Land could have been prepared ahead, in the event of Mikhail’s death or further incapacitation. With members of the Boyar Council and Holy Synod already in Moscow at the time, enlisting the other delegates necessary for an Assembly of the Land—that is, representatives from the service ranks and townspeople—could be accomplished rather quickly.⁷³ One problem with this idea is the evidence that, up to that time, those Assemblies of the Land that chose a new tsar after the death of the previous tsar did so on the 40th day (not counting Sundays) following the day of demise.⁷⁴ But the elective Assembly that subsequently chose Peter as tsar in 1682 met on April 27, the day after Tsar Fedor died.

Olearius’ information, however, was second-hand since he was not in Moscow at the time of Aleksei’s accession, and he may have been confusing different events—the elective Assembly with the oath of allegiance taken by members of the court, which did not have a 40-day prohibition attached to it. In addition, his testimony leads to the complication of postulating two coronation ceremonies, one on July 13, for which we have no other evidence, and the other on September 28, for which we have extensive evidence.⁷⁵ Another source,

⁶⁹ Philip Longworth, *Alexis, Tsar of All the Russias* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984), 19. Ol’ga Kosheleva asserted in an on-line discussion that chancellery documents contain no evidence that an Assembly of the Land took place in 1645. ESSL, April 12, 2001. See also Ol’ga Kosheleva, “Leto 1645 goda: smena lits na rossiiskom prestole,” in *Kazus. Individual’noe i unikal’noe v istorii*, ed. Iu. L. Bessmertny and M. A. Boitsov (Moscow: Izdatel’skii tsentr Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo humanitarnogo universiteta, 1999), 148–70. In addition, Hellie has pointed to Ivan Ushakov’s denunciation of M. A. Pushkin in 1645 for his criticism that Aleksei Mikhailovich had not been elected to the tsarstvo as evidence that no Assembly of the Land met to elect Aleksei. Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 359 n. 68. Yet, what Ushakov reported Pushkin as saying is that “Aleksei Mikhailovich ruled in the Muscovite state not by their choice” (*ne po ix’ vyboru*). *Akty moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia akademiia nauk, 1890–1901) 2:167–68; Nikolai Ia. Novombergskoi, *Slovo i delo gosudarevy. Protsessy do izdaniia Ulozheniia Alekseia Mikhailovicha 1649 goda* (Moscow: A. I. Snegirev, 1911) [in *Zapiski moskovskogo arkhologicheskogo instituta*, vol. 14], 369–72. Since Pushkin had participated in the elective Assemblies of 1598 and 1613, he probably meant that neither he nor any immediate member of his family took part in the election of Aleksei, not that Aleksei had not been elected at all.

Griboedov's *History*, written 25 years later, in 1669, tells us Aleksei ascended to the throne on July 13 but was not formally crowned until September 28.⁷⁶ And Griboedov makes no mention of an elective assembly. One possible indication that an elective Assembly met derives from the Pskov Third Chronicle, which states: "On September 2, the sovereign tsar and grand prince of all Rus' Aleksei Mikhailovich was designated as sovereign" (*narekli na gosudarstvo*).⁷⁷ The September 2nd date corresponds more closely than Olearius' "next day" to Kotoshikhin's "a little time passed" (*malo vremia minuvshe*) between the death of Mikhail (July 12) and the meeting of the elective Assembly.⁷⁸ Therefore, in order to account for the evidence at hand, we can provisionally assign the date of meeting of the Assembly of the Land that elected Aleksei Mikhailovich to September 2nd.

The Assemblies of 1610 and 1682 have been called "fictional" Assemblies because they depended on the Muscovite crowd as a component part. But this is again misunderstanding the case. If one remembers the criteria for the composition of an Assembly of the Land's existence established above—that is, the presence of the Church prelates and the Boyar Council as well as a third group usually made up of representatives from the service ranks and townspeople—then one can see that the criteria are met for the Assemblies in both years. Although other Assemblies, such as those of 1566, 1584, and 1648, showed much more interest in calling the "good" men from the provinces, an Assembly of the Land, like a *quriltai*, did not depend on the quality of the representation or the process of choosing to be considered legitimate.

In comparing the Assembly of the Land with the Mongol and Kazan' *quriltai*s, we can see that they performed the same three functions of advising the ruler on matters of significance affecting the realm, choosing rulers, and deposing rulers. In Muscovy, the Assembly of the Land met mostly to advise on policy. Although no Assembly chopped off a sovereign's head as the English Parliament and French National Assembly did with their respective monarchs, an Assembly of the Land did vote to depose Vasilii Shuiskii in 1610.

When Peter I became tsar in his own right, he revamped the governmental administration in Russia, with resulting general chaos as administrators did not know what they were supposed to do. When they were able to figure it out, most

⁷⁰ Grigorii Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, 4th ed. (St. Petersburg: Glavnoe Upravlenie Udelov, 1906), 4.

⁷¹ Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii*, 126.

⁷² *The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia*, trans. Samuel H. Baron (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 195.

⁷³ Other Assemblies were convened in one day. The 1634 Assembly of the Land was ordered by Tsar Mikhail on January 28 and met the next day. Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory*, 249. In 1642, an Assembly of the Land that he ordered on January 3 also met the next day. Got'e, *Akty*, 49.

⁷⁴ Hulbert, "Sixteenth-Century Russian Assemblies of the Land," 177.

⁷⁵ Archimandrite Leonid, "Chin postavleniia na tsarstvo tsaria i velikogo kniazia Alekseia Mikhailovicha," in *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti*, vol. 16 (St. Petersburg, 1882), 3–39.

of them were not trained to carry out their responsibilities. Peter and, before him, his father Aleksei may have seen their elimination of the Assembly of the Land as a form of modernization in order to make the functioning of their respective governments more efficient. The bringing of people from the service ranks into the Boyar Council, and thereby vastly increasing its size, by 92 percent from 50 members in 1646 to 96 members in 1676 (the year of Aleksei's death), and an additional 57.3 percent to 151 members in 1682 (the year of Fedor's death), acted to some degree as a substitute for the functions of the Assembly of the Land. Information and opinions from middle ranks were brought to the attention of the court, at least initially as these new members drew on their lower ruling-class backgrounds. With the passage of time, however, the ability of the vastly enlarged Boyar Council to continue to perform this function deteriorated as, in the natural order of things, those now in the Council became distanced from their former status. Perhaps, as a result, the ruling elite felt the need to call into session Assemblies of the Land in the first half of the 1680s (those of 1682 were convened by the Patriarch). They ceased being convened under the regent Sophia, which in turn may have contributed to her isolation.

Hellie has proposed two other circumstances that could have contributed to Aleksei's not needing to convene an Assembly of the Land during the last 23 years of his reign: (1) "the development of the chancellery (*prikaz*) system...to the point that after 1653 Moscow had the apparatus at hand to find out what the condition of the periphery was at any time..." and (2) "a ready pool of recent governors [the result of the establishment in the seventeenth century of a new system of provincial governors (*voevody*), which] was always available in Moscow to enlighten policy-makers about conditions in the provinces...."⁷⁹ Miliukov claims that the demand by Muscovite townsmen for an Assembly of the Land in 1662 "was a formal protest against the substitution of committees of experts" in place of the Assembly.⁸⁰ Aleksei ignored their requests while continuing to build up the Boyar Council, the chancellery system, and provincial governors.⁸¹

When Peter assumed power, he continued the policy of non-convocation. Although Peter may have modeled much of his administrative reform on Sweden's government,⁸² where the *Riksdag* (Assembly) had played an important role, Peter's reforms came at a time when the *Riksdag* was in eclipse in Sweden.⁸³ But in 1718, he decreed a regulation for evening gatherings, or "assemblies," to be held in St. Petersburg.⁸⁴ At these soirees, not unlike the receptions of Mikhail and Filaret almost a hundred years earlier, members of the upper and lower ruling class, chancery officials and their wives and children as well as prominent

⁷⁶ Feodor Griboedov, *Istoriia o tsariakh i velikikh kniaziaxh zemli russkoi*, ed. S.F. Platonov and V.V. Maikov, in *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti*, vol. 121, (St. Petersburg, 1896), 57–58.

⁷⁷ *Pskovskie letopisi*, ed. A.N. Nasonov, 2 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1941, 1955) 2:286.

⁷⁸ Campbell, "Composition, Character and Competence," 179–83.

⁷⁹ Hellie, "Zemskii sobor," 232–33.

townspeople (merchants and craftsmen) could socialize and discuss matters, either business or pleasure in nature. Such gatherings helped break down the isolation of the upper ruling class and continued on a restricted-access basis through the reigns of Peter's successors, who do not seem to have given much thought to reviving the Assembly of the Land. Peter also ended the Boyar Council and, in addition to not appointing a new patriarch to head the Holy Synod, had delegated the patriarch's duties as protector of the external Church to a department of his government. So, even if his successors had wanted to revive the Assembly, they would have had to come up with a new composition. Indicative of this point is the fact that in the Legislative Commission of 1767, which Beliaev, among others, described as the closest gathering to an Assembly of the Land in the eighteenth century,⁸⁵ the clerical establishment was excluded, except for one representative (Metropolitan Dmitrii) from the Holy Synod. Moreover, during interregna, there was no longer a Boyar Council or Patriarch to convene an Assembly of the Land to choose a new monarch or to depose a sitting tsar.

In his study of the Assemblies of the Land in the seventeenth century, Campbell pointed to three types of circumstances that could lead to the convening of an Assembly of the Land: when the tsar was weak; when there was a crisis; and when the government was looking for a source of legitimacy. As the government and dynasty became more established and stable, the requirement of legitimacy from the Assembly was needed less.⁸⁶ One might also suggest that the elimination of the Assembly of the Land reflected the simple fact that the government no longer saw its legitimacy as deriving from the tsar's position as a steppe khan. Siberia had been conquered and all the immediately neighboring khanates (save that of Crimea) had been subdued or disappeared.

Until the end of the fifteenth century, the general direction of diffusion of inventions, ideas, and innovations was from east to west across Eurasia and northern Africa. Then, by 1500, the general direction of diffusion reversed to a

⁸⁰ Paul Miliukov, "Alexis Mikhailovich (1645–1676)," in Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, *History of Russia*, 3 vols., trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), vol. 1: *From the Beginnings to the Empire of Peter the Great*, 154–55.

⁸¹ During the course of Aleksei's reign, according to statistics compiled by Demidova, the number of civil officials (*sud'i*, *d'iaki*, and *pod'iachie*) rose from 866 in 1646 to 1,601 in 1677. Nataliia F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absoliutizma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 23, Table 2. That is an increase of 84.9 percent in a little over 30 years.

⁸² Claes Peterson, *Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms: Swedish Antecedents and the Process of Reception*, trans. Michael F. Metcalf (Stockholm: A.-B. Nordska, 1979).

⁸³ Myers, *Parliaments and Estates*, 116.

⁸⁴ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, s 1649*, 1st series, 45 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1830), (PSZ), vol. 5, 597–98, no. 3241. See also Friedrich Christian Weber, *The Present State of Russia*, 2 vols. (London: W. Taylor, 1723), vol. 1, 186–88. Weber tells us these "assemblies" were held three times a week in the winter.

west-to-east flow. For much of the history of Muscovy, “modernization” meant changing to accommodate the last phase of the influence from the east. Thus, the adoption and modification of the steppe *quriltai* into the Assembly of the Land can be seen as one of the last (if not the last) adaptation by Muscovy to this “old” modernization. Then, as western Europe began its rise to global hegemony, the Muscovite orientation gradually shifted over the course of two centuries to the “new” modernization. Although we find examples of this new or westerly “modernization” occurring from as early as the end of the fifteenth century (with Italian architecture in the Kremlin) and the sixteenth century (with the gunpowder revolution), this new orientation, toward Europe, began imposing itself on Muscovite policy more emphatically in the reign of Peter’s father Aleksei. Yet, at this point when Muscovites were coming into more or less direct contact with European governments, most of those governments had already ceased convening their representative assemblies.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the formal advice-giving role of the Assembly of the Land was replaced by informal consultation with members of the ruling class. In any case, it is a mistake, in my opinion, to attribute the demise of the Assembly of the Land to the so-called “rise of absolutism” in Russia.⁸⁸

The contention of this paper is that studying the Muscovite Assembly of the Land through the lens of European parliaments and other Western representative institutions skews our understanding of the Assembly, its operation, and its functions. Nor does asserting the indigenous origin of the Assembly explain either its sudden appearance in the middle of the sixteenth century or its specific composition and duties. Instead, we find a number of answers by seeking its origins in the steppe *quriltai*, an advisory group of notable men called on an *ad hoc* basis to advise the khan on significant issues of policy, to select a new khan, or depose a sitting khan. We can then explain why the Assembly of the Land appeared when it did in Muscovy as well as its operation and functions.

No longer is it necessary to denigrate the Assembly of the Land as “primitive,” “insignificant,” or “incomplete,” or criticize it for not turning into something it was never intended to be. As an *ad hoc* consultative assembly of the highest notables in the realm as well as a representative selection of men from the ranks of the lower ruling class and townspeople, the Assembly of the Land was never intended to represent non-existent “estates” in Muscovy. Nor would it have

⁸⁵ Ivan D. Beliaev, *Zemskie sobory na Rusi*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: A.D. Stupin, 1902), 73–76. See also Shchapov, *Sochineniia*, vol. 1, 727.

⁸⁶ Campbell, “Composition, Character and Competence,” 186–87.

⁸⁷ European states where representative assemblies ceased meeting in the seventeenth century include, besides France, the Spanish Netherlands (1632), Naples (1642), Prussia (1653), Denmark (1660), and Bavaria (1669). Myers, *Parliaments and Estates*, 97–143.

⁸⁸ On the inadequacy of the absolutism model to explain the available evidence about early modern monarchies in general, see Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern Monarchy* (London: Longman, 1992); and on its inadequacy for early modern Russia in particular, see my “The Façade of Legitimacy.”

fulfilled its functions if it were to act in opposition to “the government,” although it could in theory be called by the ruling elite as a means of deposing the ruler or approving the selection of a new ruler. The Assembly of the Land was an integral part of the Muscovite ruling process, and, in that capacity, operated honorably and competently throughout its 135-year existence.

MERCANTILISM IN PRE-PETRINE RUSSIA

Jarmo T.Kotilaine

K.V.Bazilevich in 1940 opened his classic treatise of mercantilism under Aleksei Mikhailovich by stating that “The history of the genesis and development of Russian mercantilism still awaits its student.”¹ In spite of valuable work by a number of Russian and Western scholars, this statement remains largely true even today. A fair amount has been done to describe the intellectual history of seventeenth-century mercantilism in Muscovy, or at least the views of the most prominent advocates of mercantilistic reform. However, scant attention has been devoted to the nature and importance of mercantilism in practice, largely due to the persistent conventional wisdom of Peter the Great as the father of Russian mercantilism. This paper will seek to examine the ways in which mercantilism entered not only the political discourse but also the concrete economic policies of pre-Petrine Russia. The discussion will proceed in three stages. First, the general meaning of “mercantilism” will be explored. Secondly, an attempt will be made to describe the available evidence of mercantilistic thinking and its practical implications in seventeenth century Russia. Thirdly, there will be an assessment of the general significance of Russian “mercantilist” policies.

THE MEANING OF MERCANTILISM

Mercantilism is an umbrella term for a number of policies and ideas that are often more connected temporally than thematically. E.F.Heckscher, the preeminent historian in the field, quite appropriately described mercantilism as “the economic policy of the time between the Middle Ages and the age of *laissez-faire*.”² In simple terms, therefore, it was a system that departed from the typical features of a medieval economy and developed characteristics of the capitalist system. Naturally, with a common point of departure and a shared destination, the various policies grouped under the general heading of mercantilism did have important common denominators. In contradistinction to medieval universalism and particularism, mercantilism served as an agent of *unification*: “its first object was to make the state’s purposes decisive in a uniform economic sphere and to make all economic activity subservient to considerations corresponding to the requirements of the state....”³ In D.S.Landes’ words, “Mercantilism was not a doctrine, nor a set of rules. It was a general recipe for political-economic management: whatever enhanced the state was right.”⁴ Of particular importance in this context was the focus of the state’s

external power in relation to other states. Indeed, mercantilism can be thought of as the economic equivalent of absolutist state-building. It tended to be a protectionist system as wealth-creation in the world was conceived of as a zero-sum game. An ideal situation for a country was a trade surplus settled in specie. To this end, governments typically instituted export monopolies and exchange controls, as well as seeking to find new markets and sources of cheap imports and specie in colonies.

Given the statist and protectionist nature of mercantilism, it is instructive to think of the economic situation of seventeenth-century Russia in terms of two constraints—one external, one internal—faced by Muscovite policy-makers. The first one of these will be termed the “specie constraint,” used to denote the amount of currency circulating in the economy. Due to a lack of domestic sources of precious metals, Russia depended completely on foreign currency for replenishing her money supply.⁵ Yet, Muscovy was a highly, albeit far from completely, monetized economy. As is suggested by the classical quantity theory of money, the total value of goods in the economy was directly related to the money supply, especially assuming that the velocity of money, the rate at which it changed hands, was constant, which was likely the case in an economy with no banks and little financial innovation. In the circumstances, an increase in nominal national income was attainable through exogenous injections or currency debasement, which was indeed periodically resorted to.⁶ Overall, a policy of active trade was naturally preferable to inflationary deficit financing, even if Russia did not fully escape from the repercussion of the global gold inflation.⁷ As a long-term strategy, the Russian government did indeed adopt a policy of steady trade surpluses, a decision of great significance at a time when,

¹ Konstantin V. Bazilevich, “Elementy merkantilizma v ekonomicheskoi politike pravitel'stva Alekseia Mikhailovicha,” *Uchenye zapiski Moskovskogo ordena Lenina gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. M.V. Lomonosova* 41 (1940), 3.

² Eli F. Heckscher, *Mercantilism*, revised edition (London and New York: Macmillan, 1955), 20.

³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴ David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 443.

⁵ Arthur Attman, *Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik: 1558–1595* (Lund: Lindstedts univ. bokhandel, 1944); *idem*, *The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade 1500–1650* (Gothenburg: Institute of Economic History of Gothenburg University, 1973); *idem*, *The Struggle for Baltic Markets. Powers in Conflict, 1558–1618* (Gothenburg: Vetenskaps- o. vitterhets-samhället, 1979).

⁶ For instance, the rouble was devalued by 33 percent under Vasilii Shuiskii and Mikhail Feodorovich. An even more dramatic instance was the copper money reform of 1654 which introduced a dangerously inflationary copper rouble at 1:1 exchange rate. However, the measure was never conceived of as a lasting policy and its disastrous consequences forced the restoration of the silver rouble in 1662. For the most comprehensive account of this, see: Konstantin V. Bazilevich, *Denezhnaia reforma Alekseia Mikhailovicha i vosstanie v Moskve v 1662 g.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1936).

as N.A.Baklanova suggests, foreign trade played a more important a role than at any other point in Russian history. Russia was faced with strong demand for many of her products, especially raw materials and efforts to control imports ensured a trade surplus which the Westerners would invariably settle in the sought-after *efimki* (Joachimsthaler, the Russian term for Western silver specie).⁸

The second constraint facing Muscovite policymakers was the state budget which typically constituted the main source of difficulties. Under mercantilism, economic policy had to not only *generate* wealth but use it specifically to enrich and strengthen the state. In Muscovy, however, the government's revenue base remained fragile and far from adequate to prepare the state for unexpected contingencies. Unlike western European governments, Russia tended to draw its state revenue from indirect rather than direct taxes, which practice not only facilitated evasion but also made the state budget vulnerable to fluctuations in economic activity. Data for Novgorod and Nizhnii Novgorod in the 1610s and 20s reveals that one to two-thirds of the government's revenues came from customs receipts. The total indirect tax receipts including tavern (*kabatskie*) duties amounted to two-thirds to nine-tenths of the total. A revealing official report from 1614–5 laments the fact that the government had no revenues apart from customs and tavern duties. Still in 1680, the share of direct taxes was, at 44 percent, less than a half of the total, with special direct taxes alone accounting for 16 percent. In the circumstances, any sudden emergency, typically wars, presented Russia with the prospect of a budget deficit that had to be covered by means of currency debasement or extraordinary tax collections. The first of these, the *piatinnye den'gi* of 1614–5, was a truly chaotic affair, and the situation did not improve markedly as time went on. The Smolensk war of the 1630s resulted in two extraordinary collections, which had major social repercussions in peasant flights and non-compliance. The Thirteen Years' War was accompanied and followed by a total of nine extraordinary levies of 5–20 percent each in 1654–80. The reliance on such measures led to a great deal of confusion and abuse but also to growing arrears, R 1 million worth of which were canceled in 1681, along with a 31 percent tax reduction.⁹

Meeting the “specie” and budget constraints was a precondition for satisfying a third—geopolitical—constraint, arguably the main rationale of mercantilism. Russia depended on internal fiscal health for ensuring her political independence which was threatened more than once in the course of the seventeenth century. The most extreme case of this was naturally the total economic, social, and political collapse during the Time of Troubles. However, the Thirteen Years'

⁷ Artur Attman, “The bullion flow from the Netherlands to the Baltic and the Arctic, 1500–1800,” in *The Interactions of Amsterdam and Antwerp with the Baltic region, 1400–1800 (De Nederlanden en het Oostzeegebied): Papers presented at the third international conference of the Association Internationale d'Histoire des Mers Nordiques de l'Europe*, Utrecht, August 30th–September 3rd 1982, ed. Johanna M. van Winter (Leiden: M. Nijhoff, 1983), 19–22. For a systematic analysis of Russian price data in the seventeenth century, see: Richard Hellie, *The Economy and Material Culture of Russia, 1600–1725* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

War—financed by means of the aforementioned copper money reform—was not much better. The rouble collapsed and the domestic economy reached the brink of disintegration due to the fiscal pressure that was relentlessly applied to avert a political catastrophe. In the circumstances, Russia was effectively forced to modernize herself by adopting more rational and efficient institutions. Economic reforms became a precondition for political survival. Russian economic policies had to converge at least to a degree with the mercantilism practiced by her neighbors. A flurry of reformist activity was accompanied by a steady expansion in the armed forces by two and a half times between 1631 and 1681, with their real cost rising threefold.¹⁰

While the necessity of managing these three constraints in the Russian context was indisputable, traditional discussions of Muscovite mercantilism have tended to focus much more either on protectionistic elements in economic policy or its various more specific objectives of which N.A.Baklanova identified two in particular: (i) the construction of a merchant navy and in (ii) the development of the most necessary branches of industry. These objectives largely agree with A.Soom's description of mercantilist policies pursued across the border in the Swedish Baltic provinces, Estonia, Livonia, and Ingria, which clearly constituted a model that at least some Russian politicians sought to emulate. The key added element was (iii) the creation of companies to pool domestic capital resources for investment projects, an idea that entered the mercantilistic debate not only in Russian but throughout Europe.¹¹

FOREIGN MERCANTILISTS IN RUSSIA

The history of foreign influences on Russian mercantilistic thinking in the seventeenth century is quite well known and need not be examined in detail here.¹² However, by focusing on a limited number of more or less accomplished theorists, historians of Russian economic thought have tended to underestimate the practical repercussions of the intensive interaction between Russians and the Western merchants visiting the country in ever-increasing numbers. Even if the advice of the Dutch, English, and German merchants trading at Arkhangel'sk was based more on self-interest than anything else, it served to stimulate Russian

⁸ Bazilevich, "Elementy merkantilizma v ekonomicheskoi politike pravitel'stva Alekseia Mikhailovicha," 11; Vasilii O.Kliuchevskii, "Russkii rubl' XVI–XVIII vv. v ego otnoshenii k nyneshnemu," in *Sochineniia*, 12 vols. (Moscow: Mysl', 1987–90), vol. 7, 100–12; Natalia A. Baklanova, "Ian de-Gron—prozhektor v Moskovskom gosudarstve XVII veka," *Uchenye zapiski, Rossiiskaia assotsiatsiia nauchno-issledovatel'skikh institutov obshchestvennykh nauk: Institut istorii*, 4 (1929), 110; Arkadii G.Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii vtoroi poloviny XVII v.* (St Petersburg: Nauka, 1998), 151.

⁹ Pavel N.Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII stoletii i reforma Petra Velikago*, 2nd edition (St Petersburg: Tip. M.M.Stashiulevicha, 1905), 17–8, 43, 46; Vasily O.Kliuchevsky [Vasilii O.Kliuchevskii], *A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century*, (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1994), 247, 253–54; Bazilevich, "Elementy merkantilizma," 7.

export trade in many important ways and also provided the Tsar with new sources of revenue. For instance, John Merrick, an English agent, in 1620 advised the Russians to restrict tar exports so as to promote domestic cordage production, a strategy that did indeed meet with some success with the establishment of a handful of English and Dutch rope walks in Arkhangel'sk, Kholmogory, and Vologda.¹³ Eventually, however, the Dutchman Julius Willeken (a partner of Andries Winius) in 1636 acquired the tar monopoly for five years. He gained broad rights for tar production in the Dvina-Sukhona valleys against a total payment of R 2,750. For the ensuing five-year period, the monopoly went to his countryman Herman Fenzel of the famous De Vogelaer-Klenck partnership. After tough bidding by the English, the government's receipts from the sale rose to R 5,750. However, this payment may have been excessive, given the lack of willing buyers in 1646–8, after which Winius took control of tar production as a reward for his services in promoting Russian industrialization. In the end, however, Russia ended up with a large-scale tar industry which allowed tar to become an important export to Western Europe, with an annual total of 1–2,000 barrels (valued at one rouble each) by the middle of the century.¹⁴

Foreigners also played a central role in initiating potash production in Russia. The Dutch merchant Karel du Moulin in 1630 gained permission for burning potash in northern Russia and was granted a 10-year monopoly on its exportation. After a failure in Tot'ma, he was allowed in 1631 to expand his operation to the Volga valley. He continued to be plagued by misfortunes and labor shortages and was in 1643 outbid by Simon Digby whose enterprise was taken over after his death (1645) by a relative, John White. Jointly with colleagues Francis Ash and John Dought, White in 1648 acquired extensive rights for production in central Russia for a decade, evident difficulties notwithstanding. Also Alexander Crawford gained a seven-year grant for potash production in Murom *uezd* in 1644.¹⁵ Potash emerged as one of Russia's most important exports with a high value added. This enabled Muscovy to exploit her forest resources in ways that long distances and high transportation costs might otherwise have rendered unprofitable. State control on the production and sale of potash also allowed the

¹⁰ Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History*, 232. Further on this, see: Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 181 ff.

¹¹ Baklanova, "Jan de-Gron," 111; Arnold Soom, "Die merkantilistische Wirtschaftspolitik Schwedens und die baltischen Städte im 17. Jh.," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, N.F., 11:2 (1963), 184.

¹² The earliest comprehensive survey was Pavel P. Smirnov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika Moskovskogo gosudarstva v XVII veke* (Kiev: Tipografiia T-va I.N. Kushnerev i Ko., 1912).

¹³ Smimov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 7–8; Andrei V. Demkin, "Zapadnoevropeiskie kapitaly i proizvodstvo v Rossii v pervoi polovine XVII v.," in *Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe razvitie feodal'noi Rossii: Sbornik statei*, ed. Arkadii A. Preobrazhenskii and Andrei V. Demkin (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1985), 22–23. Dutchman Karel du Moulin's ropewalk in Kholmogory produced some 1,000 *pud* of ropes in the 1620s. The two English rope walks in Arkhangel'sk and Vologda were in 1649 jointly valued at R 550.

government to concentrate essentially all potash trade at Arkhangel'sk which it favored over trade via the Swedish-controlled eastern Baltic ports. After a mere two decades of development, Russian potash exports in 1655 reached a total of 18,000 shippounds (*berkovtsy*) which accounted for nearly a quarter of the total value of Arkhangel'sk's exports. This proportion steadily declined in the second half of the century but was still well over 10 percent in the 1670s.¹⁶

The Dutch ambassadors Albert Coenraadszoon Burgh and Johan van Veltndriel in 1631 presented the Tsar with an eloquent case for timber production and shipbuilding in northern Russia. While permission to cut trees along the Dvina was indeed granted to a group of Dutch merchants headed by Du Moulin, the project appears not to have taken off. Only in 1670 was a mast monopoly granted to the Dutchman Werner Muller who built a sawmill at Arkhangel'sk. By 1674, annual exports totalled 150–200 masts. Muller was succeeded in 1680 by his partner, Heinrich Butenant von Rosenbusch of Hamburg, who in the 1680s exported an annual average of some 200 masts. The export toll alone generated an income of R 5 per mast in the early 1670s.¹⁷ The Russians produced significant quantities of timber also for the Baltic area. The timber producers of the Smolensk region came to account for a growing proportion of Riga's timber exports in the second half of the century. Similarly, Russian villages along the Ingrian border supplied the saw mills of Narva.¹⁸

Much better known, and possibly also more influential, among the self-appointed foreign economic advisors were a French vagabond bureaucrat-entrepreneur Jean de Gron(ier) and a Croatian priest Juraj Križanec, known in Russia as Iurii Krizhanich. "Ian de Gron" presented his economic "project" soon after his arrival in Moscow in 1651. His focus was primarily on the dual goals of creating a merchant navy and promoting import substitution. He stressed that no other activity is as profitable as overseas trade (*morskoï promysl*) for which Russia was, moreover, ideally suited given her wealth of naval stores. De Gronier foresaw the annual construction of 100 ships, some of which could be sold abroad at R 10,000 each and the rest used for trade throughout the world, as well as herring fishing and whale hunting. The latter was said to yield profits of R 5,000 p.a. for each ship, in part through a dramatic increase in train oil exports. De Gronier offered to find a site for a White Sea shipyard, to be supplied entirely with domestic construction materials. He further proposed a similar shipbuilding project for the Volga and the Caspian. De Gronier maintained that the mechanized sawmills required for processing the timber for shipbuilding would

¹⁴ Demkin, "Zapadnoevropeiskie kapitaly i proizvodstvo," 24–5; Thomas Birch, ed., *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq; Secretary, First, to the Council of State, And afterwards to the Two Protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell*, 7 vols. (London: Printed for the executor of F.Gyles, 1742), vol. 3, 731; RA (Riksarkivet, Swedish National Archive) Kommerskollegium: Huvudarkivet F IV: 96: Handel med Ryssland 1670-talet.

¹⁵ Demkin, "Zapadnoevropeiskie kapitaly i proizvodstvo," 26–7.

¹⁶ *Thurloe Papers*, vol. 3, p. 713; RA Kommerskollegium: Huvudarkivet F IV: 96: Handel med Ryssland 1670-talet.

play their own important role also quite independently as they would produce a surplus of planks for exportation.¹⁹

De Gronier advocated the use of Western masters for the purpose of establishing a glass-making industry, as well as for producing textiles of Dutch quality. He sought to ensure competitiveness and profitability above all else by minimizing input costs. He proposed, consequently, that the domestic labor force for these industries should come from the ranks of low-cost serfs. This was particularly important in the case of a twofold scheme for increasing export revenues which consisted of turning Russian forests first into potash and then into grain fields, which, he suggested, would allow Russia to overtake Danzig (Gdansk) as a grain exporter.²⁰ Overall, de Gronier's mercantilism stands out by its statism and its reliance on compulsion.

Križanic, whose masterpiece *Politika* was written in the 1660s during his Tobol'sk exile, presented a much more sophisticated project which in its conception went far beyond economics. As S.H. Baron has noted, Križanic's motivations were in some key ways similar to those of pure-bred mercantilists, but the inspiration for his project came from his early pan-Slavism and ecumenical thinking inspired by a desire to mend the rift between the Eastern and Western churches. Very un-mercantilistically, the reforms would be undertaken not so much for Russia's own sake as for the sake of the Slavic peoples which Russia, as the largest Slavic nation, had a historic mission to liberate. Križanic was patently aware of the weakness of Russian institutions and the quasi-colonial way in which Western Europeans were able to exploit the country's resources. He lamented Russia's lack of natural resources, unfavorable geographic circumstances, and lack of market towns, as well as the Russians' "undeveloped" and "sluggish" minds and "laziness, their lack of skills and passivity in trade."²¹ Križanic, in addition to attacking inefficient state monopolies, reproached the government for allowing West European merchants to trade freely within the country, which led to subservience to foreigners, as well as for exploiting its people, which stifled initiative. Križanic sought to stimulate the Russian economy by expelling foreign merchants from Russia's interior to ports and other border towns where they would be allowed to trade for only a few weeks of the year. In this manner, Russia through its own merchants was to become a real intermediary of East-West trade.²²

Križanic, like de Gronier, advocated the creation of fleets in the Caspian and on the northern coast. He encouraged the government to favor exports over imports, "or more precisely, to favor the import of raw materials and the export of processed goods." Consequently, he advocated restrictions on the exportation of other than surplus raw materials and on the importation of certain finished products such as paper. This, he thought, would also encourage the development

¹⁷ Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 2, 21–23; RA Kommerskollegium: Huvudarkivet F IV: 96: Handel med Ryssland 1670-talet.

¹⁸ J.T. Kotilaine, "Riga's Trade with its Muscovite Hinterland in the Seventeenth Century," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 30:2 (1999), 149–51; Arnold Soom, "Narva metsakaubandus ja metsatööstus XVII sajandi lõpul," *Ajalooline Ajakiri* 19 (1940), 2.

¹⁹ Baklanova, "Ivan de-Gron," 111.

of domestic industry through import-substitution. In line with his opposition to monopolies, he demanded full access to trade by people of all social estates. The availability of credit was to be increased through non-interest-bearing government loans, the formation of banks, and the use of letters of credit. Križanic's key idea, in Baron's words, was that "the interests of the state treasury would be most effectively safeguarded were the ruler to encourage enterprise rather than make exorbitant demands upon the producers of wealth."²³ Efficiency throughout the economy would be improved through education, better infrastructure and equipment, standardization, and liberalization. New exports could be produced by cultivating dyestuffs and tobacco, as well as wine in the south. Similar encouragement was given to whaling, as well as to mining where he felt that experts should be dispatched to all corners of the country with the promise of a reward.²⁴

Križanic explicitly addressed the question of Russian backwardness. He clearly saw the state as the driving force of the necessary changes and attributed the Tsar a pivotal role in foreign trade: "As a decisive means of terminating the commercial exploitation of Russian by foreigners,...the tsar should take all foreign trade into his own hands.... He could thereby ensure that nothing needed at home is exported and nothing unnecessarily imported. Similarly, foreign merchants would be compelled to pay good prices for Russian goods (and presumably not overcharge for goods they brought in from abroad)."²⁵ While this statism would have cut dependence on foreign merchants, it also would have curbed the freedom of action of Russian merchants.

Baron finds fault with Križanic's mercantilism on three important issues: (i) his insistence that the "transformation of Russia be carried out in conformity with religious and ethical principles;" (ii) his apparent acceptance, nay idealization, of a stratified class society, and (iii) his statism: "It would be impossible, in our opinion, to find anywhere in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries a program that required so ubiquitous and pervasive a role for the state as Križanic's."²⁶ He further saw Križanic as un-mercantilist inasmuch as he dismissed policies incompatible with Christian morals, e.g. those reflective of greed, as unacceptable. However, in fairness, one should remember that in many western European countries mercantilism was the economic counterpart of political absolutism which was justified by theories of divinely appointed rulers. Similarly, while the class system may appear incompatible with the modernizing thrust of mercantilism, classes are a way of structuring societies and they retained this key role in western Europe up to and even beyond the French Revolution. The fact that a middle class is absent from Križanic's classification is no more peculiar than having the rising bourgeoisie be part of the French

²⁰ Ibid., 114–16, 120; Bazilevich, "Elementy merkantilizma," 13.

²¹ Samuel H. Baron, "Was Križanic a Mercantilist?," *History of Political Economy* 19 (1987), 67.

²² Ibid., 67–69.

²³ Ibid., 71–72.

²⁴ Ibid., 72.

Third Estate. Križanic seemed to espouse a rather classical contempt of merchants as executors of unproductive labor. This is an attitude that is not only peculiar but more importantly incompatible with the rest of Križanic's agenda. Even then, however, he probably would not have objected to a system like the seventeenth-century Muscovite institution of state-appointed corporations of merchants which could in a sense be seen as the Tsar's servants.

In many essential ways, Križanic's agenda reminds one of economic "catching-up" through state-led industrialization, etc., much along the lines described by the A. Gerschenkron in the context of late nineteenth-century Russia. Russian history has been one of trying to overcome economic backwardness and, in the absence—or rather relative underdevelopment—of the structures and mechanisms that allowed gradual modernization in Western Europe, the state has had to step in to speed up the process. Križanic was effectively a proto-Gerschenkronian, justifying the heightened role of the state in Muscovy by two factors: (i) the absence of a strong West European-style bourgeoisie and (ii) the unfavorable geographic circumstances which made Russia a "closed" and isolated country. State-led industrialization and import-substitution stood to make Russia a much more populous and prosperous country than she was.²⁷

While the intellectual history of foreign influences on Russian mercantilism is of great importance, it does normally not address the key question of the relevance of these ideas and the ultimate influence that de Gronier and Križanic had. It seems clear, however, that many of their ideas were not only studied but also absorbed and implemented. De Gronier's project was read by Aleksei Mikhailovich and also noticed by the Swedish resident in Moscow Johan de Rodes. Evidently his ideas, which appear to have had an impression on foreign merchants, too, played some role in the development of the Russian potash industry. It is more difficult to establish the degree of influence Križanic enjoyed in Russia. On the one hand, we know that he "had remarkable success in gaining the acquaintance of leading courtiers," yet he was soon enough exiled to Siberia for reasons unknown to us.²⁸ Nonetheless, both men belonged a limited group of permanent foreigners in Russia, and it is very unlikely that their ideas did not attract more than modest interest by the local political elite. Many of their ideas circulated in the Muscovite political discourse for several decades. Moreover, there is an undeniable correlation between many of the measures proposed by the two theorists and the subsequent evolution of Russian economic policy.

²⁵ Ibid., 73.

²⁶ Baron, "Was Križanic a Mercantilist?," 80–85.

²⁷ Bazilevich, "Elementy merkantilizma," 25–6. For further background discussion on this, see Samuel H. Baron, "The Weber Thesis and the Failure of Capitalist Development in 'Early Modern' Russia," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, N.F., 18 (1970), 321–36.

²⁸ Baklanova, "Ian de-Gron," 117–19; Bazilevich, "Elementy merkantilizma," 13; Konstantin Bazilevich, "Kollektivnye chelobit'ia torgovykh liudei i bor'ba za russkii rynok v pervoi polovine XVII veka," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR: Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk* (1932), no. 2, 98.

THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIAN MERCANTILISTS

Alongside foreign influences, and perhaps in response to them, Russia also developed her own “home-brewed” mercantilism. Of considerable importance in normalizing the fiscal situation in the ‘40s was the activity of Boris Morozov as the head of the government. His record was ultimately mixed, not least because of the failure of his ambitious salt-tax reform which sought to minimize tax-evasion by taxing a basic necessity used by all. However, he was receptive to new ideas and many of his reforms may have been inspired by exchanges with foreigners, as both he and his colleague Nazarii Chistoi were frequently advised by Winius. Morozov was a staunch supporter of commercial interests and demanded a complete monopoly of trade and handicrafts for the townsmen (*posadskie liudi*) whose distinctiveness and rights were defined *de iure* by the 1649 *Ulozhenie*. Overall, the town reform of 1648–52 played a key role in strengthening the urban classes of artisans and merchants by effectively eliminating many of their competitors. The Russian artisan class thrived in the second half of the century and one of their main products, processed oxhides known as *iufti*, came to account for nearly one-half of Russia’s overall exports by the end of the century.²⁹ Morozov also defended the interests of Russian merchants against foreigners and resisted the widespread special privileges of various strata of society. His government preoccupied itself with ensuring a secure revenue base for the government through efforts to remove the traditional privileges of monasteries, *gosti*, and foreign merchants and through the liquidation of the previously tax-exempt *belye slobody*.³⁰

Kliuchevskii correctly portrayed the *Ulozhenie* as an attempt to reassert central authority through codification of administrative practices and elimination of corruption.³¹ Other analysts, in contrast, have dismissed it as a fatal step in the wrong direction, towards a more ordered, hierarchical, and rigid society of the kind that was more characteristic of the Middle Ages than the early modern period. However, the new socio-economic ordering, even the imposition of serfdom, was arguably necessary in order to allow the weak central government to impose more uniform norms on economic policy, the administration of which had tended to be fairly decentralized. It would not be an exaggeration to characterize the *Ulozhenie* as the single most important monument of Muscovite mercantilism. In it, the Muscovite state addressed the key question of resource allocation among social strata. Certain physical locations were now associated

²⁹ Andrei V. Demkin, “Izmeneniia v politike Russkogo pravitel’sтва po otnosheniiu k zapadnoevropeiskomu kupechestvu v 40 gg. XVII v.,” in *Reformy v Rossii XVI–XIX vv.: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov*, ed. Ivan A. Bulygin and Andrei V. Demkin (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1992), 51; Richard Hellie, “The Stratification of Muscovite Society: The Townsmen,” *Russian History* 5:2 (1978), 130 ff; Iurii V. Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli i proekty gosudarstvennykh preobrazovaniï Rossii 40–60-kh godov XVII veka (Uchebnoe sposobie)* (Chita: Ministerstvo prosveshcheniia RSFSR et al., 1973), 56.

³⁰ Iurii A. Tikhonov, “Tamozhennaia politika Russkogo gosudarstva s serediny XVI do 60-kh godov XVII v.,” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 53 (1955), 221–22; Hellie, “The Stratification of Muscovite Society,” 119–75.

with particular kinds of production. Distributional questions thus settled, Russian could devote more attention to increasing efficiency in their particular spheres of production. The vexing issues of tax evasion, peasant flight, relocation of productive facilities to land that was taxed less no longer acted as a constant drain on resources. By successfully curbing the problem of mobility, the *Ulozhenie* created a stable tax base on which a growing burden could more easily be placed. Without such a tax base, Russia's rise to the ranks of European superpowers would have been well-nigh impossible. This secure revenue-base was, moreover, an absolute precondition for state-led economic reform.

Morozov's role as the nation's "leading mercantilist" was eventually taken over by Afanasii L. Ordin-Nashchokin, whose increasing proximity to power allowed many of his innovative ideas to be translated into economic policies.³² Nashchokin's mercantilism combined considerable pragmatism with knowledge and foresight rare among seventeenth-century Russian politicians. He, like Križanec, recognized that Russia's backwardness was not merely institutional but, in many important ways, geopolitical in nature. A prosperous Russia for Nashchokin would have to be one with free access to the Baltic. This was a key plank of the offensive on Riga he designed in 1656. In spite of the failure to reach the ultimate goal, Russia gained control of much of Livonia until 1661 and Nashchokin launched an ambitious program of local economic reform, including ultimately unsuccessful attempts at shipbuilding. He was also an active participant in efforts to overcome the copper money crisis collecting some R 27,000 of silver money already by December 1660. Even after his days as the *voevoda* of Tsarevichev-Dmitriev (Kokenhusen, Latv. Koknese) were numbered, Nashchokin remained an economic reformer, playing a key role in the repopulation and economic exploitation of the Smolensk area and its incorporation in Riga's sphere of influence. His 1662 reforms in Smolensk focused on combating the strength of foreign merchants and on maximizing silver and currency receipts from abroad, *inter alia* by forcing foreigners to settle their deficits in bullion.³³

These measures served as prototype for subsequent more full-fledged reforms in Nashchokin's native Pskov in 1665, which, however, were repealed within a year.³⁴ Nashchokin's initiatives limited the right of foreign merchants to engage in trade to fairs organized twice a year during which no duties would be exacted. Foreigners were forbidden to commission Russian merchants to work for them and they were no longer allowed to trade with people other than Pskov merchants. Poorer Russian merchants were told to ally themselves with wealthier

³¹ Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History*, 139.

³² Samuel H. Baron, "A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin and the Orel Affair," in idem, *Explorations in Muscovite History* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1991), 1–22.

³³ J.T. Kotilaine, "Opening a Window on Europe: Foreign Trade and Military Conquest on Russia's Western Border in the seventeenth Century," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, N.F. 46 (1998) 4, 511–4; Iurii V. Kurskov [J. Kurskovs], "A.L. Ordins-Nashchokins-Kokneses vaivads (1656.–1661. g.), Jautajuma par vīna sociālā ekonomiskājiem uzskatiem," in *Vēstures problemas*, ed. Karlis Strazdiņš (Rīga, 1958), vol. 2; Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 60.

colleagues, something that Nashchokin saw, among other things, as a guarantee of social stability. A merchant-run *Zemskaja izba* was even to act as the main judicial body in the city. The interests of Pskov merchants were to be ensured by favoring Russian merchants in foreign trade and fixing the prices of export commodities so as to avoid harmful bargaining. The sale of liquor was deregulated. A group of Pskovians led by Mina Grobova made renewed attempts to resuscitate the reforms in 1668 but were arrested following a petition to the Tsar.³⁵ The Pskov reforms in particular, are very reminiscent of the reform program pursued in the Baltic cities across the border.³⁶

While Nashchokin remained first and foremost a diplomat, one feels compelled to agree with E.V.Chistiakova's assessment that "the goal of Nashchokin's diplomacy was the increase of Russia's foreign trade."³⁷ Economic development was the key objective of his political activity and, unlike Križanic, Nashchokin had no compunctions about the immorality of commerce. On the contrary, he described it as an activity pleasing to God. However, acutely aware of the strength of Western merchants, he did support Križanic's desire to free Russian trade of the meddling of foreigners. The peak of this process was reached with the unveiling of the New Commercial Code in 1667 which was based on his project in Pskov.³⁸ 1667 also saw other significant accomplishments on Nashchokin's part, most notably the 1667 commercial treaty with Persia whereby the Shah consented to export its entire silk crop via Russia. The treaty allowed an Armenian company of New Julfa to monopolize this transit trade. Connected with a treaty provision requiring the Muscovites to guarantee the safety of the Armenians in Russia, Nashchokin launched a shipbuilding project in the court village of Dedinovo in Kolomenskoe *uezd*. Five ships were built by 1669, led by the *Orel*. Concessions to the Armenians were followed by a grant 1668 of unimpeded free trade by Khwarazm (Khiva) merchants who acted as intermediaries in commerce with India.³⁹

³⁴ Elena V.Chistiakova, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie vzgliady A.L.Ordina-Nashchokina (XVII vek)," *Trudy Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 20 (*Sbornik rabot po istorii*) (1950), 3–57; Konstantin G.Mitiaev, "Oboroty i torgovye svyazi smolenskogo rynka v 70-kh godakh XVII v.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 8 (1942), 54–83; Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 67–68; Iurii V.Kurskov, "Pskovskaia gorodskaja reforma 1665 goda (k voprosu o sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh vzgliadakh A.L.Ordina-Nashchokina)," *Uchenye zapiski LGPI im. A.I.Gertsena* 194 (1958), 169–92.

³⁵ Chistiakova, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie vzgliady A.L.Ordina-Nashchokina, 28–29; Anatolii I.Pashkov, ed., *Istoriia russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1955–60), vol. 1, part 1, 234–35; Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 68–69.

³⁶ See especially Arnold Soom, "Der Kampf der baltischen Städte gegen das Fremdkapital im 17. Jahrhundert," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 49 (1962), 433–58; idem, "Die merkantilistische Wirtschaftspolitik Schwedens," 183–222.

³⁷ Quoted in Baron, "A.L.Ordin-Nashchokin and the Orel Affair," 4; Chistiakova, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie vzgliady A.L.Ordina-Nashchokina," 15.

³⁸ Baron, "A.L.Ordin-Nashchokin and the Orel Affair," 4.

Nashchokin's mercantilism was considerably less statist than Križanić's. In his idealized administration bureaucrats would be independent thinkers capable of following his maxim: "Where the eye sees and the ear hears, action must be taken without delay." Corruption and sloth would give way to "zeal" and "singleness of purpose," and ethics that would render state compulsion redundant.⁴⁰ The role of the state was primarily geopolitical, extend the realm and-if that could not be done—maintain peace so as to maximize the chances of economic development and trade. Nashchokin's focus may be explained by his background as a regional administrator. Much of his reformist zeal found its expression at the local level and he clearly did not see a lack of state intervention as an impediment for economic reform. Nashchokin, unlike his ideological predecessors, also had the advantage of personal experience as a merchant. Commercial operations with Riga had given him a good understanding of how international trade operated, and he also appreciated the way the Swedes had organized their economic administration. While the parallels between Nashchokin's ideas and those of de Gronier and Križanić are obvious, he was just as directly influenced by Swedish mercantilism and was eager to replicate the economic institutions of the Baltic provinces. The mercantilistic policies of Duke Jakob of Courland are likely to have constituted another significant influence, given the close ties between the Duchy and Muscovy in the middle of the century. Nashchokin was indeed a self-confessed admirer of "German (i.e. Western) business and German customs."⁴¹

Many of Nashchokin's ideas were developed further by Vasilii V. Golitsyn, whose ideas form the bridge between late Muscovite mercantilism and Peter I's modernization efforts. Golitsyn's reformist zeal was mercantilistically inspired in that he recognized the intimate relationship between the urgent modernization of the armed forces and the economic well-being of Russia. One of the most dramatic expressions of his radicalism was a proposal to abolish serfdom as conducive to efficiency gains and increased tax receipts.⁴² Even if Golitsyn did possess considerable talent as an administrator, his practical significance was limited by his association with Regent Sophia whose overthrow in 1689 also terminated Golitsyn's career.⁴³

³⁹ Baron, "A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin and the Orel Affair," 6; Pashkov, ed., *Istoriia russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli*, vol. 1, part 1, 238–39; Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 79.

⁴⁰ Baron, "A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin and the Orel Affair," 5.

⁴¹ Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History*, 362; Edgars Dunsdorfs, *Latvijas vsture 1600–1710* (Stockholm: Daugava, 1962), 337–41; Walter Eckert, *Kurland unter dem Einfluss des Merkantilismus* (Riga: G.Löffler, 1927).

⁴² Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History*, 381–82.

⁴³ For a survey of Golitsyn's career, see: Lindsey Hughes, *Russia and the West: The Life of a Seventeenth-Century Westernizer Prince Vasil' Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1643–1714)* (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1984).

RUSSIAN MERCANTILISM IN PRACTICE

The Muscovite government in the seventeenth century introduced a number of reforms designed to improve efficiency and enhance economic independence. In a number of cases, clear links can be drawn between policy decisions and the mercantilist ideas introduced by foreign or Russian economic thinkers and reformers. In other instances, policies whose conception had little to do with mercantilism nonetheless led to measures which served the key purpose of strengthening the state. In spite of this convergence between Russian and western European economic policies, it would be wrong to characterize Russian mercantilism as a carefully thought-out economic program. Indeed, reformist measures were adopted at various times, often with completely unrelated and essentially *ad hoc* motivations. The main thrust of reformist activity was found in the agricultural sphere, colonial policy in Siberia, and commercial policy broadly defined where the link with European mercantilism was the most obvious.

Of particular significance for the Russian economy in the seventeenth century was the evolution of private landholding, where the new policies arguably had more in common with medieval than with early modern Europe. The historical distinction between hereditary *votchina* lands and conditionally held service lands, the so-called *pomest'e*, gradually disappeared. Starting in the late sixteenth century, it became increasingly common for government service, and thus *pomest'e* holdings to be passed on within families, and decrees in the 1610s "forbade the transfer of service land to anyone besides relatives."⁴⁴ The probability of myopic economic behavior was further reduced as moves starting in the 1620s ensured all *pomest'e*-owners life-long control of their lands. While some legal restrictions remained, government servitors evolved into a class of hereditary landowners by the middle of the century. These trends were consolidated by a 1674 decree which "permitted a discharged *pomeshchik* to sell or mortgage his service lands."⁴⁵ Conditional land holdings had become private property, a state of affairs that the government recognized in 1676–7 by effectively abolishing the old distinction between *votchina* and *pomest'e*.

Important as the land reforms were, the state stood to really benefit from them only if two conditions obtained: (i) the landowners had to be guaranteed access to adequate labor resources, and (ii) the system of direct taxation should be redesigned so as to allow the state to claim its share of the profits generated by increased agricultural productivity. While Russia's vast land masses easily lent themselves to agricultural production—subsistence level agriculture was possible even in much of northern Russia—labor was the crucial limiting variable, so often in short supply. The endemic problem of peasant mobility reached a new peak during the Time of Troubles which "shifted masses of the taxpaying population about and disorganized the old communities...which were jointly responsible for the taxes paid by their individual members."⁴⁶ In northwestern and western Russia especially entire villages were abandoned. Moreover, this phenomenon represented merely the peak of a long exodus of people to the

⁴⁴ Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change*, 57.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 58.

southern frontiers or simply to seigniors who demanded lighter obligations. Yet “[m]embers of the middle service class could not afford the loss of any peasants...”⁴⁷ Tackling the problem of mobility was crucial not only for Russia’s security, through protecting the livelihood of the servitor class, but also for efficient economic production in the core areas with labor shortages. A series of measures in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century tackled this challenge by stripping peasants of various rights until serfdom on all privately owned land was codified in 1649.

The successful efforts to curb peasant mobility allowed the government to institute a more efficient system of direct taxation which was further enhanced by Morozov’s aforementioned town reforms designed to create a uniform tax-paying class of artisans and merchants. The old system of direct taxation was based on the unit of *sokha*, a predetermined amount of tilled land. Peasant flight had significantly reduced the amount of tilled land in central Russia and peasants increasingly avoided taxes by cultivating abandoned land which was no longer listed in the *sokha* records. A transition through the so called “living *chetvert*” eventually led to the adoption of a system of taxes levied on homesteads. Under the *sokha* and living *chetvert* systems, inefficiencies had been caused by the often arbitrary administrative distribution of the tax burden among the families living in a given area. In order to overcome the problem, the government had to levy taxes on individual peasants. Even though a new system of taxing individual homesteads was indeed adopted following the census of 1646, the efficiency gains were limited by the fact that, while the amount of tax per homestead was fixed by the government for individual districts, taxes continued to be assessed on the district as a whole.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, efficiency increased because of better data collection—the censuses of 1646 and 1678–9, a broader tax base, less mobility, and the unification of the system of direct taxes, the rates of which differed depending on whether an individual was free or a serf. The increased efficiency of tax-collection allowed the government to increase the rate of taxation. For instance, the *strel'tsy* duty, used to finance the growing army, increased ninefold in 1630–63 and new duties were added in the 1670s.⁴⁹

Related to the government’s need for more revenue was the gradual conquest of Siberia starting in the sixteenth century. The costs of the conquest were minimal as it was largely carried out by small numbers of adventurers and bandits. A more substantial financial burden was imposed by the more systematic colonization and the imposition of a system of administration. Annual shipments of money from Moscow amounted to R 20,453 in 1632 and R 15,000 in 1691, even though, to save money, payments to the serving men were often withheld, leading to arrears of R 143,000 by 1691. Overall, the colonial venture appears to have been highly profitable. With new settlements, self-sufficiency in the agricultural sphere was attained by the early 1680s when grain shipments from

⁴⁶ Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History*, 184.

⁴⁷ Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change*, 127.

⁴⁸ Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History*, 246.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 246–47.

European Russia ceased. The rich fur resources of Siberia allowed the government to acquire furs worth R 50–125,000 a year, in large part by collecting the in-kind *iasak* duty from the native population. Formal tax payments were supplemented by various “gifts” presented by the locals. The real value of this treasure was increased by the fact that the furs and pelts normally sold at some 20 percent more in Moscow. To this, one has to add taxes collected in money which seem to have ranged between R 7,000 and R 57,000 p.a. Overall, Siberia is likely to have contributed upwards of 10 percent of the state’s annual budget revenues. On the other hand, Moscow’s expenditures in Siberia seldom exceeded R 100,000 p.a. and thus the overall “profit rate” appears to have ranged between 10 and 40 percent.⁵⁰

The influence of mercantilist ideas was particularly pronounced in the sphere of commercial policy, the main focus of which was on the “specie” constraint. The Russians emulated the West in seeking to set up the rudiments of a domestic industry, primarily for the purpose of import-substitution. Much of the industrial development relied on cooperation with foreigners who would typically introduce their Russian apprentices to the basic techniques. In almost every area of significance, the government granted concessions to a relatively small group of Western entrepreneurs, among whom the Winius, Marselis, Akema, and Van Sweeden families deserve particular mention. Even if the degree of Russia’s backwardness was rather exceptional on the European scale, important steps were taken to stimulate metal extraction and production, as well as to establish other productive activities.⁵¹ A 1632 grant led to the development of Russian iron industry, initially in the Tula-Kashira region, subsequently also at Olonets. In spite of ownership changes and financial difficulties, production increased and arms deliveries of some substance were made with increasing regularity. Johan van Sweeden became, among other things, the pioneer of Russian paper and textile industries.⁵² In addition, foreigners more or less single-handedly laid the foundations for metal prospecting, even if concrete results remained rather meager in the pre-Petrine period. They also developed saltpeter and gunpowder

⁵⁰ George V. Lantzeff, *Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), 123–54, 173.

⁵¹ With the exception of iron, metal extraction remained largely unsuccessful, in spite of a number of searches for silver, gold, and copper. Only efforts by Peter Marselis and Harmen van der Gaten led to the development of a copper extraction industry at Olonets during the last quarter of the century. Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 2, 23–5. For a more general survey of Russian proto-industrialization, see: Joseph T. Fuhrmann, *The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972).

⁵² Tikhonov, “Tamozhennaia politika Russkogo gosudarstva,” 243–44. Further on the development of Russian iron industry, see Nina N. Stoskova, *Pervye metallurgicheskie zavody Rossii* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1962); Pavel G. Liubomirov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi promyshlennosti: XVII, XVIII i nachalo XIX veka* (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1947); Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 2, 4–12. Further background information on foreign entrepreneurship in Russia can be found in: Vera A. Kovrigina, *Nemetskaia sloboda Moskvy i ee zhiteli v kontse XVII—pervoi chetverti XVIII veka* (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1998), 183 ff.

production.⁵³ A series of measures in 1687 and 1695 sought to develop domestic industry by making it more profitable to export finished products. Raw hides and *iufiti* were equated in value for the purposes of assessing export duty.⁵⁴

Overall, it is naturally important to recognize that what Russia experienced was far from anything comparable to, say, Colbertism in France. Muscovite industry was in its infancy and the state developed no comprehensive legal framework for its industrial policy.⁵⁵ Of much greater consequence in the seventeenth-century context was foreign trade where the single most important element of continuity between the disparate measures adopted was the steady rise of protectionist tendencies which, of course, were a natural concomitant of mercantilism everywhere. Most famously, the English Navigation Laws sought to stimulate the growth of English trade and shipping at the expense of the nation's foreign competitors. Similar reasoning constituted the basic legal framework for the regulation of foreign trade in the Baltic ports. The old principle "*der Gast handele nicht mit dem Gaste*" remained an objective for policymakers, even if local shortages of capital in some cases made it impossible to uphold.⁵⁶ It was widely believed that domestic merchants should be given some degree of monopoly in intermediating foreign trade, so as to allow them to prosper and curb the influence of foreign merchants who otherwise sought to sell dearly and buy cheaply, a state of affairs which constituted an obvious threat to the expected bullion inflows.

While protectionism was more the norm than the exception in seventeenth-century economic policy, it posed a particular challenge in the Russian case. The Muscovite state was far weaker than its western European counterparts and the Kremlin never really formulated a systematic program of economic development. Its limited capital resources and still rudimentary administrative apparatus made it impossible for the state to fully control the process of modernizing the Russian economy. On the other hand, the need to turn to foreign merchants for scarce know-how and capital not surprisingly generated xenophobic impulses among domestic merchants and produced a highly charged economic policy debate. This xenophobia expressed itself in a number of high-profile petitions by Russian

⁵³ Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 2, 42 ff. For a summary of Dutch weapons exports to Russia, see: J.W. Veluwenkamp, "De Nederlandse wapenhandel op Rusland in de zeventiende eeuw," *Armamentaria* 31 (1996), 71–76. More generally: Thomas Esper, "Military Self-Sufficiency and Weapons Technology in Muscovite Russia," *Slavic Review* 28 (1969), 185–208. While the role of foreigners as monopolists was of pivotal importance, monopolies were sometimes farmed out to Russians. For instance, Ivan Epanchin controlled the *karluk* (fish glue) monopoly since 1688 and the *Gost* I. Pankrat'ev was granted the linseed monopoly. Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 145.

⁵⁴ Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 80.

⁵⁵ Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 151.

⁵⁶ For policies pursued in Swedish Narva, see: Enn Küng, "Handelsverhältnisse für Fremde in Narva im 17. Jahrhundert," in *Die schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen Estland und Livland im 16.–18. Jahrhundert*, Aleksander Loit and Helmut Piirimäe (Stockholm: Centre for Baltic Studies, Stockholm University, 1993), 179–92.

merchants to the government, designed to show that the privileges granted to their foreign competitors hurt Russia more than they helped her. Under their influence, the stated goal of economic policy periodically shifted to this more narrowly defined special-interests agenda of ridding the country of the allegedly pernicious influence of foreign merchants and entrepreneurs. Although the petitions of elite merchants increased in sophistication over time, their emphasis remained squarely on the losses suffered by Russian merchants in the hands of foreigners. References to customs revenues lost by the state because of speculation and cheating by foreigners were secondary and used exclusively as an argument for expelling Westerners from the Russian interior. The main objective was to use legal means to shift the terms of this international exchange in favor of Russian merchants.⁵⁷ While clear-cut distinctions based on the motivations behind different varieties of mercantilism are nearly impossible, the agenda pursued by Muscovite merchants was clearly heavily influenced by “class” interests rather than the state’s interest. This platform had no explicit goal apart from wealth redistribution between foreigners and Russians. For that reason alone, this xenophobic agenda often resulted in measures incompatible with mercantilism defined in more general terms.

While the Russian merchant “class” was far from numerous, the elite corporations—especially the *gosti* and the *Gostinnaia sotnia*—constituted a very homogenous group with clearly defined legal privileges and interests. Johan P. Kilburger, a Swedish diplomat and observer, depicted the *gosti* as a powerful group of shrewd, self-seeking businessman which was also of key importance as a means for the government to control the direction of foreign trade. Kilburger described the elite merchants as “a self-interested and harmful group.... They ceaselessly think of how to exclude [Russia’s] commerce entirely from the Baltic Sea, and nowhere allow freedom of trade, in order that they alone may the better cheat the master [the Tsar] and fill their own pockets.”⁵⁸ Kilburger’s scathing comments naturally have a lot to do with his frustration at the elite merchants’ opposition to the Swedish policy of diverting Russian trade to the Baltic. It is equally clear, however, that prely distributional concerns were often central to the thinking of representatives of the state-appointed corporations. In their frequently expressed longing for “the good old days” when westerners were under control, the elite merchants became early representatives of the age-old Russian struggle between Westernizers and (proto-) nationalists.

A protracted tug-of-war developed between Russian and foreign merchants. At the beginning of the century, under Boris Godunov, “Westernizers” gained the upper hand as the Tsar evidently deliberately sought to curb the influence of Russian elite merchants by offering numerous incentives to foreign merchants. However, the circumstances changed dramatically following the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar. The elite merchants were once again coopted by the

⁵⁷ It is important to note, however, this protectionistic attitude does not appear to have been shared by lower tiers of the merchant class who often developed close ties with foreigners. Man’kov, *Zakonodatel’svo i pravo Rossii*, 140.

⁵⁸ Boris G. Kurts, *Sochinenie Kil’burgera o russkoi torgovle v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Kiev: Tip. I.I. Chokolova, 1915), 164.

government and their numbers dramatically increased—in the case of *gosti* from 15 in 1613 to 25 in 1625—in an effort to stimulate foreign trade and curb foreign influence. Their growing economic clout was accompanied by greater political assertiveness. This was helped by the fact that many appointments to *gosti* were made at least in part as a reward for services rendered and loyalty during the Time of Troubles. Their new proximity to the throne allowed Muscovite merchants to make the first known demand for barring foreign merchants from the Russian interior as early as 1627.⁵⁹

Especially in the early Romanov years, these aspirations were enhanced by the disconcerting memory of the Time of Troubles when, in addition to the Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish interventions, James I had offered to turn northern Russian into an English protectorate.⁶⁰ The negative perception of Westerners was exacerbated by the preferential tax treatment afforded to them and by their tendency to collude in order to reduce prices on Russian goods while exacting extortionate prices for their own wares. For instance, the *Gost' Averkii Kirillov* estimated that in 1667 Russian merchants trading at Arkhangel'sk lost R 15,000 because Westerners had driven down *iuft'* prices.⁶¹

By the time the Russian merchants embarked on their struggle against their foreign rivals, they faced a deeply entrenched “enemy.” Already by the beginning of the century, Dutch, English, and North German merchants had with remarkable success penetrated the Russian market due to their ability to establish supply networks of the “poor and indebted” Russian merchants and, led by the Dutch, they completely dominated the Arkhangel'sk market. They frequently traded in the Russian interior, often without requisite permission by the authorities. In the circumstances, it was clear that the Westerners could not be expelled from Russia overnight, nor was it obvious that such a measure would be beneficial to Russia. Nonetheless, renewed pleas to control foreign penetration were made in the 40s. The 1648–9 Assembly of the Land heard a broadly based demand for the prohibition of trade by foreigners in the Russian interior, and this approach was in fact applied to the English in an apparent response to the execution of Charles I. In addition, some Westerners lost their houses and Peter Marselis and Thieleman Akema's iron works on the Vaga were temporarily nationalized in response to a rift with Andries Winus and claims that they were not honoring their 1632 contract.⁶²

⁵⁹ Nina B. Golikova, *Privilegirovannye kupecheskie korporatsii Rossii XVI–pervoi chetverti XVIII v.* (Moscow: “Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli”—RGADA 1998), vol. 1, 60–61, 86, 89; Pavel P. Smirnov, “Novoe chelobit'e moskovskikh torgovykh liudei o vysylke inozemtsev 1627 goda,” *Chtenita v istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* 23 (1912), 97–102. Reproduced in Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 131–34.

⁶⁰ Inna I. Liubimenco, “Angliiskii proekt 1612 goda o podchinenii russkogo Severa protektoratu korolia Iakova I,” *Nauchnyi istoricheskii zhurnal* 2:3 (1914), 1–16.

⁶¹ Elena V. Chistiakova, “Novotorgovy ustav 1667 goda,” *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1957 god* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1958), 111–13; Bazilevich, “Kollektivnye chelobit'ia torgovykh liudei,” 96–7, 104, 106; Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo v Rossiiv XVII v.*, vol. 1, 67.

While the state was relatively slow to challenge the deeply-entrenched position of Western merchants, the hostility that the Russian merchant elite very often translated into discrimination and bullying not directly sanctioned by the law. The position of the *gosti* as local economic administrators and tax collectors gave them ample opportunity to bend the rules in their favor. Thus the *Gost'* Grigorii Shorin, acting as the Head of Customs at Arkhangel'sk in 1629, forbade Fabian Smith of the Muscovy Company to buy tar for the needs of the English, something that the government had explicitly permitted. In 1646, the *Gost'* Kirill Bosov valued goods brought by a group of Dutch and Hamburg merchants at 2–3 times the normal rate for tax purposes. The *Gost'* Vasilii Shorin in the late 50s restricted the rights of foreigners to trade directly with Russian merchants and charged a group of 11 Dutch merchants excess duty at R 920. The *Gost'* Grigorii Nikitnikov appears to have played a key role in trying to push out the important De Vogelaer-Klenck partnership which had since 1613 paid customs duties at half the regular rate. In 1640–1, the company was forced to pay full taxes, although an intervention by the Dutch *Staatshouder* resulted in the restoration of the old privileges in 1642, but only until 1650. The old rights were again temporary restored in 1662–7.⁶³

Mercantilism and protectionism mixed in peculiar ways also in customs policy where reformist activity constituted one of the most important achievements of Russian economic policy-making in the seventeenth century, eliminating as it did a “most complex and confusing” system of internal customs duties. Various cities had traditionally exacted a wide array of different imposts, something that not only added to transportation costs, but in fact created ample opportunity for corruption and cheating. The first half of the century witnessed a certain convergence in the policies of the various regions, something that is traditionally presented as a key element in the formation of an “all-Russian market.”⁶⁴ Subjecting all goods and merchants to a uniform and consistent set of customs duties promoted efficiency by making long-distance trade more profitable and predictable. It, however, also provided the legal framework for eliminating various tax exemptions granted to foreigners. Whereas under Mikhail Fedorovich the maximum rate of customs duty on foreign wares had been 7 percent (1.5–2 percent at Arkhangel'sk and 3–5 percent in the interior), Aleksei Mikhailovich had initially revised these rates to 3–4 percent at Arkhangel'sk and 1.5–2 percent on transit into the Russian interior. However, foreign merchants now paid additional duties of one percent. Starting in 1646, when all existing tax concessions to foreigners were eliminated, the burden on Westerners may in fact have begun to exceed the taxes levied on Russian merchants. The new tax code of

⁶² Demkin, “Izmeneniia v politike Russkogo pravitel'stva,” 48–49, 51–3; Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 2, 5–6.

⁶³ Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 66–7.

⁶⁴ Evgraf G. Osokin, *Vnutrennie tamozhennye poshliny v Rossii* (Kazan': Gubernskaia tip., 1850), 112; Tikhonov, “Tamozhennaia politika Russkogo gosudarstva,” 258; Aleksandra T. Nikolaeva, “Otrazhenie v ustavnykh tamozhennykh gramotakh Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVI–XVII vv. protsessa obrazovaniia vs Rossiiskogo rynka,” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 31 (1950), 262; Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 141.

1653 combined a uniform internal rate with an overall increase in imposts. Simultaneous instructions sent to the *Voevoda* Iu.B. Miloslavskii on tax collection at Arkhangel'sk reveal a desire to carefully control interactions between Russian and foreign merchants. Persistent abuses and inefficiencies prompted Vasilii Shorin, the head of the Arkhangel'sk customs in 1658, again to recommend measures on a close supervision of trade and its more complete concentration in Russian hands.⁶⁵ K.V.Bazilevich suggests that the government in fact came close to adopting a significantly more protectionist policy *vis-à-vis* foreign merchants, but stopped short because of the onset of the Polish war and the fiscal demands this policy created.⁶⁶

The tax reforms of the middle of the century were in part related to the government's agenda of trying to ensure the supremacy of the Arkhangel'sk route in Russian foreign trade, largely in a bid to maximize the degree of control over foreign trade. Ever since the loss of Narva to the Swedes in 1581, and more important, since Russia was completely barred from the Baltic in the Stolbovo treaty of 1617, the Russian government had discriminated against the traditionally dominant Baltic route, a task made easier by the devastation caused in northwestern Russia—the natural hinterland of the Swedish Baltic ports—by the Time of Troubles. The growing discrimination against foreign merchants in the Russian interior made it particularly difficult to revive trade across the Swedish border. The reforms of 1653, adopted at a time of great difficulties for Arkhangel'sk and considerable diplomatic tension on the Swedish border, made the discrimination of the Baltic route even more obvious. They put the basic duty at Arkhangel'sk at 2 percent on weighed and 1.5 percent on unweighed goods, while the basic border duty at Novgorod and Pskov was 6 percent, accompanied by a 2 percent levy on goods taken further into the Russian interior. There was a temporary doubling of these duties in 1663.⁶⁷

The Russian government also sought to promote Arkhangel'sk by taking control of trade in certain commodities which would invariably be sold to foreigners by the White Sea. The Tsar typically monopolized re-exported luxury goods from Asia, mainly various dyes and medicaments. Of much greater importance was Persian raw silk which, while not a government monopoly *sensu stricto*, was closely supervised by the Crown to prevent a diversion to the Baltic. The Crown similarly controlled to varying degrees certain strategic exports, e.g. tar, potash, caviar, and masts. The most important single export, in both volume and value terms, was grain, which in the early 1650s accounted for nearly one-quarter of the total exports of Arkhangel'sk—the only exit route where grain was

⁶⁵ Pashkov, ed., *Istoriia russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 258; Tikhonov, "Tamozhennaia politika Russkogo gosudarstva," 276–77, 283–85; Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 55; Nikolaeva, "Otrazhenie v ustavnykh tamozhennykh gramotakh," 263; Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 143; Bazilevich, "Elementy merkantilizma," 11; Chistiakova, "Novotorgovyi ustav," 106, 108.

⁶⁶ Bazilevich, "Elementy merkantilizma," 10; Bazilevich, "Kollektivnye chelobit'ia torgovykh liudei," 113.

⁶⁷ Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 61; vol. 2, 99–108; Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 62.

available.⁶⁸ Grain, however, remain an oddity among Russian exports. It was typically used to finance large-scale weapons imports and available only in exceptional years when shortages in western Europe pushed prices to a level that justified the high transportation costs. Significant quantities of grain were exported during three “grain peaks,” in the 1630s, 50s, and 70s.⁶⁹

Capital shortages above all dictated that the share of the government in Russian foreign trade would remain limited and in fact fairly static over the long term.⁷⁰ The share of Siberian furs, which the Treasury exported on a large scale, declined from nearly one-half of the total value of Arkhangel'sk's exports in the first half of the century to less than 10 percent in the second half of the century. Silk seldom accounted for more than one percent of the total value of the annual exports of Arkhangel'sk, and even caviar typically remained in the 3-percent range. Moreover, the most dynamic state-controlled sectors typically owed their dynamism to the government's ability to alleviate capital shortages by farming out state monopolies to other, usually foreign, entrepreneurs, something that limited the state's revenue stream to rent and toll payments. By the middle of the century, direct state control of export industries was a rare phenomenon indeed. The extraordinary measures of 1662, when the Treasury temporarily monopolized all foreign sales of six important commodities, constituted a major, even if ephemeral exception, to the general pattern of rather limited participation in trade. Indeed, this policy was a rather desperate attempt to find a way out of a serious financial crisis and thus only used as a last resort. The state's resources almost certainly would not have allowed it to be pursued in the long term. Moreover, the economic dislocations it resulted in were considerable even when placed against the monetary stabilization it made possible.⁷¹ Dynamic expansion of the Russian open sector had to (and did) rely increasingly on the exportation of bulky naval stores in the Age of Navigation. The government simply did not have the resources to organize the production or distribution of such goods on a nationwide scale.

The dual agendas of mercantilism and protectionism combined and culminated in the New Commercial Code of 1667, again in an apparent response to a petition

⁶⁸ RA Muscovitica, vol. 601.

⁶⁹ For further information on this, J.T. Kotilaine, “Quantifying Arkhangel'sk's Exports in the Seventeenth Century,” *Journal of European Economic History* 28:2 (1999) 2, 259–60. The 1630s' grain peak was analyzed in great detail by Maria Bogucka, “Zboże rosyjskie na rynku amsterdamskim w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku,” *Przegląd Historyczny*, 53 (1962) 3, 611–26.

⁷⁰ Some estimates of state sales of goods at Arkhangel'sk are provided by Paul Bushkovitch. While the sums involved are often impressive, in relative terms they seldom accounted for more than a couple of percentage points of the total value of Arkhangel'sk's exports. Paul Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow 1580–1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 151–8.

⁷¹ Nikolai N. Repin, “K voprosu o sviazi vneshnego i vnutrennego rynka Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII—pervoi chetverti XVIII v. (po materialam Arkhangel'skogo porta),” *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriia IX: Istorii*, 25:6 (1970), 61 ff; Bazilevich, *Denezhnaia reforma Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, 65.

by Muscovite merchants.⁷² The new statute represented the most resolute attempt up to that time to ensure full compliance with customs regulations but, in addition, it significantly increased the tax burden facing foreign merchants and made a further attempt to confine them to border cities through both restricted access to the interior and prohibitive transit duties. Foreign specie receipts were to be maximized not only through higher tax rates, even on unsold goods, but also a compulsory system of exacting those payments in specie at a rigged exchange rate. The basic impost at border towns was set at 5 percent on weighed goods and 4 percent on unweighed goods. An additional 9 percent was levied on transit into the Russian interior. A sales tax of 6 percent was imposed in the towns of the interior which took the overall duty to an unprecedented 20–21 percent. Exacting the duty in specie at a rigged exchange rate yielded the crown R 2 in pure profit for every R 7 collected. Emulating western practices, the New Commercial Code imposed quality controls on import and export goods alike, although this measure appears to have been implemented with mixed success at best.⁷³

While the new charter was designed to increase tax revenues, it did so in part by multiplying confiscations of certain goods as “illegal” or “contraband,” as tensions between Westerners and hostile *gost’* administrators reached a new high. Already in 1668, a collective petition by foreign merchants accused Averkii Kirillov of numerous instances of abuse connected with duty collection at Arkhangel’sk. Together with fellow *gosti* Shorin and Aleksei Sukhanov, he in turn charged foreigners with trying to turn the terms of trade in their favor through illicit collective action. The Russified foreigner Peter Marselis entered the fray by suggesting that the new trade policy had backfired and led to a reduction in customs receipts and called for revisions in the Code. Marselis’ suggestions are worth examining in some detail because they do represent an attempt to put this tentative Muscovite mercantilism on a healthier footing at a time when the state, reeling from years of warfare, was in a desperate need of money. Marselis endorsed the plans for exacting duty in specie and ensuring Russian control of trade by banning direct dealings among foreigners. However, he also suggested that no duty be payable on specie imports for the purchase of Russian goods and suggested that foreign trade in the Russian interior be allowed to continue so long as Western merchants paid double transit duties. A slightly modified version of the proposals was presented two years later, again to no avail.⁷⁴ The concessions to Russia’s elite merchants may in fact have been based on unrealistically rosy expectations at a time when a commercial treaty with Persia was set to ensure an increase in silk trade while the Andrusovo treaty with Poland-Lithuania put an end to prolonged warfare in the West.⁷⁵

In spite of attempts to relieve tension, relations between Russians and foreigners remained charged. Westerners claimed that the *Gost’* Ivan Pankrat’ev in 1673 confiscated nearly R 16,000 worth of goods from Dutch and Hamburg merchants. An additional blow to foreign merchants came from the

⁷² Aleksandr I. Andreev, “Novotorgovyi ustav 1667 g. (K istorii ego sostavleniia),” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 13 (1942), 306.

⁷³ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol 1, no. 408, 45.

government's decision to extend the Arkhangel'sk fair past St Simon's Day, September 1, if necessary. Westerners opposed the change, being desperate to leave in time to avoid autumn storms and the prospect of spending the winter in Russia instead of realizing their profits. In response they, at least in 1674, decided to impose an October 1 deadline on their purchases of *iufti*, much to the consternation of Russian merchants who were notified only two days beforehand. The situation went from bad to worse with a 1677 decree allowing Western Europeans into the Russian interior solely for the purpose of collecting debts. The measure was repealed only in 1679 after Westerners threatened not to return to Arkhangel'sk.⁷⁶

While the general trend under Aleksei Mikhailovich was towards elimination of special privileges for foreigners, which boosted the relative standing of Russian merchants, it is clear the letter of the law was not always followed rigidly or consistently. Hostile impulses *vis-à-vis* foreigners were frequently seasoned by a pragmatic recognition of the need to avoid actions harmful to trade, which resulted in numerous instances of policy reversals and *ad hoc* concessions. The 1653 increase in imposts was accompanied by exhortations for local officials to show flexibility with foreigners at a difficult time for the Russian economy. In the 80s and 90s passports were once again granted for some foreign merchants to operate beyond the border cities, even though the New Commercial Code had sought to severely limit such activity.⁷⁷

This zig-zag between relative liberalism and protectionism seems to have arisen from an at least tacit realization that, while Russian dependency on the West remained an irritant to Muscovite merchants, it could not easily be remedied by driving out foreign merchants when there was essentially no domestic capital to turn to. Extensive supply networks and capital resources had made Western merchants highly resistant to most restrictions and, in addition, attempts to constrain their freedom met with stubborn resistance, both economic and diplomatic in nature.⁷⁸ The foreigners' relative strength derived above all else from their unparalleled access to capital. Import goods were almost invariably sold to Russians at least in part on credit, against future deliveries of Muscovite wares. The most typical kind was so-called *kabala* credit, which tended to tie poorer and middling Russian merchants into quasi-permanent supply networks. The standard rate on the loans was 20 percent, although the *Ulozhenie* significantly limited open usury. The degree of Russian dependency on Western capital is reflected by the fact that the outstanding claims of the Muscovy Company in 1649, when it was driven out of the Russian interior,

⁷⁴ Tikhonov, "Tamozhennaia politika Russkogo gosudarstva," 286–88; Chistiakova, "Novotorgovyi ustav," 116.

⁷⁵ Stefan Troebst, "Isfahan-Moskau-Amsterdam: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des moskauischen Transitprivilegs für die Armenische Handelskompanie in Persien (1667–1616)," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, N.F., 41 (1993) 2.

⁷⁶ Chistiakova, "Novotorgovyi ustav," 124; Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 61–62, 65, 69–70.

⁷⁷ Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 2, 39, 42, 47, 50, 99–109.

amounted to R 42,138. In 1666–7, the exports of hemp from Moscow by foreign merchants twice exceeded the quantity carried by Russians.⁷⁹

In the circumstances, the growing protectionism of Russian policy makers was fraught with risk as little attention was devoted to developing ways for Russians to take control of at least some of the activities dominated by Westerners. Arguably the single most important failure of Muscovite mercantilism was its inability to promote capital accumulation and credit at home which would have created an alternative to Western money. As it was, the cost of available credit in Russia had been driven to truly usurious levels by its shortage and domestic sources of loans tended to be open only to *gosti*, and even then at the hefty interest rate of 20 percent p.a. Ordin-Nashchokin was arguably the first high-ranking politician to give the issue of capital shortages serious consideration. The New Commercial Code, evidently under the influence of Nashchokin, also recognized the problem of capital shortages and mooted the idea of issuing credit to merchants via the Great Customs of Moscow (*Bol'shaia moskovskaia tamozhnia*) and the *zemskie izby*. In addition, the preamble of the Code proposed the idea of companies combining large and small-scale merchants in an attempt to isolate the small-scale merchants from foreign traders of whom many served as agents. However, the practical importance of these pronouncements remained marginal at best. The only instance of banking of any significance was when the Stroganovs were allowed to deposit their money with the central administration in Moscow and receive money against these deposits from local *voevody*.⁸⁰

The most concrete attempt to address the problem continued to be new appointments of elite merchants. Data collected by N.B. Golikova reveals a clear increase in the numbers of *gosti* in the second half of the century: from 25 in 1650 to a peak of 61 in 1687. The ranks of the *Gostinaia sotnia* swelled from just over 200 in 1651–70 to more than 400 in 1671–90. Very often the stratum of elite merchants for solidified by the frequency of *de facto* hereditary appointments, as well as frequent transitions between the elite corporations. While it is not clear that this increase warrants the *gosti* being labeled a nascent bourgeoisie, they did evolve into pivotal players in Russian foreign trade and trade policy.⁸¹ However, even in larger numbers, the Russian merchants did not provide a real alternative to Western capital. Indeed, most of the western merchants trading at Arkhangel'sk represented partnerships that were wealthy by the standards of Amsterdam and Hamburg, let alone Moscow, and, moreover, they far outnumbered the *gosti*.⁸² Another failed intention of New Commercial Code concerned the special "Merchant Chancellery" (*Prikaz kupetskikh liudei*). Ordin-Nashchokin had envisioned a special ministry for merchant affairs, which would have defended the interests of Russian merchants in border towns, as well against foreign abuses as against attempts by the local Russian administrators to

⁷⁸ Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 140.

⁷⁹ Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 121–22, 127, 130; Andrei V. Demkin, "O formulirakh zaemnykh "kabal" i "pamiatei" pervoi poloviny XVII v.," *Sovetskie arkhivy* 72:5 (1985), 35–37. On efforts to curb tax evasion in the 1680s, see Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 154.

⁸⁰ Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 66–67.

exact excess duties. An institution by such a name in fact existed in 1669–78 but it was subjected to the Siberian Chancellery and occupied itself exclusively with fur trade and thus evidently had nothing to do with Nashchokin's intentions.⁸³

The failure to encourage active trade by Russians through the creation of a domestic merchant fleet was another major failure of Russian economic policy. Nashchokin's endeavors to build one in the Baltic in the 1660s came to nought, and the Caspian fleet was destroyed before it gained any significance. The situation changed dramatically only when Peter the Great built the Solombala shipyard in Arkhangel'sk in 1693 and Russian shipbuilding on a sustained basis began.⁸⁴ The only exception to this generally bleak situation were the merchants of the Russian northwest. They produced small vessels for their trade with Stockholm and became the only significant active participants in seventeenth-century Russian foreign trade. The scale of the vessels was modest and the technology primitive. They were slightly glorified river boats suited for the somewhat rougher seas of the Gulf of Finland and would certainly not have been seaworthy beyond the Baltic.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, the merchants became highly successful. It was quite common for them to pool their resources, and the *karbasy*—the most common type of these vessels—invariably carried cargo belonging to a group of merchants. Similar arrangements were made at the *Ryssgårdén*, the complex of Russian guest houses and warehouses in Stockholm where Russian merchants could reside for an extended period taking care of the interests of a number of their colleagues. From modest beginnings in the 1630s, northwestern Muscovite trade with the Swedish capital rose to account for close on one-third of the total value of Arkhangel'sk's exports by 1700. Ultimately, the spectacular success of the Stockholm trade route depended quite heavily on the innovativeness of merchants from Novgorod, Tikhvin, Olonets, and other communities, and it is particularly astounding viewed against the background of continued state support for the Arkhangel'sk route where the *gosti* remained dominant.⁸⁶

Whereas the New Commercial Code has been seen by many as a triumph of Russian mercantilism it became, in the hands of Muscovites wholly unaware of the Laffer curve, a near-fatal blow to the goose that lay the golden eggs.

⁸¹ Golikova, *Privilegirovannye kupecheskie korporatsii*, vol. 1, 126, 147–49, 381, 443.

⁸² Pashkov, ed., *Istoriia russkoi ekonomicheskoi my sli*, vol. 1, part 1, 243; Saul Ia. Borovoi, *Kredit i banki v Rossii: seredina XVII v.-1861 g.* (Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1958), 20–23; Chistiakova, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie vzgliady A.L.Ordina-Nashchokina (XVII vek)," 27–28; S.H. Baron, "Who Were the *Gosti*?" *California Slavic Studies* 7 (1973), 21–22; Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 151; Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 26–8.

⁸³ Chistiakova, "Novotorgovyi ustav," 122; Pashkov, ed., *Istoriia russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli*, vol. 1, part 1, 238; Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii*, 149; Kurskov, *Vedushchee napravlenie obshchestvennoi mysli*, 75.

⁸⁴ Pavel A. Krotov, "Solombal'skaia verf' v nachale XVIII stoletia," *Arkhangel'sk v XVIII veke*, ed. Iurii N. Bespiatykh (St. Petersburg: BLITS, 1997).

⁸⁵ Igor P. Shaskol'skii, *Russkaia morskaiia torgovlia na Baltike v XVII v. (torgovlia so Shvetsiei)* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1994), appendix.

Foreigners, as could be expected, took pains to circumvent some of the more drastic provisions of the new legislation. Moreover, the bargaining power of the Dutch in particular was sufficient to allow them to translate any tax increases into higher prices for their goods, the demand for which remained undiminished. Nonetheless, this demand was not perfectly price inelastic, not least because of the availability of similar goods via the Baltic, and thus threatened the further growth of Arkhangel'sk's commerce. Arkhangel'sk also suffered from the unwillingness or inability of the Russian merchants and authorities to ensure quality standards. There were numerous instances of rigged weights and various other kinds of cheating: good quality goods mixed in with bad, watered-down liquids, skins and fibres stuffed with ashes, stones, etc. to increase the weight, etc.⁸⁷ In the Swedish Baltic ports, in contrast, strict quality controls were systematically enforced. Local goods were branded and their reputation defended in a way that ensured a loyal clientele and higher prices. In almost every area, the quality of comparable goods was worse and less predictable at Arkhangel'sk than at Narva or Nyen.⁸⁸

The more hostile business environment at Arkhangel'sk not only deterred western merchants but also contributed to a general diversion of Russian trade to the Baltic. Increasingly, petitions by Russian merchants began to be filled not with requests to expel the foreigners but with pleas to be allowed to trade in the Baltic. Starting in the 1660s, and especially in the 1680s, many Central Russian merchants established regular links with the Baltic, and the hinterlands of Riga, Reval, Narva, and Nyen expanded far beyond the northwestern regions around Novgorod and Pskov. Important goods, such as *iufiti*, began to be taken to Sweden in growing quantities and the complete diversion of Persian silk trade from Arkhangel'sk to Narva marked one the crowning triumphs of the Swedish "derivation" policy.⁸⁹

Surviving customs data on Arkhangel'sk and the Western border towns Novgorod and Pskov (which agrees with data on shipping and exports in the White Sea and the Baltic) reveals striking changes in the orientation of Russian foreign trade following the adoption of the New Commercial Code. The last quarter of a century was characterized by relative stagnation at Arkhangel'sk. Trade remained at a fairly high level but the upward trend of earlier years was a thing of the past. At the same time, the northwestern cities, as well as the Swedish Baltic ports, experienced an unprecedented boom in their foreign trade. This presented a serious challenge to Moscow. Naturally, higher trade volumes meant greater tax receipts, but trade in the Baltic was more difficult to control and presented Moscow with the disturbing prospect of dependency on Sweden.

⁸⁶ J.T.Kotilaine, "The Significance of Russian Transit Trade for the Swedish Eastern Baltic Ports in the Seventeenth Century," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-forschung* 49:4 (2000), 582–7.

⁸⁷ Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 64–65.

⁸⁸ Russian tar is a case in point. Arkhangel'sk's exports were described as watery and generally inferior to Baltic exports. Sven-Erik Åström, *From Tar to Timber: Studies in Northeast European Forest Exploitation and Foreign Trade 1660–1860 (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 85)* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1988), 28.

In spite of the government's relative loss of control over foreign trade flows, seventeenth-century protectionism was, overall, remarkably successful in protecting Russia's economic independence in a highly asymmetric global marketplace. This was amplified by measures to rationalize the system of tax collection. In 1679, the system of direct taxes was reformed as a whole range of them—land tax, postal tax, ransom money, and *strel'tsy* money—were unified as the *strel'tsy* money collected by the Musketeer Chancellery (*Streletskii prikaz*) and the postal tax (*iamskaia podat'*) which was the responsibility of the Postal Chancellery. The following year, the regional tax-collecting authorities in Kostroma, Ustiug, Galich, Novgorod, etc. were merged under the Great Treasury (*Bol'shaia kazna*).⁹⁰ This did not free Russia from the need to levy a whole array of extraordinary taxes but it did lead to dramatic increase in tax receipts overall. Total tax collections rose from R 1.5 million in 1680 to R 3.6 million in 1701.⁹¹ Even though this did not usher in an era of financial stability, it did demonstrate the government's ability to mobilize the material resources of the country for its urgently needed reforms. The expansion of the state budget was accompanied by extensive non-monetary levies, especially grain for the growing army.⁹²

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our conclusions on the significance of seventeenth-century Russian mercantilism have to be mixed. While there were a number of important economic reforms, the standard mercantilist "agenda" was far from fully implemented, making Muscovite mercantilism a pale imitation of its European counterparts. The state was on the whole very successful in ensuring steady trade surpluses and it significantly increased economic efficiency by harmonizing internal tolls and ensuring a more secure revenue base. Advances in industry, while admittedly very modest, deserve some credit, given the near-total lack of proto-industrial production at the beginning of the century. At the same time, however, the state, while proving increasingly receptive to the demands of the elite merchants, did little to promote the development of a prosperous Russian merchants class. Nor did it, however, significantly curb the evolution of an active class of merchants in the northwest, perhaps because they supplied the country with sought-after Swedish copper and iron. Still, a positive agenda for the development of trade was largely missing. Little was done to develop domestic institutions of credit and, especially on the Arkhangel'sk route, the *gosti* remained dominant and their juridical status and attitudes essentially incompatible with any significant cooperation with lower economic strata. Other Russian merchants were denied

⁸⁹ Kotilaine, "The Significance of Russian Transit Trade," 574–82.

⁹⁰ Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven: Yale University, 1998), 136.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁹² See for instance: Carol B. Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995), esp. chs. 1 and 2.

domestic sources of capital and thus effectively left with the sole alternative of serving Western creditors. In the circumstances, any attempt to curb the activities of foreigners was bound to create serious capital shortages and reduce or reorient trade. The Russian government also largely failed in their attempts to promote active trade by Russian merchants. Sustained shipbuilding only began in the 1690s. Due to this, Russian merchants could not hope to establish true independence in foreign trade. The market that they relied on for their livelihood existed only by virtue of Westerners journeying to Arkhangel'sk every summer.

As Križanec aptly noted, Russia was in a weak position—isolated and impoverished—to catch up with western nations. While the Tsar did remain the nation's leading merchant, the state apparatus was underdeveloped compared to western Europe and was hardly in a position to play a crucial role as a modernizing force. The basic dilemma of Russian mercantilism was that, in seeking to ensure political independence by limiting the influence of foreigners, the country ran the risk of substituting permanent backwardness and stagnation for what had been viewed as excessive dependence on the West. This created an uneasy dialectic between the domestic and foreign merchant communities. In a striking parallel with today's Russia, which is once again struggling with a systemic transition to a new era, late Muscovy was a society with an economic oligarchy which tried, with considerable success, to wrest internal trade from the hands of foreigners. A very premature move, given the limitations of Russia's resources, this did not result in strengthening the state in any appreciable ways. Fortunately for Russia, this "xenophobic mercantilism" was discontinuous and the most drastic reforms were prevented by recurrent wars.⁹³ In times of instability, Russians reverted to their instinctive conservatism. Nonetheless, the bargaining between the state and the *gosti* did eventually yield the protectionistic New Commercial Code with pernicious repercussions for Russian foreign trade. For the foreigners, doing business in the north became more expensive and they began to seek other ways of expanding their ties with Eastern Europe. For the Russians, the basic discrepancies of the Arkhangel'sk market became even more accentuated than before. Their poverty of capital did not allow them to challenge the foreigners on whom many of them depended for credit and who continued to be the only suppliers of many luxuries and some weapons. There was next to nothing the Russians could do to prevent the terms of trade turning even more sharply against them as the foreigners struggled to ensure adequate profits in the new circumstances. In spite of these shortcomings, Muscovite mercantilism did successfully protect the county's economic independence, something that appeared far from guaranteed in the 1610s. Problematically, however, this goal was met in a way that undermined economic efficiency. Moreover, the growing diversion of trade to the Baltic towards the end of the century remained a serious source of concern.

Overall, a lot remained to be done to make Russian mercantilism efficient enough to allow Muscovy to stand its ground against Western competitors. E.V. Anisimov, discussing Peter I's reforms, claims that "It may be confidently asserted that in the first quarter of the eighteenth century an abrupt economic

⁹³ Baklanova, "Jan de-Gron," 109.

leap took place in Russia equal in significance and consequences to the industrialization of the Soviet period.”⁹⁴ The results of Petrine industrialization were indeed impressive: “over the years 1695–1725 no fewer than two hundred enterprises of different sorts arose—that is, ten times more than there had been at the end of the seventeenth century....”⁹⁵ It is important to realize, however, that in many ways Peter’s mercantilism was no less mercantilism by necessity than that of his father. It arose in many essential ways as an appendix to a military plan, or even as a response to a failed military campaign. The Russian artillery had to be replaced following the fiasco at Narva, at a time when Russia naturally did not have access to Swedish iron resources. The military emergency put the focus of Peter’s reforms squarely on consolidating the “military-industrial complex.” Government profits were increased manifold by the introduction of numerous monopolies in foreign trade, far beyond the *zapovednye tovary* of the seventeenth century.⁹⁶ One can but be impressed by the numerous continuities between Aleksei Mikhailovich’s and Peter’s economic policies. Not only were Peter’s policies inspired by the same factors as Aleksei’s, they also constituted “more of the same” in almost every area, even if in some cases the increase was quite dramatic. Perhaps the most important departure had to do with Peter’s determination to elevate the role of the state as a force for economic modernization, something that had still remained beyond the reach of his predecessors. While Adam Smith’s description of “the merchants and manufacturers...[as] far the principal architects...of the whole mercantile system” has some truth in the seventeenth century context, the state became definitely the leading force of economic change under Peter and consequently diminished the relative standing of the merchant elite.⁹⁷ In this area, as in so many others, Peter sought to modernize Russia by freeing the state from the grip of special interests. In doing so, however, he tied the future of the Russian economy ever more closely to the government’s actions and reduced the scope for Western-style market-driven organic development.

⁹⁴ Evgenii V. Anisimov, *The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress through Coercion in Russia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 70.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 71, 75.

⁹⁷ A. Smith quoted in Bohdan Krawchenko, “Petrine Mercantilist Economic Policies toward the Ukraine,” in *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays*, ed. I. S. Koropecyky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 187.

THE ARKHANGEL'SK TRADE, EMPTY STATE COFFERS, AND THE DRIVE TO MODERNIZE: STATE MONOPOLIZATION OF RUSSIAN EXPORT COMMODITIES UNDER MIKHAIL FEDOROVICH

Maria Solomon Arel

A popular textbook on Russian history places the beginning of “modern” Russia in 1645. The “misleading exactitude” of the periodization aside, the author’s choice of date underscores the importance of the reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645–76) to the gradual advance of Russia into the modern era.¹ Philip Longworth’s biography of Aleksei provides abundant evidence of the pivotal nature of this time in Russian history, particularly in relation to the dramatic, much scrutinized reign of Aleksei’s son, Peter the Great.² Under Aleksei, the various ‘isms’ normally associated with modernization in the West between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries appear in Russia to various degrees: absolutism, bureaucratism, mercantilism, humanism. The overhaul of the Muscovite military and increasing openness to Western influences further distinguish the period from former times.

It is difficult not to agree that the dawn of the modern era in Russia rightly belongs in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. However, the policies and developments of this time also had their antecedents. These are to be found in the decades immediately following the Time of Troubles, during the much neglected reign of the first Romanov ruler, Mikhail Fedorovich. The mushrooming of the central administrative apparatus and proliferation of both the Moscow and provincial secretaries (*d’iaki*) and clerks (*pod’iachie*) that we see under Aleksei dates to Mikhail’s time, which has been described by one source as “a period of administrative reconstruction, expansion, and innovation.”³ Important changes are also apparent in the Muscovite military in these years. The inevitable showdown with Poland for the recovery of Smolensk (lost by Russia during the Time of Troubles) spurred the government to improve the army through costly innovations in the 1620s and early 1630s, including the formation of new infantry regiments using the latest in expensive military weaponry and tactics from the West, commanded and partly manned by highly paid Western mercenaries.⁴ The West, increasingly apparent in Russian life during Aleksei’s time, and omnipresent under Peter, first penetrated Muscovy in a major way under Mikhail, not only in the military sphere, but in various other branches of the tsar’s service, as well as in trade and industry.⁵

¹ Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia: Medieval, Modern, Contemporary* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1990), 67–78.

² Philip Longworth, *Alexis, Tsar of All the Russias* (London: Seeker & Warbug, 1984).

This article will examine one of the methods employed by the government of Mikhail Fedorovich to help finance the growth and innovations that characterize his reign, viz the monopolization of lucrative commodity trades. These included, tar, caviar, and potash, which were traded at Arkhangel'sk on the White Sea coast, mainly by the English and the Dutch. State monopolization of Russian exports, as we shall see shortly, was not a novel practise, but the seventeenth century witnessed a greater reliance on this approach to filling state coffers. As the century wore on, more and more commodities were withdrawn from the open market in an effort to exploit a strong and often growing demand for Russian goods. An important aspect of this development that has received relatively little attention to date is how exactly these proliferating state monopolies operated. This question is the focus of the discussion below. Specifically, it will address the issues of administration, operation, and participation. It will also explore the kinds of conflict that competition to control the monopolies bred and how these conflicts were handled by the various parties involved.

STATE MONOPLIES: BEGINNINGS

Trade between Western Europeans and Russians along the White Sea route was established in the mid-sixteenth century by the English, whose exploratory voyage in search of the northeast passage inadvertently landed them on the frigid shores of the White Sea. Undeterred by the unexpected landing, Richard Chancellor and his crew made their way south to Moscow and appeared before an equally curious Russian tsar (Ivan IV) and his dazzling court. The meeting was a fruitful one for both sides: For the English, it set in motion diplomatic exchanges between the Russian and English courts that laid the foundation for a century of Anglo-Russian relations and trade, conducted by the Muscovy Company. For the Russians, it provided the possibility of political and military support and, more concretely, freed Muscovy from a debilitating dependence on its ancient Baltic foes (Livonia and Sweden), as well as the no less hostile Poland and Lithuania, for access to Western goods, military supplies, and skilled labour.⁶ When the Dutch and other Western Europeans appeared at the White Sea coast on the heels of the English, Muscovy's gain from the opening up of the northern route was further strengthened. The founding of the port of Arkhangel'sk in 1585 testified to the growing importance of the route, which drew ever larger numbers of ships from the West, mostly from England and the Low Countries, by the end of the sixteenth century. Following the disruptions of the Time of Troubles, the

³ Bickford O'Brien, "Muscovite *Prikaz* Administration of the Seventeenth Century: The Quality of Leadership," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 24 (1978), 224.

⁴ Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 151–80.

⁵ For works on foreign merchant and entrepreneurial activity in Russia in the first half of the seventeenth century, see Maria Salomon Arel, "Masters in Their Own House: The Russian Merchant Elite and Complaints against the English in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 77 (July 1999), 402–3 (notes 229–30).

trend continued. As the Russian population grew, towns spread, and the Russian economy recovered in the decades following the Troubles, Arkhangel'sk underwent dramatic growth, experiencing a three-fold increase in both the total value of trade and ship-traffic between 1590–1650.⁷

From the start, some of the goods shipped to the West from the White Sea were subject to state-decreed restrictions, which mirrored Muscovite policy vis-à-vis lucrative Asian re-exports, such as Persian raw silk. Export bans were imposed on certain goods (*zapovednye tovary*), while others were withdrawn from the open market and traded solely by the state (*ukaznye tovary*), either directly, or increasingly, by farming out monopolies to the highest bidder.⁸ Both practises apparently became more frequent in the latter decades of the sixteenth century as the state's need for revenue increased in the face of the enormous cost of the Livonian War and the disastrous drop in tax receipts caused by the decimation of the population during the *Oprichnina* period. Payments in specie to the treasury for monopoly goods, or for the farming rights to such goods was another important incentive for a state whose currency relied on foreign silver.

Muscovite monopolies were part of a world-wide phenomenon of rulers and states imposing restrictions on trade in order to exploit their natural resources to the fullest in the interest of immediate, tangible gain to themselves, as well as to draw specie to their treasuries. Muscovy's Asian neighbours, for example, were expert at this policy, as English and Dutch merchants soon discovered when they came searching for new commercial possibilities in this part of the globe in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Trade in Mughal India operated in open and restricted sectors, and the numerous rulers of the port states of southeast Asia controlled, directly or indirectly, the exchange of the region's most sought-after goods, including tin, deer hides, rice, salt, wax, and various fisheries. In Persia, the legendary silk trade was in the hands of the shah.⁹ At the other end of the world, in England, royal monopolies proliferated during the cash-strapped reign of Elizabeth I and the trend continued in the first half of the seventeenth century, over the increasingly harsh protests of English merchants and entrepreneurs.¹⁰ In

⁶ Russian efforts to secure an alliance with England in the Muscovite period are discussed in Thomas S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553–1603* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956); Geraldine M. Phipps, *Sir John Merrick, English Merchant-Diplomat in Seventeenth Century Russia* (Newtonville: Oriental Research Partners, 1983); Maija Jansson and Nikolai M. Rogozhin, eds., *England and the North: The Russian Embassy of 1613–1614*, trans. Paul Bushkovitch (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1994), 1–71. On Russian difficulties in the Baltic, see Anna L. Khoroshkevich, *Russkoe gosudarstvo v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii kontsa XV-nachala XVI v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 38–39, and Thomas Esper, "A Sixteenth-Century Anti-Russian Arms Embargo," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 15 (1967), 180–96.

⁷ Paul Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow, 1580–1650* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 45, 51, 55–56. For details on the commodities handled at Arkhangel'sk, see Boris N. Floria, "Torgovlia Rossii so stranami zapadnoi evropy v Arkhangel'ske (konets XVI-nachalo XVII v.)" *Srednie veka* 36 (1973), 129–51; Arel, "Masters in Their Own House," 414–21.

⁸ A. S. Muliukin, *Ocherki po istorii iuridicheskago polozheniia inostrannykh kuptsov v moskovskom gosudarstve* (Odessa: Tipografiia "Tekhnika," 1912), 29–65.

Muscovy, the trend of the latter decade of the sixteenth century resumed following the disruptions of the Time of Troubles. In the 1620s, the relatively free trade in Russian commodities at Arkhangel'sk came to an end as the state sought to replenish its resources after a decade and a half of war and economic chaos, and bolster its administrative and military apparatus. Important Arkhangel'sk exports that came under state control at this time were tar, caviar, and potash.¹¹

THE TAR TRADE

Tar was plentiful in the densely forested Russian north, where boat-building and rope-making were important industries. The production of tar was an ancient industry in Russia, going back to the twelfth century, and from the start, it was an important commodity exported to the West through the Baltic.¹² Traditionally, the main center of Russian tar production was in areas around the Vaga River, particularly at Shenkursk. English and Dutch cordage manufacture in Russia, coupled with the refurbishing needs of the larger number of river craft using the Northern Dvina-Sukhona waterway and of the ships now coming to the White Sea coast every year, spurred a growing demand for tar in the Russian north and the expansion of tar-making in the second half of the sixteenth century. The activity spread throughout the Vaga region and further north, in areas along the Northern Dvina.¹³ For centuries, the rural inhabitants of the Vaga and Northern Dvina regions had made some tar on the side to help supplement their income from agriculture. By our period, however, many peasants produced tar on a large scale for the market and sale abroad.¹⁴

The English Muscovy Company was the single most important customer for Russian tar, which it used in the manufacture of cordage, its main export from

⁹ Sinnappah Arasaratnam, *Maritime India in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 225, 227, 235, 239.

¹⁰ For details on the plethora of English monopolies and the heated controversy they provoked in Parliament, see John Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 397–403.

¹¹ The discussion of these monopolies is based on a more detailed treatment in, Maria Salomon Arel, “The Muscovy Company in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century: Trade and Position in the Russian State—A Reassessment” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1995), 369–94, 413–27.

¹² Artur Attman, *The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade, 1500–1650* (Göteborg: Institute of Economic History of Gothenburg University, 1973), 17; J.K.Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century; A Study in Anglo-Polish Commercial Diplomacy* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 117–19.

¹³ Pavel M.Luk'ianov, *Istoriia khimicheskikh promyslov i khimicheskoi promyshlennosti Rossii do kontsa XIX veka*, 6 vols. (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1951), vol. 3, 318, 327.

¹⁴ Petr M.Trofimov, *Ocherki ekonomicheskogo razvitiia evropeiskogo severa Rossii* (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1961), 20–21, 30.

Arkhangel'sk.¹⁵ The Russians, who employed a large and varied number of river craft for trade and transport throughout Russia, were adept rope-makers. However, given the absence of sea-faring ships in Russia in the Muscovite period, there was no knowledge of the production of heavy cables or cordage. The English thus produced their own cordage in Russia, in several rope walks located at Arkhangel'sk, Kholmogory, and Vologda. The Dutch operated two similar enterprises, one at Kholmogory by the early 1620s at the latest, and another at Arkhangel'sk in the early 1640s.¹⁶ Since the latter decades of the sixteenth century, the English navy relied almost exclusively on Russian cordage supplied by the Muscovy Company, and by the early 1600s, the East India Company was another big customer. With the steady growth of English shipping in the first half of the seventeenth century, the demand for Russian cordage also rose. Thus, the quantities handled by English merchants in this period were substantial. According to one source, in the early 1630s, Russia was supplying between 90–97 per cent of London's cordage requirements.¹⁷

Given the importance of their cordage trade, the English needed large and steady supplies of tar each year. Naturally, they also wanted to get it as cheaply as possible. To achieve these goals, they went directly to the source, i.e. the rural tar producers of the Vaga region. The English approached the Vaga tar-makers through their Kholmogory house servant (*dvornik*), sometime in the winter, placing orders for large quantities to be delivered to various sites (Kholmogory or Arkhangel'sk) later on, in the spring, when the last phase of cordage manufacture—the tarring of the ropes—got underway.¹⁸ From all indications, the main supply area for the English was around Shenskursk.¹⁹ For the Russian tar-makers of the region, the arrangement worked out with the English was a good one. The English were assured customers and they also paid cash upfront.²⁰ The Muscovy Company's relationship with the tar producers, however, went against one of the most important proscriptions on English (and other foreign) trade in Russia since the late sixteenth century, namely a complete ban on direct

¹⁵ An essential step in making cordage was tarring, which helped protect the ropes against the corrosive effects of brine. Tar was also essential for caulking river craft and sea-going ships.

¹⁶ Trofimov, *Ocherki ekonomicheskogo razvitiia evropeiskogo severa Rossii*, 20–23; Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, 8 vols. (New York: E.P. Dutton & co., 1907), vol. 1, 391–92; Valentin N. Kashin, *Torgovlia i torgovyi kapital v moskovskom gosudarstve* (Leningrad: Izd-vo Kubuch, 1926), 136; Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts [hereafter RGADA], f. 35 [Anglo-Russian Relations], opis' 1, d. 146, II. 7r–10r: January 1641. Rope walks of the type established by the English and Dutch in Russia were not operated by the Russians themselves until the eighteenth century.

¹⁷ Arel, "Masters in Their Own House," 414–15; Henryk Zins, *England and the Baltic in the Elizabethan Era* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 230–32.

¹⁸ RGADA, f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 222r–24r: 15 June 1637.

¹⁹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 311r, 325r–26r: 16 Feb. 1638; d. 126, II. 332r–334r: 18 April 1638; d. 126, I. 564r. 28 Jan. 1641.

²⁰ RGADA f. 35, op. I, d. 92, I. 3r: 21 March 1625.

commercial interaction with either the Russian producer or consumer.²¹ In negotiations in 1620–21, however, the English succeeded in securing permission to bypass Russian merchants and purchase tar directly from the countryside.²² This privilege, which the English held on to for most of the subsequent period under review here, was almost as important as the coveted right to duty-free trade enjoyed by the Muscovy Company since the mid-sixteenth century.²³ But the privilege also benefitted Russians, as the English were quick to point out during the negotiations: The cash advances for tar paid out by English merchants during the winter helped Russian tar-makers meet their tax obligations (the *tiaglo*) to the state precisely at the time of year when tax-collectors came calling, and also provided much needed liquid that promoted the trading activities of many Russians.²⁴

The state's involvement in the tar trade dates to 1615, when tar was designated a "forbidden" or *zapovednyi* good, i.e. it could not be exported without the tsar's permission. Interestingly, this move was prompted by the urgings of the English during their negotiations with the tsar's officials for a new set of trade privileges. During the talks in Moscow, the Company allegedly argued that the tsar, like other rulers in Europe, should forbid the export of unfinished goods, or such natural products as might be profitably used in the domestic manufacture of important commodities, which could be sold abroad more dearly, and which also provided the population with gainful employment.²⁵ The merits of this interesting mercantilist argument aside, it is difficult to believe that the English had Russian interests at heart. It is more likely that they sought a ban on tar exports in order to keep its price down in Russia and to ensure a large enough supply for their rope walks. There is some indication in the sources that the English were having difficulties securing sufficient quantities of tar at this time because of Dutch competition for the product, which the latter used in Russia for their own cordage manufacture, and probably exported abroad as well.²⁶

The ban was seriously discussed by the tsar's officials, in consultation with a handful of prominent Russian merchants, from the perspective of the state's finances—would the ban help or hurt the tsar's coffers? Two sides emerged during the talks. One group argued that the ban would undermine state revenues by bringing the price of tar down, and thus the profits of Russians trading in the

²¹ Muliukin, *Ocherki po istorii iuridicheskago polozheniia inostrannykh kuptsov v moskovskom gosudarstve*, 14–17.

²² RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 92, 3r:21 March 1625; d. 126, f. 111r: 27 May 1637.

²³ For a detailed discussion of English trade privileges in Russia over time, see Arel, "The Muscovy Company in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century," 111–85.

²⁴ Aleksandr S. Lappo-Danilevskii, *Organizatsiia priamogo oblozheniia v moskovskom gosudarstve so vremen smuty do epokhi preobrazovaniia* (St. Petersburg: I.N. Skorokhodov, 1890), 331–32; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 92, 3r: 21 March 1625.

²⁵ Konstantin Lodyzhenskii, *Istoriia russkago tamozhennago tarifa* (St. Petersburg: Tip. V.S. Balasheva, 1886), 15.

²⁶ Kashin, *Torgovlia i torgovoi kapital*, 136; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, f. 111r: 27 May 1637.

product. This would ultimately reduce the tax-paying potential of a segment of the population. The opposing group viewed the possible effects of the ban in a more sanguine light. The proponents of the ban argued that state revenues would actually increase because three separate customs could be levied to the fullest extent: when tar was sold by the peasants to traders; when tar was sold by the traders to the foreign rope walks in Russia; and when the heavy cordage produced by these walks was weighed on state scales. In addition, banning the export of tar would undercut cordage production abroad and increase the activity of the rope walks in Russia, thus providing a livelihood for more Russians to the benefit of the population and the state. The latter argument ultimately prevailed, and the export of tar was banned. Moreover, to better enforce the ban, all those Russians who sold tar to foreign merchants, either for use in English and Dutch ropewalks or for the refurbishing of foreign ships before the return voyage to Europe, were required to send their supplies up to Arkhangel'sk, where these would be bought up by the tsar's officials for sale to the Western Europeans.²⁷

It would be wrong to view English success on the question of tar in 1615 and again in 1621 solely from a trade perspective. In fact, the English were able to advance their interests concerning tar in part because the Russians hoped to gain some political support from England against Poland and Sweden in the years immediately following the end of the Time of Troubles. This period witnessed a flurry of Russian diplomatic activity in the West, including England, whose goal was to secure money, arms, and an alliance against the Polish monarch, and assistance in bringing hostilities with Sweden to an end. The English managed, as they always had before, in staying out of an alliance in these years, but they did successfully mediate peace between Muscovy and Sweden (Treaty of Solbovo, 1617) and, several years later, in a new round of talks on politics and trade in 1620–21, they succeeded in convincing the Russians that the English monarch might be inclined to sign a “league of amity” with the Muscovite tsar at some point. It was in this context of Russian vulnerability and expectations that English trade privileges in Muscovy were upheld and bolstered by Russian concessions in the tar trade between 1615–21.²⁸

Russian hopes of a fiscal boon through the ban on tar exports do not seem to have been met, and in the latter half of the 1620s, the trade was resumed, only now as a state monopoly. It was surely no coincidence that the introduction of the monopoly came precisely at a time when the price of tar abroad began to rise.²⁹ The new policy also made more sense from a domestic point of view, given the fact that the English in Russia were such big customers of tar, but paid no customs. Thus, the anticipated higher revenue from the export ban probably

²⁷ Lodyzhenskii, *Istoriia russkago tamozhennago tariff* 15–16; Muliukin, *Ocherki po istorii iuridicheskago polozheniia inostrannykh kuptsov v moskovskom gosudarstve*, 50, 64; Trofimov, *Ocherki ekonomicheskogo razvitiia evropeiskogo severa Rossii*, 33.

²⁸ A more detailed summary of Anglo-Russian relations in this period appears in Arel, “Masters in Their Own House,” 409–11.

²⁹ William H. Beveridge et al, *Prices and Wages in England From the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Centuries* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, 1939), 671, 673; Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, 118–19.

fell well short of expectations. The state was better assured of income by monopolizing the tar trade and making the English (and everyone else) buy at an artificially high price. To achieve this vis-à-vis the English, the latter's right to deal directly with the Russian tar-makers had to be abolished. The necessity of withdrawing this important privilege from the Muscovy Company had already been apparent in late 1621, shortly after the privilege was awarded. Dvina customs officials reported at that time that profits from their sale of tar to foreigners at Arhangel'sk dropped 75 percent compared to the year before because the English had bought up most of the tar in previous months by agreement with the producers. Thus, very little of what arrived at the coast was for sale.³⁰ A few years later, similar problems led to more aggressive action by the tsar's officials. In 1625, Muscovy Company agent Fabian Smith complained to the authorities in Moscow that the customs head at the coast, Vasiliï Shorin, had prevented English merchants from taking any of the tar brought to Arkangel'sk that year and had also dishonoured the Company's men by heaping insults on them. Smith claimed that the Company's rope works had suffered as a result.³¹ Moscow tried to remedy the situation by instructing the local governor to uphold privileged English access to tar,³² but, when the export of tar was resumed as a state monopoly shortly thereafter, Moscow knew better than to compete with so generous a privilege. English access to the tar-makers was therefore prohibited.

In keeping with the pattern of wavering Muscovite policies, by 1630, the English were permitted to resume their direct dealings with the countryside.³³ The reversal was probably prompted by a combination of factors. The English might have exerted pressure on the tsar by limiting their purchases from his officials, which would have both hurt the monopoly and slowed down English rope production, with deleterious effects on the Russian tax-paying and trading population in the tar-producing areas. The tactic was a common one in the period. If a monopoly was particularly harmful to a trade, the merchants affected simply stopped buying until the monopoly was lifted or its terms ameliorated. English and Dutch merchants involved in the lucrative indigo trade in Gujarat and northwest India in this period, for example, found that such pressure produced results, albeit only after several years of pressure.³⁴ Larger political developments might also have played some part in prompting a return to the old policy. By 1630, Muscovy was preparing for renewed hostilities with Poland and seeking arms deals with the Dutch, the Swedes, as well as with the English.

³⁰ Stepan B. Veselovskii, Viktor I. Buganov, eds., *Prikhodo-raskhodnye knigi moskovskikh prikazov, 1619–1621* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), 252.

³¹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 94, f. 2r: 16 March 1625.

³² RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 94, ff. 3r–8r: 21 March 1625; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 92, ff. 1r–4r: 21 March 1625.

³³ RGADA f. 35, op. 2, d. 46:5 January 1630, Charles I to Mikhail.

³⁴ Pramod Sangar, *Growth of the English Trade under the Mughals* (Jalandhar: ABS Publications, 1993), 237–38.

It is possible that the tsar chose to favour English merchants in Russia at this time in expectation of some recompense of a military nature from King Charles I.

The state's intrusion into the tar trade in the latter half of the 1620s positioned it to benefit from an increased demand—and price—for tar in the West at this time, although it seems that the monopoly was not as tight as the tsar and his officials would have wanted. This is suggested by the activities of the English and Dutch in Russia in the 1630s and 40s. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Muscovy Company chose not to export tar from Arkhangel'sk because the freight charges on the bulky product were too high.³⁵ The situation changed, however, in the course of the first half of the seventeenth century. This was a period that witnessed the steady expansion of Western European shipping, particularly in England.³⁶ Consequently, demand for tar, a basic naval store, went up, as did its price, making it an increasingly lucrative commodity. The increased demand for tar appears to have induced the English to make the most of their right to deal directly with the Russian producers, by surreptitiously exporting some of their supply rather than using it all in Russia for their cordage manufacture, as they were required to do. In the mid-1630s, Russian officials, and later the Dutch, charged that the English abused the tsar's favor (and hurt his monopoly) by shipping tar abroad and selling to other foreigners at the coast. For example, the Dutch farmer Julius Willeken claimed that the English needed no more than 500 barrels of tar per year for their cordage manufacture and ship repair, but bought more than 1 000 barrels, half of which was exported or traded at Arkhangel'sk.³⁷ The English called these accusations "misreports raised by some officers at Arkhangel'sk to bring displeasure upon [them]," and insisted that they needed about 1 500 barrels of tar annually.³⁸ This might have been so, but the larger picture suggests that there was probably some truth to the charges. It is telling that, in 1636, the very same year in which the English were accused of wrongdoing by the Arkhangel'sk customs officials, King Charles wrote to the tsar requesting permission to ship a substantial quantity of tar to England over the course of seven years.³⁹ Even more incriminating is a contract for joint investment in a Russian adventure in 1637, signed by the English merchants Abraham Ashe, Francis Ashe, John Dickens, and Thomas Powell, which

³⁵ Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations*, vol. 1, 382–83.

³⁶ For details on the expansion of English shipping, see Raymond W.K. Hinton, *The Eastland Trade and the Common Weal in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: University Press, 1959), 46–49, 100; Geoffrey J. Marcus, *Naval History of England* (London: Longmans, 1961), 123–28; J. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 134–36; J.S. Kepler, "Fiscal Aspects of the English Carrying Trade During the Thirty Years' War," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 25 (1972), 261–83.

³⁷ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, I. 25r: June/July 1636; d. 126, II. 210r–13r: May 1637.

³⁸ RGADA f. 35, op. 2, d. 46:5 January 1630, Charles I to Mikhail.

³⁹ RGADA f. 35, op. 2, d. 71:25 March 1636, Charles I to Mikhail [published by Inna B. Liubimenco in, "Letters Illustrating the Relations of England and Russia in the seventeenth Century," *English Historical Review* 32 (1917), 102]. Charles asked for 3 000–4 000 hogsheads, or 55 500–74 000 gallons of tar per year. The request was denied.

specified quantities of Russian commodities, including tar, to be bought and shipped out of Arkhangel'sk.⁴⁰

By the mid-1630s, the Vaga region had become a veritable battlefield between the English, the treasury, and the Dutch, as all groups scrambled to get a hold of as much of the "black gold" as possible at the other's expense. In the summer of 1636, things came to a head in a violent confrontation at the coast, when English merchant Richard Powell and his men bought over 500 barrels of tar from peasants heading to Kholmogory and Arkhangel'sk on rafts, pre-empting the tsar's officials. As a result, the officials complained, there was no tar for the tsar's trade, which, in previous years, had earned the treasury between 400–1 000 roubles and more a year. Matters worsened when Powell allegedly hindered the interrogation of his peasant suppliers and, in the scuffle that ensued on the rafts, shoved, beat, and injured the *pristav* (bailiff) who had been sent out by the local governor to investigate. When Powell was brought before the governor, he allegedly hurled insults at everyone, insisted that he would buy as much tar as he wanted in future, and threatened violence if he were hindered. As the governor suggested in his report to Moscow, the basic problem was that there was no restriction on privileged English access to tar, for instance a barrel limit per year. Moscow did perhaps consider such a restriction at this time, but ultimately deemed it easier and more profitable to simply farm out the tar monopoly and let someone else deal with the problem of the English.⁴¹ One wonders, of course, why the English privilege was not withdrawn or, at least, restricted at this time, especially in light of the recent violence involving Powell. Political motivations do not appear to be important by the mid-1630s. One can only surmise that Moscow was concerned about undermining the livelihood of the many Russians connected to the English rope walks in Russia. These people numbered in the hundreds and there were more of them in the 1630s and 40s than ever before. Muscovy Company agent Simon Digby, for instance, claimed that the English employed four times as many Russians to produce their ropes in 1641 than they had in previous years.⁴²

When the tar monopoly was farmed out to the Dutch merchant Julius Willeken in 1636 for a term of five years, it cost 400 roubles the first year, 550 roubles each of the next three years, and 700 roubles in the final year.⁴³ The rent was not enormous, but it was a constant, assured sum whose collection, moreover, was not complicated by difficulties connected to enforcing the monopoly and dealing with the English. Farming out the monopoly was the most cost-efficient, problem-free way to exploit the tar trade, especially for a cash-strapped state with extremely limited manpower at its disposal. It soon became apparent, though, that the tar trade could generate even more for the treasury because of its growing demand abroad and competition between the English and the Dutch to

⁴⁰ Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich, 1/77:42, Ashe Papers, 21 June 1637.

⁴¹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 23r–28r: June/July 1636.

⁴² RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 146, I. 8:27 January 1641.

⁴³ Serge Kononov, "Seven Letters of Tsar Mikhail to King Charles I, 1634–1638," *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 9 (1960), 46–47; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, I. 46r: 1636/37.

control the Arkhangel'sk supply. Not long after the monopoly was given to Willeken, Muscovy Company agent Simon Digby and former agent Thomas Wych entered negotiations with the treasury to take over the farm for a term of eight years, following the expiration of Willeken's license. Digby and Wych offered to pay 1,500 roubles per year for the farm, more than double what Willeken had to pay in the final year of his monopoly, or a total of 12,000 roubles over eight years.⁴⁴ The bid was, no doubt, attractive to the treasury, but, in the end, it faltered over the sensitive issue of customs.

It will be recalled that English merchants in Russia enjoyed complete duty-free trade in this period. Consequently, were the tar monopoly to be placed in English hands, the state's income from the trade would be limited to the annual farm rent. Customs on the weighing, selling, and transport of tar would be lost. From this perspective, it was ultimately more profitable to accept another Dutch bid for the farm, which was somewhat lower than the English offer, but had the benefit of coming from parties who were not tax-exempt. The next farm (1640–45) thus went to the Dutch merchant Herman Fenzel, who agreed to pay 1 150 roubles per year over the course of five years, or 350 roubles less per year than the English had been prepared to pay.⁴⁵ For the English, there was no question of agreeing to customs charges on the tar trade because it would have undermined the most important privilege held by the Muscovy Company. A dangerous precedent would have been set. It is perhaps such an erosion of English privilege that the Dutch hoped to ultimately achieve, when they allegedly bribed the tsar's officials into insisting that Digby and Wych pay the usual customs on the tar trade. Lucrative as the farm was, the English withdrew their bid.

Who exactly profited from Dutch bribes aimed at weakening the English bid is impossible to say with absolute certainty. However, it would be reasonable to assume that individuals connected to the *Bol'shaia Kazna*, or the Great Treasury, were involved, beginning with its head, boiar Prince I.B. Cherkasskii, and its acting head in 1638, boiar F.I. Sheremetev.⁴⁶ Cherkasskii was Tsar Mikhail's cousin and a member of the inner circle around the tsar (the *blizhnye*) as early as 1621. He was a key figure at the Muscovite court throughout Mikhail's reign, his growing influence reflected in the number and importance of Moscow chancelleries he controlled. When Patriarch Filaret, the tsar's father and real ruling force in Muscovy, died in 1633, Cherkasskii moved to the helm, until his death in 1642.⁴⁷ Foreign merchants long active in Russia and knowledgeable about Muscovite court politics recognized Cherkasskii's pre-eminent position, especially after 1633. Charles I of England, for example, in a letter to Tsar Mikhail on trade matters, referred to Cherkasskii as "Great Lord" and "your nearest nobleman," while Muscovy Company agent Simon Digby, in one of his

⁴⁴ English efforts to secure the farm are discussed in various documents: RGADA f. 35, op. 2, d. 73:13 December 1638, Charles I to Tsar Mikhail; op. 1, d. 126, II. 546r–48r: 26 June 1640 [Copy of a letter from Tsar Mikhail to Charles I]; Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], State Papers, Foreign [hereafter SPF] 91/3:51 (5 September 1639); PRO, SPF 91/3: 60 (7 September 1640).

⁴⁵ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 548r, 561r: 1640.

⁴⁶ PRO, SPF 91/3:17 (2 September 1636).

dispatches to London, described him as “the most potent minister in this state.”⁴⁸ Sheremetev, a *blizhnii* boiar since 1634, was in the same league as Cherkasskii, his brother-in-law, assuming control of the Muscovite government upon Cherkasskii’s death in 1642. Like Cherkasskii, Sheremetev headed a slew of chancelleries and, when Cherkasskii was temporarily away at Tula in 1638, he stepped in at the Great Treasury, at about the time Digby and Wych were making their bid for the next tar farm.⁴⁹ Digby, we know, dealt directly with the head of the Great Treasury rather than his underlings, when seeking approval for special contracts or projects involving his merchants,⁵⁰ and there is no reason to believe that the Dutch did not do the same. Moreover, the English are known to have secured Cherkasskii’s “favor” through bribery, in the caviar trade, as we shall see shortly. Again, the Dutch would have also emptied their pockets to sway the powerful Cherkasskii as well as his kinsman and occasional replacement at the Great Treasury, Sheremetev. It is fairly certain that one or both of these grandees made a tidy sum in the latter 1630s, when English and Dutch merchants tried to outbid each other for control of the tar trade in the 1640s.

Dutch control of the tar monopoly between 1636–45 did not knock the English out of the picture; it merely triggered a dirtier war. The fundamental English weapon remained direct access to the peasant producers, a right that the Muscovy Company managed to maintain while Willeken and Fenzel “monopolized” the trade. The crucial privilege allowed the English to evade a dangerous dependence on the Dutch and, at the same time, struck a hard blow against the Dutch monopoly itself. Not bound by price limits dictated by annual farm payments to the treasury, or customs charges, the English were able to offer Russian tar-makers a better price for their product, thus eating into the supply available to the Dutch. In the early 1640s (and as late as the 1660s), the total supply of tar headed for Arkhangel’sk was between 2,000–2,500 barrels a year. In the 1630s, the English were buying up to 1,500 barrels, and, in the early 1640s, even when Fenzel was doing his utmost to block English contracts with Russian tar suppliers, the Company still managed to get its hands on 1 000 barrels.⁵¹ These numbers help explain Dutch exasperation with the English and the fierceness of the competition.⁵²

⁴⁷ Pavel P. Smirnov, *Posadskie liudi i ikh klassovaia bor’ba do serediny XVII veka*, 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1947–48), vol. 1, 406; Robert O. Crummey, “Crown and Boiars under Fedor Ivanovich and Mikhail Romanov,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 6 (1972), 571.

⁴⁸ RGADA f. 35, op. 2, d. 76:1 June 1642, Charles I to Mikhail; Kononov, “Seven Letters,” 58.

⁴⁹ Crummey, “Crown and Boiars,” 552; Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 119, 143, 179, 240; Smirnov, *Posadskie liudi*, vol. 1, 406; Aleksandr Barsukov, *Rod Sheremetevykh*, bk. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1883), 176.

⁵⁰ Digby approached Cherkasskii on behalf of various Muscovy Company men for the caviar farm in 1636 (see below), for a prospecting project in 1640, and for a cannon contract in 1641. Kononov, “Seven Letters,” 58; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 150, II. 1r–8r: 2 June 1640; d. 126, I. 583v: 16 February 1641.

In 1638, Willeken was paying his Russian suppliers under 40 kopeks/barrel. The English, on the other hand, were offering the peasants substantially more: between 54–69 kopeks.⁵³ In the early 1640s, Fenzel complained that the English outbid him by 10–20 kopeks/barrel.⁵⁴ The English used other tactics as well. For instance, during Fenzel's term, they secured permission to buy as much tar as they needed from Fenzel himself if the rural supply did not meet their needs. The only consolation for Fenzel was that he was permitted (but only after loud protests) to sell his tar to the English at the monopoly price he offered to customers at Arkhangel'sk, rather than at cost, as the English wanted, and initially succeeded in getting.⁵⁵ Continued protests from Fenzel that he was being "utterly ruined" by English machinations brought some added relief, in the form of a 400-barrel limit to the total amount of tar the Company could purchase yearly, but Fenzel was still obliged to supply the English if they could not procure 400 barrels from the countryside.⁵⁶ The new order was definitely a setback for the English since it more than halved their annual tar purchases.

The voluminous surviving record speaks of a great deal of manoeuvring by the contestants at the *Posol'skii Prikaz*, or Diplomatic Chancellery, to which the English and Dutch alike turned for support, and the Great Treasury, which farmed the tar monopoly to the Dutch. Competing interests were at work that pitted not only the two sets of merchants against each other, but also elements within the Russian central administration. In one confrontation after another, the English enjoyed the consistent support of the Diplomatic Chancellery, while the Dutch clearly had the Great Treasury on their side. The situation was a delicate one. It was one of the basic functions of the Diplomatic Chancellery to ensure that privileges held by foreign merchants in Russia were respected. But how was the state secretary (*dumnyi d'iak*) in charge of the chancellery to exert pressure on the Great Treasury to show such respect to the English, when the Treasury was headed by the two most powerful men in Muscovy? Complicating matters further was the fact that there was no obvious reason why privilege should be respected, especially privilege enjoyed by foreigners, when it infringed upon state interests, for instance, by undermining a state monopoly. In Muscovy, the state's interests clearly came first, and the Great Treasury, the repository of the tsar's wealth and commercial arm of the state, expressed this reality time and time again by simply ignoring English privilege in the tar trade.

Thus, when Willeken and Fenzel secured the tar monopoly, the notices sent by the Great Treasury to the local officials failed to mention that the English right to

⁵¹ Luk'ianov, *Istoriia khimicheskikh promyslov*, vol. 3, 332; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 210r–11r: 31 May 1637; d. 126, I. 624r: 19 June 1641.

⁵² Angry Dutch complaints and English rebuttals are recorded in, RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 204r–13r: May 1637; d. 126, II. 327r–31r: 16 February 1638; d. 126, II. 621r, 623r: 12 June 1641; d. 152, II. 31r–45r: 13 March–13 May 1644.

⁵³ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 330–31r: February 1638.

⁵⁴ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 152, II. 31r–45r: 13 March–13 May 1644.

⁵⁵ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, I. 618r: 1 May 1641.

⁵⁶ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 152, II. 31r–45r: 13 March–13 May 1644.

deal directly with the countryside remained in force. In fact, in 1636/37, the Treasury's notice to the *voevoda*, or provincial governor, at Vaga specifically stated that the English were not to be allowed to purchase tar in the countryside, only from the Dutch farmer Willeken.⁵⁷ Consequently, local officials blocked English access to the rural producers. The Diplomatic Chancellery responded to this situation by sending out letters upholding the Muscovy Company's privilege, but this remedy was only partially successful because the local officials insisted that, in the matter of a Treasury monopoly, they were to abide by instructions sent out by the Treasury alone.⁵⁸ We have a record of Diplomatic Chancellery memos to the Treasury requesting that such instructions be issued, but it is impossible to say whether the Treasury actually complied.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, the dynamics behind the working relationship between the various arms of the Moscow administration remain murky. What seems certain in the case of the tar monopoly, though, is that there was more at work than just a lack of communication between the two chancelleries.

At the local level, the tar war was a mixed blessing for the rural producers. On the up side, the English right to deal with the producers directly, the monopoly notwithstanding, was a boon because it maintained some competition for their product, thus preventing a plunge in price. The trade in train oil is revealing on this point. In the 1640s, after the expiration of his tar license, Fenzel (and his partner Peter Marselis, the Hamburg entrepreneur) became the sole exporter of train oil, with catastrophic results for the Kholmogorans and other Russians of the White Sea area who produced the oil. Empowered by the monopoly, Fenzel offered the suppliers as little as one quarter of what they normally got for their product. The exploitative policy earned Fenzel profits in the range of 400 percent.⁶⁰ The favourable Russian policy towards the English prevented the unfolding of a similar scenario in the tar trade. On the other hand, as the competition heated up, the tar war turned nastier, and the rural producers were caught in the middle, with unpleasant results. In 1638, Willeken's accusations against the English induced the *voevoda* at Vaga not only to ban all transactions between the English and the tar producers of Shenkursk, but also to impose surety bonds on those who normally did business with the English to ensure their compliance with the ban.⁶¹ The situation worsened in the first half of the 1640s, when Fenzel held the farm. Incensed with the Diplomatic Chancellery's continued favour to the English at the monopoly's expense, he took matters into

⁵⁷ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, I. 618r: 1 May 1641; d. 126, II. 621 r, 623r: 12 June 1641; d. 126, I. 111r: 27 May 1637.

⁵⁸ *Diplomatic Chancellery* letters to the Kholmogory and Vaga authorities in response to English petitions: RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, I. 49r: 12 March 1637; d. 126, II. 217r–30r: 15 June 1637; d. 126, II. 291r–92r: 3 March 1638; d. 126, I. 516r: 1640; d. 126, II. 619r, 620r, 622r: 10 May 1641; d. 152, II. 46r–49r: 13 May 1644.

⁵⁹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 413r–14r: 5 January 1639; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, I. 618r: 1 May 1641.

⁶⁰ Kashin, *Torgovlia i torgovyi kapital*, 240–41; Joseph T. Fuhrmann, *The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1972), 232.

his own hands, refusing to provide the English with tar from his own supply, as well as harassing the Russians who traded with them. The English charged that Russians were thrown into prison for selling them tar and beaten with bastinadoes. Moreover, those who escaped this harsh treatment were so terrorized that they “dared not” sell any tar to anyone by Fenzel.⁶² There thus reached a point, when the competition between the English and the Dutch worked against the tar producers.

The only solution—and one that would have benefitted all parties—was for the contestants to come to some sort of agreement among themselves. This actually happened in the latter 1630s. Dutch farmer Willeken not only displayed greater restraint than Fenzel in putting pressure on the English at the local level, he also demonstrated a willingness to work with them. For instance, Thomas Wych, the Muscovy Company's former agent in Russia, was working as Willeken's partner at Arkhangel'sk in late summer 1637.⁶³ This association did not, however, prevent clashes with other Englishmen. A more effective strategy was attempted in late spring 1638, a few months after Willeken and agent Digby had a second face-to-face battle over the tar issue before the tsar's officials at the Diplomatic Chancellery. On 10 May 1638, Willeken recognized John Osborne's contract with the Russians Bazhen Kirilov and Roman Farsov for 500 barrels of tar, to be delivered to Osborne “or anyone else of the [Muscovy] Company for their need.” Willeken also agreed to the English seeking an additional 300 barrels from the countryside (for a total of 800 barrels), and, if they could not secure the additional 300 barrels from the tar producers, he promised to provide as much from his own supply. Finally, for the rest of Willeken's term, the two sides were to agree each year on how much tar the English would procure and send to Arkhangel'sk for the making of cordage and ship repair.⁶⁴

The agreement appears to have resolved the conflict to everyone's satisfaction. There is no record of any English or Dutch complaints over tar, or reports of peasants being harassed in 1638, in the months following the agreement, or in 1639, the final year of Willeken's farm. Unfortunately, the transfer of the farm from Willeken to Fenzel in 1640 put an end to the short-lived experiment in cooperation and, as we saw, the tar war reached its nadir in the first half of the 1640s, to the detriment of Fenzel, the English, the Russian suppliers, and possibly the state. When Fenzel's license expired in 1645, the axe came down on everyone for several years. The death that year of Sheremetev, who oversaw the monopoly, and the establishment of a new government set on sweeping fiscal reform, following the death of Tsar Mikhail that same year, surely played some role in the changes that came about in the tar trade at this time: The treasury chose not to farm out the monopoly and, now, made sure that it was not undermined by special privileges. The English were finally stripped of

⁶¹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, f. 311r: February 1638.

⁶² RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 152, I. 30r: 13 March 1644; d. 152, II. 31r–45r: 13 March–13 May 1644.

⁶³ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, I. 327r: 16 February 1638.

⁶⁴ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 336r–39r: 10 May 1638.

the right to purchase tar directly from the producers. Henceforth, everyone was to buy from the tsar's officials at Arkhangel'sk, with the English limited to only 200 barrels per year.⁶⁵ The treasury's strict new policy was surely a blow to the Muscovy Company's cordage operation in Russia. So was the eventual Dutch retrieval of the tar farm in 1649, when the treasury awarded the monopoly to the powerful Dutch merchant Andrei Winius, from whom the English were obliged to buy all of their tar.⁶⁶ The decisive blow came a few months later, though, when the English were expelled from the Russian interior and their rope walks were shut down entirely. The areas around Kholmogory and Vaga thus grew quieter than they had been in a long time. For the local population that had done business with the English for decades, these could not have been positive developments.

THE CAVIAR TRADE

Caviar was produced all along the Volga River. The roe was provided by the Volga's plentiful sturgeon, and salt, necessary for pickling the roe, was extracted in substantial quantities from the salt marshes of the lower Volga, around Astrakhan'.⁶⁷ Every year, several hundred barrels of caviar were sent up the Volga to Nizhnii Novgorod and Iaroslavl', and from there to Arkhangel'sk for shipment abroad.⁶⁸ The English and the Dutch both bought up large quantities of the delicacy, for which the biggest markets were Italy and Constantinople.⁶⁹ The Muscovy Company appears to have been trading in caviar as early as the 1550s, and towards the end of the century, it found it profitable to export between 100–150 barrels per year, or 27–40 tons.⁷⁰ The trade tightened up in our period, though, when caviar, like other lucrative Russian commodities, was made a state monopoly. By the 1660s, one foreign observer commented on the "considerable trade" generated by caviar, one of the principal Russian exports at this time. The strength of this trade explained why the "tsar [kept] it to himself."⁷¹

Unfortunately, information on the caviar trade is less plentiful than for tar. What we do know is that demand for caviar was growing in our period and bred growing competition in Russia. As in the tar trade, this competition produced both friction and cooperation among interested parties. In the case of the caviar monopoly, however, competition did not get ugly, and was tempered by a fair dose of collaboration. Interestingly, this trade also involved Russian

⁶⁵ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 156, II. 29r–32r: June 1646; d. 156, II. 33r–34r: Not dated.

⁶⁶ Fuhrmann, *The Origins of Capitalism in Russia*, 89.

⁶⁷ Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow, 1580–1650*, 139.

⁶⁸ Aleksandr I. Iukht, *Torgovlia s vostochnymi stranami i vnutrennyi rynok Rossii (20–60-e gody XVIII veka)* (Moscow: In-t Rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1994), 197, 199, 200.

⁶⁹ Violet Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 116; Boris G. Kurts, ed., *Sostoianie Rossii v 1650–1655 gg. po doneseniiam Rodesa* (Moscow: Imp. obshestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, 1914), 159; Willan, *The Russia Company*, 237, 250.

⁷⁰ Willan, *The Russia Company*, 188–89, 250.

entrepreneurs, at least in the early decades of our period. One of these was *gost'* Nadeia Sveteshnikov. Sveteshnikov, one of the wealthiest merchants in all of Muscovy, after the Stroganovs, was involved in numerous commercial and entrepreneurial activities in the first half of the seventeenth century, including the Arkhangel'sk trade, the Persia trade, the Siberian fur trade, and Volga region salt trade.⁷² His Iaroslav' roots and entrepreneurial interests in the Volga area made him an ideal candidate for overseeing the state's caviar monopoly. He was active in this capacity between 1623 (perhaps earlier) and 1630. It would appear that his caviar sales for the treasury amounted to about 14,000 roubles worth per year, at a profit of at least 17 percent. In 1624, he signed a contract with the English magnate and single most important member of the Muscovy Company Ralph Freeman and his associates William Bladwell, Francis Flyer and Thomas Fowell, agreeing to sell them his entire yearly supply of caviar for six years.⁷³ The English thus controlled the tar trade until 1630, shipping the commodity to the Mediterranean ports of Venice, Leghorn, Corfu and Zante.⁷⁴ One source suggests that the Dutch partners Georg Everhard Klenck and Marcus de Vogelaer might have been involved with the Freeman group in the caviar trade by the late 1620s. Klenck and De Vogelaer carried on a substantial trade in Russia in the first half of the seventeenth century, enjoying the patronage of Patriarch Filaret, the tsar's father. Alone among all Dutch merchants active in Russia in this period, they were permitted to trade at half duty.⁷⁵

In 1630, the Dutch took over the farm from the English, but in 1637, it was back in English hands, for a term of five years.⁷⁶ This time, the monopoly, which gave the English exclusive right to sell caviar within Russia and to other foreigners at Arkangel'sk as well as at Pskov and Novgorod, went to Henry Garaway and "some others" of the Muscovy Company, represented in Russia by their factor John Osborne, who dominated English merchant activities in Russia in the 1630s and 40s.⁷⁷ English success at recovering the farm seems to have owed much to the swaying power of silver. In one of his reports to London, Simon Digby, who negotiated on behalf of the Garaway group, claimed that "the largesse of the gratuities" he offered to Cherkasskii played a significant role in securing control of the tar trade.⁷⁸ When the English license expired, in 1642, the

⁷¹ Guy de Miegé, *A Relation of Three Embassies From His Sacred Majestic Charles II to the Great Duke of Muscovia, the King of Sweden, and the King of Denmark, Performed by the Right Honourable Earl of Carlisle in the Year 1663 and 1664* (London, 1669), 31, 79.

⁷² Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow, 1580–1650*, 20–21, 98, 105, 118, 142.

⁷³ Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow, 1580–1650*, 154; PRO, SPf 91/3:16 (17 March 1636). Sveteshnikov's deal with Freeman and his associates perhaps explains why the 1627 petition against foreign merchants in Russia lodged by the Russian merchant elite, bearing Sveteshnikov's signature at the top, made no complaint against the English (unlike later petitions).

⁷⁴ PRO, SPf 91/3:16 (17 March 1636); *Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 1626–28*, 355.

⁷⁵ Ven'iamin A. Kordt, "Doneseniia poslannikov soedinennykh Niderlandov pri russkom dvore; Otchet Al'berta Burkha i Ioganna fan-Feltdrilia o posol'stve ikh v Rossiui v 1630 i 1631 gg." *Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva* 116 (1902), 194r.

treasury retrieved the monopoly. Sheremetev took over control of the Great Treasury at the passing of Cherkasskii at this time, and he perhaps wanted to try his hand at direct control of the caviar trade. Whatever the case, in 1649, the same year that the tar trade was farmed out once again, and just shortly before the English were expelled from the Russian interior, the policy was reversed and Osborne was awarded the caviar farm for a term of six years.⁷⁹ This time round, the farm included Dutch participation. Dutchman David Ruts was one of several merchants who guaranteed Osborne's agreement with the treasury.⁸⁰ Although not technically Osborne's partner, Ruts probably was in practise. He would have helped raise the hefty annual payment to the treasury.⁸¹ More importantly, the Dutch connection provided by Ruts enabled Osborne to get a hold of the silver he needed. The Russian treasury demanded payment not in roubles, but in thalers, and silver could only be shipped out of England with special permission and in limited quantities. Shipping it out of the Low Countries through a Dutch associate facilitated matters for the English entrepreneur.

The expulsion order of 1649 jeopardized Osborne's farm, but since he was one of a handful of Muscovy Company men who remained in Russia for another few years to help in the winding up of English affairs, he was permitted to retain the monopoly for the full six-year term. The halt to his other trading activities in Russia, however, was a serious blow to his finances that ultimately undermined his hold on farm. In the fall of 1650, he was 14,000 thalers behind in his payments to the treasury and he owed an additional 500 thalers in connection with another transaction. By late winter 1652, the situation had improved somewhat, but Osborne still owed 9,000 thalers and was seemingly unable to come up with the money in a timely fashion. The treasury therefore ordered that Osborne's debt be cleared by his guarantor David Ruts. By 1653, if not earlier, the caviar monopoly was controlled by the Dutch (probably Ruts), in association with a group of Italians.⁸²

When he first held the farm, between 1637–42, Osborne paid the treasury 30,000 thalers per year (or 12,600 roubles), not counting his own expenses. For the second farm, which he secured in 1649, he agreed to pay considerably more, 51,975 thalers per year.⁸³ Just how substantial these sums are is suggested by a comparison with the total amount of thalers imported to Arkhangel'sk and sent to

⁷⁶ This turn runs contrary to the the existing view that the Dutch alone controlled the caviar trade in the first half of the seventeenth century. See, for instance, Jonathan I. Israel, *Empires and Entrepôts: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585–1713* (London: Hambledon Press, 1990), 139.

⁷⁷ PRO, SPf 91/3:17 (2 September 1636); RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 296r–97r: 9 April 1638.

⁷⁸ PRO, SPf 91/3:17 (2 September 1636).

⁷⁹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 173, I. 45r: 8 July 1649; d. 173, II. 285r–86r: 30 October 1650.

⁸⁰ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 173, I. 304r. 9 February 1652.

⁸¹ Such deception was not uncommon in the period. For examples among the English, see Thomas S. Willan, *Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade* (Manchester: University Press, 1959), 11–12.

Moscow in 1630:47,571.⁸⁴ The caviar monopoly was thus a very expensive investment. Apparently, it was worth it. Judging by the competition between the English and the Dutch to secure the monopoly in the 1630s and 40s, and the dramatic increase in the price of the farm between 1637–49, there is no doubt that caviar became an increasingly lucrative commodity in these decades. According to one English source, the monopoly returned a certain profit of between 30–40 percent in the 1660s.⁸⁵ The caviar trade was not only lucrative, it was also growing. In the five years that Osborne held the monopoly (1637–42), he appears to have handled 241 tons of caviar per year, or 6–9 times the amount shipped by the entire Muscovy Company in the 1590s. By the terms of his second farm contract (1649), Osborne agreed to handle 362 tons of caviar per year, i.e. 50 per cent more than he had handled previously.⁸⁶

The lack of friction in the caviar trade and instances of both Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Dutch collaboration in exploiting the monopoly is attributable to several factors. First, unlike the situation with the tar trade, the caviar monopoly, whether directly controlled by the treasury, or farmed out to the English or the Dutch, was not undermined by any special privileges awarded to any person or group. The integrity of the monopoly was therefore never undermined and the potential for tension reduced. Another important factor was the enormous sums of money and thus risks that were involved in handling the caviar trade. The substantial financial investment required to farm and operate the trade made it impossible, or unwise for any one entrepreneur to act alone. Each time the English controlled the trade, there were several individuals involved, including at least one Dutchman by the end of the 1640s, and when the Dutch held the farm in the early 1650s, they partnered with Italian associates. The only Russian entrepreneur involved in the trade that we know of is Sveteshnikov, who acted as an agent for the treasury in the 1620s. He, too, found it more expedient to work with others, namely Freeman and his associates. His deal with the Freeman group guaranteed the sale of his annual caviar supply at a pre-set price that covered his costs and earned him a certain profit over the course of several years. In subsequent decades, Russian merchants do not appear to have had any role in the monopoly, most likely because they were not in a position to come up with the very large sums of silver that were needed to farm the trade.

It was important that the treasury provided the farmers with support that ensured that their considerable efforts and investment and, ultimately, the tsar's profit, were not threatened by corrupt officials or interlopers. Local officials were sternly warned against taking "gifts" of caviar, and were instructed to watch for illicit trading by Russians or foreigners at local markets and fairs as well as at

⁸² RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 173, I. 45r: 8 July 1649; d. 173, II. 176r–78r: 1 May 1650; d. 173, II. 285r–86r: 30 October 1650; No, 173, I. 304r: 9 February 1652; Kurts, *Sostoianie Rossii*, 159.

⁸³ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 173, I. 45r: 8 July 1649; d. 173, II. 176r–78r: 1 May 1650.

⁸⁴ Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow, 1580–1650*, 63.

⁸⁵ Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century*, 116.

⁸⁶ Arel, "Masters in Their Own House," 416–17.

the White Sea coast and the Baltic hinterland.⁸⁷ The one interloping case to have survived from this period suggests that action came swiftly and decisively. In March 1638, John Osborne complained to the *voevoda* at Vologda that Roman Bladwell, another English merchant attached to the Muscovy Company, had secretly traded in caviar, thus infringing on his monopoly. The *voevoda* immediately sent a local investigator to question Bladwell. When Bladwell proved uncooperative and belligerent, the matter was taken over by the Great Treasury in Moscow, which dispatched its own investigators to the scene. Bladwell disappeared in the meantime, prompting the Moscow investigators to seize several English merchants who had vouched that he would appear for questioning. The locking up of his associates forced the fugitive out of hiding and into the hands of the authorities, who promptly threw him behind bars as well.⁸⁸

THE POTASH TRADE

The importance of the Russian potash trade was on the rise as well in the 1630s and 40s. A basic ingredient in the manufacture of such important every-day products as cloth, soap, and glass, potash enjoyed a strong and steady demand in England, where the disappearance of the forest made the commodity increasingly scarce. For a long time, it had been supplied by the Eastland Company from Prussian sources.⁸⁹ Ash, from which potash is made, was produced in large amounts in many parts of forest-rich Russia. In the sixteenth century, three major ash-making centres emerged: the regions around Moscow, Vologda, and Nizhnii Novgorod. In the following century, Nizhnii Novgorod, on the upper Volga (south-east of Iaroslavl'), became an increasingly important ash-producing area, joined by the neighbouring province of Arzamas.⁹⁰ The Russian treasury took over the ash trade sometime in the early 1620s.⁹¹ The more refined potash does not seem to have been produced in Russia until the 1630s, when the Dutch merchant Karel du Moulin set up the first potash works in the Russian north and the Volga region. Du Moulin secured the farm in 1630 for a period of ten years, at a cost of one rouble for each barrel exported.⁹² According to the initial farm agreement, du Moulin was to "burn forest and make ash" north of Vologda, in Tot'ma and Ustiug *uezdy*, in areas along the Sukhona, Iug and Northern Dvina rivers.⁹³ Later on, he extended his activities into Galich *uezd* along the Vetluga, and further east around Viatka, Nizhnii Novgorod *uezd*, and all along the Volga as far south as Samara.⁹⁴ His efforts, in 1640, to extend his operations westward

⁸⁷ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 296r–97r: 9 April 1638.

⁸⁸ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 126, II. 296r–310r: 9 April, 16 April, 1638; d. 126, II. 376r–83r. Nov. 1638; d. 126, II. 458r–64r: Feb./March 1639. Unfortunately, as is often the case with the Muscovite historical record, the documents that would tell us how the Osborne-Bladwell affair was resolved, are missing.

⁸⁹ Attman, *The Russian and Polish Markets*, 5, 18; Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, 115–16. Most Baltic potash was shipped from Elbing, Königsberg, and Danzig.

towards Murom and Kadom, in the Oka basin, and even as far as Briansk (near Russia's western frontier) met with no success, however.

No data is available on Du Moulin's trade, but it seems that it did not go as well as he had planned, or the treasury expected. As Du Moulin's license approached expiration, the treasury noted disapprovingly that he had failed to maintain permanent works anywhere and had made "little profit" for the tsar. For his part, Du Moulin complained of having suffered "great losses."⁹⁵ Consequently the farm was transferred to Simon Digby in 1642.⁹⁶ Du Moulin did put up somewhat of a fight to retain control of the trade, but his efforts could not compete with the English bid at this time, whose strength is underlined by the generous terms of the new license: Digby was granted the farm for a term of twelve, not ten, years and he was charged no more than his predecessor had been, i.e. one rouble per each barrel exported. Furthermore, while Du Moulin had been required to make farm payments to the treasury from day one, Digby was granted a two-year exemption, while he searched for suitable forests, set up the works, and traded his first batches of potash. Finally, like Du Moulin, Digby was permitted to bring over three or four skilled workers from abroad to assist in the making of potash.⁹⁷ The only potential difficulty with the licence is that it restricted Digby's activities to areas bordering the Moscow-Arkhangelsk route—Iaroslavl', Vologda, Tot'ma, Ustiug and Dvina *uezdy*, along the Sukhona, Iug, Dvina and Vaga rivers—and expressly forbade access to the Volga region, where ash-making was an important and growing industry and where Du Moulin had operated.⁹⁸ On this point, the tsar ruled that it was "not fitting that foreigners [should] go and look around" in territory east of the Moscow-Arkhangelsk route, especially in areas along the Volga.⁹⁹

The voice of the Russian merchant elite echoes in this prohibition. Russian merchants might have feared that allowing Western Europeans to set up ash works in the area provided them with a cover for infiltrating the lucrative Eastern and Siberian trades, both of which were jealously guarded by the Russians in this

⁹⁰ Aleksandr S. Kliuchevich, *Iz istorii material'noi kultury i narodnogo khoziastva Rossii; Moiushchie sredstva, pererabotka zhivov s drevneishikh vremen po 1917 god* (Kazan': Izd-vo Kazan, un-ta, 1971), 62, 96.

⁹¹ Trofimov, *Ocherki ekonomicheskogo razvitiia evropeiskogo severa Rossii*, 33.

⁹² RGADA f. 50, op. 1, d. 1, II. 1r, 3r: January 1630; d. 1, II. 66r–90r: 1631; d. 174, I. 635r: March 1654; Geraldine M. Phipps, *Britons in Seventeenth Century Russia* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1972), 23.

⁹³ RGADA f. 50, op. 1, d. 1, II. 1r, 3r: January 1630; d. 1, II. 9r–15r: 25 January 1630; Kashin, *Torgovlia i torgovyi kapital'e*, 136.

⁹⁴ RGADA f. 50, op. 1, d. 1, I. 22r: 1631; d. 1, I. 52r: 20 June/July 1633; d. 148, II. 6r–49r: 11 June 1642.

⁹⁵ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, II. 6r–49r: 11 June 1642.

⁹⁶ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, II. 6r–49r: 11 June 1642; d. 148, II. 4r–5r: 7 March 1642; d. 148, I. 49r: 20 June 1643; Telegina, "K voprosu o torgovo-predprinimatel'skoi deiatel'nosti anglichan v Rossii v 30–40kh godakh XVII veka," 234.

⁹⁷ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, I. 49r: 20 June 1643.

period.¹⁰⁰ In 1627, a petition lodged by the Russian merchant elite charged that, prohibitions notwithstanding, the Dutch were probing into Siberia and tapping into the fur trade. In addition, Eastern merchants coming up from the Caspian Sea region who were supposed to trade only at Kazan' and Astrakhan' allegedly expanded their activities into other towns, where they traded with all manner of people, including, presumably, Western Europeans.¹⁰¹ In 1635/36, another petition accused Dutch and Hamburg merchants of engaging in illicit trade in Siberia, while, in 1641, Moscow merchants accused their English, Dutch, and German counterparts of trying to infiltrate the Eastern trade by secretly dealing with merchants attached to a Persian embassy in the capital. Leading representatives of the accused—Digby for the English, David Ruts and several others for the Dutch, and Peter Marselis for the Hamburg group—vigorously denied these charges, when questioned by the tsar's officials, but they remained under suspicion and were sternly warned of the "sovereign's wrath."¹⁰² In the context of expanding trade opportunities on the one hand, and the growing possessiveness of interested segments of the Russian merchantry on the other, Western European activities in the upper and middle Volga region connected to the ash trade were bound to arouse suspicion, more so because, in our period, the center of gravity of the fur trade gradually moved from northern to southern Siberia. Consequently, the main route into the area shifted from the Vychegda and Ob' in the north to the Kama River which flowed into the Volga at Kazan', between Nizhnii Novgorod and Samara.¹⁰³ This was one of the areas where Du Moulin had been permitted to set up ash works.

Exclusion from the Volga region was a blow for Digby, but the agent's shrewdness allowed him to circumvent the problem in an ingenious way, demonstrating the possibilities afforded by personal contacts with the right people. In 1641/42, just as Digby was acquiring the potash farm from Du Moulin,

⁹⁸ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, II. 6r–49r: 11 June 1642.

⁹⁹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, II. 6r–49r: 11 June 1642. Following the tsar's order that no potash works be set up in areas not immediately adjacent to the Moscow-Arkhangelsk route, Digby successfully bid to extend his activities into Vologda, Iaroslavl', and Dvina uezdy.

¹⁰⁰ English trade along the Volga and access to Persia, via the Caspian Sea, came to an end back in the 1580s, but the Muscovy Company continued to harbor hopes of re-establishing a presence in the area. The issue was regularly raised by the English during trade talks with the Russians in the first two decades of the seventeenth century. For details, see Phipps, *Sir John Merrick*, 130; Lodyzhenskii, *Istoriia russkago tamozhennago tarifa*, 22–23; Sergei M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 15 vols. (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1960–66), vol. 9, 1175–79; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 87, I. 28r: Nov. 1623. On English forays into Siberia, see Samuel H. Baron, "Thrust and Parry: Anglo-Russian Relations in the Muscovite North," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, new ser., 21 (1988), 34. A useful background discussion is provided by *idem*, "Muscovy and the English Quest for a North East Passage to Cathay (1553–1584)," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 3 (1985), 1–17.

¹⁰¹ Kashin, *Torgovlia i torgovyi kapital*, 227.

¹⁰² RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 136, II. 55r–59r: January 1638; d. 126, II. 595–603r: 17–18 January 1641.

his factor John White leased forest along the Volga, in Nizhnii Novgorod *uezd*, from the personal estate of Il'ia Danilovich Miloslavskii. Miloslavskii's activities in the tsar's service revolved around foreign affairs and the commissioning of Western technological and military expertise. It was as a result of such activities that White undoubtedly made his acquaintance, and a fortuitous acquaintance it was too. Not only did Miloslavskii own land in the area that White wanted to infiltrate, he also enjoyed the patronage of boiar Boris Ivanovich Morozov, tutor to Aleksei, the tsar's son and heir. When Aleksei came to the throne in 1645, Morozov became the most powerful man in government. With Morozov's support, Miloslavskii succeeded in marrying his daughter to Aleksei in early 1648 and the marriage link to the tsar enhanced Miloslavskii's position further and, by extension, White's good fortune. Via White, the Miloslavskii connection allowed Digby to extend his activities into the upper Volga region, the limitations of his license notwithstanding.¹⁰⁴

In later years, the English presence in the region was further strengthened by new strategies employed by White, who took over Digby's farm in 1644, following the latter's death.¹⁰⁵ These strategies linked White to Alexander Crawford, a Scottish colonel in Russian employ who, in 1641/42, was rewarded for his services to the tsar with the exclusive right to make and trade ash in the Murom forest and Arzamas *uezd*, south of Nizhnii Novgorod, i.e. areas where White was not allowed to operate.¹⁰⁶ In the 1640s, White became the main, if not sole, customer for Crawford's product.¹⁰⁷ By the end of the decade, White finally attained what had eluded Digby: In 1647, he requested that his farm extend to Nizhnii Novgorod and Arzamas *uezdy*, in place of Tot'ma, Ustiug, and Dvina *uezd*, where the forest was less suitable for the making of potash. In a reversal of earlier policy, the request was granted and White's license was re-issued for a new term of ten years (1647–57), at a slightly higher annual farm payment.¹⁰⁸ The reversal is most likely attributable to the influence of Miloslavskii, whose position at court improved dramatically in early 1647, when his daughter Maria became Tsar Aleksei's wife.

Despite obstacles and limitations put in his way, White succeeded in consolidating the bulk of his ash trade and accessing prime forest along the Volga in the course of a few years. The scale of White's trade appears to have been substantial. Although the figures are extremely limited, they suggest that,

¹⁰³ Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow, 1580–1650*, 119.

¹⁰⁴ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, I. 165r: 17 May 1650; d. 148, II. 170r, 179r: July 1650, 6 May 1651; d. 148, I. 10 February 1652.

¹⁰⁵ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, I. 54r: 9 April 1644; d. 148, I. 61r: 7 June 1644; d. 148, I. 67r: 22 June 1644; d. 148, II. 68r–79r: 15 August 1644.

¹⁰⁶ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, II. 81r–83r: 11 November 1644. Crawford's monopoly was granted by the *Prikaz Bol'shogo Dvortsa* (Office of the Great Court) for a term of seven years.

¹⁰⁷ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, I. 84r: 3 Jan. 1645; d. 148, I. 98r: 6 May 1647; d. 148, II. 107r–111r: May 1647; d. 148, I. 140r: 11 April 1648; d. 166, II. 37r–42r: 24 May 1648; d. 148, I. 148r: March 1650.

between 1647–50, White handled some 81–160 tons of potash annually, perhaps reaching as high as 310 tons in better years. The latter figure represents almost half the average annual export of Baltic ash by the English in the 1640s.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately for White, he was not able to long enjoy the success of his trade. With the expulsion of the Muscovy Company from the Russian interior in 1649, his license was prematurely terminated, his pleas notwithstanding, and Moscow ordered that the potash works he had invested some 7,000 roubles to set up be sold immediately.¹¹⁰ All White could salvage was the enterprise he had built on the land leased from boiar Miloslavskii. Misfortune also befell Crawford at about the same time. In 1650, while he was away on a campaign against the Kalmyks, Francis Ashe and John Doufte, former partners of White, secured permission to remain in Russia and assume control of Crawford's works, which they claimed he could not keep up since he was away indefinitely on the tsar's service. Crawford's repeated protests induced Ashe and Doufte to agree to sharing one third of their profits with him. However, the agreement seems to have been a hollow one. In 1653, Crawford complained that he had not received a single payment in three years.¹¹¹

It is very clear from Dutch and English activities in the 1630s and 40s that ash, already an important enough commodity in the 1620s to be made a state monopoly, became an increasingly lucrative product, when refined into potash in later decades. Over time, and in later years, the demand for the potash grew dramatically: By 1653, 1,930 tons were being shipped from Arkhangel'sk, making it the third most important Russian commodity sent abroad at this time, value-wise (excluding grain, an occasional Russian export). Two years later, in 1655, it was reported that 2,893 tons of potash were shipped from Arkhangel'sk. Value-wise, only *iufti* surpassed potash in importance that year.¹¹² At the same time, the 1650s witnessed the complete and permanent collapse of the Baltic potash trade, where English import levels in the second half of the seventeenth century never approached those of the earlier period.¹¹³ Fedorowicz has suggested that changes in technology may have been partly the cause of this collapse, but it would seem that the competition of Arkhangel'sk potash was an important—perhaps the key—factor. This is suggested by the fact that the first appreciable drop in the amount of potash imported by the English from the Baltic since the depressed trade of the 1620s comes *not* in the 1650s, but in the 1640s, precisely the decade when the English in Russia assumed control of the potash monopoly there.

¹⁰⁸ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, II. 113r, 121r–22r: 19 June and 11 July 1647; d. 148, II. 123r–38r: 15 July 1647; d. 173, I. 48r: July 1649.

¹⁰⁹ Arel, "Masters in Their Own House," 417; Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, 114–15.

¹¹⁰ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 173, I. 48r: July 1649; RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 173, I. 49r: 12 July 1649.

¹¹¹ RGADA f. 35, op. 1, d. 148, I. 165r: 17 May 1650; d. 148, II. 170r, 179r: July 1650, 6 May 1651; d. 148, I. 186r: 10 February 1652; d. 174, II. 635r–40r: March 1654.

The state, as well as wealthy and enterprising Russians, quickly grasped the money-making potential of potash and joined the push to exploit it. As early as the late 1640s, those with access to vast forest lands, cheap serf labour, and the means to invest, such as the state, the Rtishchev brothers, the Stroganovs, and various monasteries, made their own potash and plied a large trade in the commodity, and in the second half of the century, potash became a major Russian export, handled largely by the treasury, powerful courtiers, and *gosti*.¹¹⁴ Morozov, tsar Aleksei's righthand man, was particularly active and successful in the trade. Although it is unclear when exactly he started, in 1650, he was looking for suitable forest on his estates in Nizhnii Novgorod and Arzamas to set up "new" potash works.¹¹⁵ In this new environment, where immensely wealthy and powerful Russians such as Morozov acquired the necessary know-how and could easily establish potash works on their personal estates, Western European entrepreneurs like White became unwanted competitors. The direction of the tide was evident by the late 1640s, when White's new license allowed access to the prime Volga area, but restricted the Englishman's activities to purchasing ash from Russians, rather than making his own, and working it into potash.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In his important study of Muscovite taxation, Lappo-Danilevskii characterized the seventeenth century as a period when the two most urgent issues confronting the Russian state were military needs and finances.¹¹⁶ As in the West in the same period, the two issues were intimately connected, and efforts to deal with them led ultimately in the direction of modernization.¹¹⁷ In Russia, the first few decades after the Time of Troubles posed serious challenges to the fledgeling Romanov dynasty. After years of war, social upheaval, political chaos, and economic collapse, the newly-resurrected Russian state of the post-Troubles years was faced with an empty treasury at first, and then by mounting expenses connected to the expansion of the administrative apparatus and reform of the military along Western lines (the Smolensk War, 1632–34, and fortification of the southern frontier were additional drains on state coffers). In these circumstances, the growth of the Arkhangel'sk trade in the decades following the Time of Troubles was bound to attract the attention of the state, as ways were sought to alleviate the

¹¹² Kurts, *Sostoianie Rossii*, 167; John Thurloe, *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, 7 vols., (London: F.Gyles, 1742), vol. 3, 713.

¹¹³ Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, 114–15.

¹¹⁴ Pavel M.Luk'ianov, *Kratkaia istoriia khimicheskoi promyshlennosti SSSR* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1959), 45.

¹¹⁵ In 1651, he sent eighty-eight tons of potash to Vologda (White had sent 160 tons to Arkhangel'sk in 1647 and 130 tons to Vologda in 1648), and there is no doubt that the volume of his trade increased over the years as he expanded his operations. Aleksei I. Iakovlev, ed., *Akty khoziastva boiarina B.I.Morozova*, 2 vols., (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1945), vol. 1, 127–28, 159, 179.

¹¹⁶ Lappo-Danilevskii, *Organizatsiia priamogo oblozheniia*, i.

persistent fiscal pressure. Consequently, state monopolies, which were applied to Russian exports now and then in the second half of the sixteenth century, were imposed more systematically under Mikhail. Tar, caviar, and potash, all three commodities that generated increasing competition in Russia between the English and the Dutch, the two dominant Western European groups at Arkhangel'sk, were placed under state control in the 1620s and 30s and remained in the state's hands into subsequent decades. Under Aleksei, Mikhail's successor, the need for revenue continued to increase as Russia advanced towards modernization, and a slew of other profitable exports were taken over by the state as well, including, at various times, hemp, sables, tallow, *iuft*, and rhubarb.¹¹⁸

By far the most lucrative of the state monopolies under Mikhail was caviar, which generated thousands of roubles per year, in addition to customs levied on the exchange and movement of the product. Tar and potash were much less profitable monopolies than caviar, but the demand for both was rising fast in the West, and in the case of tar, Western (particularly English) cordage manufacture in Russia, as well as the refurbishing needs of the growing number of ships coming to Arkhangel'sk each year, assured a steady annual market for the product. In the case of all three commodities, strong Western demand also provided work for growing numbers of Russians involved in either the production process or transport, thus contributing to the tax-paying ability of the population and, ultimately, state revenues. The state's concern with taxes helps explain the seemingly anomalous freedom (direct access to the tar-makers) allowed the English in the tar trade, even though this freedom undercut the state's monopoly. Political considerations probably played a role as well.

For the most part, the Muscovite state's control of the tar, caviar, and potash trades translated, in practise, into Western European monopolies. As elsewhere in the same period, the state farmed its monopolies to the highest bidder, and in the Russia of the post-Troubles decades, that was the English and the Dutch. Their superior credit practises and networks, ability to make advance annual payments to the treasury, and the thalers they provided to a mine-deficient state whose currency was dependent on costly imports of foreign silver positioned them to assume control of some of Russia's most lucrative export commodities. It is impossible to tell from the available sources the extent to which Russian merchants with the means (*gosti* and others) joined the Europeans in bidding for the farms. In the case of caviar, it was undoubtedly a lost battle once the state found it could secure large quantities of foreign silver for the monopoly. Russian merchants, although they traded in thalers, could not possibly have come up with

¹¹⁷ For a useful discussion on the efforts of modernizing Western European states to raise more and more revenue between the fifteenth-eighteenth centuries, see Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation and Capitalism, fifteenth-eighteenth Century*, vol. 2: *The Wheels of Commerce* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 519–49. On the connection between war and state finance in the seventeenth century, see John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State 1688–1783* (London and Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

¹¹⁸ Longworth, *Alexis, Tsar of All the Russias*, 149.

the amounts the English and Dutch were able to provide. The potash trade was also problematic since the commodity was new to Russia and Western know-how was needed to produce it, at least in the initial years of the trade. The English and the Dutch thus had the advantage here too. The tar trade was probably the most even bidding field. However, given the critical importance of tar to English and Dutch cordage manufacture in Russia, which provided a livelihood for hundreds of Russians in and around Vologda, Kholmogory, and Arkhangel'sk, the government of Mikhail Fedorovich was perhaps reluctant to place the tar trade in the hands of Russian farmers and thus risk disrupting the flow of tar to the foreign rope walks.

Handsome bribes to the right people and personal connections probably helped the Europeans further. Powerful courtiers like Cherkasskii, Sheremetev, Morozov, and Miloslavskii could make or break a bid, assist or hamper the operation of a given farm, or subvert official policy. Cherkasskii, in particular, appears to have played a pivotal role in this game. He made the most of Anglo-Dutch competition for control of some of Russia's most important export trades, awarding the tar farm to the Dutch in 1636 and again in 1640, and the caviar and potash farms to the English in 1637 and 1641. He offered opportunities for profit to both groups of merchants, thus keeping all sides satisfied. At the same time, his actions prevented the concentration of several trades in the hands of any one group, and undoubtedly earned him handsome sums to boot. Pre-modern strategies revolving around personal favour, acquaintance, gifts, and bribes, and pre-modern outcomes such as restricted zones of trade, state interference in trade, and the enrichment of a small handful—both Russian and foreign—were part of the process, whereby Muscovy amassed the resources needed to modernize.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, THE SMOLENSK WAR AND THE MODERNIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE

Paul Dukes

Modernizing Muscovy is a process that cannot be fully appreciated without a due measure of attention being given to international relations in Europe. Moreover, this exercise involves much more than diplomatic exchanges, requiring discussion of the relative weight of the powers, their internal situation and, especially in the early stages of the process, the nature of their religious confession. To take the seventeenth century in particular, at the beginning the Habsburg Empire predominated, at the end Bourbon France. Social disturbances were endemic and frontiers fluctuating nearer 1600, stability in both regards more evident towards 1700. And what was seen widely as Christendom throughout the century was being increasingly recognized as a secular entity by the century's latter turn. To illustrate the process for the continent as a whole and for Muscovy in particular, let us take the example of the pan-European conflict known as the Thirty Years' War, 1618–48, and the associated Smolensk War, 1632–34. The following exposition will move through four phases: an introduction, considering the nature of the Thirty Years' War; an examination of aspects of the Smolensk War and its context; a discussion of the sequel to the Smolensk War; and a conclusion involving an evaluation of Thirty Years' War as a whole, in particular the manner in which it came to an end.

INTRODUCTION: THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Historians of the twentieth century often argue that, while colleagues specializing in earlier centuries are often confronted by too little evidence, they themselves are usually weighed down by too much. Of course, they have a point, and yet the problem of too much rather than too little is a burden for early modern historians, too, nowhere more so than in the case of the Thirty Years' War, 1618–48. For example, no less than 45 volumes have been planned to publish in full the correspondence and negotiations concerning the peace of Westphalia. So no single scholar, however assiduous, could hope to attain the mastery of sources, let alone the linguistic expertise, necessary for a comprehensive grasp of this great subject as a whole. As Geoffrey Parker has observed: "any single scholar who believes it possible to refight the war alone suffers from dangerous delusions of grandeur." And even with the collaboration of an international team of ten historians, Parker still found that: "To do justice to such turmoil within the

framework of a single volume, without over-simplification or distortion, is not easy."¹

One response to the daunting question of how to grasp the Thirty Years' War in its totality is to deny that it existed, to agree with Nicola Sutherland that it is "a largely factitious conception which has nevertheless become an indestructable myth²," an episode in the long struggle between the Habsburg Emperors and the French Kings. An immediate and telling counter to this dismissal is the fact that, unlike such terms as "feudalism," "capitalism," and "absolutism" which have been devised by later generations as explanatory tools, "Thirty Years' War" was a phrase already used by contemporaries.³

And yet, few of us today would accept the view of some of them then, that the conflict was no more than a precursor to the final showdown between good and evil heralding the Day of Judgement. We do need our explanatory tools, therefore, at the same time as accepting their limitations as well as our own. Inevitably, interpretations differ, depending on methodological approach as well as partiality of knowledge. Thus, employing a method which he calls "dialectical or historical structuralism," the Czech Josef Polišenský put forward in a range of publications the thesis that the war was "a military-political conflict rooted in the past, in which two models of European civilization confronted one another: those represented by the lands in which development toward a modern capitalist society had been halted, and the lands in which this development had been allowed to proceed."⁴ For the German Ronald Asch, on the other hand:

In fact, there was one central issue justifying the contemporary judgement that the Thirty Years' War was a contest with a definite beginning and a definite end and with a structure giving coherence to the various military campaigns, not just an amorphous and haphazard series of individual wars: the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire and—inseparable from this question—the balance of political and religious forces in central Europe.⁵

Asch goes on to observe that the war was also in fact "very much a European civil war as well as a contest between dynasties, princes and republics" and "an important phase in the process of European state formation." "States" vied with "estates" for supremacy, with military finance as an important bone of contention. He also suggests that the war is "the best example of a political 'event' which profoundly changed political and social structures, and perhaps even collective mentalities (though this is a field as yet largely unexplored)."⁶

¹ Geoffrey Parker in *History Today*, November 1984 and *The Thirty Years' War* (London: Routledge, 1987), xvi.

² Nicola M. Sutherland, "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War and the Structure of European Politics," *English Historical Review* 107:424 (1992), 587.

³ Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, xiii–xiv.

⁴ Josef Polišenský, *Tragic Triangle: The Netherlands, Spain and Bohemia, 1617–1621* (Prague: Charles University, 1991), 8.

In both the Polišíenský and the Asch definitions, the Thirty Years' War was of considerable importance in the process of "modernization"—perhaps the grandest explanatory tool of all. There has been much discussion of its impact in this regard in Central Europe and other parts of the continent. However, to the East, Muscovy has often been seen as an outsider as far as both the conflict and the modernization of international relations in the seventeenth century are concerned. The customary overview looks first at the civil disturbances and foreign intervention known as the Time of Troubles (1598–1613). Then, there is a period of inactivity punctuated only by the localised Smolensk War (1632–34) until the wider conflict with Poland leading to the assimilation of Ukraine constituting the Thirteen Years' War (1654–67) which takes Muscovy further into Europe. If this overview is correct, Muscovy misses out on very nearly a third of a century of an important aspect of the process of modernization as characterised by Polišíenský and Asch.

Here, our purpose will be to evaluate the validity of that view by way of the work of the Soviet historian Boris Fedorovich Porshnev, who boldly set out to write a trilogy about the system of European states during the period of the Thirty Years' War, with emphasis on the relations between the West and East of the continent. The concluding part—*France, the English Revolution and European Politics at the Middle of the Seventeenth Century*—was published first, in 1970.⁷ The principal purpose of this work was to demonstrate that the English Revolution was influential throughout Europe and beyond. As well as being essentially to the disadvantage of the Habsburgs in its encouragement of anti-absolutist forces in general, it also pushed Louis XIV with the advice of Mazarin to seek peace for France so that the dangers inherent in the Frondes could be overcome before the pernicious influences spread across the Channel. Just previously, Mazarin had a moment's hesitation as he saw the revolt in Naples as an embarrassment to the Spanish Habsburgs which might contribute to their comprehensive defeat. In this book, Porshnev also considered the contribution to the outcome of the war made by events in Sweden and Poland. And in conclusion, he narrowed his argument to consider it on the basis of the individual life and then broadened it to the whole of Eurasia. The fact that two-thirds of the world's population probably lived in Asia in the seventeenth century made it necessary not to omit that continent from any examination of widespread historical movements at that time, he suggested. This was still so even though Asia did not interfere with Europe as much as previously. If China and India had not been busy with domestic conflict and Persia and Turkey had not been at war with each other, Muscovy would probably have felt more pressure on its southern and eastern frontiers and would probably therefore have been unable to devote its energies to the infiltration of Siberia and to the struggle with European rivals, principally the Crimean Tatars and the Poles.

The last of these occupied centre stage in the first part of the trilogy, which came out in 1976, four years after Porshnev's death, but almost exactly as he had

⁵ Ronald G. Asch, *The Thirty Years' War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618–1648* (London: Macmillan: 1997), 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4–5, 7.

prepared it for publication. Entitled *The Thirty Years' War and the Entry into It of Sweden and the Muscovite State*,⁸ the book was concerned primarily with the negotiations leading up to the Smolensk War, 1632–4, when Muscovite Russia attempted to retake the fortress seized earlier by Poland during the Time of Troubles. Here in general, he argues that the aggressors were the Habsburg powers, especially the Empire; and that the war was largely concerned with the Imperial attempt to suppress the opposition to this aggression by the Protestant princes. Hostilities in Germany were in the first instance not so much because of intervention from outside as because of internal circumstances. There were four categories of contradiction: state, between the Empire and the princes; confessional, especially between Catholics and Protestants; national, involving principally Germans, Slavs and Hungarians; and social, between the classes. The first category was the most noticeable, and the last—the least, but their actual importance was the other way round. Nevertheless, outside intervention could be highly significant, especially at key moments, and one example was the Russo-Polish War for Smolensk and the negotiations leading up to this conflict. Essentially, the argument here, supported by a considerable amount of archival evidence, is that Sweden encouraged and supported Muscovy's ambition to retake the city lost during the Time of Troubles in order to keep Poland occupied while King Gustav II Adolf advanced from the Baltic into Germany. Some confirmation of the significance of the ensuing war for the wider conflict may be found in publications of the time in both German and Spanish celebrating the Polish success at Smolensk.⁹

THE SMOLENSK WAR

The theme of the middle part of the trilogy was to be the subsequent crisis and rupture in relations between Western and Eastern Europe and also the fortunes of the general European war. One aim of this paper is to discuss this theme along lines suggested by Porshnev himself. According to his own plan, there were to be four major subjects for discussion:

- 1) The Muscovite peasant-Cossack uprising, the so-called *Balashovshchina*, 1633–34.
- 2) The Russo-Polish Peace of Polianovka of 1634; the crisis in Russo-Swedish relations and the Peace of Stuhmsdorf of 1635; the open entry of France into the war against the Habsburgs.

⁷ B.F. Porshnev, *Frantsiia, Angliiskaia revoliutsiia i evropeiskaia politika v seredine XVII veka* (Moskva: Nauka, 1970). See also Paul Dukes, "Russia and Mid-Seventeenth Century Europe: Some Comments on the Work of B.F. Porshnev," *European Studies Review* 4:1 (1974).

⁸ B.F. Porshnev, *Tridtsatiletniaia voina i vstuplenie v nee Shvetsii i Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976). A substantial part of this work, translated by Brian Pearce and edited by Paul Dukes, has been published as *Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years' War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

3) The epic career of Jacques Roussel; Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy and Islam; the struggle for the unification against Catholicism of the other Christian churches in the 1630s.

4) The position and the role of Turkey in Eastern and Western European politics in the 1630s.

For the first three of these subjects, Porshnev bequeathed some guidance regarding the lines that his argument was likely to follow in the shape of articles and summaries of conference papers. Unfortunately, however, his ideas about the fourth of them, Turkey, were never set out in any similar way.

As we proceed to make use of his pertinent publications in our reconstruction of the missing link in his trilogy, then, we must recognize at the beginning that the exercise resembles an attempt to complete a jigsaw puzzle lacking some of the most important pieces and any exact pictorial guide. In fact, a large part of what Porshnev wrote concerns the context of the Smolensk War and fails to discuss much of the period from 1635 to the end of the Thirty Years' War. Fortunately, however, the gap may be filled to a considerable extent by reference to the third volume in the trilogy and to Porshnev's overall thesis as set out in his presentation to the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Stockholm in 1960.¹⁰

On the basis of such materials as we have at our command, let us attempt to consider the four themes as listed above. Certainly, they provide evidence of activity in all four of the areas designated by Porshnev himself: state; confessional; national; and social.

1) THE PEASANT-COSSACK UPRISING, THE *BALASHOVSHCHINA*

Porshnev discussed the peasant-Cossack uprising known as the Balashovshchina in two articles.¹¹ The first of them was more generally entitled "The socio-political situation in Russia at the time of the Smolensk War," and its argument runs as follows. The Smolensk War was begun for two reasons: dynastic and territorial. The Romanovs succeeded in their first aim, since Władysław IV Vasa agreed to drop his claim to their throne. But the second aim, the reunion with the Muscovite state of West Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian lands, was not achieved at all. Three reasons were normally given in Soviet historiography for this failure: (i) the international situation, in particular the collapse of the anti-Polish Russo-Swedish alliance; (ii) incursions from the south

⁹ For description of pamphlets in German and Spanish celebrating the Polish triumph over the Muscovite army including Scottish and other mercenaries, see Paul Dukes, "New Perspectives: Alexander Leslie and the Smolensk War, 1632–4," in *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, ed., Steve Murdoch (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 180–2.

¹⁰ B.F. Porshnev, "Les rapports politiques de l'Europe occidentale et de l'Europe orientale à l'époque de la guerre de Trente Ans," *XIe. Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, Rapports IV, Histoire moderne* (Göteborg-Stockholm-Uppsala, 1960), 136–63.

by the Crimean Tatars; (iii) the intensification of the class struggle behind the lines. Which of these was the most important?

(i) Often, the Russian commander, the boyar M.B.Shein, was blamed for not making a more vigorous attempt to recapture the fortress of Smolensk. However, that was not the basic task assigned to him, at least not until a Russo-Swedish mercenary force attacked Poland from the west, from Silesia. But the attack never came, because the death of Gustavus Adolphus in September 1632 necessitated a change of plan. Shein attempted thereafter to pursue a policy of watchful waiting, but unforeseen events to his rear enforced further reconsideration. Although innocent, he was made a scapegoat for the failure to take Smolensk and for the subsequent armistice, as well as to appease popular disaffection, in April 1634.

(ii) Certainly, the Crimean Tatar incursions were troublesome. Yet research has shown that there was none of these between September 1633 and July 1634, the very period when they could have made their maximum impact.

(iii) Very little could be found in historiography, both pre- and post-revolutionary, about the intensification of the class struggle. But what had contemporaries said? One of them, a visitor to Moscow Adam Olearius had written that, while Russians customarily bore their slavery and their heavy yoke for the love of their ruler, there was a point which beyond which they went berserk. It could be said of them: "Try patience often enough, and madness at last ensues." Subsequently: "Once they are aroused, they are difficult to pacify; notwithstanding the danger that may threaten them, they resort to every kind of violence, and rage like madmen."¹² Another useful source was Polish intelligence, which learned from Russian deserters early in May 1634 that there had recently been fires and disturbances in Moscow, Mozhaishk and Borovsk. Such information was also to be found in German publications such as Khevenhuller's *Annales* and Abelin's *Theatrum Europaeum*.¹³ The Poles and Germans alike believed that these domestic upsets had forced the Russians to make peace, and so did the Swedes.

On the eve of the Smolensk War in 1632, memories were still fresh of the Time of Troubles. The government's inclination towards serfdom was being met to a significant extent by the response of peasant flight. Then, mobilization intensified the alienation of peasants and Cossacks alike; partisan bands were joined by deserters from Shein's army, while one Ivan Balash became a symbol of the peasant-Cossack movement down to the end of the Smolensk War. At times helping the war effort against the Poles, much more often hindering it, far from always agreeing among themselves about their aims and actions, the insurgents centred their activities from the autumn of 1633 to February 1634 on the town of Roslavl', near enough to Smolensk for more deserters to join them. Some governmental attempts at reconciliation came to nothing, and the

¹¹ B. F. Porshnev, "Sotsial'no-politicheskaia obstanovka v Rossii vo vremia Smolenskoii voyny," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 5 (1957), 112–40; idem, "Razvitie "Balashovskogo" dvizheniia v fevrale-marte 1634 g.," *Problemy obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Rossii i slavianskikh stran: Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu akademika M.N. Tikhomirova*, ed. A.A. Preobrazhenskii et al. (Moscow: AN SSSR Institut istorii SSSR, 1963), 225–35.

movement reached its peak from March to April 1634, bringing forward the Peace of Polianovka. From May to June, the Balashovshchina began to fade. Porshnev underlined his argument that the class struggle was a much greater influence than the international situation or Crimean Tatar incursions in bringing the war for Smolensk to its end in an article concerned with "The Development of the "Balashov" movement in February-March 1634."

2) THE PEACE OF POLIANOVKA, 1634. THE PEACE OF STUHMSDORF, 1635. THE OPEN ENTRY OF FRANCE.

Porshnev repeated his assertion in another article, "Towards the Peace of Polianovka in 1634."¹⁴ Nevertheless, here his emphasis was on an exposition of the views of the two sides as the war neared its end.

To take the Poles first, King Władysław IV would have liked to have taken the Russian throne promised him earlier on by, among others, the tsar's father, Filaret Nikitich, when the future Patriarch was in Polish captivity during and just after the Time of Troubles. According to a Polish historian, Władysław confidently wrote to Charles I in England on 13 December 1633: "a free road is opening up for us inside the Muscovite realm"¹⁵. However, pay arrears were among the reasons why he was worried about his army. Moreover, the Polish nobles were not keen to strengthen their king's power by spilling their blood to capture for him the Russian throne, some of them seeing more advantage accruing from resumption of the war against Sweden. At least a few hopes were expressed that both Christian powers could unite against the Moslem infidels.

As for the Russians, a *zemskii sobor* or Assembly of the Whole Land convened in January 1634 demonstrated a determination to fight on at least until the road from Moscow to Smolensk was cleared and the Poles were driven back to their own pre-war borders. Other questions arose during the course of preliminary negotiations: the loyalties of the Zaporozhian Cossacks; the nature of the relations between Poland and Sweden; the nature of the relations between Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire, Persia, the Crimean Tatars and even the Nogai Tatar Hordes from beyond the Volga. Nearer home, the death of the Patriarch Filaret Nikitich in October 1633 had led to a palace revolt, for which Porshnev gives four reasons: the failure of the Russo-Swedish alliance; the intensification of social disturbances, especially the *Balashovshchina*; the lack of military activity at Smolensk; the compromising policies of the Patriarch in church matters, in particular concerning a union of Orthodoxy with Calvinism.¹⁶ The most important immediate consequence of the palace revolt was the return to power of the "Polish party" anxious for rapprochement with the old enemy. (Filaret Nikitich had broken his promise on this score after his return from exile). And so, the Peace of Polianovka was signed on 15 June 1634 without too much previous argument because it was very necessary for both sides.

¹² *The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia*, ed. and trans. S.H. Baron (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 153.

¹³ Franz Christoph Khevenhüller, *Annales Ferdinandeae...*, 12 vols. (Leipzig: M.G. Weidmann, 1721–6); J.P. Abelin, *Theatrum Europaeum*, 21 vols. (Frankfurt, 1662, 1664–1738).

So much for Poland, the old enemy: what of the former ally, Sweden? On this latter subject, Porshnev published the theses of two conference reports.¹⁷ The first of them, entitled "The Swedish Embassy to Moscow in 1634," makes seven points:

i. This embassy followed the Russian Embassy to Stockholm in 1633, and was aimed at preventing the Russo-Polish peace. When the news spread from Polianovka, it became a damage-limitation exercise.

ii. Polianovka opened up before Sweden various disadvantages, the most serious of which was the possibility of war with Poland, but which also included the loss of cheap Russian grain to be sold at a profit on the Amsterdam and Antwerp markets and the closure of access via the Volga to the "Persian trade."

iii. A high priority was to stop Polish troop movement against Sweden through the Muscovite state. Such movement did not in fact take place, although only a small part was played here by Swedish diplomacy.

iv. However pressing the Swedish requests, continuance of the Russian grain subsidy was categorically refused.

v. The embassy worked hard to discredit Jacques Roussel, who had promised intercession regarding the "Persian trade" not only to the Swedish but also to other European merchants, in particular from Holstein. The Swedes made an agreement with the Holsteiners, whose significant embassy was described by Olearius.¹⁸

vi. The embassy was the last twist in a tortuous struggle for a Russo-Swedish alliance during the so-called "Swedish period" of the Thirty Years' War. However, normal relations between Russia and Sweden were maintained until the end of that war in spite of continued Polish efforts to the contrary.

vii. Swedish sources on the embassy appeared to be scanty, but a fairly full, detailed account could be given on the basis of documents from the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA) in Moscow.¹⁹

The second set of Porshnev's theses concerning Sweden are on "The Peace of Stuhmsdorf of 1635: Its Historiography and Historical Significance." Here, he makes just two points:

i. This Peace was made between Sweden and Poland at the end of the Swedish period of the Thirty Years' War, 1630–35. The concluding year 1635 marked the moment of maximum Swedish expansion into continental Europe, which was the consequence partly of aspects of the internal situations obtaining in the German states and Sweden, partly of elements in the international situation of Europe. The threat of war with Poland had to be averted, especially after Polianovka, but this aim could not have been achieved without French intercession.

ii. French diplomacy, along with British and Dutch as well as Swedish, worked hard to change the course of Polish foreign policy. According to the terms

¹⁴ B.F.Porshnev, "Na putiakh k Polianovskomu miru 1634g.," *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, politika, diplomatiia XVI–XX vv.: Sbornik statei k 80-letiiu akademika I.M.Maiskogo*, ed. V.V. Al'tman et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 512–37.

¹⁵ Władysław Godziszewski, *Polska i Moskwa za Władysława IV* (Kraków, 1930), 10.

¹⁶ See, for example, Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 259–88, 335–7.

of the Stuhmsdorf treaty, Poland guaranteed its neutrality to France and Sweden in exchange for significant territorial and political concessions. Porshnev again gave emphasis to the point that previous historiography had neglected to describe the international relations of the period in their completeness, especially the part played in them by the links between Sweden and Russia.

3) JACQUES ROUSSEL: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNIFICATION AGAINST CATHOLICISM OF THE OTHER CHRISTIAN CHURCHES.

Jacques Roussel, who has already been mentioned briefly, makes a full appearance in the concluding volume of Porshnev's trilogy under the heading "On the Scale of the Individual Life" after a briefer notice in an article "Towards the History of Russo-French Relations in the Period of the Thirty Years' War."²⁰ In the article, Porshnev argues that the historiography of Franco-Russian relations in the early modern period has concentrated too much on the monarchs and the statesmen, especially Richelieu, neglecting therefore to give sufficient emphasis to the point that the Frenchmen who made the major contributions to the establishment of relations between the two countries were in fact the representatives of the political opposition, Huguenots especially. Jacques Roussel was one of them.

Porshnev chose him for particular attention partly because he was a cosmopolitan with a range of connections stretching throughout Europe to Persia, partly because he was a bearer of the spirit of the age, combining interests in the state, the market and the church:

Jacques Roussel, son of a citizen of Châlons [Champagne] and brother of a well-known Calvinist preacher, was a typical man of the late Renaissance period—fashionably educated and a man of the world, yet at the same time a fanatical adherent of Calvinistic Protestantism. He was a confederate and confidant of the leader of the French Huguenots, the Due de Rohan. Roussel's activity embraced France, Poland, Savoy, Mantua, Venice, Transylvania, Turkey, Muscovy, Sweden, Germany and Holland. He gained the complete trust of Bethlen Gábor [Prince of Transylvania], Gustavus Adolphus and Patriarch Philaret, and played in the 1620s and the early 1630s no small part in the practical realization of a political task of enormous importance, the welding together of an anti-Habsburg coalition, and also in attempts to put into effect a plan to unite all the non-Catholic Christian Churches which had been conceived at that time in anti-Catholic ecclesiastical and political circles. He visited distant Moscow several times,

¹⁷ B.F. Porshnev, "Shvedskoe posol'stvo v Moskvu v 1634 godu," *Tezisy dokladov vtoroi nauchnoi konferentsii po istorii, ekonomike, iaziku i literature Skandinavskikh stran i Finliandii* (Moskva, 1965); idem, "Stuhmsdorfskii mir 1635 g.: ego istoriografiia i istoricheskoe znachenie," *Tezisy dokladov 4-i Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii po istorii Skandinavskikh stran* (Petrozavodsk, 1968), 195–7.

¹⁸ *The Travels*, 7–9, 15, 38–9, 68–70.

¹⁹ Porshnev, *Muscovy and Sweden*, 238–42, observes only that this embassy was delayed.

as Bethlen Gábor's ambassador, as Gustavus Adolphus's plenipotentiary, and, on the last occasion, in 1633, as plenipotentiary of the States-General of Holland. In the final stage of his career Roussel particularly stressed the commercial aspect of his activity. He worked persistently and patiently to realise a grand project for opening up to Europe's merchants a route through Russia (down the Volga and across the Caspian Sea) to the Persian market. Calvinist piety was in him merged, quite in the spirit of the age, with tremendous cupidity. He became extraordinarily rich. In 1636 Roussel was in Constantinople, and there, through some epidemic that was raging, he met his death. He was only forty years old. Although Roussel was certainly not free from some of the traits of an adventurer, he won from Gustavus Adolphus, as from a number of other important statesmen, great respect for his wisdom and his political ideas.²¹

Porshnev himself did not enter the doctrinal aspects of this complex question, but he did refer to the pertinent activities of other individuals. In 1630, for example, Jacques Roussel along with another French emissary Charles de Talleyrand put forward in Moscow on behalf of Bethlen Gábor a detailed plan for an East-European military coalition. This plan had been agreed by them on the road to Constantinople (as can be seen in the credentials presented to them by the Grand Vizier, Rejeb Pasha), with the mediation of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Cyril Lukaris, the Dutch ambassador Cornelius and probably, the French ambassador Césy. Already in 1626 Gustavus Adolphus had suggested to Bethlen Gábor the idea of a joint attack by Sweden and Transylvania, along with Muscovy and the Crimean Tatars (who were vassals of the Ottoman Empire), against the Habsburg Empire and Poland. And now, in response to a proposal for an alliance put forward more recently by Mikhail Fedorovich, Bethlen Gábor asserted that he wanted an alliance "not in words but in deeds," continuing:

And since these three great sovereigns—the Tsar's Majesty, and the Swedish King and...Bethlen Gábor—are united and mean to act together against their enemies, and the Turkish Sultan Murad intends also, for his part, to oppose these enemies, nobody will be able to withstand these great forces. So as to secure and establish this beforehand, let good alliance be maintained. The enemies of these forces are the King of Spain, the Roman Kaiser and the King of Poland. So as to stand against them and take revenge for their enmity.²²

²⁰ B.F.Porshnev, "K istorii russko-frantsuzskikh svyazei v epokhu tridtsatiletnei voyny," *Frantsuzskii ezhegodnik: stat'i i istoki po istorii Frantsii, 1958* (Moskva: Nauka, 1959), 56–72.

²¹ Porshnev, *Muscovy and Sweden*, 79–80. For other individual examples, see for example G.W.van der Meiden, "Isaac Massa and the beginnings of Dutch-Russian relations," in *Russians and Dutchmen*, ed. J.Braat, A.H.Huussen Jr., B.Naarden, C.A. L.M.Willemsen (Groningen: Instituut voor Noord- en Osteuropese Studies, 1993; Dukes, "Alexander Leslie and the Smolensk War."

The proposed alliance could be strengthened further by the adherence of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Jacques Roussel suggested. Having apparently discussed the subject with Cyril Lukaris Patriarch of Constantinople, Roussel then wrote to the Tsar and his father the Russian Patriarch Filaret soon after his departure from Moscow, still in 1630, that the Poles had been inciting the Cossacks to make incursions into Turkish territory for forty years, adding: "if Your Majesty allows, I will labour night and day to persuade the Zaporozhians to go to war and involve them in this cause...."²³ In the end, the grand alliance did not materialise, but the very discussion of it overlapped with the more purely religious question of the struggle for the unification of the other Christian churches against Roman Catholicism. It also touched upon the fourth of the themes to be addressed by Porshnev in his uncompleted volume, the part played in relations between Eastern and Western Europe by the Ottoman Empire.

4) THE POSITION AND ROLE OF TURKEY IN THE 1630s.

Although Porshnev devoted no monograph to this theme, an outline of his view may be reconstructed from the two published volumes of his projected trilogy. His basic point is that, preoccupied by war with Persia and internal dissension, the Ottoman Empire was in no position either to exert pressure on the frontiers of Muscovy, or more generally to play a vigorous part in European international relations, for most of the period of the Thirty Years' War, even if it would have wanted to.

To supplement Porshnev with a brief discussion of some pertinent earlier aspects of the problem, let us begin with Greece, then submerged in the Ottoman Empire. Here, the principal contribution was probably the attempt to revive the Crusade initiated by Neophytos, the Orthodox Bishop of Magnisa and taken up by, among others, Charles de Gonzague, due de Nevers and Père Joseph de Paris. By the beginning of 1621, an ecumenical army was in process of mobilization for embarkation to the Balkan peninsula. But the recently appointed Richelieu withdrew the indispensable support of a French fleet in 1624, under the pretext that it was necessary for the security of the state under Huguenot threat. In fact, Richelieu realised that to support the Crusade and threaten the Ottoman Empire could only lead to the expansion of the Habsburg Empire. Furthermore, the Protestant cause could be furthered, especially if the rapprochement between the Orthodox and Protestant churches envisaged by the Patriarch of Constantinople Cyril Lukaris and enthusiastically supported by the British and Dutch ambassadors to Constantinople were to succeed. At least as concerned by this possibility as Richelieu, the Sultan executed Lukaris in 1638.

Earlier, at the beginning of the great conflict, the Sultan Osman II had resisted the offer of a Protestant delegation from Bohemia to pay him fealty and tribute in exchange for his support. But he had allowed Bethlen Gábor, Prince of Transylvania—part of his Empire, to fight for the Protestant cause, and sent artillery units in support under the command of one of his generals. Defeating

²² Porshnev, *Muscovy and Sweden*, 20.

²³ *Ibid.*, 94n.

Wallenstein and taking Bratislava, the Hungarian-Turkish combined force approached to within 40 kilometres of Vienna in 1619. Now called King of Hungary by the Sultan, Bethlen Gábor defeated another Habsburg army and consolidated many of his gains with the Accord of Nikolsburg on 31 December 1621. Beset by a range of imperial problems, however, Osman II would not involve himself further in the war for fear of provoking open Habsburg opposition, and, for the most part, this remained the policy of the Sublime Porte.

In this regard, we must recognize that we are looking at an indistinct and fluctuating frontier area, with many characteristic attributes. For example, much of the military activity is of a border guard or irregular nature. One calculation based on the Austrian archives is of an Imperial militia numbering approximately 31,500 men only a few of whom were ever in the field. About fifty of the hundred or so fortresses along the "Slovak" frontier were owned by Hungarian noblemen, who lent support whenever it seemed advantageous to do so to Bethlen Gábor or György Rákóczi, his successor as prince of Transylvania from 1629, behaving in a similar manner to the "great powers" of the time. Poland was involved here, too: in 1619, for example, its light cavalry defeated Hungarian troops under György Rákóczi, persuading Bethlen Gábor to abandon his siege of Vienna before going on to play an important part in the Imperial victory at the Battle of the White Mountain near Prague in 1620. To turn from land to sea, for the Ottoman Empire especially, the Mediterranean was vital. It was also important for the Habsburgs and their enemies.

However, as the Mediterranean began to lose the significance that it had previously possessed, more important battles for naval supremacy were fought to the North. In 1626, Poland proposed a plan of action which would enable Sigismund III to retake his Swedish throne and Spain to cut off the Hanseatic basis of Dutch power. But the Habsburgs could not realise their hopes of becoming "masters of the Northern Pillars of Hercules" while the Imperial failure to take Stralsund was a further impediment. Possibly, Spain should have concentrated its energies on building up the strength of its navy at Dunkirk. More certainly, with the peace of Altmark between Sweden and Poland in 1629, the Baltic route to Spanish hegemony in Europe was closed. The Dutch defeat of the Spanish navy at the Downs ten years later was a telling reprise.²⁴

Porshnev's references to the sea are more concerned with the trade war between the British and the Dutch, and especially with the sale of grain to Sweden at prices sufficiently low to allow great profits in the markets at Amsterdam, Antwerp and elsewhere.²⁵ But his emphasis is on the land, involving not only Europe but also the vastnesses of the Muscovite frontier. As he points out, the Russian government had constantly to think not only of dealings with Sweden, Poland and other potential friends and enemies to the West, but also of the constant threat posed by the Tatars, the Ottoman Turks and other hostile elements to the South and East. It was interested in expansion into Siberia as well as in the recapture of Smolensk.

²⁴ The above observations taken from unpublished papers given and notes taken at the XXIIIrd Colloquium of the International Commission of the Military History on the subject of the Thirty Years' War in Prague in August 1997.

AFTER THE SMOLENSK WAR, 1635–54

This remains the case as we turn from the centrepiece of his case for including Muscovite Russia in any comprehensive discussion of the Thirty Years' War, the period preceding, including and immediately following the Smolensk War of 1632–34, to a sequel still influenced by the nature of that conflict as part of the international struggle involving virtually the whole of Europe and by the predicament of Muscovite Russia on the frontier of Europe. It also remains the case that the four aspects of the conflict noted by Porshnev—state, confessional, national and social—remain in evidence. In his book *France, the English Revolution and European Politics at the Middle of the Seventeenth Century*, Porshnev himself suggests three periods for the post-Smolensk War years: (1) 1635–42; (2) 1642–45; and (3) 1645–54.

1) 1635–42

From 1635 to 1642, the Russian government concentrated on the construction of the Belgorod Defensive Line. This would form a much-needed barrier with a dual purpose: to counter incursions from outside by the Crimean Tatars, joined by the Tatars of the Nogai Hordes from 1635–6; and to restrict the possibility of peasants running away to join the Cossacks. Mikhail Fedorovich's government was careful in its attitude towards the question of aid to the Don Cossacks after their seizure from the Turks of the fortress and port of Azov in 1637, determined to avoid a military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. Not even the decision of the Assembly of Land in January 1642 to support the Cossacks deterred the government from its chosen course, and it ordered the abandonment of Azov to the Turks. Later in the same year, there were more Tatar incursions foreshadowing others.

Generally speaking, Russia adhered closely to the policy which it adopted in June 1634 of avoiding any further close involvement in the Thirty Years' War and the other affairs of Europe. Even the export of grain, saltpeter and other products to Sweden, Denmark and Holland was carried out in a manner serving primarily Russian national interests. Similarly, the use of foreign mercenaries was strictly curtailed at the end of the Smolensk War, an exception being made only for officer-instructors who would assist the build-up of an indigenous army along modern lines.

2) 1642–45

By the early 1640s, the Thirty Years' War was moving into its last phase, the only outstanding question being not who would win, but how convincingly? For the Franco-Swedish alliance was in the ascendancy, and the Habsburg side was heading for defeat. Nevertheless, the degree of the victory was of prime interest to two powers, Denmark and Poland. Swedish hegemony over the Baltic would mean for the former subservience, for the latter acceptance of the loss of Livonia and the danger of losing Western Prussia. And so, these two powers discussed

²⁵ On aspects of this question, see the contribution of Jarmo Kotilaine to the present volume.

joint action against Sweden, with Poland hoping for the acquisition of Silesia as a token of the Habsburg Emperor's gratitude. A further possibility was the incorporation in an anti-Swedish alliance of Muscovite Russia, which would be facilitated by the marriage of the Russian Princess Irina with the Danish Prince Waldemar, and the promise from Poland of joint action against the Tatars.

After some diplomatic preliminaries, Waldemar, accompanied by a large suite, set out for Russia towards the end of October 1643 soon after war had broken out between Denmark and Sweden. The time was not propitious, since a decree of May 1643 had ordered the destruction of Protestant churches as part of a policy of potential rapprochement with Roman Catholicism and an important step leading towards the confinement of all foreigners in the "German" settlement beyond the River Iauza as from 1652. However, Christian IV already celebrated the triumph of his diplomacy with the observation that the last hairs on the head of Swedish Chancellor Oxenstierna would turn grey at the news of the Danish triumph. Władysław IV was also encouraged, although he needed the active participation of Russia in the alliance in order to overcome internal opposition to it. This was perfectly understood in Vienna, to which a Polish ambassador Fantoni came in May 1643 to investigate the possibilities of acquiring Silesia as a reward for the organization of an anti-Swedish coalition. From that time onwards, the Imperial ambassador in Poland Walderode regularly informed Vienna about events relating to the impending royal marriage.

Prince Waldemar travelled to Moscow via Poland, where King Władysław IV came to meet him in Wilno in December 1643. Meanwhile, the Swedes were put on the alert. Indeed, in January 1644, just as Prince Waldemar was making a solemn entry into Moscow, they surprised all Europe with a sudden pre-emptive invasion of Denmark. Poland was in no position, and had no wish, to come to the relief of Denmark. Władysław IV learned of the Swedish strike from his ambassador in Copenhagen Denhof on 19 January. Immediately after this, an emissary named Jan Zebrowski was sent to Moscow with letters for Prince Waldemar and his entourage from the King and the Chancellor Ossoliński. These letters ordered all possible pressure on the tsar to invade Livonia, so that the Swedes would move most of their troops from Denmark to the Russo-Swedish frontier. Through this pressure, increased by other Polish agents such as Stepkowski, Władysław IV calculated that at worst these negotiations would vitiate Russo-Swedish relations, and incite the Swedes to attack Russia.

However, Russia did not allow itself to be provoked. When the Swedish resident in Moscow Peter Krusebjörn apprised the tsar of the invasion of Denmark, Mikhail Fedorovich changed his mind about his daughter Irina's marriage, in particular insisting now that Prince Waldemar would have to change his religion, and refusing to give any guarantee that this concession would lead to Russian intervention. In such circumstances, Waldemar would not agree to any discussion of his conversion, and was placed under house arrest for his stubbornness and an attempted escape.

Władysław IV did not give up hope immediately while negotiations continued in 1644 about royal titles and national frontiers, but Muscovite recalcitrance forced both him and Christian IV to rethink their position. The Danish king demanded the return of Waldemar and the whole Danish embassy. But the Russians did not want to give the Swedes any cause for suspicion, and so did not

allow Waldemar to go back to Denmark until August 1645, after the death of Mikhail Fedorovich and the accession of Aleksei Mikhailovich.

Although Russian policy broke the rules of international relations in its forceful delay of the return of Waldemar, the infringement helped it to avoid involvement in what would have been a disastrous alliance with a Denmark about to suffer a speedy defeat, and to maintain good relations with a Sweden at the peak of its power. At the same time, it resisted the plans of Władysław IV, which would have been advantageous only for Poland.

Away from the Baltic, another matter of great concern to the Muscovite government was heavy attacks by in 1644 and 1645 by the Tatars encouraged by the Ottoman Turkish Sultan. There was some talk of joint action by Poland and Russia against their common enemies to the South.

3) 1645–54

After the accession of Aleksei Mikhailovich in July 1645, Russian emissaries went to Warsaw to discuss such joint action. But there was reluctance on both sides to engage the Ottoman Empire in full-scale war, and a purely defensive alliance was concluded between Russia and Poland in September 1647. Meanwhile, the Muscovite government strove to repair relations with Sweden, sending ambassadors to Stockholm in 1646 and receiving them in Moscow in 1647.

Relations with Great Britain were concerned first with trade, in which the Muscovy Company was gaining the upper hand in competition with its Dutch counterparts, and then with the Revolution of the three Kingdoms. As throughout all the period of the Thirty Years' War for the whole of Europe, the Muscovite government was kept well-informed about the dramatic developments of the 1640s in the offshore islands by the *vesti-kuranty* consisting for the most part of translations from foreign newspapers and collected by the *posol'skii prikaz*, the Diplomatic Chancellery. In addition, as on so many other occasions, there were diplomatic exchanges, in this case most notably the embassy led by G.S. Dokhturov. Setting off for London in August 1645, the embassy was to report on the death of Mikhail Fedorovich and accession of Aleksei Mikhailovich and to investigate the struggle going on there. Arriving in Greenwich, Dokhturov and his companions were transported ceremoniously by barge to the centre of town, where they were similarly received by both Houses of Parliament. The Russian visitors failed in their attempt to meet King Charles I, and returned to Archangel about a year after their departure from Moscow with a charter in the name of Parliament to the "emperor" Aleksei Mikhailovich. Such an address did not restrain the Muscovite government from expressing its disgust at the execution of Charles I and banishing the merchants of the Muscovy Company to Archangel in a decree of 1 June 1649. By this time, Muscovite Russia was experiencing its own serious social disturbances, leading to the composition of the *Ulozhenie* (Law Code) of 1649 and the introduction of serfdom.

Oliver Cromwell establishing his Protectorate sought to renew commercial relations with Muscovy with a considerable degree of success even though impeded by the propaganda of Royalist sympathisers. He welcomed the outbreak of the Thirteen Years' War with Poland in 1654 as the intensification of the

struggle against the Habsburgs and Roman Catholicism. More generally, the commencement of this conflict was associated with the onset of a new stage in the complex international relations of Europe as a whole.²⁶

AFTER THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR: CONCLUSION

The social disturbances and their sequel in Moscow and elsewhere in 1648 constitute enough evidence to include Muscovite Russia in any consideration of the situation throughout Europe as a whole at the end of the Thirty Years' War. They also reinforce the case for the inclusion of Muscovy in what Ronald Asch has deemed "an important phase in the process of European state formation" including the struggle of states with estates for supremacy, with military finance as an important bone of contention.²⁷

Moreover, it should be recognized, as Porshnev argued, that the struggle involved the whole of society as well as all Europe. This was widely asserted to be the case at the time, for example in a pamphlet published in London in 1648 with the title *We have brought our Hogges to a Faire Market*:

In these late, bad and worst of times, wherein all the Christian World hath been imbroyl'd with Warre, and all the miseries of Sword, Fire, and Famine; when Nation did rise against Nation, and Realme against Realme; the *Swede* against the *German* Emperour, the *Pole* against the *Russian*, the *Spaniard* against the *French*, the *Hollander* against the *Spaniard*, and *France* in most bloody and cruell Civil War with itselfe. When all those Kingdomes and Territories were...drencht and neer drownd with blood and slaughter, these Kingdomes of England, Scotland and Ireland were...the onely...spectators and lookers on...[yet] Warre we would have at any rate

²⁶ The above three-part survey from Porshnev, "Moskovskoe gosudarstvo i evropeiskaia politika v 40-kh godakh XVIIv.," *Frantsiia*, 237–61; Osip L.Vainshtein, "Zakliuchenie," *Rossiia iTridtsatiletniaia Voina 1618–1648: Ocherki iz istorii vneshnei politiki Moskovskogo gosudarstva v pervoi polovine XVIIv.* (Leningrad: Ogiz-gospolizdat, 1947), 202–10; Aleksei A.Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1948), 222–7, 295, 368–70. See also G.Edward Orchard, ed. and trans., Sergei M.Soloviev, *History of Russia*, Volume 17, *Michel Romanov: The Last Years, 1634–1645* (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press) especially Chapter 2: "Turkish Affairs, 1622–1643" and Chapter 3: "Prince Valdemar, 1640–1645."

²⁷ See the suggestive articles of John Keep: "The decline of the zemsky sobor," *Slavonic Review*, 36 (1957–8); idem, "The Muscovite elite and the approach to pluralism," *Slavonic Review*, 48 (1969–70), both reprinted with "Afterword" in John Keep, *Power and the People* (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, CO, 1995). Chester Dunning's stimulating article, "Does Jack Goldstone's Model of Early Modern State Crises Apply to Russia?," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39:3 (1997) is concerned mostly with the Time of Troubles. But the question could also be asked of Russia at the end of the Thirty Years' War. For a discussion of Russia and the "General Crisis," see Chapter One of Paul Dukes, *October and the World: Perspectives on the Russian Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

or price whatsoever...killing and cutting throats, robbing, rifling, plundering...spoyling, and ruining one another (under the fair pretences of Religion and Reformation) with more barbarous inhumanity and cruelty, then could have been committed here by...millions of Turkes, Tartars, or Cannibals.²⁸

The translation of J.J.Wallhausen's *Kriegskunst zu Fusz*...in 1647 had already indicated that there were both internecine and public wars, and that internecine wars were "considered the most pernicious by all the pagan scribes." Internecine wars were no stranger to seventeenth-century Muscovy. There was a particular relevance to the observation that public wars included "those wars which are waged against those who flout and banish God's honour and word and who are the enemy of every Christian, such as the Turks, Tatars, pagans, and barbaric peoples." In Muscovy, the distinction between internecine and public wars had been blurred, making its own predicament rather more serious than that of most if not all of its Christian fellows.²⁹

1648 produced not only the Revolution of the Three Kingdoms in the offshore islands and many other social disturbances throughout Europe but also the peace of Westphalia bringing the Thirty Years' War to an end. As Derek McKay and Hamish Scott observe, "the peace was one of the most important in European history and it has often been seen as opening the modern era of international relations."³⁰

We should not be misled by the fact that the documents comprising Westphalia made little reference to Muscovite Russia, giving the tsar the title of "Magnus dux Moscoviae" and introducing him solely as the ally of Sweden.³¹ As Heinhard Steiger makes clear, the "christlicher Friede" and "pax Christiana" were ecumenical rather than denominational. Steiger asserts: "Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists were partners in the treaties; the Orthodox were also included with the grand prince of Moscow in the IPO [*Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense*] and thereby joined the community of international law."³² Events in the second half of the seventeenth century were to show even more clearly what those of the first half had already demonstrated, as argued by Porshnev and illustrated by many contemporaneous documents such as *We have brought our Hogges to a Faire Market* cited above, that no consideration of "the Christian world" could be complete without the inclusion of East along with West.³³

Credit must certainly go to Porshnev for the vigour of his exposition and his use of archival material³⁴, even though the subject with which he deals had

²⁸ Quoted by Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 48–9. Ironically, Scott makes no substantial reference to Russia in his description of the European context. His work, therefore, can be taken as a recent example of the persistence of the view that Europe in the seventeenth century consisted mainly of the West.

²⁹ Vladimir E. Grabar, *The History of International Law in Russia, 1647–1917*, trans. and ed. W.E. Butler (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 15–7. The "pagan scribes" are almost certainly classical, especially Roman, not from the same origin as the more recent enemies of Christendom.

already been put on the map by predecessors such as G.V.Forsten and David Norrman.³⁵ Moreover, post-Soviet publication on the subject has yet to show a clear advance on Porshnev and his colleagues. L.I.Ivonina writes: "The Thirty Years' War which posed a clash of two conceptions of Europe, the feudal and the national-absolutist, opened the possibility for further development and the realization of a third conception, the bourgeois."³⁶ Here, there are echoes of Soviet formulations as well as the view of J.V.Polišenský that the war constituted the confrontation of "two models of European civilization" one inhibiting and the other allowing the development of a modern capitalist society.

However, we must also consider more recent publication in the West. For an authoritative overview, let us turn to the book by Robert Frost³⁷, who adopts Klaus Zernack's designation of Northeastern Europe as a region including Scandinavia, Poland-Lithuania and Russia, and follows him in opting for the wider term "Northern Wars" rather than "Baltic Wars" to describe international conflicts involving the region. Frost's first major focus is on what has traditionally been called the Livonian War, 1558–83, promoting the ascendancy of Poland-Lithuania as Ivan the Terrible failed to establish a firm foothold on the Baltic. The second Northern War, 1650–60, overlaps the Thirteen Years' War between Poland-Lithuania and its upstart rival, Muscovite Russia, including the transfer of much of Ukraine from the former to the latter. The third or Great Northern War, 1700–21, leads to the triumph of Imperial Russia under Peter the

³⁰ Derek McKay and H.M.Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815* (London: Longman, 1983), 3.

³¹ Vainshtein, *Rossiia*, 3. This belittling version of the tsar's title provoked an angry response from the Russian government. See also Elena I.Kobzareva, "Vestfal'skaia mirnaia sistema i Rossiia," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 4 (1999). A comparison may be made with the situation obtaining at the end of the First World War, when "the Maximalist Government of Russia" received scant mention in the Treaty of Versailles. See John M.Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 400–2.

³² Heinhard Steiger, "Concrete Peace and General Order: The Legal Meaning of the Treaties of 24 October 1648," in *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, vol. 1, *Politics, Religion, Law and Society* ed. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling, (Münster-Osnabrück: Verlag Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 1998), 443.

³³ See, for example, James Howell, *Familiar Letters on Important Subjects, wrote from the year 1618 to 1650*, 10th edition (Aberdeen: F Douglass and W.Murray, 1753), 411–2; Philippe Briet, *Parallela geographiae veteris et novae*, vol. 1 (Paris: Sumptibus Sebastiani Cramoisy et Gabrielis Cramoisy, 1648), 161.

³⁴ Porshnev was a man of wide interests, including not only social psychology but aspects of the natural sciences, too. He was also president of the Soviet society devoted to the search for the yeti and an accomplished juggler.

Great and the partial eclipse of Poland-Lithuania and those other erstwhile great powers, Denmark and Sweden.

Frost also considers the interstices between the major conflicts, the first of them incorporating the Muscovite Time of Troubles with invasions by both Poles and Swedes and the Thirty Years' War including the unsuccessful attempt by Muscovy to retake Smolensk. For this period, Frost posits "a crisis of the whole principle of service in the eastern Slavic world,"³⁸ suggesting that both Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania were confronted by the necessity to reorganize their military forces to defend the indispensable economic foundation of state power to be found in an agrarian economy becoming more commercialized and thus bringing about an increased social tension. Hence, Eastern European variations of the "military revolution" discussed by Marshall Poe and others.³⁹ By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Muscovite army had modernised sufficiently to play an active part in what Frost calls the second Northern War, 1650–60, especially in the further conflict with Poland known as the Thirteen Years' War, 1654–67.

As for international relations, policies pursued on Europe's mobile steppe frontier necessarily possessed different emphases from those adopted in more settled parts of the continent to the West. State, confessional, national and social considerations all carried special nuances in Muscovy. In this regard, as in the military, the Thirty Years' War constituted a period of adjustment leading to a higher degree of efficiency and success. By the time of the third Great Northern War, 1700–21, the process was taken to a new level. But we overestimate the abruptness of this change if we see Peter the Great bursting into Europe where his predecessors had not previously made any impact at all. In reality, the recovery from the severe disruption of the Time of Troubles a necessary predecessor and precondition for the more obvious integration of Muscovy into the modernised system of relations between the states making up Christendom becoming Europe at Westphalia. If H.D.Schmidt is correct in his assertion that

³⁵ Georgii V.Forsten, *Baltiiskii vopros v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh (1544–1648)*, vol. 2: *Bor'ba Shvetsii s Pol'shei i Gabsburgskim domom (30-letniaia voina)* (St. Petersburg: Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo fakul'teta imperatorskogo Sankt-petersburgskogo universiteta, chast' 34, tom 2, 1894); David Norrman, *Gustav Adolfs politik mot Ryssland och Polen under Tyska kriget (1630–1632)* (Uppsala: Amqvist & Wiksells, 1943).

³⁶ I.V.Ivonina, "Tritsatiletniaia voina i Vostochnaia Evropa," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 11–2 (1996), 134.

³⁷ Robert Frost, *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (Harlow, Longman, 2000).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 69.

³⁹ Marshall Poe, "The Consequences of the Military Revolution in Muscovy: A Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 38:4 (1996). See also, for example, John Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Carol Belkin Stevens, *Soldiers of the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995); and the contributions of Stevens and William M.Reger IV to the present volume.

the triumph of William III and the Grand Alliance over Louis XIV's alleged attempt to set up a universal monarchy and a united Catholic Christendom "brought about the first major stage in the long process of western secularization, the exchange of *Europe* for *Christendom* as supreme political collectivity,"⁴⁰ we must not neglect the part played by Russia in this transition.⁴¹

⁴⁰ H.D.Schmidt, "The Establishment of 'Europe' as a Political Expression," *The Historical Journal*, 9:2 (1966), 178. Schmidt's italics.

⁴¹ See Paul Dukes, "How the Eighteenth Century Began for Russia and the West," in A. G.Cross, ed., *Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century* (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Reserch Partners), 1983.

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EUROPEAN MERCENARY OFFICERS AND THE RECEPTION OF MILITARY REFORM IN THE SEVENTEENTH- CENTURY RUSSIAN ARMY

William M. Reger IV

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of September 6, 1661, Patrick Gordon and several other newly arrived European mercenary officers were summoned by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovitch's father-in-law, Ilia Danilovich Miloslavskii, who was the head of the Foreign Chancellery and the Foreign Mercenaries Chancellery, to a field outside the city of Moscow. Arriving at the appointed place, they found Miloslavskii waiting with pikes, muskets, powder, fuse and musket balls, and they were ordered to "take [these] up...and show how [they] could handle [their] armes." Surprised at such an order, Gordon answered that "if I had knowne of this, I should have brought forth one of my boyes, who perhaps could handle armes better as I myself; adding, that it was the least part of an officer to know how to handle armes, conduct being the most materiall." Nevertheless, Miloslavskii insisted "that the best colonell comeing in to this countrey must do so...; to which I replied, Seeing it is the fashion, I am content. And so haveing handled the pike and musket, with all their postures, to his great satisfaction, I returned."¹

Gordon's description of the meeting between mercenaries from Europe and a Russian nobleman illustrates very well the parallel conduit of authority and expertise through which Russia received military reforms from Europe: the mercenary officers introduced tactical and technical information to the Russian army; the Russian government, in the person of Miloslavskii, monitored the skills of the mercenaries; the perceptions and assumptions of each party reflected basic attitudes toward the gunpowder weapon and toward the nature of the officer's role in training and commanding the western model or "new-formation"² regiments. Because the new weapons and tactical systems introduced to Russia on a tremendous scale demanded increased discipline and training, the European officer who trained and led the new army must be considered a crucial component in Russian military innovation in the seventeenth century.

¹ Patrick Gordon, *Passages from the Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968), 45–46.

Ancillary factors existed in addition to foreign officers and other personnel experienced in command and training, engineering, and manufacture of weapons technology. Textual sources conveying military information, for example, were translated by the Russian government for the use of its officers in training and command, and were also brought into Russia in the personal possession of mercenary officers who used them in their military service.³ Above all, the indigenous military culture helped to define the nature and outcome of the assimilation of innovations. As the example of Patrick Gordon's inspection suggests, Russian military culture was dominated by the state and by the aristocratic elite. The perceived inadequacy of Russia's gentry cavalry forces induced some aristocratic elite to favor military reform. Throughout Europe, such reform-minded elite cabals sought increased military power in order to reinforce or expand the power of the state (in the case of Poland, the objective was to defend magnate privileges against the rise of such a state), and were therefore one of the most important aspects of indigenous military culture in innovating states.⁴

The inspection of Gordon and his officers demonstrates how a military culture can define the nature and extent of change at the grassroots level, while at the macro level the change in Russia's military was reflected in the increasing numbers of troops committed to the new forms of military organization during a

² The terms "new-formation," "western model," "foreign model," and "western-formation," can be used interchangeably to describe military units organized according to Dutch and Swedish models utilizing gunpowder weapons and the tactics designed to implement those weapons in battle, but no such term was used in the documents examined for this study. Fedor I. Kalinychev, *Pravovye voprosy, voennoi organizatsii russkogo gosudarstva vtoroi poloviny XVII veka* (Moscow: Gos. izd. iurid. lit-ry, 1954), 44, notes that *polki novogo stroia*, or "regiments of new formation" is the most correct term, but it was not used in the archival documents pertaining to the European mercenary officers. The most common contemporary terms describing troops organized along western lines referred to their particular organization: *soldatskii stroi* or infantry-formation, *reitarskii stroi* or cavalry-formation, *dragunskii stroi* or dragoon-formation, *gusarskii stroi* or hussar-formation (heavy cavalry). The Russians of the seventeenth century also used the more general terms *peshii stroi*, or foot formation, *konnyi stroi*, or horse formation, and *ratnoi stroi*, or military formation.

³ Petr P. Epifanov, "Uchenie i khitrost' ratnogo stroeniia pekhotnykh liudei," *Uchenie zapiski Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Kafedry istorii SSSR* 137 (1954), 95–96; Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (RGADA) fond 210 (Razriad), Moskovskii Stol, 862:90.

⁴ Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, Boris Godunov, Boris I. Morozov, Alexei Matveev, and Vasilii Golitsyn were examples of reform-minded elite. Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 162–63, 183, 188–89; John L. H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar, Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 80; David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 11.

⁵ Philip Longworth, *Alexis, Tsar of All the Russias* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984), 111; Ludwik Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–55* (Warsaw: Naklad Gebethnera i Wolffa, 1911), 216–18.

period of intense military build-up. The Tsar's army in 1654 numbered slightly over 56,000,⁵ including new-formation regiments, armed with pistols, carbines, and matchlock (and the new flintlock) muskets, and commanded by European mercenary officers. By 1663 the Russian army had increased to slightly over 90,000; 122,000, if we count the Cossack regiments that operated in conjunction with the Russian regiments; 215,000, if the numerous garrison forces, reserve and auxiliary units are also counted.⁶ By far the most significant portion of this army was the 75 new-formation regiments—55 infantry and 20 cavalry—in which at least 51,000 men and officers were mustered.⁷ Between 1651 and 1663, the percentage of troops in the traditional forces fell from 93 percent to 21 percent; correspondingly, the percentage of troops in new-formation regiments rose from 7 percent to 79 percent.⁸ The transfer of traditionally non-combatant segments of society into the military grew increasingly to favor the entrance of peasants into infantry regiments over the entrance of gentry into cavalry regiments. Between 1658 and 1660, nearly 80,000 peasants and townsmen (merchants, artisans, bureaucratic clerks and under-clerks, skilled and unskilled laborers, as well as lower service class servitors, such as gunners and gatekeepers) entered military service in new-formation infantry regiments. By 1663, furthermore, there were more infantry regiments than cavalry.⁹

Can we assume that this notable increase in the numbers and implementation of new-formation armed forces constituted a “modernization” of Russia's military? The concept of modernization belongs to a class of models that attempt to explain the transmission of cultural artifacts from one culture to another. Many disciplines of scholarly inquiry (anthropology, communications science, ethnology, political science, and sociology, to name a few)¹⁰ have sought to understand this phenomenon, and historians can partake of a rich and bemusing banquet of ideas if they have the time and inclination. The term “modernization” is only one of several terms used to describe the phenomenon of cultural and social change:

1. Acculturation (borrowing, influence)
2. Modernization (industrialization)
3. Westernization (“selective westernization”)
4. Europeanization
5. Reception

⁶ Evgenii D.Stashevskii, “Smeta voennykh sil Moskovskogo gosudarstva v 1663 g.,” *Voenna-istoricheskii vestnik* 10 (Kiev, 1910), 18; Henadz' Sahanovich, *Neviadomaia vaina, 1654–67*, (Minsk: Navuka i Tekhnika, 1995), 118.

⁷ *Ocherki Istorii SSSR*, eds. A.A.Novoselskii and N.V.Ustiugov 3 vols. (Moscow: Izd. ANSSSR, 1955), III: 515; Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 269; Stashevskii, “Smeta voennykh sil Moskovskogo gosudarstva v 1663 g.,” 7, 12; Stepan B.Veselovskii, “Smety voennykh sil Moskovskogo gosudarstva 1661–63 gg.,” *ChOIDR* 238 3 (1911), 1–60.

⁸ Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 269.

Acculturation is the broadest label applied to the transmission of culture, signifying the simple transfer, through borrowing or influence, of “‘cultural’ or social elements from one society to another.”¹¹ Modernization has been applied indiscriminately to many fields of human endeavor, and most especially to economics. Moore defines modernization as the “total transformation” of traditional society, with industrialization at its core.¹² Westernization and europeanization are synonymous with modernization, but are more specific in their implication that *European* values, practices, and institutions serve as the criteria for measuring change. Finally, reception refers to the most specific process by which one society receives and assimilates cultural artifacts from another culture.

In this essay I will address military innovation in seventeenth-century Russia in terms of the process of reception, which emphasizes less the target result of change (becoming more European, for example) than the process of change itself. As used in this essay, reception suggests that the recipient culture acts out of its own volition and self-interest, and modifies both traditional and new, imported cultural forms to create a hybrid variety that meets a particular and locally relevant purpose. Reception suggests, therefore, that the resulting product of the transmission of culture will be unique to the recipient society, rather than merely a shadow or copy of the original. This uniqueness is determined by a variety of factors, most notably political vision, military objectives and force, economic capacity, and other background elements already in place when the change is accepted.

PROBLEMS WITH MODERNIZATION

Many problems with using the modernization model to understand military change in seventeenth-century Muscovy can be identified, not least of which is the vaguely odious hint of European supremacy. The cornerstone idea of modernization—that “traditional” societies can develop into “modern” societies—assumes ideal types that resist specific definition. Though some scholars have attempted to define more carefully what is meant by a modern or a traditional society, the definitions either become unwieldy or useless when applied to specific examples. The boundaries of social systems resist clear demarcation, and must continually be redefined, so that progress from one condition to the other

⁹ *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva, izd. Imp. Akademiei nauk*, 3 vols., ed. N.A. Popov, (St. Petersburg, 1890–1901), hereafter *AMG*, vol. 3, 451; *Ocherki Istorii SSSR*, vol. 3, 515.

¹⁰ A short list of useful texts would include: Marion J. Levy, *Modernisation: Latecomers and Survivors* (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Wilbur E. Moore, *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963); C.D. W. Goodwin and I.B. Holley, Jr., *The Transfer of Ideas: Historical Essays* (Durham, N.C.: South Atlantic Quarterly Publications, 1968); C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernisation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) and *Comparative Modernisation: A Reader* (New York: Free Press, 1976); Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change and Modernity* (New York: Wiley, 1973); D.C. Tipps, “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, 1 (1973).

cannot be clearly measured. The danger of anachronistic comparisons exists as well when historians begin to look at periods of progress that are separated in time in order to understand how modernization actually works.¹³

The bias implicit in the modernization model has led some historians to place the European mercenary officers in the Tsar's service somewhere on a continuum between two contrasting points of value: on the one hand, serious shortcomings in Muscovy's traditional military forces were revealed by the Polish invasion and occupation of the Kremlin in Moscow in 1611–12 during the Time of Troubles; on the other, however, the solution to this problem—characterized by Keep, following Kliuchevskii and Soloviev, as “a thorough-going ‘Westernization’ of the military establishment”—could only come at the cost of potential damage to Russian Orthodox society and culture. In addition, historians have dismissed the foreign mercenary officers as violent, cruel, tyrannical, incompetent, treacherous and expensive.¹⁴ Historians' notion of “westernization” through the presence of European mercenary officers during this period can be summarized, therefore, as a necessary evil in the face of continuing threats from the better organized, armed, and trained armies of Russia's western neighbors.

Broader historical treatments of Russia's relationship to Europe also reflect the bias of the modernization model. Sir George Clark wrote of the seventeenth century that “one of the most momentous changes of the century was the effacement of differences between Russia and the countries of the West, culminating in the earthquake of Peter the Great,” suggesting that, for Russia, the seventeenth century was a period of convergence with Europe that was essentially completed under Peter the Great. The primary evidence for this convergence was Russia's ability to reform its military strength to the point that Sweden under Charles XII could not prevail over Petrine Russia. Russia itself, however, remained external to European culture and civilization during this period, until the end of the eighteenth century, when “western civilization set out on a course of eastward expansion overland as well as by sea” and “Russia become one of its abodes and one of its points of departure.”¹⁵ Russia became Europe-like through Peter the Great's reforms, according to this line of thought, but European only when Europe expanded to include it.

Similarly, in his study of the early seventeenth century Geoffrey Parker describes Europe and Russia as separated by a geographical frontier beyond which, to the east, everything changes: agriculture, population density, building materials, food availability and cost, and even social structures. Beyond this frontier, the family unit is more extended in order to concentrate labor resources; serfdom increased to support the expansion of upper gentry domain lands. An impoverished lesser gentry and peasantry gave little thought to agricultural innovation that might have increased their food production.¹⁶ This palpable dividing line between east and west was crossed primarily in two fields of

¹¹ Moore, *Social Change*, 85.

¹² Moore, *Social Change*, 89–112.

¹³ Raymond Grew, “Modernization and its Discontents,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, 21: 2 (1977):289–312.

endeavor, education and the reform of the military forces of the east along western lines.¹⁷

In his recent book, Geoffrey Hosking describes two varieties of empire: Asiatic and European. Russia, in his view was “straddled awkwardly” between two extremes, an amalgam of two strains of culture. But, continues Hosking, “If [Russia] wished to remain an empire, it had no choice but to become a European great power, for there were no natural barriers to protect it from its western neighbors.”¹⁸ Russia became European, therefore, in order to compete against Europe.

The nineteenth-century Russian historian, Vasilii O.Kliuchevskii, recognized this superiority when he defined the relationship between Russia and the west in terms of influence:

Influence begins when a society comes to recognize the superiority of the culture that influences it, the necessity of learning from it, of morally submitting to it, and of borrowing not merely its practical achievements, but the actual principles of social order, views, ideas, customs, public relations.¹⁹

Like Kliuchevsky’s notion of influence, modernization rests upon terms of the inherent inferiority or “moral submission” of one society or culture to another, which distorts our understanding of the transmission of culture between societies by assuming a cultural void which must be passively filled from abroad, like water flowing into the lowest elevation. A more useful conceptual model would recognize an active participation on the part of the recipient culture, the “recurrent element of choice and the role of the individuals, groups and institutions that made and implemented these choices,”²⁰ such as is illustrated in Gordon’s account of his inspection, rather than a passive submission to a relative superiority.

In these and other general texts we find the unquestioned premise that Russia (and Eastern Europe) were divided from the West, and that elements of Western culture spilled over to promote significant change. Underlying the idea that the culture of Europe engulfed and changed that of the Russian and Slavic nations is the notion that Europe did so because it was inherently better, more vital, stronger. The argument, stated succinctly, is that peripheral societies in Eastern Europe, to become better, had to become more European and therefore more

¹⁴ John L.H.Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar, Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 80; Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 167–68, 173.

¹⁵ George Clark, *The Seventeenth Century* (New York: Galaxy Books, 1967), xiv, 170, 175.

¹⁶ See Janet Martin, “‘Backwardness’ in Russian Peasant Culture, A Theoretical Consideration of Agricultural Practices in the seventeenth Century,” in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 19–33, for a discussion of Russian agricultural innovation.

modern. This built-in assumption of the superiority of one culture, or cluster of cultures, over others betrays the utility of the model of modernization for explaining historical change; it ignores the volition of recipient cultures.

A MORE USEFUL MODEL

The indigenous perception of national self-interest is the element that determines what is absorbed; indigenous values determine the extent and nature of implementation. The process of reception assumes that the recipient culture defines and carries out the implementation of military technology and organization in ways specific to its needs, policies, resources and traditions. For Peter Burke, a historian of Renaissance Italy, employing the model of reception is an effort to shift

attention from what one might call ‘supply’ to ‘demand’ and looking not so much at what was borrowed (let alone from whom), as at the process by which it was assimilated, absorbed, reworked, domesticated, transformed. In other words,...to replace the simple idea of ‘influence’ by the more subtle one of *a process of creative misinterpretation*. [italics mine] So when we look at the Italians abroad, we need to ask not only who went where, at what time, and for what purpose, but also what kind of reception (in yet another sense of the term), they received.²¹

The kind of reception given European itinerant military officers in Russia is a crucial clue to understanding military reform on the eastern periphery of Europe. Defining Russian military culture in light of alien normative influences invariably skews our understanding as much as it allows us to construct a context for the Russian experience. The temptation to make these sorts of comparisons is quite strong in the historiography of the relationship between Russia and Europe, “because comparing Russia to Europe to Russia’s detriment has been a preoccupation of the Russian intelligentsia since at least the nineteenth century... and has occurred since the late fifteenth century as Russia began to enjoy increasing political and military contact with Europe.”²²

¹⁷ Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis, 1598–1648* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 321–33; see also Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), for a more recent discussion of the geographical and cultural frontier between East and West.

¹⁸ Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia, People and Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 8–9.

¹⁹ Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, *A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century*, trans. Natalie Duddington, intro. Alfred J. Richer (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 275.

²⁰ Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1453–1815* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 19.

²¹ Peter Burke, *The Renaissance* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987), 28.

Using the model of reception to examine the interaction of Russia and the West concentrates our attention on the process of change within Russian culture, potentially liberating the debate from the baggage of cultural superiority and inferiority complexes. A defining characteristic of historiography on Russia and the West has been the notion of Russia's backwardness in relation to Europe.²³ Recently this notion has come under attack in a study of seventeenth-century agriculture, which proposes that the "'failure' of the Russian peasantry to adopt the 'more advanced' crop rotation methods of agriculture might be interpreted not as a sign of backwardness, but as a sensible response to the realities of the demographic, social and economic conditions of seventeenth-century Muscovy."²⁴ Why, in other words, did Russian peasants not "receive" certain agricultural reforms from cultures to the West? Answer: Because Russian agricultural economy dictated a different response. By the same token, the reception of military reform in Russia resembles less a "moral submission" than a "sensible response to the realities" of the military situation in which Muscovy found itself, and which dictated that the state use the tools and resources at its disposal in its own interest.

THE RECEPTION OF MILITARY REFORM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY AND THE WORLD

Before turning to the Muscovites, let us consider that the process of reception was ongoing in other areas of Europe during this period. In the course of European expansion around the world, the superiority of European arms and military organization did not go unnoticed among Europe's enemies and allies. European military technology was coveted, stolen, borrowed, adopted, and used against the Europeans and locals alike by non-Europeans whose ability to implement successfully the technology they acquired depended upon a variety of factors present in their culture.²⁵ The military tradition of the receptor culture was thus highly determinative of the rate and quality of innovation and was, in turn, itself changed by the new elements it received.²⁶ Scholars of military history have noted that the receptor culture's ultimate purpose for waging war also had a

²² Nancy Shields Kollmann, "Concepts of Society and Social Identity in Early Modern Russia," in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine* ed. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 43. A recent Russian history survey continues to succumb to these qualitative comparisons: "Some of the world's greatest empires have been created by a peripheral power on the edge of an ecumene: one thinks of Macedonia and later Rome at the edge of the Hellenic world, of the Mongols in Eastern Asia, or of the Ottomans in the Middle East. Such states borrow techniques and customs from their more advanced neighbors, and then employ their own relatively primitive and warlike social structure to achieve dominance. This is how Russia proceeded too." See Geoffrey Hoskings, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 8.

²³ See Henry L. Roberts, "Russia and the West: A Comparison and Contrast," *Slavic Review* 2 (1964), 3–12.

direct impact on its use of new technology and tactical organization received from outside sources.²⁷ This process of reception was similarly present among the nations on the periphery of Europe which also experienced change in their military cultures as a result of the reception of military reforms emanating from the European core. The transmission and reception of military culture did not occur in a vacuum. As innovations spread outward to the peripheral areas of Europe and across the globe, their reception across cultural lines was both facilitated and filtered by the receptor culture. The interplay of these elements determined the eventual (relative) success or failure of military change. That the “military revolution” was not a monolithic experience is demonstrated by the variations in implementation among peripheral European military cultures. The most noteworthy examples were the Ottoman Empire, England, Ireland, and Poland.

The Ottoman Empire experienced what has been referred to as a “parallel” (to Europe proper) revolution in military technology and culture.²⁸ Europe enjoyed a relatively homogeneous military culture characterized by similar institutions and experiences, as well as by the exchange of personnel and ideas along an Iberian-Italian-Habsburg axis.²⁹ This military “community” did not include peripheral powers such as the Ottoman Turks or Muscovite Russia. Though the Turks stood at the center of a comparable military community that stretched from North Africa to Afghanistan, spreading gunpowder technology throughout the region of their influence, ultimately they failed to match European global accomplishments.³⁰ Turkish artillery tended to be too large with limited maneuverability; no use was made of defensive trench-works against relief forces, nor of the *trace italienne* or bastion cross-fire. Neither did they manufacture satisfactory domestic arms, relying primarily on imports. Most damning of all was the failure of the Turkish military culture to incorporate the organizational doctrines that developed in European countries where the military revolution was well established.³¹ Ottoman military culture, in other words,

²⁴ Janet Martin, “Backwardness’ in Russian Peasant Culture, A Theoretical Consideration of Agricultural Practices in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, 31. For brief discussions of the idea of “backwardness” and other historical models for comparing Russia with the West, see William C. Fuller, Jr., *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), xvii, xix, and Henry L. Roberts, “Russia and the West: A Comparison and Contrast,” *Slavic Review* 2 (1964), 3–12.

²⁵ A.C. Hess, “Firearms and Ibn Khaldun’s Military Elite,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* IV (1972), 179, 181; Weston Cook, *The Hundred Years War for Morocco* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 138–40, 279–80; *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 320; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution, Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Elman R. Service, “War and Our Contemporary Ancestors,” in *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*, eds. Morton Fried, et al., (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press, 1968), 161.

²⁶ *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Rogers, 323.

practiced gunpowder warfare selectively, and it is this selectivity which set the Turks apart from Europe.

Keeping the Ottomans in mind is instructive for Muscovite historians, because the Turks, like the Muscovites to the north, had already begun to develop their own innovative martial institutions in which the integration of gunpowder weapons from outside the Empire played a determining role. The Ottomans and the Muscovites used gunpowder weaponry almost from the beginning of its introduction in Europe. Like Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire relied on a gentry militia supported by lands held in service-tenure, the timer-holders, which ceased to provide adequate military service sometime in the Early Modern period. Both Muscovites and Turks began to develop native solutions to supplement their flagging land-based armies and also to implement the new technology of firearms. Muscovy, however, turned to Europe for hired mercenaries to supplement its gentry forces, an innovation the Ottomans did not pursue until the late eighteenth century when European technicians began to be imported to a limited degree.³²

Unlike the Ottoman Empire, England's Civil War armies were closely connected to the armies of Europe, and subsequently to the reforms taking place in an environment of almost constant warfare. During the English Civil War (1642–46), Cromwell's New Model Army received and adapted military technology and organization through three factors: (1) soldiers and officers who fought in Europe during the Thirty Years War and who returned with expertise in modern warfare; (2) foreign military engineers; and (3) "a more professional approach to all aspects of warfare," especially the implementation of strict discipline and more efficient artillery. The Royalist army also relied on professional officers to train and command regiments, though less so on foreign officers and "soldiers of fortune."³³ English reception of modern military innovations, nonetheless, included an element of trial and error. At the 1648 siege of Colchester, the Parliamentarian Fairfax was hampered by a lack of mining engineers and sappers, but he did construct lines of circumvallation around his trench-works to protect them from any relief effort and, in the end,

²⁷ Parker, *Military Revolution*, 121; Keith F. Otterbein, "The Evolution of Zulu Warfare," in *Law and Warfare, Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict* ed. Paul Bohannon (Austin: Texas University Press, 1967), 353–55; Keith F. Otterbein, "An Analysis of Iroquois Military Tactics," *Ethnohistory* 11:1 (1964), 5–62; Delmer M. Brown, "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543–98," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* VII (1948), 244–45; Service, "War and Our Contemporary Ancestors," 162.

²⁸ John F. Guilmartin, Jr., "The Military Revolution: Origins and First Tests Abroad," in *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Rogers, 299–324; another example of this exception would be Cook, *The Hundred Years War for Morocco*.

²⁹ This idea is echoed in Hess, "Firearms and Ibn Khaldun's Military Elite," 182.

³⁰ *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Rogers, 301–03, 323; Hess, "Firearms and Ibn Khaldun's Military Elite," 184.

³¹ Parker, *Military Revolution*, 126–27; Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 31: 2 (1977), 169; *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Rogers, 318.

Colchester fell. The absence of such lines brought the sieges at Gloucester (1643) and York (1644) to early ends. The varying performance of the armies of Cromwell and his successor Ireton during the Irish Rebellion (1641–49) resulted more from the inability of the military leadership to implement effective siege tactics than from any other factor. Attacking commanders could easily implement artillery, entrenchment and sapping techniques, but the advantage gained by these was negated in large measure by resolute defense employing earthwork fortifications. Cromwell's New Model Army was not well served by his single-minded loyalty to the storm as a method of winning a siege because it cost lives (valuable lives considering the cost of training these troops), which also inhibited the development of the more methodical engineering capacity for bringing down walls. The "attitude persisted that military engineering was an exotic and un-English art that was best left to foreigners."³⁴

Similarly, Ireland experienced a series of military innovations during the 1640s, including the artillery fortress, the naval broadside, increased reliance on firepower in combat, and strategies for multiple armies operating simultaneously. At the center of these Irish innovations were also officers and soldiers who, with long military experience and training on the continent, bearing a wealth of military training literature, gave life to the Irish rebellion. At the 1646 battle of Benburb against a Scottish force, for example, Spanish-trained commanders "used the defensive techniques perfected by Habsburg troops to defeat a Scottish force, under Swedish trained leaders, using the offensive tactics pioneered by Gustavus Adolphus." These foreign-trained officers lent their abilities to the local production of gunpowder and artillery, as well as the construction of fortifications.³⁵ Though Irish combat techniques before 1641 relied primarily on guerrilla tactics and hastily thrown up earthen defense works, a long tradition of Irish mercenary service abroad created a wellspring of experience in European tactics and weaponry that served the Irish well against the English.³⁶

On the opposite side of Europe, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*) provides an interesting comparison. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the *Rzeczpospolita*'s successes in Prussia and Livonia, and its victories over Sweden and Muscovy suggested that its military culture was capable of integrating tactical innovations. During the period of 1648–67, however, the Polish army fell victim to the crippling need for political reform. Its victories against the Ottoman Turks in the latter part of the century were more the result of Turkish weaknesses than Polish strengths. It has been suggested recently that

³² Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," 183, 323; Martyn Rady, *Russia, Poland and the Ukraine, 1462–1725* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), 70–71; J.C. Hurewitz, "The Beginning of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis," *The Middle East Journal* 22:2 (Spring 1968), 148–53.

³³ James Burke, "The New Model Army and the Problems of Siege Warfare, 1648–51," *Irish Historical Studies* 27 (May 1990), 1–3; P.R. Newman, "The Royalist Officer Corps, 1642–1660: Army Command as a Reflexion of the Social Structure," *The Historical journal*, 26, 4 (1983), 946, 952–53.

one of the underlying reasons for this string of military failures was not that Poland-Lithuania failed to adopt “allegedly superior Western models,” but that it rejected them out of a distrust of a strong central government. “In Poland-Lithuania at least, purely military change was perfectly possible before the emergence of more effective government; it was fear of the consequences of such government which led to the Commonwealth’s deliberate rejection of the changes introduced elsewhere in Europe after 1660.”³⁷

One result of this distrust was that military innovation took place increasingly in a local rather than a national context. For example, several categories of artillery forces developed in Poland-Lithuania, grouped around local and national centers of power, so that Polish artillery consisted of (1) royal and Lithuanian artillery supported by regular funding from the Crown estates, and with regular officers; (2) town artillery supported with money from the towns and controlled by the town councils; and (3) magnate artillery. In the large, wealthy cities, town artillery was frequently updated, but in the more modest towns, older equipment remained in use. In addition, the magnates and the monasteries often maintained their own artillery parks. The private arsenals of the magnates, frequently staffed by foreigners, came into play in emergencies.³⁸ Innovation in fortification architecture flourished under the magnates and monasteries whose strongholds throughout the countryside rivaled many towns in their implementation of bastions and other modern defensive structures. Modern bastions were constructed at major frontier towns such as Smolensk, Witebsk (Vitebsk, Vitebsk) and Mohylew (Mahiliou, Mogilev), but the *Rzeczpospolita* did not act decisively and much of this construction initiative was incomplete when Russian armies arrived in 1654.³⁹ As late as 1684, a French observer noted that

the Poles put all their resources into their armies, and shun almost all fortresses. There are just two strongholds which they regard as impregnable: namely, Vitebsk in Lithuania against the Russians, and Kamenets in Podolia against the Turks. But we in France would not hold them in anything like such high esteem. At the very most they are fit only to withstand *coups de main*.⁴⁰

From this we may conclude that, though Poland had a more developed system of producing and implementing artillery than did Russia, its artillery force was also controlled from many different centers of power and was thereby weakened, an

³⁴ Burke, “The New Model Army and the Problems of Siege Warfare, 1648–51,” 4–7, 27–29.

³⁵ Rolf Loeber and Geoffrey Parker, “The Military Revolution in seventeenth-century Ireland,” in *Ireland From Independence to Occupation, 1641–1660* ed. Jane H. Ohlmeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 66, 70–71, 73–74, 77.

³⁶ Loeber and Parker, “The Military Revolution in Seventeenth-Century Ireland,” 67; Micheline K. Walsh, “The Wild Goose Tradition,” *The Irish Sword* 17 (Summer, 1987), 4–15, recounts the successive waves of Irish emigration to the continent and the military activities of the Irish in the French, Spanish and Imperial armies.

excellent example of how a military culture determined the ultimate character of innovation.

THE RECEPTION OF MILITARY REFORM IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY RUSSIA

The reception of military innovation in Russia took place in three successive, overlapping phases, each of which was characterized by a fundamental change in Russia's military culture. The first phase may be termed the Artillery Phase, because it began with the adoption of artillery. Prince Dmitrii Donskoi first implemented primitive cannon against the Tatars in 1389, although these early *tiufaki* may have been received from the Tatars themselves who had artillery of a sort in their possession. Italian gun-casting masters appeared in Moscow under Ivan III, initiating a proliferation of gunpowder weapons mounted on town fortifications and gun carriages.⁴¹ Ivan III ordered the construction of the first *pushechnaia izba*, or cannon factory. By the sixteenth century Russia's military accomplishments rested in large measure on its artillery, as was frequently noted by foreign observers.⁴² Artillery played a decisive role in Muscovy's expansion to the west and northwest during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and it continued to be of central importance well into the seventeenth century. The number of Russian artillery at the disposal of the Russian army nearly tripled between the reigns of Ivan the Terrible and Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov.⁴³

A far more significant development in terms of social impact, was the appearance of the hand-held firearm, which characterized the second phase of reception, sometime during the first decade of the sixteenth century. As elsewhere in Europe, the hand-held firearm in Russia demanded the participation in warfare of ever-increasing numbers of men, and simultaneously required improvements in military organization and administration. By the mid-sixteenth century, Moscow began to use lighter, more efficient muskets and reorganized its harquebusiers into *strel'tsy* (literally, "archers" or "shooters"), or musketeers, commanded and trained at first by gentry officers in smaller tactical regiments of 500 men called *prikazy*, and attached to towns as regiments.⁴⁴ On the battlefield these *strel'tsy* fought in conjunction with Cossacks and the armed retainers of

³⁷ Robert I. Frost, "The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the 'Military Revolution,'" in *Poland and Europe: Historical Dimensions* eds. M. B. Biskupski and James S. Pula (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 23–24.

³⁸ *Poland and Europe: Historical Dimensions*, eds. Mieczysław B. Biskupski and James S. Pula, 24–25; Tadeusz Nowak, "Problem stosowania broni palnej przy obronie i zdobywaniu umocnień przez wojska polskie w XVI i XVII w.," *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości* 12:1, (Warsaw, 1966), 15–32, 36–37, 40.

³⁹ M. A. Tkachou, "Vaina Rasii z Rechchiu Paspalитай, 1654–67," *Entsyklapedyia historyi Belarusi*, 6 vols. (Minsk: "Belaruskaja entsyklapedyia" imia Petrusia Brouki, 1993–), vol. 2, 192, 194.

⁴⁰ Blondel, quoted in Christopher Duffy, *Siege Warfare, The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494–1660* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1996), 190.

gentry servitors to defend or attack fortified positions. These forces grew from 3,000 in 1550 to 33,775 in 1637 and approximately 50,000 in 1680.⁴⁵

The rise of firearm-bearing infantry forces was almost exactly paralleled by the third phase of reception, which may be referred to as the Foreign Mercenary Phase. The first stage of this phase began at the beginning of the sixteenth century when Russia began to employ foreign mercenaries. In 1514 approximately 1,500 men, mostly artillery experts, gathered at Moscow prior to Russia's assault on Smolensk. In the 1520s a force of Lithuanian and German mercenaries assisted in the defense against the Crimean Tatars. Foreign sappers and engineers were also present at the capture of Kazan' in the mid-sixteenth century, and thereafter the Russians continued to employ such specialists from abroad. By the late 1590s Boris Godunov increased the foreign presence in the army by recruiting at least 2500 mercenaries, primarily from the neighboring countries of Poland and Livonia, and placing them under the command of Jacques Margeret.⁴⁶ From this early beginning, mercenaries became increasingly central to military development in seventeenth century Russia.

Jacques Margeret was a well-educated, wealthy Huguenot officer from Burgundy. After Henry IV converted to Catholicism Margaret left France and served for a period of years in Eastern Europe before eventually entering Russian service in 1600. Margeret remained in Russia for several years, learned Russian, and was close to the court of Godunov, even remaining loyal to Godunov's son for a short while after the tsar's death in 1605, and finally leaving in 1611. He and his regiment of mercenaries played a prominent part in defeating the invasion of the Pretender Dmitrii Ivanovich, though he eventually joined forces with the Pretender. Margaret continued to serve in high positions after the fall of the False Dmitrii, and won praise from his contemporaries as an "intelligent, sober and valiant soldier."⁴⁷

Margeret and his contemporaries who served during the Time of Troubles represented a second stage in the Foreign Mercenary Phase of reception,

⁴¹ I.S.Prochko, *Istoriia razvitiia artillerii s drevneishikh vremen i do kontsa XIX veka* (St. Petersburg: Poligon, 1994), 20, 46, 49; M.M.Denisova, *Russkoe oruzhie XI–XIX vv.* (Moscow, 1953), 10.

⁴² *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia*, vol. 73 (London: Halduyt Society, 1886), 360; Heinrich von Staden, *The Land and Government of Muscovy* trans. and ed. Thomas Esper (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 82; *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom, Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth-Century English Voyagers*, eds. Lloyd E.Berry and Robert O.Crummey (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 186; E.E.Kolosov, "Razvitie artilleriiskogo vooruzheniia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII v." *Istoricheskie zapiski* 71 (1962), 259, indicates this observation continued to be true at the end of the seventeenth century.

⁴³ Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar, Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874*, 75. Ivan IV had approximately 150 guns at Kazan' in 1552; about 400 guns played a role in the 1679 campaign, three years after Alexei died (1676).

⁴⁴ Esper, "Military Self-Sufficiency," 196–97; A.V.Chernov, *Vooruzhennnye sily russkogo gosudarstva v XV–XVII vv. s obrazovaniia tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva do reform pri Petre I* (Moscow: Ministerstvo Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1954), 19–20, 30.

characterized by the phenomenon of European officers training and organizing native Russian troops. Margeret and the foreign officers under his command trained Russian infantry to fight in linear formation at the battle of Dobrinichi in 1605, where the Russians were victorious over the Poles.⁴⁸ As Margeret described the encounter, the Russians chose to defend the village of Dobrinichi and received an attack from the Poles on January 21, 1605. The Polish forces quickly turned the Russians' right wing, "after some resistance made by the foreigners" and found themselves in a position to take the village. At that key moment, the Russian infantry "fired a volley from ten or twelve thousand harquebuses which so frightened the Poles that they turned back in great confusion." This decisive volley created fear in the Polish ranks, which ran headlong in retreat pursued by Russian cavalry for nearly 10 *verst*s.⁴⁹

From Margeret's description, we cannot clearly determine if the Russians executed the precise maneuvers associated with the Dutch Model, or if they merely stood in lines and fired muskets at the Poles. Isaac Massa, however, related that the *strel'tsy* fired from behind field fortifications and that their volley was strengthened by fire from nearly 300 regimental cannon which helped create the panic among the Polish cavalry.⁵⁰ The linear formation required musket-bearing troops to form long ranks in order to maximize firepower by delivering shot in the form of a salvo, after which the front rank retired, each surviving soldier moving to the rear of his file.⁵¹ The second rank would then fire and retire, followed by the third and so on. The use of the volley increased the destructive capacity of the relatively inaccurate musket. The combination of this maneuver with field fortifications and artillery strengthened the *strel'tsy* line considerably, considering that it faced, without pike, a cavalry charge. Certainly the noise, fire, and smoke of the volley, and the dread in Polish hearts and minds generated by the sudden fall of tens or hundreds of troops, had more to do with Margeret's victory than intricacy of drill.

The battle at Dobrinichi suggests the pattern of reception that developed as Muscovite military culture modified innovations from the West. Prior to the implementation of the Dutch model for delivering fire, the Muscovite *pishchalniki* (harquebusiers) and *strel'tsy* fought behind town or field fortifications such as the *guliai gorod*⁵² (mobile fortress), or in concert with the middle-service class cavalry.⁵³ The musket became closely associated with

⁴⁵ Chernov, *Vooruzhennye sily*, 48, 50–51; see also A.V.Chernov, "Obrazovanie streletskogo voiska," *Istoricheskie Zapiski Akademii nauk SSSR* 38 (1951); Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Way to the West, Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700–1800* (London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 6. Kalinychev cites the following figures for the *strel'tsy*: 16,955 (1681), 11,262 (1687), 9,644 (1689). See F.I.Kalinychev, "Russkoe voisko vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka," *Doklady i soobshcheniia instituta istorii*, vyp. 2, (Moscow: ANSSSR, 1954), 77.

⁴⁶ D.F.Maslovskii, *Zapiski po istorii voennago iskusstva v Rossii*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1891–94), vol. 2, 21; Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 169.

⁴⁷ Chester Dunning, "The Use and Abuse of the First Printed French Account of Russia," *Russian History* 10:3 (1983), 369–71.

⁴⁸ Chester Dunning, "French Account of Russia," *Russian History* 10:3 (1983), 371.

fortifications in Russian usage, permitting the *strel'tsy* to be arranged in only three or four firing ranks, as opposed to the 6–10 used in Europe. The urgency for reloading in the face of an enemy force was reduced by the protective fortifications.⁵⁴ The orchestration of musket-bearing troops with pike and cavalry, therefore, did not develop in Russia as it did in Europe, until much later when foreign mercenaries used pike and musket together. The relative scarcity of the pike was also characteristic of Poland's infantry which consisted of one-seventh pike by 1530, and strengthened during the next century until it comprised one-third of Polish infantry.⁵⁵

The Dutch and Swedish models implied the coordination of pike and firearms in mutual defense on the battlefield, while the Russian variation emphasized the alternative coordination of cavalry and foot.⁵⁶ It is arguable that the pike, and heavy infantry in general, did not develop because Russia dealt so much with mounted enemies from the southern steppe, which involved distances and speeds greater than could be achieved by such a force. When Colonel Van Dam specified to the Muscovite government, during the organization of new-formation regiments in the 1630s, that the proper mix of arms would be 2/3 muskets and 1/3 long pikes, the state had to send agents abroad to purchase pikes as well as muskets.⁵⁷ The fact that the musket in Russia did not develop together

⁴⁹ Jacques Margeret, *The Russian Empire and Grand Duchy of Muscovy, A seventeenth-Century French Account*, trans. and ed. Chester S.L. Dunning (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 62–63. Russians measured distance using the *verst'* which equalled approximately 2/3 of a mile, or one kilometer.

⁵⁰ Isaak Massa, *Kratkoe izvestie o Moskovii v nachale XVII v.* (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1937), 89.

⁵¹ For a contemporary illustration of this maneuver, see Figures 5 and 6, in Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 19, 21. The Swedish version required the soldier in the rear of the file to move forward with his loaded musket.

⁵² Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971), 164. The *guliai gorod* probably began to be used early in the sixteenth century against the Tatars. It consisted of sections constructed of wooden boards or logs, and mounted on wheels, with apertures to allow the defenders to fire at the approaching enemy. It served to protect the musketeers and artillery positions, and allowed the Russian cavalry to regroup after a charge. Hellie suggests that it was not a very effective addition to Russian tactics. A Polish squire, however, described the use of the moving fortress at Mohylew in 1660 in terms more convinced of its effectiveness: "Those moving fortresses are built on a frame like a turnstile in the shape of the stockaded wooden siege towers we call 'garlics' and often use at corner bastions with our fieldworks; that is, hollow logs are laced together in a cross and fastened at the ends with iron clasps. They are carried by foot soldiers in front of the battle ranks; as the army goes into battle, they place them on the ground and stick their muskets through them; there's no way to break in upon the enemy, for the horses would be speared. Being behind those things, it's as if an army were behind a fortress, whence the name: moving forts." Nevertheless, it should be noted that Czarnetskii and his comrades succeeded in breaking down Dolgorukii's *guliai gorod* at Mohylew. See *Memoirs of the Polish Baroque, The Writings of Jan Chryzostom Pasek, A Squire of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania*, ed. and trans. Catherine S. Leach (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 80–81.

with the pike in battle is further suggested by Bogoiavlenskii's argument that the forked props used to support the heavy musket barrel while firing were seldom mentioned in archival sources because they were rarely used; gunmen propped their weapons up on the wall in front of them. An order from Alexei Mikhailovich for 2,000 of these props to be sent to his camp at Smolensk in 1654 to accommodate his infantry further confirms this fact.⁵⁸ The Russian *strel'tsy* did not take an aggressive role on the battlefield before the introduction of the Dutch innovation, leaving the fighting mostly to the gentry cavalry and Cossacks, and acting primarily as a human abatis of sorts.⁵⁹ Thus, the musket-bearing troops of Russia, behind walls of wood, stone, or earth, had no need for formations of pike to protect them in battle.

Russian pikemen came from traditional military groups (*strel'tsy*, gentry cavalry, Cossacks) and were trained by European mercenary officers. In one instance 500 *strel'tsy* from Smolensk were sent to Witebsk to be trained to fight with the long pike. Following their training they were given pikes upon inspection of their ability with the weapon, and were then attached to musket-bearing soldiers in new-formation regiments with a ratio of 80 pike and 40 musketeers per company.⁶⁰ The introduction of the pike during the Smolensk War and the Thirteen Years War represented an important facet of Muscovy's reception of military reform from the West, and one of the central contributions of the European mercenary officers.

The ascendancy of infantry firepower manifested in the growth of musket and pike units struck quite deeply at Russian assumptions about social rank and military service, which focused on gentry cavalry supported by musketeers and other lower-class servitors. Mercenaries previously acted as advisors or fought in separate, imported units formed abroad, but soon began to instruct Russian officers and troops in the use of military technology and organization. The Smolensk War (1632–34) marked the beginning of this second stage of the Foreign Mercenary Phase.⁶¹ Moscow not only sent mercenary officers abroad to recruit foreign regiments against Poland; it also organized native soldiers into new-formation regiments. To accomplish this, the Russians turned to European mercenary officers.⁶² The state intended from the foundation of these regiments to man them with landless gentry, but the gentry were opposed to service with foreign officers, whereupon the government turned to marginalized groups such

⁵³ Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 162.

⁵⁴ Razin, *Istoriia voennogo iskusstva*, vol. 3, 73–74.

⁵⁵ Wieslaw Majeski, "The Polish art of war in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," in *A Republic of Nobles. Studies in Polish History to 1864* ed. J.K.Fedorowicz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 184, 188.

⁵⁶ RGADA f. 210, Moskovskii Stol, 875:227–33 (1650/51); Jan Willem Wijn, *Het Krijgswezen in den Tijd van Prins Maurits* (Utrecht: Hoeijenbos & Co., 1934), 134–46; David A. Parrott, "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The 'Military Revolution,'" in *The Military Revolution Debate* ed. Clifford J. Rogers, 231–32.

⁵⁷ *Materialy dlia istorii russkoi armii, Pokhody 64-go pekhotnogo Kazanskogo ego imp. vys. vel. kn. Mikhaila Nikolaevicha Romanova polka 1642–1700–1886* comps. V. Borisov and A. Sytsianko (St. Petersburg, 1888), 3.

as Tatars, Cossacks and anyone without ties to a town or landholding (*vol'nye liudi*, or free people.) By the time the war began only two regiments of 1,600 men had been formed; another six infantry regiments and a cavalry regiment of 2,000 men were subsequently formed. In all, the Russians organized ten new-formation regiments containing 17,400 men, or half of the Russian forces at Smolensk. Though the Russians lost the war, due largely to a failure to coordinate the logistical needs of artillery, the troops trained during this conflict formed a nucleus for subsequent new-formation regiments.⁶³

Following Russia's defeat at the hands of Poland, the 1634 Treaty of Polianovka stipulated, among other things, that Russia's mercenary officers were to leave the tsar's service and either enter Władysław IV's service or return to Europe. Many of these officers, however, returned to Muscovy very soon afterwards and took an active part in the reorganization of new-formation regiments in the early 1630s and 1640s.⁶⁴ Officers such as Adam Gell von Seitz and Alexander Leslie left Russia after Smolensk but then returned in the course of their itinerant careers.⁶⁵ They played a crucial role in organizing dragoons at Komaritskaia and infantry regiments at Olonets in the northwest. These early regiments bridged the divide between the seemingly aborted experiment with western military organization in the 1630s and the further development of the new-formation regiments after 1654. Without them, it is unlikely Russia could have mobilized westernized forces during the early years of the Thirteen Years War. Many of the foreign colonels who fought against Poland-Lithuania and Sweden served in the regiments at Sevska, Tula, and Olonets during the two decades before 1654.⁶⁶

THE THIRTEEN YEARS WAR, 1654–67

By 1654 Russia's military culture had accommodated a musket-bearing infantry for roughly a hundred years or more, with foreign mercenaries, as trainers, leaders, and experts, becoming more central. Although bloodied in short

⁵⁸ Sergei K. Bogoiavlenskii, "Vooruzhenie russkikh voisk v XVI–XVII vv.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 4 (1938), 270; RGADA f. 210, Moskovskii Stol, 867:485 (1653/54).

⁵⁹ Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 162; Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 18; Chernov, *Vooruzhennye sily russkogo gosudarstva v XV–XVII vv.*, 50–51.

⁶⁰ RGADA f. 210 Moskovskii Stol, 875:227–44 (1654); 875:227 (1654); Sevskii Stol 153/I: 101–02 (1654); 159:150–54 (1660/61); AMG 3:347; Bogoiavlenskii, "Vooruzhenie russkikh voisk v XVI–XVII vv.," 280.

⁶¹ Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 60, 111, 237; Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914*, 1–14, offers a concise relation of the war's narrative from a military standpoint.

⁶² Maslovskii, *Zapiski po istorii voennago iskusstva v Rossii*, vol. 1, 21; A.S. Muliukin, *Priезд inostrantsev v Moskovskom gosudarstve, iz istorii russkikh prava XVI i XVII vekov* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Sankt-Peterburgskogo Toverishchestva "Trud," 1909), 114–15, 127, 133–35. These officers included Alexander Leslie, Hendrik van Dam, Valentin Rosform, Tobias Unzin, Charles Ebert, and Franz Pentzner Leslie, Rosform and their sons continued to serve in 1654.

conflicts earlier in the century, the Russian new-formation regiments first saw extensive battlefield action only after 1654. The new-formation regiments found a niche in the structure of the army as reconnaissance, guerrilla, and garrison forces, but the Russian elite who commanded the Tsar's armies also recognized the valuable role infantry forces played and deployed them in several crucial battles and campaigns throughout the war.

In the first Polish campaign (1654–55) the infantry performed reconnaissance and slash-and-burn tactics, in addition to siege warfare at Smolensk and other towns. Very little concerted effort was given to dislodging the Poles from fortified positions that offered determined defense, especially those, like Liakhovichi, which possessed modern bastions. Burning outlying villages and suburbs was a common tactic in the region and had the benefit of driving peasants into the fortified towns and putting a greater strain on the resources of enemy defenders.⁶⁷

The new-formation infantry operated in the field under an independent commander for the first time when peasant soldiers or *pashennye soldaty* of the Zaonezhskii district around Olonets were combined under the command of Prince Semen A. Urusov with other new-formation infantry regiments in Belorussia.⁶⁸ In October 1655, Urusov marched toward Brest, and encountered a force under Pavel Sapieha 150 kilometers away from Brest at the village of Belye Peska. Sapieha drove the new-formation infantry back to the village of Verkhovichi, 25 kilometers from Brześć (Brest). Urusov again tried to approach the town in late November 1655, but again without success.⁶⁹ Urusov's campaign demonstrated that unsupported infantry was not as effective as infantry combined with cavalry or dragoons.

New-formation regiments were deployed widely as garrison forces.⁷⁰ When the gentry companies, or *sotnia*, returned to their estates to prepare for the next campaign season, the Russians resisted Polish attacks late in the season of 1654/55 with new-formation regiments originally intended to guard Russia's Swedish border.⁷¹

One of the better-documented illustrations of the new-formation regiment's performance as a garrison force took place at Borisov. The Russians took the town with a force of 5,400 men, including more than 4,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry, and held it from 1655 to 1661.⁷² One Russian infantry regiment garrisoned

⁶³ Fuiler, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914*, 1–14; Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 171–72; Kalinychev, “Russkoe voisko vo vtoroi polovenie XVII veka,” 75–76.

⁶⁴ RGADA f. 210, Moskovskii Stol, 911/stolpik 3:17–30 (1643); *Rossiiskaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka*, 39 vols., (St. Petersburg-Leningrad, 1872–1927), vol. 10, 161–65, 176–78, 181, 268; Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 187.

⁶⁵ RGADA f. 210, Moskovskii Stol, 867:169–79 (1653/54).

⁶⁶ Brian Davies, “Village into Garrison: The Militarized Peasant Communities of Southern Muscovy,” *The Russian Review* 15 (1992), 491–94; *Dopolnenie k aktam istoricheskim*, 12 vols., index (St. Petersburg, 1846–75), vol. 3, 33, 64, 82; vol. 4:146; see also various pages in Moskovskii Stol, *stolbtsy* 867, 870, 875, 907, 908, 911, and Sevskii Stol, *stolbets* 157, for details about the regiments organized, at Olonets.

at Borisov was commanded by Colonel Thomas Beli (Baillie?). In preparation for an attack from Stefan Czarnecki in 1662, Beli moved his infantry into trenchworks and positioned his cavalry outside the town to screen a bridge across the Berezina from enemy attack. When Beli himself left Borisov to assume a command position in an outlying fortification some distance from the town and ordered that its gates be cleared of earth in order to facilitate sorties, his actions suggested to some that he planned to desert to the Poles. He was relieved of his command and replaced by his lieutenant colonel, Alexei Kinket (Kincaid).⁷³

The beginning of the Swedish phase of the war in May 1656, found the new-formation regiments continuing in the dual role of garrison and field army. Several thousand men, many of them horsemen from the Mordva, Chuvash and Cheremis tribes organized as cavalry under the command of the Livonian Colonel Joachim Fahrensbach, screened Smolensk from attack.⁷⁴ Infantry garrisons from Avram Leslie's regiment held captured towns along the Western Dvina River, including Dünaburg. These troops repaired fortifications and wells, harvested grain from surrounding fields, organized local forces, and detained carpenters, blacksmiths, gunners, and other artisans and craftsmen, to be shipped back to Moscow.⁷⁵ Though the Russians failed to take Riga, the new-formation regiments under Prince Ivan Khovanskii effectively harassed the districts around Narva and Gdov in 1657/58.⁷⁶

Prince Khovanskii clearly viewed the new-formation infantry as an essential tool in his conduct of war, but in practice he proved himself a poor commander. He confused quantity with security, as illustrated by his request for several thousand troops to garrison Brześć adequately, despite the fact that the garrison there was already forced to range far and wide to scrounge provisions and fodder. In his pursuit of more troops, he risked the tsar's disfavor by coaxing away from Novgorod Colonel Vasilii Kunigam (Cunningham?) and his regiment of 700 veterans, placing them in trenches on the Nevel' Road as part of his siege at Liakhovich. Kunigam's former superior officer, on his own initiative, tried to lure Kunigam's regiment back with promises of higher pay, a fairly successful ploy that resulted in nearly 200 desertions from Khovanskii's trenches. The tsar interceded, ordering the deserters to be returned, but barely half of the truant troops returned.⁷⁷

⁷³ AMG II: 717.

⁷⁴ AMG II: 640–641; RGADA f. 210 Novgorodskii Stol 162:37, 38, 388; Maltsev, *Rossiiia i Belorossiia v seredine XVII veka*, 105.

⁷⁵ RGADA f. 210 Novgorodskii Stol 162:318–22; Maltsev, *Rossiiia i Belorossiia v seredine XVII veka*, W5.

⁷⁶ RGADA f. 210 Novgorodskii Stol 262:127; Maltsev, *Rossiiia i Belorossiia v seredine XVII veka*, 82, 87–88.

⁷⁷ RGADA f. 210 Novgorodskii Stol 161:350; Maltsev, *Rossiiia i Belorossiia v seredine XVII veka*, 55.

⁷² Maltsev, *Rossiiia i Belorossiia v seredine XVII veka*, 89.

Prince Khovanskii also sought to rebuild his army through huge levies of troops. Mobilization decrees from Moscow provided gentry militia from a variety of Russian towns,⁷⁸ but Khovanskii also levied new troops for his new-formation infantry by depopulating local estates of their peasantry. From the estate of one complainant he took as many as one peasant from every five households for military service in his army,⁷⁹ which bordered on rapaciousness when compared with state-sanctioned collections that took place between 1658 and 1660, in which the rates of removal of peasants for military service ranged from one peasant from every 12 to 30 households. In other words, Khovanskii conscripted new soldiers at more than twice the normal rate.⁸⁰ The tsar ordered him to cease his conscription, however, promising him reinforcements for his army, including several odd ends of gentry militia, Tatars, and *strel'tsy* from Pskov.⁸¹

The reception pattern that was evident earlier in the century continued to exhibit itself in the Thirteen Years War. Russia's reliance on traditional tactical devices such as the *guliai gorod* in conjunction with the new-formation regiments continued to be a characteristic factor. Prince Petr A. Dolgorukii's defense of Mohylew in the fall of 1660 offers an example to compare with Dobrinichi. At Mohylew, Dolgorukii commanded more than 15,000 dragoons and infantry under the command of 12 European and Russian colonels.⁸²

The *Rzeczpospolita* forces found the Russians already in motion, advancing behind a *guliai gorod*, and quickly constructed earthworks and brought up infantry and field-artillery. They sent a number of cavalry into a narrow and sparse tract of woods separating the two armies, but the Russians, seeing this, responded with their own advance force. These two groups of horse taunted one another in order to elicit a first strike. "Your Tsar can kiss me here!" shouted one young Polish horseman, baring his backside to the Russians who, according to Pasek's colorful account, rushed forward and were captured or killed.⁸³

When the two main bodies of troops came within sight of one another they paused about two hours before the Russian cavalry emerged from behind the *guliai gorod*, and attacked the Polish right flank. Only a few minutes of fighting passed before 1500 horse from the Polish left flank charged the Russian cavalry and helped drive them back. At this point, probably soon after the Russian horsemen returned behind the *guliai gorod*, the Russian infantry and artillery fired a heavy volley at the Poles, with little effect, according to Pasek, because the attacking Polish cavalry rode so near the Russian guns that the balls passed over their heads. The Polish cavalry retired to their earthwork defenses to wait out the continuing Russian artillery barrage. The Russian cavalry, however, again

⁷³ RGADA f. 210 Sevskii Stol 151:138–46.

⁷⁴ RGADA f. 210 Moskovskii Stol 276/I: 65, 72.

⁷⁵ AMG II: 840, 867.

⁷⁶ Maltsev, *Rossii i Belorossii v seredine XVII veka*, 115.

⁷⁷ AMG, vol. 3, 55.

⁷⁸ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, 45 vols., (St. Petersburg, 1830), I: 277.

abandoned their *guliai gorod*, leaving a few infantry with the cannon, and assaulted Polish positions, supported with infantry and field artillery.⁸⁴

Russian gunpowder weaponry clearly had less effect on the Poles in 1660 than at Dobrinichi in 1605. At the moment of the Russian cavalry charge, the Poles brought forward their camp attendants posing as a reinforcing army. They moved forward from the Polish left as the Russians struck the right Polish flank. Fierce fighting took place, during which the Polish hussars assaulted the nearly abandoned *guliai gorod* and caused a section of the wall to give way, allowing them to turn and face the Russians behind their defenses. Czarnetskii's regiment moved forward to support his hussars and threw the Russians into a panic. The hussars had taken the gateway between two sections of the defensive wall, so that any Russian units retreating behind the wall through the gate encountered Polish lances. The Russians could not dislodge the hussars with firearms without catching themselves in crossfire. "Nor were they firing from the cannon anymore, it being to no avail amid the tangled armies. At that moment we charged into them, slashing; the moving fortresses were difficult to demolish in a hurry, being strongly fastened together with iron clasps."⁸⁵

The Russian new-formation infantry failed to perform effectively when its traditional tactical defensive measures were taken by Polish heavy cavalry. It is impossible to say what might have happened at Mohylew if the Polish cavalry faced a more traditional free-standing pike-musket formation or even a line of continuously volleying muskets, according to the Swedish or Dutch models. Russia's fortified infantry, combined with artillery, could not withstand a Polish cavalry assault when its flanks came under attack, especially because it had abandoned the protection of the *guliai gorod* and was not well enough trained to resist cavalry in the open. The Polish capture of the *guliai gorod* revealed a significant weakness in the tactical utility of fortified infantry.

These observations help explain the pattern of performance of Russian arms during the Thirteen Years War. Several factors determined the utility and performance of the new-formation regiments. During the 1654–55 campaign the Russian army succeeded against towns that were by and large poorly defended, encountering resistance only when a town possessed some variation of bastion defenses, such as at Smolensk, Witebsk, Mohylew or Liakhovichi. The strategic focus of this campaign was to regain Smolensk, a goal well within the reach of

⁷⁹ RGADA f. 210 Moskovskii Stol 322:7.

⁸⁰ *AMG*, vol. 3, 101, 236, 262, 297, 301, 414, 453, 504, 554, 582, 583; Kalinychev, *Pravoie voprosy, voennoi organizatsii russkogo gosudarstva vtoroi poloviny XVII veka*, 81.

⁸¹ RGADA iz 210 Moskovskii Stol 322:8, 13–15, 39–40, 49–50, 63–65.

⁸² *AMG*, vol. 3, 530; Maltsev, *Rossia i Belorossia v seredine XVII veka*, 124. New-formation cavalry under Colonels Venedikht Zmeev, Khristofor Menzies, Vasilii Cheliustkin, Dmitrii Boriatinskii, Grigorii Tarbeev, Thomas Shal, Ivan Jungman, Denis Fanvisin; another five thousand or so infantry under Colonels Albrekht Shnevents, Nicholas Van Zalen, Alexander Leslie, William Drummond, and William Bruce.

⁸³ Catherine S. Leach, trans. and ed., *Memoirs of the Polish Baroque, The Writings of Jan Chryzostom Pasek* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 79–83.

their logistical capacity, even though it weakened other aspects of their overall activity along the northwestern front. Russian artillery, for example, was concentrated almost exclusively around Smolensk in the early months, to the detriment of sieges at Vitebsk and Dubrovna, to name only two examples of sieges complicated by a shortage of artillery. The strategic concentration at Smolensk delayed the dissemination of men and materiel throughout the front and probably contributed to the Russian practice of avoiding protracted sieges.

The second Polish campaign (1658–63), on the other hand, was notable for the many disasters that befell the overextended Russian army. If the second campaign had a strategic focus to compare with the first, Khovanskii's desire to "send war" to Warsaw might make a plausible symbol of that focus, but the obstacles to and distractions from this objective were too great for it to provide the same momentum that accompanied the conquest of Smolensk. The concentration of sufficient Russian force was hindered by distance and the sheer logistic magnitude of supporting the army across that distance. In addition, the Polish counter-blow in 1660 knocked the Russians off balance, and they could neither reorganize nor reinforce their armies before the Poles retook the initiative. Dolgorukii remained inactive too long at Smolensk with a large army while the Poles approached the Dnieper; Khovanskii's forces were shattered and fell back to be regrouped under Dolgorukii. Instead of attacking towns, Russian forces were largely on the defensive in the towns they held. The Poles, like the Russians before them moved through a network of towns that remained poorly fortified, though the Russians, through the efforts of the European mercenary officers, had made improvements.

Though it is true that the structure of the regiments and the leadership of the European mercenary officers "permitted the army to continue functioning in spite of the massacres in a way which would never have been possible had the old 'Russian formation' army continued to dominate the scene,"⁸⁶ the successes of the new-formation army derived primarily from their tactical diversity and increased flexibility. These characteristics can be credited not only to the European mercenaries, but also to the Russian military culture which fostered the implementation of western forms within an indigenous context.

The reception of military reform in seventeenth century Muscovy relied on a coordination of effort between the European mercenary officers and the Russian government. To perform their duties adequately and construct an efficient army, the mercenary officers relied on the ability of the state to provide their regiments with men, guns, supplies and money in a timely fashion. Conversely, the state relied upon the officers to know their business and train and command soldiers

⁸⁴ Leach, *Memoirs of the Polish Baroque*, 83–84. Pasek reports 12,000 Russian horse, but Russian sources cited above report only 10,000 dragoons were present. It is unclear how many were actually mounted. It is doubtful that more than 10,000 horse were available.

⁸⁵ Leach, *Memoirs of the Polish Baroque*, 86.

drawn from the lower- and middle-service classes and the peasantry. Both members of this partnership faced significant barriers to their success and were not always competent, but their joint response to the difficulties they encountered met with ultimate success: Russia won its war with the Poles and gained control over the territories east of the Dnieper River and around the city of Smolensk.

⁸⁶ Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, 201.

MODERNIZING THE MILITARY: PETER THE GREAT AND MILITARY REFORM

Carol B.Stevens

Peter the Great (r. 1682–1725) to this day is conventionally portrayed as Russia's great modernizer, the forward-looking ruler who dragooned backward Muscovy into becoming a modern European empire. He built St. Petersburg, Russia's European capital on the shores of the Baltic; he cut off the boyars' beards and forced them into European dress. But most of all, he involved Russia in ceaseless wars, wars that many historians view as a chief cause of Peter's Europeanizing efforts: a brief war against Persia, still briefer encounters with the Ottoman Empire, battles against internal rebellion and border peoples, an expedition in Central Asia, and, most significantly, the momentous struggle against Sweden in the Great Northern War (1700–21).

Peter's victory in the Great Northern War is often seen as a sign of successful military reform and the basis for Russia's emergence in the eighteenth century as a European empire. It is a familiar tale: Although Peter demonstrated an early interest in military and naval affairs, the humiliating defeat of Russia's army by a small Swedish force at Narva in the opening months of the war galvanized the Russian ruler into action. Over the succeeding years, even as Russia battled the formidable Swedish military machine and Charles XII, its general-king, the tsar doggedly fought to put in place substantial elements of a modern European army. Dramatic results followed quickly. While Charles fought Peter's ally, Augustus of Saxony and Poland, Russia captured Swedish fortresses in Ingria, Karelia and Estland, retook Narva (1704), and began construction on his new capital of St. Petersburg. When Augustus finally withdrew from the war, Charles turned the Swedish army eastward. Peter delayed as long as possible engaging with the Swedes, but when the encounter did take place, the Russian army triumphed in major battles at Lesnaia (1708) and Poltava (1709). As Sweden's ability to fight was eroded by the long years of war, the absence and then death of its king, Russia's new navy gained power in the Baltic, winning at Hangö and supporting the army as it moved against Finland, in northern Germany, and finally against Sweden proper.

Relative peace brought the consolidation of military reform. By 1725, the Russian military numbered 200,000 men; they wore Russian-made uniforms and were armed with standard Russian-made weapons. A specialized artillery corps and an established navy supported the army. Most of the military was paid, supplied and provisioned (if irregularly) by the state; their trained officers were mostly Russian noblemen. Administration of the army and navy were unified in the Admiralty and the War College, and a military ethos was developing in the

armed forces. Recognition of the changes was reflected in Europeans' view that Russia had become an integral part of the European military and diplomatic equation.

For many historians of the Petrine era and of the Russian military, the success of Peter's modernizing, Europeanizing reforms to the Russian military explains the victory over Sweden and European power status. Meticulous comparisons to contemporary European armies have emphasized Russia's improved training of officers and men, the availability of newer technology such as standard muskets with bayonets, Russian tacticians' willingness to use and improvise with orthodox European methods, as well as the effort to create universal administrative support systems and fiscal regularity.¹

Elements of this conventional interpretation have long been challenged. Some historians have emphasized that Peter's military reforms were not a sudden reversal of established policy, but that reform had begun in earnest in the mid-seventeenth century, if not before.² Recent research, especially, has demonstrated how military reforms fell far short of their goals. The new recruiting system launched in 1705, for example, strongly resembled Muscovite conscription; it also failed to deliver a reasonably predictable number of recruits until the 1720s, forcing the army and navy to rely on *ad hoc*, unsystematic measures.³ Despite new financial and provisioning institutions, hungry and unpaid soldiers deserted the ranks during the Northern War. Rapid turnover allowed limited the impact of formal training on the forces. Although uniform, Russian-made weapons were an obvious boon, at crucial moments there were not enough of them, and soldiers used shovels, axes and swords.⁴

Critics and enthusiasts of Peter's reforms alike describe the financial and social costs of the Petrine reforms as very high. The expense of maintaining the army and navy led to the imposition of the soul tax, which cost the peasants dearly. Military reform also had profound social consequences. The rigidification of serfdom, the reinvigoration of the state service ethos, and the reliance on a command state, it has been argued, effectively limited the ability of Russian society to modernize and transform itself.⁵

¹ For example, Pavel O. Bobrovskii, *Perekhod Rossii k reguliarnoi armii* (St. Petersburg: Tip. V.S. Balasheva, 1885); Liubomir G. Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armii i flot v XVIII veke* (Moscow: Nauka, 1958); various works by Nikolai I. Pavlenko, most recently, *Petr velikii* (Moscow: Mysl', 1990).

² Anatolii V. Chernov, *Vooruzhennnye sily Russkogo gosudarstva* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva oborony Soiuza SSR, 1954), 223; Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 64.

³ M. D. Rabinovich, "Formirovanie reguliarnoi armii nakanune severnoi voiny," in Viktor I. Shunkov, ed., *Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 267.

⁴ William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 44.

⁵ Evgenii V. Anisimov, *Vremia Petrovskikh reform* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1989); Iaroslav E. Vodarskii, "Petr I," *Voprosy istorii* no. 6 (1993), 59–78.

A consistent evaluation of Peter's military reforms and an explanation of Russia's victory over Sweden are difficult to derive from these conflicting interpretations. A new approach is required, one which views the Petrine reforms from a more comprehensively cross-cultural perspective.

By way of introducing this perspective, it is worthwhile pointing out that most discussions of the Petrine military accept the standard of a "Europeanizing" army and navy quite uncritically. No doubt this can be attributed in part to Peter and his contemporaries, who frequently used Europe as a benchmark of success in their discussions of reform. This standard of argument has continued; historians of the period often evaluate the success or failure of Peter's reforms on a west European standard, labeling them "backward" or "advanced." All too frequently, the narrative of military change presses the point home by focusing exclusively on the long war with Sweden. The implicit comparison to an ideal European model can obscure significant accomplishments and result in misleading conclusions, although it can occasionally illuminate Russia's relative position.

To begin with, similar military systems existed across a much larger area than Europe alone. For the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a "common zone" has been identified, within which military innovation in technology and organization were widely disseminated. Inside that zone, a certain battlefield parity existed. New ideas emerged throughout the area; no recognizable center could be identified. For more than a century, states strove to maximize some shared features of their military forces: they had hierarchically-organized units commanded by trained officers; among ground units, infantry predominated over cavalry. The men of these units were trained and tactically maneuverable. Directly or indirectly, they were often paid, supported and maintained by the state in whose service they fought. Defense frequently consisted of a string of garrisoned fortresses facing borderlands and frontiers. In the eighteenth century, new tactical, strategic, and organizational characteristics appeared, not the least of which was the careful coordination of increasingly diverse military forces and diplomatic relationships. The resulting armies and navies might be called "modern" standing forces, although this description refers more to their resemblance to present-day military forms than to their qualities by comparison with contemporary if distant states such as China.⁶ This "common zone" was not exclusively European, however, since it included the Ottoman Empire and, by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Russian Empire.⁷

Membership in that "common zone" should not, however, be misconstrued to mean that specific technologies, particular tactical maneuvers, or certain organizational forms were necessarily present across the area. Broad similarities concealed a considerable variety of techniques and time frames for achieving them. For example, within the framework of the "common zone," even apparently simple changes in weaponry and tactics were adopted at different times and used quite differently. The Swedish cavalry, certainly aware of a variety of firepower alternatives, often forswore firepower altogether, attacking

⁶ Peter Purdue, "Military Mobilization," *Modern Asian Studies* 30:4 (1996), 757–63, offers one of the few such comparisons.

⁷ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700* (London: UCL Press, 1999), 108.

with cold steel alone, as did their Russian neighbors.⁸ The appearance of flintlock muskets with bayonets, to use a further example relevant to the Russian case, became standard in armies of the common zone over quite an extended period. They were generally used by the army of Wurttemberg after 1688, by Brandenburg-Prussia after 1689; Sweden from the 1690s; by France after 1703; by Britain after 1704; Russia just before Poltava in 1708; and by Ottoman forces after 1739.⁹ Furthermore, although bayonets arguably had a significant impact on battlefield tactics, armies did not necessarily win wars, or even battles, because they held such technological or tactical advantages. The Russian infantry apparently did not use their bayonet “advantage” at the disastrous battle against the Ottomans on the River Pruth in 1711. Considerable disagreement persisted even after 1725 about that weapon’s most constructive tactical use. Nor were other tactical elements generally agreed upon within the common zone. Swedish and other European forces were experimenting with a variety of infantry line formations at this same time. It was, of course, a complex admixture of technology, tactics, resource mobilization, adaptability, organization, support, and politics which gave some forces battlefield parity, not individual reforms or changes, which may or may not have been in general use.

Beyond variability among individual armies, the Euro-Ottoman common zone also had identifiable, but by no means exclusive, sub-zones. Geographic, demographic, and other circumstances led to different emphases in military development. For example, there were forms of warfare and military organization that were particularly important in southeastern Europe and the Pontic steppe. The forces of the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian Empires emphasized some similar such elements, but their forces should not be accounted either “backward” nor “peculiar” on that score. Rather, demographic patterns, unproductive agriculture, the absence of sharply demarcated frontiers, and other political circumstances imposed certain military conditions. Some of the relatively localized responses to these conditions included a persistent emphasis on numerically large armies, a particular focus on large-scale provisioning, flexible frontier arrangements, and an unusual emphasis on mobility—often using irregular cavalry troops. By later in the eighteenth century, such regional emphases might have been less important. But, in the early 1700s, they were quite pronounced. Both the Russians and the Ottomans were skilled in the use of irregular cavalry. The Habsburg general, Prince Eugene of Savoy, brought “eastern” modes of warfare westward with great success, whereas previous Habsburg commanders had usually kept them separate.¹⁰ Such differences within the Euro-Ottoman common zone bear serious consideration in understanding of the Russian army and its accomplishments under Peter the Great.

⁸ Anthony K. Upton, *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 83.

⁹ Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1660–1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 39–40.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 106.

Before Peter came to power, Russia had already begun reforms that brought its army increasingly into line with other armies of the Euro-Ottoman common zone. From the 1650s onward, Russia began creating permanent campaign forces in which ‘new formation’ regiments were numerically dominant; these had hierarchically-organized officer corps with numerous foreign officers hired to introduce and implement new military practice. From the 1660s, half or more of these regiments were infantry; at least some were paid or supplied and underwent some training in connection with imminent campaigns. By the late 1670s, the Russian infantry had improved its tactical ability and held formation against superior numbers.¹¹ The Russians were also reasonably well provided with Russian and imported artillery. The resistance of Russia’s foreign officers to diluting their troops with less well-trained men in 1681 may indicate a nascent professionalism.¹² Peasant conscription and in-kind provisioning helped maintain these units alongside the noble cavalry, itself increasingly supported by the state. These changes were accompanied by the formal consolidation of serfdom, a political concession to the gentry which gradually led to its relinquishing its traditional military role. By 1681–82, even the noble cavalry had been restructured into new formation units.¹³

Russian forces even with the new-style troops grew very rapidly in size in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Russian army had over 100,000 men on its roster beginning in 1650 and 200,000 by the 1680s. After the mid 1660s, despite some devastating losses, the number of men departing on campaigns routinely numbered 100,000. Since the rapid escalation coincided with the Doroshenko campaigns, it appears to have been stimulated by the end of the multi-front Thirteen Years’ War and the threat of Ottoman troops in the Ukrainian theater. Although constraints on the Porte’s ability to put large, well-provisioned armies in the field were becoming apparent in late seventeenth century, the Russian army remained second in size only to the Ottoman forces in the region.¹⁴

As Russia created new formation forces and then rapidly expanded them, it tried to consolidate institutions capable of conscripting, mustering, paying and supplying its men. Conscription of recruits with year-round pay and supply for them was prohibitively expensive for such a large army, however, as well as institutionally and politically difficult to arrange. Russia apparently never considered size reduction. Rather it developed partial and part-time support systems, expanding such offices as military town governorships and military administrative regions to intensify the state’s extractive abilities.

¹¹ Brian L.Davies “Russian Military Power, 1453–1815,” in *European Warfare, 1453–1815*, ed. Jeremy Black (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999), 167.

¹² Carol B.Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe* (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995), 172–73; Oleg Leonov and Ilia Ulianov, *Reguliarnia pekhota* (Moscow: AST, 1995), 9–11.

¹³ Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe*, 35, 141.

¹⁴ Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700*, 39–41; Peter Wilson, “Warfare in the Old Regime,” in *European Warfare*, ed. Black, 80; Gabor Agoston, “Ottoman Warfare in Europe, 1453–1826,” in *European Warfare*, ed. Black, 132, 136.

Russia used its army to win the Thirteen Years' War (1654–67) against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Its continuing ability to replace infantry units year after year was a key element in its staying the course.¹⁵ In the Russo-Turkish War (1676–81), the Russians proved adequate in numbers and supply to fight a holding action against the Ottoman colossus, restricting it to Podol'ia without defeating it. Still later, in attacking the Ottoman vassal state of Crimea in 1687 and 1689, the Russians tried to use coalition warfare to offset the still threatening size and efficient supply system of their potential enemy.¹⁶

Finally, pre-Petrine Russia developed a stable defensive system for its steppe frontier which would shape Russian Imperial policy not only under Peter, but into the nineteenth century. This dealt with a military concern shared by the Ottomans, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburgs: open borderlands, whose precise 'frontiers' shifted with the fluctuating loyalties of peoples living on or near the unclaimed expanse of the Pontic steppe. As it had in the past, Russia from the mid-seventeenth century built new fortified lines at the southernmost edge of Russian agricultural settlement, to protect it from Tatar and other raiders. The lines aggressively advanced the limits of Russian power, markedly narrowing the steppe zone. Numerous small fortresses along the lines were maintained, armed and garrisoned by the state. As a defensive strategy, this was stunningly successful, since raids soon ceased to have serious impact north of the garrisoned line. More aggressively, the new safety of the Russian south drew population. By 1678–81, increasingly dense settlement and migration from Ukraine resulted in a newer line, still further south.

The effectiveness of defensive line and garrison forces had very dramatic implications. It released Russia's army to focus on battlefield encounters. It no longer needed to muster annually to pursue the Tatars in the south. From their southern fortresses, garrison troops also acted as internal police and significantly extended army reserves. The burdens this imposed on a frontier population increased tensions within the frontier, especially as the lines constrained flight out of the reach of the Russian government. Finally, the lines changed Russia's relations with southern nomadic confederations. That is, the good will of at least some military irregulars drawn from among the steppe nomads (such as Kalmyks or Don cossacks) remained crucial to Russia's ability to sustain adequate defense. Moscow's failure to maintain such unstable relationships could lead to rebellion or allegiance with a hostile power. But steppe peoples also acted as skilled irregulars in the Russian field army, often in significant numbers.¹⁷

In sum, then, seventeenth-century Russia had already begun a process of military reform that brought it increasingly into line with the Euro-Ottoman zone. The Russian army of that era had certain eastern characteristics, in its size, its emphasis on cavalry and heavy provisioning. Other areas of considerable strength were artillery and its steppe defense. Reform was sustained by an

¹⁵ Robert Frost, *After the Deluge: Poland Lithuania and the Second Northern War, 1655–1660* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 13, 18, 32.

¹⁶ Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700*, 9, 113.

¹⁷ Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armiia i flot v XVIII veke*, 47–48, for example.

administrative culture which more than one historian has described as overly centralized with respect to military decision-making. However, it was still developing permanent institutions which coordinated military activity; similarly it was beginning to impose new forms of organization and universal standards. As states across Europe had also discovered, the reformed military was very expensive. The Russian crown resorted rarely to loans or to international credit to pay for it, as West European states did. Instead it used land grants and payments in kind to minimize cash needs. These helped to produce a military hybrid of semi-standing, semi-professional forces. Perhaps for this reason, despite reform and undeniable territorial conquest (right-bank Ukraine, Smolensk, the settled steppe, Siberia), the Russian army was not highly rated by most Europeans.

What then did Peter contribute to this military? And why did the Russian forces win the Swedish war? In the context of the previous achievements of Russian reform and of the variability of Euro-Ottoman armies, straightforward answers are not easily found. However, given current research, it seems certain that Peter's self-consciously "Europeanizing" reforms neither completely transformed the Russian army, nor were those reforms alone responsible for that army's victories over Sweden up to and including Poltava (1709). Indeed, emphasis deserves to lie not so much on the introduction of reforms Peter explicitly copied from Sweden and elsewhere in western Europe. Rather, the particular strengths of the Russian army and of its tsar and leader seem rather to have been the skillful use of diplomacy to improve the battle conditions for his military forces and the successful combination of new tactics and organization from northern Europe with experience and knowledge from the southeastern part of the Euro-Ottoman zone.

Peter's first military victories against Sweden were achieved in the Baltic region following Russia's defeat at Narva (1700). In the immediately following years of the great Northern War, Peter hastily introduced a number of military changes. While eventually relevant to the changing overall capabilities of the military, several examples suffice to illustrate the point that Peter's new reforms were not alone responsible for Russia's conquests in Ingria, Karelia, and Estonia (Estland) prior to 1705. Early attempts to regularize recruitment (1699, 1705), at first stumbled for lack of accurate census data and desertion from the ranks, while *ad hoc* arrangements helped swell the ranks. Attempts to train the new recruits were likely dwarfed by the heavy turnover in personnel. While a nascent Russian navy appeared in the Baltic before 1705, helping to capture Kronstadt and other locations, its ships tended to be small and their quality unpredictable.¹⁸

Peter did bolster Russia's already relatively strong artillery by separating it into an independent corps by 1701. The new organization surely speeded the dissemination of new information and equipment in a specialized sector of the army. New Russian artillery made after Narva (1700) was generally lighter; it would be an important element in the recapture of Narva in 1704.¹⁹ Peter's successful diplomacy, which supported the continued efforts of Augustus of

¹⁸ Anisimov, *Vremia Petrovskikh reform*, 164–65; P.A. Krotov, "Sozdanie lineinogo flota na Baltike pri Petre I," *Istoricheskii zapiski* 116 (1988), 327 argues that the Baltic navy was carefully planned and built up in three stages.

Saxony and Poland against Charles XII in Poland, limited Russian troops' contact with the main Swedish army.

However, Sweden's Baltic fortresses faced their Russian attackers with small garrisons (often 500–600 men). The Russian army overwhelmed them with some established strengths: sheer numbers (of volunteers, new recruits, older-style forces, reorganized *strel'tsy*), and, in particular, cavalry irregulars who attacked the fortresses, garrisoned the northwestern frontier and acted as Saxon auxiliaries.²⁰

In time, Peter's emphasis on professionalized battlefield behavior and his personal efforts to coordinate military reforms had increasingly broad impact. For example, some elements of the Russian army had real combat experience by 1708 and 1709, the years of its great victories over Sweden. Experienced veterans made up for the failures of the formal training system; the emphasis on meritocratic promotion for officers also had an effect.²¹ Like Sweden and other armies operating in eastern Europe, Petrine Russia after 1704 chose to retain a very high proportion of cavalry among its regular troops.²² The infantry increasingly used standard Russian-made muskets with bayonets, which made the infantry more maneuverable; new artillery was standardized in size and caliber.²³ The recruitment system maintained regimental numbers; regimental structure was itself more standardized. Since the artillery corps now had its own horses, field weapons (especially the recently invented horse mortar) could be rapidly mobilized. The *corps volant*—a highly mobile combination of mounted infantry units with cavalry, high firepower, and a minimum of supplies—played a crucial role at the battle of Lesnaia (1708).²⁴ A broad change in battlefield demeanor and discipline meant that the infantry was able now to stand its ground and maneuver rapidly under fire. After Poltava, the army had sufficient self-discipline to pursue its defeated enemy, instead of looting the battlefield.²⁵

Without denying that these particular changes played a role in Russia's battlefield victories against Sweden, they should not stand alone as an evaluation

¹⁹ Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 76, 82.

²⁰ Ivan I. Rostunov, ed., *Istoriia severnoi voiny 1700–1721 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 58–59; Alf Åberg, “The Swedish Army from Lutzen to Narva,” in *Sweden's Age of Greatness, 1632–1718*, ed. Michael Roberts (New York: St. Martin's, 1973), 286.

²¹ Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armia i flot v XVIII veke*, 130–35, 168–70; Petr P. Epifanov and A. A. Komarov, “Voennoe delo,” *Ocherki Russkoi kul'tury XVIII veka*, eds. V. A. Aleksandrov and B. I. Krasnobaev, 3 vols. (Moscow: MGU, 1987), vol. 2, 197–200.

²² Robert I. Frost, *The Northern Wars, 1558–1721* (London: Pearson Education, 2000), 62–69; Carol B. Stevens, “Social and Organizational Characteristics of the Petrine Army,” in *Russian Military History to 1917*, eds. Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

²³ V. A. Zolotarev, et al., *Voennaia istoriia otechestva s drevnykh vremen do nashikh dnei: v trekh tomakh*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Mosgosarkhiv, 1995), vol. 1, 285; Aleksei Baiov, *Istoriia Russkoi armii: kurs voennykh uchilishch* (St. Petersburg: Tip. M. Stasiulevicha, 1912), 15.

²⁴ Baiov, *Istoriia Russkoi armii*, 32–35. Ottomans were well aware of this mobility—supply relationship. Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700*, 109.

of the Russian military by 1709. Other elements deserve consideration. The first and most obvious is the state of the Swedish army as it finally did battle with the Russians. Peter, like many contemporary commanders, disliked risking the destruction of supplies, provisions, armaments, and, worst of all, experienced men in a major battle, and he did his utmost to avoid a set-piece battle with the Swedes. As Charles turned his army of 46,000 men eastward after Augustus' withdrawal from Polish affairs in 1706, the Russians pulled back behind their borders, implementing a scorched earth policy as they went. The Swedes, whose reliance on provisioning from increasingly resentful Poles had begun in 1701 and 1702, thus moved into increasing deprivation as they moved east and south.²⁶ A Swedish relief force was thwarted by the Russian victory at Lesnaia; support from Mazepa's Cossack forces was undermined by the Russian attack on his headquarters at Baturin, and the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich restricted help from the Dniepr Cossacks. By the time the Swedes reached Ukraine, food and fodder shortages were dire; men lacked food and horses fodder; even gunpowder was in short supply. Russian cavalry further harassed the enemy army on the march. The Swedish force whom the Russians faced at Poltava had lost nearly half its numbers and crucial battlefield supplies before the encounter ever took place. In other words, whatever advantages accrued to Russia as a result of reforms, good generalship, and persistence, its victory at Poltava was in part due to the limited size and resources of the Swedish army, and to errors of judgment and understanding on the part of the Swedish king.²⁷

Equally importantly, the impact of Petrine military reforms (many drawing explicitly on north European models) were successfully and innovatively coordinated with other elements of military experience and knowledge. For example, the decision to withdraw Russian troops, and then to take advantage of Sweden's provisioning problems, was made at a council of war at Zholkiev, where the tsar and his principal military commanders were present. Although the centralization of military decision-making implicit in such councils was far from new to Russia, this particular arrangement offered new flexibility in coordinating diplomacy, strategy and tactics. It combined the pre-Petrine council of war, which was a consultation of commanders at the front about immediate conditions, broader strategic decision-making, which had formerly taken place in Moscow with limited input from the front, and diplomatic information, in this case, from the tsar's personal knowledge.²⁸

In one respect at least, the decision at Zholkiev also made use of military conditions more typical of Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg warfare. What militarily distinguished the open steppe and southeastern Europe was, in part, its sparse population and limited agriculture, which made provisioning an army of any size an unusually difficult proposition. Peter and his predecessors had

²⁵ Cf. Richard Hellie, "The Petrine Army," *Canadian American Slavic Studies* 8:2 (Summer 1974), 241.

²⁶ This was not the first time the Poles had experienced Swedish provisioning demands. Frost, *After the Deluge*, 53.

²⁷ Åberg, "The Swedish Army from Lutzen to Narva," 271, 275, 283; Peter Englund, *The Battle of Poltava: the Birth of the Russian Empire* (London: Gallancz, 1992), 49, 50, 89.

learned the hard way about the military effects of the withdrawal of provender, and Peter's own preoccupation with the topic is clear. For all of the Swedes rightly celebrated military organization and Charles' own attention to provisioning questions, they were less informed and experienced about southeastern European conditions, and the Russians more so.

The same might be said for the use of irregular cavalry units outside of battlefield engagements; battlefield set-pieces were, in fact, relatively rare, and irregulars were forces which the Russians used to their great advantage and the Swedes did not.²⁹ One might even argue, further, that the *corps volant*, with its emphasis on the relationship between high mobility and a small baggage train, drew on steppe cavalry experience as well as manpower. Although the Swedes were certainly aware of the importance of mobility across eastern Europe, their own highly trained and innovative forces had less experience with irregulars. Charles XII appears to have disdained them.³⁰

Other kinds of Petrine reforms, especially attempts to create Swedish-style fiscal and administrative support systems, contributed less to the Poltava victory, remaining notoriously unreliable. Although domestic production of weapons, uniforms, and equipment were underway, their delivery to the military was unpredictable. Peter lamented the rag-tag appearance of his army; after Poltava, bayonets and muskets were in short supply.³¹ New systematic recruitment decrees still yielded uneven and unpredictable numbers of recruits. While a national food supply system was in operation, requisitioning provided much of the army's food.³² A welter of *ad hoc* measures and the insistence of the tsar bolstered the military. After Poltava, the size of the Russian army was briefly decreased, in order to improve its quality.

Russia lacked a context, in both political and administrative terms, which would allow it to replicate the uniformity and reliability of Swedish systems closely or quickly.³³ Older administrative units, which Peter discarded one by one, had worked on the basis of a delicate balance between central government interests and those of local élites and stakeholders: where grain could really be collected, where tax exemptions granted, and what compromises would produce a cavalry of appropriate size, for example. Such balances were roughly overturned by the piecemeal creation of new systems; regularization and new arrangements stalled in their absence. Peter's own frustration and his repeated attempts to resolve malfunctioning with policing and new regulations are

²⁸ On Zholkiev: Bobrovskii, *Perekhod Rossii k reguliarnoi armii*, 178–80; Richard Hellie, “The Petrine Army,” 245; Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914*, 76–83.

²⁹ Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914*, 81; Peter would have preferred to delay the battle of Poltava until the arrival of Kalmyk cavalry reinforcements. *Voennaia istoriia otechestva*, 263.

³⁰ Englund, *The Battle of Poltava*, 55, 64.

³¹ Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 73; *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra velikogo* (St. Petersburg), vol. 9 (1975), 160.

³² Despite the existence of a provisioning network. V.N.Avtokratov, “Pervye komissariatskie organy,” *Istoricheskii zapiski* 68 (1961), 63–88.

eloquent testimony to this process. When the combination of old military chancelleries with new departments failed, a new form of centralization was attempted with new institutions; decentralization followed that failure in 1708;³⁴ still more major reorganizations would follow. In practice, a limited number of individuals close to the tsar tended to the rough-and-ready functioning of new systems: it proved well worth their while, not only in rewards from the monarch.³⁵ Little more could perhaps be expected until greater political harmony was established between Peter and more of the boyar elite.³⁶ Much research remains to be done to describe the actual functioning of such systems in Russia. New accommodations were clearly being reached, however: new recruits were informally trained by sergeants and soldiers' artels organized to regulate food.³⁷ Furthermore, the absence of formal regional and local power-bases permitted the tsar to mobilize Russia's resources with little organized opposition, in particular when it came to executing ad hoc remedies and short-term policies such as Zholkiev.

Less well studied than Russia's successful war with Sweden is its humiliating confrontation with another formidable enemy on the battlefield. Irritated by Peter's demands after Poltava that the sultan relinquish the fugitive Charles and disturbed by Russian expansion into Ukraine, the Ottoman Empire entered the lists against Russia late in 1710. Peter rushed to move an army southward, to meet the Ottomans and prevent Ottoman concerns from interacting further with Polish-Swedish affairs. Russia was unable on short notice to raise and supply a large army for the purpose. Peter attempted to supplement his own forces by encouraging Christian resistance in the Balkans against the Ottomans, calling for support from Wallachia, and, still less successfully, Moldova.³⁸ The Russian army that belatedly arrived on the Pruth numbered less than 40,000 men, a fairly typical size for an engagement in the Northern War, but small for confronting the Ottomans. It was poorly supplied, poorly informed, and plagued by heat and locusts that further deprived men and animals of food and water.

The Ottoman Empire, by contrast, responded with dispatch, arriving ahead of Peter with a well-armed, well-supplied, and numerous army (at least 100,000 men), as well as Cossack and Tatar irregulars. Reputedly, the Ottomans found

³³ Cf. taxation in David G. Kirby, *Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period* (London and New York: Longman, 1990), 306.

³⁴ V.N. Avtokratov, "Voennyi prikaz," in *Poltava: k 250-letiiu Poltavskogo srazheniia; sbornik statei*, ed. Liubomir G. Beskorovnyi (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1959), 228–45.

³⁵ Davies, "Russian Military Power, 1453–1815," 172; Pavlenko, *Petr velikii* 503.

³⁶ See Paul Bushkovich, *Peter the Great. The Struggle for Power, 1671–1725* (New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).

³⁷ John Bushnell, "The Russian Soldiers' Artel," in *Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia: Communal Forms in Imperial and Early Soviet Society*, ed. Roger Bartlett (Basingstoke: Macmillan in Association with the School for Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1990), 381.

³⁸ Virginia H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1995), 37 for Ottoman reaction.

their foe less formidably prepared than the Russian army that had faced Crimea in 1689.³⁹ Ottoman artillery kept the Russians from water, while a raid by the Russians on Ottoman supply magazines was unsuccessful.

The battle on the Pruth was itself something of an anti-climax. Russian artillery inflicted damage early in the day. The Russian infantry with protective *chevaux-de-frise* on its temporary encampment may have prevented the Russian troops from being overrun with steppe cavalry, just as Peter intended.⁴⁰ The Russian army was subjected to very heavy Ottoman artillery bombardment and infantry attack from nearby trenches. While the Russians beat back these attacks, they were outnumbered, surrounded, sustaining significant losses; without food and fodder they had no choice but to sue for peace. The Ottoman Empire, apparently interested in retaining its borders and border fortresses rather than expanding, was moderate in its demands of Russia. The return of Azov permitted the Ottomans to resume their war against Venice; Swedish and Tatar concerns received little consideration.

Russian concentration on the Northern War and the military qualities needed to win it perforce limited military preparedness on the southwestern frontier; some former military strengths had been neglected. Given Russia's other military commitments, Peter neglected standard seventeenth-century concerns with army numbers in the south. He apparently made no attempt to match Ottoman numbers on the battlefield in 1711. The need to maintain troops in the Baltic area and a severe outbreak of plague helped to absorb a national levy of 50,000 men and a panic partial conscription on Moscow's domestic servants.⁴¹ Russian provisions and supplies, when available, were often to be found at some distance from the Ukrainian border. The problem of collecting and transporting supplies over vast empty expanses would not be resolved by the Russians until much later.⁴² The locally-based Ottoman provisioning systems remained an important advantage. Peter's attempts to establish coalition support for his army failed. At the Pruth, both Cossacks and Tatars swelled an already large Ottoman army. The Russian military took great care to avoid any repetition of such a situation later in the century.⁴³ Finally, although Peter was certainly conscious of the military differences between his Ottoman and Swedish adversaries, Russian troops were unable to turn this to military benefit. At the Pruth, the Ottoman army boasted more artillery and an overwhelming cavalry, as well as numerical and logistical advantage. Peter may have overestimated the importance of his army's new technological and tactical abilities, but it seems unlikely. Russian bayonets were known not to be effective against the Janissaries, and the Russian infantry did not use them.⁴⁴ More likely, Peter and his military staff had few alternatives and underestimated the speed and size of the Ottoman army. Like Eugene of Savoy, Peter successfully used reform, some east European tactics, and Russia's

³⁹ Comment by Alexandre Benningson cited in Hellie, "The Petrine Army," 250.

⁴⁰ Anisimov, *Vremia Petrovskikh reform*, 217.

⁴¹ John L.H.Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 106; Pavlenko, *Petr velikii* 334.

⁴² The order in 1711 was only for three-months' supplies. Pavlenko, *Petr velikii* 339.

resources to win a westward war. Unlike him, Peter lacked the flexibility and resources, in the midst of the Great Northern War, to create a military configuration that would defeat the Ottomans.

In many respects, the goals and direction of Russian military reform after Pruth were not substantially changed. Systematically organized, regular and permanent battlefield forces remained the desired end. The war against Sweden was not yet won. The navy grew in both the number and quality of its ships.⁴³ Deliveries to the army improved as the census and other changes led to more regular taxation, noble service, and more consistent recruitment. Many, but not all, support transactions were shifted to cash; Habsburg provisioning standards were introduced for wartime, while local billeting shifted the maintenance of troops in peacetime directly to the peasantry. New military administration was often closely modeled on Swedish examples; some of these military codes and institutions would remain the Russian standard for more than a century and a half. Before the Great Northern War was over in 1721, Russian forces were active in northeastern Europe; the Russian navy was a visible presence in the Baltic. But demobilization did not follow Nystad. In addition to expansion into Siberia and Central Asia, Russian troops were active against Persia on the Caspian shore. West Europeans, in particular the Dutch and English, commented with annoyance, if not trepidation, on the increasing resemblance of the Russian army and navy to their own forces. By the 1730s, it was quite generally acknowledged that Russia had campaign forces comparable in practice and preparation to other European military establishments.⁴⁶

Efforts to achieve these goals in the Russian context continued to produce rather distinctive military and institutional responses, both during and after the Swedish war. A new simplified and regular direct tax, the poll tax, with its attendant social implications, did not pay for the military from a poor agricultural economy. Instead, the army was quartered directly in the countryside and its poll tax support was supplemented by indirect and *ad hoc* taxes whose total value and impact is difficult to evaluate. One might also mention the reinforced relationship of noble status to state service, and its impact on the long-lived Petrine Military Statute, or wish for more close examinations of the military implications of a serf army. Other examples abound.

In one major respect, however, the defeat on the River Pruth led to a major addition to military goals and structure. Rather than focus so exclusively on the

⁴³ Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman war and warfare," in *War in the Early Modern World, 1450–1815*, ed. Jeremy Black (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1999), 165; *PiB*, vol. 11, 9, discusses isolating the Cossacks. For numbers, see B. Haggman, "Sequel to Poltava," *Ukrainian Quarterly* (1992), no. 4, 411.

⁴⁴ Leonov and Ulianov, *Reguliarnia pekhota*, 28.

⁴⁵ Krotov, "Sozdanie lineinogo flota na Baltike pri Petre I," 319–24.

⁴⁶ Walter Pintner "Russian's Military Style. Russian Society and Russian Power in the Eighteenth Century," in *Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Anthony C. Cross (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1983), 262–71; Simon Dixon, ed. and trans., *Britain and Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1998), no. 263.

Swedish opponent, some regional characteristics of southeastern European armies reappeared on the Petrine reform agenda. In the late seventeenth century, Russian military forces had not all been intended explicitly to confront the armies of other states on the battlefield. The campaign forces were, of course, and they were the target of most of the reforms discussed above. Although they fought on several fronts rather than concentrating in a single theater, these numbered about 100,000 men for most of Peter's reign; they were supported by a navy of 27,000 men. However, the garrison forces of the preceding reign received little attention from the early Petrine state. They seemed instead something of a waystation for transitional old-style troops. After the confrontation with the Ottomans in 1711, however, that situation changed. Garrison duties and status received serious attention. By 1725, some 74,000 men served in reconfigured units. While the resulting garrisons have been described as "internal troops,"⁴⁷ many staffed border fortresses in the Baltic and Ukraine. All garrison troops acted as reserves and training regiments for the field forces. Garrison forces also supplied some policing needs for Russia's widely dispersed population, most obviously on the long and indistinct Russian frontiers to the south and in Siberia. Schools in garrison towns prepared soldiers' children for military service in their turn.

But garrisons alone could not sustain all frontier defense, releasing campaign forces for service on the battlefield. The landmilitia (a local landed militia) was formed experimentally near St. Petersburg in 1712–16 and permanently from among poorer southern military families along the southern steppe frontier in 1724; it had about 6,000 men by the end of Peter's reign.

Russian use of irregulars was re-emphasized at the same time. Some 100,000 irregular cavalymen, whose allegiance could be based on relatively stable salary arrangements or unstable treaties and alliances, became auxiliaries that could be called upon to join either the field forces or garrison troops. The composition and duties of such forces were intertwined with the ongoing demands of the unstable southern and eastern frontiers. Irregular forces there included an exceedingly wide variety of peoples: Kalmyks, Bashkirs, organized Cossack hordes and individual Cossacks, who might accept land or salary for (temporary) Russian service. Especially to the east, Cossacks still formed an essential element in Russian defense against steppe cavalymen (which might include Kazakh, Oriot, or members of the above-mentioned groups). Like the Cossacks, the Kalmyks and others had joined the Russian campaign forces against Sweden's Baltic fortresses during the Great Northern War, and the arrival of a substantial cavalry contingent was anticipated as battle was joined at Poltava. With reluctance, the Kalmyk also formed an important element in the Russian "Lower Volga" units that won the brief war against Persia (1722–24).⁴⁸

Especially prior to 1711, neither garrison nor irregulars were seen as particularly dependable. It was the "unreformed" *strelets* garrison of Astrakhan' which led the rebellion in that notoriously unstable border town (1705–06), trying to rouse nearby Cossack communities. A later split in the Don Cossack community was the impetus for the dangerously widespread Bulavin rebellion (1707–08). The Bashkirs were in almost constant dissent, threatening to link

⁴⁷ Zolotarev, *Voennaia istoriia otechestva*, I, 287.

themselves with the Ottoman Empire, thus turning border disturbances into international confrontations. New recruits had to be sent south toward Azov to defend the southern frontier in 1711 rather than members of its garrison swelling the army against the Ottomans.⁴⁹ On such occasions, campaign forces were diverted to the frontier to quell disturbances. These diversions were fiscally and militarily expensive, and they were necessarily temporary.

The complexities of the frontier region and the unpredictable loyalty of local armed force led Peter to resume the investment of energy and resources in southern defense. These efforts are rarely described in tandem with other military reforms, perhaps because they seem similar to late seventeenth century policies and misleadingly distant from the battlefield. Nevertheless, Peter extended Russia's defensive lines, as did his successors. He regularized the garrison forces and established resident landed militias to encourage local loyalty to the crown. The building and arming of fortresses adapted specifically for local conditions proceeded apace in Siberia and facing Central Asia; some towns were even built in the midst of the Swedish war.⁵⁰ Peter's relationship with the Kalmyks was negotiated with care.⁵¹

However, outright contradictions remained between Russia's desire for a regular field army and the defense imperatives of the open frontier. Most noticeably, the need for predictable numbers of recruits and regular cash payments for the field forces put financial and manpower pressures on Russian peasants. They fled, often to the frontier, and the Russian state stepped up its demands for the return of fugitives. Making such demands of Cossacks or Bashkirs only exacerbated regional volatility. Such situations led to uneasy compromise. Peter cautiously offered Ukrainians exemptions from some taxes and certain kinds of punishment, while openly arguing that all Cossack leaders were traitors.⁵² The Kalmyks remained valued Russian military auxiliaries, but Russian colonization pressured them into leaving later in the eighteenth century. Such contradictions and compromises form an intimate part of the institutional context and character of Petrine military reforms, for more cases than the one just described.

⁴⁸ Michael Khodarskovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 38, 235, 333, 355. L.J.D.Collins, "The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," in *War, Technology and Society*, eds. V.J.Parry and M.E.Yapp (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 275. states that the Kalmyks were the most disciplined of the irregular cavalry. Also see footnote 29.

⁴⁹ Rostunov ed., *Istoriia severnoi voiny*, 106–07; Nikolai N.Molchanov, *Diplomatiiia Petra pervogo* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1984), 405.

⁵⁰ Nikolai I.Nikitin, *Nachalo kazachestva Sibiri* (Moscow: In-t rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1996), 73; I.L.Buseva-Davydova et al., "Goroda-kreposti," in *Peterburg i drugie novye Rossiiski goroda XVIII-prevoi poloviny XIX vekov*, ed. Nikolai F.Gulianitskii (Moscow: Stroizdat, 1995), 282; Zolotarev, *Voennaia istoriia otechestva*, I, 287; Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armiiia*, 39–49.

⁵¹ Khodarskovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met*, 132–33 ff.

Where does this leave us? Peter's military reforms for the field army initially integrated innovations, ideas and organizational forms from Sweden and western Europe with those from the eastern part of the Euro-Ottoman "common zone." New battlefield performance and professionalism, greater tactical maneuverability, and very gradually more central coordination were some of the results. Given the strengths of Peter's personal leadership, this proved an effective combination against the over-extended but militarily still powerful Sweden. As the war with Sweden ended, continued regularization of the campaign forces gained Russia increased stature in the eyes of western Europe. Such recognition was a significant military and diplomatic advantage, especially given the later eighteenth-century decline in Russia's other principal enemy, the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, Russia under Peter was unable to meet the Ottoman Empire on even terms, nor did it resolve the contradictions inherent in its open and armed frontier. In those areas, the context of armed confrontation gave Russian military reform very different goals and means of attaining them. "Europeanization" was only one element in the transformation of Russian military forces, and Peter's efforts were only a part of the broad military changes that took place in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

⁵² Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 458.

REBELLION AND REFORMATION IN THE MUSCOVITE MILITARY

Graeme Herd

INTRODUCTION

During the reign of Ivan IV Muscovy was a “predator-state and prey-nation”—a paradoxical entity in which the state was strong enough to terrorise society, but too weak to provide protection from external threats.¹ Muscovy entered the seventeenth century as a ‘failed state’, subject to Polish and Swedish territorial conquests during the Time of Troubles (1598–1613). By the first quarter of the eighteenth century Russia was victorious in the Great Northern War (1700–21), and risen to a European Great Power status. Although the “Petrine revolution” had its roots in the seventeenth century, it is remarkable that the military—and in particular—the *strel'tsy* regiments—proved to be obstacles to modernization. In the absence of nationalism as a modernising force, etatism and imperialism became the motors of modernization. Within this context the inability or unwillingness of the state to reform what should have been a key pillar and bastion—the Russian military—was remarkable. Rather than embark on the root and branch reform of the military, the Romanov tsars of the seventeenth century drifted into a policy—driven more by default than design—of creating parallel mercenary-led military structures within the state. This “strategy” was to prove decisive in 1698 when a *strel'tsy* revolt with the potential to unseat Peter I and so disrupt if not overturn further overt western influences within Muscovy, was suppressed by a mercenary-led and pro-Petrine military force.

In the half century before 1698, a series of riots and uprisings punctuated the stability of the Romanov regime, revealing the strengths and weaknesses of the economic, religious, military and political pillars that underpinned Muscovite governance. The *strel'tsy* (musketeers) were the first regular units in the Muscovite army, created in the 1540s and 1550s by Ivan IV as the country’s first standing army corps. They were expected to place loyalty to the Tsar above involvement in the power struggles of leading boyar groups. By the middle of the seventeenth century service was not only for life, but was now considered hereditary. An enclosed military caste had developed with its own ingrained sense of self-identity and particular perception of their role and the meaning of their service within the state. They resided with their families in their own settlement (*sloboda*) within Moscow, buttressed by well-defined privileges, obligations and duties.

The ability of the *strel'tsy* to campaign effectively against external foes had been challenged by the creation of "Soldier" regiments in 1632, which had become the main part of the Russian field army by 1655. Internally, the musketeers' primary function as guarantors of the safety of the tsar had been undermined by their poor performance relative to the newly introduced mercenary regiments, during the Salt Tax Riot of 1648 and the Copper Riot of 1662. Here primarily economic discontent amongst elite merchants (*gosti*) and townsmen had spilled over into rioting, potentially threatening the regime's stability. The *strel'tsy*, with families and small businesses in Moscow were becoming increasingly "civilianized" and could not be relied upon not to side with the townsmen when their livelihoods were threatened. More ominous still, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the *strel'tsy*-particularly the Colonels commanding their regiments-had become much more politicised as witnessed by their role in the uprisings of 1682 and the "events" of 1689 which saw Peter finally assume complete formal authority within the state.

These internal disturbances brought into sharp focus three key dynamics of late seventeenth century Muscovite power politics. Firstly, the nature of clan infighting amongst the boyar elite, particularly the circulation of power within that enclosed elite and the dynamic tension between "in" and "out" clans that both promoted and restricted innovation. Secondly, the steady decline in military effectiveness of the *strel'tsy* compensated by, and directly attributable to, a growing politicization and civilianization of the corps. This process was reflected in their determination to define for the state the nature of their service and duties and increasingly to regulate themselves and operate within their own moral code. Thirdly, the process through which the growing westernization of the Russian military establishment gave shape to and stimulated an internal opposition to the diffuse secular, scientific and cultural challenges that these mercenary officers posed to Muscovite traditionalism and Russian Orthodoxy.²

Given the importance of the *strel'tsy* uprising of 1698 for mapping Muscovite conceptions of systemic transformation, it has received little attention from historians of late modern Muscovy and Petrine Russia, particularly when compared to scholarly work on the events of 1682 and 1689. Although Russian published primary sources on this episode are strong,³ its significance has received scant analysis by secondary sources on the Petrine period. Historians have tended to summarize and dismiss the episode in a few paragraphs between an extensive account of the Grand Embassy and the origins of the Great Northern War⁴ and, indeed, more recent works have treated the subject lightly.⁵

¹ Laurent Marawiec, *L'Esprit de Nations. Cultures et Geopolitique* (Paris, Editions Odile Jacob, 2002), 250, cited in Sergei Medvedev, 'Russia at the end of Modernity: Foreign Policy, Security, Identity', August 2002 draft Marshall Center paper.

² For an analysis, for example, of Patrick Gordon's role as a Jacobite and *London Gazette* correspondent see Graeme P. Herd, "The Mercenary as Diplomat: the Fall of the House of Stuart and Rise of the Romanov Order," 24–44, in *Russia and the Wider World in Historical Perspective*, ed. Cathryn Brennan and Murray Frame (London: Macmillan, 2000).

This chapter will primarily focus on the evidence of three contemporary foreign accounts of the *strel'tsy* uprising. The key source for the rebellion in 1698 remains the unpublished diaries of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries (1635–99)⁶, the little used *History of Peter the Great* written by General Gordon's son-in-law, Alexander Gordon of Auchintoul⁷ and the well-known *Diary of an Austrian Secretary*, Johann Kerb's account.⁸ By 1698 Patrick Gordon was the highest-ranking military officer in Russian service, with over 45 years of mercenary experience, the vast majority of them in Russia. He mixed freely with leading members of the Boyar elite, was a counsellor to Peter, played a leading role in 1689 events, the formation of the emergent navy and war-gaming of the early 1690s, and was one of three key commanders at the sieges of Azov in the mid-1690s. He was Russian speaking, had commanded *strel'tsy* at Azov and on the Tavan expedition of 1697, comprehending *strel'tsy* strengths, limitations and understanding fully the difference between the rhetoric of redress of genuine grievances and that of outright revolt.⁹

THE *STREL'TSY* AND THE STATE, 1672–92

The *strel'tsy* revolt of 1698, falling as it did on the centenary of the start of the Time of Troubles, and containing within it the same potential for chaos and destruction, was brutally though effectively suppressed by the Petrine regime. It is, however, difficult to perceive the clash in 1698 between old-style *strel'tsy* regiments and new-style guards regiments as the culmination of growing friction and antagonism between two inherently opposing modernization projects, that of traditional conservative Old Muscovy and young, dynamic westward-looking Petrine Russia. Peter's savage repression of the *strel'tsy* revolt in 1698 can be partly attributed to his visceral hatred of the corps that had proved so consistently disloyal and capricious during the first 26 years of his life, but is much more a reflection of his belated realization of the real and unexpected threat these regiments posed to his regime's survival. But some historians have linked the *strel'tsy* uprising of 1682, their role in 1689, coupled to their ineffective conduct during war games and the diminution of their power through the creation of a fledgling army and navy in the early and mid-1690s, and their poor performance

³ Viktor I. Buganov, *Vosstanie moskovskikh strel'tsov: 1698 god* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980) provides primary sources on the *strel'tsy* uprisings and is particularly useful for analyzing *strel'tsy* petitions. See also: Mikhail M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I: Materialy dlia biografii*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Gos. sotsial'no-ekon. izd-vo, 1940–48), vols. 2–4.

⁴ Matthew S. Anderson, *Peter the Great* (London: Thomas and Hudson, 1978), 45, describes the June mutineers as “disorganized and leaderless.” M. Raeff, *Imperial Russia, 1682–1825* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 5: “Peter's regiments, commanded by Gordon, went to give battle, and his artillery easily routed them near the Voskresensky monastery 18/28 June 1698,” whilst Pavel N. Miliukov, *History of Peter the Great*, vol. 1, *From the Beginnings to the Empire of Peter the Great* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 229, contradicts this: “the revolt was effectively and ruthlessly put down by Prince F. Iu. Romadanovsky, the tsar's Lieutenant in Moscow.”

at the siege of Azov 1695–96, as all adding fuel to the fire of Peter's distrust of the *strel'tsy*.¹⁰

However, a closer examination of Peter's relationship with the *strel'tsy* in the late seventeenth century does not support such a back and white understanding of Peter's attitudes to the *strel'tsy*, and it falsely assumes that in the 1680s and 1690s the *strel'tsy* had an understanding of and determination to resist something called 'Petrine modernization'. Rather we could argue that the *strel'tsy* were encouraged to become the *de facto* military wing of the politically powerful Miloslavskii faction during the 1682 *strel'tsy* uprising¹¹ and their involvement in the dynastic struggle for succession between the Naryshkin and Miloslavskii clans on the death of Fedor III proved decisive.¹² This then allowed for the succession of Ivan V and Peter I as cotsars and the "accession" of Ivan's half-sister Sophia Alekseevna Miloslavskaia as regent. During the 1680s Sophia, aware of the potential danger *strel'tsy* regiments posed to her political authority and the stability of her regime, adopted a dual strategy of containment: she gradually restricted their power by revoking many of the privileges granted them

⁵ Evgenii V. Anisimov, *The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress through Coercion*, trans. John T. Alexander (New York: Armonk, 1993), 60; Alexander B. Kamenskii, *The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Armonk, 1997), 57; Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 454: "Government troops suppressed the revolt." The most extensive account by a western scholar is that of Lindsey Hughes in her biography of Sophia; here the account is viewed primarily through the prism of Sophia's involvement and alleged guilt in instigating the revolt, rather than the mechanics of the revolt itself. See: Lindsey Hughes, *Sophia, Regent of Russia, 1657–1704* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990).

⁶ The unpublished diaries of Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries are housed in *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi-Istoricheskii Arkhiv* (RGVIA), Moscow, f. 846, op. 15, ed. khr. vols. 1–6.

⁷ Alexander Gordon, *The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia, To which is prefixed a Short General History of the Country, from the Rise of that Monarchy: and its author's life*, 2 vols. (Aberdeen, F. Douglas and W. Murray, 1755). Vol. 1 contains Books I–VIII, Vol. 2 Books IX–XVI. This understudied source has been translated and reprinted in German in Leipzig, by J.F. Jomius in 1765. For a recent analysis of the Scottish influences in the reign of Peter the Great, see: Dmitrii Fedosov, "Peter the Great: The Scottish Dimension," in *Peter the Great and the West: New Perspectives*, ed. Lindsey Hughes (London: Macmillan, 2000), 89–101.

⁸ Johann G. Korb, *The Diary of an Austrian Secretary of Legation at the Court of Peter the Great*, trans. Count Macdonnell (London: Cass, 1968). These contemporary sources are particularly useful in supplying the factual details of the revolt and although the three key eyewitnesses were in Moscow in 1698, they were written independent of each other. As these three sources generally agree when discussing similar events, there is no reason to doubt that when the testimony of one source includes particular details or events not included in the other sources it is not similarly accurate and truthful.

⁹ Graeme P. Herd, "Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries (1635–1699): A Scot in Seventeenth-Century Russian Service" (Ph.D. diss.: University of Aberdeen, 1995).

in 1682, and further consolidated her control over the by now highly politicised *Streletskii prikaz*, by replacing Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii with Fedor Leont'evich Shaklovityi. The "political weight" of the *strel'tsy* was further diminished with the transfer of twelve of the nineteen Moscow-based regiments to frontier towns. Peter's "exile" to the trans-Iauza region around Preobrazhenskoe and the Foreign Quarter (*Nemetskaya Sloboda*) beyond the city walls, underscored a more systematic and catastrophic loss of power by leading boyars within the Naryshkin clan, relegated to the role of disposed counter-elite until 1689.

Peter assumed formal and full power as co-tsar with the removal of Sophia Alekseevna from the regency in September 1689 following another attempted *coup d'état*. The very "open eruption or breach" between Peter and the Regent Sophia was initiated by the mobilization of some *strel'tsy* troops on her behalf on 7 August 1689. Gordon noted that as the *strel'tsy* commander Fedor Leont'evich Shaklovityi and "certain and known persons" supported Sophia and were mobilised, causing Peter, who feared assassination, to immediately ride to "the Monastery of the Holy Trinity." On the following day his relatives as well as some of "the guards and others belonging to the Court" joined him.¹³ When Peter sent a "person of quality" to: "the eldest Tzaar & the Princess Sophia Alexeiovna to know the reason of conveeing so many Streltsees in such an unreasonable tyme it was answered that it was to guard the Princess to a Monastery whither she has to go for devotion sake."¹⁴

The breach may have been "open," but each faction appeared careful to limit the cleavage to within the enclosed elite to avoid repeating the disastrous and violent bloodbath of 1682. A battle had begun for the hearts and minds of the *strel'tsy* regiments, with Peter relying on a steady seepage of *strel'tsy* from Moscow, encouraged by his sending written orders: "to the soldiers & *strel'tsy* regiments to each apart & to the Colls, to repair to the Troitza Monastery on the 29th for business of his Majesty." In response, Sophia waged her own information warfare, informing the *strel'tsy* in an "eloquent oration from the Princess her Self that none of them should offer to go, or meddle themselves in the differences betwixt them & her brother." This oration was reinforced as: "the Oknitze Fiod. Leont. Shoklovite the Governour of their office came out & tooke them very sharply, telling them that if any went hither she [Sophia] would cause

¹⁰ As Alexander Gordon noted: "neither did he think himself nor the government secure, until the very memory of the Strelitzes should be abolished, who had been the instruments of all the insurrections and revolts, during his grandfather's, his father's, and his own time; proceeding indeed, from the tyrannical administration of those in power, and fermented by the factious nobility, who wanted to have a hand in the management: to remedy which, Czar Peter resolved to take the management into his own hands." Alexander Gordon, *History*, vol. 2, 84. For a forceful support of this interpretation, see: Robert L. Massie, *Peter the Great: His Life and His Work* (Sphere Books Ltd., London, 1989), p. 244: "Ever since Sophia's downfall, the former elite troops of the old Muscovite armies had been deliberately humiliated." (Chapter 19:244–61).

¹¹ By 1681 it is calculated that the Russian army had 55,000 *strel'tsy*, 22,500 of which were stationed in Moscow. John Keep, "Mutiny in Moscow: a Contemporary Account," *Canadian American Slavonic Papers* 23 (1981), 410–42.

intercept them, & strike off their heads.” Gordon went on to note: “The Boyar Kniaz Vas: Vas: [Vasilii Vassel’evich Golitsyn] gave me expressed orders not to stirr from Mosko upon no order or acco.t.”¹⁵

From mid-August 1689 until the resolution of the crisis, although both “parties” tested the loyalty of the *strel'tsy*, they actively and successfully attempted to ensure that these regiments did not become further involved in the unfolding political debacle. Gordon notes that amongst the military units garrisoned in Moscow, the prevailing attitude was one of “passive loyalty, and to hold to what point matters may come.”¹⁶ Peter himself ordered these troops to “lie in quietness and make no stirs and troubles”¹⁷ and when petitioned by loyal *strel'tsy* troops to round up “the accused and [those] suspected of conspiracy” he refused permission, “fearing a tumult and it should not go without blood.”¹⁸ Gordon comments that “this was wisely done” and highlights the pains Peter took to ensure that there was no opportunity for rioting and disorder in Moscow by relating how “the wiser sort” amongst Peter’s counsellors “fearing danger and bloodshed” advised against a precipitous move to “Preobrasinsko or Alexeyovits.”¹⁹ That the *strel'tsy* remained largely passive throughout this period appears to have suited the interests of both Sophia and Peter. Indeed, as the only available “neutral” disciplined and effective military force was the foreign military establishment, their joining Peter at the Trinity Monastery proved decisive. The public show of loyalty by the mercenary contingent within the Foreign Quarter resolved the crisis clearly in Peter’s favor: “Our going to the Troitza was the crisis of the business for all began to speake openly in the behalfe of the yongest Tzaar.”²⁰ When Peter returned to Moscow, it was notable that only a few *strel'tsy* were accused of sedition and attempted regicide: “Fetka Sho[klov]ite, a Fyer Silverster Nedziveduf and 19 streltsees (who w[ere] armed) with other their complices had conspired to murder the youngest Tzaar: his mother, the Patriarch and diverse of the nearest Boyars.”²¹ Even when the guilty few had been identified: “The young Tsar with great difficulty was got to

¹² The Boyar Duma headed the hierarchy of ranks and institutions in Muscovy. Its members were divided into two titled (princes) and two non-titled (gained nobility through ownership of land and an informal social consensus) ranks, within a descending hierarchy: *boyarin*; *okol'nichii*; *dumnyi dvorianin*; and, *dumnyi diak*. By the 1690s the Boyar Duma had 150 members, a gradual six-fold increase from the start of the century. Robert O.Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). See also: Peter Bowman Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” *Russian History* 10 (1983), 269–330; C.Bickford O’Brien, “Muscovite Prikaz Administration of the Seventeenth Century: the Quality of Leadership,” *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 24 (1976), 223–35.

¹³ Gordon, Diary, 9 July 1689-RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 249.

¹⁴ Gordon, Diary, 9 July 1689-RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 249.

¹⁵ Gordon, Diary, 16 August 1689-RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 250. Shaklovityi had been promoted through the ranks of the Boyar Duma during the regency in the 1680s-23 July 1682 *dumnyi diak*; 26 January 1688, *dumnyi dvorianin*; 21 March 1689, *okol'nichii*.

coassent [*italicised letters crossed out in original*] to the execution of these people and not until the Patriarch [Ioakim] did persuade him.”²²

This reading of the role of the *strel'tsy* in the events of 1689 undercuts the standard historical interpretation of growing opposition by an enclosed military elite to Petrine conceptions of Western-oriented modernization. The breadth and depth of progressive “westernizing” reforms that Sophia and Golitsyn had already instituted during the Regency (1682–89) overshadowed Peter’s interest in the West, which was confined to “yachting to Columinska” on the River Iauza or freely associating with foreigners in the Foreign Quarter. Such activity, in the words of one historian: “does not in the least justify the traditional conception of Peter as a consistent and conscious reformer.”²³ Peter assumed power with the support of those that embodied the old Muscovite conservative tradition—Patriarch Ioakim, the majority of the *boyar* elite alienated by Sophia’s patronage of western influences, and with the passive support of the *strel'tsy*. Peter, after all, was the living embodiment of Muscovite traditionalism. He was a hereditary heir and rightful tsar who not only opposed the promotion of a woman to tsarina but on securing power executed or exiled an emergent echelon of westernising Miloslavskii advisors, politicians and favorites (such as V. Golitsyn, S. Medvedev, F. Shaklovityi) from positions of influence.

In the early 1690s government lay in the hands of Peter’s Naryshkin favorites.²⁴ If this power elite was governed by any single guiding principle, it was naked self-interest and an overwhelming desire to fill the vacuum of power that threatened to emerge after the collapse of Sophia’s regime. There appears to be no overriding guiding set of beliefs that underpinned a general desire to westernise the state, only a determination to crush latent opposition. Gordon relates how in January 1690: “some words having been spoken in prejudice of the Government & youngest Tzaar [Peter] & his friends [Naryshkin clan] Kniaz And. Ivan Golitzin, Iveffsabakin the Chancellour Jeremy Leont. Polomsky and others sent into exile.”²⁵ True, the death of Patriarch Ioakim in March 1690 released Peter from the restraining influence of the most conservative and deeply traditional of his supporters, allowing his personality to more openly pursue his mainly military-based interests. Gordon himself had noted the conservative anti-

¹⁶ Gordon, *Diary*, 1 September 1689—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 250ob. See also: John Keep, “The Muscovite Elite and the Approach to Pluralism,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 18 (1970), 223: “The *Strel'tsy* regiments did not play an active part in these events. Those of Sukharev and Tsykler were loyal to Peter; the Stremianoi, Etimov and Zhukov regiments, which favoured Sofia, were paralysed by her chronic indecisiveness.”

¹⁷ Gordon, *Diary*, 2 September 1689—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 252.

¹⁸ Gordon, *Diary*, 3 September 1689—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 252ob–253.

¹⁹ Gordon, *Diary*, 3 September 1689—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 250ob–253.

²⁰ Gordon, *Diary*, 4 September 1689—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 253.

²¹ Gordon, *Diary*, 4 September 1689—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 253.

²² Gordon, *Diary*, 12 September 1689—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 4, 258ob

²³ Jurij Serech, “Stefan Yavorsky and the Conflict of Ideologies in the Age of Peter I,” *Slavonic East European Review* 30 (1951–52), 41.

western influence of the Patriarch in constraining his access and participation within the power elite: "I should have dined above [Kremlin] but the Patriarch protested against."²⁶ In the early 1690s reform was limited to the military sphere, and only here to "military science" and technological innovation—such as siege craft and fortifications—and then only reflecting Peter's personal interest, rather than a supposed strategic blueprint of rapid modernization. It is clear that consolidation of Peter to power in 1689 did not signal a wholesale embrace of policies and influences designed to rapidly modernise Muscovy.

The role of *strel'tsy* regiments in the war games or the early 1690s and at Azov has received attention by military historians. It is argued that the regiments suffered at the hands of Peter's "Play Regiments" (*poteshtnye*) during the numerous "war games" and military manoeuvres that characterised this period, inculcating a sense of isolation and siege mentality, both literally and figuratively, amongst the *strel'tsy*. However, it is clear from Gordon's account that although the *poteshtnye* were usually called upon to storm *strel'tsy* regiment redoubts and the attackers were mostly deemed to have won the engagement, they suffered disproportionately from wounds and death. During the siege of Azov there is no evidence to suggest that Peter was openly antagonistic towards the *strel'tsy* regiments. Generally, Russian units as a whole suffered from poor intelligence, reconnaissance ability and tactical manoeuvring. Peter in a letter to Winius on 19 May 1695, discussed the handling of barges transporting troops down the Moskva, Oka and Volga rivers to Tsaritsyn. He laconically noted: "The winds delayed us badly, but most of all Our delays have been due to stupid pilots & workmen, who call themselves masters, and who are as far from being masters as heaven is from earth."²⁷

The differences in military tradition, professionalism and performance between *strel'tsy* regiments and the newly appointed guards' regiments was becoming apparent to the foreign officers, though. On one occasion when Gordon, calculating the amount of provisions needed for various regiments, noted that the *strel'tsy* needs were "so excessive, I calculated how much of all sorts of ammunition they had." That such a calculation could and was regularly carried out as a matter of course surprised and perplexed the *strel'tsy* regimental commanders.²⁸ On another occasion, when attempting to cross the River Donets at a suitable "narrow rocky passage," Gordon "divided the worke among the Regiments according to their respective numbers" and noted "but the Laziness, unwillingnes or unskilfulness of the streltsees retarded the worke very much."²⁹

By 19 June 1696 the town fell, and Peter immediately informed Moscow by letter 'written in Our conquered town of Azov'. However, once the campaign

²⁴ Robert O. Crummey, "Peter and the Boiar Aristocracy, 1689–1700," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 8 (1974), 274–87; Paul Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction and the Opposition to Peter the Great: the 1690s," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte: Beiträge zur 7. Internationalen Konferenz zur Geschichte des Kiever und des Moskauer Reiches* (Berlin, 1995), 80–120.

²⁵ Gordon, Diary, 10 January 1690—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 5, 1–1ob. Later in the month: "some imprisoned for works against this present government." Gordon, Diary, 28 January 1690—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 5, 4.

was over, the triumphal celebrations in Moscow that were held on the evening of 30 September 1696 broke with precedent and firmly fixed in place one of the foundation stones of *strel'tsy* grievances.³⁰ The impact of the victory parade and Peter's representation of a new image of monarchy in the symbolic language and political imagery of western absolutism upon conservative Muscovite society must have been startling.³¹ The campaigns had destabilised the already insecure identity and cohesion of the *strel'tsy* regiments and victory helped secure the positions of a new stratum within the boyar elite which emerged, flourished and was promoted through their loyalty to Peter and their ability to embrace Petrine reform. The Whitworth account clearly demonstrates that Peter Matveevich Apraksin ("Boyar Peter Mastfeovitz Apraxin") commanded two redoubts with three artillery batteries in Golovin's army during the first campaign³² and Prince Iakov Fedorovich Dolgorukii ("Kniaz Jacob Fiodorovitz Dolgorukoy") commanded a strong detachment of 4000 with artillery. Both these men were promoted by Peter as a result of their Azov successes and were to enjoy leading elite positions within the Petrine state.

The death of the co-tsar Ivan V on 29 January 1696 and victory following the surrender of Azov in June 1696 allowed for the consolidation of the position of Peter as tsar. Azov, as well as popularising the idea of reform, also provided the ostensible *raison d'être* of the Grand (or Turkish) Embassy—the recruitment of foreign professional mercenaries to continue the war against the Ottoman empire.³³ Peter left Moscow at the start of his Grand Embassy on 10 March

²⁶ Gordon, Diary, 28 February 1690—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 5, 6ob. Gordon, Diary, 17 March 1690—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 5, 8: "The Patrarch Joakim dyed at 4 aclock in the afternone." See also: "May our sovereigns never allow any Orthodox Christians in their realm to entertain any close friendly relations with heretics and dissenters—with the Latins, Lutherans, Calvinists and godless Tatars (whom our Lord abominates and the Church of God damns for their God-aborred guile); but let them be avoided as enemies of God and defamers of the church." Extract from the Testament of Joachim, Patriarch of Moscow (1674–90), 17 March 1690, in *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), vol. 2, 362.

²⁷ *Pis'ma i bumagi Petra I*, vol. 1, St Petersburg, 1887, p. 30.

²⁸ Gordon noted: "haveing showne and let them copy of this writeing, they seemed perplexed at my knowing and takeing so ane exact acco.t of the provisions they had; yet not haveing any colour of exception, they objected only their Priests, & Regiments bussinesses & writeings which I excused by teling them, that the sojourns Regiments furnished these things from the Reg.ts money, not finding it fitt to condescend to their desires in ane instant, knowing that when I had admitted that they would stil find more pretences, and be alwayes craveing." Gordon, Diary, 21 April 1695—RGVIA fond 846, opis 15, vol. 5, p. 465–66.

²⁹ Gordon, Diary, 1–6 June 1695—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 5, pp. 476–478ob.

³⁰ Charles Whitworth, writing in the early eighteenth century but making use of contemporary sources provides a clear account of the event Charles Whitworth: "Account of the Seiges of Asof in 1695 & 1696. writ by General Gordon who commanded a considerable part of the army", British Library, Additional Manuscript, 96970, fols. 425–52.

1697, unconcerned at evidence of an assassination plot uncovered on 23 February 1697 in which “Alexey Prokosuf Sutovnin, Ivan Eliseuf Sickler, Fiodor Matseuf Puskin” were implicated. “They all confessed that they had an intention to have murdered his Matie and to that purpose had tried to draw the streltsees to their party and because the Boyar Ivan Michaelovitz Miloslavsky who deceased about 12 yeares ago was the Author of all plots against his present Matie, it was ordained that he should be digged up and brought in his coffin to the place of execution which was accordingly done, and he being drawne on a sledge by two great boates brought to the place & the coffin being made open and he uncovered, the blood of each of their heads as they were cut off sprinkled on the dead carkass which in some places was rotted & consumed.”³⁴

On his departure Peter had divided the command of Russia between three leading Boyars, with Boyar Aleksei Semenovitch Shein in overall command.³⁵ Earlier that year it had been decided that Gordon, Shein and “Kniaz Luka Fiodorovity Dolgorukoy” would lead three armies south, in the hardest campaigning year before the advent of the Great Northern War, to continue the “Tavanish expedition”: “9 Regiments of the Streltsees ordered to go to service 6 to Azov, 2 to Byalgorod and 1 to Kyov.”³⁶ Following the fall of Azov the Turks counter-attacked across the Black Sea (“the pure and immaculate virgin”), striking Azov and the newly built forts of Tavan and Kasakerim on the Dneiper.³⁷ As Gordon marched south to relieve Azov and its newly appointed governor “Kniaz Alexey Petrovits Prosarofsky,”³⁸ Peter was in constant contact with him, writing directly to Gordon from Pskov, Novgorod, Mitau and Konigsberg. Thereafter letters arrived forwarded from Moscow. In his replies Gordon informed Peter of the progress of the army of nine *strel'tsy* regiments, those *strel'tsy* from Tambov and his Butirsky guards regiment: “At my comeing being in sight and near Azov I saluted it and with 3 shott of cannon.”³⁹ As the co-ordinated Turkish naval and army counter-attack on Russian positions on the

³¹ Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, Vol. I: *From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 42–47.

³² Whitworth, “Account,” fol. 437r.

³³ For further discussion on western and Turkish influences on Petrine modernization and reform, see: Andrei M. Edushevskii, “Administrative Reforms in the Russian Empire: Western Models and Russian Implementation,” in *Peter the Great and the West: New Perspectives*, ed. Lindsey Hughes (London: Macmillan, 2000), 36–50.

³⁴ Gordon, Diary, 4 March 1697—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 96–96ob.

³⁵ “His Majesty appointed an army of 12,000 soldiers, of which most of the officers were foreigners, to be quartered in the suburbs of Moscow, to keep the city in awe, commanded by General Gordon, who had entered in the Russian service in the time of his father, and who, by his extraordinary behavior and success, had acquired both the love of the army and the esteem of the whole nation.” Captain John Perry’s *State of Russia under the Present Czar* (London: B. Tooke, 1716), 156.

³⁶ Gordon, Diary, 24 May 1697—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 110. The Belgorod, Sevska and Tambov *razriady* or military districts defended Russia from Tartar incursions into southern Muscovy.

Dnieper increased in effectiveness through September 1697, more *strel'tsy* regiments were rushed south to reinforce the fort of Azov: "to witt Affonasse Czubanuf & Tichon Hundermark."⁴⁰ Their remit was, in the words of Peter, "to march in all haste to such places where the enemy was expected."⁴¹ The Turks raised the siege of Azov on 15 October 1697 and the Russian army was dismissed to winter quarters and Gordon returned to Moscow, careful to ensure that the Moscow garrison received payment in arrears.

THE JUNE 1698 *STREL'TSY* UPRISING

The Tambov and *strel'tsy* regiments were not so fortunate. On 1 April 1698 the Tambov soldiers petitioned Gordon, who: "diswaded to trouble themselves with petitioning or being at expences untill his M.[ajesty] returned."⁴² On 3 April four unpaid *strel'tsy* regiments (Cherny, Chubarov, Kolzakov and Hundermark) followed suit.⁴³ Gordon relates how four hundred of the "Streltsees who were petitioners & those who had runaway out of the Army of Kniaz Michael Greg: Romodanovsky" came "to the house of their Boyar Kniaz Ivan Boris Troyuruf desireing to be heard."⁴⁴ Four representatives from the regiments were given an audience where they were: "remonstrating the great necessities they had suffered and still laboured under, and aggravateing all beyond measure, and that they are reduced almost to despaire." Their plea for the redress of grievances was cut short and "their Boyar" ordered them "immediately to service and to be gone instantly." The four regimental representatives disobeyed, were imprisoned and then promptly set free by their fellow *strel'tsy*: "which caused a great consternation among the great men especially those in the City."⁴⁵

The following day the members of the Boyar Duma ("at the Kremlin in Council") were "very apprehensive of danger," but, as Gordon noted: "as the Russes are by nature apprehensive of danger so in this & the like they have another design, which is by aggrevateing things of this nature to make their service and dilligence in appeasing, oppressing and overcomeing the difficulties appeare more illustrious and meritorious."⁴⁶ Indeed, events bore out this assessment, for on the appearance of: "some hundreds of the Simonofsky Regiment haveing been sent to hasten away the Streltsees to service they not

³⁷ See B.H.Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Hamden Anchon 1965), 22

³⁸ Gordon, Diary, 24 May 1697—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 110. Prince Aleksei Petrovich Prozorovskii was created boyar on 10 July 1690 and died 1705. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, 211.

³⁹ Gordon, Diary, 24 May 1697—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 110. Peter replied promptly: "his M. letters of grace to us for our making hast to Azov." Gordon, Diary, 24 May 1697—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 110ob.

⁴⁰ Gordon, Diary, 20 September 1697—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 146ob.

⁴¹ Gordon, Diary, 9 September 1697—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 138.

⁴² Gordon, Diary, 1 April 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 187ob.

only resisted, but made themselves ready, and having delivered up the ringleaders of the sedition were all gone by midnight.”⁴⁷

Gordon, perhaps conscious of the combustible nature of *strel'tsy* grievances, was quick to adjudicate and settle any lingering dissension amongst his own troops; on 5 April: “after dinner passed the tyme with decideing of controversies among the sojourns.”⁴⁸ He also wrote a letter to Peter “the passage of this last weeke.” This letter may have addressed the nature of *strel'tsy* complaints, particularly the non-payment of wage arrears and the bitterness the *strel'tsy* felt at service in winter. The redeployment of these regiments under the command of “Kniaz Michael Greg: Romodanovsky” to the garrison of Velikie Luki near the Lithuanian frontier, without any leave to visit Moscow, in order that Russia might “project power” and provide support to the previous election of August to the Polish, throne was deeply resented.⁴⁹ This reversed the privilege of *strel'tsy* returning to their families and small businesses in Moscow and other key provincial garrisons in the non-campaigning season. Moreover, the manual labor that characterised *strel'tsy* activity over the previous three years—siege warfare in the Azov campaigns (1695–96), naval port construction at Taganrog (1696–97), and the hardships endured in the “Tavanish” campaign of 1697 and redeployment to Velikie Luki, were collectively considered to demean their status as imperial guardsmen.⁵⁰ Peter’s response to the April 1698 mutiny can be gauged by the letter he wrote to Romodanovskii, their commander, in which he expressed his anger that ringleaders had not been tortured.⁵¹

The expulsion of *strel'tsy* representatives and supporters from Moscow by the Semenovskii guardsmen contributed to the proliferation of their simmering grievances and open dissension. On 8 June 1698 news reached Gordon that “the 4 regiments of the streltsees at Toropets enclineing to mutiny & disobedience” had risen and marched on Moscow.⁵² On 9 June, Gordon had dined at the Austrian Legation where inevitably news of the mutiny would have been discussed by the foreign elite, and that night Korb noted in his *Diary*: “Today, for the first time, a vague rumour of the revolt of the Strelitz struck terror.”⁵³ By 11 June 1698, two Captains having recently left Toropets substantiate the rumor, reporting to Gordon that “about 8000 of them”⁵⁴ had “resolved not to go to their designed places, but to go directly to Moscow.”⁵⁵ Korb reports that:

⁴³ The regiment of Col. Chubanov and Col. Hundermark had served under Gordon at the siege of Azov (see footnote above). All regiments in the Russian army were named after their Colonels until the creation of Peter’s four elite guard’s regiments.

⁴⁴ Gordon, *Diary*, 3 April 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 185ob. Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov was “their Boyar”; he headed the *streletskii prikaz*.

⁴⁵ Gordon, *Diary*, 3 April 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 185ob. In analyzing why they failed Gordon noted “the weakness of that party, and the want of a head.”

⁴⁶ Gordon, *Diary*, 4 April 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 187ob.

⁴⁷ Gordon, *Diary*, 4 April 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 187ob

⁴⁸ Gordon, *Diary*, 5 April 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 187ob

⁴⁹ Gordon, *History*, 3, 121. Bugarov reports that on this occasion the *strel'tsy* secretly established communication with Sophia, who wrote them two letters of support.

“Four Regiments of the Strelitz, which lay upon the frontier of Lithuania, had nefariously plotted to change the Sovereignty. The regiment of Theodosia abandoned Viasma, the Athanasian regiment quitted Picla, the Ivano-Tzernovio-Wlodomirian left Ostheba, and the Ticchonian quitted Dorogobusa, in which places they were in garrison.”⁵⁶

This caused the Russian boyar elite to immediately convene a “Boyar Council” where: “It was resolved to send an army against them of horse & Foot, and that I [Gordon] should advance with the Foot befor, untill the Cavalieri might be convened.”⁵⁷ At this meeting, Korb reports that General Aleksei Semenovich Shein “agreed to accept the power they, the Boyars, would entrust to him, but upon condition that the decree approved unanimously should be also confirmed by all the seals and signatures.”⁵⁸ In effect, Shein had ensured that all boyars who had signed and placed their seals under an unanimous decision to resist the rebellion with force were firmly and publicly wedded to Petrine order. Potentially, the boyars could now be massacred as pro-Petrine supporters; Shein’s ultimatum was therefore designed to pre-empt the creation of a “Fifth column” within the capital and bind the boyars to the tsar.

On the same day Gordon mobilised the bulk of the Moscow garrison, which he commanded. He gathered field artillery pieces, five hundred of his own regiment and “as many of each of the other three standing Regiments in Mosco should be comanded. I accordingly ordered the officers & sojourns who must go.”⁵⁹ The “other three standing Regiments” refer to the three remaining of Peter’s new guards regiments, the Semenovskii, Ismailovskii and Preobrazhenskii—Gordon’s mobilised Butirkii constituted the fourth.⁶⁰ On 12 June Korb notes that the Polish Envoy hosted a dinner for “the Imperial and Danish representatives,

⁵⁰ Viktor I. Buganov, “*Strel'tsy* Uprising of 1698,” in *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, ed. Joseph L. Wiczynski, 60 vols. (Academic International Press, 1984) vol. 7, 210, notes that the *strel'tsy* had to draw their own guns to Velikie Lukie due to a shortage of horses.

⁵¹ *Pisma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo*, 9 vols. (St. Petersburg: Gos. tip., 1887 -), vol. 1, 724–27; Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 376.

⁵² Gordon, Diary, 8 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196.

⁵³ Korb *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 121. See also: Gordon, Diary, 11 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob.: “news of the 4 Regiments of Strelets which had been in the Campe at Veliky-Luky and now at Toropets upon the dismissal of the rest of the army and orders for them to go to diverse Townes were discontent and causing to Mutiny.”

⁵⁴ Alexander Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 122.

⁵⁵ Gordon, Diary, 11 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob.

⁵⁶ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 70.

⁵⁷ Gordon, Diary, 11 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob. Romodanovskii wrote a report of these events to Peter on 11 June 1698, which Peter received in Vienna 15 July: “Pismo Kniazia romodanovskago k Petru I, 11 iunია 1698,” Nikolai Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikogo*, 9 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. II-go otd-niia Sobstv. Ego Imp. Vel., 1853–63), vol. 3, 474–76.

General de Gordon—who had to take leave and quit the table to hasten to march against the rebels—the Commissary of Denmark, Colonels Blumberg and Grage, and several other guests.”⁶¹ The foreign elite was thus well placed to provide accurate and insightful accounts of the *strel'tsy* revolt.

On 12 June Gordon left Moscow and “marched along with a body of three thousand foot, and good artillery, consisting of twenty-seven field pieces, from six to ten pounds.”⁶² Although Gordon had, with “great difficulty, got the Generalissimo persuaded to march out of the capital at the head of four thousand of the neighboring gentry cavalry,” this Russian gentry army appeared to play no active role in the eventual suppression of the revolt.⁶³ Gordon notes that on 15 June: “the Boyar [Shein] with the p[rinci]p[a]ll persons who were here came by me and stayed an howre or two then returned to Mosko.”⁶⁴ Here they remained for the duration. The task of defeating the *strel'tsy* was reserved to Gordon and the new guards regiments—his Butirskii (Gordonov) regiment, the Preobrazhenskii (commanded by Romodanovskii), Semonovskii and Lefortovo (created Ismailovskii in 1730)—as well as the “Gentlemen of his M.[ajesties] Court” and “the household servant’s of his M.[ajesty] and the writers [scribes]” which Gordon mobilised on 15 and 16 June. The mobilization of Peter’s courtiers, servants and members of the nascent Petrine administration created an additional 1,200 troops that could be utilised: “96 Household Servants on horseback & 113 to Foot, and of writers 280 on horseback and 741 to Foot.”⁶⁵

The seriousness with which contemporaries understood the *strel'tsy* threat posed to the continuation of the Peterine order is attested by a number of factors, not least the mobilization of central chancellery officials for military activity which was in itself an exceptional event. The Boyar Duma was convened the day that the news reached them and it exercised its power to quickly agree and

⁵⁸ Korb went on to note: “Although what he required was fair, there was not one among them all that did not refuse to put his hand to this resolution. It was hard to say whether this was through fear or envy: but the danger was too near to admit delay and the dread was lest the seditious cohorts of the *strel'tsy* should penetrate into Moscow.” Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 71–72. Shein was created a Boyar 9 April 1682 and died 12 February 1700.

⁵⁹ Gordon, Diary, 11 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob.

⁶⁰ Korb dramatised Gordon’s call to arms: “The regiments of the guards got notice to hold themselves in readiness to march at an hour’s notice, and that those who decline to act against the sacrilegious violators of the Majesty of the crown would be held guilty of misprision of their crime—that no ties of blood or kindred held binding when the salvation of the sovereign and the state were at stake—nay, that a son might slay his father if he rose to ruin the fatherland. General Gordon strenuously executed this Spartan measure, and exhorted the troops entrusted to him to perform their noble task, telling them how there could be no more glorious deed than to have saved the sovereign and the state.” Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 72.

⁶¹ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 125–26. See also: Gordon, Diary, 12 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 196ob.: “I dined by the Polls Envoy with the other Envoyes and ffrinds.”

⁶² Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 123.

implement a defensive plan.⁶⁶ According to Alexander Gordon: “The generalissimo [Shein], together with the rest of the nobility and gentry were in the greatest terror imaginable the General [Gordon] told them not to be uneasy, for he was not without hopes of getting them [*strel'tsy*] persuaded to return to their duty; and that even in case of the worst, he hoped to give a good account to them.”⁶⁷ Gordon was: “obliged to leave one thousand foot to keep matters right in Moscow, and to guard the palace”⁶⁸ as there was an upsurge in the incidence of looting, arson and murder in the Foreign Quarter.⁶⁹ Korb reports that for precautionary reasons the “Czarewicz” (Aleksei Petrovich) was escorted to the fortress-monastery of the Trinity-St. Sergius for his own protection.⁷⁰

Troop mobilization was so rapid that only partial deployment from Moscow was possible (one regiment without regular cavalry support)—as Korb noted: “It appeared more advisable to march out against them than to await an invasion so fraught with the veriest peril.”⁷¹ Gordon himself implicitly admitted the precarious loyalty of other *strel'tsy* regiments. In a letter to Peter he relates how he attempted to disguise “our slowness” in an effort to dissuade other regiments posted to the Lithuanian border under Romodanovskii’s command from joining the rebellion.⁷² This impression is reinforced by Alexander Gordon, who noted: “The Strelitz who remained in the army seemed much more elevated than the ordinary, shewing but little regard to orders: so that he [Gordon] feared the worst.”⁷³

By 16 June Gordon had marched his troops to the river Svidina. A chance meeting with a servant turned informant on 17 June provided valuable intelligence of the rebels’ intentions. The *strel'tsy* “were marching very hard

⁶³ Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 123. The negligible contribution of the old middle class service cavalry to the eventual suppression of the revolt perhaps serves to underscore its growing obsolescence.

⁶⁴ Gordon, *Diary*, 15 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 197. Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 123 and Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar*, 99–100 both give the impression that 4,000 and 8,000 gentry cavalry respectively were mobilized by Shein in support of Gordon’s troops against the *strel'tsy* uprising. It is clear from Gordon’s own account that Shein and other leading boyars had returned to Moscow by 15 June and the gentry cavalry failed to materialize.

⁶⁵ Gordon, *Diary*, 15 and 16 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 197. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar*, 99–100, mistakenly asserts: “General A.S.Shein, who was in charge of military affairs in Peter’s absence, put together a force of 8,000 men, most of them gentry cavalry.”

⁶⁶ Gordon’s diary specifically refers to Shein, Romodanovskii and Troekurov as core decision-makers and instrumental in organizing Moscow’s response to the threat posed by the uprising. They were wedded to the Petrine order through a combination of ideological conviction and the desire to maintain the status quo. Prince Mikhail Grigor’evich Romodanovskii was created a *Boyar Duma* member on 22 November 1677 and by 1696 he was the sixth wealthiest individual lay landowner in Russia, Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov being the eighth, and Aleksei Semenovich Shein the fourth. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, 114, Table 1: “Ten Wealthiest Individual Lay Landowners in Russia.”

⁶⁷ Alexander Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 125.

intending to gett to the Voskreschinsky [New Jerusalem] Monastery that night, which made me make as great hast as possible to prevent them.”⁷⁴ The fortress-monastery of New Jerusalem lay in the vicinity of Istra, fifty verst west of Moscow and was strategically important—its capture provided a springboard for the anticipated march on Moscow, as the strenuous efforts made by the *strel'tsy* to secure the monastery indicate.

An advance party of *strel'tsy* and Gordon accompanied “with such horsemen as I had gott together” met outside the walls of the New Jerusalem monastery, where he was handed: “a list of their services, with ane aggavation of their grievances and a desire to come to Mosko to visitt their houses, wives & children and to petition for their necessities.” As the main body of *strel'tsy* were still “15 verst off and not likely to reach the Monastery that night,” Gordon “ordered the campe to be drawn out near the Monastery in the most convenient place.” He then sent an urgent request to Moscow for more cavalry, only to be informed by his scouts that the *strel'tsy* had reached the Svidina and were “passing it at a Ford.” In response, Gordon intercepted the *strel'tsy* “within two versts of the monastery.”⁷⁵

Gordon decided to negotiate with the *strel'tsy*, a decision that was partially determined by the lack of options open to him: “Fatigued with a long march, and still without sufficient force, Gordon, setting wisdom in the place of strength, strolled along the banks to talk with the Strelitz.”⁷⁶ Nothing was settled, and as night approached Gordon: “with expostulations & faiewords advised and commanded them to returne over the River and campe on the other syde, to which they would not agree.”⁷⁷ Although the *strel'tsy* would not have their disposition dictated to them and insisted in camping in a meadow on the Moscow side of the river “leaving a strong guard in the Lane,” some agreement was reached as “promises made on both sides, that no moveing should be this night.” Gordon camped two of his regiments in a nearby village, two “in the Fields by the Moskoes way,” one battalion was placed on standby and one directly opposite the *strel'tsy* encampment “occupied an advantageous height.”⁷⁸

⁶⁸ Alexander Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 123. Two regiments of the conscripted elite “selected” infantry (*vybrannye*) were permanently stationed in Moscow and kept at full strength. In the 1660s and 1670s these consisted of 2000 men each (half pikemen, half musketeers), reduced to 1000 per regiment in the 1690s. It appears that at least one of these regiments was left in Moscow to maintain order.

⁶⁹ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 125–26 reports such incidents, dated June 16, 17, 18, 19 and 24.

⁷⁰ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 126.

⁷¹ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 72.

⁷² “Gordon to Peter, 29 June 1698” (old style)—Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov, Moscow (RGADA), f. 9, op. 5, no. 1, 411. To my knowledge this and other letters I cite from RGADA are unpublished. For published correspondence between Peter, Gordon and leading boyars, see: Bogoslavskii, *Pisma i Bumagi*, Vol. 1, p. 33–34, 505, 614, 725, and 777.

⁷³ Gordon, *History*, 3, 123. Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 77: “the perfectly determined wickedness of the Strelitz.”

Alexander Gordon makes it clear that Gordon feared the *strel'tsy* grievances could “reduce and corrupt any of his troops [and therefore] had caused the officers to patrol the whole night long).”⁷⁹

When all appeared quiet and there were no “appearances of stirrs among them,” Gordon, Mikhail Grigorievich Romodanovskii and six *strel'tsy* deputies “consulted what should be done.” By 18 June a concord had been negotiated. It was agreed that Gordon and the *strel'tsy* deputies would: “intimate to them that 1st they should returne and go to the places to the which they had been ordered, 2 that they should deliver the 140 fugitives who had run away from Veliky Luky to Mosco and also the ring leaders of the stirres up of this mutiny & disobedience to his M.[ajesty] Comands and that his M.[ajesty] should in the places in the which they should go cause give them their usuall pay & bread or money according to the price currant there and that this fault of their disobedience should be pardoned them as also the others more guilty should not suffer any great punishment.”⁸⁰

However, when these terms were put to the *strel'tsy* as a whole: “they answered that they were all ready to dy, or go to Mosko, albeit for 2 or 3 dayes, and thence go wither his M.[ajesty] should declare.”⁸¹ Gordon “used all the Rhetorick I was master of to perswade them to submission, and to bring a petition of being guilty of transgressing his M.[ajesty's] commands,” but the *strel'tsy* were equally adamant in their resolve.⁸² Indeed, the volatility of the situation is noted: “two old fellows among them began to aggravate their grievances & necessities,” causing “a great deal of stirr.” In an effort to break this impasse Gordon then suggested that each regiment should individually decide whether or not they would comply with the government's order. Yet “they refused, saying they were of one mind.”⁸³

Persuasion having yet again failed, Gordon intimated that he would withdraw for fifteen minutes and upon no further response, delivered an ultimatum. Gordon ordered the *strel'tsy* to accept the conditions previously agreed with their nominated deputies or he “should be forced to use violence to reduce them.”⁸⁴ The *strel'tsy* then delivered an ultimatum of their own, defiantly stating that: “they recognized no master, and would listen to orders from no-body: that they would not go back to their quarters; that they must be admitted to Moscow; that if they were forbidden [to enter Moscow], they would open up the road with

⁷⁴ Gordon, Diary, 15 and 16 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 197.

⁷⁵ Gordon, Diary, 15 and 16 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 197ob. Korb stresses the immediacy of the situation, for: “Had the rebels reached the monastery but one hour sooner, safe within its strong defences, they might perhaps have worn out the loyal troops with such long and fruitless labour that they might have lost heart, and Victory, hostile to Loyalty, might have set her garland upon the brow of Treason.” Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 73–74.

⁷⁶ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 74.

⁷⁷ Gordon, Diary, 17 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 197ob

⁷⁸ Gordon, Diary, 17 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198. Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 75: “Schachin constenting.”

cold steel.”⁸⁵ At this point, it was “with signes of comiseration” that Gordon deployed his forces in an attempt to suppress this rebellion.⁸⁶

SUPPRESSION AND CONFESSIONS

Gordon placed the “Foot regiments & cannon to a convenient place and environed their Campe on the other hand with the Cavallierie.” A last appeal was made, but this appeal for a “categoricall answer” was rejected.⁸⁷ Indeed: “they rejected all propositions of accommodation and prepared for defence, bragging of being alike with us if wee should begin to use violence.”⁸⁸ The *strel'tsy* began preparations for battle in a systematic and composed manner: “they drew up their array; pointed their artillery, dressed their ranks, and as if the strife in which they were about to mingle was a struggle with a foreign foe, they proceeded it with customary prayers and an invocation to God.”⁸⁹

In a well-controlled engagement that lasted an hour, Gordon defeated the *strel'tsy*. His artillery played a decisive role in reducing their battle formation and morale. At first, however, “Out of pure compassion thinking thereby to intimate them”⁹⁰ the first volley was a blank, but this stratagem “backfired” as “the first volley passing without wound or slaughter, only added courage to guilt. Vastly emboldened, they responded by a discharge, by which some where laid lifeless, and severall were bloodily wounded.”⁹¹ The *strel'tsy* then moved onto the offensive and “sallyed out with 5 or 6 colours into a Lane.” Gordon responded by ordering “Gen. Le Fort his Reg.t and 4 Companies of the Butirsky to secure the post.”⁹² Thereafter Gordon ordered the use of live rounds which “vomited such a perfect hurricane upon them, that many fell, numbers fled away, and none daring enough to return to fire them [*strel'tsy* artillery pieces].”⁹³ Surrender followed the fourth salvo of “deadly bolts” and all prisoners captured: “The horse, being of no use in the engagement, took a great many prisoners; so that the rebels, being all on foot, not a single person escaped.”⁹⁴ News of victory was immediately sent to Moscow.

That the *strel'tsy* refused to compromise suggests that historians ought to examine “the crimes upon which they were bent.”⁹⁵ On 18 June 1698 twenty-two

⁷⁹ Gordon, *History*, 3, 126.

⁸⁰ Gordon, *Diary*, 19 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198. See also: Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 40–41.

⁸¹ Gordon, *Diary*, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198ob.

⁸² Gordon, *Diary*, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198ob. “After blaming somewhat the disobedience of the regiments, he discoursed largely of the Czars clemency, telling them, that it was not by sedition and mobbing together, that the desires of the soldiers should be made known to the Czar.” Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 75.

⁸³ Gordon, *Diary*, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198ob.

⁸⁴ Gordon, *Diary*, 19 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198. Korb relates that Gordon was stung by the “unexpected fierceness” of “men that were predetermined to try the strength of their arms.” Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 77.

rebels were killed outright by Gordon's cannon and forty or so lay dying on the battlefield, bringing the total death toll amongst the *strel'tsy* to around seventy.⁹⁶ All survivors were available for torture designed to extract confessions and assign guilt. The first session began with questioning on June 19; torture was then introduced on 21 June and it was brought to a halt on 4 July. Gordon administered it under orders from Moscow, in a systematic and thorough manner. But before it began, unsolicited accusations from amongst the *strel'tsy* prisoners produced the names "of some of their ringleaders." This prompted Gordon to muster one of the defeated *strel'tsy* regiments "and asking the opinion and votes of the p[rinci]p[a]ll persons and others as to their behaviours, they freely declared some to have been ringleaders and troublesome mutineers." The accused and the accusers were separated "the good on the one hand, and the bad on the other," and this process repeated with each of the other three *strel'tsy* regiments.⁹⁷

On 21 June torture of the ringleaders encouraged them to confess "their malicious designs had they gott to Moskow." Gordon reports that twenty-four *strel'tsy* confessed and were found "guilty of hainous Crimes as of ane intention when they were off to Mosko, of massacring some of the p[rinci]p[a]ll Boyars, forcing an augmentation of their salary or pay, and a regulation of their service."⁹⁸

Gordon sent daily despatches of "all that passed" to Moscow⁹⁹ and on 24 June he also wrote "in short all the Circumstances of this expedition" to Peter, sending this letter via a "Mr Vinius" in Moscow.¹⁰⁰ In his diary he noted: "This and the

⁸⁵ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 77. Alexander Gordon states: "they told him [Gordon], they neither had nor would alter their resolution, but were determined (seeing they were so near) to visit their wives. If that were all he told them, their wives should be sent to them. They told him that there was no use for that, since besides seeing their wives, they had all of them affairs of their own to look after which they would put an end to before they could think of returning." Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 126. This account is reinforced by that of Korb: "But Gordon's speech did not move the now hardened stubbornness of the false traitors; and they only saucily answered that they would not go back to their appointed quarters until they had been allowed to kiss their darling wives at Moscow and had received their arrears of pay." Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 76.

⁸⁶ Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198ob.

⁸⁷ Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 198ob.

⁸⁸ Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 199.

⁸⁹ Gordon, *History*, vol. 2, 77.

⁹⁰ Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 127.

⁹¹ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 78.

⁹² Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 199. It is most likely that each company had its own colours and so five or six companies of *strel'tsy* attacked LeFort's regiment and four companies of Gordon's regiment, the Butirskii.

⁹³ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 78.

⁹⁴ Gordon, *History*, 3, 128.

⁹⁵ Korb, *journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 76.

⁹⁶ Gordon, Diary, 18 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 199.

following dayes except Sunday wee were everyday busied from morning to evening examineing business and many were tortured some whereof confessed.”¹⁰¹ On 27 June Gordon was instructed in a letter from Moscow “to send the less guilty strel'tsees to diverse Monasteryes to be kept in prisons there.”¹⁰² The “greater guilty” were to be executed “by hanging” rather than beheaded. On 28 June Gordon wrote to Moscow “for orders” concerning those between the “greater” and “lesser” guilty, whom Gordon characterises as “the Rest who were guilty of twice deserting and clamouring and being troublesome.”¹⁰³

Evidently he received orders to continue the judicious combination of physical torture and psychological pressure. In dealing with one *strel'tsy* regiment, Gordon commented: “many examined & brought to the torture in Col. Hundermark's Regiment, but none of them would confess, to be more guilty as another, but were all alike. So we ordained them to cast lotts, that every tenth man should dy, which they did. above 100 persons knuted in the afternoon.”¹⁰⁴ Such pressure brought dividends and Gordon was able to identify the “ringleaders of the mutiny” with Hundermark's regiment and along with “those who had twice deserted & some others” were readied for execution the following day. A further four were sentenced to be beheaded and only the “sick and wounded were left in the Monastery, so that but 25 persons remained there.”¹⁰⁵ On 1 July: “In the morning the 4 sentenced on Saturday Last were brought out into the fields where the other were and beheaded. They all except some few, dyed very insensibly without speaking any thing, but crossing themselves, and some takeing leave of the spectators.”¹⁰⁶ Gordon then calculated the total number of *strel'tsy* killed, wounded and imprisoned: “130 were executed, 70 were killed & dyed of their wounds, 1845 persons sent to prison in diverse Monasteryes & 25 remained in the [New Jerusalem] Monastery.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, by 1 July 200 of the *strel'tsy* had died and 1870 were imprisoned. Taking into account

⁹⁷ Gordon, Diary, 19 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 199ob.

⁹⁸ Gordon, Diary, 22 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 200. Kerb's account reinforces that of Gordon, adding that one rebel had admitted that the *strel'tsy*. “had the intention to set fire, sack and ruin the whole German Suburb, and when the Germans, without exception, had been got rid of by massacre, to enter Moscow by force, to murder all there that would offer resistance...the necessity of defending the faith...Princess Sophia Alexiowa was to be raised to the throne until Czarewicz should have attained his majority and the strength of manhood.” Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 82–83; Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 151–52.

⁹⁹ These “messages” must have constituted the basis for Kerb's account of the first phase of the inquisition. See: Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 81–82.

¹⁰⁰ Gordon, Diary, 24 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 200. Andrei Andreevich Vinus had entered the Boyar Duma with the rank of *dumnyi d'iak* 24 March 1695. Crummey, using formal criteria and informal consensus, notes that Vinus, LeFort and Gordon were three foreigners amongst the forty-nine that constituted the Petrine boyar elite of the 1690s. See: Crummey, “Peter and the Boiar Aristocracy, 1689–1700,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 8 (1974), 279, fn. 13. Gordon directly refers to one fifth of this inner circle in the course of the uprising.

the 72 executed on 2 July, the final figures are 272 *strel'tsy* killed or executed, with 1870 imprisoned. As Gordon noted that hardly a single mutineer escaped, this indicates 2,342 were involved in the revolt. In other words, just over half the compliment from the four *strel'tsy* regiments revolted.¹⁰⁸

On 2 July Gordon reports a further: "72 persons hanged to fyre and to three on gibberts" and that: "a Okolnitse Kiaz Fiodor Ivanovitz Shachofsy came to the campe, and in a set speech, asked our healths and praised our service, with other usuall Compliments."¹⁰⁹ By 4 July those loyal troops under Gordon's command were paid and the "expedition" against the *strel'tsy* uprising was "disbanded." Alexander Gordon attributes the comparatively restricted use of execution to Gordon's advice to Shein that the *strel'tsy* "might be reserved till his Majesty's return, that the ground of this rebellion might be better divided into."¹¹⁰ Indeed, according to Korb, the execution of *strel'tsy* prisoners in late June early July "was contrary to General Gordon's and Prince Masatski's advice that the General proceed to execute the rebels; as in the manner the chiefs of the revolt may, without sufficient examination, have been removed by premature death, from further inquest."¹¹¹

In a brief and guarded letter "writt to Lefort" on 30 June, Gordon mentioned the use of "sharp inquisitions," using the metaphor of a "fire" being "quenshed" for the suppression of the *strel'tsy* uprising: "I would rather speak or tell of my contribution later. God be praised that a great fire was in the beginning quenshed and quietened. I wish with all my heart that M.[ajesty] en. ve [envoy i.e. a reference to Peter in the Russian ambassadorial suite?], with the whole Suite may be here soon."¹¹² This letter, along with those Gordon had written on June 16 and 24, clearly suggests that it was from Gordon that Peter was first to hear news of the uprising in Moscow.¹¹³ It is likely that Gordon would have informed Peter that both sides in this engagement appeared evenly matched as both commanded regimental artillery, and both possessed cavalry elements. The *strel'tsy* had an officer cadre and command structure, even if it was self-elected; they had expelled all "the loyal officers that happened to be among them, distributing military ranks amongst themselves,—the readiest for the crime being fittest for command."¹¹⁴ It is clear that the *strel'tsy*'s morale was high, they were defiant and resolute, armed and dangerous. Indeed, Alexander Gordon argues that had Patrick Gordon been murdered or held hostage whilst negotiating with the *strel'tsy*—"which they might have done without any difficulty"—then "they

¹⁰¹ Gordon, Diary, 25 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 200.

¹⁰² Gordon, Diary, 27 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 200ob.

¹⁰³ Gordon, Diary, 28 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 200ob.

¹⁰⁴ Gordon, Diary, 30 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 200ob..

¹⁰⁵ Gordon, Diary, 1 July 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 201.

¹⁰⁶ Gordon, Diary, 1 July 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 201ob..

¹⁰⁷ Gordon, Diary, 1 July 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 201.

¹⁰⁸ Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar*, 98, states correctly that the *strel'tsy* mutineers were "some 2,200 strong."

would have carried their point, for there was none other who had the resolution to oppose them.”¹¹⁵

Their ideology was powerful and contagious. It appeared that the *strel'tsy* petitioners evoked a persuasive sense of the traditional hierarchical Muscovite military and political order—the Russian Orthodox Church embodied spiritual power within the State under the true Russian Tsar, and the loyal *strel'tsy* defended Church and Tsar against the infidel in the South and corrupted Christianity in the West. In analysing the language and rhetoric of *strel'tsy* petitions—particularly their invocations to God, readiness to use violence and force and preparedness die (martyrdom?)—they appear to employ the discourse of dissent that was strikingly similar to that of Old Believer communities and monasteries, *Strel'sty* troops from Olonets and Novgorod, for example, had been used by the state to suppress monasteries and Old Believer communities that refused to embrace Nikonian reform following the schism of 1666. They had also suppressed ‘unruly frontier men who refused to live within the social and administrative order of Muscovy’ throughout the second half of the seventeenth century.¹¹⁶

On receipt of the news Peter hurriedly left Vienna for Moscow, slowing his journey at Krakow on receipt of news that the uprising had been crushed, and reached the capital on 25 August 1698.¹¹⁷ The speed of Peter's return took contemporaries by surprise, including Gordon who was visiting his estate thirty miles from Moscow at “Krasna Slobod.”¹¹⁸ Gordon was the prime mover in suppressing the *strel'tsy* revolt and had personally overseen the first phase of inquisition at the New Jerusalem monastery. He possessed the fullest account of the *strel'tsy* uprising, and returned to Moscow on 8 September, when: “his M. [ajesty] sent for me & received me very graciously, he being in Colonell von Kraune his house here I stayed about 3 hours & came home at eleven a'clock.”¹¹⁹ Had Gordon been in Moscow he may have been able to supply Peter with an

¹⁰⁹ Gordon, *Diary*, 2 July 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 201. However, in contradiction, Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 3, 118 and Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 404, report that between 18 June and 4 July 799 men were executed and 193 sentenced to lesser penalties. Prince Fedor Ivanovich Shakhovskoi was appointed *okol'nichii* 25 September 1682.

¹¹⁰ Gordon, *History*, 3, 128.

¹¹¹ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 84.

¹¹² “General Patrick Gordon to Francis Lefort, Vosresenie, 30 June 1698”—RGADA f. 11, op. 2, no. 18, 1–10b. Gordon, *Diary*, 30 June 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 200ob.

¹¹³ Viniius, for example, wrote letters to Lefort on July 8 (RGADA f. 11, op. 2, no. 1) and 16 (RGADA f. 11, op. 2, no. 2) and August 5 (RGADA f. 11, op. 2, no. 4) and 12 (RGADA f. 11, op. 2, no. 4), whilst Admiral Lima wrote to Lefort on 6 July (RGADA f. 11, op. 2, no. 53).

¹¹⁴ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 77. Alexander Gordon, *History*, 3, 127: “They turned off all their officers, and created new ones from among themselves.” Anderson, *Peter the Great*, 45, erroneously dismisses the *strel'tsy* as “disorganized and leaderless.”

¹¹⁵ Gordon, *History*, 3, 127.

immediate and full account of the uprising that Peter demanded, his: "first anxiety, after his arrival, was about the rebellion. In what it constituted? What the insurgents meant? Who had dared instigate such a crime? And as nobody could answer accurately upon all these points, and some pleaded their ignorance, others the obstinacy of the Strelitz, he began to have suspicions of everybody's loyalty, and began to cogitate about a fresh inquisition."¹²⁰

It is not difficult to understand why Peter personally took command of investigating the remaining *strel'tsy* mutineers. Once the *strel'tsy* had entered Moscow, their traditional power base, it appears almost certain that they would have attempted to reassert the primacy of their political and military role within Muscovy. In effect, any restoration of their "regulation of service" could not have been effected unless Peter was eliminated from power. If we take the restricted objectives of regulation of service at face value—an insistence upon their traditional custom of payment in money rather than in kind, campaigning one year in two and residing in winter quarters in Moscow with their families and small businesses—what was the likelihood that Peter would have condoned the this restitution his return to Moscow? It may rather have been imagined that upon Peter's return to Moscow, the corrosive effects of even the limited Petrine *perestroika* of the 1690s would multiply and eventually overwhelm what in Peter's eyes increasingly came to represent reactionary and conservative traditionalists.

Moreover, even if we give some credence to the ostensible rationale of revolt, once the *strel'tsy* were within the city walls, any attempt to enact these limited concessions would have entailed the murder of opposition—the powerful Naryshkin clan, other pro-Petrine boyars and foreigners. Under such conditions, Sophia and her Miloslavskii clan, who had been marginalised following the loss of the regency in 1689, would have become the symbolic, if not actual, centre of this power struggle. The *strel'tsy* were in effect instigating a *coup d'état* beneath

¹¹⁶ Georg Michels, "The Violent Old Belief: an Examination of Religious Dissent on the Karelian Frontier," *Russian History*, 19 (1992), 229 (203–29). See also: Georg Michels, "The Solovki Uprising: Religion and Revolt in Northern Russia," *The Russian Review*, 51: 1 (1992), 1–15. The extent to which Old Belief and banditry spread from the dissenting monasteries and unstable frontier into the *strel'tsy* corps is a subject of further study.

¹¹⁷ Weekly reports of *The London Gazette* plotted the route of Peter's European tour, see: *The London Gazette*, issue nos.: 3046; 3407; 3412; 3417 and, 3418 ("parted this place [Vienna] the 30th [July] on his return to Muscovy").

¹¹⁸ Gordon received news of Peter's arrival on 2 September from a letter written by Lt. Col. Leviston: "with notice that his M.[ajesty] was arrived the same day in Mosko and had been in my house asking of me, whereof I caused hast with my preparations to be gone the next day." Gordon, Diary, 2 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 207ob; Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 154.

¹¹⁹ Gordon, Diary, 8 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 208ob.; Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 171: "He bowed to earth twice, and was begging pardon for being so late to pay his Court, imputing the delay to the broken weather and storms. His Majesty the Czar raised him up, and when he would have embraced his knees, stretched him his hand instead."

the cloak of conservatism and restoration. Forcible “regulation of service,” with Peter abroad, would have necessitated a struggle for succession, and, in the absence of the law of primogeniture, *strel'tsy* action could be legitimised by the restoration of Sophia as regent. As Alexander Gordon commented, the *strel'tsy* “giving out everywhere that the Czar was dead and abroad and for that reason, it behoved them to march to the capital, to choose a Regent to manage matters during the young Czar Alexis Petrowich’s minority.”¹²¹ Indeed, Alexander Gordon indicated that even Patrick Gordon himself believed that “the Strelitz must have encouragement from higher hands or they durst never have undertaken so bold an enterprize with so small number.”¹²²

On 15 September Peter ordered Gordon’s Butirskii regiment to bring the captured prisoners to Moscow from the various monastery prisons in which they had been taken.¹²³ By 17 September, the name-day of Peter’s half-sister Sophia, the second phase of the inquisition began in earnest: “many streltsees brought & pined his M.[ajesty] intending a more severe inquisition as wee had done.”¹²⁴ On 19 September another “strict inquisition made among the streltsees” was initiated under Peter’s supervision,¹²⁵ and on 20 September: “many were examined & pined, and some to be given notice to prepare themselves for death.”¹²⁶ By 22 September Gordon reveals the relentless pace of the investigation and Peter’s central role: “many streltsees brought to examination & the pine, his M.[ajesty] came to me in the evening and told me many things concerning the examinations of the streltsees, stayed about halfe ane houre drunk one glass of sack and being called for departed.”¹²⁷ Peter was particularly interested in establishing a direct and unambiguous link between Sophia and the instigation of the *strel'tsy* revolt. Gordon indirectly confirms this, for on 23 September: “In the afternoon was to Preobrasinsko in vaine, all being busy above [i.e. in the Kremlin] about takeing out some of the attendants on the Princess Sophia & putting the Queen in the [Novodevichy] Monastery.”¹²⁸ The next day Gordon was: “In Preobrasinsko see the maid Anna Alex. pined.”¹²⁹ The routine of interrogation and execution continued—on 30 September Gordon notes “In Preobrasinsko many streltsees executed.”¹³⁰ “[S]trict examinating” again took place on 7 October.¹³¹ On 12 October, “110 persons executed by diverse hands.”¹³² On 19 October: “many

¹²⁰ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 86. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I.*, vol. 3, 5–126 provides a detailed account of Peter’s role in the inquisition.

¹²¹ Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 122. See also: Nina B. Golikova, *Politicheskie protessy pri Petre I* (Moscow: MGU, 1957), 131–32, 160–01, 101–02, as cited by Lindsey Hughes, “Attitudes towards Foreigners in Early Modern Russia,” *Russia and the Wider World in Historical Perspective*, 10–11 (footnotes 52, 54, 65, 58 and 60.)

¹²² Gordon, *History*, vol. 3, 125.

¹²³ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 176.

¹²⁴ Gordon, *Diary*, 17 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 209ob.

¹²⁵ Gordon, *Diary*, 19 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 209ob.; Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 176: “September 29.—The Czar himself examined a certain pope, an accomplice in the revolt, who, though menaced with the rack, has so far confessed nothing.”

executed. The great Ambassade at Audience by his M.Majesty, my Regiment [Butirskii] releaved by the guards in the town.”¹³³

CONCLUSIONS: “PARADISE LOST” AND THE PARADOXES OF LATE MUSCOVITE MODERNIZATION

In June 1698 four *strel'tsy* regiments garrisoned on the Polish border rose and marched on Moscow, demanding a “regulation of service.” Paradoxically, though, the *strel'tsy* perception that Peter had consciously attempted to relegate this distrusted elite to secondary roles in an attempt to curtail their power and pivotal position within the state, provided the very spur to *strel'tsy* opposition to the Petrine order. This opposition exploded into outright rebellion in June 1698. Following the failure of the revolt disbanded the conservative *strel'tsy*, integrating them into the regular reformed Russian army during the Great Northern War (1700–21) and began the enactment of reform legislation. The intercession of Patriarch Adrian on behalf of the *strel'tsy* strengthened Peter’s resolve to reform the Russian Orthodox Church, beginning with the abolition of the Patriarchy in 1700. The boyar elite within a Moscow-based Boyar Duma found themselves in a few short years within an imperial Senate in Russia’s new capital of St. Petersburg.

Simon Dixon has argued that Peter’s ‘commitment to innovation automatically branded those who resisted change as subversives’ and in 1698 that the *strel'tsy* ‘were motivated not so much by ideology as by resentment of their conditions of service. But their lasting commitment to the Old Belief helped to identify the schism with resistance and subversion in the tsar’s mind.’¹³⁴ However, there was only one possible condition under which the *strel'tsy* demands could have been met—the removal of Peter I from power. Regime change could not have been instituted successfully without ideological support and legitimacy. According to the prevailing discourse, if Peter were the Anti-Christ, supported by the Sinful West, hellish mercenaries and heretical foreigners, then by implication opposition to the Petrine order was with Christ in Holy Russia, protected by a heaven-sent *strel'tsy* and nourished by the loyalty of a true boyar elite.¹³⁵ In

¹²⁶ Gordon, Diary, 20 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 209ob.

¹²⁷ Gordon, Diary, 22 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 209ob.

¹²⁸ Gordon, Diary, 23 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 210.

¹²⁹ Gordon, Diary, 24 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 210. See, Alexander Gordon, *History*, 3, 129–30 for an account of a *strelets's* confession of correspondence “betwixt Princess Sophia and his master, by means of an old woman, who lived by the charity of the cloisters.”

¹³⁰ Gordon, Diary, 30 September 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 210ob.; Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 182–83.

¹³¹ Gordon, Diary, 7 October 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 21 1ob.; Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 1, 187.

¹³² Gordon, Diary, 20 October 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 212ob.

effect, for this revolt to succeed, it would have had to fuse together the most conservative elements of the traditional Muscovite elite into a new triangle of power. Conservative Boyar clans, Russian orthodox factions that opposed Petrine attitudes and the *strel'tsy* would create a new power elite, each part dependent on the other. The uprising reveals the way in which the traditional Muscovite political elite understood the reality of systemic transformation.¹³⁶

It was experienced through the reinvention of past practices and behavior and opposition to efforts to break from the increasingly sclerotic and self-enclosed “thought world” of Muscovite traditionalism. Previous uncoordinated and ineffective opposition to nascent Petrine modernization would have consolidated into a new conservative regime. The *strel'tsy* would have been the instrument of conservative restoration, a clan leader within the boyar elite (most probably Sophia) would have had to agree to be regent to Aleksei Petrovich, and Patriarch Adrian could legitimise the new order with the blessing of Russian Orthodoxy. 1698 highlights a paradox at the heart of the ‘orthodox’ concept of Muscovite modernization. In an effort to preserve Muscovite conservatism—embodied not only by the regulation of *strel'tsy* service, but more characteristically by service to the tsar—this newly created troika would have had to negate traditional notions of kingship and the rightful role of a tsar within the state. The very act of preservation would have undermined Muscovite traditionalism.

The uprising, occurring as it did on the cusp of a new century, provoked contemporary debate on the nature of Petrine-led Muscovite modernization that has raged since the end of the seventeenth century.¹³⁷ That the revolt took place was in itself an indication of the fragility of Muscovite traditionalism as a self-sustaining ideology, one able to self-reproduce and maintain itself. The failure of the revolt was instrumental in shaping the central feature of the emergent Petrine template of modernization: its reactive and repressive nature, created in opposition to Muscovite traditionalism. As Alexander Kamenskii has argued, “*only in a state in crisis did reforms become possible at all,*” and the *strel'tsy* revolt clearly signified a crisis within the military component of the Muscovite system of power.¹³⁸ It was this crisis of Muscovite military traditionalism that proved to be the unwilling mid-wife that finally induced the birth of Petrine modernization and allowed it to take shape according to the strains of warfare and Peter’s personality.

¹³³ Gordon, Diary, 7 October 1698—RGVIA f. 846, op. 15, vol. 6, 211ob.

¹³⁴ Simon Dixon, *The Modernisation of Russia 1676–1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 1, “Modernization theory and Russian history,” 1–13. Equally, it could be argued that the *strel'tsy*’s commitment to “restoration” rather than reform automatically branded those that challenged the status quo as revolutionary.

¹³⁵ For further discussion, see: Ju.M.Lotman and B.A.Uspenskij, “The Role of Dual Modes in the Dynamics of Russian Culture (Up to the End of the Eighteenth Century),” in *Semiotics of Russian Culture*, ed. A.Shuckman, (Ann Arbor, MI, 1984), 3–35

¹³⁶ Alexander Kamenskii, “The Systemic Crisis in Seventeenth Century Russia and the Petrine Reforms,” *Russia in the Reign of Peter the Great: Old and New Perspectives*, ed. A.Cross (Cambridge: Study Group on Eighteenth Century Russia Newsletter, 1998), 1–11.

The juxtaposition of the *strel'tsy* revolt between the Grand Embassy and the Great Northern War also amplified its impact on the creation of a Petrine "thought world" to rival that of the *strel'tsy*, old boyar elite and Russian orthodoxy. The timing of the revolt played a critical role in shaping the identity and rationale of the emergent Petrine order. It served as a prism through which Peter more clearly identified the necessity of adopting western reforms and technological innovation and the motivation for the manner of their implementation. The clash of "Third Rome ideology" with unfounded fears of outright westernization of the state produced a synthesis of the two. This synthesis could be termed "Third Way" modernization—the adoption of western technology and norms and their adaptation to a Russian context. Korb writes that Peter's brutal investigation of the *strel'tsy* between September 1698 and February 1699 was designed "to strike terror into the rest by an example of public vengeance."¹³⁹ The method in which the uprising was suppressed provides a first glimpse of what was to constitute the hallmarks a developing Petrine modernization paradigm. It was to be imposed from above, applied with force, implemented at speed and suffered largely in silence. A key paradox at the heart of Petrine modernization emerges—Peter adopted the imprimatur of Muscovite traditionalism—the widespread use of terror and coercion—in order to more effectively reform and transform a relatively peripheral Muscovite principality to a Great European Power.

Although the systemic shock of 1698 provided a catalyst that fatally undermined the persuasive power of the pre-existing Muscovite modernization paradigm, historians analysing the *longue duree* are able to more clearly determine change and continuity in Russian historical development. It is debatable whether Petrine, Romanov, Soviet and post-Soviet Russian modernization paradigms are in turn themselves ultimately assimilated and subsumed into traditional Muscovite "folkways."¹⁴⁰ Are there patterns of behavior and values, 'path dependencies' and durable dynamics shaped by an unrelenting geography, history and the pursuit of political power, which provide a thread of continuity linking the seventeenth to the 21st centuries?

Whilst such questions have yet to generate answers that unite the majority of scholars in the field and much about the impact of the Petrine period on future Russian historical development is contested, historians have raised Marc Raeff's

¹³⁷ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); L. R. Lewitter, "Peter the Great and the Modern World," in *Russia and Europe*, ed. P. Dukes (London, Collins & Brown, 1991), 92–107; C. Offe, *Modernity and the State; East, West: Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought* (Oxford: MIT Press, 1996); Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service, eds., *Reinterpreting Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Cathryn Brennan and Murray Frame, eds., *Russia and the Wider World in Historical Perspective* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

¹³⁸ Kamenskii, *Russia in the Reign of Peter the Great*, 9. See also: M. Raeff, "Transfiguration and Modernization: The Paradoxes of Social Disciplining, Pedagogical Leadership and Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Russia," in *Alteuropa—Ancien Regime—Fruhe Neuzeit. Probleme und Methoden der Forschung*, ed. Hans Erich Bodeker (Stuttgart and Bad Connstatt, 1991), 101.

contention to the nearest equivalent of an axiom in Petrine scholarship: “The historiography of Peter the Great provides an almost perfect mirror for the Russian intelligentsia’s views on the past and future of Russia, their relationship to the West, and the nature of the social and political problems confronting their country.”¹⁴¹ If this is so, then it might be postulated that the *strel'tsy* revolt of 1698 fulfilled a similar function for Peter himself. It shaped Peter’s view of the Muscovite past as stagnant, the present as dangerously unstable and reactionary and provided him the spur to push the state and polity forward—radical reformation, a break with the present to enable a decisive move into the future.

¹³⁹ Korb, *Journey into Muscovy*, vol. 2, 84. Voltaire’s “pour encourager les autres” is most likely taken from this source.

¹⁴⁰ Edward L. Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” *Russian Review*, 45:2, (1986), 115–81—for alternative views, see: *Russian Review*, 45:2, (1987). See also: Richard Hellie, “The Structure of Modern Russian History: Towards a Dynamic Model,”

¹⁴¹ Marc Raeff, “Suggestions for Additional Reading,” *Peter the Great Changes Russia* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1972), 195.

Russian History, 4:1, (1977), 1–22; Sergei Medvedev, “A General Theory of Russian Space: a Gay Science and a Rigorous Science,” *Alternatives* 22 (1997), 523–53.

CHURCH REFORM AND THE “WHITE CLERGY” IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIA

Debra Coulter

As the essentially medieval Muscovite state made its first tentative moves towards modernity during the seventeenth century, it was perhaps inevitable that this process had a knock-on effect on the church. Since the acceptance of Christianity by Prince Vladimir of Kiev in 988, the Orthodox church had held a religious monopoly over ethnic Russian subjects of the tsar. Heresy was a state crime; offenders were liable to be executed.¹ The crown gave the church extensive judicial privileges too, and in return the government expected wholehearted support from the clergy. However, the traditional relationship between church and state gradually began to change as Muscovy embarked on the metamorphosis by which it eventually developed into Imperial Russia. This change, detectable from early in the seventeenth century, accelerated after Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich succeeded to the throne in 1645. Modernization is a term which does not easily fit the Russian Orthodox church, an institution notable throughout Christendom for its steadfast adherence to and reverence for tradition. If, however, the idea of modernization is applied in its loosest conception, described by Simon Dixon as “a programme of reform required to bring an allegedly outmoded institution up-to-date and fit to face the future,”² then the Muscovite church could indeed be said to have undergone a process of modernization during the seventeenth century. Partly in response to changes from without, and partly in response to complaints from within, the Orthodox church itself initiated reforms within its own ranks in order to eradicate malpractice and improve inefficiency in clerical literacy, ordination, remuneration, episcopal supervision and in rules regarding widowed clergy. Some of these reforms were sweeping, others were subtle, but most were undertaken by the monastic elite in response to lobbying by ordinary secular clergymen. This article is not about episcopal reform *per se*, a subject covered elsewhere,³ but rather considers more specifically how reforms undertaken by both church and state affected the secular clergy. The Russian Orthodox clerical estate consisted of two parallel orders: the secular married clergy, known as the “white” clergy below *dukhovenstvo*), and the so-called “black” monastic clergy (*chernoe dukhovenstvo*). It is the “white” clergy, who were ordained as priests, deacons and minor clerics

¹ *PSZ*, vol. 2, no. 1163, 647–50 (1685).

² S.M.Dixon, *The Modernisation of Russia 1676–1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.

serving in parish churches, cathedrals, convents, hospitals and regiments, who are our focus here.⁴

LITERACY AND ORDINATION

Seventeenth-century Muscovy was, in Gary Marker's words, "a profoundly illiterate society," in which less than five percent of adult males could read or write.⁵ The clergy were prominent in this tiny literate sector of society yet were poorly-educated by Western criteria, prompting foreigners to contemptuously describe Russian priests as "void of all manner of learning."⁶ Indeed, the vast majority of clergymen received only a rudimentary education, as their fathers had, learning from a primer (*bukvar*) which contained an ABC and a prayerbook, following on to the Book of Hours, Psalms and Book of the Apostles, in the home of a clergyman or occasionally in a monastery. Most priests taught their sons to read so that they could assist in parish work and eventually inherit the benefice, but there was a considerable number of clergymen whose own literacy was sub-standard.⁷

Muscovite church leaders had long recognized that there were inadequacies in the training of the parish clergy, and were made increasingly aware of the disparity in educational levels between their own Orthodox clergy and their Catholic rivals on Russia's western borders, especially after the incorporation of Ukraine at the treaty of Pereiaslavl' in 1654 and the subsequent influx into Moscow of learned Ukrainian clerics. Consequently, from the middle of the seventeenth century the church authorities embarked on tentative reforms in clerical training, a process which received additional impetus with the spread of schism within Russia from the 1660s. The hierarchy's objective was not to provide higher education nor to expand the available curriculum, but merely to improve basic literacy levels among the clergy by ensuring that all priests and deacons could read, write, copy religious books and chant the church liturgy

³ Episcopal reform, rather than specifically the "white" clergy, are the subject of research by Cathy J. Potter, "The Russian Church and the Politics of Reform in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century" (Ph.D. diss.: Yale University, 1993); Ivan M. Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii v XVI-XIX vv., ikh otkrytie, sostav, i predely*, 2 vols. (Kazan': Tip-litografiia Imp. Universiteta, 1897-1913); and V. Veriuzhskii, *Afanasii, Arkhiepiskop Kholmogorskii i Vazhskii*, (St. Petersburg; Tip. I.V. Leont'eva, 1908).

⁴ This chapter is adapted and revised from my PhD dissertation: Debra Coulter, "The Russian Orthodox White Clergy in the Seventeenth Century" (Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1999).

⁵ Gary Marker, "Literacy and Literacy Texts in Muscovy: a Reconsideration," *Slavic Review* 49, 74-88; Pokrovskii, *Russkie Eparkhii*, vol. 1, 264; *Vologodskie eparkhial'nyia vedomosti*, no. 6 (March, 1890), 97.

⁶ Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Commonwealth*, intro. Richard Pipes, index by John V.A. Fine (1591) (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966), 84-85; Adam Olearius, *The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia*, trans. Samuel H. Baron (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 237; John Perry, *The State of Russia Under the Present Czar* (1716) (New York, 1968), 209.

correctly. In Suzdal, for instance, illiterate clergymen were dismissed by their bishop and consequently lost clerical status, and in Moscow the patriarchal printing office began producing more primers for new students.⁸ In the central eparchies, bishops concentrated on raising standards among clergy sons and clerics in minor orders (*d'iachki*), from whom the next generation of priests would be drawn. *D'iachki* in Moscow diocese had to undergo a literacy test at the Metropolitan's office or at a monastery, and obtain the signature of the examiner to testify that they had passed.⁹ Whilst serving in office, they were subject to spot-checks. In Liven and its surrounding district, for example, the archpriest was ordered by the prelate to take statements from parishioners in all parish churches "to ensure that church *d'iachki* were suitable for church rank."¹⁰ The Moscow church council of 1667 commanded all clergymen to ensure that their sons could read and write, so they would be fit to succeed their fathers.¹¹

While standards undoubtedly improved in eparchies where testing was rigorous, on the whole clerical learning remained at a low level throughout the century because the hierarchy failed to invest in or insist on adequate schooling for the parish clergy. Only a minority of priests and deacons had access to higher education, and although there is evidence that fluency in Latin was not unknown among those who served in the capital, foreign languages were not widely taught because they were viewed with suspicion as a vehicle for heretical propaganda. Ironically, though, it was lack of education that facilitated the spread of heresy and schism in Russia.¹² As Muscovy gradually opened its doors to the Western world, the need for higher clerical education began to be recognized by the last decades of the seventeenth century, but it was only as a result of Peter the Great's reforms the following century that schooling was made compulsory for clergymen and that foreign languages, the key to the riches of European learning, began to appear on the curriculum.¹³ Nevertheless, it is to seventeenth-century bishops that credit belongs for enforcing almost universal literacy amongst their white clergy, thereby providing the groundwork for the revolutionary modernization of clerical education that followed in the eighteenth century.

⁷ Primary sources indicate that most, but not all, priests and deacons in "white" orders were literate, and most ensured that their sons could read and write. A very small minority of parish clergymen could read but not write, e.g., AI 4, no. 202, 434; "Skazki popov Krutitskoi eparkhii," SKE, 239 (nos. 18, 19), 253 (no. 19), 267 (no. 12).

⁸ I. Rumiantsev, *Nikita Konstantinovich Dobrynin* (Sergeev Posad: 1916), vol. 2, 3.

⁹ SKE, 144–5 (1692), 113 (no. 3).

¹⁰ SKE, 137.

¹¹ PSZ 1 no. 412, art.29; N.I. Subbotin, ed. *Materialy dlia istoriia raskola*, 9 vols. (Moscow, 1875–84), 2, 188.

As part of the program of improving clerical standards, Muscovite bishops began to overhaul the ordination process. Responding to complaints by clergyman, Patriarch Ioakim undertook a review of ordination expenses in the 1670s and concluded that fees had been too high and bureaucratic delays too long under former patriarchs. In addition to the basic ordination charge (*novichnaia poshlina*), a presentee for major orders had to pay a bewildering variety of lesser fees and gratuities that brought the total cost of ordination to as much as four roubles.¹⁴ This equated to half the average stipend of a parish priest, a considerable sum for a young man to find,¹⁵ hence the Patriarch issued a decree in 1675 limiting the cost of ordination to two roubles and standardizing the procedure, in order to reduce the number of middlemen taking bribes and gratuities from ordinands.¹⁶ Even before Ioakim's reform, changes in ordination procedure were afoot. There appears to have been a growing tendency by prelates during the second half of the seventeenth century to ordain candidates to the diaconate for an interim period before priesting them, rather than allowing fast-track ordinations from the laity or minor orders directly to the priesthood, as happened previously.¹⁷ It is not uncommon to come across situations like that faced by Iakov, the son of a retired priest of Sud'bishch. His father and parish asked the metropolitan to ordain Iakov as priest, but instead the Metropolitan replied that he "has ordained him as deacon to learn church work, and ordered that until he is ordained, the church must hire a priest."¹⁸ Bishops frequently refused to ordain an applicant until he had undergone further training.¹⁹ D'iachok Tarasei Ivanov applied for ordination to his deceased father's benefice in 1689, but was refused until he had completed a period of residential study at Dukhov monastery in Novosil' "for church instruction (*nauchenie*)."²⁰ D'iachok Ivan Vasil'ev of Bolkhov town was told to spend another year learning from his father, a widowed priest, before he could be ordained. When Ivan's father died within the year, the metropolitan ordained Ivan to the diaconate, not to the priesthood.²¹ In central Russia at least, bishops insisted that newly-ordained deacons and priests underwent a statutory six-week post-ordination training period,²² and by the last third of the century some prelates were distributing copies of *A bishop's teaching to a newly-ordained priest* and John Chrysostom's

¹² In some parishes, priests were teaching old rites through ignorance even late in the century: Georg Michels, "Myths and Realities of the Russian Schism: the Church and its Dissenters in Seventeenth Century Muscovy" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991), 409–10, 413, 419, 443.

¹³ Relatively few clergymen studied Latin or Greek until the early eighteenth century, after Peter I obliged priests' sons to learn Latin in 1708, and not until 1780 were there seminaries in every eparchy: Gregory Freeze, *The Russian Levites: Parish Clergy in the Eighteenth Century*. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977), 82–90.

On the Priesthood to their clergy, along with sermons, to provide basic instruction on piety and pastoral care.²³

In addition to improving the standard of ordinands, subtle changes in the screening of candidates who presented for ordination at the episcopal palace were introduced. These modifications can be seen as part of a wider reform program carried out by the church hierarchy during the second half of the seventeenth century to strengthen their authority over ecclesiastical affairs, in response to encroachment on church jurisdiction by laymen.²⁴ Since time immemorial the Muscovite laity had great autonomy in the selection of their clergy because the vast majority of churches were built and maintained by parishioners. Before a candidate for the priesthood could apply to the bishop for ordination, he had to find a church willing to nominate him and obtain a letter of election (*vybor*) from his prospective parishioners or patron.²⁵ An analysis of church records indicates that although most bishops continued to respect the right of the laity to elect a candidate in the first instance, they began to tighten episcopal control over appointments during the course of the seventeenth century. Prelates became more rigorous in ensuring that candidates met canonical requirements; under-age applicants appear to have been rejected more consistently after 1660,²⁶ and ordinands were questioned to ensure that no other person with prior claims to the position was being overlooked.²⁷ Candidates were required to bring a parishioner from the nominating parish to stand as guarantor that the candidate's papers were genuine and that he was eligible to be ordained.²⁸ When a candidate in Ustiug diocese was rejected by the bishop because of his ignorance and unorthodox views, both the candidate and his sponsor were incarcerated in the episcopal prison on the grounds that the sponsor, as representative of the parish, bore the responsibility for choosing an unsuitable candidate.²⁹ Priests transferring from one post to another were required to furnish proof that their transfer would not leave former parishioners without spiritual care.³⁰ Furthermore, bishops began to insist that parishes or patrons provide adequate maintenance for their clergy,³¹ and forbade the laity from dismissing

¹⁴ GAVO f. 496, op. 1, d. 5; AI 4, no. 259, 563; Nikolai I. Subbotin, *Dokumenty iz istorii raskola*, 8 vols. (Moscow: 1874), vol. 1, 192; E.M. Prilezhaev, *Novgorod-sofiiskaia kazna* (St. Petersburg: 1875), 43–47.

¹⁵ On Muscovite clerical remuneration see Coulter, "The Russian Orthodox White Clergy," 64–96.

¹⁶ AI 4, no. 259.

¹⁷ SKE, 118, 125, 128, 137; RIB 35, nos. 10, 135, 339; RIB 6, no. 133 (916).

¹⁸ SKE, 118, 120, 128.

¹⁹ OSS, pt. 12, 16; SKE, 109.

²⁰ SKE, 118.

²¹ SKE, 128 (1694).

²² N.A. Skvortsov, ed. *Dukhovenstvo moskovskoi eparkhii v XVII veke*, (Sergeev Posad: 1916), nos. 253–79 (1653); Paul of Aleppo, *The Travels of Macarius: Bishop of Antioch*, trans. Francis C. Belfour (London: Oriental Translation Committee, 1829–36), 347; AI 4, no. 259; cf. RIB 6, no. 131 (903–04).

their priest without episcopal permission.³² These measures enabled prelates to sift out unsuitable or surplus clergy elected by the laity, and in some cases bishops installed a priest of their own choosing in a parish, without reference to parishioners' wishes.³³ Nonetheless, episcopal control over appointments was limited by the fact that parishioners held the purse-strings, for the great majority of clergymen were paid by their congregation. Knowing the strength of their position, parishes at times dismissed their bishop's appointee and ignored orders to reinstate him, or subjected the new priest to a barrage of fabricated accusations to drive him out. Parishioners of the Church of the Intercession in Tushamsk *volost'* retaliated against the Metropolitan of Tobol'sk's unilateral appointment of priest Dmitrii Irodionov to their church in 1698 by not paying Dmitrii his stipend and by accusing him of a long list of illegalities, such as always being senselessly drunk, failing to turn up at church, swearing at parishioners, and overcharging them for prayers. Aware of their schemes, the Metropolitan did not concede to the petitioners' request to have Dmitrii replaced by a priest they had nominated, but ordered a full investigation and legal confrontation between the priest and his accusers.³⁴ Sometimes bishops found themselves powerless in the face of lay hegemony over appointments. Metropolitan Markell of Pskov complained to the government in 1685 that churches in Pskov eparchy were run entirely by parishioners, who dismissed good priests and appointed their preferred candidates, disregarding the prelate's orders.³⁵

CHURCH LAND

It was largely in order to reduce the laity's control over church appointments and manipulation of their clergy that Patriarch Ioakim undertook an ambitious

²³ AAE 4, no. 184 (1671); DAI 12, no. 35; RIB 14, no. 201 Khol. (1695); RIB 6, 101–10; *Pouchenie sviatitel'skoe k novopostavlenному iereiu* (Moscow, 1670, 1696). Ordination certificates also included lengthy teaching: e.g., MTS 2, Prilozhenie, no. 4; AI 4, no. 259 (1675).

²⁴ The church hierarchy's wider program to strengthen control was partly in reaction to the promulgation of Tsar Aleksei's Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, which had eroded Church jurisdiction and privileges: Potter, "The Russian Church," 63, 156, 167, 302–490; Mikhail M. Bogoslovskii, *Zemskoe Samoupravlenie na Russkom Severe v XVII v.*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Imp. ob-va istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, 1909–12), vol. 2, 26, 31, 35.

²⁵ SKE, 84 (1686), 75 (1695), 143 (1690), 49, no. 11 (1682), 52, no. 17 (1684), 83 (1686), 66 (1694), 85 (1686).

²⁶ OSS, pt. 11, 191, n. 172 (1672), pt. 12, 116, no. 126; SKE, 58–91 (1692–3), 106 (1690), 109 (1694), 128 (1694), 120 (1691), 125 (1693), 137 (1686); RIB 5, no. 150.

²⁷ Candidates with prior claims were usually family members of the former incumbent: e.g., SKE, 83, 84, 138.

²⁸ OSS, pt. 11, 190, no. 170 (1672).

²⁹ RIB 12, no. 252 Ust. (1695).

project to ensure that all parish clergymen received sufficient glebe land for their maintenance. Clergymen who served in cathedrals and endowed churches, which made up approximately ten percent of Muscovy's total number of churches, received stipends and subsidies from the crown, but the majority of parish churches received no central funding from state or church, neither was there any standardized form of clerical remuneration by parishes similar to the compulsory tithe of corn and produce that the contemporary English clergy received from their congregations. Instead, the primary source of a priest's income came from voluntary payments by the laity for *potreby*, a term which included various prayers and religious rites performed at the individual request of parishioners. In some cases the clergy also received a stipend paid in grain by their parishioners or patron, the amount of which could differ markedly from parish to parish.³⁶ Glebe was commonly provided by parishioners for the clergy's private use in addition to, or instead of, a stipend, and could consist of fields, meadows and kitchen gardens. Theoretically, when new cadastres were compiled in the early 1620s each parish church should have been assigned from adjacent estates sufficient acreage to provide for the maintenance of the clergy and the running of the church.³⁷ Churches that received land from the crown were in a relatively comfortable position, but most often the parish community or landowner who built the church was responsible for allotting glebe for their clergy, hence the size of plots varied enormously.³⁸ In many cases there was a discrepancy between the amount of land shown in census books (*pistsovyie knigi*) as belonging to a parish, and the amount actually farmed by the clergy. Most clergymen had considerably less than the figure shown because it had been expropriated by laymen, and a large proportion received no glebe at all. An analysis of statements made by clergy of ninety-five churches in Moscow eparchy in 1683–84 reveals that 29 percent had smaller allotments of land than recorded in the census books, 52 percent had no allocation of meadowland, and 20 percent had no land at all. Although the size of holding considered necessary

³⁰ SKE, 134 (1683). There are many similar examples in SKE, 42–187.

³¹ SKE, 59, 85, 96, 140.

³² OSS, pt. 7, 54–57; RIB 25, no. 27; RIB 12, no. 148; LZAK 14, 67; Bogoslovskii, *Zemskoe Samoupravlenie*, vol. 2, 31.

³³ RIB 12, no. 261 Ust. (1696); OSS, pt. 7, 36, no. 3 (1693); Archimandrite Melety, ed. *Drevniia tserkovnyiia gramoty vostochno-sibirskago kraia (1653–1726)*, (Kazan': Universitetskaia tip., 1875), no. 77 (1699).

³⁴ Melety, *Drevniia tserkovnyiia gramoty*, no. 77. For similar accusations against episcopal appointees see RIB 12, no. 261 Ust. and SPIRIAN f. 117, op. 1, d. 661.

³⁵ AI 5, no. 122. Another example of parishioners disregarding episcopal orders is OSS, pt. 7, 109, nos. 1–9 (1697). The laity retained considerable control over clerical appointments in most parishes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, except in Siberia, where bishops were able to dominate appointments by the mid-eighteenth century: Vera Shevzov, "Popular Orthodoxy in late Imperial Rural Russia: 1860–1914" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1994), ch. 2, 207–11; Gregory Freeze, *The Russian Levites*, 157; Natal'ia D.Zol'nikova, *Sibirskaia prikhodskaia obshchina v XVIII veke*, (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1990), 151, 180.

to support a peasant household was thirty *chetverti* of good arable land (40 acres), more if the soil was poor,³⁹ it was not unusual for parishioners to allow their clergy to till only a few acres of church land.⁴⁰ In Liven town and district, for which we have the most detailed figures, the majority of priests (58 percent) tilled a meager glebe of between one and ten *chetverti* (1.3–13 acres), which was barely subsistence level; 16 percent tilled a medium-sized plot sized between twelve and thirty *chetverti* (15–40 acres), and 13 percent had no glebe at all.⁴¹ This trend appears to have been common in other regions.⁴² A priest from Sizmo village, Vologda eparchy, told his bishop he could not survive as he had only three and a half *chetverti* of rye fields, barely any meadow, and received no stipend from his parish.⁴³ With inadequate land to support their families, clergy were forced to lease tillage and pasturage, an expense which could impoverish a rural cleric.⁴⁴

It is a well-known fact that the higher clergy of the Muscovite church steadily acquired inheritable real estate (*voichina*) during the pre-Petrine era, but such land acquisitions rarely ever came into the possession of the lower clergy. On the contrary, parish church land was steadily eroded by laymen throughout the seventeenth century. When churches were destroyed by enemy invasion their lands were often distributed to the gentry as service estates (*pomest'ie*), and glebe was illegally seized from active churches.⁴⁵ A survey of church assets by Metropolitan Varsonofii of Sarai and Podonsk in 1684 revealed an appalling rate of illegal seizure: 34 percent of clergy questioned in ninety-five parish churches replied that their glebe had been seized by noblemen, townsmen or peasants.⁴⁶ Likewise records from Vladimir, Viatka and Vologda provinces show that church land provided easy pickings for avaricious laymen, who sometimes took advantage of new priests who did not know the parish boundaries.⁴⁷ Parish priests had great difficulty claiming it back, for even when the highest ecclesiastical and civil authorities ruled in their favor, it was not unusual for the illegal possessor to simply refuse to comply.⁴⁸ Despite obtaining an injunction

³⁶ RIB 14, no. 174 Khol; RIB 14, no. 65 Ust. (1682). Fletcher estimated in 1591 that clerical income amounted to 30–40 roubles annually, but this figure is far too high; only a few cathedral priests came near this figure: *Of the Russe Commonwealth*, 87.

³⁷ Petr V. Znamenskii, "Zakonodatel'stvo Petra Velikogo otnositel'no dukhovenstva," *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik* 10 (1863), 127; I.I. Shimko, *Patriarshii Kazennyi prikaz* (Moscow: I.N. Kushnerev, 1894), 102. Decrees on church land include PSZ 1, nos. 633, art. 14 (10 March 1676), PSZ 1, no. 700, art. 18 (10 Aug. 1677), PSZ 2, no. 832, art. 4 (25 Aug. 1680), PSZ 2, no. 890, art. 2 (26 Aug. 1681), PSZ 2, no. 1074, art. 4 (Apr. 1684).

³⁸ For example, sixty three percent of churches in Peremyshl town and district in 1683–84 had received grants of land from the crown: SKE, 118–228. In other eparchies grants of crown land may have been relatively small.

³⁹ Jerome Blum, *Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 237–640. Blum estimates that the average peasant holding was frequently only 14–18.6 *chetverti* per home in the second half of the century.

⁴⁰ See Lodma church records in RIB 25, and statements by priests of Cherni, Liven, Chernavsk, Peremyshl and Novosil: SKE, 188–228 (1683–84).

from the crown, a rural priest in Novosil district was still unable to reclaim his illegally-seized glebe because, he reported, the predatory landowners “ignore the Great Sovereign’s *ukaz* and decrees, they set up boundaries and build new fences, not in accord with the land registers.”⁴⁹

Expropriation of church land was so widespread by the early 1680s that Patriarch Ioakim embarked on a nation-wide campaign to claim it back. He sent a decree to all urban and rural clergy ordering them to petition for church lands to be reassessed whilst State assessors from the Land Chancellery were undertaking a general survey,⁵⁰ so that “henceforth the churches of God will not decrease and priests and clergy not be impoverished and driven out by hereditary landowners and service landowners.” If any priest found the assessment to be incorrect, he was to dispute it with the scribe and immediately inform the patriarchal agent’s office. Clergy of new churches built after the land survey were instructed to petition the state scribe to have their church fields and meadows entered in the land registers and to obtain a copy of that entry.⁵¹

Patriarch Ioakim’s measures to recover church land received the crown’s support, but redress was hindered by obstructive landowners and peasants, by scribes greedy for bribes, and by the lack of powers of enforcement.⁵² A further hindrance was ignorance and apathy among the clergy: 17 percent of priests who were questioned in Moscow eparchy in 1684 and 1689 said they did not know whether or not their church owned any land, most attributing their ignorance to the fact that they had no land deeds or copies of land register entries.⁵³ Ioakim’s letters and threats motivated some priests to obtain copies of the land registers so that they would know their parish borders,⁵⁴ but there is no evidence of any significant improvement in clerical landholdings.⁵⁵ Numerous churches still failed to provide sufficient land for incumbents to the end of the century and

⁴¹ SKE, 208–28.

⁴² LZAK 14, 107; OSS, pt. 3, 12, no. 18; pt. 8, 101, no. 147; RIB 12, no. 29 Ust.; Sergei I. Kotkov, ed., *Pamiatniki delovoi pis’mennosti XVII veka: Vladimirskii krai* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), no. 1.

⁴³ OSS, pt. 3, 44, no. 64 (1682).

⁴⁴ For examples of clergymen leasing land see “Akty Koriazhensk monastyrja,” LZAK 23, nos. 101, 166; SKE, 188–28.

⁴⁵ DAI 6, no. 137, 408–10; AI 5, no. 137, 235–6; Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii*, 1, no. 346–7, Shimko, *Patriarshii Kazennyi prikaz*, 137–8; and LZAK 5, pt. 4, 56–61.

⁴⁶ Statements by priests of Chern’, Liven, Chernavsk, Peremyshl and Novosil: SKE, 188–228.

⁴⁷ OSS, pt. 12, 54. Pre-1685 cases of clergy land being seized or disputed can be found in: “Opisanie moskovskago Bogoiavlenskago monastyrja,” ChOIDR (1876) kn. 4, 175 (1653); RIB 12, no. 29 Ust. (1627); RIB 14, no. 165 Ust. (1649–50); RIB 5, no. 259 (1667); RIB 12, no. 116 Ust. (1677); OpMAMlu 16, no. 722 (1674–81); OSS, pt. 1, 1, 23 (1618, 1678), pt. 3, 55, 46; pt. 5, 28 (1676), pt. 10, 61, 77 (1673, 1679), pt. 11, 17, 21, 63, 142, (1641–69), pt. 12, 51, 54, 78, 84, 91, 100 (1678–84).

⁴⁸ For example, see cases in DAV, no. 100 (1615) and *Materialy dlia istorii Vladimirskoi eparkhii*, ed. V.I and G.I. Kholmogorov, (Vladimir: 1894), vol. 1, 52, 158 (1630, 1679).

beyond,⁵⁶ and disputes between clergy and laity over land ownership continued to appear before the courts, which prelates complained was causing priests "much wasted time, losses, and ruination from other people's offences."⁵⁷ The priests of KhyI'nov in Viatka *uezd* had to repeatedly fight for their glebe, each time paying out fees and gifts to clerks, secretaries, and governors to have their case heard.⁵⁸ Even ancient glebe was encroached upon. A priest of Komelskii *volost'* complained to Archbishop Gavriil of Vologda in 1695 that parishioners had taken his fields, "and since time immemorial that is priest's land (*popovskaia zemlia*), lord; my grandfather priest Pantelemon, when he was a priest at St. Nicholas, sowed his rye on that land, and it is not church land or the people's (*mirskoi*) land."⁵⁹ The clergy of one northern parish became impoverished from the high rent they had to pay to the church treasurer for the use of church meadows between 1688 and 1698, forcing them to appeal to their archbishop for more time to pay their episcopal levies on several occasions.⁶⁰

As a result of insufficient land or income, clerical poverty was widespread. Its effect can be seen in the difficulties which the lower clergy had paying episcopal and state taxes⁶¹ and in the rising toll of clergymen in debt.⁶² A very large number of clergymen were forced to rely on non-clerical by-employments to make ends meet, and a disturbing number turned to theft and armed robbery.⁶³ Inequalities in parish revenues and outright poverty gave rise to frequent disputes between clergymen. Indeed, nearly 15 percent of surviving pre-Petrine documents relating to the white clergy from Vologda diocese concern clerical quarrels over land and income,⁶⁴ and in Moscow diocese disputes between clergy represent one-tenth of church records relating to transfers, ordinations and permits from 1662–99.⁶⁵ The fact that these problems continue to appear with consistent frequency in records dating to the end of the century suggests that Patriarch Ioakim's efforts to secure church land failed to materially improve the clergy's economic situation. Whilst seventeenth-century prelates considered that

⁴⁹ SKE, 200, no. 12 (1684).

⁵⁰ PSZ 2, no. 890, 348 (1681).

⁵¹ AAE 4, no. 285 (11 June, 1685).

⁵² PSZ 2, no. 890, 348 (26 Aug. 1681); PSZ 2, no. 913 (9 April 1682); AI 5, no. 137; LZAK 14, 62; Znamenskii, *Zakonodatel'stvo Petra*, 127.

⁵³ SKE, 188–228 (1683–84) and 229–74 (1689), St. Nicholas, Krasnoe stan and St. Demetrius, Liven posad.

⁵⁴ When parishes applied for the ordination of a priest or deacon, bishops required them to furnish proof that there was land or other means of clerical support. At the end of the century Archbishop Afanasii of Kholmogory ruled that clergy should be assigned 25 chetverti (33.75 acres) of arable fields and 30 kopen (8.1 acres) of meadow: Bogoslovskii, *Zemskoe Samoupravlenie*, vol. 2, 37.

⁵⁵ LZAK 14, 62 (1685); Znamenskii's theory that most clergymen remained without land may well be correct: Petr V. Znamenskii, *Rukovodstvo k russkoi tserkovnoi istorii* (Kazan': Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1870), 230.

⁵⁶ LZAK 9, no. 90 (1696); SKE, 188–274: e.g. St. Nicholas, Krasnyi stan and St. Demetrius, Liven posad.

provision of adequate land was the ideal means to modernise clerical remuneration, eighteenth-century thinkers and bureaucrats viewed both farming and trade as improper for a priest and detrimental to the church.⁶⁶ The Spiritual Regulation of 1721 decreed that parishioners should pay a specified tax to the clergy, “so that, as far as possible, they will have complete self-sufficiency,” and several decades later Catherine the Great agreed that the clergy needed “adequate support free from popular control,” but ultimately nothing was done.⁶⁷ No equivalent to Queen Anne’s Bounty was provided to eliminate clerical poverty in Russia,⁶⁸ hence clergymen remained dependant on the goodwill of their parishioners and the mercy of their bishops.

WIDOWED CLERGY

The sector of the clerical estate which suffered most from poverty and debt, and which potentially had the most to gain from modernization of the seventeenth-century Russian church, was the widowed clergy. From early in its history the Muscovite church hierarchy, like their colleagues in other Slavic Orthodox churches, viewed widowed clergy with suspicion. A widowed priest (*vdovoi pop*) was strictly forbidden to remarry, as were deacons and sub-deacons, but could not be trusted to withstand sexual temptation if allowed to remain in his parish without a wife, and at the very least he was vulnerable to slander. In the early fourteenth century Metropolitan Petr of Moscow ruled that clerics in holy orders were to be suspended from office upon the death of their spouse, and either tonsured or demoted to minor orders. If they wished to remarry they had to renounce their orders altogether.⁶⁹ These injunctions were upheld by the Moscow

⁵⁷ RIB 12, no. 201 (1689); OSS, pt. 5, 93; pt. 7, 99, 104 (1695); pt. 8, 79, 87, 91 (1694–95); *Materialy dlia istorii Vladimirskoi eparkhii*, 41, 72–74; RGADA f. 1443, op. 2, dd. 6, 53, 55; f. 1433, op. 1, d. 82.

⁵⁸ The Khył’nov clergy’s legal expenses are listed in DAV, no. 100 (1615), no. 154 (1684), no. 160 (1696).

⁵⁹ OSS, pt. 8, 91, no. 127 (1695).

⁶⁰ RIB 25, nos. 276, 303, 309.

⁶¹ A sample of the clergy’s petitions to prelates for a reduction in episcopal taxes and arrests for non-payment can be read in OSS, pt. 3, 34, 47, 66, 76, 81, 88; pt. 4, 57; pt. 5, 92; pt. 7, 37, 82, 160 (g), 115; pt. 8, 101, 103; pt. 9, 141; pt. 10, 144, 158, 160, 181, 185; pt. 11, 206; pt. 12, 32; RIB 14, no. 64 Ust. (1682); RIB 12, no. 177 Ust.; LZAK 14, 12.

⁶² RGADA f. 1443, op. 2, d. 13, 21, 58 (1686–87), f. 1433, op. 1, d. 41 (1682); LZAK 27, no. 622; SKE, 46, no. 6; RIB 12 nos. 159, 225 Ust. Examples of clerical debt in Vologda can be found in OSS, pt. 1, 36; pt. 3, 29, 59; pt. 5, 27; pt. 7, 108, 159; pt. 8, 54, 64; pt. 9, 9, 60, 90, 128; pt. 10, 81; pt. 11, 42; pt. 12, 4, 74, 119, 120, 161, 227; pt. 13, 63.

⁶³ RGADA f. 1443, op. 2, dd. 3, 15, 16, 17, 44; f. 196, op. 3, dd. 708, 923; LZAK 27, no. 792, OSS, pt. 4, 48; pt. 8, 10, 15; pt. 9, 42; pt. 12, 117; RIB 12, nos. 269, 287 Ust.

⁶⁴ OSS, pts. 1–5, 7–13: (excluding records which deal primarily with episcopal fees and permits).

⁶⁵ SKE, 42–187.

church councils of 1503 and 1551, but a major change came when the 1666–67 church council revoked the former prohibitions against widowed clergy on the grounds that they were not based on canon law, and decreed that priests and deacons would henceforth be allowed to retain their benefices after the loss of their wives, under certain conditions.⁷⁰ This reform came about as a result of many decades of lobbying by the white clergy,⁷¹ amongst whom widowers represented a large proportion, possibly as much as 40 percent.⁷²

When the church hierarchy ruled in 1667 that chaste widowers could remain as parish priests, the response from the white clergy was enthusiastic.⁷³ Parishes, too, responded positively: diocesan records contain as many requests from the laity asking for permits for their widowed clergy to remain in their benefices, as from the priests themselves.⁷⁴ Very often parishes asked the prelate to grant a permit on account of the priest's motherless children.⁷⁵ Indeed, for clergymen with young families, the 1667 ruling was no less than revolutionary. Its impact on the lives of thousands of dependants in clergy families can be glimpsed from the many applications that subsequently streamed into episcopal offices from widowers asking for permits to continue serving in their former capacities on the grounds of family responsibilities, "for the sake of my small children," "so that my children will not starve," "until my daughter is married" "because there is no-one to feed and care for them and give them in marriage."⁷⁶ The entire extended family stood to benefit from the reforms, for it was not unusual for a clergyman to be supporting widowed and orphaned relatives as well as his own children, and bishops were often sympathetic towards priests with dependants.⁷⁷ Priest Nikifor of Piatinitso village in Viaz'ma district, left with seven children to care for when his wife died in 1673, was allowed to remain in his parish for over five years.⁷⁸

Despite the high hopes the 1667 reform had given the white clergy, in reality widowhood still made a clergyman's position precarious, for the new rules did

⁶⁶ Ivan Pososhkov, *The Book of Poverty and Wealth*, ed. and trans. Alexis P. Vlasto and Lucian R. Lewitter (London: Athlone Press, 1987), 174; Freeze, *The Russian Levites*, 118; Ioann S. Belliustin, *Description of the Clergy in Rural Russia: Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Parish Priest*, trans. Gregory Freeze (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 126.

⁶⁷ *The Spiritual Regulation of Peter the Great*, trans. and ed. Alexander V. Muller, (Seattle: 1972), 55; Freeze, *The Russian Levites*, 118.

⁶⁸ Queen Anne's Bounty was introduced in England in 1704–17 to provide adequate remuneration for clergy of poor parishes. It was derived from donations from the laity and crown, and by taxing rich clergymen.

⁶⁹ RIB 6, no. 161.

⁷⁰ "Gramota mitropolita Fotiia v Pskov," RIB, 6, no. 434–35; P. Zuzek, *Kormchaja Kniga* (Rome, 1964), 152; Jack Kollmann, "The Moscow Stoglav Church Council of 1551." (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1978); PSZ, vol. 1, no. 412, 705 (1666–67). In the sixteenth century Metropolitan Simon allowed twice-married priests to retain their benefices, but later councils forbade this practice: Eve Levin, *Sex and Society in the World of the Orthodox Slavs* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 264–65.

not automatically guarantee him the right to keep his old job. He had to apply for an episcopal permit, called a *patrakhil'naia gramota*, which could be given or withheld at the prelate's discretion, and if granted had to be renewed each year.⁷⁹ Few bishops allowed widowers to renew it more than five times, at most.⁸⁰ Hierarchs differed in their policies toward widowers, depending on the personality of the prelate and the service record of the priest. With a clean record, a priest could hope to have his permit renewed to serve in the parish for several years, but if he had a son old enough to succeed him or a blemished service record, he was likely to be ordered into a monastery without delay.⁸¹ Disregarding a desperate plea in 1697 by priest Konstantin of Volovo village to remain in the parish "until my children have grown up, and so that they will not wander from house to house and starve, and so that I can teach them to read and write," the Moscow Metropolitan ordered him to be tonsured immediately in Liutikov monastery, almost certainly because he had served as a judge's private priest without an episcopal permit for the past two years.⁸²

If the lower clergy had their disappointments, the hierarchy also had belated doubts about the wisdom of the reforms. The 1666–67 Church Council had been optimistic about modernizing the rules for widowed clergy, confidently asserting that it was right to abolish their compulsory retirement because "now, by God's grace, among the Russian people there are found [widowed] priests and deacons who have understanding of Holy Scripture, who continue to lead a chaste and upright life."⁸³ But by November 1681, Patriarch Ioakim acknowledged that widowers were proving to be unsatisfactory priests: "All widowed priests live incorrectly. Some drink to excessive drunkenness. Others keep disgraceful people in their homes [...] and others live at the courts of various ranks of people

⁷¹ Widowed priest Grigorii Skripitsa, for example, complained to the Church Council of 1503 that the forcible retirement of widowers was unjust and uncanonical. His letter can be found in "Napisanie," ChOIR (1847/8), kn. 6, ch. 4, 45–54.

⁷² One nineteenth-century Russian clergyman estimated that forty percent of young priests were widowers. The figure would have been no less two centuries earlier: Gregory Freeze, "Revolt from Below," *Russian Orthodoxy Under the Old Regime*, ed. R. Nicholas and T. Stavrou (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 113. Documents relating to widowed clergy comprise up to a third of the content of seventeenth-century diocesan archives, hence it is not surprising that their plight demanded the urgent attention of the Muscovite Church

⁷³ PSZ, 1, no. 412. There are numerous petitions for *patrakhil'naia* permits from widowed priests and deacons in diocesan records: OSS, pts. 1–13, SKE, 42–187; LZAK 27 nos. 869, 870, 872, 870, 873–4; RIB 12, no. 181 Ust.; *Dukhovenstvo moskovskoi eparkhii*, nos. 33–145.

⁷⁴ For example, LZAK 27 nos. 624, 846, 861, 864, 865, 868, 870, 878, 881, 882, 885, 887; OSS, pt. 11, 196, 197, 200–02.

⁷⁵ e.g. RIB 12, no. 181 Ust.; OSS, pt. 11, 191, 201, 202.

⁷⁶ SKE, 43, 76, 77, 87, 90, 111, 123, 175–85; OSS, pt. 3, 55; pt. 5, 29, 62; pt. 7, 144; pt. 10, 177–78; pt. 11, 191, 200–02.

⁷⁷ OSS, pt. 11, 191, no. 172; SKE, 48–50, 76, 77, 87, 90, 111, 123.

⁷⁸ SKE, 175, no. 2.

and they serve in chapels, and from these priests there arises a great deal of disorder, and abuse and dishonor against the clerical rank."⁸⁴

Many widowers who were refused a *patrakhil'naia* permit, or failed to apply for one because of the cost, carried on administering the sacraments regardless in parishes and private homes throughout Russia. Some were caught when episcopal officials came through to inspect permits, others were denounced by rival clergymen or parishioners.⁸⁵ Widowed priest Kondratei of Netrubezho, for instance, was ordered into a monastery but secretly remained in the parish, doing services for parishioners. He was eventually denounced by his colleague, priest Iosif, who resented having to share the parish income with him.⁸⁶ Indeed many widowers faced unemployment and poverty as a result of competition with other clergy.⁸⁷ To regions where priests were scarce, such as Siberia and the Don, the reform may have brought relief, but in the greater part of Russia there was no shortage, and in many areas there was already a surplus of clerics. By allowing a large number of widowed clergy to remain serving as parish priests, many of whom would previously have resigned or retired to a monastery, the new ruling aggravated pre-existing tensions amongst clergy over the division of church land and income. Consequently, disputes and court cases between clergymen escalated dramatically in the last third of the century, and widowers were frequently the losers.⁸⁸ Even amongst family members there was resentment when widowers blocked their promotion, as in the case of widowed priest Feodor of Beloozero *uezd*, who in 1699 was squeezed out by his impatient son-in-law, priest Andrei.⁸⁹ Widowers who were forced out, or who were refused a permit and resisted tonsure, became the dropouts of the clerical estate: unemployed, itinerant, defying authority. No small number ended up as supporters of the Schism because they could not find work within the mainstream of Orthodoxy.⁹⁰

Reports of schismatic or immoral widowers among the white clergy convinced prelates that the monastery was the best place for a wifeless cleric. In response to concerns over bad behavior by widowed clergy, the 1681–82 Moscow church council recommended that widowers be allowed only one year in the parish before being tonsured in a monastery,⁹¹ and numerous documents show that these recommendations were readily followed by bishops during the last two

⁷⁹ LZAK 14, 80, 89, 113; see also Vologda and Moscow diocesan records cited in this chapter.

⁸⁰ The longest-held *patrakhil'naia* permit I have come across was issued to a priest from Vorotynskii *uezd* in Moscow eparchy, who was widowed in 1671 and had his permit renewed until 1681, when the metropolitan ordered him tonsured into a monastery. Two years later he was given permission to serve as a black priest: SKE, 78, no. 4.

⁸¹ SKE, 147–8 (1697), 175 (1678).

⁸² SKE, 151 (1697).

⁸³ DAI 5, no. 102, 493.

⁸⁴ Potter, "The Russian Church," 338; RGADA f 153, dd. 59, 61.

⁸⁵ DAI 5, no. 67, 339; AI 5, no. 244, 451; OSS, pt. 5, 22, no. 38; pt. 10, 77, no. 58; pt. 10, 160, no. 146; SKE, 147, 281.

decades of the seventeenth century. Large numbers of widowed priests were retired to monasteries “by *ukaz* of his holiness the Metropolitan.”⁹² Priests who were allowed to remain in their parishes with *patrakhil’naia* permits were subject to stricter limitations.⁹³ If a clergyman failed to apply for a permit immediately after the death of his wife, he had to account for the delay,⁹⁴ and if he had a son, brother or nephew eligible to be ordained to his place, a widower was less likely to have his permit renewed by his bishop.⁹⁵ Priest Evstafii of Oslopovo village petitioned the Metropolitan in 1693 to ordain his son, but the prelate replied: “when the *d’iachok*’s father priest Evstafii is tonsured as a monk, at that time the *d’iachok* will be ordained a priest.”⁹⁶ Knowing their time in the parish could be short, widowers petitioned for their sons or other relatives to be ordained in order to safeguard the benefice for the family.⁹⁷ Recognizing the inevitable, one Moscow priest appealed in 1697 for a renewal of his *patrakhil’naia* “until my daughter is married, and after that I will enter a monastery.”⁹⁸ Others asked for permission to be tonsured in a particular monastery of their own choice, rather than await the time when they would be ordered into a less favored one.⁹⁹

Under the circumstances it is not surprising to find that the number of widowed clergymen who eventually retired to monasteries surpassed the number of those who remained “in the world” throughout the seventeenth century, in keeping with previous centuries.¹⁰⁰ The tonsure was not necessarily a bad option for an ambitious cleric. The highest rank attainable within the white priesthood was that of archpriest, but within the monastic orders there were opportunities for more exalted promotion. As hieromonks, widowed white priests occupied a respected position in monastery life, and an inordinate number went on to become founders, priors and abbots of hermitages and monasteries.¹⁰¹ Several reached the bishopric.¹⁰² The evidence suggests that ultimately the church’s attempt to bring its policy on widowers “up to date” was not a success. Although the 1667 reform allowed many priests to remain with their families and continue full sacerdotal duties in their churches far longer than they could have previously,

⁹² SKE, 147–8 (1697). A similar case in Vologda is LZAK 27, no. 560.

⁹³ OSS, pt. 5, 22, no. 38; pt. 10, 77, no. 58; pt. 10, 160, no. 146.

⁹⁴ RGADA f. 1433, op. 1, d. 25, 1680; OSS, pt. 12, 114, 124, pt. 9, 146, no. 126; pt. 9, 124, no. 102; pt. 9, 120, no. 100; pt. 9, 150, no. 129; pt. 7, 60; SKE 148; VKS, Prilozhenie, 177–78.

⁹⁵ QSS, pt. 7, 123 (1699).

⁹⁶ SKE, 151; DAI 12, no. 17; DAI 5, no. 10, 465; Melety, *Drevniia tserkovnyiia gramoty*, no. 22; RGADA f. 210, Mosk. stol., d. 641. On widowers who became dissenters see Michels, “Myths and Realities,” 443–46.

⁹⁷ Potter, “The Russian Church,” 338; RGADA f. 153, dd. 59, 61.

⁹⁸ DAI 12, no. 17, 182–83; SKE, 49, 58–60, 73, 78, 82, 84, 94, 141, 142, 147, 150, 151, 160, 166; OSS, pt. 5, 64, no. 123; pt. 7, 97; pt. 9, 88–89, no. 69; RIB 25, no. 370; RGADA f. 1443, op. 2, dd. 5, 121, 25; K. Dokuchaev-Barskov, *Tserkovno-prikhodskaia zhizn’ v gorode Kargopole v XVI–XIX vekakh* (Moscow, 1900), 18.

⁹⁹ SKE, 151; RIB 12, no. 224 Ust.; AIuB 1, no. 7, III; OSS, pt. 7, 60–63.

¹⁰⁰ SKE, 46, no. 7 (1687), 97; no. 12 (1691), 123 (1691), 148 (1697).

overall the average widowed cleric who remained in the parish faced hardships and uncertainties. The tonsure represented the best career move for widowed clergymen to the very end of the seventeenth century and beyond.¹⁰³

EPISCOPAL SUPERVISION

The entire clerical estate, widowers, married and monastic clergy alike, were subject to the jurisdiction of their bishop, who ruled over his eparchy like a prince with almost limitless powers to tax, judge, and punish subordinates.¹⁰⁴ The seventeenth century was a time of significant change in the development of episcopal supervision, witnessing the deployment of deputies from the lower clergy in unprecedented numbers. Traditionally prelates relied on a network of deputies appointed from the monastic and senior cathedral clergy, whilst the major role in episcopal supervision prior to the seventeenth century was delegated to bishops' lay officers (*desiatil'niki*, *deti boiarskie* and *nedel'shchiki*),¹⁰⁵ who were sent out to parishes to collect episcopal dues and undertake ecclesiastical investigations. By the middle of the sixteenth century so many complaints about the extortion and injustice of these lay officers had been received from the clergy, that hierarchs of the church recognized the need for change. In 1551 the Stoglav council admitted that priests and deacons had suffered "deprivation and great loss at the hands of *desiatil'niki*,"¹⁰⁶ and ruled that henceforth lay officers were to share the job of collecting episcopal taxes with priest-supervisors, who were to be elected by the clergy, but this ruling was only partially and slowly implemented and in the opening decades of the

⁹⁵ SKE, 147–48. Even before 1682, bishops preferred to ordain a relative rather than grant a *patrakhil'naia* permit: OSS, pt. 7, 38, no. 34; pt. 10, 183, no. 186; pt. 11, 191, no. 172; pt. 11, 194, no. 178.

⁹⁶ SKE, 90 (1693).

⁹⁷ OSS, pt. 3, 55, 89, pt. 8, 51; SKE, 90, 128, 144–45.

⁹⁸ SKE, 90

⁹⁹ RGADA f. 1443, op. 2, d. 20; OSS, pt. 4, 56, no. 551.

¹⁰⁰ Coulter, "The Russian Orthodox White Clergy," 200–09.

¹⁰¹ At least three widowed priests became Father Superiors of the huge Trinity-St. Sergius monastery: David of Rzhev village (1570–1633); Fedor of Podosen'ia village (d. 1674), Vasilei Antip'ev of Moscow (widowed in 1700). There are many similar cases of promotion, e.g., PNG, 228–29; AI 4, no. 202, 432–33; Melety, *Drevniia tserkovnyiia gramoty*, no. 49 (1694); RIB 5, no. 309; RIB 14, no. 108 Khol.; *Dukhovenstvo moskovskoi eparkhii*, no. 23; Subbotin, *Dokumenty* 1, 457–58; SKE, 150.

¹⁰² Among such we find Archbishop Feodosii of Astrakhan (consecrated in 1602), Archbishop Moisei of Riazan (1638–51), and Metropolitan Pavel II of Sarskii and Podonskii (1664–76).

¹⁰³ The stigma of being labelled a "widowed priest" continued well beyond the Muscovite era: e.g., *Materialy dlia istorii Vladimirskoi eparkhii*, 206. The widowed clergy's prospects do not appear to have significantly improved in the following centuries: Freeze, "Revolt from Below," *Orthodoxy Under the Old Regime*, ed. Nicholas and Stavrou, 205.

seventeenth century *desiatil'niki* were still collecting tithes and dues in most eparchies.¹⁰⁷ As a result of their continued abuses, the church councils of 1666–67 and 1675 took steps to reduce the authority of episcopal *desiatil'niki* and recommended that episcopal fees be collected only by ordained men of either black or white clerical rank.¹⁰⁸ By the end of the seventeenth century the number of clergymen serving in supervisory capacities had increased and the tyranny of the *desiatil'niki* had been reduced in most eparchies.¹⁰⁹

The role of the lower clergy in episcopal supervision, which had been insignificant prior to the Romanov era, greatly expanded during the seventeenth century. Ordained priest-supervisors (*popovskii starosta*) are mentioned in the Pskov Chronicle in 1343 and in charters issued by Moscow metropolitans during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,¹¹⁰ and their employment was endorsed by the Moscow church councils of 1551 and 1594, but the real rise to prominence of priest-supervisors appears to have begun some time after the Moscow council of 1604.¹¹¹ By the late 1620s we find them well-established in Moscow and its countryside. In *Radonezhskaia desiatina*, for instance, data was collected by priest-supervisors from one hundred parish churches and recorded in income books of the Patriarchal treasury office for 1628,¹¹² and in the capital itself there was a network of priest-supervisors under the management of a chief supervisor by 1636.¹¹³ There was a small number of priest-supervisors in Novgorod diocese in 1577 and their roll may have increased slightly under Metropolitan Makarii in the 1620s, yet Novgorod prelates continued to rely primarily upon their lay officials for the first three-quarters of the century.¹¹⁴ Only after 1673 was the supervision of clergy by ordained officers effected in almost all the diocese as a result of Metropolitan Ioakim's limitations on the powers of lay officers. Not only did Ioakim increase the number of priest-supervisors in Novgorod, but within two years of his election as Patriarch in 1673 he had pushed through the church council ruling recommending the wider employment of priest-supervisors throughout Russia.¹¹⁵ These measures were part of the church hierarchy's overall strategy to protect church people and property from the attacks of laymen, the brunt of which hit the white clergy hardest. Whilst upholding the honor of the priesthood may have been the prime motive for reforming episcopal supervision,

¹⁰⁴ Clergymen were subject to the civil courts only in cases involving theft, treason, murder, and after 1682, heresy. PSZ 1, nos. 442, 505; AAE 4, nos. 155, 161; *Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, Part 1: Text and Translation*, ed. and trans. Richard Hellie (Irvine: Charles Schlacks, 1988); AI 5, no. 75, 108–18.

¹⁰⁵ For the purposes of this study, these agents will be referred episcopal lay officers or *desiatil'niki*. Lay officers were appointed to high positions as district administrators, as well as to lower ranks as mere episcopal tax-collectors.

¹⁰⁶ Kollmann, "The Moscow Stoglav Church Council of 1551," 458.

¹⁰⁷ AIuB 2, no. 230 iv (1606); LZAK 14, 8 (1619); Shimko, *Patriarshii Kazennyi prikaz*, 31; Samuilov, "Desiatil'niki i popovskie starosty," *Tserkovnye vedomosti* 35 (1900), (pribavleniia) 1393; OSS, pt. 10, 158.

¹⁰⁸ PSZ 3, no. 412; AAE 4, no. 161.

¹⁰⁹ RIB 12, no. 92, 145, 147–51, 159; GAVO, f. 496, op. 1, d. 35.

there were material advantages for the hierarchy too. A prosperous clergy freed from the extortion of *desiatil'niki* would result in fewer complaints to deal with,¹¹⁶ and increased revenue for bishops, for the dishonesty of *desiatil'niki* caused losses to the prelate's coffers as well as to his clergy.¹¹⁷ Above all, the employment of parish priests as priest-supervisors gave the prelate a wider net of agents to track down non-payers and deviants into the furthest corners of the eparchy.¹¹⁸ The need for low-level informers grew as schism spread, and priest-supervisors like Vasilei Semenov of Kemsii gorodok (Kem'), who denounced many so-called Old Believers, were invaluable to their bishop.¹¹⁹

Priest-supervisors were elected from and by the parish clergy, whereas area-supervisors (*zakashchiki*), who were frequently members of the lower clergy as well, were appointed by the bishop. Together, priest-supervisors and area-supervisors contributed to an improvement in episcopal administration by flushing out a great many illegalities, amassing large quantities of data on churches and clergy, and collecting in vast sums for episcopal treasuries, according to the evidence of diocesan archives. The church hierarchy were evidently satisfied with their performance: they issued no public rebukes against priest-supervisors,¹²⁰ and rarely fined or dismissed them for dereliction of duty.¹²¹ Each successive church council between 1604 and 1699 endorsed the appointment of supervisors from the white clergy and recommended their wider employment, and most prelates appear to have gradually increased the number employed in their eparchies. Generally, the white clergy fared well under the supervision of their peers, it seems, albeit that priest-supervisors were not paragons of virtue. An episcopal investigation in 1688–89 revealed that Sol' Vychegodsk supervisors were taking bribes (*pochest'*) from parish priests, in contravention of church rules,¹²² and several similar charges against ordained episcopal agents appear in ecclesiastical records, but on the whole, these complaints were few and petty compared to the numerous petitions against *desiatil'niki*.¹²³ The relative paucity of complaints against priest-supervisors was largely due to the fact that abuse of power was limited by the temporary nature of the job. An elected supervisor held his office for a period of one to three years only before being replaced, hence fear of reprisals from colleagues restrained him

¹¹⁰ Samuilov, "Desiatil'niki i popovskie starosty," 1394.

¹¹¹ AAE 1, no. 360; AAE 2, no. 223.

¹¹² V.I and G.I.Kholmogorov, eds., *Istoricheskie materialy o tserkvakh i selakh XVI–XVIII stoletii* (Moscow: S.F.Snegireva, 1886), pt. 5, 3.

¹¹³ AAE 3, no. 264; Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. 11, 84.

¹¹⁴ LZAK 14, 11 (1627–35); Prilezhaev, *Novgorod-Sofiiskaia kazna*, 79.

¹¹⁵ AAE 4, no. 198, 4, no. 204.

¹¹⁶ For example, Kholmogory tithe-collectors were told in 1689 that they must not over-charge priests "so that his holiness the archbishop will receive no petitions about this in future." RIB 12, no. 198 (Ust).

¹¹⁷ For a Siberian example see Melety, *Drevniia tserkovnyiia gramoty*, no. 15.

¹¹⁸ Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii*, vol. 1, 358–59; Shimko, *Patriarskii Kazennyi prikaz*, 145–47. Episcopal supervision barely penetrated northern parishes until after 1670.

from dishonesty. In addition, prelates instituted a system of mutual supervision that foreshadowed Peter the Great's administrative system. Bishops encouraged clergy to inform on dishonest or negligent priest-supervisors,¹²⁴ and made supervisors from the lower clergy accountable to an archpriest, abbot or *desiatil'nik*, who was in turn responsible for ensuring that subordinates fulfilled their duties honestly.¹²⁵ Newly-elected priest-supervisors had to carefully audit the books of the out-going supervisor, and they were ordered to thoroughly question parish priests about their predecessor's collections, in order to expose any illegality.¹²⁶

Although the new system worked well, priest-supervisors never entirely replaced *desiatil'niki*, who continued to serve in episcopal supervisory capacities until the early eighteenth century. *Desiatil'niki* were still needed simply because there were not enough priests willing to be supervisors. The financial and administrative tasks for which an episcopal supervisor was responsible were overwhelming, requiring more time than a priest's liturgical and pastoral obligations allowed. A supervisor could delegate some of his duties, yet the majority had to be carried out personally, and fear of punishment for failing to tend to the bishop's tasks must in many cases have led to the neglect of a priest-supervisor's own church. One Nizhnii Novgorod abbot complained in the early 1640s that the area-supervisor, archpriest Volodimir, hardly ever came to church services because he was always occupied with the prelate's administrative duties.¹²⁷ The same problem concerned parishioners of Erenskii gorodok in 1692–93 after their assistant priest left, as we can see from their petition to the archbishop: "And now by your ukaz, lord, the other priest at that church, priest Mikhail, has been elected as priest-supervisor for your holiness's affairs and is sent on your lordship's business to all Erensk *uezd*, and this church of God is now without services."¹²⁸ In 1701 the Monastery Prikaz took over management of collections of church tithes and dues in all eparchies,¹²⁹ and after 1721 bishops lost their autonomy and became accountable to Synod, which itself was under the control of the Sovereign.¹³⁰ By the late 1760s the post of priest-

¹¹⁹ LZAK 14, no. 15 (1669).

¹²⁰ AI 5, no. 244, AI 5, no. 152, AI 4, no. 240.

¹²¹ Accusations of negligence or dismissed in Vologda eparchy: OSS, pt. 7, 60–63, 109–10, pt. 9, 150, no. 128; pt. 11, 164, 177. One case was acquitted.

¹²² RIB 12, no. 196 Ust.; cf. AI 5, no. 244; AI 4, no. 240.

¹²³ Accusations-RGADA f. 1433, op. 1, d. 68; RIB 12, no. 26 Khol.; RIB 14, no. 23 Ust.; RIB 12, no. 211 Ust.; RIB 25, nos. 214, 215; LZAK 14, 114, 141. Acquittals—OSS, pt. 5, 63, no. 122; RIB 12, no. 200 Ust.; RIB 12, no. 196 Ust.

¹²⁴ OSS, pt. 5, 63, no. 122; SKE, 257; AI 4, no. 240; Kollmann, "The Moscow Stoglav Church Council of 1551," 465, 472.

¹²⁵ Kollmann, "The Moscow Stoglav Church Council of 1551," 465, 472; AAE 1, no. 360, 2, no. 223; AI 5, no. 244; OSS, pt. 5, 63, no. 122; SKE, 257

¹²⁶ AAE 4, no. 249; LZAK 14, 12, 141; OSS, pt. 13, 54, no. 60; DAI 12, no. 35; A.N. Piskarev, ed. *Drevnie gramoty i akty riazanskogo kraia*, (St. Petersburg: T.A.Terskov, 1854), no. 37; SKE, 66, no. 10.

supervisor had been phased out altogether and replaced by consistories and superintendents,¹³¹ but continuing complaints by the clergy against corruption by these new episcopal agents and appeals for the re-introduction of elected priest-supervisors suggest that the modern superintendents were in fact little better than the old *desiatil'niki*.¹³²

PARISH ADMINISTRATION

One of the last major reforms of the seventeenth century to directly affect the white clergy was the modernization of parish administration, which was begun by the church and later expanded by Peter the Great. Prior to the 1600s the white clergy had little to do with general parish finances, apart from storing valuables in the church. Instead, the church elder and treasurer, who were elected by the parochial council (*mir*), managed the parish funds and leased out church land to tenants.¹³³ Only on rare occasions do we find mention of a priest acting as treasurer.¹³⁴ Under enterprising bishops like Afanasii of Kholmogory, however, the parish clergy began to take a more prominent role in parish business.¹³⁵ In order to reduce the power of the laity, Afanasii decreed in October 1685 that at each church the priest was to take control of the finances, and the elder would henceforth be an assistant, subordinate to the priest—a reversal of the former status quo.¹³⁶ Afanasii's policies were not a complete success: the laity retained more control than he wished.¹³⁷ Even so, his reform elevated the role of the clergy, the effect of which can be seen from 393 letters concerning parish business in the archives of the Church of St. George and Epiphany in Lodma. Only three of the 252 letters written during the sixteenth century mention the parish priest at all: he evidently had no say in the parish economy. Likewise, the clerical role is negligible in the 141 letters written between 1600 and 1686. In contrast, after 1686 every letter from the Kholmogory episcopal office was addressed primarily to the priest rather than to the parochial council, as had formerly been the case, and in virtually every letter the clergyman takes a central role in parish financial affairs that were previously undertaken exclusively by the laity.¹³⁸ Afanasii's policy, purportedly generated by his concern that church elders had been pilfering from parish funds, was an intrinsic part of his plan to use parish priests as his local administrators, thereby extending episcopal control into the remotest corners of his eparchy.¹³⁹

¹²⁷ RIB 2, no. 212, 959.

¹²⁸ RIB 12, no. 231 Ust.

¹²⁹ Prilezhaev, *Novgorod-Sofiiskaia kazna*, 89.

¹³⁰ Freeze, *The Russian Levites*, 51–77; Cracraft, *Church Reform*, 165–261.

¹³¹ Samuilov, “Desiatil’niki i popovskie starosty,” 1396. In some eparchies, such as Vladimir, prelates continued to employ priest-supervisors until 1767, but they found it more convenient to appoint them, rather than have them elected.

¹³² Freeze, *The Russian Levites*, 53–58; Belliutsin, *Description of the Clergy*, 157–58.

STATE INVOLVEMENT IN CLERICAL REFORM

Archbishop Afanasii was not the only Russian leader to make use of the parish clergy for administrative purposes and for the maintenance of central authority, neither was he the first. Changes in the civic role of parish priests began early in the seventeenth century as church and state alike placed demands on parish priests that foreshadowed Peter the Great's "service clergy." Scholars have tended to underestimate the degree to which Peter's exploitation of the clerical estate was a continuation or intensification of his predecessors' policies.¹⁴⁰ Tsar Mikhail's government imposed obligatory duties upon clergymen that became more extensive during the following reigns. Priests had long been obliged to write up documents and sign them on behalf of elected officials, tax collectors, prison guards, and army recruits,¹⁴¹ and were increasingly liable to be called on by the government to serve as witnesses during tax assessments, or when there was a legal dispute over property boundaries.¹⁴² Like officers in a Justice department, the white clergy were burdened with numerous legal tasks, especially priest-supervisors, whose responsibilities extended to interrogating witnesses and judging defendants. In both civil and episcopal courts, confessors had to assist in cases involving their parishioners and to sign their statements.¹⁴³ Theoretically, priests did not have to reveal the secrets of the confessional, but in practice they could be required to disclose the intentions of their parishioners in certain cases, even if it meant relying on statements made in confession. When a Vologda nobleman's wife left him in 1662, for instance, the wife's confessor was summoned to court to give evidence regarding charges against her.¹⁴⁴ Information provided by a confessor could have a significant bearing on cases involving moral issues. When a woman was charged with bigamy in 1685, the family's parish priest was interrogated and required to give information that could only have been known to him through the confessional. His evidence was crucial to resolving the case and rescuing her from life-long incarceration in a convent.¹⁴⁵ For the duration of the seventeenth-century, however, tsars stopped short of declaring it a legal duty for a priest to disclose the secrets of the confessional: "interrogate confessors in chancelleries about oral commands and wills, but do not interrogate the confessor about what has been told to him in

¹³³ RIB 25, no. 67; RIB 12, nos. 818, 828; Bogoslovskii, *Zemskoe Samoupravlenie*, vol. 2, 41–43.

¹³⁴ From 1613 to 1621 priests of Kuropol'sk church served as treasurers (*prikashchiki*); RIB 12, no. 144 Ust. (1683); RIB 12, nos. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 Khol.

¹³⁵ RIB 25, no. 277–79 (1630s).

¹³⁶ RIB 14, no. 195 (Oct. 1685); Bogoslovskii, *Zemskoe Samoupravlenie*, vol. 2, 86.

¹³⁷ RIB 25, nos. 276, 303, 309; Bogoslovskii, *Zemskoe Samoupravlenie*, vol. 2, 46.

¹³⁸ RIB 25, nos. 246–394.

¹³⁹ SPIRIAN, f. 117, op. 1, d. 465 (1658); RIB 14, no. 473 Khol. See also V. Veriuzhskii, *Afanasii, Arkhiepiskop Kholmogorskii i Vazhskii* (St. Petersburg: I.V. Leont'ev, 1908).

¹⁴⁰ James Cracraft, *Church Reform*, 76–77, 100, 246; Evgenii V. Anisimov, *The Reforms of Peter the Great*, trans. Jay Alexander (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 208, 210

repentance," Tsar Fedor decreed in 1680.¹⁴⁶ Fedor's successor Peter took the final step in transforming the clergy into civil servants when he decreed in 1721 that all priests were legally responsible for revealing any "illegality [...] treason or mutiny" revealed in confession, on pain of being tried for treason themselves.¹⁴⁷

In other spheres too, we find evidence that Peter the Great's church reform was anticipated by changes during the seventeenth century. Long before Peter issued his decree of February 20, 1724 making parish priests responsible for keeping registers of births, deaths and marriages,¹⁴⁸ the seventeenth-century white clergy were being used as registrars by both church and state. Clergymen had to furnish their local episcopal office with data on the number of marriages, illegitimate births and irregular deaths there were in the parish each year, and in 1667 the Moscow church council ordered all priests to keep registers listing full particulars of the names, dates and addresses of all persons presenting for marriage and baptism, and their sponsors.¹⁴⁹ Successive Muscovite governments called on the parish clergy to supply information and statistics on the deceased after the great plague of 1654 and subsequent epidemics.¹⁵⁰ Parish priests had to be ready to perform a variety of other duties for the State when needed, such as administering the oath of allegiance,¹⁵¹ billeting troops, and serving as *tseloval'niki* to collect the government's grain requisitions from the people.¹⁵² Neither was Peter the first ruler to exploit clerics for publicizing "the monarch's commands."¹⁵³ From the earliest years of the seventeenth century, parish clergy were obliged to announce every royal birth, death and marriage,¹⁵⁴ to read out the tsar's letters in times of war or natural disaster, to order the people to pray for the royal family and for the tsar's armies, and to announce news of victories.¹⁵⁵

From the 1660s the Muscovite government, in league with the church, began to look to the lower clergy to police the countryside. Orthodoxy was equated with loyalty to the crown, hence after the Nikonian ecclesiastical reforms had been ratified by Tsar Aleksei and Moscow church councils, parish priests were expected to inform on subjects who failed to conform. In a decree of March 10, 1660, the tsar commanded all priests to record the names of parishioners who failed to appear in church or attend confession and send these details to the local

¹⁴¹ Vladimir A. Borisov, *Opisanie goroda Shui i ego okrestnostei, s prilozheniem starinykh aktov*, Prilozhenie, (Moscow: Tip. Ved. Mosk. Gorod. Politsii, 1851), 261; DGPV 1, 55 xix (1627); DGPV 3, 155 (1670); RIB 24, 931–1042 (1646).

¹⁴² AIuB 2, nos. 132, 135, 136 iii and iv, 137; DAI 2, no. 56, 133 (1627); RIB 35, no. 55, 98 (1606); RIB 38, 92 (1597).

¹⁴³ LZAK 27, no. 792 (1668); OSS, 4, 5, 7, 9, 26, 85, 106; pt. 8, 23, 25, 29, 57, pt. 11, 14, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37, 45, 48, 53, 64, 67, 76, 79, 91, 121, 125, 135, 143, 145, 173; pt. 12, 24, 72; pt. 13, 4, 17; Borisov, *Opisanie goroda Shui*, 261, no. 11 (1621).

¹⁴⁴ OSS, pt. 11, 91, no. 73. A similar example is OSS, pt. 10, 78–79, no. 60 (1679).

¹⁴⁵ OSS, pt 10, 105.

¹⁴⁶ PSZ 2, no. 827 (1680); LZAK 27 nos. 835, 860 (1669, 1670).

¹⁴⁷ *Spiritual Regulation*, Article 11 of the Supplement, 28 April 1722, 60–61.

¹⁴⁸ PSZ 7, no. 4480, 266–67 (1724): Petrine registers were called *Metricheskie knigi*.

governor.¹⁵⁶ This revolutionary decree was regularly re-issued in succeeding years with only slight variations, and it continued to be official policy even into the eighteenth century.¹⁵⁷ For most of the seventeenth century, it seems, hopes were high that by this means dissenters could be weeded out.¹⁵⁸ Lists of non-attendees were duly compiled, and a number of parish priests denounced schismatics in their congregation.¹⁵⁹ A few even became fervent crusaders against schism, like priest Ermolai of Beser'genev and his friends, who volunteered to hunt out dissidents along the Don and Chira rivers in 1686 and were paid expenses by the tsar for their endeavors, but their efforts ultimately failed owing to their own internal quarrels.¹⁶⁰ Despite the efforts of Russia's leaders of church and state, schism continued to spread, largely because too many parish priests were turning a blind eye.¹⁶¹ Even so, measures to detect schismatics had the useful side-effect of supplying the government with more information on the populace, and by 1699 priests were being told to keep a record of the names of all their parishioners, not just dissenters.¹⁶²

In the field of social welfare, too, the white clergy's responsibilities increased during the seventeenth century. Almost every church traditionally provided some form of free accommodation for paupers and widows who were "maintained by the church,"¹⁶³ but the government imposed additional charitable obligations on parish priests by sending war refugees to be homed with clergymen in 1618–21 and 1648–51, and by taxing the clergy for the redemption of prisoners-of-war after 1661.¹⁶⁴ The Church too, expected white priests to assume greater

¹⁴⁹ DAI 5, no. 102, 461–2 (1666–67). The Church hierarchy wanted this information to facilitate the full collection of their fees and to prevent uncanonical practices. Many examples of birth, death and marriage reports from priests can be found in Vologda diocesan records (OSS) and Piskarev, *Drevnie gramoty*, no. 37.

¹⁵⁰ AIuB 2, nos. 132, 136 iii, iv, 137; DGPV 1, 154, 162; DGPV 2, 3; DAI 4, no. 29; DAI 11, no. 42.

¹⁵¹ Administering the oath was usually a cathedral archpriest's responsibility, but parish priests performed this role in certain districts on crown land, or when Moscow nobles were unable to take the oath at a cathedral: PSZ 2, no. 620, 3 (1676); RGADA f. 1107, op. 1, pt. 2, d. 3453 (1688).

¹⁵² AI 3, no. 280 (1614); Stepan N. Mameev, ed. *Rukopisi biblioteki tobol'skago gubernskago muzei za XVII i pervuiu chetvert XVIII stoletii*, (Tobol'sk; Tip. Gubernskago pravleniia, 1894–96), pt. 1, 25, 33, nos. 93, 121, 126 (1636–45), pt. 2, 19, no. 166 (1653–54).

¹⁵³ PSZ 5, no. 3169 (17 Feb. 1719); Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 345.

¹⁵⁴ RIB 35, nos. 371, 341, 353, 448; PSZ 1, nos. 235, 444, 446, 464, 495; PSZ 2, nos. 748, 878, 881, 1356, PSZ 3, no. 1378, 1406, 1417; AAE 2, no. 31; DAI 8 nos. 9, 102; RIB 5, no. 287.

¹⁵⁵ AAE 2, nos. 28, 57, 58, 67, 73; AAE 3, nos. 333, 334; PSZ 1, nos. 47, 514; DAI 3, no. 123; DAI 4, no. 16; DAI 8, no. 33; Andrei A. Titov, ed. *Dvinskaiia letopis'* (Moscow: P.A. Fokin, 1889), 96; Nikolai I. Novikov, ed. *Drevnaia Rossiiskaia Vivliofika* (St. Petersburg, 1788–91), pt. 11, vii, 173; RIB 14, no. 144 Khol.; RIB 35, nos. 69, 429.

¹⁵⁶ AAE 4, no. 115.

responsibility for the poor. In 1677–78, for instance, Patriarch Ioakim ordered all paupers' shacks in Moscow streets to be demolished and the inhabitants sent to parish churches, where they were to build themselves new huts on church land, and in 1682 he taxed the lower clergy to pay for Moscow almshouses.¹⁶⁵ Unfortunately, it was not uncommon for a priest to find himself robbed or betrayed by those he gave refuge to. After priest Nikifor of Moshka village and his wife had looked after an orphaned beggar-girl for seven years, she tried to extort money from them by falsely accusing the priest of rape.¹⁶⁶ Despite these problems, priests could not escape from the obligation to shelter these people, for the Muscovite state offered no alternative to paupers other than to find aid from the church, and the Petrine government basically continued these policies. Peter the Great's plans for orphanages and hospitals relied largely on the unpaid service of parish priests, who were expected to serve as carers and administrators.¹⁶⁷

For the average Muscovite parish clergyman, however, there was no reward for his labors on behalf of the state. Few received state stipends, and many were burdened with crippling state taxes and imposts as well as episcopal ones.¹⁶⁸ Prior to 1649 the clergy had been legally liable only to the judgements of their bishop, except in cases involving theft, treason and murder, but the promulgation of Tsar Aleksei's Law Code (*Ulozhenie*) left the provincial clergy within the jurisdiction of local governors (*voevody*), who proved to be notoriously corrupt and unjust.¹⁶⁹ Although ecclesiastical legal immunities were to some extent restored in 1667 and 1669,¹⁷⁰ governors were reluctant to relinquish their authority, and the lower clergy became pawns in an on-going battle between church and state. Bishops frequently protested against the illegal taxation and punishment of their clergy by provincial governors, yet the government did little

¹⁵⁷ PSZ 5, no. 3169 (17 Feb. 1719); *Spiritual Regulation*, 48 (1721).

¹⁵⁸ PSZ 1, no. 570, 966 (1 March 1674); "Materialy dlia istorii Arkhangel'skoi eparkhii," ChOIDR (1880), kn. 2, 6; LZAK 14, 55; DAI 11, no. 39, 42; DAI 8, no. 92, 317; PSZ 3, no. 1612 art. 9 (Dec. 1697).

¹⁵⁹ Priests' reports from Novgorod parishes exist in RGIA, f. 834, op. 2, d. 1849–55 (1690–97); LZAK 14, 15.

¹⁶⁰ DAI 12, no. 17 iii–v.

¹⁶¹ Metropolitan Kornilii of Novgorod warned that any priest who covered up for a schismatic would be expelled: DAI 8, no. 92, 317 (1681); LZAK 14., 99 (1692).

¹⁶² Melety, *Drevniia tserkovnyiia gramoty*, no. 80. Priests were told to list the names of women and children as well.

¹⁶³ Parish-maintained homes for the poor are mentioned in numerous sources, such as DAI 6, no. 90; RIB 12, no. 245 (Ust.), 1150–1; OSS, pt. 8, 81; OSS, pt. 3, 3, no. 1 (1652); OSS pt. 11, 139, no. 129 (1668); MTS 4, 17; I.Ia.Kunkin, ed. *Gorod Kashin. Materialy dlia ego istorii*, 2 vols., (Moscow: Imp. ob-va istorii i drevnostei rossiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, 1903–05), vol.2, no. 20; Borisov, *Opisanie goroda Shui*, 91; Grigorii N.Anpilogov, *Riazanskaia pistsovaia pripravochnaia kniga*, (Moscow: MGU, 1982), 324. *Pamiatniki delovoi pis'mennosti*, no. 186, (1683).

¹⁶⁴ RIB 38, 446, 484, 465; LZAK 27, n. 115; AAE 2, no. 52; DAI 1, no. 77; AI 5, no. 37, 264; AI 5, no. 141; DAV, no. 157; DGPV 3, 48 cvii; PSZ, no. 956; AAE 4 nos. 228, 232; AI 4, nos. 33, 216; SPIRIAN, f. 171, Novgorod, pt. 5, nos. 206, 209.

to alleviate the situation.¹⁷¹ In contrast to the lowly parish clergy, cathedral clergy generally received generous financial and social remuneration from the crown, albeit that they had been made painfully aware of the fact that their royal stipends, grants and charters were not a guaranteed salary nor an inalienable possession, but a grant, the gift of the sovereign, which he could give or withhold at pleasure.¹⁷² As the century drew to a close, darker clouds loomed on the horizon for Muscovy's cathedrals. In 1694 archpriest Feodor Mikhailov and staff of Tot'ma cathedral discovered to their dismay that the government had ceased all payments to the cathedral, without notice.¹⁷³ This was the beginning of Tsar Peter's measures to divert state funds to support his military ventures. By 1698 the majority of stipends, privileges and immunity charters issued to cathedral clergy had been curtailed or abolished.¹⁷⁴

The "modernization" of the Russian church and the transformation of the white clergy into civil servants, for which Peter the Great has been credited, began decades before the Reforming Tsar's reign. Although Peter's church reform was more radical than those of previous governments and hit clergymen harder, many of his ideas followed closely the precedents set by seventeenth-century bishops, patriarchs and sovereigns before him. His predecessors on the throne invariably viewed the clergy as a useful arm of the state and ruthlessly exploited them to bolster royal power. They obliged parish priests to carry out numerous administrative and policing duties, to be unpaid social workers, registrars and scribes for the benefit of the crown or state. Reforms undertaken by the church hierarchy, on the other hand, though sometimes used to defend

¹⁶⁵ Ivan E. Zabelin, ed. *Materialy dlia istorii, arkheologii i statistiki moskovskikh tserkvei*, (Moscow: Izd. Moskovskoi gorodskoi dumy, 1884), 1085; AAE 4, no. 275; PSZ 2, no. 956, 468 (1682).

¹⁶⁶ *Pamiatniki delovoi pis'mennosti*, no. 186; RGADA f. 1433, op. 1, d. 45 (1683). A similar charge was made against priest Aleksei of Totma: RIB 12, no. 245 (Ust), 1150–51.

¹⁶⁷ Cracraft, *Church Reform*, 96–97. In 1704 Peter the Great ordered midwives to take malformed infants to the parish priest, who was required to report the matter to the Monastery prikaz. Peter also proposed that orphanages were to be founded near parish churches "as is seemly," and orphanage carers were to be paid from "surplus" parish revenue: PSZ 4, no. 1964, PSZ 5, no. 2856.

¹⁶⁸ An example of clerical destitution caused by state taxes can be found in RIB 12, 145 (Ustiug, 1684).

¹⁶⁹ AAE 4, nos. 155, 161 (1667); PSZ 1, no. 442, 800 (1669), 1, no. 505, 869 (1672); R. Hellie, "The Church and the Law in Late Muscovy: Chapters 12 and 13 of the Ulozhenie of 1649," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 25 (1991), 179–99.

¹⁷⁰ AAE 4, no. 161 (1667); PSZ 1, no. 442, 800 (1669).

¹⁷¹ Numerous cases of oppression of clergy by governors exist in seventeenth-century records, such as OSS, pt. 7, 11, 65, pt. 10, 72, 90; RIB 12:270; AAE 4, no. 176 (1670); DAI 10, no. 101 (1683); ChOIDR (1882), kn. 2, smes', 14–15; Nikolai A. Popov, ed. *Akty Moskovskago gosudarstva*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1890–1901) vol. 2, no. 610; S.P. Znamenskii, "Prikhodskoe dukhovenstvo na Rusi," *Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie* 22 (1867), 188.

episcopal authority against encroachment by the laity, were frequently inspired from below and carried out for the benefit of ordinary clergymen. The election or appointment of supervisors from the lower clergy, the decision to allow widowed clergy to remain serving as parish priests, episcopal measures to raise moral and educational standards amongst the clergy, and Patriarch Ioakim's campaign to reorganize church land were all initiated in response to requests from the white clergy themselves. Some of these innovations met with disappointing results, such as the attempt to reclaim church land and ameliorate the position of widowed clergymen. There were also successes. Ordination procedure was improved and the updating of Russian liturgical practice set a standard that remained long in use. Least recognized by later generations, perhaps, is the contribution made by seventeenth-century episcopal reforms to the modernization of clerical education. Though often accused by scholars of holding back progress in education, the Muscovite church introduced gradual improvements in literacy levels during the last third of the century that laid a firm foundation upon which later reformers built.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NOTES

AAE	<i>Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsiei imp. Akademii nauk.</i> 4 Vols. (St. Petersburg: 1836).
AI	<i>Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannnye arkheograficheskoiu kommissiei.</i> 5 Vols. (St. Petersburg: 1841–42).
AIU	<i>Akty iuridicheskie.</i> (St. Petersburg: 1838).
AIuB	<i>Akty otnosiashchiesia do iuridicheskago byta drevnei Rossii.</i> 3 Vols. (St. Petersburg: 1884).
CHOIDR	<i>Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh.</i>
DAI	<i>Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim, sobrannye Arkheograficheskoi kommissii.</i> 12 Vols. (St. Petersburg: 1846–72).
DAV	<i>Drevnye akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Viatskago kraia.</i> (Viatka: 1881).
DGPV	<i>Drevnie gramoty i drugie pis'mennye pamiatniki' kasaiushchiesia Voronezhskot gubernii.</i> eds. N. Vtorovyi and K. Aleksandrovyi-Dol'ikov, 3 Vols. (Voronezh: 1851–53).

¹⁷² For example, Kazan' Archpriest Deonisi and his staff had a difficult task reclaiming fishing rights that had been granted by Ivan IV and later rescinded by Tsar Mikhail, and other provincial cathedral clergy had similar problems: RIB 35, no. 337, 637 (1624); DAI 6, no. 65, 5, no. 65; RIB 35, no. 337; DAV, nos. 98, 133.

¹⁷³ RIB 12, no. 244 Ust.

¹⁷⁴ PSZ3, nos. 1664, 1711.

- GAVO** Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Vologodskoi oblasti.
- LZAK14** P.Ianovskii, 'Opisanie aktov novgorodskago sofiiskago doma', *Ljetopis' zaniatii arkheograficheskoi kommissii*. Vol.14 (St. Petersburg: 1902).
- LZAK27** M.G.Kurdimov, 'Opisanie aktov khраниashchikhsia v arkhive Imperatorskoi Arkheograficheskoi kommissii. Kolleksiia P.I.Sawaitova', *Letopis' zaniatii arkheograficheskoi kommissii*. Vol. 27 (St. Petersburg: 1915).
- MTS 2** N.D.Izvekov, 'Moskovskiiia kremlevskiiia dvortsovyia tserkvi i sluzhivshiia pri nikh litsa v XVII vek', *Moskovskaia tserkovnaia starina*. Vol. 2 (Moscow: 1906).
- OPMAMIU** *Opisanie dokumentov i bumag khраниashchikhsia v Moskovskom arkhive Ministerstva iustitsii*. Vol. 16. (Moscow: 1910).
- OSS** N.I.Suvorov, *Opisanie sobraniia svitkov, nakhodiashchikhsia v Vologodskom eparkhial'nom drevnekhраниlishche*. 13 Parts. (Vologda: 1899–1917).
- PNG** Archimandrite Makarii, *Pamiatniki tserkovnykh drevnostei. Nizhegorodskaia Guberniia*. (St. Petersburg: 1857).
- PSZ** *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii*. Vols. 1–3 (St. Petersburg: 1830).
- RGADA** Rossiiskii (formerly Tsentral'nyi) gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov.
- RGIA** Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv, St.Petersburg.
- RH** *Russian History*
- RIB** *Russkaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka*. 39 Vols. (Spb.1875–1927).
- SKE** 'Saraiskaiai i krutitskaia eparkhii', ChOIDR Vol.203 1902 Bk. 4.
- SPIRIAN** Sankt-Peterburgskii Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii Akademii Nauk (formerly LOI).

THE PATRIARCH'S RIVALS: LOCAL STRONGMEN AND THE LIMITS OF CHURCH REFORM DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Georg B.Michels

Russian historians have grappled with the origins of the Russian Schism or *Raskol* for the last two centuries and few topics of Muscovite history have generated as large a body of secondary literature. Interpretations fall into two basic camps following models set by the pre-revolutionary scholar Pavel S.Smironov and the Soviet scholar Vladimir G.Kartsov. Smironov, a specialist in seventeenth-century polemic literature, attributed the schism entirely to the writings of a few men, the so-called Old Believers who rejected the liturgical reforms of Patriarch Nikon. To Smironov, apocalyptic and anti-Western ideas contained in letters and treatises written by Old Believers such as Archpriest Avvakum Petrov, Deacon Fedor Ivanov, and Abbot Spiridon Potemkin strongly influenced general societal moods and caused a massive refusal to accept the reforms by the deeply religious and xenophobic Russian masses.¹ Kartsov agreed with Smironov on the centrality of Old Believer texts, but he argued that these texts used the language of religion only as a propagandistic device to inspire a broad movement of protest against the prevailing socio-economic order. In particular, Kartsov argued that the Old Believers provided the ideology for large popular revolts such as the Don Cossack revolt of the late 1660s.²

Western scholars have largely followed the Smironov school of thought. Pierre Pascal viewed the Old Believers as the founders of a new alternative church that was in constant struggle with the church of Patriarch Nikon. According to Pascal, Nikon had no real sense of the deeper meaning of religious conviction and used religion only as a means to bolster his political and administrative power while the Old Believers were “the more serious Christians.” The schism created a profound spiritual rift that deprived patriarch and church of its popular religious support.³ More recently, Robert O.Crummey has argued that the first generation of Old Believers created “a canon of sacred texts” which “formed the

¹ Pavel S.Smironov observed what he called a primitive “literal and ritualistic faith” (*bukvo-obriado-verie*) and spoke, in particular, of “eschatological hope” (*eskhatologicheskoe chaianie*) which he considered an extension of traditional Muscovite anti-Latinism and end time expectations evoked by Catholic aspirations in the East. See Pavel S.Smironov, *Vnutrennie voprosy v raskole v XVII veke* (St. Petersburg: Tovarishestvo “Pechatnia S.P.Iakovleva,” 1898), CXXIX–CXXXIII. Cf. similar statements in Nikolai F. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i tsar’ Aleksei Mikhailovich*, 2 vols. (Sergiev Posad: Tip. Sviato-Troitskoi Sergievoi Lavry, 1909– 12), esp. vol. 1, 447, 489.

cultural backbone of the movement [against the church].” These texts were accessible to men and women “of various social backgrounds” and influenced popular culture by “osmosis.” Crummey expresses the dominant Western view of the Russian Schism by stating that all manifestations of protest against the official liturgies shared Old Believers’ “devotion of pre-Nikonian Orthodoxy” as “the only authentic expression of the Christian faith left in the world.”⁴

My own interpretation of the schism breaks with the two main schools of thought and can be traced to Afanasii P. Shchapov and Vasilii G. Druzhinin, two largely forgotten scholars of the pre-revolutionary era. Both de-emphasized the significance of Old Believer texts and focused instead on archival sources. In particular, Shchapov argued that local contexts must be studied in order to elucidate the popular dimensions of the schism. He repeatedly noticed the existence of local anti-church traditions and the absence of a strong sense of Orthodox Christian identity among the vast majority of Russians.⁵ Shchapov was hampered in the elucidation of his provocative observations by a rather limited access to seventeenth-century archives, but his arguments were illustrated in great detail by Druzhinin’s unsurpassed work on the schism and the Don Cossacks. Druzhinin convincingly demonstrated that one cannot understand the *Raskol* of the southern steppe without first identifying the Don Cossacks’ longstanding tensions with Muscovite church and state.⁶ In other words, both scholars called for the study of the local histories that preceded—or coincided with—the outbreak of the schism.

² Vladimir G. Kartsov, *Religiozni raskol kak forma antifeodal'nogo protesta v istorii Rossii*, 2 vols. (Kalinin: 1971), vol. 1, 76–101. One might argue that Kartsov assimilated the views of the early Soviet scholar Sergei P. Mel'gunov, cf. *Religiozno-obshchestvennye dvizheniia XVII–XVIII vv.* (Moscow: “Zadruga,” 1922).

³ Pierre Pascal, *Avvakum et les débuts du raskol. La crise religieuse au XVIIe siècle en Russie*, vol. 7 of *Études sur l'histoire, l'économie et la sociologie des pays slaves* (Paris-The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), XVI–XVII, XXII, XXIV.

⁴ Like Smirnov, Crummey is an expert in Old Believer texts, and this leads him to postulate a significant influence of Old Believer “high culture” or “book culture” on ordinary Russians. Cf. Robert O. Crummey, “Old Belief as Popular Religion: New Approaches,” *Slavic Review* 52:4 (Winter, 1993), 700–12, esp. 703, 705–7; idem, “Past and Present Interpretations of Old Belief,” 6, forthcoming in Georg B. Michels and Robert L. Nichols, eds., *Russia's Dissident Old Believers* (Minneapolis: Modern Greek Studies, 2003); idem, “The Origins of the Old Believers’ Cultural systems: The Works of Avraamii,” *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (1994), 121–38, esp. 124, 138. Similar views were expressed by Sergei A. Zenkovskii and Michael Cherniavsky in Sergei A. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe staroobriadchestvo. Dukhovnye dvizheniia semnadtsatogo veka*, vol. 21 of *Forum Slavicum*, ed. Dmitrii Tschievskij (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1970) and Michael Cherniavsky, “The Old Believers and the New Religion,” *Slavic Review* 25:1 (March, 1966), 1–39.

⁵ Afanasii P. Shchapov, *Russkii raskol staroobriadchestva, razsmatrivaemy v sviazi s vnutrennim sostoianiem russkoi tserkvi i grazhdanstvennosti v XVII veke i v pervoi polovine XVIII veka. Opyt istoricheskogo issledovaniia o prichinakh proiskhozhdeniia i rasprostraneniia russkogo raskola* (Kazan', Izd. knigoprodavtsa I. Dubrovina, 1859), 159, 250–62, 365–80.

I have argued that the “religious language,” “logic,” and “political theology” of the Old Believers hardly provided the catalyst sufficient for the schism.⁷ The “old belief” (*staraia vera*) writers and preachers of the seventeenth century constituted a small minority out of touch with the religious aspirations of ordinary Muscovites; they recruited themselves largely from disaffected members of the Russian church elite with whom they shared a learned and arrogant language of religious reform. Their communities remained small and comprised mostly family members and a few exceptional zealots. Isolated from the popular masses these old belief communities quickly dissolved under persecutionary pressures. The establishment of the Old Believer Church (*staroverie* or *staroobriadchestvo*) which played a visible role in modern Russian history occurred only at the turn of the eighteenth century with the emergence of stable old belief community networks.⁸

But if the schism had little to do with the preaching of old belief zealots, what then was its essential nature? I have argued that the schism—or better, what contemporary church sources described as a schism (*raskol*)—was in fact a crisis of church power that occurred on two distinct levels. On the institutional level it became obvious that entire regions had escaped the reach of the patriarch and his bishops. Leaders of monasteries, peasant strongmen, Cossack elders, and merchants banned church agents from their spheres of influence and effectively prevented the implementation of reforms. On the popular level the church failed to change the religious behavior of countless ordinary Muscovites. A vast reservoir of itinerant clerics and runaway peasants could not be disciplined due to their enormous mobility. And in addition, there were many individuals such as inspired artisan preachers and women ascetics who sought religious meaning on their own without consulting church representatives. This double crisis was not inspired by any coherent ideology. On the contrary, the implementation of liturgical reforms that began during the patriarchate of Patriarch Nikon (1652–66) revealed unambiguously to church leaders that they had insufficient clout to change the religious affairs of Muscovy.⁹

The Muscovite church had attempted a number of reform projects since the creation of the patriarchate in 1589, but all of these reforms had failed. For example, the foundation charter of the patriarchate had envisaged the creation of several new bishoprics to increase church control over remote monasteries and parishes. But the patriarchs’ efforts to carve out smaller ecclesiastical domains from the gigantic territories held by Muscovy’s prelates quickly collapsed during the Time of Troubles.¹⁰ Patriarch Filaret’s ambitious efforts to regulate the

⁶ Vasilii G. Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu v kontse XVII veka* (St. Petersburg: Tip. I.N. Skorokhodova, 1889), esp. III–IX.

⁷ These or similar terms are commonly found in the scholarly literature, cf. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe staroobriadchestvo*, 7; Cherniavsky, “Old Believers and New Religion,” 5, 16, 19, 39; Anna S. Eleonskaia, *Russkaia publitsistika vtoroi poloviny XVII veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 73–75, 124.

⁸ See, for example, Georg B. Michels, “Some Observations on the Social History of Old Belief During the Seventeenth Century,” forthcoming in *Russia’s Dissident Old Believers (1650–1950)*.

liturgical practices of provincial monasteries and parishes, and thereby integrate local areas into the fold of the Orthodox Church, had also yielded little success. And during the 1640s, veritable crusades against local villages and towns, aimed at drawing people into churches, provoked numerous revolts instead. Local clerics and laymen resented the closing of taverns and eviction of minstrels as unwarranted intrusions into their communities. They turned their wrath against church reformers who desperately ran for their lives to escape being murdered.¹¹

The patriarchate of Nikon witnessed the beginning of what was arguably the most ambitious church reform project of the seventeenth century. Central to this project was the assumption that the purity of Russian liturgies and rituals had to be restored by adopting the liturgical practices of the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople. Nikon ordered the revision of most basic rites of orthodox worship, thus implementing a plan that had already been under consideration by earlier patriarchs. Changes included the introduction of the three-fingered sign of the cross (replacing the old Russian two-fingered sign), Greek liturgical vestments for the clergy, and, most importantly, revised liturgical books based on Greek liturgical manuscripts.¹²

Much has been written about these reforms and their intrinsic problems, but little attention has been paid to the great logistical challenges the church confronted: tens of thousands of old liturgical books such as Service Books, Psalters, Lectionaries (*prologi*). Books of Need (*potrebniki*), and others had to be confiscated from Muscovy's provinces, and tens of thousands of new liturgical books had to be shipped from Moscow to provincial churches and monasteries. The records of the patriarchal printing press reveal the enormity of this undertaking. Every year thousands of new books were distributed to Muscovy's bishops and major monasteries; all newly-ordained priests were given copies, and laymen were encouraged to buy the new books directly from the press.¹³

⁹ Georg B. Michels, *At War With the Church: Religious Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 217–29.

¹⁰ Pavel F. Nikolaevskii, *Patriarshaia oblast' i russkie eparkhii v XVII veke* (St. Petersburg: Tip. F. Elionskogo, 1888), 22–23; Nikolai F. Vinogradskii, *Tserkovnyi sobor v Moskve 1682 goda. Opyt istoriko-kriticheskogo issledovaniia* (Smolensk: Parov. tip.-lit. Ia. N. Podzemskogo, 1899), 63.

¹¹ Konstantin V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikoruskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan': Izd. knizhnogo magazina M. A. Golubeva, 1914), reprint in vol. 119 of *Slavistic Printing and Reprinting*, ed. C. H. van Schooneveld (The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1968), 99–115; RGADA f. 210, Novgorodskii stol, d. 96, Mery k izkorenniu bezchinnia vo vremia posta i suevernykh obychaev, 11. 1–13, 251–54, 316; Sergei N. Vvedenskii, "Kostromskii protopop Daniil," *Bogoslovskii vestnik*, 1913, no. 4:844–54.

¹² On the specific reforms, cf. Nikolai S. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i ego protivniki v dele ispravleniia tserkovnykh obriadov* (Moscow: 1887); idem, "Tserkovno-reformatsionnoe dvizhenie vo vremia patriarshestva Iosifa i ego glavnye predstaviteli," *Bogoslovskii vestnik*, 1908, bk. 1, 309–505; idem, *Patriarkh Nikon i tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich*, esp. vol. 1, 151–269, 432–90; Metropolitan Makarii, *Patriarkh Nikon v dele ispravleniia tserkovnykh knig i obriadov* (Moscow: Tip. M. N. Lavrova, 1881).

To ensure the execution of these reforms, the church gave extraordinary powers to its emissaries. Church officials traveling to Muscovy's hinterlands with new liturgical books were under strict orders to denounce all Muscovites who failed to switch to the new rites as dangerous enemies of the church. In fact, a church council in 1666 insisted that all disobedient Muscovites formed part of a dangerous conspiracy against the church—a conspiracy that was given the name “schism” (*raskol*) by the church polemicist Simeon Polotskii suggesting an analogy to the split of the Western church during the Reformation. Armed with Polotskii's treatises, ever greater numbers of church agents began to descend upon Muscovy's provinces eager to identify and eradicate schismatics (*raskol'niki*).¹⁴

To reconstruct the great drama of the Russian Schism, historians must turn to the records gathered by church agents. These records are widely dispersed in various Russian archives and provide quite a contrast to the self-serving accounts of old belief preachers who tended to greatly overestimate their own roles and the importance of their ideas. In fact, church investigators rarely encountered Old Believers. Who then were the men and women whom the church identified as schismatics? What behavior did they demonstrate? And what were their aspirations?

A great variety of schism investigations (*raskol'nye dela*) are documented in church records and can be classified broadly as follows: cases involving local strongmen (*sil'nye liudi*); investigations of itinerant clerics and laymen; protocols and reports about individual religious zealots; and finally, matters relating to the activities of old belief preachers. I will focus here on cases involving local strongmen because these cases apparently alarmed seventeenth-century church leaders more than others and usually left the most substantial traces in the archives.¹⁵ I begin with the stories of Muscovy's disobedient monastic leaders whose behavior greatly perplexed the patriarchal court; then, I turn to schismatic peasant strongmen, Cossack leaders, and runaway serfs; finally, I discuss the merchants and noblemen whom the authorities targeted as schismatics.

¹³ RGADA f. 1182, Prikaz knigopechatnogo dela, opis' 3, Dokladnye zapiski patriarkham, nos. 27–31, 35–49. Typical editions of new books comprised 1200 copies but these were usually followed by several more editions; some editions comprised 2400 copies (such as the Service Book edition of November 6, 1670) and even 4,800 copies (such as the Psalter edition of May 19, 1671). Interestingly enough, the output of new liturgical books increased constantly. By the 1690s, the printing of 4800 and even 7200 copies in each edition had become quite typical (*ibid.*, nos. 92, 110, 174, 182, 194, 203).

¹⁴ Nauchnaia biblioteka Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (NB MGU) [=Research Library of Moscow State University, Manuscript Division, Moscow], *Sobranie knig kirillicheskoï pechaty*, no. 564, Simeon Polotskii. *Zhezl' Pravleniia*; Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka (RGB) [=Russian State Library, Moscow], *Sobranie Moskovskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii*, no. 68, Simeon Polotskii. *Demonstratio verae fidei contra schismaticos*; Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA) [=Russian State Historical Archive, St. Petersburg], f. 834, *Rukopisi Sinoda*, opis' 5, no. 38, II. 1–7, *Rospis' knigam vziatym s pechatnogo dvora v Novgorodskoi eparkhii dlia tserkvei i monastyrei* (1668).

One of the most dramatic episodes of the Russian Schism occurred at the Solovki Monastery shortly after the conclusion of the 1666 Church Council. For decades prior to their refusal to accept the new liturgical books, Solovki archimandrites and elders had failed to cooperate with the demands of the Moscow patriarchs and the metropolitans of Novgorod (who both claimed jurisdiction over the monastery). These church leaders often complained that the Solovki monks evaded taxation and enriched themselves at the expense of the church treasury. The patriarchs and metropolitans also accused Solovki's monastic elite of lacking piety, demanding that they abandon drinking and violent quarreling. But they were powerless. Patriarch Filaret (1619–33), for example, had to limit himself to imploring the Solovki monks to reform their ways. The metropolitans of Novgorod, though geographically much closer to the remote Solovki Islands, also had to admit failure. Metropolitan Nikon of Novgorod, later patriarch, tried in vain to discipline the powerful monks for their “spiritual crimes.” In a frustrated letter to the Kremlin he predicted great trouble (*smuta velikaia*). Apparently urged by Nikon, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich launched his own investigations and concluded that the brewing conflict with the church was due to Archimandrite Il'ia of Solovki (1645–59) and the “conspiratorial and criminal monks (*vory startsy*)” with whom he had surrounded himself.¹⁶

The conflict between Solovki and the church came to a head when the first new Service Books (*sluzhebniki*) arrived at the monastery a few years later. Archimandrite Il'ia ignored all patriarchal and episcopal orders to distribute the books to monks and priests, and used the occasion to protest Muscovite church intervention in the affairs of his monastery. Inhabitants of the monastery were ordered to sign a statement denouncing the Muscovite church as corrupt and declaring the new Moscow-issued Service Books to be full of lies.¹⁷

Opposition against the new books was highly organized. Monks and priests who refused to cooperate were threatened with violence by the archimandrite's cronies. A few priests, who somehow managed to smuggle a letter out of the monastery, informed the tsar that they had been coerced into signing the statement against the church. The letter described the determination with which Il'ia and his retainers enforced their position: “The archimandrite and his advisors started yelling at us as if they were wild animals and they slandered and scolded us, Your pious servants, with indecent words: ‘You dirty little priests, you miserable creatures! We dare you to celebrate the heretical Latin Mass. You won't get out of this refectory alive!’ And we...were intimidated by their threats and prohibitions and gave our signatures.” Those who did not obey were thrown into prison where they were tortured, starved, and beaten with whips.¹⁸

Who enforced the will of Solovki's monastic elite? Most visible among the opponents of the church were men who had been exiled by church decree.¹⁹

¹⁵ For records about itinerant clerics, laymen, and religious zealots, see Michels, *At War with the Church*, passim. Archival information about old belief preachers I have discussed in Georg B. Michels, “The First Old Believers in Tradition and Historical Reality,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 41:4 (1993), 481–508 and “The Place of Nikita Konstantinovich Dobrynin in the history of early Old Belief,” *Revue des Études Slaves* 69: 1–2 (1997), 21–31.

Gerasim Firsov, an adventurous monk from Moscow, had been exiled for embezzling precious stones and sables from wealthy merchants. At Solovki he formed “a secret pact” with powerful monastic elders and quickly gained control of the treasury. Firsov also became known for his ruthless violence and had the notorious distinction of using a knife against anyone who dared to disagree with him. Another highly visible exile was the former archimandrite of the Savva-Storozhevskii Monastery who had formed a network of clients including members of the monastic council and other exiles.²⁰ When Muscovite troops surrounded the monastery in the summer of 1668, Nikanor personally led the monastery’s military defense. Eyewitnesses report that he “was walking incessantly from tower to tower” giving orders and encouraging the monks to fight Muscovite forces to the death. Apparently highly strung, Nikanor not only spoke to the monastery’s defenders but also to the monastery’s cannons: while sprinkling these cannons with holy water and incense he addressed them as the monastery’s best friends and exhorted them to do great damage to the intruders from Moscow and Novgorod.²¹

This alliance of monastic elite and exiles combined with another factor that helps to explain the determined resistance of the Solovki Monastery: peasants from Solovki’s hinterlands, the White Sea coastal region, supported the revolt. In night-and-fog operations as well as in daring daylight voyages, they braved the dangerous waters of the White Sea in order to transport food supplies and weapons to the encircled monastery. Unknown numbers of peasants—and indeed entire peasant families—lived at the monastery during the siege and contributed directly to the monastery’s defense. Peasants also attacked Muscovite musketeer detachments stationed in their villages.²²

The coastal peasants’ solidarity with the Solovki elite had been firmly in place for a long time. Throughout the seventeenth century, local peasants had been living entirely under the tutelage of the Solovki monks with little, if any, contact to the centers of Muscovite official religion. The Solovki Monastery represented the religious and economic center of their lives and they accordingly ignored the

¹⁶ Rossiiskaia natsional’naia biblioteka (RNB) [=Russian National Library, Manuscript Division, St. Petersburg], *Solovetskoe Sobranie*, no. 18/1477, dd. 197, 325; no. 19/1478, dd. 14, 31; no. 20/1479, dd. 44, 55, 73–74, 161. Quotations from no. 1479, d. 44, l. 84 and Archimandrite Dosifei, *Geograficheskoe, istoricheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie Solovetskogo monastyria*, 3 vols. (Moscow: V Universitetskoi tip., 1853), vol. 3, 219.

¹⁷ Nikolai I. Subbotin, ed., *Materialy dlia istorii raskola za pervoe vremia ego sushchestvovaniia*, 9 vols. (Moscow: Red. “Bratskogo slova,” 1875–94), vol. 3, 7–8.

¹⁸ Subbotin, *Materialy*, vol. 3, 7–11, 327; Iakov L. Barskov, ed., *Pamiatniki pervykh let russkogo staroobriadchestva* (St. Petersburg: Tip. M.A. Aleksandrova, 1912), 116.

¹⁹ Archimandrite Il’ia had not kept exiles under guard but instead allowed them to participate in monastic affairs and even join the monastery’s ruling council, see Dosifei, *Opisanie Solovetskogo monasteria*, vol. 3, 219 and Sergei A. Belokurov, *Materialy dlia russkoi istorii* (Moscow: Universitetskaia tip., 1888), 8–9.

²⁰ Subbotin, *Materialy*, vol. 3, 82, 87–88, 101, 145; RGADA f. 125, Monastyrskii prikaz, opis’ 1, d. 5, ll. 18–20, Rospis’ miatezhnikov Solovetskogo monasteria.

²¹ Subbotin, *Materialy*, vol. 3, 327.

demands of any outside authority. In 1627, for example, Patriarch Filaret remarked that peasants “lived together without the sacrament of marriage” and that parish priests were saying Mass without ordination papers. When church officials arrived to enforce changes in behavior the peasants simply expelled them as unwelcome intruders. Two decades later, Metropolitan Nikon of Novgorod experienced similar frustrations: monastic elders refused to help him introduce the so-called *edinoglasie* reform which outlawed the simultaneous performance of liturgical chants and called for the separate recitation of different litanies and psalms. Church services in villages of the Solovki Monastery remained as chaotic and short as they had been during previous decades.²³

Several factors thus contributed to the emergence of the schism at Solovki: a long history of conflict dating back at least to the patriarchate of Filaret (1619–33); a coalition between the independent-minded monastic elite and exiles hostile to the church; and local peasant support for the monastery’s struggle with Moscow. Church authority prevailed against these obstacles only after an eight-year large scale military operation.

The resistance of monastic strongmen such as the Solovki elders and exiles was not easily overcome.²⁴ Another example is the revolt of the Kozhezerskii Monastery in the Kargopol’ district. The Kozhezerskii Monastery had, similar to the situation at Solovki, long been in conflict with the church. For the previous twenty years a powerful monk named Bogolep had been the ultimate arbiter of affairs at the monastery—not the patriarchs of Moscow or the metropolitans of

²² RGADA f. 125, opis’ 1, d. 5, II. 25, 154, 172, 330, 417; f. 210, Razriadnyi prikaz, Moskovskii stol, d. 421, II. 41–47.

²³ RNB, Solovetskoe sobranie, no. 20/1478, d. 53; “Dela Tainogo prikaza,” *Russkaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka*, 39 vols. (St. Petersburg/Petrograd/Leningrad: Izd. Arkheograficheskoi komissii, 1872–1927), vol. 38, 373; Dosifei, *Opisanie Solovetskogo monastyria*, vol. 3, 218, 225–26; Sankt-Peterburgskii filial Instituta rossiiskoi istorii Rosiiskoi Akademii nauk (SPbFIRI) [=St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg], f. 171, Novgorodskii Sofiiskii arkhieieiskii dom, pereplet III, no. 172, l. 45. About the *edinoglasie* reform, see Christian Hannick, “Der einstimmige Russische Kirchengesang in der Auffassung der Altgläubigen und der Orthodoxen Kirche,” in *Sprache, Kultur und Geschichte der Altgläubigen. Akten des Heidelberger Symposions vom 28. bis 30. April 1986*, ed. Baldur Winter (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1988), 46–64.

²⁴ There were only a few exceptions. For example, Muscovy’s most prestigious monastery, the Troitsa Sergieva Lavra, initially rejected the new liturgies because Archmandrite Ioasaf was in conflict with the patriarchal court. Ioasaf’s behavior, while greatly annoying church leaders, appeared to have two motivations: first, to improve his political clout at the patriarchal court and second, to increase the opportunities of his family to plunder ecclesiastical wealth. Only when it became clear that Ioasaf would become the next patriarch did the conflict between Moscow and Troitsa begin to calm down, and Ioasaf saw to it that the new liturgies were quickly introduced. A similar incident occurred at the Novodevich’ii Convent. Cf. RGADA f. 27, Tainyi prikaz, d. 192, Investigation of Archimandrite Ioasaf of the Troitsa Monastery; f. 210, Razriadnyi prikaz, d. 985, II. 589–93, Petition by Abbess Melaniia of the Novodevich’ii Monastery and various notes by agents of the Secret Chancellery.

Novgorod. Church-appointed abbots had not fared very well. Between 1648 and 1653 the patriarchal court had to send a new abbot every year because Bogolep chased one after the other into the forests. After 1653, Moscow-appointed abbots managed to stay in office for longer than a year, apparently because Patriarch Nikon had once done Bogolep a favor and Bogolep liked him. None of these appointees, however, dared to discipline the monks. When a new appointee arrived in 1662 and began to blame Bogolep for drunkenness, the sexual molestation of children, and other excesses at the monastery, Bogolep immediately began making loud noises again about the unsuitability of this new abbot. The abbot in turn accused Bogolep of religious indifference: he did not attend church services or take communion and he never confessed his sins to a spiritual pastor.
25

Soon afterwards the conflict with the church came to a head over the new liturgies and church polemicists began calling Bogolep a dangerous schismatic. But Bogolep not only rejected all demands by the patriarchal court for compliance with the new liturgies; he also bragged to Metropolitan Pitirim of Novgorod, who claimed jurisdiction over the monastery, that Pitirim could send as many orders as he wished but that nobody would obey him since Bogolep did not care about the metropolitan's wishes.

Bogolep was a formidable opponent. A member of a powerful boyar clan, the L'vovs, he had begun acting like an autocratic lord ever since entering the Kozhezerskii Monastery during the 1640s. First, he had surrounded himself with a large retinue of monastic elders and runaway servitors (*sluzhilye l'iudi*). Then, he turned the monastery into a fortified robber's den and its territory into his private domain. Bogolep's retinue regularly launched raids about the richly endowed hinterlands of the monastery and he had a huge arsenal of weapons as this disposal. Anyone who annoyed Bogolep was subject to violence and Bogolep did not hesitate to use vicious torture.

Bogolep's monopoly over local affairs was broken only by his unexpected death in 1666 in the midst of the growing conflict with the church over the new liturgical books. His clients appear to have abandoned the monastery soon afterwards, probably in order to escape a military confrontation, and the remaining monks accepted the liturgical reforms.²⁶

Monastic troublemakers such as Bogolep presented the most frequent schismatic type of the seventeenth century. Not all of them were as violent as Bogolep but without exception they all commanded great local influence and power. Another example of this phenomenon is found in the case of the boyar nun Elena Khrushcheva. Elena was supervisor of ceremonies (*ustavshchitsa*) at the Voznesenskii Convent in the Kremlin during the early 1660s.²⁷ In this

²⁵ A. Kononov, *Sud'by Kozhezerskoi Bogoiavlenskoi pustyni Arkhangel'skoi eparkhii* (St. Petersburg: Tip. P.P. Soikina, 1894), 13–15; Pavel M. Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov i nastoiatelei monastyrei rossiiskoi tserkvi* (St. Petersburg: Tip. V.S. Balasheva, 1877), 1001; Subbotin, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 464–65.

²⁶ Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei (GIM) [=State Historical Museum, Manuscript Division, Moscow], *Sobranie Sinodal'noi biblioteki* [=Collection of the Synodal Library], nos. 1154–55; Subbotin, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 464–66.

capacity she came into conflict with the abbess whom she denounced for being illiterate and ignorant in matters pertaining to the liturgy. The abbess responded by putting chains around the necks of Elena's supporters. In 1666, Elena lost her position because she refused to give up the old liturgical rites and she was exiled to the provincial town of Kaluga. To the dismay of Muscovite officials, the outspoken woman was not silenced by her exile. Instead, she took command of the Kazanskii Convent to which she had been confined. In 1669, Abbess Maren'iana complained to the Kremlin that she had no power to restrain Elena and that many of the nuns were listening to Elena's commands.²⁷

Elena Khrushcheva became a powerful rival of the patriarch in Kaluga. In fact, she seems to have eclipsed central church power completely because throughout her lifetime, that is well into the 1690s, the Kremlin was unsuccessful in implementing the liturgical reforms in Kaluga and its hinterlands. One might even say that Elena acted as the bishop of Kaluga and filled a spiritual vacuum for local residents who were only poorly served by the metropolitans of Krutitsy—the titular heads of the elusive eparchy of Sarai and Podon'e—who resided in faraway Moscow.²⁹

After Elena's death the town of Kaluga, still without a bishop, found itself under the control of another powerful monastic leader: Archimandrite Karion of the Lavrent'ev Monastery. Like Elena Archimandrite Karion refused to introduce the new liturgical books in Kaluga. In fact, he continued his resistance throughout nearly the entire Petrine period. Karion's rule over the town of Kaluga caused a great scandal in Moscow and St. Petersburg and agents of the Holy Synod were repeatedly instructed to investigate. These agents described a local regime that greatly relied on violence and coercion: any local resident who attempted to side with the Orthodox Church was intimidated by beatings and strict warnings. And despite repeated exhortations by orthodox missionaries, Kaluga parish priests

²⁷ Elena belonged to a little known, but apparently ambitious boyar clan that eventually produced at least one member of the boyar duma during the seventeenth century. Elena's male relatives were not exactly known for their friendliness towards the church. One Fedor Khrushchev, for example, became known for persecuting the abbess and sisters of a convent by stealing wood from their forests. Cf. Robert O.Crummey, *Aristocrats and servitors. The boyar elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 155, 203; Vera S. Rumiantseva, ed., *Narodnoe antitserkovnoe dvizhenie v Rossii XVII veka. Dokumenty Prikaza tainykh delo raskol'nikakh 1665–1667 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 35, fn. 2.

²⁸ "Chelobitnaia igumen'i Maren'iany," *Kaluzhskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1862), no. 9:142–44; Pavel S.Smirnov, "Zhenshchina v dele oslableniia staroobriadcheskogo raskola," *Khristianskoe chtenie* 219:1 (1905), 50–66, esp. 51–54; idem, *Vnutrennie voprosy*, 170–172, 055; Barskov, *Pamiatniki*, 301, 312–13.

²⁹ I.Tikhomirov, *Raskol v predelakh Kaluzhskoi eparkhii* (Kaluga, 1900), 19–20. The eparchy of Sarai and Podon'e was founded in 1261 and the bishops resided in Sarai under the auspices of the Khan. When the power of the Golden Horde weakened during the late fifteenth century the hierarchs moved to Moscow and became important players in church politics who were greatly feared by the patriarch. See Ivan M.Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii v XVI–XIX vv., ikh otkrytie, sostav i predely*, 2 vols. (Kazan': Tipo-litografiia Imp. Universiteta, 1897–1913), vol. 1, 232–33.

continued for many more years to say Mass according to the old liturgical rites.³⁰

Numerous other monasteries resisted the introduction of liturgical reforms and they were all lead by powerful monastic leaders who refused to recognize any church authority above them. A few examples demonstrate this point: Superior (*stroitel'*) Avraamii of the Kazanskii Monastery outside Lyskovo (Nizhnii Novgorod district) managed to elude not only the agents of the patriarch but also those of his landlord, Boyar Boris I. Morozov, and the voevoda of Nizhnii Novgorod; Superior Mikhail Kharzeev of the Pertominskii Monastery (Arkhangel'sk district) kept church inspectors out of his monastery's church with the help of a local musketeer captain (*polkovnik*); Abbot Moisei of the Blagoveshchenskii Monastery in Viazniki (Suzdal' district) hired an assassin to murder a church agent; Abbot Evfimii of the Pokrovskii Monastery in Ivanovo (Suzdal' district) personally beat up and chased away an advocate of church reform; and the nuns of the Troitsa Convent in the village of Murashkino (Nizhnii Novgorod district) evaded conflict with Moscow by tricking the authorities into believing that they had accepted the new liturgies.³¹

The monastic schism occurred primarily in areas where church institutions were underdeveloped or absent. As in the town of Kaluga, where the nun Elena Khrushcheva operated in an ecclesiastical vacuum, the leaders of the small monasteries and hermitages (*pustyni*) of the central Volga remained without any church supervision until the foundation of the Nizhnii Novgorod eparchy in 1668. The new archbishops made a priority of bringing small monasteries under their control.³² Similar observations can be made about the many small monasteries of the vast Novgorod and Vologda eparchies (particularly in the remote Olonets and Tot'ma regions). Some were never brought under control and others succumbed to church influence only after new, and much smaller, eparchies had been founded during the early 1680s.³³

Thus, a significant number of monasteries refused to accept the new liturgical books. The uprising of the Solovki Monastery and its hinterlands demonstrates

³⁰ *Opisanie dokumentov i del sviateishogo pravitel'stvuiushchego Sinoda*, 50 vols. (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tip., 1869–1915), vol. 1, 332–33, 343–44, 395; CCLXVI–CCLXXIV; *Polnoe sobranie postanovlenii i razporiazhenii po vedomosti pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia*, 10 vols. (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tip., 1869–1915), vol. 1, 56–59, 73–75; Stroev, *Spiski*, 579.

³¹ RGADA f. 27, d. 258, pt. IV, 11. 1–89, Murder of church agent in Viazniki region; f. 27, d. 614, Izvet startsa Serapiona...na viaznikovskikh pustynnikov; f. 396, Oruzheinaia palata, d. 42849, Case against Superior Avraamii; Subbotin, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 461–63; GIM, *Sobranie sinodal'noi biblioteki*, no. 110, Delo o Mikhaile Kharzeeve; Michels, *At War with the Church*, 127–29.

³² Cf. RGADA f. 163, Raskol' nicheskie dela, d. 4, Delo po chelobit'iu Filareta mitropolita Nizhnego Novgoroda. Several small monasteries and hermitages in the new Nizhnii Novgorod eparchy were put under the control of larger monasteries. Cf. Archimandrite Makarii, ed., *Pamiatniki tserkovnykh drevnostei Nizhegorodskoi gubernii* (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tip., 1857), 424, 436; Ia.E. Vodarskii, ed., *Vladiiia i krepostnye krest'iane russkoi tserkvi v kontse XVII veka* (Moscow: In-t Istorii SSSR ANSSSR, 1988), 39.

how a long history of tension with the church culminated in schism; the case of the Kozheozerskii Monastery highlights the violence and coercion that was often used by monastic leaders to keep the church at bay; and other cases illustrate the association of schismatic monasteries with various towns and village communities. In all these cases the initiative for protests against the church came from the men—and women—who controlled these monasteries. These cases also demonstrate that the behavior of these powerful individuals influenced large numbers of rank-and-file monks and laymen who began to act in accordance with the wishes of their leaders.

It must be emphasized that much of the popular participation in monastic resistance against the church was voluntary. For example, peasants of the Solovki hinterlands helped defend the monastery against Muscovite troops. Similarly, peasants from Lyskovo protected Superior Avraamii of the Kazanskii Monastery against patriarchal agents apparently because they hated the Moscow-appointed archimandrite of the neighboring Zheltovodskii Monastery. Their strong feelings, which culminated in open revolt in October 1670, can be attributed to the archimandrite's constant admonitions to give up drinking and dancing with bears. A similar conflict occurred in the town of Tikhvin whose inhabitants revolted against the Moscow-oriented Bogoroditskii Monastery but supported the abbot of the small Besednyi Monastery. With local help, Abbot Dosifei was able to stay in power for several years despite repeated church efforts to dislodge him. Similarly, the Pokrovskaiia Hermitage in the Vologda eparchy held out against church pressures with the help of strong peasant support.³⁴

Despite such popular support, violence was often a crucial component in the maintenance of local control by monastic strongmen. For example, the monks Gerasim Firsov and Bogolep used the threat of violence to inspire popular fear and did not hesitate to resort to torture or even murder to enforce obedience. The use of brutal force, both against local residents and church agents, can also be observed among the lay strongmen who resisted the church. To these powerful laymen I will now turn.³⁵

Lay schismatics included men from all spheres of Muscovite society: peasant strongmen, merchants, Cossacks, and nobles. These men provoked some of the most spectacular confrontations of the Russian Schism. A good example is the destruction of the Paleostrov Monastery, an isolated outpost of church authority on the northern shore of Lake Onega. In January 1687, Metropolitan Kornilii of

³³ Cf. RGADA f. 163, d. 7a, Raskol'nic'h'i gramoty Olonetskomu i Kargopol'skomu uездam. On monasteries around the trading village of Tot'ma, see Ivan K. Stepanovskii, *Vologodskaiia starina. Istoriko-arkheologicheskii sbornik* (Vologda: Tip. Vologodskogo gub. pravleniia, 1890), 271 and Michels, *At War with the Church*, 130–31.

³⁴ Andrei A. Titov, *Troitskii Zheltovodskii monastyr' starogo Makariia* (Moscow: Izd. A.N. D'iachova, 1887), 24, 38–41; Michels, *At War with the Church*, 139–41; SPbFIRI, f. 117, Vologodskii arkhieiereiskii dom, d. 1097, Instructions by Patriarch Ioakim regarding the exile of Abbot Feodosii of the Pokrovskaiia Hermitage.

³⁵ Such strongmen also can be found among Russian parish priests, but their number was much smaller than that of schismatic monastic leaders. Cf. Michels, *At War with the Church*, 171–79.

Novgorod dispatched a detachment of musketeers to rescue the Paleostrov Monastery which had been occupied by a “band of schismatics.” The musketeers surrounded the monastery and demanded that the schismatics give themselves up.³⁶ But the rebels started shooting instead, thus provoking a fierce battle which lasted several days. When the musketeers finally succeeded in entering the monastic compound, they found utter destruction. Most of the monastery’s buildings had burned down, hundreds of charred corpses were lying in the debris. The monastery’s church, which was still standing, had been devastated; holes had been cut in the walls surrounding the church altars and used as latrines (*nuzhnik*). Icons had been broken out of their frames and removed from the walls, and the sacristy had been robbed of its most valuable objects.³⁷

Muscovite investigators blamed everything on one man, a peasant named Emel’ian Ivanovich Vtorogo. This “brigand” and “his ugly band” had seized the monastery and chased away the monks. Countless peasants from nearby villages, many of them poor from many years of social and economic hardship, had then joined in to participate in the plunder of the monastery. While hundreds of these peasants died in the ensuing inferno, Vtorogo and his band managed to escape. In fact, in September 1688 they again went on the offensive: the monks who had returned from hiding and started to rebuild their monastery were put into chains and thrown into a dungeon. For several weeks they endured torture, starvation, and cruel beatings. The monastery itself, or what remained of it after Vtorogo’s first visit, was converted into a fortress (*ostrog*). The ensuing battle with Muscovite troops led to hundreds of casualties on both sides and the murder of all monks. But again Vtorogo and his men escaped unharmed.³⁸

Emel’ian Vtorogo belonged to a powerful peasant clan which had long dominated local affairs on the northern shores of Lake Onega. Emel’ian’s uncle, the patriarch of the family, was locally known as the “*voevoda*”—a usurpation of title that greatly annoyed the Moscow-appointed *voevoda* of Olonets. The Vtorogo clan had come into conflict with the Paleostrov Monastery during the 1670s because the tsar had given orders to appropriate their native village of Shunga, located only a few miles to the southwest of the Paleostrov Monastery, and turn it over to the church. Mobs organized by Emel’ian’s father and uncle had then chased church tax collectors from Shunga and forced them to seek refuge at the Paleostrov Monastery. Soon afterwards reports reached Moscow that all church agents in villages around the Paleostrov Monastery would be

³⁶ RGADA f. 163, d. 9, Delo po otpiske Korniliia mitropolita novgorodskogo o poimke... raskol’nika povenchanina Emel’iana Ivanova; RGB Sobranie biblioteki Obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh, no. 103, Sbornik gramot i razlichnykh aktov novgorodskogo arkhieiereiskogo doma (1651–97), II. 22–24, Tsarskaia gramota o raskol’nikakh paleostrovskikh (March 27, 1687); “Tsarskie gramoty novgorodskomu mitropolitu Korniliu i Olonetskim voevodam...o zavladenii pomorskimi raskol’nikami Paleostrovskim monastyrem,” *Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoiu kommissiei*, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. Ekspeditsii zagotovleniia gosudarstvennykh bumag, 1841–42), vol. 5, 252–62.

³⁷ “Sudnoe delo o razorenii Paleostrovskogo monastyria,” *Olonetskie gubernskie vedomosti* (1849), nos. 8–14, esp. no. 8, pt. 2, cols. 1–4; no. 9, pt. 2, cols. 3–4.

killed unless they went into hiding immediately. Only by exiling the entire Vtorogo clan to Siberia in 1682 did the tsar finally re-establish control over the villages on the northern shores of Lake Onega. However, Emel'ian escaped from Siberia a few years later and one can understand his assault on the Paleostrov Monastery as an act of revenge for his family's misfortune.³⁹

Other peasant clans accepted Emel'ian as their leader and joined his revolt because they had similar grievances against the church. For example, the Kliucharev clan had also lost much land and real estate due to church incursions. In fact, the voevoda of Olonets, apparently encouraged by the Vtorogos' exile, had turned the Kliucharevs' most fertile lands over to the Paleostrov Monastery in June 1683. The Kliucharevs then bitterly complained to the tsar about the monks' arbitrariness: not only had they fallen into great poverty but they felt greatly humiliated because of the Kremlin's ingratitude. They pointed out that their ancestors had given refuge to the exiled wife of the later Patriarch Filaret during the Time of Troubles and that the grateful Filaret had made them honorary key bearers (*kliuchari*) in one of the Kremlin churches. But neither tsar nor patriarch listened to the Kliucharevs' pleas for mercy. By 1688, the males of the Kliucharev clan were boiling with anger. Shortly before joining Emel'ian Vtorogo in his march on the Paleostrov Monastery they warned Moscow that "they would no longer tolerate the oppressive acts (*utesneniia*) committed by the monks."⁴⁰

Clearly, the confrontation between angry Onega peasant leaders and the Paleostrov Monastery, which church hierarchs called a schism, had little to do with popular sentiments about issues of church reform. Rather, the church found

³⁸ Elpifidor V.Barsov, ed., "Sudnye protsessy XVII–XVIII vekov po delam tserkvi," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskorn universitete* (1883), bk. 4, pt. 5, 1–42, here 30–31 (hereafter *Chteniia*); "Sudnoe delo o razorenii Paleostrovskogo monastyria," no. 8, cols. 2–3 and no. 9, col. 3; Institut iazyka, literatury i istorii Karel'skogo nauchnogo tsentra Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk, Nauchnyi arkhiv (NA IIALI KNTs) [=Institute of Language, Literature and History of the Karelian Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Research Archive, Petrozavodsk], Kolleksiia drevnikh aktov [=Collection of Ancient Acts], razriad 1, opis' 1, nos. 47, 57, Complaints by the Paleostrov monks about the destruction of their monastery (early 1690s). Two principal developments contributed to poverty in the area: the intrusions of Muscovite church agents (see below) and the establishment of a large-scale mining industry by foreign entrepreneurs whose competition quickly ruined much smaller peasant mines and ironworks. See Raisa B.Miuller, *Ocherki po istorii Karelii XVI–XVII vv.* (Petrozavodsk: Gos. izd-vo Karelo-Finskoi SSSR, 1947), 123–32, 138–60.

³⁹ Raisa B.Miuller, "Bor'ba krest'ian Shungskogo pogosta s Tikhvinskim monastyrem," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 43 (1953), 237–45; "Iz istorii raskola na severe Rossii. Samosozhzheniia v Paleostrove," *Ezhegodnik Muzeia istorii religii i ateizma* 2 (1958), 172–82; Elpifidor V.Barsov, "Paleostrov, ego sud'ba i znachenie v Obonezhskom krae," *Chteniia* (1868), bk. 1, smes', 19–222, here 89.

⁴⁰ "Sudnoe delo o razorenii Paleostrovskogo monastyria," nos. 10–11, esp. col. 3; Barsov, "Paleostrov, ego sud'ba i znachenie v Obonezhskom krae," 39, 100–105, 124–26, 193–200.

it was unable to assert its authority because local peasant strongmen perceived church agents as hostile intruders and refused to cooperate.⁴¹

The Muscovite church's failure to assert its authority on Lake Onega greatly resembled its lack of success on the Don River among the Don Cossacks. During the 1680s, for example, the most powerful church lord of the southern steppe zone was not a bishop but Ataman Lavrent'ev. Lavrent'ev and other Cossack leaders had long been embroiled in conflict with Muscovite officialdom over a variety of economic and political issues and when church orders arrived to distribute new liturgical books to local churches Lavrent'ev simply refused to buy them. In fact, Lavrent'ev told the local population, both clergy and Cossacks, that they should continue to say Mass according to the old liturgical books. Church agents who dared to enter the territory under Lavrent'ev's control were chased away or tortured. For example, a monk named Pavel, who insisted on the implementation of the liturgical reforms, had a chain put around his neck and was then tied to a pole. Hostility against the Muscovite church was expressed in other ways as well: radical preachers on Lavrent'ev's payroll began an aggressive campaign against all icons showing the three-fingered sign of the cross and in fact the paint was scratched off many icons and they were then repainted. Lavrent'ev also encouraged sermons denouncing both the patriarch and the tsar and calling on the Cossacks not to pray any more for Kremlin leaders.⁴²

Patriarch Ioakim was aware of the limits of church power in Don Cossack territory and therefore appointed two new bishops in the southern towns of Voronezh and Tambov. But it was not enough to establish church power by decree alone. The newly-appointed bishops were the spiritual leaders of the Don Cossack region only by title and remained unable to implement even the slightest liturgical changes. This is not surprising since these bishops faced much local opposition: parish priests whom they ordained and sent out to Don parishes with appointment charters could not find any employment and those few who were lucky enough to find parish positions soon had to be replaced because they had transferred their loyalties from the church to the Cossack leadership. Thus, the southern steppe region remained beyond the reach of the official church despite dramatic new initiatives.⁴³

The Cossack territories of the Left Bank Ukraine also remained largely independent of the Muscovite patriarch's authority during the seventeenth century. In March 1657, Patriarch Nikon appointed Lazar' Baranovich, a strong supporter of patriarchal power, to the sedisvacant bishopric of Chernihiv.⁴⁴ But members of the Ukrainian Cossack elite, who considered the Muscovite

⁴¹ Other revolts involving independent-minded peasants, who recognized neither the authority of bishops or secular lords, occurred in the Pomor'e region and Siberia. Cf. Michels, *At War with the Church*, 201–8.

⁴² "Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii donskikh kazakov i k raskolu na Donu," *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoiu kommissiei*, 12 vols. (St. Petersburg: V tip. II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi E.I.V.Kantseliarii, 1846–1872), vol. 12, 122–283, esp. 182–83; Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, 141–42, 146, 251, 295, 298.

⁴³ Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii*, vol.1, 374–84; Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, 219–20.

appointee an intruder, refused to recognize his authority. They did not accept parish priests appointed by Baranovich and organized mobs that attacked episcopal agents.⁴⁵ At about the same time Baranovich's officials made unsuccessful attempts to confiscate old liturgical books from Russian settlers living under the protection of local Cossack officers.⁴⁶ It seems that Baranovich's connections with the Kremlin did not help him much in establishing control over local religious affairs.

A typical enemy of Baranovich's was the Cossack officer Petro Roslavets whom the archbishop reported to the tsar in July 1676 as a great troublemaker before excommunicating him. Roslavets had not only refused to cooperate with the church but he encouraged serfs owned by the Muscovite elite to flee their masters and settle on Cossack lands in return for temporary freedom from taxation.⁴⁷ It seems that hundreds, if not thousands, of Muscovite serfs established a more secure existence for themselves in northern Ukraine during the 1660s and 1670s with the encouragement of Roslavets and other Cossack leaders.⁴⁸

Muscovite landlords complained bitterly to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and emphasized that the runaway serfs included many dangerous rebels. They had been involved in local insurgencies and "...committed many crimes, beat, and burnt their landlords before they fled across the border into Little Russian towns.... It seems that they come to [the Cossacks] directly from the gallows (*priamo s viselitsy*)."⁴⁹ Muscovite servitors tried in vain to retrieve these peasants because Cossack leaders were not cooperative. In fact, when appearing in the Starodub area to reclaim their serfs, not a few Muscovite nobles were "physically abused and robbed, beaten to death, and set into the water (*v vodu*

⁴⁴ On Lazar' Baranovich and religious affairs in the eparchy of Chernihiv, see Archbishop Filaret (Gumilevskii), *Istoriko-statisticheskoe Opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 7 vols. (Chernigov: 1861–73), vol. 1, 33–44. On Baranovich's connections with the Muscovite church, see Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, 234–38, 348–51, 421–27.

⁴⁵ Baranovich's personal envoy to the town of Starodub was beaten almost to death in August 1677. Cf. Orest Levitskii, ed., *Letopis' samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam s prilozheniem* (Kiev: K.N.Milevskii, 1878), reprint in vol. 7, pt. I of *Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972), 135–137; Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, 351.

⁴⁶ Letter by Archbishop Baranovich from July 1677, cited in Mikhail I. Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola na Vetke i v Starodub'e XVII–XVIII vv.* (Kiev: G.T.Korchak-Novitskii, 1895), 24–25 and Aleksandr M. Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 2 vols. (Kiev: Tip. K.N.Milevskogo, 1888–89), vol. 1, 180.

⁴⁷ "Delo starodubskogo polkovnika Petra Roslavtsa i nezhinskogo protopopa Simeona Adamovicha," *Vestnik Evropy* (1880), no. 8, 417–30; Filaret, *Opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, vol. 7, 25; Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, vol. 1, 180.

⁴⁸ In 1674, for example, runaway serfs explained in a petition to Patriarch Ioakim that they left Muscovy because their wives had repeatedly been raped by their landlord. Cf. *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii*, 15 vols. (St. Petersburg: E.Prats, 1863–92; reprint, The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1970), vol. 9, 855–59; Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, 22–23.

sazhaiut).⁵⁰ One can imagine the serious obstacles that Muscovite agents, both church and state, had to overcome in order to assert their authority in the hinterlands of Starodub.

The Muscovite church would have to wait many years before it could enforce the liturgical reforms among these runaways. The first opportunity for punishing opponents of the liturgical reforms came only in 1700 when agents of the Kremlin's Little Russian Chancellery (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*) and the Ukrainian Hetman began investigating a number of spectacular robberies and murders.⁵¹ The inquiry centered on two schismatics, Fedor Stepanov, a runaway serf from the Iaroslavl' area, and Nikita Shelkovnikov, a fugitive from the slums of Moscow.⁵²

After settling in the vicinity of the northern Ukrainian town of Starodub, Stepanov and Shelkovnikov had become involved in criminal activities under the protection of Cossack officers. Shelkovnikov was known as the leader of a gang of highway robbers and horse thieves. His victims included merchants and wagoners (*podvodniki*) passing through the area to the Starodub market. On one occasion he obtained the exorbitant sum of 3,000 roubles in ransom for two merchants he had abducted on the road from Kaluga. When challenged Shelkovnikov took the law into his own hands. For example, when a relative refused to hand over money, Shelkovnikov raided his home and murdered (*mordoval*) his wife. Then, Shelkovnikov abducted the relative and tortured him.⁵³

Stepanov led a gang of robbers that not only ambushed travelers on the highway to Moscow, but even organized burglaries in the capital itself. For example, investigators found a large crate near his house with booty taken from the home of a wealthy musketeer officer in Moscow. They also linked Stepanov to a spectacular raid on a saltpeter transport en route from Starodub to Moscow, and identified a mill belonging to a leading Starodub officer as the gang's meeting place.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Cited after Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, 38–39. About fugitive serfs from the village of Danilovskoe (Kostroma district) which was repeatedly investigated for rebellion during the seventeenth century, see RGADA f. 141, Prikaznye dela starykh let, d. 122, II. 1–57, O vorakh i razboinikakh, kotorye poimany v Kostromskom uезде and Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, 39, 54–55, 58.

⁵⁰ Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, 39.

⁵¹ The Ukrainian Hetmans, who had great difficulties controlling officers of the Starodub Regiment, repeatedly expressed frustration that the worst “scoundrels and adventurers” (*pluty i svoevol'niki*) of Muscovy had made their way to the Dnepr' region. Cf. “Delo starodubskogo polkovnika Petra Roslavtsa,” esp. 424.

⁵² Mikhail I. Lileev, ed., *Novye materialy dlia istorii raskola na Vetke i v Starodub'e XVII–XVIII vv.* (Kiev: Tip. G. T. Korchak-Novitskogo, 1893), 60–61, 72–73, 96–98.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 46–48, 60–77, 84–85, esp. 61, 64, 75.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 99–104; Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, 221–23. The mill belonged to the head of the Starodub Regiment, Full Colonel Mikhailo Myklashevs'kii (1689–1706). See George Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1978), vol. 1, 21.

Both Stepanov and Shelkovnikov were adherents of the pre-Nikonian rites and since they commanded considerable reputations in their communities, it was quite natural that pre-reform religious rituals (e.g. the three-fingered sign of the cross) prevailed in the settlements of Russian fugitives around the town of Starodub. Even the arrest of Stepanov and Shelkovnikov did not change the basic fact that the Muscovite church was greatly reviled by local Russians. During the early 1720s, for example, Russian settlers descended angrily upon Starodub, broke into churches using the new liturgies, profaned crosses with their feet (*popranie rugatel'ne nogami*), and beat up parish priests. Efforts by the Holy Synod to force these unruly Russians to adopt the liturgical reforms failed miserably.⁵⁵ Only in 1735, when military detachments began to burn Russian refugee communities and chase away roughly 40,000 local residents, did the Russian Orthodox Church establish its authority in the area.⁵⁶

Other regions of Muscovy were less openly hostile towards the church, but local resistance was nevertheless significant, as demonstrated by the community networks of Novgorod merchants. These wealthy strongmen were not more easily subdued than the other powerful schismatics of the seventeenth century even though they were less willing to defend themselves by violence. Their principal weapons against the church seem to have been money and religious fervor.

One of the best documented networks was established by the merchant Ivan Dement'ev. Dement'ev had become very rich from trading white bread (*kalachi*). But at some point during the early 1670s he quit his business and used his immense financial resources and social clout to agitate against the liturgical reforms. He himself seems to have had a sudden religious conversion comparable to that of the French medieval merchant and heretic Waldes of Lyons. He adopted an apostolic way of life, gathered disciples, and embarked on a missionary crusade. He wandered from village to village in the Novgorod district, educating peasants about the old rites and secretly entered the homes of Novgorod townsmen in order to re-baptize their children. He visited hidden forest hermitages and convinced monks to follow him, and made friends with parish priests such as Andrei Evfifeev of the St. Savior's Church in Novgorod.⁵⁷

Another merchant, Semen Gavrilov, may have posed an even greater threat to the authority of the Novgorod metropolitans. Gavrilov too had become a caretaker of souls and regularly visited families all over the Novgorod eparchy during the early 1680s. His power reached as far as the settlement of Tolvui on Lake Onega. With money Gavrilov enlisted a few churchmen in order to promote his missionary activities. At Tolvui, for example, he found a formidable ally in the parish priest Evtikhei whom Muscovite investigators later identified as an unruly and uncooperative troublemaker. And in Novgorod he managed to win

⁵⁵ *Polnoe sobranie postanovlenii i razporiazhenii po vedomosti pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia*, vol. 4, 166–67.

⁵⁶ Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, 79–80; Manfred Hildermeier, "Alter Glaube und neue Welt: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Raskol im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 38 (1990), no. 3, 372–98, here 386.

⁵⁷ RGADA f. 159, Novgorodskii prikaz, opis' 1, d. 1395, II. 299–391.

over some officials in the episcopal palace. Gavrilov later claimed that he needed the help of these officials for the production of written propaganda materials since he could barely read and write himself (*gramote malo umeet*). Metropolitan Kornilii was outraged when he learned that his own clerks and icon painters were composing the pamphlets and broadsheets which Gavrilov used in his preaching. But there was very little he could do since he could not forego the services of these trained specialists. Greatly embarrassed, the metropolitan forced his officials to sign a piece of paper that they would never again conspire against the church and would henceforth avoid all contact with schismatics.⁵⁸

The extent to which these far-flung networks replaced church channels of religious worship must have been significant. In 1683, Metropolitan Kornilii sent the following urgent appeal to Patriarch Ioakim for help: "Please, my Lord,... defend me against these opponents of the holy church.... If Semen [Gavrilov] and Ivan [Dement'ev] are not disciplined and punished for this in Great Novgorod... it will be completely impossible to control other acts of opposition against the church.... I have no one in Great Novgorod who could help me except you (*pomoshchi sebe krome tebia ne tnzeiu*)."⁵⁹ But the patriarch's assistance—and indeed the additional involvement of state agencies such as the Novgorod Chancellery—did not substantially alter Kornilii's powerlessness in local affairs. In 1687, the metropolitan issued a memorandum to his officials at the Novgorod cathedral in which he acknowledged that few Novgorodians even bothered to listen to church demands.⁶⁰

Merchant schismatics were identified in several other large towns along Russia's major trade routes such as Nizhnii Novgorod, Vologda, Kholmogory, Olonets, Arkhangel'sk, and Pskov.⁶¹ But in most of these cases anti-church activities of schismatic merchants remained unnoticed until the patriarch chose to provoke a confrontation. In one such case, Patriarch Ioakim decided to create an episcopal see in order to subdue the wealthy and independent-minded residents of Velikii Ustiug. Archbishop Gelasii, who was appointed to the eparchy in March

⁵⁸ Ibid., II. 93–111, 134–42; Sergei A. Belokurov, "O poruchnoi zapisi po pod'iachem novgorodskogo mitropolita," *Chteniia* (1903), bk. 4, pt. 3, 68; *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, vol. 12, 319–21.

⁵⁹ RGADA f. 159, opis' 1, d. 1395, l. 111.

⁶⁰ *Akty istoricheskie*, vol. 5, 262–64. In this context it is worth recalling an alarmed statement by Metropolitan Nikon dating from the late 1640s. Commenting on tensions with the town of Novgorod, the metropolitan observed that Novgorodians were oriented much more toward Sweden than toward Muscovy, and he warned the tsar that the town was on the verge of seceding from the Muscovite state. The town, which had been occupied by Sweden during the Time of Troubles, still maintained bonds with Muscovy's formidable opponent several decades later. In fact, one might question to what degree the religious searches and evangelizing activities of merchants such as Ivan Dement'ev were inspired by contacts with Swedish Protestants. Cf. *Delo o patriarkhe Nikone. Izdanie Arkheograficheskoi kommissii po dokumentam moskovskoi Sinodal'noi (byvshei Patriarshei) biblioteki* (St. Petersburg: Izd. Arkheograficheskoi kommissii, 1897), 217. For basic information on the historical peculiarities of Novgorodian religion during preceding centuries, see James H. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe: An interpretive History of Russian Culture* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 79–84.

1682, experienced great difficulties in establishing his authority. After launching a systematic campaign against local schismatics, he quickly lost control of the town's commercial districts. In November 1683, Gelasii had barricaded himself in his palace, and could only watch while gangs of thugs began attacking his agents. All priests and deacons had been chased from the cathedral, parish priests were assaulted and tortured, one parish priest had even been defrocked and murdered, and church services were interrupted everywhere.

Gelasii lay the blame for his troubles on the German governor of Velikii Ustiug, Fedor Afanasii Trauernicht, whom he suspected of being a heretic since Trauernicht neither knew how to pray in Russian nor how to make the sign of the cross (*krestobrazno ne krestitsia*). The archbishop observed that Trauernicht was acting in the interests of a powerful coalition of merchants led by the *gost'* Vasilii Grudtsyn. Grudtsyn had long been conspiring to deprive the episcopal treasury of valuable tax revenues, and together with Trauernicht had established a dictatorial regime hostile to Gelasii. The archbishop could not make any purchases at the local market; church cemeteries were turned into townsmen's lands; and bribes were constantly extorted from the bishop's clients. Deeply humiliated, the archbishop begged the tsar to come to his aid.⁶²

The Velikii Ustiug confrontation can be viewed as one conflict in a long series of conflicts that pitted towns against Muscovite church hierarchs: Novgorod vs. Metropolitan Nikon (1650), Viatka vs. Bishop Aleksandr (1659), Suzdal' vs. Archbishop Stefan (1659–60), Kostroma vs. Archimandrite Gerasim of the Bogoiavlenskii Monastery (1666), Tikhvin vs. the Bogoroditskii Monastery (1666), and Pskov vs. Metropolitan Markell (1683).⁶³ It is difficult to establish the degree to which merchants got directly involved in these rather violent events. Typically, merchants played invisible roles behind the scenes since they did not want to undermine their trading operations. And given their unusual mobility, they could simply withdraw from confrontations by leaving for other, less dangerous, territories. For example, when Kremlin investigators came to

⁶¹ RGADA f. 163, d. 10, Delo po chelobit'iu pskovskogo posadskogo cheloveka Semena Men'shikova; Shchapov, *Russkii raskol*, 226, 241, 256; Michels, *At Warmth the Church*, 197–99.

⁶² *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, vol. 10, 445–48; RGADA f. 163, d. 11, Reports by Voevoda Iurii Selivanov, Trauernicht's successor, on schismatics in the Velikii Ustiug region (1690).

⁶³ RGADA f. 27, d. 364, O razbore del Tainogo prikaza, pt. 2, II. 421 v, 427v (Viatka); f. 210, Prikaznyi stol, d. 576, II. 1–77, Sysknoe delo o vorovskom pi'sme (Kostroma); Mikhail N. Tikhomirov, *Klassovaia bor'ba v Rossii XVII v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 340–43, 345–50 (Novgorod); Ivan I. Rumiantsev, *Nikita Konstantinovich Dobrynin ("Pustosviat"). Istorikokriticheskii ocherk (K istorii bor'by pravoslaviia s staroobriadchestvom v XVII veke)*, 2 vols. (Sergiev Posad: Tip. Sv.-Tr. Sergievoi Lavry, 1917), vol. 2, *Prilozheniia* (Suzdal'); Ksenia N. Serbina, *Ocherki iz sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii russkogo goroda. Tikhvinskii posad v XVI–XVIII vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademii nauk SSSR, 1951), 377–79; "Delo o proiznesenii nepristoinykh slov pskovskimi strel'tsami," *Sbornik Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 6 vols. (Moscow: Pechatnia A. Snegirevoi, 1913–14), vol. 6, 191–99.

Novgorod in the early 1680s, they learned that schismatic merchants had gone into hiding in the neighboring Swedish territory.⁶⁴

Merchants seem to have been among the most educated and religiously inspired of all the seventeenth-century schismatics. Ivan Dement'ev, for example, owned a collection of religious books and studied them quite carefully.⁶⁵ And the merchant Iakov Kalashnikov admonished ordinary Novgorodians to stay away from parish priests because these clerics spent most of their time in taverns and were therefore unworthy of their holy orders (*ne iskusny*).⁶⁶ Not surprisingly, some of these merchants came to the attention of the highly learned and ascetic old belief preachers. Archpriest Avvakum Petrov apparently told his wife to contact Ivan Dement'ev after learning about Dement'ev's missionary activities in the Novgorod region. And Archpriest Ivan Neronov relied on both the religious zeal and wealth of the merchant Ivan Zadorin to recruit followers for the Nizhnii Novgorod old belief community.⁶⁷

One other group of schismatics similarly combined social power with religious fervor: the noble men and women who turned their estates into outposts of the old liturgical order. Unlike the typical religious zealots of the seventeenth century who were recruited from the lower classes, these men and women belonged to Muscovy's elite. They were able to influence the religious affairs of entire districts through the prestige of their family names alone. Given the status of these individuals, it is not surprising that the highest Kremlin authorities, both patriarch and tsar, became involved in investigating their activities.

During the 1680s Patriarch Ioakim, himself a nobleman by birth, began an aggressive campaign against schismatic noble estates in Muscovy's provinces. Among these were the scattered estates of the Tokmachev clan in the remote Poshekhon'e district of the Rostov eparchy. The head of this clan, Fedor Iakovlevich Tokmachev, stubbornly refused to listen to church agents. When two priests urged Tokmachev to obey Metropolitan Iona of Rostov and to accept the new liturgical books, Tokmachev called on his peasants to beat the priests up and shot at them with his gun. The church responded with full force. A few weeks later, a military detachment raided Tokmachev's estate and attempted to arrest him.

But Tokmachev had escaped and neither his family nor his peasants claimed to know anything about his whereabouts. The frustrated authorities then arrested Tokmachev's wife in his place, but they eventually released her. The female members of Tokmachev's family, his wife and three sisters, continued to abide by the old rituals. Church investigators then threatened violence, but the women remained uncooperative. They apparently stayed in touch with Tokmachev, who

⁶⁴ Cf. Kremlin letter addressed to the Swedish king in RGADA f. 159, opis' 1, d. 1395, I. 222.

⁶⁵ RGADA f. 159, opis' 1, d. 1395, II. 299, 301, 306. Among these books were apparently also apocalyptic treatises.

⁶⁶ Ibid., II. 143–45, 237r–v, 255–57.

⁶⁷ Ibid., II. 300–301; “Zhitie Grigoriia Neronova, sostavlennoe posle ego smerti,” in Subbotin, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 243–305, esp. 256–60, 270–71.

remained in hiding nearby. Concerned about the continuing local influence Tokmachev wielded, Muscovite agents threatened peasants and noblemen from surrounding estates with severe punishment for not assisting them in his capture, but to no avail.⁶⁸

Another schismatic noble clan was discovered in the Novgorod district in the early 1680s. Agents of the Novgorod Chancellery arrested the nobleman Dmitrii Khvostov, a declared enemy of church and state. Khvostov had refused to swear allegiance to the tsar. His name was missing from the books recording the act of kissing the cross (*krestoprivodnye knigi*) as a sign of submission to the Kremlin. When asked to explain his behavior, Khvostov referred to religious texts he had read and denounced the church for changing the shape of the cross. While his resistance to church authority appears motivated by religious convictions, his arrest did not significantly aid the church's cause in the Novgorod district.⁶⁹

Other family members, including Khvostov's sister Ul'iana who was the caretaker of her brother's estate, apparently shared his religious convictions. Khvostov also had formidable allies in his cousins, the Dirin brothers, whose estates were soon identified by church investigators as hideouts of hostile preachers. The two male Dirins were subsequently chased from their estates by military force. They found refuge on an estate belonging to Tat'iana Dirina, their widowed mother, and their sisters offered them additional hiding places.

Church investigators thus confronted a tightly knit family that relied on extended kinship relations in order to evade capture and arrest. When Tat'iana Dirina was herself forced to flee her estate, she went into hiding on the estate of her granddaughter. And Khvostov's aunt, the widow Afrosinia Bolkoshina, was identified by the church as a particularly dangerous schismatic. She was eventually taken from the area and imprisoned in the Pokrovskii Convent at Suzdal', a confinement reserved for troublesome women from the highest Muscovite circles.⁷⁰

Similar acts of defiance occurred on noble estates in other parts of the Novgorod and Poshekhon'e districts, as well as in isolated areas in the Murom, Nizhnii Novgorod, and Vologda districts. Since these nobles were evading Kremlin-assigned service duties, a fact that probably brought them to the attention of the church in the first place, they were also investigated by state bureaus such as the tsar's Secret Chancellery (*Tainyi prikaz*).⁷¹

The documented resistance cases among nobles share some similarities with the resistance of Novgorod merchants. In both groups one observes a powerful combination of religious fervor and local power rare in other spheres of Muscovite society. But the behavior of nobles differed considerably from that of

⁶⁸ RGADA f. 210, Novgorodskii stol, d. 335, II. 1–85, esp. 16, 39, 46, 55, 62–65, 77.

⁶⁹ For six years Khvostov had stayed away from church and refused to take communion. See RGADA f. 159, opis' I, d. 1395, II. 64–65, 276–81, 323–25.

⁷⁰ Ibid., II. 25–39, 55–58, 86r–v. On female exiles in the Suzdal' convent, see Ivan F. Tokmakov, *Istoricheskoe i arkheologicheskoe opisanie Pokrovskogo devich'ego monastyria v gorode Suzdale* (Moscow, 1889), *Prilozheniia*, 22–25 and Marie A. Thomas, "Muscovite Convents in the Seventeenth Century," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 10:2 (1983), 234.

monastic leaders, Cossack officers, and peasant rebels who resisted the church with uncompromising violence. As did all opponents of the Nikonian reforms discussed here, provincial nobles sought to maintain their independence from Kremlin control. But they only occasionally used force against church agents or called on peasants to expel agents from their estate. When encircled by troops, these nobles were more likely to run away, usually to the neighboring estate of a relative.

I conclude that the schism was not inspired by a handful of old belief preachers and activists. Contrary to the assertions of Old Believers such as the archpriests Ivan Neronov and Avvakum Petrov, most seventeenth-century Russians were not engaged in an apocalyptic struggle over Muscovy's religious and historical destiny and did not care whether Muscovy remained true to its medieval cultural tradition—"the third Rome" legacy—or succumbed to the rational influences of the West (as represented in the critique and revision of old liturgical books). And most seventeenth-century Russians were not affected by an "eschatological psychosis," as James Billington has surmised from studying erudite treatises by the old belief theologian Abbot Spiridon Potemkin.

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Instead, I have found diverse forms of resistance against a centralized church authority that were labeled schismatic by church polemicists. These acts of resistance were not inspired by a common ideology, the so-called Old Belief, as many historians have postulated. In fact, ideological concerns were surprisingly absent from most manifestations of the schism. These confrontations did have one feature in common: they occurred after the arrival of new liturgical books in the provinces. Does this mean that Muscovites were particularly sensitive about the substitution of old rites by new ones? Certainly, some of the protagonists discussed here expressed such sensitivities. But at the heart of their resistance lay another concern: the determination not to allow either the church or its representatives to regulate their lives.

The merchants of Novgorod, the noblemen of Poshekhon'e, Onega peasant rebels and Cossacks, and schismatic monastic leaders had not previously had much contact with Muscovite churchmen, and they certainly had never been exposed to systematic pressures to conform to church demands. The church's unprecedented and aggressive campaign to implement Patriarch Nikon's

⁷¹ Cf. estates of Fedot Dovlarov (Vologda district), the Dolgorukii brothers (Poskhekon'e district), Ovdot'ia Vasil'evna Pozharskaia (Nizhnii Novgorod district), A.V. Cherkasskaia (Murom district), and Katerina Palitsyna (Novgorod district) that became the targets of repeated investigations between 1665 and 1683, in RGADA f. 27, d. 258, pt. 2, II. 2, 80–83; pt. 3, II. 28–30; pt. 4, I. 134; pt. 5, I. 69; f. 159, opis' 1, d. 1395, II 263–64; Dmitrii I. Sapozhnikov, "Samosozhzhenie v russkom raskole (so vtoroi poloviny XVII veka do kontsa XVIII.) Istoricheskii ocherk po arkhivnym dokumentam," *Chtenia* (1891), bk. 3, pt. 4, 24–27; Sergei N. Vvedenskii, "Iz tserkovnoi stariny Muromskogo kraia," *Trudy Vladimirskei uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii* 11 (1909), 16–17.

⁷² Billington, *The Icon and the Axe*, 139–40; idem, "Neglected Figures and Features in the Rise of the Raskol," in *Russia and Orthodoxy. Essays in honor of Georges Florovsky*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), vol. 2, 189–206.

liturgical reforms created unrelenting pressure and unleashed fierce, often violent, resistance.

Often rejection of the Nikonian reforms represented the culmination in a long history of resistance. The Solovki monks and peasants, for example, had been harassing church agents ever since Patriarch Filaret had tried to reform their unruly behavior during the 1620s. Monastic troublemakers, such as the monk Bogolep and Superior Avraamii, had for years tyrannized and plundered the regions under their rule, ignoring any attempts at outside interference. Cossack leaders on the Don and Dnepr' Rivers were hostile toward the Orthodox Church—and the Muscovite state—long before they started beating up and chasing away church emissaries. The peasants on Lake Onega had for decades resented the encroachments of Muscovite church agents on their fertile lands. And the merchants of Novgorod had been perceived as troublesome as early as the 1640s.

But a history of tension was not a necessary pre-condition for rejecting the Nikonian reforms. More important was geographic location in an area that had been poorly integrated into the official structure of the Orthodox Church. For example, many of the small monasteries that failed to adopt the new rites were located in the Nizhnii Novgorod region, an area larger than all of early modern France, that had never had its own bishop. And the southern steppes as well as northern Ukraine, only recently acquired from Poland, were still largely *terrae incognitae* for Muscovite church officials despite the establishment of a new bishopric in Belgorod (1657) and the appropriation of the Chernihiv bishopric (1657). Even some regions within the eleven old Muscovite bishoprics remained isolated: the Poshekhon'e district was only loosely attached to the vast metropolitanate of Rostov; the Onega and White Sea areas were impassable for much of the year due to cold weather or rain; peasant trading settlements in the Suzdal' bishopric (e.g. Ivanovo and Viazniki) maintained monasteries and convents that were much more closely affiliated with their local communities than with the Kremlin; and wealthy centers of commerce such as Velikii Ustiug (Rostov eparchy) and Kaluga (Sarai eparchy) were only occasionally visited by agents of faraway episcopal lords.

The widespread failure to implement the Nikonian reforms revealed to the church unambiguously that it was not in control of large parts of Muscovy. In response, church leaders such as Simeon Polotskii and Patriarch Ioakim considered dramatically increasing the number of bishoprics from the seventeen existing in 1682 to thirty-four or, according to a draft submitted by Patriarch Ioakim to the tsar, even up to seventy-two. The purpose of these new bishoprics was to infiltrate schismatic strongholds. For example, the Onega region was to be subordinated to a new eparchy in the town of Olonets; the Kargopol' district, where monk Bogolep had once ruled, was to be subjugated to a new bishop in the town of Kargopol'; the White Sea region, until recently entirely in the hands of the Solovki monks, was to be controlled by two new bishops assigned to Kholmogory and the Kola peninsula; the Poshekhon'e and Murom regions would each receive their own bishops as would the trading centers of Kaluga, Velikii Ustiug, and Tot'ma. In the Nizhnii Novgorod region, at least four new bishoprics were to be founded; the southern steppe zone was to receive at least eight new bishops. Similar plans were made for schism-infested Siberia.⁷³

Only very gradually, if at all, did determined efforts to implement the Nikonian reforms overcome the various forms of resistance to church power, and then only with the help of state institutions and military force. The church remained limited in its power to transform the religious landscape of Muscovy. Reform attempts during the 1680s aimed at increasing the number of bishoprics became largely rhetorical once the tsar lost interest. But without additional bishoprics, the central dilemma of the Muscovite church persisted: patriarchs and bishops were unable to control the religious affairs of vast territories that had never been linked with their remote seats of power.

⁷³ Vinogradskii, *Tserkovnyi sobor v Moskve 1682 goda*, 9, 52–54, 63–66; Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii*, vol. 1, 320–23.

SECULARIZATION AND WESTERNIZATION REVISITED: ART AND ARCHITECTURE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIA

Lindsey Hughes

Between the beginning and the end of the seventeenth century something happened to Russia culture that historians have tried to explain with reference to “Westernization,” “secularization,” or even a delayed Renaissance, linking novel, “modern” features in the arts—for example, the use of naturalistic-looking light, shade and perspective in religious painting; the proliferation of elements of the Classical order system in architecture; the appearance of genres new to Russia, such as portrait-painting—to broader developments in domestic and foreign affairs. The notion of “modernization” in the figurative arts is, of course, a relative concept, which has little to do with efficiency or movement towards a clearly defined goal. Even in architecture, new engineering or materials may produce buildings which are taller, safer, or warmer, but architectural style defies categorization in terms of linear progression. When art historians speak of “modern art,” they usually have in mind developments in European painting and sculpture from the latter half of the nineteenth century onwards, when artists consciously broke with “old” Renaissance conventions. The Renaissance, too, has been construed in terms of a shift from “medieval” to “modern.” In neither case can Russian developments neatly be accommodated in the Western time frame, no more than Russian history fits easily into categories such as “medieval,” “early modern” and so on. This paper revisits the question of change in seventeenth-century Russian art and architecture. In doing so, it does not offer a systematic survey of artistic developments, but aims to provoke a fresh look at received wisdom on a contentious and under-researched topic.

The wider context of this investigation is the relationship of Russian and Western culture. It is a historical commonplace that, when measured against a Western European yardstick, Russia experienced an unusually extended “medieval” period, dominated by religious art. In the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, the Rus’ principalities were part of the cultural map of Christian Europe, albeit within an Orthodox sub-section with significant local peculiarities. Thereafter, elements of culture which appeared in nearly all Western and Central Europe failed to materialize in those parts of Rus’ that experienced a protracted period of Mongol occupation, but appeared in those western principalities which developed under Polish-Lithuanian rule. In what was to become Muscovy, neither Gothic nor Renaissance art made much impact, even in cities such as Novgorod which enjoyed lively commercial relations with northern Europe. Icon-painting flourished in a number of regional schools, but free-standing easel painting in oils, both secular and religious—portraiture, the

nude, still life, landscape, history painting (including Biblical subjects) and genre (scenes from everyday life)—failed to develop. In the Russian north there was a thriving school of wooden figure carving, perhaps best described as icons in the round, but sculpture deep chiselled in stone or cast in metal (bell-making excepted) was unknown. More generally, it can be argued that Early Russia had no theoretical concept of “the arts” and “architecture,” but only knowledge and experience of the practice of certain crafts. Explanations for Russia’s deviant cultural path (when set alongside Western developments, it must be emphasized) include not only the “barrier” of Mongols occupation, but also physical and psychological remoteness from Classical antiquity; the special emphases and prohibitions of Orthodoxy (on sculpture and instrumental music, for example); the oppressive nature of Russian government; social immobility; low literacy rates; weak urbanization, hence lack of middle class patronage; and economic backwardness generally.

The weighting and interdependence of the factors that “delayed” Russia’s development continue to be the subject of debate and will not be considered further in this essay. What is not in doubt is that Russian culture evolved differently from that of its Western neighbors, a fact which has been used to demonstrate, on the one hand, Russia’s cultural distinctiveness (*samobytnost’*) in a positive sense (what might be termed the Slavophile view), on the other, its “backwardness” (*otstalost’*) in relation to Western civilization (the Westernist view). In the early eighteenth century—immediately following the developments to be examined below—the dominant discourse was a proto-Westernist one: Peter the Great transformed Russia “from non-existence into being,” as his chancellor Gavril Golovin expressed it in 1721, which meant that most things pre-Petrine were regarded as a blank. Muscovite Russia had patently failed to acquire Civilization, of which the arts were a tangible manifestation. In this respect Russia was a nation apart, “one which played no role in the system of Europe,”¹ but which could achieve cultural salvation by imitating and assimilating Western culture. The idea that modern Russian art began with Peter held sway for the next century and a half, roughly coinciding with the period that (Neo) Classicism dominated the arts in Russia, as it did the elite art of most of Europe.

The systematic interpretation of Russia’s seventeenth century as an “age of transition,” the curtain raiser to Peter’s reforms, was developed in the nineteenth century by such historians as Sergei Mikhailovich Solov’ev, although Solov’ev had little to say about the arts as such. “In our history,” he wrote in the foreword to the first volume of his monumental history of Russia (1851), “the seventeenth century is closely linked to the first half of the eighteenth; the two cannot be separated.”² The beginnings of the scholarly study of pre-Petrine Russia in the nineteenth century coincided more or less with the national revival in Russian art, which began in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, flourished in the reign of Nicholas I (1825–55), who favored a Classical Russo-Byzantine idiom, and was further stimulated later in the century by the rediscovery and cleaning of icons and the study and restoration of early architecture and applied art. Seventeenth-century buildings, with their colorful combination of picturesque indigenous ornamentation with distinctly Western-looking features, sometimes referred to as “Italianate” (*friazhskii*, literally “Frankish”), were widely imitated in neo- or pseudo-Russian architecture.³ A re-invented seventeenth-century style became

the fashion preference at the court of Nicholas II (reigned 1894–1917), who liked to see himself as a latter-day Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645–76).

The scholarly investigation of seventeenth-century Russian art flourished in the early twentieth century, when the work of Aleksandr I. Uspenskii and others on the royal workshops in the Moscow Armory (*Oruzheinaia palata*) uncovered something of the history of artists and artistic production.⁴ These and subsequent studies revealed the following picture. Along with foreign military personnel and merchants and imported technology, from the 1640s a small number of Western artists came to Moscow, men such as the painters Hans Deters or Deterson from Holland, the Pole Stanisław Lopucki and the Germans (or Dutch?) Daniel Wuchters (in Russia 1663–67), “master of perspective” Peter Engels (1670–80s), and Ivan Walter, who arrived from Hamburg in 1679. These and other foreign painters have been dismissed as “men of limited artistic talent,” who ended up in Russia because they could not find employment elsewhere.⁵ In fact, we know too little about their work to pass judgement. No doubt they were not the equals of contemporaries such as Van Dyck or Rubens who plied their trade in Western courts, but they undoubtedly transmitted skills and ideas to their Russian co-workers. They were as much a symptom as a cause of the growth in demand for secular art among the Russian elite, which was underlined by the establishment in 1683 of a separate Armory workshop for non-religious art (*zhivopisnaia palata*).⁶ A few foreign architects, too, worked in Moscow, including Christopher Galloway, who built the upper sections of the Kremlin Spasskii Tower and installed a clock in the 1630s, John Tallar, “master of palace” building, who

¹ See Fontenelle’s eulogy to Peter the Great delivered to the Paris Academy of Sciences in 1725, quoted in James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Imagery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 3 (hereafter, Cracraft, *Imagery*), which provides the most comprehensive examination available in English on the visual arts in late seventeenth-century Russia. See also Gianluigi Goggi, “The Philosophes and the Debate over Russian Civilization,” in *A Window on Russia: Papers from the V International Conference of the Study Group on eighteenth-Century Russia*, ed. Maria Di Salvo and Lindsey Hughes (Rome: La Fenice Edizioni, 1996), 299–305.

² See my introduction to Sergei M. Soloviev, *History of Russia*, vol. 25, *Rebellion and Reform. Fedor and Sophia 1682–1689* (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1989), xvi.

³ See Evgeniia I. Kirichenko, *The Russian Style* (London: L. King, 1991), chapter 3, for a summary.

⁴ See, for example, Aleksandr I. Uspenskii, *Tsarskie ikonopistsy i zhivopistsy XVII veka*, 4 vols. (Moscow: Snegirev, 1910–16); idem and Igor E. Grabar’, “Tsarskie ikonopistsy i zhivopistsy XVII veka,” in *Istoriia russkago iskusstva*, ed. I. E. Grabar’, 6 vols. (Moscow: I. Knebel, 1910–15), VI, 425 ff; For an overview, L. Hughes, “The Moscow Armoury and Innovations in seventeenth-century Muscovite art,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 13:1–2 (1979), 204–23.

⁵ Ekaterina S. Ovchinnikova, *Portret v russkom iskusstve XVII veka* (Moscow: “Iskusstvo,” 1955).

⁶ See Hughes, “Moscow Armoury,” 208–09.

carried out restoration work in the Kremlin, and a Swede Johann Kristler, who designed a never-completed bridge over the Moskva river. Architects were few in number and seem to have been hired for their engineering skills rather than their mastery of modern Western architectural idiom.⁷ We should add that Western craftsmen registered in the Armory and other workshops in the 1660s–80s were greatly outnumbered by Belarusians and Ukrainians, who brought elements of Polish Baroque, especially through the medium of wood-carving and other decorative arts.

There were other possible paths of diffusion besides hired foreign personnel. Imported pictures, books and artefacts probably had as much impact as foreign artists. For example, the influence on Russian religious art of illustrations from the Dutch Piscator Bible has been well documented.⁸ Engravings and etchings, maps and illustrated books (including many on architecture) found their way into Muscovite libraries, including the royal collections.⁹ In the rare cases where such works depicted Russian subjects, for example, the print of the ambassador Peter I. Potemkin (after Sir Godfrey Kneller, 1682), they may have fuelled a demand for similar portraits among the Russian elite. The handful of Russians who travelled abroad picked up ideas about art, notably Tsar Aleksei himself, whose encounters with city architecture and magnates' estates while on military campaigns in Lithuania and the Baltic in the 1650s led, according to his English doctor Samuel Collins, to some remodelling of the royal court.¹⁰ The palace at Kolomenskoe (1660s–70s), with its decorative carvings and ceilings painted with signs of the Zodiac, was a striking manifestation of new tastes in a traditional wooden architectural setting. Some Russian may even have ventured into the Moscow German Quarter (*nemetskaia sloboda*), that "small corner of Western Europe," and gazed at its Protestant churches, shops and taverns, although restrictions on access limited the Quarter's potential impact.¹¹

Evidence that local artists were becoming aware of their place in the wider world of art is found in the first Russian artistic treatises. In his epistle to fellow Moscow icon-painter Simon Ushakov (1629–86), written some time between 1656 and 1666, Iosif Vladimirov asked: "How can people claim that only Russians are allowed to paint icons and only Russian icon-painting may be revered, while that of other lands should neither be kept nor honored?" He emphasized the importance of similitude and even artistic autonomy. In the reply

⁷ See L. Hughes, "The West Comes to Russian Architecture," in *Russia and Europe*, ed. Paul Dukes (London: Collins and Brown, 1991), 24–47. Jeremy Howard, *The Scottish Kremlin builder: Christopher Galloway: Clockmaker, Architect and Engineer to Tsar Mikhail, the First Romanov* (Edinburgh: Manifesto, 1997).

⁸ Hughes, "Moscow Armoury," 212; Cracraft, *Imagery*, 94–96.

⁹ Sergei P. Luppov, *Kniga v Rossii XVII veka* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1970); L. Hughes, "Western European Graphic Material as a Source for Moscow Baroque Architecture," *Slavonic and East European Review* 55:4 (1977), 433–43.

¹⁰ Samuel Collins, *The Present State of Russia* (London, 1671), 64–65.

¹¹ See Samuel Baron, "The Origins of Seventeenth-Century Moscow's Nemeckaja Sloboda," *California Slavic Studies*, 5 (1970), 1–18; L. Hughes, "The seventeenth-century 'Renaissance' in Russia," *History Today*, Feb. 1980, 41–45.

attributed to him, Ushakov wrote of the usefulness of image-making for recalling the past and witnessing the present, comparing the painter's skill with the properties of a mirror. Both writers were concerned with the quality of painting, but they remained within a firmly Orthodox context, as we shall see.¹²

Major developments in church-state politics were another factor which prepared the ground for the spread of the influence of foreign sacred and secular art. The religious schism that followed the reforms of Patriarch Nikon in the 1650s, for example, weakened the authority of the Orthodox Church, which had already been stripped of some of its powers by the Law Code of 1649. The ongoing correction of service books required the invitation of learned churchmen from Ukraine and Belarus, where, as noted earlier, Western art forms had already taken hold in an Orthodox idiom which was easier for Muscovites to assimilate than direct from Western Europe. The nature and extent of this influence on art and architecture awaits fuller investigation. The theory of the cultural interaction of the "fraternal" nations fitted comfortably into the Soviet ideological framework, but Russia's "elder brother" status limited the extent to which borrowing from Ukraine could be acknowledged, as did the mainly religious character of the influence.¹³ At the same time, one should not exaggerate the weakness of the post-Nikonian church, which fiercely opposed what were perceived as "Latin and Lutheran" influences in religious art. In 1674, for example, Patriarch Joachim banned the sale of paper prints "made by German heretics, Lutherans and Calvinists, according to their own damned persuasion, crudely and wrongly." He and his predecessors did battle with icons in which "everything is depicted after the manner of earthly things."¹⁴ Their opponents agreed with them on this matter. The most frequently reproduced pronouncement on the subject is the Old Believer Archpriest Avvakum's complaint that some icon-painters made Christ "look like a German, big-bellied and fat, except that no sword is painted on his hip."¹⁵

Such complaints were aimed at both non-canonical icon subjects (especially imported religious prints from Catholic sources) and non-traditional, three-dimensional depictions which added unseemly, "worldly" volume and life-like

¹² "Poslanie nekoego izografa Iosifa k tsareva izografu i mudreishemu zhivopistsu Simonu Ushakovu" and "Slovo k liubozhchatel'nomu ikonno go pisaniiu" (ca. 1667), attributed to Ushakov. See Cracraft, *Imagery*, 82–88.

¹³ See Hughes, "Moscow Armoury," 211–21, and "Byelorussian Craftsmen in Seventeenth-Century Russia and Their Influence on Muscovite Architecture," *The Journal of Byelorussian Studies* 3 (1976), 327–41. On wider questions, Max Okenfuss, *The Rise and Fall of Latin Humanism in Early-Modern Russia: Pagan Authors, Ukrainians, and the Resiliency of Muscovy* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1995), and editors' introduction and Edward Keenan's afterword in *Religions and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, eds. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy S. Kollmann (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997).

¹⁴ Dmitrii A. Rovinskii, *Russkie gravery i ikh proizvedenie s 1564 do osnovaniia Akademii Khudozhestv* (Moscow: Izd. grafa Uvarova, 1870), 135–36.

¹⁵ See Nikolay E. Andreyev, "Nikon and Avvakum on Icon-Painting," in idem, *Studies in Muscovy* (London: Variorum, 1970), essay XIII, 43.

features to images which, according to Orthodox tradition, were supposed to give intimations of a divine world beyond the icon, not a flesh and blood imitation of this one. There was no reason for churchmen to resist secular painting *per se*. Indeed, Patriarch Nikon had his portrait painted several times, although scholars still disagree whether the famous painting of Nikon with the clergy was painted by Daniel Wuchters (the only extant work attributed to this artist) or produced for the consecration in 1685 of the Cathedral of the Resurrection at New Jerusalem on the basis of portraits made during Nikon's lifetime.¹⁶ A study of early portraits of the Russian Orthodox clergy, a topic largely ignored in the Soviet period, is much needed.

Resistance to portraits would have been a waste of energy, for there is little evidence of a significant demand in Muscovy for Western paintings. Contacts and "preconditions" do not invariably lead to radical change. This is underlined, for example, by the fact that Dutch and Flemish art left little trace at this point on Russian painting, even though a strong Dutch presence in seventeenth-century Russia coincided with the golden age of realistic portraiture and genre painting in the Netherlands. It is unlikely (although not impossible) that any Russian artist had heard of Rembrandt, Vermeer or Hals. And lack of travel opportunities prevented them from seeing actual works by major Western painters. Russian artists' receptiveness to the outside world was limited by religious artistic conventions, while insufficient technical knowledge (lack of familiarity with the preparation of oil paints and canvases, for example) and ignorance of Classical history and mythology prevented them from producing paintings in a fully-fledged Western manner. Likewise, Russian builders (there was as yet no equivalent of the term "architect") were unacquainted with treatises on the five orders of architecture and none, as far as we know, had first-hand experience of Western buildings in the round, even if they could gain an impression from engravings. Vigorous efforts from on high would be needed to transform professional training in the arts, for example by sending artists abroad to train and encouraging them to study foreign languages.

Such a program for the arts was patently absent during the reigns of the seventeenth-century tsars. "Modern" trends may have infiltrated the tsar's palace and the mansions of a few boyars in the form of portraits, wall-paintings on historical subjects (sadly none survive), foreign books, clocks, mirrors and furniture, even Western dress, but they were not intended for, far less imposed upon a wider public. The acquisition of such things was more or less restricted to the upper echelons of the boyar class, who were numbered only in hundreds.¹⁷ The most visible evidence of semi-Westernized tastes is found in architecture. The late seventeenth-century élite—boyars, chief merchants and churchmen—favored the so-called "Moscow Baroque" style (in its 1690s phase also referred to by art historians as "Naryshkin Baroque"), in which elements of the Classical order system, used decoratively in carved stone and brick ornament inspired by Western Renaissance and Baroque originals, were combined with traditional structures. The builders, only some of whose names have come down to us, were Russians, who used time-tested techniques and designs, but also borrowed ideas

¹⁶ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 98. Discussion in Cracraft, *Imagery*, 117–18.

for decoration from imported Western graphic materials or from the work of Belarusian woodcarvers.¹⁸ Other arts, too, fitted this tentative and hybrid model of “transition,” for example, syllabic verse introduced from Poland; prints and etchings incorporating Classical motifs and Christian imagery; and Tsar Aleksei’s short-lived court theater (1672–76). The performers were young men from the German Quarter, but the repertoire was largely religious and/or moralizing, reminiscent of the Byzantine court theatre.¹⁹ The theatre also accelerated the importation of Western musical instruments and musical scores, although prohibitions remained on the use of instruments in church, where only the human voice was permitted.

Soviet art historians readily accepted the seventeenth century as an age of transition (*perekhodnyi vek*) within the accepted scheme of historical periodization, although the idea of the “Baroque” century met with some resistance. The debate over whether the developments under consideration added up to a Muscovite version of Baroque culture today has lost some of its edge.²⁰ Dmitrii Sergeevich Likhachev’s formula of the “discovery of the value of the human personality” (*lichnost’*) in a delayed Renaissance, which incorporated certain stylistic features of contemporary (seventeenth-century) Western culture, won more adherents. Seventeenth-century Muscovy, it was argued, experienced a new appreciation of the worldly individual outside the religious context, as manifested in literature and the arts. This endowed the seventeenth century with

¹⁷ See Ivan E. Zabelin’s studies of the Muscovite royal family, e.g. *Domashnii byt russkikh tsarei v XVI i XVII st.* (Moscow: Tip. V. Gracheva, 1862 and later revised editions). On boyar culture, Robert Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Paul Bushkovitch, “Cultural Change among the Russian Boyars 1650–1680. New Sources and Old Problems,” *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 56 (2000), 89–111. On servitors outside Moscow, Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces. The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

¹⁸ See James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Architecture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 85–109. L. Hughes, “Western European Graphic Material” and “Moscow Baroque—a controversial style,” *Transactions of the Association of Russian-American Scholars in USA* 15 (1982), 69–93.

¹⁹ See C.R. Jensen, “Music for the Tsar: a Preliminary Study of the Music of the Muscovite Court Theatre,” *The Musical Quarterly* 79:2 (1995), 368–401; Mariia A. Alekseeva, “Zhanr konkliuzii v russkom iskusstve kontsa XVII-nachala XVIII v.” in Tatiana V. Alekseeva, ed. *Russkoe iskusstvo barokko* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 7–29; Aleksandr M. Panchenko, *Russkaia stikhotvornaia kul’tura XVII veka* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1973); Lidiia I. Sazonova, *Poeziia russkogo barokko* (Moscow: Nauka, 1991).

²⁰ A key work in the debate was *Barokko v Rossii*, ed. Aleksei I. Nekrasov (Moscow: GAKHN, 1926); see in particular, Mikhail V. Alpatov, “Problema barokko v russkoi ikonopisi,” 81–92. My own unpublished Ph.D. dissertation “Moscow Baroque Architecture: a Study of One Aspect of Westernization in Late Seventeenth-Century Russia” (Cambridge University, 1976), summarises the debate, which Cracraft takes further in *Architecture and Imagery*. See also Natalia Kostotchkina, “The Baroque in seventeenth-Century Russian Art: Icon-Painting, Painting, Decorative and Applied Art” (M. Phil. diss., SSEES, University of London. 1994).

something “close to the significance of the Renaissance in the cultural history of Western Europe.”²¹

But how did Soviet historians, wedded to an atheistic world view, deal with the awkward fact of the prolonged control of established religion over seventeenth-century Russian culture? They coped by emphasising material and “humanistic” features, in other words, by reducing or denying the religiosity of religious art and underlining instead its popular (*narodnye*) and “life-enhancing” (*zhizneradosnye*) qualities.²² The highest praise was reserved for those artists who celebrated “human” qualities. Even Andrei Rublev’s famous icon of the “Old Testament Trinity” (1410–20s) was subjected to this treatment. Rublev, it was argued, painted three angels (instead of three human-beings) because he lived among people who were “naively convinced of the mysterious power of old iconographic forms, in order to avoid offending this attachment to the old ways (*starina*)”²³ His icon symbolized “mankind’s dream of a perfect world in which harmony, love and friendship would reign.”²⁴ Seventeenth-century icons and frescoes provided even better opportunities than Rublev’s for applying the secular approach. They were scrutinized for evidence of realism (illusion of three-dimensional reality and linear perspective), naturalistic landscapes, peasant physiognomies and everyday (*bytovye*) details, such as tableware and furniture. Soviet architectural historians pointed to an increase in the second half of the century in the number of domestic and civic buildings constructed of stone and brick as a “progressive” development. Cult architecture could be the bearer of progressive features, too. Seventeenth-century church architecture, for example, was said to have “drawn closer” to civic architecture. By reducing domes to mere decorative appendages and articulating facades with carved window frames, architects made their churches look more like palaces. Soviet scholars, particularly during the Stalin period, naturally put less emphasis than their tsarist predecessors on borrowing (foreign influence was a sensitive area), more on the indigenous development of new ideas. But Western and Soviet scholars more or less agreed that modern Russian art originated in the seventeenth century, if not earlier.²⁵

It now seems that scholars (the present author included) were over-eager to declare the triumph of secular culture, relying too heavily on the equation of “secularization” (the favored Soviet term was *obmirshchenie*) with “progressiveness.” Simon Ushakov, for example, seems the very embodiment of “transition,” a pioneer of such features in icon-painting as *chiaroscuro* (light and shade) effects and the inclusion of real-looking architecture and landscape, but

²¹ Dmitrii S. Likhachev, *Razvitie russkoi literatury X–XVII vekov* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1973), 214. Also idem, “Barokko i ego russkii variant 17 veka,” *Russkaia literatura*, no. 2 (1969), and *Chelovek v literature drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970).

²² Igor E. Grabar’ et al. eds, *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, 13 vols. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1953), vol. 1, 504.

²³ Mikhail M. Alpatov, “Andrei Rublev i ego Troitsa,” *Iunyi khudozhnik*, no. 1 (1980), 34–41.

²⁴ See Anatolii F. Dmitrenko, *Fifty Russian Artists* (Moscow-London: Raduga, 1985), 13, which omits seventeenth-century art altogether.

nevertheless he failed to become a fully-fledged easel painter.²⁶ His icon “The Planting of the Tree of the Muscovite Realm” (1668) may be analysed with reference to both “modern” and “archaic” trends. On the one hand, it includes images of Tsar Aleksei, his first wife Mariia and two of their sons; in fact, it is the only surviving image of the tsar known for sure to have been produced during his lifetime and signed by an artist. (The signing of a few icons, usually produced anonymously, has been interpreted as further evidence of the growth of artistic autonomy.) As one historian writes, the icon gave Ushakov an opportunity to “demonstrate his skill as a portraitist,” a skill which is impossible to judge elsewhere as none of his free-standing portraits have survived.²⁷ The “Tree” icon also contains precisely delineated representations of the walls of the Kremlin and the Spasskii Tower. But far from “undermining the religious-symbolic basis of early Russian art”²⁸ or being a mere vehicle for “realism,” which Soviet historians emphasized, the icon may also be perceived as wholly conventional in the way it ignores real time and space, not to mention the “laws” of perspective (still an unfamiliar concept in mid-seventeenth-century Muscovy), bringing together heaven and earth (the upper and lower spheres), architecture of different periods and holy men of different epochs, all presided over by an image of the Vladimir Mother of God, Moscow’s protector. Images of rulers and their families in poses of supplication or prayer, making donations or holding scrolls with sacred texts, as here, were not “modern,” but wholly in the Byzantine tradition of ruler images.²⁹ There is no reason to believe that these stylized figures, dressed in robes of gold thread, fitted with haloes and, in the case of the tsar, in coronation regalia, were painted from life. Ushakov clearly had no intention of depicting the “struggle between the secular and the religious,” detected by some modern historians.³⁰

The Russian art historian Engelina Smirnova has challenged the idea that Ushakov’s work was a “move towards a new artistic epoch,” arguing on the contrary that the painter resurrected ancient subjects and forms—Byzantine, Kievan and Muscovite—in an art which she categorizes as “late medieval.”³¹ The work of other leading painters of the era, such as Fedor Zubov, Karp

²⁵ See, for example, “The Beginning of Modern Painting: Moscow 1550–1700,” chapter 18 of George H. Hamilton, *The Art and Architecture of Russia* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983).

²⁶ On Ushakov as “failed artist,” Grabar’ and Uspenskii, “Tsarskie ikonopistsy,” 440. For a popular Soviet view, Nataliia G. Bekeneva, *Simon Ushakov 1626–1686* (Leningrad: Khudozhnik RSFSR, 1984). Also Vera G. Briusova *Russkaia zhivopis’ XVII veka* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1984), plate 17; L. Hughes, “The Age of Transition: Seventeenth-Century Russian Icon-Painting,” in *Icons* 88, ed. Sarah Smyth and Stanford Kingston (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1988), 63–74.

²⁷ Irina E. Danilova and Nadezhda E. Mneva, “Zhivopis’” XVII veka,” in *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, ed. Grabar’, vol. IV, 380.

²⁸ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 13.

²⁹ See Frank Kämpfer, *Das russische Herrscherbild von den Anfängen bis zu Peter dem Grossen: Studien zur Entwicklung politischer Ikonographie im byzantinischen Kulturkreis* (Recklinghausen: A. Bongers, 1978).

Zolotarev, Ivan Bezmin, Ivan Saltanov, Gurii Nikitin and Kirill Ulanov, needs to be re-evaluated in this light.³² Zubov, for example, copied some of his compositions from Western (Catholic) sources and there are elements of “naturalism” in his work, for example, in his “Crucifixion” of 1685, in which blood, usually omitted from the Orthodox iconography of this subject, drips from Christ’s hands and sides, but at the same time he worked in a standard Orthodox idiom. His icons are most remarkable for their stylized ornamentalism and jewel-like details. The intricate decorativeness and bright colors that are hallmarks of much seventeenth-century Russian art, including applied art (enamel ware, metal work, leather work, fabrics), appear to owe as much to Oriental as to Western influences.³³

This is not to deny that Ushakov and some of his fellow artists were better acquainted with Western art than their predecessors. The Classical arch in the background of his icon of “The Old Testament Trinity” (1671), for example, was copied from a print of a painting by Paolo Veronese. Several of his engravings are based on foreign originals, for example “The Seven Deadly Sins” (1665) and the title page to Simeon Polotskii’s *History of Barlaam and Josaphat* (Moscow, 1681), hailed as “the first example of the use of Classical symbolism by a Russian artist.”³⁴ Like Ushakov, other icon-painters were extending their repertoire. In a petition of 1681, for example, Vasilii Poznanskii announced that he was skilled in both icon- and secular painting (*ikonopis’* and *zhivopis’*) and could do historical subjects, “perspective” studies and—not least—portraits.³⁵

Seventeenth-century Russian portraits remain elusive. A scholarly landmark on this topic was Ekaterina S.Ovchinnikova’s monograph of 1955, which aimed to reveal the “realistic” tendencies and “national foundations” (*narodnye osnovy*) which led to the birth of portrait-painting in Russia.³⁶ The author embraced the

³⁰ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 22. See Cracraft, *Imagery*, 19, on the exaggeration of “the degree to which such painting was ‘secular’ in either subject or style.” Kämpfer, *Herrscherbild*, 227–30, analyses the work, with reference to the Tree of Jesse. See also L.Hughes, “Simon Ushakov’s Icon The Tree of the Muscovite State’ Revisited,” *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 58 (2002), 1201–12; Isolde Thyret, *Between God and Tsar. Religious Symbolism and the Royal Women of Muscovite Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001), 70–78.

³¹ Elena S.Smirnova, “Simon Ushakov—‘Historicism’ and ‘Byzantinism’: On the Interpretation of Russian Painting from the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century,” in Baron and Kollman, *Religions and Culture*, 170–83.

³² See Vera G.Briusova, *Fedor Zubov* (Moscow: “Izobrazitel’noe iskusstvo,” 1985) and idem, *Gurii Nikitin* (Moscow: “Izobrazitel’noe iskusstvo,” 1982); A.A.Pavlenko, “Karp Zolotarev i Moskovskie zhivopistsy poslednei treti XVII v.,” in *Pamiatniki kul’tury. Noveye otkrytiia*. 1982 (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984). Kostotchikina, “Baroque,” 100–31 [on Bezmin, Zubov and Zolotarev]; A.A.Pavlenko, “Evolutsiia russkoi ikonopisi i zhivopisnoe masterstvo kak iavlenie perekhodnogo perioda,” *Russkaia kul’tura v perekhodnyi period ot Srednevekov’ia k novomu vremeni* (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1992).

³³ On applied art, Kostotchikina, “The Baroque,” 191–266.

³⁴ Cracraft, *Imagery*, 127, 155.

belief that secularization was a “progressive” phenomenon rooted in realism (the objective reflection of reality) and an independent manifestation of national originality (*natsional’noe svoeobrazie*); native artists carefully selected only “the best” of what foreigners had to offer.³⁷ The cliché for this sort of borrowing process among Soviet historians was “reworking the advanced achievements of world art” (*pererabotka peredovykh dostizhenii mirovogo iskusstva*). As already indicated, however, the seventeenth-century Russian royal portrait had its roots not in Western but in Byzantine art, filtered through Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia, the conventions of which allowed saintly images to be joined by those of non-canonized and even living people in attitudes of prayer and supplication.³⁸ The Moscow Kremlin was full of such ancestral “portraits” of the princely dynasty in the form of wall paintings, notional likenesses with conventional attributes which worked in a religious context even when decorating a secular room.³⁹ Even princes not formally regarded as saints were depicted with the haloes that Byzantine painters conventionally attached to members of imperial dynasties. Such images formed an integral part of the “symbolic landscape” of Muscovite Russia, in which the accidental boundaries of real time and space were ignored in order to convey a sense of the links between the hosts of heaven and men on earth, between old and new empires, the saintly dead and the princes of Moscow, up to and including the seventeenth-century Romanov occupants of the throne.⁴⁰

Portraits of Russians painted in a Western manner depicting a person or persons detached from an iconic composition or a dynastic cycle are extremely rare before the 1680s. Ovchinnikova identified the first documented example of a Russian artist painting a portrait from life as Fedor Iur’ev’s non-extant study of Tsar Aleksei of 1671.⁴¹ Pictures of earlier figures often mistakenly identified as near-contemporary “portraits,” for example, the famous Copenhagen panel of Ivan IV (reigned 1533–84) and images of Prince Mikhail V. Skopin-Shuiskii and

³⁵ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 29.

³⁶ Ibid., 3. Other studies of portraits include V.G. Chubinskaia, “Novoe ob evoliutsii russkogo portreta na rubezhe XVII–XVIII vv.,” *Pamiatniki kul’tury. Noveye otkrytiia*. 1982 (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 320–7; Andrei B. Sterligov, *Portret v russkoi zhivopisi XVII–pervoi pol. XIX veka* (Moscow: Goznak, 1986); Kostotchikina, “The Baroque,” 70–79; L. Hughes, “Images of the Elite: A Reconsideration of the Portrait in Seventeenth-Century Russia,” *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 56 (2000), 165–85.

³⁷ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 7.

³⁸ For reproductions of rulers’ portraits in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia, and a few from Kiev and early Muscovy, see Kämpfer, *Das russische Herrscherbild*, passim.

³⁹ “...a revival of Byzantine concepts,” *ibid.*, 171.

⁴⁰ On symbolic landscape and “iconic Russia,” see Robin R. Milner-Gulland, *The Russians* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 208 ff.; Mariia B. Plukhanova, *Siuzhety i simvolny moskovskogo gosudarstva* (St Petersburg: “Akropol,” 1995); A.L. Batalov, L.A. Beliaev, *Sakral’naia topografiia srednevekovogo goroda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1998); Michael Flier, “The Iconology of Royal Ritual in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy,” in *Byzantine Studies: Essays in the Slavic World and the Eleventh Century*, ed. Speros Vryonis Jr. (New York, 1992), 53–76.

Tsar Fedor Ioannovich (1584–98), are remarkable in that they show free-standing images of secular individuals, but in other respects are closer to icons. All are painted in tempera on wood, all posthumous (some scholars now date the Ivan and Shuiskii images to the 1670s) and all “primitive” by contemporary Western standards.⁴² Such “transitional” portraits are generally referred to by the term *parsuna* (or *persona*), borrowed from Latin via Polish, but denoting also Byzantine-style images. Written evidence survives of *parsuny* of Tsar Mikhail (reigned 1613–45) being made in the Kremlin workshops in the early 1620s in connection with the search for a foreign bride. In 1632 an image (*obraz*) of the tsar on a board (*na tske*), undoubtedly in the Byzantine style, was sent to the patriarch of Constantinople, but no contemporary portraits of the first Romanov survive. Indeed, diplomatic correspondence suggests that such portraits were hidden away and closely guarded as a precaution against the evil eye being transmitted back to the original, an indication that superstition may have been one of the factors delaying the appearance of portraiture in Russia.⁴³ When one considers that Tsar Mikhail was the near contemporary of Charles I of England (reigned 1625–49), whose likeness was recorded constantly in paintings, prints and sculpture from childhood to death, the cultural gap becomes clearer.⁴⁴

The key period in the evolution of the *parsuna* portrait may well be the short reign of Tsar Fedor Alekseevich (1676–82), which saw the further spread of Polish cultural influences. The best-known surviving portrait of Fedor’s father, Tsar Aleksei, anonymous and undated, but often assigned to the 1660s, may date from this time. Stiff and stylized (a Cyrillic inscription labels it as *obraz*), with more of the artist’s attention devoted to conveying details of costly fabrics than personality, this fairly standard example of Byzantine-Slavic iconography suggests some development towards three-dimensionality in the attempt at constructing a spatial background and in the moulding of the face.⁴⁵ Tsar Fedor was very active in honoring his predecessors. In 1677 he commissioned portraits for the tombs of Tsars Mikhail and Aleksei from the icon-painter Fedor Zubov and in 1682 ordered two half-length portraits of his father from Ivan Saltanov. Rare equestrian studies of Tsars Mikhail and Aleksei, painted in tempera on canvas and naive in style, with gold icon-like backgrounds, also date from Fedor’s reign.⁴⁶ Fedor expanded the manuscript portrait collection known as the *Tituliarnik* (1672–73; 1678), made in the Armory for the Diplomatic Chancellery

⁴¹ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 27.

⁴² On Ivan (presented by Tsar Fedor Alekseevich to a Danish envoy, ca. 1672–6): see Frank Kämpfer, “Die ‘parsuna’ Ivan IV. in Kopenhagen—Originalporträt oder historische Bild?” *Essays in Honor of A.A. Zimin* (Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers, 1985), 187–98. Idem, *Herrscherbild*, 174–76. On Fedor, illustrations in Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 59; Kostotchkina, “Baroque,” 72.

⁴³ Boris N. Floria, “Nekotorye dannye o nachale svetskogo portreta v Rossii,” *Arkhiv russkoi istorii*, vyp. 1 (1992), 137–39. Kämpfer, *Herrscherbild*, 211–12.

⁴⁴ Danilova and Mneva, “Zhivopis’,” 381; Kämpfer, *Herrscherbild*, 220. See also Jane Roberts, *The King’s Head. Charles I: King and Martyr* (London: The Royal Collection, 1999).

⁴⁵ Kostotchkina, “Baroque,” 91; Kämpfer, *Herrscherbild*, 214.

as a sort of dynastic and heraldic reference work. This project was, by its very nature, secular, acknowledging Russia's place in the wider scheme of world politics, but the images are conventional, drawn from various literary sources, identifying individuals by inscriptions and appropriate regalia rather than by unique features, with little to distinguish Aleksei Mikhailovich from twelfth-century Prince Vladimir Monomakh.⁴⁷

A striking example of this transitional art is the posthumous portrait of Fedor himself, probably commissioned for placing by his tomb in 1685/6.⁴⁸ It suited Ovchinnikova's agenda to describe it as "lifelike and authentic" (e.g. in the moulding of the face) and to suggest that the prototype was a non-extant portrait of Fedor from life. It is recorded, for example, that in 1678 Ivan Bezmin went to the palace to paint the tsar: ("pisal gosudarskuiu personu").⁴⁹ However, one might equally focus on the traditional materials and iconic technique or perhaps compare the painting with similarly static and decorative panel portraits of Tudor kings and queens painted in England more than a century earlier. Frank Kämpfer argues for the individuality of Tsar Fedor's portrait not on the basis of its style and composition, but with reference to cartouches containing information about Fedor's virtues and deeds, dubbing it a transitional work between the anonymous early *parsuny* and an image of a unique individual accompanied by his own life story.⁵⁰

A more decisive break comes in the 1680s with the appearance of free-standing easel portraits of non-royals. These were generally primitive or naive in execution, based on the model of the formal "Sarmatian" portraits of nobles in Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Ukraine.⁵¹ Examples include portraits of boyars G. P. Godunov (1686), V. F. Liutkin (1697), L. K. Naryshkin (by Mikhail Choglov, 1680s), A. B. Repnin and I. M. Vlasov (by Grigori N. Odol'skii (Adol'skii), 1694–5). The famous engraved portrait of Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, attributed to the Ukrainian Leontii Tarasevich, ca. 1687, is wholly in the Polish-Ukrainian manner, down to the coat of arms, heraldic verses and the hetman's mace in the prince's hand. Like nearly all such prints, it is based on an original done in oils.⁵² In the seventeenth-century *parsuna*, men are portrayed as representatives of their clans, rather than as individuals. There was probably little attempt on the part of the artist even to make the subject look like the living original, which resulted in a certain "mannequin-like" quality.⁵³ As James

⁴⁶ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 27–28; Aleksei B. Novitskii, "Parsunnoe pis'mo v Moskovskoi Rusi," *Starые годы*, July–Sept. (1909), 390; Danilova and Mneva, "Zhivopis'," 457.

⁴⁷ See V. Kostsova, "Tituliarnik sobraniia Gos. Ermitazha," *Trudy Gos. Ermitazha* 3 (1959), 16–40; Cracraft, *Imagery*, 68–70; Kostotchkina, "Baroque," 82–84.

⁴⁸ Briusova, *Russkaia zhivopis'*, plate 36.

⁴⁹ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 47–48, 51–53. Aleksei E. Viktorov, *Opisanie zapisnykh knig i bumag starinnykh dvortsovykh prikazov 1584–1725g.*, 2 vols. (Moscow: S. P. Arkhipov, 1883), II, 446.

⁵⁰ Kämpfer, *Herrscherbild*, 242.

⁵¹ See Larisa I. Tananaeva, "Portretnye formy v Pol'she i v Rossii v XVII v. Nekotorye svyazi i paralleli," *Sovetskoe iskusstvoznanie* 81 (1982); Cracraft, *Imagery*, 190–91.

Cracraft remarks: "Technically...such effigies, as they may better be called, were exceedingly provincial and even regressive by contemporary Western European standards of portraiture."⁵⁴ It must be said, however, that "Western European standards" were by no means uniformly professional and that the primitive and naive portrait, produced by semi-trained or untaught provincial artists, remained the norm outside court and capital circles all over Europe and in North America, too.

The appearance of portraits, then, represents a landmark in seventeenth-century Russian cultural history, but one should beware of making extravagant claims about their wider popularity, as some Soviet writers attempted to do. One might have expected a growing market for portraits, given the evidence that increasing disposable incomes led to new consumption patterns among the Russian elite. As Richard Hellie concludes in a recent study, "whatever there was to be had in much of the world...was available to the more affluent Great Russians: spices, precious metals, textiles, coaches, or books."⁵⁵ But not, it seems, portraits in any significant quantities. Icons and paints show up in Hellie's data bases and indexes, but paintings occur only in inventories of Vasili Golitsyn's possessions in a separate chapter devoted to case studies of "great wealth." Golitsyn also owned "German" prints, maps and mirrors. There is evidence elsewhere that he had a whole portrait gallery, as did his predecessor in the Diplomatic Chancellery Artamon Sergeevich Matveev.⁵⁶ But there are reasons for regarding both these men as exceptional. Even allowing for high rates of loss and destruction of noble property as a result of wars, revolutions and frequent accidental fires, the meagre evidence of both surviving portraits and of identifiable painters working in Russia during the seventeenth century undermines attempts to demonstrate the "wide distribution of portraits in the 1680s not only in the capital but also in the provinces." Ovchinnikova seems to have made this claim on the evidence of just one portrait of the Vologda merchant (*gost'*) G.M.Fetiev (died 1684).⁵⁷

The gap between Russia and the West was at its widest in respect of female portraits, which as long as élite women were kept in semi-seclusion were scarcely permissible at all outside the religious context. Recent studies argue that royal women were empowered by the use of religious symbolism and rhetoric—see, for example, Ushakov's image of Tsaritsa Mariia above.⁵⁸ But their living

⁵² Lindsey Hughes, *Sophia Regent of Russia 1657–1704* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 144–45.

⁵³ Chubinskaia, "Novoe ob evoliutsii," 320; Kostotchkina, "Baroque," 77.

⁵⁴ Cracraft, *Imagery*, 192.

⁵⁵ Richard Hellie, *The Economy and Material Culture of Russia 1600–1725* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 630.

⁵⁶ See Olga S.Evangulova, *Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo v Rossii pervoi chet. XVIII v.*, (Moscow: MGU, 1987), 74. Cf. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, 161: "Only one boyar,...Golitsyn, could claim to be a whole-hearted devotee of the new cultural standards."

⁵⁷ Ovchinnikova, *Portret*, 101; ill. in Briusova, *Russkaia zhivopis'*, 59.

likenesses remained a rarity. The first documented (but non-extant) portrait of a Russian princess, Boris Godunov's daughter Kseniia, was made by a "German" jeweller in miniature for the purposes of broking a foreign marriage. This practice failed to develop as later seventeenth-century tsarevny remained unmarried.⁵⁹ Even the first known free-standing female portraits in Muscovy, dating from the 1680s, are best regarded as an adaptation of Byzantine practice with some Western features added. The painted and engraved images of Tsarevna Sophia (1657–1704), for example, apart from the feminization of the allegorical Seven Virtues which surround her in some versions, are firmly in the Byzantine tradition (c.f. the portrait of Tsar Aleksei described above), emphasising the androgynous attributes of rulership, as symbolized by the orb, sceptre and crown and the double eagle.⁶⁰ Portraits of Peter I's mother Nataliia Naryshkina depict her as nun-like, her hair hidden by a severe black head-dress. Celebrations of female beauty and sexuality, not to mention nudity, were as yet out of the question in Russia and remained so for some time. While late seventeenth-century England enjoyed the "age of the pin-up," with prints (sometimes nude) of Barbara Villiers, Duchess of Cleveland, Nell Gwynn and assorted actresses widely available for sale, Muscovite women remained faceless.⁶¹

The furthest development of the cautious, transitional Muscovite model of Westernization can be observed in the 1690s, before Peter I brought his influence decisively to bear. The Moscow Baroque of the 1680s spread beyond the capital. Peter's maternal relatives commissioned so many churches in the style that it is often referred to as "Naryshkin" Baroque. One of the finest examples, the Church of the Intercession at Fili, built by unknown architects for Peter's uncle Lev Naryshkin in 1690–3, features a centralized composition of a tower of receding octagons flanked by four annexes, each capped with a cupola, all decorated with intricately carved limestone details. Inside, a carved, gilded iconostasis holds round and octagonal, as well as rectangular icons, evidence of the way in which the icons' shape was subordinated to the demands of the architecture in order to allow the iconostasis to function as a decorative whole rather than as a subsidiary support. The subjects of some of the Fili icons also bear witness to the trend of "customising" the contents of the local (ground level) tier of the iconostasis to reflect the patron's family connections, in this case signalled by images of SS Peter and Paul, John the Baptist and Alexis Man of God (patron saints of Tsars Peter and Ivan and Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich respectively). An icon of St Stephen bears a striking resemblance to the young Peter, who often visited the church. All the icons were painted in a distinctly "Italianate" style, still canonically correct, but far removed from traditional

⁵⁸ See Thyret, *Between God and Tsar*.

⁵⁹ Floria, "Nekotorye dannye," 133–35.

⁶⁰ See Hughes, *Sophia*, 139–44, and "Sophia, 'Autocrat of All the Russias': Titles, Ritual and Eulogy in the Regency of Sophia Alekseevna (1682–89)," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 28:3 (1986), 266–86.

⁶¹ David Piper, *The English Face* (London: National Gallery, 1978), 103–04,

Russo-Byzantine painting.⁶² An even more remarkable tower church is the Church of the Sign commissioned by Peter's favorite Prince Boris Golitsyn on his estate at Dubrovitsy near Moscow in 1690 and completed in 1704. Its design departs more radically from traditional Orthodox conventions than the church at Fili by dispensing with the cupolas in favor of an open-work crown) and including statues of saints outside the church and Latin inscriptions inside.⁶³ In civic architecture, large buildings of the 1690s such as the Main Pharmacy and the Sukharev tower in Moscow demonstrated new trends in masonry construction, with the same Moscow Baroque decorative devices found in churches applied to their symmetrical facades.

The painting of the 1690s, still inadequately studied, bears witness to both the widening of Western influences and the resilience of religious culture. In January 1692 the Armory received an order for eleven large pictures for Peter's residence at Pereiaslavl'-Zalesskii (which he used as a base for his sailing expeditions), the subjects of which included Christ the Savior, the Mother of God, Saints Peter, Alexis Man of God and Alexander Nevskii and the Martyrs Nataliia and Evdokiia. The family references—Alexander Nevskii, for example, was the patron saint of Peter's infant son Alexander (1691–92); Nataliia and Evdokiia were the names of Peter's mother and wife respectively—were almost certainly chosen by Peter's mother; but the commission reflected “modern” trends insofar as these were not wooden panels but paintings on canvas in frames, probably in a style similar to the icons at Fili.⁶⁴ Peter's own taste was probably better indicated by his orders in July 1691 for twelve foreign portraits (*person nemetskikh*) in gilt frames to be brought to his apartments from the confiscated property of Prince Vasilii Golitsyn and, even more emphatically, for twenty-three battle paintings “after the German (*nemetskii*, i.e. foreign) model” in August 1694.⁶⁵ In June 1697, while Peter was abroad, the same team of painters from the Armory was instructed to paint eight pictures on canvas depicting “troops going by sea” copied from German pictures or engravings.⁶⁶ Painters were also called upon to decorate the new ships which Peter built at Voronezh in 1696–97 and to make regimental banners.

Classical imagery began to make its appearance on the streets. The victory parade held in Moscow in 1696 to celebrate the capture of Azov from the Turks took place against a backdrop of architectural devices, allegorical paintings and

⁶² See N.Gordeeva and L.Tarasenko, *Tserkov' Pokrova v Filiakh* (Moscow: “Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo,” 1980); Kostotchikina, “Baroque,” 125–27.

⁶³ William C.Brumfield, *A History of Russian Architecture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 189–90; T.A.Gatova, “Iz istorii dekorativnoi skul'ptury Moskvy nachala XVIII v.,” in *Russkoe iskusstvo XVIII veka*, ed. Tatiana V.Alekseeva (Moscow: “Iskusstvo,” 1968), 40–41.

⁶⁴ Grigorii V.Esipov, ed. *Sbornik vypisok iz arkhivnykh bumag o Petre Velikom*, 2 vols (Moscow: Universitetskaia tip., 1872), 1, 127. Also L.Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 12–20.

⁶⁵ Esipov, *Sbornik vypisok*, vol. 1, 119.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 143–44, 161–62.

sculptures on triumphal gates which bore the words of Julius Caesar: "I came. I saw. I conquered."⁶⁷ The Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy, founded in 1685 on the model of the Kiev Mohyla Academy, was responsible for devising the programmes for such parades. Meanwhile, the number of icon-painters in the Armory (although not in the country as a whole) declined, until in 1701 only two are left on the payroll, the rest redeployed on other tasks and a few years later transferred to the new capital of St Petersburg.⁶⁸

The examples above indicate the emergence of a distinctly hybrid elite culture by the middle of the 1690s. Russian art might have continued to evolve in a gradual way had it not been for the decisive influence of the Great Embassy to Europe (1697–98), when Peter was able not only to observe Western buildings, paintings and sculpture in context, but also to participate in balls, masquerades and regattas. On his return he issued his famous orders forcing townsmen to shave and adopt foreign dress. Peter's own tastes and priorities worked with some pre-existing trends to set an artistic agenda several years before St Petersburg became his cultural flagship. The Embassy was especially crucial in the matter of Peter's own image. In January 1698 the first portrait of a Russian ruler wholly in the Western manner was painted in London by King William III's court painter Sir Godfrey Kneller. This full-length portrait of Peter in armor with a column to his right and a ship in the background to his left was a set-piece composition, but the face was acknowledged by people who knew Peter to be a good likeness. It spawned numerous copies, prints and miniatures.⁶⁹

After 1700 Russian royal portraits abandoned Byzantine-Slavic iconography. Thereafter the Russian court quickly "caught up" with Western fashions, not least in the matter of the female image. The portraits (ca. 1717) of Peter's daughters Anna and Elizabeth as nymphs in diaphanous dresses by Peter's French court painter Louis Caravaque contrast sharply with the handful of Russian female portraits surviving from the period immediately before Peter's dress reforms (1700–1), which show women in traditional modest Muscovite costume, for example, the Russian Museum's portrait of Tsaritsa Marfa Matveevna.⁷⁰

To declare the "triumph" of Western culture in the Petrine era would be premature, however. Although it produced some passable imitations of Westernized images, especially in portrait-painting, we are still far from the "liberal" atmosphere that Western thinkers such as David Hume regarded as essential for the flourishing of the arts, which in Russia remained firmly

⁶⁷ See details in Richard Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), vol. 1, 42–44.

⁶⁸ Esipov, *Sbornik vypisok*, vol. 1, 154.

⁶⁹ See the comparison with Kneller's portrait of James II (1685) in Cracraft, *Imagery*, 133–34; Kämpfer, *Herrscherbild*, 250.

⁷⁰ Anna and Elizabeth are illustrated in Ninel' V. Kaliazina and Galina N. Komelova, *Russkoe iskusstvo Petrovskoi epokhi* (Leningrad: "Khudozhnik RSFSR," 1990), plate 118. On Caravaque, Cracraft, *Imagery*, 206–08. See also Hughes, *Russia in the Age*, 188–91, "Images of Greatness: Portraits of Peter I," in *Peter the Great and the West: New Perspectives*, ed. Hughes (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2000), 250–70, and *Peter the Great: A Biography* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002).

harnessed to the needs of the state. Even the first Russian portraits to display real hints of character, the so-called 1690s Preobrazhenskii series, emerge from the context of the tsar's own All-Jesting, All-Drunken Assembly, itself arguably a bizarre variation of regular service requirements.⁷¹ The first truly secular images produced independently by Russian painters wholly in the Western idiom were painted abroad, away from the ideology and demands of the court. Notable among these are Ivan Nikitin's "Field Hetman," which appears even more remarkable if we accept Sergei Androsof's theory that it is in fact Nikitin's self-portrait, painted while he was studying in Italy, and Andrei Matveev's "Self-portrait with Wife," a rare example of a Russian double domestic portrait, allegedly painted in the Netherlands in 1729.⁷² But mysteries surround both these works. The subjects of Matveev's picture have been identified alternatively as Grand Duchess Anna Leopoldovna and her husband, parents of the ill-fated Emperor Ivan VI, while the attribution of practically all Nikitin's work is highly problematical. Indeed, some art historians doubt whether "Field Hetman/Self Portrait" is his at all.⁷³

The fact is that fully-fledged Russian artists trained in the Western manner, and architects, too, were slow to appear even in Peter's reign, as was a whole range of subject matter, including the free-standing landscape, still life, history painting and genre. This anomaly has been explained by the dearth of independent patrons with a taste for secular art, by the problems of finding a niche for painters in Russia's stratified society outside the royal workshops; even by the theory that minor genres were too "frivolous" for Peter's Russia.⁷⁴ As a consequence, it remained easier for a man to make a living as an icon painter, a trade with deep roots in Russian society, than as a *zhivopisets*. Indeed, nearly all the best-known eighteenth-century Russian artists started their careers painting icons and frescos and continued to do so even as they undertook commissions for portraits and other secular works. Just as once the boundaries of "modern" Russian art were pushed back from Peter's reign into the seventeenth or even the sixteenth century, perhaps the time has come to extend the "age of transition" well into the eighteenth century or beyond. The secular credentials of Petrine Russia, that apparently worldly, even "godless" era, need to be scrutinized.⁷⁵ Post-Soviet writing, ranging from beginners' guides to iconography to cultural histories of the icon, is beginning to restore the spiritual content to medieval Russian art and also to explore its impact in the post-Petrine era.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Chubinskaia, "Novoe ob evoliutsii," 325, calls these portraits of Peter the Great's cronies *antiparsumy*. See Hughes, *Russia in the Age*, 251–52; Cracraft, *Imagery*, 192–93. On Hume, Goggi, "Philosophes."

⁷² See Sergei O. Androsof, "Painting and Sculpture in the Petrine Era," in *Russia in the Reign of Peter the Great. Old and New Perspectives*, ed. Anthony G. Cross (Cambridge: Study Group on eighteenth-Century Russia, 1998), 168, and idem, *Zhivopisets Ivan Nikitin* (St Petersburg: D. Bulanin, 1998), 177–79.

⁷³ Conversations in 1999–2000 with curators in the Russian Museum, St Petersburg.

⁷⁴ See Olga S. Evangulova, "Portret petrovskogo vremeni i problemy skhodstva," *Vestnik MGU*. seriia 8. Istoriia, no. 5 (1979), 69–82, and "K probleme stil'a v iskusstve petrovskogo vremeni," *ibid.*, no. 4 (1974), 67–84.

In many respects, then, the history of seventeenth-century Russian art has still to be written. As we have seen, attributions and dating are often imprecise and surviving examples often too few to allow generalizations. Provincial art in particular requires further study. We may conclude that, by and large, Russo-Byzantine Orthodox models continued to meet most of the needs of the sort of society that Muscovy then was and to reflect the sort of view of the world which most Muscovites still held. Hence, tsars in their portraits looked more like Byzantine emperors than French or English kings; church architecture retained most of its traditional features; you could buy an icon in any town, but not an oil painting. At the same time, evidence of receptiveness to selected genres and features of Western art is strong and not surprising, for Muscovite art and architecture did not develop in isolation, but in a complex relationship with phenomena examined elsewhere in this volume. The desire of the upper service elite to distinguish itself from those just below it by acquiring portraits with coats of arms or of the Diplomatic Chancellery to have images of foreign rulers to hand, for example, may be set within the wider context of changes in the career patterns of the service elite and expanding relations with foreign powers respectively. On the other hand, “influence” and “reception” in the arts can rarely be explained purely in terms of practical needs or the kind of search for efficiency which dictated reforms of the military establishment or state administration. A window frame based on a Classical pediment is no more “efficient” than a frame made of traditional brick carving. Patterns of borrowing and receptiveness suggest, rather, a growing attachment to a dominant centre, a preferable culture—i.e. the West—an attachment as yet dimly formulated, filtered through other cultures (notably Ukraine) and contradicted by discourses of the dangers of alien customs. Seventeenth-century Muscovites failed to assimilate many things which were commonplace from London to Warsaw, Madrid to Stockholm, including free-standing still life and landscape paintings, colonnaded and porticoed mansions on aristocratic estates and, before the 1680s, pictures of women. The terms “secularization” and “Westernization” should be used with caution in relation to seventeenth-century Russian art, the history of which has still to be written.

⁷⁵ See further discussion in Hughes, *Russia in the Age*, 292–94. On the delineation of secular and religious spheres, see Viktor M. Zhivov, “Religious Reform and the Emergence of the Individual in Russian Seventeenth-Century Literature,” in *Religions and Culture*, ed. Baron and Kollmann, 184–98, and “Kul’turnye reformy v sisteme preobrazovaniia Petra I,” in *Iz istorii russkoi kul’tury. Tom III. (XVII-nachalo XVIII veka)*, ed. Aleksei D. Koshelev (Moscow: “Iazyki russkoi kul’tury,” 1996), 528–83.

⁷⁶ See, for example, Oleg Iu. Tarasov, *Ikona i blagochestie: ocherki ikonnogo dela v imperatorskoi Rossii* (Moscow: “Progress-kul’tura,” 1995).

THE ADMINISTRATION OF WESTERN MEDICINE IN SEVENTEENTH- CENTURY RUSSIA¹

Eve Levin

In the seventeenth century, the Russian state endorsed Western medicine as the privileged therapeutic system. It imported Western medical personnel and Western medical equipment and pharmaceutical supplies in large quantities. It also created an administrative structure within the government, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* (Apothecary or Pharmacy Chancery), to oversee them. By combining Western medicine with Muscovite government, the Russians created the first state-administered centralized health care system in the Western world.

The story of the importation of modern Western medicine into early-modern Russia has been well-known for over a century and a half. The historiographical tradition noted the presence of classical Greek medicine in Kievan Rus, its elimination in the Mongol period, and the reintroduction of learned medicine from the West during the reign of Ivan III in the fifteenth century.² From that point, most extant literature focuses on the biographies of Western doctors who came to Russia, lauding the Muscovite leaders who recognized the merit of Western medicine and sponsored it. The establishment of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and the *Novaia Apteka* (New Pharmacy) formalized the government's endorsement of modern medicine and facilitated its spread. In short, the medicine of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* was a harbinger of later importations of Western technology and Western knowledge.

Within this general consensus, scholars have disagreed on the degree to which the system of Western medicine imported in the seventeenth century answered to Russia's needs. All of them recognized that the *Aptekarskii prikaz* had a limited purview—essentially the tsar's family, the army, and the court. To some scholars, this limitation meant that seventeenth-century medical practice fell short of what a health care system should do: dispense medical knowledge widely and provide universal treatment.³ To others, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* represented an auspicious beginning for the building of a modern health care system: the government recognized the importance of high-quality care for its citizens and developed methods to deliver it.⁴ But all of these scholars simply assumed the superiority of Western medicine, and failed to ponder why the Russian government chose to import a foreign therapeutic system rather than depend upon indigenous talent. Nor have scholars noticed that the Muscovite system of health care prefigured modern ones, not only in the type of medicine practiced, but also in its national scope and bureaucratic methods.

For all their lauding of Western medicine as a positive innovation in Russia, scholars have devoted little attention to comparing Russian developments with

those in the West. In early modern Western Europe, a triad of medical professionals—physicians (doctors), surgeons (barbers), pharmacists (apothecaries)—tried to establish a monopoly on health care. They organized themselves into self-regulating guilds in order to oversee the quality of services, delineate specializations, and eliminate unlicensed practitioners. Women healers were among the primary victims of this trend, as they did not qualify for guild membership. Despite the desires of guild leaders, a wide variety of persons, both men and women, educated and illiterate, experienced and unschooled, continued to dispense medical advice.⁵

State regulation of medicine also made its appearance in the early modern period. The court physician, who looked after the health of the king, as well as that of his family and retinue, was an ancient and honorable institution. These doctors also advised the ruler on scientific, intellectual, and even cultural matters, but did not supervise medical practice within the realm more generally.⁶ Governments in pre-modern Western Europe did try to manage the allocation of medical resources, albeit on a limited and local scale. Municipal governments saw the sense in enforcing guild licensing, and the need for coordination of medical services in times of plague.⁷ In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Protestant Reformation spurred governments in parts of Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and the British Isles to take over poor relief, which had formerly come largely under the purview of the Catholic Church. Providing medical care to the indigent was one concern, although less for humanitarian reasons than to restrict expenditures on charity to the “authentic and morally upright poor.”⁸ The preferred governmental institution for oversight of medical matters was a College of Medicine (*Collegium Medicum*). Composed of medical professionals—always physicians and often apothecaries as well—these Colleges of Medicine enforced guild licensing of medical specialists, inspected pharmacies, and supervised the the operation of hospitals. They were founded throughout northern Europe in the seventeenth century: Amsterdam in 1636; Antwerp in 1620; Danzig (Gdansk) in 1636; Brussels in 1649; Ghent in 1663; Courtrai in 1683.⁹ In this way, governments in early modern Western Europe worked through and reinforced existing corporate institutions of medical personnel.¹⁰

Unlike in Colleges of Medicine in Western Europe, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* was not established to reinforce guild self-regulation, or to manage poor relief, or to

¹ This article is a radically revised and expanded version of my paper “*Et Saepe Saepius Divinare Cogimur*: Cosmology and the Planetary System in the ‘Works’ of the Leichoudes Brothers,” (AAASS Conference, Seattle, November 1997). It is partly based on my dissertation, funding for the writing stage of which was generously provided by an Honorary Dissertation Fellowship from the Spencer Foundation for Research in Education, and by a Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation. I am grateful for their support. I also wish to thank my advisor, Prof. Paul Bushkovitch for his unstinting encouragement, help, incisive criticism and humor; the discussant of the Seattle panel, Prof. Robert Crumme for his patience and constructive commentary; and the audience for their questions and remarks on the paper. I have profited greatly from their advice; still, all remaining errors are mine alone.

coordinate health care during outbreaks of the Black Death. Russia did not have any system of guilds analogous to those in Western Europe; it had no schools for theoretical education in the medical arts, and no formalized apprenticeships. Instead, medics (*lekari*), midwives (*baby*), herbalists (*travniki*), barbers (*tsyriulniki*), and their like picked up their knowledge where they could and learned from experience.¹¹

Neither did the Russian state face the problem of finding a substitute for the Church's system of poor relief. Indeed, the Church's traditional role in caring for the sick grew in the early-modern period, as the cults of miracle-working relics and icons flourished among ordinary lay people. Monastery guest houses functioned as hospitals, offering refuge and treatment to the sick. But much like conservative Western churchmen, Russian clerics took an ambivalent attitude toward physical medicine, and ecclesiastical institutions did not foster it.¹²

Although in Western Europe, the Black Death spurred the development of some of the earliest government institutions for the administration of health care, the Muscovite government handled these crises through its military administrative structures, not through the *Aptekarskii prikaz*. The Russian government imposed quarantines and arranged for the disposal of corpses, but it did not found *lazeretti* for the sick. Although army medics on field duty occasionally helped with plague relief, for the most part the *Aptekarskii prikaz* was not involved.¹³

If the motivations for the founding of Colleges of Medicine in Western Europe did not apply in Russia, what reason did the Muscovite state have to establish the *Aptekarskii prikaz*? The *Aptekarskii prikaz* emerged out of the tsar's household administration, perhaps as early as the 1560s, but certainly before 1607.¹⁴ According to an account written at the end of the seventeenth century, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* was founded for the "care and protection of the health of the sovereigns and the sovereign's most illustrious house when they have contracted illnesses."¹⁵ The sovereign's "house" included not only his family and retainers, but also key servitors and the army. The structure of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* mirrored that of other government offices, which were similarly established to harness the human and financial resources of Muscovy for the use of the tsar and the state he ruled.¹⁶ It was only in 1672, with the founding of the *Novaia Apteka* (New Pharmacy), that the *prikaz* officially extended its interest in the health of "every rank of people."¹⁷ And this to but a limited extent: the *Novaia Apteka* provided the public with certified medicines, but did not extend state-funded Western medical care to the non-governmental population otherwise.

The *Aptekarskii prikaz* did not seek to eliminate the ambient traditions of folk medicine and spiritual healing, but rather to offer a better alternative—Western medicine—to government servitors. From its inception, the *prikaz* hired primarily foreign medical practitioners. The government's choice to entrust the health of its members to foreigners requires explanation, because in general Muscovite society was suspicious of persons of alien religion and language, rather than welcoming to them. Although the sources do not speak directly to the government's motivations, they hint at certain considerations. First, Muscovite policy-makers seem to have believed that Western medical knowledge was superior. When asking for medical advice of a general nature, they much preferred to consult foreign medical practitioners rather than their own.¹⁸

However, it is not clear that Western physicians were actually more successful than their Russian counterparts in treating patients, and they used the same methods.

Thus, it is likely that the decision to rely upon foreign personnel stemmed a second consideration, that of security. The experience of the imperial court in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries indicated that native healers could not be trusted. Not only did the ecclesiastical culture conflate indigenous healers with sorcerers, but the Muscovite elite had an exaggerated dread of poisoning. It is not clear how many members of the Muscovite royal lineage actually perished this way, but each suspicious death generated rumors.¹⁹ Foreigners might have seemed less easily suborned, owing their positions as they did to the largesse of the Muscovite ruler. Still, Muscovites did not entirely trust the foreign doctors, as the oath demanded of them reveals. They swore to serve “in truth and until death without any deception,” promising not to slip harmful substances into “food or drink or medicine” of the tsar or members of his family. They also had to swear to report any plots to harm the tsar or his family, and any attempts to suborn the doctors themselves.²⁰

As a further guard against deliberate or accidental malpractice, *prikaz* administrators tried to require physicians to be “agreed and of common advice and thought among themselves” on the diagnosis and treatment of the tsar and his family.²¹ Not depending merely upon the physicians’ word, Muscovite authorities established procedures for dispensing medicines to the tsar and members of his family that ascertained the “chain of custody” (to use modern pharmaceutical terminology) from the writing of the prescription to its administration to the patient.²² Some documents indicate that the doctor who wrote the prescription and the pharmacist who filled it both had to ingest a sample before it was administered to the royal patient.²³ When it became known that Sigismund Sommer (Simon Zomer) substituted for Stefan von Gaden (Stefan Fangaden, Danil Fongadanov, Danil Il’in) in preparing a prescription for Tsar Fedor, and the herbal guide he used turned up missing, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and the *Sysnyi prikaz* (in charge of political investigations) looked into the matter, even though both practitioners had long served the tsar responsibly.²⁴ The government was similarly concerned about possible espionage by doctors, and restricted their communication with their homelands.²⁵ Andreas Engelhardt (Andrei Engelgart) inadvertently violated security protocols when he sent a letter to a Swedish nobleman visiting Moscow. He was exculpated on the testimony of a more experienced fellow doctor, who swore that “nothing harmful was written in that letter; in that letter he wrote about doctor’s matters; he, the doctor, came recently and does not know Muscovite custom and the Sovereign’s order.”²⁶

The administrative structure of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* also reflected the exaggerated Muscovite concern with security. Several of the boyars heading the *Aptekarskii prikaz* were related by marriage to the tsar. For example, Boris Godunov served this role during the reign of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich and Tsaritsa Irina Godunova. I.B.Cherkasskii, F.I.Sheremet’ev, N.I.Odoevskii, and Ia N.Odoevskii were all Romanov cousins. B.I.Morozov was the husband of Tsaritsa Mariia Miloslavskaia’s sister; and I.D.Miloslavskii came from her family. A.S. Matveev, who became the head of the *prikaz* in 1673, had a close connection to the new tsaritsa, Natalia Naryshkina.²⁷ These men would have

better reason than anyone else to preserve the health of the tsar and the tsaritsa, and thus their own families' place in the Muscovite hierarchy.

The functioning of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* was typical of the Muscovite governmental administration in other ways as well. Like other governmental offices, its activities were centralized in Moscow. Although satellite pharmacies were established in regional centers such as Novgorod and Kiev later in the seventeenth century, the Moscow office made all the decisions.²⁸ Russian bureaucrats directed the operations of the *prikaz* without consulting the foreign medical staff—a situation quite unlike Colleges of Medicine in the West, which were run by the doctors themselves. Furthermore, all decision-making, even on the most petty matters such as the routine payment of travel subsidies and the preparation of paperwork, had to be referred to the tsar. A bottleneck occurred in 1655, when no boyar was designated to receive *prikaz* reports on the tsar's behalf, so no action could be taken.²⁹ In most cases, the tsar's orders replicated the recommendations of the boyars and secretaries of the *prikaz* and it is unlikely that the tsar deliberated over each case individually except in rare instances. However, the obligation to seek authorization from above for every matter caused delays in decision-making and discouraged initiative.

Although the extant scholarship emphasizes the high level of qualifications of the foreign physicians who came to Russia, in fact, the medical practitioners of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* came from a variety of backgrounds with a wide range of levels of skill. Some of the Western doctors had extensive academic training and arrived in Moscow with endorsements from crowned heads of Europe. Dr. Robert Jacoby, for example, who came to Russia from England in 1581, had studied at Cambridge and Basel, and had served as a personal physician to the Queen Elizabeth.³⁰ But most foreign medical practitioners possessed neither prestigious training nor royal connections. A few, entitled "*dokhtur*" had some university education and attestations from prominent patrons. Many more had minimal formal education, or none at all. Of the ten medical specialists recruited in 1679, none had university degrees. Most had learned their trade through an apprenticeship, and claimed expertise on the basis of prior experience.³¹ In Western European parlance would probably have been termed "surgeons" rather than "doctors;" in Russian, they were called "*lekar*"—"healer" or "medic"—a term also applied to indigenous medical practitioners. The native Russian term for physician, *vrach*, was not used in the *Aptekarskii prikaz* although it was part of the active vocabulary of Russians at the time, as evidenced by its use in ecclesiastical literature.

In addition, practitioners with specialized skills were employed. Pharmacists or apothecaries—the third party in the Western European triad of medical practitioners—enjoyed high status within the *Aptekarskii prikaz* nearly equal to that of doctors. Other specialists, such as bonesetters, barber-surgeons, and bloodletters, were less well regarded than medics, just as alchemists (who formulated medications) had lower status than pharmacists. Lowest ranking were the students, who learned medical or pharmaceutical techniques by assisting practicing specialists. Like modern medical interns, they assisted with the treatment of patients.

In addition to these foreign medical practitioners, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* employed Russians as well. Because no Russians had academy training, they could

not qualify for the position of “*dokhtur*”. Russians could be medics, however, and their numbers increased in the course of the seventeenth century. They could enter into the lesser medical specializations as well, where they outnumbered foreigners. Most students were Russian; the foreign students were usually young relatives of resident aliens.³² Although the ranks of non-regulated Russian medical practitioners included many women, none of the employees of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* were female. Even the occasional women patients—relatives of persons entitled to governmental medical care—were treated by male practitioners. Thus the Western-style medical practice diverged sharply from the gender patterns of the indigenous Russian therapeutic systems.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Russian government needed only an occasional court physician, who could be obtained through friendly requests to Western rulers.³³ Recruitment of the larger number of medical personnel required to serve the burgeoning ranks of governmental servitors required different methods and less selectivity. A few still came with royal imprimatur: Johann Custerius von Rosenberg (Iagan Kusterius, Iagan Rozenburkh), who arrived in 1667, had previously served as personal physician to Prince Christian of Mecklenburg and King Carl Gustav of Sweden.³⁴ Nils Anderson, who came the next year, presented an attestation from King Frederick III of Denmark. But it is likely that Anderson chose to come not at his king’s behest, but rather through arrangements made by his brother-in-law, who was already living in Moscow.³⁵ Hartmann Gramann (Artman Gramon) arranged the appointment of his nephew Johannes Albanus (Ieganus Belovo) as a medic.³⁶ Personal connections also led to the recruitment of the pharmacist Robert Benyon (Roman Binian) in 1656; his predecessor in Russia, Robert Tewe (Roman Tiu) had been enlisted by Boyar Ilia Miloslavskii to identify a suitable successor.³⁷

Personal connections could not satisfy the personnel needs of the *Aptekarskii prikaz*, so used alternative methods as well. In 1678, the medic Willem Horsten (Vilim Gorsten, Vilim Gortsyn) was deputed to go abroad to find ten medics and an oculist, as well as purchase pharmaceutical supplies. His Russian masters asked for well-trained men, especially those who could speak Polish (in order to communicate more easily with the troops), and who could make a commitment for two or three years of service at a monthly salary of three to eight roubles, or ten roubles for the best qualified. Horsten traveled to Danzig and Hamburg, but had difficulty finding willing men: “I questioned several medics here in Gdansk, but they ask for a lot of money in advance and give no assurances.”³⁸ He had better luck in Lübeck amongst Danish medics, but as he wrote to officials in Moscow, “I do not know what to do with them, because in my instructions it was written not to hire them for more than ten roubles.”³⁹ Ultimately he succeeded in recruiting all but the oculist, but only by promising the highest salaries.⁴⁰

Another technique was to send the children of foreigners in Muscovite service abroad for medical training, with the understanding that they would return to Moscow to practice. Hendrik Kellerman (Andrei Kelderman), the son of a German merchant, spent seventeen years abroad studying at Leipzig, Strasbourg, Oxford, Paris, and Padua. He returned to Russia reluctantly, at the insistence of his father Thomas, who had borrowed thousands of roubles to finance his son’s education. But if Muscovite officials hoped that a “natural slave” (*kholop prirodnoi*) of the tsar work out better, they were disappointed in Hendrik

Kellerman. In his years abroad, he had lost his knowledge of Russian and needed an interpreter, just like other foreigners. Furthermore, expected to be treated like a highly-sought court physician, and objected vociferously to his salary, which equalled that of medics, not doctors.⁴¹ Hartmann Gramann's nephew Michael was also reluctant to return, although he did, and worked for the *prikaz* for the next ten years.⁴² The first Russian to be educated in medicine abroad, Petr Postnikov, returned not to practice healing, but first to teach rhetoric at the Moscow Slaviano-Greko-Latin Academy and then to serve as a diplomat abroad.⁴³

Because it was so hard to find even minimally qualified foreigners, *prikaz* officials accepted volunteers eagerly. The alchemist Peter Pill (Petrushka Pil') came to Russia in the household of Dr. Johann von Freuden (Iagan Fomfrozen). When von Freuden died within months of his arrival, Pill was left to fend for himself, and he asked the *Aptekarskii prikaz* to take him on.⁴⁴ The Pole Senka Kevriagin was a war refugee who had been brought to Russia at the age of nine. While a teenager, he had lived with the pharmacist Robert Tewe, learning to distill spirits and treat wounds.⁴⁵ The oculist Johann Malgorn (Ivan Malgar) had treated army personnel outside of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* system, as well as private patients, before asking to join the *prikaz* staff.⁴⁶ Stefan von Gaden had an even more checkered background. He described himself as "a Jew of the Lutheran faith" who had studied with a German doctor in Poland before practicing as a field surgeon with German armies. Taken captive in the Crimea, he was ransomed by Jews in Constantinople, and made his way back to Poland. He came to Moscow with a foreign military officer and had been practicing bloodletting in Moscow when he was hired by the *Aptekarskii prikaz*.⁴⁷

Muscovite authorities were so desperate for trained medical specialists that they even drafted prisoners of war. Two German prisoners in 1658 were brought under guard to the Chudov monastery for rebaptism into Orthodoxy before assignment to military regiments. Although this narrative suggests a degree of compulsion, one of the two, Ergar Dliakler (Flor Dliakler), averred that he was happy to convert and eager to teach Russians how to make German-style bloodletting tools.⁴⁸ While Dliakler adapted well to his new life, another convert, called by the Russian name Senka Vlasov, ran away from his first assignment as a field medic.⁴⁹

Difficult as it was to recruit foreign medical practitioners, finding suitable Russians was not much easier. Because the bulk of the Russian population was already bound into service to the state, either directly or indirectly, there was a severe shortage of men free to take employment at the *Aptekarskii prikaz*. Once again, the *prikaz* had to be willing to accept such persons as offered their services, whether as medics-in-training or as non-professional staff. Savka Terent'ev and Ivashko Grigor'ev had no background in herb-gathering when they applied for positions as *travniki*; Terent'ev had been a church guard and a tailor; Grigor'ev was an artisan and a refugee from a famine in Ustiug.⁵⁰ Some of the Russians hired at the *prikaz* had already been rendering medical care to troops without an official appointment, and they used this experience to petition for salaried positions. Thus the bonesetters Ivashko Maksimov and Stenka Dorofeev cited their experience with the army in the company of a current employee of the *prikaz* Pervoi Petrov. When Petrov confirmed their association, the two were hired.⁵¹ When Petrov died, his cousin Ivashko Avdokimov

petitioned for his place, averring that he had learned something of bonesetting from him.⁵² Thus the *prikaz* depended upon current employees' personal contacts to find new recruits.

Although *prikaz* officials made some attempt to determine whether applicants were indeed free to offer their services, ambiguities could arise, as the case of Fedor Vasiliev and Andrei Fedotov illustrates. The two came from black *sotni* in Moscow, and were enrolled in the *strel'tsy* at a young age. After a couple of years, they were transferred to the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and they served as field medics on the southern and western frontiers for nineteen years. When they returned to Moscow for a family visit, they were arrested as deserters from the *strel'tsy*. They then petitioned *Aptekarskii prikaz* officials with desperation, asking to be released from jail to return to medical duties.⁵³ Another medical student, who was similarly impressed into *strel'tsy* service after a field assignment, deserted and hid out at the Solovetskii monastery for years. When he finally reported again to the *Aptekarskii prikaz* to request reinstatement, he was accepted without demur.⁵⁴ To forestall situations such as these, a 1670 ukase forbade the *Aptekarskii prikaz* from recruiting students from the ranks of the *strel'tsy* and other service people.⁵⁵

Once Russians were found, they needed to be trained in the techniques of Western medicine.⁵⁶ It was not feasible to send them abroad to study; they lacked the basic education, especially the knowledge of Latin and modern languages that were the prerequisite for admission to universities in the West. Instead, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* assigned Russian students to Western practitioners, so that they would learn the practical skills needed to treat patients. Foreign practitioners usually accepted supervision of Russian students as a part of their duties. However, Johann Albanus rejected his Russian student, saying that he would teach only after he had been paid his annual salary, which was+After a variable period of study at the *prikaz* in Moscow, the students were assigned to military regiments, either as assistants to medics or on their own. Because students performed essential duties, a crisis of sorts developed in 1660, when a group of thirty who had entered in 1652 were all reassigned, leaving no students at the *Aptekarskii prikaz* itself. The situation was remedied by the recruitment of fifteen new students.⁵⁸ *Aptekarskii prikaz* officials eventually recognized that knowledge of foreign languages was indispensable for pharmaceutical study, and in 1678, authorized two Russian students to study German and Latin with a schoolteacher in the German Quarter.⁵⁹

Recruitment was only one aspect of the staffing difficulties for the Muscovite state. The *Aptekarskii prikaz* had to make sure that its employees, both Russians and foreigners, could fulfill their responsibilities. Muscovite authorities attempted to ascertain qualifications by questioning applicants, examining documentary certifications, and soliciting recommendations. Most candidates were interviewed as to their background and training before the *Aptekarskii prikaz* formally employed them. They were usually asked to identify their homeland, religious affiliation, place of medical training, prior experience, and breadth of competence. They stated their credentials in the presence of the Russian administrators of the *prikaz* and the highest-ranking foreign practitioners. On occasion, but apparently not often, candidates had to pass an oral examination covering the basics of medical practice. Because the Russian

administrators were not themselves learned in Western medicine, they relied upon foreign professionals already in Muscovite service to administer the exam. In one such test, Philippe Briot (Filip Brit'e) was asked to describe the preparations of various types of medicines and the treatment of wounds.⁶⁰

Aptekarskii prikaz officials valued written documentation of applicants' qualifications, even though they did not insist upon it. The pharmacist Robert Tewe brought a letter from his guild in London.⁶¹ When Hendrik Kellerman returned from the University of Padua with a long letter from his professors attesting to his fulfillment of degree requirements, *prikaz* officials were impressed, especially by the three red seals.⁶² Attestations could take the form of letters from former patrons, given to the candidates to present on their own behalf. The German medic Sebastian Roesler (Svost'ian Rezler, Bast'ian Rezler), recruited first in 1679 by Willem Horsten, presented two letters of recommendation when he reapplied for employment: one by Dutch military and civilian leaders, describing his work as a navy medic; and another by two Amsterdam doctors.⁶³ Occasionally, instead of presenting such documents, applicants explained why they did not have them. One Greek doctor did not present a recommendation from the University of Padua, saying that his teachers no longer remembered him. However, he did call in a Greek monastic priest resident in Moscow to attest to his background and training.⁶⁴ Alexander Lichiufinus claimed that his letters had been stolen by Russian and Circassian soldiers, but he got a foreign military officer to introduce him in the *prikaz* and he claimed acquaintance with a member of Patriarch Nikon's staff. He also presented a list of satisfied patients, including Boyar Boris Morozov, Boyar Ilia Miloslavskii, as well as Miloslavskii's wife and another kinsman, and foreign officers.⁶⁵

Despite the attempts, however sporadic, to ensure quality, a number of the carefully-recruited doctors did not work out. The most famous instance involved the English doctor Thomas (or Timothy) Willis, who was rejected upon arrival in 1599. Queen Elizabeth had personally recommended Willis to Boris Godunov, so there could be no question of imposture or competence. Russian officials gave a reason for refusing Willis his arrival without books or medicines, which had been shipped separately. Scholars have taken his case to be evidence of the upholding of standards; but probably the real issue was security: Willis carried diplomatic dispatches concerning English naval involvement with Poland.⁶⁶ A number of employees were fired because of an uncooperative attitude. Philippe Briot refused to accept reassignment from pharmaceutical duties to treatment of patients.⁶⁷ Valentin Byls (Falentin Falentinov Bils) was the Moscow-born son of a foreign physician, sent abroad to study medicine. Returning to Russia in 1643, he pledged "eternal service," but then objected to his assignment and salary. Despite being Russian-born, he was treated like a foreigner; he was dismissed from service and expelled from the country.⁶⁸ Few of Horsten's recruits worked out. At the end of two years, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* wanted to extend the appointments of only three of the ten, and only two agreed to stay on.⁶⁹

Aptekarskii prikaz authorities did not want incompetent Russians, either, but they were reluctant to let them off. The Russian medical student Sereshka Vavilov was fired for illiteracy in 1672, but four years later, *prikaz* officials

determined that had been paid for labor he had not performed and demanded that he return to duty. Vavilov argued that he was not competent: "the medical knowledge, which was in my memory, I forgot while wandering between dwellings." Eventually, *prikaz* officials decided to just make him repay the money.⁷⁰ Grigorii Ignat'ev, a pharmacy student, tried to wriggle out of his obligation to work for the *Aptekarskii prikaz* on the grounds of illness: fear and trembling. *Prikaz* officials, not entirely unsympathetic, ordered him back to work at the *Novaia Apteka*, but allowed him to opt out of certain duties.⁷¹

Throughout its existence, the *prikaz* provided medical care to the tsar and his family.⁷² Physicians not only made house calls at the Kremlin, but also accompanied the tsar on his travels. In 1663, when Tsar Aleksei made a pilgrimage to the Trinity-St. Sergei monastery, a physician, pharmacist, medic, and medical student came along.⁷³ Much more staff time was taken up with rendering medical care to the tsar's servitors. Because the terms of access were never formalized, servitors had to petition the tsar for each consultation and prescription. A sub-secretary who broke his leg in a fall from a horse received authorization for treatment by a bonesetter, to be sent to him from Moscow, riding day and night to arrive posthaste.⁷⁴ A scribe was able to obtain free medical care for his wife, who suffered a knife wound from brigands who invaded their home while he was away on the tsar's business.⁷⁵ A foreign goldsmith received free treatment, as did the young son of a Dutch merchant, injured in a sleigh accident.⁷⁶ Foreign dignitaries, such as Crimean ambassadors who suffered frostbite on their way to Moscow, also petitioned successfully for free care.⁷⁷ Even employees of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* themselves had to seek authorization to use *prikaz* facilities for their own medical care. The medic Sigismund Sommer, injured in a brawl at a German Quarter wedding, had to petition to be treated.⁷⁸

There was some ambiguity about who, exactly, was entitled to the *prikaz*'s services, and some petitioners were turned down. A serviceman stationed in Kiev, who requested medicines to be sent from the *Aptekarskii prikaz* in Moscow, was refused, apparently because supplies were supposed to be available there.⁷⁹ A memo from 1677, at the time of the reorientation of power structures in the Muscovite government, listed who among the boyars was, and was not, entitled to automatic access to *Aptekarskii prikaz* facilities. Kiril Naryshkin and Artamon Matveev, leaders of Tsaritsa Natalia Naryshkin's defeated faction, were explicitly excluded, even though Matveev had previously been the chief administrator of the *Aptekarskii prikaz*.⁸⁰ A subclerk from the *Prikaz Bol'shogo Dvortsa* was authorized to seek treatment of an injury at the *Aptekarskii prikaz* but his home office bore the cost of the medicines.⁸¹ Ivan Rostovskii asked for a variety of headache medications, but upon the advice of *prikaz* officials, received only some of them: the oils, but not the vodkas.⁸²

Prikaz employees were very wary about providing services without authorization from the tsar through normal channels. Two of Tsar Fedor's sisters summoned Stefan von Gaden to treat two of their noble ladies-in-waiting, and he duly came to examine them. However, *Aptekarskii prikaz* officials balked at paying for the medicines he prescribed without a specific order from the tsar.⁸³ The medical student Aleshka Ivanov found himself in a bind when he refused to treat a coachman of the *Streletskii prikaz* until directed to do so by the *Aptekarskii*

prikaz. The injured coachman brought a lawsuit against Ivanov in the *Streletskii prikaz* and Ivanov had to ask the *Aptekarskii prikaz* to intervene.⁸⁴

Many of the servitors seeking medical care were military men who sought free treatment for injuries suffered in the course of duty. Fedor Buturlin had suffered wounds in a battle near Arzamas.⁸⁵ Stepanko Tatarinov had contracted an eye ailment while a prisoner of war in Wilno (Lith. Vilnius).⁸⁶ When wounded soldiers from the battle of Chyhyryn (Chigirin) streamed into Moscow in 1678, hundreds of them were entitled to care, taxing the ability of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* to provide it, even with contributions of food, firewood, and hospital space from other *prikazy*.⁸⁷ Doctors Laurentius Blumentrost and Hendrik Kellerman treated one group of the Chyhyryn wounded who suffered from bloody noses, body aches, and breathing problems. They prescribed four cups of wine (*vino*, which could instead be vodka) and two *krushki* of beer per day indefinitely, but *Aptekarskii prikaz* bureaucrats cut the amount back to the beer and three cups of wine for ten days.⁸⁸ Injuries need not have been sustained in battle for patients to be eligible for free medical treatment. A *strelets* who suffered an injury while firefighting in Moscow qualified, as did Ivashko Karmyshev, who suffered a broken leg after being kicked by a horse.⁸⁹

Servicemen frequently petitioned for release from duty, and military authorities depended upon the advice of *Aptekarskii* personnel—always foreigners, apparently to guarantee impartiality—to decide which requests to grant. More often than not, the physicians and medics judged the men unfit for service. Valid excuses ranged from battle wounds to injured limbs to communicable disease to old age.⁹⁰ Sometimes the physicians could not tell whether an injury precluded military service, as in the case of a *strelets* who had lost two fingers.⁹¹ In the case of Dieko Stupishin, a twenty-year veteran who complained of ringing in his ears and old age, the doctors judged that he was not fit for service at present, but his ailment could be cured.⁹² The case of Fedka Leskov was more complicated. He had obtained a medical discharge in 1676 on the basis of old age, stiffness, and a stomach condition, but appeared for duty for several years after that. When he again sought release in 1702, the authorities were skeptical, and the medical examination indicated that he was not old.⁹³ Occasionally the doctors disagreed about the diagnosis and the patient's fitness for duty.⁹⁴ Once the doctors had written their reports, they had to be forwarded to the military administration in order for the ailing servicemen to secure release from duty. Mishka Novokshchenov's paperwork got lost somewhere between the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and the military command, and he had to petition the tsar to ask that a second copy be sent.⁹⁵

Non-Russian military servitors similarly sought documentation of medical excuses, as did the Temnik *mirza*, Prince Enikeev.⁹⁶ Occasionally non-military personnel petitioned for release from duties, and verification of their excuses was requested from the *Aptekarskii prikaz*. An ailing *d'iak* was diagnosed with scurvy and a hernia, conditions pronounced curable with time.⁹⁷ When Stefan von Gaden examined the *stol'nik* Mikhail Morozov and the singer Kiril Fedorov, however, he determined them to be healthy.⁹⁸

Thus *Aptekarskii prikaz* personnel treated a wide range of patients as part of their official responsibilities. Protocols instructed physicians to render the same care to all patients, regardless of rank or wealth.⁹⁹ The practitioners did not

normally receive extra pay for these services, although the medic Sigismund Sommer received five roubles in sables for performing bloodletting on some of the tsar's personal servants.¹⁰⁰ Alexander Lichiufinus received a hundred roubles in 1657 as payment for the treatment of additional patients at the tsar's behest.¹⁰¹

Aptekarskii prikaz physicians could take private patients as well. It is difficult to determine how often this occurred, because record of them would survive only in the case of a problem that was brought to the *prikaz* for resolution. Patients paid practitioners for treatment, sometimes in very large amounts. With high remuneration available in the private sector, it is not surprising that some foreign practitioners wanted to opt out of *prikaz* contracts. Five of Willem Horsten's medics asked to stay in Moscow when their contracts expired, but only if they could take private patients rather than work for the government. *Prikaz* authorities were suspicious of such arrangements, however, and did not allow them this option.¹⁰²

In addition to treating patients, the professional staff of the *Aptekarskii* assisted government officials by providing information pertinent to investigations. When the Patriarchal *syn boiarskii* Dimitrii Volodimerov was arrested, herbs found in his hayloft were sent to the *Aptekarskii prikaz* for analysis. In this case, the drugs were determined to be harmless.¹⁰³ *Aptekarskii prikaz* physicians also functioned as coroners, determining the cause of death.¹⁰⁴

A significant portion of the work of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* involved the acquisition, production, and distribution of pharmaceutical supplies, as the name of the institution itself indicates.¹⁰⁵ Medicines came from both foreign and domestic sources. Most of the herbs, roots, and flowers used medicinally were collected within Russia. *Prikaz* personnel—a pharmacist, medic, *travnik*, or student—supervised peasants, who collected and processed the requisite plants.¹⁰⁶ The operation did not always work smoothly. One *prikaz travnik* sent to Nizhnyi Novgorod failed to recruit enough peasants and the collection fell short. *Prikaz* officials ordered the *voevoda* to procure the herbs and send them on to Moscow without delay, but it is unlikely that he was able to do so; the order was issued in January.¹⁰⁷ Sometimes the collection was delegated to local military governors altogether, without greater success. The *voevodas* of Korotiak and Voronezh failed to fulfill their quota for the collection of medicinal roots, or send the proper paperwork with the incomplete shipments.¹⁰⁸ While neither the *voevodas* nor *Aptekarskii prikaz* officials were prone to accept it, often the problem lay not in incompetence or dereliction of duty, but simply in growth patterns of the wild plants.¹⁰⁹ The *Aptekarskii prikaz* had its own gardens, but they were not extensive.¹¹⁰

More esoteric medicines were purchased abroad. Sometimes arriving physicians brought their own, or asked relatives to send them.¹¹¹ More often medical practitioners or merchants were commissioned to go abroad and make the purchases from lists compiled in the *prikaz*. Arranging the necessary travel documents and transportation was a complicated business, even when no peculiar circumstances arose.¹¹² Once shipments arrived at the port of entry—Arkhangelsk in the north, Putivl' in the south, and Narva in the west—the *prikaz* had the obligation of getting them conveyed to Moscow, without loss from spoilage or theft en route.¹¹³ When the supplies reached Moscow, the staff of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* examined the shipment, to make sure the order was complete

and the goods of proper quality.¹¹⁴ The purchasers usually got reimbursed, although not automatically, or promptly.¹¹⁵ However, Willem Horsten could present receipts for only a fraction of the expenditures on his recruitment and purchasing trip, and so received less than a sixth of the amount he claimed.¹¹⁶

The formulation of the specific medications physicians prescribed took place within the *Apteka*. The strict protocols concerning the handling of pharmaceutical stock pointed to the overriding concern with security. *Prikaz* officials worried not only about deliberate adulteration of drugs to commit murder, but also about inadvertent mistakes, spoilage, and theft—especially of vodka.¹¹⁷

Much of the medical care administered to military personnel occurred in the field, and keeping armies distant from Moscow supplied with medical personnel and materiel proved difficult.¹¹⁸ Medics were supposed to keep records of whom they treated and for what injuries, in order to determine the wounded soldiers' eligibility for disability release and also to account for the supplies they used.¹¹⁹ Commanders complained when they did not get the practitioners and medicines they needed. Prince Grigorii Romodanovskii, on campaign in Belgorod, petitioned the tsar, "in 172 (1664) in various months and dates we wrote to you... many times that we, your slaves, do not have a medic in our army and little medicine to give out."¹²⁰ Usually only one or two practitioners—medics, bonesetters, bloodletters, or students—were assigned to any given regiment.¹²¹ Part of the problem in staffing the army medical corps was desertion; the foreign medics from Cherkasskyi assigned to go to Novo-Sergiev to treat scurvy among the troops instead went to Moscow. When questioned about their dereliction of duty, the medics claimed that they had received different orders, and scurvy lay outside their purview.¹²² The foreign medic Johann van der Mont (Iaganko Fontermont) had the opposite problem. He had been sent to Sevsk to treat the wounded there, and the army had withdrawn, leaving him behind because he had no orders for reassignment.¹²³

The administrative complexities of running the centralized health care system were not limited to providing care to patients or the distribution of pharmaceutical supplies. Like other Russian institutions, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* was responsible for the well-being and proper conduct of its employees. The total number of employees grew in the course of the seventeenth century, but remained small—probably little more than a hundred.¹²⁴ However, the large percentage of foreigners meant that the *prikaz* had to provide a great deal of assistance to its personnel.

From the moment foreign medical practitioners crossed the frontier, the state was responsible for paying their expenses and providing transportation. The *Aptekarskii prikaz* also had to provide employees, especially foreigners, with lodgings. Dr. Samuel Collins, for example, lived in a house purchased for his predecessor. When he left Moscow, he passed it on to Andreas Engelhardt.¹²⁵ Sometimes there was a severe shortage of space, and *prikaz* officials had to scramble. When Willem Horsten's ten medics arrived, the *Inozemskii prikaz* was ordered to locate housing for them, and moved them into dwellings already inhabited by foreigners.¹²⁶ Often the housing was substandard, as in the case of Lithuanian medic Artur Nazarev's house, which was located in a wet and muddy place, unsuitable for examining patients. When this house burned down, he expected to be provided with an alternative residence, and complained when he

did not get it.¹²⁷ Russian employees, too, sometimes needed help with housing. A group of 38 medical students, expelled from *strel'tsy* settlements because of their transfer to the *Aptekarskii prikaz* petitioned successfully to return there.¹²⁸

Because the foreign medical practitioners did not speak Russian, they had to be provided with interpreters.¹²⁹ Hendrik Kellerman needed one, even though he had spent his early childhood in Moscow. He complained when his interpreter did not show up for a week, making it impossible for him to administer the medicines long since prepared.¹³⁰ The medic Heinrich Bekker's interpreter got himself arrested, and Bekker had to get his case transferred to the jurisdiction of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* in order to get him released.¹³¹ Recruiting interpreters was almost as difficult as recruiting foreign doctors, and the *Aptekarskii prikaz* had difficulty filling the demand. On several occasions, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* had to turn to the *Posol'skii prikaz* to find someone.¹³² Arguing that he could not perform his duties without a translator "even for an hour," Johann Rosenburg found his own among foreign employees of the *Inozemskii prikaz* and asked that he be transferred.¹³³

Some of the foreign medical practitioners had dependents—family and servants—who likewise became the responsibility of the *Aptekarskii prikaz*. They had to be provided with transportation coming and going, too, and the necessary documentation to allow them transit. For example, Johann Gutmensch's (Ivan Gutmensch) wife petitioned to be allowed to return to her homeland to see to an inheritance.¹³⁴ Robert Benyon's widow was readily granted permission to go home, along with her three children and servant woman, but when the travel documents arrived, they were valid for only three persons. She had to petition again to remedy the mistake.¹³⁵ Widows of employees received stipends, sometimes small and sometimes considerable.¹³⁶

Western medical care did not come cheap, and the *Aptekarskii prikaz* struggled with its financial obligations. As Willem Horsten discovered, even modestly-trained surgeons refused to come to Moscow for anything less than top rouble. Academy-trained physicians, especially those with credentials from monarchs, expected princely salaries. Poles and Greeks received less than Western Europeans, and former prisoners of war still less. Russians were at the bottom of the pay scale, and few of them ever reached salary levels of even the lowest-paid foreigners.¹³⁷ Foreign doctors who had served satisfactorily often received handsome honoraria at the time of their departure.¹³⁸ Practitioners who were fired got nothing, except, sometimes, their back pay, calculated to the day, and transportation to the border.¹³⁹

Although foreign medical practitioners earned lavish salaries by Muscovite standards, they frequently found it difficult to live within their means. They, and Russian employees of the *prikaz* also, petitioned repeatedly for raises, bonuses, or advance pay. Although often their claims of dire poverty seem formulaic, in other cases they clearly faced severe financial constraints. A group of medical students in 1667, who petitioned for payment of their debts incurred in buying food and firewood, finally got their overdue salaries.¹⁴⁰ In 1662, when the Muscovite state debased the copper currency, causing runaway inflation, employees of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* petitioned, one after another, for raises. First the foreigners applied successfully, not only for more money, but for payment in silver rather than copper. Then Russians followed suit.¹⁴¹

Staff people could request raises for reasons other than—and often in addition to—financial need. Many argued for raises on the basis of equity. In response to such requests, *prikaz* officials compared the salaries of employees holding the same post, and made adjustments as warranted. The interpreter Vicent (Mikita Vitsent) pointed out that a colleague made considerably more, and as a result Vicent's was raised, although not up to the same level.¹⁴² Stefan von Gaden was more successful in his equity appeal; he ended up receiving a sizable raise, from 100 to 146 roubles per year—twelve roubles more than his peer group.¹⁴³ Andreas Engelhardt asked for a raise in 1662 not only because of the inflation, but also because of overwork: previously there had been two or three doctors in Moscow on the staff of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and now he was the only one.¹⁴⁴ Artur Nazarev thought he deserved higher pay not only because of his housing problems, but also because his property had been stolen; he was being threatened by creditors; and he had to put up with “endless red tape” (*besprestannaia volokita*) in performance of his duties.¹⁴⁵

Although Russian and foreign medical practitioners performed many of the same tasks, they were not treated equally. In 1662, a group of eighteen Russian field medics protested their low pay, not only in comparison to their foreign counterparts, but even in comparison to the soldiers they treated. The Russians did indeed receive a raise, but the foreigners did, too, and three times as much.¹⁴⁶ Vaska Shilov chafed under the career inequities. After twelve years of study with foreign apothecaries, inventorying the stock of the *Novaia Apteka*, and supervising the gathering of herbs, he wanted a commensurate rank and salary. But because the title of “pharmacist” was reserved for foreigners, he asked to be named as a “distiller” based on his expertise in manufacturing spirits. In recognition of his experience and mastery of the pharmaceutical trade, *prikaz* officials awarded him the title he requested and a substantial raise—although he still made much less than foreign pharmacists.¹⁴⁷

Some of the salary complaints stemmed from delays in receiving due compensation. Sometimes the *Aptekarskii prikaz* hired employees without simultaneously arranging for them to be paid.¹⁴⁸ Willem Horsten's recruits were lucky—they each received three roubles as an advance on their salaries soon after their arrival in Moscow.¹⁴⁹ Established employees accidentally omitted from pay rosters eventually received their due, but only upon special application.¹⁵⁰ When Andreas Engelhardt's salary was held up, he got so frustrated with the run-around he received that he filed a lawsuit against the *prikaz* clerk responsible for disbursing his pay. He won, and the clerk was ordered to pay Engelhardt “without bureaucratic delay” (*bez volokitno*).¹⁵¹

In some cases the delay in issuing salaries and reimbursements was due to the government's shortage of cash rather than a foul-up in paperwork. The expenses of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* far outweighed its income. In 1681, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* earned 2,426 roubles from all its operations, but expenses totalled 8,512 roubles.¹⁵² Furthermore, the income in 1681 was much higher than a decade earlier, because the *Novaia Apteka*, established in 1672 to sell medicines to the public, was the *prikaz*'s primary source of income. Supplies there were marketed at a substantial mark-up of 300 percent or more.¹⁵³ To make up the difference between the financial obligations of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and its income, the funds were transferred from government treasuries. Sometimes the treasuries

were empty, and the Muscovite government had to requisition salary money for the *Aptekarskii prikaz* from other *prikazy*. Thus in 1656, the *Pechatnyi* (Printing) *prikaz* was ordered to provide 2430 roubles for *Aptekarskii prikaz* employees. *Pechatnyi prikaz* officials protested that they did not have that much cash.¹⁵⁴ In 1673 and 1675 the government required the Novgorod *prikaz* and the Siberian *prikaz* to provide the wherewithal to pay the staff of the *Aptekarskii prikaz*. The Siberian *prikaz* paid in sables, which employees of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* were reluctant to accept.¹⁵⁵ In 1682, the tsar granted a *votchina* to the *Aptekarskii prikaz* to help to assure its income.¹⁵⁶

Because the *prikaz*, as host institution, bore responsibility for the behavior of its employees, it was called upon to resolve problems that had nothing whatsoever to do with their professional activities. The *prikaz* served as a court of law for its subordinates. Several cases of theft involving *prikaz* employees either as victims or perpetrators were brought to *prikaz* authorities for judgment.¹⁵⁷ Andreas Engelhardt brought suit in the *prikaz* in a dispute with his insubordinate German manservant.¹⁵⁸ Elizarei Rolant sued Anton Tamson, a German craftsman with whom he had a series of contretemps, for insult. Muscovite law regarded *bezchest'e* as a very serious offence—something Rolant knew from a prior suit. When Boyar Boris Morozov, sitting as judge, ruled in Rolant's favor and ordered substantial compensation, Tamson was stunned. He appealed for an exemption from the judgment, arguing "I, a foreigner, am not schooled in Russian custom and do not understand it."¹⁵⁹

In the intersection between Western medical practitioners and the Muscovite mental universe and bureaucratic system, it is surprising that cross-cultural misunderstandings did not occur more often. Overt manifestations of religious prejudice against the foreigners, given the intimacy of the patient-physician relationship, occurred, but not often enough to seriously impede their work. For the most part, the foreigners were allowed to practice their versions of Christianity in peace. Attempts by religious zealots to get non-Orthodox observances banned, such as one in 1643, were unsuccessful.¹⁶⁰ Although some foreigners in Russian service converted to Orthodoxy, there is little evidence that the Muscovite government pressured them to do so, except in the case of prisoners of war.

The different understanding of the causes of illness and health in Western Europe gave more room for misunderstanding. In the West, the ancient theory of humors still predominated, although the theory of airborne miasmas spreading disease had made an appearance. Russian acquaintance with these notions, except in connection with the Black Death, was slight before the advent of Western medicine in Russia. Instead, Russians conceived of diseases as sentient, alien forces—which clerical writers identified with demons—that could come in and inhabit the body.¹⁶¹ Given this divergent understanding of the causes of disease, it is hard to know what *Aptekarskii* officials made of Johann Belau and Hartmann Gramann's explanation of a patient's cough. They diagnosed a disease "called 'angina' in Latin," and explained that the illness arose from unfavorable winds and dampness, and from overeating and hot blood. It could also be transmitted through the miasma from their buried corpses.¹⁶² Dr. Arnoldus van der Hulst's (Zakharii Fandergunst) tried to provide a bilingual explanation of the cause of death of one of his patients, giving the names of the diseases in both Russian and

Latin. But *prikaz* officials were less interested in the correct identification of the disease than in van der Hulst's conduct as doctor. They wanted to know why he did not discuss the case with more experienced physicians, what medicine he gave the patient, and whether the "cure" had resulted in the patient's death.¹⁶³

The divergent understandings about the causes of disease could largely be ignored because the approach to treatment was similar. Both Western and traditional Russian medicine relied heavily upon herbal treatments, and the herbal manuals that circulated very widely in Russia were, in fact, largely of Western European origin.¹⁶⁴ Russians, like Western Europeans, accepted the significance of astrology for proper health care.¹⁶⁵ In addition, Russians accepted the curative value of bloodletting.¹⁶⁶ Thus, in terms of practical treatment, Western methods seemed quite familiar.

The real culture shock seems to have come from the differences in administrative structure. Foreign doctors, especially those with high-class university credentials, expected to be treated like pampered court physicians. Instead, their place in the Muscovite hierarchy was that of low-level servitors. They had to petition to obtain the most basic elements of sustenance, including the salaries they had been promised. They had to yield administrative control to *prikaz* bureaucrats, and they were assigned to their duties without regard for their preferences. Much to the dismay of the foreigners, Russian authorities frequently ignored their distinct competences, and assigned them to whatever job needed to be done. The medic Balcer (Balsyr), called in to treat the tsar's fiancée Mariia Khlopovaia, protested that "doctors know this kind of illness."¹⁶⁷ Philippe Briot protested when he was ordered to work as a medic instead of a pharmacist, and asked to be allowed to go home instead.¹⁶⁸ Hartmann Gramann objected when the Greek physician Dmitrei treated internal illnesses, citing the qualifications required in Germany. *Prikaz* officials, less concerned about formalities, responded by testing Dmitrei's practical knowledge for themselves, asking him about the proper treatment of sore feet and headache.¹⁶⁹ Stefan von Gaden could petition *prikaz* authorities successfully for reclassification from *lekar* to *poddokhtur* ("subdoctor") and later to *dokhtur*, even though he had not pursued any academic training in the interim.¹⁷⁰ To the *prikaz* officials who responded to von Gaden's petition, medical ranks did not represent distinct professional classifications, but instead categories in the Muscovite bureaucracy, and servitors who gained imperial favor could hope to move up.

Although the Muscovite bureaucracy seemed alien to the foreign medical practitioners who found themselves enmeshed in it, the *Aptekarskii prikaz* bears a remarkable resemblance to modern governmental health care systems.¹⁷¹ Like modern systems, it was designed to deliver medical services to persons who otherwise would not have access to them. Through centralization, the Muscovite government tried to manage limited resources and contain costs, while introducing new technologies, maintaining quality, and providing for all persons who had legitimate claim to services. And to a degree, it succeeded. The *Aptekarskii prikaz* fulfilled its mandate and gradually broadened its operations to provide care not only for the tsar and his court, but also for a wide range of governmental and military personnel. Patients seem to have been mostly satisfied with the care they received. With government sponsorship, Western medicine not only gained a foothold in Russia, but became the officially endorsed

therapeutic system. It remained, however, the system of the elite. The vast majority of people did not have access.

Centralization and state regulation of health care yielded benefits, but also suffered from limitations. The center at Moscow was much better supplied than the peripheries. The need to gain approval from the highest levels of government slowed and complicated the process of delivering health care. Even routine decisions had to go through multiple layers of bureaucracy, where frustrating delays ensued and paperwork got lost. Bureaucrats who were not physicians themselves vetted the recommendations of doctors, and occasionally overruled them. Many of the practitioners, more used to working as free agents than as salaried employees, chafed under administrative oversight, protested their job assignments and salaries, and clogged up the bureaucracy with appeals that had little to do with their medical duties. *Aptekarskii prikaz* officials, for their part, found it difficult to maintain sufficient and appropriate staff, and had take whomever was available, rather than holding out for quality. Financial planning was totally insufficient, and the *Aptekarskii prikaz* faced repeated fiscal crises. These problems, so familiar to modern health care systems, impeded the delivery of Western medicine in seventeenth-century Muscovy.

The story of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* presages not only modern state-run health care systems, but also later Russian patterns in the introduction of new technologies imported from abroad. State leadership in technological innovation has been a mainstay of the Russian modernization from the sixteenth century into the recent past. It has also been axiomatic for Russia that a subset of the elite, key government servitors should be the first beneficiaries. That Russia should borrow both the technology and the people to dispense it also typifies the Russian experience. Although scholars and non-specialists alike are well aware that Russia welcomed foreign experts in the Western-oriented periods of its history, particularly in the eighteenth century, specialists such as the foreign doctors of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* were imported even in periods of ideological suspicion. Later Soviet-era foreign *spetsy*, like their counterparts among Muscovite medical practitioners, expected to be treated with greater honor and consideration than they received. Perhaps they expected ideological wariness, if not hostility; it was present, but did not mark their daily experience nearly to the extent the encounter with an alien administrative structure did. Totally dependent upon their institutional hosts, embedded in a labyrinthine bureaucracy, and subjected to substandard working and living conditions, the *spetsy* had a difficult time carrying out the duties they had been brought in to perform. They were ready to share their expertise with Russian colleagues, but the latter, although willing to learn, lacked the background to assimilate the full range of Western knowledge.¹⁷² Nonetheless, the foreign experts had a significant impact on the development of Russian technology, because their skills were valued, even if they were not.

One of the primary characteristics of modernity is the mobilization of technological expertise and the professionals who possess it to advance the goals of the state. A frequent corollary to this process has been the creation of a governmental bureaucracy regulate the professionals' activities and direct their services to the public. In regard to the administration of medicine, seventeenth-century Muscovy, quite unbeknownst to itself, led the world.

NOTES

- 1 The author would like to thank John Burnham, Christopher Burton, Michael David, Katherine David-Fox, Sandra Levy, Mary MacRobert, Margaret Phillips, William Reger, Kurt Schultz, Isolde Thyrêt, and Maria Unkovskaya for their valuable insights and bibliographical assistance. The author also gratefully acknowledges the institutional support of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for research in Russia in 1997, as well as the Summer Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois, and the Hilandar Research Library of Ohio State University.
- 2 For a brief yet lucid summation of the history and the historiography, see M.V.Unkovskaya, "Learning Foreign Mysteries: Russian Pupils of the Aptekarskii Prikaz, 1650–1700," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s., v. 30 (1997), 1–10. For a bibliography of older works, see D.M.Rossiiskii, *Istoriia vseobshchei i otechestvennoi meditsiny i zdravokhraneniia. Bibliografiia (1996–1954gg.)* (Moscow, 1956; reprint: Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1981). Most studies used a very limited source base, relying heavily on the framework of earlier secondary works, particularly that of Vil'gel'm Rikhter (Wilhelm Richter), *Istoriia meditsiny v Rossii* (3 vols., Moscow: Universitetskaya tip., 1814, 1820, 1820). The exceptions are essays by N.Novombergskii, who published multiple volumes of documents on the history of medicine in Russia: *Materialy po istorii meditsiny v Rossii* (vol. 1: St. Petersburg: Tip. M.M.Stasiulevicha, 1905; vol. 2, St. Petersburg: Tip. Altshuler, 1906; vol. 3, pt. 2, St. Petersburg: Tip. Altshuler, 1906; vol. 4, Tomsk: Pech. S.P.Iakovleva, 1907). Novombergskii's works, while knowledgeable, served primarily as an introduction to the documents he published; cf. *Vrachebnoe stroenie v do-Petrovskoi Rusi* (Tomsk: Parovaia tipo-lit. Sibirsk t-va pechati diela, 1907) and *Ocherki po istorii aptechnago diela v do-Petrovskoi Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1902). The most reliable concise surveys are "The History of Medical Education in Russia," in *The History of Medical Education*, ed. C.D.O'Malley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 303–27; Mikhail Sokolovskii, *Karakter i znachenie deiatel'nosti Aptekarskago prikaza* (St. Petersburg: Tip. N.P.Soikina, 1904) and N.P.Zagoskin, *Vrachi i vrachebnoe dielo v starinnoi Rossii* (Kazan: Tip. Imper. Universiteta, 1891). Zagoskin's essay seems to have served as the primary (albeit unacknowledged) source for the chapter "Court Medicine" in Michael L.Ravitch's *The Romance of Russian Medicine* (New York: Liveright, 1937), which is marred by numerous factual errors. The most recent surveys are by M.B.Mirskii: *Ocherki istorii meditsiny v Rossii XVI–XVIII vv.* (Vladikavkaz: Reklamno-izdatel'skoe agentstvo Ministerstva pechati i informatsii, 1995); and *Meditsina Rossii XVI–XIX vekov* (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996); see also the English synopsis of his work, "State of Medicine in Russia (1581–1918)," in *Russia and Wales: Essays on the History of State Involvement in Health Care*, ed. John H.Cule and John M.Lancaster (Cardiff: History of Medicine Society of Wales, 1994), 15–65.
- 3 Iakov Chistovich, *Istoriia pervykh meditsinskikh shkol v Rossii* (St. Petersburg: Tip. Ia.Trelia, 1883); Zagoskin, 5, 67.
- 4 For example, Dmitrii Tsvetaev, *Mediki v Moskovskom Rossii i pervyi russkii doktor* (Warsaw: Tip. Varshavskago in-ta glukhoniemykh i sliepykh, 1896), 38.

- 5 See, for example, Hilary Marland and Margaret Pelling, eds. *The Task of Healing: Medicine, Religion and Gender in England and the Netherlands 1450–1800* (Rotterdam: Erasmus, 1996); Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones, *The Medical World of Early Modern France* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 231–83; Michael MacDonald, “Religion, Social Change, and Psychological Healing in England, 1600–1800,” in W.J. Sheils, ed., *The Church and Healing* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 101–25; David Gentilcore, *Healers and Healing in Early Modern Italy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Richard Godbeer, *The Devil’s Dominion: Magic and Religion in Early New England* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 26, 40–41, 66–67; Richard Harrison Shryock, *Medicine in America, 1660–1860* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 2–4, 12–13; Luz Maria Hernandez Saenz, *Learning to Heal: The Medical Profession in Colonial Mexico, 1767–1831* (New York: Peter Lang, 1997).
- 6 On the various roles of court physicians in early modern Europe, see Vivian Nutton, ed., *Medicine at the Courts of Europe* (London: Routledge, 1990).
- 7 For a brief exposition of this development, see Daniel M. Fox, “Medical Institutions and the State,” in W.F. Bynum and Roy Porter, eds., *Companion Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), vol. 2, 1207–10. For Spain, see Michael R. McVaugh, *Medicine before the Plague* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 235–45; for Florence, see Katharine Park, *Doctors and Medicine in Early Renaissance Florence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), esp. 6–8, 15–24, 87–99, and Carlo M. Cipolla, *Faith, Reason, and the Plague in Seventeenth Century Tuscany* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979); Cipolla, *Miasmas and Disease: Public Health and the Environment in the Pre-Industrial Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), for Paris, Brockliss and Jones, 170–229; Margaret Pelling and Charles Webster, “Medical Practitioners,” in *Health, Medicine and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 168–69; Gentilcore, 29–95.
- 8 Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham, “The Reformation and Changes in Welfare in Early Modern Northern Europe,” in Grell and Cunningham, eds., *Health Care and Poor Relief in Protestant Europe, 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 1977), 4.
- 9 For Amsterdam, see Jonathan I. Israel, “Dutch Influence on Urban Planning, Health Care and Poor Relief,” in *Health Care and Poor Relief*, 77; for Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, and Courtrai, see Hugo Soly, “Continuity and Change: Attitudes Towards Poor Relief and Health Care in Early Modern Antwerp,” 102; for Danzig, see Maria Bogucka, “Health Care and Poor Relief in Danzig (Gdansk),” 215.
- 10 The state’s cooptation of medical professionals to advance its power over the individual is a recurrent theme in the opus of Michel Foucault, cf. *Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (New York: Pantheon, 1965); *The Birth of the Clinic* (New York: Vintage, 1994); and *The History of Sexuality* (3 vols; New York: Vintage, 1980, 1985, 1986). For sensible critiques of Foucault’s theories, see Nikolas Rose, “Medicine, History and the Present,” in *Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine and the Body*, ed. Colin Jones and Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1994), 48–72; and Colin Jones, “The Medicalisation of eighteenth-Century France,” in Roy Porter and Andrew Wear, eds., *Problems and Methods in the History of Medicine* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 57–80.

- 11 For works that emphasize non-governmental medicine, see L.F.Zmeev, *Byloe vrachebnoi Rossii* (St. Petersburg: Dom prizreniia maloletnikh bednykh, 1890); Zmeev, *Chteniia po vrachebnoi istorii Rossii* (St. Petersburg: Tip. Demakova, 1896); F.L.German, *Suevierie v meditsinie* (Kharkov: P.A.Breitigam, 1895); N.A.Bogoiavlenskii, *Drevnerusskoe vrachevanie v XI-XVII vv.* (Moscow: Medgiz, 1960); Bogoiavlenskii, *Meditsina u pervoselov russkogo severa* (Leningrad: Meditsina, 1966); B.D.Otamanovskii, *Bor'ba meditsiny s religiei v drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Meditsina, 1965); Russell Zguta, "Witchcraft and Medicine in Pre-Petrine Russia," *Russian Review* 37:4 (1978), 438–48.
- 12 Russell Zguta, "Monastic Medicine in Kievan Rus' and Early Muscovy," in Henrik Birnbaum and Michael S.Flier, eds., *Medieval Russian Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); see also the respectful critique by David Prestel, "Medicine or Religion: The Perils of Hagiography as Historical Source," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 25 (1991), 43–51. On clerical ambivalence towards physical medicine in the West, see, for example, Cipolla, 1–6, Andrew Wear, "Religious Beliefs and Medicine in Early Modern England," in *The Task of Healing*, 145–69; Anne F.Dawtry, "The *Modus Medendi* and the Benedictine Order of Anglo-Norman England," in *The Church and Healing*, 25–38. For Byzantium, see A.Kazhdan, "The Image of the Medical Doctor in Byzantine Literature of the Tenth to Twelfth Centuries," in *Symposium on Byzantine Medicine*, ed. John Scarborough, (*Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, vol. 38, 1984) (Washington DC, 1985), 43–51.
- 13 For more information, see Eve Levin, "Government Regulation of Health in Seventeenth-Century Russia," National Council for Eurasian and East European Research Working Paper, 2001.
- 14 Mirskii, *Meditsina Rossii*, 13–14; Unkovskaya, "Learning Foreign Mysteries," 4–5. The older study by Zagoskin suggests a later founding date, sometime before 1607, based on Margeret's reference to it, cf. 29.
- 15 Institut russkoi literatury, St. Petersburg-Pushkinskii Dom (PD), Koll. Velichko, No. 26, I. 17v. The account is contained in a medical miscellany of the early eighteenth century, and the text itself can be dated by a reference to the current rulers, the co-tsars Peter I and Ivan V (d. 1696).
- 16 On the nature of the Muscovite *prikaz* system and the personnel in it, see Peter B.Brown, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," *Russian History* 10 (1983), 269–330; and Borivoj Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and Their Staffs," in Walter M.Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, eds., *Russian Officialdom* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 19–45.
- 17 Mirskii, *Meditsina Rossii*, 38.
- 18 See, for example, the questions put to foreign practitioners concerning the medicinal use of blood, brains, and hearts of various animals, Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 54–55.
- 19 On Muscovite suspicion of poisoning at the hands of medical practitioners, see Valerie A. Kivelson, "Political Sorcery in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy," in A.M.Kleimola and G.D.Lenhoff, eds., *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584* (Moscow: ITZ-Garant, 1997), 267–83.
- 20 For examples of these oaths in early seventeenth century versions, see *Mater'ialy dlia istorii meditsiny v Rossii*, vyp. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tip. M.M.Stasiulevicha,

- 1881), 48–57; see also another version from 1677: vyp. 4, (St. Petersburg: Tip. B.G.Ianpol'skago, 1885), 906–7.
- 21 PD, Koll. Velichko, No. 26, I. 18.
- 22 For examples of the “chain of custody,” see Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 1–8.
- 23 For the protocols on the handling of medicines, see PD, Koll. Velichko No. 26, 11. 18v–21.
- 24 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (RGADA), f. 143 (Aptekarskii prikaz), op. 2, d. 1152; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 897–99. Russian sources frequently recast foreign names in Russian form, substituting native first names for unfamiliar Western ones and creating patronymics. As a further complication, the spelling of names was not standardized either in Russian or in the native languages of the foreigners. See Maria Unkovskaya, *Brief Lives: A Handbook of Medical Practitioners in Muscovy, 1620–1701* (London: Wellcome Institute, 1999), 4. I will use the most probable Western name, where it can be recovered, followed by the most common Russian variants in parentheses at the first appearance.
- 25 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 53–54.
- 26 *Mater'ialy dlia istorii meditsiny v Rossii*, vyp. 3 (St. Petersburg: Tip. B.G.Ianpol'skago, 1884), 648–49.
- 27 For a list of the personnel of the Aptekarskii prikaz see *Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika*, vol. 20 (Moscow, 1791; reprint: Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, vol. 250/20, The Hague: Mouton, 1970); see also Robert O.Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 56, 77–78, 238, note 52; Mirskii, *Ocherki istorii meditsiny*, 15; Zagoskin, 30.
- 28 Novombergskii, *Ocherki po istorii aptechnago dela*, 29.
- 29 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 636–37.
- 30 Mirskii, *Meditsiny Rossii*, 14. Unkovskaya, *Brief Lives*, contains biographical sketches of many medical practitioners.
- 31 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1178–81. For more examples of the wide variety, see the descriptions of the qualifications of potential recruits from the end of the seventeenth c., Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 84–102.
- 32 On Russian employees of the Aptekarskii prikaz especially students, see Unkovskaya, “Learning Foreign Mysteries,” 10–20.
- 33 Zagoskin, 20–22, 24–25, 27–28.
- 34 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 158–63; Unkovskaya, *Brief Lives*, 25–26.
- 35 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 84–85.
- 36 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 614–16; Unkovskaya, *Brief Lives*, 67–68.
- 37 *Mater'ialy dlia istorii meditsiny v Rossii*, vyp. 2 (St. Petersburg: Tip. B.G.Ianpol'skago, 1883), 158–59, 171–73.
- 38 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1094.
- 39 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1095.
- 40 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1071–82, 1094–95, 1154–56, 1166–68, 1178–81. The oculist was found by the retired doctor Johann Rosenburg, cf. *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1154–56.
- 41 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 3, pt. 2, 153–54; *Mater'ialy* vyp. 4, 970–71, 985–89. The quoted phrase is in *Mater'ialy*, 970. See also Unkovskaya, *Brief Lives*, 41.
- 42 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 794–95. Dr. Michael Gramann was dismissed in 1677, see *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 911–17.
- 43 Tsvetaev, 22–33.
- 44 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 789–99.

- 45 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1132–33.
- 46 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 78–79; Unkovskaya, *Brief Lives*, 80–81.
- 47 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 454–55; Unkovskaya, *Brief Lives*, 34–37. It is likely that Dr. Samuel Collins was referring to von Gaden when he complained about a “Jewish Chyrurgion (pretendedly baptiz’d Lutheran)” who conspired with a high-ranking boyar to murder his wife, *The Present State of Russia* (London: John Winter, 1671), 119–20.
- 48 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 42–43; vol. 2, 128; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 698, 703–4, 712–13, 724. See also the case of two other prisoners of war, a German and a Pole, who were apprenticed to Dr. Andrei Engelhardt, Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 46–47.
- 49 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 777–79. When Vlasov was caught three years later, he claimed that he had been robbed en route and did not dare report, and then had been sick. Under the provisions of the Ulozhenie of 1649, he was knouted and the landlord who harbored him during his absence was fined fifty roubles.
- 50 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1280–82.
- 51 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 644–45.
- 52 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 678–79.
- 53 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 434–35. Vasiliev and Fedotov were turned in by Fedor’s brother-in-law, with whom he had a fight. See also Unkovskaya, “Learning Foreign Mysteries,” 16–17.
- 54 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 352.
- 55 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 36–37.
- 56 Ori the training program, see Unkovskaya, “Learning Foreign Mysteries,” 12–15.
- 57 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 708, 728.
- 58 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 708, 728.
- 59 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1064–65. Stefan von Gaden’s son was added to the class soon after, and two more students were authorized the next year, see *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1082, 1115.
- 60 “Meditsinskii ekzamen v Aptekarskom Prikazie v tsarstvovanie tsaria Mikhaila Fedorovicha,” *Protokoly zasiedanii Obshchestva russkikh vrachei v S-Peterburgie za 1877–1878 god (god sorok-chetvertyi)* (St. Petersburg: Tip. Iakova Trelia, 1877), 107–15.
- 61 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 157–58.
- 62 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 153.
- 63 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 84–85.
- 64 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 3, 547–48.
- 65 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 647–48.
- 66 Zagoskin, 27–28; Mirskii, *Meditsiny Rossii*, 18–19. For Elizabeth’s correspondence concerning Dr. Willis, see Rikhter, vol. 1, 426–29.
- 67 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 64–72.
- 68 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 64–72.
- 69 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1244–50.
- 70 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 867–68; see also Unkovskaya, “Learning Foreign Mysteries,” 15–16.
- 71 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1270.
- 72 For examples of consultations, see Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 1–8.
- 73 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 234–35.

- 74 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 554–55.
- 75 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 604.
- 76 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1163; vyp. 3, 605–6.
- 77 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 240. See *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 553–54, for a similar case involving a Kalmyk official.
- 78 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 71.
- 79 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 909.
- 80 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 961–62.
- 81 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 64.
- 82 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 4.
- 83 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1086.
- 84 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1254–55.
- 85 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 74–75. See also similar cases of battle wounds, *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 96, 745, 753–54, 758.
- 86 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 599.
- 87 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1008–32, 1049–50.
- 88 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1056–57.
- 89 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 908–9; vyp. 3, 646–47.
- 90 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 122–23, 134, 176–78; vol. 3, pt. 2, 410–12; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 311–13, 316, 319–23.
- 91 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 114.
- 92 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 226–29. See also a similar case, in which the patient was sent to his country estate to recover from a fever before returning to duty, Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 3, pt. 2, 150–51.
- 93 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 4, 405–06.
- 94 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 500–12.
- 95 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1161.
- 96 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 105–6.
- 97 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 842–44.
- 98 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 75–76.
- 99 PD, Koll. Velichko, No. 26, I. 19v.
- 100 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 35.
- 101 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 166.
- 102 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1244–50.
- 103 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 60–61.
- 104 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 62–63; vol. 4, 910–911, 1161–62. See Unkovskaya, “Learning Foreign Mysteries,” 9–10, for a discussion of popular revulsion towards autopsies.
- 105 For more information, see Eve Levin, “State Pharmacy Practice in Seventeenth-Century Russia,” National Council for Eurasian and East European Research Working Paper, 2001.
- 106 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 96–98, 80–182; vol. 2, 289–90.
- 107 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 62–63.
- 108 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 68–70, 76–78, 108–9.
- 109 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 287–88.
- 110 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 206–9; vyp. 3, 667; vyp. 4, 902–5; Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 92.
- 111 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 612.

- 112 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 28, 31–32; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 173, 210–11, 385; vyp. 4, 1000–2, 1122–25.
- 113 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 14–15, 83; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 143–44.
- 114 PD, Koll. Velichko No. 26, II. 18v–19; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 355–56; vyp. 4, 1191–93.
- 115 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 187–89; vol. 2, 10; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 166–67; see also the case of Robert Benyon's widow, who petitioned for money owed to her husband for pharmaceutical purchases, *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1000.
- 116 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1200–3.
- 117 PD, Koll. Velichko, No. 26, II. 18v–19v.
- 118 For more information on the activities of field medics, see the forthcoming publications of William M. Reger. I am grateful to Dr. Reger for making his research available to me in advance of publication.
- 119 See, for example, Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 42–46, 57–58.
- 120 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 766, 786–87. In 1674, Romodanovskii again requested a medic, see Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 190–91. See also *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 599–600, for another example of a request for the shipment of medicines.
- 121 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 919–22.
- 122 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 2, 17–18.
- 123 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1070–71.
- 124 Zagoskin, 30–32; Sokolovskii, 16–17.
- 125 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, 137–41.
- 126 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1170–73.
- 127 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 327–29.
- 128 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 704–5.
- 129 For a further discussion of the language difficulties, see Unkovskaya, “Learning Foreign Mysteries,” 7, 13.
- 130 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1063.
- 131 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1278.
- 132 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 397–99, 417–19; vyp. 4, 989–97.
- 133 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 514–15.
- 134 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 4, 449–50.
- 135 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1002–3.
- 136 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 202, 325–26.
- 137 For examples of salary rosters, see Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vyp. 1, 22–24; vyp. 2, 473–81, 535–39.
- 138 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 130–33, 137–41, 143–44; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 760–61; vyp. 4, 916–17.
- 139 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 69; vyp. 4, 962–66, 966–70, 983–84.
- 140 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 106–7.
- 141 Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 33–34; *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 226–29, 269–70.
- 142 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 245–46.
- 143 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 210–11.
- 144 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 226–27.
- 145 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 327–29. Dr. Samuel Collins similarly complained about the Muscovite government's way of doing business in his account, 42–44: “They waste abundance of Paper in writing down things at large (as our Common law clerks do)

- ...All things are transacted by way of Petition...and the Petitioner holds it up before the Boyar, who if in a good humor puts forth his hand to receive it.”
- 146 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 217–19.
 - 147 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1082–84.
 - 148 See, for example, the case of the Russian medical student Davyd Akseñ'tev, Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 73–74; or the foreign medic Johann Kladbarg, Novombergskii, *Materialy*, vol. 1, 148–49; or the specially recruited pharmacist, Robert Benyon, *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 171–73; or the Russian medic Davyd Berlov, *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 552–53; or two Russian bonesetters, *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 650.
 - 149 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1182–83, 1186–87.
 - 150 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 2, 212–13, 224–25.
 - 151 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 669–70.
 - 152 *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 4, 1258–68. Zagoskin, 32, included the transfers of funds from other *prikazy* in his calculations of the Aptekarskii *prikaz*'s financial health, and so came to the conclusion that it was solvent.
 - 153 See, for example, the list of supplies purchased by Willem Horsten, including his cost and the resale price, *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 4, 1182–86; for Apteka revenues, see 1236–43.
 - 154 *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 3, 660.
 - 155 *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 2, 545–51, 571–75; vyp. 3, 842–44; vyp. 4, 902–5.
 - 156 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1272–74. The total income from the *votchina* cannot be determined because the list of properties and the revenues from them seems to be incomplete.
 - 157 *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 2, 164–65; vyp. 3, 652–56, 670–72; vyp. 4, 1252–53.
 - 158 The dispute involved Engelhardt's wife's servant girl, who became pregnant by the manservant. Engelhardt wanted him punished; he wanted to marry the girl, who had been sent home in disgrace. See *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 719–21.
 - 159 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 3, 579–97.
 - 160 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 106–7. For a brief description of other manifestations of prejudice against foreign doctors, see Unkovskaya, “Learning Foreign Mysteries,” 8–9, 19.
 - 161 Eve Levin, “Supplicatory Prayers as a Source for Popular Religious Culture in Muscovite Russia,” in Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Religion and Culture in Early modern Russia and Ukraine* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 96–114.
 - 162 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 1, 44–46.
 - 163 *Mater'ialy*, vyp. 4, 1288–89.
 - 164 The most frequently found herbal manual from the seventeenth century was the *Vertograd*, translated from the German in 1534. Translated texts underwent considerable revision and emendation, using Russian names for plants and diseases, measurements in Russian terms, and the addition of Russian prayers. The most complete listing of Russian herbals is L.F. Zmeev, *Russkie vrachebniki, Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti*, vol. 112 (St. Petersburg: Tip. V. Demakova, 1895), although it is incomplete. The best study of the content of herbals is V.F. Gruzdev, *Russkie rukopisnye lechebniki* (Leningrad, 1946); another shorter, but useful, examination is V. Sokolov, “Materialy dlia istorii starinnoi russkoi liechebnoi literatury (Liechebnik No. 480 Moskovskoi Patriarshei (ninie

- Sinodal'noi) biblioteki)," *Varshavskiiia universitetskiiia izvestiia*, no. 6 (1872), 65–115.
- 165 Russkaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka (RGB), f. 310 (Undol'skogo), No. 1072, II. 39v–85. For another zodiac guide, see PD, Koll. Velichko, No. 26, II. 264–66, 272–79, from the early eighteenth century.
 - 166 See, for example, the guide on the proper times for bloodletting from various veins, RGB f. 310 (Undol'skogo), No. 1072, II. 42–49v.
 - 167 Zagoskin, 30–31. Another medic similarly declined to treat a Kalmyk official in Moscow, citing the limits of his competence, cf. *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 2, 553–54.
 - 168 *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 1, 64–72.
 - 169 *Mater'iaty*, vyp. 3, 616–18.
 - 170 Novombergskii, *Materiaty*, vol. 1, 112; Zagoskin, 53.
 - 171 For an introduction to the classification of modern health care systems, see Milton I. Roemer, "National Health Systems Throughout the World: Lessons for Health System Reform in the United States," in Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, *Health Care Reform in the Nineties* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1994), 8–23. On later Russian health care systems, see John F. Hutchinson, *Politics and Public Health in Revolutionary Russia, 1890–1918* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), esp. 1–9, 24–27, 28–30, 162–68, 189–95; and Neil B. Weissman, "Origins of Soviet Health Administration," in John F. Hutchinson and Susan Gross Solomon, eds., *Health and Society in Revolutionary Russia* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 97–120.
 - 172 For an example of the experiences of foreign spetsy in the Soviet period, see Walter Arnold Rukeyser, *Working for the Soviets: An American Engineer in Russia* (New York: Covici-Friede, 1932), esp. 233–236; see also Kurt Schultz, "The American Factor in Soviet Industrialization: Fordism and the First Five Year Plan, 1928–1932," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1992).

A JESUIT ARISTOTLE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIA: COSMOLOGY AND THE PLANETARY SYSTEM IN THE SLAVO-GRECO- LATIN ACADEMY

Nikolaos A.Chrissidis

It is by now widely accepted in scholarly circles that the reign of Peter the Great did not signify as sharp a break with the Muscovite past as had been previously thought or imagined. Recent work has investigated several aspects of Muscovite culture in which the ground had already been prepared for Peter the Great's subsequent "reforms." Such work has provided clues and even in some cases analyzed in depth, the ways in which western ideas (whatever the "West" that they came from was) had penetrated into Muscovy since at least the middle of the seventeenth century. Literary scholars took the lead in this direction by analyzing the western, baroque notions of language and style prominent in the

¹ For examples, see Lidiia I.Sazonova, "Poeticheskoe tvorchestvo Evfimiia Chudovskogo," *Slavia* 56:3 (1987), 243–52 [but cf. her "Vostochnoslavianskie Akademii XVI–XVIII vv. v kontekste evropeiskoi akademicheskoi traditsii," *Slavianovedenie* 1995, 3, 46– 61, in which she still employs the binary model grecophile-latinophile, although she avoids any characterizations of the Leichoudes themselves in this regard]; Andrei N.Robinson, ed., *Simeon Polotskii i ego knigoizdatel'skaia deiatel'nost'* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982); Aleksandr M. Panchenko, *Russkaia stikhotvornaia kul'tura XVII v.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1973); Anna S. Eleonskaia, *Russkaia oratorskaia proza v literaturnom protsesse XVII veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990); Andrei N.Robinson, *Bor'ba idei v russkoi literature XVII v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); Anatolii S. Demin, "Russkie p'esy 1670-kh godov i pridvornaia kul'tura," *TODRL* 27 (1972), 273–83; James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Architecture* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), esp. chap. 4; Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Cathy J. Potter, "The Russian Church and the Politics of Reform in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1993).

² Pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians had also identified education and active pursuit of learning as speeding up in the second half of the seventeenth century but almost invariably misinterpreted it, or failed to analyze it fully or to draw its implications for the subsequent developments. Representative are: Nikolai F.Kapterev, *Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii k pravoslavnomu vostoku v XVI–XVII stoletiiakh*, 2d ed. (Sergiev Posad: Izd. M.S.Elova, 1914); Andrei P.Bogdanov, "K polemike kontsa 60-kh—nachala 80-kh godov XVII v. ob organizatsii vysshego uchebnogo zavedeniia v Rossii. Istochnikovedcheskie zametki," in *Issledovaniia po istochnikovedeniiu istorii SSSR. XIII–XVIII vv. Sbornik statei*, ed. Viktor I.Buganov et al. (Moscow: In-t istorii AN SSSR, 1986), 177–209.

Russian court since the 1660s. Historians of art have disputed the extent of baroque influences on Russian art and architecture, but nonetheless have identified changes as well. Historians have expanded upon these developments by tracing their impact on the court elite's attitudes to learning and religious experience.¹ The majority of these scholars have emphasized an increasing interest and even active quest for education and learning by the court elite as a theme running throughout the second half of the seventeenth century.² Both informal, private and formal, institutional education appear to be major venues through which western ideas, (whether modern or not in the West, but certainly new in the Russian context) found their way into Russia. Still, much more work remains to be done, especially with regard to attempts at institutionalized education, prior to Peter's initiatives. Only through an in depth analysis of the content, purposes and possible impact of these attempts can we hope to fully realize the evolution of Russian educational enterprises in particular, and Russian culture in general on the eve and during Peter the Great's reign.

In this article I wish to look into one aspect of Muscovite formal education concerned with "science" and natural philosophy. Specifically, I will investigate the cosmological and astronomical subjects taught by the Leichoudes brothers³ in the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy in the 1680s and 1690s. What I hope to do is analyze the content of such instruction and trace its potential impact on attitudes to learning on the eve of Peter's initiatives in the realm of culture. As I will show, instruction in such subjects in the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy is in essence (if not always in name) one version of the *countless* and *variable* commentaries on Aristotelian natural philosophy as they had developed within Jesuit circles by the middle of the seventeenth century.⁴ Such teaching accorded a predominant role to natural philosophy (that is, qualitative physics, cosmology) but also sought to incorporate into it "science" (astronomy, astrology and mathematics) as tools for understanding the natural world.⁵ Despite the fact that for the western European context the content of such philosophical and "scientific" instruction might already by and large have been under attack,⁶ for the Russian context it carried rather radical implications. Theology, or to be more precise, religious belief, were not any more the sole purveyors of all truth. Rather, philosophy and "science" *could* and *did* explain the structure and function of the universe. The

³ Although my discussion focuses on works appearing in manuscripts "written" by Ioannikios Leichoudes, I see the teaching activity of the two brothers as a whole. They appear to have collaborated on many of their textbooks, and in any case they both taught in the Academy at the same time (except during Ioannikios's absence between 1688–91 while on a diplomatic mission to Venice) and used the same textbooks.

⁴ I wish to stress here that there was no single, uniform Jesuit teaching on natural philosophy; rather, Jesuit scholars exhibit a wide variety of opinions even on matters touching upon axiomatic tenets of faith, within the general framework of Aristotelian natural philosophy as a methodology for studying the natural world. See most recently, Paul-Richard Blum, "Der Standardkurs der katholischen Schulphilosophie im 17. Jahrhundert," in *Aristotelismus und Renaissance: In memoriam Charles B. Schmitt*, eds. Eckhard Kessler, Charles H. Lohr, and Walter Sparr, [*Wolfenbütteler Forschungen*, vol. 40] (Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz, 1988), 127–48. See also following fn.

implications of such education were twofold: it sanctioned philosophical and scientific investigation as tools for understanding the material world; it also signified the first steps towards the institutionalization of scientific education in Russia. As a consequence, the Academy's education potentially laid the groundwork for a more receptive attitude towards science (either in its more traditional qualitative form, or its more recent, experimental form) on the part of the Muscovite educated elite. In this sense, it can also be connected with later attempts by Peter the Great at the creation of both humanities' schools and specialized schools where some of the applied sciences were taught.⁷

COSMOLOGY AND ASTRONOMY IN THE ACADEMY

As was the case with many other areas of knowledge, in Kievan Rus' and Muscovy religious belief dominated perceptions about the structure and function of the universe. Indeed, whatever elements of ancient views on the universe one finds in the extant sources was always filtered and cleansed of any perceived pagan or anti-Christian element. It could not have been otherwise, since these sources comprise mainly the works of Church Fathers and later clerical authors and commentators. Well into the second half of the seventeenth century, the *Izborniki* (of 1073 and 1076 AD), the *Shestodnev* section of the *Tolkovaia Paleia* (together with various other versions of commentaries on the six days of creation) and the *Christian Topography* of Kosmas Indikopleustes were, in addition to the

⁵ According to Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, Book XIII, chap. 2; *Physics*, Book II, chap. 2), astronomy was a branch of mathematics, which in turn (in its pure, non-applied form) was not a "science" since it did not utilize causes for arriving at conclusions. Still, starting with Christopher Clavius in the late sixteenth century, the Jesuit colleges' curriculum exhibits a sustained emphasis on mathematics for its practical utility: see James M. Lattis, *Between Copernicus and Galileo: Christoph Clavius and the Collapse of Ptolemaic Cosmology* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 32–38; Peter Dear, "Jesuit Mathematical Science and the Reconstitution of Experience in the Early Seventeenth Century," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 18:2 (1987), 133–75. The distinction between astronomy and astrology was first introduced by Ptolemy and was gradually refined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the late medieval and early modern period, astronomy usually signified the science that studied the magnitudes and motions of celestial bodies. Astrology was occupied specifically with the motions and phenomena associated with the stars and their effect on the terrestrial world, and thus could be also employed in prognostication: see, S.K. Heninger, Jr., *The Cosmographical Glass: Renaissance Diagrams of the Universe* (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1977), 7. For an argument against a too rigid distinction between astronomy and judicial/divinatory astrology, see Eugenio Garin, *Astrology in the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life*, trans. Carolyn Jackson and June Allen, trans. revised in conjunction with the author by Clare Robertson (London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). For a discussion of astrology in the Muscovite period, see most recently William F. Ryan, *The Bathhouse at Midnight: An Historical Survey of Magic and Divination in Russia* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), chap. 15. Ryan notes that "Astrology and astronomy are not terminologically distinguished in a consistent way in Church Slavonic or Old Russian until the eighteenth century, a little later than in the rest of Europe." (*ibid.*, 385).

text of the Genesis, the main sources of information on the creation and operation of the physical world.⁸ Using the Genesis narrative as a yardstick, these texts countered the views of Ptolemy and ancient philosophers. Instead, they presented a quasi-scientific view of the cosmos, dressed in Christian garb and sprinkled with an extremely simplified and watered-down version of Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic physics. Central to this Christian view was God's creation of the world. Questions concerning the earth's flatness or sphericity, the existence of three or more heavenly spheres, the circular or elliptical motion of the sun and the planets, and the like were answered variously by individual Christian authors at different times. Whatever their answers to these questions were, theirs was a conception of the universe built upon pagan foundations but very much in agreement with Scripture. In the case of Russia in particular, until the middle of the seventeenth century, this shared Christian legacy remained devoid of any of the intricate scholastic (natural philosophical), astronomical and observational commentary which had long been the norm in western Europe.⁹

The Academy's curriculum, on the other hand, constitutes a clear departure from this state of affairs. In accordance with the precepts of the Jesuit curriculum, it included the teaching of natural philosophy. Specifically, the Leichoudes appear to have devoted some time to a discussion of natural philosophical (including cosmological and astronomical) subjects.¹⁰ The Leichoudian cosmological views can be culled from two treatises on Aristotle's *De Caelo*, found in manuscript miscellanies in the possession of the two brothers. One treatise is in Greek and is titled *Eis ta tou Aristotelous Vivlia peri Ouranou* ("On Aristotle's Books on the Heavens;" hereafter: *Peri Ouranou*);¹¹ the other is in Latin and is titled *De Mundo. In Libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Mundo, et Celo* ("On the Universe. [Treatise] on the Books of Aristotle the Stagirite on the Universe and the Heavens;" hereafter: *In Libros*).¹² According to B.L.Fonkich, both treatises are dated on or before 1690,¹³ and both texts are autographs of Ioannikios Leichoudes.¹⁴ Allowing for the possibility that the Leichoudes might have had access to other relevant materials, *Peri Ouranou* and *In Libros* are the

⁶ Cartesianism and applied science had already been challenging the predominance of speculative philosophy for quite some time. Still, Newton's *Principia*, arguably the death blow to medieval speculation, was published only in 1687. Moreover, the Jesuit curriculum proved remarkably adept at incorporating new ideas into its overall Aristotelian framework: see Patricia Reif, "The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy, 1600–1650," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 30:1 (1969), 17–32; Edward Grant, "In Defense of the Earth's Centrality and Immobility: Scholastic Reaction to Copernicanism in the Seventeenth Century," in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 74:4 (1984), esp. 3 and *passim*; Gabriele Baroncini, "L'insegnamento della filosofia naturale nei collegi Italiani dei Gesuiti (1610–70): un esempio di nuovo Aristotelismo," in *La "Ratio studiorum." Modelli culturali e pratiche educative dei Gesuiti in Italia tra Cinque e Seicento*, ed. Gian Paolo Brizzi (Rome: Bulzoni, 1981), 163–215 (esp. 192–202 on the relation between mathematics and physics, and 202–14 on physics itself); and on Jesuit responses to the Copernican system, see the revisionist article by John L. Russell, SJ, "Catholic Astronomers and the Copernican System after the Condemnation of Galileo," *Annals of Science* 46 (1989), 365–86.

only two works on cosmology found among the manuscripts the two brothers had at their disposal in Russia. As such, they can be seen as comprising the Leichoudes' cosmological instruction.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the two works, some remarks on authorship are here in order. A look at the convoys of the two manuscript miscellanies reveals the following: in addition to *Peri Ouranou*, manuscript RGB f. 173 (Moskovskaia Dukhovnaia Akademiia, Sobranie Fundamental'noe), op. 1, no. 303 (Grech. 186) also contains 1) a commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione* by Gerasimos Vlachos, erstwhile teacher of the two brothers in Padua;¹⁵ 2) an excerpt from an introductory astronomical textbook (one of Alessandro Piccolomini's works, most possibly *De la sfera del mondo* (1540))¹⁶ with information on the magnitudes and distances of stars; 3) a small note on the degrees of relation which permit or prohibit marriage among relatives. The paleographer B.L.Fonkich, in both the unpublished *opis'* and in his articles, refers to this miscellany as "commentaries of Gerasimos Vlachos on the works of Aristotle." However, this is true only as far as the first commentary on

¹⁵ For treatments of Russian scientific education in the medieval and early modern period, see: Petr P.Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura v Rossii pri Petre Velikom*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: "Obshchestvennaia pol'za," 1862), esp. vol. 1; Boris E.Raikov, *Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovozzreniia v Rossii* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1937; 2nd. ed., with additions, Moscow-Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1947 [I use the first edition]), esp. chaps. 1–9; Timofei Rainov, *Nauka v Rossii XI–XVII vekov* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1940); Alexander Vucinich, *Science in Russian Culture: A History to 1860*, 2 vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), and bibliography; Loren R.Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), although Graham focuses on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Specifically on astronomy, see Boris A.Vorontsov-Veriaminov, *Ocherki istorii astronomii v Rossii* (Moscow: Gos. Izd-vo tekhniko-teoret lit-ry, 1956); William F.Ryan, "Astronomical and Astrological Terminology in Old Russian Literature," D.Phil. Thesis, (Oxford University, 1969) [these two titles were not accessible to me]. For a very helpful bibliography on astronomical and astrological subjects in Kievan Rus' and Muscovy, see Oleg R.Khromov, "Astronomiia i astrologiia v drevnei Rusi: Materialy k bibliografii," in *Estestvenno-nauchnye predstavleniia Drevnei Rusi*, ed. Rem A.Simonov (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), 290–310. See also, Max Okenfuss, "The Jesuit Origins of Petrine Education," in *The Eighteenth Century in Russia*, ed. John Gordon Garrard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 106–30. Okenfuss rightly emphasizes that not all schools set up by Peter the Great, (among them was the reorganized Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy after 1700, although its new curriculum has yet to be studied in detail), provided instruction in applied science. Rather, he correctly points out that most of these schools were organized along the lines of Jesuit colleges. Still, in briefly discussing the Leichoudian period of the Academy, Okenfuss, stresses its "Greek" character, allegedly on the basis of the victorious "grecophile" Muscovite Church party's preference for Greek education (he does not specify what the "Greekness" of education entailed). To be fair, Okenfuss *does* note that Latin and philosophy were part of the curriculum, but appears to attribute the downfall of the Leichoudes to their teaching such subjects. For an attempt at charting the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy's instruction regarding the cosmos in the beginning of the eighteenth century, see: A.V.Panibratsev, "Ideia mirozdanii v filosofskikh kursakh Slaviano-Greko-Latinskoi Akademii," in *Perevodnye pamiatniki filosofskoi mysli Drevnei Rusi*, ed. Mikhail N.Gromov (Moscow: IFRAN, 1992), 109–30.

⁸ On the *Shestodnevnyy* see *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi: XI-pervaia polovina XIV v.*, ed. Dmitrii Likhachev, vyp. 1 (Leningrad: Nauka, 1987), s.v. "Shestodnevny," on the *Izborniki*, see *ibid.*, s.v. "Izbornik 1073 g." and "Izbornik 1076 g."; on the *Christian Topography*, see *ibid.*, s.v. "Khristianskaia Topografiia Kozmy Indikoplova." In addition to the above, other available sources which could potentially provide information on cosmological and astronomical subjects were: 1) the encyclopedic work *Lutsidarius* (a translation most probably of a German original through Polish into Russian) which appears to have attracted the wrath of Maxim Grek but extant copies of which are dated only in the seventeenth century (see *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi: vtoraiia polovina XIV–XVI v.*, ed. Dmitrii Likhachev, vyp. 2, ch. 2 [Leningrad: Nauka, 1989], s.v. "Lutsidarius"); 2) the *Khronika* of Martin Bielski (first published Cracow 1551), several translations of which are attested in Russia beginning in the middle of the seventeenth century (see *ibid.*, s.v. "Khronika Martina Bels'kogo"); 3) various other cosmographies (all translations of one, usually geographical, work or compilations from various sources) on which see *ibid.*, vyp. 2, ch. 1, s.v. "Kosmografiia," 4) the *Selenographia* of Johannes Hevelius (1647), translated by Stepan Chizhinskii in the late 1670s (see Rainov, *Nauka v Rossii XI–XVII vekov*, 438–48; on Chizhinskii, see S.N.Nikolaev, "Issledovatel'skie materialy dlia 'Slovaria knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi,'" *TODRL* 40 [1985], 181). Almost invariably these additional sources are attested in Russia from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards. In addition, they are mostly reworked or edited translations in which the meaning of the original is sometimes unintelligible (see in this regard the remarks of Raikov concerning *Lutsidarius* in *Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovoztreniia*, 19–20). One should also consider the extent to which these additional sources were known to a wide audience: a very cursory look at the relevant information in the *Slovar' knizhnikov* and Raikov's *Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovoztreniia*, gives one the impression that their availability could not in any way have been wider than that of the *Shestodnevnyy*, the *Izborniki*, or the *Christian Topography*. A word or two is in order here about astrological texts as well: it is incontestable that a wide variety of astrological and divinatory texts were available in Kievan Rus' and especially Muscovy. Beyond the emphasis on the stars, some of these texts also contained cosmological and astronomical information. Indeed, since the boundaries between astrology and astronomy in the medieval and early modern period (both in Russia and in the rest of Europe) were not clearly delineated, such texts can also be seen as providing astronomical and cosmological information which was presumably available (esp. through oral transmission and by custom) to a wider audience than such "scientific" texts as the *Shestodnevnyy* or the cosmographies. See in this regard the remarks of Raikov, *Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovoztreniia*, chap. 3; more recently, Ryan, *The Bathhouse at Midnight*, chap. 15. Finally, mention should be made here of the apocryphal *Kniga Enokha*, which provided the reader with a fascinating ascent through the heavenly spheres all the way to God's throne: see, *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi: XI-pervaia polovina XIV v.*, ed. Dmitrii Likhachev, vyp. 1, (Leningrad: Nauka, 1987), s.v. "Apokrif o Enokhe;" and of the *Prenie Panagiota s Azimitom*, an anti-Latin tract dating from the thirteenth century in which the issues of heavenly spheres and the magnitudes of the stars appear: see Ihor Ševcenko, "Remarks on the Diffusion of Byzantine Scientific and Pseudo-Scientific Literature among the Orthodox Slavs," *The Slavonic and East European review* 59:3 (1981), 321–45, esp. 337; and two excerpts (in a *Zlatoust* and in a *Kratkaia Khronograficheskaia Paleia*) on the heavenly spheres, containing the Arabic names of the planets: see Evgenii G.Vodolazkin, "K voprosu ob arabskikh naimenovaniakh planet v drevnerusskoi knizhnosti," *TODRL* 50 (1996), 677–83 (the author concludes that the Arabic terms are more of a decorative character, and do not necessarily suggest direct contact with an Arabic cultural milieu). Of course, this list is far from complete. For example, the materials contained in various *florilegia* and miscellanies, once studied, might potentially provide new sources.

generation and corruption is concerned. Indeed, the *Peri Ouranou*, is not the work of G. Vlachos, but of Nikolaos Koursoulas (?-1652), a graduate of the St. Athanasius College (Collegio Greco) of Rome.¹⁸ Koursoulas's treatise remained unpublished and is attested in at least thirteen other manuscripts scattered all over the Greek East in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.¹⁹

The Latin miscellany, (RGB f. 173, op. 1, no. 319 [In. 3144]), in addition to the treatise on the heavens, contains: 1) an exchange of arguments on the immortality of the soul, 2) a treatise on the elements, 3) a commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione*. In other words, this miscellany appears to be a fairly typical Renaissance and post-Renaissance collection of

⁹ See e.g. Alexander Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957); Edward Grant, *Planets, Stars, and Orbs: the Medieval Cosmos, 1200–1687* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

¹⁰ That the Leichoudes proceeded to teaching natural philosophy after they had taught logic is apparent from an introductory note in manuscript Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka [hereafter RGB], f. 173, (Moskovskaia Dukhovnaia Akademiia, Sobranie Fundamental'noe), op. 1, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 1–10b., in which Ioannikios makes a statement to this effect adding that first the two brothers will write their lectures in Latin, and then in Greek, "...to the benefit of our students in the reigning and imperial great city of Moscow, the most Christian and most Orthodox..." It is worth noting in this regard that the Leichoudes's teaching *of* (if not *on*) physics and philosophy was castigated by their erstwhile patron (who had proved instrumental in their being sent to Moscow) Patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem (1669–1707). Indeed, in a letter to Patriarch Adrian in 1694, Dositheos, among other things, accused the Leichoudes of spending their time on philosophy and physics, instead of teaching Greek grammar "and other subjects [presumably, rhetoric and logic-NC]:" see Mikhail Smentsovskii, *Brat'ia Likhudy: Opyt issledovaniia iz istorii tserkovnogo prosveshcheniia i tserkovnoi zhizni kontsa XVII i nachala XVIII vekov* (St. Petersburg: Tip.-litografiia M.P.Frolovoi, 1899), 286. Of course, Dositheos was unhappy with the Leichoudes for many other reasons, chief among which seems to have been their unwillingness to cooperate with his envoy, archimandrite Chrysanthos (Dositheos's nephew and successor) in the attempt at establishing a Greek printing press in Moscow: see *ibid.*, 284–88, for Smentsovskii's discussion of Dositheos's accusations. Dositheos cannot but have been feigning displeasure against the two brothers for their teaching of philosophy, the more so since the Patriarchal school in Constantinople had been reorganized (better: reopened) in 1691 and the *sigilion* containing the curriculum expressly included "scientific subjects" which in the opinion of the most recent student of Greek education during the period 1453–1821, meant philosophy and theology: see Angeliki Skarvele-Nikolopoulou, "Ta mathemataria ton Hellenikon scholeion tes Tourkokratias" (Ph.D. diss.: Athens, 1989), 181. Dositheos was among the signatories to this *sigilion*. For a fuller consideration of the reasons for the Leichoudes's removal from the Academy see Nikolaos A. Chrissidis, "Creating the New Educated Elite: Learning and Faith in Moscow's Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, 1685–1694" (Ph.D. diss.: Yale University, 2000).

¹¹ RGB f. 173 (Moskovskaia Dukhovnaia Akademiia, Sobranie Fundamental'noe), op. 1, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 97–134.

commentaries on major works of Aristotle. Whether Ioannikios himself is the author of specifically the treatise on the heavens is still an open question. It is likely that Ioannikios Leichoudes simply copied the contents of collection (or collections) of Aristotelian commentaries during his studies in Venice. My comparison of the treatise with the titles, incipits and explicits provided by Charles Lohr has not produced an exact match with any of the treatises Lohr indexes.²⁰ On the other hand, the collection's treatise on the soul is an exchange of arguments on the immortality of the soul culled from the works of Fortunius Licetus and Antonius Roccus.²¹ In addition, Ioannes Cottunius, in whose *Collegia* both Leichoudes appear to have studied while in Padua, was a professor of Philosophy in the University of Padua and author of several commentaries on Aristotle's works. Unfortunately, there exists no study of Cottunius's authorial output beyond the mere titles of his works, and as a result, it is impossible to gauge the extent to which Ioannikios (or somebody else) copied, or might have

¹² RGB f. 173, op. 1, no. 319 (In. 3144), 1–79 (of the second pagination; the manuscript has two different paginations): *Tractates in Libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Mundo et Celo, ac de Generatione et Corruptione, una cum dubiis, et Quaestionibus hac tempestate in scholis agitari solitis cum 3ci indice; quorum primus quaestiones omnes Primi Tractatus amplectitur; Secundus, 2i; 3us, 3ii. eodem ordine quo agitantur* ("Treatise on the Books of Aristotle the Stagirite on the Universe and the Heavens, together with uncertain issues and Questions which are currently [and] customarily deliberated upon in schools, together with triple indices; of which [indices] the first includes the questions of the First Treatise; the Second, of the second; the Third, of the Third. [I]n the order in which they [i.e., the questions-NC] are treated.")

¹³ Specifically, the Latin treatise is dated "MDC.LXIII, XXV Septembris more vet[ero]" ('1663, September 25, Old Style): RGB f. 173, op. 1, no. 319 (In. 3144), p. 78. According to the unpublished *opis*, the Greek treatise's date is 1690: RGB f. 173, op. 1, no. 303 (Grech. 186), I. 1: "1690 a di 8. Giugno." See also: Boris L.Fonkich, "Novye materialy dlia biografii Likhudov," *Pamiatniki Kul'turj. Novye Otkrytiia* (1987), 61–70. esp. p. 68 [published also in Greek as: Boris L.Fonkich, "Nea stoicheia gia te zoe kai to ergo ton adelphon Leichoude," in *Praktika tou E' Diethnous Panioniou Synedriou (Argostoli-Uxouri, 17–21 Maiou 1986)*, 3 vols., ed. Georgios N.Moschopoulos (Argostoli, Greece: Hetaireia Kephalleniakon Historikon Ereunon, 1989), vol. 1, 227–39, esp. 237]. The dates of both manuscripts would suggest that the Greek treatise was copied during Ioannikios's sojourn (1688–91) in Venice (Fonkich specifically mentions Venice as the place of writing) as an envoy of Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, whereas the Latin one dates from the period of Ioannikios's studies in Venice in the 1660s.

¹⁴ See Fonkich, "Novye Materialy," 68 and unpublished *opis* 1 of RGB f. 173.

¹⁵ On Vlachos, see Vasiles N.Tatakes, *Gerasimos Vlachos ho Kres (1605/7–1685). Philosophos, theologos, philologos* (Venice, 1973).

¹⁶ On Alessandro Piccolomini, see Charles H.Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries II: Renaissance Authors*, (Florence: L.S.Olschki, 1988), 329–30; also Lattis, *Between Copernicus and Galileo*, 34–36.

¹⁷ See above, fn. 15. To be fair, Fonkich also notes the existence of the other texts, both the treatise on the heavens and the excerpts on star sizes and the degrees of relation permitted in a marriage, but does not address directly the issue of the *Peri Ouranou*'s authorship.

been influenced by Cottunius's work.²² In conclusion: I am more inclined at this point to submit that Ioannikios was most likely not the author of the treatise *In Libros*, but rather that he copied it from one of the countless Jesuit textbooks (probably part of a *cursus philosophicus*) which were circulating at the time. Indeed, the frequent invocation of the authority of Thomas Aquinas as well as the almost exclusive reference to the works of Jesuit natural philosophers and astronomers would support such a proposition.²³

Both *Peri Ouranou* and *In Libros* are typical, scholastic²⁴ commentaries on Aristotle's *De Caelo*. They follow the familiar pattern of Renaissance and post-Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle's philosophy. First comes an exposition of the Aristotelian thesis (which the author usually shares) on each issue treated. This opinion is then checked against the judgments of Aristotelian commentators and (when needed) Scriptural texts. Each separate discussion generally ends with the approval of the Aristotelian thesis, either in its original form or with adaptations necessitated by recent advances in astronomy and cosmology, or by Scriptural and doctrinal constraints. In this way, both treatises adduce three kinds

¹⁸ After becoming "doctor philosophiae et theologiae" in St. Athanasius College in Rome, Koursoulas appears to have started studies in law in Padua, but did not complete them. He returned to his native Zakynthos in the Ionian islands and became a hieromonk. In 1637 he is attested as teacher of Latin (*precettore latino*) in Kerkira (Corfu) and later on in Zakynthos. After unsuccessful attempts at entering the Church hierarchy as bishop, he retired to Mt. Athos until his death in 1652. Although his biography is known in general lines, virtually nothing has been written on his philosophical works; and that, despite the fact that if one is to judge by the number of manuscripts in various repositories in the Greek East, his commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo* seems to have enjoyed widespread circulation (esp. in the Ionian Islands and in Epirus). On Koursoulas, see: Gerhard Podskalsky, *Griechische Theologie in der Zeit der Türkenherrschaft (1453–1821), Die Orthodoxie im Spannungsfeld der nachreformatorischen Konfessionen des Westens* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1988), 242–44 (Podskalsky does briefly discuss Koursoulas's theology); Thanases Papadopoulos, *He Neellenike philosophia apo ton 160 eos ton 180 aiona* (Athens: I.Zacharopoulos, 1988), 163–73; Zacharias Tsirpanles, *To Helleniko Kollegio tes Routes kai hoi mathetes tou, 1576–1700: symvole ste melete tes morphotikes politikes tou Vatikanou* (Thessalonike: Patriarchikon Hidryma Paterikon Meleton, 1980), 444–45, where references to previous bibliography as well. On issues pertaining to the manuscript tradition of Koursoulas's and Vlachos's works, see Linos G.Benakes, "He cheiropgraphe paradose ton scholion sto "Peri Psyches" tou Aristotele ton Nikolaou Koursoula kai Gerasimou Vlachou," *Deltion tes Ioniou Akademias* 2 (1986), 141–67.

¹⁹ See Giannes Karas, *Hoi epistemes sten Tourkokratia: Cheirotographa kai entypa*, 3 vols. (Athens: Vivliopoleion tes Hestias, 1992–94), vol. 2, 211–15. The earliest copy known to Karas is dated 1639. Karas does not know of Ioannikios's copy of Koursoulas's treatise. Koursoulas also wrote commentaries on Aristotle's physics and on his *De Generation et Corruptione*: *ibid.*, 207–20.

²⁰ Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol. 2: *Renaissance Authors*, *idem*, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol. 3: *Index Initiorum-Index Finium* (Florence: L.S.Olschki, 1995).

²¹ On Antonius Roccus (Rochus, Rocco, d. 1653), see Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II. Renaissance Authors*, 388–89; on Fortunius Licetus, see *ibid.*, 222–23.

of arguments: physical, metaphysical and Scriptural, depending on the question treated.

At the same time, there is one significant difference between Koursoulas's work and *In Libros*. Koursoulas almost exclusively emphasizes the Greek commentators of Aristotle with particular preference for the opinions of the Neo-Platonist Symplicius (although Alexander of Aphrodisias and Ioannes Philoponos are also mentioned).²⁵ *In Libros*, on the other hand, is replete with references to Christopher Clavius, Raphael Aversa, Christopher Scheiner and Giovanni Battista Riccioli: almost all of them were Jesuits (with the exception of Aversa who was a Carmelite priest), and natural philosophers (though, Riccioli was more of a "technical astronomer and scientist").²⁶ However, this is not to say that either treatise ignores other, medieval, Latin and Arabic

²² On Cottunius, himself a graduate of the St. Athanasius College of Rome, see Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II. Renaissance Authors*, 105; Zacharias Tsirpanles, *Hoi Makedones spoudastes tou Hellenikou Kollegiou tes Romes kai he drase tous sten Hellada kai sten Italia (160s ai.-1650)* (Thessalonike: Hetaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1971), 126–59; also idem, *To Helleniko Kollegio tes Romes*, 397–99. Tsirpanles does an excellent job in tracing Cottunius's studies and career (all the way up to the position of professor of Philosophy in the University of Padua), but his purpose is not to analyze Cottunius's works. Although Cottunius was a student of Cesare Cremonini (1550–31), the famous neo-Aristotelian, he appears to have broken with the naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle of his teacher and to have followed a more traditional, scholastic path in his approach to the Philosopher's works: see the comments of Heinrich C.Kuhn, *Venetischer Aristotelismus im Ende der aristotelischen Welt: Aspekte der Welt und des Denkens des Cesare Cremonini (1550–1631)* (Berlin-New York: P.Lang, 1996), 142–44 and esp. 143, fn. 7. Edward Grant ("In Defense of the Earth's Centrality," 17, fn. 53) positions Cottunius among the scholastic predecessors of the authors he treats extensively in this work (the last of which is Melchior Cornaeus whose *Curriculum philosophiae peripateticae*... was published in 1657). Cottunius's *Commentarii in IV Libros De Caelo una cum quaestionibus*, had already been published in 1653. *In Libros* does refer to Riccioli's work *Almagestum Novum* (1651) (but not to Cornaeus) and, as already mentioned, Ioannikios "wrote" the text in 1663: as a result the period in which *In Libros* was authored can possibly be narrowed down to between 1651–63. Potentially, *In Libros* could actually be either an exact copy or a version of Cottunius's work. Such an argument can be supported by the fact that the author of *In Libros* is quick to emphasize points of agreement between Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches wherever he can find them (see below). Cottunius, according to Tsirpanles (*Hoi Makedones spoudastes*, 146–47 and 154–55) was in good terms both with the Roman Catholic Church and with the Orthodox circles of Venice and Padua; and he does not appear to have thought of the two Churches as irreconcilable, although the specifics of such a stance are not clear from Tsirpanles's account. A word of caution is in order here: any pronouncement on the possible debt of *In Libros* to the work of Cottunius is merely guesswork since Cottunius's works have not been studied (even by Italian scholars who have written on Aristotelianism in Padua: see for example, Antonino Poppi, *Introduzione all'aristotelismo padovano*, 2nd. ed. (Padova: Antenore, 1991).

²³ In this regard, it is interesting to note that the title of *In Libros* appears to be closest to the titles of similar commentaries produced by Jesuits in Spain (and the Spanish-speaking world) and Portugal (of course, the commentaries themselves were mostly in Latin): see Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries II: Renaissance Authors*, *passim*.

commentators since the names of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus as well as the Arabic philosophers frequently appear in the discussion.²⁷ Indeed, beyond the emphasis on the Greek commentators, Koursoulas's work differs from *In Libros* in very few other essential points (mainly in the number of issues treated and the amount of space devoted to them: e.g. the comets are hardly discussed at all; in contrast, whether the heavens are a simple and unmixed body receives a lot of attention). All in all, *Peri Ouranou* gives the impression of a typical Western commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo*, (not surprising since Koursoulas had studied in the St. Athanasius College in Rome and had most certainly studied under the Jesuit curriculum). At the same time, Koursoulas's work is cleansed from excessive references to Latin medieval and patristic commentators, most likely so that its author could avoid any possible charges of Roman Catholic sympathies.

In both *Peri Ouranou* and *In Libros*, when the theme under discussion comes under the purview of religion and is directly connected to doctrine, then faith and even direct references to the fathers of the Church and the Bible are taken into account. Indeed, both works strive to uphold both faith and reason by adapting philosophical investigation to the axiomatic requirements of Christian doctrine. Oftentimes, however, this adaptation works in the opposite direction as well: both treatises frequently and consciously interpret Scriptural authority in symbolic or metaphorical manner, so as to allow for the truth of the conclusions arrived at by qualitative physics.²⁸

Nowhere is this more evident than in the discussion of the creation and nature of the heavens. Noting the incongruity between the Aristotelian conception of the heavens as uncreated, eternal and incorruptible, with the Christian belief of God's creation of the heavens and their finiteness, both works strive to explain it by finding recourse in the Aristotelian dichotomy between substance and accidents. First, the treatises discuss the nature of heavens: they are composed of matter and form, and celestial matter and form are different from those of sublunar bodies.²⁹ Continuing into the problem of incorruptibility, in *Peri Ouranou*, Koursoulas declares that both Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius declare the heavens to be incorruptible: since the heavens are the place where God resides, it befits them to be eternal and ungenerated; since they are circular, there

²⁴ Typical in terms of their overall Aristotelian framework and scholastic in terms of their methodology (i.e., the "systematic and sequential commentary or...systematic formulation of questions based on a specific text..." [Grant, "In Defense of the Earth's Centrality," 3–4]). Neither typical, nor scholastic should be taken to imply total uniformity of either actual questions posed or answers given. See also, Charles B. Schmitt, *Aristotle and the Renaissance* (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1983), esp. chap. 1, where the author speaks of "Renaissance Aristotelianisms;" Reif, "The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy," 17–32 and esp. 19–20.

²⁵ Koursoulas consistently exhibited the same preference for Symplicius in his other works as well: see Benakes, "He cheirographe paradose," 153–54.

²⁶ On Clavius, see Lattis, *Between Copernicus and Galileo*; on Aversa, Scheiner and Riccioli, see primarily Grant, "In Defense of the Earth's Centrality," (and 12 for the quote on Riccioli); also *idem*, *Planets, Stars, and Orbs*.

can exist no opposite motion which could counter their circular motion; moreover, until now, no one has reported any alteration to the heavens; finally, the heavens are not subject to the motions of sublunar bodies.³⁰ In echoing these arguments, *In Libros* cites both Aristotle and (instead of Pseudo-Dionysius) Thomas Aquinas, and adds yet another one “from daily experience” (*ex diuturna experientia*): no one has reported any alteration to the lunar orb because of its proximity to the heavenly orb of fire (this last argument is presented as the most effective defense against astronomers who detect the appearance and disappearance of new stars).³¹

But how is one to reconcile these propositions with Scriptural authority? Koursoulas’s answer is that the heavens are corruptible not by nature but supernaturally, that is, by command of God. Moreover, whenever Scripture refers to the destruction of the heaven, this is corruption in terms of accidents: e.g. when David (Ps. 102:25–26) says that “the heavens are the work of your hands. They will perish, but you endure,” he means not the substantial, but the accidental destruction of the heavens (e.g., light will disappear during the second coming of Christ). This and other Scriptural passages, Koursoulas continues, should thus be explained as referring to the eventual transformation of the heavens into “a better and more perfect result.”³² *In Libros* almost verbatim

²⁷ This is mostly the case in the Latin treatise: not surprisingly is Thomas Aquinas the favored medieval commentator, since the Jesuits were, *generally speaking*, staunch proponents of his theological and philosophical views. In the *Peri Ouranou*, when Latin and Arabic commentators are mentioned, they are usually (but not exclusively) referred to as a group (e.g., *hoi Latinoi*, [the Latins], *hoi peri Thoman*, [those around Thomas {Aquinas}]), whether approvingly or disapprovingly. Indeed, the Greek treatise shows a clear preference for the Greek commentators and refers to Aristotle as “our Aristotle.” to be sure, this is a common trait among natural philosophers both in the Latin West and in the Greek East (usually, so that natural philosophers could differentiate themselves from practical scientists, such as astronomers and mathematicians); however, one detects in Koursoulas’s language a certain authorial pride for the accomplishments of another Greek, i.e., Aristotle. Such a feeling seems to point to a general characteristic of seventeenth century Greek thought: an intensification of the rediscovery (already started in the sixteenth century Greek world) of ancient Greek philosophy as a part of the Greeks’ own historical past: see e.g. Giannes Karas, *Hoi thetikes epistemes ston helleniko choro (15os–19os at.)* (Athens: I.Zacharopoulos, 1991), 40–41. On Aristotelian commentators in general, see most recently *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1995), s.v. “Commentaries on Aristotle.”

²⁸ In this way, both authors avoid the pitfalls of “double truth,” one coming from reason and the other from faith. Koursoulas especially is clearly attested as an implacable enemy of the theory of double truth: see Benakes, “He cheirographe paradose,” 154–55, with references to Koursoulas’s invectives against Theophilos Korydalleus, the major proponent of double truth in the Greek East.

²⁹ RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 99–103; RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 33–35. Both treatises have already posited that the heavens are a fifth element (quintessence) [I. 98 and 39–40 respectively]; *In Libros* adds that the heavens and three elements share some qualities and accidents (the heat [of the earth], the transparency [of the water] and the light and warmth of [fire]) but proceeds to argue that these qualities and accidents are not shared in the same way: 40.

follows the same line of reasoning. Such “explaining away” of Scriptural passages constituted staple argumentation among natural philosophers.³³

Having established the accidental corruptibility of the heavens, *In Libros* proceeds to a consideration of new stars and comets, and the number of heavenly spheres as well as their solidity or fluidity. It emphasizes the variety of opinions on the issue of new stars (*novae*) and comets.³⁴ Referring to the opinions of “many experienced astronomers,” the author rejects the possibility that the new stars are really comets. If not, how can one explain their appearance? Some say that they are stars which approach the eighth celestial sphere and then retreat. But this would presuppose that the firmament is fluid, which is not true, as the author will argue shortly. The best explanation is provided by the Conimbricenses (that is, the Coimbra Jesuits³⁵) who explain the new stars as miracles. In his omnipotence, God can create whatever he wishes. Still, our author remains obviously uncomfortable with the persuasive power of this solution: it is not easy, he states, for Orthodox believers to reject such an explanation; after all, Scripture oftentimes refers to new stars (such as that of the Nativity) and to eclipses.³⁶ However, “if one is unwilling to embrace this explanation,” let him believe that new stars appear by accidental mutation of the heavens: that is, when a part of the heavens becomes opaque, some parts of it retain the light and thus appear as stars.³⁷ As for the comets, the author yet again

³⁰ RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 104–04ob.

³¹ RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 43–45. Almost all of these arguments go back to Aristotle’s original argumentation.

³² RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), I. 105–05ob.

³³ On the incorruptibility of the heavens, see Edward Grant, “Were There Significant Differences between Medieval and Early Modern Scholastic Natural Philosophy? The Case for Cosmology,” *Nous* 18:1 (1984), 5–14; and in more amplified form, *idem*, “Celestial Incorruptibility in Medieval Cosmology 1200–1687,” in *Physics, Cosmology and Astronomy, 1300–1700: Tension and Accommodation (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 126)*, ed. Sabetai Unguru (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 101–27.

³⁴ Tycho Brahe’s (on whom see below, fn. 71) studies of the New Star of 1572 and of the comet of 1577 had dealt a prominent blow to the assumptions of scholastic cosmology on celestial incorruptibility and on comets as sub-lunar phenomena: see Grant, “Celestial Incorruptibility,” 108–09.

³⁵ On the Jesuit Coimbra school of natural philosophy, whose textbooks were extremely influential in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century, see Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II. Renaissance Authors*, 98–99; W.G.L.Randles, “Le ciel chez les jésuites espagnols et portugais (1590–1651),” in *Les jésuites à la Renaissance. Système éducatif et production du savoir*, ed. Luce Giard (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1995), 129–44.

underlines the multiplicity and variety of the astronomers' opinions, and finds recourse to Aristotle's explanation: they are dry exhalations of earth and occur only in the aerial sphere, and hence, are sublunar phenomena. As for comets being divine portents and omens, our author non-committally states that some people think that way, without elaborating further.³⁸

Proceeding to the issue of celestial fluidity or solidity, *In Libros* cites Tycho Brahe's³⁹ preference for fluidity, while at the same time admitting that Aristotle posited the heavens' solidity. The treatise presents as "more satisfactory" a middle solution that would allow for the solidity of the firmament and empyrean spheres, but would assign fluidity to the planetary one. Thus, the Scriptural passages speaking of the solidity of heavens should be taken as referring to the empyrean orb or the firmament, and not to the lower (planetary) spheres. In arguing for this solution as "the more likely,"⁴⁰ the author cites the judgments of Riccioli and Scheiner, among others. Such an explanation would also account for Mars's motion as well as for the appearance and disappearance of comets (if, of course, one were to accept that comets were celestial phenomena).⁴¹ Interestingly, the author continues by stating that Aristotle was wrong in his reasoning on celestial solidity. Aristotle had argued that the planetary spheres are solid, since they are moved by Intelligences.⁴² But the telescope (which he lacked, the author emphasizes) has proven that the planets revolve around themselves. Still one should not be too quick in condemning Aristotle for erring in something that he lacked adequate instruments for.⁴³ It is more probable that the heavenly spheres are moved by Intelligences, rather than by their intrinsic form. Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as well as Pseudo-Dionysius and physical principles support such a probability.⁴⁴ As for the shape and number of the heavens, *In Libros* posits that they are spherical and, in accordance with Scripture, accepts three celestial spheres: those of the planets, the firmament and

³⁶ This is one of the occasional instances in which *In Libros* refers to the Eastern Orthodox faith. Another one has come early on in the treatise where the author discusses the number of the worlds, and concludes that both the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic faith teach us that we cannot deny God the power to make other worlds, although, since God is one, He made one cosmos: RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 4–7.

³⁷ Ibid., 46–48. Specifically on the nova of 1572, our author appears to be undecided: he cites other authors' defense of Tycho's discoveries, says it was a miracle and finally admits that he cannot provide a definitive answer. On opacity and transparency as qualities of the heavens, see Grant, "Celestial Incorruptibility," 113–14.

³⁸ RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 49–51. On comets in seventeenth century Muscovite translations of Western texts, see most recently, S.I.Nikolaev, "Komety v perevodnoi literature XVII v.," *TODRL* 50 (1996), 684–88. These translations overwhelmingly ascribed to comets the character of divine omens.

the empyrean. When Aristotle spoke of eight heavens, it was because he posited one sphere for each of the seven planets.⁴⁵

In comparison to *In Libros*, Koursoulas spends a lot more time in establishing that the heavens are a simple body and not mixed. Similarly to *In Libros*, he argues that celestial matter and form are different from those of sublunar bodies. He adds, however, that in terms of matter, the heavens are more perfect than man; in terms of essence, man is more perfect since he is adorned with soul and life.⁴⁶ Again echoing the Latin treatise and Aristotle, Koursoulas posits the existence of seven heavens (one for each planet), an eighth one of the fixed stars (firmament) and lastly the empyrean sphere. However, he adds that some astronomers posit the existence of yet another immovable sphere between the firmament and the empyrean. Despite the fact that these astronomers speak of this additional sphere “somewhat illogically” (*alogos pos*), the author accepts it as the place of the Northern Star. This is the philosophically acceptable scheme for Koursoulas, but interestingly he also provides an alternative for those “who wish to follow the more recent opinion of those who theologize in accordance with Holy Scripture.” Such of his readers can believe that there are three heavenly spheres: the fluid planetary one in which “the planets sail like fish in the sea;” the firmament, where the fixed stars are; and finally the empyrean, in which the angels reside and where the heavenly paradise is, as Paul (2 Cor. 12:2) proclaimed. As is evident, the two alternative schemes are not mutually exclusive and Koursoulas, in his eagerness to uphold Aristotle’s opinion, allows his readers free choice.⁴⁷ As for the motion of the heavenly spheres, the author diverges slightly from *In Libros* and ascribes such motion to a separate substance, but certainly not to the intrinsic form of the heavens.⁴⁸

Both treatises pay special attention to heavenly influence in the sublunar world. This was a vexing and delicate question since it involved issues concerning the human soul and will, as well as judicial astrology and predictions

³⁹ On Tycho Brahe, see below fn. 71.

⁴⁰ On the use of the “more likely” (*probabilius*) in natural philosophy textbooks, see Reif, “The Textbook Tradition,” 30. Referring to the early seventeenth century, Lattis argues that “this expression of probability is characteristic of Jesuit philosophical teaching in the period and in contrast with the more absolutist Aristotelians of the sixteenth century”: see Lattis, *between Copernicus and Galileo*, 76, citing William Wallace, “Galileo’s Early Arguments for Geocentrism and His Later Rejection of Them,” *Novita celesti e crisi del sapere. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi Galileiani*, ed. Paolo Galluzzi (Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1984), 31–40. Both *In Libras* and *Peri Ouranou* make frequent use of the expression in their arguments.

⁴¹ RGB f 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 51–53.

⁴² Actually, Aristotle had not provided a definitive answer on the issue.

⁴³ RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 53–54.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 54–58.

of the future. Both Koursoulas and *In Libros* accept that heavenly bodies affect natural phenomena. Thus, the lower stars (the planets) and the Northern Star do appear to affect earthly matter: e.g. the Moon affects rainfall and the sea tides, or the Arctic Pole attracts the magnet. Also, as simple experience proves, light and heat come from the sun. However, in accordance with physical arguments and with Christian faith, the authors flatly deny the stars any *direct* influence on the human soul, will and intellect. Still, citing Galen and medical doctors, they posit indirect influence on the human body's humors. Specifically, according to Koursoulas, "it should be said that heavens and the stars act accidentally (*kata symvevekos*) on both the intellect and human will," because the latter two are dependent upon one another in their actualities (*energeiai*). "And the heavens and stars in themselves (*kath' auta*) act on the human body and its fluids and the bodily qualities and the organs of the senses," and hence also on the senses themselves on which the intellect and will depend in terms of their actualities. However, since soul, intellect and will are immaterial, the material stars and heavens do not affect them. Still, accidentally the stars and heavens do influence human autonomy (*autexousion*) to the extent that they arouse anger and disturb imagination and, thus, lead someone to act rashly and hastily. As for the immaterial demons and the angels, they are affected neither accidentally nor in themselves since they are immaterial and incorporeal. Koursoulas insists that one should pay no attention to cases in which the demons appear to fear certain herbs and to be affected by the appearance of certain stars: "this they do artificially and on purpose for the deception of the simpler and uneducated folk (*anthroparion*)."⁴⁹ Finally, the stars and the heavens can be studied as signs of future natural phenomena such as rain, drought and wind. However, "they are neither signs (*semeia*), nor causes (*aitia*) of our own actions and of those things that are under the control of our own will."⁴⁹ *In Libros* echoes the spirit (if not always the letter) of Koursoulas's argumentation, and provides a clear refutation of judicial astrology: it is vanity to engage in predictions of the future. Indeed, the author argues, whenever such predictions have proven successful, it is by luck and not because of the intrinsic abilities of judicial astrologers⁵⁰

It is evident that, in teaching cosmology, the Leichoudes proceed beyond the sophisticated understanding of the nature and function of the heavens and the stars, and deal directly with one of the main concerns that the study of the stars posed in Muscovy (and certainly not only there): that of their potential influence on human actions and their utilization for the prediction of the future. Divinatory astrology was very much practiced in Muscovy as is evident from the repeated condemnations of it found in conciliar decisions (such as the *Stoglav*) and in the treatises, homilies and letters of several clergymen, including most famously Maxim Grek and going down to the works of (or ascribed to) patriarch Ioakim.⁵¹ The Leichoudes reject any kind of predictive use of the stars but they do so

⁴⁵ Ibid., 59–60.

⁴⁶ RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 99–102.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 109ob.–10.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 107–08. Both treatises have already established that the heavens are inanimate.

almost exclusively in “scientific,” not in religious terms. Thus, divinatory astrology is worthless not because it is pagan and runs contrary to Orthodoxy; rather, it is baseless in terms of natural philosophy. It is worth emphasizing this point since it clearly shows the extent to which Leichoudian teaching provided its Muscovite audience with alternative ways of understanding the natural world. This understanding was not meant to undermine religious belief. Instead, it sought to eliminate common and crude perceptions of the cosmos and its influence on human life. In doing so, it necessarily ventured into the realm of religion, and although without seeking to substitute it, this new “scientific” explanation definitely *chipped away* from religion’s absolute and authoritative hold on the Muscovite conception of nature.

This is not to say that Leichoudian teaching is anything but scholastic. As already noted, the treatises they had at their disposal are on natural philosophy, not on applied or experimental science. The Leichoudes’s aim is to provide physical interpretations to all issues. Still, they do not offer only philosophical solutions. Theology and faith are still very much there to extend answers or disprove philosophical speculation when the line of reasoning turns to questions directly related to doctrine. However, the relation between physical and religious arguments is not uni-directional: that is, Scripture does not always shape the contours of the physical argumentation. Indeed, as we have seen, Scriptural passages oftentimes are necessarily explained away with reference to physical principles. The prime example is the issue of celestial incorruptibility. Leichoudian teaching first provides an array of all ancient philosophical answers and then considers faith: God did create the universe at a fixed moment in time and can destroy the world. The heavens however will be destroyed only accidentally and not substantially. Likewise, the Leichoudes offer their students two alternatives on the number of heavenly spheres containing the celestial bodies: either the Aristotelian multi-sphere or the Scriptural three-sphere heaven. In addition, as we shall see shortly in more detail, the “subordinate sciences” also play an important role in the shaping and argumentative strength of physical principles. Thus, *In Libros* does not shy away from declaring Aristotle wrong on planetary motion because the telescope has provided some new evidence that they revolve around themselves.

PLANETARY SYSTEMS IN THE ACADEMY’S CURRICULUM

The cosmology taught by the Leichoudes in the Muscovite Academy is Aristotelian.⁵² More importantly, it is the Aristotelian cosmology of Jesuit natural

⁴⁹ Ibid., 123–27.

⁵⁰ RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 63–64.

⁵¹ See William F. Ryan, “Magic and Divination. Old Russian Sources,” in *The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture*, ed. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 35–58, for a helpful summary and references to sources; and more recently, Ryan, *The Bathhouse at Midnight*.

philosophy. Thus, the Earth is located at the center of the universe, and the Moon, the Sun, the planets and the stars reside (fixed or moving) in translucent, concentric heavenly spheres that revolve around the Earth. Certainly, as faith teaches, God created heaven and earth at a specific moment in time. Accordingly, and in keeping with the aforementioned distinction between substance and accidents, the universe becomes finite both in terms of space and in terms of time.

By Muscovite standards, even such an explanation of the nature, form and function of the universe can be considered as a substantial novelty. First of all, it provided the students with a detailed explanation of the Aristotelian conception of the universe. This was indeed a very different Aristotle from the one usually to be found in Kievan Rus' and Muscovite literature: i.e., Aristotle the pagan, the hippiatrist, the practitioner of divination, or even the pagan prophet of Christ's coming.⁵³ This new Aristotle followed naturally the Leichoudian teaching on logic which was also almost entirely based upon the Philosopher's works.⁵⁴ More importantly, the Leichoudes taught Aristotelian natural philosophy in one of its Jesuit versions, in detail, from a position of authority, in the institutional framework of a school, as part of a formal curriculum which had the sanction of both Church and State.⁵⁵ In this way their instruction added and expanded upon the presumed knowledge of the court and Church elite, which might have first heard approving echoes of Aristotelian teachings in the sermons and poems of Simeon Polotskii.⁵⁶

Leichoudian teaching in natural philosophy went even further and ventured into a discussion of the planetary system, as well. Indeed, after the lengthy discussion on the nature and shape of the heavens, both *In Libros and Peri Ouranou* pick up the issue of the stars and the planets. They treat, in sequence, the forms, motions and numbers of the stars, as well as their classification along the signs of the zodiac.⁵⁷ The treatises end with a detailed presentation of the six planetary systems that had been developed from antiquity to the middle of the seventeenth century. It is in this part of their exposition that Koursoulas and *In Libros* significantly diverge from purely theoretical natural philosophy and rely more heavily on astronomy (with mathematics) and astrology, i.e. the practical sciences, in the investigation of the heavenly bodies and their motions.

In treating the shape of the stars and the planets, Koursoulas refers to Aristotle's opinion that they are spherical in shape. However, he adds that this fact can be confirmed "through astrological observations" as well.⁵⁸ Moreover, astrology's aim is to categorize stars and planets according to their size.⁵⁹ It is mathematics that measures the distances between the planets.⁶⁰ Astronomy studies the celestial bodies closer to the Earth and provides answers as to how the eclipses of the Sun and the Moon occur.⁶¹ Koursoulas thus makes a clear distinction between natural philosophy and the three branches of "scientific" investigation that deal with the nature and function of the celestial bodies.

⁵² For Aristotle's natural philosophy, see: Sir David Ross, *Aristotle*, 6th ed. (London-New York: Routledge, 1995); chap. 3; Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. chaps. 4–5, with references to selected bibliography.

Equally important, he also clearly separates astronomy, astrology and mathematics and assigns a specific interpretative function to each.⁶² *In Libros*, as we have already seen, has used evidence from astronomy and mathematics to buttress physical arguments throughout the discussion. Along these lines, after positing the sphericity of the planets and stars, its author refers the readers to the works of Christopher Clavius (that is, the Jesuit mathematician's commentary on the sphere of Sacrobosco) for further information.⁶³

The final part of both treatises is devoted to the six planetary systems known in western Europe by the middle of the seventeenth century. First, both works emphasize the variety and diversity of planetary systems proposed by philosophers and astronomers. They then proceed to a brief presentation of the Ptolemaic,

⁵³ On Aristotle in Russia, see primarily, Vasilii P. Zubov, *Aristotel'* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1963); William F. Ryan, "Aristotle and Pseudo-Aristotle in Kievan and Muscovite Russia," in *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The Theology and Other Texts* (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, vol. 11), ed. Jill Kraye, William F. Ryan, and Charles B. Schmitt (London: Warburg Institute, University of London, 1986), 97–109 for the argument that "For the most part... Aristotle is not known in Muscovite Russia for his philosophy or science, as we know it from genuine Aristotle texts or commentaries, but from the biographical information in literature such as the Alexander Romance... and from a few pseudo-Aristotelian works..." (103); Ihor Ševcenko, "Remarks on the Diffusion." On ancient sages as "harbingers of Christ's incarnation," within the iconographic theme of the Tree of Jesse, see *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, ed. Alexander P. Kazhdan, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), vol. 3, s.v. "Philosopher;" K. Spetsieres, "Eikones Hellenon philosophon eis ekklesias," *Epistemonike Epeteris tes Philosofikes Scholes tou Panepistemiou Athenon* 14 (1963–64), 386–458; Odysseus Lampides, "Mikra symvole eis tas parastaseis archaion philosophon eis ekklesias," *Theologia* 44 (1973), 351–54. For examples from Russia, see I. D. Dmitriev, *Moskovskii pervoklassnyi Novospasskii Stavropigial'nyi monastyr' v ego proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoriko-arkheologicheskii ocherk* (Moscow: Russkaia Pechatnia, 1909), 43 (the Transfiguration Cathedral of the Novospasskii monastery was the burial place of the Romanovs); also, Nataliia A. Kazakova, "Prorochestva ellinskikh mudretsov i ikh izobrazheniia v russkoi zhivopisi XVI–XVII vv.," *TODRL* 17 (1961), 358–68, for connections of the iconographic theme with the text "Prorochestva ellinskikh mudretsov" found in Chronographies and miscellanies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

⁵⁴ On the instruction in logic, see Chrissidis, "Creating the New Educated Elite," chap. 4, 228–32.

⁵⁵ The Academy had been founded with the cooperation of both Church and State. See Chrissidis, "Creating the New Educated Elite," chap. 2. Cf. Potter, "The Russian Church," for an argument that essentially the Academy's foundation was an act of the Church, specifically of the Patriarchate.

⁵⁶ Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society*, 163–75; L. U. Zvonareva, "Naturfilosofskie predstavleniia Simeona Polotskogo," in *Estestvenno-nauchnye predstavleniia Drevnei Rusi*, ed. Simonov, 228–46; B. K. Bylinin, "Poesia docta Simeona Polotskogo," *ibid.*, 246–60. One wonders how many members of the Russian court elite might have had the opportunity to take a glimpse at the ceiling of the Kolomenskoe Palace, built by tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, which is reported to have been adorned by a painting depicting the heavenly spheres, planets and stars: see Raikov, *Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovozreniia*, 77–78.

Platonic, Egyptian, Copernican, Tychonic, and semi-Tychonic systems. In each case, they trace the antecedents and first propagators of the individual theory and provide a description of the position of the planets. The exposition is accompanied by schematic representations of each system.⁶⁴

The description of the planetary systems is almost identical in the two treatises. There is, however, a very important difference: they diverge in their preference as to the most favorite system. In vouching for the semi-Tychonic system, *In Libros*, states that

“We are more satisfied with this system than with others because we maintain that the Planetary Heaven [planetary spheres-NC] is fluid. More about these [systems-NC] is the business of Astronomers whose [job-NC] it is to explain them more extensively and more meticulously.”⁶⁵

In other words, the author, following the general Jesuit line of the middle of seventeenth century, expresses his preference for the semi-Tychonic geoheliocentric system. He also justifies his choice by the fact that the semi-Tychonic system upholds the fluidity of the heavens. Koursoulas, on the other hand, appears to vacillate between two systems, the Ptolemaic and the semi-Tychonic:

“And this last system [i.e., the semi-Tychonic one-NC] as well as the first one, that of the Chaldaeans, which is commonly called Ptolomaic [sic] we accept and embrace with pleasure.”⁶⁶

Since Koursoulas does not provide any particular justification for his choices, how is one to explain them? At least in the manuscript in the Leichoudes’s

⁵⁷ RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), p. 65–70; RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 110ob.–14ob.

⁵⁸ RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 114–14ob.

⁵⁹ Ibid., II. 120ob.–21.

⁶⁰ Ibid., I. 114ob.

⁶¹ Ibid., II. 114ob.–16.

⁶² As already noted, this distinction hearkens back to the Aristotelian division of sciences.

⁶³ RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 65–70. It is interesting to note in this regard, that early on in its discussion, *In Libras* has already posited that the earth in physical (but *not* in mathematical terms) is actually a terraqueous globe: 30–31. Indeed, *In Libros* exhibits a particular respect for the conclusions of mathematicians (no doubt because of the stature of Clavius and Riccioli), provided of course that such conclusions do not come into direct clash with physical principles or Scriptural authority: see e.g. a reference to mathematicians as “non tam veritatis quam novitatis sectatores” following a clear mention of the condemnation of the heliocentric system (28–29). On the issue of the terraqueous globe, see Grant, “In Defense of the Earth’s Centrality,” 22–32; on Jesuit mathematics, see most recently, Giard, ed., *Les jésuites à la Renaissance: Système éducatif et production du savoir*, part IV.

possession, Koursoulas attempts to strike two birds with one stone, so to speak: it is possible that, in his eagerness to show his adherence to the opinion prevailing in the Greek East, the author adds the reference to the Ptolemaic system as a safeguard against any possible accusations of innovations. In this way, he tries to appeal to the Greek Orthodox milieu for which the Ptolemaic system was generally an article of faith (certainly in the seventeenth century, but also for most of the eighteenth century).⁶⁷ Simultaneously, Koursoulas cannot but also side with the semi-Tychonic system, one would think because of its partial geocentricity, but also because it preserved as much of the Aristotelian cosmology as was possible after the blows dealt it by the discoveries of both

⁶⁴ RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 128ob.–34; RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 70–78. It is noteworthy that Koursoulas studiously avoids any reference by name to Galileo, unlike *In Libros*. I have been unable to consult L.V.Zhigalova, “Pervye upominaniia o Galilee v russkoi nauchnoi literature,” *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* 16 (1964), 91–93.

⁶⁵ “Hoc systemma [sic] pro caeteris magis nobis arridet, dum Celum Planetarium liquidum esse defendimus. Plura de his pertinent ad Astronomos, quorum est ea fusius et enucleatius explicanda”: RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), 72–73.

⁶⁶ “kai touto to eschaton systema [i.e., the immediately preceding semi-Tychonic system-NC] osper kai to Aon to ton Chaldaion to koine legomenon ptolomaikon [sic] asmenos dechometha kai aspazometha”: RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 129ob.

⁶⁷ For a recent overview on the historiography of Greek scientific works in the period 1453–1821, see Dimitrios Dialetis and Efthymios Nicolaidis, “Issues in the Historiography of Post-Byzantine Science,” in *Trends in the Historiography of Science, (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 151)*, eds. Kostas Gavroglu, Jean Christianidis, and Efthymios Nicolaidis (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 121–27. On the Ptolemaic system in the Greek Orthodox East, see: Panagiotis Kondyles, “To heliokentriko systema kai he plethys ton kosmon,” in idem, *Ho Neellenikos Diaphotismos: Hoi Philosophikes Idees*, (Athens: Ekdoseis Themelio, 1988), 109–28; Giannes Karas, *Hoi thetikes epistemes ston helleniko choro*, 246–54. (Incidentally, Karas, *ibid.*, 249, argues that Chrysanthos Notaras, patriarch of Jerusalem (1707–31) and successor to Dositheos, was the first one to acquaint a Greek audience [in his *Eisagoge eis ta Geographika* (1716)] with the Copernican system: himself a proponent of the Ptolemaic system, Chrysanthos also discussed and refuted the Copernican system on the basis of Scripture, although he did acknowledge the validity of Copernicus’s astronomical arguments. Karas’s argument should be restricted with reference to published works, since the Copernican system appears to have been available in Greek manuscripts at least in the seventeenth century (if not earlier), as the case of Koursoulas’s treatise on *De Caelo* shows); Dimitris Dialetis, Kostas Gavroglu and Manolis Patiniotis, “The Sciences in the Greek Speaking Regions during the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries. The Process of Appropriation and the Dynamics of Reception and Resistance,” in *The Sciences in the European Periphery During the Enlightenment (Archimedes: New Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, vol. 2)*, ed. Kostas Gavroglu (Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 40–71, and esp. 48–49 (on the absence of any reference to the heliocentric system in the works of Theophilos Korydalleus, the preeminent Greek natural philosopher of the seventeenth century) and 51–59 (on the views of patriarch Chrysanthos and other Greek authors of the eighteenth century).

Tycho and Galileo. His main concern, as we have already seen, was to safeguard the Aristotelian view of the universe as intact as possible. Hence, for example, the reminder to his readers that epicycles were fictional mathematical devices contrived by astronomers and not corresponding to objective reality.⁶⁸ Thus, Koursoulas's simultaneous pro-Ptolemissm and pro-Tychonism seem to spring out of his eagerness both to uphold Aristotle's cosmological conception and to remain faithful to Scripture (and consonant with his Greek audience's views).⁶⁹

I would argue that the same explanation can be applied in the case of Leichoudian teaching in the Academy. Whatever the answer to this problem might be, the fact remains that the Leichoudes were certainly acquainted with the variety of planetary systems available in the West in the seventeenth century, and presented them to their students. That they most likely were real adherents of the semi-Tychonic system would appear to be a natural outcome of Tycho's geocentricity, the acceptance of the planetary spheres' fluidity, and, of course, the system's ultimate agreement with Scriptural authority. (Both Koursoulas's treatise and *In Libros* are in agreement in all these points.) Such a conclusion is further supported by the fact that, by the middle of the seventeenth century, the geoheliocentric semi-Tychonic system is the one favored in the Jesuit curriculum: it posited celestial fluidity and allowed for more recent advances in celestial phenomena such as comets and new stars, while at the same time preserving a form of geocentricity.⁷⁰ Keeping in mind that the Leichoudes were in essence teaching a Jesuit curriculum in Orthodox guise to their students, there is nothing surprising in the presence of the semi-Tychonic system in the Academy.

LEICHOUDIAN COSMOLOGY AND ASTRONOMY IN THE MUSCOVITE CONTEXT.

By comparing the Muscovite Academy's cosmology and astronomy with the variety of opinions potentially available to the educated Westerner by the middle of the seventeenth century, one is at first tempted to dismiss the Leichoudes as strict adherents of a quasi-scientific, natural philosophy: they are not "modern," in that they have not broken out of the medieval Aristotelian spell and moved on towards the contemporary scientific experimentation exemplified by Galileo's

⁶⁸ RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), l. 109. Koursoulas does not refer to Ptolemy by name in this case but it is obvious that he has primarily him in mind. As Russell notes Ptolemy's epicycles and equants went against any strict interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of the universe: "Catholic Astronomers and the Copernican System," 368, fn. 8.

⁶⁹ It should be noted here that this is only one possible explanation. Interestingly, in the other manuscripts preserving Koursoulas's treatise, the reference to the semi-Tychonic system appears to be absent: I say "appears" because at least in the explicits of the manuscripts as cited by Karas, (*Hoi epistemes sten Tourkokratia*, vol. 2, 211–15), it seems that Koursoulas sides only with the Ptolemaic system. Would it be possible that Ioannikios simply inserted the reference to the semi-Tychonic system in Koursoulas's final words? Only *in situ* study of the relevant manuscripts would confirm such a proposition, final judgment on which I reserve until such time.

telescope. Thus, they impart to their students the dry, scholastic version of natural philosophy that was already in retreat in the West, rather than that of its attackers, the experimental scientists.⁷¹ Such a judgment seems justified to a certain extent, but *only* to a certain extent. Indeed, there are three problems with this verdict. First, it posits Aristotelianism and scholasticism as inflexible analytical categories, and thus overlooks the fact that, in Western Europe, there were many different varieties of Aristotelianism and scholasticism, starting at least in the sixteenth century and onwards. Second, it disregards significant aspects of Leichoudian cosmology which belie the absolute medieval character attributed to it. Finally, by using the West as an undifferentiated yardstick, it patently overlooks the fact that the acceptance of new scientific discoveries was only gradual even in the West.⁷² Most importantly, however, such a judgment fails to situate the Leichoudian cosmological teachings within the Muscovite cultural framework and draw their implications using Muscovite standards.

First of all, the Leichoudes make a clear distinction among Scripture, philosophy and “science,” the latter in this case encompassing astronomy (whose part is mathematics) and astrology.⁷³ They employ all three,⁷⁴ whether individually, in pairs or in unison in order to provide explanations for the structure and function of the universe. They attribute most natural phenomena to natural causes and furnish physical or quasi-scientific interpretations. Not unexpectedly, when at issue are Scriptural statements, philosophy and “science” adapt accordingly. Oftentimes, though, the opposite is also true: Scripture is creatively interpreted, in accordance with physical arguments. Still, it is notable that the Leichoudes offer their students alternatives to faith. In this way, they raise the status of philosophy, astronomy and astrology and legitimate them in front of an audience which had been traditionally warned to avoid them as

⁷⁰ On the gradual acceptance of a version of the Tychonic system (or variants thereof) by the Jesuits, see: Lattis, *Between Copernicus and Galileo*, 205–16; Michel-Pierre Lerner, “L’entrée de Tycho Brahe chez les jésuites ou le chant du cygne de Clavius,” in *Les jésuites à la Renaissance: Système éducatif et production du savoir*, ed. Giard, 145–85; Baroncini, “L’insegnamento della filosofia naturale nei collegi Italiani dei Gesuiti,” 176–79; Christine Jones Schofield, “The Tychonic and semi-Tychonic World Systems,” in *Planetary Astronomy from the Renaissance to the Rise of Astrophysics: Part A.: Tycho Brahe to Newton*, ed. Rene Taton and Curtis Wilson [Michael A. Hoskin, ed., *The General History of Astronomy*, vol. 2], 33–44, for the argument that “Whatever their innermost convictions, the Jesuits produced after the 1633 decree [of the condemnation of Galileo-NC] a flood of pro-Tycho literature which continued until the closing decades of the seventeenth century.” (41); Russell, “Catholic Astronomers and the Copernican System.” On Tycho Brahe, see John Louis Emil Dreyer, *Tycho Brahe: A Picture of Scientific Life and Work in the Sixteenth Century* (Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1890; repr. New York: Dover Publications, 1963).

⁷¹ Sergei M. Solov’ev, *Sochineniia*, 18 vols. (Moscow: Mysl’, 1988–95), vol. 7, 469–70; Smentsovskii, *Brat’ia Likhudy*, 25–32; Aleksandr S. Lappo-Danilevskii, *Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli i kul’tury XVII–XVIII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 210–28 [written in the beginning of the twentieth century]; A. N. Rogov, “Shkola i prosveshchenie,” in *Ocherki russkoi kul’tury XVII veka*, ed. Artemii V. Artsikhovskii, 2 pts. (Moscow: Izd-vo MGU, 1979), pt. 2, 142–54.

enemies of the faith. Philosophy does not anymore carry only negative, pagan connotations. Nor is it only the highest level of wisdom attained by divine grace.⁷⁵ Accordingly, Leichoudian astronomy and astrology are not idle, dangerous and heretical occupations: this is not the astrology which drew the wrath of Maxim Grek and the condemnation of the *Stoglav* Council, or featured in the lists of prohibited books.⁷⁶ Nor for that matter is it the astrology of the *gromniki* and the *lunniki*, i.e. the meteorological and calendrical divinatory texts popular in Russia well into the modern period.⁷⁷ Rather, this kind of astrology is a “science” of its own, connected to mathematics.⁷⁸

This distinction among religious belief, philosophical speculation and “scientific explanation” is most vividly exemplified in the case of the Leichoudian teaching on the planetary system. From among the six versions of it that the Leichoudes discuss, they declare their preference for the Ptolemaic and semi-Tychonic, geocentric systems. It is important to note however, that they do present the Copernican, heliocentric system and trace its antecedents to the philosophers of antiquity.⁷⁹ In neither case do they justify their choice explicitly in religious terms.⁸⁰ Although it is natural that they take Scriptural authority into consideration, the Leichoudes simply expound upon the different planetary systems proposed by philosophers and astronomers, and make their own choice.

The Leichoudes are not modern scientists, say, in the post-Galilean sense of the word. Their cosmology is one of the countless versions of Jesuit scholastic natural philosophy. They betray an awareness of the role played by observation and experience that fits well with Jesuit science of the seventeenth century. Accordingly, the Leichoudes do accept the data and validity of some astronomical observations. But more often than not, they revert to speculative arguments and qualitative physics.

For the Muscovite cultural context, Leichoudian teachings on natural philosophy and the “sciences” signified an added impetus to the Western

⁷² See, e.g. A. Rupert Hall, *The Revolution in Science, 1500–1750*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Longman, 1983), 117–46; also Grant, “In Defense of the Earth’s Centrality.”

⁷³ It should be noted that this distinction accords well with the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy’s foundation charter, the so-called *privilegiia*, which also differentiated between religious as well as secular sciences. For a discussion of the *privilegiia*, see Chrissidis, “Creating the New Educated Elite,” chap. 2.

⁷⁴ That is, philosophy, theology and “science.”

⁷⁵ On the term philosophy in early Slavic literatures, see Ihor Ševcenko, “The Definition of Philosophy in the Life of St. Constantine,” in *For Roman Jakobson: Essays on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday, 11 October 1956*, ed. Morris Hale et al. (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), 449–57; see also, V.V. Mil’kov, “Opredeleniia filosofii Ioanna Damaskina i ego slaviano-russkie varianty (O Kirillo-mefodievskom i drugikh ideino-religioznykh napravleniakh v dukhovnoi zhizni Drevnei Rusi),” *Perevodnye pamiatniki filosofskoi mysli Drevnei Rusi*, ed. Mikhail N. Gromov (Moscow: IFRAN, 1992), 44–78.

⁷⁶ For a brief overview, see: Raikov, *Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovoztreniia*, chap. 3.

⁷⁷ On the *gromniki* and the *lunniki*, see Ryan, “Magic and Divination. Old Russian Sources;” *idem*, *The Bathhouse at Midnight*, chap. 14.

education and culture which the Ukrainian and Belorussian scholars had first introduced in the 1650s and 1660s. The Leichoudes drove home and enhanced the argument which differentiated between religious faith and secular learning and attempted to join the two into a harmonious whole. More importantly, they did so in the institutional framework of a school which was supported by both the State and the Church of Muscovy. Thus, they addressed their message to a far wider audience within the narrow confines of the Muscovite court elite than Slavinetskii and Polotskii had done. Both Slavinetskii and Polotskii had taught a very small number of mainly sons of *d'iaki* and Printing Office clerks. In contrast, the Leichoudes instructed a student body which was far more numerous and included princely, boyar and merchant offspring, clergymen, and sons of *d'iaki*.⁸¹ The Leichoudes *were actually teaching* the sons what Polotskii *had only urged* their fathers to value in his orations and poems.⁸²

In Libros ends the presentation of the planetary systems with the following statement: "Let this exposition be adequate concerning the heavens, about which it is scarcely possible to be certain on any point, and most of the time we are obliged to guess, because pure reason is not enough, nor is the mode of operation [of the planets] certain."⁸³ At first glance, this statement appears to hearken back to the formulation: where reason fails, faith comes in. Significantly, the author (and following him) the Leichoudes do not bring in religion in this final concluding remark. If anything, right before, as we have already seen, the author advises the readers to turn to the astronomers for more information on the planets since they are the specialists. To which astronomers, the treatise does not mention.⁸⁴ Thus, in the case of Leichoudian cosmology one can see an overall

⁷⁸ As already noted *Peri Ouranou* is followed by two mathematical tables containing the distances of the stars from the earth as well as measurements of the star's different positions for every twenty-four hour period of the week: RGB f. 173, no. 303 (Grech. 186), II. 135–38.

⁷⁹ As Raikov notes (*Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovoztreniia*, chap. 5), the heliocentric system was known in Russia since the translation of Joan Blaeu's *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum sive Atlas Novus* (Amsterdam, 1645), by Epifanii Slavinetskii in the 1650s. Only one copy of the complete translation was apparently made, though its introductory cosmographical part (where Copernicus's theory appears) apparently is found separately in several copies from the end of the seventeenth century (Raikov, *Ocherki po istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovoztreniia*, 84 and fn. 3). Still, the Leichoudes can be said to be the first to present the heliocentric system in Russia to a wider audience in the framework of a school. Raikov does not seem to have worked first-hand with Leichoudian manuscripts and relies only on the secondary literature for his presentation of Leichoudian philosophy: as a result, he does not mention their discussion of the planetary systems. For a recent, linguistic, study of the Russian translation of Abraham Ortelius, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, (first published 1595), see Peter Kosta, *Eine Russische Kosmographie aus dem 17. Jahrhundert: Sprachwissenschaftliche Analyse mit Textedition und Faksimile (Specimina Philologiae Slavicae, vol. 40)* (München: O. Sagner, 1982).

⁸⁰ This is not to downplay the religious dimensions of the problem. As already noted (fn. 64), *In Libros* has early on made a clear reference to Galileo's condemnation of 1633. Still, it is interesting that this reference has come early on more as a safeguard, and is not repeated here.

reflection of the Academy's education: it is a transitory blend of old and new, the scholastic and the "scientific." The potential implications of this combination on the mentality and intellectual outlook of the Academy's students are not always easy to gauge. As far as natural philosophy and cosmology are concerned, however, the Academy acquainted the students both with the theoretical framework of natural philosophy, its vocabulary and terminology, as well as with many of the latest advances in astronomy (albeit in a cursory manner) and very elementary conceptions of mathematics. In this sense, it can be interpreted as the first attempt at institutional, formal education in science in Russia. Seen in such a framework, the subsequent establishment of Moscow's Navigation and Mathematics School does not appear as sudden.⁸⁵

⁸¹ For a list of the Leichoudes's students during their tenure in the Academy, see Dmitrii Yalamas, "Filologicheskaiia deiatel'nost' brat'ev Likhudov v Rossii" (Candidate's diss., Moscow State University, 1992), 4–5; also, the discussion in Chrissidis, "Creating the New Educated Elite," chap. 2.

⁸² See Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society*, 163–75, on the activities of both Slavinetskii and Polotskii.

⁸³ "Atque haec de Mundo, et Celo sint satis, in quibus vix certi aliquod potest haberi, et saepe saepius divinare cogimur, cum vera ratione non suppetat, nec certus effectus": RGB f. 173, no. 319 (In. 3144), p. 78.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 73. Pages 73–78 contain plans of the planetary systems. Thus, the reference to the astronomers and the statement on guessing flank, so to speak, the plans.

⁸⁵ Some years ago, a scholar of Russian science asserted that there was a "total absence in Russian society at the end of the seventeenth century of even the most rudimentary formal training in science and mathematics." Moreover, the same scholar interpreted what he saw as the *tabula rasa* of Russian education in the same period as an advantage for the advent and subsequent acceptance of Newton in Russia: see, Valentin Boss, *Newton and Russia. The Early Influence, 1698–1796* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 234. I would argue that the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy's education since its establishment in 1685 proves that this argument needs revision. On the School of Mathematics and Navigation, see *ibid.*, 79–80 and bibliography.

SOCIETY, IDENTITY AND MODERNITY IN SEVENTEENTH- CENTURY RUSSIA

Nancy Shields Kollmann

It is a challenge to define how Muscovite society was structured or how people expressed their identity, because Muscovy was not self-reflective. Muscovites did not produce such theoretical visions of society as the medieval European “great chain of being” or Peter the Chanter’s commentaries on the social order.¹ Nor did they write empirical studies of their realm’s social structure, economic resources or territorial expanse. Nevertheless, seventeenth-century sources do exist from which one can reconstruct social structure, individuals’ sense of identity and prescriptive visions of the social whole. In this essay our intent is to give an overview of society and identity for the general reader by first describing Muscovy’s social structure and then analyzing how prescriptive sources envisioned the social community and how individuals negotiated that code.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The most important attribute about seventeenth-century Muscovite society was its dynamism and diversity, which stemmed in part from the state’s energetic growth. By the end of the century Muscovy stretched from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea steppe; it had incorporated important Belarus’ian and Ukrainian territory and it stretched through Siberia to the Pacific. Expansion incorporated countless non-Russian, non-Orthodox communities, including Siberian natives, steppe peoples from Kalmyks to Bashkirs and Zaporozhian Cossacks. Furthermore, expansion itself, with its attendant military and bureaucratic reforms, generated new social groups such as frontier guards and settlers.

Despite its ethnic and confessional diversity, Muscovy presented a fairly simple society in comparison to its West European contemporaries. Enserfment, affecting the majority of the population, and the tsar’s control over economic resources restricted economic growth, limiting incentive and opportunity for innovation, investment and capital accumulation. Accordingly, Muscovy had a far less dynamic economy, a weaker middle class, virtually no professional classes, and less social mobility than, for example, the most developed European countries in the seventeenth century.

Also in contrast to constitutionally progressive early modern European states, Muscovy did not have juridically guaranteed personal freedoms, a fact that many have emphasized as key to Russia’s differences from the ideal European path.²

In Muscovy there were no legal estates, noble or bourgeois. In principle everyone was a dependent of someone else: slaves had masters, serfs had landlords, virtually everyone else from urban taxpayers to court officials served the tsar. Similarly for churchmen: they served the tsar and patriarch, as well as their immediate bishop, abbot or other hierarch. Service or taxpaying was obligatory to all, save slaves. Freedom to be self-determining in occupation and residence was not a privilege provided juridically, nor an attribute necessarily valued by Muscovites, as we shall see. To counterbalance this image of dependency, one should note, however, that the elite service classes enjoyed aspects of self-determination in the seventeenth century: steadily decreasing service obligations, an active market in land, the convergence of patrimonial with service-tenure land. And in practice, as we shall see, some peasants, even private serfs, enjoyed significant *de facto* mobility and self-determination.

So the historian has to be cautious about the issue of personal “freedom.”³ To impose our post-Enlightenment concept of personal freedom on Muscovy, or to generalize the obligation of service and enservment into a national character of servility, distorts the complexity of such a traditional society. The key issue regarding freedom in such traditional societies is the tension between claims made on individuals by dominant institutions (the state, the church, ideology, landlords and masters) and individuals’ negotiation of those claims. Before looking at how these tensions played out for Muscovites, let us first let us detail social structure.

THE LANDED ELITE

Muscovy’s landed elite was characterized jointly by service to the tsar and by the privileges imparted by that service. Members of the elite enjoyed almost exclusive right to own land hereditarily (*votchina*), to receive land in service-tenure as *pomest’ie*, to own serfs and to litigate in central chanceries rather than in local courts. They rarely suffered corporal punishment, although there was no legal guarantee of this. Tsars had the right to confiscate land and punish servitors at his displeasure, but in practice they rarely did. Punishments such as disgrace (*opala*), imprisonment and even confiscation of property were usually symbolic and exemplary, short-lived and quickly mitigated by the tsar’s mercy.⁴

The most important social stratum in the seventeenth century was the upper ranks of the elite, the so-called *Moskovskie chiny*. It was an increasingly literate

¹ See my “Concepts of Society and Social Identity in Early Modern Russia,” in Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann, eds., *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 34–51.

² This is explicit in Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974) and implicit in much of Richard Hellie’s work, such as *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971) and *Slavery in Russia, 1450–1725* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

³ These remarks are inspired by Valerie Kivelson’s stimulating essay, “Muscovite ‘Citizenship’: Rights without Freedom,” *Journal of Modern History* 74 (2002), 465–89.

bureaucratic, military and administrative elite that Robert Crummey has labeled the “noble officials.” The Moscow ranks ranged from the top four conciliar ranks (boyar, *okol’nichii*, state gentryman, state secretary) through several honorific court titles. Richard Hellie sees a twofold increase in this entire group from about 3,000 in 1663 to about 6,000 in 1681; Robert Crummey has documented the spectacular growth of the four conciliar ranks, numbering 28 in 1645 and 153 in 1690.⁵ In the seventeenth century they were wealthy and ostentatious in their display of wealth; it was in this social stratum that seclusion of women was practiced and it was these people who enjoyed the right to litigate in precedence (*mestnichestvo*) disputes.⁶

Lesser in status and wealth but still enjoying privileges of land and serfs were the provincial gentry. These cavalymen were becoming militarily obsolescent in this century and were being transformed into a landed “gentry,” in Valerie Kivelson’s term. Serving from provincial towns in the Center and Northwest, by the middle of the century those gentry who had not been squeezed into “new style” regiments were required to serve only three months per year. In turn they staffed local offices and served as *de facto* regional bureaucracy as most peasants in the Center and southern frontier (not in the North or Siberia) fell into serfdom under private landlords. Provincial gentrymen constituted informal regional “corporations” through locally-focused marriage, service and landholding. Again citing Hellie’s statistics, their numbers declined radically by the end of the century: they numbered only about 10,000 in 1681 and they, plus the Moscow ranks, constituted only 8 percent of the armed forces.⁷

A few other social groups shared the privileges of landholding, serf ownership and exclusive judicial venues. These include the privileged merchants (*gosti*), numbering only a few dozen men, while the couple of hundred men in the lesser merchant guilds (*gostinnaia* and *sukonnaia sotni*) enjoyed only limited tax breaks. Reflecting the convergence of military and bureaucratic service, chancery officials (*prikaznye liudi*) enjoyed rights to own land and serfs, distributed generously to conciliar secretaries (*dumnye d’iaki*) and more modestly through the lower ranks all the way to undersecretaries (*pod’iachie*) in local offices (*prikaznye izby*).⁸

⁴ On this contentious issue, see the polemic between Pipes and George Weickhardt: Weickhardt, “The Pre-Petrine Law of Property,” *Slavic Review* 52:4 (1993), 663–79; Richard Pipes, “Was There Private Property in Muscovite Russia?” *Slavic Review* 53:2 (1994), 524–30; George Weickhardt, “Response,” *Slavic Review* 53:2 (1994), 531–38. On the leniency of punishments of the elite, see my *By Honor Bound State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 121–27, 154–67, 182.

⁵ Hellie, *Enserfment*, appendix; Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors. The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), app. A.

⁶ See my “The Seclusion of Elite Muscovite Women,” *Russian History* 10, pt. 2 (1983), 170–87. Admittedly, in the seventeenth century lower social groups, such as merchants and bureaucrats, muscled in on precedence; see my *By Honor Bound*, chap. 4.

⁷ Hellie, *Enserfment*, appendix; Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces. The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), passim (p. 44 for declining service norms).

In the church a parallel elite existed. Church hierarchs (patriarch, metropolitans, bishops) and monasteries had the right to own land and serfs; indeed the church was one of Muscovy's greatest landholders, despite efforts since Ivan the Terrible's time to limit this. Church institutions and their dependents enjoyed their own judicial venues, save for the highest crimes. In status and wealth, there was a sharp hierarchy within the church; most monasteries were small and poorly endowed, while a few, such as the Trinity-St. Sergii and St. Cyril-Belozerskii, were wealthy economic enterprises owning hundreds of peasant villages. Parish priests were poorer still, subsisting with peasants on a more or less equally equal footing.

Straddling the elite and taxpaying majority were those who served "*po priboru*," often rendered "contract servitors." This extremely diverse group represented successive waves of military reform, starting with Cossacks, musketeers and artillerymen (*strel'tsy*, *pushkari*) in the mid sixteenth century through "new model" infantry and cavalry in the seventeenth. Hellie chronicles the steady increase in their numbers such that by 1681 these ranks constituted 92 percent of the army. These groups by and large lived in cities and frontier towns, were not in theory granted *pomest'e* or allowed to own serfs, and were in turn permitted to farm land dedicated to their community and to engage in artisanal work and trade in the off-season (for which they paid taxes). Most of these groups lived on the steppe and Siberian frontiers, where the social dynamic often transgressed theory.⁹ Here one encounters musketeers and Cossacks owning *pomest'e* and peasants and rapid social mobility as runaway serfs moved into border guard ranks. Life on the steppe frontier gives the lie to any image of seventeenth century as an immobile, status-bound society.¹⁰

The majority of the tsar's subjects paid taxes and owed services to the state, as well as to private owners in most cases. Most of them were enserfed peasants, belonging to private lay or ecclesiastical owners, tied to their land by cadastral registration and the state's willingness to pursue runaway serfs without limit of time after 1649. Ia.E.Vodarskii notes that in 1678 there were about 2,300,000 privately-owned serfs and about a third again as many (700,000) church peasants. Together he estimates that they constituted 60 percent of the population in 1678; another 19 percent was made up of "state" (*gosudarstvennye*) and "court" (*dvortsovye*) peasants. The latter were peasants in the fertile zones who worked directly for the tsar, and the former were peasants in areas such as the North and Siberia where climate and soil were too infertile to support both a *pomest'e*-based landholding class. Both state and court peasants governed themselves through communes, and enjoyed more *de facto* self-determination and mobility than private peasants.¹¹

⁸ On merchants, see J. Michael Hittle, *The Service City: State and Townsmen in Russia, 1600–1800* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1979) and Samuel H. Baron, "Who were the *Gosti*?" *California Slavic Studies* 7 (1973), 1–40. On chancery officials, see Nataliia Fedorovna Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absolutizma* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1987), chaps. 2–3.

⁹ Carol Belkin Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995).

Paralleling the state peasants were townsmen (*posadskie liudi*), who paid an annual tax (*obrok*) and sales taxes on their production and sales. They governed themselves communally and were fixed to their residence by urban cadastres. Vodarskii estimates them at about 134,000 in 1678.¹² Dispersed throughout Muscovite society, constituting at least a tenth of the population, according to Richard Hellie, were slaves (*khology*). Juridically inferior to serfs (they did not pay taxes), slaves were generally Russians who had voluntarily chosen the status or inherited it; they lived side by side their fellow Muscovites in occupations ranging from domestic service to farm labor to military service. Hellie argues that slavery functioned as a safety net for a society always on the brink of poverty.¹³

Most of the people in the status groups discussed above were Russian speakers and Orthodox in religion. The many non-Russian ethnic groups in the empire substantially complicate the social picture: east and south of Moscow were lands of Tatar and Turkic language, generally Islamic or observing native religions. They included the Tatars and Mordva of the Middle Volga, the steppe nomads of the lower Volga, the Kalmyks north of the Caucasus, native tribes in the vast Siberian forest and Bashkirs in the steppes of western Siberia. Don Cossacks also constituted a semi-autonomous community on the steppe frontier. On the western border, social structure followed European lines; here lived Orthodox, Uniates, Protestants, Catholics and Jews; burgers and noblemen with legal charters of political rights; enserfed peasants; semi-autonomous Cossack communities.

Muscovite colonial policy in the steppe and Siberia was *laissez-faire*: the cream of colonial elites was often converted and lured to Muscovite service, while most stayed in place and retained their customary status, land and local political and judicial roles. In the seventeenth century the emphasis was on resource extraction, not Christianization or Russification. Force was used to put down regular uprisings, official graft and corruption were rampant, but the government did not intervene greatly in local institutions or politics. With the exception of the privileged elites, native peoples paid taxes, generally called the "*iasak*" in kind or cash. Vodarskii estimates there to have been in 1678 about 200,000 *iasak* peasants in the Middle Volga, about 30,000 Bashkirs in western Siberia, about 4,000 Arctic border tribes (*Saamy*) and about 160,000 Siberian natives.¹⁴

On the western border, *laissez-faire* colonial policy meant the maintenance of significant political and social autonomies. In Ukraine the Cossack hetmanate, about 40,000 strong according to Vodarskii, was a virtually independent state, with its own judicial and political system. Its total population Vodarskii sees as

¹⁰ In an otherwise stimulating book, Marc Raeff repeats a common image of Muscovy as a frozen, immobile society of fixed ranks: *Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), chap. 1.

¹¹ Iaroslav Evgen'evich Vodarskii, *Naselenie Rossii v kontse XVII—nachale XVIII veka* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1977), 95, 97, 192.

¹² Vodarskii, *Naselenie Rossii*, 130.

¹³ Hellie, *Slavery*, 679–89.

15 percent of the Muscovite population in 1678.¹⁵ Similarly Muscovy initially tolerated political privileges and institutions for towns and estates when it incorporated Belarus'ian areas in this century. In turn Ukrainian and Belarus'ian Orthodox clerics had immense cultural impact in late seventeenth-century Muscovy.

The full impact of non-Russian, non-Orthodox subjects on the "identity" of Muscovite society is impossible to gauge. Further work needs to be done regarding the self-representation of discrete ethnic groups, and the ways in which they interacted with Russians on Muscovy's many borders and internal frontiers. At the present state of knowledge, one can only caution that the ideal vision of identity presented below, which excludes these groups, masks a far more complex social reality.

That reality is all the more complicated by the fluidity of individuals throughout the empire. Muscovy strove for a fixed social hierarchy, judging by attempts embodied in the 1649 Lawcode and other legislation of the time to fix taxpayers to their place of residence or landlord and to simplify social categories. But in practice there was significant social and geographical mobility. Ia.E. Vodarskii has, for example, tracked the tremendous geographical movement of people into the fertile south lands over the turn of the eighteenth century.¹⁶ Beyond that, people were on the move in many other ways. Serfs were on the road regularly: they traveled on errands for their masters, or worked in towns for their masters, or traveled visiting kinsmen in villages near or far. Others migrated to new social statuses. Some opted for slavery; many peasants fled enslavement to the steppe. In turn non-Russians on steppe borderlands fled their tribes into Russian towns. Runaway peasants fitted in the interstices of their society, working as hired labor, begging or falling into crime; sources speak of rootless people as the "wandering people" (*guliashchie liudi*). Some minstrels were settled, and others traveled about the countryside. The state was constantly trying to return these vagabonds, runaway serfs, slaves, minstrels and others to taxpaying or service status. The state contributed to geographical mobility by developing the exile system in the seventeenth century. Convicted criminals, often with families, were deported to Siberia, taking up new identities in the new settlements. Defrocked priests, monks and nuns, as Georg Michels has chronicled, challenged the established ranks in the countryside.¹⁷ By the end of the century communities of Old Believers themselves demonstrated that one could create one's own place and worldview in the social order. We cannot quantify the impact of these groups but we must bear them in mind as

¹⁴ Vodarskii, *Naselenie Rossii*, 108–9. For excellent overviews see Andreas Kappeler, *Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung. Geschichte. Zerfall* (Munich: Verlag C.H.Beck, 1993) and Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002).

¹⁵ Vodarskii, *Naselenie Rossii*, 108, 192. On Ukraine, see Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), chaps. 10–12. Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), chaps. 15–21.

counterbalances to the rationalizing impulse imposed by the Muscovite systems of taxation and service.

IDENTITY

How did people define themselves in this vast and diverse realm? How did that identity relate to society-wide discourses of Muscovy as an integral community? These are two different questions, and to some extent the second one is anachronistic. Society-wide discourses are a quintessential project of the modern era, shaped by Enlightenment universalism and nationalism. It is a modern penchant to envision states as self-conscious, integral communities, founded on a postulated heritage of historical experience and common ethnicity. Modern presumptions of popular sovereignty generated a vision of the state as equal with the nation and inspired models of rational institutional reform to reflect that universalism and social inclusivity.

By comparison, premodern societies were chaotic in institutional and ethnic diversity, and in social theory blissfully unmindful of their diversity. Nevertheless, as Derek Sayer writes regarding the Czech lands, “a sense of national community is not something unique to modernity.” Premodern rulers generated visions of unity around the rubrics of Christian universalism, loyalty to dynasty and pride in what might be called national achievement, simply excluding those elements of social reality that did not fit. Premodern rulers used ritual and ceremony, architecture and art, sermons and proclamations, hagiography and chronicles, and other written and symbolic media to promote their social vision. Sayer, for example, has masterfully sketched out how the fourteenth-century Czech king and Holy Roman Emperor, Charles IV, and his court promoted Czech national consciousness by constructing a magnificent Gothic cathedral in Prague and filling it with shrines to specifically Czech saints and events.¹⁶

Making the leap between prescriptive visions of identity disseminated by the dominant elites and individuals’ psychological reception of them is perhaps impossible (at least given Muscovite sources), but it can be shown that individuals integrated dominant ideologies in their public presentations of self. So we shall turn here first to exploring the prescriptive vision of society that the Muscovite state disseminated or supported, and then turn to how individuals defined themselves and their place in society.

¹⁶ *Rossiiskoe zakonodatel'stvo X–XX vekov* 3 (Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia literatura, 1985), 106–12 (chap. 10, arts. 27–99). Vodarskii, *Naselenie Rossii*, chap. 4.

¹⁷ Georg B. Michels, *At War with the Church: Religious Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), chaps. 4–6.

PRESCRIPTIVE VISIONS OF SOCIETY AND IDENTITY

In ceremony, art, architecture and written sources the Muscovite state presented an image of itself as a “Godly community,” in Daniel Rowland’s phrase.¹⁹ It depicted the community as bound by a common religious faith—Orthodoxy—and a common commitment to salvation as the goal of life and the purpose of secular power on earth. Whenever the tsar appeared in public, or was described in written sources as presiding over ceremonies, banquets, consultations and the like, he was accompanied by the patriarch, church hierarchs and boyars; together they embodied the unity of church and state, the Godliness of the realm. When the tsar presented himself to the people, it was not in secular entrances and celebrations, but in religious ones: cross processions and pilgrimages, liturgies such as the Epiphany and Palm Sunday processions, celebrations of births and namedays in the ruling family. During these events, blessings were bestowed, alms distributed, prisoners pardoned.²⁰

Like their sixteenth-century predecessors, Muscovy’s rulers used art and architecture to promote a vision of the realm: Patriarch Nikon’s famous injunction that churches should not be topped with tent roofs created a characteristic silhouette of a five-domed church plus tent-topped bell tower that was repeated throughout the realm from Novgorod to Irkutsk, from Iaroslavl’ to Vologda. The energetic spread of “Naryshkin Baroque” at the end of the seventeenth century similarly disseminated a unified vision from center to periphery. Unlike the sixteenth century, when the church was embracing regional cults of saints to symbolically integrate newly-conquered regions, in the seventeenth century it was more skeptical of saints’ cults, restricting their number to establish a national norm and promote a central vision of piety.²¹

From the time of Aleksei Mikhailovich, the court welcomed western portraiture, generally in oil, to depict the piety and majesty of the ruler and his men. Not only rulers from Aleksei Mikhailovich to regent Sofiia, but also Patriarch Nikon and major boyars sat for their portraits. The new medium was deployed to express a traditional message. Aleksei Mikhailovich’s coronation portrait displays regalia replete with tradition: the hat and mantle were said to have come to Kievan Prince Vladimir Monomakh from Byzantium. The fact that the hat was of fourteenth-century Uzbek production and that the Monomakh tale was of sixteenth-century vintage does not detract from its symbolic power, and thus legitimacy, in the seventeenth century.

As with the “Church Militant” icon in the sixteenth century, icon painting in the seventeenth legitimized the present by reference both to defining moments in Muscovite history and to elements of the universal. Semen Ushakov’s 1688 “Tree of the Muscovite State” surrounds the central Mother of God image with

¹⁸ Derek Sayer, *The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 29, 32–35.

¹⁹ Daniel Rowland, “Did Muscovite Literary Ideology Place Limits on the Power of the Tsar (1540s–1660s)?” *Russian Review* 49:2 (1990), 125–55 and “The Problem of Advice in Muscovite Tales About the Time of Troubles,” *Russian History*, 6:2 (1979), 259–83.

medallions of Russian saints and saintly rulers. At the foot of the tree, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich with wife and sons and Patriarch Nikon look on as Grand Prince Ivan Kalita and Metropolitan Peter—both fourteenth-century figures revered in dynastic mythology as founders of the state²²—water the roots. Historical works retained old chronicle traditions, or experimented with new forms, to promote the state's legitimacy. The *Tsarskii Tituliarnik*, a source in traditional style that listed official titles of world rulers and provided brief histories of Russian rulers, is reminiscent of the great compilative works of the mid sixteenth century (the Nikon Chronicle and its continuations, the Great Menology, the Book of Degrees, the Illustrated Nikon Chronicle); it also added the innovation of color portraits of Russian rulers from Riurik to Aleksei Mikhailovich. Such works as the "Synopsis" and Lyzlov's "Scythian History," meanwhile, linked Russia with antiquity and with Ukrainian and Belarus'ian history in a more modern historical narrative form.

No effort was made in this official imagery to include Russia's numerous non-Russian subjects in this "imagined community," and this was typical. Derek Sayer chronicles the same tendency towards social exclusivity in the Czech case. Such an Orthodox-centric ideology continued through Nicholas I's "official nationality" and Nicholas II's deliberate evocations of Muscovy and Orthodoxy in the early years of the twentieth century.²³ Anachronistic on the eve of the Russian Revolution to be sure, such a vision made sense in the seventeenth century, when Russia was untouched by the universalism and Enlightenment emerging in Europe. And it appealed to the people who needed to be coopted into the state's work, namely central and local secular elites, for whom conversion to Orthodoxy was always a requisite step towards political success.

Other sources brought this message to individuals: the sixteenth-century domestic handbook, the *Domostroi*, continued to circulate in secular court and provincial circles in the seventeenth century.²⁴ It stressed patrimonial authority in the family and depicted the realm as patriarchy defined large, the tsar assuming the role to his people of the father in his family. Patriarchs exerted authority and discipline, with kindness and justice, over their wives, children, serfs, servants and other dependents; the entire effort of the household was directed towards achieving salvation through piety, humility, charity and subservience. Women

²⁰ On court ritual, see Michael S. Flier, "Breaking the Code: The Image of the Tsar in the Muscovite Palm Sunday Ritual," in Michael S. Flier and Daniel Rowland, eds., *Medieval Russian Culture*, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 213–42 and his "The Iconology of Royal Ritual in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy," in *Byzantine Studies: Essays on the Slavic World and the Eleventh Century*, ed. Speros Vryonis, Jr. (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1992), 53–76; Paul Bushkovitch, "The Epiphany Ceremony of the Russian Court in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Russian Review* 49:1 (1990), 1–18; and my "Pilgrimage, Procession and Symbolic Space in Sixteenth-Century Russian Politics" in *Medieval Russian Culture, 163–81*. In general on such "strategies of integration," see my *By Honor Bound*, chap. 5.

²¹ On saints' cults, see Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), chaps. 4–5.

played a pivotal role in the *Domostro*'s ethics, for they set a moral example for servants and children and were responsible for the orderly maintenance of a pious home. Hagiography complemented this vision in the seventeenth century, by glorifying saintly individuals (as opposed to the politically active, larger than life saints revered in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). Iulianna Osorina's life, for example, situates her piety in a domestic setting; at the same time local cults of saints flourished despite the church's efforts to rein them in. To judge by prescriptive literature, individuals in Muscovy were pious, modest, charitable and oriented towards the life beyond, and they occupied a state that reflected those values and goals.

Balancing this ideal vision is the secular literature that gained popularity in the late seventeenth century. Here social values were overturned. Rogues such as Frol Skobeev were celebrated as heroes, clerics were satirized as corrupt, women engaged in illicit activity, peasants bested their landlords. Folklore and woodblock prints echoed the same themes.²⁵ In the tension between prescribed norms and folkloristic abandon, individuals carved out their identity.

IDENTITY IN PRACTICE

Sources do not make it easy to penetrate to the individual in Muscovy. No memoir sources survive; the limited epistolary material that survives is formulaic and rarely personal.²⁶ Portraiture of private individuals was in its infancy and adopted the conventions of the Polish "parsuna," thus distancing us from the subject. One can glean a bit about personal identity from the addresses in Muscovite petitions. Petitioners identified themselves by characterizing their locality and/or social class: enserfed peasants cited village and landlord, slaves their master, contract servitors their regiment, and gentry their town and rank.²⁷ Formulaically, individuals applied to themselves submissive attributes, the privileged ranks calling themselves "slaves" (*khology*) of the tsar, the taxpayers naming themselves "orphans" and the clerics, "pilgrims." Because these are formulaic attributes, one cannot know whether individuals identified psychologically with the sentiments expressed by these servile expressions. But it is clear that the emphasis is on the collectivities to which individuals belonged, be they relationships of personal dependency or attributes of family, clan, rank, region or gender. This is particularly clear in one fascinating type of source.

That is litigation over insult to personal dignity (*beschest'e* or "dishonor" suits), fascinating because they straddle prescriptive social codes and lived experience. People of all social ranks, of all ethnicities and religions, free and unfree, were

²² See my discussion of the cult of Metropolitan Peter and other symbolic strategies of legitimation in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 7: c. 1415–c. 1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 766–67.

²³ Richard Wortman, *Scenarios of Power. Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), chaps. 11, 13.

²⁴ Carolyn Johnston Pouncy, ed. and trans., *The Domostroi. Rules for Russian Households in the Time of Ivan the Terrible* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 45–46. For further on traditional values, see my *By Honor Bound*, 36–41.

eligible to sue for insult. Insult was primarily verbal, although certain kinds of humiliating assaults to a man or woman's personal attire, hair or face were also judged "dishonor." The state gained good will and social stability in offering the services of the court to punish insult, which often took place in tandem with disorderly behavior, assault or crime; through these litigations individuals maintained their reputations in their communities, on which complex networks of economic and social bonds depended.

When an individual went to court to protest an insult, he or she was, of course, creating a sort of "fiction," in Natalie Zemon Davis' term.²⁸ They were presenting a picture of themselves that flattered them most and fit most closely the social values the judges were expecting. So these sources cannot be said necessarily to reveal the "true" person. But in their immediacy and detail, dishonor suits testify to values that individuals considered important enough to defend in public, even at the risk of drawing attention to the insults they had been subject to. Like all social codes, dishonor suits define the parameters of socially accepted behavior and demonstrate the boundaries of the acceptable and the deviant.

"Honor" was nowhere explicitly defined. Laws define sanctions, not what was insulting. But by listing insults one can identify values.²⁹ Insults focused on social rank, on honesty and criminality, on sexual propriety, on family and reputation, on piety and decorum. Individuals went to court when their social rank, however lowly, was impugned; when they were accused of dishonesty, criminality or dereliction of service; when they were accused of sexual profligacy; when their mothers, fathers and kinsmen were insulted; when they were called names in public; when their piety was impugned. Women were crucial to this code; their sexual behavior reflected on the men to whom they were subordinate (husbands, fathers). Non-Russians litigated as well as Russians, so the code of values around honor was more socially integrating than the theoretical visions of Godly community disseminated from above.

Judging by these suits, what mattered to members of Muscovite society was protecting their status and reputation in their communities. Most striking is the emphasis in dishonor suits on the collective. To be sure, men and women sued when they personally, individually, had been insulted; they received compensation for insult individually. They complained when their personal freedom was impugned; they protested being called slaves. But that was not a common insult and fell into the broader category of insults to social rank. Individual dignity was by and large embedded in collective norms of identity, judging by the emphasis that dishonor suits placed on familial, religious, and

²⁵ On secular literature, see Marcia A. Morris, *The Literature of Roguery in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2000).

²⁶ See my comparison of Aleksei Mikhailovich and Peter the Great's correspondence styles in "'What's Love Got to Do With It?': Changing Models of Masculinity in Muscovite and Petrine Russia," in Barbara Evans Clements, Rebecca Friedman and Dan Healey, eds., *Russian Masculinities in History and Culture* (London: Palgrave, 2002), 15–32.

²⁷ See my "Concepts of Society."

status group ties. Family was a key concern: individuals vigorously protested insults to their parents and kinsmen or to their family name. Accordingly, sexual probity was a high value, because arranged marriages and patrilineal inheritance were crucial tools for economic and political advancement. Sexual propriety was important also because marriage was the fundamental social institution at all economic levels of society. Without the kinship ties and economic support provided by family, individuals had few resources to turn to in time of need. Thus, rewarding modesty, chastity and marital fidelity and discouraging sexual license and illegitimacy made economic sense.

People also identified themselves in relation to their social status: men in the Moscow ranks protested being called provincial gentry; provincial gentry resented being called musketeers; musketeers resented being called field workers (*stradniki*), etc. The code of sanctions for insult to honor reflected this consciousness by adjusting compensation for insult according to rank: the higher the rank of the insulted person, and the lower the rank of the insulter, the harsher the punishment. People were bound up in overlapping networks of identity—family, clan, status, dependency, gender, village—and they defended their proper place in these webs of association through litigation over honor.³⁰

The code of individual behavior and identity implicit in honor suits comes full circle with the vision of state as Godly community, because it explicitly places the tsar at the apex of the system, to the benefit of the insulted subject. Insults that occurred in the tsar's presence, in his palace, on Cathedral Square in the Kremlin, in his courtrooms, in front of his officials, or to his representations such as coins and documents—all were regarded as doubly offensive. The insulted individual usually received at least double dishonor compensation, and the insulter often faced corporal punishment for the insult to the tsar. Here in the practice of honor one sees acted out a vision of the state as composed of pious individuals, grouped in orderly families and arranged in a hierarchy of service to landlord or tsar.

Reality surely deviated from this ideal, as other accounts allege: foreign travelers, for all their prejudices, described a populace that was more lusty, more violent and less God-fearing than this image would suggest. Court cases show that Muscovy was not immune from murder, crime, illegitimacy, adultery and assault. As noted above, late seventeenth-century picaresque tales celebrated rogues and satirized the elite. This code of Christian honor values that focused on piety, patriarchy, social hierarchy and political loyalty was constantly being tested.

²⁸ Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives. Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987).

²⁹ See my "Honor and Dishonor in Early Modern Russia," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46 (1992), 131–46 and *By Honor Bound*, chaps. 1–4.

THE QUESTION OF MODERNITY

As such tensions suggest, seventeenth-century Muscovy was gradually and organically changing towards the modern in a way that prepared ground for more self-conscious and radical change in later generations. Without this important groundwork, Peter the Great would have been unthinkable.

There are many ways to define, and many paths to achieve, “modernity” on the model that the leading states of Western Europe (France, England, the Low Countries, the Germanies west of the Elbe) established from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. Strictly speaking, “modernization” refers to economic transformations towards free markets in labor and land that Russia has, arguably, never yet achieved.³¹ Using this connotation of the term, seventeenth-century Russia was only minimally “modernizing,” inasmuch as *pomest’e* land was *de facto* converging with *votchina* land. The more important arena where change towards the modern was taking place was social practice, self-consciousness and identity, and the preferable terminology might better center on “becoming modern” or achieving “modernity.”

Becoming modern means that individuals were shaped in a different way. In Europe under the influence of Renaissance and Reformation, demographic crisis and economic growth and the sixteenth-century revolution in print and literacy, ties that bound individuals to corporate groups, kinship networks and communities loosened. Economically and emotionally people found more opportunity to shape their own destinies. People pursued leisure time for learning, reading, friendship and play. At the same time they engaged in what Jürgen Habermas calls the “public sphere”—discussing literature and public affairs in salons, newspapers and other institutions of “sociability,” creating the new force of “public opinion.” Spurred by the Reformation and wars of religion, they learned to tolerate diverse visions of the world; by the seventeenth century they were enjoying the fruits of scientific and geographic exploration of undiscovered realms of knowledge.³² Certainly these processes did not affect all people in early modern Europe; literacy would seem to have been a requisite skill to engage in this brave new world. Women in what remained a patriarchal society enjoyed less personal emancipation than men: in the propertied classes women lost property rights; they suffered disproportionately from the poverty that came with social mobility and change. But, undeniably, some women enjoyed the liberating aspects of this movement towards the delineation of public and private lives.

Becoming modern, as contemporary social critics have reminded us, is not all good. Some would argue that becoming modern atomizes individuals, depriving them of nurturing community connections, all the better to subordinate them to the all-inclusive demands of the mobilizing modern state. In this paradigm, represented by social theory from Marx and Durkheim to Foucault, the emphasis is on the mobilization of the state, its transformation into a proactive player in the secular world. The early modern/modern state is interventionist and dynamic,

³⁰ See a detailed explanation of the hierarchy of compensation and sanction in my *By Honor Bound*, 52–58.

extracting resources, providing services, homogenizing the realm in the aim of enriching (in theory) the social whole. Whether one agrees with the implicit nostalgia for a premodern world of connectedness inherent in these critiques, or in a more liberal fashion celebrates modernity's emancipatory power,³³ it is undeniable that modernity changed individuals' relationships to the discourses and institutions that shaped their lives.

This heady vision of social and political change does not sit well with the theocratic, service-based and patriarchal state and society that we have portrayed as seventeenth-century Muscovy. But under the surface, within the paradigm of Orthodoxy and autocracy, ideas and practices were changing in the elite. These changes may seem ephemeral against the backdrop of Muscovy's millions of illiterate, enserfed peasants, but the proof of their impact is the readiness with which much of the elite embraced Peter the Great's reforms.³⁴

In the second half of the seventeenth century the individual was beginning to be discernible within the networks of family, status and community that had traditionally bound people. Not that people liberated themselves from collective bonds, but they began to distinguish themselves as individuals within those settings. We see this in literature, where hagiography, history-writing and secular tales were focusing on individuals, their achievements and aspirations. We see this in private space, as people were decorating their homes with European furniture and books. We see this in leisure activity, as men in the elite took up hunting, attending theatrical performances at court, acquiring suburban estates. These practices were supported by social change in the court and gentry elites. We see this is self-presentation, as people were trying out new forms of dress, from Polish to Hungarian to German in the last decades of the century, and having their portraits done.

In politics, figures such as Fedor Alekseevich, regent Sofia and boyar Prince V. V. Golitsyn manipulated the political realm, producing panegyrics, medals and portraits to bolster their legitimacy or promote themselves. A new vision of the role of the state and the relationship of the individual to the state was also being introduced. Ukrainian and Belarus'ian theorists brought to Muscovy the concept of the state as a proactive agent that serves the "common good"; Semeon Polotskii wrote that the good ruler leads his people "to the pasture of health, safety, and divine law, not contrary to the laws of human society"; precedence (*mestnichestvo*) was abolished in 1682 for the sake of the "general good." And the elite was being introduced in sermons at court to the Renaissance concept of "virtue," the expectation that the cultivated man serves his society in the public realm, for the sake of improvement in the world as we know it. All this rhetoric

³¹ For a summary of critiques of modernization theory, see Joyce Appleby, "Modernization Theory and the Formation of Modern Social Theories in England and America," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 2 (1978), 259–85.

³² For a general approach to these issues, see Roger Chartier, ed., *A History of Private Life*, vol. 3: *The Passions of the Renaissance* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) and his "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)," *New German Critique* 3 (1974), 49–55.

remained within the paradigm of Orthodoxy and theocracy, but it opened doors to envisioning individuals and state as engaged in the here and now.

The schism in the Orthodox Church constitutes a special moment in the shaping of identity for Muscovites, because it shattered the equation of people, state and belief. Individuals of all social ranks radically broke with tsar and Church for the sake of their beliefs, taking the quintessentially “Protestant” step towards defining a more personal relationship with God. After the Schism, even though the state officially persecuted and demonized the Old Belief, Russians were forced to come to grips with a society in which some people shaped their individuality as they saw fit, rather than according inherited status. The full emancipatory impact of the example of the Old Belief was only realized in the late nineteenth century (witness the Silver Age fascination with the Old Belief), but it exerted a subversive influence from the moment it came into being.

Russia did not become “modern” in the seventeenth century, and arguably only at the turn of the twentieth century did it fit the European model sketched out above in politics, economy and society. But Russia was started on the path to modernity by the transformations of the seventeenth century. Peter the Great introduced and executed a powerful and self-conscious program of economic modernization and social reform towards the modern. He took ideology, institutional models, dress and arts from the Protestant lands of northern Europe, and he speeded the pace of change immeasurably. But the message he put forward—about the energized state, about voluntarism and agency, about the engagement of the individual with the public through service, about the potential of the here and now and the possibility of individual self-fashioning—these ideas were familiar to the Muscovite elite to whom he was preaching. They, their parents and grandparents had seen this ethos at the courts of Aleksei Mikhailovich, Fedor Alekseevich, regent Sofiia. Enough seventeenth-century people were ready such that organic development became an irrepressible march towards modernity under Peter I.

³³ Peter Berger exemplifies this tension: “On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour,” in Michael J. Sandel, ed., *liberalism and Its Critics* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 149–58.

³⁴ The following is based on my *By Honor Bound*, 210–21, which provides extensive bibliography.

DISCOVERING INDIVIDUALISM AMONG THE DECEASED: GRAVESTONES IN EARLY MODERN RUSSIA

Daniel H.Kaiser

Philippe Ariès, in documenting the history of graveyard commemoration in Europe, noted the sharp difference between the ancient, classical approach to post-mortem memorials and the view of medieval European Christians. Whereas Roman notables had felt the need to cultivate their fame, and therefore often left behind elaborate tombstones and commemorative tablets, in the Middle Ages many graves bore no mark whatsoever. Ariès attributed this difference to altered senses of identity:

The common function of all the [Roman] epitaphs is identification. They give the name of the deceased, the date of his death, and his age (with increasing precision: he lived for so many years, so many months, and so many days)...Sometimes the tomb bears more than an epitaph: the family survivors may have added a portrait...designed to perpetuate the features of the deceased, just as the epitaph preserved his identity and, on occasion, his biography.¹

Medieval cemeteries, however, provided few clues to the identities of the dead:

What became of the dead? On the surface they were hardly visible, apart from a few tombs or scattered bones. Gone were the orderly rows of graves of the late Roman and Merovingian periods. Instead, underground, from which no stelae or other signs of recognition now emerged, the dead were laid out in every direction...Bodies were buried one on top of another. The individual nature of the tombs...disappeared...Bodies were now buried directly in the earth with no coffin, no individual grave, more or less heaped randomly one upon another....²

¹ Philippe Ariès, *Images of Man and Death*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 4, 31. For a recent discussion of Roman gravestones, see Lawrence Keppie, *Understanding Roman Inscriptions* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 98–109.

² Ariès, *Images*, 20, 23.

For most of the Middle Ages, therefore, anonymous burial was the norm, and no gravestone marker preserved the memory of the deceased, whose identity was lost to posterity as soon as friends and family died.

In early modern Europe, however, individual gravestone commemoration revived. As before, the poor only rarely were remembered by tombstones. "Even a plain wooden marker was unusual," notes David Cressy, describing early modern England. "In most cases...the individuality of the deceased dissolved, becoming blended in the churchyard with the community of departed Christians."³ But increasingly the graves of Christians did sport markers that testified to the identities of the dead.⁴ The revival of epitaphs marked a distinct change in attitude toward commemoration. John Weever, whose 1631 study documented the rituals of death in the England of his day, confirmed the change:

Grave-stones were made, and Tombes erected with inscriptions engraven upon them to continue the remembrance of the parties deceased to succeeding ages; and these were called Epitaphs...declaring (and that sometimes with a kinde of commiseration) the name, the age, the deserts, the dignities, the state, the praises both of body and minde, the good or bad fortunes in life, and the manner and time of death of the persons therein interred.⁵

Clare Gittings' study of memorial ritual in early modern England confirms this interpretation. Whereas Tudor epitaphs proved spare, often simply providing the raw data of life experience—identifying dates of birth and death, offices held—seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epitaphs waxed voluminous and featured more personal characterizations.⁶ In this way, cemetery commemoration preserved the memory of the deceased individual in the world of the living.

But why did graveyard commemoration revive? Ariès finds the explanation in a renewed sense of individual identity:

Beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and increasing sharply in the sixteenth century, the epitaph became the most common means for men of the Middle Ages to emerge from anonymity and acquire a tomb that was specifically their own.⁷

Ariès connects this change to altered representations of the afterlife. If earlier the Second Coming of Christ had captured medieval imaginations, uniting the entire collective of Christians, then later the apocalyptic vision of Christ, complete with the Last Judgment, emphasized the individual.⁸ Western Christian iconography of the early modern period, Ariès contends, came to emphasize not the universal judgment at the end of time, but the "...individual judgment in the very bedroom of the dying man—'at the hour of death,' as it is phrased in the second part of the Ave Maria, composed during this period." By this reading, "death is the moment when each man intuitively recognizes his entire life, which is illuminated suddenly as by a flash of lightning and revealed to him in every detail."⁹

Russian Orthodox eschatology seems never to have embraced this view of death and judgment, pitting the individual dying sinner before a Just Judge.¹⁰ Nevertheless, in Russia, too, by the eighteenth century, gravestones and tombs of the elite had developed an elaborate architecture and iconography. For example, late in the nineteenth century Aleksei Martynov found in the Church of the Prophet Elijah, beyond the Prechistenskie gates in Moscow, a memorial tablet with the following inscription:

At the eighth hour of the night, January 9, 1756, on the day of the Holy Martyr Poluekht, Sergei Afonas'evich Durov, slave of God, captain of the Moscow infantry regiment, died. And from birth his life [stretched] 60 years. He was born on the Day of the Feast of the Protection of the Most Holy Mother of God, October 1st, and his name-day was October 7th. His body is buried opposite this tablet.¹¹

³ David Cressy, *Birth, Marriage and Death. Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 470.

⁴ Philippe Ariès, *The Hour of Our Death*, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Knopf, 1981), 207.

⁵ John Weever, *Ancient Funerall Monuments* (London: Thomas Harper, 1631), as quoted in Allan I. Ludwig, *Graven Images: New England Stonecarving and its Symbols, 1650–1815* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1966), 55.

⁶ Clare Gittings, *Death, Burial and the Individual in Early Modern England* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 143–44, 148.

⁷ Ariès, *Images*, 40.

⁸ “In making this transition from the Second Coming to the Last Judgment, we have passed from a general view of man as a species...to an inventory in which each individual soul is an object of examination and the entire life is taken into account” (Ariès, *Images*, 143). But see Colin Morris, who finds much evidence for a “search for the self” in western Europe in the twelfth century (*The Discovery of the Individual, 1050–1200* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press in association with the Medieval Academy of America, 1987]). See also Walter Ullmann, who dates to a time beginning in the late twelfth century “a greater inclination to pay attention to the individual’s own features,” as confirmed by painters such as Giotto and Giovanni Pisano (*The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages* [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966], 104–05). Alan Macfarlane argued that “individualism...[was] present in England by at least the start of the thirteenth century and perhaps long before” (“Individualism and the Ideology of Romantic Love,” in *Rethinking the Subject: An Anthology of Contemporary European Social Thought*, ed. James D. Foubion [Boulder: Westview Press, 1995], 132).

⁹ Ariès, *Images*, 143, 147. Morris, although dating this development much earlier than Ariès, nonetheless agrees that the “decisive moment” was death, making the individual the center of attention (Morris, *Discovery*, 146–57).

¹⁰ John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology. Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes*, 2d ed. (NY: Fordham University Press, 1983), 220–21.

Some epitaphs of the era provided evidence of sorrow and condolence, correspondingly lengthening the epitaph inscription:

In this place is buried the body of the slave of God, Prince Ioann Anikitich Reprnin, *polkovnik*. His birth [took place] January 20 in the year 7194 since Adam; he departed this world November 17, 1727 at 7:30 in the evening. And the length of his life from birth was 41 years, 9 months, and 26 days. And at his death his spouse and children buried his body with great and inconsolable grief.¹²

But these fulsome remembrances from eighteenth-century Russia stand in sharp contrast to the earliest gravestones of Muscovy. In early modern Russia as elsewhere in Europe, the great mass of the dead slept beneath the earth which bore no testament to their lives. And when the first stones did appear over Muscovite graves, they provided no identification of the persons buried there. Some of the oldest gravestones were simply fashioned out of boulders which, except for some half-hearted attempt at shaping, bore no decoration or inscription.¹³ The oldest sarcophagi from Rus' borrow their design and ornamentation from western Europe, but here, too, one searches in vain for any identification of the dead. Like their equivalents in western Europe, they left faint trace of their lives among the living.¹⁴

In a process that stretched over more than two centuries, however, Muscovite gravestone commemoration came to identify and celebrate the names and lives of the deceased. During the first stage, whose origins may be traced to the end of the fifteenth century, an increasing number of gravestone inscriptions identified the deceased, usually along with an indication of the date of death or burial.¹⁵ Later, in the sixteenth century, Muscovite gravestones added more details about the time of death. Many stones supplied the name of the church festival

¹¹ Aleksei A. Martynov, "Nadgrobniaia letopis' Moskvu," *Russkii arkhiv* (1895), kn. 2, 523. The most recent student of Muscovite gravestones points out that most of the early publications, including Martynov's, omitted illustrations of the stones, and therefore, unless the present location of the stone is known, prevent confirmation of their readings. As other publications show, errors in reading epitaphs are not uncommon (See Leonid A. Beliaev, *Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie* [Moscow: Modus-Graffiti, 1996], 13–14, 247–48). Consequently, for this paper I have tried as far as possible to rely on gravestones whose present locations are known, and whose inscriptions therefore may be confirmed.

¹² Leonid, *Istoriko-arkheologicheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie Borovskogo Pafnutieva monastyr'ia*, 2nd ed. (Kaluga: Tipografliia Gubernskogo pravleniia, 1894), 191.

¹³ Sergei Z. Chernov, "Sel'skie nekropoli XIV–XVI vv. na severo-vostoke Moskovskogo kniazhestva," *Moskovskii nekropol'. Istoriiia, arkheologiiia, iskusstvo, okhrana*, eds. V. F. Kozlov et al. (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut kul'tury, 1991), 76–77, 90.

¹⁴ Beliaev, *Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie*, 41–97; Simon Franklin, "On the Pre-History of Inscribed Gravestones in Rus'," forthcoming in a festschrift honoring Ihor Ševčenko. On the history of stone sarcophagi in the Kievan and Muscovite eras, see Tat'iana D. Panova, "Kamennye groby v pogrebal'nom obriade russkogo srednevekov'ia (XI–XVII vv.)," *Russia medievalis* 10:1 (2001), 156–70.

celebrated on the day that the deceased passed away, and not infrequently also reported the exact hour of death. In addition, sixteenth-century gravestones began to mention the social rank or occupation of the deceased. Finally, late in the seventeenth century engraved epitaphs began to report the full spans of life enjoyed by the dead, often with startling precision. The result is that gravestones of early modern Russia eventually resembled compact biographies, testifying to the identities of the deceased whose names, social rank, times of death, and spans of life the epitaphs dutifully recorded. It is but a short step from here to the elaborate inscriptions that became so common in eighteenth-century Russia.¹⁶

Like the Roman epitaphs that so captured the attention of Philippe Ariès, Muscovite gravestones came to identify the deceased in a way that separated out the person being commemorated from every other individual, living or dead. The particulars of biography etched into stone helped guarantee that those who entered the earth would nevertheless be remembered among the living for many years.

Most Muscovite gravestones and sarcophagus covers from the fifteenth century do not contain a single letter; instead, carved ornamentation outlines the shape of the stone, and then weaves across the center, often culminating in a seal or stamp. As a result, even the most prominent among the dead slept anonymously with no more than abstract decoration marking their graves. For example, covers from the sarcophagi of metropolitans Fotii and Kiprian (see Figure 1), both of whom were buried early in the fifteenth century, demonstrate the importance of ornamentation, but offer no hint to the authority that their occupants wielded while they labored among the living: their gravestones include no word of identification.¹⁷ Indeed, as a recent student of the stones has observed, the craftsman decorated the gravestones in such a way as to preclude the possibility of inserting any inscription.¹⁸

By the last years of the fifteenth century, anonymous burials gave way to simple epitaphs that employed such free space as was available on gravestones to add a few words to identify the dead person. A late fifteenth-century tablet in the

¹⁵ Beliaev, *Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie*, 138–39.

¹⁶ In a personal communication (16 January 2000) Gail Lenhoff reminded me that even from very early times chronicle death notices summarized lives of the princes and church elite, and may have served as the source of epitaphs. The “Slovo o zhitii i prestavlenii velikogo kniazia Dmitriia Ivanovicha,” for example, provides detailed commentary upon Donskoi’s accomplishments and death (Lenhoff, “Unofficial Veneration of the Daniilovichs in Muscovite Rus’,” in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584*, eds. A.M.Kleimola and G. D.Lenhoff [Moscow: ITZ-Garant, 1997], 402–11). The sixteenth-century “Book of Steps” also anticipates seventeenth-century biographical panegyrics (Gail Lenhoff, *Early Russian Hagiography: The Lives of Prince Fedor the Black* [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997], 10–12).

¹⁷ Beliaev, *Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie*, 115, 138–41. See also M.V.Frolov, “Belokamennnye nadgrobiiia XVI–XVII v. iz Borisoglebskogo monastiria v g. Dmitrove,” *Drevniaia Rus’*, no. 3 (Sept. 2001), 18–19, 21, who suggests that a sixteenth-century gravestone that bears no inscription may simply never have been used.




Figure 1

Trinity St. Sergius Monastery, for instance, notes that “In the year 1494 [here] was placed [the body of] the slave of God, Iurii Romanov [Ale]kseev.”¹⁹ The

words identifying the dead man fit imperfectly into the free upper quadrants of the stone formed by the triangular “wolfs” teeth” design (see [Figure 2](#)), suggesting that the inscription was added later, after the stone had already been prepared. Besides, the carving betrays an unprofessional hand, confirming that the decision to identify Alekseev had arisen spontaneously.²⁰ Another gravestone proved even more modest in identifying the dead man: “In April 7019 [1511] this stone was placed over [the grave of] the slave of God, Ivan.”²¹ This marker confirmed the man’s life, in that way extending personal identification well beyond the gravestones of the early fifteenth century. Without a surname in the inscription, however, the dead man—whose name was the most common of any in early modern Russia—could hardly hope by such an epitaph to guarantee that survivors would remember him.²²

During the course of the sixteenth century, identification of the dead became more common, in the process attracting increasingly professional hands for the inscriptions. A gravestone from the Goritskii monastery nicely illustrates this development. Carved into the open panel at the head is the following inscription: “In the year 7046 [1537] died the slave of God Matvei Esipov syn Dedov November nineteenth.”²³ The notice seems spare to the modern eye, delivering only the briefest acknowledgment of Dedov’s existence.

Seen against the backdrop of fifteenth-century commemoration, however, gravestones of the sixteenth century represent a considerable change of attitude. No longer does anonymity reign; instead, Muscovite gravestones boldly—although perhaps casually, given the amateur appearance of the carvings—proclaim to the living the names of the deceased, and identify their dates of death.²⁴ Ornament, which had dominated the space of earlier gravestones, recedes into the background, leaving ever increasing space for the inscriptions (see [Figure 3](#)). In turn, epitaphs grew more voluminous, offering additional details about the deaths of the persons they commemorated.²⁵

Among the innovations in epitaphs of this era was an increasing sensitivity to the time of death, which came to be identified not only by the calendar date, but by the church holiday being celebrated that day as well. For example, a stone from the Smolensk Cathedral of the Novodevich’i monastery reports that

¹⁸ N.S.Sheliapina, “Nadgrobiia mitropolitov Kipriana i Fotiia v Uspenskom sobore moskovskogo kremliia,” *Sovetskaia arkheologiia* (1973), no. 4, 233.

¹⁹ V.B.Girshberg, “Materialy dlia svoda nadpisei na kamennykh plitakh Moskvy i Podmoskov’ia XIV–XVII vv., chast’ 1: Nadpisi XIV–XVI vv.,” *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 1 (1960), 16; see also Tatiana V.Nikolaeva, “O nekotorykh nadgrobiiakh XV–XVII vv. Zagorskogo muzeia-zapovednika,” *Sovetskaia arkheologiia* (1958), no. 3, 171–72.

²⁰ Nikolaeva, “O nekotorykh nadgrobiiakh,” 171.

²¹ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 1,” 18.

²² On name frequencies in Muscovy, see Daniel H.Kaiser, “Naming Cultures in Early Modern Russia,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995), 271–91.

²³ N.V.Levitskaia and L.B.Sukina, “Nadgrobnnye plity nekropolia Goritskogo monastyria v Pereslavl’e-Zalesskom XVI–XVII vv.,” in *Pamiatniki kul’tury: Novye otkrytiia. 1991* (Moscow: Nauka, 1997), 352–53.



Figure 2

Princess Ul'iana, wife of Prince Iurii Vasil'evich, died on May 8th, "on the day of St. John the Theologian."²⁶ Less notable Muscovites also came to have

²⁴ On the basis of the sizable collection of gravestones recovered from the Trinity St. Sergius monastery, Tatiana V. Nikolaeva observes that, at least through the first third of the sixteenth century, many inscriptions were done by amateurs who added texts to gravestones that had been previously prepared ("Novye nadpisi na kamennykh plitakh XV–XVII vv. iz Troitse-Sergievoi lavry," *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 6 [1966], 208). See also Tat'iana D. Panova, "Pogrebal'nye komplekсы na territorii Moskovskogo kremlia," *Sovetskaia arkheologiya* (1989), no. 1, 231. Beliaev notes that in Moscow it was possible to purchase ready-made gravestones and sarcophagi (*Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie*, 21, 129).

inscribed over their graves the month and day of death as well as the church festival celebrated on that day. Ivan Petrov syn Volyzhka, for example, died in 1551 on May 2nd, “on the day of St. Afonasei,” as his gravestone reports.²⁷

By the end of the century, memorial inscriptions sometimes identified the day of the week, and later even the exact hour, when death came to the person being commemorated. Here, as with so many of the burial rituals in Muscovy, the elite led the way.²⁸ The tomb of Elena Glinskaia, mother of Ivan IV, includes the following six-line inscription: “April 3d, 7046 [1538], Wednesday in the fifth week of Lent at the second hour of the day” Grand Princess Elena died.²⁹ A 1560 sarcophagus cover from the Moscow Kremlin (see Figure 4) reports that Tsaritsa Anastasia died “August 3, 7068 [1560], Wednesday at the fifth hour of the day of the blessed martyr Domentian.”³⁰ The tomb of Mariia Temriukovna, one-time wife of Ivan the Terrible, notes that the tsaritsa died “in the seventh hour at night,” and the sarcophagus of another of Ivan’s wives, Marfa Vasil’evna, reports that she died “on the day of the holy apostle Philip in the first hour of the day.”³¹ Another Kremlin

gravestone preserves word that on June 8, 1579 “the nun Nastas’ia, wife of Roman Iur’evich, died in the first hour of the night.”³²

Olga Kosheleva notes that seventeenth-century letter-writers hurried to commit to paper news about the deaths of relatives and friends, often writing on the same day that the person died.³³ Gravestones from this era also betray a heightened attention to the precise hour of death. The 1637 passing of tsarevna Evdokeia Mikhailovna, for example, is recalled on the cover of her Kremlin sarcophagus, reporting that she died “in the fifth hour of the night between Friday and Saturday,” while Sofia Mikhailovna is reported as having died August 25, 1636 “at the sixth hour of the night on Thursday.”³⁴ When Tsaritsa

²⁵ Beliaev, *Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie*, 140–43.

²⁶ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 1,” 27. Uliana died in 1574.

²⁷ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 1,” 31.

²⁸ I.I.Sokolov reported an apparent exception to this generalization. In 1978 he published word of a 1948 discovery in the Savvin monastery of a gravestone which recalled a monastic servitor who had died March 5, 1568, “in the night between Thursday and Friday.” Soon after Sokolov’s visit, however, vacationing schoolchildren heaved the stone into the River T’ma, breaking it into several pieces and therefore destroying it (“Namogil’naia plita iz Tverskogo Savvina monastyria,” *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 12 [1978], 186–87).

²⁹ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 1,” 56.

³⁰ Ibid., 56–57.

³¹ Ibid., 59, 61. On the history of the Kremlin necropolis where women of the tsars’ families were buried, see Tat’iana D.Panova, “Istoriia nekropolia Voznesenskogo monastyria Moskovskogo Kremliia,” *Tserkovnye drevnosti. Sbornik dokladov konferentsii* (27 ianvaria 2000 g.) (Moscow: Otdel religioznogo obrazovaniia i katekhizatsii russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 2001), 95–115. See also L.I.Shlionskaia, “Tsarskie grobnitsy v Novodevich’em monastyre,” in *Novodevichii monastyr’ v russkoi kul’ture* (‘Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo muzeia, vyp. 99) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii muzei, 1998), 94–113.



Figure 3

Mariia Vladimirovna died, her sarcophagus inscription measured the hour of death very carefully: "...at the ninth hour of the night between the sixth and seventh of January, 7033 [1625]."³⁵ The death of Mikhail's second wife also notes the hour: "at the sixth hour of the night."³⁶

Soon the grave markers of lesser Muscovites also came to record the exact hour of death. When in 1645 Irina Il'inichna, wife of *okol'nichii* Dmitrii Alekseevich Dolgorukov, died, her gravestone noted not only the day of death,



Figure 4

but the exact hour.³⁷ And when Ioann Borisovich Repnin died in 1697, his gravestone reported that he had died June 5th, “in the third hour of the day.”³⁸ Although none of the earliest of Pskov’s ceramic memorial plates indicated the exact hour of death, by the late seventeenth century this level of detail was not uncommon. One Pskov plate remembers the nun Polinariia, for example, who died October 14, 1698 “at the eighth hour of the day”; the spouse of state

secretary Aleksei Sakharov died “at the first hour of the second day of November” that same year. Some memorial inscriptions provided even more precise timing to death. The memorial plate for Grigorei Iur’ev syn Karnaukhov, who also died in 1698, remembers him as having passed away “in the second quarter of the first hour of the day.”³⁹ The memorial inscription of Praskoviia Ivanovna Sukina reports that she died “September 14, 7201 [1692], on the day of the Exaltation of the Cross at the 11th hour, in its third quarter.”⁴⁰ By measuring off so exactly the hour of death, gravestone inscriptions brought closure to the lives of those remembered by these monuments, and further emphasized the unique dimensions of their earthly lives.⁴¹

Late in the sixteenth century Muscovite gravestones began to specify not only the name, but also the social rank of the individuals buried beneath them. As might be expected, churchmen—including those tonsured in the last moments of life—were among the first to exercise this option, but the secular elite soon followed, employing gravestone commemoration to help separate them in death from their inferiors whose company they had shunned in life. Over time, especially into the seventeenth century, the lesser lights of Muscovite society also laid claim to this prerogative; their gravestones, too, reported their social station at the time that death claimed them.

For example, a marker discovered in the Trinity cathedral of the Trinity St. Sergius monastery commemorates the 1495 death of the Novgorod archbishop Sergei.⁴² Soon many other servants of the church also had their lives observed in stone. A gravestone uncovered in Kolomna late in the last century reports that “in March, 7062 [1554] this gravestone was placed over [the body of] the monk Ontonii Timofeev syn Arsenev.”⁴³ The inscription over a grave in the Trinity St. Sergius Monastery records the 1578 death of “the monk Kirillo, whose name in the world was Boris Ivanov Sukin.”⁴⁴ The sarcophagus of Evfrosiniia Staritskaia

³² Ibid., 62. Exactly whom this stone remembers is unclear. Girshberg hypothesized that the person buried beneath it was the mother of Anastas’ia Romanova, who, at tonsure, took as her monastic name the same name as her daughter, by this time already dead for almost twenty years.

³³ O.E.Kosheleva, “Smert’: Emotsional’nyi podtekst zaveshchaniia i perepiski russkogo boiartstva XVII v.,” in *Chelovek i ego blizkie na zapade i vostoke Evropy (do nachala novogo vremeni)*, eds. Iurii Bessmertnyi and Otto Gerhard Oexle (Moscow: RAN, Institut vseobshchei istorii, 2000), 202.

³⁴ Girshberg, “Materialy dlia svoda nadpisei na kamennykh plitakh Moskvy i Podmoskov’ia XIV–XVII vv., ch. 2: Nadpisi pervoi poloviny XVII v.,” *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 3 (1962), 251–52. The death of still another of Mikhail’s daughters was similarly commemorated (ibid., 244).

³⁵ Ibid., 235.

³⁶ Ibid., 263.

³⁷ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 2,” 264.

³⁸ Leonid, *Istoriko-arkheologicheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie*, 190.

³⁹ Izilla I.Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobnnye plity Pskovo-Pecherskogo monastyria,” *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 12 (1978), 124.

bears an inscription specifying both her secular and religious identities: "October twentieth, 7078 [1569] Princess Efrog[sinia], mother of Prince Volodimer An[d] reevich, died; and her monastic name was Evdokeia."⁴⁵

But if monks, nuns, churchmen and -women were among the first to have social titles inscribed on their gravestones, the secular elite was not far behind. Grigorei Iur'evich Zakhar'in, for example, died on March 1, 1556, and was buried in the Smolensk Cathedral of the Novodevich'i monastery. Like others of the era, his gravestone identifies the date of death, reporting on the church festival observed then. However, unlike earlier stones, the Zakhar'in epitaph also provides notice that the man buried beneath it was a boyar ("*boiarin rab bozhii Grigorei Iur'evich*").⁴⁶

Zakhar'in was unusual for his age, but during the course of the seventeenth century, reports of social rank became common on gravestones. A surviving marker from the Trinity St. Sergius Monastery tells how "*boiarin* Prince Timofei Romanovich Trubetskoi" died November 12, 7111.⁴⁷ Some years later "*boliarin* [boyar] Prince Ivan Ivanovich Odoevskii" died, taking up his place not far from Trubetskoi's remains.⁴⁸ Odoevskii's kinsman "*stol'nik* Prince Stefan Fedorovich Odoevskii" also found a permanent resting place at the Trinity Monastery, where his gravestone duly remembered the dead man's rank in Muscovite society.⁴⁹ And a marker from the Spaso-Efim'ev monastery in Suzdal' records the 1668 death of "*okol'nichei* Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Pozharskoi."⁵⁰

The gentry or middle service class (*dvoriane*) also figure in numerous graveside inscriptions. A 1677 Pskov memorial, for example, recalls the "Moscow *dvorianin*" Evsegneii Nikitin syn Neelev, while a 1679 inscription remembers another *dvorianin*, Grigorii Grigor'ev syn Chirikov.⁵¹ Numerous memorial plates from the Pskov Caves monastery identify the deceased as "*pomeshchik*," confirming the fact that the middle level of Muscovite servitors became accustomed to adding social rank to grave markers.⁵² Soon *zhiltsy* and others who inhabited the middle levels of the Muscovite social order also had their rank recalled in commemorative tablets.⁵³ Seventeenth-century ceramic memorials commemorate a musketeer (*strelets*), artilleryman (*pushkar'*), and others from the lower reaches of the military service classes.⁵⁴

Chancellery officials, too, came to have their occupations and rank inscribed on gravestones. For example, during work within the Georgievskii monastery

⁴⁰ Nikolaeva, "Novye nadpisi na kamennykh plitakh," 252.

⁴¹ Ariès, *Images*, 143.

⁴² Nikolaeva, "Novye nadpisi na kamennykh plitakh," 210.

⁴³ Girshberg, "Materialy..., ch. 1," 53.

⁴⁴ Girshberg, "Materialy..., ch. 1," 39; Tatiana V. Nikolaeva, "K izucheniiu nekropolia Troitse-Sergievoi Lavry," *Soobshcheniia Zagorskogo muzeia-zapovednika* 3 (1960), 182.

⁴⁵ Girshberg, "Materialy..., ch. 1," 60.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 32. See Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics. The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 101, 215.

near Moscow workers uncovered a stone remembering the 1605 death of a clerk (*pod''iachei*) of the Kazan' Chancellery, and a seventeenth-century memorial from Pskov remembers state secretary (*d'iak*) Grigorei Popinskoi, one of many *d'iaki* immortalized in epitaphs.⁵⁵ Other burial inscriptions remember persons with special duties and honor in the sovereign's own household. At least two gravestones survive to honor the memory of the Kirillov family, several of whose most esteemed members held the rank of "Sovereign's gardener" (*gosudarev sadovnik*) (see Figure 5).⁵⁶

Townsfolk, merchants, and artisans also came to have their trades and rank remembered in epitaphs, just as their parallels in western Europe had done before them.⁵⁷ A 1616 memorial from Pskov, for instance, recalls the death of the Pskov elite merchant (*gost'*) Iev Maksimov; nineteenth-century construction in Moscow uncovered a gravestone commemorating the 1639 death of "*gost'* Sofonii Fedorov syn Torokanov" (see Figure 6).⁵⁸ Lesser artisans and townsfolk also left behind a stone remembrance of their trades. For example, an epitaph from earlier in the seventeenth century combines the monastic and artisanal callings of the "monk Savost'ian, a kvas-brewer," and a 1692 marker remembers a Pskov carpenter.⁵⁹ A 1630 inscription commemorates Boris Mikhailov syn Kolesov, "a saltpeter master."⁶⁰ Other seventeenth-century grave markers recall a candlemaker, a maker of powders—possibly gunpowder—(*zeleishchik*), and a purveyor or creator of cups and bowls (*aloveinik*).⁶¹ Even an urban cotter had his rank inscribed on a gravestone.⁶²

⁴⁷ Trubetskoi was first buried on his estate at Trubchevsk, and only in 1614 was moved to the Trinity St. Sergius monastery, where the gravestone remembers this posthumous migration (Tatiana V. Nikolaeva, "Nadgrobye plity pod zapadnym pritvorom Troitskogo sobora," *Soobshcheniia Zagorskogo gosudarstvennogo Istoriko-khudozhestvennogo muzeia-zapovednika* 2 [1958], 105). Girshberg corrects the dating error in Nikolaeva ("Materialy..., ch. 2," 232).

⁴⁸ Nikolaeva, "Nadgrobye plity," 94. Ivan Ivanovich men'shoi Odoevskii became a boyar in 1622 and died in 1628 (Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors. The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983], 73, 182); Marshall Poe, *The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century: The Consular and Ceremonial Ranks of the Russian "Sovereign's Court" 1613–1713* (forthcoming from Finnish Academy of Sciences, 2003).

⁴⁹ Nikolaeva, "Nadgrobye plity," 95. For more stones marking the deaths of *stol'niki*, see Girshberg, "Materialy..., ch. 2," 222, 228.

⁵⁰ N.M. Kurganova, "Nadgrobye plity iz usypal'nitsy kniazei Pozharskikh i Khovanskikh v Spaso-Evfimievom monastyre Suzdalia," *Pamiatniki kul'tury. Novye otkrytiia. 1993* (Moscow: Nauka, 1994), 402. Pozharskii joined the Boyar Duma in 1658 (Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, 192).

⁵¹ Pleshanova, "Kamennye nadgrobye plity," 96, 110, 115.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 88, 91, 92, 96–97.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁵⁴ Izilla I. Pleshanova, "Keramicheskie nadgrobye plity Pskovo-Pecherskogo monastiria," *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 6 (1966), 163, 176.



Figure 5

⁵⁵ Girshberg, "Materialy...", ch. 2," 221; Pleshanova, "Kamennye nadgrobynye plity," 66. One of the earliest gravestone identifications of a clerk comes from a 1561 memorial plate from Pskov (Pleshanova, "Keramicheskie nadgrobynye plity," 172).

⁵⁶ Girshberg, "Materialy...", ch. 2," 255, 262–63. Another Moscow gravestone bears an inscription recalling "Anna Vasil'eva doch' gosudareva sadovnika Bogdana Nikulina zhena" (*ibid.*, 260).



Figure 6

⁵⁷ Among the oldest extant gravestones to remember a craftsman is one from the Iosif-Volokolamsk monastery where archeologists found a stone remembering the 1546 death of the monk Vas'ian who is also identified as an icon-painter (Iurii M. Zolotov, "Nadpisi XVI v. iz Volokolamska," *Rossiiskaia arkheologiia* (1996), no. 3, 192). V. Gamburtsev attempted to restore the inscription of a gravestone from the Church of the Resurrection of Christ Beyond the Iauza. As it stood in the nineteenth century, the stone, partially damaged, recalled the 1686 death of "slave of God...of the Chancellery of Masonry Affairs Dmitrii Mikhailov syn Startsev." Gamburtsev proposed on the basis of additional evidence that Startsev was a "podmaster" in this chancellery, and therefore suggested that the damaged section of the inscription must have originally held that word ("Zametka o 'zamurovannom' nadgrobii Moskovskogo arkhitekora XVII veka, pri tserkvi Voskreseniia v Taganke," *Arkheologicheskie izvestiia i zametki izdavaemye imp. Moskovskim arkheologicheskim obshchestvom* 5 (1897), 214–21); Ariès, *Images*, 231.

Memorials of peasants and slaves were evidently still rare, but a handful of epitaphs recalling these dependents do survive. Although part of the inscription is now lost, a memorial cross from the late seventeenth century remembers a Trinity St. Sergius peasant who was a murder victim, and two Pskov memorials from this era also commemorate peasants.⁶³ A sixteenth-century stone is unusual in remembering the servant (*slug*) of Mikhail Glinskii, Agapei Ivanov syn, who died in 1586.⁶⁴ In the following century more and more slaves (some of whom, of course, occupied elite status in privileged households) came to have their identities preserved on gravestones. For instance, investigators discovered near the Church of Christ the Savior in Moscow a seventeenth-century marker erected in memory of Isai Nikiforov syn, “slave of Nikita Konstantinovich Naumov.”⁶⁵ Two more gravestones uncovered in the Kitaigorod district of the capital remember slaves of Aleksei Ivanovich and Ivan Alekseevich Vorotynskii.⁶⁶ A 1632 stone from Moscow commemorates a slave of Vasilii Iansheevich Suleshev, Nikita Semenov syn Shiriaev, while Pskov memorials remember the slaves of Petro Tutaevich and Mina Ivanov syn Grobov.⁶⁷

As was so often the case in early modern Russia, Muscovite women—even in death—took their identities from fathers and husbands, so that markers commemorating deceased women often reference the men in their lives.⁶⁸ For example, a stone discovered in the Novospasskii monastery remembers a woman in the context of both her father and husband: “slave of God, Mariia, daughter of Andrei [and wife] of Petr Afon[aseev] syn Kozhevnik.”⁶⁹ More often, however, Muscovite epitaphs neglect to identify the natal families of dead women, pointing out only their husbands who, in the patriarchal order that characterized Muscovy, had replaced fathers as figures of reference for women’s identity. For instance, a stone accidentally uncovered during reconstruction of Khitrovo alley in Moscow remarked on the 1595 death of the “slave of God, Nastaseia, wife of Aleksei Shapilov.”⁷⁰ A stone from the Trinity St. Sergius monastery (see

⁵⁸ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 2,” 255; Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobye plity,” 70.

⁵⁹ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 2,” 220–21; Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobye plity,” 118. On the monk-kvas brewer, see also Nikolaeva, “O nekotorykh nadgrobiakh,” 177–78.

⁶⁰ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 2,” 240.

⁶¹ Iurii M. Zolotov, “Nadgrobiia moskovskikh remeslennikov XVII v.,” *Sovetskaia arkheologiia*, 1961, no. 1, 291–94; Pleshanova, “Keramicheskie nadgrobye plity,” 187.

⁶² Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobye plity,” 117.

⁶³ Nikolaeva, “K izucheniiu nekropolia,” 189; Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobye plity,” 79. Iurii M. Zolotov reports on a similar seventeenth-century cross commemorating another homicide victim, also apparently a peasant (“Kamennyi krest XVII v. so st. Zhilevo,” *Sovetskaia arkheologiia* (1960), no. 3, 334). Beliaev maintains that these crosses were distinctive to the lands of Northwest Rus’ (*Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie*, 26).

⁶⁴ Nikolaeva, “Novye nadpisi,” 241.

⁶⁵ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 2,” 248–49.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 247, 266.

Figure 7) remembers “Evdokeia, whose monastic name was Efrosin’ia, the wife of Andrei Mikhailovich Kutuzov.”⁷¹ And a primitively carved inscription recalls simply “slave of God, Varvara, wife of Ivan,” whose life was defined by her membership in God’s creation and by her marriage to some Ivan.⁷²

Women might also be remembered in death by their social rank, or, as often happened, by their husband’s rank. For example, a late seventeenth-century memorial tablet from the Trinity Cathedral in Sergiev Posad reports that on “June 23, 7184 [1676]...the slave of God, wife of boyar Prince Fedor Nikitich Odoevskii, the widow *boiarinia* Princess Sofia Ivanovna died....”⁷³ A 1637 stone remembers the wife of *okol’nichii* Grigorii Konstantinovich Volkonskii, while a 1639 epitaph recalls Pelageia, “wife of state secretary Ivan Kirillovich Griazev.”⁷⁴ Finally, a 1692 marker commemorates the death of a woman who had been married to a carpenter.⁷⁵ But the great majority of gravestones continued to remember deceased men; women’s claim on the memory of survivors was relatively modest.⁷⁶

Children sometimes earned special mention on Muscovite memorials. Even before gravestone commemoration defined the length of life enjoyed by the deceased, memorial inscriptions took special note of the fact that the dead had not succeeded in reaching adulthood. For example, a stone from the Trinity St. Sergius monastery (see Figure 8) remembers that “On June 15, 7088 [1580], on the day of the prophet Amos, the child Isidor Eufim’evich Voeikov died.”⁷⁷ Similarly, a gravestone from the Pozharskii family vault in the Suzdal Spaso-Evfim’ev monastery records the 1608 deaths of “the slaves of God, the children Prince Petr Nikitich Khovanskoi and Prince Nikita Dmitrievich Pozharskoi.”⁷⁸ And the lower section of the gravestone of Nastaseia Shapilova reports the

⁶⁷ Ibid., 242; Pleshanova, “Keramicheskie nadgrobye plity,” 179; Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobye plity,” 105. For a fuller discussion of Shiriaev’s identity, see A.F. Dubynin and D.A. Soboleva, “Nadgrobie Nikity Shiriaeva iz Zariad’ia (XVII v.),” *Sovetskaia arkhologiia* (1960), no. 4, 196–99.

⁶⁸ Natalie Zemon Davis observed that in sixteenth-century France even the most identifiable of women took their identities as “daughter of so-and-so, widow of so-and-so, wife of so-and-so.” Although some women managed to create autonomous space, they did so within the boundaries of the prevailing domestic and social hierarchy dominated by men (“Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France,” in *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, eds. Thomas C. Heller et al. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986], 55–61).

⁶⁹ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 1,” 42.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 43–44.

⁷¹ Ibid., 34. See also Nikolaeva, “O nadgrobiakh,” 174–75.

⁷² Iurii M. Zolotov, “Dva kamennykh nadgrobiia XVI v. iz Moskvyy,” *Sovetskaia arkhologiia* (1962), no. 2, 240.

⁷³ Nikolaeva, “Nadgrobye plity,” 95.

⁷⁴ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 2,” 253–54, 256.

⁷⁵ Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobye plity,” 118.



Figure 7

1593 death of her son, “slave of God, the child (*m lade [nets]*) Nikita Alekseev syn Shapilov.”⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Ludwig Steindorff, in reviewing the unequal representation of women among those named in the various memorial lists at the Iosif-Volokolamsk monastery, observed that the predominance of men’s names was a function of the fact that men often paid for their own memorialization. “Women, by contrast, rarely paid for the remembrance of their own souls;” more often husbands or children entered the names of wives or mothers on the various lists, because “a woman, on entering into marriage, entered the memorial society of her husband’s family, so that now her new ‘kinsmen’ more often guaranteed her memorialization” (“Kto blizhnie moi? Indivīd i kul’tura pominoveniia v Rossii rannego novogo vremeni,” in *Chelovek i ego blizkie*, 219, 22r).

⁷⁷ Nikolaeva, “Novye nadpisi,” 238.



Figure 8

⁷⁸ Kurganova, "Nadgrobye plity," 400.

The final stage in graveyard identification flowered in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when more and more often Muscovite gravestones preserved biographical details of those buried beneath them.⁸⁰ Among the first pieces of life history preserved in gravestone inscriptions were the circumstances of death. For example, a 1560 memorial tablet reports that Grigorei Ododurov had died at Valid under the command of Vasilei Borboshin.⁸¹ Almost a century later (1651), another memorial situated the dead man in a civic rebellion: “*dvorianin* Iev Ivanov syn Ordin Nashchokin was killed in his sovereign’s service below Pskov during the Pskov time of troubles.”⁸²

Other stones immortalize even less happy last moments. One Pskov tablet recalls numerous members of a single family who found their way into a common crypt at the Caves Monastery by some uncommon ways. The 1652 death of the Novgorodian Vasilei Stepanovich Skobeltsyn was evidently unremarkable, except perhaps for his financial well-being which underwrote the building of a family burial vault. His wife soon joined him there, recreating in death the family they had founded in life. Soon thereafter the wife of their son Petr joined them in the crypt, along with another son, Timofei, whose misfortune it was to have been killed by his own wife, Fedos’ia Gavrilova doch’, as the epitaph soberly reports.⁸³

Homicide was not unknown in this age, of course, so it is small surprise to learn that epitaphs occasionally recorded violent deaths. Although the stone is partially damaged, depriving us of the full text, the basic message of a memorial cross is clear: “In the year 7194 [1686] on the eve of the first day [of a month whose name is lost] at this place robbers murdered slave of God, *striapchei*... Mokeevich Pustoshkin.”⁸⁴ Another seventeenth-century cross, this one discovered in a woods south of Moscow, commemorates yet another homicide victim, a certain Zenov[i], apparently a peasant, as the absence of a patronymic implies.⁸⁵ Finally, a Pskov ceramic memorial plate recalls Il’ia Andreevich Selivanov who likewise “was murdered by robbers.”⁸⁶ In describing the

⁷⁹ Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 1,” 43–44. Since Shapilova did not die until 1595, it seems likely that her son’s death was not memorialized until Shapilova herself was buried, after which the epitaph for her son was added to her gravestone.

⁸⁰ The earliest dated stone with this kind of life span information was reported by Martynov, who described a stone marking the 1611 death of Elena Grigor’eva zhena Ivanovicha Gorikhvostova and her children. The stone concludes with the formula later regularly used to measure a life: “...a zhitiiia eia bylo...,” but then breaks off; the stone having been broken at its base (Martynov, “Nadgrobynye nadpisi,” 221; see also Girshberg, “Materialy..., ch. 2,” 226). Unfortunately, the stone does not survive to allow confirmation of the early date that Martynov reported.

⁸¹ Pleshanova, “Keramicheskie nadgrobynye plity,” 172.

⁸² Pleshanova, “Kamennye nadgrobynye plity,” 89.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁸⁴ Iurii M. Zolotov, “Pamiatnyi krest po striapchem Pustoshkine,” *Sovetskaia arkheologiya* (1986), no. 1, 267. Zolotov has identified the father of the deceased as Mokei Ivanovich Pustoshkin.

circumstances of violent death, gravestones wrote the final lines, if not a complete chapter, in the biographies of the deceased.

Although providing the name of the deceased, his social rank, the date and time of death, and perhaps even the circumstances that led to death all did their part to establish the identity of the deceased, no summary of the dead person's life would be complete without reckoning the span of life. And whereas gravestones had long identified dates of death, only in the seventeenth century did these memorials attempt to summarize and calculate the length of life enjoyed by those whom the stones commemorated.

A stone in the Stroganov family burial vault, for example, reports the 1639 death of Tat'iana Dmitrievna, wife of Andrei Semenovich: "and she lived from her birth 55 years, 8 months, and 11 days."⁸⁷ But so early a calculation of life's full measure was still rare early in seventeenth-century Russia.⁸⁸ By century's end, the practice was much more common, so that when Paraskeva Ivanovna, widow of Emel'ian Ivanovich Buturlin, died in early 1689, her gravestone reported that her life had indeed been full: 88 years, one month, and four days.⁸⁹ Similarly, the burial marker for Dar'ia Petrovna Lopukhina took note of her death in 1696, adding that she had lived 40 years, 11 months and ten days.⁹⁰ Even in this era, however, most men and women—few of whom seem to have known their exact birthdays—went to their graves without anyone knowing, much less recording on their gravestones, exactly how many years they had lived.⁹¹ Only later did tombstones and memorial inscriptions routinely measure off the exact length of life enjoyed by the deceased.

So that when Mikhailo Pronchishchev was buried in the Archangel church of the Pafnut'ev monastery, officials marked his life with the following inscription:

⁸⁵ Zolotov, "Kamennyi krest XVII v.," 334. A recent attempt to catalog and analyze the semiotics of the cross makes no reference to these memorials to murder victims (A.V. Sviatoslavskii and A.A. Troshin, *Krest v russkoi kul'ture: Ocherk russkoi monumental'noi stavrografii* [Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2000]).

⁸⁶ Pleshanova, "Keramicheskie nadgrobnye plity," 160.

⁸⁷ E.M. Kravtsova, "Nadgrobnye plity iz usypal'nitsy Stroganovykh Sol'vychevodskogo Blagoveshchenskogo sobora," in *Problemy izucheniia traditsionnoi kul'tury Severa (K 500-letiiu g. Sol'vychevodska)* (Syktyvkar: Syktyvkar'skii universitet, 1992), 117. My thanks to Ann Kleimola for providing me with a copy of this article.

⁸⁸ In western Europe and colonial America, however, the provision of life span and other vital dates was far from unusual in the seventeenth century. For some examples see Ariès, *Images*, 42, and Ludwig, *Graven Images*, 166, 286, 289. Some Muscovite gravestone fragments that evidently belong to the seventeenth century—no dates survive—include phrasing that indicates that these stones may have provided the age of the deceased. Without confirmed dates for the stones, however, these texts cannot be used to confirm the early existence of this custom. See Beliaev, *Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie*, 343.

⁸⁹ Ivan F. Tokmakov, *Istoricheskoe i arkhologicheskoe opisanie Moskovskogo stavropigial'nogo pervoklassnogo Simonova Monastyrja*, vyp. 2 (Moscow: Tipografiia vdovy N.L. Orlova, 1896), 54.

⁹⁰ *Istoricheskoe opisanie Moskovskogo Spaso-Andronikova monastyrja* (Moscow: Universitetskaya tipografiia, 1865), 22–23 (appendix).

In the year 1702, on February 27th, on the day of our blessed Confessor, Procopius the Decapolite, *stol'nik* Mikhailo Ivanovich Pronchishchev died. His name day celebrates the Cathedral of the Archangel Mikhail, and his life from birth [lasted] 47 years, 4 months minus nine days.⁹²

Similarly, when the daughter-in-law of Artamon Matveev died in 1698, her gravestone reported that she had died October 1, “in the second quarter of the second hour of the night” on the day remembering the martyr Ierofei, Bishop of Athens. The stone went on to note that the dead woman had been the spouse of *okol'nichei* Andrei Artamonovich Matveev, and daughter of *stol'nik* Stefan Aleksandrovich Anichkov who had lived “devoutly and chastely in marriage 15 years, four months, and five days of her 33 years of life.”⁹³ This kind of biographical precision persisted throughout the eighteenth century, effectively measuring and characterizing the days on earth lived by the men and women who had already moved on to another world.

No doubt funerary remembrances like these continued to represent a distinct minority of Muscovites, most of whom managed to find eternal rest within or near churches. Even if practiced only among a minority, however, the growing tendency to individuate and memorialize with gravestone markers addresses an important question of early modern Russian culture.⁹⁴ Many years ago the late Dmitrii Sergeevich Likhachev noted the emergence in seventeenth-century Muscovy of a new elite culture that celebrated the individual. Literature of the era, he observed, abandoned many of the conventions of an earlier time, and by the beginning of the seventeenth century had already given voice to what he called the “individual principle,” represented by autobiography and similarly “individualized” genres. Named, identified authors, almost unknown in earlier centuries, came to dominate the so-called “democratic literature” of the era. Even the characters of fiction, he maintained, demonstrated an “emancipation of personality,” and their fates submitted to “individualization.” The new subjects, genres, characters, and authors all combined to emphasize and celebrate the individual in Muscovite culture.⁹⁵

⁹¹ On the relatively poor sense of life span among Russians of this era, see Daniel H. Kaiser and Peyton Engel, “Time- and Age-Awareness in Early Modern Russia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993), 824–39.

⁹² Leonid, *Istoriko-arkheologicheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie*, 196.

⁹³ M. Kiianovskii, *Grobnitsa boiarina Artamona Matveeva* (Moscow: Tipografiia Shtaba Moskovskogo Voennogo Okruga, 1914), 14. Kiianovskii does not remark on the date of this inscription, although it seems to have been original. Early in the nineteenth century a new structure was built over the Matveev family graves (*ibid.*, 3).

⁹⁴ Even among elites of the era, the graveside memorial to Ioannikii Likhud was exceptional. Bilingual and featuring a representation of the deceased, the inscription also addresses readers in a way that no contemporary Muscovite gravestones did. See Nikolai P. Likhachev, “Portret Ioannikiia Likhuda,” *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti i iskusstva* 146 (1902), 67–72, app.; Boris L. Fonkich, “Zametki po grecheskoi epigrafike Moskvyy XVII v.,” *Greko-Latinskii kabinet* 1(1992), 35–37. My thanks to Nikos Chrissidis for alerting me to this memorial inscription.

Victor Zhivov makes much the same point. Characterizing the seventeenth century as “an age of crucial changes,” Zhivov discerns in literature “a new concern with personality” that emerged not only in secular tales of the sort to which Likhachev most often pointed, but in ecclesiastical literature as well. Church reform in the first half of the century had served, he argued, like the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in western Europe, to condition “...the emergence of the individual as an autonomous cultural value.” As the numerous monuments of seventeenth-century culture confirm, in opposition to a public sphere a private realm of personal reflection came into being, reinforcing the sense of the individual.⁹⁶

Likhachev and others had attempted to argue that the emergence of portrait painting in the seventeenth century also testified to the relatively new valuation of “ordinary individuals.” Far from “ordinary,” Vasiliĭ Golitsyn boasted a collection of more than 40 portraits catalogued after his exile in 1689.⁹⁷ But recent reviews of portraits surviving from this era cast doubt on the most far-reaching claims about the popularity of portraits in Muscovy, at least for any time before the 1680s. Lindsey Hughes has noted that before the last two decades of the century, Muscovite portraiture was apparently quite rare, only a handful of examples surviving. Besides, in those attempts at representation from before the 1680s “the personal is firmly subordinated to the typological” and portraits commemorate the dead rather than the living.⁹⁸ But Hughes acknowledges that the appearance of authentic, realistic portraits at century’s end had its analog in the emergence of panegyric verse at about the same time. Golitsyn himself was the subject not only of an engraving executed during Sophia’s regency, but also of an accompanying verse praising his alleged renown.⁹⁹ Hardly designed for “ordinary individuals,” the surviving epitaphs, like that written by Silvester Medvedev in honor of Simeon Polotskii,

⁹⁵ Dmitriĭ S. Likhachev, *Razvitie russkoi literatury X–XVII vekov. Epokhi i stili* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1973), 141, 144, 149. See also idem, *Chelovek v literature Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), esp. chapter 10. More recently A. E. Chekunova has argued a more modest, gradual development of autobiographical prose, which nevertheless confirms that by the end of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century first-person narratives did begin to appear (*Russkoe memuarnoe nasledie vtoroi poloviny XVII–XVIII vv.* [Moscow: Rossiiskoe universitetskoe izdatel'stvo moskovskogo otdeleniia rossiiskogo nauchnogo fonda, 1995]).

⁹⁶ Victor M. Zhivov, “Religious Reform and the Emergence of the Individual in Russian Seventeenth-Century Literature,” in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, eds. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), esp. 187, 189, 195.

⁹⁷ Lindsey Hughes, *Sophia, Regent of Russia 1657–1704* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 145.

⁹⁸ “Images of the Elite: A Reconsideration of the Portrait in Seventeenth-Century Russia,” in *Von Moskau nach St. Petersburg. Das russische Reich im 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke (*Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, Bd. 56) (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2000), esp. 175, 173, 171. Also see Hughes’s contribution to this volume.

nevertheless celebrated the individual in ways that earlier generations of Muscovites evidently had not imagined.¹⁰⁰

It is hardly surprising that Polotskii and others who had helped invent Muscovite rhetoric also played a part in popularizing the sermon in Orthodox worship. Over the course of the seventeenth century the church urged clergymen to utilize sermons to encourage an individualized morality. In commending humility and charity and condemning pride, avarice and debauchery, sermons invited hearers to reflect upon themselves and attempt to cultivate personal ethics. "The sermons represent the final move toward individual religious life, for in a very direct way they tell the individual to be personally a good Christian, not merely a participant in liturgy and ritual or an outside admirer of the monks."¹⁰¹

All the same, if high culture in this era did in fact witness the emancipation of the individual, if literature "served as a vehicle for ego exposition," the apparent discovery of the individual coincides with a time when, as Richard Hellie has noted, "The law severely circumscribed the individuality of almost everyone in society...."¹⁰² Muscovite legislation worked to stratify society, and bound men and women to the social categories to which they had been born. Peasants were ensnared and townsfolk inscribed onto the rolls of the cities where they lived, and none of them could reasonably expect to escape their corporate status in order to give expression to personal ambition or character.¹⁰³ How might individuality flourish in such a restrictive, corporate social order?

Writing about sixteenth-century France, Natalie Zemon Davis emphasized that self-discovery is always embedded in relationship—political, familial, religious, and gender. "The example of the sixteenth century," she wrote, "suggests the importance of seeing the person as part of a field of relations and of being open to paths and modes for the constitution of a self different from those in nineteenth-century thought." In seeking evidence of individuation, Davis "pointed to apertures in the boundary of the person as important conditions in defining the self."¹⁰⁴ Similarly, Alan Macfarlane observed in his study of individualism in England that "...there is no necessary evolutionary set of stages

⁹⁹ Lindsey A.J. Hughes, *Russia and the West, the Life of a Seventeenth-Century Westernizer, Prince Vasily Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1643–1714)* (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1984), 85.

¹⁰⁰ *Pamiatniki literatury Drevnei Rusi: XVII vek: Kniga tret'ia* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1994), 215–16. Composed at the order of Tsar Fedor Alekseevich, the poem was later carved onto two stone tablets which were placed over Polotskii's grave in the Zaikonospasskii monastery (ibid., 551).

¹⁰¹ Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 9, and 150–75.

¹⁰² Richard Hellie, "The Great Paradox of the Seventeenth Century: The Stratification of Muscovite Society and the 'Individualization' of Its High Culture, Especially Literature," in *O Rus! Studia litteraria slavica in honorem Hugh McLean*, eds. Simon Karlinsky et al. (Oakland: Berkeley Slavic Specialties, 1995), 125.

¹⁰³ Richard Hellie, "The Stratification of Muscovite Society: The Townsman," *Russian History* 5:2 (1978), 119–75.

from hierarchy to equality. They are alternative systems which may co-exist in time.”¹⁰⁵

The men and women of early modern Russia were no doubt firmly anchored in their own time, and therefore could not help but experience all the public social limitations of which Hellie reminds us. Nevertheless, despite the imposing list of prohibitions that circumscribed social mobility, Muscovites articulated on their gravestones a growing understanding of what distinguished them from one another, leaving behind lasting testaments to their unique, individual lives. Nurtured no doubt mainly within the privacy of their own thoughts and feelings, the sense of individual identity to which these epitaphs attest demonstrates an awakening awareness of self.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Davis, “Boundaries,” 63.

¹⁰⁵ Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and Social Transition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 197.

¹⁰⁶ Nancy Shields Kollmann has pointed out a similar process of individuation set against a background of more government and more social control (*By Honor Bound. State and Society in Early Modern Russia* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999], esp. ch. 6).

PETER AND THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Paul Bushkovitch

For much of modern Russian history the seventeenth century has served as a background whose function is to provide contrast for the reign of Peter the Great. To provide the maximum contrast, both the Slavophiles and Westernizers of the middle of the nineteenth century painted a picture of the decades previous to 1689 as one of unchanging continuation of “tradition.” That picture has survived the changes in culture and ideology in Russia and elsewhere in large part because (until quite recently) the seventeenth century of Russian history was comparatively unknown. The huge boom in studies of the sixteenth century that began in the 1950s in the Soviet Union has no counterpart for the seventeenth century. That being said, the work of the last thirty years or so makes it possible to see Peter’s achievement in at least a somewhat new light, and to get beyond searching for the origins of Peter’s attitudes in the German Suburb. We know enough now to say that there were trends which we can trace in the Russia of the seventeenth century that lead forward to Peter’s time, even if we do not know all the details and many areas are left unexplored. These trends fall into three groups: religious-cultural changes, the evolution of the state and state policy, and the larger socio-economic background, including demographic and geographic issues.

Following tradition, I will begin with religious and cultural trends. I wish to insist on this area a bit, since many historians remain largely unaware of the work of philologists and historians of Old Russian literature which are essential to understanding the cultural situation, especially after 1650.¹ Broadly speaking, Russian culture remained essentially religious in content until about the 1670’s or 1680’s, at which point the court and church elite began to move toward the secular cultural world that we find characteristic of Peter’s time. This means that before about 1670 we have to look at the culture of the church for cultural changes. These changes were very real, and they came in the form of the cultural influences from the Ruthenian lands of Poland, primarily from the Kievan Academy. This part of the story is, I hope, relatively well known. Let me stress only a few points.

1. There are clear indications of interest in the new linguistic doctrines and literary genres coming from the Ruthenian lands in Russia by the 1630s and 1640s. I refer, among other things, to the didactic poetry of the “prikaz poets” and associated linguistic norms, which were already taught to the Princes Odoevskii by the 1630s and continued to be taught for the rest of the century.

2. As the early interest in Ruthenian writings was a matter of the court and prikaz elite, so the full stream of Kievan culture that came in roughly 1650–90 was also largely a matter of the court and church elite. The main teachers and writers, Epifanii Slavinskii, Simeon Polotskii, and others operated in and around the Kremlin in the Kremlin monasteries and the court. These changes affected not just a few clerics but the court elite, that is, the *boiarsvo*. Our problem here is one of sources. Perhaps uncharacteristically to some historians, the Russian state paid no attention whatever to the education of the boyar elite. There were almost no formal schools before the Greek Likhudes brothers arrived 1685, and the state left no trace of regulation of private education, yet there clearly was some such education. We know a few names of private tutors, and we do know that some of the boyar families taught their sons Latin by the late 1660s: the Golovins, the princes Romodanovskii, Golitsyn, and by the 1680s the Cherkasskiis. We have no reason to believe that these were the only such families in this very small elite, since our information is entirely random in origin.²

3. The story of the church as an institution, and its cultural role is much more complicated than the traditional schemas present. Starting with the Zealots of Piety, the church tried to interiorize Christian belief and practice among the population. It is a cliché of Russian history that this never really worked, but the fact is that the church tried, starting in the last years of tsar Michael. The agenda of the Zealots, more frequent and more attentive attendance at liturgy, sermons from the clergy, avoidance of popular ritual, is all present in Peter's spiritual regulation, often interpreted as Protestant influence. The church tried to carry out this program in fits and starts, one under Nikon which ended in schism, later on under Ioakim especially. At the same time we need to recognize that there were some counter-trends in the church: for Nikon as Ioakim, the reform of the church meant the reinforcement of the power of the patriarch and bishops, and Nikon in particular intended that the patriarch be far above the bishops in power and even wealth. Peter's whole aim was to put the higher clergy in their place, an aim

¹ Dmitrii S. Likhachev, *Razvitie russkoi literatury X–XVII vekov: epokhi i stil'* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1973), 165–214; Andrei N. Robinson, *Bor'ba idei v russkoi literature XVII veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); Lidiia I. Sazonova, *Poeziia russkogo barokko: vtoraiia polovina XVII—nachalo XVIII v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1991); Anna S. Eleonskaia, *Russkaia oratorskaia proza v literaturnom protsesse XVII veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990); Aleksandr M. Panchenko, *Russkaia stikhotvornaia kul'tura XVII veka* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1973); Sergei I. Nikolaev, *Pol'skaia poeziia v russkikh perevodakh: vtoraiia polovina XVII—pervaia tret' XVIII v.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1989). Following their lead: Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). For particular topics, see Peter Rolland, "Three Early Satires by Simeon Polotsky," *Slavonic and East European Review*, no. 1 (January 1985), 1–20; idem, "'Dulce est et fumos videre Patriae'—Four Letters by Simiaon Polacki," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9:1/2 (June 1985), 166–81; idem, "'Nieskoro' prawi 'munsztuk do tych trab otrzymacie': On Lazar Baranov's *Truby sloves propovidnyx* and their Non-publication in Moscow," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17:1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992), 205–16; David A. Frick, "Zyzanii and Smotryc'kyj (Moscow, Constantinople, and Kiev), Episodes in Cross-Cultural Misunderstanding," *ibid.*, 67–94.

which he achieved only with the Synod and the replacement of Stefan Iavorskii by Feofan Prokopovich as the most influential churchman. In this he to a large extent solved not only the problem that Nikon had presented to tsar Aleksei, but also the problem caused by powerful bishops and heads of monastery that were largely out of the control of the state or the church.³

4. At the end of the seventeenth century, roughly from the 1670s, there is a new wave of Westernization which involves impulses coming from farther away than Kiev. Polish culture is one source: this is the period of extensive translation of Polish literature, such as Samuel Twardowski's poem on the Cossack revolt or Otwinowski's translation of Ovid (one of the few books we know Peter read). The Diplomats reported that Peter's mother Natalia Naryshkina was brought up "in the Polish manner," presumably when her father commanded a musketeer regiment in Smolensk 1667–71, and that tsar Fiodor's first wife, Agaf'ia also favored Polish dress. Both families were on the lower fringes of the court elite by that time. In Smolensk, the Scottish mercenary Col. Daniel Crawford knew the Naryshkins well enough to describe Natalia's girlhood, and other of the family associations were the Marselis clan and Paul Menzies.⁴ Here we see in part the cultural effect of the Thirteen Years' War and the mercenary officers.

There were other cases of Russian elite interest in Western culture. Tsar Aleksei asked the Danish ambassador for a "tube of the invention of Tycho Brahe" in 1673.⁵ The story of the court theater of 1671–76 is fairly well known, as is the crucial role of Artamon Matveev in that theater. Matveev saw to it that his son learned both Latin and Polish, even in exile in Pustozersk. Finally, the most dramatic example, both in fact and in historiography, is the discovery that the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy copied its courses from Jesuit models, adapting and translating Jesuit courses in rhetoric and logic, astronomy and cosmology. The Academy taught not only future clerics: from the incomplete records that we have, once again the court elite appears, the princes Odoevskii, Musin-Pushkin (patriarch Ioakim's relatives), Golitsyns, Prozorovskii.⁶

In other words, the Russian elite, at the very least, was not a group of long-bearded traditionalists in 1689. The old boyar elite (before the inflation of honors that is particularly strong after 1676) was only some 30–40 men at one time, some 50 clans, and our very imperfect information makes it clear that at the very least Golitsyns (not just Vasilii Vasil'evich), Romodanovskii, Cherkasskii, Sheremetevs, Prozorovskii, Sheins, Golovins were heavily involved in the new

² Paul Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change Among the Russian Boyars 1650–1680: New Sources and Old Problems," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 56 (2000), 91–112.

³ See Bushkovitch, *Religion*, 51–73, summarizing the literature to 1992; Vera S. Rumiantseva, *Narodnoe antitserkovnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v XVII veke* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986). For the actions of bishops and heads of monasteries see Georg B. Michels, *At War with the Church: Religious Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 39–41, 67–8, 73, 176–77, and elsewhere.

⁴ Nikolaev, *Pol'skaia poeziia*; Paul Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great: the Struggle for Power 1671–1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 59–61, 81.

trends. At a somewhat lower level of the elite, there is such information for Naryshkins (before Natalia's marriage), Rtishchevs, and Musin-Pushkin. It is also the case that the pace of change was rapid, and that some seem to have been a half-phase or phase behind. In the 1690s the Sheins and Prozorovskiis, for example, were still closer to the older Kiev-Ruthenian culture of the 1650's and 1660's than Sheremetev or Golovin, with their Latin-Polish orientation.⁷

The one area which is still the murkiest is the penetration of such cultural changes below the level of the court and church elite. An example is church building, for about 1680 the court elite started to build churches in a quite new style (the so-called "Moscow baroque"), a style that broke sharply with the traditional structure of the Orthodox church, not just in matters of style but also in substance.⁸ The new churches altered the character of the icon screen, the disposition of space, and the traditional schema of wall paintings, all of which had theological implications. What effect did any of this have on the congregations, peasants and rural gentry? We just do not know.

Finally, there are the much larger areas, crossing class and regional boundaries, of inwardness, individualism, and various questions of identity which are usually understood as part of the modern world. Seventeenth century Russia seems to have been a society of group identities which was showing signs of more individualistic conceptions. This trend is visible in elite religion, with the new emphasis on individual behavior and morality and the duty of the church to inculcate a more inward form of Christianity. The gradual appropriation of Western culture in last decades of the century had the same effect, for it is an old cliché that starting with the Renaissance, European culture moved toward a more individualistic conception of man and his place in the world.⁹

The area that is best known to us is naturally that of the trends in evolution of the state and state policy in the seventeenth century. The archives have the richest material for such studies, and the traditionally "statist" orientation of Russian

⁵ Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change," 99; Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen (DRA) Tyske Kancellis udenrigske Afdeling til 1770 (TKUA) Rusland B 38, 4 March 1673: "L'affaire principale laquelle M. le Chancelier m'avoit fait venir aupres luy, estoit que le grand Tzar prie sa Majesté de le vouloir obliger luy envoyer un Tube de l'invention de Tyko Brahe, un certain Astrologue venu de Moldavie a tant dit et fait que l'envie a pris au Grand Due de Sçavoir ce que s'est, autrefois ils ont été si superstitieux icy, que de defendre les Almanachs, comme une espede de sortilege, presentement ils sont plus esclairez"; 29 September 1673 (the tsar asked about the telescope); 16 December 1673 (tube received from Klingenberg via Archangel).

⁶ Nikolaos Chrissidis, "Creating the Educated Elite: Learning and Faith in Moscow's Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy 1685–1694" (PhD dissertation: Yale University, 2000), 131–2.

⁷ Aleksandr I. Zaozerskii, *Fel'dmarshal B.P. Sheremetev* (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 167–240; Paul Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction and the Opposition to Peter the Great: the 1690's," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (Berlin, 1995), 110–11.

⁸ Boris R. Vipper, *Arkhitektura russkogo barokko* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978); James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Architecture* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 79–110.

historiography has reinforced the direction toward state institutions and policy. That being said, it is very difficult to draw very firm conclusions on the basis of existing knowledge. Only some aspects of the state's structure and development seem relatively clear.

The Russian state, at least the central administrative apparatus, grew in size in the seventeenth century. Demidova found that the actual number of *prikazy* grew from some 45 to 55 in the course of the century, but the number of *d'iaki* from 46 to 86. The *pod'iachie* are even more interesting: from 575 in 1626 to 1,702 in 1682. Nearly a thousand were added in the next fifteen years, making 2,648 by 1698.¹⁰ So far so good, but there are two caveats. Peter clearly thought that there were far too many clerks, and drafted many of them into the army from 1699 onwards. Perhaps he was just rash, but his moves suggest that expansion of numbers does not necessarily equal greater administrative effectiveness and power of the state. The other caveat is that, as usual in Russian history before the twentieth century, the provincial administration expanded more slowly: the number of *pod'iachie* expanded from 474 (1640s) to 1,303 (1690s) and the number of provincial *prikaznye izby* from 185 (1626) to 299 (1682) and 302 (1698). The number of higher local administrators (*d'iaki*) remained the same, about twenty-five, over the century.¹¹

None of this really answers the question about the effectiveness of the state. Like most pre-modern weak states, the Russian state made extravagant claims, but what did they actually do? One red herring of the past is the assumption that the state was impossibly chaotic, the *prikazy* were completely disorganized, and the whole should be seen as the origin of the bureaucratic incompetence seen in Gogol' and Saltykov-Shchedrin. In fact the *prikazy* had elaborate rules of procedure, even if largely preserved orally, and obeyed the existing laws as best they could.¹² The idea that the state's operations were completely arbitrary is a nineteenth century liberal myth.

On the other hand, the state's operations were in most areas not terribly elaborate and relied on the cooperation of the population for their effectiveness. Some recent studies suggest that the state's power outside the core areas was limited: when local peasant or Cossack communities did not like the government's policies, the government had to back off.¹³ Even in central Russian

⁹ Bushkovitch, *Religion*, 150–75. It is important, however, not to overstress the rate of change in the West and attribute to the early modern era the culture and values of later times. The Russians who went to Europe in the 1690's did not yet confront a world of Hobbesian individualists. Outside England and the Netherlands, they found a society where such new notions in their pure form were the preserve of a few scholars, and for most people any such new orientation was still buried within very traditional notions.

provinces, the government had to deal with gentry who did not necessarily do what the state wanted or ordered.¹⁴

What the government could do is collect taxes fairly effectively and mobilize the army. These were not small achievements, given not only the relatively backward level of Russian infrastructure, but also the sheer size and low population density. The ability of the Russian state to conduct the cadastral surveys and assess taxes is perhaps the best example of its effectiveness. It is too bad that the exact details remain more than a bit murky. We do know that the normal method was to send out someone of Moscow rank (*stol'niki* were common) or just below that with a *pod'iachii* to cover some rather large area. From what we know it seems that the pair (how many others did they bring? were they also clerks or just valets and cooks?) took up residence in a local town, village, monastery, or estate and expected the locals to bring them the relevant documentation. Apparently they did go out to the sites and measure the land and inspect it, but mainly in controversial cases. For most of their records, they seem to have relied on the population to cooperate. Given the complexities of the system, with different taxes on *tiaglo* land, *obrok* land, and new or fallow land (*naezzhaia pashnia*, *perelog*, *pustoshi*) it does not require much imagination to see that there must have been massive undercounting. Indeed the demographers estimate that the tax cadaster missed about 25 percent of the population. The state sent in soldiers to make people pay up only when there was some sort of crisis, basically in wartime. Cherniakova reports that cadasters in the *Zaonezhskie pogosty* in the late sixteenth century (roughly modern Russian Karelia) record peasants claiming they could not pay because soldiers and *oprichniki* had taken all their grain. In the 1640s, by contrast, they reported that it was bad harvests that were the main problem. What they objected to in both Karelia and Siberia were not the burden of regular taxes, but the illegal (in their eyes, and probably that of the state as well) exactions of local *voevody*.¹⁵ The state did not have the apparatus to extract the last penny out of the peasants: this was not France or Prussia. It could, by keeping its demands modest, rely on their cooperation for at least basic revenue. And then there was the liquor monopoly and the sales tax (*tamozhennyi sbor*) which were both more “automatic,” came from the towns and trade centers, and came quickly and in cash and constituted some 53 percent of the total revenue in 1680. But those taxes were collected by merchants and townsmen as a state service, not by officials. Again they relied on

¹⁰ Natal'ia F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanie absoliutizma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 23–24. Peter Brown gives the number of chancelleries as about 60–70 annually in the seventeenth century: Peter Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” *Russian History/Histoire russe* 10:3 (1983), 271.

¹¹ Demidova, *Sluzhilaia*, 31, 34–5.

¹² Richard Hellie, *Slavery in Russia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

¹³ Nikolai N. Pokrovskii, *Tomsk 1648–1649 gg.: Voevodskaia vlast' i zemskie miry*, (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1989); Vadim A. Aleksandrov and Nikolai N. Pokrovskii, *Vlast' i obshchestvo: Sibir' v XVII v.* (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1991); Irina Cherniakova, *Kareliia na perelome epokh: Ocherki sotsial'nooi i agrarnoi istorii XVII veka* (Petrozavodsk: Izdatel'stvo Petrozavodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1998), 170–76

local cooperation, though in this case there is considerable anecdotal evidence that these “burdens” were highly profitable.¹⁶

The object of all these tax collections was primarily to support the army. Miliukov calculated long ago that in 1680 the army absorbed 62 percent of the states expenditures (roughly 700,000 of 1,125,000 roubles).¹⁷ The army, of all state institutions in the seventeenth century, probably is the most desperately in need of serious study. Richard Hellie’s attempt long ago to bring it to the consciousness of historians and suggest some social consequences of military change produced more controversy than research. One certain effect of military change was to require the state to pay more cash for it. As long as the army was a gentry cavalry with *pomest’ia*, the amount of centrally allocated cash needed was limited. Once the army went over to musketeers, new formation infantry and cavalry, then more cash (or centrally allocated grain, in the case of the musketeers) was necessary.¹⁸ To be sure there were still resources paid to the state in kind, and we all know that the musketeers worked as artisans and traders, but the new regiments were staffed by peasant conscripts or micro-servitors from the southern borders. The state had to pay them, or provide equipment or both. All this is to say nothing of fortifications.

Essentially the Russian state, like its neighbors farther west, collected taxes to pay an army. What was left over went to the palace and to administrative costs. What seems to have changed in the seventeenth century is that Russia managed to do this in an increasingly competitive international environment. It managed to fund and supply a growing army, one that must have had much higher costs per soldier in 1690 than in 1620.

The relative success of collection of the basic taxes did not mean that the state’s treasuries were overflowing. Indeed the inefficiencies in collecting taxes from the peasantry and the great opportunities for graft in the liquor monopoly and the sales tax collection meant that Russia’s resources were chronically underutilized, at least from the point of view of the state. Hence the endless need for extraordinary taxes (*piatinnye den’gi* and others) and the search for new sources of revenue. Most of these measures designed to keep the coffers as full as possible are very poorly known. In Siberia, for example, the state tried to preserve the native societies of *iasashnye liudi* because they provided an important source of fur for the treasury. While there is no evidence that the state provided more than a small proportion of the fur sold at Archangel, it certainly did derive important revenue from what it did sell. The state at various times also monopolized caviar, tar, and potash, and tried various schemes for trade with Iran. It is an old cliché that Ordin-Nashchokin’s trade measures of 1667 were

¹⁴ Valerie Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Viacheslav N.Kozliakov, *Sluzhilyi “gorod” Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVII veka (Of Smuty do Sobornogo ulozheniia)* (Iaroslavl’, 2000).

¹⁵ Iurii V.Got’e, *Zamoskovnyi krai v XVII veke: opyt issledovaniia po istorii ekonomicheskogo byta Moskovskoi Rusi*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1937); Iaroslav E.Vodarskii, *Naselenie Rossii v kontse XVII-nachale XVIII veka” chislennost’, soslovno-klassovyi sostav, razmeshchenie* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 18–58; Cherniakova, *Kareliia*, 27–29, 105–6.

“mercantilist.” They certainly were designed to protect Russian merchants and the state’s revenue from trade as well. Throughout the century the state varied the level of privilege of English, Dutch, and other merchants, trying to combine encouragement for trade with protection for Russia’s markets and revenues. All of this most certainly leads into the policies of Peter the Great, which were focussed on increasing Russian trade.

Finally, there were clearly certain economic and demographic changes in the seventeenth century that were crucial for Peter, though he was not aware of most of them. One of them was the growth of the world markets outside Russia throughout the century, which witnessed a real commercial revolution in Holland and England, most of it directed toward trade with Asia and eventually the Western hemisphere. Russia participated in the expansion of European trade only to some extent. Russia’s trade with Europe continued to expand after 1620, but probably not at the same pace as general European commerce, internal and external. Russia’s trade with Europe may have occupied a larger share of total European trade in 1600 than in 1700. At the same time there were changes right at the end of the seventeenth century, the growing English trade in Russian goods through the Baltic provinces, for example (Sound Tolls). Peter seems to have been acutely aware of the commercial situation in Europe of this time, indeed the only known explanation for the Northern War from his pen is that he needed a Baltic port for commercial purposes.

Inside Russia the most dramatic change is the beginning of the enormous demographic explosion that made Russia a huge country by the twentieth century. In 1678 Vodarskii tells us that the cadasters, adjusted for various problems of miscounting and undercounting, produce a population of 5.6 million male souls, about 11 million people.¹⁹ The overall increase is hard to measure exactly, especially since there is little consensus on figures for the years just before the Smuta, but if we take seven million as a likely figure, then the increase over 80 years is nearly 60 percent. The story is more dramatic if we remember that the years of the Smuta, roughly 1603–18, were periods of devastation and stagnation if not decline in population. Partial figures suggest that the rebound was very great by about 1630, followed by a smaller decline that is hard to measure because the cadasters for the 1640s are less complete than those of the previous decades (male children and some other categories seem not to have been counted). In the Novgorod area the population increase among the peasants by the cadaster between 1646 and 1678 was nearly 100 percent, 44,900 to 89,900 male souls excluding the Obonezhskie pogosty.²⁰ The Zaonezhskie pogosty showed the following figures for the rural population in male souls:

¹⁶ Pavel N. Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII stoletii i reforma Petra Velikogo* (St. Petersburg, 1892), 96–103; Cherniakova, Kareliia, 188.

¹⁷ Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 96–103.

¹⁸ Anatolii V. Chernov, *Vooruzhennye sily Russkogo gosudarstva v XV–XVII vv.: s obrazovaniia tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva do reform pri Petre I* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1954); Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1971).

1616:	4,400
1628:	14,500
1646:	11,100
1678:	30,100 ²¹

By comparison, the Novgorod district grew by some 94 percent, to 174,000 male souls, from 1678 to 1719. Russian population growth overall for 1678–1719 is about 42 percent.²² If Novgorod is then typical for the whole period from the 1640's to 1719 (typical in being ahead of the rest of the country, but growing at the same rate), then the overall Russian population in the 1640s must have been about 3.7 male souls, seven million altogether and perhaps about the same as in 1600.

Allowing for the sharp ups and downs in the period 1600–40, the total Russian population increased in the second half of the seventeenth century from some seven million to some 9.6 million, 10.4 adding in the Ukrainian hetmanate, by 1678. All indications are that this population increase continued on into Peter's reign, in spite of the hardships imposed by his wars and new taxes. Some of the reasons for this rate of increase come from a glance at regional figures. Generally speaking for 1678–1719 Vodarskii found that newly settled areas to the south and east of the Oka increased by 72 percent, while the older areas only by 20 percent (though there were areas of sharp increase here, as in Novgorod). Another spectacular example is the North and the Urals. As we have seen the Western area around Lake Onega grew spectacularly after the Smuta to 1678. In the later period, however, it and the whole north show a decline of 13 percent, the highest in all of Russia, while the northeast (Viatka, Tot'ma, Iarensk) an increase of 62 percent. Given what we know of migration streams, the northern peasants were simply moving east in large numbers.²³ Russia simply had so much land that modest numbers of migrants produced large increases in newly settled areas, a phenomenon not unique to Russia. This movement of people, both in numbers and in space, is essential to understanding the seventeenth century. In spite of serfdom, I think we have to see it as a century of prosperity, especially since the rapid population increase, as Richard Hellie's demonstration of the absence of inflation in grain prices shows, did not put pressure on land or resources.²⁴ Furthermore, the increase in population led to a fall in the tax rate (at least the direct taxes per *sokha* and later household) since the assessment did not keep up with the growth in population.²⁵ The population increase seems to have served to unlock resources rather than overcrowd them, as was the case in many societies in Western Europe at the time.

¹⁹ Vodarskii, *Naselenie*, 192.

²⁰ Vladimir M. Vorob'ev and Aleksandr Ia. Degtiarev, *Russkoe feodal'noe zemlevladienie of "Smutnogo vremeni" do kanuna petrovskikh reform* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1986), 130–31, 146–47

²¹ Cherniakova, *Kareliia*, 103.

²² Vodarskii, *Naselenie*, 192.

²³ Vodarskii, *Naselenie*, 154, 163.

Population increase meant many things. One of them was the increasing wealth of the landholding class. The increase in the size of landholdings on the part of the boyar elite seems to be a leading trend of the second half of the century.²⁶ Beyond purely economic changes, the increase in wealth and population among the elite, and the landholding class generally had implications. The increase in wealth and population may also be some of the factors behind the inflation of honors. It certainly simplified matters for the Russian army, as it made possible increases in the size of the army.

Finally, it would be nice to be able to conclude the survey of economic changes with an account of agriculture. This topic reminds us again how little we really know. Everyone knows that the seventeenth century was the first century of Russian serfdom, and that in this period some 75 percent of the peasantry were serfs. There was a tendency for the serf proportion to fall, since state peasants (about 20 percent of peasants) grew in number faster (evidently for demographic reasons, as the tsars continued to hand out land in gifts) than serfs. This tendency was very limited however, and the proportions remained roughly the same until Catherine secularized church lands (some 15–20 percent of the serf peasantry were church peasants) in 1764.²⁷ About peasant life, outside of the relatively well studied north, we know little of even the basic facts. Recent work suggests that villages grew larger in the course of the century, producing the characteristic Russian rural settlement pattern familiar from the nineteenth century in place of the very small villages of the sixteenth century.²⁸ We have some idea of the taxes and the labor and rent obligations of the peasantry, their migration patterns, even of peasant culture.²⁹ What we do not know is the eco-geography of peasant agriculture, simple facts like the nature of the crops, the role of grain versus stock-raising, supplemental activities from hunting to trading. Without this kind of knowledge it is difficult to make and defend any significant generalizations about Russian agriculture, and—to be frank—that means we are ignorant of the foundation of Russian life for the whole century.

Within the limits of our knowledge, there are a number of clear continuities and discontinuities between the seventeenth century and Peter's reign.³⁰ In one respect there is much cultural continuity, for the view of the seventeenth century as unchanging traditionalism is hard to sustain, especially at the elite level. Furthermore, the older histories of Peter have presented his cultural program, so

²⁴ Richard Hellie, *The Economy and Material Culture of Russia 1600–1725* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1998), 634–36, showing that prices of foodstuffs rose for short periods as a response to catastrophes or wars (and devaluation of the currency), but remained generally fairly stable over the century.

²⁵ Cherniakova, *Kareliia*, 156–57. This is only one local example, but in principle it should work throughout the country.

²⁶ O. A. Shvatchenko, *Svetskie feodal'nye votchiny v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka: istoriko-geograficheskii ocherk* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 1996).

²⁷ Vodarskii, *Naselenie*, 134.

²⁸ Vasilii I. Kuznetsov, *Iz istorii feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia Rossii (po materialam Kolomenskogo uezda XVI–XVII veka)* (Moscow, 1993), 106–24.

to speak, as all of a piece, revealed from 1689 with some reinforcement after the first trip to Europe in 1697/8. To be sure, there are some radical innovations in the 1690s, the trip itself, the simultaneous decision to send about a hundred young aristocrats³¹ to Venice and Amsterdam, and the famous prohibition on beards and the decrees mandating Western dress. These extremely well known facts somewhat obscure the character of elite culture in the early years of the reign, which remained very much in the Baroque mode, with a certain Polish-Latin direction until about 1710 or thereabouts. The best example is Peter's appointment of Stefan Iavorskii as Metropolitan of Riazan' and locum tenens of the patriarchate in 1701. If we remember that book printing relied on church personnel, and that Peter's "cultural services" were under Ivan Alekseevich Musin-Pushkin, a product of the Jesuit curriculum at the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, whom Just Juel reported as able to converse in Latin, the "Baroque" character of early Petrine culture is clear.³² It is only toward the end of the reign, when Feofan Prokopovich, with his political idea borrowed in part from Grotius and Puffendorf, becomes Peter's principal spokesman, that we see the elements of seventeenth century Western rationalism that look toward early Enlightenment. We should also not forget the generational problem: men of Peter's generation, such as count A.A. Matveev (1666–1728) and prince B.I. Kurakin (1676–1727), were certainly westernized but remained in the Baroque world, as is evident from their unfinished histories of Peter's reign. It is only the younger generation, men like Tatishchev (1686–1750), who emerge at the end of the reign, who are already at home in eighteenth century thought.

Thus in one respect the culture of Peter's time developed the earlier trends. More basically, however, Peter's reign signified the most radical break in Russian culture between Kievan times and the Stalin era. I refer to the secularization of Russian culture. This is a peculiar subject, for we all know that it happened, yet Peter never decreed any such thing, and it came about as a by-product of other cultural innovations, particularly western schooling and the importation of Western culture. Old Russian culture was almost entirely religious, yet by the end of Peter's reign it had declined to the place it held in the west—extremely important to be sure, but not all-embracing. Among the upper classes a certain skepticism about basic Orthodox practices (belief in miracle working relics, for example) begin to appear by the time of Peter's death.³³

In economics, the continuity is greater than would appear from the historiography. The problem here is again with the now traditional view of Peter as an industrializer. This idea has two historical roots, the first being the classic

²⁹ Iurii A. Tikhonov, *Pomeshchich'i krestiane XVII v.: feodal'naiia renta v XVII—nachale XVIII v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974).

³⁰ On Peter see Reinhard Wittram, *Peter I: Czar und Kaiser*, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964); Lindsay Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998); and Bushkovitch, *Power*.

³¹ Most of them were *komnatnye stol'niki*, a new rank that emerged in the 1650s, becoming increasingly important by the 1680's. Men holding this rank were the sons of (mainly) duma rank aristocrats and served in the palace, serving the tsar, tsaritsa, or tsarevichi.

Russian historians, Solov'ev and Kliuchevskii, who obviously saw in Peter the ancestor of the reformers of the time of Alexander II. Solov'ev and others, however, in their brief surveys of economic policy, devoted as much time to trade as to industry, and were aware that Peter's efforts in this area were largely directed at technology. What they underplayed was the extent to which Peter was mainly interested in military production, hence his emphasis on iron mines and iron working. Soviet historians who were looking for precedents for Soviet industrialization sharpened this conception in the 1930s, and ultimately produced a misleading picture of Peter as an early industrializer, totally ignoring his commercial policies. Yet it seems clear from the amount of effort expended to build and develop St. Petersburg (to say nothing of other policies), that it was only in the area of international trade that Peter really had an "economic" policy. Yet we have no history of the commercial measures that accompanied the founding of Petersburg: the attempted compulsory movement of Russian and foreign merchants to the new capital, various privileges for those who traded there, the larger questions of Russian trade at Arkhangel'sk, Azov, and other ports, the financial connections with Amsterdam, and so on. Important as these policies were, they represent not a new departure, rather a much more vigorous pursuit of the same aims as Ordin-Nashchokin and other seventeenth century rulers. Similarly Peter's encouragement of military-related industries had its roots in the Marselis and other enterprises of the seventeenth century.

There might be other continuities apparent in Peter's commercial policies if more was known about trade and merchants in his time and before. Unfortunately Russian historians have only recently begun to turn back to this theme, finding that the old myth that Russian merchant dynasties did not exist is just a myth, even in provincial towns, that the merchant elite (and often not-so-elite) was closely tied with the state in both the "services" in the tolls and liquor monopoly and in all sorts of lucrative contracts. Finally, they have even begun to look at what are probably the real sources of Russian capitalism, which were not the town merchants of our period or even the early eighteenth century, but the *torgovye sela* such as Pavlovo and Murashkino or later Ivanovo and Voznesenskoe, whose merchants, still during the whole period serfs, began to appear at the Archangel fairs at the end of the seventeenth century.³⁴ But any serious analysis of this, in Peter's time or before, is work for the future.

The church seems to be the greatest case of discontinuity, but is this really the case? The elimination of the patriarchate seems to follow tsar Aleksei's reaction to Nikon, but not his appointment of the very similar Ioakim. On the institutional level the break with the past was extremely sharp. Religious practice was another story. Recently A.S.Lavrov has argued that many of the changes that Peter tried to legislate in the *Dukhovnyi reglament* and before were continuations of the ideas of Zealots of Piety, Nikon, and the church councils of 1667, 1682, and others. Here he has in mind the attempt to prohibit "pagan" practices, to encourage confession and communion, preaching, and the regulation of popular piety.³⁵

³² Just Juel, *En rejse til Rusland under tsar Peter* (Copenhagen, 1893), 243.

³³ A.S.Lavrov, *Koldovstvo i religiia v Rossii 1700–1740 gg.*, (Moscow: "Drevnekhramilishche," 2000), 306–09 (the case of Senator M.M.Samarin).

Peter's 1716 decrees to the bishops were in part attempts to deal with the problem of powerful and autocratic churchmen out in the provinces who were so common in the previous century. Another new departure was the attempt to compromise with the Schism by replacing a policy of simple repression with double taxation, as well as the official toleration of foreign non-Orthodox Christians.

It is in the area of the development of the state that the issue of continuity is the sharpest. On one level, the continuities are clear. The size of the state apparatus grew considerably in the seventeenth century, reaching just under 2,000 men by the 1680s. For Peter's time the numbers are hard to find, in large part because the Colleges were understaffed and the records are incomplete. Troitskii found 2,091 officials in the central government in 1755, in spite of some expansion of the apparatus from 1730 onwards. It does not look like Peter expanded the central government much, indeed he (or his successors) reduced it from the high of the 1690s back to the numbers of the 1680s. Local administration was a little different. Demidova found 1918 officials (not including *voevody*, about 85) in the 1690s, while Troitskii gives 3,328, an increase of about one third, but again it is not clear when it took place.³⁶ At the very least, however, the provincial administration of 1755 existed on the basis of Peter's decrees of 1719, and it was thus his product, even if to a large extent realized posthumously.

The sheer size of the state apparatus does not tell us everything. What Peter did that was new was to provide the administration with a more rationalized structure with more explicit rules on Swedish models. As far as procedural rules went, this was not absolutely new, for the old *prikazy* were not just arbitrary in their functioning. The functional rationalization was considerable, however, particularly in the financial area, where the variety of regional *prikazy* collecting taxes of one sort or another was replaced by a single College of Finance. This change was not complete and came only with the Colleges, however, which were not decreed until 1717 and implemented until 1721. Before that, Peter relied on a series of *ad hoc* measures and ultimately unsuccessful experiments like the

³⁴ Andrei V. Demkin, "K voprosu o preemstvennosti torgovykh kapitalov XVII v. (Po materialam g. Torzhka), *Promyshlennost' i torgovlia v Rossii XVII–XVIII vv.*, ed. I.A. Bulygin et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), 168–74; idem, *Russkoe kupechestvo XVII–XVIII vv.: Goroda verkhnevolzh'ia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990); Aleksandr I. Aksenov, *Genealogiia moskovskogo kupechestva XVIII v.: Iz istorii formirovaniia russkoi burzhuzii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988); Viktoriia R. Tarlovskaiia, *Torgovlia Rossii perioda pozdnego feodalizma: Torgovyie krest'iane vo vtoroi polovine XVII nachale vv.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGU, 1988); M.V. Nikolaev, "K voprosu o chastnom stroitel'stve v Moskve v kontse XVII—pervoi chetverti XVIII vv.: podriadnaia forma organizatsii rabot," in *Torgovlia i predprinimatel'stvo v feodal'noi Rossii*, ed. L.A. Timoshina and I.A. Tikhoniuk (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1994), 168–89; Mikhail Ia. Volkov, *Goroda Verkhnego Povolzh'ia i Severo-zapada Rossii: pervaiia polovina XVIII v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1994); Nina B. Golikova, *Privilegirovannnye kupecheskie korporatsii Rossii XVI—pervoi chetverti XVIII v.*, vol. 1 (Moscow: "Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli"—RGADA, 1998). For a somewhat later period see Natal'ia V. Kozlova, *Rossiiskii absolutizm i kupechestvo XVIII veke (20-e—nachalo 60-kh gbdov)* (Moscow, 1999).

³⁵ Lavrov, *Koldovstvo*, 341–436.

“large gubernias” of 1708–19 (modified by the addition of the Senate after 1711), which look suspiciously like some of the experiments of the seventeenth century with regional military offices.

The famous soul tax of 1724 was a departure in that the tax now came per male peasant rather than per household, but the methods of assessment and collection remained broadly similar to those of the seventeenth century, even if they seem to have done the work. At first the 1719 *Reviziia* officials relied on *skazki*, that is, the reports of local village elders or landholders. Then from 1722 to 1728 the government sent large numbers of army officers commandeered *ad hoc* (like the seventeenth century *stol'niki*!) to check up on the results. They did manage to find many concealed “souls,” concealed by both peasants and landholders, so perhaps they did better ultimately than their ancestors. The number of concealed “souls” from 1719 was still about 25 percent, judging by later results, but it is unclear how many more were not counted: the records have many cases of bribery and unresolved cases. Menshikov’s estate near Rannenburg apparently paid no taxes for the whole of Peter’s reign.³⁷ Peter’s income was much higher than that of his immediate predecessors, ahead of the population increase, so he was able to extract more resources, even if we do not know exactly how (new taxes? higher taxes? better counting, at least at the end?).

The grand claims to authority of the Russian state in the seventeenth century continued into the eighteenth. In both cases it is not so clear how effective they were in reality. The lack of effective state apparatus in the provinces (which required all the extraordinary commissions of officers) meant that more resources could be extracted, but not necessarily in proportion to actual levels of local development. At the other end of the pipeline, government officials stole enormous amounts of money. In the wake of the 1714 investigation of Menshikov he seems to have appropriated several million roubles, about a third or half of the whole Russian state revenue, which Peter made him give back. This sort of thing seems to have been on a much larger scale than in the seventeenth century, and was a consequence of the administrative “experiments” of that lasted much of the first twenty years of the eighteenth century.

The diplomats at the Russian court did not think that the Tsar was extremely powerful either in the seventeenth century or in Peter’s time, at least when they wrote privately to their sovereigns. Of course, it was hard to see the rulers from 1676 to 1689 as powerful, but even Peter did not seem to them all-powerful. Publications were of course different, they had an ideological side, there was also a matter of secrecy. When Johann Korb published his famous diary of the Imperial embassy to Russia in 1698–99 he was recycling the despatches he copied and probably wrote for his ambassador, Ignaz von Guarient. In those dispatches he described the really important and secret information of the time, which was not military information but court politics. In the secret dispatches we

³⁶ Demidova, *Sluzhiloe*, 23, 35, 37; Sergei M. Troitskii, *Russkii absolutizm i dvorianstvo v XVIII v.: formirovanie biurokratii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 171–73.

³⁷ Evgenii V. Anisimov, *Podatnaia reforma Petra I: Vvedenie podushnoi podati v Rossii 1719–1728gg.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1982), 63–115.

learn that the boyar elite was enraging Peter by its internal rivalries and disloyalty to him, as well as bribe-taking and the usual misdeeds. Korb knew that Peter felt in January, 1699, that he could rely on no one from the boyar elite and that he would have to rule by himself, bypassing the boyars. None of this appears in Korb's published diary.³⁸ Like other diplomats, he could not let another court know how much he really knew, but the effect of the published version is to make Peter look much more powerful than Korb knew to be the case. The diplomats realized that Russia was rife with aristocratic rivalries, aristocratic discontent with Peter, and all sorts of popular discontent that came out in the Bulavin revolt and other episodes. They remembered the Time of Troubles and the Razin revolt. Generally they believed that without Peter, there would not be much change in Russia. The Danish envoy Paul Heins summed it up:

If God gives his grace to the Tsar to live a considerable time more it is clear that he will put Muscovy on a footing such as it has never been before, but it is also true that this prince risks much and that human fatality, which Heaven forbid, would be capable of putting everything to rout: and into a state more deplorable than this country has ever been because of the disunity of minds and the jealousy that exists among the boyars and among all the people.³⁹

My belief is that Heins was right, but that is another matter.

³⁸ Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 98–109, 114–20.

³⁹ DRA TKUA B 42, 21 February 1699: "Si le bon Dieu fait la grace [au Czaar de vivre encore quelque temps considerable encore] il est apparent [qu'il mettra la Muscovie] sur un pied [ou elle n'a jamais esté] mais il est vray aussi que [ce prince s'hazarde] beaucoup [et qu'une fatalité humaine], que le Ciel veuille detourner, seroit [capable de mettre tout au deroute: et dans un estat plus deplora]ble [que ce] pays [n'a jamais esté à] cause [de la desunion des esprits et la jalousie qui] est [parmy les Boyars et] parmy [tout le peuple]."

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