



PETER THE GREAT

The Struggle for Power, 1671 – 1725

PAUL BUSHKOVITCH

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This book is a history of Russian politics over the fifty years that saw the transformation of Russia into virtually a European monarchy by Peter the Great. It shows, however, that Peter was not the all-powerful tsar working alone to reform Russia, and that he moved into a system with powerful and contentious aristocrats whom he struggled to control in order to achieve his goals.

Paul Bushkovitch reveals the intense battles within the boyar elite in the 1670s and the ultimate victory of Peter's family and their boyar supporters in the 1690s. But Peter turned against them and tried to rule through his favorites Golovin and Menshikov. This experiment ended in the establishment of a decentralized administration controlled largely by the great aristocrats, followed by the establishment of an equally aristocratic Senate in 1711. As the aristocrats' hegemony came to an end in 1716–18, in the final years of the reign – those of the most long-lasting reforms – Peter ruled through a complex group of favorites, a few aristocrats, and appointees promoted through merit.

Thus Peter managed in his reign to master a contentious and powerful elite through a series of compromises, at first tilted toward the tsar and his favorites, then toward the aristocrats, and finally toward a mix that favored new men but which did not exclude the aristocrats entirely. The outcome was a new balance of power at the center and a new, European, conception of politics.

PAUL BUSHKOVITCH is Professor of History, Yale University. His publications include *The Merchants of Moscow 1580–1650* (Cambridge, 1980) and *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Oxford, 1992).

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The Struggle for Power, 1671–1725

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Preface

In fifteen years of research I have acquired debts too numerous to repay as they deserve. Without the staff of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents, and in particular M. P. Lukichev and S. R. Dolgova, the work could not have been done at all. I owe thanks as well to the staff of the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, and in particular to Dr. Leopold Auer. My thanks are due to the Svenska Riksarkiv in Stockholm, the Danska Rigsarkiv in Copenhagen, the Algemeene Rijksarchief in the Hague, the Public Record Office in London, and the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France in Paris. Many libraries as well have helped enormously, the Historical Library and the Russian State Library in Moscow, the Russian National Library (Publichka) in St. Petersburg, the British Library, and the Slavic Library of the University of Helsinki (and especially Irina Lukka) all made my work easier. My greatest debt among librarians goes to the staff of the Sterling Memorial and Beinecke Libraries at Yale University. Tatjana Lorković and Susanne Roberts were an unfailing source of assistance and provided me with a continuous stream of new and old material. The Interlibrary Loan office, Maureen Jones and Liz Johnson, found arcane and unknown works in the most unlikely places. The Circulation Desk staff, Barbara Gajewski, Pearlene Ford, and their colleagues solved more problems than could ever be imagined. A particular debt goes to Kevin Pacelli and the staff of the Microtext Room of Sterling Library, who kept me and several elderly machines going with unfailing courtesy and good humor through several phases of rebuilding and ultimate reequiptment. Of course none of the work could have been done without the support of the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, the American Philosophical Society, the Scandinavian American Foundation, the Deutsch–Amerikanische

Austauschdienst, and several provosts of Yale University. None of their valuable support would have been much good if Merete and Nils Bormanis had not been there to get me to where I needed to be.

My colleagues and students gave greater help than most of them realize. Charles Halperin, E. H. Melton, and Samuel Ramer read through the entire manuscript with great attention, improving my style, finding all sorts of errors, and assuring me that I was on the right track. Nikos Chrissidis took an active and welcome interest in Peter and was always ready with references and assistance. In the final and most hectic stages of this work, he was a person to rely upon. David Schimmelpenninck made sure I did not get lost in the many byways of one of his ancestral countries. Maria Arel, Jason Lavery, Cathy Potter, Carla Schmidt, Vera Shevzov, Jennifer Spock, Kathy Stuart, Cherie Woodworth, and other Yale graduate students survived years of professorial preoccupation and kept up a dialogue in Russian and European history that was invaluable. In Russia, S. O. Shmidt provided a forum on Peter where it belonged, while the late D. S. Likhachev solved a small but crucial problem. Vladimir Skopin's help and knowledge were crucial at several points. Sergei Kondrat'ev introduced me to parts of Russia I never expected to see. L. V. Betin and his family remained essential to my experience in Russia, through the years of Peter as before. Outside of Russia my debts are almost as numerous. Wladimir Berelowitsch and the faculty and students of the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris heard an early version of my work on Peter and provided invaluable responses and criticism. The American Philosophical Society and Tulane University performed a similar service. Many colleagues and friends around the world are probably unaware of the importance of their encouragement and intellectual stimulation, but it is no less great. Let me mention them: the late Gustave Alef, Aleksei Chagin, Robert Crummey, Ol'ga Dmitrieva, Harvey Goldblatt, Andrea Graziosi, Nancy Kollmann, Alexandra Korros, Eve Levin, Gael Moullec, Marshall Poe, Frank Turner. Christine Restall and Peter Hasler were an oasis in long archival sessions and provided never-failing hospitality and humor. D. C. B. Lieven not only gave me a place to stay and write in London, but also introduced me to a part of the Russian past I would otherwise never have encountered. Hans Torke deserves a particular place in my thanks. His contribution to my understanding of history, to broadening my scholarly contacts, and to the sheer pleasure of the

profession was immense. I regret that he will not see this book in print, to whose early stages he provided a much needed platform. Finally, Sven-Erik and Tora Johnsson gave me my first sight of one of Peter's battlefields, and the many Mörens introduced me to the farther reaches of Peter's world.

My greatest debt, however, is to Maija Jansson, Director of the Yale Center for Parliamentary History, who was the original inspiration for this work and sustained it over many years. It was she who first showed me that apparently hackneyed themes could be fundamentally rewritten with new material, and that an old and familiar story might simply be wrong. A historian cannot ask for more.

Abbreviations

ADM.	A. D. Menshikov
AME	Archive du Ministère des affaires étrangères
ARSG	Algemeene Rijksarchief, Staaten Generaal
ChOidr	<i>Chteniia v imp. Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete</i>
DR	<i>Dvortsovye razriady</i>
DRV	<i>Drevniaia Rossiiskaia Vifiiofika</i>
GPB	Gos. Publichnaia Biblioteka=Rossiiskaia Natsional'naia Biblioteka
GSAPK	Geheime Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz
HHStA	Haus- Hof und Staatsarchiv
PI	Peter the First
PiB	<i>Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo</i>
RBS	<i>Russkii biograficheskii slovar'</i>
RGADA	Rossiiskii gos. arkhiv drevnikh aktov
RIB	Ruskaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka
RS	<i>Ruskaia starina</i>
SHSA	Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv
SR	Svenska riksarkivet
SRIO	<i>Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva</i>
TKUA	Tyske kancelli, udenrigske avdelning
ZA	<i>Zakonodatel'nye akty</i>
ZhMNP	<i>Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia</i>
ZORSA	<i>Zapiski Otdela russkoi i slavianskoi arkheologii Imp. Akademii nauk</i>

Introduction

After three hundred years Peter the Great retains his hold over the imagination of Russia as well as the rest of the world. For Russians in particular, the absorbing issue is the significance of his reign and of what are usually called his reforms. Did they really change Russia? Were they a good thing or a bad thing? Did they lead to democracy? To 1917? To the participation of Russia in European culture? To the alienation of Russia from its spiritual home in Orthodoxy? These are the questions which the story of Peter the Great will elicit in Russia and probably always has elicited, and this book will offer a direct answer to none of them.

I will offer no direct answer because it is my argument that Peter's reign has remained in large and crucial areas unknown. We cannot evaluate the significance of Peter's actions until we know what they were, and the traditional accounts have this in common that they do not tell us enough about those actions. It is my aim to rewrite the political narrative of the reign and its antecedents, using sources which have been largely bypassed or underutilized in the study of the period. The principal result of a new narrative of the politics of Peter's time will be to elucidate the informal structures of power in the Russian state.

Russian and Western historiography of Peter reflects the grand divisions of thought on the Russian past, perhaps more thoroughly than any other subject. To a large extent it breaks down into the "state" school and its opponents, including but not restricted to the Slavophiles. The state school looked at Russian history as the development of statehood (*gosudarstvennost'*), by which it meant formal bureaucratic institutions. The leading idea was the development of legal order, essentially of the *Rechtsstaat*, which would supposedly lay the foundations for representative government. Not surprisingly, the state school crystallized in the era of the Great

Reforms of Alexander II, but its way of looking at Russian history has to a large extent survived the original ideology and political subtext. Its methods and concerns are found whether the historian is largely hostile to Peter (P. N. Miliukov) or favorable (M. M. Bogoslovskii). Soviet historiography, on the rare occasions when it turned its attention from agrarian history and the class struggle, followed largely in the path of the state school, looking at formal institutions. We see its outcome in the work of E. V. Anisimov. Similarly, the Western historians who have turned their attention to Peter, most notably Reinhard Wittram, have been firmly in this tradition.¹

There is nothing wrong with the history of formal institutions, unfashionable as it may be today. Without this sort of study, the historian could not make sense of the shifting political structure of Russia, particularly in Peter's time. The difficulty that such history presents, however, is that it does not really get at the actual levers of power and the mechanism of political action in Russia before the nineteenth century. It has had to rely on the autocratic tsar as a sort of *Deus ex machina*, whose magic wand effects all change in a society that is a vacuum and by means of a state that is merely a series of passive, if rather incompetent, instruments. The other result of the state school is that it produces a history without living people. The state is essentially an abstraction, as is the tsar-autocrat.

Naturally, no historian is entirely the prisoner of his conception. Bogoslovskii and Wittram managed to combine a fundamental allegiance to notions derived from the state school with a lively account of the culture, personalities, and much of the politics of Peter's time. Nevertheless, they did not escape far enough to examine the social groups which were crucial to Peter's success or failure, and with whom he lived and worked and often struggled against. By this group I mean the ruling elite, essentially the old

¹ Nicholas. V. Riasanovsky, *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought*, New York, 1985; S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 15 vols., Moscow, 1960–66, vols. VII–IX (originally vols. XIII–XVIII, 1863–67); Solov'ev, *Publičnye chteniia o Petre Velikom*, Moscow, 1872; P. N. Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII stolietia i reforma Petra Velikogo*, St. Petersburg, 1892; M. M. Bogoslovskii, *Oblastnaia reforma Petra Velikogo: provintsia 1719–1727 gg.*, *ChOIDR* (1902), pt. 3, 1–208; pt. 4, 209–522, appendix 1–46; E. V. Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye preobrazovaniia i samoderzhavie Petra Velikogo*, St. Petersburg, 1997; Reinhard Wittram, *Peter I: Czar und Kaiser*, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1964; Marc Raeff, *Comprendre l'ancien régime russe*, Paris, 1982, 46–68; Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, New Haven, CT, 1998.

boyar aristocracy with the addition of the new favorites and officials of Peter's reign.

The ruling elite of the Russian state in the early modern era has been the subject of intensive research, but largely focussing on the sixteenth century. S. B. Veselovskii, A. A. Zimin, R. G. Skrynnikov, A. P. Pavlov in Russia, and Gustave Alef, Ann Kleimola, and Nancy Kollmann have, for all their different approaches, given us a thorough and detailed picture of the composition of that elite.² The seventeenth century has not been so fortunate, and until recently has attracted more attention outside Russia itself. Richard Hellie's sociology of the whole landholding class as a military elite has come to rest aside Robert Crummey's prosopography of the boyars to provide two very different accounts. The present work rests for its knowledge of the boyar elite mainly on that of Crummey, supplemented by Marshall Poe, and on the studies of John LeDonne and Brenda Meehan on the eighteenth century.³

It is the American historians Kollmann, Crummey, and LeDonne who have posed most sharply the issues of the composition and political role of the ruling elite of Russia in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. They share a belief that the traditional picture of the tsar-autocrat is unrealistic, requiring a degree of power in his

² S. B. Veselovskii, *Issledovaniia po istorii klassa sluzhilykh zemlevadel'tsev*, Moscow, 1969; A. A. Zimin, "Sostav boiarskoi dumy v XV–XVI vv.," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1957 g.*, Moscow, 1958, 41–87; A. A. Zimin, *Formirovanie boiarskoi aristokratii v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XV–pervoi treti XVI v.*, Moscow, 1988; R. G. Skrynnikov, *Nachalo Oprichniny*, Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo gos. pedagogicheskogo instituta im. A. Gertsena 294 (Leningrad, 1966); R. G. Skrynnikov, *Oprichnyi terror*, Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo gos. pedagogicheskogo instituta im. A. Gertsena 374, (Leningrad, 1969); Skrynnikov, *Rossia posle Oprichniny: ocherki politicheskoi i sotsial'noi istorii*, Leningrad, 1975, 5–108; A. P. Pavlov, *Gosudarev dvor i politicheskaiia bor'ba pri Borise Godunove (1584–1605 gg.)*, St. Petersburg, 1992; Gustave Alef, *The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy: the Age of Ivan III*, *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 39 (1986); Ann M. Kleimola, "The Changing Face of the Muscovite Autocracy: The Sixteenth Century: Sources of Weakness," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 25 (1977), 481–93; Kleimola, "Up Through Servitude: The Changing Condition of the Muscovite Elite in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 6/2 (1979), 210–29; Kleimola, "Patterns of Duma Recruitment 1505–1550," in Daniel Waugh, ed., *Essays in Honor of A. A. Zimin*, Columbus, OH, 1985, 130–58; Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547*, Stanford, CA, 1987.

³ Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, Chicago, IL, 1971; Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia 1613–1689*, Princeton, NJ, 1983; Marshall Poe, *The Consular and Ceremonial Ranks of the Russian 'Sovereign's', Court 1613–1713*, *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Humaniora*, (forthcoming); Brenda Meehan-Waters, *Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Service Elite of 1730*, New Brunswick, NJ, 1982; John P. LeDonne, "Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order 1689–1825," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 28, no. 3–4 (July–December 1987), 233–322; LeDonne, *Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order, 1700–1825*, New York, 1991.

hands that is not attested to in the sources. They have correctly emphasized that the boyar elite was not a transitory series of great men but a congeries of clans, some at the pinnacle of society since the fourteenth century, and who remained at that pinnacle at least until the end of the eighteenth century. This is not to say that there were no new additions, but that there was no "fall of the aristocracy" and "rise of the gentry" posited particularly by S. F. Platonov. The American school has correctly identified the actual path of promotion to and within the Duma ranks, and its dependence on ancestral position and the complex and informal rules by which such promotions occurred. It has also pointed out the absolutely central role of the marriage politics of the ruling dynasty. In the seventeenth century, neither Dolgorukii, Streshnev, Naryshkin nor Apraksin would have been great names without marriages to the tsar. Even the rejected Lopukhins managed to maintain an important position in Russia after Peter's death.

The American studies of the ruling elite posit, however, a relationship of the great clans to politics which is not sustained in all aspects by the investigation of actual political action. Kollmann, Crummey, and LeDonne all see kinship relations as absolutely crucial to the political role of the great families. Yet the great families were not necessarily united within themselves. In the 1680s two first cousins, Princes Boris Alekseevich and Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, battled for predominance in the Russian state. V. V. Golitsyn paid for his failure with a twenty-five-year exile in the Russian north. Yet his victorious cousin Boris tried hard to prevent a worse fate, acting largely from family solidarity. In the course of Peter's reign there were many other families which split along political lines. The sense of kinship and solidarity was real, attested to many times, but it was not enough to allow the historian to infer similar political goals and feelings. The American school also assumes that the aim of the great families was their maintenance at the peak of power and control of the progression of their relatives and others up the ranks. Yet the political life of Peter's time was not a naked struggle for power, position, and access to the treasury. To a large part it was about the character of the informal structure of power, about concrete issues such as foreign policy, and occasionally about the larger political and cultural direction of the country. The issues were not the same in every decade or every case.

The study and elucidation of the composition of the ruling elite

runs the risk of substituting sociological abstraction for institutional abstraction. The belief that the great clans really ran Russia in conjunction with the tsar, not as his passive instruments, cannot really be sustained without the examination of the political events of the time. It is there that we shall see or not the action of the great families. Hence to really understand the functioning of the state, that is, the tsar, the ruling elite, and the institutions of state, we need to write the political narrative of the time. In the case of Peter, this means largely to rewrite the narrative, for the one we have is seriously lacking.

There are many problems with the existing narrative. The most dramatic is that of simple falsification, primarily in the case of events for which historians have relied on the work of N. G. Ustrialov. His falsification and omission of crucial documents from the affair of Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich has misled historians for a century and a half.⁴ There are the many legends about Peter and his reign, deriving from sources which are unreliable, late, or both, such as de Neuville, Matveev, Kurakin, and the collections of real and spurious anecdotes about Peter from the late eighteenth century. The largely worthless biographies of Peter manufactured in the West soon after his death circulated in Russia, often with spurious documents, and influenced the early historians of Peter such as I. I. Golikov. From Golikov and other sources these legends entered the history of Peter and are very hard, if not impossible, to expel. E. Shmurlo tried to do this at the turn of the century, but much of his work has been forgotten. Thus the romantic story of the encounter of Tsar Aleksei and Natalia Naryshkina at the house of Artamon Matveev is still alive a hundred years after Shmurlo proved it untenable.⁵

The legendary history of Peter is not merely an annoyance for the historian or a goldmine for the popular biographer. As I will show later, the romantic story of Natal'ia and Aleksei, attested to only a half century after the events, fundamentally distorts the history of the political career of Artamon Matveev, of the evolution of the Naryshkin faction, and thus of the origins of the political crises of the

⁴ N. G. Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikogo*, vols. I–IV and VI, St. Petersburg, 1858–63 (esp. vol. VI); Paul Bushkovitch, “Power and the Historian: The Case of Tsarevich Aleksei 1716–1718 and N. G. Ustrialov 1845–1859,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 141, no. 3 (June, 1997), 177–212; and Bushkovitch, “Istorik i vlast': delo tsarevicha Alekseia (1716–1718) i N. G. Ustrialov (1845–1859),” in Michael David-Fox, ed., *Amerikanskaia rusistika*, Samara, 2000, 80–120.

⁵ See below, chapter 2.

later seventeenth century. This incident also points to another issue, the excision of Peter's "private life" from the mainstream of historical debate. Inattention to Peter's private life is a basic methodological error. Neither Russian tsars nor any other monarchs of the pre-modern world had a private life in the modern sense. Every bit of their lives, whether minor household appointments, journeys, forms of recreation, mistresses, or places of habitation, had some political overtones. Peter's affair with Anna Mons, his divorce, and his attachment to Ekaterina and his subsequent marriage to her were all in large part political acts. Unfortunately, the female households of the Romanov dynasty as well as the mistresses are largely unknown, and worse yet, the domain of unreliable semi-journalistic history, particularly that of M. I. Semevskii from the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Semevskii was the last to write about most of the women of Peter's time, and his works mix legend, fantasy, and solid information in a manner that is at times impossible to disentangle. As he was looking at "private life" as he understood it, he at least wrote about the women in Peter's life, though from a point of view which marginalized their political role. No one has looked at the household and inner structure of the court since the antiquarian I. E. Zabelin, who in any case stopped at 1700.⁶

To rewrite the political narrative of Peter's time it is necessary to integrate what is now known of the family and clan structure of the elite, the so-called "private life" of Peter, and the institutional history which the state school and its offshoots have left us. The narrative of politics will allow us to reconstruct the informal structure of power, but to tell the story we need sources that make it possible. Writing the narrative of seventeenth-century Western European politics (or history) is not all that difficult: there is a multitude of diaries, correspondence, and memoirs that allow us to get behind the façade. For Peter's Russia there is no Madame de Sevigné or Duke de Saint-Simon to tell us what we want to know.⁷ Surviving correspondence is extremely rare, and much of it is very formal, the ritualized exchange of greetings more common among European noblemen of the sixteenth century. Peter's own letters, collected in the *Pis'ma i bumagi Petra Velikogo*, ongoing since 1887, goes only up to the middle

⁶ I. E. Zabelin, *Domashnii byt russkogo naroda v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1862–69; M. I. Semevskii, *Tsaritsa Praskov'ia 1664–1723*, St. Petersburg, 1883; Semevskii, *Tsaritsa Ekaterina Alekseevna, Anna i Villim Mons 1692–1724*, St. Petersburg, 1884.

⁷ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Saint-Simon ou le système de la Cour*, Paris, 1997.

of 1713 and in any case contains relatively little of either personal correspondence or letters and memoranda setting out Peter's motivations. In most of the letters he gives orders to subordinates, passes news to the favorite Aleksandr Menshikov or other major figures, commands the army, and exchanges diplomatic messages with other sovereigns. He does not tell us about the factional struggles at court, or give us private thoughts on Menshikov or Field Marshal Sheremetev. Only Menshikov himself, Sheremetev, Prince B. I. Kurakin, and a few others left substantial bodies of correspondence but it too is largely devoted to administrative, diplomatic, or military matters.

The one large body of source material to illuminate the political life of the Russian court continuously and in detail is the dispatches of the many foreign diplomats at the Russian court. Since the time of Leopold von Ranke historians of Western Europe have regarded diplomatic reports as crucial documents for the study of court politics, as well as for diplomacy. Russian historians, in contrast, have largely ignored these sources or used them opportunistically to write the history of Peter's time, though they have been used widely for later periods. Perhaps the problem has been that many of them are unpublished, and also that many of them are unknown. Starting in the mid-nineteenth century the Russian Imperial Historical Society began to publish (mostly excerpted) the reports on Russia from England, France, Prussia, and Austria for the eighteenth century, but only those from England and France covered Peter's time. Their value varied. England did not have an ambassador in Russia for much of Peter's reign, and Charles Whitworth, an accomplished diplomat who represented Queen Anne in 1704–10 spent more time on negotiations than on collecting information. France had no permanent presence until 1715, when the French commercial agent, Henri Lavie, arrived, only to spend much of his time drinking and repeat what was generally known in the diplomatic community.⁸

The Russian Historical Society missed the most interesting diplomatic series for Peter's time and immediately before. Beginning after the treaty of Andrusovo (1667), Russia began to attract the increased

⁸ A more positive view of Lavie is found in Samuel Baron, "Henri Lavie and the Failed Campaign to Expand Franco-Russian Commercial Relations (1712–1723)," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (1995), 29–50.

attention of European powers. Until that moment the only state to maintain a regular resident in Russia had been Sweden. The reports of Swedish agents begin in 1630 and continue until the outbreak of the Northern War in 1700, forming one of the most important sources and one of the least known for Russian history in those years. After 1667, the Swedes began to acquire colleagues. A Danish ambassador arrived in 1673, and a Dutch ambassador in 1676. Both countries had more or less permanent representation from that time.⁹ The Holy Roman Empire was also aware of the rising power to the east, and sent more and more frequent envoys to Moscow. In 1692 the Imperial embassy left behind one Otto Pleyer, a young man with high-ranking relations in the Vienna bureaucracy and court, to learn Russian and observe the country. In the wake of the 1697–98 Imperial embassy Pleyer became the recognized Imperial representative and from then on provided monthly or even weekly reports for twenty years. At the outbreak of the Northern War, Pleyer was joined by ambassadors from Prussia and Peter's temperamental ally, Augustus II of Poland-Saxony. As the Polish constitution did not allow the king to maintain a permanent diplomatic staff abroad, Augustus used the Saxon Electorate to provide such emissaries, and their voluminous reports remain in Dresden today, unread by Russian historians since the 1880s. Similarly, only fragments of the Prussian reports from Peter's reign, extensive and highly informative, made it into print. It is all these reports that form a solid basis to construct the continuing thread of political life at the Russian court, yet only small fragments have been published.

Diplomatic sources are not terribly fashionable today, perhaps because of the misapprehension that they exclusively concern diplomatic negotiations. Many of the powers in question had no important business with Russia for years on end, or when they did, sent high-ranking extraordinary ambassadors. The residents and agents remained, sending out endless reports of Russian happenings, some of which were then pirated, legally or not, and often rewritten for

⁹ G. V. Forsten, "Datskie diplomaty pri moskovskom dvore vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka (1648–1700)," *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* 355–56 (September 1904); and Forsten, "Snosheniia Shvetsii s Rossiei vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka (1648–1700)," *ibid.*, 315–17 (1898), 323 (1899), 325 (1899); Heinz Ellersieck, "Russia under Aleksei Mikhailovich and Feodor Alekseevich 1645–1682: The Scandinavian Sources," Ph.D. University of California at Los Angeles, 1955; Thomas Eekman, "Muscovy's International Relations in the Late Seventeenth Century: Johan van Keller's Observations," *California Slavic Studies* 14 (1992), 44–67.

the emerging newspaper market.¹⁰ The diplomats were not merely rumor-mongers. They took considerable care to indicate when they knew something firsthand, from observation or from direct conversation with the principals, when they knew it from trusted sources, when something was the general talk, and when it was plain rumor. Obviously their firsthand conversations with Peter or Menshikov are more trustworthy than other sources, but their network of sources was not trivial.¹¹ Reading the dispatches year after year allows the historian to reconstruct the network of the diplomat, to see where he got his information and thus to infer the climate of feeling among certain of the courtiers or officials. Pleyer is a prime example, for his dispatches in the years 1700–09 reveal his contacts with the Sheremetev family, and later on with some of those implicated in the case of Tsarevich Aleksei, Avram Lopukhin and Vasilii Alekseevich, the Siberian tsarevich. These were all oppositional circles, while the Danish ambassadors first allied with the Naryshkin faction in the 1680s and later had more contact with Peter and Menshikov than with the discontented grandees whom Pleyer cultivated. All the diplomats had good access to the Russian court and government offices, most startlingly on the occasions when they reported in detail on supposedly secret investigations of political crimes.

To be sure, the diplomats had their agenda. Issues of no importance to their sovereigns they ignored. Thus the church and the cultural changes going on in the church almost never figure in diplomatic reports. The church appears only on the rare occasions where it impinged on high politics or on foreign relations. There are cultural blind spots, but on the whole the diplomats do not present

¹⁰ In the seventeenth century the Swedish reports were regularly purchased and appeared, with frequent changes, in the German newsletters: Martin Welke, "Rußland in der deutschen Publizistik des 17. Jahrhunderts (1613–1689)," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23, (1976), 105–276. The same occurred even more often in Peter's time. The most often cited and plagiarized history of the tsar was that of Jean Rousset, a French protestant *émigré*, who published in Amsterdam in 1728–26 his *Mémoires du règne de Pierre le Grand* under the name of Iwan Iwanowits Nestesuranoi. The work was a compilation of public and diplomatic sources. His account of the affair of Tsarevitch Aleksei, for example, is a combination of the official Russian manifesto and the dispatches of the Dutch resident, Jacob de Bie. See vol. IV, p. 33, where the description of the ceremony of abdication of the tsarevich is a fairly exact translation of de Bie's report for 6/17 February 1718 in ARSG Rusland 7368, 1718. Rousset, like the earlier German journalists, evidently did not have access to the encoded portions of the despatches. On Rousset and the plagiarism of his work, see R. Minzloff, *Pierre le Grand dans la littérature étrangère*, St. Petersburg, 1873, 40–3.

¹¹ On some of the methods and terminology of the diplomat's reports see Paul Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction and the Opposition to Peter the Great: The 1690s," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50, (1995), 80–120.

an exotic story of wild orgies and barbaric cruelties such as dot the pages of many of the published accounts of Russia in the early modern era. The diplomats were in Russia to conduct business. They needed to know how the country worked, who was powerful, who was on the rise and the opposite, what was Peter like and what did he want. They did not find the Russian court impenetrably alien or incomprehensible. In the 1670s and 1680s they certainly realized that it did not run on European lines and that its culture was different, but they saw it less as alien or foreign than primitive. The Russians lacked the culture assumed in Europe since the Renaissance and so naturally (they thought) its customs were backward and ignorant. The diplomats did not have any trouble understanding the political structure. Unlike many later historians who have agonized over the exact nature of the Russian elite, for the European diplomats of Aleksei's time or Peter's, it was clearly a nobility: *Adel* or *noblesse*. Within it they identified "the great" (*die grossen, les grands*), the favorites, both from great families and from lesser, and the various factions. They saw the women of the ruling house and some others engaged in political life, and reported it without shock or surprise. As Russian culture, particularly at court, became more European, the diplomats' understanding of Russian politics began to match that of the Russian elite, who abandoned the religious terminology of earlier centuries.

Russian sources naturally form the core of the study of Russian history, though they cannot by their nature answer all questions. The mass of documents of the *Razriad*, with its year by year recording of promotions to Duma and court ranks, combined with the records of appointments to head the various chancelleries, allows a precise tracking of the official positions of the elite for the seventeenth century. Unfortunately, no similar body of data exists for the eighteenth century, but in recompense the historian has the letter collections of Menshikov and a few other grandees. Mostly bureaucratic correspondence and formal greetings, they nevertheless contain crucial nuggets of information. I have scarcely been able to exploit their varied uses. Among the most valuable records are those of the investigation and trials of various opponents of Peter within the elite, particularly the Tsykler-Sokovnin case and the investigation of Tsarevich Aleksei. Ustrialov's very selective publication of the records of the case of Aleksei has required a reexamination of the archival originals. Finally, the huge mass of bureaucratic docu-

ments retains its value, particularly when the historian uses the information which they contain on the personnel of the institutions as well as the records of formal structures and actions. Only with such sources can we retell the story of the elite politics of Peter's reign.

The result is a new story of Peter the Great, some episodes familiar, some with new elements, some entirely new. As it has been my principal aim to reconstruct the narrative, I have mostly refrained from repeatedly entering the historiographical battles which have surrounded Peter since his death. Where unavoidable, I have relegated these to the notes. It has been my aim to strip away many of the legends and anachronistic conceptions of the events of Peter's reign, but also to construct a picture of the politics of the time. It is my hope that a new narrative of Peter's time makes clear the informal rules of the political game, the need of the monarch to balance the factions at court and to compromise even when carrying out radical changes. The narrative will also demonstrate that the rivalries of the boyars had an autonomy of their own, under both a strong ruler and a weak one. Within these rules, Russian politics was not a stagnant pool of routine autocracy, rather it was in continuous motion, a myriad of competing forces seeking an unattainable equilibrium. It is my hope that the demonstration of the truth or falsity of this conception of Peter's reign and its immediate antecedents will arise from the story.

The reader is advised that square brackets in footnotes quoting diplomatic reports indicate material in code in the original.

Prologue: Court politics and reform

The reign of Peter the Great was one of the great turning points in Russian history, and indeed of European history as well. In so far as Peter's transformation of Russia increased the speed of its rise to the status of a great power, he affected the whole history of western Eurasia, laying the foundations of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the advance of Russia into Transcaucasia and Central Asia. His transformation of the Russian state, moving it toward a bureaucratic monarchy of the European type, did not outlast the Romanov dynasty, but his transformation of Russian culture was permanent. Russia entered the sphere of West European culture, including that of secular political thought.

These were momentous changes. But how did Peter do it? For thirty years, from the mid-1690s to his death in 1725, he gave thousands of orders which added up to fundamental changes in Russian life. Many of the orders were not popular, and in the early years, roughly from the musketeer revolt of 1698 to the end of the Bulavin revolt in 1708, there was much opposition from the common people of Russia. As we shall see, for virtually the whole of the reign the other pole of society, the ruling elite, was rife with discontent, discontent aroused as much by Peter's reliance on a small circle of favorites (especially Menshikov) as by Peter's larger goals. This elite discontent came to a head with the affair of Tsarevich Aleksei in 1716–18. Thus Peter carried out his transformation of Russian society against the will of some of the most powerful of Russia's elite as well as that of his own son. His success was not due to having a powerful state apparatus at his command. The old administrative and governmental system he inherited from the seventeenth century had coped with its normal tasks fairly well, but in no sense was it an efficient modern bureaucracy. In any case, it ceased to function after about 1700, and for the next twenty years,

the time of crucial tests of strength, the state apparatus was a series of improvisations held together by a desperately overworked tsar and his equally overworked favorites.

Peter's success came from his ability to manage the politics of the court and the elite as much as it did from his personal abilities in administration, in military and diplomatic affairs. For Peter was not alone at the head of the Russian state. He had inherited a wealthy and traditionally important ruling elite, essentially the boyars and others with Duma rank, who had served his father in virtually all important offices, civil and military. Most of these people were to a greater or lesser extent unhappy with his changes, yet he managed ultimately to conciliate them enough to remain in power and carry out his will. As we shall see, this was more than just a matter of issuing orders.

CHAPTER I

Tsar and boyars: structures and values

The deadly rivalry among the boyars after the death of Tsar Aleksei in 1676 can only be understood in the context of the value system and political structure of the court and the court elite in the last years of the life of Peter's father. At the time of Peter the Great's birth, 30 May 1672, the feast of St. Isaac of Dalmatia, the scene of Russian political life was the court of his father, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. The setting for the tsar's court in those years, as it had been for centuries, was the Kremlin in Moscow, primarily the tsar's palace in the southwest corner.

Most of that space today is taken up by the Grand Palace of the time of Tsar Nicholas I, but some fragments of the old palace of the tsars remain, immediately adjacent to K. A. Ton's classical pile. The original palace was roughly in the shape of the letter "U," with the lower part of the "U" facing east toward the small square formed by the bell tower of Ivan the Great and the two cathedrals, the Dormition and Archangel Michael.¹ This lower part included most of the public rooms, the audience chambers where the tsar received ambassadors and where the Duma met. In the sixteenth century the two arms of the "U" running roughly west toward the wall were the private rooms of the ruling family, and behind them were the offices of the palace administration, the stables, the workshops, and the storehouses. Projecting from the lower part of the "U" were two additional structures connected to the main palace. One was the palace chapel, the Cathedral of the Annunciation from

¹ S. P. Bartenev, *Moskovskii Kreml' v starinu i teper'*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1912–16. The seventeenth-century palace has been the least studied of the Kremlin structures, the best account remaining is that of I. E. Zabelin, *Domashnii byt russkikh tsarei v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1868–72 (reprint of vol. 1, *Gosudarev dvor ili dvorets*, Moscow, 1990). N. A. Geinike, N. S. Elagin, E. A. Efimova, and I. I. Shitts, *Po Moskve: progulki po Moskve i ee khudozhestvennym i prosvetitel'nym uchrezhdeniiam*, Moscow 1917 (reprint, 1991), 161–91 and endpaper maps.

the 1480s with its even older icons, some from the brush of Andrei Rublev. The other was the Hall of Facets, the work of Venetian builders, Marco Ruffo and Pietro Antonio Solari (1487–91). For the Kremlin, that most Russian of all places, is largely the work of Italians. Ruffo and Solari built the walls (1485–95) after the pattern of Italian fortresses, Aristotele Fioravanti the Dormition Cathedral (1475–79) and Alevisse Novi the Archangel Cathedral some twenty years later. Fioravanti amazed the Russians with his engineering skills in putting up the church, but he and his colleagues adhered to a traditional Russian design, weaving in a few Renaissance decorative elements.

In the time of Tsar Aleksei's father Michael, much of the Kremlin had to be rebuilt. The fighting of the Time of Troubles (1604–18) and the resultant occupation of the Kremlin by Polish soldiers had left its mark. The palace was rebuilt, following roughly the old "U"-shaped plan but with the more decorated style of the seventeenth century. The resulting structure had no symmetry, no grand entrance and no Palladian columns. The roof was a jumble of different heights and different forms. The facade was irregular with the Hall of Facets and the Annunciation Cathedral jutting out and the main entrance (the Red Staircase) on the left wall of the Hall of Facets, not in the center. While the Hall of Facets (and perhaps the exterior of the Golden Hall) reflected the Renaissance style to some extent, the rebuilt living quarters were entirely Russian. Peter's father and grandfather had moved the main living quarters (the *terem*) from the left arm to the right arm of the "U," and rebuilt them in Russian style. The window frames were elaborately carved and throughout the facade and low rooms floral decoration and carving ran riot. The most striking fact about the palace, however, was how small it was and how modest compared to the churches around the palace square. The Hall of Facets had only four windows on its main floor facing the square, and five on the two sides. It rested on a sort of high basement, with one full floor and a low attic. Its roof did not come up to the roof line of the Dormition Cathedral immediately adjacent, or that of the Archangel Cathedral across the square, to say nothing of the bell tower. The new living quarters, in the right arm of the "U" back of the Hall of Facets, were a bit higher, for there were two full stories with a high basement and one large attic room. Seen from across the Moscow river, it was not the palace that dominated the silhouette as it does today, it was the churches. The

message of the Kremlin at the time of Peter's birth was that God is great and man is small, even the tsar.

The new decoration and modest increase in the size of the tsar's living quarters did not affect this message, essentially established at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Peter grew up in a structure utterly different in conception from the European royal palaces of the Renaissance. The kings of Europe built their palaces to exalt royal power, whether in Madrid, Paris, London, Copenhagen, or Warsaw. Philip II of Spain made a move toward a more religious conception with the monastic palace of the Escorial, but his descendants did not follow him, as the example of Buen Retiro shows. Philip II had few imitators in Europe (Peter's contemporary Karl VI of Austria at Klosterneuburg was one of the few), and kings both Catholic and Protestant preferred to exalt royal power rather than God, even the very Catholic Sigismund of Poland in the first version of the royal palace in Warsaw.²

The Kremlin not only conveyed a different message than did its counterparts in Europe, it also used a different artistic language. By the seventeenth century the Italian contributions had been largely overwhelmed by native Russian styles, though in 1634 the Holstein ambassador Adam Olearius still recognized the Italian look of the palace.³ He did not see the Italian aspects of the churches, which were indeed matters of minor decoration, nor the Italian basis of the Kremlin walls themselves. The walls had come to look entirely different in the seventeenth century. The towers received pointed roofs on the flat-topped Italian towers, giving the whole its characteristic "Russian" appearance. That Russian look was a curious amalgam of massive decoration over a basically functional design. The churches had to be built in certain ways because they were a sacred space. They had to have certain elements and be painted with

² Philip IV's Buen Retiro, though built around a monastery, was a typical Baroque monument to the king and his glory. See Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, New Haven, CT and London, 1998, 97–98; Jonathan Brown and J. H. Elliott, *A Palace for a King: The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV*, New Haven, CT 1980; Werner Kitlitschka, "Kunstgeschichte der Neuzeit," in *Klosterneuburg: Geschichte und Kultur*, vol. I. Klosterneuburg, and Vienna, c. 1990, 157–65; Simon Thurley, *The Royal Palaces of Tudor England: Architecture and Court Life 1460–1547*, New Haven, CT, 1983; Jerzy Lileyko, *Zamek warszawski: Rezydencja królewska i siedziba władz Rzeczypospolitej 1569–1763*, *Studia z historii sztuki* 35, Wrocław, 1984, 93–97; and the many works on Versailles, such as Yves Bottineau, *Versailles, miroir des princes*, Paris, 1989 and Guy Walton, *Louis XIV's Versailles*, Chicago, IL, 1986.

³ Adam Olearius, *Vermehrte neue Beschreibung der Muscowitischen und Persischen Reyse*, Schleswig, 1656, reprint edition, Tübingen, 1971, 146.

only a small number of possible themes and with the high icon screen before the altar. The disposition of the icons was not random, it was fixed by the notions of the icon screen's message. A church was not the object of artistic creativity, it was the meeting place of this world and the beyond, something much too important for man to alter. The palace also was largely functional. It was not there to convey the glory of the tsar, but to house him and his family and provide space for the activities of rule. The rooms were not grand halls designed to overwhelm the visitor, they were small and low and designed to retain heat in the winter, with large tiled stoves taking up much of the space. The windows were small and set deeply into the thick walls and contained panes of mica in metal frames rather than glass. The palace, or at least its public rooms, also had a message to convey, but that came not from its overall architecture but from the painting on the wall of the Golden Hall and the Hall of Facets.⁴

In those paintings the Kremlin palace of Peter's childhood did not proclaim the glory of the earthly tsar. They demonstrated the place of the tsar in the divine plan of the world. The iconographic program is clear from the descriptions and remains of the main public rooms, the Golden Hall of Ivan the Terrible, decorated 1547–53, and the Hall of Facets, decorated 1584–98. All of these were low-ceilinged, vaulted rooms, with small windows which must have preserved heat well but seemed dark and cramped by Renaissance and Baroque standards. The ceilings and walls were not designed to be finely proportioned in themselves, but to be functional and to carry the iconographic program of the palace.

The program of the Golden Hall was centered on Christ, not on the tsar. Christ enthroned as the Saviour Emmanuel looked down from the ceiling on the hall, surrounded by the Mother of God, the apostles, saints, and prophets, and allegories of the virtues and vices and God's creation of the world. On the next row were the saintly princes (Boris, Gleb, Michael of Tver', Alexander Nevskii) as well as Ivan III and Vasilii II and the story of Gideon (Judges 6–8), the

⁴ The Hall of Facets still remains, with its paintings heavily "restored" in the nineteenth century. The Golden Hall was torn down with adjacent rooms in 1752 to make way for Empress Elizabeth's Kremlin Palace, which in turn fell victim to Nicholas I and Ton. What is known of the paintings survives from very detailed seventeenth-century descriptions. Bartenev, *Moskovskii Kremľ*, 2, 183–93; O. I. Podobedova, *Moskovskaia shkola zhivopisi pri Ivane IV*, Moscow, 1972, 59–68, especially the appendix: K. K. Lopialo, "K primernoi rekonstruktsii Zolotoi Palaty Kremlevskogo dvortsa i ee monumental'noi zhivopisi," 193–98.

judge of the people of Israel who led them against the infidel Midianites. Below Gideon and the princes the wall showed the stories of the baptism of Prince Vladimir of Kiev in 988 and the legend of the acceptance of the Byzantine regalia by Vladimir Monomakh, one of the justifications for the introduction of the title of tsar by Ivan IV in 1547. The entrance hall to the Golden Hall was similar. Again Christ sat on the lap of the Lord Sabaoth in the ceiling, looking down first on allegories of Christian virtue, then on the Old Testament kings and the story of Moses. Along the walls was a detailed story of Joshua's conquest of Canaan. As in the case of the story of Gideon, the message was that faith in God led to victory over His enemies. All the paintings revealed the power of God primarily in the stories of the Old Testament. Byzantium played a decidedly secondary role, there only to introduce Christianity and the regalia. There was no depiction of Constantinople on its own or Byzantine history apart from Russia. Moscow was the New Jerusalem, not the Third Rome, and even Russia's princes paled before Gideon and Joshua.⁵

Thirty years later the message of the Hall of Facets had not changed and indeed most of the subjects of the Golden Hall were repeated. Painted in the time of Boris Godunov and repainted in 1672, the eastern wall of the Hall of Facets (where the throne stood) illustrated the legend of the descent of Riurik from Augustus Caesar, the genealogical foundation legend of the dynasty that ruled until 1598. The 1672 repainting kept this subject, just as the written histories of the Romanovs stressed their succession to the throne of the Riurikovichi. The Hall of Facets retained the story of the translation of the Byzantine regalia to Vladimir Monomakh, but omitted the story of the baptism of St. Vladimir. It showed instead the story of Joseph in great detail and vignettes of David and Solomon. The entrance hall displayed Joshua, Constantine, and the story of David and Goliath. Three small depictions of virtuous rulers, one confronting treacherous aristocrats, another showing the good tsar handing over the sword of retribution, and a third more

⁵ Podobedova, *Moskovskaia*, 59–68. Zabelin, *Domashnii*, I (1990), 193–215. Podobedova, following Zabelin, saw in the depictions of Joshua a reference to Ivan's conquest of Kazan' and in the stories of the healing of sick rulers a reference to Ivan's life as well. Joel Raba, "Moscow – the Third Rome or the New Jerusalem," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (1995), 297–308, and Daniel Rowland, "Moscow – The Third Rome or the New Israel," *Russian Review* 55, no. 4 (1996), 591–614, esp. 606–07.

detailed story of the good and evil judges, added to the whole. The Russian princes appeared on the sides of the deeply set windows. The details varied from those of the paintings in the Golden Hall, but once again the Old Testament vastly predominated over Byzantium. The room demonstrated the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty and its Augustan descent on a background of the Kings of Israel, stories of virtuous princes and of the power of God.⁶

The other part of the palace that carried a message was the Annunciation Cathedral, not a free-standing church but the main palace church attached to the main buildings by a covered corridor. Russian churches of the pre-Petrine era were simply churches, and any dynastic or “political” messages they might carry were strictly secondary. In the gallery of the church the wall showed the Tree of Jesse, the genealogy of Christ, not of the tsar, even in his principal chapel. The Tree of Jesse was appropriate for a church dedicated to the Annunciation of Christ’s birth, and the wall paintings of the church itself were almost entirely devoted to the life of Christ, other than the traditional depiction of the Apocalypse on the southern wall. Only the pillars revealed the dynastic connection, for there stood the Russian princes and the Greek warrior saints, along with Constantine and Helen, the Byzantine emperors Michael and Theodora (the restorers of Orthodoxy after iconoclasm) and St. Vladimir and St. Ol’ga, the founders of Russian Christianity. The pillars, however, were not the place of honor, and the Annunciation Church remained a church dedicated to the Annunciation of Christ’s birth, not to the patron saints of the dynasty, Moscow, or individual members of the dynasty.⁷

Just as the Old Testament predominated over the Byzantine world in the palace wall paintings, the great churches and the bell tower dominated the main Kremlin square, not the palace. The palace church of the Annunciation was tiny by comparison to the two main churches, the Dormition and Archangel Cathedrals. These were quite different in function and conception. The Dormition Cathedral was the principal church of the patriarch of Moscow, and was dedicated to the Dormition of the Mother of God, one of

⁶ Zabelin, *Domashniĭ*, I (1990), 215–22; Andrei Batalov, *Moskovskoe kamennoe zодchestvo kontsa XVI veka: problemy khudozhestvennogo myshleniia epokhi*, Moscow, 1996, 249–59.

⁷ In the *terem* there were chapels which were dedicated to the patron saints of the members of the dynasty. Though richly appointed, they were small and private, not part of the public expression of the consciousness of the tsars.

the most important Russian Marian festivals. The dedication was typical of many Russian cathedral churches of the twelfth–thirteenth centuries and included in it the idea of the intercession of the Mother of God for Christians, for the Russian Land. Built by Fioravanti and painted soon after, it was restored in great detail in 1643 by Tsar Michael's orders. The iconographic program was primarily Marian, not political. Most of the walls were covered with a detailed history of the life of the Mother of God, with the western wall reserved for the Day of Judgment. The side altars also were dedicated to Marian themes ("Praise of the Mother of God"), and the wall dividing the altar space from the rest of the church was covered with paintings of holy monks from the earliest times through the Russian monastic saints. As the church of the patriarch, who came from the monastic clergy by Orthodox tradition, the monks were highly appropriate.⁸

Even the wall paintings of the Archangel Cathedral, dedicated to St. Michael the Archangel, and the necropolis of the Russian princes and tsars, stuck almost entirely to theological and biblical themes. The western wall depicted the Symbol of Faith, including a large section with the Day of Judgment. The southern wall showed the archangels Gabriel and Michael and other Old Testament figures, while the northern wall continued the story of Michael the archangel to include his Christian miracles, including helping the emperor Constantine. Only on the lowest row, at eye level just above the coffins of the princes and tsars, stood depictions of the Russian princes, the Moscow dynasty and its ancestors. The princes stood in armor or monks' robes, and each with a nimbus around his head, saintly in death. This row of solemn princes was the closest that the Kremlin churches and palaces got to glorifying the dynasty, and by western standards, it was not very close.⁹

⁸ T. V. Tolstaia, *Uspenskii sobor Moskovskogo Kremliia*, Moscow, 1979, 15–26; *Uspenskii sobor Moskovskogo Kremliia: materialy i issledovaniia*, ed. E. S. Smirnova, Moscow, 1985, esp. O. V. Zonova, "O rannikh altarnykh freskakh Uspenskogo sobora," in *ibid.*, 69–86.

⁹ Iu. N. Dmitriev, "Stenopi's Arkhangel'skogo sobora Moskovskogo Kremliia (materialy k issledovaniiu)," V. N. Lazarev *et al.*, eds., *Drevnerusskoe iskusstvo: XVII vek*, Moscow, 1964, 138–59; and E. S. Sizov, "Datirovka rospisi Arkhangel'skogo sobora Moskovskogo Kremliia i istoricheskaiia osnova nekotorykh siuzhetov," in *ibid.*, 160–75; Michael Cherniavsky, "Ivan the Terrible and the Iconography of the Kremlin Cathedral of the Archangel Michael," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 2, no. 1 (1975), 3–28. All of the princes have the nimbus, even those never proclaimed saints, which reflects the more general use of the nimbus in Russian religious art than in the West. It conveyed general holiness and piety, not specific sainthood.

CEREMONIAL

Like the physical setting, the ceremonial of the court emphasized the divine over the human. In its almost exclusively religious presentation of the tsar the Russian ceremonial differed not only from that of post-Renaissance Europe, but even from Byzantium, where powerful elements of the secular glorification of the emperor remained.¹⁰ In Moscow the two most important of the annual court ceremonies were the blessing of the waters at Epiphany and the Palm Sunday procession. At Epiphany the tsar, the whole court and the people of Moscow came down to the frozen Moscow river where the patriarch blessed the waters of the river, then sprinkled the water on the tsar and the boyars. At Palm Sunday the patriarch recreated Christ's entry into Jerusalem, riding on a donkey with the tsar walking before him and holding the bridle. Both of these ceremonies emphasized the tsar's respect for the church, not the majesty of the tsar.¹¹ Outside of the capital, the tsar showed his piety by the numerous pilgrimages to the Russian monasteries. The most important was the September pilgrimage to the Trinity Monastery to pray at the shrine of St. Sergii of Radonezh on his feast day, but usually the tsar went to the Trinity Monastery at least one other time in the year and often went much further afield, even to the Vologda monasteries in the north and the monastery of St. Kirill at Belozero. Each of these pilgrimages was a major enterprise, the tsar going with most of his family and innumerable courtiers and servants.

These ceremonies emphasized the respect of the tsar for the church. These were not the only public ceremonies, for the coronation of the tsar was also crucial to the presentation of the tsar to the people. This was the fullest "autocratic" presentation of the tsar,

¹⁰ On Byzantine ideology and court ceremonial see most recently Henry Maguire, ed., *Byzantine Court Culture from 829 to 1204*, Dumbarton Oaks, 1997. Byzantine official ideology, expressed in the culture and ceremonial of the court as well as in literature, was much more complex than Russian. It incorporated elements of Roman Imperial ideology and Byzantine learning based on pagan Greek culture as well as Christianity. It was also more self-consciously "autocratic." Paul Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos 1143–1180*, Cambridge, 1993; and Otto Treitinger, *Die oströmische Kaiser- und Reichsidee nach ihrer Gestaltung im höfischen Zeremoniell*, Jena 1938, and Darmstadt 1956.

¹¹ Crummey, "Court Spectacles," 130–58; Paul Bushkovitch, "The Epiphany Ceremony of the Russian Court in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Russian Review* 49, 1 (1990), 1–17; Michael S. Flier, "Breaking the Code: The Image of the Tsar in the Muscovite Palm Sunday Ritual," in Michael S. Flier and Daniel Rowland, eds., *Medieval Russian Culture*, vol. II, Berkeley, CA, 1994, 213–42; and more generally Richard Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, vol. I, Princeton, NJ, 1995, 22–41.

based on a Byzantine prototype which emphasized that his power came from God, and on the Russian legend of Riurik's descent from Augustus Caesar. It was more respectful of the church than the Byzantine ceremony, but remained a powerful presentation of the majesty of the tsar, the equal of the Byzantine and Holy Roman emperors. A more frequent if less dramatic portrayal of the tsar as great monarch took place at the state banquets, where the tsar ritually distributed food to his courtiers and servants. These were long affairs, with the name of each guest read out before he received his food, an honor so great he was not actually expected to eat the food in the presence of the tsar but to take it home. The ritual of generosity was also central to the tsar's presentation of himself, for generosity was one of the principal virtues of the good tsar.¹²

This traditional ceremonial, much of it so out of keeping with the increasing pretensions of the Russian tsars, had to change, and change it did. The vehicle of change in Tsar Aleksei's time was the teaching of the monks trained in the Kiev Academy, Orthodox Ukrainians and Belorussians from the Polish Commonwealth. The first such monks, Epifanii Slavinetskii and his contemporaries, stuck pretty much to religion, influencing the court culture by altering the exclusively liturgical content of church services to include sermonizing in the best Baroque manner. In the 1660s the Belorussian monk Simeon Polotskii came to Moscow, and continued the sermon tradition, but also went farther. He composed elaborate panegyric poetry for increasingly complex court ceremonies, ones that incorporated various elements of a Polish-inspired secular culture. He even produced a poem celebrating the beauty and convenience of the tsar's new house at his country residence at Kolomenskoe, calling it with clichéd exaggeration the eighth wonder of the world. The celebration of a secular building was an entirely new idea in Russian literature and culture, ironically composed in Baroque forms for one of the last specimens of truly Russian architecture still largely uninfluenced by the West.¹³ Simeon's poetry was something new, but

¹² V. Savva, *Moskovskie tsari i vizantiiskie vasil'evy*, Khar'kov, 1901, 110–270; E. V. Barsov, "Drevnerusskie pamiatniki svyashchennogo venchaniia tsarei," *ChOIDR* 1, pt. 1 (1883), 1–160; Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: an Aspect of Medieval Russian Political Theory," in Michael Cherniavsky, ed., *The Structure of Russian History*, New York, 1970, 65–79; Daniel Rowland, "Did Muscovite Literary Ideology Place Limits on the Power of the Tsar (1540s–1680s)," *Russian Review* 49 (1990), 141.

¹³ Simeon Polotskii, *Izbrannye sochineniia*, ed. I. P. Eremin, Moscow and Leningrad, 1955, 103–08; A. N. Robinson, *Bor'ba idei v russkoi literature XVII veka*, Moscow, 1974; Paul

it was only an addition to the older tradition. The tsar continued to go to church virtually every day, and the banquets went on.

The essentially religious character of the culture of the court and of Russia generally did not mean that the tsar and the elite had no political ideas at all. It meant that they expressed these ideas in a religious and moral framework, one that did not contain notions such as sovereignty, natural law, or social contract.¹⁴ Also, the Russians produced no systematic political thought, and besides the ceremonial, it is in their chronicles and tales for the most part that their ideas were contained. The chaos and drama of the Time of Troubles gave rise to many such tales, but most of them were written or compiled by writers far from the boyar elite (Khvorostinin, Shakhovskoi, Katyrev-Rostovskii). The only one to reflect the official point of view was the so-called New Chronicler, a work compiled about 1630.¹⁵ The New Chronicler laid stress on the boyar rivalries at the beginning of Fyodor's reign and then went on to detail the exile of aristocrats at the instigation of Boris Godunov, as well as his hatred of the boyars. At the election of Vasili Shuiskii in 1606 the New Chronicler omitted any reference to boyar rivalries, but criticized the boyars for not consulting anyone beyond a narrow circle. He also gave some space to Vasili Shuiskii's oath at his election. The text of the oath seems to say that Vasili promised not to execute anyone without the agreement of the boyars, but the New

Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, New York, 1992. For an attempt to explain the developments in Russian culture of the period without reference to Western influence see: V. M. Zhivov and B. A. Uspenskii, "Tsar' i Bog. Semioticheskie aspekty sakralizatsii monarkha v Rossii," in B. A. Uspenskii, ed., *Iazyki kul'tury i problemy perevodimosti*, Moscow, 1987; and Victor M. Zhivov, "Religious Reform and the Emergence of the Individual in Russian Seventeenth-Century Literature," in Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann, eds., *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, DeKalb, IL, 1997, 184–98.

¹⁴ The older literature on political thought in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Russia focusses almost exclusively on notions of the power of the tsar and suffers from the search for constitutional precedents and their absence. V. Val'denberg, *Drevnerusskie ucheniia o predelakh tsarskoi vlasti*, Petrograd, 1916; M. A. D'iakonov, *Vlast' moskovskikh gosudarei*, St. Petersburg 1889; Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, New Haven, CT, 1961. For newer conceptions see Daniel Rowland, "The Problem of Advice in Muscovite Tales about the Time of Troubles," *Russian History/Histoire russe* 6, no. 2 (1979), 259–83; and "Muscovite Literary Ideology, 125–55." See also George G. Weickhardt, "Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Russia," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 21, no. 3 (Fall 1994), 316–37; Marshall Poe, "What Did Russians Mean When They Called Themselves 'Slaves of the Tsar'?", *Slavic Review* 57, no. 3 (Fall 1998), 584–608.

¹⁵ *PSRL* 14, St. Petersburg, 1910, 23–154; Ia. G. Solodkin, "Letopisets Novyi," *Slovar' knizhnikov . . . XVII v.*, 3/2, 257–62. The text refers to the year 6138 (1629/30) as the present and breaks off in July, 1630: *PSRL* 14, 146, 154.

Chronicler interpreted the oath to mean that Vasiliï would not take revenge on those who had helped or even instigated Boris Godunov to persecute him, and claimed that he later went back on his promise. Vasiliï and Boris were thus bad tsars who did not live in harmony with the boyars or the people.¹⁶

The election of Tsar Michael in 1613 was the central turning point for the New Chronicler. In his description, the Russian people wanted to choose a tsar according to their own ideas, forgetting the words of scripture: "God gives not only the kingdom but the power to whom he wants." The people fell silent, and then God gave a ruler as he had given Saul to Israel. These events were God's will, not the people's or Michael's.¹⁷ The New Chronicler went on to describe the reign of the new God-given tsar in terms of the ideal of harmony, where the tsars, boyars, and people are united in their struggle to expel the Polish and Swedish invaders. The comet of 1618/19 was a sign of the new order. At first the tsar and the people were terrified, but then "wise philosophers" explained it to them: the head of the comet was over Russia, which demonstrated that order and peace would return, while the tail was over Germany and Poland, which would be racked by war, dissension, and bloodshed. So it came to pass, for Poland continued at war and the Thirty Years War broke out in Germany. The portrait of harmony in Russia came to some extent at the expense of truth, however. The New Chronicler described Michael's second marriage to Evdokiia Streshneva in 1626, but there was no mention of the scandal over Mariia Khlopova and the exile of the Saltykovs.¹⁸

This was the central ideal, that of the powerful tsar ruling in harmony (moral-religious harmony, not secular constitutional harmony) with the boyars. Tsar Aleksei himself expressed it in a letter to Prince Nikita Ivanovich Odoevskii: "[God] has given us, the great sovereign, and to you the boyars to judge with one soul the people of His light by justice, equally for all."¹⁹ The image was in

¹⁶ *PSRL* 14, 35–36, 40, 47, 52–54, 69–70. This ideal of harmony was shared by the other tales of the Time of Troubles, whether from the secretary Timofeev or the *stol'niki* and Moscow gentlemen Khvorostinin, Shakhovskoi, and Katyrev-Rostovskii: Paul Bushkovitch, "The Formation of a National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, 3/4 (December 1986), 369–73. See also Rowland, "Advice," and "Muscovite Literary Ideology."

¹⁷ *PSRL* 14, 129.

¹⁸ *PSRL* 14, 146, 150–52.

¹⁹ P. I. Bartenev, ed., *Sobranie Pisem tsaria Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, Moscow, 1856, 225 (Aleksei to N. I. Odoevskii, 3 September 1652).

many ways contradictory, for it presented both the tsar's power and the harmony of a wise and meek tsar with the equally wise and humble boyars. In the mind of the Russians of the time, it was the tsar's virtue that reconciled the two: a good tsar could be powerful and at the same time live in harmony with elite and people.

The idea of harmony was so strong that it was in that light that Tsar Aleksei interpreted the one text available to him that discussed the nature and requirements of ruling without explicit reference to Christianity or religion, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum secretorum*. Translated into East Slavic in the fifteenth century as the *Tainaia tainykh*, this was not the work of Aristotle but that of an Arab scholar of roughly the eighth to tenth centuries, widely known in the West in two Latin translations as well as vernacular translations from the Latin. The version known in Russia, however, was made from the Hebrew version, apparently translated in Kiev and brought to Novgorod with other translated philosophical texts at the time of the so-called heresy of the Judaizers (1480s).²⁰ The text presents itself as the advice of Aristotle to his pupil Alexander the Great, and is essentially a typical example of the Muslim and medieval European genre known as the mirror of princes, an advice book for rulers. It tells the prince how to be generous and avoid avarice, how to rule himself and live a moderate life, how to be just and how to deal with his servants. It then goes on to more specific advice on how to appoint various kinds of officials, how to send embassies and conduct wars, and concludes with a long section of medical advice with interpolations from the works of Maimonides and Al-Razi. It even tells the prince to avoid pale men with thick hair or blue eyes, all signs of bad character. Tsar Aleksei read the work, for he quoted it in a letter to Prince N. I. Odoevskii from July, 1658. In reproaching Odoevskii for supporting the unjustified complaints of his colleagues P. V. Sheremetev and Prince F. F. Volkonskii the tsar said, "And

²⁰ A. I. Sobolevskii, *Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi XIV–XVII vekov*, Sbornik Ordeniia russkogo 74/1, St. Petersburg, 1903, 419–23; M. N. Speranskii, ed., *Iz istorii otrechennykh knig: IV Aristotelevy vrata ili Tainaia tainykh* Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti i iskusstva 171, St. Petersburg, 1908; D. M. Bulanin, "Tainaia tainykh," *Slovar' knizhnikov* 2/2, 427–30; W. F. Ryan, "The *Secretum secretorum* and the Muscovite Autocracy," in W. F. Ryan and Charles B. Schmitt, eds., *Pseudo-Aristotle, the Secret of Secrets: Sources and Influences* (Warburg Institute Surveys 9), London, 1982, 114–23; Moshe Taube, "The Kievan Jew Zacharia and the Astronomical Works of the Judaizers," *Jews and Slavs* 3 (1995), 168–98; Taube, "The 'Poem on the Soul' in the *Laodicean Epistle* and the Literature of the Judaizers," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995), 671–85; Taube, "The Spiritual Circle in the *Secret of Secrets* and the 'Poem on the Soul'," *ibid.*, 18 (3/4) December 1994, 342–55.

Aristotle writes to all sovereigns, ordering them to select such a man who would reconcile his sovereign to people, not to anger them.” This statement appears to be a reference to book II of the *Secretum*, where “Aristotle” advises Alexander to speak to the people through servants who will make peace, not trouble, for the ruler, but it is not an exact quotation.²¹ It was the means to harmony between tsar and people that Aleksei remembered from the tract, not any sort of call to autocracy. In theory at least, Aleksei’s idea of the autocrat and his power was that of his 1660 letter to Sheremetev: he would appoint boyars according to their ancestry and God’s will, but sometimes he might choose not to make the appointment and he might also promote deserving men of lower rank. Aleksei may have had autocratic power in practice, but his conception of it was much milder, a conception that bound him to respect the traditions of the state and the elite and behave as a meek and proper Christian.²²

THE BOYARS AND THEIR VALUES

In May of 1660 Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich wrote a letter to the boyar and governor of Kiev, Vasiliï Borisovich Sheremetev. The tsar’s letter was in answer to the report he had received that Sheremetev wanted to come to Moscow, to the court, and Aleksei was annoyed. The situation in Kiev was unsettled, for the war with Poland was still on,

²¹ “A Aristotel’ pishet ko vsem gosudarem, velit vybirat’ takova cheloveka, kotoroi by gosudaria svoego k liudem primiril, a ne ozlobliat,” A. Barsukov, *Rod Sheremetevykh*. 8 vols., St. Petersburg, 1881–1904, IV, 1884, 422–23. Cf. Speranskii, *Tainaia*, 144. Prince N. I. Odoevskii’s wife was born Evdokiia Fyodorovna Sheremeteva, a cousin of P. V. Sheremetev: Aleksandr Barsukov, *Rodoslovie Sheremetevykh*, St. Petersburg, 2d ed., 1904, 8–9.

²² Some Byzantine texts on kingship were also known in seventeenth-century Russia, most importantly the *Ekthesis* of the sixth-century deacon Agapetus and the work known as Pseudo-Basil, probably of the ninth century. Agapetus was widely copied in the Orthodox Slavic world, including Russia, by the sixteenth century. Pseudo-Basil was translated by the fifteenth century and known in Russia. It was printed in the Ukraine in the late sixteenth century and then in Moscow in 1661/63 and 1680. On Agapetus see Ihor Ševčenko, “A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology,” in Michael Cherniavsky, ed., *The Structure of Russian History*, New York, 1970, 80–107; Moscow: Paul Bushkovitch, “The Life of Saint Filipp: Tsar and Metropolitan in the Late Sixteenth Century,” in Flier and Rowland, *Medieval*, 29–46 (on the uses of Agapetus). On Pseudo-Basil see Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, 2 vols., Munich, 1978, I, 157–65; Sobolevskii, *Perevodnaia*, 20; and F. I. Setin, “‘Testament’ v izdanii Simeona Polotskogo,” in A. N. Robinson et al., eds., *Simeon Polotskii i ego knigoizdatel’skaia deiatel’nost’*, Moscow, 1982, 116–33. Text: Pseudo-Basil, “Kefalaia parainetika”, *Patrologia graeca* 107, xxi–lvi. Pseudo-Basil is a strikingly un-autocratic text, stressing the responsibility of the monarch for his subjects, his faith, learning, justice, temperance, sobriety, and similar virtues. It also tells him not to glory in victories over his enemies (“Kefalaia,” liii).

the Crimean Tatars were a potential threat, and the Ukrainian cossack host was rife with internal conflict. Sheremetev was needed in Kiev. Besides ordering him to remain, the tsar explained his views of a boyar's service to his monarch. He sent him a little treatise, starting with a question: "Why is your honor of boyar not a simple thing?" The honor was not a simple (in the sense of unrefined, low) thing because God had willed Sheremetev to become a boyar to serve his sovereign, to serve faithfully and virtuously, for the cause of the tsar was the cause of God. Sheremetev should not be offended at the orders to stay at his post, for he was general of the earthly army of the great Tsar of Tsars in heaven. Aleksei continued:

You know yourself that the great eternal Tsar wanted you, Vasilii Borisovich, to be a boyar with us, the great sovereign and mortal tsar, not in vain. And we, the great sovereign, know that by your inheritance the honor of boyar is eternal, and it is given by the will of the great and eternal Tsar and heavenly ruler and by our appointment. And it sometimes happens that you lords who have had your fathers in the honor of boyars yourselves do not receive that honor even until your death, and others who live a long time without that honor but with other of our, the sovereign's, ranks, when they are old are introduced into that honor of boyar by the will of the great and eternal Tsar of Tsars by our mortal appointment. And it is not proper to boast that that honor is inborn nor is it proper to hope for it strongly, for it is to be remembered from holy scripture: 'let the wise man not boast of his wisdom nor the strong of his strength, but boasting boast of knowledge and understanding of the Lord and of doing justice and right in the midst of the earth, and especially of having cleanliness and love; of these is the kingdom of heaven.'²³

Nothing could sum up better the complexities of status of the Russian ruling elite at the end of the seventeenth century than Tsar Aleksei's letter. Sheremetev was to serve his sovereign at the rank his family had traditionally held, but he was not to get too cocky: the tsar was still the tsar, and the tsar was put on earth by the Tsar of Tsars in heaven, whose will was supreme. At the same time, if a boyar grew too restive, the tsar might write him a letter, half scolding and half cajoling him. The tsar was not a tyrant, and he needed his great men on a daily basis to run the state, command the armies, and advise him on future steps to take as the sovereign of Russia.

²³ Tsar Aleksei to V. B. Sheremetev, 6 May 1660, *ŽORSA II* (1861), 749–55. The tsar seems to be using the word "eternal" (*vechnyi*) in its secondary sense of belonging to the world of the spirit, as opposed to the earthly world.

For the Russian state of the seventeenth century, politics consisted largely of the relationship of the court elite to the tsar, and to one another. The Duma was the council of nobles who held one of the four Duma ranks. At the top of this hierarchy were the boyars, about twenty-five men in the last years of the reign of Tsar Aleksei. Below them in dignity were the *okol'nichie* (about fifteen or sixteen), the *dumnye dvoriane* (about twenty-five), the *dumnye d'iaki*, and the Duma secretaries (seven to eight). Appointment to these ranks was not arbitrary, but reflected the traditional place of the various aristocratic clans in the precedence system (*mestnichestvo*). Some families were gradually promoted through marriage to the tsar's family or by simple favor, but they then remained in the court elite, gradually fitting in with the older families.²⁴ This was the formal system: informally there were also favorites of the tsar among this elite who exercised greater power than their official position implied.

The Duma seems to have been the locus of much important decision-making, at least formally, but it was an institution about which we know remarkably little. The term itself comes from modern scholars, the contemporaries simply referred to "the boyars."²⁵ Nevertheless, it seems that almost all laws and decisions involving the army and appointments to civilian offices were decrees of the tsar alone, while matters of finance and land were decrees of the tsar and boyars, the result of some Duma discussion.²⁶ Foreign affairs were in large part under the purview of the Duma as well. Committees of boyars conducted negotiations with foreign ambassadors, not the tsar or the head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery alone. Translated newsletters from abroad were customarily read out in the Duma, and later chapters will show that many issues of

²⁴ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 12–33, 177; V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma drevnei Rusi*, 4th ed., Moscow, 1909; N. P. Pavlov-Sil'vanskii, *Gosudarevy sluzhilye liudi*, *Sochineniia*, I, St. Petersburg, 1909, 128–46.

²⁵ Russian historians since the middle of the nineteenth century have been fascinated by the tsar himself and the "bureaucracy." On the latter, see Hans-Joachim Torke, "Gab es in Moskau Reich des 17. Jahrhundert eine Bürokratie?," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 38 (1986), 276–98; Peter B. Brown, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 10, no. 3 (1983), 269–330; N. F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absolutizma*, Moscow, 1987. The only attempt to study the Duma was the classic study of Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma*.

²⁶ A. G. Man'kov, "Statistika i dinamika zakonodatel'nykh aktov Rossii vtoroi poloviny XVII v. (O nekotorykh osobennostiakh stanovleniia absolutizma)," *Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie dissipliny* 20 (1989), 175–87; and Man'kov, *Zakonodatel'stvo i pravo Rossii vtoroi poloviny XVII v.*, St. Petersburg, 1998, 12–32.

foreign policy were discussed there.²⁷ More than that we cannot say, and to ask if the Duma was a limit on the power of the tsar is to ask a question that cannot be answered and perhaps should not be posed. Given the absence of a learned juridical tradition and the religious character of all political thought, formal legality was not even an issue. The crucial question is where the real power lay, and that question can only be answered by the narrative of events.

At the time of Aleksei's death in 1676, there were twenty-three men with the rank of boyar, ranked according to the order of their appointment. There were also twelve *okol'nichie*, the next rank down, nineteen Duma gentlemen, and eight Duma secretaries, as well as the cupbearer (*kravchii*), treasurer (*kaznachei*), head chamberlain (*post-el'nichii*), and keeper of the seal (*pechatnik*). The Duma secretaries were heads of major offices, but not part of the social elite, forming the elite of the professional administrators only.

Most of the boyars are only names to us, men whose careers we can trace in the records of the court, the army, and the *Razriad*. For a few we have glimpses of their character and their cultural world, primarily because of the various foreign ambassadors who noted down what they could learn of the major figures at court, such as Augustin von Meyerberg, whom the Emperor Leopold sent to Moscow in 1661–2.²⁸ More unusual was the work of the Polish nobleman, Paweł Potocki. Potocki was captured by the Russian army in 1656 and remained in captivity in Moscow until 1668. He was free to walk about the city, he appeared at court and seems to have obtained the favor of Tsar Aleksei and even married one of the Saltykovs. On his return home he produced an account of the Russian court unique for its information about the men who held boyar rank the year of his departure.²⁹ Of course, even more

²⁷ Most of the literature on the Ambassadorial Chancellery focusses on the officials of that office: S. A. Belokurov, "O Posol'skom prikaze," *ChOIKR* pt. 3 (1906); L. A. Iuzefovich, "Kak v posol'skikh obychaiakh vedetsia," Moscow, 1988; Robert M. Croskey, *Muscovite Diplomatic Practice in the Reign of Ivan III*, New York, 1987; E. V. Chistiakova and N. M. Rogozhin, eds., "Oko vsei velikoi Rossii," Moscow, 1989.

²⁸ Augustin Maierberg, "Puteshestvie v Moskoviiu Barona Avgustina Maierberga, trans. A. N. Shemiakin, *ChOIKR* (1873), 3–5; (1874). A more complex source is the account by one of Tsar Aleksei's English doctors, who includes some sensational stories about Khitrovo's alleged Polish mistresses among apparently reliable data: Samuel Collins, *The Present State of Russia*, London, 1671.

²⁹ Paulus a Potok Potocki, *Moschovia sive brevis narratio de moribus Magnae Russorum monarchiae*, in *Opera omnia*, Warsaw, 1747. Paul Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change among the Russian Boyars 1650–1680: New Sources and Old Problems," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 56 (2000), 91–112; Mirosław Nagielski, "Potocki Paweł," *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. xxviii,

revealing would be the private papers and correspondence of the Russian boyars themselves, but they are few and far between. Most surviving papers of boyar families are estate correspondence with stewards in far-away villages, and even these are only a handful. In compensation there is some correspondence of Tsar Aleksei himself, which throws a sharp light both on the tsar and his aristocracy.³⁰ To identify the tsar's favorites and the structure of court factions, it is the ambassadors who provide the most complete information.³¹

At the time of Meyerberg's embassy there were seventy or so men of Duma rank, five of whom he regarded as more powerful than the rest. First was B. I. Morozov, the tsar's old tutor, who was by then in poor health and died while Meyerberg was in Moscow (on 1 November 1661). If he had not been so avaricious, he would have been able to run the state in the tsar's name.

After his death the most powerful was I. D. Miloslavskii, the tsar's father-in-law. In Meyerberg's account, Miloslavskii's significance was in spite of the tsar's evident dislike and contempt for him. Supposedly Aleksei had no hesitation in insulting him verbally (and crudely at that) and pulling his beard. That is what happened at the Duma on 10 November 1661, as the tsar was discussing remedies for a recent defeat at the hands of the Poles and Miloslavskii bragged that he would bring back the king of Poland's head. Miloslavskii's besetting sin was also avarice.³²

According to Meyerberg, another influential figure who lacked the moral defects of Morozov and Miloslavskii and who enjoyed the tsar's affection was F. M. Rtishchev. In spite of his virtue he earned the hatred of the people for his role in debasing the coinage (the "Copper Revolt" of July 1662). An emerging favorite was B. M.

Wrocław, 1984–85, 117–19. P. Matveev in "Artamon Sergeevich Matveev v prikaze Maloi Rossii i ego otnosheniia k delam i liudiam etogo kraia," *Russkaia mysl'* 8 (1909) 1–23; 9, 46–75, first identified as Potocki's work the partial translation published by Bulgarin and Grech (from an anonymous manuscript, not the printed text) as "Kharaktery vel'mozh i znatnykh liudei v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha," *Severnyi arkhiv* 17, no. 20, 295–314; 18, no. 22, 105–12.

³⁰ *ŽORS4*, II (1861), 702–79; Bartenev, ed., *Sobranie pisem*.

³¹ See Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, V–VI, Philip Longworth, *Alexis: Tsar of all the Russias*, New York, 1984; Crumme, *Aristocrats*; Heinz Ellersieck, "Russia under Aleksei Mikhailovich and Feodor Alekseevich 1645–1682: the Scandinavian Sources," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1955.

³² Miloslavskii headed six major offices from 1646–50 until his stroke in 1666: the Great Treasury, the Musketeers, Mercenaries, and Cavalry Chancelleries, as well as the Treasury and Apothecary Chancelleries: S. K. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i XVII veka*, Moscow, 1946, 14–15, 25–27, 55–56, 70–71, 149–50, 165–66.

Khitrovo, whose military and civilian abilities the tsar respected.³³ Earlier on, the Imperial ambassador thought that Prince Iurii Ivanovich Romodanovskii was perhaps the closest friend to Aleksei and a wise man to boot, but more witty than really intelligent. He too was fond of gifts. Finally, Meyerberg realized that in previous years Patriarch Nikon had been among the first favorites, but since 1658 was entirely out of power.³⁴

Potocki's account was fuller than Meyerberg's. The year the Pole returned home, 1668, the senior boyar was Prince B. A. Repnin (died 1670), who entered the Duma in 1640 as the favorite of Tsar Michael. He had long since lost importance, deservedly, for his harshness, Potocki implied. He held a number of administrative positions and other posts, but was no longer a favorite. In 1668 he was first in order of rank simply because he had lived longer than most of his contemporaries.³⁵ Next in order was Prince Nikita Ivanovich Odoevskii. He had received boyar rank in 1640 from Tsar Michael and served Aleksei as diplomat, general, and administrator for the whole of the reign. The Odoevskiis were Riurikovich princes, descended from the princes of Chernigov, who had come with their lands to serve Ivan III of Moscow at the end of the fifteenth century. The first to hold boyar rank seems to have been Prince Nikita Romanovich Odoevskii, whom Ivan IV transferred from the Staritsa appanage of his cousin Vladimir to the *Oprichnina* about 1570, giving him boyar rank in the process. Like most *Oprichnina* officers, Prince Nikita did not live long, for he was executed in 1573. From then on, however, the Odoevskii princes remained at the pinnacle of power and landed wealth. Prince Nikita was not only a distinguished servant of the tsar, by the end of life he was the wealthiest man in Russia.³⁶

Paweł Potocki thought well of Nikita Odoevskii. He believed that

³³ Collins called Khitrovo the "whispering favorite," since Khitrovo preferred to work behind the scenes rather than openly in the Duma. Khitrovo first entered the Duma as *okol'nichii* in 1647 and survived until 1680. In 1655 Aleksei appointed him to head the Armory House in the Kremlin, and he went on to gain control of most of the palace offices: Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 19–21, 43, 48, 53, 82–3, 90–91, 97–98, 157–58, 162–63, 179–80, 219. I. A. Selezneva, "Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi deiatel' XVII v. B. M. Khitrovo," *Voprosy istorii* 1 (1987), 78–87.

³⁴ Maierberg, "Puteshestvie," 167–71; Collins, 103–06, 119–20, 130.

³⁵ Potocki, *Moschovia*, 194; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 185. Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, V, 262, confirmed Repnin's favor under Tsar Michael, though relying on Tatishchev writing in the 1740s.

³⁶ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 119–21, M. M. Krom, *Mezh Rus'iu i Litvoi*, Moscow, 1995, 36–44, Zimin, *Oprichnina*, 201, 338, 478.

Odoevskii was much more polished than many of his colleagues, and was learned in the study of Slavic letters and the history of Poland. A man with innate sparks of generosity and a prudence more than just slyness, his age and illness kept him from the inner councils of Tsar Aleksei. Potocki thought that he was worthy of a freer soil and country (meaning, of course, Poland).³⁷ Tsar Aleksei valued him as well, up to a point. When Odoevskii's son Mikhail died in November 1653, the tsar wrote him a letter of consolation. He did not think much of his political talents, however: in 1658 the tsar had to write to his general, the boyar Prince Iu. A. Dolgorukii, assuring him of his continued favor even though Dolgorukii had disobeyed his orders, and the tsar blamed Odoevskii for convincing him: "I suspect that Prince Nikita Ivanovich convinced you, and you should not have listened. You know yourself what sort of operator he is. Just listen to how they sing about him in Moscow."³⁸

Potocki also reported that Prince Nikita Odoevskii's son, the boyar Iakov was learned in Slavic letters like his father, though the son's abilities came more from nature than application. He was a good administrator rather than a soldier, gaining boyar rank in his youth as a result of his governorship of Astrakhan' (1663–66). Better education and knowledge of the world would have helped him to overcome his natural pride and the arrogance typical of Russian boyars. Potocki was less impressed with Prince Iurii Romodanovskii than Meyerberg had been. Romodanovskii, head of the artillery office in 1665–73, was another boyar with better education than usual: "a bit versed in Latin and our vulgar [= Polish] letters." In his case, learning only served to conceal his vices, pride and hypocrisy. A bold man, he calumniated his enemies in private and praised them in public.³⁹ This was the man whom Meyerberg had seen as a particular friend to the tsar.

³⁷ Potocki, *Moschovia*, 192: "Liberiore dignior solo et patria, si prudentiam non omnino callidam et innatae, nondum penitus extinctas scintillas, spectes generositatis. Eo accessit studium literarum Sclavonicarum exactissimum, alicui notitiae Historiarum Polonarum conjunctum . . . Cumulata morbis senectus, saepe eum ab intimo et sacratori Principis excludit consilio, cui si pristina constaret alacritas et valetudo, non utique illum inter saevientis instrumenta Tyrannidis numerarem, sed ut naevus unus aut alter pulchritudine corporis nihil detrahit, ita eminentior in uno Virtus, tantorum scelerum congeriem, quorum feracissima haec regia est, nunquam velat." Potocki (died 1675) married the daughter of the boyar Petr Saltykov, whom he praises to the skies (*ibid.*, 195–96).

³⁸ Barsukov, *Rod Sheremetevykh*, vol. IV, 1884, 420–23; *ŽORSA II* (1861), 702–06; 756–58.

³⁹ Potocki, *Moschovia*, 193, 196; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 136–37; Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change," p. 103.

For Bogdan Khitrovo, in contrast, Potocki could not find enough praise. He was always open to the petitions of the unfortunate, especially from foreigners, and used his position in the palace to bring such matters to the tsar. He used his control of the Treasury to win friends for the tsar, not to abuse his liberality. Khitrovo had the distinction of being the longest lasting favorite of Tsar Aleksei, sitting in the Duma from 1647 until his death in 1680 and accumulating control of the major palace offices from 1655. His role was in part a result of the increasing size and importance of the tsar's household and court. Potocki was also lavish in his praise of A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin for the peace with Poland and of the *okol'nichii* F. M. Rtishchev, a "new man" promoted from below, a man of virtue and learning.⁴⁰

One important family which Potocki disliked was that of the Princes Dolgorukii. The Pole hated Prince Iurii Alekseevich Dolgorukii, claiming that he was worse than Catiline and that his cruelty and injustice was responsible for unrest among the Don cossacks.⁴¹ The Dolgorukii clan had a complicated history. At the end of the seventeenth century the Princes Dolgorukii were considered among the most aristocratic of Russian families, yet the first one to attain boyar rank was Prince Vladimir Timofeevich in 1606. The sixteenth-century Dolgorukiis were simply a minor branch of the then much more important Obolenskii clan, and first attained significant rank (*okol'nichii*) in the 1570s. They were hardly new arrivals, since the Obolenskii clan had served the Moscow princes at the highest ranks since the fourteenth century. Prince Vladimir made the family fortune first by supporting Prince Pozharskii's resistance to the king of Poland in 1612 and then marrying his daughter to the first Romanov tsar, Michael, in 1624. In exile from 1629/30, Prince V. T. Dolgorukii died in 1632/33. The next Dolgorukii to enter the Duma was Prince Iurii Alekseevich in 1648.⁴² Prince Iurii was a major

⁴⁰ Potocki, *Moschovia*, 196–98. Potocki left before the rise of Matveev and does not mention him in his account.

⁴¹ "Fabium iste simulat, cum sit deterior Catalina. Servilis tumultus potius quam belli et refractariae Cosacorum Dunensium contumaciae incensor et lituus." Potocki, *Moschovia*, 196. Potocki's comparison of Dolgorukii to Catiline suggests that the Pole thought Dolgorukii wanted to exploit popular unrest for his own ends.

⁴² Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 179, 188. Zimin, *Formirovanie*, 43–44, 295. Prince Timofei Ivanovich Dolgorukii became an *okol'nichii* in April, 1578 and disappears from the records in 1581: Zimin, *V kanun*, 47, 87. Prince Vladimir was presumably his son. The 1624 marriage of Maria Vladimirovna to Tsar Michael ended rapidly in her death the next year, but by the 1640s the family was back in prominence.

commander in the war against Poland, and ultimately led the defeat of Stenka Razin's revolt in 1670. Whatever Dolgorukii's character was, he was certainly one of the most powerful of the boyars, an important general even if not any particular favorite of the tsar.

The formal political role of the boyars, their families, and even the basic features of their economic role are clear to us. Their mental world is not, and much remains unknown.⁴³ What they were not is either aristocratic constitutionalists or secular absolutists, for such thinking required a secularization of culture unknown before Peter's time. The boyars were part of the Russian culture of their time, religious to its core, and their life reflected it. They spent enormous amounts of time in the religious ceremonial of the court, went on pilgrimages with the tsar and on their own. Each great clan had one or two monasteries where they buried their dead and to which they were especially generous, the Trinity Monastery for many clans, the Novospaskii Monastery near Moscow for the Romanovs.⁴⁴

The monastery burial grounds were not the only focus of loyalty for the great clans. Each of the clans had elaborate genealogies and genealogical legends. The princely clans could look back to the dynasty of Riurik, the rulers of Kiev Rus' and earlier Russia, or to the house of Gedimin, the grand princes of Lithuania in the Middle Ages. Others claimed descent from more or less mythical ancestors from Prussia, Poland, the Golden Horde and other more exotic lands. The Tatar tsarevichi could claim descent from Chingis Khan himself.⁴⁵

The clans were jealous of their honor, as the precedence system encouraged and even required. The disputes over rank at court and in the army were endless, no matter how much the tsars tried to

⁴³ For some idea of the elite's values see Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 135–63 and Bushkovitch, *Religion*, 32–50. For the values of the provincial gentry see Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century*, Stanford, CA, 1996.

⁴⁴ Bushkovitch, *Religion*, 39–40.

⁴⁵ M. E. Bychkova, *Rodoslovnye knigi XVI–XVII vv. kak istoricheskiĭ istochnik*, Moscow, 1975. For an example of a new family trying to get into the elite, see Marshall Poe, "The Imaginary World of Semen Koltovskii: Genealogical Anxiety and Falsification in Late Seventeenth-Century Russia," *Cahiers du monde russe* 39, no. 3 (July–September 1998), 375–88. In the second half of the seventeenth century, boyar and gentry clans began to compile even more fanciful genealogies, influenced by Polish genealogical literature, and to claim kin with the great Polish families: M. E. Bychkova, *Legendy moskovskikh boiar*, Moscow, 1997 and Ignatii Rimskii-Korsakov, *Genealogiia iavlennoi ot sotvorenii mira familii . . . Korsakov-Rimskikh*, ed. A. P. Bogdanov, Moscow, 1994.

curb them, until the final abolition of the system in 1682.⁴⁶ Even then, the abolition of the system involved the compilation of an official Book of Genealogy, which would preserve the glory of each clan. Privately, boyars and lesser landholders kept records of their service and that of others, and preserved these records well into the eighteenth century, long after the old rank system and offices had gone.⁴⁷

The more political values of the boyars are harder to grasp. They shared many of the official ideas reflected in the New Chronicler and the letters of Tsar Aleksei as well as in the writings of the more humble historians of the Time of Troubles. As in other cases, it is from the chronicles connected with the boyar clans that we can trace some of their ideas. By the middle of the seventeenth century the great chronicle tradition of fifteenth-sixteenth century Russia had changed radically. In place of the enormously long annals of the Russian state reaching back to Kievan times the chronicles had grown shorter, more “literary” in composition, and without pretence of full coverage of the past in all its complexity. Some of these new, shorter chronicles, whose subject matter was exclusively more recent history from the time of Ivan the Terrible onward, were compiled with one or more boyar clans in view. Such were the Piskarev Chronicle, which reflected the interests of the Golitsyn clan and the Belaia Chronicler, evidently the product of the Prozorovskii clan’s patronage.⁴⁸

At one level the connection of the seventeenth-century chronicles with aristocratic clans was very simple. They told the story of the recent past and included notices borrowed from the *Razriad* books of the military, diplomatic, and administrative services of the great boyars, giving particular detail for certain families. They also included excerpts from the official genealogies of the great clans,

⁴⁶ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia*, Ithaca, NY 1999. Kollmann concludes that the precedence system simply preserved the status quo of the ruling elite and the existing relations with the tsar. It was neither an example of aristocratic privilege nor an instrument of the tsar against the elite: *ibid.*, 165–67.

⁴⁷ For example, see the manuscript containing the so-called *Žapiski* of I. A. Zheliabuzhskii (in reality the work of Mikhail Zheliabuzhskii), which also includes several *raziady* for particular families. RGADA, f. 181, d. 125. D. Iazykov, ed. [I. A. Zheliabuzhskii], *Žapiski*, St. Petersburg, 1840.

⁴⁸ *PSRL* 34, Moscow, 1978. The Piskarev Chronicler received that name from that of a nineteenth-century bibliophile and collector, while the Belaia Chronicler allegedly showed special interest in that region near Smolensk. See Ia. G. Solodkin, “Letopisets Bel’skii,” and “Letopisets Piskarevskii,” *Slovar’ knizhnikov*. . . XVIII v, 3/2, 234–36, 250–52, 269–74.

mainly the stories of clan origins from the Genealogy of Patriarch Filaret.⁴⁹ Information of this type was not absolutely new: the great chronicles of the sixteenth century often did the same, though more evenhandedly than the seventeenth-century boyar chronicles. The sixteenth-century chronicles simply included the names of the more important boyars when they came into the story. The seventeenth-century boyar chroniclers, in contrast, were trying to stress the role of a particular family in Russian history and thereby glorify the clan. They did not try to glorify the clan by voluminous and exaggerated praise or a radical distortion of the past. They merely inserted into the general story the particular accomplishments of the clan in question, real or fictitious, important or trivial.

The Piskarev Chronicler noted the arrival of the Lithuanian grand prince in Novgorod in 1333 for no other reason than to add that he was the “root of the Golitsyns” (*Golitsynykh koren'*).⁵⁰ He followed the fortunes of the Golitsyns, whether they played a major role in events or not. For the 1578 campaign in Livonia the Chronicler informs us that Tsar Ivan sent “princes and generals, Prince Ivan Iur'evich Golitsyn and associates, with a great army,” naming no other names, but in fact Golitsyn was only one of seven generals, playing a larger role only in one encounter.⁵¹ Though a boyar, Prince Andrei Ivanovich Golitsyn played no important role in the reign of Boris Godunov (Golitsyn was out of favor), yet the Chronicler mentions a precedence dispute and his tonsure as a monk.⁵²

⁴⁹ “Rodoslovnaia keleinaia kniga sviatishego gosudaria Filareta Nikiticha Patriarkha vseia Rossii,” *Iubileinyi sbornik imperatorskogo S.-Peterburgskogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta, 1613–1913*, i–xxvii, 1–118. This text is a revision of the “Sovereign’s Genealogy” (*Gosudarev rodoslovet*) of the 1550s: Bychkova, *Rodoslovyie*, 32–85.

⁵⁰ Narimant came to Novgorod both to be baptised (with the name Gleb) and take possession of some Novgorodian territories. The Nikon Chronicle described all this (*PSRL* 10, 206) without mention of the Golitsyns. The Piskarev Chronicler tells the reader nothing about the reason why Narimant came to Novgorod, only noting the connection with the Golitsyns (*PSRL* 34, 109), evidently taken from the Genealogy of Filaret: “Rodoslovnaia,” 5–6. Similarly, the Piskarev Chronicler lists the witnesses to the will of Grand Prince Vasilii I Dmitrievich (1389–1425), including Prince Iurii Patrikeev (the grandson of Prince Narimant) “who first of the Golitsyns came from Novgorod” (*tot pervoi v Golitsynykh vyekhal s Novagoroda*) (in 1408), even though the Golitsyns branched off from the clan of Prince Iurii a century or so after he witnessed the will (*PSRL* 34, 186). On the Patrikeev–Golitsyn connection see Kollmann, *Kinship*, 225–26.

⁵¹ *PSRL* 34, 193. Compare V. I. Buganov, ed., *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg.*, Moscow, 1966, 286. The Piskarev Chronicler misdated the campaign to 7087 [1579] instead of the correct date 7086 [1578].

⁵² *PSRL* 34, 203–04; Pavlov, *Gosudarev dvor*, 77, 117. Two sons of Prince A. I. Golitsyn entered the Duma, Ivan Andreevich in 1634 (died 1654) and Andrei Andreevich (1638, died the same year): Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 184–85.

The so-called Belaia Chronicler showed a similar interest in the Princes Prozorovskii. This was a much less comprehensive text than the Piskarev Chronicle, covering only the years 1598–1634 and devoting most of its space to the Time of Troubles. Originally the text went on to the 1660s but the latter part has been lost, except for a cryptic comment, apparently from the boyar Prince Ivan Semenovich Prozorovskii, the patron if not the author of the work. The purpose beyond telling the story of those years seems to have been to give prominence to Prince Semen Vasil'evich Prozorovskii as military commander in the Time of Troubles and the Smolensk war. Since Semen Vasil'evich entered the Duma as *okol'nichii* only in 1630 (boyar 1646, died 1659) and his father Vasilii Aleksandrovich had never risen above Moscow gentleman, the chronicler was also celebrating a new family among the Duma ranks.⁵³

The boyars and lesser hangers-on⁵⁴ who brought their families into the traditional narrative of Russian history also included themselves in a narrative that had a definite political message, albeit not one in the secular terms of Western Europe. The Piskarev Chronicle, the most elaborate of the three, inserted the Golitsyns in a full account of the glories of Russia and its rulers back to Kievan times. After the end of the Kiev period, it laid particular stress on the time of Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi, but largely omitted the period 1425–1530. The Chronicler noted that he wanted to fill in the gap, but lacked material. More revealing was his account of the century

⁵³ *PSRL* 34, 259, 261–62, 269–71. Pavlov, *Gosudarev dvor*, 116; V. I. Buganov, M. P. Lukichev and N. M. Rogozhin, eds., *Boiarskaia kniga 1627 g.*, Moscow, 1986, 66; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 183, 192. Prince S. V. Prozorovskii was prominent not only in the Tikhvin siege and the Smolensk war but also in the council of 1648 and later in Ukrainian affairs as *voevoda* of Putivl'. Prince I. S. Prozorovskii was killed at Astrakhan' in the Razin revolt: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, V, 164–65, 485, 552; VI, 301–04.

⁵⁴ Lesser families made use of the genre. The Moscow Chronicler constructed his narrative to find a place for the much more humble Ianov family, which never rose above *stol'nik* in the seventeenth century. The chronicler did this by inventing an ancestor, one Mikhail Dashkovich Ianov, who supposedly came from Lithuania to serve Ivan III. He inserted this "Ianov" just before mention of the Lithuanian general Evstafii Dashkovich, whom the Russians defeated in 1502. After describing the defeat of Evstafii Dashkovich "Ianov" according to previous chronicles and the *Razriad* books, he added that many gentry clans (*dvorianskii rody*) came to serve Ivan III from Lithuania. He also inserted one Fyodor Ianov as a junior officer in the 1584 campaign against the Tatars in the Volga. Vasilii and Ivan, the sons of Fyodor Ianov, were Moscow gentlemen by 1627 and Vasilii's son rose to *stol'nik* by 1640. It was his generation that seems to have been behind the chronicle. The Ianovs were actually a Suzdal' local clan. *PSRL* 34, 223, 229, 232–35, 237; [Ivanov] *Alfavitnyi ukazatel' familii i lits, upominaevmykh v Boiarskikh knigakh*, Moscow, 1853, 495–96. Ia. G. Solodkin, "Letopisets Moskovskii," *Slovar' knizhnikov*. . . XVII a., III/II, 250–52; Kivelson, *Autocracy*, 91.

1530–1630. Naturally, the reign of Ivan the Terrible occupied a great deal of space and the Chronicler presented it with full drama. The portrait of Ivan was anything but idealized. After giving him and the boyars full credit for the glorious conquest of Kazan', he goes on to report a legend that Metropolitan Makarii had a vision which told him, "Dishonor and bloodletting and division (*razdeleniē*) of the land is coming." In 1563, the story continued, Tsar Ivan asked the metropolitan for some reading useful for the soul and Makarii sent him the burial service. Ivan was angry, "such books are not brought into our tsar's rooms." Makarii replied that this was the best reading for the soul, for "he who reads it with attention will never sin."⁵⁵

The next year Ivan grew angry and by the evil counsel of Vasillii Mikhailov Iur'ev and Aleksei Basmanov, "he made the *oprichnina*, the division [*razdeleniē*] of the land." He divided the landholding class into the *oprichnina* and the *zemshchina*, and "there was hatred among people against the tsar from everyone." "Then evil people began to turn the tsar against many people and they perished by these evil words." The text continues with a long account of the executions and the destruction of Novgorod. The story of Ivan concluded with another legend, however, of a slightly different order. Supposedly, shortly before his death, Ivan held a feast with the boyars and indeed "all ranks" and got everyone drunk. They began to sing, to bark like dogs, and to utter shameful words and Ivan ordered that all their words be secretly written down. The next morning he had the record brought to him "and they were amazed that such intelligent and humble people from the tsar's council said such simple words, and they showed the words to them, and they themselves were amazed at this wonder."⁵⁶

The story of the feast threw as equally harsh a light on the boyars as on the tsar. That was part of the Piskarev Chronicler's purpose, for his descriptions of the political behavior of the boyars was often no more flattering than his portrait of Ivan. He devoted much space to the boyars' intrigues, complete with legalized and unlegalized murder, of the regency period during Ivan's youth (1533–47). After

⁵⁵ *PSRL* 34, 190.

⁵⁶ Basmanov was authentically an important figure in the *oprichnina*, while V. M. Iur'ev, in contrast, though certainly a boyar, Ivan's major-domo, and a supporter of the *oprichnina* policy, was not. He was, however, the first cousin of Tsaritsa Anastas'ia Romanovna and her brother Nikita Romanovich Iur'ev, the grandfather of Tsar Michael. A. A. Zimin, *Oprichnina Ivana Groznogo*, Moscow, 1964, 134, 196–98; R. G. Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora*, St. Petersburg, 1992, 178–79; *PSRL* 34, 190–94.

Ivan's death, he described the intrigues under Tsar Fyodor thus: "the original hater and enemy of the human race and human virtues began a rebellion and division (*razdelenie*) among the boyars." At the death of Boris Godunov he remarked on the hatred of Boris for the boyars but also the denunciations (*dovody*) among the boyars.⁵⁷ He described the fighting among the boyars that accompanied the election of Vasilii Shuiskii as tsar during the Time of Troubles.⁵⁸ He also noted the oath of Vasilii Shuiskii, who swore not to put anyone to death without consulting the boyars, and a number of lesser promises. In the account of the Piskarev Chronicler, the point of the story was that the boyars and indeed all Russians swore to obey him and then broke their oath.⁵⁹ Along with the weak Fyodor and the evil Boris and even more evil False Dmitrii were the boyars with their endless bloody rivalries. The message was clear. Not only did the tsar need to be virtuous, listening to the church and wise counsellors, but the boyars needed to cease their rivalries and work together to serve the tsar as they should. Harmony was necessary among the boyars as well as between the elite and the tsar.⁶⁰

That elite was not uniform in its conception of the proper way for

⁵⁷ By and large the Moscow Chronicler (Ivanovs) had the same point of view. He told a long story from the time of the *oprichnina* about the strange episode of Simeon Bekbulatovich, when Ivan "abdicated" for a year and gave the throne to Simeon. In the Moscow Chronicler's interpretation, this move was an attempt by Ivan to prevent the succession of his son Ivan Ivanovich. Churchmen and boyars reproved the tsar, so he had them executed. This interpretation of the episode had no foundation in fact, but served to emphasize Ivan's wickedness. The chronicler also noted the enmity among the boyars after the accession of Tsar Fyodor. In miniature, the Moscow Chronicler replicated the viewpoint of the Piskarev Chronicler. Evidently these views circulated beyond the most aristocratic elite of Russia. *PSRL* 34, 226–27, 232.

⁵⁸ *PSRL* 34, 173, 177–78, 195, 205, 211. The Piskarev chronicler, almost alone among chroniclers of the time, did not idealize Tsar Fyodor. Listing some of the boyars he exiled, he remarked, "God knows, whether for good cause or not." He also noted the exile of the Romanovs and others: *ibid.*, 195–96, 202.

⁵⁹ *PSRL* 34, 213–14. The oath has been variously interpreted. Platonov was mainly concerned to demonstrate that it did not really limit the power of the tsar, a reflection of the constitutional debates of the early twentieth century and his own monarchist views: S. F. Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii smuty v Moskovskom gosudarstve XVI–XVII vv.*, 3d ed., St. Petersburg, 1910, 282–87.

⁶⁰ Another of the Piskarev chronicler's legends emphasizes the respect boyars should show to their sovereigns. Once the boyar Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Shuiskii came to pray at the Danilov Monastery just south of Moscow. As he was leaving he used the grave of St. Daniel to mount his horse. A peasant who lived there reproached him, saying "Lord prince! you are not doing right. That is the grave of Grand Prince Daniil." Shuiskii replied, "There are a lot of Grand Princes." God immediately struck down the horse and rendered Shuiskii dumb. Only by lying on the grave during the service was the prince cured. *PSRL* 34, 205. In fact Daniil (Aleksandrovich, 1261–1303) was buried in the Archangel Cathedral in the Kremlin: *PSRL* 10, 174.

tsars and boyars to conduct themselves. The Belaia Chronicler differed from the Piskarev Chronicler. Though the Prozorovskiis had no special prominence or favor under Boris Godunov, the text was free of the denunciations of his wickedness in the Piskarev and Moscow Chronicler as well as in the better-known historical tales of the Time of Troubles. The Belaia Chronicler made no mention of the boyars sent into exile under Boris, even of the Romanovs. There is no account of boyar dissension at the election of Tsar Vasillii Shuiskii, and the text launches into an unusually detailed recounting of the peasant revolt under Ivan Bolotnikov, a rarity in most of the historical works of the time. In this text it was Vasillii Shuiskii's jealousy of his cousin Prince Mikhail Skopin-Shuiskii that caused trouble, not boyar rivalries.⁶¹ This was a world of good and bad tsars and wicked peasant and cossack rebels, with little sense that the boyars could make any difficulties for Russia with their rivalries.

None of these writers of recent history for their boyar patrons were in any sense oppositional in sentiment. They all accepted the fundamental notion that the ideal was harmony among the boyars and between boyars and tsar. This ideal of harmony of boyars and tsar was just that, an ideal, and did not pretend to cover the routine realities of life and politics at the tsar's court. There is one brief glimpse of that reality from close up, in the life composed to honor the *okol'nichii* Fyodor Mikhailovich Rtishchev (1625–73).⁶² The genre of the work was derived from the traditional genre of the lives of saints, the only biographical genre available in older Russian culture. Nevertheless, it did not portray Rtishchev as a saint, merely as a pious and virtuous Christian of the new type of the later seventeenth century, both pious and learned. The first of his good deeds in this account was to bring in and support learned Ukrainian monks, led by Epifanii Slavynetskii, around 1649.

Most of the text, however, concerns Rtishchev's life at court. It begins by noting that his father held the rank of *okol'nichii*, and then went on to describe Tsar Aleksei's appointment of the young Rtishchev to court rank as *postel'nichii*.⁶³ He was chaste in his

⁶¹ PSRL 34, 238–40, 244, 253.

⁶² "Zhitie milostivogo muzha Feodora zvaniem Rtishcheva," in I. P. Kozlovskii, "F. M. Rtishchev: istoriko-biograficheskoe issledovanie," *Kievskie universitetskie izvestiia* 12 (December, 1906), 155–68. See also Bushkovitch, *Religion*, 160–63; and E. K. Romodanovskaia, "Zhitie Feodora Rtishcheva," *Slovar' knizhnikov* 3/1, 391–93. The text was probably composed sometime in the latter 1680s.

⁶³ Mikhail Alekseevich Rtishchev was himself *postel'nichii* 1646–50, receiving the rank of

married life, and was interested neither in acquiring wealth or honors nor in “genealogical arrogance, hateful to God,” like the other courtiers. He was humble, and attentive to the needs of the church. The anonymous author went into some detail on his hero’s relationship with the favorite Morozov, who “by the good will of the tsar was strong in word and deed. On account of his favor he had many friends, advisors, and servants to his will.” Morozov had so much to do that he was often careless in managing state affairs, and none of his friends and clients dared to correct him. Rtishchev, in contrast, pointed out his errors, “quietly and peacefully, without any accusation.” In the Polish war Rtishchev was compassionate and merciful, he suffered unjustly but with humility the wrath of the people in the Copper Revolt (1662).

The culmination of his good deeds came when Tsar Aleksei named him the tutor (*diad'ka*) of Tsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich, until his untimely death in 1669 the heir to the throne. According to the author, the tsar wanted to give him the rank of boyar but Rtishchev refused out of humility. With similar humility he bore the accusations of one Vladimir Eropkin, a *stol'nik* who had been the object of his benefactions. Rtishchev reproved Eropkin for his greed and theft, so the former client slandered him to the tsar, “forgetting the saying of Solomon, that the heart of the tsar is in the hand of God, Who directs it where he wishes [Proverbs 21, 1].” Aleksei did not believe the slanders, and reasoning that if Eropkin served Rtishchev so poorly, so would he serve the tsar poorly, and sent Eropkin to exile on his estate. There God struck down Eropkin with madness. Rtishchev bore similar anger from another former client, Ivan Ozerov, with similar humility and calm (*nezlobie*). After many other acts of charity and humility, Rtishchev fell ill, and realizing that the end was near, he called his daughter Akulina and her husband, Prince Vasilii Fyodorovich Odoevskii and asked them to be merciful to the peasants whom they would inherit from him. Then he called his cousin Bogdan Khitrovo (the tsar’s favorite) and asked him to take care of his father and his household. His final act was to distribute alms to the poor.⁶⁴

okol'nichii in 1650. His son Fyodor replaced him as *postel'nichii* in that year. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 189, 192.

⁶⁴ Prince V. F. Odoevskii (died 1687) was the grandson of Prince N. I. Odoevskii and the nephew of Prince Ia. N. Odoevskii. His own father Fyodor Nikitich had died young in 1636. Prince Vasilii Fyodorovich was *kravchii s putem* in 1675–76 and boyar from 1680: Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 55; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 202.

This portrait of the ideal Christian courtier reveals a great deal about the atmosphere and structure of court politics. The text explicitly states that the normal courtier was occupied with the acquisition of wealth and honor and boastful about his distinguished family. The latter charge was not manufactured, as the historical texts we have just surveyed demonstrate, as well as the genealogical literature. The life of Rtishchev also clarifies the hierarchy of patronage, where Morozov was Rtishchev's patron, and Rtishchev the patron in turn of Eroptkin and Ozerov. The relationship of patron and client was not free of problems. Morozov's clientele was allegedly subservient and craven, and there is the suggestion that Rtishchev's attempt to correct his patron's errors was not entirely welcome. Rtishchev himself had to endure slander and abuse from his own clients, in spite of his benefactions. Rtishchev's position was secure because the tsar trusted him (if we believe the text) both after the Copper Revolt and at the time of Eroptkin's complaints. His daughter's marriage points to an alliance with the powerful Princes Odoevskii, who also shared Rtishchev's cultural interests.

While the life of Rtishchev throws light on the realities of court life with its intrigues and betrayals, its overall political conception remains fully traditional. Tsar Aleksei is simply the traditional good tsar, pious and just, without any hint of a more secular idea of the state. There is also no sense of dissatisfaction with the tsar or even with his favorite Morozov. Rebellion is outside the court among the people of Moscow. The political values of court society were not, however, completely unchanging. The life itself reflects the newer currents in Orthodox spirituality, which emphasized the need for learning and a moral order founded on charity and humility, the spirituality of Epifanii Slavinskii and Simeon Polotskii. Still within the religious world, there were other cultural changes afoot by the end of the life of Rtishchev and of his sovereign Tsar Aleksei.

NEW TRENDS

These new trends in culture, the gradual spread to Russia of the culture of Baroque Europe, could not but begin to affect the understanding of political power. An early example of this was in the work of Simeon Polotskii himself. Though the monk's primary effort was in preaching and religious compositions, he also produced much moralistic and occasional verse, the latter primarily for occasions at

court. One such was his “Russian Eagle” (*Orel Rossiiskii*), a poem for the proclamation of the ill-fated heir, Tsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich on 1 September 1667. The poem was a frank celebration in full Baroque linguistic and stylistic artifice of the power and glory of the Russian tsars and of Russia itself, the new Sarmatia, destined to rule over Eastern Europe. It celebrated the might, courage, conquests, and glory of the tsar and proclaimed a similar future for his son in a manner unheard of in earlier Russian panegyrics. Even the great conquests of Ivan the Terrible on the Volga had never received such treatment.⁶⁵

However important, Simeon was only one man writing for an audience not perfectly clear to us today. Equally decisive but more public changes in political thought came from the various cultural enterprises of the head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery (1671–76), Artamon Matveev. Matveev’s career will be the subject of a later chapter, but for the moment it is enough that in his years at the Ambassadorial Chancellery he was the preeminent favorite of the tsar. More than that, he was one of the best educated men of his time. How that came about we do not know. By the time he came to head the Ambassadorial Chancellery, he was the head of an entire cultural enterprise. He had unusual assistants for the time, the most unusual being Nicolae Spatharie-Milescu (c. 1635–1708), a Moldavian product of the Greek patriarchal school in Constantinople and one of the Italian universities, probably Padua. From about 1656 to 1671 he served the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, participating in various court intrigues (as a result of one he had his nose slit in punishment) and traveling in Germany and Sweden on diplomatic missions. In June 1671, he came to Moscow. He became a client of Matveev, who sent him in 1675 on a mission to China, the first Russian mission to the Ching emperors, returning only in 1678, after the fall of his patron. From then on he remained in Moscow as a translator for the Ambassadorial Chancellery until his death.

⁶⁵ N. A. Smirnov, ed., Simeon Polotskii, *Orel Rossiiskii*, Obshchestvo liubitelei drevnei pis’mennosti 133, St. Petersburg, 1915. In earlier times even very official sources were reluctant to glorify power and conquest. The sixteenth-century Nikon Chronicle portrayed Metropolitan Makarii as praising not Ivan the Terrible’s power or glory resulting from the conquest of Kazan’, but his faith, purity, love, wisdom, bravery, and chastity, which led to victory (*PSRL* 13, 219–37, esp. 226). The unofficial *Kazanskaia istoriia* also stressed Ivan’s piety rather than his glory and power (*PSRL* 19). B. M. Kloss, *Nikonovskii svod i russkie letopisi XVI–XVII vekov*, Moscow, 1980; Bushkovitch, “National Consciousness”; Rowland, “Advice,” and “Literary Ideology.”

During Matveev's ascendancy he was a major figure, repeatedly used for confidential communications between Matveev and the Danish ambassador. It was he who told the tsar about telescopes, and conveyed to the Danes a request for one to be sent to Moscow. He was also the main figure in the compilation of a series of magnificent manuscript books which the Ambassadorial Chancellery produced in those years: a series of portraits and titles of the rulers of the world (the *Tituliarnik*), and others. He taught Latin and Greek to Matveev's son Andrei, later one of Peter's most important diplomats.⁶⁶

The books were not the only innovation of the Matveev years. The most dramatic, in the literal sense, was the court theater, of which Matveev was the primary initiator and even occasional director. The court theater was a radical break in the culture of the Russian court, and indeed of Russia in general. The theater's plays were not mystery plays or theology on the stage: Russia had no tradition of either. Its vernacular theater, such as we know it, was improvised, comic, and popular. What Matveev put on were German Baroque dramas in full costume with verse texts translated into Russian. Their stories came from the Bible, but in the same way that Baroque drama did in the West, using the Bible stories to convey messages that were mainly political and ethical. These were not devotional works. That Matveev was at the heart of the effort is not in doubt. The first orders to write a play came in June 1672, through the Ambassadorial Chancellery to one Johann Gottfried Gregorii, a Lutheran pastor and schoolteacher in the German Suburb of Moscow. Gregorii was to write a play on the Book of Esther. Further orders specified that it was to be held in the tsar's country house in Preobrazhenskoe. The actors were the boys of Gregorii's school, and by 17 October they were able to perform it in Russian before the tsar.⁶⁷

The first play, *Artakserksovo deistvo* (The Play of Artaxerxes), survives in both Gregorii's German and the Russian translation, along with the text of a later play based on the Book of Judith and some lesser

⁶⁶ I. N. Mikhailovskii, "Ocherk zhizni i sluzhby Nikolaia Spafariia v Rossii," *Sbornik . . . Bezhorodko*, I (Kiev, 1897), 1–40; Mikhailovskii, "Vazhneishie trudy Nikolaia Spafariia (1672–77)," *ibid.*, II, (Nezhin, 1899), 24–79; I. M. Kudriavtsev, "'Izdatel'skaia' deiatel'nost' Posol'skogo prikaza (K istorii russkoi rukopisnoi knigi vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka)," *Kniga* 8, (1963), 179–244; D. T. Ursul, *Nikolai Milesku Spafarii*, Kishinev, 1985; Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change," 108–9.

⁶⁷ S. K. Bogoiavlenskii, "Moskovskii teatr pri tsariakh Aleksia i Petre," *ChOIDR* (1914), i–xxi, 1–192.

productions.⁶⁸ The plays on Esther and Judith are essentially transpositions of court life onto the stage, the more remarkable for their central figures, in both cases women, presumably a reference to the new tsaritsa, Natalia Naryshkina. Matveev himself found his counterpart in the “chancellor” of the Esther play, Memucan the chief advisor of Artaxerxes (Ahasuerus in the Bible).⁶⁹ Nothing in the action of either play, however, reflects any specific events of Russian politics at the time. The “Russian” atmosphere is confined to the role of Memucan and the councillors of King Artaxerxes, who are specifically called *dumnye* so that the analogy is explicit. Both Memucan and the councillors play a larger role in the play than in the biblical story. Similarly, the Judith play opens with a long discussion among Nebuchadnezzar’s councillors, with varied opinions expressed on the forthcoming military campaign against the Jews. This discussion was entirely invented and had no biblical prototype. The effect of these additions was to “russianize” the stories by introducing the Boyar Duma as a major actor, and Memucan/Matveev as a principal advisor, but not the only man of wisdom and influence. Similarly, the role of Esther is not entirely biblical. As in the Bible, Vashti refuses to attend her husband’s feast (Act 1, scene 2), but explains her refusal in a long speech about the unequal position of women, Gregorii’s invention. Esther obviously rejects this position, but herself behaves as in the Bible with strength and resolution, if following the form of the traditional role of woman and wife. As the author presents it, presumably following Matveev’s directions, royal women are entitled to some political role as long as they remain within the conventional queenly roles. Judith, however, was not a queen, and here Gregorii stuck very closely to the Biblical text. Women in court politics had clearly become an issue.

These particular reactions to Russian circumstances of the early

⁶⁸ André Mazon and Frédéric Cocron, *La comédie d’Artaxerxès (Artakserksovo deistvo)*, Paris, 1954; N. M. Kudriavtsev, ed., *Artakserksovo deistvo*, Moscow, and Leningrad, 1957. Besides the plays of Esther and Judith, we have one complete play on Tamerlane and Bayezid, and parts of the texts of plays on the biblical Joseph and on Adam and Eve. Texts for a ballet on the story of Orpheus, plays on David and Goliath and on Venus and Bacchus do not survive. The play about Tamerlane (*Temir-Aksakovo deistvo*) is a fairly straightforward heroic drama about Tamerlane’s victory with a strong anti-Ottoman element, a sort of war propaganda play. Plays of Joseph and Adam and Eve are fragmentary. A. N. Robinson, ed., *Ranniaia russkaia dramaturgiia*, I–II, Moscow, 1972.

⁶⁹ Most commentators have seen the analogy to Matveev in Judith’s uncle and guardian Mordecai, but that identification rests on the acceptance of the legend that Matveev was Natalia Naryshkina’s guardian (see chapter 2).

1670s are developed within the framework of very traditional European (though not traditional Russian) ideas of the powerful and virtuous ruler. Both the Esther and Judith plays open with a long invocation to the power and glory of the tsar, his immense possessions, and his victories over his enemies. These invocations are simply the clichés of praise of monarchs from a hundred processions, masques, and court ceremonies since the Renaissance, but they were new in Russia. Earlier Russian texts had not gloried in conquests in this secular fashion, rather they stressed the ruler's defense of Orthodoxy, his incessant prayers and those of the clergy and people, and the direct dependence on God, the Mother of God, Christ and his saints for their victories. The plays assume a virtuous ruler, but one more in the European mode. Piety and meekness are not the central virtues, but concern for the subject. Artaxerxes expresses this at the very beginning (Act 1, scene 1), and the other plays present the defeats of the proud, self-seeking rulers Nebuchadnezzar and Bayezid, concerned only for their own glory, not for the welfare of the subject.

The plays do not only depict good and bad rulers, they present the vices and virtues of aristocratic councillors. In the Judith play the unbiblical dispute among Nebuchadnezzar's councillors shows some bent on mindless praise of the king, endless conquest, and wanton slaughter, while others counsel caution and humanity. The contrast is even greater in *Artakserksovo deistvo*, for in large part the plot revolves around replacement of the evil and proud Haman by the meek and virtuous Mordecai as chief minister of the king. This comes about through the courage, tenacity (and humility) of Esther, but also through Mordecai's denunciation of the conspiracy of Bigthan and Teresh against the king. The conspiracy is a minor episode in the Bible (Esther 2, 21–23), but Gregorii made it much more important and invented a new twist: they conspire to restore Vashti to power, another realistic detail from court politics.

Matveev's court theater, with its Orpheus ballet and biblical dramas of court life, represented the first full incorporation of European cultural forms and ideas into the Russian court. It did not immediately replace the older forms and values, and the next twenty years saw a complex cultural amalgam of old and new. The importance of the plays lies in their public performance at the court and the participation and approval of Tsar Aleksei, as well as that of Matveev himself. The plays also provide us with a glimpse of the

court as they understood it, a place where a wise ruler needed ample advice from aristocratic councillors (led, of course, by the chancellor). The plays represented not a radical innovation in thought, but a shift of emphasis from meekness, piety, and traditional justice alone to the addition of more secularized concern with the welfare of the subjects and the interrelations of ruler and councillors.

The amalgam of old and new in the years of Peter's youth comes out strikingly in what we know of the new elements in the decoration and paintings in the Kremlin Palace. These all appeared in the private rooms of the tsar, with one exception, his new dining hall of 1662, which featured a ceiling painting of the heavens, not with God but with the Zodiac, the planets, fixed stars, and comets, the work of his builder Gustav De Penkin. In his private rooms the tsar kept a series of portraits (*parsuny*) of members of the ruling dynasty, important churchmen, and other subjects. The painters were all foreigners, and besides portraits they depicted the story of Alexander the Great and allegories of the five senses, but also the capture of Jerusalem by Titus and the fall of Jericho, the latter in perfect harmony with the public rooms.⁷⁰ Not all private rooms, however, displayed this sort of innovation. The women's rooms in the palace seem to have been more traditional. As late as the 1680s the private apartments of Peter's rival, his half-sister Sofia, and his mother Tsaritsa Natalia were perfectly traditional, both of them having walls and ceiling covered with the life of Christ.⁷¹ The suburban summer palaces, on the other hand, whose architecture was entirely in the traditional Russian style, had a mixture of old and new in the paintings on the walls, judging by the Kolomenskoe palace of 1672.⁷²

⁷⁰ Zabelin, *Domashnii*, I (1990), 258–63.

⁷¹ The public rooms from the sixteenth century included the Gold Hall of the tsaritsa, her public receiving room, which was decorated with frescoes of pious women from the Bible and Christian history. Zabelin, *Domashnii*, I (1990), 222–24, 229–33.

⁷² The palace at Kolomenskoe had pictures of the four seasons, the four parts of the world, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and the Zodiac, but also the book of Esther (as in the theater), David and Solomon, and the usual Christian icons over the doors, and the traditional floral decoration. Zabelin, *Domashnii*, I (1990), 235–36, 245–47; Simeon Polotskii, *Izbrannye*, 103–08. The literature on the summer palaces is sparse: see P. V. Sinitsyn, *Preobrazhenskoe i okružhaiushchie ego mesta: ikh proshloe i nastoiashchee*, Moscow, 1895; I. Datieva, "Gosudarev dvor na Izmailovskom ostrove", in A. S. Kiselev et al., eds., *Tsarskie i imperatorskie dvortsy*, Moscow, 1997, 87–95; A. Bugrov, "Tserkvi Staro-Preobrazhenskogo sobora", in *ibid.*, 95–103; I. L. Buseva-Davydova, "Tsarskie usad'by XVII v. v razvitiu russkoi arkhitektury," *Russkaia usad'ba* 1(17), 1994, 140–44; and A. I. Zaozerskii, *Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich v svoem khoziaistve*, Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo fakul'teta St. Peterburgskogo universiteta 135, Petrograd, 1917.

If the tsar's own rooms were repainted to any extent after the death of Tsar Aleksei, there is no known record of such activity. Until Peter moved out of the palace for good on his mother's death in 1694, the Kremlin palace continued to speak the traditional language of the Russian state, the almost total predominance of religion over secular thought and the harmonic conception of the state, with the elements of secular thought confined to the private apartments of the tsar himself. The elements of secular culture coming from the Ukraine and Poland which we can trace in the mental world of the boyar elite were similarly enfolded in a largely traditional religious world. It was Peter who would break the mold, but to do that he had first to come out the victor in the twenty years of political battles that succeeded his mother's marriage. In those early years naturally it was not the boy himself who led the struggles, but they were no less decisive for Russian history.

The ascendancy of Artamon Matveev, 1671–1676

The origins of the political alignments at the court of Peter the Great lie in the years of his childhood, in the last years of the reign of his father Tsar Aleksei (roughly, 1667–76). In those final years of his life, Tsar Aleksei began to move away from the balanced court of his earlier years, one that guaranteed some place for all the major factions of aristocrats of Duma rank. Instead, he began to rule through favorites, first running foreign policy through the strengthened Ambassadorial Chancellery headed by Afanasii Lavrent'evich Ordin-Nashchokin. Then he replaced Ordin-Nashchokin with Artamon Matveev in the Ambassadorial Chancellery, but also giving him formal or informal charge of a whole series of important offices. This was a radical departure and it had consequences. The ascendancy of Matveev evoked enormous jealousy and hatred among the boyars toward the new favorite and in turn produced a massive explosion of intrigue and legalized violence after Aleksei's death. The reign of Peter's older half-brother Fyodor (1676–82) and the regency of Tsarevna Sofia (1682–89) were years of almost continuous intrigue and struggle for position among the great aristocrats and officials of Russia. Out of these struggles the Naryshkin faction was born, the faction of the family of Peter's mother Natalia, which finally came to power with the young tsar in the *coup d'état* of 1689. These struggles determined the personal and political composition of Peter's court and government in its first decade, which was the starting point of the cultural changes, the restructuring of government, and the great victories of Peter's reign. All these struggles at court began with Matveev and his moment of glory.

The ascendancy of Artamon Matveev brought a sharp end to more than a generation of peace (1613–71) among the Russian boyars. The contrast with the sixteenth century, or more properly the period from the 1490s to the end of the Time of Troubles, is

striking. In those years some important boyar was exiled or executed in virtually every decade, culminating in the savage violence of the *Oprichnina* of Ivan IV and the factional fighting among aristocrats that was a major element in the Time of Troubles. The succeeding years were very different. In the time of the first Romanov, Tsar Michael (1613–45), most of the cases of exile fell in the period of predominance of his father, Patriarch Filaret (1619–33). In those years there were nine cases of exile in the Duma ranks.¹ The most important were the exile of the Saltykov brothers, the boyar B. M. Saltykov and the *okol'nichii* M. M. Saltykov, in 1625/26 and their ally Prince A. V. Lobanov-Rostovskii. Predominant before 1619, the Saltykovs were accused of slandering the first prospective bride of Tsar Michael, Maria Khlopova, claiming she was not healthy enough for the marriage.² The other case was much better known and more serious, the execution of boyar M. B. Shein and the *okol'nichii* A. V. Izmailov in April 1634 for their alleged failures in the Smolensk war. The war had been the project of Michael's father Patriarch Filaret, and his death in 1633 was probably more important to their fate than any actual military mistakes.³ Filaret's death had the opposite effect for the Saltykovs, for they returned to the

¹ The boyars Prince I. S. Kurakin and M. M. Godunov were in exile by 1624, the latter for supposed improper words about the tsar and the former for alleged treasonous notions, according to Swedish diplomats. V. F. Rzhiga, ed., "Soobshchenie iz dvukh shvedskikh istochnikov," *Deistviia Nizhegorodskoi gubernskoi arkhivnoi komissii* 14, Niznii Novgorod, 1913, otdel III, 19–22; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 179. The Duma secretaries I. T. Gramotin and F. F. Likhachev suffered the same fate, Gramotin in 1626–34, for "disobedience" to Filaret and Tsar Michael, and Likhachev in 1631–32, cause unknown but presumably disfavor with Filaret. He was back in favor by April 1634. Belokurov, "O Posol'skom," 109–10; *DR* II, 867.

Possibly unpolitical cases were those of Prince I. V. Golitsyn (1624–26, over a precedence case) and the boyar Prince V. T. Dolgorukii. The case of Prince Dolgorukii is ambiguous: Robert Crummey listed him as exiled 1628/29 in *Aristocrats*, 179, referring to RGADA, f. 210, stolbets moskovskogo stola 51, sb. 3:2v. However, the note in the document merely says "v derevne" (Robert Crummey to PB, personal communication 3 January 1999). Such a notation frequently did refer to exile (in *boiarskie knigi*, for example), but also to other situations such as senility or illness, mental or physical. His daughter, Tsar Michael's first wife Maria, died after a marriage of only a few weeks in January 1625, and Dolgorukii was sent as *voevoda* to Vologda in 7133 (1624/25), where he remained until 7135 (1626/27). He died 1632/33. *DR* I, 740, 937.

² Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, V, 125, 127–28. The Saltykov brothers had entered the Duma before 1613, but Boris became a boyar on 6 December 1613, after Michael's coronation: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 180–81, 183.

³ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 46, 180–81; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, V, 161–73. The last exile cases in Michael's reign were those of *okol'nichii* S. M. Proestev (1644, for a year or less, over a diplomatic error) and of boyar Prince A. M. L'vov (1644, for a year or less, cause unknown).

Duma in 1634, as did the Duma secretaries Gramotin and Likhachev. The rest of Michael's reign was peaceful.

In the reign of Tsar Aleksei there were no executions at all. There seem to have been only four cases of exile, all of them but one short. The exception was the exile in 1664/65 of the boyar N. A. Ziuzin, who had supported Patriarch Nikon when he was the object of the tsar's wrath. Ziuzin never returned, a unique victim among the elite of the most serious and most public battle of Aleksei's reign.⁴

The lack of executions and exile did not mean that the court of Tsar Aleksei saw perfect harmony among the boyars.⁵ It did mean that for most of the reign there was not a single strong favorite and that a relative balance existed among the various groupings of boyars. This balance in the court and government began to dissolve with the appointment to the Ambassadorial Chancellery of Afanasii Lavrent'evich Ordin-Nashchokin in 1667. The first man to run the office who was not just a Duma secretary, Ordin-Nashchokin got the new title of "Keeper of the Great Seal and Protector of the Sovereign's Great Ambassadorial Affairs." He not only ran the Ambassadorial Chancellery, he added to it two administrative-financial offices, the Vladimir and Galich Quarters as well as the Little Russian Chancellery. In his personal fortress of chancelleries, Ordin-Nashchokin was surrounded by powerful boyars and *di'aki* who controlled the other offices. The Apothecary Chancellery was the preserve of the Miloslavskiis, first the tsar's father-in-law Il'ia

⁴ The only other case where the cause of exile is known was that of the *krauchi* Prince S. A. Urusov (c. 1610–57) in 1645/46, exiled apparently for malfeasance as governor of Novgorod. He reappeared when he was given boyar rank in 1655. He was the son of the Nogai princeling Kasim-Murza (c. 1586–1647), who converted to Orthodoxy in 1615. Kasim-murza's grandfather was Urus-murza (c. 1540–1610), Nogai prince, and from 1586 ally of Russia: A. N. Narbut, *Kniaz'ia Urusovy*, Rodoslovnye Rospisi 2, Moscow 1994, 6–9; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 51, 191; A. A. Zimin, *V Kanun groznykh potriaseniï*, 141.

A more typical case was the "exile" of the Streshnevs, the *krauchi* Semen Luk'ianovich and his cousins, in 1647, on accusations of sorcery. Smirnov believed that they had fallen foul of B. I. Morozov. Their punishment was to be sent as governors to distant provinces: P. P. Smirnov, *Posadskie liudi i ikh klassovaia bor'ba do serediny XVII veka*, 2 vols., Moscow, and Leningrad, 1947–48, vol. II, 23; and O. E. Kosheleva, "Leto 1645 goda: smena lits na rossiiskom prestole," *Kazus 1999*, Moscow, 1999, 153.

⁵ The literature on the elite and the factional groupings in the reign of Tsar Aleksei is sparse. See Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI–VII; Smirnov, *Posadskie liudi*, vol. II, 5–28, 196–215; Longworth, *Alexis*; Joseph T. Fuhrmann, *Tsar Alexis: His Reign and His Russia*, Gulf Breeze, FL, 1981; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 82–106; Ellersieck, "Russia under Aleksei Mikhailovich and Feodor Alekseevich 1645–1682"; and E. I. Filina, "Tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich i politicheskaia bor'ba pri Moskovskom dvore (1645–1652)," M. D. Karpachev, ed., *Rossiiskaia monarkhiia: voprosy istorii i teorii*, Voronezh, 1998, 97–113.

Danilovich (1650–1667), and then Il'ia's relative Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii (1667–1669). Fyodor Rtishchev, one of the tutors (*diad'ki*) of Tsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich, headed the Great Palace as an *okol'nichii* from 1657 to 1666, and was succeeded by his relative and ally, Ordin-Nashchokin's enemy, the boyar Bogdan Khitrovo. In the Great Treasury and the Mercenaries Chancellery, which oversaw the increasingly important mercenary soldiers, Il'ia Miloslavskii had ruled since 1649 and only in 1666 was replaced in both positions by Prince Nikita Odoevskii. A succession of various princes Dolgorukii and Romodanovskii ran the Artillery Chancellery throughout the 1650s and 1660s. Two crucial offices, the *Razriad* and the Estates Chancellery, were headed by *d'iaki* whose relationship to Ordin-Nashchokin is unknown, though in 1666–71 the head of the former was Dementii Bashmakov, longtime chief of Aleksei's Privy Chancellery and a favorite of the tsar in his own right.⁶ Thus, Ordin-Nashchokin had his own little empire, but in the midst of other powerful aristocrats and officials, some of them unfriendly to him as far as we know. Without Aleksei he was nothing.

It was not bureaucratic or court politics, however, that earned Ordin-Nashchokin the tsar's favor, but his foreign policy. Historians describe this policy as hostile to Sweden and friendly to Poland, combined with contempt for Russia's new acquisition, the Ukrainian cossack Hetmanate.⁷ Ordin-Nashchokin's views of foreign policy, however, were only able to make a difference because he had the confidence of the tsar. This relationship was evident already in the negotiations which led to the treaty of Andrusovo of 1667. Negotiations began in 1662, and, even before that, Ordin-Nashchokin was in disagreement with the boyars on tactical issues. He wanted peace, and they wanted Tsar Aleksei to negotiate for the Polish throne.

⁶ Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 15, 20–21, 26–27, 39, 42, 55–57, 84, 122–23, 135–37, 147; I. Ia. Gurliand, *Prikaz velikogo gosudaria Tainykh del*, Iaroslav', 1902; "Kniga diad'kam i mamam i boiaryniam verkhovym i stol'nikom tsarevichym," *Vremennik OIDR* 9, smes', 46.

⁷ The literature on Ordin-Nashchokin is large for a seventeenth-century figure. Most work, however, is based on Solov'ev and on V. Eingorn, "Otvstavka A. L. Ordina-Nashchokina i ego otnoshenie k Malorossiiskomu voprosu," *ZhMNP* 314 (November 1897), 92–176, who were the only older historians to use the archives extensively. Among the many popular works on him are: V. S. Ikonnikov, "Blizhnii boiarin Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin, odin iz predshestvennikov petrovskoi reformy," *Russkaia Starina* 40 (October 1883), 17–66, (November 1883), 273–308; V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs Russkoi Istorii, Sochineniia*, III, 334–51; Pavel Matveev, "Moskva i Malorossiiia v upravlenie Ordina-Nashchokina Malorossiiskim prikazom," *Russkii Arkhiv* 39, no. 2 (1901), 219–43; I. V. Galaktionov and E. V. Chistiakova, *A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin, russkii diplomat XVII v.*, Moscow, 1961; and V. I. Buganov, "Afanasii Lavrent'evich Ordin-Nashchokin," *Voprosy istorii* 3 (1996) 60–81.

Aleksei supported Ordin-Nashchokin.⁸ In the 1664 negotiating sessions he did not get along with his fellow ambassadors, Princes Nikita Ivanovich Odoevskii and Iurii Alekseevich Dolgorukii, both of them great boyars. He wrote to the tsar about the matter, alleging that the disputes were personal, not issues of principle. Whatever the truth, when negotiations resumed in February, 1666, Ordin-Nashchokin came without the boyars and brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion on 20/30 January 1667. Throughout the last year of talks Ordin-Nashchokin received the crucial instructions directly from Tsar Aleksei, not through the Ambassadorial Chancellery.⁹ It was Aleksei's discontent with the resistance of the boyars to his policy of peace with Poland that brought Ordin-Nashchokin to power, a discontent that seems to have surfaced in the 1660s when the tsar virtually ceased appointing new boyars. Aleksei had never been shy about reproving his boyars, as the 1660 correspondence with V. B. Sheremetev revealed.¹⁰

Ordin-Nashchokin's foreign policy thus involved from the start the issue of Tsar Aleksei's relationship to the boyar elite. In his position as principal favorite, Ordin-Nashchokin also prefigured the role of his successor Matveev. The foreign policy issues themselves were not simple. Peace with Poland in 1667 allowed Russia to confront a far greater threat arising on the southern horizon: the resurgent Ottoman Empire.¹¹ Turkey's newly recovered strength

⁸ Zaozerskii, *Tsarskaia votchina*, 284–85; I. V. Galaktionov, "Russko-pol'skii soiuz: obosnovanie idei A. L. Ordinyim-Nashchokinym nakanune peregovorov v Andrusove," *Slavianskii sbornik* 4, Saratov, 1990, 81–125.

⁹ The 1667 treaty with Poland was the culmination of Ordin-Nashchokin's foreign policy, but the tsar's views of policy did not entirely coincide with his own. Already in 1664, Ordin-Nashchokin had been willing to concede Russian rule over most of the Ukrainian lands to achieve a peace with Poland, but Aleksei firmly vetoed that proposal, and the diplomat followed his sovereign's orders: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 162–85; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza*, Warsaw, 1959.

¹⁰ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 193–96. In 1672 Aleksei called Prince G. G. Romodanovskii, one of his principal generals, the enemy of the cross of Christ, a new Achitophel, and Judas for disobeying his commands and failures in the war against Doroshenko and the Ottomans. Romodanovskii remained in his command and suffered no consequences, but the incident demonstrates how close to the surface was the tsar's anger. *ŽORSA*, II (1861), 771–75.

¹¹ After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Russia had studiously avoided conflict with the Ottomans, accepting almost any humiliation from them and their Crimean vassals rather than fight the mighty Turks. Ottoman decline in the early seventeenth century relieved the pressure, but the Ottomans recovered under the vigorous leadership of the Köprülü vizirs (Mehmet Köprülü, 1656–61, Fazil Ahmet, 1661–76, and the great Kara Mustafa, 1676–83). Fazil Ahmet brought to a successful conclusion the war with Venice over Crete in 1669, freeing the Turks for action against Russia and Poland. N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiiia i Turtsiia v XVI–XVII st.*, 2 vols., Uchenye zapiski MGU 94, Moscow, 1946, v. 2, 118–24.

threatened both Poland and Russia when the Crimeans named Petro Doroshenko as Ukrainian hetman in 1665 and he accepted Turkish suzerainty in 1669.¹² Ordin-Nashchokin had been aware of the Turkish issue for years. His memorandum to Aleksei back in 1664, as he set off for the negotiations with Poland, stressed that one important reason for an alliance with Poland was that Russia could not only protect the Orthodox population of Poland but also that the alliance of the two states would exert an attractive force on the Rumanian principalities to pull them away from the Ottomans.¹³ In the context of Doroshenko's contacts with the Turks, about which both the Polish and Russian governments were aware, any issue involving him or his relations with the hetmans of the Left Bank Ukraine under Russian rule necessarily involved Turkey. Ordin-Nashchokin's preference for dealing with the Ukrainian church over the Ukrainian (Left Bank) hetmans was in large part a response to the Turkish problem, not merely a way to control the Ukraine. His memoranda of May, 1669 clearly demonstrated that fact, as did his final memorandum to the tsar of March, 1671.¹⁴ His desire for reconciliation with Poland was not the central point of his policy, it was a tactic in the struggle with the Ottomans.

Though head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery and guardian of the Great Seal, Ordin-Nashchokin was not able to control his own chancellery or successfully manage relations with the Ukrainian cossack and church leadership, so his great aims came to nought. He was able neither to conclude a final treaty with Poland nor to keep the favor of the tsar and in July 1671, he (*de facto*) lost his position to Matveev, head of the Little Russian Chancellery since 1669. Some of

¹² For this tangled story see Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 149–50, 178–79, 353–59, 371–74, 377–81; N. I. Kostomarov, *Ruina, Sobranie Sochinenii*, XV, St. Petersburg, 1905, 47–54, 67–84, 92–104, 118–33, 138–62; Dmytro Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko: Ohliad ioho zhyttia i politychnoi diial'nosti*, New York, 1985, 47–286; I. V. Galaktionov, "Andrusovskii dogovor 1667 goda i problema russko-pol'skogo soiuza," *Slavianskii sbornik* 2 (Saratov, 1978), 70–120; and Galaktionov, "Ukraina v diplomaticheskikh planakh Rossii, Pol'shi, Kryma i Turtsii v kontse 60–kh godov XVII veka," *ibid.* 3 (Saratov, 1985), 40–65.

¹³ Both Solov'ev and Eingorn isolated the Polish–Ukrainian issue from the larger international context formed by the revival of Ottoman power: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 162–63; Eingorn, "Ostavka." For a somewhat different view see Zbigniew Wójcik, *Miedzy traktatem Andruszowskim a wojna turecka: Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie, 1667–1672*, Warsaw, 1968, 267; and Galaktionov, "Andrusovskii dogovor" (1978) and "Ukraina" (1985).

¹⁴ N. Kostomarov, ed., *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, IX, St. Petersburg, 1877, 7–22, on which see Eingorn, "Ostavka," 105, note 7; for the March 1671 memorandum see *ibid.*, 92–93, 171. Ordin-Nashchokin's feelers to Doroshenko in 1669 were similarly tactical: Galaktionov, "Ukraina" (1985).

his failures in policy were the result of objective causes. There were too many complex issues with Poland to solve so quickly, but his ultimate fate was the result not only of this failure and his clashes with the Ukrainians, but also because his base lay entirely in the tsar's support. He had quarreled with two of the greatest boyars, Prince Iurii Dolgorukii and Prince Nikita Odoevskii, in 1664, and the next year the Swedish emissary reported clashes with Prince Ivan Semenovich Prozorovskii and the general Prince Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii as well as Ordin-Nashchokin's widespread unpopularity with the boyars. Other sources point to disagreement with the boyar B. M. Khitrovo and the *iasel'nikhii* Ivan Zheliabuzhskii, an important diplomat. His disputes involved the *d'iaki* of the Ambassadorial Chancellery such as Gerasim Dokhturov and Efim Iur'ev.¹⁵ In most of these disputes tactical disagreements over policy escalated into major conflicts because of personal jealousies or jurisdictional battles, but, whatever the cause, Ordin-Nashchokin remained an isolated figure, whose power came exclusively from the tsar's favor. Once Aleksei perceived him as having failed and withdrew that favor, he fell like a stone.

MATVEEV'S RISE

The appointment of Ordin-Nashchokin to the Ambassadorial Chancellery in 1667 had already begun to upset the balance at court, and Aleksei's replacement of him with Artamon Sergeevich Matveev upset it even more, for Matveev was more than just a trusted diplomat, he was clearly the tsar's new favorite. He was much more successful in his policies than Ordin-Nashchokin and had few potential rivals. In Matveev's time, contrary to the practice before 1671 and after 1676, few boyars held high administrative office in Moscow. The main exception was Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo, who headed all the chancelleries having to do with the administration of the palace. Prince Iurii Alekseevich Dolgorukii, who nominally headed the Russian army, had headed the Kazan' Palace (administering the whole of the lower Volga basin) before Matveev

¹⁵ Ellersieck, Russia, 290; Eingorn, "Odstavka," 101, 121, 145; and S. F. Faizov, "Neizvestnaia stranitsa iz predystorii odstavki A. L. Ordina-Nashchokina," *Slavianskii sbornik* 3 (Saratov, 1985), 66–76. In 1672 Iu. A. Dolgorukii thought that the activities of Doroshenko and the Crimean khan in the Ukraine were to Russia's good as they harmed mainly Poland in 1670–71.

and would hold major office afterwards, but not in 1671–76. He and the eldest of the boyars, Prince Nikita Ivanovich Odoevskii, certainly took part in Duma deliberations, but neither of them held a major office.¹⁶ Parallel to the disappearance of the boyars from the central administration was the sharp decrease in appointments to any ranks of the Duma in 1671–76. After a group of ten named in 1670, the number of new appointments fell sharply to five in 1672, only one in 1673, two in 1674 and none at all in 1675. By the end of Aleksei's reign the men of boyar rank had mostly received that honor before 1660, and must have been a visibly ageing group. The small number of appointments in 1671–75 sharply contradicted the practice of Aleksei's early years, the appointment of men in larger numbers and from less exalted backgrounds than earlier.¹⁷ At the same time, the tsar's favorite was not a dictator. In the very years 1674–75, when new appointments were so rare, as we shall see, the Duma was consulted and played a major role even in foreign policy, Matveev's particular domain.

Who was this all-powerful Matveev, a secondary figure (if even that) until 1669? Born in 1625, he was the son of the secretary Sergei Matveev, an official who worked in 1632–34 in the Musketeer Chancellery and in 1636–42 in the Kazan' Palace, as well as handling relations with the various native peoples of the region, Tatars, Bashkirs, Nogais, and Kalmyks. He was also a diplomat, and his specialty was the East: around 1626 he was sent to the Nogais, in 1634–35 to Istanbul itself, and in 1642 all the way to Iran. After that he disappeared from view, and presumably died. Sergei Matveev had worked his way up from subsecretary (*pod'iachii*) and never made Duma secretary. An efficient servant of the tsar, he was not a great man at court.¹⁸

His son would be different. Years later in exile he listed all his offices, ranks, and deeds in his petition to the tsar, and they made a long list. He was a military officer at first, the commander of musketeer regiments in the war against Poland (1653–67). He also served in the Russian delegation at the signing of the Pereiaslav

¹⁶ The diplomats repeatedly style Prince Iu. A. Dolgorukii *Feldherr* or even *Grossfeldherr*, in French *connetable*, all titles that implied a supreme command of the army. The diplomats were usually extremely precise in their reports of titles and offices and their translations of them, but I have been able to find no clear Russian equivalent.

¹⁷ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 22–31, 196–98. The trend in 1671–75 is particularly striking looking at the year by year lists in Poe, "Consular," 123–37.

¹⁸ Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 62, 164; S. B. Veselovskii, *D'iaki i pod'iachie XV–XVII vv.*, 324.

treaty in 1654 that brought the Ukrainian cossacks under the “high hand” of Tsar Aleksei, and in missions to Poland. In the 1660s, however, his own regiment of musketeers served in Moscow, doing guard duty in the Kremlin. His regiment was one of those that defended the tsar during the “Copper Revolt” of 1662. His chance to rise came in 1669, when the tsar sent him to help disentangle Russia’s relations with the Ukrainian cossacks. Matveev seems to have been instrumental in calming the cossacks’ passions by providing them with a new charter of privileges, and helping to elect a new hetman. His reward was to be appointed head of the Little Russian Chancellery on 9 April 1669.¹⁹

To understand Matveev’s political career we must first dispose of the legends around his rise, legends intertwined with those around the marriage of Peter the Great’s mother, Natalia Naryshkina, to Tsar Aleksei. The traditional story is that of the supposed conflict of the families of Aleksei’s two wives, the Miloslavskiis and the Naryshkins. The Naryshkin clan allegedly came to power with the marriage of Tsar Aleksei to Natalia Naryshkina on 22 January 1671. The marriage of the tsar to a second wife immediately put the Naryshkins in conflict with the Miloslavskiis, the relatives of Aleksei’s first wife, Mariia Il’ichna.²⁰ The story assumes that the rivalry of the families of the two wives of Tsar Aleksei was merely the natural result of the existence of two families led by strong personalities. As we shall see, the rivalry only dates from the winter of 1676–77, and was the result of concrete actions by Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii. From that moment on, Tsaritsa Natalia, in spite of her youth, took control of Naryshkin affairs, while Tsarevna Sofia played no role at all in the contest until 1682. The struggle of the Naryshkins and Miloslavskiis before 1676 is a myth.

The Naryshkin family stood at the very lowest level of the Moscow elite. Natalia’s grandfather, Poluekt Ivanovich Naryshkin, was a *vybornyi gorodovoi dvorianin* from Tarusa in 1627, when he received 600 cheti of land in *pomest’e* (service estate). Though he did not formally speaking “serve from Moscow” his status kept him just above the provincial landholding elite of the seventeenth century, the

¹⁹ Solov’ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 386–91; Kostomarov, *Ruina*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, XV, 138–47; Eingorn, “Ostavka,” 92–176; V. I. Buganov, *Moskovskoe vosstanie 1662 g.*, Moscow, 1964, 83–86.

²⁰ Solov’ev assumed that the competition between the Naryshkin and Miloslavskii clans began with the marriage. Solov’ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 185; Lindsey Hughes, *Sophia: Regent of Russia 1657–1704*, New Haven, CT and London, 1990, 36–37.

rank and file *gorodovye dvoriane*. His son, Kirill Poluektovich Naryshkin, was the head of a musketeer regiment, and also not of Duma rank.²¹

When did he come in contact with Matveev? The traditional story was that Natalia was Matveev's ward (*vospitanitsa*).²² The story went on to add that the tsar was so close to Matveev that he saw Natalia, Matveev's ward, before the *smotriny*, the viewing of prospective brides, of February, 1670, when he visited Matveev in his house. The assertion that Natal'ia was Matveev's ward appeared first in the *Gistoriia* of Count A. A. Matveev (A. S. Matveev's son), written probably in 1725–8.²³ The more elaborate version comes from the memories of Matveev's granddaughters, Mariia and Natal'ia, as reported in the late eighteenth century.²⁴ As early as 1902, E. V. Shmurlo demonstrated that Matveev was in no sense close to the tsar or even well known to him before he was made head of the Little Russian Chancellery in 1669.²⁵ Shmurlo discredited the story of the friendship of Matveev with Aleksei, but did not address the issue of Matveev's guardianship over Natalia. That story came from the younger Matveev, reproduced by Novikov. Both accounts were romantic nonsense.

²¹ V. I. Buganov, M. P. Lukichev, and N. M. Rogozhin, eds., *Boiarskaia kniga 1627 g.*, Moscow, 1986, 131. K. P. Naryshkin's wife, born Anna Leont'evna Leont'ev (died 1702), was also from obscure provincial gentry. Her father, Leontii Dmitrievich Leont'ev, was simply a landholder of Kashira. The Leont'evs who served in the palace and eventually made it to Duma ranks in the seventeenth century were distant cousins: A. N. Narbut, *Leont'evy*, *Rodoslovnye rospisi* 4, Moscow, 1995, 9–11.

²² Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 607–08; VII, 135; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 101–02; Hughes, *Russia*, 390.

²³ A. A. Matveev, *Zapiski*, in I. P. Sakharov, *Zapiski russkikh liudei: Sobytiia vremeni Petra Velikogo*, St. Petersburg, 1841 (reprint, Newtonville, MA, 1980), 15. See Epilogue, note 42.

²⁴ One variant of the granddaughter's story was that of Maria Andreevna Rumiantseva, recorded in Jakob von Stählin, *Originalanekdoten von Peter den Grossen*, Leipzig, 1785, 3–9. The other variant was that which Nikolai Novikov reported in 1776 from the stories of Natal'ia Andreevna's husband, Prince Vasilli Ivanovich Meshcherskii. Mariia Andreevna Rumiantseva (1698–1788) could not have heard these stories much earlier than about 1710 or later than her father, A. A. Matveev's, death in 1728. Stählin only began collecting anecdotes well after he came to Russia in 1735, and also heavily edited them for publication: N. I. Pavlenko, *Petr Velikii*, Moscow, 1994, 348–58. Novikov also reported that Prince Meshcherskii told him he had letters in which Tsar Aleksei addressed Matveev as "Sergeich," but never showed Novikov the letters. See N. Novikov, ed., preface to *Istoriia o nevinnom zatochenii blizhnego boiarina Artamona Sergeevicha Matveeva*, St. Petersburg, 1776.

²⁵ This promotion was the result of his success on a mission to the Ukrainian cossacks in the context of increasing discontent in Moscow with Ordin-Nashchokin's Ukrainian policy. E. Shmurlo, "Kriticheskie zametki po istorii Petra Velikogo," *ZhMNP*, 330 (August 1900), 193–202.

The actual connection between Matveev and the Naryshkin family was much more mundane: Kirill Naryshkin and his brother Fyodor served in Matveev's regiment of musketeers. From 1662 until at least 1668 Matveev's regiment was stationed in Moscow and every week or so stood guard at the Kremlin palace. Frequently Fyodor Poluektovich Naryshkin, Natalia's uncle, who held the rank of *polugolova*, took the duty for Matveev. By 1664 at the latest Fyodor had been joined by Kirill Poluektovich, who held the rank of *rotmistr* in that year. Fyodor is mentioned regularly in Privy Chancellery records of 1662–67, always in the same position, until he received his own regiment in fall, 1667, and was sent south in the spring of the following year. Kirill, as would befit a more junior officer, does not appear between his mention as a *rotmistr* in Matveev's regiment in 1664 and his appearance in Smolensk in 1668, already as *golova* of his own regiment of Moscow musketeers. Kirill was still in charge of his regiment in Smolensk in autumn 1670, *after* Natalia had been proclaimed the tsar's future bride. Fyodor Naryshkin still commanded his regiment as *golova* in October 1670. Finally, Fyodor Poluektovich seems to have been married to the niece of Matveev's wife. After the marriage and Matveev's rise the brothers moved up into the Duma ranks, Kirill as *dumnyi dvorianin* on 7 February 1671. Fyodor Poluektovich received the same rank in May 1672.²⁶

Tied to the fortunes of the Naryshkins was another family whose men served as musketeer colonels: the Lopukhins. Avram Nikitich Lopukhin was a colonel of musketeers as early as 1660, where he is to be found in Kremlin banquets with Matveev and his relative (presumably) the secretary Larion Lopukhin. In April, 1670, he took charge of the tsaritsa's Workshop Office, a post he held until September, 1676. At the wedding of Natalia Naryshkina and Tsar Aleksei in 1671 Avram Lopukhin sat *za postavtsom*, that is, he supervised the bringing of food from the kitchen to the table where it waited to be served. Avram Lopukhin thus became one of Natalia's inner circle of male noble servants, going on pilgrimages with the tsaritsa herself, her father, and Matveev. In 1672 he received the

²⁶ Philipp Longworth seems to be the first to have noticed the service of the Naryshkins in Matveev's regiment: Longworth, *Alexis*, 199. S. A. Belokurov, ed., "Dneval'nye zapiski Tainykh del 7165–7183 gg.," *ChOIDR* 1–2 (1908), 137, 142, 144, 155, 187, 191, 217, 257, 281; *RIB* 21, 1542; *RIB* 23, 487, 517, 487–88, 1026, 1083, 1402; N. V. Charykov, *Posol'stvo v Rim i sluzhba v Moskve Pavla Menez'ia, 1637–1694 issledovanie*, St. Petersburg, 1906, 85–87; Crummev, *Aristocrats*, 197 (with Fyodor's death apparently misdated, should be 1675); A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Russkaia rodoslovnaia kniga*, 3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1873–78, 2, 6.

rank of Duma gentleman on the same day as F. P. Naryshkin. His son Fyodor (later called Larion) Avramovich Lopukhin first appeared in 1664 at the formal reception for the English ambassador, Charles Howard, earl of Carlisle, as a *striapchii*, presumably as a very young man, even an adolescent. He quickly followed his father into the army, for by 1670 he and his brother Petr were both heads of musketeer regiments. Five years later Fyodor commanded a guard detachment on the Kremlin wall. More importantly, he was also the father of Evdokiia Lopukhina, later Peter I's first wife.²⁷

The history of the Naryshkins does not leave much room for a time when Natalia could have lived as Matveev's ward. Born in 1652, she presumably lived with her father in Moscow and after 1668 in Smolensk, for a number of contemporary sources connect her with Smolensk. Paul Menzies, who served there in Daniel Crawford's regiment, called her "a girl from Smolensk" on his embassy in Italy. The rumors spread by her enemies (see below) accused her of misdeeds placed in Smolensk as well. Further, the list compiled by the Privy Chancellery of the girls brought to the palace for the viewing, the *smotriiny*, note in a number of cases that the girl lived with a relative or someone other than her parents, but there is no such notation after Natalia's name. The most likely explanation is that she lived in Matveev's house (if at all) only after the viewing. The rest was family legend designed to inflate the importance of the Matveevs.²⁸

Matveev's relationship to the Naryshkins was simply that of an older officer of the *strel'tsy* to younger colleagues. When Matveev was

²⁷ Dolgorukov, *Russkaia rodoslovnaia*, II, 57–8; *DR* III, 146, 216–18, 569, 879, 889, 987, 1418, 1515; *RIB* 23, 406, 1283 (Petr, presumably Avramovich), 1316, 1523, 1683; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 197; Bogoiavenskii, *Prikaznye*, 211. The Matveev and Naryshkin commands were highly important, for the Moscow musketeers were the elite of the *strel'tsy*, comprising only a little over 20,000 of the some 40,000–60,000 musketeers. In 1680 the Moscow musketeers formed twenty-one regiments of about 1,000 men each. Matveev, the three Lopukhins and the two Naryshkin brothers were thus six of some twenty or thirty colonels of Moscow musketeers in the 1660s–1670s. It is hardly surprising that they were to form marriage ties and close friendships. A. V. Chernov, *Vooruzhennnye sily Russkogo gosudarstva v XV–XVII vv.*, Moscow, 1954, 167–69, 189.

²⁸ Charykov explained the Matveev–Naryshkin connection by the marriage of Fyodor Naryshkin to the niece of Matveev's allegedly Scottish wife, so that they must have met before 1670: Charykov, *Posol'stvo*, 517–20. The marriage was more likely the result of the regimental connection, and in any case does not prove that Natal'ia was Matveev's ward. According to P. V. Sedov (oral communication, June 1998), Matveev's wife was not a Scottish Hamilton, since the Hamilton ancestor of the Russian Khomutovy was far back in the sixteenth century and in any case probably legendary.

on the rise, Natalia appeared in the list of girls chosen for inspection, but we do not actually know that he put her on that list. What we do know is that once she emerged as one of the more serious contenders in spring 1670, Matveev was believed by her opponents to be her supporter. The first inkling that the marriage project was seriously under way comes from the Dutch envoy Nicholas Heinsius.²⁹ He reported as early as 29 December 1669/8 January 1670 that Aleksei was planning to remarry in view of his heirs' poor health, and that three or four Russian ladies were under serious consideration. Tsarevich Aleksei's death a few weeks later only increased his resolution.³⁰ Nothing happened for several months, however, and in the meantime Heinsius filled his reports with the details of the Razin rebellion. What he did not yet report was that Bogdan Khitrovo had brought to the tsar's attention anonymous letters which had appeared in the palace on 22 April with some sort of allegation against Natalia. The investigation focussed on one Ivan Shikhirev, the uncle of a girl named Avdot'ia Beliaeva, who apparently lived in the Voznesenie Convent in the Kremlin. In the investigation Shikhirev accused Khitrovo of rejecting Beliaeva for the specious reasons that her arms were too thin. Shikhirev confessed that he thought at one point that she had won against Naryshkina, that he had asked the archimandrite of the Chudov monastery (the future Patriarch Ioakim, who was archimandrite at Chudov 1664–72) to help him, and other things, but nothing criminal, emerged. The surviving incomplete documentation does not accuse Matveev, but later in his

²⁹ Heinsius (1620–81) arrived in Russia from Sweden, where he had been the Dutch envoy, in the fall of 1669 and stayed until August 1670. He was thus present in Moscow for the crucial period of Aleksei's decision about his new wife. Heinsius was well informed: he seems to have known Peter Marselis, who had traded and run iron works in Russia since 1629 and took over the Russian postal service in that year from his son, who had run it since 1668, and he met the Scottish Colonel Daniel Crawford, a fellow officer to Patrick Gordon as well as Kirill Naryshkin. Heinsius' mission was to mediate potential conflicts between Russia and Sweden. He was also a well-known neo-Latin writer of the age and figured in the learned circle of Queen Christina of Sweden: A. H. Kan, "Heinsius, Nicholas," in *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biographisch Woordenboek*, vol. II, Leiden, 1912, 557–60.

³⁰ ARSG 7364 (1670), Heinsius to SG, 8 January (NS), 1670: "Den czaar heeft de rouw oover syne gemaeline nu volkomen afgelegd, staet maeckende eersdaecht het tweede huwelick aantegaen, ten waere, t'geen Godt verhoede: daer omtrent eenige uytstel voorviel doort een of 't ander inconvenient, neemende de langwylyge onpasselickheyd van den ouden Czaaren Prince, gaende in seventiende jaer syns ouderdoms, noch al gestaedich de overhand. Wie vor den staet van Czaarse gemaeline sal verheeven werden, is noch niet secker, synde dry ofte vier Russe Dames boven andre daer toe considerabel." 1/11 January 1670, Heinsius to SG (Aleksei Alekseevich gets worse, the tsar delays his marriage, unknown yet who the bride will be); 10/20 January 1670, Heinsius to SG (death of Aleksei Alekseevich).

petitions from exile he said that he had been accused then of using herbs to influence the tsar.³¹

Who was behind the campaign against Natalia and Matveev? Heinsius returned to the subject of the marriage on 21/31 July 1670, noting the anonymous letters and that several women had been tortured in the investigation, but nothing had come to light. A week later (28 July OS) he reported:

his Majesty the Tsar's oldest sister [=Irina Mikhailovna], who has great power over the mind of the highly mentioned Majesty, has finally brought things so far that the marriage, into which the Prince had resolved to enter with a certain Lady (who is related by marriage to one or two of the principal favorites of the court) shall be put off much farther into the future. The cause is that between this lady and a certain Polish nobleman certain deep engagements are supposed to have passed in the time when her father held the office of general on the border. I suspect that it is because of this lady that many persons were brought to torture, of which a good number who underwent the pains died.³²

On 4/14 August he continued:

we are assured by trustworthy persons, among others the Major-General Crawford (which persons claim to know the said young lady well), that all the things with which some are trying to cover her have no other basis but the hostility of the envious.³³

These reports throw a great deal of light on the proceedings that led up to Aleksei's marriage to Natalia Naryshkina. They confirm that the anonymous letters did directly or indirectly try to stop the

³¹ Zabelin, *Domashnii*, II, 1868, 266–70; Longworth, 199–200; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 130–31; *Istoriia . . . Matveeva*, 145.

³² ARSG 7364, 1670: 21/31 July 1670, Heinsius to SG (long account of Razin revolt, "pasquillen" spread in the court three months ago, women tortured, rumor that tsar will marry in secret); 28 July 1670 OS, Heinsius to SG (more on Razin): "Sedert het afgaen van myne jongsten voor acht daegen, heeft eyndelick syne Czaarse Mayt. Oudste Suster, synde van groot vermoogen op t' gemoet van Hoochste gedachte syne Mayt., soo veel te weegh gebracht, dat het Huwelick, t' geene dien Prince geresolveert hadde aen te gaen, met sekere Dame, synde vermaeghschap met een ofte twee der principaelste Favorysten van dit Hoff, gansche ende gaer om verre is gestooten, ter oorsaecke dat tusschen deselve Dame, ende seker Poels Edelman eenige deepe engagementen voor deese soudensyn gepasseert, ten tyde, haer vader, op die grensen t' ampt van Weywode bekleede: Ick vertrouwe dat die deselve Dame sal syn, om wiens wille voor deese veele persoonen ter torture syn gebraght, van welke den goet getal de uytgestaende smerte hebben bestorven."

³³ ARSG 7364, 1670: 4/14 August 1670, Heinsius to SG (more on Razin): "Wegens het Czaarse huwelick be myne jonghste vermeldt, staen de saecken op deselve voot; alleen werde my versekert door geloofwaerdige persoonen, ende onder anderen door den Heer General Majoor Crafford, welke persoonen de geseyde Juffrouw pretenderen seer wel te kennen, dat alle het geene waermeede men deselve soeckt te bekladden, geen ander Fondament is hebbende, als alleen de groote afgunst van benyders."

choice of Natalia. They also demonstrate that rumors were put about to discredit her by alleging some sort of improper relations with a Polish nobleman in Smolensk. They do not explicitly connect her with Matveev but do assert that she was related by marriage to "one or two" of the court favorites. One of these could be Matveev, for he was on the rise in 1670, and his wife's niece was the wife of Natal'ia's uncle. Heinsius also reinforces the Smolensk connection with his information from Crawford, whose regiment had been stationed in Smolensk for most of the 1660s.

Most importantly, Heinsius gives us the name of Natalia's opponent, Tsarevna Irina Mikhailovna (1627–79), a woman to reckon with. Irina may well have been behind the candidacy of Beliaeva. The Privy Chancellery listed Beliaeva thus: "From the Voznesenie convent the daughter of Ivan Beliaev Avdot'ia. Her uncle Ivan Shikhirev and her grandmother the nun Iraida, the former wife of Ivan Egakov, brought her."³⁴ Presumably the nun Iraida herself was from the Voznesenie Convent, which would explain Shikhirev's ability to contact Archimandrite Ioakim. The Voznesenie Convent, located in the Kremlin near the Spasskii Gate, was essentially the house convent of the women of the ruling dynasty, the place where the tsaritsas were buried.³⁵ In 1670, Tsarevna Irina was the oldest woman of that dynasty, long held in high regard by Aleksei, and was by her position closely connected with the convent. The circumstantial evidence points to Irina's connection with the convent and its ward, Avdot'ia Beliaeva, as the source of the opposition to Natalia Naryshkina. Even if Irina did not pull the strings in the Beliaeva affair, she was the source of opposition to Naryshkina. The Miloslavskii family had nothing to do with it.

MATVEEV IN POWER

During the last five years of the life of Tsar Aleksei, after his marriage to Peter's mother, the most important sources for Russian court politics, the reports of the various resident ambassadors, make no mention of a Naryshkin faction. They record unanimously the

³⁴ Zabelin, *Domashnii*, II, 266.

³⁵ Tsaritsas Evdokiia Alekseevna (Tsar Michael's wife), Mariia Il'inichna, and Agafia Semenovna (first wife of Tsar Fyodor) were all buried in the Voznesenie convent. Irina herself rested in the Novospasskii Monastery, the Romanov house monastery on the southeastern outskirts of Moscow: *DRV* 11, 204–08.

enormous power and influence of the head of the *Posol'skii prikaz*, Artamon Sergeevich Matveev, at least where foreign affairs were concerned.

Matveev's accumulation of offices had started before the choice of Natalia and the tsar's marriage to her and continued afterwards. Matveev had received charge of the Little Russian Chancellery in April 1669. By January 1670, Heinsius could report noticeable disagreement between Ordin-Nashchokin and other unnamed persons. In July the disagreements became sharper and Ordin-Nashchokin had continued to lose the tsar's favor. He intended to resign and return to his estates or enter a monastery.³⁶ Matveev received the rank of *dumnyi dvorianin* on 27 November 1670, and a few weeks later Ordin-Nashchokin appeared for the last time at court for the reception of the Polish embassy. He soon departed for the Pskov Pechery Monastery, and Matveev received the Ambassadorial Chancellery on 22 February 1671, only a few weeks after Aleksei's marriage (7 February). On the day of Peter's birth, 30 May 1672, Matveev was promoted to *okol'nichii*, and finally to boyar on 8 October 1674. Matveev not only controlled foreign affairs; while he was head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery (1671–76) he also ran the Vladimir, Novgorod, and Galich *Cheti*, tax collecting and administrative offices for large regions of Russia, and continued to head the Little Russian Chancellery. All this just by itself gave Matveev enormous control over the routine administration of a good half of European Russia, as well as supervision of the most important taxes collected in cash, the sales tax (*tamozhennyi sbor*) and liquor monopoly (*kabatskii sbor*) in these huge areas. In 1672 he took control of the Apothecary Chancellery, which oversaw the tsar's doctors, among other duties, giving him considerable access to the intimate details of the household.³⁷

Foreign policy remained Matveev's basic task. His principal foreign policy problem was the Polish–Ukrainian tangle and the

³⁶ ARSG 7364, 1670: 8 January 1670 NS, Heinsius to SG (Ordin-Nashchokin will soon return to Moscow, will not approve rude treatment of Heinsius and the English envoy); 28 July 1670 OS: "Ondertusschen continueert als nogh de oneenighheyt te hoovde onder de Ministers; ende is nu geduyrende myn verblyf alhier voor de derde mael, den Cancellier in de Cancellerye der uytheemsche saecken verandere. Den Heer Nazokin siende dat hem 't credyt by syne Czaarse Mayt. meer ende meer ontvalen, soude sterck aenhouden omme sigh op syne land goederen by Novogorod te moogen retireren ofte wel in den Clooster te gaen."

³⁷ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom Prikaze*, 112; S. K. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i XVII veka*, Moscow, and Leningrad, 1946, 15–16, 39, 42, 95, 85.

related threat of Turkish expansion on and near Russia's southern frontier.³⁸ The revived Ottomans naturally exploited the confused situation that emerged in the Ukraine at the end of the Russo-Polish War. From the Ukrainian town of Chigirin on the right bank of the Dniepr, in Polish territory, Petro Doroshenko proclaimed himself hetman of the cossacks, challenging not only the Polish king but also the tsar as overlord of the left bank. Doroshenko's acceptance of the *sancak*, the Ottoman standard, in 1669, finally put him under the protection of Sultan Mehmed IV. Furthermore, the Ottomans attacked Poland in 1672, besieging the Polish fortress of Kamieniec-Podolski in the western Ukraine and took it after only a few weeks. The balance of power between Turkey and Poland had been fundamentally altered.

Fortunately, in spring 1672, the Ukrainian cossacks on the left bank replaced the unreliable hetman Briukhovets'kyi with Ivan Samoilovych, who was to remain hetman until 1687. Samoilovych saw as his principal goal the removal of Doroshenko, both from fear of the Turks and because Doroshenko was a rival for the Ukrainian hetmanate. By January 1674, a large Russian and Cossack army moved into the right bank, undermining Doroshenko and receiving the allegiance of most of the Ukrainian cossack regiments in the region. The sultan replied with a large force to rescue his allies, and the Russian army withdrew. The election of Jan Sobieski as king of Poland (1674–97) complicated Matveev's task considerably in the next few years.

Matveev and Tsar Aleksei seem to have had their way in foreign policy throughout these years, with little challenge or opposition from the boyars. They did not try to work without consulting the boyars, and on some issues tsar and favorite had differences of opinion, for the first time in August, 1673. At least, this was the first disagreement which the main foreign observer of Matveev, the Danish emissary Mogens Gjøl, recorded.

Gjøl came to Russia in August 1672, to take up the post of resident of the king of Denmark in Russia. His mandate was to get some sort of Russian backing against Sweden. Louis XIV's invasion of the Netherlands in alliance with Charles II of England in spring, 1672, had rendered a general European war inevitable. Sweden was

³⁸ For the following see: Kostomarov, *Ruina, Sobranie sochinenii*, XV, 163–238; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 413–50; Doroshenko, *Het'man*, 287–432; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką: stosunki polsko-rosyjskie, 1667–1672*, Warsaw, 1968.

generally assumed to be in the French camp, so Denmark expected war, hoping to recover the provinces lost to Sweden in the previous generation. This required allies, and Christian hoped for some aid from Russia as well as improved trade relations.³⁹ The first year in Russia, Gjøe spent much of his time trying to understand Matveev, for he had frequent meetings with him and recognized that his favor was the key to any Danish desires. His initial encounters and impressions were unfavorable, until the Dane was attacked by robbers in November, 1672. Matveev was highly sympathetic, found and punished the criminals, and afterwards relations became more cordial. Gjøe was still suspicious, and reported that unfortunately Matveev seemed much less favorable to Denmark than his predecessor, Ordin-Nashchokin.⁴⁰

Gjøe was aware of Matveev's power, calling him the "kinglet" (*routelet*) of Russia. He found him hard to deal with, "choleric" in the terminology of the time, and seemingly uninterested in foreign affairs. "The main occupation of this First Minister is to have plays

³⁹ Klaus Zernack, *Studien zu den schwedisch-russischen Beziehungen in der 2. Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Osteuropastudien der Hochschulen des Landes Hessen, Reihe 1: Giessener Abhandlungen zur Agrar- und Wirtschaftsforschung des europäischen Ostens, bd. 7, Giessen, 1958, 58–72; G. V. Forsten, "Datskie diplomaty pri Moskovskom dvore vtoroi poloviny 17 veka," *ZhMNP* (1904), 355 (1904), 116–21. Knud J. V. Jespersen, *Danmarks Historie*, vol. III, *Tiden 1648–1730*, Copenhagen, 1989, 238–61.

⁴⁰ TKUA Rusland, B38, Gjøe to Bierman, Moscow: "[On le (=Matveev) croit bon suedois] mais ce n'est qu'un bruit" (29 October 1672). The robbers were certain Tatars in the service of the prince of Georgia ("certains Tartares gens du Prince Grusinchi Zareviz") (19 and 26 November 1672). In December the Dane still thought Matveev was pro-Swedish: "[le Grand Chancelier icy est a moitié gagné des suedois]" because he had been bribed. "Sa Majte. [=the King of Demark] a perdu en cette cour un fort fidele serviteur dans la personne d'un certain boyar nommé Narschen qui soit rendu religieux estant luy qui traversoit par tout les desseins des suedois et favorisoit les notres" (21 December 1672).

T. V. Starostina asserted in her study of Matveev's fall that Gjøe was deeply prejudiced against him: T. V. Starostina, "Ob opale A. S. Matveeva v sviazi s sysnym delom 1676–1677 gg. o khranении zagovornyykh pisem," *Uchenye zapiski Karelo-finskogo universiteta* 2, vyp. 1, *Istoricheskie i filologicheskie nauki*, 1947, 44–89. She relied for her information, however, on the tendentious and frequently inaccurate selection of tidbits from Gjøe's reports in Iu. N. Shcherbachev, "Iz donesenii pervogo datskogo rezidenta v Moskvu (1672–1676)," *ChOIDR* 2 (1917), smes', 32–42. Among other things, Starostina stated (p. 70) that the Dane provided a written complaint about Matveev on 2–3 July 1676, before his fall and thus hastening it. This is inaccurate. The Russian documents which Starostina herself cited (Charykov, *Menezia*, 64–65, 684–87), make clear that Gjøe wrote complaining that he had not been paid adequately for shipments of wine only on 9 July, after he heard of Matveev's fall (Charykov, *Menezia*, 267–68). The Dane left Moscow two days before Matveev's fall and heard about it in Iaroslav' (TKUA Rusland, B38, 9 July, 1676). Matveev may not have liked the complaint (*Istoriia . . . Matveeva*, 145), but it had nothing to do with his fall, which occurred on 3 July (Starostina, 70). For a more objective evaluation of Gjøe see Forsten, "Datskie diplomaty," 355 (1904), 116–44.

performed, and he even appears himself on the stage to keep in order the children who are the players." By early 1673, however, Matveev was beginning to appear in a more favorable light. Matveev assured Gjoe personally that he would favor Denmark's trade proposals, but things moved slowly, interrupted by Tsar Aleksei's request, forwarded by Matveev, for a telescope, "a tube of the invention of Tycho Brahe," about which Aleksei had heard from Nicolae Spatharie-Milescu. The delay in submitting a formal response to the Danish proposal seemed to come to an end in March, when Gjoe's memorandum ended up at a meeting of the Duma: "By an extraordinary good fortune the memorandum came into the hands of the Great Tsar when he was in the *sedanie*, which is a sort of Council, where he ordered the Commander-in-chief named Dolgorukii and the first boyar Odoevskii together with the Chancellor to take this affair in hand and expedite it as fast as possible, to the exclusion of the other *dumnye* and *d'iaki*, who have meddled in this task until now." In a few weeks the issues were resolved in principle.⁴¹

A resolution in principle did not imply an immediate written agreement and Gjoe had to wait longer. In May, Matveev told him that the Russians were just too busy with the Turks to deal with Danish trade. The Russian expedition to Azov in aid of King Michael of Poland had not done well, and the summer was still ahead. An injury to Matveev (he had gotten on too spirited a horse in his stable and the horse had reared, hitting Matveev's head on the ceiling) caused more delay. A long conversation in late July clarified the situation more, for in it Matveev provided the clearest account of his foreign policy views. After receiving reassurances that Matveev understood that favor to Sweden was not in Russia's interest, Gjoe asked him about the Anglo-Dutch War that had broken out in early 1672 as part of Louis XIV's grand scheme:

He answered me very foolishly that God was watching it, and when I tried to discuss it with him he said that it was not for men to know the future of

⁴¹ TKUA Rusland, B38, "kinglet," "choleric," and the plays (19 November 1672). Matveev's favor to Denmark (5 and 25 February 1673). Matveev requests the telescope and experts on silver mines to explore Siberia (5 March 1673). "Cet escrit par bonheur extraordinaire tomba entre les mains du Grand Zar, quand il fust dans le Sedainye, qui est un espèce du Conseil, ou il ordonna que le Connestable nommé Dolgeroucka, et le premier Boyar Atofski conjointement avec M. le Chancelier prendroient cette affaire au main et la despescheroient au plustost, a l'exclusion des autres Domni et Diackes, qui jusques à present se sont meslez de cette commission . . ." (18 March 1673). The trade issues are resolved (4 April 1673).

things, but he wished for the good of Christendom that all his forces would be employed to reduce the power of the infidels.

Gjøe commented that

here, my lord, is the whole mystery of this government, and the others think the same way, for though they are eager to know the foreign news, they receive it with indifference, for when the loss is on the side of the Dutch, they say that it is just that rebellious peasants are punished, and if it is on the side of France they say that God wished to punish the pride of their king.⁴²

The Dane had finally found out the secret of Matveev's lack of energy on Danish affairs, and from then on his reports reflect at least some of that understanding. No West European affairs, not even the Danish–Swedish tangle, were remotely comparable to the potential threat to Russia from the Ottoman Empire. They were interesting to Matveev only in so far as they affected relations with the Turks.⁴³

Denmark's problems were peripheral to Russia at this point, but they were important enough to lead to the first known conflict of Matveev with at least some of the boyars. On 19 August Gjøe reported that the Russian continued to favor the Danish trade agreement and that

the Chancellor greatly desires that this business be done, and to put it in the condition in which it now lies, he had quarrelled with the two principal Lords here, the one the Grand Marshal of the kingdom called Bogdan Matveevich [=Khitrovo] who controls the mind of the Grand Duke and regulates his expenses, the other called Troekurov [= Prince Boris Ivanovich] who is a boyar and has the administration of Justice for foreigners and besides that is a favorite of the Grand Duke. These two lords

⁴² TKUA Rusland, B38. Turkish war causes delays (13 May 1673). Matveev is injured (26 May 1673). Matveev explains his views: "Quand je luy ay demandé ce qu'il jugea de la guerre presente entre le Prince Anglois et les Hollandois, il me repondit fort niaisement que Dieu le voyait, et quand j'ay voulu me mettre à raisonner avec luy, il dit que ce n'estoit pas aux hommes de scavoir les choses à l'avenir bien souhaitteroit il pour le bien de la chrestiente que toutes ses forces s'employassent pour abbaissier la puissance des infideles. Voila, Monsieur, tout le mystère de ce Regiment la, les autres raisonnent de mesme, car quoy qu'ils soient tres avides pour scavoir les nouvelles de dehors, si est ce pourtant, qu'ils les recoivent fort indifferement, car quand la perte est du coste des Hollandois ils disent, que c'est juste qu'on chastie les paysans rebelles, et si elle arrive du coste de France ils disent, Dieu veut punir l'orgueil de leur Roy. . ." (21 July 1673).

⁴³ A few months later Matveev was very concerned about the news of the rupture between France and the emperor, as he thought "this would lead to a long war for all Christendom, and take from his master (= the Tsar) all hope of the aid he had been promised against the Turks." ("ce qu'il dit adveneroit à mettre toute la cretienté à une longue guerre, et osteroit enfin [à] son maitre toute l'esperance du secours qui s'estoit promis contre les Turqs.") TKUA Rusland, B38, 29 October 1673.

in the full assembly before the Grand Duke, during the reading of my propositions, when they saw that the Chancellor was paying for his reasons (?), they were so angry at him that they spoke many insults to him, pretending that he was involving himself in their business contrary to the custom of the country, that he was only the son of a priest, and a thousand similar villainies.

The tsar himself had to intervene and make Khitrovo and Troekurov be silent and let Matveev speak. Matveev defended the utility of the trade agreement for the tsar, and accused his opponents of being in collusion with the merchants who furnished the palace. Aleksei decided for Matveev, ordering him to handle the business. Matveev immediately afterwards called Gjoe to him to tell him of the whole affair.⁴⁴

Neither at the time nor later did Matveev or the Danish resident suggest that Matveev's conflict with Khitrovo and Troekurov had any larger political context. Instead, it was a classic jurisdictional dispute, sharpened perhaps by the hints of interests in personal profit on both sides. No one suggested that Khitrovo or Troekurov favored Sweden or disagreed with Matveev's Polish policy. Matveev could make enemies for wholly non-political reasons.

Political differences were not long in coming and when they came they were differences with the tsar himself. They arose from the effect on Russia of the death of King Michael of Poland in November 1673, the day before Jan Sobieski's victory over the Turks at Chocim. The Russians kept themselves well informed on this

⁴⁴ TKUA Rusland, B38: "D'ailleurs M. le Chancellier desire grandement que cette affaire se fasse, et pour la mettre en estat ou elle est, il s'est brouillé avec les deux principaux seigneurs icy, l'un Grand Mareschal du Royaume appellé Bogdan Matvivitz qui gouverne la raison du Grand Duc et en regle les déponds, l'autre appellé Triakurov qui est Boyar et a l'administration de la justice sur les estrangers et outre celà favori du Grand Duc, ces deux seigneurs en pleine assemblée en presence du Grand Duc, lorsqu'on fist la lecture de mes propositions et instances et voyant que M. le Chancellier payoit (?) ses raisons, se sont tellement emportez contre luy jusques à luy dire force des injures, le representant que contre la coutume du pays il se mesloit de ce qui estoit de leur charge, qu'il n'estoit que fils d'un pretre et mille semblables villainies et jusques à que le Grand Duc les fist taire, et commandast à M. le Chancellier de parler, qui tant outré de cet affront exposa l'utilité de cette affaire pour le Grand Duc et reprochast les autres d'interest qu'ils cherchoient avec les Marchands qu'ils fournissoient les denrees au grand dommage du Grand Duc . . ." (19 August 1673).

The Troekurov in question must have been Prince Boris Ivanovich, since he was the only Troekurov of boyar rank in 1673 (appointed in April of that year) and the events took place in the Duma. He was not the head of Foreigners' Chancellery, however, as Gjoe stated: that in 1670–76 was his son, Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov, in 1673 only a *stol'nik*. Ivan Borisovich was married to a Khitrovo. Crummev, *Aristocrats*, 191, 198; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 57; LeDonne, "Ruling Families," 291.

campaign, not least because the newly arrived Polish resident in Moscow was begging them for the help promised in the treaties. The news of Michael's death reached Matveev by early December, and his initial reaction was calm. The war would continue in Wallachia, he thought, and the tsar would continue to reassure the Poles of his imminent aid (which was indeed imminent this time, though it was not simply disinterested aid). Matveev did not yet worry about the election, for "his tsar would not be concerned who will be King of Poland for he needed only to treat with the Republic on which the King would be dependent; and besides they had many means and enough clients in Poland to work against those who would want a King against their wishes." Matveev was clearly thinking of the hetman of Lithuania, Michał Kazimierz Pac, with whom the Russians and Matveev himself had long been in contact, and who was known to support a pro-Russian orientation in Polish politics.⁴⁵

Matveev continued to be confident. Gjõe's warnings of French and Swedish influence on the Polish election roused little fear in Matveev, who thought that it was the Habsburg emperor's task to oppose the French in Warsaw. The tsar himself would not be a candidate, since the Polish constitution required the king to be a Catholic. By early February 1674, however, Augustyn Konstantynowicz, the emissary of Pac and his Lithuanian supporters, had arrived in Moscow and presented their conditions for the election of Tsarevich Fyodor. The tsar named Matveev and Prince Iurii Dolgorukii to discuss the matter. Gjõe thought that the Russian aim in talking to Pac's emissary was simply to divide Lithuania from the rest of the Commonwealth out of fear that Poland seriously wanted to regain Smolensk and the other provinces lost in 1667.⁴⁶ Matveev

⁴⁵ TKUA Rusland, B38, 2 December 1673: "Le terme d'Election d'un novau Roy est arresté au mois de May, au Sujet de la quelle M. le Chancellier dit, que son Tsar auroit pour indifferent celui qui seroit Roy comme n'ayant qu'à faire avec le Republique, dont le dit Roy auroit la dependance; qu'au reste ils avoient bien moyens et assez des creatures en Pologne pour briger contre ceux qui voudroient un Roy contre leur gré."

Pac supported a Russian candidate for the Polish throne in 1668, and in spring 1673, had asked the Russian ambassador Voznitsyn to ask Matveev specifically for help to Poland against the Turks. Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski, 1629–1696*, Warsaw 1983, 214–19; Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji, 1674–1679: studium z dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej*, Wrocław, 1976, 34; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 503.

⁴⁶ TKUA Rusland, B38, 22 December 1673; 25 January 1674; 11 February 1674. The Lithuanians said they would elect Fyodor if he accepted Catholicism, would marry Michael's widow Eleonor of Habsburg, return the lost provinces, and help Poland against the Turks. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita*, 34–35, note 99, Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VI, 506–08. Matveev communicated the Lithuanian conditions to Gjõe: TKUA Rusland, B38, 1 March 1674.

and Dolgorukii could not agree to the full Lithuanian conditions, and besides (at least officially) preferred the tsar himself as the candidate. On this basis they pursued the issue, asking the Russian resident in Warsaw, Vasilii Tiapkin, to continue talks with Pac himself. The two could not come to an agreement, and in May the diet elected Jan Sobieski king.⁴⁷

Matveev actually opposed the suggestion to elect Aleksei king of Poland, though presumably he loyally assisted Dolgorukii in presenting the idea to Konstantinowicz. After Tiapkin's instructions had been compiled and already sent, Matveev explained his personal views to Gjøe:

I had the occasion to see the Chancellor, who first off told me that he had the news that his Majesty sent an ambassador to Poland toward the time of the election and as far as I could understand his reasoning, he wanted me to know that his Majesty would not succeed in his design and it seems that the hopes which Lithuania and Great Poland have given to the Tsar have put down such strong roots that they cannot be pulled up and for this reason he would try, if it were possible, to turn his Majesty from his design. They have commanded Khovanskii, one of their bravest generals, who was supposed to command an army toward Azov, to go to the frontiers of Lithuania with an army of forty thousand men under the pretext of assisting the Poles, but in fact to give strength to their faction and it is believed that this business has been arranged with the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania [=Krzysztof Pac].⁴⁸

Both Matveev and the tsar had a shock on 3 June 1674 (NS) when the news arrived that the candidate of France and Sweden, Jan Sobieski, had won the election.⁴⁹ Sobieski's election created a new situation for Russia, not only in its direct relations with Poland but indirectly for relations with the Turks and even with Sweden. The

⁴⁷ Wójcik, *Sobieski*, 214–19.

⁴⁸ TKUA Rusland, B38, 18 March 1674: "J'ay eu l'occasion de voir M. le Chancelier, qui de premier abord me dit d'avoir nouvelles que sa Majesté envoyoit une Ambassade en Pologne vers le temps de l'Election et autant que j'ay pu comprendre de ses raisonnemens, il me vouloit donner de connaitre [que sa Majté. ne reussiroit pas dans son dessein] et il semble bien que les esperances que [Lithuanie et la grande Pologne ont donné] au [Zar] ont jetté de si fortes racines, qu'elles ne peuvent estre arrachéz, et par cette raison il taschera, s'il estoit possible, de [detourner sa Majté. de son dessein]. Ils ont icy commandé Gavanski, un de leur plus brave Generaux, qui devoit commander l'armée vers Assow, d'aller sur les frontières de Lithuanie avec une armée de quarante mille hommes sous pretexte d'assister les Polonois, mais en effect pour donner plus de force à leur faction, et mesme croit on que cetter affaire cest ainsi concerté avec [le gr. Chier. de Lithuanie]."

⁴⁹ TKUA Rusland, B38, 3 June 1674, Gjøe reported that the Russians still hoped for a Russian candidate to emerge as king of Poland, adding in a postscript the news of Sobieski's victory.

Russians responded by trying to cultivate Sobieski and maintain the anti-Turkish alliance, while at the same time taking a much more hostile attitude toward Poland's potential ally, Sweden. Matveev, Tsar Aleksei, and the boyars seem to have all agreed on this policy, and it caused no conflicts.

Other issues were not so simple, and the summer of 1674 was a difficult one for Matveev. To begin with, he found himself in a dispute over the presence of resident ambassadors in Russia. A Swedish resident had served in Russia on and off since 1630, Gjõe had been there for two years, and his Polish colleague Paweł Świdorski since summer, 1673. Only a few days after the news of Sobieski's election Matveev announced to Gjõe that he would have to leave, and that the tsar had decided to discontinue the reception of foreign residents in Russia. The Dane pressed him for the reason of the sudden and sharp change, but Matveev would only say that "the matter had been arranged in the Duma and was consequently out of his hands." Further, Aleksei wanted to have no Swedish resident but also not to offend Sweden, so he had decided to expel them all.⁵⁰ A few weeks later Matveev was more forthcoming:

the messages which he had sent me [=Gjõe] were not of his making, but the commander in chief Dolgorukii [=Prince Iu. M.] had made so much noise about it in the last assembly that he was forced for his own relief to take charge of it in his own way, he said in his own terms, 'I have all the Senators [=Duma] on my shoulders and they believe that there is no benefit in the residents here,' he reported to me the very words of the said commander in chief, to wit 'My father and yours got along well and served his Tsarish Majesty happily, but that they had some trouble to take advice from foreign ambassadors,' and if anyone would introduce any novelties the inconveniences would fall on him.⁵¹

In fact Gjõe did not leave, nor did his colleagues, until well into the next reign, so Matveev seems to have been adept at stalling the issue,

⁵⁰ TKUA Rusland, B38, 9 June 1674: "l'affaire estoit ainsi concerté dans le Senat, et par consequent hors de ses mains."

⁵¹ TKUA Rusland, B38, 1 July 1674: "il me protesta en outre avec des grands serment, que les messages qu'il me voit fait n'estoit point de son mouvement, mais que M. le Connestable Dolgeroucki en avait fait tant de briut dans la derniere assemblé, qu'il avait esté contraint pour sa descharge, de s'y prendre de la façon mesme dit il avec ces propres termes, J'ay toutes les Senateurs sur mes espauls, et ils croyoint, qu'il ne vient de grand profit de ce qu'il y a des residents icy; il me raconta les propres paroles du dit connestable, à sçavoir, Mon Pere et le tien se sont bien trouvés, et ont servis heureusement sa Majesté Zarique, mais qu'il ont eu à faire de prendre avis des Ministres Etrangers, et si l'on [?] introduira des novautez, scachez que les inconveniens en tomberont sur luy."

The diplomats regularly used *sénat* or *Reichsrat* to signify the Duma.

as were the residents. Nothing more was heard of this issue for some time.

Matveev's troubles were not over, however, for in August there was another incident with one of the Troekurovs, who allegedly took advantage of Aleksei's illness to make difficulties for Matveev to the point where Troekurov was forbidden access to the court. Gjõe's account of the incident is somewhat obscure, but it seems that Troekurov tried to enlist Gjõe and Śviderski on his behalf, since they had had various complaints against Matveev, but Gjõe not only refused to go along but told the whole story to Matveev. Matveev seems to have justified himself successfully, for in October he received the rank of Boyar, and even "Near and Chamber Boyar" (*blizhnii i komnatnyi boiarin*), which (the Dane reported) also gave him access to Tsaritsa Natalia, a particularly great honor.⁵² At the same time, there were no more recorded conflicts with the boyars, and the tsar, Matveev and the boyars were apparently united in their response to the new situation created by the election of Sobieski.

The Russians were not happy with the events of the summer and fall of 1674 in Poland and the Ukraine, as Gjõe faithfully reported home. A Russian military expedition that summer against Doroshenko produced some political gains among the cossacks, but necessarily complicated relations with Sobieski.⁵³ These developments also raised for the Russians a dilemma of much more interest to the Dane, namely relations with Sweden. Sweden's involvement in the French-led coalition against Holland led to an embassy under Count Oxenstierna right in the spring of 1674, aiming to persuade Russia either to ally with Sweden or at least not to join with any of

⁵² TKUA Rusland, B38: 27 July 1674 (the tsar's illness); 19 August 1674: "il y a eu icy grande brouillerie à la cour entre les grands dont [M. le Chancellier] a eu le pire, un certain Boyar appellé Triaucourow a rendu si bons offices au dit Ministre pendant la malaise du Tzar, qu'on luy a defendu d'aller plus à la cour, le dit Seigneur a voulu interesser l'Envoyé de Pologne et moy [dans leur querelle car voyant que nous estions mal satisfait du dit Ministre apres avoir defendu? aupres du Zaar] le tort et les outrages qu'il nous faisoit à tout moment sans en dire ni raisons, pour autant plus autoriser son dire [m'a voulu presuader que je delivrasse des plaintes contre luy] mais je n'ay non seulement voulu complaire à cette lacheté, mais franchement ouvert a [mon dit Ministre] le trame qu'on ourdoit sourdement contre luy, dont il m'en sceu gré." Matveev planned to tell the tsar about the attempt to solicit the ambassadors, which in turn should ruin Troekurov in spite of his great credit with Aleksei. This must be the younger Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov, since his father had died in January 1674, though the younger Troekurov was only a *stol'nik*: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 191, 198. Matveev became "proche et Conmyny Boyar" on 8 October 1674: TKUA Rusland, B38, 19 October 1674, and Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 197.

⁵³ Kostomarov, *Ruina, Sobranie Sochinenii*, XV (1905), 238–69.

the anti-French powers, such as Denmark or the Empire. The Swedish attempt failed miserably, to Gjõe's great satisfaction.⁵⁴ It still left the Russians with a dilemma, because they could not be sure of the intentions either of Sobieski or Karl XI. Furthermore, Denmark joined the alliance against France in July, and in December the Swedish army marched into Brandenburg. By summer 1675, there was war between Sweden and Denmark.

In this situation, Gjõe tried in autumn 1674, to convince Matveev that now was the time to declare war against Sweden and recover the Russian provinces lost in 1617. Matveev was more cautious, and argued that an open break with Sweden was not really possible. Then Denmark, seeing war with Sweden coming, raised the ante. The king ordered Gjõe to open negotiations with Matveev to make a formal alliance of the two powers against Karl XI. In December 1674, when the court reassembled after the long fall break in Preobrazhenskoe (with the usual comedies and ballets), the Dane presented the proposal. Matveev's initial response was that such a league would depend on the position taken by the emperor, but that the idea had some merit. Gjõe then told Matveev that he had news that the Swedish army would take winter quarters in Prussia, from which it could conceivably threaten Russia if only by combinations with Sobieski. Matveev took this very seriously, and was able to persuade the Boyar Duma to threaten Sweden with an army mobilized on the borders of Livonia, though not to actually declare war. A month later the Duma agreed at least to allow discussion of the league with Denmark. Beyond these moves Russia would not go, since its greater commitments were in the south and Sobieski's attitude was unclear to Moscow.⁵⁵

The Russian army was mobilized in the summer of 1675 along the Livonian frontier, and Tsar Aleksei stuck to the policy of threatening

⁵⁴ TKUA Rusland, B38: Russians fear to break off talks with Sweden as there is a rumor of a Swedish-Polish alliance and war against Russia (16 June 1674); the Russians are afraid that Sobieski will change the government of Poland (presumably strengthening the crown) and ally with Sweden (23 June 1674); Zernack, *Studien*, 58–61.

⁵⁵ TKUA Rusland, B38: the tsar expresses general approval of Gjõe's views on Sweden (2 September 1674); ballets and comedies (10 November 1674); Sobieski takes winter quarters in the Ukraine, causing "jealousie" in Moscow (8 December 1674); Gjõe receives orders on the alliance and talks to Matveev (15 December 1674); the "Senat" approves an army on the Livonian border (23 December 1674); "conseil" agrees to negotiations with Denmark (26 January 1675). The Danish council of state decided to look for an alliance with Russia only on 25 November: Zernack, *Studien*, 59–60.

Sweden without actual war until his death.⁵⁶ The policy reflected Matveev's caution and overarching concern with the Turks, but also appears to have been in part the result of disagreement among the boyars. An imperial embassy arrived in summer, 1675, to solicit Russian aid against Sweden, and Gjõe and the imperials were uncertain for a long time how the Russians would react: "for we know that in the Senate (that is, those whom the tsar admits, only a small number) this business has been put to discussion several times with no result, so many are the different opinions." The disagreements were not between Matveev and the Duma, but rather inside the Duma including Matveev, and represented tactical disagreements in an exceptionally complex situation.⁵⁷

Given the international situation and the Duma's position on it, nothing came of the imperial mission but a serious incident between Gjõe and Matveev, who was enraged by the Dane's close cooperation with the imperial embassy. The quarrel was partially reconciled, but the two never again worked well together, and Gjõe came increasingly to rely on the Scottish colonel Paul Menzies for information on Russian affairs.⁵⁸ The Dane continued to press for an alliance against Sweden but the Duma was not able to reach a decision before Tsar Aleksei died on 29 January 1676.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ TKUA Rusland, B38: Tsar Aleksei reassured Gjõe that he would keep Khovanskii's army in readiness on the Livonian frontier (6 July 1675).

⁵⁷ TKUA Rusland, B38: "[car nous scavons que dans le Senat] (c'est à dire ceux que le Tsar admet d'ont il n'y a qu'un petit nombre) [cette affaire a este mise seule plusieurs fois en deliberation sans aucun] resultat [tant qu'ils sont de differents sentiments]" (15 September 1675). In reports from November 1675, onward Gjõe referred to the Duma more often as "conseil" rather than the earlier "Sénat" or "assemblée" (see notes 55, 59). This "council" seems to be a *blizhnaia Duma*, better known in the sixteenth century: Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma*, 315–30, 433–35; Sergei Bogatyrev, *The Sovereign and His Counsellors: Ritualized Consultations in Muscovite Political Culture 1350s–1570s*, *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae*, Humaniora 307, Helsinki, 2000.

⁵⁸ TKUA Rusland, B38: Gjõe thinks that Matveev is treacherous, since Russia will only put troops on the border to frighten Sweden, but no more (6 October 1675). Menzies reports Matveev's anger over Gjõe's relations with the Imperial mission (Menzies to Gjõe, undated but with 6 October 1675). Matveev and Gjõe are partially reconciled (20 October 1675).

Menzies seems to have quickly replaced Peter Marselis, who died in August 1675, as Gjõe's main informant. Death of Marselis: 10 August 1675. Menzies was connected with the Naryshkins, and the Marselis family headed Russia's post office from 1668 until Peter Marselis' death. See Charykov, *Posol'stvo, passim*; and Erich Amburger, *Die Familie Marselis: Studien zur russischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, *Giessener Abhandlungen zur Agrar- und Wirtschaftsforschung des europäischen Ostens* 4, Giessen, 1957.

⁵⁹ TKUA Rusland, B38: Matveev held the usual fall comedies and ballets for the tsar, but the Danish proposal would be discussed in the "conseil" (17 November 1675); the "conseil" met twice on the subject but came to no conclusion, according to Matveev a letter would be sent to Sweden demanding Ingria and Narva (24 November 1675).

Within a few months of the death of Tsar Aleksei, Matveev was in exile. For five years he had been the most powerful figure at the Russian court, seemingly unchallenged. No contemporaries, Russian or foreign, record any serious opposition to him before the tsar's death, nor do they specifically record any factional line-up at court. Gjølø mentioned in his reports right after Aleksei's death that there were "many factions" among the boyars, but named no names. The only recorded conflicts which Matveev had in his years of power were with Prince Iu. Dolgorukii, B. M. Khitrovo, and the Troekurovs, not the Miloslavskii. All of the conflicts were over matters of jurisdiction and influence over policy, not policy itself. Further, Matveev had removed the Miloslavskii from office, not from rivalry or fear of them but simply to make way for his own clients. Gjølø told the story, reporting on the situation immediately following the death of Tsar Aleksei:

the Tsar [=Fyodor] at present, immediately after the death of his father, thought of the relatives of the Grand Duchess his mother, and has had orders sent to recall them to court, the Grand Chancellor [=Matveev] having removed them from there, from the governance of his establishment, under the pretext of giving them great office and more considerable governments, but in reality to fill it [=the court] with his relatives and his creatures, who have no other attachment but to his career, in giving them the principal offices of the state and by that means taking away from all others access to the Prince.⁶⁰

Thus Matveev had removed from the court the relatives of Aleksei's first wife and replaced them with his own appointees. Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii was sent as governor to Astrakhan' in 1674 and Ivan Bogdanovich to Kazan' the next year, so Gjølø seems to have been right.⁶¹ Only these two were provincial governors in

⁶⁰ TKUA Rusland, B38 (3 February 1676), and see chapter 3, note 4.

⁶¹ The boyar Ivan Bogdanovich Miloslavskii headed the Petition Chancellery in 1669–70 and from February 1673, until February 1675 and was then sent as governor of the province of Kazan'. The Chancellery apparently went to Dementii Bashmakov, the trusted secretary of the tsar but not apparently a client of Matveev. The *okol'nichii* Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii took over the Apothecary Chancellery from Il'ia Danilovich in 1667 and lost it in 1669 to the Duma secretary Luk'ian Golosov, who in turn surrendered it to Matveev himself in March, 1672. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 15, 221; A. Barsukov, *Spiski gorodovykh voevod i drugikh lits voevodskogo upravleniia Moskovskogo Gosudarstva XVII stolietiiia, po napechatannym pravitel'stvennym aktam*, St Petersburg, 1902, 11, 89, 208. Golosov survived Matveev's fall: Veselovskii, *D'iaki*, 123. Matveev denied in his 1678/79 petition to I. M. Miloslavskii that he had been the cause of his "exile," asserting that it was the tsar's idea and that Miloslavskii's cousin (*brat*), the *okol'nichii* Andrei Ivanovich Chirikov, could bear witness to Matveev's lack of hostility to Miloslavskii: *Istoriia . . . Matveeva*, 326–27.

those years, and no other Miloslavskii is known to have been give important provincial posts.

Gjõe's assessment was that Matveev's base was in the *prikazy*, not only in the six which he headed but in others as well. The Dane reported that he had more than thirty chancelleries under his control by means of various clients (*créatures*), but unfortunately he did not name them. He did report that shortly after Aleksei's death Iu. Dolgorukii charged Matveev with making considerable personal profit by means of his client in the *Pricas des tavernes*. This is an important clue, for that can only be the *Novaia chet'*, which did collect the revenues from taverns in Moscow and the south. From September, 1669 its head was the Duma secretary Gerasim Semenovitch Dokhturov, who died two days after Tsar Aleksei on 31 January 1676. Dokhturov had served long and with distinction, going on a mission to England in the middle of its Civil War in 1646. In the years of Matveev's ascendancy he headed not only the *Novaia chet'* but also the Chancelleries of the Seal, of Estates, and in 1674–76 the Military Office (*razriad*).⁶² The last two were perhaps the most important offices concerned with domestic affairs other than finance. Here were four of the chancelleries Matveev controlled, other than the six he headed himself.

Though we know too little of the personal ties between Matveev and the various heads of chancelleries in 1671–75, one thing is clear. In those years the boyars who had headed these offices in the 1660s were replaced by men of lesser rank. Among those replaced were the Miloslavskii, but there were many more, and the process began before Matveev took over the Ambassadorial Chancellery. Already in 1670 the senior boyar Prince Nikita Odoevskii lost three important offices. The Great Treasury went to the boyar P. M. Saltykov, but Saltykov surrendered it to a mere *stol'nik*, L. V. Liapunov, in January 1673. The Mercenary and Cavalry Chancelleries also went to a *stol'nik* (though a boyar's son), Prince I. B. Troekurov. Since 1663 the Courier Office (*Iamskoi prikaz*) had been under the boyar Prince Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii, but in 1670 it went to the Duma secretary Grigorii Karaulov for two years, followed by I. F. Buturlin, simply a gentleman. In 1673 the boyar Prince Iurii Ivanovich Romodanovskii, though a personal favorite of the tsar, lost

⁶² TKUA Rusland, B38, 9 February, 1676; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 91, 116, 123–24, 148.

the Artillery Chancellery to a Duma gentleman, I. I. Baklanovskii.⁶³ The Musketeer Office was also I. D. Miloslavskii's until 1665, going then to a Duma secretary, A. Durov, but in 1669 to another Duma secretary, Larion Ivanov, who remained in office until Aleksei's death.⁶⁴ Most of the major offices were lost to the boyars in these years, and to make things worse for them the financial Quarters (Vladimir, Novgorod, Galich) had been transferred from the boyars to the Ambassadorial Chancellery long before Matveev took it over. The major office that continued to be held by a boyar was the Kazan' Palace, going from Prince Iuri Dolgorukii in 1670 to the boyar Prince Iakov Odoevskii and then in 1672 to the boyar Prince Mikhail Iur'evich Dolgorukii.⁶⁵ After 1670–73 the only other group of offices under boyar control was the palace complex under Bogdan Khitrovo. Our information about Matveev's clients and relatives is scanty, and Dokhturov is the only one whom we know to be in that category. The Naryshkin family provided Matveev with no valuable support in the time before Aleksei's death, which is not surprising. Natalia Naryshkina was only twenty-three when Aleksei died, and played no known political role until that moment. Her father and brothers were only in the course of acquiring position (and presumably wealth). Natalia's father, Kirill, became a boyar in 1672, but acquired office (the Great Treasury and Great Income) only on 17 January 1676.⁶⁶ This appointment might have given Matveev an

⁶³ In the seventeenth century there were Buturlins of Duma rank, but I. F. Buturlin became an *okol'nichii* only in 1682, directly from the rank of gentleman (*dvorianin*), and died 1687/88: RGADA, f. 210, d. 7, boiarskaia kniga 7184 g., f. 54. His father, Fyodor Grigor'ev, never made the boyar lists even at the lowest rank: Dolgorukov, *Rodoslovnaia*, II, 156–57; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 52–53. Crummey lists I. I. Baklanovskii as attaining the rank of Duma gentleman in 1655, but this Baklanovskii may have been the father: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 192, 205; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 234–35.

⁶⁴ Larion Ivanov seems to have been Khitrovo's client, but only after 1676: Ellersieck, *Russia*, 313–14.

⁶⁵ Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 27, 39, 42, 55, 64, 136–37, 150–51, 166–67, 226–27. The Novgorod Quarter was attached to the Ambassadorial Chancellery beginning in 1650, but in 1670–72 it was briefly under the control of one of the Khitrovos, the Duma gentleman Ivan Sevast'ianovich the elder (*ibid.*, 95).

⁶⁶ Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 27, 35. The appointment of Kirill Naryshkin to such offices does suggest where Aleksei was moving at the time of his death. The tsar gave two crucial financial offices to his brother-in-law in the place of relatively minor officials, and to a brother-in-law who was also an ally of Matveev. Had Aleksei lived, his government would have consisted entirely of his brother-in-law and the two favorites, Matveev (the more powerful) and Khitrovo. Natal'ia's uncle (and Matveev's nephew by marriage) Fyodor Naryshkin, a Duma gentleman since 1672, served as *voevoda* at Archangel 1673–75 but died in December 1676: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 197, Barsukov, *Spiski*, 65–66.

ally, but since Aleksei fell ill on 20 January, and died nine days later, it was not of much use.

Matveev's entire political base was the tsar's favor. With that favor behind him he was able to assume a predominant position within the administration and policy-making network of the court. The gradual removal of the great boyars from the chief offices of state before the arrival of Matveev suggests that it was not Matveev who imposed the policy on a compliant tsar, but rather that Aleksei himself consciously set out to push the boyars aside to make way for his parvenu favorite. The only other favorite mentioned in the sources for these years was Bogdan Khitrovo, and Khitrovo was essentially the same type of man as Matveev, using the same methods. Khitrovo came from the provincial gentry, not from the old boyars, and built his power by accumulating several offices that gave him control of the palace as well as the ability to filter petitions to the tsar. Unlike Matveev, he seems to have had little impact on policy, but between the two they controlled the Russian government in the last years of the life of Tsar Aleksei.

Matveev did not try to be a dictator, and the important issues (at least in foreign policy, about which we know more) were fully discussed in the Duma. Perhaps Matveev realized that the tsar could choose to forget the boyars when it came to appointments, but he could not. In any case, discussion in the Duma was the custom, and Matveev frequently had to argue his position with some difficulty to convince the boyars to support him. On one important occasion, the Polish election of 1674, Matveev disagreed sharply with the position of the tsar himself, though he claimed not to have worked against his sovereign's plans. Even though Matveev seems to have formally played within the traditional rules and discussed policy in the Duma, Tsar Aleksei's support meant that on almost all issues Matveev's will would triumph. Not surprisingly, by the tsar's death "the Boyars are generally animated by an immortal hatred of the chancellor and all his relatives."⁶⁷ This hatred would soon erupt into the most violent factional struggle at court since the reign of Boris Godunov.

⁶⁷ TKUA Rusland, B38: "les Boyars generalement animez d'une haine immortelle contre le chancelier et tout son parentage" (3 February 1676).

CHAPTER 3

The reign of Tsar Fyodor, 1676–1682

The death of Tsar Aleksei in January, 1676, unleashed a struggle of unparalleled ferocity among the boyars. Not since the end of the Time of Troubles had the Russian aristocracy fought among themselves with such ruthlessness: the loser in the battle, Artamon Matveev, was the first boyar since 1613 to be actually deprived of his rank of boyar.¹ At the same time, the new regime inaugurated an expansion of honors of unprecedented proportions, the Boyar Duma increasing in size by one third and some lesser ranks by even more. The abolition of the precedence system (*mestnichestvo*) in the last months of the reign signaled further changes to come.

The struggle began on the day of Tsar Aleksei's death, 29 January 1676, and the fullest account of the events comes once again from the Danish resident Magnus Gjøl. The tsar's illness was concealed at first, though the Dane knew about it by 26 January four days after it began. Aleksei's death was exemplary: he refused to take medicine and passed the time in devotion. On the twenty-eighth he called in the young Fyodor, giving him his blessing and "very fine and Christian homilies." He put the scepter into his hands and exhorted the boy to rule the people with sweetness and in the fear of God. He was to follow the counsels of the boyars, particularly Bogdan Khitrovo. The next day the dying tsar ordered the release of prisoners, especially those imprisoned for debts to the tsar, and had alms distributed to the poor. He died between six and seven o'clock in the evening, leaving his son Fyodor, not quite fifteen years old, to rule Russia.²

¹ The Ukrainian cossack hetman Briukhovets'kyi was made a boyar in 1665 and deprived of the rank when he was expelled from the position in 1667/68, but this was an aberrant case: no other hetman was ever given boyar rank. Ordin-Nashchokin also resigned his rank by becoming a monk on his fall from grace in 1670. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 193, 195.

² TKUA Rusland, B38, 26 January 1676; 3 February 1676: "Il [the tsar] mourut le 29e janvier apres une maladie de Sept Jours, pendant lesquels on ne luy a jamais pu obliger à prendre le moindre medicine, passant ce temps là à une tres grande devotion dans laquelle il

The next day the tsar's body was taken with great ceremony to the Archangel Cathedral in the Kremlin, with the patriarch and high clergy, the boyars, and the nobility down to *spal'niki* and *stol'niki* walking in the procession. Four boyars carried Tsar Fyodor in a chair, followed by Tsaritsa Natalia lying in a sleigh with her head resting on the knees of one of her ladies of the court. The body of the tsar rested before the altar for six weeks, guarded by two boyars, and was then buried. All this seemed to Gjõe to be a funeral without pomp.³ The struggle for power began the same day, for the letters sent out to provincial governors with the oath of loyalty to the new tsar mentioned tsaritsa Natalia as well, implying that she would not retire to a convent but participate in the government.

this will be undoubtedly a move by the Chancellor [Matveev] to preserve the same power in affairs as he had during the life of the late tsar. There is also great appearance that the present tsar having been very unhealthy and melancholic since childhood, cannot live long and his brother [Ivan] being nearly blind and humpbacked, the succession will infallibly fall on the prince and son of the present tsaritsa [Peter].

Gjõe thought that the boyars also rated Natalia as a serious player in the new situation of Russian politics:

In consideration of this the boyars will proceed toward the said tsaritsa (who is only 23 years old, young and full of ambition, raised in the Polish manner and with more freedom than this nation [the Russians]) with much circumspection.

This note from the Danish ambassador is the first indication that Natalia would play any role in Russian politics. There is no such indication in any source during the lifetime of Tsar Aleksei, as is only natural. Until her husband's death Natalia was a very young and inexperienced woman fully occupied with three pregnancies in five

perservera jusques à la fin. Le dernier jour il communia et sentant la mort approcher il fist appeller le Prince aîné à present Zar, à qui il donna sa benediction, et à ce qu'on dit, de tres belles et Chretiennes moralitez, luy donna mesme le Sceptre entre les mains l'exhortant surtout de gouverner son peuple avec douceur et dans la crainte de Dieu et de suivre les Conseils des Bons Serviteurs que luy laissait, et nommément luy recommanda un Boyar appellé Bogdan Matveivitz; Environ un heure devant sa mort il ordonna qu'on relaschait un grand nombre de prisonniers, qu'on remist en liberté ceux qu'ils estoient arrestez pour les debtes due à luy, on fist aussi distribuer les ausmones jusques à 4 mille escus; il expira la soir entre six et sept heures en la quarante sixieme année de son age et en la 31 de son regne, et laissa la succession à la courrone à son Filz aîné Prince Feodor Alexeivitz, qui n'a pas encore seize ans accomplis." Gjõe's main informant was Menzies, who was close to Matveev: TKUA Rusland, B38, 19 January, 1676.

³ TKUA Rusland, B38, 3 February, 1676; [A. M. Loviagin, ed.], *Posol'stvo Kunraada fan-Klenka k tsariam Alekseiu Mikhailovichu i Feodoru Alekseevichu*, St. Petersburg, 1900, 136–39, 429–33.

years and the resultant son Peter and two daughters, Natalia and Feodora, as well as living under the authority of her husband the tsar.

In the same letter the Miloslavskiis appear as a group also for the first time, but they were not the only faction at court. The new lines of political struggle would be complicated, with all the boyars opposing Matveev allied with the less powerful Naryshkins:

it is assured that this death will bring a notable change to the state, the court being divided into several factions, the prince young, sickly and in no way interested in the affairs of the world, the boyars generally animated by an immortal hatred of the chancellor and all his relatives, to whom I would add those of the late grand duchess, who will do everything they can to destroy the relatives of the reigning grand duchess [the Naryshkins], who have no other point of support than that of the chancellor.

The boyars wanted to recover the power that they had lost during the ascendancy of Matveev, and the struggle would be all-absorbing.

I fear also [continued Gjœ] that by this death business will suffer greatly, for this nation being attached uniquely to its own interests, the boyars in this situation will have no other aim than to improve their condition without consideration of the public good.⁴

⁴ TKUA Rusland, B38 (3 February 1676): "On croit que la Zaritsa aura quelque part dans le gouvernement d'autant que les lettres qu'on a expediez aux Veyvodes et gouverneurs pour recevoir le serment de fidelité de ceux de leur gouvernement sont escrites au nom du Zar et de la Zaritsa, on est autrement accoustumé de l'envoyer dans un couvent six semaines apres la mort du Zar mais cecy sera sans doute une politique de M le Chancellier, pour se conserver le mesme pouvoir dans les affaires qu'il a en pendant la vie du feu Zar. Il y a aussi grande apparence, que le Zar à present ayant esté de son enfance tout à fait mal sain et melancolique, ne pourra vivre long temps et son frere estant presque aveugle et bossu, la succession tombera infailliblement sur le Prince et Filz du Zaritsa à present, en considerant de quoy les Boyars procederont vers la dite Zaritsa (qui n'a encore que 23 ans, jeune et pleins d'ambitions, nourrie à la Polonoise et avec plus de liberté que cette nation) avec beaucoup de circonspection. Cependant, le Zar à present, immediatement apres la mort de son Pere, songea aux parents de la grande duchesse sa mere, et a fait expedier les ordres pour les rapeller à la cour, M le Grand chancellier les avant esloigné de là, de le commandement de son etablissement, sous pretexte de leur donner des grands emplois et plus considerables gouvernements, mais en effet, pour la remplir de ses parents et de ses creatures, qui n'avoient point d'autre attachements qu'à sa fortune, en les donnant les principales charges de l'estat, et par là oster à tous les autres l'accès aupres le Prince. Jusques à present l'on ne sçaura juger qu'il plis prendront les affaires, mais c'est assuré que cette mort apportera un notable changement à l'estat, la cour estant divisée en plusieurs factions, le Prince jeune, maladiv et nullement incliné aux affaires du monde, les Boyars generalement animez d'une haine immortelle contre le chancellier, et tout son parentage à quoy j'adjouteraz celuy de la feue grande duchesse qui mettra tout dessus dessous, pour destruire les parents de la grande duchesse regnante, qui n'ont point d'autre appuy que celuy du grand chancellier. Je craiz aussi que par cette mort les affaires patiront grandement, car cette nation estant attaché uniquement à ses propres interests, les Boyars dans cette conjuncture n'auront autre visée, qu'à ameliorer leur condition sans se soucier du bien publiq." Cf. *PSZ* II, no. 619, 1-2.

The Dane's remarkably prescient dispatch describes two interrelated but distinct struggles, that of the boyars against Matveev and that of the Miloslavskii and Naryshkins. Until Matveev's fall at the beginning of July the Miloslavskii–Naryshkin battle remained in the background, and it was the position of Matveev that was the object of dispute.

The boyars did not wait to strike. The first blows fell on 3 February and six days later Gjõe had full information. The chief man in power, for the time being at least, was Prince Iurii Alekseevich Dolgorukii. He received power during the minority of the tsar as well as the headship of the Musketeers' Chancellery. Gjõe also reported that the boyars took away thirty *prikazy* which Matveev controlled directly or through his clients, leaving him only the Ambassadorial Chancellery. The Danish resident exaggerated the numbers, but his general picture was correct. Russian sources confirm the new appointments. Prince Iu. A. Dolgorukii did indeed receive the Musketeers' Chancellery by 4 February, a position he retained until 1682. Dolgorukii reproached Matveev in the Duma with taking for himself the profits of the tavern monopoly through his control of the Tavern Chancellery, or New Quarter, and on 3 February it went to Iu. A. Dolgorukii's nephew, the *okol'nichii* Prince Vladimir Dmitrievich Dolgorukii. To investigate Matveev's alleged wrongdoings the boyars wanted to establish a new Chancellery of Investigations (*sysknoi prikaz*). The Estates Chancellery, also until recently under Matveev's client Dokhturov, went on 3 February to the boyar Ivan Borisovich Repnin. Around the same time Matveev lost the Apothecary Office to the eldest of the boyars, Prince Nikita Ivanovich Odoevskii. Matveev was left with only the Ambassadorial Chancellery of the major offices, and his only sure ally was Natalia's father, Kirill Naryshkin. The latter had simultaneously received three financial offices, the Great Income, the Great Treasury, and the Ustiug Quarter only twelve days before Aleksei's death. As Gjõe wrote, "The boyars are making in this situation, which is so favorable to them, the utmost efforts to take back their ancient authority, which the violence of this favorite made them lose in the last few years."⁵ As winter and spring progressed, there were more

⁵ TKUA Rusland, B38, 9 February 1676: Negotiations with the Dutch are suspended, "les Boyars estant occupez continuellement à regler et reformer le gouvernement de l'Estat qu'il a beaucoup souffert depuis plusieurs années par l'indulgence du feu Zar, et les malversations du grand chancelier et ses creatures. C'est le Connetable Dolgoruki, comme celui qui tient

changes in the personnel of the Russian government. On 17 February as Gjõe had predicted, a new Investigation Chancellery was set up headed by Prince Iurii Dolgorukii and the Duma secretary Larion Ivanov, who would soon move on to even greater things. In March the *Razriad* came under a new chief, for its former head was the late Dokhturov. His replacement was the Duma secretary V. G. Semenov, a career official who served in the *Razriad* from 1663 until his death in 1693. His assistant was none other than Fyodor Leont'evich Shaklovityi, later to earn notoriety in the time of the regent Sofia.⁶ On 27 April Kirill Naryshkin lost the Ustiug Quarter to Prince Iurii Dolgorukii, an important financial office for the prince to control. The next major changes came in May and early June.⁷

The changes in composition of the Duma also made things more difficult for Matveev. There were some twenty-three boyars in the Duma at Aleksei's death, but not all were present in Moscow. A number had office as provincial governors or generals and were probably away from Moscow.⁸ Thus only seventeen of the boyars

le premier rang entre les Boyars, et beaucoup considéré pour les merites, à qui on a différé toute l'autorité pendant la minorité du Zar, et pour effect luy a on attriqué la surintendance des Strilitz, ou l'infanterie Russienne, qui est ce que les Jannissaires son aupres les Turqs. Les autres chancelleries ou Pricas a on osté aux parents de Mr. le Chancelier et distribuez entre les Boyars, si bien que de plus de trente Pricas qui demouroit souz la direction du dit Chancelier (d'ou il tinoit annuellement des sommes immenses) il ne luy en reste à present que celuy des affaires estrangers, lequel à ce qu'on dit, il ne gardera pas longtemps. Enfin l'autorité de ce Ministre va de jour en jour en se diminuant, à quoy tous les Boyars contribuent unanimement. On veut aussi establir une chambre de justice, pour tirer de luy à ce qu'on dit la raison de l'administration des Finances, puisque le Connestable dans le plein Senat luy a reproché d'avoir tiré pour son propre profit d'un seul Pricas qui s'appelle le Pricas des Tavernes annuellement vingt mille escus. On n'entend icy que les changements, et les Boyars font dans une si favorable conjuncture pour eux les derniers efforts pour reprendre l'autorité ancienne, que la violence de ce favoris leur avoit fait perdre depuis quelques années . . ." For confirmation of the Dane's reports on the appointments see Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 16, 27, 35, 87, 124, 167, 201, 226; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 88–89.

⁶ Semenov was promoted to Duma secretary on 4 May, 1676. Shaklovityi had served since 1672/73 in the Privy Chancellery. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 148–49, 195; Veselovskii, *D'iaki*, 160, 468–69, 516–17, 571; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 196, 199.

⁷ On 26 April 1676, the Duma gentleman Bogdan Ivanovich Ordin-Nashchokin, a relative of the former head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery, took over the Slavery Chancellery from the *stol'nik* P. A. Izmailov. On 9 May I. F. Buturlin was removed from the Estates Chancellery and replaced by the *stol'nik* N. A. Vel'iaminov. Five days later the boyar Prince Iurii Petrovich Trubetskoi replaced Prince I. B. Troekurov in the Cavalry Chancellery (*reitarskii prikaz*). Finally, in the last major change before Matveev's fall, on 6 and 7 June, Ivan Timofeevich Kondyrev took over the Stable Chancellery and became a Duma gentleman. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 79, 116, 124, 151, 201, 207; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 199.

⁸ The provincial governors were P. V. Sheremetev (Tobol'sk), P. M. Saltykov (Tobol'sk, then Astrakhan'), Prince A. A. Golitsyn (Kiev), Prince G. G. Romodanovskii (Kursk and also

were normally to be found in the capital. These boyars, one should note, had not been running the day-to-day affairs of state. The government offices at the moment of Aleksei's death, as we have seen, were largely in the hands of Matveev and his client Dokhturov, of Kirill Naryshkin with the financial offices, and of Bogdan Khitrovo with the palace complex of offices. Only Prince M. Iu. Dolgorukii headed a major office, the Kazan' Palace, from 1672 to 1680. Prince F. F. Kurakin, who soon emerged as Matveev's enemy, had possessed a major role, but not in the chancelleries. His importance came from the tsar's household where he had been the *d'iadka* for Tsarevich Fyodor.⁹ The basic political and administrative role of most of the boyars in the last years of the reign of Tsar Aleksei was simply to sit in the Boyar Duma, but that role soon expanded. Following Aleksei's death, the boyars had come back to power.

The original twenty-three boyars in the Duma were soon joined by others, almost all of whom were unlikely to be favorable to Matveev. The first, on 4 May, was Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, who would earn fame and the enmity of the Naryshkins in the time of regent Sofia. Golitsyn received the rank directly from that of *stol'nik*, bypassing the rank of *okol'nichii*, as was common in the case of very aristocratic families. Three days later came Prince Petr Semenovich Urusov. Even more important appointments came in June. Directly from the rank of chamber *stol'nik* came Prince Iurii Mikhailovich Odoevskii, Prince Petr Ivanovich Prozorovskii (both 8 June), and Mikhail Ivanovich Morozov (18 June). The Golitsyn, Prozorovskii and Morozov families all had marriage ties to the Khitrovos, and were thus not likely friends to Matveev.¹⁰ On the

commanding the Russian army in the south against Doroshenko and the Turks), and I. B. Miloslavskii (Kazan'). Prince Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii was governor of Pskov and commanded the army near Livonia until May, then going on to be governor of Archangel. Barsukov, *Spiski*, 11–12, 66, 89, 102, 123, 186, 240–41.

⁹ Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 64–65; "Kniga diad'kam i mamam i boiaryniam verkhovym i stol'nikom tsarevichevym," *Vremennik OIDR*, IX, smes', 46–51. Prince N. I. Odoevskii married Prince F. F. Kurakin's sister Evdokiia Fyodorovna: Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 315; "Rodoslovie kn. Kurakinykh," *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 359.

¹⁰ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 81. Prozorovskii had also been the *diad'ka* of Tsarevich Ivan Alekseevich, the future Ivan V, since 1674: Shmurlo, "Kriticheskie zametki," *ZhMNP* 330, 219. Prince P. S. Urusov was the grandson of the Nogai princeling Kasim-murza (c. 1586–1647), who converted to Orthodoxy in 1615 (with the name Andrei Satych) and attained the rank of Moscow gentleman, and the son of Prince Semen Andreevich. More famous than his male relatives was Prince P. S. Urusov's wife Evdokiia, born Sokovnina, the sister and fellow martyr for Old Belief of Feodos'ia, "Boiarynia Morozova." Prince Petr Semenovich died in 1686, leaving no sons. The family continued in the descendants of his brothers: Narbut, *Urusovy*, 8–9; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 191.

same day, however, two of the Streshnevs became boyars from the rank of *okol'nichii*, Rodion Matveevich and Ivan Bol'shoi Fyodorovich. Rodion would become Peter's tutor (*diad'ka*) in 1679, and by then at least seems to have been an ally of the Naryshkins. Two days later two probable opponents of Matveev cancelled them out, however, as Prince Mikhail Andreevich Golitsyn (from chamber *stol'nik*) and Ivan Bogdanovich Khitrovo (from *okol'nichii*) received boyar rank. The next two, on 22 June, were Prince Semen Andreevich Khovanskii (from *stol'nik*, brother of the general) whose views are unknown, and Vasilii Semenovich Volynskii, from *okol'nichii*. Matveev later wrote that Volynskii was one of his principal enemies, and for certain so was Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii, made boyar from *okol'nichii* on 27 June, the last before Matveev's fall.¹¹ The new appointments were mostly predictable, given the ancestry of the men involved, but the result was not in Matveev's favor.

Matveev's fall was not the result of foreign policy issues, for in this area the Russian court seems to have been united for the time being. The Dutch and Danish effort to convince the Russians to move actively against Sweden met with the same negative results as in previous years. Matveev (and Dolgorukii) handled these discussions, preserving continuity in personnel as well as policy, and there is not the slightest hint in the sources that any of the boyars objected to the policy of cautious pressure on Sweden. In the south, the campaign against Doroshenko by Russia and Hetman Samoilovych continued as before. After Matveev's fall, the Russian army under Prince G. G. Romodanovskii and Samoilovych's cossacks finally took Chigirin and forced Doroshenko to surrender, but again there is no hint that Matveev's fall had any impact on these movements. The Russians had been waiting for Doroshenko to clarify his position and when he did not their patience ran out.¹²

Boyar opposition to Matveev centered on the accumulation of power in his hands through the control of the main Chancelleries

¹¹ RGADA, f. 210, d. 7, boyarskaia kniga 7184 g., ff. 23–26; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 81, 102, 191–92, 195, 199.

¹² TKUA Rusland, B38, 22 March 1676 (Russia strengthens its army near Livonia), 3 May 1676 (Dutch and Danish envoys request the Russians to invade Livonia; their memoranda read in Duma, leading to replacement of Khovanskii with Troekurov; Troekurov ordered to approach nearer to border by Narva), 16 May 1676 (39,400 Russian cavalry and 8,000 infantry for Troekurov's army); [Loviagin], *Posol'stvo*, 129, 203, 421, 504, and note 13; Kostomarov, *Ruina, Sobrańie*, XV, 259–71; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 197–209; Doroshenko, *Het'man*, 557–622; and Zernack, *Studien*, 71–83.

and his personal influence on Tsar Aleksei. There were, however, other grounds. At the end of February, after Tsar Aleksei's death, Gjoe reported that

it is said that the state will be ordered here according to the ancient custom, that is to say, that the plays and ballets will cease forever, that residents of foreign princes will not be permitted, and that the post will stop. It is the old boyars who are pressing for the abolition of all these things, and after Easter it will all explode.¹³

This is the first sign of opposition to the cultural innovations of Matveev and Tsar Aleksei, and in fact the plays did cease until Peter's time. Attempts to expel foreign residents were made on and off in the next few years, but without permanent success. The post continued. Even if only partially successful, however, the "old boyars" had formulated a program of opposition to the court culture of the Matveev era, a program with a distinctly xenophobic air to it. Meanwhile, Matveev himself, the patron and presumed author of this new culture, grew more and more isolated politically.

By late spring it seemed that Matveev's fate was sealed, but at that point a new factor entered the struggle which delayed his fall and simultaneously set the stage for the factional struggles of the coming years: Dolgorukii's change of heart. In the days after Aleksei's death Prince Iurii Dolgorukii seemed to be one of Matveev's bitterest opponents. It was he who had denounced Matveev's profiteering in the New Quarter, and becoming the *de facto* regent, he replaced Matveev as the leading man of state. He exercised the role, for at the end of February yet another quarrel erupted between Gjoe and Matveev which Dolgorukii settled, apparently to mutual satisfaction. Dolgorukii's power was evident especially in view of the young tsar's poor health. His coronation had been postponed once already as early as mid-March, and at Easter (26 March OS), when he distributed eggs to the boyars and officers, he could hardly walk. The result of Dolgorukii's newly acquired power was that, by the

¹³ TKUA Rusland, B38, 23 February 1676: "Au reste, dit on qu'on va regler l'estat icy selon l'ancienne coustume, à scavoir, que les comedies et balets cessent pour jamais; qu'on ne souffre des residents des Princes estrangers; qu'on cesse la poste; Ce sont les vieux Boyars qui pressent abolition des toutes ces choses, apres Pasques tout cela esclattera." Such plans were still plans at the end of the year: "Here we have the News of his Imperial Majties. resolution to put down the convenience of Post, dismiss all Foreign Officers, Deny all Merchants coming to Musco and to sette all things after the old custome as it was in his Imperial Maties. Grand-Father's days." PRO SP 91/3, 18 December 1676, Pskov, John Hebdon to Sir Joseph Williamson, secretary of state.

beginning of March, he already had begun to excite considerable jealousy among the older boyars. In early May, however, his prestige was still rising as Matveev's fell, and it was he, not Matveev, who handled most of the Russian–Danish negotiations with Gjøe. At about the same time Tsar Fyodor gave permission to the Dutch to leave Johan Willem van Keller in Moscow as a resident, a clear defeat for the “old boyar” conservatives who were increasingly jealous of Dolgorukii. As Fyodor was scarcely able to make policy on his own, Dolgorukii must have been the chief architect of the permission for van Keller.¹⁴ In June the situation at court still looked as before, with most attention seeming to go to plans for Fyodor's coronation on 18 June. Van Keller paid his first formal visits to Dolgorukii, Khitrovo, and Matveev, following what he saw as the successful example of Gjøe. He and the Dane as yet picked up no rumors suggesting that Dolgorukii had changed his views of Matveev or was less powerful, until June 25. That day Keller reported that Khitrovo had received new positions, that Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii had received the rank of boyar (thus reporting the event two days before the official announcement!), and that the new treasurer was Ivan Bogdanovich Kamynin. The same letter reported trouble for Dolgorukii and Matveev.¹⁵

Matveev lost his position as head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery on 3 July. The day before Keller wrote back to the Hague with the news of Matveev and Dolgorukii's disgrace, as well as the loss of power by Kirill Naryshkin. Matveev's replacement would be Larion Ivanov, who took office formally on 4 July.

The causes of these changes, one says are, High Mighty Lords, that the close relatives of the first marriage, and especially the Princess, Irina Mikhailovna, the aunt of this his Majesty the tsar (who some years ago was sought by Count Waldemar the natural son of his late majesty the King of Denmark Christian IV), with great passion work to get out of the way and

¹⁴ TKUA Rusland, B38, 8 March 1676: “Les Boyars cependant sont en grande dissension, et les plus anciens commencent à avoir grande jalousie du trop absolu pouvoir de Dolgerouki, enfin tout est icy en confusion, et ce qui se fait aujourd'hui, n'est plus de mise demain”; 15 March 1676: postponement of coronation; 5 April 1676: Fyodor at Easter, decline in authority of Matveev; 10 May 1676: Dolgorukii (not Matveev) handles Danish affairs, Tsar Fyodor allows the Dutch to leave Johan Willem van Keller as a resident; 16 May 1676: further work of Dolgorukii on Danish affairs; [Loviagin], *Posol'stvo*, 503, note 8 (letter of 25 April 1676 reporting prestige of Dolgorukii). On Keller see O. Schutte, *Repertorium der nederlandsche vertegenwoordigers, residerende in het buitenland 1584–1810*, the Hague, 1976, 286–87.

¹⁵ ARSG 7364: 11/21 June, 18/28 June, 25 June/5 July (Keller to States General); *PSZ* II, no. 648, 42–68 (Coronation of Fyodor, 18 June 1676). Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 72.

remove from office all those who were ever allied with or related to the oft-mentioned Empress widow. Which latter is held to be of too petty origin to come into comparison with the previous [Maria Miloslavskaia] and her remaining heirs: it is openly said that the former? Chancellor of the Realm Artamon Sergeevich arranged the marriage with the last wife, since the lady is related to him: and he had no small influence on the mind of the late tsar, who was a very good lord.

I. M. Miloslavskii had recently had an “encounter” (*rencontre*) of some sort with Matveev and Dolgorukii.

The supreme general Prince Dolgorukii has also a hard blow and run the danger of seeing a great change in his honor and state, as he stubbornly held to the party of the Chancellor [Matveev]; and held up certain letters of importance, the same's correspondence, which his majesty the tsar had dispatched to the son of the abovementioned.

Dolgorukii argued his long service and escaped disgrace, but with his respect and authority damaged. Keller concluded that in the future he would cultivate Miloslavskii.¹⁶

With the fall of Matveev, the first phase of the struggle was over. The second phase, the removal of the Naryshkins, was about to begin. It began quietly, for Paul Menzies was able to report that after some initial dissension “the sparks of discord and faction which had been lighted among the boyars are extinguished by those who have the greatest charge of affairs during the youth of the tsar.” The replacement of Matveev with Larion Ivanov seemed to the Scot simply leaving his position open and putting in a man of lesser stature to take care of the routine, probably a correct judgment. For the next few months there were few appointments to boyar rank or to the

¹⁶ ARSG 7364, 2/12 July 1676: “D’oorsaecken van dese veranderingen seidt men te syn, Hooch Mogende Heeren, dat de naeste verwantens van t’Eerste Huwelick ende in specie de Princesse Kneine Irena Michalowna Moeye ofte Tante van dese syne Zarisse Majesteit (De welcke voor einige jaeren gepretendeert is geweest van Graff Waldemar natuirlicken soon van den Sal. Koninck van Dennemarck Christianus den vierden) met grote passie arbeiden, om alle die geene uyt den wegh te ruymen, en van harre ampten t’ontsetten, die einigsins ge-allieert ofte vermaeghd syn met dese meergemelten Keiserinne Wedue. Als de welcke van al te geringen extractu te syn gehouden wordt omme in comparatu te komen met de voorgaende, en desselfs nagelatene erwen: Mens sijdt nu hautement dat de vaes.? Ryxcancelier Artemon Sirgewitz t’ huwelick met dese laeste heeft gecuppelt, dewyl dat de Dame hem verwant is: en hy geen geringe influentie en [. . .] hadde int’Esprit van de overledenen Zaar, die en seer goedt Heer was.” “De Veldtheer Knees Juriaen Dolgarouka heeft mede en harden stoot gehadt, ende gevaer geloupen van een groot changement in syn eer ende staet te sien, overmits Hy de Partie van den Ryxcancelier opiniaterlick heeft gehouden: Ende met desselfs correspondentie, seeckere brieven van belange opgehouden de welcke Syne Zarisse Majesteit aen desen voornoemden synen soon[?] gedepescheert hadde.”

major offices. The court was quiet, but there were some signs of the shifting balance of power. I. M. Miloslavskii replaced Kirill Narshkin at the Great Treasury and the Great Income on 17 October, the beginning of a rapid accumulation of offices. The new chief soon added the secretary Averkii Kirillov, his ally and perhaps "creature" for the next few years. Tsar Fyodor's health improved, and he even went on a pilgrimage. The feeling at court was that Russia would do nothing to help Poland against the Turks, and Menzies was unable to persuade the Russians to move against the Swedes in Livonia. The news of Sobieski's peace with the Turks at Żurawno (17 October 1676) created great consternation in Moscow, with Patriarch Ioakim and the Duma meeting every day, but no decisions followed, for other issues intervened.¹⁷ The next stage came in December.

This stage in the struggle was the result of two accusations of sorcery and magic (*chernoknizhie*) against Matveev.¹⁸ The former chancellor had left Moscow immediately after his disgrace, the

¹⁷ TKUA Rusland, B38, 19 July 1676 (Menzies): "Il y a grande dissension parmi les boyars ou plus proches ministres et conseillers d'estat, la quelle à cause de la jeunesse du Czar continue encore et Dieu scait en quoy la dite dissension se terminera"; 25 July 1676: "les estincelles des discordes et factions qui furent allumées parmy les Boyars semblent esteintes par la Prudence de ceux la qui ont le plus grand menagement des affaires pendant la jeunesse du Czar. Depuis le banissement et depart de nostre grand Chancelier il n'y a encore aucun en sa place, sinon un Concillier de'Estat qu'il supplie à ses Charges, et il semble que son plus grand affaire est de faire revis et examiner tout ce qui soit passé dans lec Chancellerie pendant la regence du dit Chancelier"; 8 August 1676: good health of Tsar Fyodor, plan of pilgrimage; 29 August 1676: court is quiet, tsar on pilgrimage, boyars seem ready to demand territory from Sweden; 7 September 1676: tsar back in Moscow; 14 September: boyars seem firm against Sweden; 20 September: boyars respond coldly to Menzies on Sweden, but tsar and Duma not resolute; 27 September: tsar in Duma decides to pursue claims on Sweden; 4 October: Swedes spread news of their victories; 11 October: boyars pretend to plan great things against Sweden but the court leaves for the countryside. ARSG 7364, 16 August 1676: Russian court would not help Poland against Turks; 21 September: rumors of war against Sweden. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita*, 83; Bogoiavlenskii, *Priказnye*, 28, 35.

¹⁸ The issues around magic and astrology in Russia differed from those in Western Europe. In Russia (1) there were far fewer trials for witchcraft than in the West, and most of the accused were men rather than women; (2) there was no elaborate theology or legal doctrine about witchcraft or magic, and (3) Russia had no tradition of learned magic as in Western Europe. The tsar's foreign doctors did practice medical astrology (in spite of prohibitions), but they did not seem to communicate it to Russians. What was at issue in the accusations against Matveev was his interest in European medical literature, which would naturally include astrology at that time. See Valerie Kivelson, "Political Sorcery in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy," Ann Kleimola, ed., *Culture and Identity in Muscovy*, Moscow, 1997, pp. 267–83; W. F. Ryan, "The Witchcraft Hysteria in Early Modern Europe: Was Russia an Exception?" *SEER* 76, no. 1 (1998). The prohibition against astrology was in the *Stoglav*, the compendium of ecclesiastical enactments of the 1550s, though the context suggests the church was worried mainly about its use in legal cases instead of a Christian oath: *Stoglav*, ed. E. D. Kozanchikov, St. Petersburg, 1863, 136–37.

rumor being that he had left all his property to Natalia Naryshkina and her son Peter. This does not seem to be true, but does show how closely Matveev and the Naryshkins were associated in the minds of the courtiers by that time. As with his family and servants he traveled toward exile in Verkhotur'e in the Urals, he was halted by a courier in Laishev on the Kama river.¹⁹ The command was the result of the first denunciation of Matveev in November, which we know only from Matveev's later petitions for redress. One of the surgeons who had worked for him formerly in the Apothecary Chancellery, David Berlov, an illiterate former serf, had been arrested for debt and got out of his difficulties by declaring *gosudarevo delo* ("the sovereign's affair," that is, treason or some other serious crime) against Matveev.²⁰ Berlov asserted that he had heard from Matveev's house serfs, the dwarf Zakharka and Ivashka the Jew, that Matveev, Spatharie-Milescu, and Stefan von Gaden had locked themselves in a room and read a magic book (*cherniaia knizhka*). Spatharie had used the same book to teach Matveev's son, and another magic book was in the possession of Matveev's servant Ivashka the Jew, who had stolen it from his master. On 25 November Aleksei Luzhin, a lieutenant colonel (*polugolova*) of musketeers, caught up with Matveev in Laishev, demanding a book in Matveev's possession allegedly written in code. Matveev gave him a *lechebnik*, a medical manuscript in Russian with some notations on medicines in a kind of code. Matveev later claimed that he insisted on a formal search of his baggage, but Luzhin refused, instead searching the possessions of Ivashka, and then took him and Zakharka to Moscow.

Under torture Zakharka confessed that Matveev had beaten him for seeing his master, von Gaden, and Spatharie reading the magic book. He had been asleep on the stove when Matveev heard his snoring and threw him out of the room, kicking him in the ribs. Zakharka heard demons telling Matveev that there was someone in the room. Various doctors and bonesetters confirmed that the dwarf

¹⁹ TKUA Rusland, B38, 19 July, 1676. Prince Iurii Dolgorukii apparently was able to halt Matveev's progress in exile in September: Starostina, "Ob opale," 71; *Istoriia . . . Matveev*, 2–3.

²⁰ Berlov, merely a *lekar'*, not a Western-educated physician, had been fired by Matveev earlier for incompetence: Starostina, "Ob opale," 61. Until about the 1670s such Russian medical specialists were not infrequently illiterate, as they did not practice the learned medicine of the West. On the hierarchy of the Apothecary Chancellery, with its foreign physicians and artisanally trained Russian surgeons and other specialists, see M. V. Unkovskaya, "Learning Foreign Mysteries: Russian Pupils of the Aptekarskii Prikaz 1650–1700," *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 30 (1997), 1–20.

did have two broken ribs. Ivashka the Jew confessed that Matveev had sent him with a medical book to the Apothecary Chancellery to have it burned, but Ivashka had stolen it. Matveev had read it together with the secretary Larion Ivanov. At the end of December the Duma gentleman Fyodor Prokof'evich Sokovnin and the secretary Vasiliï Semenov, the chief of the *Razriad*, arrived in Laishev for another investigation of Matveev, Ivashka's wife and all the baggage.²¹ Sokovnin and Semenov found nothing incriminating, but orders came to take Matveev and his party to Kazan', under the watchful eye of Ivan Bogdanovich Miloslavskii. The investigation continued, with examinations of former officials of the Apothecary Chancellery and others, but nothing much emerged. Ivashka died under torture, but not before he recanted earlier accusations.²²

This entire story comes from Matveev's petition for redress to the tsar from Pustozersk, written months after the events. Matveev's memory was extremely good, however, for his story is confirmed in almost all details in the reports of the new Danish ambassador to Russia, Friedrich von Gabel. On the very heels of the events he wrote:

the first originator of all these affairs and of so many innocent victims was a Russian doctor, who did not want to pay a considerable debt to his son-in-law and according to the [?] Russian custom could be rather unmercifully treated, took revenge for the pain and dishonor, announcing that his son-in-law was guilty of sorcery. When he was interrogated as to how he had learned such a thing he answered that he knew it certainly enough and more. He [=son-in-law] had learned his art from Artamon's magic books. At this the case was taken somewhat more seriously. Later the Russian doctor confessed further that he had seen through a slit in the door that Artamon together with a baptized Jew doctor named Daniel worked magic from books and made the devil swear to serve their will, but the devil excused himself and asked that first they should ask a small dwarf who had hidden behind the stove to leave, since he could do nothing while there were people present who had not surrendered to him. At that Artamon jumped up angrily and when he found the dwarf he kicked two ribs in his body and threw him out the door. Then the devil had to dance to their pipe and was said to have done tricks, taken from heaven, meaning that he could darken the sun and moon.

²¹ The Sokovnins were related to the Khitrovos and Rtishchev. Fyodor was the brother of Aleksei Prokof'evich, the leader of the 1697 plot against Peter, as well as of two women martyrs for Old Belief, Feodosiia Prokof'evna Morozova (*boiarynia* Morozova) and Evdokiia Urusova. Fyodor became an *okol'nichii* in 1677, a boyar in 1682, and went into exile in 1697. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 78, 196, 204–05.

²² Starostina, "Ob opale," 72–74, 79–81; *Istoriia . . . Matveeva*, "Pervaia chelobitnaia" (July–August, 1677) 2–4, 9–12, 20–34, 36–38.

Meanwhile the dwarf was sent for at great speed and also at the desire of the Russian doctor two other Russian doctors who had taken care of the dwarf's ribs were brought in. These immediately agreed that they had cured the dwarf and that he had said to one of them that he had fallen from a chair onto a sharp corner; but to the other that the young Artamon [Andrei Artamonovich] had thrown him onto a pointed corner when he found him sleeping. The dwarf was then horribly tortured about this in order to get the right foundation to all this. They could bring nothing out of him, however, but that he asserted that the reason why he explained his fall in two ways was that he in fact did not trust the one so much as the other, and from fear that the case would come before Artamon and his son would be punished, whom he would then have as an eternal enemy if he did not tell the story right.

Gabel went on to report the story of Ivashka the Jew taking the book back to the Apothecary Chancellery. In Gabel's account the Russian doctor had named one of Matveev's "noblemen" as knowing the magic science, but under torture the nobleman insisted that the books were only on anatomy and medicine, as Larion Ivanov could testify. There was a book of anatomy which they had studied and borrowed from the Apothecary Chancellery, but they had planned to return it. The nobleman did not have time to return it, so he asked one of Matveev's house servants to do it. When the servant learned that he might be questioned about it he burned the book, but said that it was not magic, just anatomy. According to Gabel, the doctor's accusations were proved lies and the seventy people (as he was assured) who were tortured proven innocent.²³

²³ TKUA Rusland B39: 24 January, 1677: "der [ehrschte urheber aller dieser hendel] und so vieler [unschuldigen marter] ist gewesen [ein russischer doctor] dieser nachdehm [er] von seinen [schwiger sohn welchem er eine ziemliche [schuld nicht bezahlen wollen und er können] mit [wadenst? reichen] Russischen [gebrauch nach zimliche unbarmherzig] tractiret, hat für diesen [schmerz] und [schimpf rache] zu nehmen bemelden [seinen schwiger sohn] der [Zauberey beschuldiget wie er] hinauff [questioniret wo er] solches erfahren hat er geantwortet er wüßte [es gewis genug] un noch [mehr wehre] er hätte auß [Artemon] seinen [Zauberbucher die Kunst erlehret hierauf ist die sache] etwaß ernstlicher [furgenommen worden] folgens hat der [russische doctor] weiter [außgesagt] wie er durch einen [rize in der thur gesehen] daß [Artemon] zugleich mit einem [umgetauften Juden docter Daniel genant] auß [buchern gezaubert] und dem [teufel] ihren willen [zu verrichten beschworen] welcher sich doch aber Anfangß entschuldiget und gebeten man möchte zu vor einen [kleinen zwerg] welcher [hinter dem ufen lege heraus gehen heissen] weihn er nictes [thun konte so lange] leute zugegen [die sich ihm] nicht [ergeben hetten] worauff [Artemon] zornich [aufgesprungen] undt wie er den [Zwerg gefunden haben] ihm [zwey rippen in leib zertretten und folgens zur thur] hinauß gestoßen hierauff hätte [der teufel] nach Ihrer Pfeife tanzen müßen undt hätte thun [stricke] vom [himmel geholet mit] solchen [sin unter] anderen auch [son und mond verfinstern können] unterdeßen ist auff eyligste [nach benannten Zwerg gesant worden] undt sindt auch auff [deß] Reu[sischen doctors begeren zwey] andern [reussischen doctors] welche den [Zwerg von den rippen bruch curiret]

At the same time the investigators pursued other lines of inquiry, the records of which have survived. This started in December, 1676, when one *stol'nik* Fyodor Tikhonovich Zykov reported to Prince Nikita Odoevskii as head of the Apothecary Chancellery that one of his serfs, Mishka Svashevskii, had a magic book copied from Matveev.²⁴ Several of Zykov's house serfs were interrogated, and they incriminated one of the *gosti* of Vologda, Gavriilo Martynov Feteev, whom they claimed learned magic from Matveev. The merchant had supplied the Apothecary Chancellery under Matveev with herbs, but he denied any involvement with magic. The investigation dragged on, with searches of his house and books in Vologda, and eventually his business affairs and property were given over to his wife. At this point the records break off, but Feteev died in Kholmogory in 1683 and was buried in Vologda, which does not sound as if the accusations against him were substantiated. Charges against Mishka Svashevskii and some others were substantiated, so

herzugeholet] diese haben so fort [gestanden] daß sie den [Zwerg geheylet und hette] Er gesagt [zu dem] einem erwehre vom [stul auf ein] scharffe [ecke] ge[fallen zu dem andern] aber erstatte ihn [der junge Artemon] wie er [ihn schlaffend gefunden] von [stul an] eine [spizige ecke geworffen] der [Zwerg ist hierieber [greulich gepeiniget] umb von Ihm von dieser [sache den rechten grund zu haben]. Allein man hat nichts auß ihm bringen können alß] daß er die Uhrsache warumb Er [seinen fal auf zweyerlei manier] erzehlet, diese [zu sey gestanden daß] er nehmlich dem einen [nicht so viel getrauet alß dem andern und auß furcht] es mochte die sache für [Artemon komme] und deßz [sohn hierüber gestraffet werden] nachdem [er den] zum ewigen feinde haben [wurde] hatte er Ihm die [sache nicht recht erzehlen durfte] ferner hat [der] Reu[ssische Docter] deß [Artemons] edelleuten [einen angegeben] welcher umb die [sndrer? wissenschafti] haben sollte. Dieser wie er auch [gepeiniget hat] fest [verneinet] daß er von [Zauberbuchern wuste] sondern wohl von [buchen darinnen] von der [medicin und anatomic gehandelt welche sein] hier fleißig [gelesen] wie solches [Lorivan bezeugen] könte, der auch zum öffteren [drin gelesen] daß er vielmahl bey [Artemon] in einem solchen [buch gelesen] daß aber nicht von [Zauberey] sondern [von anatomic]wesen [gehandelt] hätte wie nun weyter deß [Artemons edelman befraget] wo daß [buch geblieben] hat er [ausgesaget] es wehre ihm von [seinem] Herrn [befohlen] Solches nach der [Apothek] darauß er [es entlehnet] umb darin [zu lesen] wider zu [bringen] allein auß mangel der Zeit hätte er es an [Artemons kammerdiener geben] müssen [welchen] wan man ihn [nur befragte] wohl wissen würde [wo es geblieben dieser wie] ihm ?zuahrer] kommen daß er dieses [buches wegen] solte [besprochen] werden hat [es] geschwinden ver[brennen lassen] wie er aber nachgehends [hier gebracht und befraget worden] wo daß [buch] wehre hat [er geantwortet er] hätte verneinet man wolte ihn alß einen [dieb] deß [buches anklagen] damit nun solches bey ihm [nicht] möchte [gefunden] worden hätte er [selbiges verbrännen lassen] es wehre aber hierinnen [nichts] von [Zauberey] gedacht worden sondern hätte von der [anatomic gehandelt] wie dieser seine [außsage also mit Lorivans] undt [deß] Edelmans [über]eingestimmt hat man gesehen wie daß [reussischen Docters aussage gegen Artemon] und bloß auff lauter lügen gegründet gewesen, undt sindt also über die [siebzig personen wie mir] für gewiß berichtet [unschuldiger weyse] ge[peiniget] worden.”

²⁴ Zykov became a Duma gentleman in 1683, thereafter holding a variety of lesser offices until 1698: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 206, Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 177, 209.

that Svashevskii and one other were burnt for calling on demons and for casting spells to cause a husband to cool toward his wife and casting an aphrodisiac spell on women. This part of the investigation shows how diligent Matveev's enemies were, but nothing useful to them seems to have come of it. More damaging were the charges that Matveev had not been careful enough with the health of Tsar Aleksei. Matveev himself asserted that these charges were the work of Tsar Fyodor's tutor Prince F. F. Kurakin and Ivan Bogdanovich Khitrovo, Bogdan Matveevich's son, though when exactly they were made is not clear.²⁵ In any case, it seems to have been Berlov's charges that provided the basis for the sentence, announced to Matveev in Kazan' by I. B. Miloslavskii on June 11: Matveev's property was confiscated, his rank of boyar taken away, and he was to go into permanent exile in Pustozersk.²⁶

The fall of Matveev and the later charges of sorcery were part of a well-crafted campaign against the Naryshkins. Keller reported in late December that there were accusations circulating that Matveev had plotted to poison the tsar to put the Naryshkins in power. Gabel reported in more detail a bit later: "the tsaritsa's father and brother were knouted and tortured yesterday."²⁷ The boyars were spending so much time on the Matveev affair that they barely had time to eat,

²⁵ Starostina, "Ob opale," 74–79. Starostina's assertion that Svashevskii's testimony injured Matveev is not borne out by any evidence, and Matveev ignored it in his petitions. Matveev accused Kurakin and the younger Khitrovo in both his 1677 and 1681/82 petitions: *Istoriia* . . . *Matveeva*, 7–8, 140.

²⁶ Matveev, *Istoriia*, 5–6.

²⁷ While Gabel's contacts were with Dolgorukii and his reports of Matveev's alleged crimes reflected the scepticism of his contacts, John Hebdon's report reflected the views of Matveev's enemies: PRO SP 91/3, Hebdon to Sir Joseph Williamson, Moscow, 9 January 1676 [=1677]: Hebdon could not get an audience, "I suppose the reason is the confusion that at present is at court amongst the Lords who are daily discovering great Treachery not alone against his Imperial Maties. Person plotted by the late great favorite that is sent to Siberia [=Matveev]. The Lords at present sett daily in Cou[n]cil from one Lords house to another hardly giving themselves the liberty to receive their daily sustenance, and daily wracking all such that have received favours from that great lord in the time of his prosperity. The plott is not as yett discovered but in my next hope to give yr. Honr. an acc't thereof only thus far That his present Imperiall Maty. and his Brother (being of the first Venter) hath had a great deale of foule play playd them soet that it is not without a cause such severity hat bin used to soe great a person, God grant that all such Trayters may receive the same punishment." These differences in networks of contacts also reflected diplomatic differences, for Gabel worked against Hebdon: PRO SP 91/3, Hebdon to Sir Joseph Williamson, Moscow, 27 February 1676; ARSG 7364, 21 and 28 December, 1676; TKUA Rusland, B39, 3 January 1677: "der [Zarin vater und ihre bruder sind gestern geknutet gebraten gepeiniget] und [solches daß tageliche exercitium]." The brother in question was presumably Natalia's oldest brother, Ivan Kirillovich Naryshkin (1658–82). Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Russkaia rodoslovnaia*, 2, 6.

much to the disgust of Gabel, who wanted them to pay attention to his business. Part of Gabel's problem was that he had the wrong contacts at court: he mainly relied on Dolgorukii, and that was a mistake:

now I see the situation thus, that in fact Miloslavskii has the most power with the Tsar, but Khitrovo cannot be removed by him since he used his time well and filled almost all the offices with his creatures. In addition he has almost all the boyars on his side, in a word has brought the whole government under him. Dolgorukii goes between both and is redoubtable because all the musketeers depend on him, also he has besides a considerable following among the commons, and I believe that in the last few days things have not gone according to his intention since his people have not been able to come to rights with him.²⁸

Gabel was very frustrated with the situation at the Russian court, for he could never be sure who would be in power on any particular day. People who had merely written to Matveev out of politeness during his prosperity were being arrested and tortured to find out about Matveev's sorcery, and were burned with hot irons and had their ribs broken to get them to confess or name someone. The cause of all this was once again the sinister Tsarevna Irina Mikhailovna, who had caused so much trouble before Tsar Aleksei's marriage to Natalia:

the cause of all these procedures is supposed to be an old maid, thought holy here because of her great piety, whom the tsar respects in place of a mother and obeys, that is, the oldest sister of the late tsar. For this reason everything here is now full of mistrust and everyone is waiting for the time that his majesty the tsar will choose a spouse in order to see what planets will rise with her.²⁹

²⁸ TKUA Rusland, B39, 10 January 1677: "[anjezo aber sehe ich den Zustand] also an [nehmlich daß [Mileslawski am meisten beym Zaar vermag, Kidrof aber] von Ihm nicht kan [gehoben werden] weil er sein tempo wohl bebrauchet und fast alle [functionen mit seiner creaturen beseyet] Zu dem der größten [theil ja fast alle boiaren] auff seine [seite hat] mit einem wohrt er [hat daß ganze civilwesen unter sich gebracht Dolgeruki gehet] zwischen beyden [und] ist [redoutabel weile alle strelizen] von Ihm dependiren [er auch] sonstn ziemlichen [anhang bey der gemeine] hat, undt gläube ich daß es seyt einigen [tagen gewis nicht recht] nach [seinem sin gangen den seine leute] nicht haben können mit Ihm zu rechte] kommen." Gabel's reliance on Dolgorukii in the previous fall had led to conflict with the other Russian "Lords": PRO SP 91/3, John Hebdon to Sir Joseph Williamson, Pskov, 18 December 1676, ff. 223–23v.

²⁹ TKUA Rusland, B39, 10 January, 1676: "Ich habe unterschiedliche wege neuerlich gehabt umb [noch eines] in Ihr. Mayt. Affairen hier [zu wagen aber] die Affairen lauffen [hier so dol] daß nichts [hier beständig ist und] den man heute nimmt [am brette zu sein der ist morgen herunter] weile keinen für den scharfe inquisition sicher ist und] wer nur auß Höfligkeit in [Artemon seinem] glück [an im geschrieben der muß] sofort mit[geknutet]

The interrogation, however, did not stop with Matveev's alleged sorcery. The Naryshkins as well remained under torture. According to Gabel, it was Berlov again who had accused them after he failed to convincingly implicate Matveev.

Therefore after the Russian doctor saw that with these [accusations against Matveev] he could not get anywhere, he said that he knew something else important, namely that the brother of the widowed tsaritsa, once when in the lifetime of the late tsar he was shooting arrows with the now reigning tsar in the garden, said to one of his noblemen, "it would be a convenient time to get the tsarevich." At this the torture started up again. They have been able to get nothing out after inhuman pain from his nobleman Blokhin other than that he and his lord knew nothing and that God would punish those who had let so much innocent blood flow.

Natalia's brother gave equally little incriminating information, so that the boyars who had encouraged the investigation were surprised that so little had emerged, and drew back. Plans were afoot to send Natalia and her family into exile, but Gabel thought nothing would come of them. His own view was that the entire furor would die down.³⁰

werden und gepeinigt] ob er nichts [von Artemon seine Kunsten] undt [seiner Zauberey wisse und] wirdt so lange [gebrand geknütet mit gluenden Zangen gerieben] und Ihm [rippen aus dem leibe gebrochen biß er etwaß bekennet] oder einen [anderen nennet] der dar [etwaß von wisse] aller dieser [procedures ursache solle in eine alhier] wegen Ihrer [grossen gottesfurcht] sehr [heylich gehaltene alte junfer] so [der Zaaren an mutter stad ehret und hören sol] nehmlich daß [verstorbenen Zaarn elteste swester] Auß dieser [ursachen ist] jezo alles [hier vol mistrauen und] warten alle die Zeit daß [ihre Zaarische Majestet eine gemahlin erwählen] umb zu sehen waß dafür Planeten mit auffgehen werden."

³⁰ TKUA Rusland B39, 24 January, 1676: "Nachdem also der [reussische Docter gesehen] daß er mit diesem [angehen nicht] durchdringen könnte hat [er] gesagt er [wüste noch] waß importantes, nemlich wie der ver[witweten Zaarin ihr bruder] wie er auff eine Zeit mit [dem jetzt regirenden Zaar] bey deßen herr [Vaters lebzeit] im [garten] mit [pfeilen schossen] zu einem seiner [Edelleuten gesagt es] wehre jetzend bekväme Gelegenheit dem [Zaarewizen] zu reichen, hierauff ist [die peinigung] wieder vom frischen [angangen] man hat aber nach [unmenschlicher pein] auß deß Bli[ochtenis] seinen [edelman] nichts [bringen] können alß daß [er und] sein Herr von [nichtes wusten] und Gott diejenigen strafen würde die so [viel unschuldige bluht] ver[giessen ließen]. Nach dem sind der [Zaarin bruder auf scharfste gepeinigt] worden, diejenigen [Bojaren] welche dieses [feuer] immer zugeschürt undt in [marterung] der [armen] leute dem [Zaar] Ihre [treu] erweisen wollen hierüber nicht wenig [besturzt] daß sich in dieser Sachen kein [besser grund] gefündet, Anjetzo ist man bemühet [die verwitwete] Groß[fürstin] samt [ihren] Gantzen [familie] alß die aufs ewig [geschimpft] von [hier auß] an einem sonst sicheren Ohrt [zu bringen] Allein man hat biß hießigen solches füglich ins [weck zu richten] noch kein anständiges [mittel ersonnen] sonsten scheint es daß sich die [sache] allmählich [stillen] undt weilen man auf [Artemon] nichts wie man vermuhet [bringen können] ist [er] zu [Astrachan] wieder auf [freyen fuß] gestellt. Allein wie man berichtet so sollen Ihre Zarische Maytet. doch einen [unversöhnlichen haß gegen ihn tragen]."

From the end of January until the summer the court was the scene of a three-way struggle between Khitrovo, Miloslavskii, and Dolgorukii. The intent was to continue the torture of Natalia's brother, but Dolgorukii and some other boyars said in the Duma that it was time to stop. Nothing had been found. Gabel thought that the prince had spoken out to restrain Miloslavskii in the fear that if the tsar died, Miloslavskii would have too much power.³¹ By early March, however, they seem to have found a way to patch up the quarrel, even though Miloslavskii had grown more powerful and replaced Prince Trubetskoi as head of the Mercenary and Cavalry Chancelleries.³² A few weeks later Miloslavskii took control of the financial-administrative offices grouped since Ordin-Nashchokin's time with the Ambassadorial Chancellery, leaving Larion Ivanov with only the Ambassadorial Chancellery itself and the Little Russian Chancellery. These offices, the Galich, Vladimir, and Novgorod Quarters, were a serious loss, and one not only for Ivanov but more importantly for his patron, Bogdan Khitrovo. To some extent Khitrovo's loss was balanced by the rise in importance of his cousin Ivan Bogdanovich Khitrovo, one of the *diad'ki* of Tsar Fyodor, to greater favor, but Miloslavskii was now the principal favorite. His large group of

Blokhin was presumably the *stol'nik* Aleksei Mikhailovich Blokhin, the husband or relative of Maria (Matrena) Vasil'evna Blokhina, who was one of Natalia Naryshkina's *boiaryni*: Zabelin, *Domashnii*, II, 508; "Kniga diad'kam," 47; *DR* III, 370; IV 17, 22. A. M. Blokhin was still at court in 1679, and in 1694 stood at the coffin of Natalia Naryshkina: *DR* IV, 108, 859.

³¹ TKUA Rusland B39: 7 February, 1677: "Sonsten ist es anjetzo mit deß [Artemons proces] ganz [stille] undt muste man nicht weilen mann [nichts aus] ihn und der [verwitweten Kaiserin Vater] undt [bruder finden] konte wie man ihren [los werden]. Solte man also schon [resolviret] (wie man sagen will) [daß die Kaiserin in] ein [Kloster ihr Vater und bruder in ein Kloster Artemon in] ein [Kloster solten] derjenige [bruder aber der Kaiserin] so [beschuldiget] daß er den [Zaarn] habe [umbringen] wollen solte noch erst [gepeiniget und den hencker befohlen werden] ihm solche [Knuten schlage] zu geben daß [er davon sterben] mußte [alleyn] dieses alles hat sich [verendert] undt sindt [Artemon drey heuser in Casanen geraumet] worden und hat für [wenig tagen Dolgerucki] daß herz [nebst] noch einen [boyaren gefasset oben im] Raht [zu] sagen [waß haben wir nun] mit allen [peinigen] ausgerichtet am scheu daß wir daß eusserste gethan umb etwas [auf Artemon zu finden und] haben nicht daß geringste [finden können] waß haben wir den auf den [man zu sagen warum] verschaffet man [ihm da er ohnschuldig ist] wir müßen [uns befahren das] es allen eben [so ergehen konte] er [solche discourse] kommen [mir] sehr [nachdrucklich vor] undt halte ich nicht daß er sie [hette furren dürfen] wen [nicht] Apparens undt die furcht dar sey daß diese krankheit mit dem [Zaar übel] ausschlagen möchte und dan werde [Miloslawski übel daran seyn . . ."]

³² TKUA Rusland, B39, 7 March, 1677: Again Gabel knew of Miloslavskii's new offices before the official change, as he reported the events 7 March (NS) and the official change was 2 March (OS), that is, 12 March (NS): Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 57, 151.

financial and military offices made him a formidable figure, even if many of the boyars distrusted him.³³

Throughout the spring the struggle at court continued, in complex ways intertwined with Russia's foreign policy. The issue at hand remained the Turkish threat combined with Russia's desire to put pressure on Sweden in the context of its war with Denmark and Brandenburg. In October, 1676, the treaty of Żurawno had put a temporary halt to the Polish-Turkish conflict. Poland lost Podole to the Ottomans, and the latter now had a free hand to deal with the Russians in Chigirin. They lost little time, and by late April 1677, the probable Ottoman moves were known in Moscow. At the same time, Gabel was spending all his effort trying to persuade the new Russian government to continue the previous policy of pressuring Sweden by keeping an army on the Livonian frontier, and even still hoping to convince the tsar to declare war against Denmark's rival. Gabel needed allies at the Russian court, for Larion Ivanov was too weak to be much help. More importantly, Khitrovo was generally hostile to Gabel's plans. Dolgorukii had been fairly friendly all along, but was himself under continual pressure from his rivals. Gabel turned to Miloslavskii, who gave him a sympathetic ear. Thus Miloslavskii was prepared to continue the foreign policy of Matveev, whom he was trying his utmost to destroy.³⁴ The Dane even planned to further his cause by increasing Miloslavskii's rivalry against Khitrovo, but his task was extremely difficult. He believed that one

³³ TKUA Rusland, B39, 14 March, 1677: "dem Lorivan Iwanowitz drey Precasen abgenommen, undt ihm nuhr die Posolsky und Circassische gelassen, bey welchen er nichts als mühe und ganz keine nutze haben kan, dahingegen die andere Precasen von sehr grossen nutzen wahren, ich vermeine also daß er von sich selbstnen abdancken wirdt, doch hoffe ich er werde im fall er es nicht thut, noch diese oder künftige woche abgesetzt worden und die Posolske Precase dem Miloslawski gegeben werden. Welcher den auch die anderen drey Precasen so dem Lorivan genommen unter sich bekommen, undt ist anjetzo seidt wenig tagen summus Favorita." Cf. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 39, 42, 95. PRO SP 91/3, Hebdon to Williamson, Moscow, 1 May 1677, ff. 250–50v: "The Grand Council of [Lords] have noe other way but to lett him [= I. M. Miloslavskii – PB] have his [swing] putting upon him more [Places] than hee is able to [officiate] and by that means hope to [undermine him]. He takes noe [Bribes] nor doth hee much [good]." "Kniga diad'kam," 46; Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Russkaia rodoslovnaia*, 2, 318–20.

³⁴ Initially Gabel thought that the "younger boyars" were on his side and the older against him: TKUA Rusland, B39: 12 December 1676. At first he tried to work through the Duma secretary Luk'ian Golosov, who had excellent Latin, but he proved unreliable and pro-Swedish. Furthermore, Gabel soon learned that the Duma was against a war with Sweden (13 December 1676). Golosov did promise to pass Gabel's memorandum to Khitrovo and Dolgorukii, but nothing came of that, and Larion Ivanov was clearly hostile (20 December 1676; 10 January 1677). Gabel tried to make contact with Miloslavskii (17 January 1677).

of the reasons the boyars were more concerned about the Turks was that the greatest men had estates in the south, and they feared their destruction if the Turks and Tatars were too strong, while those with estates in the northwest near Livonia had profitable trade with the Swedish possessions. Furthermore, the Polish resident was bribing Russian officials to oppose confrontation with Sweden. By the end of February, Russian armies were being organized to move south, a move that Gabel saw as a continuation of Matveev's policy. Miloslavskii, however, did not prove a very decisive ally to Danish interests, for he pleaded loyalty to the tsar and promised only to bring the Danish proposals before him.³⁵

In between the Danish intrigues (including Gabel's request for money to bribe Russians hostile to Khitrovo) the battles between Khitrovo and Miloslavskii continued. Bogdan Khitrovo went to his estate in March to recover from illness, while his cousin Ivan Bogdanovich Khitrovo had an encounter with Miloslavskii that reached the ears of the Danish embassy.

meanwhile the Khitrovo who is the tutor and teacher of the tsar has very harshly reproached Miloslavskii in his house at the table and asked whence he is so bold as to take so much on himself, if he imagined that he wanted to govern everything alone, and finally he is supposed to have said, "Miloslavskii, Miloslavskii, look out, it is truly not your business; more belongs in the bargain than you, and his Majesty the tsar has to listen to more honorable people than you alone". Miloslavskii is supposed to have answered him, he would look out for himself, that he would not forswear his majesty the tsar, he did everything in the greatest loyalty to his majesty the tsar and defied anyone to find anything else in him etc.

Gabel kept trying to cultivate everyone, the younger Khitrovo, Bogdan Khitrovo, Prince V. V. Golitsyn, Miloslavskii's factotum, the

³⁵ TKUA Rusland, B39, 7 February 1677: "ich dem [Miloslawski] erst [recht die lauff ins ohr] sezen undt [gegen Chidrof jalousie erwecken kan]"; 28 February 1677: (reasons for Russian preference for war with Turkey to war with Sweden); 7 March 1677: (preparations for war in the South, Romodanovskii going to Kiev, other armies against Crimea and Astrakhan') "Ich kan nicht anders schliessen als daß man hoc rerum statu alhier sich geresolviret deß Artemons seine forgehatte desseins zu folgen, Damit wen er etwas wiederaufkommen möchte er nicht Ursache fünde Ihre entreprenen zu tadlen"; 28 March 1677: (Miloslavskii will not persuade the tsar in favor of Denmark, merely bring the issue up for discussion). PRO SP 91/3, Hebdon to Sir Joseph Williamson, Moscow, 27 February 1676 [=1677] (Fyodor fears only the Poles, Gabel tries to persuade Russia to fight Sweden); 3 April 1677, Moscow, Hebdon to Williamson, "That never was any place in that distraction as this Empire is a present hardly two Councils of one minde jealous of the whole world and especially of the Turke and Pole and much great preparation against them."

Duma secretary Averkii Stepanov Kirillov, and even to make contact with the Tsarevna Irina Mikhailovna.³⁶

The intrigues had come to an end by the beginning of May, and it seems to have been Tsarevna Irina who put an end to them. In April things had seemed to be getting worse, as Averkii Kirillov, “Miloslavskii’s favorite,” accused Prince Iurii Dolgorukii of brewing and selling illegal vodka on his estates. Dolgorukii, presumably as head of the Investigations Chancellery (*sysknoi prikaz*), was ordered to continue torturing the servants of Kirill Naryshkin and David Berlov, with Kirill and his son present. Their presence implied that they would be next if the servants confessed anything. Dolgorukii, though known as a hard man, did it with tears in his eyes and asked all those present if this was not enough, that nothing wrong had come to light. If they went on this way, he said, every honest man could be tortured as well. Dolgorukii’s position seemed to be threatened. He said openly that he wanted to see Averkii fed to the crows and that the persecution of Matveev and Tsaritsa Natalia was all the fault of Miloslavskii. At this point Irina intervened. Miloslavskii had counted on Irina’s support and her influence over Tsar Fyodor, but now she changed her mind:

after the torture mentioned before she had the widowed tsaritsa and also Miloslavskii come to her and the widowed tsaritsa spoke to Miloslavskii extremely sharply and reproached him that he was a persecutor of widows and orphans; did he think that he would go unpunished? Was he not ashamed to persecute her and hers? Had he lost all respect for the one at whose side she had lain? Did he think that he could so disgrace Matveev unpunished? That Matveev was still alive and it was not impossible that he would return; that she thought him happier than Miloslavskii, that she could assure him that before his end he would be the unhappiest man in

³⁶ TKUA Rusland, B39, 4 April 1677: “der herr Bogdan Matvewitz Chydrof ist seit einigen tagen auf daß landt gewesen immittelst hat der [an] dem Chydrof so hofmeister und informator mehr zum Zarn ist [dem Miloslafski in] seinem hause über tisch sehr [hart fürgeworfen] und befraget woher er [so dreyste] sey daß er so viel über [sich nehmen durffte] ob er sich einbildet [das er alles allein regiren wolte] undt endlich soll er [gesagt haben Miloslafski, Miloslafski sieh dich vor] es soll [dir für wahr nicht] angehen. Es [gehören mehr zum Kauf als du und ihre Zarische Majestet] müßen mehr [ehrliche Leute hören als dich allein hören. Miloslavski sol ihm geantwortet haben] Er [solle sich selbst fürsehen] daß er sich nicht gegen Ihre Zarische Majestet verredete er thete] alles in högster Treüe [zu Ihrer Zarischen Majestet besten] und böhte trotz daß man ein anderß an Ihm finden solle etc.” Miloslavskii promises von Gabel protection from Larion Ivanov if necessary; 11 April 1677 (meeting with Dolgorukii and Golitsyn and plans to contact Irina Mikhailovna); 18 April 1677 (plan to meet Averkii Kirillov).

the world. Irina Mikhailovna did not want to involve herself in all this, so that the compass is askew for Miloslavskii and all the others as well as myself.³⁷

Irina's indecision was only apparent, however, for soon after Khitrovo began to speak with open contempt of Miloslavskii. Shortly thereafter Gabel could report that "the princess Irina Mikhailovna is now the highest authority with his majesty the tsar and for this

³⁷ TKUA Rusland, B39, 9 May 1677: "Sonsten hat sich [zugetragen daß dem [Dolgeruki] befohlen worden [der verwitweten Zariße ihres vater leute] etzliche [und dem Russischen doctor so] die sache gegen [selbigen] und deßen [kindern und Artemon angegeben peinigen zu lassen] und hat der [verwitweten Zariße vater und ihr einer bruder] mit der [pein stehen müssen] welches soviel bedeutet daß im fall [ihr diener] daß geringste [auf] die bekant hatten sie] selbstens mit [daran genust] hetten da dan [dehm Dolgerucki] so sonsten für den [unbarmherzigsten hingehalten werd] selbst die [thränen] über [die augen gelauffen sein sollen] nichts destoweniger [hat er] der verwitweten Zariße Vater] diener der[massen starck peinigen] laßen daß man ihn hinter die [armen den unterleib ganz hinein sehen] können so daß man auch [fast kein] exempel weiß [daß] einer so starck [gepeinigt worden; darauf hat] er alle [umstehenden gefragt] of daß auch [scharf genug gepeinigt sey und] waß den endlich drauß werden [solte sie seggen daß man auß [den leuten nichts boses kriegen] konte, undt doch wollt man [nicht aufhören sie] zu [plagen] auff solche weyse [konte man] einen [jedweden ehrlichen menschen verfolgen] und wehre [niemand] sicher, [besagter diener ist]] auf der [pein gestorben]. Von dem [Averki weis ich] anjetzo daß [Dolgerucki] en einem anderen [gesagt haben er wolle nichts] ehe [ruhm biß] er deß Averki fleisch dem raben] habe zu [essen gegeben und weilen anjezo] die [schuld] der [scharfen verfolgung deß Artemons und der verwitweten Zariße freunde allen] auff [Mileslawsky] mit[felt] und [der Averki] nichts sondern [Mileslawski thut] alß scheint es daß die [freundschaft] mit [Dolgerucki] zimlich zu [fappern] beginnet. Hierzu [kommt daß] des [Zaarn Vatern schwester Urina Michalofna] so [graf Woldemar hat] haben sollen undt [an]jezo daß [factotum hier ist] und [alles bey dem Zaarn vermag auf welcher freundschaft] sich [Miloslavski] gantz verlaßen, und welche man gemeinet daß sie mit [der verwitweten Zaarissin] keinen Gemeinschaft [mehr habe] nach oberührter [pein] die [verwitwete Zariße bey sich gehabt] undt auch den [Miloslavski zu sich] kommen [laßen da dan die verwitwete Zariße den Miloslavski] über die [massen starck angeredet] und ihm [vorgehalten] daß er [ein verfolgter der witwen und weysen] sey [ob] er meine [daß ihm] daß [ohngestrafet] hingehen [solle ob] er sich [nicht scham sie und und ihre aus so] zu [verfolgen ob] den allen [respect] bey ihm verlohren] gegen denjenigen [an] deßen [seite sie gelegen ob] er [meine er] könne so ganz [ohrgestraft dem Artemon so unschuldiger]weyse allen [schimpf anthun Artemon lebe] noch und wehre gar nicht unmöglich daß er [wieder kahme sie hielte ihn] glücklicher alß [Miloslavski] maßen sie [Miloslavski] ver[sichern wolte] daß er für [seinen ende der unglücklichste] von der [welt] sein würde, die [Urena Michaelofna] hat ganz nichts sich [in dieses alles mischen wollen] so daß den [Miloslavski] und [allen andern] so wohl alß [mir] mitt anjetzo der [compas] ganz [verruket ist] und niemand [weiße] waß er [schließen] solle [wohr] dieses [werck zusammen henget oder hinauß wil]." PRO SP 91/3, Hebdon to Williamson, Moscow, 1 May 1677, f. 250: "This Court is at present in a very great [confusion]. The same day I had audience [= 28 April-PB] the late [empresses] owne Father and [two] of his owne [sons] were carryed to see their owne [servants pined] to [death] concerning the business I mentioned to yo. worp. formerly. One [Evan Mychaylowich Moloslofskey] is at present [all] in [all, he] being related to his [Imperial Maty.s' mother] and is not wanting to make use of his [power]. . ."

reason, as I have recently learned, all private intrigues are suspended.”³⁸ Irina had calmed the storm she had herself called forth.

She did it at a price. Not only did Matveev go on to exile in Pustozersk, but on 9 August sentence was announced against Natalia’s brothers. Ivan Kirillovich Naryshkin and his brother Afanasii were exiled to Riaznsk (near Riazan’) to remain there under guard. Matveev’s niece, the widow of Fyodor Poluektovich Naryshkin, Natalia’s uncle, was ordered to remain in her village near Alatyr’. The reason given for the sentence was that Ivan had threatened the life of Tsar Fyodor before his accession, the witnesses being one of his servants and the *lekar’* Davydko, that is, David Berlov.³⁹ For the next three years, Tsarevna Irina, I. M. Miloslavskii, Bogdan Khitrovo, and Prince Iurii Dolgorukii balanced one another at the summit of power. Natalia remained in the Kremlin palace with her children, Peter and Natalia, and her small household of court ladies and male staff. The horrors of 1676–77 no doubt passed by the young Peter, who only turned five years old in May 1677. That he heard about them later in great detail is beyond question, for he was obsessed with I. M. Miloslavskii well into his adulthood.⁴⁰

The restoration of balance among the boyars led to five years of relative peace among them, the remainder of Tsar Fyodor’s reign. From the moment that such a balance came into being, however, a new element entered the picture, the struggle of the young tsar to

³⁸ TKUA Rusland, B39, 9 May 1677: Von Gabel worries that Dolgorukii will be angry at his contacts with Averkii Kirillov, but he did not know of the bad blood between them and besides “Mileslafski wenig esprit hat”. Gabel continues, “[Chydrof] inmittelst hat die Courage hirüber daß [er mit] høgster [verachtung von Mileslafsky] offentlich anjetzo [redet] enfin es gehet [allhier wunderlich] zu . . .” and there is much dissension and intrigue in the Duma. Larion Ivanov continues hostile to von Gabel. 16 May 1677: “ich soviel verspühre daß [die prinzeßin Iarina Michaelofna] die allehögste Autoritet bey [Ihre Zarische Majestet anjezo hat] und wegen deßen so ich jüngst erwehnet anjetzo alle [particulær intrighen in suspenso] alhier sindt” and that von Gabel will be able to more easily conduct diplomatic business.

³⁹ Prince V. V. Golitsyn’s steward, Matvei Boev described the public announcement of the sentence: [I. D. Beliaev, ed.], “Pis’ma k kniaziiu Vasil’iu Vasil’evichu Golitsynu,” *Vremennik OIDR* 7 (1850) 72–73. Two Naryshkin cousins, Petr and Kondrat’ii Fomich Naryshkin were also exiled: Buganov, *Vosstanie . . . 1682*, 10; and Solov’ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 191–92. PRO SP 91/3, Hebdon to Williamson, Moscow, 12 June 1677 (exile of Matveev); 4 December 1677 (confiscation and appraisal of Matveev’s goods).

⁴⁰ In 1697 when the culprits of the Tsykler-Sokovnin plot were executed Peter had the body of I. M. Miloslavskii exhumed and placed under the execution block so that the blood would run over it. A year later he attributed the 1698 musketeer revolt to the “seed of Miloslavskii” (see below, chapter 5).

emancipate himself from their tutelage. Unfortunately for Fyodor in 1677, he faced two obstacles which he could not overcome. One was undoubtedly his youth, for he had only just turned sixteen. The other was that he chose to fight the boyars on the terrain of foreign policy and took a position that could not possibly succeed. Fyodor decided to oppose war with Turkey and support the Danish schemes for war with Sweden.

At first Fyodor's position seemed to be viable. The boyar intrigues had been stilled by the beginning of May, 1677 and the terrible news that a huge Turkish army was advancing on the Russian fort at Chigirin did not reach Moscow until 8/18 July. The two and a half months in between presented the Russians with a dilemma. They had persistent news from the south that something was brewing; at the same time Sweden was still at war with Denmark and Brandenburg, and the Russian army remained on the Livonian border. Which was the greater enemy?

The Danish envoy, von Gabel, was doing everything in his power to persuade the Russian government to go to war with Sweden, or at least to increase the pressure. Until May he had relied on Miloslavskii to put his case before the boyars and the tsar, confidant of Prince Iurii Dolgorukii's passive support and of Bogdan Khitrovo's indifference, perhaps even hostility, to the scheme. Miloslavskii was no longer much help, for "the last collision with the widowed tsaritsa . . . still remains in his head and he does not want to involve himself in anything decisive."⁴¹

Von Gabel needed a new ally at court, and he found one in the tsar himself. He first learned that the tsar was inclined to break with Sweden in May, much to the irritation of the boyars. Military preparations continued, with Dolgorukii to be sent toward Livonia with a great army and Golitsyn to command in the south. Gabel was sure of the tsar's position, but the boyars gave him more difficulty: in June he thought that most of them were on Denmark's side against Sweden, though where that position would lead was not clear. Gabel had especially good information, for he had a "faithful distinguished

⁴¹ TKUA Rusland, B39, 20 June 1677: "kan ich es soweit nur bringen daß Mileslafsky ein wohrt in faveur meiner Negotiation spricht so ist der Punct richtig [allein] die letzte gehabt Rencontre mit [der] ver[wittweten] Zarissa [daran ich gemeldet lieget ihm noch im Kopf undt will er sich mit nichts decisivs bemengen, [Chytrof wie] gern er auch frieden erhalten wolte ist mir doch anjetzo auch nicht mehr zu wideren [Dolgorucki aber] vollkommen auff meiner seite undt mir affectionirt nur daß [er nichts gerne zu felde] will undt er befürchtet daß eß hin wirt treffen müßen."

friend among those who sit in the privy council” who had good enough Latin to converse in it with Gabel and his secretary.⁴² The tsar continued on his side, becoming more and more irritated with the boyars in the process: “it has been reported to me from a good source that he [=Fyodor] is supposed to have said, he believes that at last he must acquire the power that has been up to now attributed to him and cease looking among the boyars.” A few days later there was even a report that Golitsyn’s army would be ordered to Pskov, but on 8/18 July the whole scheme fell apart: news reached Moscow that the Turks had passed the Dniester River and were approaching Kiev and Chigirin. This meant war, and war thousands of miles from Moscow with the Ottoman Empire itself, a revived power fresh from its defeat of Poland. For the time being Fyodor stuck to the anti-Swedish policy, but he was alone in it and rifts began to develop between the older and younger councillors. The older boyars held back, opposing the Swedish venture, and only the younger boyars hesitatingly supported Fyodor. Fyodor was so determined on peace with Turkey that for a time he was willing to give up the Ukraine. Gabel soon had to admit that it was not only the older boyars who were against a Swedish war, and that they had the majority behind them.⁴³

With Ibrahim Pasha’s massive Turkish army besieging Chigirin Russia had no choice. Prince G. G. Romodanovskii and Hetman Samoilovych moved south toward the fort to relieve the siege. Ibrahim Pasha came out to meet them but had to retreat at the end of August. For the time being Chigirin was saved, but Russia had on its hands a major war it could no longer escape.⁴⁴ The Danish

⁴² TKUA Rusland, B40, 23 May 1677 (support of Tsar Fyodor for a break with Sweden and his opposition to a war with Turkey); 30 May 1677 (tsar’s support for Swedish war a displeasure to the boyars); 6 June 1677 (military preparations); 20 June 1677 (the tsar and the greater part of the boyars on Denmark’s side, Gabel’s friend and his Latin conversation): “[ein getreuer fürnehmer freund unter] denjenigen habe so mit im [geheimten Raht sitzen].”

⁴³ TKUA Rusland, B39, 4 July 1677: “Ihre Zarische Maytet. annoch gantz in [faveur von meiner negotiation] sindt sogahr mir [von gutter han]dt [berichtet worden daß er] solle gesagt haben er gläubete er müßte nuhr zuletzt die Ihm bißhero [attribuirte macht] zu thun [undt zu laßen] bey [seinen boyaren suchen . . .]”; 11 July 1677 (Golitsyn’s army to Pskov); 18 July 1677 (news of Turkish army passing the Dniester, old councillors feel bypassed and will not participate, younger ones afraid older councillors will sabotage their plans); 25 July 1677 (Fyodor argues in Duma for war with Sweden, peace with Turkey, will even surrender the Ukraine); 8 August 1677 (most boyars against war with Sweden).

⁴⁴ Solov’ev, *Istoriia* VII, 209–29; Kostomarov, *Ruina*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, XV, 290–328; A. Popov, “Turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie Fedora Alekspevicha,” *Russkii vestnik* 8 (March 1857), 143–80, (April 1858) 285–328.

resident entertained hopes in spite of the situation, but they were increasingly illusory, and in August he had his last official audience.⁴⁵ The situation in Moscow grew more serious, with talk of rebellions and rumors that Matveev would return to power. The conflicts of the tsar with the boyars became ever more acrimonious, he accusing them of delaying the decision about Sweden to the point where he was becoming a laughing stock. They were beginning to be afraid of him, as he could easily turn to hate any one of them and become irreconcilable and merciless. The news of Romodanovskii's victory seems to have emboldened them, however, and the boyars who accompanied the tsar on the September pilgrimage to the Trinity Monastery tried, with the support of the clergy, to get the tsar to change his mind and follow their advice,

with which the country and its previous tsars fared well and now he should not follow the advice of a foreigner (that is me), and it seems that the oldest boyars want for him as far as possible that they should take the government out of his majesty the tsar's hands and into their own.

The support of the younger boyars for Fyodor did no good and Gabel had to admit that the older boyars had won against the tsar.⁴⁶ He soon left, having failed to engineer a war against Sweden, and with the "old boyars" still in power.

THE RISE OF PRINCE V. V. GOLITSYN

One of the effects of the Turkish war was the gradual rise of Prince V. V. Golitsyn, a great aristocrat who also became one of the favorites of Tsar Fyodor.⁴⁷ Best known as the *de facto* prime minister

⁴⁵ Since the spring the older boyars, particularly Khitrovo, had been pressing for his dismissal from Russia.

⁴⁶ TKUA Rusland, B39, 29 August 1677 (rumors of rebellion and return of Matveev); 5 September 1677 (acrimonious exchanges between the tsar and the boyars, their fear of him); 12 September 1677 (news of Romodanovskii's victory); 26 September 1677: the boyars reproach Fyodor that he does not take their advice "bey welchem [daß Reich und ihre] vorige Czaren sich wohl befinden hätten und anjezo eineß [frembden daß bin ich Raht folgen undt] für ihn wollten immittelst [scheineten die alten Bojaren] alleß hier so viel ihnen möglich daß sich [daß Regiment auß Ihrer Zaarischen Majestet handen] in ihre eigne bekommen mögen . . ." The older boyars are scandalized that Fyodor follows the advice of the younger boyars, and there is very little chance of a Russo-Swedish war unless Sweden provokes it. Finally, from Pskov (14 November 1677) Gabel admitted defeat, citing as causes the Turkish war, lack of money for bribes in Moscow, the conciliatory attitude of Sweden, and the extensive bribes on its behalf.

⁴⁷ Born in 1643, Golitsyn had been in service in the palace since the age of fifteen. His first major military command came only in 1675, covering the rear of Romodanovskii's army in

of the regent Sofia in 1682–89, he began his political rise with the achievement of boyar rank early in 1676. While he was away in the south in 1677 he kept up an extensive correspondence with relatives, friends, and servants in Moscow, which chance has preserved.⁴⁸ His steward Matvei Boev and his mother, Princess Tatiana Ivanovna Golitsyna kept him informed on all the crucial events, and his mother also played a major role in them.

The correspondence demonstrates that Golitsyn was not an ally of I. M. Miloslavskii. There is one formal note to Golitsyn from Miloslavskii recommending his son-in-law Ivan Bestuzhev to the prince's attention, and several notes, one from Golitsyn's wife Anastasia Ivanovna, mentioning Miloslavskii's marriage in late July 1677, to a Prozorovskii princess.⁴⁹ More important still, Miloslavskii figured in none of the conflicts around Golitsyn that summer either as an opponent or a friend. Similarly, Tsarevna Sofia Alekseevna does not appear anywhere in any of the letters, even in those that give miscellaneous news of the movements of the court. Golitsyn's alliance with the Miloslavskii faction came only in 1682.

Golitsyn also had no apparent relationship with the Naryshkins, of whose fate he learned simply as part of the news of the court. His later antagonist and a Naryshkin supporter, the chamber *stol'nik* Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn (V. V.'s first cousin), even supported his relative in the dispute with Romodanovskii. Other

the Ukraine and simultaneously defending the southern frontier against raiding parties from the Crimea. Essentially he had the same assignment every summer from 1676 through 1680, combining it with the headship of the Artillery Chancellery from late 1676 to January, 1678, when it was absorbed by Miloslavskii's Cavalry Chancellery. Lindsey Hughes, *Russia and the West: the Life of a Seventeenth-Century Westernizer Prince Vasily Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1643–1714)*, Newtonville, MA, 1984; A. S. Lavrov, "Vasil'ii Vasil'evich Golitsyn," *Voprosy istorii* 5 (1998), 61–72.

⁴⁸ The letters were published over the last century in several different places, all without annotation or indeed any scholarly apparatus: I. D. Beliaev, ed., "Sobstvennoruchnoe pis'mo dumного razriadного d'iaka Vasil'ia Grigor'evicha Semenova k kniaz'iu Vasil'iu Vasil'evichu Golitsynu," *Vremennik OIDR* 4 (1850), smes', 65–66; Beliaev, "Pis'ma k. Vasil'ia Vasil'evicha Golitsyna k dumnomu d'iaky razriadного prikaza Vasil'iu Vasil'evichu Semenovu," *ibid.* 5 (1850), 41; "Pis'ma," *ibid.* 6 (1850), 36–48; 7 (1850), 69–76; 8 (1850), 51–54; 10 (1851), 29–56; 12 (1852), 33–54; 13 (1852), 25–36; A. Vostokov, ed., "Kniaz' Vasil'ii Vasil'evich Golitsyn: Pis'ma k nemu raznykh lits," *RS* 57 (1888), 735–38; A. Vostokov, ed., "Kniaz' Vasil'ii Vasil'evich Golitsyn: Pis'ma k nemu Boeva, Baklanovskogo, i Leont'eva," *RS*, 63 (1889), 129–32; S. I. Kotkov, ed., *Gramotki XVII – nachala XVIII veka*, Moscow, 1969, 127–54; and S. I. Kotkov, A. S. Oreshnikov, I. S. Filippova, eds., *Moskovskaia delozaia i bytovaia pis'mennost' XVII veka*, Moscow, 1968, 16–38.

⁴⁹ "Pis'ma," *Vremennik*, 10, 31–32, 51–52; 12, 48; Vostokov, "Kniaz'," *RS*, 63 (1889), 129–30. I. M. Miloslavskii married Princess Evdokiia Petrovna Prozorovskaia: Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Russkaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 383.

supporters among the tsar's favorites were Ivan Timofeevich Kondyrev, just then appointed *okol'nichii*, and Ivan Maksimovich Iazykov. Semen Zaborovskii, another recently appointed *okol'nichii* and in three years to be the tsar's father-in-law, seems also to have had good relations with V. V. Golitsyn.⁵⁰

The correspondence from 1677 also reveals the prince's contacts with lesser folk, seemingly his clients, who would make their career with him later, rising to higher positions after 1680 and sharing his fall in 1689. One letter came from Fyodor Narbekov with various news from Moscow, including that of the appointment of Semen Fyodorov Tolochanov to an embassy in Poland with the boyar V. S. Volynskii. Tolochanov himself sent Golitsyn news of his mother's good health, among other tidbits. Leontii Nepliev asked him for news of the prince's health, and news from Belgorod.⁵¹

The most important incident of the summer, however, was a series of disputes involving Vasilii Vasil'evich, Prince Iurii Dolgorukii, and Bogdan Khitrovo. The first one involved Golitsyn's request for additional cavalry and the second was a precedence dispute between Golitsyn and Prince G. G. Romodanovskii, the commander of the Russian armies defending Chigirin. The request for more troops incidentally throws much light on the real nature of the operations of the nascent Russian "bureaucracy." As the princess wrote to her son in late June, "You wrote to me with the Sevsk courier about soldiers, to add some soldiers; and I, my light, went to Prince Iurii Alekseevich and petitioned about soldiers, and he refused."⁵² Golitsyn persisted, specifying that he needed new-formation cavalry (*reitary*), and the princess again went to see Dolgorukii and tried unsuccessfully to see Khitrovo. Only a few days later Ivan Kamynin informed Golitsyn that Romodanovskii wished him no good. Golitsyn believed that he outranked Romodanovskii, who held the higher command. The princess told her son that Dolgorukii was continuing to refuse more cavalry and that Khitrovo would support Romodanovskii: "from Bogdan Matveevich, my light, there will be not the slightest help, he inclines to Prince Grigorii [Romodanovskii] and stands for

⁵⁰ Kotkov, *Gramotki*, 128–29, 135, 152; "Pis'ma," *Vremennik* 12, 33–34. Prince Boris Golitsyn's rank: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, l. 94.

⁵¹ *Gramotki*, 142–43, 147; "Pis'ma," *Vremennik* 8 (1850), 53.

⁵² *Vremennik* 13, 31 (29 June 1677). In the same letter Princess Golitsyna also reported that Ivan Buturlin, another of the rear commanders, tried to start a precedence suit against Golitsyn but Dolgorukii rejected it.

him.”⁵³ In the Dolgorukii clan Golitsyn had one supporter, however, Prince Iurii’s son Mikhail, who was also Golitsyn’s brother-in-law. Prince Mikhail wrote to his brother-in-law in late July that “there has been no decision about Prince Grigorii, and the boyars are divided in half: some say he should be with you, and others are for him, saying he should not be with you.” Hetman Samoilovych supported Romodanovskii. Mikhail was also unable to extract any more cavalry from his father. Nevertheless, Golitsyn won. His other brother-in-law, Prince Iurii Petrovich Trubetskoi, soon announced that the tsar had ordered independent commands. Golitsyn could communicate with Poland on his own, and Romodanovskii was not to do so without Golitsyn’s knowledge.⁵⁴ The disputes did not end there, for after Romodanovskii’s defeat of the Turks at the end of August there were recriminations in the Duma that Golitsyn had not supported Romodanovskii in the field. This time, however, Iurii Dolgorukii (together with Iazykov) supported Golitsyn and the talk was quashed, Golitsyn receiving the tsar’s thanks and gifts along with Romodanovskii and Hetman Samoilovych.⁵⁵

Prince V. V. Golitsyn was in such good odor by the end of 1677 that he was talked about to command the southern armies for the campaign of 1678. He did not get the command, which was, perhaps, lucky for him, as it turned out.⁵⁶ The commanders in the Ukraine, Romodanovskii and Samoilovych, now faced a much more serious opponent, the Ottoman grand vezir himself, Kara Mustafa. In the summer of 1678 the Turks took Chigirin, and the Russian army evacuated the right bank of the Dniepr. It was an ignominious defeat, and led to Romodanovskii’s son’s removal from command. The elder Romodanovskii had to spend a great deal of money to suppress the accusations against his son and keep the family honor.

⁵³ Aleksei Markevich, *O mestnichestve*, Kiev, 1879, 66–71. “Pis’ma,” *Vremennik* 6, 41–42; 8, 53–54; 12, 54–55 (12 July 1677, Princess Golitsyna to VVG: “ot Bogdana svet Matveevicha net tebe pomochi ni malye, vse tianet na kniaz’ Grigor’evu ruku i stoit za kniaz’ Grigor’ia on”). At the height of the campaign Golitsyn had only some 15,000 troops: Popov, “Turetskaia,” 160.

⁵⁴ *Vremennik*, 10, 30–31, 35–36; 7, 75.

⁵⁵ Kotkov, *Gramotki*, 128–33, esp. 130–32.

⁵⁶ In the winter of 1677–78 the Moscow government considered abandoning the fortress and concentrating on the defense of Kiev. Hetman Samoilovych and Prince G. G. Romodanovskii opposed the move, which they argued would leave the whole of the Ukrainian hetmanate exposed to Tatar raids and Turkish armies. The result of the dispute was a hesitating and half-hearted order to reinforce Chigirin. Popov, “Turetskaia,” 285–95, correcting Solov’ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 210–11 and Kostomarov, *Ruina*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, XV, 296–98.

There were rumors of revolt among the *strel'tsy*, and new names were cast about for a commander of the southern armies for 1679. One of them was Prince Iurii Dolgorukii, who loudly proclaimed that he would only take it on if Matveev were to be recalled, for he would need his advice. In the event the command went to Prince Mikhail Alegukovich Cherkasskii, with the younger Dolgorukii, Prince Mikhail Iur'evich, as his lesser colleague.⁵⁷ No Turks appeared in 1679 and in fact peace negotiations began only a few months after the fall of Chigirin. Kara Mustafa was not going to waste time in the Ukraine when he already had Vienna in his sights.

The Russians did not know this, of course, and again in 1680 they planned to mobilize an army in the south, this time to be commanded by Prince V. V. Golitsyn and one of the Sheremetevs.⁵⁸ Russian attempts to make an alliance with Poland led to nothing, especially since most of the Russian boyars by 1679 were in favor of ending the war with Turkey. Only Patriarch Ioakim and a minority in the Duma pressed for further conflict. Finally, Russian negotiations with the Crimea and Turkey paid off in the truce of Bakhchisarai in January, 1681.⁵⁹ Russia lost Chigirin and any claim to the right bank of the Dniepr (except Kiev) but Turkey recognized Russia's rule over the Ukrainian hetmanate on the left bank of the river.

TSAR FYODOR'S EMANCIPATION

As the Turkish war drew to its ambiguous end, the political constellation in Moscow was changing. The first of the powerful personalities to go was Tsarevna Irina Mikhailovna, who died early in 1679. At the same time, Tsar Fyodor was desperate to be married,

⁵⁷ ARSG 7364: 27 November, 1677 (Golitsyn rumored as future commander), 5 November, 1678 (accusations against Romodanovskii, Dolgorukii's remark about Matveev); 7365, 4 June 1679 (Cherkasskii and the younger Dolgorukii in command); SRM 604: 12 May 1679 (Christopher Kochen to king of Sweden, military preparations against the Turks); Popov, "Turetskaia," 325–26, attributed Romodanovskii's disgrace in part to Golitsyn's efforts, following Keller's dispatches.

⁵⁸ SRM 604, 11 November 1679 (appointment of Golitsyn and Khovanskii to command for 1680); ARSG 7364, 3 December 1679 (Golitsyn to command in 1680 with Sheremetev as second in command).

⁵⁹ Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita*, 143–230. The Polish ambassador Cyprian Pawel Brzostowski reported arguments in the Duma in August, 1679, over the war and Ioakim's desire to continue: *ibid.*, 212. *PSZ* II, no. 864, 307–10 (treaty of Bakhchisarai).

and the process of selecting a bride began at court, a sign that he was moving toward independence. Another sign was the founding of the Palace Typography in February 1679, headed by the tsar's old teacher Simeon Polotskii. With this act Fyodor made a move away from the cultural conservatism that was the result of Matveev's fall. At the end of the year there was a major change in the household of Tsaritsa Natalia: a tutor (*diad'ka*) was appointed for Tsarevich Peter. He was Rodion Matveevich Streshnev of the family of Tsar Michael's second wife (and Peter's paternal grandmother). He had a reputation for probity, for Potocki wrote of him, "he is more clever [than his cousin I. F. Streshnev] and in examining difficult tasks and the management of the coin of the public treasury, he is either greater than or untouched by human emotions, often used by the tsar." In spring 1680, Bogdan Khitrovo followed Irina to the grave, leaving only Miloslavskii and Dolgorukii among the older boyars at the summit of power.⁶⁰

The two deaths removed two powerful influences on the young

⁶⁰ ARSG 7365, 15 January 1679: "de oudste Princesse Irene Michalavna genoempt, schielick is koemen t'overlyden: waeroever syne Zaarssse Maiesteit seer is affligeert, als verloren hebbende syne enigste Tante: ende eene Dame van singuliere pieteit, wysheit, ende andere excellentie deugdes ende qualiteiten meer: De voor desen gemelte gedisgratieerde Generael Romadanofski is, neffens synen Sone, gepardoneert: waertoe de vergulde Interressen van enige Grandes seer veel hebben gecontribueert: Het welck geen vernoeogen en geeft aen het gemeene Volck alhier ende eene saecke is van saer donckeren gevolge. Men wenst met passie, Hooch Mogende Heeren, dat syne Zaarssse Maiesteit hem heast in der Huwelicken Staat will begeben: Ende met eene sodanige Familie allieren, waardoor syne Zaarssse Maiesteit selfs, de goede Gemeente, ende oock de Vremdelingen meerder vreugde, nutt, en welvaren mochten koemen te genieten, als sedert enige jaren herrewaerts nite en is geschiedt. Tot het welcke werck geen quade constellatie althans is schynende terwylen gesegdt werdt, dat'er enige voorname, schone, jonge Dames ten Hove staen gebrocht te werden, uyt de welcke meer hoch gedachte Syne Zaarssse Maiesteit sal kommen eligeren die Hem t'best aenstaet." 20 February 1679 (repeat notice on Irina's death). SRM 604: 11 November 1679: "Boyarin Rodion Matfeewitz Stresnoff ist der Sibrische Pricaess abgenommen, und soll er ein pffegvater oder Dedka des jüngen Prinzen Peter Alexewitz sein, in des Herrn Stresnoff stell, soll Boyarin Knes Ivan Iwan Borisowitz Repnin die Siebirsche Pricass erwalten." The Swedish report confirms Shmurlo's conclusion from Russian documents that R. M. Streshnev was appointed in November, 1679, as well as indirectly his surmise that the common statement that Tikhon Streshnev was Peter's *podd'iadka* is inaccurate for the period before 1682, and perhaps afterwards: E. Shmurlo, "Kriticheskoe . . . VI," *ZhMNP* 330, 217–223. L. A. Chernaia, "Verkhnaia tipografiia Simeona Polotskogo," in A. N. Robinson, *et al.*, eds., *Simeon Polotskii i ego knigoizdatel'skaia deiatel'nost'*, Moscow, 1982, 47–49. Potocki, *Moschovia*, 199: "Callidior hic atque Scrutandis arduis negotiis, congerendis aerarii publici nummis, veluti affectibus humanis aut major aut intactus, saepe a Principe admotus." Miloslavskii even picked up a new office in 1679, the Treasury Chancellery, after the death of treasurer Kamynin in 1678: Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 71; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 198.

Tsar Fyodor, who lost no time finding his own favorites. The tsar's temporarily better health must have played a role as well. In 1676 and 1677 he had not participated in the Palm Sunday procession, but in 1678 he performed part of the usual duties, leading Patriarch Ioakim's donkey for a short walk through Red Square, and from then on he seems to have attended most court ceremonies until shortly before his death. Fyodor took advantage of the situation to favor new men, obscure gentlemen who had risen through the palace administration. Ivan Maksimovich Iazykov, the most important, had served while a *stol'nik* in the Court Judicial Chancellery under Bodgan Khitrovo since 1670. While Fyodor was still tsarevich, Iazykov had been appointed his personal head chamberlain (*postel'nichii*). After Tsar Aleksei's death he became the tsar's head chamberlain, an office that included charge of the tsar's Workshop House. He took that over on 14 August 1676, and was joined by the *striapchii* Mikhail Timofeevich Likhachev in October. In December, 1677, Iazykov was given the new title of Duma chamberlain, giving him the right to sit in the Duma. Finally, Prince V. V. Golitsyn continued his rise as commander in chief of the southern army. Fyodor's real emancipation, however, began in summer 1680, following further improvement in his health.⁶¹

The first independent step was his marriage to Agaf'ia Semenovna Grushetskaia, the daughter of a Moscow gentleman of Polish origin and niece of the former Duma secretary Semen Zaborovskii. Zaborovskii was not wholly obscure: he entered the Duma as *okol'nichii* on 18 July 1677, just as he was soliciting the favor of V. V.

⁶¹ DR IV, 27–32 (1678). Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 179–80, 213. ARSG 7365 (1680), 13 January, 1680 (Tsar Fyodor plays his role at the Epiphany ceremony). Keller also reported in the same letter of 13 January 1680 that Golitsyn and several other great men came to pay the Dutch resident a formal visit in his house. The great men included “syn Heer Broeder Groot Chambellan van S.Z.M. (his brother the Grand Chamberlain of his tsarish majesty).” The person holding such an office could only be I. M. Iazykov, the *postel'nichii*, who was certainly not Golitsyn's brother, but Keller may have misunderstood the Russian usage of *brat* as a short form for *dvoiuodnyi* or *trouuodnyi brat*. ARSG 7365 (1680), 6 April 1680 (Fyodor takes the traditional role in the Palm Sunday procession).

Tatishchev asserted that Prince Iurii Dolgorukii and Bogdan Khitrovo put Iazykov and Likhachev forward out of fear of the treachery and evil of Ivan Miloslavskii and the desire to keep some control of affairs. Iazykov, “a man of great wit” [*chelovek velikoi ostroty*], and Likhachev, Fyodor's former teacher and a man of “good conscience” [*dobroi sovesti*], were to maintain that control for Dolgorukii and Khitrovo. V. N. Tatishchev, “Tsarstvo tsaria Fyodora Alekseevicha,” *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 7 vols., Moscow, and Leningrad 1962–68, VII, 172.

Golitsyn.⁶² Fyodor chose Agaf'ia from among four girls in the traditional fashion. Keller reported that at first he looked at daughters of the best families, but then he chose Grushetskaia from a middling noble family. In this he followed his own will like his predecessors, "and not that of the grandees," thinking that a tsaritsa of a great family would only contribute to jealousies and contention at court. The Danish resident Heinrich Butenant von Rosenbusch was even more detailed:

His majesty the tsar was married in Moscow on July 18 [8 July OS] with the noble lady Agaf'ia Semenovna Grushetskaia, whose father is a lieutenant colonel and born in Poland; the great men set themselves strongly against the marriage and did not like to see that his majesty the tsar was so contrary, but it pleased his majesty the tsar and she is supposed to be an extremely beautiful lady; it took its course, and some of the great men have fallen in importance and the tsaritsa has put her party into the game which will now see some changes.⁶³

⁶² [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 104; Zaborovskii headed the Monastery Chancellery from 1668 to March 1676, when he was replaced by Ivan Sevast'ianovich Khitrovo. In 1677 he became an *okol'nichii* and received office in the New Quarter under I. M. Miloslavskii, but his name soon vanished from their rolls. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 86–87, 92; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 188; *Vremennik*, 12, 33–34.

⁶³ ARSG 7365, 29 June 1680 (four girls chosen as possible brides from the best families); 20 July 1680: "Syn Zaarse Majesteit heeft verleden sondach Syn Bylager gecelebreert. Desselfs Gemalinne en is geene van die Princessen (Waervan myn laeste Postscript heeft gementioneert) De welcke ten Hove waren gebrocht, om uyt deselve eene Bruyd vor Syn Zaarsse Mt. te verkiesen, Maer is van een mediocre Familie, en eerder van de Poolsse, als Russische natie: willende Syne Zaarsse Maiesteit Daarmede hautement betoonen, gelyck oock Desselfs Praedecesseurs meestendeels gedaen hebben, als dat Hy absolut Synen sin ende Wille: Ende niete dien van Syne Grandes, in dit point, wil volgen; Houdende daer beneffens, het Eeene Saeck van Staat te syn, dat trowende aen Eene Gereleveerde Familie, Die selve Daerdoor al te' Hooch ende Machtig soude werden; en de mindere alsdan soecken t'onderdrucken; Waeruyt periculouse Contentien, jalousien ende onlusten koemen te rysen: De welcke Syne Zaarsse Mt. also soeckt voor te koemen: Willende liever eene geringe familie verhoogen, en verrycken, als eene Machtige, Insolent ende Insupportabel maecken"; 3 August 1680 (repeating previous). TKUA Rusland B40, 26 September 1680; "Ihro Czar. Mayt. ist in Mosco den 18 July geheyrachtet, mit die wohledele Dahme Agata Semenovna Gresofsky welches Vatter ein Ob.leut. gewesen undt auß Pohlen geburtig, die Großen haben sich sehr wieder diese heyrath gesezt?, undt es nicht gerne gesehen daß Irho Czar. Maytt. so wohl gefallen undt sie eine übermaß schöne Dame sein soll, hat es fortgang genommen undt seindt ezliche Großen um etwas in decadentz gerahten undt der Gzarin Ihre partheys ans brett welches deme wohl einige Verenderunge gehen möchte." *PSZ* II, no. 829, 270 (Fyodor's marriage, 18 July 1680).

Tatishchev later claimed that Fyodor spotted Agaf'ia in a religious procession. Supposedly Khitrovo, I. M. Miloslavskii, and Prince Iurii Dolgorukii were against the match, and Miloslavskii even accused her of promiscuity in order to stop it. Iazykov, however, was eventually able to determine her innocence, and the match took place. Tatishchev, "Tsarstvo . . . Fyodora," *Istoriia*, 7, 172–83.

Her uncle Semen Zaborovskii became a boyar on July 20, and a month later Iazykov was promoted to *okol'nichii* and given the office of armorer (*oruzheinishii*) and the Armory Chancellery.

Iazykov was now the new favorite for sure, with major offices under his control. Iazykov's replacement as head chamberlain was Aleksei Timofeevich Likhachev, who thus joined his brother in the tsar's Workshop Chancellery. Iazykov and the two Likhachev brothers now controlled half the major offices once held by Khitrovo, the palace offices that gave access to the tsar and a great patronage network. The other two, the Great Palace and the Court Judicial Chancellery, had gone in May to Prince Vasilii Fyodorovich Odoevskii.⁶⁴

The marriage of Fyodor to Agaf'ia soon brought other changes.⁶⁵ Butenant reported on his return from Archangel in October:

I found that the marriage has caused great changes at court here, since the relatives of the new tsaritsa have the most to say and there is great change in many things: for the Empress allows herself to be seen in public and often sits with his majesty the tsar in a coach and is led by the same in and out, which is accustomed never to be seen in his case.

A few days later on 22 October Fyodor issued an important decree, which changed the style of court dress for the elite: "from this time the *stol'niki* and *striapchie* and Moscow gentry and secretaries and *zhil'tsy* and all ranks of servitors are to wear service dress, *ferezi*, and long kaftans," as this is the dress they wear on campaigns, the decree continued, but when they come to Moscow they put on "town dress," *okhobni*, which are very expensive. They are to keep only the service dress, the *ferezi*, and not wear short kaftans or *chekmeni* (another sort of short kaftan).⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Iazykov also briefly held the Silver and Gold Houses, also palace workshops under the Armory in 1680, after which they went to lesser officials. He may well have continued to supervise them. Immediately on Khitrovo's death Prince Vasilii Odoevskii had received the Armory, the Silver and Gold Houses, the Great Palace and Court Judicial Chancellery, keeping only the last two after the awards to Iazykov in the summer. Crumme, *Aristocrats*, 188, 202; RGADA, f. 210, d. 7, boiarskaia kniga 7184 g., f. 50v; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 21–22, 53, 98, 158, 215–16; ARSG 7364, 3 August 1680 (Agaf'ia's uncle Semen Zaborovskii made a boyar). Golitsyn seems to have been in the Ukraine all summer watching the border, for he returned to Moscow only in late August: ASRG 7365 (1680), 24 August, 1680.

⁶⁵ Among those changes were two decrees abolishing the precedence system in the army "eternally". Apparently these decrees did not have the desired effect, for the whole issue was taken up again a year later: Iu. M. Eskin, *Mestnichestvo v Rossii XVI–XVII vv.: Khronologicheskii reestr*, Moscow, 1994, 207–08.

⁶⁶ TKUA Rusland, B40, 26 October (NS=16 October OS), 1680: "bin für 8 tagen hier Gott

The Swedish representatives recounted the decree in detail with the Russian terminology and some extra explanatory details:

Here there is a great change in the manner of dress, the great men may no longer go about in their previously customary clothes or come to the palace [in them – PB], but must be dressed like the colonels or *golovy* of the *strel'tsy* when they march before their regiments, that is, with long cloaks to be sure but narrow around the body and with hanging sleeves, underneath a long kaftan (in part the Boyars go about in Greek overcloaks), the secretaries and *kholopy* [bondservants] of the boyars must go about in kaftans. The *gosti* and townsmen, however, keep their previous dress and must keep the *odnoriadki* and *okhobni*, with the result that every estate can be easily distinguished.⁶⁷

The Swedish description of the decree follows closely the recently discovered Russian text and seems to be mistaken only in excluding secretaries from the new code. It is striking that the Swedes saw it as applying to the “great men,” a term clearly not just restricted to the boyars, since they are mentioned separately. Similarly, the monk and chronicler Sil'vestr Medvedev remembered the decree as directed to the “whole Duma” (*vsemu . . . sigklitu*). The “Greek overcloaks” must be the *ferezi*, the word being from the Turkish *ferace*, itself of Greek origin (*foresia*). The Swedish report reinforces the impression that westernization of dress as such was not commanded, as asserted in the older literature. Indeed national-cultural issues did not figure at all, rather it was a matter of establishing a certain equalization in the appearance of the court elite. The lesser court ranks, the *stol'niki*,

danck wiederumb glücklich arriviret, undt habe durch die heyrath große verenderung alhier am hofe gefunden, weiln die verwandten von der Neuen Zarinne daß meiste so sagen haben undt ist auch in vielen ein große verenderung; maßen die Kayserinne sich öffentlich sehen läßet auch zum öffteren mit Ihro Zaar Mayt. in einer Karettsche sizet, und von demselben bey der handt wirdt auß undt ein geführt welches denn für diesen nimmermehr pflegt zu gesehen.” The decree of 22 October 1680 appears in P. V. Sedov, “Reforma sluzhilogo plat'ia pri Fedore Alekseeviche,” in Iu. N. Bespiatykh, ed., *Trudy Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi konferentsii “Kogda Rossiia molodaia muzhala s geniem Petra,”* vol. I, Pereslavl'-Zalesskii, 1992, 77–84 (decree, 80). There was also a further decree in December specifying the types of *ferezi* that were to be worn on holy days: *PSZ*, II, no. 850, 288–89.

⁶⁷ SRM 604, 9 November 1680: “Alhier is grosse verenderung in Kleider ordnung, die grossen herrn mögen nicht mehr in Ihre vorhero gewöhnliche Kleider gehen noch zu Schlosse kommen, sondern müssen gekleidet sein wie die Strelzen Obristen oder Golowen; wen sie vor ihre Regimenten marchiren, nemb. zwar mit langen Röcken aber enge umb den leib, und bey hangenden Mauwen oder Ermels, unten ein lang Kaftan, theils Boyaren in grigische Oberröcken, die Schreiber und Boyarische Gollopen müssen in Kaftanen gehen. Die Goosten und bürgerschaft aber behalten Ihre vorige Kleidung, und müssen sie die Odnorädkens und Ogobneen behalten, worbey also ein jetweder stant, wohl unterschieden werden kan.”

striapchie, and Moscow gentry were to wear the same dress as the boyars, the *ferezi* (the “Greek overcloaks”), not their traditional *okhobni* and *odnoriadki*. This was the visible manifestation of the inflation of honors since 1676, and had the effect of putting the new men and the favorites such as Iazykov and the Likhachevs on the same footing in dress as the boyars.⁶⁸

The dress decree was not the young tsar’s only move. There were others and the Swedes picked them up again:

Yesterday there was another change, and three Chancelleries – the Mercenary, Artillery, and one other – were taken away from Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii and were given again to Prince Mikhail Iur’evich Dolgorukii to administer. The Duma secretary Larion Ivanovich got the Novgorod Quarter back again to add to the Ambassadorial Chancellery. Averkii Kirillov has been put over all the cash income of the country. Ivan Maksimovich Iazykov will receive the Palace to administer. Altogether there is already and every day more great change at court.

The reports were largely accurate: Miloslavskii did lose the Artillery, Mercenary, and Cavalry Chancelleries to Prince M. Dolgorukii in November 1680. Thus the Princes Dolgorukii, father and son, headed all the important military offices other than the *Razriad* itself. Ivanov already had the Ustiug Quarter, and now received the Novgorod Quarter as well as the Vladimir and Galich quarters which the report omitted. The result was to resurrect the old chancellery empire of Ordin-Nashchokin. The appointment of the boyar V. S. Volynskii to head the Ambassadorial Chancellery in December limited the benefits to Ivanov, but Volynskii’s tenure was short lived. In May 1681, Volynskii went off to govern Novgorod, and Ivanov’s stock had clearly risen. Averkii Kirillov had been increasing his control over the financial offices since 1676, and the mention of him at this time suggests that he may have been moving away from I. M. Miloslavskii. It was Miloslavskii who was the greatest loser, as he lost both his military offices and the quarters. All that he retained was the Great Treasury, which had recently incorporated the New Quarter. The result was not a minor office, but far from the extensive control he had exercised since early in

⁶⁸ Sedov interprets the decree as “national-conservative.” Sedov, “Reforma.” Later sources (the anonymous Polish tract “Diariusz zabojsstwa,” Kurakin, the *Letopis’ samovydtsa*, others; see also Markevich, *Mestnichestvo*) incorrectly described the reform as the introduction of Polish dress. A. Prozorovskii, ed., “Sil’vestra Medvedeva sozertsanie kratkoe let 7190, 91 i 92, v nikh chto sodeiasia vo grazhdanstve,” *ChOIDR* (1894), 4, pt. 2, 34.

1677. The report that Iazykov would get the Palace, assuming that the Great Palace Chancellery was meant, did not materialize, but his influence did not wane. In February 1681, his cousin Pavel Petrovich Iazykov became Treasurer (*kaznachei*), taking over the Treasury Chancellery from Miloslavskii. Prince V. V. Golitsyn stood ready to command in the south in 1681 if the Turkish war continued. The promotion of Golitsyn's clients, Leontii Nepliev, Vasilii Savich Narbekov, and Semen Fyodorovich Tolochanov, in late 1680 and early 1681, also indicated Golitsyn's growing significance.⁶⁹

Golitsyn's command in the south did not prove necessary, for the treaty with Crimea and the Ottomans was signed at Bakhchisarai in January 1681. This left Fyodor to turn to his domestic plans for Russia, but even before the news arrived there were rumors in Moscow that Matveev would return from exile. These rumors were premature by a year, but they convey the mood at the Russian court: the Miloslavskii were in trouble, Prince Iurii Dolgorukii still powerful. The tsar's health was poor in the spring, for he missed the Palm Sunday procession, recovering enough to amuse himself in the country with the tsaritsa. The court was quiet until July, when tsaritsa Agaf'ia gave birth to a boy, a possible heir. The tsaritsa died within a few days and the baby swiftly followed her. Fyodor was still without an heir and in such a poor state from disease and melan-

⁶⁹ SRM 604, 9 November (= 28 October OS), 1680: "Gestern ist abermahl eine verenderung geschehen, und sein Iwan Michalowitz Miloslavskoy 3. Pricassen als die Inosemskoj, Puskarskoj und noch einer abgenommen und an Knes Michaila Iuriewitz Dolgorukoj wieder zu verwalten gegeben worden. Der Dumnoj Diack Lariwon Iwanowitz hat bey der Posolschen Pricass, die Novogorodsche Zetwert wieder bekommen. Über alle Contante einkommen dieses Reiches ist Owerkii Steppanoff gesetzt. Iwan Maximowitz Jasikoff wird die Dworetz zu verwalten bekommen, In Summa er ist und geschiehet alhier noch täglich grosse verenderungen am Hoffe." Ivanov got the Ustiug Quarter in February 1680, from Prince Iu. Dolgorukii's Musketeer Chancellery. In November the Kostroma Quarter was given to the Musketeer Chancellery, clearly a sort of compensation. Miloslavskii seems to have lost the Treasury Chancellery in fall 1680, but Iazykov did not take it over for several months. *PSŽ*, II, no. 824, 267–68 (22 May 1680, Miloslavskii gets control of the *tamozhni*, the sales tax collection, in Moscow and the four Quarters); Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 28, 36, 39, 42, 58, 72, 92, 95, 130, 137, 152; Belokurov, *O posol'skom*, 113–14. Volynskii lasted less than a year in Novgorod and died in September, 1682: Barsukov, *Spiski*, 155; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 192. The changes in the office holders coincided with a certain centralization of military affairs in the three main offices, *razriad*, Cavalry, and Mercenaries, while the Musketeer Chancellery dealt only with the elite Moscow musketeers: Chernov, *Vooruzhennnye sily*, 191–92. Nepliev received the rank of Duma gentleman 26 October, 1680, V. S. Narbekov and S. F. Tolochanov the same on 13 February 1681. On Golitsyn's correspondence with Nepliev, Tolochanov, and V. S. Narbekov's brother Fyodor in 1677, see above. The reform of finance under Tsar Fyodor thus began under Miloslavskii (in September 1679) and continued under Iazykov: Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 84–91.

choly over his wife that his death was feared. Keller believed that Peter would succeed him, leading to the recall of Matveev as a favorite of Natalia's.⁷⁰

Before any of this could happen, Fyodor's health improved and he made one of the most serious changes in Russia's political structure for decades: he abolished the precedence system. The abolition of *mestnichestvo*, almost the only event of the reign to inspire repeated investigation, came about as a result of plans for military reform, or at least so it seems from the official acts.⁷¹ On 24 November 1681, Fyodor ordered Prince V. V. Golitsyn and the other boyars to investigate the needs of the army, and for that purpose to call together representatives of the lower service ranks, the *stol'niki*, generals, colonels of infantry and cavalry, the *striapchie*, Moscow gentry and *zhil'tsy* as well as the provincial gentry and *deti boiarskie*. The assembly that resulted proposed to break up the old "hundreds" (*sotni*) into companies (*roty*) and appoint lieutenants (*rotmistry* and *poruchiki*) from among the lower service ranks (*stol'nik* on down). The boyars agreed to this proposal, so the tsar ordered a list to be drawn up of the personnel of the lower service ranks. At this point a problem arose. The boyars and the representatives of the lower service ranks then petitioned the tsar, pointing out that in such a list many great families would be absent since there were young sons not yet mature enough for such service: the Trubetskoi's, Odoevskii's, Kurakins, Repnins, Sheins, Troekurov's, Lobanov-Rostovskii's, and Romodanovskii's. To avoid this problem they proposed eliminating the whole precedence system. Tsar Fyodor called in Patriarch Ioakim for consultation, and the patriarch came on 12 January 1682, with the higher clergy and supported the proposal to abolish

⁷⁰ TKUA Rusland, B40, 8 February 1681 (rumor of Matveev's return); ARSG 7365 (1681), 21 March 1681 (tsar unable to participate in Palm Sunday procession); 10 May 1681 (news of peace with Turks), 1 June 1681 (tsar and tsaritsa in the country); 4 July 1681 (influence of Prince Iu. Dolgorukii); 18 July 1681 (death of Fyodor's heir and son, succession of his half-brother and return of Natalia's favorite Matveev). The half-brother is presumably Peter, otherwise the reference to Natalia would not make sense. Another event of summer, 1681, was the return of Nikon from the Kirilo-Belozerskii Monastery to the New Jerusalem Monastery, and his death *en route*. Keller reported that the tsar attended the funeral: ARSG 7365, 5 September 1681.

⁷¹ On the abolition of the precedence system see Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 247–52; Markevich, *O mestnichestve*, and *Istoriia mestnichestva v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XV–XVII veke*, Odessa, 1888, 543–611; M. Ia. Volkov, "Ob otmene mestnichestva v Rossii," *Istoriia SSSR* 2 (1977) 53–54; Kollmann, *By Honor Bound*, 226–31. ARSG 7365 (1681): 3 August 1681 (tsar goes to the country on his doctor's advice); 5 September 1681 (tsar presides over New Year's ceremonies).

the precedence system. This was done, and Tsar Fyodor ordered Prince Iu. Dolgorukii and the Duma secretary V. G. Semenov, the two chiefs of the *razriad*, to burn the records of the old system. The tsar also ordered new books, genealogical books (*rodoslovnnye knigi*) to be compiled. The new books were to include a much larger number of families than the older books, which covered only the boyar elite. The new books would even include families that made their way to landholding and the tsar's service after 1613. Forty boyars, twenty-five *okol'nichie*, twenty-three chamber *stol'niki* and the representatives of the lower service ranks signed the acts of the assembly incorporating the decree.⁷²

The acts of the assembly present an extremely formal picture, full of the etiquette of the court and very literary set speeches. The chronology that it presents, moreover, is deceptive in several ways. To start with, it implies that only on 12 January, after Ioakim's intervention, was the final decision made to abolish the precedence system. The evidence of the office concerned (the *Razriad*), however, states that the abolition was enacted already on 24 November 1681 by the tsar, having taken advice from the Duma and the higher clergy, that is, before the assembly was summoned. Further, the *Razriad* archive contains the decree summoning the council, but that decree appeared only on 7 December 1681. The formal presentation of the Genealogical books and their approval took place only on 19 January, with further work in early February.⁷³ This evidence suggests that the council was an afterthought, summoned to ratify a decision already made, and that the assembly acts were more a polemical document than a record of events, collapsing chronology to make a more effective story.

The assembly acts also give no hint as to the real sponsors of the decree, though they pretend that the initiative came from the lower service ranks. Many years later Prince Boris Ivanovich Kurakin

⁷² *SGGD* IV, 396–410; *PSŽ* II, no. 905, 368–79; “Razriad bez mest tsaria i velikogo kniazia Feodora Alekseevicha vseia Velikiia i Malyia i Belyia Rosi samoderzhitsa 190 godu,” in Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 311–12. The latter source dates the presentation and signature of the Genealogical books to 19 January, not 12 January, yet another inconsistency with other documents on the part of the council acts in *SGGD* IV. On the new genealogical books see A. V. Antonov, *Rodoslovnnye rospisi kontsa XVII v.*, Moscow, 1996.

⁷³ P. V. Sedov, “O boiarskoi popytke uchrezhdeniia namestnichestv v Rossii v 1681–1682,” *Vestnik LGU*, 9 (1985), 25–29; V. K. Nikol'skii, “Zemskii sobor o vechnom mire s Pol'shei 1683/4 g.,” *Nauchnye trudy industrial'no-pedagogicheskogo instituta imeni K. Libknechta*, Seriya sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaya, vyp. 2, 1928, 51; Solov'ev, “Razriad bez mest,” *Istoriia*, vol. 74 311–14.

ascribed the project to Ivan Maksimovich Iazykov.⁷⁴ Sil'vestr Medvedev's *Sozertsanie kratkoe*, a history of the turbulent events of 1682 written in the years 1684–89, opens with a brief summary of the abolition of precedence, ascribing it to the “near associates” (*blizkie predstateli*) of the tsar. That could point to Iazykov, but also to Golitsyn, Likhachev, and others.⁷⁵ In later Russian narrative sources the initiative belonged to these favorites of Tsar Fyodor. The reports of Gabel and Keller gave a somewhat different picture.

Keller not only frequently reported strong action by Fyodor in previous years, he ascribed the initiative for a whole set of changes in 1681–82 to Fyodor. Keller did not report the abolition of *mestnichestvo*, which may have seemed too specific for his Dutch superiors to care about, but he did report changes in the army in his report of 17 January 1682. These were the establishment of a new military office (*Krygs Collegie*) headed by Golitsyn with the intention of weeding out and pensioning off less competent officers. Keller attributed this idea to the boyar Vasiliï Borisovich Sheremetev and Prince Andrei Grigor'evich Romodanovskii, both recently returned from Crimean captivity.⁷⁶ In this account, Sheremetev and Romodanovskii, but

⁷⁴ Prince B. I. Kurakin, “Vedenie o glavakh v Gistorii,” *Arkhiv kn. F. A. Kurakina*, I, St. Petersburg, 1898, 79–94, a list of chapters for his unfinished history of Peter the Great sketched out in 1723, which mentions (82) the abolition of *mestnichestvo* as a project of Iazykov. Kurakin was six years old in 1682, though of course his relatives were important figures at court. In September 1681, Pavel Petrovich Iazykov became the assistant head of the Musketeers' Chancellery, under Prince Iu. A. Dolgorukii, whose fate he was to share in May 1682: Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 167. I. M. Iazykov was extending his network into the military offices.

⁷⁵ Most Russian historians have interpreted the abolition of precedence and the defeat of the viceroy scheme as anti-aristocratic in intent. Kliuchevskii was the first to make such an interpretation (*Boiarskaia Duma*, 492), to be later complicated by V. K. Nikol'skii, who asserted that the viceroy scheme came from Iazykov and Golitsyn, who were “westernizers.” M. Ia. Volkov and P. V. Sedov agreed that the abolition of precedence was an anti-aristocratic move, but differed on the viceroy scheme, Volkov seeing it as a proposed blow to the Duma, Sedov as a failed compromise with the great boyars. All of these notions have in common the idea that Tsar Fyodor was fighting the aristocracy with the aid of his advisors (like Iazykov) of the lower nobility and the “westernizer” progressive Golitsyn. To some extent this view may rest on Tatishchev's assessment of Iazykov and Likhachev as coming from the “low nobility” (*podloe shlahetskvo*): Tatishchev, “Tsarstvo . . . Fyodora,” *Istoriia*, VII, 175. Kollmann believes the abolition of precedence to have been the result of military modernization, and that it did not harm the elite: “With the abolition of precedence, the elite did not lose a cherished perquisite . . . the abolition decree itself also enshrined the principle of elite status”: *By Honor Bound*, 229.

⁷⁶ V. B. Sheremetev had held boyar rank since 1653, was captured at Chudново in 1660, and died on 24 April, 1682, just before Tsar Fyodor. Prince A. G. Romodanovskii received boyar rank in the middle of the discussions of precedence, at Christmas 1681 and died in 1686. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 48, 52, 190, 203.

especially the former, had a great deal of time to observe the Turkish arrangements and talk about military matters with the many other prisoners, and returned with plans of reform. They had daily access to the tsar and opened the tsar's eyes so that he ordered the changes. According to Keller, they were also behind the attempt to establish boyar viceroalties, a plan to pay the *prikaz* officials more regularly, and to expel foreign merchants no longer actively engaged in trade.⁷⁷

The plan to establish boyar viceroalties has been normally understood as an attempt to establish some sort of explicit oligarchy, apparently to make up for the loss of prestige and some power in the

⁷⁷ ARSG 7365 (1681), 17 January, 1682: "De vermaarde hooge Gevangens, de welcke enige jaaren lanck in de Chrimsse Tartarie geseten hebben (namentlick d'Oude Generael Sheremitoff, en de jonge Romodanofski) syn eindelick hier ten Hove aengekoemen: En hebben Eene Favorable Audientie gehabt by Syne Zaarssse Majesteit: de welcke haere uytgestaene miserien seer beklagende, Deselve met eene aensienlicke somma geldts geregaleert: Ende daerenbovens met een considerabel jaarlyx tractament versien heeft. De genoemde Generael, synde Een Heer van sonderlinge ervarenheit, heeft dagelyx accez by Syne Zaarssse Majesteit. Men segdt, dat deselve, gedurende Syne Gevancckenisse, het Geluck heeft gehadt van dickwils visites ende aenspraecck t'ontfangen van de Turxe Gouverneurs aldaer (die neffens den Chan in de Chrimsse Tartarie t'opperste gesach hebben) Dat men Denselven oock heeft toegelaten, te sprecken met syne Landtsliedens: De welcke met grote Troupes: als arme gevangens daernaetoe gesleept, ende alomme in de Turckie verkocht werden; en dat Hy Heere Generael uyt de conversatie met d'Eerste, ende gespreeck met d'andere, veele dingen heeft ge-observeert; Dewelcke Syne Zaarssse Majesteit d'oogen opdoen: En oorsaecke geven tot veele veranderingen, so in de Militie, als Politie. Dan voor eerst, so is hier sedert een Krygs Collegie aangestelt (t'welck noyt voor desen hier geweest is) bestaende, so wel uyt buytenlandsse, als geboren Russische officiers: In het welcke de Heere Generael Knees Wasili Wasiliwitz Galytsen, als Hooft praesideert. Daerop is geresolveert een reductie onder gemelte officieren: en sullende incapable off gedegradeert off ten eenemaal afgedanckt worden. De qualificeerde, ende die haere saecken verstaen, sullen daerentegens met een hooger tractament, als sy nu hebben, werden versien. D'oude ende verlaemde officiers (de welcke onbequaem syn om het Leger te volgen) sullen gedurende naer leven een seecker jaarlicks Tantum genieten: Ende haer darmede moeten contenteren. De Politie aengeende, so sullen de heeren Cancelliers, Secretarisen, Schryvers en dier gelycke personen een jaarlicks tractament aen geldt en koorn ontfangen: En daermede te vreden syn sonder eenige praesenten, ofte vereeningen, onder wat naem of praetext het oock soude moogen wesen aenteneemen of Lyff straffe. In de kleine steden ende ter platten Lande sullen Regenten verkoren werden uyt de eerlickste, ryckste oude wyseste lieden die daer syn, om Recht en Justitie aldaer te exerceren; op dat d'onderdanen van Syne Zaarssse Majesteit van de Respective Gouverneurs niet uytgesogen: Ende geconstringeert werden, omme alhier in de Statt Muskou, te koemen klagen: Ende het haere also ten eenemale te verspillen. Verders, so werden de naemen van alle d'uytheemse negocianten opgeteekent, met uytlatinge van dieselvige, de welcke buyten de negotie syn ende geene passen, om jaarlyx naer Archangel te reisen, begeren te hebben. D'opinie is dat Syne Zaarssse Mt. dese laette, als onnuute inwooners, sal doen vertrecken: Ende d'andere daerentegens sal willen beneficiëren." Keller was so sure of Sheremetev's favor that he intended to bring the old matter of high Russian tolls to him.

On bribery see N. F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absolutizma*, Moscow, 1987, 141–45; and P. V. Sedov, "Podnosheniia v moskovskikh prikazakh XVII veka," *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1 (1996), 139–50.

abolition of the precedence system.⁷⁸ There are two versions of the plan, one from the Patriarchal archive and the other ultimately from state sources. The patriarchal document summarized the first proposal, to take the honorific viceroalties (*namestnichestva*) traditionally given to the greater boyars to raise their prestige in diplomatic negotiations and make them lifetime offices of some importance. The result would have been a system very like the Polish system of office holding. The proposal came up at the same time as the abolition of precedence, in late November 1681, but Russian documents suggest that sometime before or on 12 January 1682, Patriarch Ioakim was able to persuade the tsar to reject it. Attempts to assign authorship to this version of the proposal have been largely speculative; the only comment in the patriarchal document is the suggestion that unnamed *palatstii boiars* were behind it. Most historians have taken this to mean the tsar's favorites, Iazykov, Golitsyn, and others, but it could equally well apply to Sheremetev and Prince A. G. Romodanovskii as in Keller's report.⁷⁹ Keller's account of the plan accords well with this first version:

In the small towns and the countryside regents shall be chosen from the most honorable, richest, and wisest people there are, in order to exercise law and justice there; so that the subjects of his majesty the tsar are not exploited by the respective governors, and constrained to come to complain here in the city of Moscow and at once waste all that is theirs.⁸⁰

In Keller's account, the plan was very much as the Patriarchal document described it, a proposal to benefit the high aristocracy and decentralize the administration. It is not surprising that Sheremetev and Romodanovskii would have supported such a plan, as they belonged to precisely that aristocracy. After Ioakim's defeat of this plan, sometime before 6 February 1682, a compromise plan

⁷⁸ V. O. Kliuchevskii thought that the plan also involved the division of the country among the boyars, a sort of radical decentralization plan. Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma*, 495–96; Crummev, *Aristocrats*, 33. Solov'ev believed the plan was merely intended to separate military and civil administration: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 252–53.

⁷⁹ Volkov, "Ob otmene"; Sedov, "O boiarskoi popytke." The documents are in E. Zamyslovskii, *Tsarstvovanie Fedora Alekseevicha*, St. Petersburg, 1871, XXXIV–XXXV (the patriarchal account); and Kn. M. A. Obolenskii, "Proekt ustava o sluzhebno-m starshinstve boiar," *Arkhiv istoriko-iuridicheskikh svedenii otnosiashchikhsia k Rossii izd. Nikolaem Kalachovym*, I, 2d ed., St. Petersburg, 1876, 22–44 (the actual proposed decree). Sedov assigns the second to Iazykov ("O boiarskoi popytke," 28). Sedov is probably right in rejecting Kliuchevskii's interpretation of the first plan as decentralizing, but it remains an attempt at preserving oligarchic aspects of the government, if less extreme than Kliuchevskii believed.

⁸⁰ ARSG 7365 (1681), 17 January 1682 (above, note 77).

emerged, which appears to be the one mentioned years later by Prince Boris Kurakin. This was a more modest attempt to assign new ranks to the Duma elite, putting an end to the inflation of honors, and it also failed to be enacted.⁸¹ The result of the abolition of the precedence system and the failure of aristocratic counter-proposals was to make easier the absorption of new families into the elite while keeping the great families preeminent. The new system that resulted would have made it easier for Tsar Fyodor to widen his base in the Duma, had he lived long enough.⁸²

These measures were almost the last important act of the increasingly ill tsar. There was one more. On 15 February he married for the second time. His bride was the fifteen-year-old Marfa Matveevna Apraksina, like Grushetskaia of a humble noble family with Polish connections, but even more importantly with connections to Ivan Iazykov. He married her against the advice of his physicians and "not without the displeasure of most of the grandees of the court." There were immediate rumors that Matveev would return to power, and indeed he was allowed to move back to his estate near the capital. Rumors also circulated that there would be a Naryshkin succession if the tsar died. For a brief moment Fyodor's health improved, and Matveev stayed out of Moscow. In late April, as the tsar's health worsened, Tsaritsa Natalia's brothers, Ivan and Afanasii, were seen in Moscow, home from exile. Matveev stayed at his

⁸¹ Sedov, "O boiarskoi popytke," 28–29. V. B. Sheremetev had been a boyar since 1653, and the family was already prominent in the sixteenth century. Prince A. G. Romodanovskii became a boyar on 25 December, 1681, but his father held that rank since 1656. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 190, 192, 203; Kollmann, *Kinship*, 217. For Keller's text see note 70.

⁸² One of the Swedish diplomat Christopher Kochen's anonymous Moscow informants (Kochen was the Swedish governor in Narva in 1682) reported that Golitsyn's commission, which the informant called *Prikaz razbora ratnykh liudei*, was planning to call two representatives from all ranks and towns and compile a new law code. While not improbable, this report has no confirmation in Russian sources: SRM 604: "Moscow 20 Martii 1682. Die große Commission oder Rath, worzu man auß alle Ständen und Städten 2: Persohnen anhero verschreiben und worin Knes Wasillz Wasilliewitz Gallitzin Praesediret, hat schon seinen anfangk [?] der arth aber die [?] zusammenkunfft da diese Commission im Schloß gehalten und hat man den Nahmen auff Reüssische Pricaes Rosbor Ratnig Ludej gegeben welches auff Teütsch, eine Canzley von außsuchen oder Außschuß der Kriegs leuten, ist. Noch bleibt es darbey daß man eine neuwe wohl gefundiret und vollkommene Uloschenie, oder Gesetzbuch alda einrichten und vollenden will." Lavrov, "Golitsyn," 64, regards the report as accurate. The same report asserted that Iazykov was behind the recall of Artamon Matveev from exile as the favorite realized that Fyodor was dangerously ill. In this situation Iazykov wanted to put Peter on the throne and wanted Matveev's friendship for the new reign.

newly returned estate two days ride away, keeping up with court news and the object of attention from his old friends.⁸³

The marriage to Marfa was Fyodor's last act of defiance to fate and the boyars. The persistent rumors of the return of Matveev and the Naryshkins presaged a new alliance of the tsar that went beyond his existing favorites. Simultaneously, he continued to strengthen his hand by appointing men from his household staff to the Duma, but he lacked the time to fully consolidate his position. One of the new appointments was the chamber *stol'nik*, Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn, given the palace position (also a Duma rank) of *kravchii*, a position that he would hold until 1690, while providing Peter unfailing support and considerable abilities at court intrigue.⁸⁴ On 27 April 1682, Tsar Fyodor died. He had no children, but he did have two brothers who could succeed to the throne, the weak-minded Ivan and his half-brother Peter. The stage was set for the next explosion.

⁸³ "Razriad bez mest," Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 314, 320. ARSG 7365 (1682), 7 February, 1682 (doctors advise tsar against marriage); 23 February 1682 (Tsar Fyodor married "niet sonder deplaisir van de meeste Grandes van t'Hoff"; Apraksina's family Polish and allied with the "mignon" Iazykov; rumors of the return of Matveev and a Naryshkin succession); 14 March 1682 (Fyodor's health improves; Matveev for the moment not allowed to return to Moscow); 4 April 1682 (further improvement in Fyodor's health); 25 April 1682 (sickness of Tsar Fyodor; Matveev called for and Tsaritsa Natalia's brother seen in Moscow). Matveev's return from exile is noted in the final story of his death in Matveev, *Istoriia zatocheniia*, 405–06. This last part of the text, after A. S. Matveev's petitions, may well be the work of his son, Andrei Artamonovich Matveev, and written down in the late 1690s: V. I. Buganov, *Moskovskie vosstaniia kontsa XVII veka*, Moscow, 1969, 25–27.

⁸⁴ In September 1681 Fyodor appointed one of Iazykov's relatives, Pavel Petrovich Iazykov, treasurer since February, 1681, an *okol'nichii*, at the same time putting him in the Musketeers' Chancellery. On 18 January 1682, he replaced P. P. Iazykov with a new treasurer, Mikhail Timofeevich Likhachev: RGADA f. 210, d. 7, f. 51; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 72, 167. In the weeks between his marriage and death Fyodor made four promotions to boyar rank, Prince Ivan Grigor'evich Kurakin (23 February, from *kravchii*, replacing him with Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn), Princes Mikhail Iakovlevich Cherkasskii and Boris Ivanovich Prozorovskii (24 February, both from *stol'nik* and "near person") and Aleksei Semenovich Shein (9 April, from chamber *stol'nik*): RGADA, f. 210, d. 7, ff. 32–32v; "Razriad bez mest," 316–18. Fyodor seems to have been strengthening the Duma with men from his household. Normally on or shortly after a marriage the tsars promoted the wife's relatives, but the only such case here was much more humble, the promotion of Marfa's brothers Petr, Fyodor and Andrei Matveev Apraksin to chamberlains (*spal'niki*) from simple *stol'niki*. This was a household appointment since the brothers were presumably too young for the Duma. Petr and Fyodor were to become major figures in Peter's reign. Fyodor also promoted to Duma gentleman (5 March 1682) V. V. Golitsyn's client Fyodor Savich Narbekov: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 203.

Fyodor also continued the reductions in the officer corps (at least of foreign officers) which Keller reported earlier: ARSG 7365 (1682): 4 April 1682.

CHAPTER 4

The regency of Sofia, 1682–1689

The death of Tsar Fyodor on 27 April 1682, came in the middle of the young tsar's attempts to strengthen his political position by his marriage and new Duma appointments. His disappearance from the scene cut that process short, leaving his favorites, Golitsyn, the Iazykovs, and the Likhachevs, high and dry. The plans to ally with the Naryshkins and return Matveev to Moscow were still in the early stages, and even the briefly influential V. B. Sheremetev had died three days before the tsar himself. This was an explosive situation among the great boyars, for the court was still in flux, and there was no reason to believe that Matveev or the Naryshkins would forgive their enemies after the ordeals of 1676–77. At the same time, trouble was brewing among the musketeers, trouble that would soon lead to a bloody revolt and reorganization of power at the Russian court.

The reorganization of power was the result of the revolt, not its aim or its cause. The revolt of the musketeers was the outcome of basic social and military discontent among them, resentment of their exploitation by some of the colonels for private purposes, and the indifference of the government authorities to this exploitation. After the first day of the revolt, other issues arose that had nothing to do with the social discontent of the *strel'tsy*, and directed the revolt away from the social issues and against Artamon Matveev and the Naryshkins, in support of Tsarevich Ivan Alekseevich and his allies. In addition to the musketeers' revolt, Tsar Fyodor's death set off a struggle for power among the boyars that proceeded parallel to the musketeers' rebellion. We do not know very much about this struggle, which was conducted behind the scenes.¹ Sofia was invisible

¹ Later narrative sources, both friendly to Sofia (Medvedev) and hostile (Andrei Matveev), give a much larger role to Sofia than the contemporary ones, such as the diplomats' reports. V. I. Bуганов and Lindsey Hughes noted Sofia's minor role during the high point of the

until the outbreak of violence on 15 May, only then emerging as a major player. Her obscurity before the events should not surprise us, for she was only twenty-four at the time. She grew up in the sheltered environment of the women's quarters of the palace, where she was expected to respect her elders, including until 1679 her aunt Irina. In a series of steps, Golitsyn and Sofia gradually moved to the center of the stage in the course of the year. The destruction of Matveev and the Naryshkins, as well as of Fyodor's favorites, certainly cleared the way for the emergence of Sofia and Golitsyn, but we have no real evidence that they directed that destruction. After the election of Ivan had calmed the musketeers, the boyar rivalries took second place to the effort to suppress the musketeers and their new-found champion, the general Prince Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii. By autumn 1682, the troubles were over and an uneasy compromise had been reached, with Sofia and Prince V. V. Golitsyn having finally attained power. The surviving Naryshkins and their numerous allies remained, albeit in a secondary position, but the young Peter was still one of the two reigning tsars.

THE REVOLT OF THE MUSKETEERS

The musketeers' revolt grew out of incidents that occurred as Fyodor was still on his deathbed.² Since early in 1682, the musketeers of the Pyzhov regiment had been complaining that Colonel Pyzhov kept back their wages. On 23 April, the musketeers of the Griboedov regiment delivered a petition complaining that Colonel Semen Griboedov had forced them to labor on his estate during Holy week and other abuses. They brought the petition to P. P. Iazykov, a relative of the favorite I. M. Iazykov and a newly appointed *okol'nichii* and official of the Musketeer Chancellery.³ Iazykov gave the petition to his superior, Prince Iu. M. Dolgorukii, telling him it came from a drunken musketeer who also had bad

revolt: Buganov, *Moskovskie vosstaniia*, 173–79; Hughes, *Sophia*, 52–70. See also A. S. Lavrov, *Regentstvo tsarevny Sofii Alekseevny*, Moscow, 1999, 15–24.

² Butevant relation, Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 330–46 (=TKUA Rusland, B40, 19 May, 1682). The Polish “*Diariusz zabójstwa*,” though frequently used by historians, is not a reliable source for these events. It contains frequent crude mistakes, and is of uncertain provenance and date (it refers to Peter alone as the “present tsar,” which would suggest a post-1696 date). Like other later accounts, it gives a large role to Sofia. A. A. Miloradovich, ed., “*Diariusz zabójstwa tyrańskiego*,” *Starina i novizna* IV, St. Petersburg, 1901, 383–407.

³ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 203; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikazyne*, 72, 167.

things to say about the prince. The next day the musketeer came back to Iazykov to hear the result, and was arrested for his trouble. Iazykov tried to have him whipped, but his fellow musketeers rescued him. In the evening the musketeers began to get together to organize redress of grievances, but that night (27 April) came Tsar Fyodor's death, changing the whole situation for the moment.⁴

The next day the Boyar Duma met in the palace to decide which of the two possible heirs, Peter or his elder brother Ivan, to choose as tsar. Ivan was the elder brother, already fifteen years old and thus on the verge of his majority, but nearly blind and he had difficulty speaking. Peter was healthy, but had not quite reached the age of ten. They chose Peter. This choice does not seem to have been difficult for the boyars, perhaps because he was already the expected heir, as Keller had reported in February. The Duma ranks then came out to the porch of the palace to consult the lesser ranks, the *stol'niki* and others, who shouted for Peter. Only M. I. Sumbulov, a Moscow gentleman by rank, shouted for Ivan. The people, including the musketeers, swore allegiance to Peter. Keller claimed that the musketeers were discontented with the choice from the first, but he does not assign a clear date: their discontent with Peter may have erupted only in the days after the decision.⁵

The new government immediately began to reorganize the new tsar's household. On the very same day as Peter's proclamation as tsar a whole series of new *spal'niki* (chamberlains) were named. These were young men normally appointed as chamberlains to serve under the chief chamberlain (*postel'nichii*), who was still Aleksei Timofeevich Likhachev. The new chamberlains were Natalia's brothers Ivan, Afanasii, Lev, Martem'ian, and Fyodor, as well as Vasilii Fyodorovich Naryshkin. From among Peter's chamber *stol'niki* two more became

⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 330–32; ARSG 7365 (1682): 2 May 1682 (death of Fyodor, opposition of musketeers to Peter, their discontent with their colonels); “Razriad bez mest tsaria i velikogo kniazia Feodora Alekseevicha . . .”, in Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 319–20; Prozorovskii, “Sozertsanie,” 41–42. Medvedev attributed the oppression of the musketeers to I. M. Iazykov rather than Dolgorukii.

⁵ Prozorovskii, “Sozertsanie,” 43–46; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 331; “Kniga zapisnaia,” in V. I. Buganov, ed., *Vosstanie v Moskve 1682 goda: sbornik dokumentov*, Moscow, 1976, 9–10; Buganov, *Moskovskie*, 96–100; ARSG 7365 (1682), 2 May 1682: “Tegens geseide Electie schynen de Strelitsen, ofte Gardes van Syne Zarsse Majesteit, synde wel veertigh dusendt in getalle, haer te willen opposeren.” Keller went on to note their discontent with the colonels. M. I. Sumbulov was *striapchii* from 1657/58, Moscow gentleman from 1667/68, received the rank of Duma gentleman in 1682, and was tonsured 1696/67: [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 397; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 204. The story of his shouting for Ivan comes only in later sources: Matveev, *Zapiski*, 6.

chamberlains, T. B. Iushkov and Tikhon Nikitich Streshnev. The next day some of Fyodor's previous chamberlains were transferred to the new tsar, Princes I. Iu. Trubetskoi, Aleksei Vasil'evich and Aleksei Borisovich Golitsyn, two sons of Prince Mikhail Dolgorukii (Ivan and Petr) and Ivan Rodionov Streshnev, the son of Peter's tutor, Rodion Matveevich Streshnev. The two young Golitsyns were the sons of Prince V. V. Golitsyn and his later opponent and supporter of Peter, Prince B. A. Golitsyn.⁶

On the following day, Saturday 29 April, the musketeers came again to the Kremlin in large numbers, demanding the arrest and punishment of eight colonels of musketeers, including Semen Griboedov, and Matvei Kravkov, commander of one of the new-style infantry regiments. The revolt was now in full swing, for the musketeers had come out against the commanders of eight of only twenty-one regiments of Moscow musketeers. The new government gave in. Griboedov and the others were publicly whipped and suffered fines as well as expulsion from their posts on the next Monday and Tuesday, 1 and 2 May. The whippings took place in front of Prince M. Iu. Dolgorukii's Cavalry Chancellery, a warning of things to come.

According to Butenant, it was about this time that the musketeers began to complain of the exclusion of Tsarevich Ivan from the throne and the growing power of the Naryshkins, soon to be strengthened by Matveev. He connected these complaints with the decree on 1 May forbidding the Iazykovs and Likhachevs to see the tsar. The appointment on 7 May of Ivan Kirillovich Naryshkin to the rank of boyar and armorer (Iazykov's old title), even though he was only twenty-three-years old, aroused particular ire. More fuel for the fire came when Artamon Matveev returned to his old house in Moscow on 11 May. The very next day his property was returned, and his house began to fill with well-wishers and friends. In these critical days the new government made few appointments within the Duma, though it put Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov in the tsar's chamber and did make many new chamberlains.⁷ To the previous

⁶ Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 10–13; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 394, 490; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, ll. 106–07, listing the appointments to chamber *stol'nik* made by Peter alone, before the proclamation of Ivan as co-tsar. T. N. Streshnev was a major figure after 1690, heading the Military Chancellery.

⁷ The new government continued to appoint new chamberlains to Peter's household. These were the *stol'nik* Prince Mikhail Ivanov Kurakin (29 April); Prince Iurii Iur'evich Trubetskoi, and three sons of Prince Iurii Odoevskii, Mikhail, Iurii, and Vasilii (30 April); Petr Fomin

group of fourteen chamberlains it added fifteen more before the trouble started. These included many Naryshkins and Artamon Matveev's son Andrei (age sixteen), but most of them were the sons of the old princely families, Kurakin, Troekurov, Dolgorukii, Trubetskoi, and Odoevskii. The new chamberlains and chamber *stol'niki* were the Naryshkin relatives and friends, the obvious sons of the great families, and the son of V. V. Golitsyn, though not of Fyodor's other favorites. Also, they did not include any of the sons of Ivan Miloslavskii or any Apraksins. These appointments seem to reflect a fairly united aristocracy behind Peter. Decades later, Andrei Matveev was to claim that Peter had the support of the great families – Dolgorukii, Troekurov, Sheremetev – while Sofia (the mastermind of the opposition to Peter from the first, in his account) could count only on the Miloslavskii family, and the Tolstois, then a rather obscure family.⁸ The great families probably did support Peter in April and early May 1682, but so did most other of the Duma ranks. It was the crowd, the musketeers, and presumably Sofia and I. M. Miloslavskii behind the scenes who supported Ivan.

Events moved from riotous petitioning to revolt on May 15, Monday. A rumor spread on the street that Ivan Naryshkin had sat upon the tsar's throne in the tsar's cloak, and that Tsaritsa Marfa and Tsarevna Sofia Alekseevna had reproached him in the presence of Tsarevich Ivan. Supposedly the young Naryshkin had attacked the tsarevich in a rage, but the princesses stopped him. This story made Naryshkin even more hated among the common people. By noon the musketeers and one regiment of soldiers (from the new formation regiments) poured into the Kremlin armed, stood before the en-

Naryshkin (1 May); Kirill Alekseevich Naryshkin (5 May); Princes Vladimir and Vasilii Mikhailovich Dolgorukii and Fyodor Ivanovich Troekurov (7 May); Prince Ivan Ivanovich Troekurov (11 May); Prince Boris Ivanov Kurakin, Andrei Artamonovich Matveev, Mikhail Grigor'ev Naryshkin (12 May). Seven of the *spal'niki* also were chamber *stol'niki*: Vasilii and Vladimir Mikhailovich Dolgorukii, Mikhail and Vasilii Iur'evich Odoevskii, Princes Fyodor and Ivan Ivanovich Troekurov, and T. B. Iushkov. Prince B. I. Kurakin, then age six, was to become a major figure under Peter, as was A. A. Matveev.

Duma appointments were less numerous. On the same day as Ivan Naryshkin, 7 May, the *okol'nichii* Nikita Konstantinovich Streshnev became a boyar and the boyar Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov was included in the chamber (*v komnatu*). The Duma gentleman Fedor Ivanovich Leont'ev became an *okol'nichii* on May 8. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 331–34; Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 12–18; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, ll. 106–07.

⁸ Contemporary sources do not support Matveev's claims: Matveev, *Zapiski*, 6; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 91–97. Buganov and Pavlenko accept Matveev's account: Buganov, *Moskovskie*, 35; N. I. Pavlenko, *Plentsy gnezda Petrova*, Moscow, 1984, 112–14. P. A. Tolstoi had been a *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Natalia since 1676 and became a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsar Ivan 1686–92. [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 415.

trance stairs to the palace and demanded to see Tsarevich Ivan. The boyars hid. Peter, his mother, Tsarevich Ivan, and Patriarch Ioakim came out on the porch. Four of the boyars came out to speak to the musketeers, Princes M. A. Cherkasskii, Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii, and V. V. Golitsyn together with P. V. Bol'shoi Sheremetev, all important commanders of the army. The soldiers gave them a long list of dignitaries whom they demanded, all the Naryshkins, Prince Iu. Dolgorukii, Artamon Matveev, and Fyodor's favorites. According to Butenant, Sofia and Tsaritsa Marfa stood with Tsarevich Ivan, and the musketeers began to shout that they wanted Ivan as tsar, not Peter, and that the Naryshkins should be exterminated and Natalia sent to a convent. At that point Matveev and Prince Mikhail Dolgorukii appeared. The musketeers grabbed them and threw them over the stair rail onto the upraised pikes of the musketeers. The killing had started.⁹

For the rest of the day the musketeers hunted down their enemies. They grabbed Prince G. G. Romodanovskii from the patriarch and killed him in front of the Ambassadorial Chancellery with a halberd, but they spared his son. They caught I. M. Iazykov on Nikitskaia Street and brought him to the Kremlin, where they tore him to pieces. The musketeers streamed into the palace. They found the twenty-year-old Afanasii Naryshkin hiding in one of the palace chapels, and he suffered the same fate as Matveev and Dolgorukii. The head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery Larion Ivanov and his son also tried to hide in another of the palace chapels, but were found and immediately killed. Ivan Naryshkin so far escaped them, but they spotted the young Fyodor Petrovich Saltykov and, mistaking him for Ivan, killed him as well, a great irony to Butenant, for his father Petr Mikhailovich was a favorite with the musketeers. The climax of the day was the death of Prince Iurii Dolgorukii. He managed to get home, where some musketeers came to apologize for killing his son. They said they had only killed him in a rage because he had judged them harshly and supported Matveev. The elder Dolgorukii gave them vodka and beer, and after drinking it they began to leave politely. Then the wife of the recently murdered young Dolgorukii came out weeping and her father-in-law tried to comfort her saying, "Don't cry daughter, my son is dead but his

⁹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 334–35; Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 276–77.

teeth are still living.” Hearing this, the musketeers killed the old man, cutting his body in pieces and leaving them on a dung heap.

At this point rumors began to circulate that two of the late tsar’s doctors, Johann Gutmensch and Daniel von der Gaden, both converted Jews, had poisoned him. The next day it was the doctors whom the musketeers demanded in front of the palace, and when they could not find von der Gaden, they killed Gutmensch and von der Gaden’s son Michael. Tsaritsa Marfa was able to save von der Gaden’s wife. A Naryshkin cousin and the Duma secretary Averkii Kirillov were not so lucky. The third day the rebels found von der Gaden and killed him, but their big prize was Ivan Naryshkin. Even though Tsaritsas Marfa, Natalia, and Tsarevna Sofia begged for his life, the musketeers tortured him to death in the Kremlin tower of Saints Constantine and Helen, together with the doctor. This was the end of the killing. The government had to agree to execute Fyodor’s favorites, Aleksei and Mikhail Likhachev, Ivan Iazykov’s son Semen, Averkii Kirillov’s son, a major in the army, and the nine colonels of musketeers whose misdeeds had sparked the whole event. The only victory for the Naryshkins was that on 16 May Natalia was able to convince the musketeers to spare her three youngest brothers and her father, Kirill. He was merely to be sent to a monastery, and he took the vows in the Kremlin Chudov Monastery on the next day.¹⁰

The trouble began to calm down. On the last day of the revolt the government acquired several new faces, replacing the dead and disgraced: Prince Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii replaced Dolgorukii in the crucial Musketeer Office. Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii took over the Cavalry, Artillery, and Mercenaries’ Chancellery. Prince V. V. Golitsyn became head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery and the attendant financial offices. Not all new appointments were connected with the Naryshkins’ opponents, however. The boyar Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov took over the Estates Chancellery. Both of his sons were in the household of Peter, not Ivan. Boyar P. V. Sheremetev bol’shoi replaced Iazykov at the Armory and other palace offices, and he had no known connection to Miloslavskii. The government was able to avoid executing the Likhachevs and the colonels, who were all sent into exile on the twentieth. Simultaneously, the elderly Prince Nikita Odoevskii received I. M.

¹⁰ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 336–40; Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 277–78.

Miloslavskii's previous offices, the Great Treasury and the Great Income. On 26 May, however, the musketeers got their main wish, for Ivan Alekseevich was proclaimed co-tsar with Peter. According to the *Razriad*, Patriarch Ioakim and the whole upper clergy came to the palace and proposed the idea to Ivan with the support of Peter, the boyars, all ranks of servitors, and the townspeople of Moscow. Ivan graciously accepted.¹¹

The double election created a new political situation, for the household of Tsar Ivan was now another potential rival to Peter and his mother. What was not clear was whether Ivan's household would become a center around which a faction might form even though Ivan was himself incapable of any significant action. The competing center of power that did emerge, however, was not Ivan or his household but Tsarevna Sofia and her allies.¹² From this time on, she would be a major figure until 1689. Her rise may have been helped along by the decline in the fortunes of Ivan Miloslavskii, who swiftly lost his offices, the Artillery Chancellery to Prince F. S. Urusov on May 25, and the Cavalry and Mercenaries' Chancellery, to Prince Nikita Odоеvskii on 5 June. Miloslavskii never held any important position again.¹³

¹¹ Other appointments on 17 May included Khovanskii's son Prince Andrei Ivanovich (Judicial Chancellery), and V. S. Volynskii (Investigations): Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznyi*, 28, 36, 58, 98, 125, 138, 137, 152, 167; Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 18–19, 257–60, 279. Crummey implies (*Aristocrats*, 94) that Prince I. B. Troekurov was connected with the Miloslavskii, but the appointment of the prince and his sons to Peter's chamber before the uprising suggests the opposite. P. V. Sheremetev bol'shoi, the long time *voevoda* of Kiev, was the father of the general B. P. Sheremetev. The father continued to serve Peter as head of the Armory until his death in 1690 (Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 192). The son was Peter's great field marshal. Matveev asserted ("Zapiski," 6) that both P. V. Sheremetev bol'shoi and Prince I. B. Troekurov supported Peter against Sofia in early 1682.

¹² In Medvedev's account Sofia was formally proclaimed regent on 29 May at the request of the musketeers, but there is no contemporary evidence for the fact: Hughes, *Sophia*, 69–71. Lavrov argues convincingly that the documents and accounts asserting that Sofia was proclaimed regent on 29 May or some time close to that date are unreliable. The formal act of election was compiled in the autumn of 1682, after the execution of Khovanskii cemented Sofia's power, and that Medvedev's text derives from that document. Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 72–78.

¹³ Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 58, 137, 152; Buganov, *Vosstanie*, 279; For a few months Odоеvskii was a major office holder again, and he did not fail to excite envy. One of the Tatar tsarevichii and a tradesman of Iaroslavl' claimed that he and his son with their cousin, the major-domo Prince V. F. Odоеvskii, wanted to hang the musketeers, but under torture recanted and were executed. Prozorovskii, "Sozertsanie," 92–93; "Relationer til K. Christian den Femte fra den Danske envoye i Moskov Hildebrand von Horn, November 1682–Juni 1684," *Aarsberetninger fra det kongelige Geheime archiv* 6 (1876–82), 193–94. Prince F. S. Urusov was the brother of Prince P. S. Urusov, and the husband of the sister of tsar Fyodor's first wife, Agaf'ia Grushetskaia: Narbut, *Urusovy*, 9–10.

In June and later on over the summer the musketeers tried to recover monies owed them and recoup their fortunes, and the two young tsars increased their household with more chamberlains. Ivan acquired twenty-six, ten of them from the household of Fyodor. Peter added five of Fyodor's former chamberlains to the twenty-eight already in office. The very first such appointment to Ivan's household was Aleksandr Ivanovich Miloslavskii (I. M. Miloslavskii's son), soon to be followed by his brother Sergei and his cousin Aleksei Matveev Miloslavskii. The check in I. M. Miloslavskii's career over the summer put a stop to the appointment of Miloslavskiis, and the three young Miloslavskiis in Ivan's household never acquired any significant rank or appointment again. Ivan had as chamber *stol'niki* several Golovins, Princes Shakhovskoi, Sobakins, Sheremetevs, and the Princes Prozorovskii (the sons of his tutor), P. P. Saltykov, and lesser folk. He had the kin of Tolochanov and Rzhevskii, men from lesser families and probably clients of V. V. Golitsyn. Peter's chamber *stol'niki* included none of these families, but besides the Odoevskii, Dolgorukii, and Troekurov clans he had Sokovnin and the Princes Kurakin and Romodanovskii. The clans of Matiushkin, Apraksin, Iushkov, the Princes Urusov, Golitsyn, and Cherkasskii were divided. The boyar elite as a whole was divided between the two households.¹⁴

The coronation of the two boy tsars on 25 June gave another clue as to the standing of the various boyars. The leading figure was Prince V. V. Golitsyn. In the church he assisted Tsar Ivan, while his cousin Prince Boris Alekseevich performed the same services for Peter, another clear indication of the internal division in the Golitsyn clan. The boyars on the platform for the ceremony included the young tsars' tutors, Prince P. I. Prozorovskii and the *okol'nichii* B. G. Iushkov for Ivan and the boyar R. M. Streshnev for Peter. Other boyars on the platform were Princes Nikita and Iakov Odoevskii and I. A. Khovanskii and his brother Semen.¹⁵ On the day after the coronation Tsar Ivan acquired a personal *kravchii*, Prince A. P. Prozorovskii, while Prince Boris Golitsyn continued filling the same office for Peter. These were only two of the many appointments to

¹⁴ RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, ll. 106–20. The composition of the two households suggests again that Matveev's assertion that all the great families were for Peter was inaccurate.

¹⁵ Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 340–41, 343–48; Hughes, *Sophia*, 75–76; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 199, 202–20.

the Duma during the coronation days, as the new regime brought in new men. Besides Prince I. A. Khovanskii's son Andrei, M. B. Miloslavskii became a boyar, but most of the boyar appointments were predictable scions of old families: B. P. Sheremetev, Prince M. I. Lykov, Prince A. I. Golitsyn, and Prince V. P. Prozorovskii. Some were not from old families, such as B. G. Iushkov, the first in his clan to sit in the Duma. The *okol'nichie* were no different: L. S. Miloslavskii, the only one from the clan, V. A. Zmeev and V. S. Narbekov (both already close to Prince V. V. Golitsyn), and T. N. Streshnev (formerly Peter's chamberlain). Prince I. A. Khovanskii himself played no major role, in spite of his popularity among the musketeers.¹⁶

Sofia was not yet the only figure of importance, even among the princesses. On 5 July Patriarch Ioakim confronted the Old Believers in a public dispute in Moscow about the validity of the liturgical reforms carried out under Patriarch Nikon and affirmed by the church at the council of 1666–67. The dispute naturally enough led nowhere, for both sides had long ago hardened their positions so that no compromise was possible. Presiding over the dispute were Sofia and her aunt Tat'iana Mikhailovna, the eldest of the surviving Romanov women, seated on two thrones of equal height and accompanied by Tsaritsa Natalia, Peter's mother, and Tsaritsa Marfa, Fyodor's widow. Later on in the month, Sofia and her aunt both continued to participate in affairs of state. Tat'iana Mikhailovna took a major role in quieting the disturbances among the musketeers and townspeople of Archangel in July. This would normally fall under the Novgorod Quarter (V. V. Golitsyn), and indeed her actions were the subject of correspondence between Golitsyn and the secretary Emel'ian Ukraintsev. Both of them seemed to think her role in the affair perfectly normal. Golitsyn also told Ukraintsev to consult Sofia on matters of foreign affairs, the point of his letter being to tell the secretary to report to her directly, bypassing the "people of Prince Ivan Grigor'evich Kurakin."¹⁷ It is only after the end of July 1682, that she edged out her aunt Tat'iana and emerged as the only one of the Romanov women to participate formally in affairs of state in the course of the suppression of Prince Khovanskii and the rebels.

¹⁶ Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 340–41, 348; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 199, 202, 203–05.

¹⁷ Hughes, *Sophia*, 76; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 58, 152. Bуганов, *Vosstanie*, 65–68. Prince I. G. Kurakin was the object of wrath by the musketeers that year; however, in June he was appointed *voevoda* of Smolensk, but died in September: *Archiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 245–46, 360.

The final victory over Prince Khovanskii and the musketeers came after a tense period of stand-off that lasted through August. After going back and forth from the Kremlin to various locations in the environs, the court went to Kolomenskoe on 20 August, while Khovanskii remained in charge in Moscow. On 2 September the crisis matured. The court became aware (or formally took cognizance) of an anonymous letter denouncing Khovanskii's nefarious intentions, and the two tsars and Sofia (explicitly mentioned for the first time) decreed, with the agreement of the boyars, that Khovanskii and his son Andrei were to be executed. Over the next weeks the court slowly circled around Moscow toward the Trinity Monastery, sending out orders to the boyars and others, including Khovanskii himself, down to the rank of Moscow gentry and below, to assemble in the village of Vozdvizhenskoe on the road to the monastery. The ostensible purpose was to greet Ivan Samoilovich, the son of the former Ukrainian hetman. The boyar M. I. Lykov was sent to bring in Khovanskii and his son Andrei. When they had all arrived on 17 September, the sentence was announced to Khovanskii and he was immediately executed.¹⁸

This execution put an end to the rebellion. The musketeers had to surrender and were pardoned with the intervention of Patriarch Ioakim. The boyar M. P. Golovin supervised the process. In October the boyars and gentry who answered the government's call were rewarded, again explicitly in the name of Ivan, Peter, and Sofia. By 4 December the Musketeers' Chancellery had gone to the Duma secretary F. L. Shaklovityi, now a major figure in the new regime.¹⁹

The end of the rebellion also put Sofia definitively in charge of the

¹⁸ Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 24–47; Hughes, *Sophia*, 79–85; *Vosstanie*, 85–89, 262–65, 280.

Prince I. A. Khovanskii did head the boyar commissions running Moscow during the tsar's absence in August, but even his fellow commissioners were not his supporters. During 1682 Khovanskii was isolated within the elite: Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 18–24. Khovanskii and his son Andrei seem to have operated not only against the majority of the boyars but without even the total support of their family. Prince Ivan's brother Semen Andreevich (died 1695) suffered very little, though Princes Ivan Ivanovich bol'shoi (1645–1701), Petr Ivanovich bol'shoi (died 1709), and Petr Ivanovich men'shoi (1648–1716) suffered more serious conditions of exile and did not receive back their boyar titles until 1690. During Fyodor's reign Prince Petr Ivanovich had been in favor with both Prince Iurii Dolgorukii and I. M. Miloslavskii: *ibid.*, 42–47; G. Luk'ianov, ed., "Chastnaia perepiska kn. Petra Ivanovicha Khovanskogo," *Starina i novizna* 10, 1905, 283–462, esp. 301–02, 370–72; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia* I, 280–81; "Iz sobraniia aktov kniaziei Khovanskikh," *ChOIDR* (1913), pt. 4, smes', 20–21.

¹⁹ M. P. Golovin headed the *Zemskii prikaz* from October 1681 to 1688. Made *okol'nichii* in 1676 and boyar on 29 August 1682, he died in 1695. Bуганов, *Vosstanie*, 266–67 (*Razriad* notes describing the rewards to loyal boyars and gentry in the name of Ivan, Peter, and

government. Her final rise came about during the travels of the court around Moscow in August and September, and the arrest of Khovanskii is apparently the first legal act to bear her name along with those of the boy tsars. Sofia and Golitsyn were now in power, but not the Miloslavskii. Sofia soon pushed I. M. Miloslavskii aside, and the household of Tsar Ivan, which for a time formed a faction of its own, had little to do with the Miloslavskii family.

SOFIA AND GOLITSYN IN POWER

The regency of Sofia, ruling with the aid of her favorite Prince V. V. Golitsyn, lasted seven years, until September 1689. The first two years were spent in consolidation of power, ending with the ceremonies around the Swedish treaty of 1684, which demonstrated for all to see the tsarevna's central role in the state. From 1684 to 1686 Sofia and Golitsyn established a new foreign policy, an alliance with Poland (and other members of the Holy League) against the Turks. The attempt to carry out that policy, the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689, led to the collapse of the regime.²⁰

Sofia's consolidation of power was not immediate, though she and Golitsyn clearly had the upper hand after the execution of Khovanskii. The Danish ambassador Hildebrand von Horn recognized the situation at the end of the autumn of 1682:

the enmity between the widowed tsaritsa [=Natalia Naryshkina] and the older princess [=Sofia] grows daily and both sovereigns, who are moved by their mother and sister, begin to reveal more irritation than love between themselves. The boyars are also divided and most of them together with the whole young nobility are moving to the side of Tsar Peter Alekseevich, some, however, who are now nearly the greatest, along with the greater part of the populace are fundamentally opposed, although not publicly.²¹

Sofia, 25 October 1682); Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 47–72; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 51, 167–68; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 200; V. P. Alekseev, *Brianskii favorit tsarevny Sofii*, Briansk, 1992, 10–16.

²⁰ The ensuing account of the factional struggle in 1682–89 differs both from the traditional version and from the more recent account of Lavrov in two respects. The Sofia–Golitsyn faction was not really a “Miloslavskii” faction in that Ivan Miloslavskii played no role. The only “Miloslavskii” was Sofia herself. In addition, the household of Tsar Ivan, headed by the Prozorovskii, should not be identified with the Sofia–Golitsyn faction after 1684. The marriage of Ivan and Praskov'ia Saltykova and the death of Ivan Miloslavskii broke the tie of Ivan's household and the Miloslavskii and the results were evident in 1689. Lavrov's sources are too few to support his argument, including as they do so many of ambiguous character such as the lists of participants at court ceremonies: Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 79–101.

²¹ “Relationer,” 138, 28 November 1683: “die [uneinigheit] zwischen der [verwiittibeten

In the spring the Dane's Swedish rival Christopher Kochen reported the same alignment, with some details that explained the delicate equilibrium:

Between the two tsars there is great jealousy, the younger [=Peter] has the greatest following, especially among the nobility, although the older tsar [=Ivan] has given the nobility great gifts and favor, and lets everything be governed by his sister, the princess called Sofia Alekseevna, for the reason that the above humbly mentioned Tsar Ivan is entirely incapable. Most people are of the opinion that the youngest tsar would separate from the oldest and easily get the government alone. A few weeks ago various writings were found in the tsars' apartments in which among other things it was stated that the princess would keep the government to herself and the oldest tsar would go to a monastery, in which also the lord Miloslavskii and others who support the oldest tsar were threatened, and for this reason a great investigation was done to find out whence these came. Now Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, who is a very discreet gentleman, has the most to say and a great suite.

A month later Kochen added, *à propos* of a trip to the country by Peter and Ivan:

There is supposed to be great distrust between the two factions and therefore the greatest men do not really know whom they should follow and so try to keep away from the court as much as possible, so that it is difficult to find out what is happening. The oldest tsar's relative and favorite Ivan Miloslavskii is now very ill, if he dies the faction of the youngest tsar might take the upper hand.²²

zaaricin] und der ältern [princessin] täglich zunimmt und die beeden [hern], welche von ihrer [mutter] und [schwester] augerucket, mehr [verdrus] alß liebe gegen einander beginnen blicken zu lassen. Die [boiaren] sindt gleichfalß [getheilt] und ziehen die meisten nebst den ganzen [jungen adel] auf [zaar Peter Alexeiwitz] seiten, etlich aber, die anjetzo fast die grösten, nebst einen grossen theil deß [pöbels] sind diesen, wiewohl nicht öffentlich, jedoch [im] grunde zuwider] . . ."

²² SRM 114, 20 March 1683: "Unter beyden Zaaren ist grosse Jalousie, der jungste hatt den grössesten anhang, in sonderheit von den Adell. Wiewohl der ältesten Zaar, den Adell grosse geschenke und gnade erweisen, und durch seine schwester die Printzessin Sophia Alexeowna genant, alles Regieren läßet, auß ursachen weylen der Zaar Ioan, gleich oben allerunterhänigst gedacht, gantz impotent ist. Die meisten sein der meinung, daß der jüngste Zaar sich von den ältesten Separiren, und als den die Regierung läichte allein erhalten würde. Vor einige wochen hat man unterschiedliche schriften, in der Zaar. gemächer gefunden, worinnen unter andern gemeldet, das die erwente Printzessin sich der Regierung enthalten, und er ältesten Zaar in ein Kloster sich begeben solte, worinnen auch dem Herrn Miloslawskoi und anderen mehr, die es mit dem ältesten halten, gedreuwet werden, weßwegen grosse nachfrage anitzo gethan wird, woher dieses gekommen ist. Anitzo hat Knes Wassilli Wassiliiwitz Gallitzin, der recht ein discreter herr ist, daß meiste zu sagen, und viele auffwartung." 24 April 1683: "Es soll gross mistrauwen zwischen beyden factionen sein, dahero die grössesten nicht recht wiszen an wehn sie sich hängen und so viel müglich dem hoeffe abzuhalten suchen sollen, jedoch so kan man noch nichts

These dispatches capture the moment in the battles at court. Von Horn's implies that before November the enmity of Sofia and Natalia had been restrained, and also that the boyars had not taken sides. Only after the final end of the musketeer revolt did the factional battle come to the fore, and the majority of the boyars supported Peter. By the term *junges adel* von Horn presumably meant the lesser Duma ranks (younger in rank, and including many new men) and perhaps also the chamberlains and chamber *stol'niki*, who were in fact mostly younger sons of the great families. The minority, "nearly the greatest," must have meant Golitsyn and Ivan Miloslavskii, but may also have included others of the major families. Von Horn is clear that whatever the sympathies of the populace, the Naryshkins enjoyed the support of most boyars and the younger (or lesser) nobility.

Kochen confirmed the extent of support for Peter among the nobility, great and small, and his picture of the hesitation of the greater boyars, waiting to see how the wind would blow, explains how Sofia and her allies could remain in power with so little support among the ruling elite. Sofia and Golitsyn were certainly in power, but dangerously exposed from the very start of their ascendancy. The two made an effective political alliance, the young princess and the forty-year-old boyar and general, but the base of their power was not secure.²³

Their task was not only to maintain and strengthen their hold on the government, but also to carry out a certain foreign policy, an alliance against the Turks. This project required them first to clarify relations with Sweden and Denmark. Since the last years of Tsar Aleksei Russia's relations with Sweden had been poor, but substantive differences between Moscow and Stockholm were not great and common interests could easily overcome them. With the larger European war ended by the treaty of Nijmegen (1678) and the Danish-Swedish war by the treaty of Lund (1679), the situation in

gewisses davon erfahren, des ältesten Zaarens verwanter und favorit Iwan Michailowitz Miloslaftsky ist anitzo sehr krank, solte derselben sterben, so möchte des jüngsten Zaaren seine faction überhandt nehmen."

²³ Later rumor described the relationship of Sofia and Golitsyn as erotic. None of the diplomats seemed to think that any relationship existed other than Sofia's favor for the prince, a relationship that had no necessarily erotic overtones. Later rumors are in Neuville and Kurakin: A. S. Lavrov, ed., *De la Nevill', Zapiski o Moskovii*, Moscow, 1996, 99, and *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 48. Matveev saw Golitsyn as simply enjoying Sofia's "favor" (*milost'*): Matveev, "Zapiski," 50. Hughes is skeptical of any romantic attachment: *Sophia*, 227–29.

the north changed radically. Under the influence of his chancellor Bengt Oxenstierna, Karl XI of Sweden switched his allegiance away from Sweden's long-time ally France to the Netherlands, causing Denmark in turn to move toward France. For the Russians, these changes were significant in relation to the Ottomans, for France was the great ally of the Ottomans, and the Netherlands and now Sweden, the enemy of France. Consequently, Sweden had an interest in preserving peace with Russia to free Moscow to fight in the south. Denmark, in contrast, wanted to prevent a Russian-Swedish rapprochement both out of its particular hostility to Sweden and the greater loyalty to France and France's Turkish ally.²⁴ In order to move toward war with the Turks, Sofia and Golitsyn had first to make a firmer peace with Sweden and then a final settlement with Poland. These political issues were intertwined with the factional struggle at the Russian court from the earliest weeks of 1683 until the final overthrow of Sofia, for the Naryshkins did what they could to oppose the Swedish and Polish alliances.

The game began in January, 1683. Von Horn went to a banquet at the house of the Danish commercial agent Butenant, where he talked to many of the Russian boyars. Golitsyn was very friendly to von Horn personally, but said nothing of politics. Prince Vasiliï Fyodorovich Odoevskii, the head of the main palace offices, in contrast, told the Dane that the Russians would support Denmark in a war against Sweden. This comment says more about his own preferences (and therefore implies he supported Peter against Sofia and Golitsyn) than it does about the Russian government. Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn and Prince Lykov (evidently Mikhail Ivanovich) warned von Horn with tears in their eyes of the daily danger to Peter.²⁵ Thus three major boyars were clearly on Peter's side.

The Danish resident received many visits from Peter's supporters in the ensuing weeks. The metropolitan of Smolensk, Simeon, came to tell demeaning stories of V. V. Golitsyn's past, and soon after, Boris Golitsyn came for another visit with Prince Lykov again and

²⁴ Zernack, *Studien*, pp. 114–19; Knud J. V. Jespersen, *Danmarks Historie*, III, Copenhagen, 1989, 253–57.

²⁵ "Relationer," 141 (22 January). Boris Golitsyn made overtures of friendship to von Horn some days later, again weeping over Peter's situation: "Relationer," 142–43 (20 February). The only Prince Lykov of Duma rank in the second half of the seventeenth century was Mikhail Ivanovich: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 179, 182, 202.

“a young Dolgorukii.” Sofia got wind of all this activity and reproached Natalia: “saying that she not only turned her own people against the elder prince but even tried to draw foreign ministers to her camp.”²⁶ Throughout the spring the intrigues continued, while Ivan struggled with poor health (Peter had to take the tsar’s place in the Palm Sunday procession alone) and the two young tsars spent much of their time in the countryside. The nobility was increasingly discontented with the great boyars as the situation grew more tense. To check the Naryshkins, Sofia decided to marry Ivan off, and turned to the Saltykovs for a bride. One of them even took von Horn to meet his sister in June, a nun and “intimate friend” of Sofia. The nun Saltykova told him that the marriage project was very serious, and when von Horn asked if heirs would be expected, the reply was that Sofia would turn everything upside down to prevent Peter from ruling alone.²⁷

Boris Golitsyn grew more desperate, and in July 1683, came pleading to von Horn for help, again in tears over Sofia’s hostility to Peter, and sending a Latin message to the king of Denmark, which he virtually dictated in his own words to the Dane. The idea was that Christian V should convince his allies in France, England, and Brandenburg to support Peter against Sofia. They should send ambassadors who would secretly, if not openly, support Peter. A few weeks later Emel’ian Ukraintsev, Duma secretary and second in command (after V. V. Golitsyn) in the Ambassadorial Chancellery, repeated in very confidential talks the proposal of a Russian alliance with Denmark, Brandenburg, and France against Sweden, in which Russia would demand Ingermanland and Karelia. He recommended that von Horn speak with Golitsyn, which the Dane did, only to receive a very ambiguous, even deceptive, answer. He did not reveal

²⁶ “Relationer,” 145–46 (undated, but *c.* 26 March 1683), 147 (15 May 1683).

²⁷ SRM 114, 3 April 1683 (Ivan too ill to participate in the Palm Sunday procession, leaving Peter alone); 8 May 1683 (“Der Adel ist anitzo nicht wohl auf die meisten grossen herrn zu sprechen, und lassen dieselben Ihrn ungeneigtheit ziemlich vermercken, alles lässt sich zu einer neuen tumult ansehen.” I. M. Miloslavskii’s health better); “Relationer,” 149 (19 June, 1683): “Eine [religieuse] von grosser [familie] und vertraute [freundin] von [prinzes Sophia Alexewna] namenß [Soltikowa] welch[e] ich] gestern in ihrer [ze[l]] durch vermittelung [ihres bruders] welcher mit sich genommt, gesprochen, versicherte mich, daß man sich eußerstes bemühet dem [eltesten herrn] eine [gemahlin] zuzuführen, undt solches eintzig undt allein auf antrieb oberwehnter printzessin. Wie ich aber weiter fraget, ob man auch auß solcher [heirath erben hoffen] dürffte, ward mir geantwortet, daß solche sich auch [finden würden] zumahlen gewiß, das [die prinzes Sophia] lieber daß [unterste oben kehren] würde, alß zugeben, daß [ihr jüngster burder allein regiren solte].”

his cards, but certainly knew that "the Danish party" was trying to prevent peace with Sweden, and thus an alliance with Poland and the empire. The Ukrainian hetman Samoilovych made his opposition to any treaty with Poland known, thus putting himself in the Naryshkin camp. In late August von Horn was still convinced that "not only the whole court but also the common Moscow nobility was entirely persuaded that this country has no better friend . . . than your majesty."²⁸

The nobility in Moscow may have been persuaded of the need for Danish friendship, but Sofia and Golitsyn were not. I. A. Pronchishchev had left Moscow for Stockholm in May, to Horn's dismay, but he had no way of knowing how well the embassy was going. Serious discussions began only in October with Bengt Oxenstierna and other Swedish officials, but they were conducted in the friendliest possible atmosphere and led to an agreement in principle to renew the 1661 treaty of Kardis and forget subsequent disputes. The formal agreement came on 30 October and the Swedes promised an embassy to Moscow in the new year for final ratification.²⁹

In the fall, the court intrigues in Moscow were growing more heated. During the September pilgrimage to the Trinity Monastery Sofia exchanged sharp words with Peter himself, and Prince V. V. Golitsyn and Prince Mikhail Alekukovich Cherkasskii argued so fiercely that they drew daggers at one another and were separated only with difficulty. Von Horn continued to cultivate Boris Golitsyn, helping him during a fire, after which Tsaritsa Natalia sent Andrei Artamonovich Matveev (then seventeen!) to assure him that help to Boris Golitsyn was as good as help to her and Peter. In October came the news of the great Turkish defeat at Vienna, an event which further heartened the supporters of an alliance with the empire and

²⁸ "Relationer," 149–52, 154: 16 July, 1683; 23 July 1683; 20 August 1683.

Keller supported the Dutch ally Sweden against Denmark, noting that the "Danish party" at court was trying to hinder the alliance of Russia with the Empire, Sweden and Poland: ARSG 7365 (1683), 3 July 1683: "De Deensse Partie onophoorlick, om alle correspondentien en alliantien met Den Roomschen Keiser, Sweden en Polen te verhinderen: Betonende also by desen tydt van beeter Turcx, als Christens besint te wesen"; 30 July 1683 (Samoilovych opposes treaty with Poland); 27 August 1683 (more intrigues of the Danish party against a treaty); Kostomarov, *Ruina, Sobranie sochinenii*, XV, 333. Sofia and Golitsyn also planned to call a *Zemskii Sobor* in the winter of 1683–84 to ratify their accommodation with Poland, but it proved unnecessary: V. K. Nikol'skii, "Zemskii sobor o vechnom mire s Pol'shei 1683–4 g." *Nauchnye trudy industrial'no-pedagogicheskogo instituta imeni. K. Libknekhta*, Seriiia sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaiia, vyp 2 (1928) 1–75; Lavrov, *Regentsvo*, 115–38.

²⁹ Zernack, *Studien*, 127–29.

Poland, that is, Sofia and V. V. Golitsyn. At his country estate Prince M. A. Cherkasskii and his guest Boris Golitsyn met with von Horn and assured him that Tsaritsa Natalia would do whatever she could to help Denmark's cause, but was afraid that her open intervention would do more harm than good. By the end of November news of the agreement with Sweden had arrived in Moscow, and von Horn had an unproductive conversation with Vasilii Golitsyn, but was beginning to accept defeat. Boris Golitsyn told him that he had himself canvassed the most important boyars about a treaty with Denmark, and found them all favorable, but he could not persuade his cousin Vasilii either to bring the issue to the Boyar Duma or to give him a good reason why he should do so. Emel'ian Ukraintsev joined them, and Boris grew angrier and angrier, wondering if his cousin Vasilii was blind or bribed by the Swedes so that he preferred to betray his fatherland and bring eternal shame to the Golitsyn family. Some weeks later Natalia and Boris Golitsyn advised the Dane to try to bribe Vasilii Golitsyn, to no avail.³⁰ The Swedish treaty would go through, the first major step on the road to the alliance with Poland and the Holy League.

In early 1684 Polish and Imperial diplomats came to Moscow, the former to try to resolve the many outstanding differences, and the latter to encourage that resolution.³¹ The only agreement that came out of the Imperial embassy was Golitsyn's oral permission for two Jesuits to come to Moscow and open a Catholic church in the German Suburb. This was a controversial decision, and one that would cost Sofia and Golitsyn dear with Patriarch Ioakim. Little progress was made with Poland, but the Swedish treaty was now a certainty, so Sofia could turn her attention to Ivan Miloslavskii. He

³⁰ Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 85; "Relationer," 155–72: (10 September 1683) fire at the home of Boris Golitsyn, message from Natalia and Peter via A. A. Matveev; (1 October 1683) incidents on the pilgrimage to the Trinity Monastery; (22 October 1683) "Knais Boris, mit welchen ich gestern eine meile von hier bey knais Michael Aleukowitsch Zirkaski auf sein landgut zum eben genöthiget war, versicherte mich, daß die [verwitwete zaarizin] alleß in der welt thun würde umb dieseß werck [na[ch] meinen wundsche] durch [zutreiben] allein weihn [sie] sich befürchtet, daß [ihre] zusprache mehr [hindern] alß [nützen] moechte] muß alleß von dieser seiten [verdeckt] undt unter [der hand geschehen]"; (26 November 1683) news of agreement with Sweden arrived 25 November, fruitless conversation with Vasilii Golitsyn, discussion of Boris Golitsyn with Ukraintsev in von Horn's presence. ARSG 7365 (1683) 15 October 1683 (news of defeat of Turks at Vienna).

³¹ In January 1684 Patrick Gordon was stilling trying to convince Prince V. V. Golitsyn that a war against the Ottomans that involved an invasion of Crimea was both desirable and possible: Patrick Gordon, *Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon*, ed. M. A. Obolenski and M. C. Posselt, 3 vols., St. Petersburg 1849–52, II, 1851, 4–11.

had already lost his offices in May and June 1682, and at the end of that same year von Horn reported that some of the last musketeers to show rebellious tendencies named him as their potential leader. In the next spring Miloslavskii was ill, but still seemed to be a major figure.³² It was the marriage of Tsar Ivan to Praskov'ia Saltykova which set off the final dispute with Miloslavskii.

Praskov'ia was not happy with her fate: she said publicly that she would rather die than have Tsar Ivan for her husband. For the immediate future of the government poor Praskov'ia's feelings were less important than the conflict between Miloslavskii and Vasilii Golitsyn. The marriage was the idea of Sofia and Miloslavskii and was designed to raise Tsar Ivan's status and diminish Peter's, for Peter was showing far too much promise. Praskov'ia's father was the best friend of Miloslavskii and besides that, the family was not so large as to become a burden to the ruling house. Miloslavskii was also jealous of Golitsyn, and began to intrigue with Sofia's sisters, telling them that there was no reason that Sofia, who was not even the eldest, should rule alone without them. Therefore they should insist on the marriage, which would also diminish Sofia. At that point Sofia and Vasilii Golitsyn began to backtrack, but it was too late, and the marriage took place in January 1684.³³

Miloslavskii did not give up. In early March he began to canvass the nobility, inviting them to dinners and speaking against Golitsyn. The impending arrival of a Swedish embassy was putting a strain on many budgets, and Miloslavskii distributed hay and oats to the nobles for their horses. He railed at Vasilii Golitsyn's injustice and at Sofia as well, saying that either he or the favorite's neck must be broken. The enmity was so great that

³² "Relationer," 139–41 (2 January 1683). Von Horn reported that the Krog Regiment of musketeers and two others planned a revolt, but that two of the soldiers had revealed the plan to Golitsyn, who sent "Ziegler" (Tsykler) to capture the ringleaders, which Tsykler did. The prisoners asserted that I. M. Miloslavskii had commanded them to revolt. The prisoners were immediately beheaded and the rest of the men in the regiment were pardoned. This must be part of the revolt of the men of the regiment of Pavel Bokhin that began in October: Buganov, ed., *Vosstanie*, 242–43; Buganov, *Moskovskie*, 313–18; SRM 114, 24 April 1683 (I. M. Miloslavskii very ill); A. V. Florovskiy, *Čeští jesuité na Rusi: Jesuité české provincie a slovanský východ*, Prague, 1941, 116–24.

³³ "Relationer," 172 (23 December 1683): "Diese dame [=Saltykova] ist eine der schönsten dieseß gantzen landeß; [allein man glaubet], daß sie vielleicht [für] dem [beylager] auß [herzeleyt sterben werde, weiln sie öffentlich] sich [verlauten lassen], daß sie [lieber sterben] alß [dieses herrn gemahl werden wolte]"; 172–74 (16 January 1684): intrigues around the marriage, Peter has smallpox.

V. V. Golitsyn and Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii quarrelled in the presence of Princess Sophia to the point that they drew knives. The princess prayed with tears in her eyes not to make noise and to think of the interest of the country rather than their own. Golitsyn did not quibble to sacrifice his hatred to the tears of a princess who had not hesitated to sacrifice her heart to him, but the other said aloud that he would die rather than see things continue as they were.

In early April another incident involving both boyars kept the fires stoked. An official of the Treasury, claiming that he was one of the Naryshkins, managed to penetrate the palace all the way to Peter's anteroom, where one of the ladies stopped him, noticing that he carried a knife. He was arrested and confessed that Ivan Miloslavskii had sent him to kill Peter and his mother. The confession enraged Miloslavskii, and Prince Boris Golitsyn pointed out to him that his rage only made him more suspect. Vasili Golitsyn mocked his cousin's loyalty to Peter, saying that even the apostles did not offer to die for Christ at the crucifixion.³⁴ Miloslavskii, however, had no chance to avenge his defeats, for he died in July, 1685.

In theory the marriage of Tsar Ivan to a clan friendly with both Sofia and Miloslavskii should have at the very least strengthened Sofia's position by further attaching Tsar Ivan and his household to her. The branch of the Saltykovs from which the bride came was friendly with Ivan Miloslavskii and much less important than the older branch. Praskov'ia's father, Aleksandr (Fyodor) Petrovich Salt'kov, merely a Moscow gentleman by rank, attained boyar rank only because of his daughter's marriage.³⁵ He was governing Eniseisk in

³⁴ "Relationer," 177-78, 10 March 1684: Miloslavskii canvasses the nobles, provides fodder, and denounces Golitsyn; 181, 25 March 1684, von Horn to Gabel (then Danish ambassador in Poland): "Il y a environ quinze jours que k. W. W. G. et Ivan Michalovitsch Miloslavski se querellent dans la presence de la princesse Sophia, mesmes jusques a couteau tirer. La dite princesse les pria, les larmes aux yeux, de ne faire point de bruit et de songer plustost a l'interest de leur patrie qu'a leur propre. Gollicin ne marchanda point de sacrifier sa haine au larmes d'une princesse, qui n'a pas doutée de lui faire un sacrifice de son coeur, mais l'autre dit tout haut, qui creveroit plutot que de voir plus longtemps les affaires aller comme elles vont a present"; 182-83, 14 April 1684 (incident with the treasury clerk and subsequent recriminations); SRM 115 (30 April 1684): "Bey hiessiger itziger Regierung ist keine vertrauwligkeit noch sicherheit, man hat vor einigen tagen, einen schreiber, der in den Zar. Grossen Schatz sizet, auß verdacht gepeiniget, derselbe soll bekant haben, daß man den jüngsten Zaaren vergeben will, worüber Ivan Michalowitz Miloslavskoi (welcher mit dem ältesten Zaaren befreundet) in verdacht kommen. Ob nun der Schreiber in sein tortur auff ihn und mehr andere etwas ausgesaget, kan man nicht erfahren, der Schreiber aber soll anitzo unsichtbahr sein und weiß man nicht wo er hinkommen ist."

³⁵ The Saltykovs were part of the great group of clans descended from the Morozovs, Moscow boyars since the 1380s. The Saltykovs had branched off and entered the Duma in their own right in the early years of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, maintaining that position from

Siberia at the time of his daughter's marriage, and had to be brought back swiftly. His branch of the family were the descendants of the boyar Mikhail Glebovich Saltykov who supported King Sigismund of Poland in the Time of Troubles, and went to Poland after the Russian victory, settling near Smolensk. Russia's victory over the Poles in 1654 returned them to Russia, where they stayed, making no great career but earning Miloslavskii's friendship. It was that friendship that brought them into the ruling dynasty. Aleksandr-Fyodor was little heard of, and died in 1697.³⁶

The Swedish embassy arrived on 29 April 1684, dashing any hopes Prince Boris Golitsyn and the Naryshkins might have had of preventing an agreement with Russia. The Swedish embassy had to be received formally, and that necessity brought the factional battle

then on. In the elder branch, Mikhail Mikhailovich Saltykov was in the Duma from 1613 to his death in 1671. Potocki wrote of his illustrious ancestry and that he would have grown old still powerful if the envious had not blinded Tsar Aleksei to his virtue. His cousin Ivan Ivanovich was physically blind and frail with old age, but until his death in 1670 remained of such strong memory that he was consulted like an oracle. M. M.'s son Petr Mikhailovich (who had entered the Duma as *kravchii* in 1647, attaining boyar rank eleven years later) came in for much praise as well: "he brought from an opulent and wealthy house few vices (a thing to amaze one) but many virtues to the boyar estate." He was a man of great prudence and loyalty to the tsar, and who escaped the rivalry of other great men to remain in the constant favor of Aleksei. The wealth was not an exaggeration: the Saltykov clan had some 12,000 male souls in their hereditary estates in the 1670s, an immense fortune which does not even include service landholding. P. M. Saltykov had held many important posts, most recently the headship of the Great Treasury from 1670 to 1672 and governorship of Astrakhan' with his sons Fyodor and Aleksei as assistants in 1677–78. His son Aleksei Petrovich became a boyar directly from *stol'nik* in the wake of the double coronation of 1682. His brother Petr Petrovich Saltykov married Princess Mariia Ivanovna Prozorovskaia, the sister of Tsar Ivan's tutor and achieved boyar rank in 1688. Petr Petrovich's daughter Anna was the wife of Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin, Tsar Peter's uncle, and later of field marshal Sheremetev. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 180–81, 183, 193, 204, 206; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, l. 33v, 35v, 92v, 112v, 115–15v; boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 71v; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 27; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 12; O. A. Shvatchenko, *Svetskie feodal'nye votchiny v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka*, Moscow, 1996, 151, 277; Potocki, *Moschovia*, 195–96; LeDonne, "Ruling Families", 282.

³⁶ Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 86, note 14. DR IV, 270. A. P. Saltykov, *voevoda* in Nizhni Novgorod in 1663–65 and Eniseisk in 1683, was also the brother of Pawel Potocki's wife Elena-Eleonora. After the marriage in 1684 he took the same post in Kiev: Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, II, 71–74; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 73–74, 104, 150. Praskov'ia's brother Vasilii (died 1730) was appointed chamber *stol'nik* to Ivan in 1682–83 and remained at that rank until 1690, when Peter made him his *kravchii*, a position he retained to the end of the reign. He later earned notoriety for beating his wife, born Princess Aleksandra Grigor'evna Dolgorukaia, until her father, Prince Grigorii Dolgorukii, managed to secure a divorce: RBS 18, 74–75; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, 531–32. Praskov'ia's first cousin Petr Samoilovich Saltykov was chamber *stol'nik* of Tsar Ivan in 1682–83, boyar and governor of Smolensk 1691–1713 and of Kazan' thereafter: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 16v, RBS 18, 104–05.

out into the open in the Duma. Vasilii Golitsyn raised the issue of Sofia's role in the state:

At the first audience given to the Swedish ambassadors whom I have frequently mentioned, [wrote von Horn], the Princess Sophia was definitely present and as a ruling princess wanted to conduct the discussion in place of her brothers during their minority. Now since this is something not only of exceedingly serious consequences but also without example, it was necessary to call together the entire Duma, in which this intention was not only not approved, but also there was great amazement that such a thought could even be considered. Prince Vasilii, who had inspired the princess with this desire, said that much in the past was not customary and now not only could but must be introduced into use. He referred to the example of Queens Elizabeth of England and Christina of Sweden who not only gave public audiences to all the foreign emissaries but also for some time ruled their kingdoms in a good and praiseworthy fashion. It was answered to that, that there was a great difference to be made, since the above mentioned queens remained in the government without brothers as the legitimate heiresses.

Golitsyn's proposal would have passed, if Patriarch Ioakim had not raised his voice and managed to prevent such an outcome. A few weeks later the Duma reversed its decision and decided to allow Sofia, as well as Tsaritsa Praskov'ia, to meet both the Swedish and imperial ambassadors. During these weeks Sofia was also trying to have herself formally proclaimed regent. The Swedes did meet with Sofia and peace with Sweden was confirmed. Denmark had to be content with a treaty signed on 10 August 1684 that contained almost nothing but the resolution of protocol issues. The only satisfaction for the Naryshkins was that the Imperial ambassadors refused to meet Sofia.³⁷ Sofia and Golitsyn had won again, and moved on toward the crucial treaty with Poland.

³⁷ "Relationer," 183–84 (30 April 1684, arrival of Swedes); 184–86 (14 May 1684): "Bey gegebener ersten audiens an mehr erwehnte Schwedische gestandten hat [die prinzesse Sophia] absolut ge[ge]nwaertig sein] und alß [regierende prinzeßin] wehrender ihrer [bruder minorennetit] an dero [stat] daß [wort fuhren wollen]. Weiln nun dieseß nicht allein eine sache von [uber]auß nach[daencklichen] folgen sonder auch ohne [exempel ist], alß hat nohtwendig der [gantze raht hieruber] müßen [beruffen] werden, drinnen man dieseß fürnehmen nicht allein [nicht gebilliget, sondern sich] zum höchsten verwundert, daß man [dergleichen gedanken fassen dürfen. Knias Wassili, welcher] erwehter [prinzesin] dieseß verlangen ein[geblasen], sagte daß viel in vorigen zeiten [nicht gebraeuchlich ge]wesen, welcheß [anietzo] nicht allein [koente] sondern auch müste [zum gebrauch] ein[gefuret werden]. Er zogk hierauf [an die exempel] der könig[inen Elisabet] und [Christinen, welche nicht] allein an allen fremden [ministern oeffentliche audientzen] ge[geben] sondern auch eine geraume zeit ihre [reichen loeblich und wohl geregiret]. Man antwortete hierauf, daß hierinnen ein großer unterscheid zumachen, zumahlen oberwehnte

After the end of 1684 the rivalries at court died down, and the young Peter began to spend his time in cannon foundries and with other military interests.³⁸ In these years a realignment must have been taking place among the boyars, for, starting in 1687, when the diplomats began to report the reemergence of factional rivalries, their terminology changed. No more was their talk of the rivalry between the two tsars, but rather of the struggle of the supporters of Sofia and V. V. Golitsyn against those of Peter. There is no evidence in 1687–89 of the views of those associated with Ivan's household, but after the overthrow of Sofia, as we shall see, the Princes Prozorovskii, the Saltykovs, and others would receive great offices as rewards along with those connected with Peter's household and the Naryshkin faction. Similarly, those who lost offices with V. V. Golitsyn and went into exile, honorary or otherwise, were mostly the lesser folk who had been V. V. Golitsyn's clients as early as the reign of Fyodor. Even as they expanded the size of the Boyar Duma to unprecedented numbers, Sofia and V. V. Golitsyn came to rely on an increasingly narrow base among the ruling elite. To top it off, Sofia alienated Patriarch Ioakim over the Eucharistic controversy in 1685–87.³⁹

Sofia and Vasilii Golitsyn spent much of 1684–86 on negotiations with Poland, and after the failure to stop the treaty with Sweden the Naryshkins seem to have given up trying to obstruct the government's foreign policy. Hetman Samoilovych continued to object, arguing with Russian officials sent to convince him of the value of

[koeniginen] allein undt ohne [bruder und] folglich alß recht[maessige erben] in der [regirung nachgeblieben] wehren."; 186–87 (27 May 1684, Sofia to have an audience with the Swedes); 187–89 (10 June 1684, refusal of Imperial ambassadors to meet Sofia, Sofia proposes to the Duma that she be crowned); SRM 111 (audience); SRM 115, 1 July 1684 (refusal of Imperial ambassadors to meet Sofia to satisfaction of Peter's side); Zernack, *Studien*, 131–33.

³⁸ SRM 115, 24 February 1685 (power of Sofia and V. Golitsyn continues, Peter occupied with military affairs and cannon foundries); 3 March 1685 (Peter shooting cannon); 29 December 1685 (continued power of Sofia and V. Golitsyn).

³⁹ On the "inflation of honors" in the 1680s see Crumme, *Aristocrats*, 31–33 and *passim*. The eucharistic controversy concerned the time in the mass at which the bread and wine became the body and blood of Christ. It pitted Ioakim and the Greek scholars Ioannikios and Sophronios Likhudes against Sil'vestr Medvedev and the Ukrainian clergy. See Hughes, *Sophia*, 128–30; A. A. Prozorovskii, "Sil'vestr Medvedev," *ChOIDR* (1896), no. 2, pt. 4, 1–148; no. 3, pt. 4, 149–378, no. 4, pt. 3, 379–606; and Cathy Jean Potter, "The Russian Church and the Politics of Reform in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1993. Shaklovitski had preliminary discussions with the musketeers about removing Ioakim in 1687–88: *Rozysknye dela o Fedore Shakloritom i ego soobshchnikakh*, 4 vols., St. Petersburg, 1884–93, I, 37–38.

the Polish alliance, and sending his son Grigorii and a trusted officer, Ivan Mazepa, to Moscow to try to stop the treaty. They failed but the negotiations were still difficult. Poland needed allies to recover territory lost to the Ottomans, but did not want to concede to Russia the permanent loss of Kiev and other lands. The chief Polish negotiator, Krzysztof Grymułowski, was very unhappy in conceding the territory, though his Lithuanian colleague, Marcjjan Ogiński, felt differently. Golitsyn and his assistant, the boyar B. P. Sheremetev, kept up the pressure, and the Poles finally agreed to the Treaty of Eternal Peace on 26 April/6 May 1686. The treaty confirmed the Russian reconquest of Smolensk and other territories, and ceded Kiev and its environs permanently. Russia in return obligated itself to campaigns against Crimea. Jan Sobieski stalled with the ratification of the treaty, but finally the Polish senate convinced him there was no choice, and he delivered his signature to the Russian emissary, B. P. Sheremetev, on 21 December 1686.⁴⁰ Sobieski's reluctance to agree did not bode well for the alliance, and was just the first of a long chain of delays, misunderstandings, and recriminations. On the Russian side, this result would merely confirm the views of the Naryshkin party and their allies.⁴¹

For the moment, the Polish treaty not only strengthened Sofia's prestige, it was a stepping stone to the assertion of legitimate power, for after the signing of the treaty she appeared in documents of state as *samoderzhitsa*, autocrat, in her own right. The Swedish resident von Kochen reported:

About five weeks ago an order was sent to all *prikazy* that they were to take no petitions where the name of Princess Sofia Alekseevna is not written with them, that she now absolutely rules as well, and it is also reported that in a short time she will also be crowned, which only time will tell.⁴²

⁴⁰ Text of the treaty: *PSŽ* 2, 777–78. Kostomarov, *Ruina, Sobranie*, XV, 333–42; Hughes, *Sophia*, 191–93; Wójcik, *Sobieski*, 376–84; G. K. Babushkina, “Mezhdunarodnoe znachenie Krymskikh pokhodov 1687 i 1689 gg.,” *Istoricheskie zapiski* 33 (1950), 158–72; V. A. Artamonov, “Rossiia, Rech’ Pospolitaia i Krym 1686–1699 godov,” *Slavianskii sbornik* 5 (Saratov, 1993), 3–31, 141–47.

⁴¹ Kurakin reported many years later that the discussion in the Boyar Duma (*sovet v Palate*) pitted Prince Petr Ivanovich Prozorovskii (Tsar Ivan's *diad'ka*) and the boyar Fyodor Petrovich Saltykov against the treaty. If true, the incident showed that the household of Tsar Ivan did not support Sofia and Golitsyn. Kurakin, “Gistoriia,” *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 51–52.

⁴² Hughes, *Sophia*, 193–94; SRM 115: 20 February 1686 (arrival of Polish embassy and Mazepa as emissary from Hetman Samoilovich); 24 March 1686 (negotiations with Polish representatives); 1 May 1686 (eternal peace agreed); 15 May 1686 (Peter goes to Preobrazhenskoe, Ivan to a monastery); 21 June 1686 (“Die Printzessin Sophia Alexeowna

The Crimean campaigns would be the test of Sofia's power and that of her favorite, Vasilii Golitsyn. Immediately after the signing of the Polish treaty the Danish commercial agent Butenant noted "great jealousy and disunity" (*grosse jalousie und uneinigkeit*) between Sofia and Natalia Naryshkina. In September, he reported that there was a plan to give command for the forthcoming Crimean campaign to Prince M. A. Cherkasskii, as one experienced fighting Turks and Tatars. Cherkasskii, however, was one of Sofia's principal opponents and Peter (presumably meaning Tsaritsa Natalia) did not want to let him go. Golitsyn would take the post out of pride, though Sofia herself did not want to give him the command since she feared a "great change at court" to the advantage of the party of Peter in his absence. Peter's approaching fifteenth birthday on 1 May 1687 gave her particular cause for concern, and she began to build a strong wall around the Novodevichii Convent as a place of refuge in case she had to abdicate the government. Others in the government began to fear for the future as well.⁴³ The Swedish resident gave essentially the same story: the opinion among the lords was that

suchet grösser in der Regierung zu werden, Ihr Nahm wird überall und in schriften mit gebraucht"); 24 July 1686 ("Vor ungefehr 5 wochen hat man in alle Pricaessen einen befelch gesant, keine Supplicquen anzunehmen, wo nicht die Printzessin Sophia Alexeowna Ihr Nahm, mit diesen geschrieben ist, das [sie?] also, anitzo absolute mitregieret, und wird wohl gar gem[itt?]elt, daß sie vielleicht in kürzten mitgekrönet werden soll, worvon die zeit eine gewißheit gebenmuß. So wird auch weh[?] dieser Regierung nicht viel gutes gehoffet, Gott gebe da beste und bewahre vor gefahren"); ARSG 7365 (1686), 3 July 1686 (Sofia openly declared the third ruler of the state). Peter was even unable to secure a promotion for Artamon Matveev's old client Colonel Paul Menzies, who remained in the Smolensk garrison: TKUA Rusland 40, 26 June 1686.

⁴³ TKUA Rusland, B40, 11 September, 1686: "Die Feldherrschaft so aufs vorjahr über die Armée gegen Krim soll commendiren, ist dem Herrn Knäs Michailo Egoalkweiz Zirkasky aufgetragen worde, welcher den Krieg mit den Türken zu führen, wol versteht. [Weilen er aber einer] von dem [Principalsten] so sich [heffüg] gegen die angenommene [Regierung der Princessin sträubet] und es mit [dem Jüngsten Zaarn wohl meinert] als wil [derselbe ihn absolute nicht] von [sich lassen] sondern begehret das solches [ambt denen Knes Wasili Galizin solte aufgetragen werden] welcher [umb respect] willen und [umb achter ?den ?nn zu verhüten solche auch würd annehmenen] wie [wohl die Princessin Sophia nach aller möglichkeit] wird [suchen abzuwenden], denn wenn [dieser herr aus Muscov sein] muß [möchte sich wohl grosen verenderung am Hoffe] begeben, und [des jüngsten Zaarn] seine [Parthey oben liegen].

Die Princessin lasset ausserhalb der Stadt das alte Jungfer Kloster köstlich aufbauen und [mit einer festen Maur umbziehen worauß man muthmasset daß wen sie siehet Ihre streng nicht länger] wird [halten können die regierung abzutretten] und [dahin Ihre retirade zu nehmen] denn es [jedes daß wen der jüngste Zaar deß ? den Jahr erreichte] welcher künftigen Primus [Majo sein] wird [eine grosse verenderung] wird [vorfallen] denn [solch alhier] wird hier [mündig] gehalten, und konten denn unter [den grossen etliche wohl schlecht belohnet wurden welche sich] anjetzo [die Persohn] des [jüngsten Zaarn] wenig [annehmen] das [die gemeynet schon] anfangen zu murmuren."

Golitsyn should command because he was one of the causes of the war, so he should carry it out, but Sofia was afraid to let him go south. By October this crisis had passed and Prince Vasilii Golitsyn was named to command the army. As the army marched off to the south in spring 1687, Prince Vasilii left his son behind as keeper of the seal, and the party of Peter tried to make as much trouble as possible for him. The rumor was that Peter wanted to replace his old tutor Rodion Streshnev with Prince M. A. Cherkasskii, an idea that caused talk among high and low, and fear as well, for the prince was considered “an unruly head, a Tatar mirza by birth, entirely uninclined to the princess and the commander-in-chief’s greatest enemy, but very inclined to the youngest tsar,” and who wanted Peter to rule alone. Golitsyn, fearing for the stability of the government, convinced Rodion Streshnev to demand the retention of his position. Peter conceded after some persuasion from Sofia. The future of Sofia’s government seemed to hang on Golitsyn’s success against Crimea.⁴⁴

Sofia had much to fear, for precisely in the spring of 1687 a letter

⁴⁴ TKUA Rusland, B40, 30 October 1686 (Golitsyn, Shein, Prince V. D. Dolgorukii will lead the army); 26 March 1687 (Prince A. V. Golitsyn would be keeper of the great seal), “gienge ver[angeneh]te woche eine rede alß wolte der jüngste Zaar seinen alten hoffmeister Rodion Stresnow absetzen] und [den Knes Michailo Aligukowitz Zerkaski wider an seine statt einsetzen] welches ein [gross Gemurmel unter hohen] und [niedrigen verursacht] und [wohl ein gross unheil hette können beybringen] massen [der leztgenante ein gantz unruhiger kopff] ein [Tarterischer Mursa] von [gebuhrt, der Princessin gantz ungewogen] und [des Feldherrn] grosseste [feind, dem jüngsten Zaarn aber sehr gewogen] und wie [wohl mehr ander alliate] von [dem jungen Zaarn das Regiment der Princessin mit schelen augen ansehen] und [lieber hetten das der jüngste Zaar alle in das Regiment annehmen], so förten [sie doch nicht einstimmig umb den Tartar in solchen avantage zu setzen.” Streshnev objected, too, and Sofia was able to convince Peter to keep him on. “Es ist dennoch [zu befurchten, daß einer] oder [ander zeit] wegen dieser [sache etwaß sonderliches (Gott gebe mir nicht zu unglückliches)] und [vorfallen] in sonderheit [wo der veldherr nicht viel gutes] wird [außrichten] doch dessen [gute avantage auf dem feind möchte die Princessin Ihre Regiment noch wohl] eine [zeit lang] erhalten.” SRM 115, 18 September 1686: “Wer aber die Armé führen oder im felde commendieren soll, darein kan man nicht einig werden: die meisten herren sollen auf Knes Wasillii Wasilliewitz Golitzin votirn, vermeinend; weilen er zu diessen krieg eine ursache ist; er es auch außzuführen möge; Alleine die Princessin Sophia Alexeowna, welche bey dieserzeit das meiste zu sagen hat, und Knes Golitzin gnädig ist, wird ihm schwerlich ablassen, weilen über dieser March erst [ein]schlichten bahn geschoben soll, haben sie noch zeit genug miteinander deswegen, sich zu vermeinen”; 16 October 1686: rumors that Golitsyn will command Novgorod army and tsar of Imeretia the Moscow army; 22 October 1686: Golitsyn made commander in chief for Crimean campaign. ARSG 7365 (1686): 29 October 1686, Vasilii Golitsyn named commander of the army. Rodion Streshnev died on 10 July 1687: Crumme, *Aristocrats*, 192; TKUA Rusland, 40, 30 July 1687.

The reference to Cherkasskii as a “Tatar mirza” reflects the Russian vernacular use of “Tatar” for many of the steppe peoples. Cherkasskii was in fact a Circassian prince.

appeared in Lubianka Square during Lent with attacks and ill wishes for her. At the same time, Peter was beginning to form his “play” regiments, the nucleus of his later guards regiments. For the moment these were pretty harmless, for Peter recruited mainly the servants of his stables, though soon some young men of higher origin began to join them, especially from among his chamberlains. If Kurakin’s memory is to be trusted, the number did not exceed 300, a miniscule amount in relation to the musketeers still loyal to Sofia, but Peter was no longer totally without organized force. Not surprisingly, it was in spring of 1687 that Shaklovityi concocted the scheme of dressing up one of his associates as a boyar and having him pretend to be Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin and mistreat the musketeers. A number of the musketeers later confessed that Shaklovityi discussed with them the idea of “taking” Lev Kirillovich and the other Naryshkins, Prince B. A. Golitsyn, Prince M. A. Cherkasskii, and Patriarch Ioakim.⁴⁵

The Crimean campaign of 1687 was an ignominious failure and it was largely Golitsyn’s fault. General Patrick Gordon, a Scot in Russian service, wrote on the eve of the march south that Golitsyn “hath been the chieffe and almost only promoter of this warr, and who is extreme-ambitious, will bring us to action.” The commander-in-chief’s subordinates were almost all from families that were generally loyal to Peter: A. S. Shein, Prince V. D. Dolgorukii, Prince M. G. Romodanovskii, and I. Iu. Leont’ev. Hetman Samoilovych had opposed the treaty with Poland and was no friend to Golitsyn. Gordon reported that the Russians hoped the Turks would not get involved and leave the war to Crimea, for they feared that their allies would not be much help (an obvious reference to Poland).⁴⁶ The army marched south beyond the Russian border along the Dniepr toward Crimea at the beginning of June, unopposed. After a week the Kalmyks and Don cossacks joined the main army, and they marched on, afflicted by the heat and dust. Soon they saw the whole plain ahead of them in smoke and flames. For another five days they kept going through the burned steppe to the river Karachakrak, where they learned from their scouts and the Zaporozhian cossacks

⁴⁵ Kurakin, “Gistoriia,” 56–57; Shmurlo, “Padenie tsarevny Sofii,” *ZhMNP* 303 (January, 1896), 58–59. Shaklovityi sent a subsecretary from his home town of Briansk, one Matvei Shoshin to impersonate Naryshkin: *Rozysknye dela*, I, 92, 104, 125.

⁴⁶ S. Kononov, “Sixteen Further Letters of General Patrick Gordon,” *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 13 (1967), 86–87; Hughes, *Sophia*, 197; TKUA Rusland 40, 30 October 1686 (names of commanders).

that the whole steppe had been burned to Perekop. There the military council decided to send the infantry against the Turkish forts on the lower Dniepr, and let the rest of the army, mainly the cavalry, slowly retreat. When they reached the Samara river after many days march, Samoilovich was deposed from the hetmanate as a traitor to the cause, and Mazepa elected in his place on 23 July 1687. Such, in any case, was Gordon's account. Gordon stressed that the army did not run out of supplies (other than fodder for the horses, which the burning of the steppe eliminated), that there were no desertions, and that the campaign was a useful diversion for the Imperials. In his letters from fall, 1687, he thus exculpated Golitsyn.⁴⁷

That opinion was not universal. The supporters of Peter had never been enthusiastic about a treaty with Poland and a break with Crimea, reported Butenat, but Sofia and her following had pushed through the policy. The complaints against Vasilii Golitsyn in the summer of 1687 from that camp were vociferous. The rumor in Moscow was that the holy icon of the Mother of God of the Don did not help, and Golitsyn argued with the Duma general A. A. Shepelev. Golitsyn's failures were the cause of much acrimony:

All those who are Tsar Peter's favorites are glad to hear that it goes badly for Golitsyn and the army. There is also supposed to have been a discussion between Tsar Peter's lady mother Natalia Kirillovna and the tsarevna Sofia Alekseevna, namely the former represented to her the great danger of the army, to which the latter replied, that it meant nothing, for her late lord father Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich had several times with a greater force been before Riga and returned with nothing accomplished, but their land had suffered no harm. The princess is supposed to be trying to maintain Prince Golitsyn as much as possible.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Kostomarov, *Ruina*, *Sobranie* XV, 350–66; Kovoalov, "Sixteen Letters," 88–93 (26 July, 16 September, and 26 September 1687); Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 138–47.

⁴⁸ TKUA Russland, 40, 30 July 1687: the complaints against Golitsyn were "sonderlich [an der Kant deß jungen Zaarn, welcher nicht starck] hat [intentioniret umb den frieden] mit [dem Pohlen einzugeben] und [mit dem Chrim zu brechen, die Princessin aber] hat mit [Ihrem anhang es durchgetrieben]"; SRM 115, 8 July 1687: failure of icon of Mother of God and disputes of Golitsyn and Shepelev: "Alle die zar Peters favoriten sein, hören sehr gerne, das es dem Golitzin mit der Armé contraire ergeheth. Es soll auch ein discours zwischen Zar Peters fraw Mutter Natalie Kirilowna, und die Printzessin Sophia Alexeowna gewesen sein, nemlich die erste hat die grosse gefahr der armé Ihr vorgestellet, worauff die andere gesagt, daß hette nichts zu bedeuten, massen Irhe Seel. Herr Vatter Zar Alexey Michalowitz wehre selber mit einer grossen Macht unter Riga gewesen, und hette unverricht sachen zu Rück gehen müste, wodurch Ihr Landt keinen schaden gelitten. Die Printzessin soll Knes Golitzin so viel mügliche zu maintainiren suchen."

Peter now began to receive more respect from Sofia than before. Rodion Streshnev died, and the obvious replacement was Prince M. A. Cherkasskii, but instead the position of tutor to Peter was simply abolished. Cherkasskii was left to gloat over Vasilii Golitsyn's failure against the Tatars, made worse by similar lack of success on the part of Russia's ally, Poland. The king's son Jakub Sobieski had led a fruitless siege of Turkish-held Kamieniec in the Ukraine.⁴⁹

The most important casualty of the campaign was, ironically, the Ukrainian hetman Ivan Samoilovych. Samoilovych had opposed the treaty with Poland and Gordon, echoing Golitsyn's views, accused him of hindering the campaign. The Swedish resident von Kochen, whose government supported Russia's entrance into the Holy League against the Turks, reported that Golitsyn was trying to shift the blame for his own failures onto Samoilovych, relying on Cossack discontent to help depose the hetman. Golitsyn went so far as to surround the Cossack camp with Russian troops to ensure a favorable outcome to the election of the new hetman, and thus Mazepa entered office as V. V. Golitsyn's client.⁵⁰

Mazepa was not alone in his relationship to Russian court factions. Samoilovych seems to have been the ally of the Naryshkins:

It is said that Tsar Peter certainly directs the party of the deposed Hetman and would like to have him brought here, but it seems that the other party would like to prevent that and send the Hetman far from here to remote places so that he cannot answer and all neglect can lie at his account, and Prince Vasilii might come out of suspicion with the common man.

Samoilovych's opponents accused him of reducing the liberties of the cossacks, and indeed much of Ukraine was in revolt against him in August. At the same time half of the cossacks did not accept Mazepa, the successor to Samoilovych, either.⁵¹ Mazepa managed

⁴⁹ SRM 115, 22 July 1687 (Peter receives more honor); TKUA Rusland 40, 30 July 1687 (Cherkasskii and Streshnev; Cherkasskii rejoices at Golitsyn's defeat).

⁵⁰ SRM 115, 5 August 1687; TKUA Rusland 40, (30 July 1687, describing Golitsyn's policy of casting the blame on Samoilovych as "Machiavellian"); ARSG 7365, 5 August 1687 (Golitsyn blames Samoilovych); 9 September 1687 (similar). Kostomarov, *Ruina, Sobranie*, 15, 351–66; O. Ohloblyn, *Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba*. Zapysky naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka 170, New York, 1960. 23–31; A. S. Lavrov, "Novyi istochnik o pervom Krymskom pokhode," *Vestnik SPbGU* series 2 (1994), vyp. 4 (no. 23) 14–19.

⁵¹ SRM 115, 19 August 1687: "Man saget daß Zar Peter, zwar die Parthey von den abgesetzten Hetman vorstehet und denselben, auff anhero zu kommen haben wollen, alleine es scheint, die andere Parthey, ein solches verhindernen, und den Hetman, weit von hinnin, und an abgelegene örthe versenden werden, damit er sich nicht verantworten, und also alles versehen auff denselben liegen, und Knes Wisilii bey dem gemeinen Mann, ausser verdacht, und hass kommen möchte. Waß die Cosaken verlanget, daß hat hierdurch soviel

to assert control over the Ukrainian hetmanate, and Golitsyn seemed secure again in Moscow. By late October he was in full control: "Prince Vasilii Golitsyn is now almost greater than before, and the fact that he made a timely retreat from the steppe (whereby he saved Their Tsarish Majesties' people) is held to be great cleverness and service, and those who speak ill of him are whipped with the knout and sent into disgrace."⁵²

In the following winter, as Peter approached his sixteenth birthday, he began to take a greater part in affairs. Von Kochen reported, "Now Tsar Peter is known more than before, since Prince Golitsyn, the Prime Minister, is supposed to take all the important affairs to his Tsar's Majesty, which did not happen before." Later he observed, "His Majesty Tsar Peter is supposed to be coming all the time industriously to the Senate [=Boyar Duma-PB]," and visiting the *prikazy* incognito. According to Keller, it was Vasilii Golitsyn who introduced him to the Boyar Duma. Golitsyn and Sofia were clearly trying to appease the Naryshkins, for in May 1688, von Kochen reported, "Tsar Peter's favorites are seen now to be brought forth and into the government, as a few days before, his mother's brother Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin was raised to the boyar estate, and the government here is calm according to everyone."⁵³ Peter was approaching adulthood, and beginning to play a political role.

leichter, woll enzogen weder kommen. Alleine die meiste Reussen sagen selbst, und bleiben darbey, daß der Hetman Iwan Samuylowitz, unschuldige weisse abgesetzt worden sey." 2 September 1687: more news of the Russian army's retreat: "welche die Cosaken gelegenheit an die handt gegeben, Ihrer Hetman Iwan Samuylowitz (desselben Regierung sie schon müde gewesen, weylen er Ihre freyheiten genimbet) abzusetzen, und einen anderen zu erwehlen; und werd darbey berichtet, daß der abgesetzten, ohneschult und stetes getreuw geweßen; der neue erwelter aber, nicht so lang als der abgesetzter, das Regiment haben dürffte, sintemahlen die Helfte Cosaken den neuen Hetman Maseppa, schon nicht acceptiren, und in ihr stätte einlassen wollen." Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie*, XVI, 392, 394–97; Lavrov, "Novyi istochnik," 17. Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 88–89, note 30.

⁵² SRM 115, 28 October 1687: "Knes Wasilly Golitzin, is anitzo fast grösser, als er vor dem geweßen und wird daß er zu rechter zeit auß der Step gewichen (wodurch Er Ihre Zar. Mayt. leute serviret) vor eine grosse klugheit und dinst gehalten, wessen einige die übel von ihm geredt, mit der knute geschlagen und in ungnadt versandt sein." Shaklovityi was later to claim that simultaneously Sofia weighed and ultimately rejected a plan to divide the state between Peter on the one hand and Ivan and herself on the other: Shmurlo, "Padenie," 60–61.

⁵³ ARSG 7365 (1688) 6 January 1688 (V. Golitsyn introduces Peter to "den Hogen Raadt"); SRM 115, 16 December 1687: "Nunmehr wird Zar Peter mehr alß vor dem gekennet, sintemahl der Premier Minister, Knes Golityzin, anitzo auch alle wichtige affaires, welches vor dem nicht geschehen, dero Zarische May. antragen solten"; 10 February 1688: "Ihro Zarische Maytt. Zar Peter soll sich allemahl fleissig in Senat einfinden und unlängsten in der Nacht alle Pricaessen incognito selber da[] sehen haben"; 11 May 1688: "seheth man

The absence of a campaign in the south in 1688 allowed affairs back in Moscow to remain quiet for most of that year, in the course of which Peter strengthened his hand with new and newly prominent supporters. Not only was his uncle Lev now a boyar, but his cousin Matvei Filimonov Naryshkin and Ivan Afanas'evich Matiushkin became *okol'nichie* on Peter's name day, 29 June.⁵⁴ Another newly prominent ally was Prince Iakov Fyodorovich Dolgorukii, who was to play a leading role in Russian politics until his death in 1720. Dolgorukii had been a chamber *stol'nik* of Peter's since some time in 1682/83, moving up from simple *stol'nik* in that year. In early 1686 he and his brother Grigorii and cousin Ivan Dmitrievich got into some sort of trouble and suffered confiscation of part of their property. By the end of the year, however, all was forgiven, and Iakov was sent on a diplomatic mission to France, one of a number sent out from Moscow in accord with the provisions of the treaty with Poland, which specified that Russia would solicit further allies. France was the most unlikely candidate of all, as Turkey's principal ally, and Dolgorukii's reception was not friendly. He handled his task as best he could, and grew in credit back in Moscow, especially with Peter, whom many already believed would soon take over the government. Peter had had closer contact with him even before, for years later the tsar himself described how the prince had mentioned on the eve of his journey that he knew of an instrument that could measure distances, and promised to bring one home. This was an astrolabe, which he presented to Peter on his return in 1688, thus starting the tsar's long history of fascination with navigation.⁵⁵

At about the same time Peter picked up an even more crucial supporter, General Patrick Gordon. Gordon was a Scottish Catholic from Aberdeenshire who had come to Russia as a mercenary officer

Zar Peters Favoriten nunmehr algerade herfür und zu regierung gezogen werden, sintemahl vor etliche tage dessen Mutter bruder Leon Kirillowitz Nariskin in den Bojaren-Stand erhoben worbey der Regierung allhier ober ist nach allen Still . . ." L. K. Naryshkin became a boyar (from the rank of *komnatnyi stol'nik*) on 8 April 1688: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 208; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 11, 11v. See also Shmurlo, "Padenie," 63–64.

⁵⁴ Matiushkin was the son of Afanasii Matiushkin, a cousin of Tsar Aleksei through I. P. Matiushkin's marriage to a Streshneva as well as *lovchii*, *iasel'nychii*, and one of Aleksei's favorites. Shmurlo, "Padenie," 65; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 197, 209.

⁵⁵ In fall 1682 Prince Iakov Dolgorukii was still merely a *stol'nik*: Bugarov, ed., *Vosstanie*, 263, but the Boyar book of 7184 lists him among Peter's chamber *stol'niki* appointed in 7190 and 7191, that is, he must have received the rank between September, 1682 and 1 September 1683: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, ll. 95, 97, 120; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 1940, 62; ARSG 7365 (1688): 13 July 1688.

in 1661, and ended up spending most of his life in Russian service.⁵⁶ Starting in early 1688 he began to spend more and more time with Peter in Preobrazhenskoe and other places around Moscow, primarily helping Peter with artillery practice and providing him with soldiers for his “play” regiments. In the fall Gordon provided the young tsar with drummers and trumpeters at a time when there were rumors of an impending revolt of the musketeers. Peter had acquired an important ally, for Gordon was not only an experienced and capable officer himself, he also had many friends and relatives among the foreign senior officers, Scots and Germans alike.⁵⁷

The great event at the beginning of 1689 was Peter’s marriage, which further tilted the balance in his favor. The year had opened ominously with a madman’s attempt to assassinate Prince Vasillii Golitsyn – a man who brought a knife to the Kremlin and shouted that the prince was merely a *vremennik*, a temporary favorite. The marriage had been rumored first in December 1687: “his [=Peter’s] fiancée is the daughter of a *stol’nik* named Lopukhin, of whose family it is said that they are of good wit and have a great following.” Evdokiia herself possessed “average beauty but good understanding.” The marriage took place on 27 January 1689 in the palace church of Sts. Peter and Paul. It was a modest ceremony, and soon after Peter departed for Pereslavl’, where he was to sail the small boat he had discovered and repaired the previous summer.⁵⁸

The Lopukhin family were not newcomers to the Naryshkins. Evdokiia’s grandfather, Avram Nikitich Lopukhin, had known Matveev in the 1660s. Head of the Tsaritsa Natalia’s workshop, he lost his position early in the reign of Fyodor, as would be expected in the case of a Naryshkin ally; he entered a monastery in 1681–83, and died there in 1685. Fyodor (Larion) Avramovich was a mere *stol’nik* at the time of his daughter’s wedding and moved up to *okol’nichii* the

⁵⁶ Gordon served in Kiev in 1679–84, returning home briefly in 1686. King James II tried to make him an emissary to Russia, which Sofia’s government did not allow. Patrick Gordon, *Passages from the Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries*, Aberdeen, 1859, 109–63; Konovalov, “Sixteen Letters,” 85–86; ARSG 7365 (1686), 15 September 1686; 7365 (1687), 31 December 1686; 21 January 1687. Lindsey Hughes, “V. T. Postnikov’s 1687 Mission to London: Anglo-Russian Relations in the 1680s in British Sources,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 68 (July 1990), no. 3, 447–60.

⁵⁷ Gordon, *Passages*, 164; Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 227–29, 236; Shmurlo, “Padenie,” 65–66; M. D. Rabinovich, *Polki petrovskoi armii, 1698–1725* (Trudy GIM 48), Moscow, 1977, 23–24.

⁵⁸ SRM 115, 18 January, 1 February 1689; Bushkovitch, “Aristocratic Faction,” 89–90; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 66.

next day and to boyar on 29 June 1689 (Peter's name day). His brother Petr Avramovich bol'shoi Lopukhin became an *okol'nichii* in February and Vasilii Avramovich followed him the next month. Another Lopukhin, Petr Avramovich men'shii, had been a Duma gentleman since 1683 and became an *okol'nichii* in 1688. Two of them, Vasilii and Petr men'shii, had been musketeer colonels like their father and brother Fyodor, and had a chequered career in 1682. In May before the revolt they were among the replacements for the colonels expelled by the musketeers, but Petr seems to have attracted the rebels' wrath. He was sent to exile at the Kola fort, but apparently never made it, being called back from Iaroslavl' in September. Vasilii stayed in command of his regiment, and it was he who (with others) escorted Prince Ivan Khovanskii from Moscow on his last journey to confront Sofia in September. The swift promotions for Petr men'shii were presumably a reward for his services.⁵⁹ The Lopukhins were not only closely connected with the Naryshkins before Peter's wedding, but they had no reason to love Sofia's allies the musketeers.

The wedding strengthened Peter's hand, but it was the second failed Crimean campaign that discredited Golitsyn and Sofia. The beginnings were not auspicious, for the international context was scarcely favorable. As far as Western Europe went, the Russians were convinced of the hostility of France after the reception of Prince Iakov Dolgorukii in 1687–88, and the only bright spot on the horizon was a very distant one, the success of William of Orange against James II in England. They were fully aware of James' leanings toward the Ottoman ally France and rejoiced at his defeat. In Hungary the Imperial forces had done well. In 1686 they took Buda, and in 1687 a number of major towns in upper Hungary and capped off the year with the recovery of Transylvania; 1688 was even better, with the fall of Belgrade concluding the main fighting. Unfortunately the Imperial armies were to be distracted henceforth with the new war with France, the war of the League of Augsburg, which was to last until 1697. Operations in Hungary no longer attracted the Empire's main forces and Turkish opposition stiffened.

⁵⁹ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 197, 209; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 211; Buganov, ed., *Vosstanie*, 14, 52–53 (identifying the colonel as Petr Men'shii Avramovich Lopukhin), 174–75, 279. Both Petr men'shii and Vasilii Lopukhin held the rank of *stol'nik* in 1682 and until their promotions in 1683 and 1689, as was Petr Bol'shoi in 1689: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 31v, 33v–34. None of them was a chamber *stol'nik* of either tsar.

Sofia and Golitsyn began to fear an Ottoman–Imperial truce, and with good reason.

In any case the most useful ally to Russia was not the Empire but Poland, and here things went from bad to worse. The Polish campaign of 1688 on the Dniestr had not only accomplished nothing, but the army began to show symptoms of disintegration. The winter of 1688–89 saw such strong opposition to King Jan Sobieski in the Diet that by spring the country seemed on the verge of civil war. Sobieski had to distance himself from France again, but he and his army were in no condition to fight in 1689. It must have seemed that all the Naryshkin suspicions of Poland were coming true. Golitsyn pursued the policy of cooperation with Poland and war against Crimea, but with increasing distrust, as the Solomon affair shows (see chapter 5). In this inauspicious situation Moscow was tense at the start of the campaign. Keller reported that if all did not go well he feared a general revolt.⁶⁰

Golitsyn and the main body of the Russian army left much earlier than they had in 1687, in February 1689. By April Golitsyn had met up with other Russian units under A. S. Shein, Prince V. D. Dolgorukii, and B. P. Sheremetev. The Ukrainian hetman Mazepa joined up with Golitsyn a few days later, and they all marched south along the east bank of the Dniepr. After a series of small battles with the Tatars, the Russian army reached Perekop on 20 May. There they stopped before the Tatar fortifications, and discovered that there was no water or fodder. The khan offered peace to Golitsyn, but he refused (he reported) because the terms were contrary to the terms of the Polish alliance. After a stay of only one day the council of war decided to retreat back north. By 11 June they were out of the steppe, back in the Ukraine, and Golitsyn proceeded on to Moscow, reaching the capital with the main body of the troops on 19 July, where Sofia greeted him before the city walls with icons. The campaign, however much Golitsyn tried to paint a rosy picture in his dispatches to Sofia, was an obvious failure. François Lefort believed that 20,000 men perished and 15,000 were captured.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Hughes, *Sophia*, 204–09; ARSG 7365 (1689), 21 December 1688; 10 January; 1 February; 1 March, 19 April 1689 (revolt feared). Artamonov, “Rossiia,” 15–16; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, 443–44, 453, 457–59, 464. Andrzej Sulima Kaminski, *Republic vs. Autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia 1686–1699*, Cambridge, MA, 1993, 230, note 3; Lavrov, *Regentsvto*, 147–50.

⁶¹ Hughes, *Sophia*, 211–13; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 369–74; Lavrov, *Regentsvto*, 150–56; Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, pp. 246–66; Moritz Conrad Posselt, *Der General und Admiral Franz Lefort: Sein Leben und seine Zeit*, I–II, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1866, I, 371–75; SRM 115, 8 March 1689

The failure of the campaign had direct consequences among the population of Moscow. As von Kochen reported in the same dispatch that recorded Vasili Golitsyn's arrival:

the common man is not very satisfied with the campaign (perhaps because with such great expense and heavy contributions nothing particular was accomplished) and speaks about it in a dangerous manner, and so that a tumult might arise, for which reason many *strel'tsy* have been ordered to go about the streets, and where five or six persons are standing together, to order them to disperse, as happened last Tuesday to some German merchants who were standing together and talking at the Merchant Court. God prevent it . . .⁶²

Golitsyn had written back to Shaklovityi that he was worried about his enemies in Moscow, especially Prince M. A. Cherkasskii. To Sofia he seems to have written mainly reassurance, but the tension was building.⁶³

While Golitsyn's army was struggling to Perekop and back, Peter and Sofia waited in Moscow. Sofia went to various churches, praying for Golitsyn's success, and among her supporters rumors flew, criticizing Peter, the Naryshkins, and Prince Boris Golitsyn.⁶⁴ Peter remained with his boat in Pereslavl' until early June, accompanied by boyar Tikhon Nikitich Streshnev and writing occasionally to his uncle Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin and to his mother, enquiring after her health and requesting her to get the Artillery Chancellery to send him more rope for his boats. He returned to Moscow in time to

(Golitsyn met army at Sumy); 7 June 1689 (Golitsyn reports his successes, no word on casualties and rumors of defeats); ARSG 7365 (1689), 10 May 1689 (rumors of small encounters with Tatars).

Butenant reported on 20 September 1689 that Peter, on Golitsyn's return, reproached him that the army had accomplished nothing, specifically that it lost more men than the Tatars, fought no major battle, and that it could have taken Perekop, as Mazepa and some of the Russian generals advised. The Dane also reported as rumor the story that Golitsyn had received a cartload of gold as a bribe from the Khan: TKUA Rusland, B40, 20 September, 1689.

⁶² SRM 115, 19 July 1689: "so ist der gemeine mann wegen dieses Marsch auch nicht wohl zufriednen (vielleicht weilnen vor so grosse beschehene unkosten und starcke contributionen, nichts sonderliches außgerichtet) und reden davon gefährlich, auch also daß wohl ein Tumult entstehen möchte, weßwegen viele Strelitzen beordnet, an den gaßen überall umzugehen und wo 5 à 6 persohnen beysammen stehen, ihnen befehlen, voneinander zugehen, wie solches vorwichen diensttag an einigen teutschen Kauffleute auff den gast-hoff welche daselbst beyeinander gestanden und discourirten geschehen. Gott verhüte es . . .

PS. Vor ungefehr eine Stunde, ist Knes W. W. Golitzin anhier eingekommen, die Princessin Sophia ist ihn für die Statt mit bilder entgegen gegangen."

⁶³ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, I, 349, 382–84.

⁶⁴ SRM 115, 17 May 1689 (Sofia prays for the army's success); Shmurlo, "Padenie," 69–73 (rumors from the investigation of Shaklovityi).

celebrate his name day on 29 June, on which occasion his father-in-law Fyodor Avramovich Lopukhin received boyar rank and two of Peter's chamber *stol'niki*, I. I. Naryshkin and P. M. Apraksin, became *okol'nichie*.⁶⁵ The first hint of the coming conflict came on 8 July, during the procession to honor the appearance of the icon of the Mother of God of Kazan'. Peter told Sofia that her presence with her hair uncovered was unseemly. She refused to change, and Peter left the procession, going on to Kolomenskoe. Vasilii Golitsyn met with Peter there in formal audience the day after his return (20 July). Four days later a dispute erupted over the extent of rewards for the Crimean campaign, for Peter would not at first agree to the sums suggested by the government. On 31 July Gordon reported in his diary that "passions and humours" were increasing to the danger point, and by 6 August "rumors unsafe to be uttered." Peter waited in Preobrazhenskoe, passing his time in target practice with "his *strel'tsy*."⁶⁶

The storm broke on Wednesday, 7 August 1689. In the morning Sofia ordered the musketeers to provide a guard for her procession to the Donskoi Monastery on the following day. Some 300 musketeers were stationed on Lubianka Square in Moscow, apparently in some confusion as to their real purpose. That evening, one of Peter's chamberlains, F. F. Pleshcheev, was arrested in the Kremlin. Several of the musketeers on the Lubianka decided that a plot was afoot against Peter, and rode out to Preobrazhenskoe to warn him. Peter jumped out of bed in his shirt, ran to his uncle Lev Naryshkin's stable, where he got a horse and rode off to a nearby grove of trees. There his servants brought him clothes, and accompanied by his *postel'nichii* Gavriil Golovkin, one of the musketeers who had come to warn him, and three servants, he galloped off to the Trinity Monastery. He arrived there early in the morning and the archimandrite promised to shelter him. Soon his mother Natalia, Evdokiia, a

⁶⁵ *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo* (hereafter *PiB*) I (1887) 11–12. T. N. Streshnev had been a *spal'nik* of Peter early in 1682, achieving the rank of *okol'nichii* after the coronation and boyar in 1688: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 204, 209–10; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, 35–35v, 86v, 91.

⁶⁶ TKUA Rusland, B40, 20 September 1689; Hughes, *Sophia*, 229–32; Shmurlo, "Padenie", 73–75, 81–85. Hughes is wrong in stating that the incident on 8 July was reported only by Matveev. As Shmurlo noted ("Padenie", 75), it was reported also in the Shaklovityi case (I, 127–28). SRM 115, 2 August 1689: "Zar Peter gestern sich auff Preobrazhensky mit exercirung seiner Strelizen und schiessen aus groben geschutzen divertiret." These must be the Sukharev regiment which later followed him on 8 August to the Trinity Monastery.

few boyars including Prince Boris Golitsyn, the “play” soldiers and the musketeers of the Sukharev regiment joined him. Boris Golitsyn would direct most of the next weeks’ events.⁶⁷

The next few days were a standoff. On Peter’s command some musketeers joined him already on the tenth, most notably Colonel Ivan Tsykler, who had supported Sofia in 1682. Sofia sent Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov, the head of the Estates Chancellery, on the thirteenth to Peter as her emissary, but he returned two days later without result. On the sixteenth, Peter’s orders arrived in Moscow. These were addressed not to the boyars or even lesser nobles, but to the musketeers and the new style infantry, ordering them to send the officers and enlisted men chosen by the regiments to the Trinity Monastery.⁶⁸ The Swedish emissary added some details, colored by his own support of Vasilii Golitsyn, whom he thought a friend to Sweden:

the disagreements up to now at this court between Tsar Peter and Princess Sofia have finally broken out into the open, and Tsar Peter will no longer tolerate it that the Princess remains in the government, several days ago he left Preobrazhenskoe (where he has stayed several times this summer) with a respectable following for the Trinity Monastery twelve miles from here, from which he will go on to Pereslavl’ (as it is said) to draw the people in

⁶⁷ Shmurlo, “Padenie,” 85–88. Shmurlo relied mainly on the Gordon diary and the Shaklovityi investigation. Butenant’s very detailed report of 20 September seems to have some confusion in the chronology for the August events. He conflated the flight on 7 August with the reports to Peter later in the month of Shaklovityi’s supposed plot. According to Butenant, before the flight to Trinity Peter’s mother, her father Kirill Naryshkin, her brothers, Evdokiia and the Lopukhins, Princes Mikhail Alekukovitch Cherkasskii, Ivan Borisovich Troekurov, Urusov, and Boris Golitsyn were all in Preobrazhenskoe, moving to the monastery with the tsar (TKUA Rusland, B40, 20 September 1689). Russian sources confirm this list of boyars supporting Peter in August, as well as some others: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 3 (Prince P. I. Prozorovskii), 4v (Princes M. A. Cherkasskii and I. B. Troekurov), 5v (Prince Nikita Semenovich Urusov), 6 (Prince Fyodor Semenovich Urusov), 9v (Matvei Stepanovich Pushkin). A. S. Lavrov, using the *smotrennye spiski*, adds the names of F. P. Sokovnin and the very elderly P. V. Sheremetev to this list. He concludes quite unjustly that the presence of only thirteen boyars of forty-five in Moscow shows that Peter lacked the support of most boyars. As the number forty-five comes from subtracting only the recently dead and provincial governors from the list, we have no idea who was still with the army or at their country estates. Gordon noted (1 September) that Prince B. A. Golitsyn was the leader of Peter’s faction in August–September 1689 because the others were afraid of the risk: Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 273–74; A. S. Lavrov, ed., “Boiarskaia Duma i perevorot 1689 g.,” *Sosloviia i gosudarstvennaia vlast’ v Rossii XV-seredina XIX vv.*, Moscow, 1994, I, 272–80; and Lavrov, *Regentswo*, 157–68, 182–90.

⁶⁸ Shmurlo, “Padenie,” 88–90. Troekurov later joined Peter sometime in August, for he afterwards received 300 rubles for his service in both the years 197 and 198 (i.e. August and September, 1689): RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 4v.

that area to his side; Prince V. V. Golitsyn is supposed to have given cause to all this, as he, since he accomplished virtually nothing in the last campaign and was spoken about very insultingly and contemptuously by Tsar Peter and his favorites, was nevertheless approved by Tsar Ivan and the Princess, and in addition was rewarded with nearly 2,500 peasants on his return, similarly the other generals who were with him in the field.

The failure of the campaign and the recriminations over it had been the spark to the crisis. Von Kochen went on with his fears for the future and hinted that some hoped for a compromise:

It could come very easily to a tumult, unless the Princess resigned in good order, and the affair were resolved, which, however, could not happen before the Naryshkins, Tsar Peter's mother's brothers, were punished, since they are hated both at court and with the common man on account of their pride and rudeness against many.

Von Kochen recounted very accurately the view of the Naryshkins in the camp of Sofia, as reported later by Shaklovityi and his fellows. He then went on to note that Peter had learned of all this on 7 August. "If it comes to a revolt, it will not finish without bloody heads, for the princess also has a great following and almost all the *strel'tsy* on her side."⁶⁹

Sofia forbade the musketeers to obey Peter's order of the sixteenth and received a very ambiguous answer, for the musketeer officers demanded that she execute or arrest them, or at least give them

⁶⁹ SRM 115, 30 August 1689; SRM 115, 16 August 1689: "die bißherige Mißhelligkeiten an hießigen Hoeffe zwischen Zar Peter und der Princessin Sophia endlichen außgebrochen, und will Zar Peter durchauß nicht haben, daß die Princessin länger bey der Regierung soll bleiben, hat sich auch vor einigen tagen mit einem zimlichen Anhang von Priobraschensken, wo er sich dießen Sommer mehrentheils aufgehalten, weg nach dem Closter-Troiza 12 meil von hier, begeben, von der er, wie man sagt, weiter nach Gereslaff gehen solle, die leuthe deren orthten an sich zu ziehe; die uhrsach hierzu soll Knes W. W. Golitzin geben, welcher, weil selbiger im jüngsten feldzug sogar nichts ausgerichtet, und Zar Peter nebst seinen favoriten sehr schimpfflich und verächtlich darvon reden, es dennoch von der anderen Zar Ivan und der Princessin seiten, gebilliget und er über das nah mit 2500 bawern, wie auch die andere Generals Persohnen so mit zu felde geweßen, noch advenan[tes?] so hoch begnädiget werden. Dürffte es dennoch leicht zu einem Tumult kommen, wofern die Princessin nicht in güte abtreten, und die Sache beygelegt wird, welches aber nicht ehe geschehen dürffte biß die Narischkins, Zar Peters Mutter brüder zuvor abgestraffet, alß welche so wohl zu hoeff alß bey dem gemeinen Man, wegen ihres hochmuhts und Rudesse gegen männig, verhasset; Vor achte tagen stunde es darauff daß man sie wolte bey dem Köppfen nehmen, sie würden aber gewahrschawet daß sie sich bey nacht davon machten; Sie haben nach der hand ihre sachen in sicherheit bringen lassen und erwartet man, den außgang des spiels. Gott behute alles unheil. Solte es zu einer Revolte kommen, es wurde ohne blutige Köppfe nicht abgehen, zumahlen die Princessin ebenfahls einen grossen anhang und fast alle Strelizen auff ihrer seite hat." Shmurlo, "Padenie," 71–72.

written orders so that they might have an excuse later, as they had sworn loyalty to Peter as well as to Ivan and herself. She sent Prince P. I. Prozorovskii (Tsar Ivan's tutor) and archpriest Merkurii off to the monastery to explain her actions. This attempt failed, and Prozorovskii returned to Moscow.⁷⁰ Sofia then sent Patriarch Ioakim on a similar mission, accompanied by Peter's aunt (probably Tat'iana Mikhailovna) and his step-sister, presumably Marfa, not Praskov'ia. Back in the court in Moscow there was still hope for a compromise, and the talk was that Peter would remove Sofia and Vasili Golitsyn, who aimed at the dismissal of Boris Golitsyn and the Naryshkins. Sofia's supporters were grasping at straws, for most of the great lords and nobles were joining Peter in the hope of a positive outcome to the struggle. Sofia and Golitsyn spent these days courting the Ukrainian hetman Mazepa, who was in Moscow for his rewards from the Crimean campaign.⁷¹

Ioakim remained in the Trinity Monastery. Peter had gained a powerful ally and continued to insist on the departure of Sofia and Vasili Golitsyn from the government. His aunt and stepsister

⁷⁰ According to Gordon, Prozorovskii returned to Moscow on 18 August having failed to arrange a reconciliation: Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 270–71. Lavrov argues that the prince, though hostile to V. V. Golitsyn, came over to Peter only in September: Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 161, 166–67. The *Razriad* records, however, record service to Peter in August 1689. RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10 (7196 = 1686/7), l. 3 bears a notation after Prince P. I. Prozorovskii's name: "emu velikikh gsdrei. zhalovania pridacha za sluzhbu chto on v 197 i vo 198 byl za velikim gdrem. tsrem. i velikim kniazem Petrom Alekseevichem vsia velikiia i malia i belyia Rossii samodержtsem v Troetskom Sergieve monastyre trista rublev."

⁷¹ Shmurlo, "Padenie," 89–90; SRM 115, 23 August 1689: "Zar Peter sich annoch in Closter Troiza befindet, vorgangene woche anhero an die Strelizen geschicket, und begehret, daß von jeglichen Regiment ein ober und etliche unterofficiers zu Ihm hinauß kommen solten; welches aber ihnen die Princessin Sophia bey leib- und lebens- straff offentlich verboten. Worauff die officiers geantwortet: die Princessin solte ihnen entweder die Köpffe nehmen, oder sie in arrest setzen, oder auch es ihnen schriftlich geben, daß sie nicht pariren solten, damit sie alßo entschuldiget seyn könnten. Sintemahl Zar Peter ja Ihr Herr und Zar wäre, und hetten ihm so wohl geschworen, trew und gehorsam zu seyn, alß Zar Iwan, und Ihr der Princessin. Vor 4 Tagen ging der Patriarch mit 2 Princessin Zar Peters Vatern Schwester und seiner stieffschwester nach Zar Peter die sache, wo möglich beyzulegen.; Man hoffet, auch daß es zu einem accomodement kommen, und der revolte werde abgehen; weil die Sohn so lange aufstehet (?) und sonderlich die Strelizen, welche sonsten am meisten zu fürchten sich in die sachen mißmengen wollen. Zwar wird noch starck geredet, daß Zar Peter die Princessin von der Regierung und Knes Wassili Golitzin von seinem Am[t aus]wißen will, dahin gegen die Princessin die Narischkins und den Knes Borys Alexeiewitz alß die authores aller mißverständniß abgestattet zu werden begehret, die zeit aber lehret das gewißeste, und ein guter vergleich dürffte sie beyderseits in ihrem fleur (?) leisten." Meanwhile Sofia and Golitsyn were cultivating Mazepa, Golitsyn even taking him to his estate. "Bey Zar Peter aber versamen sich die meiste grosse herrn und von adel, da sind sie fast alle der gute hoffnung, das es zu ein gutem comportement kommen werde, welche der letzte geben wolle." See also TKUA Rusland, B40, 20 September 1689.

returned to Moscow, and Sofia's supporters tried to pretend that Ioakim had remained against his will. Peter kept up the pressure on the musketeers, with new orders arriving on the twenty-seventh, including this time not only the musketeers but also the Moscow urban population (again, not the boyar elite). This time it worked, and Sofia let them go, ordering half to remain in the city. The musketeers and townspeople began to come out to the monastery, some remaining and some returning to Moscow to convince others.⁷²

Though the boyars were still afraid to show their colors, Sofia was already desperate in the face of the gradual loss of her main support, the musketeers. Peter had ordered the German officers to come to the monastery as well, and some did. This was the trump card, for without the Germans Sofia would have no military support left. The rumor in Moscow was that she was more afraid for Vasilii Golitsyn than for herself. After long hours at prayer, she decided to go out to the Trinity Monastery herself and try for a compromise.⁷³ According to von Kochen, Sofia went accompanied by Vasilii Golitsyn, who is

⁷² SRM 115, 30 August 1689: "bis hin, lebet man hier noch zwischen furcht und hoffnung, wegen des zarlichen streits: der Patriarch, welcher gleich in meinem vorigen gedacht, mit 2 Printzessinen, nach dem Kloster Troitzza zu Zar Peter geschickt, umb die sachen beyzulegen, ist noch nicht wieder zurückkommen, er soll wieder seinen willen allda behalten werden; die beyde Princessin aber sind vergangenen montag, wieder alhier angelanget, wie gesagt wird, soll er wenig fruchtbahrliches daselbst außrichten können; in den Zar Peter darauff stehet, daß die Princessin Sophia die Regierung quitiren, und Knes W. Wassilliewicz Golitzin sein ampt abtreten soll. Vorgestern hat Zar Peter abermahls starcken befehl an den Strelitzen officier abgehen lassen, daß sie bey leib- und lebens-straff sich also forth bey ihm einfinden sollen, worauff Zar Ioann und die Princessin ordres an sie gegeben, daß die helffte hingeben, die andere helfft aber in der Stadt bleiben soll." Shmurlo, "Padenie," 90–91; Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 164–65.

⁷³ Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 273–74. SRM 115, 30 August 1689: "Imgleichen hat Zar Peter an die teutsche officiers und die vornembste da bürgers befohlen, daß sie auch zu Ihm kommen sollen, die sich auch allmählig zu ihm ziehen. Weilen nun die Printzessin ohne Zweifel siehet, daß dieses ein weit absehen und leicht eine gefahr darauff erfolgen dürffte, alß hat sie resolviret selbstn nach Troitzza zu reissen, massen sie dann dieße vergangene nacht mit Knes Wass. Wassilliewicz und mehr andere von hier weggangen, wie es da wird ablauffen verlangt jederman zu wissen. Heute soll der Cosaquische Hetman Maseppa auch dahin folgen, und hat man in wenig tagen entweder einen guthen vergleich oder tumult zu vernehmen. So viel man mercket, soll die Princessin nicht allzu wohl zu muht sein, weil sie gestern von mittag an, bis in die fünffte stunde in die nacht auß einen Kirch in die andere gangen und hefftig gebethet, daß die sache ohne gefahr möge abgehen; man saget daß sie vor sich selbstn nicht so bange alß vor Knes Wass. Wassilliewitz Golitzin, daß dießen, der in grosser Credit bey sie ist, nichts bößes widerfahren möge." Kochen went to say that Sofia hoped Golitsyn and some other favorites would remain in office, a hope which von Kochen shared as Golitsyn was a friend to the Germans and especially the Swedes.

Von Kochen's report thus contradicts the statements in Gordon's diary that the foreign

not mentioned in Matveev and Kurakin's much later accounts. His description of the events is otherwise very similar:

Princess Sofia, who went eight days ago [von Kochen was writing on September 6] to the Trinity Monastery with Prince V. V. Golitsyn, returned last Sunday at night unexpectedly, she did not get to the monastery or see Tsar Peter, indeed he sent to meet her three times, two miles from the Trinity Monastery and the last time finally had said to her that she should turn back to Moscow if she did not want to meet any insult.⁷⁴

Simultaneously an order arrived in Moscow for the arrest of Shaklovityi, the monk Sil'vestr Medvedev, and the musketeers known to oppose Peter.⁷⁵ Sofia spoke to the musketeers still in the Kremlin, defending Shaklovityi's innocence and calling on them to support her and Tsar Ivan, but to no avail. Shaklovityi and Medvedev hid, while Peter sent to Tsar Ivan, asking him to join him. Sofia consulted the Duma about Shaklovityi (who was a Duma secretary in rank), but the boyars would not defend him.⁷⁶

officers only heard of Peter's orders on 4 September after Sofia's return: Shmurlo, "Padenie," 93, following Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 274.

⁷⁴ SRM 115, 6 September 1689: "Ob man zwar gehoffet, es würde alhier zu einem guten accomodement kommen, so will es doch damit noch schlechter fortgang gewinnen; die Princessin Sophia, welche gestern 8. tag mit Knes Wass. W. Golitzin nach Troitza gereisset, ist vergangenen Sonntag zu nacht, unvermuthlich, wider anherokommen, sie ist bis Troitza nicht geweßen, weniger vor Zar Peter kommen dürfften, hintermahl derselbe Ihr zu 3 mahl, 2 meil von Troitza entgegnet gesant und das letzte mahl erachtlich sagen lassen, sie sollte wieder zurück nach Moscow kehren, faß sie keines schimpfes gewärtig seyn wolte."

Von Kochen's reports of 30 August and 6 September and Butenant's of 20 September (TKUA B40) state that Sofia went to see Peter at the Trinity Monastery on 30 August accompanied by Golitsyn and to be followed by Mazepa.

⁷⁵ Medvedev was the principal pupil of Simeon Polotskii, in the cultural battles of the 1680s the chief "Latinizer," and an opponent of Patriarch Ioakim. He had also been Sofia's house poet and an associate of Shaklovityi, though, in fall 1689, he seems to have been accused mainly of plotting against Ioakim and favoring Catholic foreigners over Protestants. Medvedev went off in chains to the Trinity Monastery but he was not executed in Ioakim's lifetime. The monk's end came in February 1691, as a result of the late interrogation of a musketeer associate of Shaklovityi, who accused Medvedev of complicity in Shaklovityi's plots against the life of Peter. See I. Kozlovskii, "Sil'vestr Medvedev," *Kievskie universitetskie izvestiia* 35 (February 1895) 1–49; (March 1895) 50–90; (May 1895), 91–130.

⁷⁶ SRM 115, 6 September 1689: "Vergangenen Mittwoch ist von Troitza ein obrister mit 200 Strelitzen an Zar Iwan und die noch hier seynende Bojaren gesant, und begehret werden, daß man man dießen Tzaglowitin lebendig hinuüßlieffern solte, dießer obrister soll nebst bey sich habenden Strelitzen, sehr hart gegen die Princessin gesprochen und gesagt haben: Sie wolten nicht von denen gehen ehe und bevor sie Tzaglowitin hetten auß den [] wie sie wol wösten, bey sich in verwahrung? hielte, we[] eher das gantze Schloss und ihre gemächen visitiren. Worauff die Princessin gesagt, sie solten sich in frieden ge[hen] sie wolte selbst nach Ihrem bruder dem Zarn Peter reißen, m[it] sich indessen bemühen, daß sie Tzaglowitin (den die sie doch [nicht] bey sich hette, auch nicht wüßte wo er wäre) bekommen möchten, Ihn alldan selbstn hinaußbringen wolte; gleichwohl wuste sie nicht was Tzaglowitin bößes gethan, sintemahl solte allezeit ein getrewer diener von Ihrnen

The final blow came on the fifth of September. The news of Peter's orders to the foreign officers became generally known in the German Suburb on the fourth, and General Gordon and the others set out for the Trinity Monastery, arriving the next day. Sofia had no more military force of any consequence left. The accusations against Shaklovityi, that he had conspired to kill Peter, became generally known in Moscow, and Sofia and Golitsyn made preparations for another trip to see Peter, but express orders from him stopped them, threatening them with insult and demanding Shaklovityi again. The people great and small were starting to go over to Peter *en masse*, including Prince P. I. Prozorovskii, the principal figure in the household of Tsar Ivan. On 6 September Peter sent another order demanding that the boyars come to him and bring Shaklovityi with them.⁷⁷

On the seventh she sent Shaklovityi to his fate, chained to a crude wagon, and Prince Vasili Golitsyn followed him to the Trinity Monastery only a few hours later in a carriage with his son Aleksei and the boyar L. R. Nepliev. Golitsyn was not allowed into the

Maytt. geweßen, begütigte darauff die Strelitzen jeden mit einer sch[] brandwein, und soll wie gesagt wird, etwas geld unter ihnen ausgetheilet haben." Hughes, *Sophia*, 236, following Gordon. Shmurlo, "Padenie," 91–93; *Rozysknye dela*, I, 326, 328.

⁷⁷ Shmurlo, "Padenie," 93–94; SRM 115, 6 September 1689: "Es hat ein wunderliches ansehen alhier und kommen seltzammes handel vorn tag, in dem nun kundt und offenbahr werden, daß man ins 5te daran gearbeitet, wie Man Zar Peter vom leben bringen möge. Dießer verraht ist vergangen Sontag der 1. September zu Troitza vor allen ständen, die dorthin beruffen, bey 4. stunde lang, abgelesen und mit weinenden Augen, so wohl von Zar Peter selbst en alß allen anweßenden angehört und beklaget worden. Ein dißfals Suspecter Obrister Nahmens Semon Jurgoff Rezantzoff, alß man selbigen nach Troitza bekommen und bey die Pein gebrachten, hat alles bekant, wie man Zar Peter auff allerhand weiße umbs leben zu bringen schon lange zeit getrachtet hette, und dießes durch practicierung eines okolnitschen Feodor Levontewitz Tzaglowitin, ein sonderlicher favorit der Princessin Sophi welcher ein zutheil der Strelizen persuadiret und erkaufft, dießes böse werck zu vollbringen . . . [Sofia – PB] War auch gekommen vorgestern mit [Knes?] W. W. G. Golitzin nach Troitza zu reißen, maßen auch schon alles fer[tig] und pferde und Wagens parat sinden, allein es kam gestern expresse ordres von Zar Peter, die Princessin solte zuruckbleiben und nicht hin kommen, oder man wurde Ihr grossen schimpf anthun, sie solte den verräthersichen Tzaglowitin heraufgeben und hinschicken . . . Unter dessen beginnet alles Volck Zar Peter anzuhanen, und dancken Gott Gross und Klein daß dießes böße werck bey zeiten noch entdeckt worden. Die teutsche und alle außländische officiers sind vorgestern auff erhaltene ordres von Zar Peter, hinauß nach Troitza gange." Mazepa still remained in Moscow. "Nach schliessung dießes werde berichtet, daß Zar Peter an hiessige Bojaren ordres geben laßen, daß sie bey lebens straff hinauß zu ihm komen und Tzaglowitin mit sich bringen solle, die Princessin aber will ihn durchaus nicht [heraus]geben." Lavrov dates Peter's letter to Tsar Ivan, which Prozorovskii delivered, to 8 September: *PBI*, 13–14; Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 166–68.

monastery for two days, and then was brought in not to see Peter but to have his crimes read to him by a secretary:

the great sovereign lady and noble princess and grand princess Sofia Alekseevna, without their, the great sovereigns', counsel, did assume full autocratic power, and you Prince Vasilii and Prince Aleksei, abandoning them, the great sovereigns, and showing preference and favor to their royal sister, did report all manner of affairs to their sister, bypassing them, the great sovereigns . . . and you Prince Vasilii in this past year of 7197 [1689] were sent with the great sovereigns' army into the Crimea and, reaching Perekop, you failed to carry out military operations and withdrew from that place . . .

He was to go into exile with his son to Kargopol' (the destination soon changing to Pustozersk for Vasilii and Kargopol' for his son). The younger Golitsyn began to cry, but his father said to him "What do you think? the will of God and the tsars must be done." The Golitsyns then left the monastery, the father then petitioning the tsar for permission to take his wife and children with him. This was granted, and he left for the north on the twelfth. Gordon reported that Vasilii Golitsyn did not meet Shaklovityi's fate because Boris Golitsyn interceded on his behalf. Soon another charge would be brought against V. V. Golitsyn, that he had taken money from the Crimean khan in 1689 to sabotage the campaign. In neither case, however, was he accused of trying to kill Peter or any of his family and faction.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Shmurlo, "Padenie," 94–95; SRM 115, 13 September 1689: "den 6te huius umb Nachmittagszeit alle Bojaren sampt denen vernehmsten bedienten auß jeder Pricass auff Zar Peters starcken befehl nach dem Closter Troiza abgereisset, gegen Abend folgte Knes Was. W. Golitzin mit seinem sohn und der Bojar Neplüoff, welcher drey zusammen in einer Carosse führen; die darauff folgende Nacht in der 5te Stund, wurde Teodor Tzeglowitin von der Princessin Sophia außgegeben, auff einen schlechten Wagen gefäßelt und mit einer starcken Wach nach Troiza geführet, welches alles der Princessin viele thränen und weinen gebracht. Den 7ten dito ist der Cosakische Hetmen Moseppa auff ordres von Zar Peter in begleitung deß Diacken Vassilly Bobinin nach Troiza gereisset. Eodem die ist Knes Was. W. zu Troiza ankommen, aber nicht wie die andere Bojaren und herrn ins Closter eingelassen sondern, nach den man Ihn über eine gute stunde lang dafür stehen, Ihn zurück in die davorliegende Vorstadt biß auff weitem bescheydt weißen laßen. Den 9te dito ist er Knes Wass. Wass. nebst seinem sohn ins Closter gefordert aber nicht vor dem Zar kommen, dan wie er auff der trepfen gewessen, hat man ihm einen Dumnoi Diak entgegengesant, welcher Ihm sein verbrechen vorgelesen, welches mehrentheils darin bestanden wie daß er einige Jahren das Regiment alzu absolute geführet und in sonderheit ist er auch wegen deß 2.mahligen ungluklichen Crimischen Marsches beschuldiget worden; deßhalben er und sein sohn in ungnaden nach Kargopol versandt werden solle; wie sein sohn solches alles angehört hat, er sehr zu weinen angefangen, deme aber der Vater als ers gesehen, zugesprochen und gesagt, Was meinestu, Gottes und der Zaren Wille muss geschehen, ist darauff sofort auß dem Closter gangen, sich mit seinem sohn in Wagen gesetzt und 2 Würst

Golitsyn's supporters, the boyar Nepluev and the *okol'nichii* Venedikt Zmeev, were condemned to exile, the former in Pustozersk and the latter in his most distant estate. Their crimes were their failures in the Crimean campaigns and feathering their nests. A. I. Rzhevskii, the head of the Great Treasury since 1682, and S. F. Tolochanov, the head of the Great Palace and the Treasury Chancellery, were arrested and put under guard in the monastery. To Shaklovityi fell the role of scapegoat for Sofia and Golitsyn. He was interrogated under torture and in public twice, the second time confessing that he had plotted against Peter's life on Sofia's orders. He was executed for these crimes on 11 September.⁷⁹ According to Gordon, Peter was reluctant to execute Shaklovityi but gave in to persuasion from Patriarch Ioakim. Peter sent out an order that all petitions were to be addressed only to the two tsars, not to Sofia, and asked his brother (presumably for form's sake) to remove "unjust" officials from the offices. The formation of a new government was

von Troiza weggefahren alwo er den Zarn bittlich ersuchen lassen, daß er Ihme doch vergönnen möge seine Gemahlin und kinder mit sich zu nehmen, welches auch willigget und ist die selbe vorgestern zu nach von hier ihme nachgereiset." 20 September 1689: Golitsyn's change of destination was the result of the interrogation of Colonel Riazantsev, who was himself exiled for his failure to denounce Shaklovityi when he heard of the plot. Golitsyn was finally sent to Iarensk, and then in 1691 to Pustozersk: Hughes, *Russia*, 77–84 (sentence of Golitsyn, *ibid.*, 77). *Rozysknye dela*, III, 1–1070; IV, 597–646. Prince B. A. Golitsyn apparently did try to lighten the sentence for his cousin: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 462; Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 168–78.

⁷⁹ SRM 115, 13 September 1689: "so ist auch der Bojar Neplüoff und der Okolnitz Wedenikt Smeoff in ungnaden versandt, jener nach Pustoi ozero und dießer auff seine aller abgelegenste landtgüte, wie man sagt, so soll der Chrimmische Marsch und Ihr beyder eigennutz davon uhrsachen. Der Okolnitz Erscheffskoy welcher über der Zarens grossen Schatz, und Semon Feodorowiz Tolotzanoff, der in der Dworez das Commando gehabt, werden in Closter Troiza starck bewachtet, was ihr verbrechen eigentlich und was ihnen widerfahren wird, wird die zeit geben. Feodor Tzeglowitin ist 2mahl öffentlich starck gepeiniget, das erste mahl hat er nichts aussagen wollen, das andermahl aber bekant, daß er auff befehl der Princessin, Zar Peter nach dem leben gestanden, er soll wie geredet aber noch nicht vor gantz gewiß gesagt wird, gestern vor dem Closter decolliret werden sein." Butenant confirms von Kochen's story in detail: TKUA Rusland, B40, 20 September 1689. *Rozysknye dela*, I, 1–504 and IV, 565–81 (Shaklovityi); *ibid.*, II, 533–762 and IV, 589–95 (Nepluev). Zmeev may have come through relatively easily because he had many Naryshkin connections in spite of his long-time loyalty to V. V. Golitsyn. The Zmeevs were classic "new men" in the elite, being descended from quite obscure ancestors, but Venedikt's older brother Prokopii Andreevich was a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Natalia in 1676. His younger brother Boris Andreevich, also a soldier, joined Peter at the Trinity Monastery in 1689, and in 1694 was one of the attendants at Natal'ia Naryshkina's funeral. His son Andrei was also a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Natal'ia. Other Zmeev cousins served in minor capacities in Peter's Great Embassy to Europe. Venedikt's association with Sofia and Golitsyn did not seem to hurt the family fortunes. V. V. Rummel' and Golubtsov, *Rodoslovnyi sbornik russkikh dvorianskikh familii*, 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1886–87. I, 304–12.

thus set in motion. Peter also came to an agreement with Mazepa, meeting him on 9 September and, to his apparent surprise, greeting him warmly, and a few days later proposing to accommodate Mazepa's desires for a revision of the articles of election that defined the hetman's position. Sofia remained in the Kremlin for the time being, entering the Novodevichii Convent at Peter's wish on 4 October. Sofia went accompanied by her sisters Ekaterina and Marfa and with great sorrow and weeping. Vasili Golitsyn's and Sofia's followers were removed from office.⁸⁰

The struggle was over. In 1682 Sofia had taken advantage of a vacuum in the Kremlin created by the musketeers' revolt. Initially she had ruled on behalf of Tsar Ivan, but soon moved to an alliance with Prince V. V. Golitsyn. This alliance was not founded merely on the desire to retain power and keep out the Naryshkins: she and Golitsyn had from the first a new conception of Russia's foreign policy. Russia should keep its focus on the threat of Turkey in the south, but move toward a firm alliance with Poland to stop it. This the Naryshkins would not accept, and their rather inept maneuvers with the Danes reflect their hostility toward the new foreign policy. Sofia gradually alienated Patriarch Ioakim, and seems to have lost the support of the aristocratic families who made up the household of Tsar Ivan. Her ability to continue in power depended on the outcome of her foreign policy, and its ignominious failure in the Crimean campaigns brought her down, together with Golitsyn and their clients. Peter now ruled, and it was up to him to use this power.

⁸⁰ Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 283 (10 September 1689); SRM 115, 13 September 1689: "Verwichenen Montags kam ordres von Zar Peter daß man ins künfftig der Princessin Sophie Nahmen in keine Suppliquen noch einige Schrifften mehr setzen, sondern bloß Zar Iwans und Zar Peters Nahmen schreiben solle; So werden auch nun mehr alle bediente in allen Pricassen die der erste faction angehangen, ab- und andere neue Ministers eingesetzt, wie sie seyn werden, stehet mit nahesten zu vernehmen"; Rzhevskii and Tolochanov were sent in disgrace as *voevody* to Samara and Pereiaslav' respectively. SRM 115, 11 October 1689: "negst verwichenen Montag [=4 October] abends, die Princessin Sophia mit 2. dero Schwester Catharina und Marpha, auff Zar Peters ernsten begehren in ein Closter das Jungfer Clost genant, welches sie von neuen Repariren lassen und hart an der Stadt lieget, gangen, wie wohl mit ihren unwillen, grosser betrübniß und vielem weinen." Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 22, 29; *PiB* I, 13–14; Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie*, XVI, 405–08.

CHAPTER 5

Peter in power, 1689–1699

By the end of September, 1689, Peter's rivals were defeated and at the age of seventeen he began to rule Russia. Until his mother's death in early 1694 he would not rule alone, for Natalia, her younger brother Lev Kirillovich, and others of the Naryshkin clan and the larger Naryshkin faction would exercise power together. Peter was not idle, however, for in these years he not only grew up and spent more and more time in the German Suburb, he also began to form the group of favorites, Russian and foreign, on whom he would rely in later years.¹ By the end of the decade, Peter had also captured the Turkish fort at Azov, traveled in Western Europe, and helped lay the foundation for the Northern War against Sweden.

For the time being, it was a Naryshkin government. They began by rewarding their most important allies, the foreign officers, who received a month's pay as a bonus, and the musketeers, who all got a ruble a year as extra salary. Another beneficiary of the new regime was Patriarch Ioakim. He had convinced Peter to arrest Sil'vestr Medvedev as an associate of Shaklovityi in September. At the same time, Ioakim secured an even greater triumph, the expulsion of the Jesuits from Russia.²

The new government quickly put its boyar supporters in office: Prince Ivan Borisovich Troekurov in the Musketeers' Chancellery, Prince Petr Ivanovich Prozorovskii (the tutor of Tsar Ivan) in the Great Treasury, Prince Fyodor Semenovich Urusov in the Mercenaries' and Artillery Chanceries. The Duma secretary Emel'ian Ukraintsev took over the Ambassadorial Chancellery. P. V. Sheremetev

¹ On the German Suburb in Peter's time see V. A. Kovrigina, *Nemetskaia sloboda Moskvy i ee zhiteli v knotse XVII – pervoi chetverti XVIII vv.*, Moscow, 1998.

² *PSŽ* III, no. 1351, 35–40 (2 October 1689); Florovský, *Čeští jesuité*, 148–67; Georgius David S.J., *Status modernus Magnae Russiae seu Moscoviae* (1690), ed. A. V. Florovskij, The Hague, 1965, 67–71.

bol'shoi continued in the Armory, and his relative P. V. Sheremetev men'shii took over from Troekurov in the Estates Office. Prince Boris Golitsyn, a key man in the new regime, continued in the Kazan' Palace. Peter's *postel'nichii*, G. I. Golovkin, came to head the Treasury Office. Most important was von Kochen's report: "the Boyar Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin, Tsar Peter's uncle, is the most important at the helm, and great flattery comes to him from high and low."³ Lev Naryshkin was only twenty-five in 1689, and perhaps not the most talented in the government. Years later Kurakin, who did not like him or any of his faction, wrote that he had mediocre intelligence and drank too much, but had to admit that he was not a villain and often did good, if only on a whim. The others, Prozorovskii, Troekurov, and Ukraintsev were older and more experienced, and the tsaritsa herself was thirty-eight and had thirteen years of court intrigues behind her.⁴

In the affairs of state Lev Naryshkin was scarcely a dictator, and his rivalry with Prince Boris Golitsyn was intense. It lasted throughout the 1690s, according to the later imperial ambassador Guarient. In the winter of 1689–90 there were persistent rumors that Boris Golitsyn was out of favor because he tried to improve the fate of his cousin Vasilii, in exile in the north. At the same time, Boris did not lose power or influence as several observers predicted. The transfer of the position of *kravchii* from Boris Golitsyn to F. K. Naryshkin was not a blow against the prince, especially since it involved his promotion to boyar. He and his rival Lev Naryshkin remained the most important of the Russian boyars for the next decade.⁵

³ Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 91; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 72–73, 98, 127; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 192, 201; SRM 115, 31 October 1689: "Nun ist der Bojar Leoff Kirilowiz Narischkin deß Zar Peters Mutterbruder der fürnembste am Ruder, und geschicht ihm von hohen und Niedrigen grosse Caresse."

Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin's father, Ivan Semenovich, had been the first in the family to make Duma rank as Peter's *postel'nichii* on 13 July 1682. His son G. I. Golovkin replaced him on 5 March 1689 (RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, l. 59v and boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 42) and took over the Treasury Chancellery in the fall.

⁴ "Gistoriia," *Arkhiv* . . . *Kurakina*, I, 63. Bogoslovskii asserted that Naryshkin was the head of the Ambassadorial Chancellery from 1689, but offered no source for this statement: Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 88–90. None of the diplomats describe meetings with Naryshkin on any regular basis. All negotiations they describe were with Ukraintsev. Peter's correspondence with his uncle for 1689–96, with rare exceptions, has no mention of foreign affairs. Belokurov, *O posol'skom*, 114; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 131.

⁵ Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 93, note 33; Hughes, *Russia*, 77–84; TKUA Rusland, B40, 20 September 1689. In early 1690 Prince A. P. Prozorovskii surrendered the position of *kravchii* to Tsar Ivan for the rank of boyar. Peter's relatives, Martem'ian Kirillovich Naryshkin (his uncle) and Petr Avramovich Lopukhin bol'shoi (Evdokiia's uncle) became boyars about the same time: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 209–10 and SRM 605, 7 March 1690.

The situation they faced was not simple. The Bezobrazov sorcery case suggested the possibility of opposition, even if not clearly connected with the defeated Golitsyn. Lev Naryshkin found anonymous letters in his bedroom threatening him with his father's fate of eight years ago. Peter did not get his own way on major decisions. When Patriarch Ioakim died in 1690, he wanted Markell, the metropolitan of Pskov, to succede, but the majority of "the higher clergy and other distinguished persons" preferred Adrian, the metropolitan of Kazan', who was chosen for the position. Ironically, the only consolation for Peter was the birth of his son Aleksei on 18 February 1690. At the same time, the general discontent with the record of the Crimean campaigns had not abated, especially with the perceived lack of Polish support.⁶

The international situation had grown more complex by this time and its complexities encouraged indecision on the part of the Naryshkin government. The empire was increasingly absorbed by the Nine Years' War with France (1688–97), but the war of the Holy League with the Ottomans was far from over. By the end of 1690 Sobieski was preparing for another campaign in Moldavia and asking Vienna to pressure Moscow to fight in the next year as well.⁷ Moscow was in no mood to accommodate Sobieski, however, since the long-standing suspicion of his motives and aims had been increased by the Solomon affair.⁸

⁶ The *stol'nik* Andrei Il'ich Bezobrazov was convicted of plotting Peter's death by sorcery and executed at the end of 1689: *PSŽ* III, no. 1362, 48–52 (23 December 1689); *Rozysknoe delo*, II, 1–533 (Bezobrazov); SRM 115, 22 December 1689 (Bezobrazov affair); 2 May 1690 (threats to L. K. Naryshkin); Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 92–93; ARSG 7365 (1690), 1 April 1690: the higher clergy so divided over the succession to Ioakim that they put off the Good Friday procession. Markell, who was probably Ukrainian, knew Latin and Polish: K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vlianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'*, pt 1, Kazan', 1914, 256. Gordon claimed that the older boyars and clergy hated Markell for his learning: Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 311, 313.

⁷ Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, 465–67.

⁸ Solomon was a Ukrainian monk whom Prince V. V. Golitsyn encountered in Moscow in early 1689 and provided with some forged letters to the Polish king, supposedly from Hetman Mazepa, asking him to take the Ukrainian hetmanate under his sovereignty. Sobieski had him arrested and under threat of torture he confessed that Golitsyn had ordered the former hetman, Ivan Samoilovich, to write them to discredit Mazepa and B. P. Sheremetev, then *voevoda* of Belgorod. Sobieski sent an emissary to Mazepa with fairly unambiguous messages urging him to revolt and come over to Poland. These messages reached the hetman in January 1690, shortly after the Russian resident in Warsaw, I. M. Volkov, found out about the whole affair and reported it back to Moscow. Mazepa, rather than joining the Poles, arrested the emissary and sent him to Moscow. The Russians demanded that Sobieski turn over Solomon to them to confront other witnesses. Kaminski, *Republic*, 201–28; Adam Darowski, "Intryga Salomonka," *Szkice historyczne* 1 (St. Petersburg),

The result was that just as the Naryshkins took power, their worst fears about Poland were confirmed. Sobieski seemed to be trying to conspire with Mazepa to reconquer the east bank of the Ukraine. The Moscow aristocracy blamed the Poles for not supporting the 1689 campaign, and felt that it had also cost too much money. B. P. Sheremetev's army in the Ukraine took a largely defensive position, repelling border raids from the Tatars.⁹ Not surprisingly, the new government in Moscow sent peace feelers to the Turks and Tatars via Moldavia as early as February, 1690.¹⁰ While the Russian feelers to Turkey continued, Moscow and Warsaw exchanged recriminations on violations of the alliance and Sobieski tried to get the Russians to act during his upcoming campaign of 1691. Russia had no intention of joining the Poles in their new attempt, and the "hostility and jealousy" between Poland and Russia was so great that war was feared between them. To top things off, internal Russian troubles and disunity prevented serious external action.¹¹

Sobieski went into Moldavia alone in 1691, his last major effort

1894, 193–246; Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 90–91, note 25; SRM 605, 28 November 1690.

⁹ SRM 115, 13 March 1690 (from Narva; von Kochen had left Moscow on 13 February): "Wie ich bey allen grossen und vornehmen herrn in Moscau überall vermercke, so ist man gegen Ew. König. Maytt. und dero Chron Schweden nicht übel zufrieden, hergegen aber mit Pohlen nicht wohl gesinnet, weil sie die Reussen im newlichen feldzug wider den Chrim nicht secundiret, und die Biellgorodische Tartern noch ihren friedens pactennicht abgeholt, und klagen die Rüssen daß sie dießer March so viel Millionen gekostet; die Regirung stehet itzund fast ganz allein bey Zar Peter . . ." Peter was spending most of his time on military exercises, especially on fireworks with the foreign officers. SRM 605 (reports of Thomas Knipper): 21 March 1690 (Sheremetev commands in the Ukraine); Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XVI, 410–26.

¹⁰ I. A. Eremiia and N. M. Rogozhin, eds., *Posol'skie knigi po sviaziam Moldovy s Rossiei 1684 g., 1690–1691 gg.*, Kishinev, 1993, 53–134; Kaminski, *Republic*, 231–48; Artamonov, "Rossiia," 18–19; ARSG 7365 (1690), 17 January, 21 February 1690. The Russians also hedged their bets, for they also sent messages via Mazepa to the Zaporozhian cossacks not to make peace with Crimea: Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XVI 427–28.

¹¹ ARSG 7366 (1691): 19 December, 1690, "er Grotte Invidien en Jalousien tusschen Dese en de Polse Landen en Rycken syn gliscerende; so schynt, dat deselve tegen t'aenstande jaar wel tot een openbaren oorlog konden koemen uyttbreken." The Russians have ordered troops to the southern frontier and the magazines to be readied, though most people think these preparations are not against Poland but the Tatars. Sobieski has written expressing a desire for friendship. 30 January 1691: little liklihood of common Russo-Polish action, "aen dese Syde Haere Zaarsse Majesteiten met binnenlantsse troulen, conspiration ende oneenigheden meer ende meer gedreigdt werden . . ." The Russians assume that Poland gets a pension from France in spite of its attempts to appear as a supporter of the Empire. Sheremetev joining his army in the south, but no news of war on Crimea: SRM 605, 6 March 1691. The troubles presumably referred not only to the boyar rivalries but also events like the musketeer arrested and executed early in 1691 for complicity in the Shaklovityi affair: SRM 605, 14 February 1691.

against the Turks, and like all others since the relief of Vienna, unsuccessful. Russia did not move. The Imperial envoy Johann Kurtz came to Moscow early in the year and reported that he found the Russian court in a confused and unstable state: "The government here is in a completely disturbed and disunited condition and no one knows who is the privy minister with the tsars." He went on to describe how the boyar Kozlovskii at the Easter banquet refused to give precedence to another whom Peter favored, and was deprived of his rank. "By which Peter only wants to demonstrate his lordship to the boyars who are opposed to it, for which reason it seems according to everything and to appearances that there could be a rebellion every hour . . ." ¹²

Kurtz wrote no more of possible rebellion, but continued to find the Russian government confused. The Austrian's attempt to get Russia to act against Crimea got nowhere, and he ran into a stone wall. Shortly before his departure he recorded that not only the government opposed any action, but that the influence of the late "Metropolitan Alekseevich," evidently Patriarch Ioakim, was still felt; on his deathbed he had warned the tsar not to continue the war with Crimea. The emissary thought Peter had little influence on affairs. The only area of Kurtz' concern where the tsar could make his influence felt was in relatively greater tolerance of the idea of a Catholic church for the foreigners in Moscow. Peter saw to it that only Kurtz knew of his attitude, and tried to keep it hidden from his own officials. He let Kurtz know that some sort of permanent Catholic priests could be sanctioned, if only they were not Jesuits. The Austrian had the impression that Peter had little support in this attitude. He did succeed, for two Catholic priests came to Moscow the next year. ¹³ Kurtz did not succeed in convincing the Russians to

¹² HHStA Rußland 16, 12 May 1691: "Dahiesige [Regimentdt] ist in einem ganz [verstornten undt uneinigem standt] undt weiß niemandt wer bey [denen Czaren der geheime Minister] eigendtllich seyn solle. Wie dan bey dem jüngsthin in deren osterferien, nach alten gebrauch allein [Czaren] gethanen [tractament] ein gewisser [boiar Caslowscy] dem anderen, welcher [der Czar Petrus] etwan heimlich dafür erkennet, bey [der taffel] vorsizen, undt ein geringsten nicht weichen wollen, wessentwegen er von gedachtem Czaren seines [Boiars] entsezet worden, man also nit weiß wer koch oder keller ist. Wordurch allein [der Czar Petrus] gegen denen darwider stehenden [Boiaren sein] dominium [erweisen] will, darob aber allem jeden undt ansehen nach stündlich [einige rebellion entstehen] undt mir selbst [dardurch nicht wohl geschehen] dörfte." PSZ III, no. 1401, 100–02 (15 April 1691).

¹³ SRM 605, 3 April 1691 (no preparations for any war against Crimea); 24 April 1691 (arrival of Kurtz); 24 July 1691 (no word of possible campaign against Crimea). HHStA Rußland 16: 28 July, 15 September 1691: "[der Metropolita Alexiowiz] von welchem

attack Crimea again and the peace feelers to Turkey and Crimea produced nothing. The Russians had no intention of working with the king of Poland, and preferred to wait out events farther west, particularly any possible Imperial–Ottoman talks. In 1692 Sheremetev commanded the army again, but with the aim just of repelling the Tatars, and indeed there were some clashes on the border but no more than that. Peter spent much of his time in military exercises and sailing at Pereslavl'. He wanted to correct the faults of earlier Russian expeditions against the Tatars, but planned nothing concrete.¹⁴

The next few years were fairly quiet in the realm of diplomacy and war for Russia, but a series of incidents gave evidence of rivalries among the boyars in Moscow, Peter's victorious faction.¹⁵ Already in January, 1691, rumors were circulating that an emissary, a monk, had come from the exiled Vasilii Golitsyn to his cousin Prince Boris, asking for help in lightening his sentence. Boris simply sent the messenger on to the tsar, and nothing seems to have come of the incident.¹⁶ Almost exactly a year later, in February, 1692, an argument erupted between Boris Golitsyn and Prince Iakov Dolgorukii. According to Kniper, at one of the many banquets during *maslenitsa*, given by an unnamed Duma secretary at the palace, Prince Boris encouraged another guest, a *stol'nik*, to pull Prince Iakov's hair as a joke. Dolgorukii stabbed the joker with a fork and was believed to have killed him, with the result that both princes had

hiesiges [gorss fürstenthum in standt gebr]acht worden, auff seinem todtbett ausdrücklich verordnet, [auf ewig in denen Tatern fried gehalten, und solcher tribut jederzeit ihnen er]leget werden solte." Keller tried to help Kurtz as representing a Dutch ally, but without much luck. He thought Kurtz spent too much time with the Polish resident Dowmont, whom the Russians distrusted: ARSG 7366, 10 July 1691. The only thing that did help the Austrian, Keller thought, was the Imperial victories in Transylvania. All that Kurtz accomplished was to leave two Dominican monks in Moscow (25 September 1691). Cf. *PSŽ* III, no. 1388; 86–87. The Russians continued anti-French (HHStA Rußland 16: 21 August, 13 November 1691). Florovskij, *Čestí jesuité*, 191–2.

¹⁴ ARSG 7366 (1692–94), 1 January 1692; 15 February 1692; 19 February 1692 (Russians assure Keller of their zeal to fight the infidel and report border clashes, Peter in Pereslavl' building boats); 24 June 1692 (Peter's exercises, he wants to correct the faults of previous campaigns against the Tatars and admires King William); 1 July 1692 (Peter fires a salute to honor King William's victories); Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XVI, 431–50.

¹⁵ By the end of 1692 Keller had very little to report. Relations with Poland and Crimea were obscure, though Tatar raids continued in the Ukraine. The Dutch envoy's only positive news was that Peter continued to admire King William and consorted so much with foreigners that his behavior aroused jealousy among Russians: ARSG 7766 (1692–94), 23 December 1692. The Ukrainian frontier was quiet from mid-1693 to 1695: Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XVI, 450–51.

¹⁶ SRM 605, 23 January 1691; *PSŽ* III, no. 1395, 89–91.

to appear before the tsar the next day. Dolgorukii called Boris a drunk and said that "he would rather he [Boris – PB] could pull his father's beard than be able to pull his hair." The case went to Tikhon Streshnev, head of the Military Chancellery. Streshnev found against the Dolgorukiis, Princes Iakov and Boris, fining them and ordering them as a humiliation to go to prison on foot. On the way they were recalled, evidently a pardon. The case dragged on until 1695, when Golitsyn forgave them the fine.¹⁷ Toward the end of 1692 another banquet at the house of P. V. Sheremetev ended in a quarrel in which Prince M. G. Romodanovskii called the boyar A. S. Shein a whore's son and Shein struck him. The case went this time not to Streshnev but to Boris Golitsyn, who ordered Romodanovskii to pay an enormous fine for dishonor.¹⁸

Finally, there were some obscure incidents involving the Lopukhins. In February 1693, Avram Fyodorovich Lopukhin, Tsaritsa Evdokiia's brother, married the youngest daughter of Prince Fyodor Iur'evich Romodanovskii, a close confidant of Peter. However, at the end of the month a quarrel between one of the Lopukhins, supposedly Avram Fyodorovich, and François Lefort led to blows. Kniper reported that,

The twenty-sixth of this month His majesty the tsar dined with the Russians and Germans he has with him at the house of General Lefort, where his majesty the tsar had a very good time, during which good times General Lefort was insulted by one of the gentlemen named Lopukhin, who tore the General's wig from his head in a drunken state and spoke very contemptuously of the general, but his majesty the tsar immediately boxed Lopukhin on the ears and two hours before daybreak went with his Pereslavl' companions to Pereslavl', and they will stay until the week before Palm Sunday to carry out the building of boats.¹⁹

¹⁷ SRM 605, 19 February, 4 March 1692. Russian sources confirm Kniper's story: Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 94–95. The story of a similar incident in 1691 between the two princes in Zheliabuzhskii (Žapiski, 25) sounds suspiciously like this one in parts and has no known sources confirming it.

¹⁸ SRM 605, 23 December 1692; *PSZ* III, no. 1460, 149–51.

¹⁹ SRM 605, 12 February 1693 (marriage of A.F. Lopukhin); 3 March 1693: "Den 26 ejus speiseten Ihr. Zar. Maytt. mit dero bey sich habende Réussischen und teutschen, bey H. General Lafort, alwo sich Ihr. Zar. Maytt. recht frölich erzeugten, in wärender frölichkeit wurde H. General Lafort von ein jenigen Herrn Nahmens Lapugin, welcher gedachten Herrn Generalen die Peruque in trunken Muht von haupte (?) gerißen und sehr hämisch von H. General gesprochen, affrontiret, welches aber Ihr. Zar. Maytt. mit einigen Orfeige an gemelten Lapugin gleich darauff gepochen (?), und 2 stunde vor tage mit Perosch[laff]schen gefährten nacher Peroschlaff verreiset, und werden selbige bis die woche vor Palm Sontag sich im persquiring der schiffsbau alda auffhalten." Ustrialov, relying on Kochen's reports from Narva, believed that it was A. F. Lopukhin: Bushkovitch,

Two years later, Petr Avramovich Lopukhin bol'shoi, the former head of the Great Palace Chancellery, supposedly died under torture, but what crime was being investigated is not clear. If M. B. Miloslavskii, interrogated in the Avraamii case (see below, p. 189), is to be believed, the issue was a corruption charge which L. K. Naryshkin had fabricated to discredit him.²⁰ All of these incidents point to a gradual breakdown of the Naryshkin faction and increasing internal dissension among its members, as well as growing alienation between Peter and his wife's family.

This record of intrigue and political indecision on the crucial issue of the war against the Turks reflects the confusion of public affairs in these years which so impressed Johann Kurtz. In the background, however, other things were happening which would very shortly change the face of Russian politics. That was the formation by Peter of his personal following, a motley crew formed of his personal servants, scions of aristocratic houses, foreign generals, and foreigners of less exalted rank, all of them composing much of the future elite of Peter's reign. Starting in the fall of 1690, Peter began to spend most of his time in Preobrazhenskoe, dining with Gordon, Lefort, and a whole series of important aristocrats: P. V. Sheremetev, Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii, Prince I. B. Troekurov, his uncle L. K. Naryshkin, as well as other relatives, P. A. Lopukhin, A. P. Saltykov, and Andrei Artamonovich Matveev.²¹ The next year Kniper also reported banquets with M. K. and F. K. Naryshkin, F. M. Apraksin, Princes Grigorii Fyodorovich and Boris Fyodorovich Dolgorukii, Romodanovskii, Buturlin, Golovkin, Sheremetev, Lopukhin, Boris Golitsyn, and the Danish resident Butenant.²²

Of all these men, in the next years Lefort would become the most important, his great favor with the tsar noticeable by early 1691. Born in 1656 in Geneva, he came to Russia in 1675, and participated in most of Russia's wars from then. Though a Calvinist, he

"Aristocratic Factions," 97. The occasion was Tsaritsa Evdokiia's name-day, and Peter actually was back in Moscow by 3 March: *DR* IV, 766–67, 769.

²⁰ The story of P. A. Lopukhin's death comes from Zheliabuzhskii (*Žapiski*, 40) reported by all historians as fact and the victim identified as P. A. Lopukhin bol'shoi. P. A. Lopukhin's tenure as head of the Great Palace came to an end in 1692; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 23. The *Razriad* records very clearly specify P. A. Lopukhin men'shoi as dying in 7203 (1694/95): f. 210, opis' 26, kn. 36, l. 3. On the same page there is no comment by P. A. Lopukhin bol'shoi's name, and other sources give his death as 1701: Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, II, 57.

²¹ Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 319–29; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 93.

²² SRM 605, 13 February, 2 March 1691 (banquets).

was related by marriage to the Catholic Gordon, and the two seem to have worked together closely. In 1691 Peter made him a lieutenant-general, a clear sign of favor. As a military man in Peter's entourage he was no more important than Gordon, but he was a livelier companion and a participant in many of the young tsar's escapades in the German Suburb. The military appointment and general favor of the young tsar immediately made the boyars jealous, and they came up with a proposal to send Lefort on an embassy abroad to get rid of him. Peter would not let him go, and made him a full general in the spring of 1692, giving him also the Shepelev regiment to command.²³ Sometime during the early 1690s Lefort also cemented his relationship with Peter by introducing him to the tsar's first mistress, Anna Mons, the daughter of a German merchant from Minden, a resident of Moscow's German Suburb for some decades. Mons' own relationship with Lefort seems to have stemmed from the Genevan's friendship with the Swedish resident Thomas Kniper, the young woman's godfather. Thus the romantic liaison had a political side as well, tying Peter more closely to his favorite Lefort and Lefort's pro-Swedish views.²⁴

The new entourage was in large part military. Besides Lefort and Gordon, there were the soldiers and officers of the old "play regiments" of the 1680s, formed of young nobles and the servants of the tsar's stables. By 1691 Peter had formed them with the help of Gordon and others into two full strength guards regiments, the

²³ See Posselt, *Lefort*; Peter was dining at the houses of the Danish, Swedish, and Dutch ambassadors by summer, 1691: ARSG 7355 (1691), 19 June 1691. SRM 605, 6 February 1691 (great favor of Lefort); 23 October 1691 (proposed embassy and jealousy of boyars); 20 November 1691 (Peter will not let him go); 1 April 1692 (Lefort a full general, gets Shepelev regiment). Shepelev had died in 1688: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 208; Rabinovich, *Polki*, 24.

²⁴ The usual date cited for the beginning of Peter's liaison with Mons is 1692, but the first documentary evidence is a letter of September, 1696 from Lefort to Peter mentioning her. Semevskii, *Tsaritsa Katerina*, 21; SRM 605, 14 October 1692 (Lefort a friend of Sweden); Livonica 94, 25 March 1697, Erik Dalbergh to King of Sweden, with extract from letter of Kniper; "ich den H. Principal Legaten Lefort jederzeit für einen Favoriten den schwedischen Nation befunden, und derselbe offers viel zum faveur der Schwedischen trafiquerenden ernstlich cooperirt." At the time of Lefort's fall from power the Danish envoy described the faction of Lefort as opposed to that of L. K. Naryshkin and the other boyars: "Ils [the supporters of L. K. Naryshkin – PB] ont [l'autre Boyar pour ennemy qui n'est pas moins grand et qui s'] appelle [Knes Boris Alexewitz Gallichin], Mr. [Lefort tire avec ce dernier la meme corde et l'une des mains lave l'autre] comme on dit par le proverbe; [et le Commissaire de Suede se] tient [du costé du dernier] ne pouvant reussir [de l'autre costé et cela par la raison d'une certaine Dame] nommée [Madamessele Mons qui peut tout sur l'esprit de] Mr [Lefort et qui est née à Riga dont le Commissaire Kniper est parrain.]" TKUA Rusland, B42, 8 February 1699.

Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii regiments, a reservoir of leaders for the rest of the reign.²⁵ In the fall Peter staged elaborate maneuvers near Semenovskoe to test and train these and other units. One side consisted of the new guards regiments and other modern units (the Butyrka and Lefort infantry regiments), the other of the musketeers. On the modern side the commander was Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii, with General Avtomon Mikhailovich Golovin commanding the center and Gordon and Lefort the wings. The commander of the musketeers was I. I. Buturlin the elder. The cavalry units were all commanded by foreigners. All the Russian commanders were highly aristocratic, with ancestors in the Duma, and all had been chamber *stol'niki* of Peter.²⁶

Shortly after the end of the maneuvers at Semenovskoe for the first time Gordon mentioned in his diary the "All-Drunken Council," a sort of drinking society that parodied church and state. Kurakin later claimed that the first patriarch of the council had been the boyar Matvei Filimonovich Naryshkin, who died in 1691/92. In January 1692, the tsar and his companions elected a new patriarch, Peter's old teacher the Duma secretary Nikita Zotov, whose title eventually evolved to "Prince-Pope." The other members of the council came to be Lefort, Tikhon Streshnev, G. I. Golovkin, I. A. Musin-Pushkin, F. M. Apraksin, Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii, Prince M. N. L'voy, A. P. Protas'ev, Alexander Menshikov, and the secretary A. A. Vinius, a russified Dutchman. The group combined aristocrats with Peter's more plebeian favorites. The aristocrats were Streshnev,

²⁵ The *poteshnye* soldiers seem to have been formed into regular guards regiments in late 1691: P. O. Bobrovskii, "Poteshnye i nachalo Preobrazhenskogo polka," *Voennyi sbornik* 248 (1899) 7, 5–34; 8, 237–69; Bobrovskii, "Uchrezhdeniia Preobrazhenskogo polka," *ibid.*, 254 (1900) 8, 225–47; and Bobrovskii, *Istoriia leib-gvardii Preobrazhenskogo polka*, I–II, St. Petersburg, 1900–04. At a banquet at the house of General Lefort on 3 February 1691 Peter questioned Kniper very closely about the Swedish life guard regiments, whether they kept hourly watch at the palace, what were the Swedish colors, and similar details. This incident supports Bobrovskii's date of November 1691, as the approximate moment when the units were professionalized: SRM 605, 6 and 13 February 1691.

²⁶ Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii himself never reached Duma rank, though he had been a *spal'nik* of Tsar Fyodor and chamber *stol'nik* of Peter's since 1682. Bуганов, *Vostanie*, 11, 84, 263; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, l. 119; Kollmann, *Kinship*, 230–31. A. M. Golovin's father was a boyar and headed the Land Chancellery (in charge of Moscow) in the 1680s. The Buturlins were somewhat less distinguished: the first with Duma rank in the seventeenth century was an *okol'nicii* in 1619, the first boyar was V. V. Buturlin in 1652. Golovin and Buturlin similarly were among Peter's chamber *stol'niki* by at least 1685/86. RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 89v, 90; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnica*, III, 105–08; Kollmann, *Kinship*, 210–11; Crummev, *Aristocrats*, 180, 182, 189, 200; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 51 (if the chamber *stol'nik* Buturlin of the 80s was the elder I. I. B.)

Golovkin, Apraksin, and L'vov, who had ancestors in the Duma since the 1620s and himself had boyar rank from 1692. Some were new men in the elite, the first in their families to enter the Duma as *okol'nichie* (Musin-Pushkin and Protas'ev). Farther down the social scale came Vinius and Menshikov. The aristocrat Romodanovskii seems to have played one of the central roles in the council's festivities, very early getting various titles, "prince of Preobrazhenskoe," or more commonly "Prince-Caesar," and whom Peter usually addressed in Dutch as Lord King, "Her Kenich."²⁷ Romodanovskii also soon came to head the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery, which took care of the court, Peter's personal business, and the Preobrazhenskii guards, and tried opponents of the tsar. Romodanovskii's position was also understood by foreign diplomats to be that of a sort of viceroy in the absence of Peter.²⁸

Many of the same people accompanied Peter during his trips to Archangel in 1693 and 1694: Princes Boris Golitsyn, A. S. Shein, V. F. Naryshkin, Prince M. N. L'vov, the *kravchii* K. A. Naryshkin, Lefort, Golovkin, Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii, I. I. Buturlin the elder, Prince F. I. Troekurov, F. M. Apraksin, F. L. and S. A. Lopukhin, Zotov, and Vinius.²⁹ Greeting Peter on arrival in Archangel was another companion from Moscow banquets, A. A. Matveev, governor of the province from 1692 to 1694.³⁰ The trip to Archangel lasted from 4 July until 1 October, much to the distress of his mother, who made him promise not to actually go out to sea. As the incident shows, she was still to a large extent in command – not for long. Natalia Naryshkina died on 25 January 1694, a death which caused some realignment at court, but, even more importantly, left Peter alone, his own man for the first time in life. Butenant recorded that

²⁷ "Gistoriia," *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, 71; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 183, 205, 208–209, 211. Wittram, *Peter I*, 108 is the best account of the council. Musin-Pushkin was also the nephew by marriage of the deceased patriarch Ioakim and as such the brother-in-law of I. I. Buturlin: L. M. Savelov, "Savelkovy i Savelovy XV–XX vv.: Rodoslovie," *Letopis' istoriko-rodoslovnogo obshchestva* 10, 2, 38–39, appendix, Moscow 1914, 14–16, 21. S. A. Khomutov, *Musiny-Pushkiny v istorii Rossii*, Rybinsk, 1998.

²⁸ Golikova argues that the first evidence of the existence of the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery as a formal institution is the spring of 1695, though Romodanovskii, Buturlin, and Golovin had earlier both led the incipient guards regiments (and before that the "play" troops) as well as taken care of the court at Preobrazhenskoe: N. B. Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre, I*, Moscow, 1957, 12–13, 185.

²⁹ Bogoslovskii, *Materiaby*, I, 155.

³⁰ Barsukov, *Spiski*, 66.

my last letter, in which was the death of the youngest tsar Peter Alekseevich's mother, the widowed tsaritsa Natalia Kirillovna, I reported how such a death would cause some changes among the great men at court, which is happening, and mainly to the tsaritsa relatives who have now not so much to say, though her oldest brother Lev Kirillovich still has his rank, the Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn is certainly in the greatest favor and esteem with the youngest tsar . . .

Golitsyn was not able to lighten his cousin Vasilii's sentence, however, a continuing issue. A few months after his mother's death Peter was the first tsar to omit the traditional Palm Sunday procession, though he went to Easter services in the Dormition cathedral. From this moment the old Russian court ritual ceased to exist.³¹ Equally important in 1694 was something that did not happen. There were no promotions to or within the Duma ranks. For the first time in centuries, no one became a boyar, an *okol'nichii*, or a Duma gentleman. From this point on, such promotions were tremendous rarities, rewards to a few aristocrats who still prized the old title. Similarly, the Duma began to lose its share in the government, after 1696 assembling only on rare occasions of unusual importance.³²

In summer, 1694, Peter went off to Archangel, and this time he went out to sea. His suite was much the same as the previous year, with a few additions and changes. Gordon came in place of Lefort, L. K. Naryshkin and T. N. Streshnev as well as Prince Boris Golitsyn and Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii. A. M. Golovin, commander of the new Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii guards joined the party and F. M. Apraksin was already there, appointed governor of Archangel province in place of Matveev. On the way up, Peter encountered P. A. Tolstoi, a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsar Ivan and governor of the province of Ustiug Velikii in 1693. The meeting was cordial, and

³¹ DR IV, 881, 884–87; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy* I, 161–62, 176; Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 95; TKUA Russland, B40, 27 April 1694: "In aller unterthänigkeit, von den 26. Januarii an Ihro König. Mayestet mein jüngstes, darinnen das absterben von der jüngsten Zaaren Peter Alexewiz seine Mutter, die verwitbte Zaarin Nathalia Kirilofna berichtet, wie auch das solche Sterbfall, einige veränderung unter den grossen am Hoffe würde causiren, welches auch erfolget, und meist an der Zarinne ihre verwandten, welche nun nicht mehr so viel zu sagen haben, doch ihr ältester bruder Löf Kirilowiz hält noch seinen rang, der Knäs Boris Alexewiz Galitsin ist bey dem jüngsten Zaarn wol in grössten gnaden und ansehen, doch kan er nicht zuwegebringen, das seine bruder der Knäs Wassilii Wasiliwiz auß seinen Exilio zuruck werde geruffen, und lebet derselbe sehr kummerlich zu Mesen an der See Kant, doch wirt ihme Knäs Boris Alexewiz etwas erleichterung zuwegebringen."

³² The decline of the Duma in 1694–96 was the more significant if Man'kov is right that its share in legislation was higher in 1676–94 than under Tsar Aleksei: Man'kov, "Statistika," 186. See also Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma*, 438–42.

Tolstoi would prove a loyal servant. Another loyal servant had also emerged, for one of the letters Peter sent to Apraksin from shipboard bore the signatures of several of the All-Drunken Council, including that of Alexander Menshikov, the first record of the future favorite's presence.³³ At the time, Menshikov was just one of several soldiers of the bombardier company of the Preobrazhenskii regiment who accompanied the tsar. Unlike most of Peter's entourage, he was not an aristocrat: the most likely origin of the favorite was among the servants of the palace stable.³⁴

The return to Moscow was the signal for the last big maneuvers of Peter's youth, the so-called Kozhukhovo campaign south of Moscow at Kolomenskoe during 23 September to 18 October, 1694. Prince Romodanovskii commanded one side, with the Preobrazhenskii (under A. M. Golovin, second in command Prince N. I. Repnin) and the Semenovskii (under John Chambers) guards regiments, the Butyrka (under Gordon) and Lefort's regiments, against the musketeers under Buturlin. Other troops were those led by Iakov Turgenev, the tsar's fool, and composed of palace servants and two cavalry companies under the Siberian tsarevich [Vasilii Alekseevich?]. The great boyars served on both sides. Under Romodanovskii, A. S. Shein and Prince M. Ia. Cherkasskii served as commanders, and in a lesser capacity Peter himself. Buturlin led six regiments of musketeers, including the guard (*stremiannyi*) regiment of Sergeev. Besides them were several companies formed of secretaries and undersecre-

³³ Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 176–93; *PiB* I, 25–26. Golovin seems to have commanded the two guards regiments as a unit. The colonel of the Preobrazhenskii regiment was Iurii von Mengden. In 1697 P. A. Tolstoi went to Italy as a “volunteer” to learn navigation and Italian: L. A. Ol'shevskaia and S. N. Travnikov, eds., *Puteshestvie stol'nika P. A. Tolstogo po Evrope 1697–1699*, Moscow, 1992; and Pavlenko, *Ptenty*, 115–28.

³⁴ Later on Menshikov had a fantastic genealogy compiled with clearly mythical aristocratic ancestors in Poland. The work claimed his father was captured by the Russian army in 1664, married a Russian merchant's daughter and went on to serve in the tsar's stables. Menshikov's parents and daughter were buried in the parish church of the palace village of Semenovskoe, which housed the falconers of the court in the time of Tsar Aleksei. The falconers and stable servants were early on among the *poteshnye* troops and went to make up the two guards regiments. Menshikov appears in the list of soldiers of the bombardier company, which Bobrovskii dated to after 1692. The legend that he sold *pirozhi* seems to date from about 1710: G. V. Esipov, “Zhizneopisanie kniazia A. D. Menshikova, po novootkrytym bumagam,” *Russkii arkhiv* 13, no. 7 (1875) 233–47; no. 9 (1875) 47–74; no. 10 (1875) 198–212; no. 12 (1875) 477–81; esp. no. 7, 234. Rach', “Bombardiry v Poteshnykh voiskakh Petra Velikogo,” *Voennyi sbornik* 11 (1860), 1–48; Bobrovskii, “Poteshnye,” *ibid.*, 248 (1899), nos. 7–8, 3–34, 237–69; Bobrovskii, “Uchrezhdenie Preobrazhenskogo polka,” *ibid.*, 254 (1900), no. 8, 235–42 (an excerpt from P. O. Bobrovskii, *Istoriia leib-gardii Preobrazhenskogo polka*, 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1900–04); N. I. Pavlenko, *Poluderkhavyi vlastelin*, Moscow, 1991, 23–37.

taries of the chanceries, and a company of *stol'niki*, and various boyars, including the boyar F. P. Sheremetev as well as Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii, still only a chamber *stol'nik*. Once again Romodanovskii's men stormed the fort, and the musketeers were defeated.³⁵ Shortly after the conclusion of the maneuvers, in the last weeks of the year, Peter decided on a real war, the conquest of Azov.

THE AZOV CAMPAIGNS

The circumstances surrounding this fundamental decision are extremely obscure. Gordon's diary and Lefort's letters tell us when the decision and the plans were laid down, approximately the middle of December 1694 to the end of January 1695. A later letter of Peter's confirms that he had not had such a campaign in mind at the time of the Kozhukhovo campaign. Unfortunately neither Butenant's nor Kniper's reports survive for that whole winter, so our usual informants are silent. The only thing that is sure is that after 1689 there are no sources pointing to factions formed along foreign policy lines or having a foreign policy aspect. The many dissensions of the early 1690s seem all to be personal rivalries. The main figures remained Boris Golitsyn and L. K. Naryshkin, and in the Ambassadorial Chancellery Ukraintsev lasted through the whole decade.³⁶ On the eve of the campaign Gordon recorded extensive discussion of strategy with Prince Boris Golitsyn, L. K. Naryshkin, T. N. Streshnev, and Prince P. I. Prozorovskii, besides the tsar himself. He recorded no hint of dissension or hesitation.³⁷

In the spring of 1695 he moved south. The army had three large corps, two under Gordon, Lefort, and A. M. Golovin went to Azov,

³⁵ Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 193–206; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 205, 210.

³⁶ Prince F. S. Urusov's death in 1694 required new appointments to Mercenaries, Cavalry, and Artillery Chancelleries, which went to Duma secretary Avtomon Ivanovich Ivanov for the years 1694–97. The only other changes involved Lopukhin in 1692 and the transfer of the Treasury Chancellery to Prince P. I. Prozorovskii from G. I. Golovkin in 1694. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 59, 73, 138, 152–53. Similarly the only change in the Ambassadorial Chancellery was the transfer of A. A. Viniius to the Siberian Chancellery early in 1695, but Viniius also remained a confidant of Peter, corresponding with him on foreign affairs. S. A. Belokurov, "O Posol'skom prikaze," (Moscow, 1906), 114, 125–28.

³⁷ Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 501–08. Artamonov argues that before Peter took matters in hand at the end of 1694 the boyars were moving toward a *de facto* surrender, a return to the conditions of the 1681 treaty of Bakhchisarai. His own evidence points not to such inclinations, but rather to a standstill, with the southern border defended but no diplomatic moves, either toward the Tatars or toward strengthening the Polish alliance. Artamonov, "Rossia," 24–25.

and a third corps under B. P. Sheremetev went down the Dniepr with Hetman Mazepa to attack the Turkish forts on that river. Prince Boris Golitsyn, who as head of the Kazan' Palace was responsible for the southern Volga and north Caucasus, went with the army to Azov. The Azov army naturally included the Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii guards regiments, commanded by von Mengden and John Chambers, respectively. Romodanovskii remained behind in Moscow, with the fiction of his authority maintained in Peter's letters, as did Vinius (who ran the post), and L. K. Naryshkin.³⁸ Peter's surviving correspondence with them is very much in accord with their governmental roles. With Romodanovskii and Buturlin he corresponded about the Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii regiments, but with the prince also matters of general order. He asked Romodanovskii to deal with a rebellion of the peasants assigned to the Danish agent Butenant's iron works in Olonets, and the prince kept him up to date on fires and other events in Moscow. Tikhon Streshnev passed on news of Sheremetev's march along the Dniepr and received orders from the tsar on Military Chancellery issues. Vinius sent Peter foreign news regularly, especially of the war in the Balkans and in Western Europe. With Naryshkin the exchanges were more general, mostly news of the campaign and greetings, and even less official were the letters from Golovkin, whose position had little to do with the war. More formal communications took place with Patriarch Adrian and Tsar Ivan.³⁹ The machine seemed to be working smoothly.

The first siege of Azov was a failure, but Peter left in good spirits for home with the army. After his return he held a council of the generals and decided that he needed a fleet to properly invest the fort, and began to build one, a galley fleet that used as its model a Dutch galley that he had managed to get during the summer, via Archangel.⁴⁰ As Peter reached this momentous decision, new signs of trouble among the old Naryshkin faction surfaced in Moscow,

³⁸ Serving in the Preobrazhenskii regiment as company (*rota*) commanders were Prince G. F. Dolgorukii and Prince D. M. Golitsyn. Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 217. Princes M. I. Lykov and M. N. L'vov and P. T. Kondyrev, all boyars also followed the army, apparently in administrative or judicial capacities. Lykov headed the Investigation (*systk*) Chancellery, L'vov the Land Chancellery, Kondyrev the Tsaritsa's Workshop until the previous year: Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikazyne*, 51–52, 66–67, 197, 203. *PiB* I, 29–31, 510–11. For the campaign see also Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, II, 568–82.

³⁹ *RIB* I, 29–54, 480–81, 507–47, 883–88.

⁴⁰ *PiB* I, 53–54.

putting Peter in conflict with his uncle Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin.⁴¹ Another more serious case further reflected disintegration of the Naryshkin faction as well as signs of aristocratic discontent. Kniper's brief report of the incident tells us: "a few days ago in the high presence of his Tsar's majesty the *spal'nik* Peter Mikhailovich Dolgorukii and the *stol'nik* Fyodor Petrovich Izmailov let themselves speak in disrespect of his tsar's majesty, which immediately came to his ears, and right away the *spal'nik* was hard treated, the *stol'nik's* feet were tied and so bound he was dragged through the city to the Kremlin." Whatever they said, it was not very serious, for both went to serve the tsar, Dolgorukii in the Preobrazhenskii regiment and Izmailov with the rank of *striapchii*.⁴² Trivial in themselves, both incidents pointed to the future.

The next year's campaign did not begin until Peter had built his fleet. In Voronezh on the upper Don he spent much of the winter building his galleys, corresponding with Streshnev over wood and personnel, with Boris Golitsyn about the Kalmyks, Circassians, and Terek cossacks, with Vinius about the war in Flanders, and other matters. The most important decision before the fleet sailed down the river was the matter of a commander. The first choice was Prince Mikhail Alekukovich Cherkasskii, in the 1680s a leader of the Naryshkin faction, with a long career more at court and in administration than in the field. Cherkasskii was born a *murza* and a Circassian prince, and men thought of him as good for fighting the Turks and Tatars.⁴³ Since he was not in good enough health for the position, Peter's choice fell on A. S. Shein. For the diversion along the Dniepr there was no issue, as Sheremetev remained in command as the previous year.

⁴¹ Lev Kirillovich had been attempting to quash an investigation into corruption by Naryshkin relatives in Siberia: Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 96.

⁴² SRM 605, 31 December 1695: "Vor einige tagen haben in Ihro Zaar. Mayt. hohes anwesenheit der Spalnick Peter Michailowity Dolgorucka und der stolnick Foedor Petrowitz Ismailoff in despect Ihr Zaar. Mayt. etwaß discursive vor sich fahren lassen, welches alsofort höchst erwehnten zu Ohren kommen, und auf frischem that erst bemelten Spalnick hart tratiret, den Stolnicken aber die fuße binden lassen, und an Ihro Zaar. Mayt. Schloss also gebunden durch dies statt geschleppt." Dolgorukii's father had been the victim of the musketeers in 1682, he himself had been in the first group of *spal'niki* appointed after Tsar Fyodor's death, and he received the rank of chamber *stol'nik* by the end of the year. Izmailov was apparently the brother of Tsar Ivan's chamber *stol'nik* of 1682–83, Andrei Petrovich Izmailov (later a prominent diplomat). Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 96–97; Buganov, ed., *Vosstanie*, 11, 263; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, ll. 113v, 116; Ivanov, 1856, pt. 1, l. 818v.

⁴³ *PiB I*, 54–63, 547–71; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 274–77.

Shein, a boyar since 1682, was a much less exotic choice than Cherkasskii. Shein joined Peter's side fairly early in 1689, serving in the palace, accompanying Peter to Archangel in 1693 and commanding in the Kozhukhovo campaign of that fall. On the other hand, he did not even go on the first Azov campaign, and his experience, like that of Cherkasskii, was more that of an administrator than of a field commander. As we shall see, this appointment was the beginning of a pattern in Peter's military commands, the appointment of a Russian from the old families as commander over the combination of Russian and foreign professional officers. In this case Lefort was already admiral of the fleet, and his vice and rear admirals were Giorgio Lima (a Venetian) and Balthasar de l'Oisière (a Frenchman). The *admiralteets*, apparently a sort of quartermaster's job, was A. P. Protas'ev, the head of the Vladimir Judicial Chancellery.⁴⁴ The military commands under Shein went to Lefort as well, Gordon, Golovin (with the two guards regiments), and Karl Riegemann. The same boyars remained in charge in Moscow as in 1695.⁴⁵

Azov fell to the Russian forces on 19 July 1696, and Peter returned in triumph to Moscow, where he staged a formal victory parade through Moscow, a triumphal entrance in full Baroque style. Worked out in advance with Vinius, the 30 September entrance featured triumphal arches in the Roman manner with an allegorical program. There were statues of Mars and Hercules, and the Turkish prisoners marched by in the style of a Roman triumph. One of the arches bore (in church Slavic, not Latin) Caesar's motto, "I came, I saw, I conquered." Though this was a victory over Muslims, and

⁴⁴ The Sheins were a junior line of the Morozov clan, the latter boyars in the fourteenth century and the former attaining that rank in 1546. A. S. Shein's great-grandfather had led the Russian army before Smolensk in 1633 and was executed for his failure. In the last years of Tsar Aleksei A. S. Shein had been at court, serving the tsar rather than the tsaritsa, and in 1680–82 was governor in Tobol'sk. In the last weeks of Tsar Fyodor's life he granted Shein the rank of boyar, making Aleksei Semenovich the first in his family since his great-grandfather's disgrace to enter the Duma. He played a minor role in the events of 1682, and the next three years he was governor of Kursk. The southern governors usually also had a military role, and in the Crimean campaign he commanded the Novgorod troops. Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 274, 277–78, 280; Kollmann, *Kinship*, 221.

For Protas'ev see Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 170 (a brief appointment in the Judicial Chancellery in 1681–82) and 178 (head of the Vladimir Judicial Chancellery 1692–95 and 1697–1700). In 1686–90 he served as governor at Mangazeia in Siberia: Barsukov, *Spiski*, 134. The boyar Prince M. N. L'vov served as *general-profos*, a sort of military judge, apparently in continuation of his previous year's service: Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 281.

⁴⁵ L. K. Naryshkin did correspond with Russian diplomats, giving them news of the war, while Peter expected Ukraitsev to carry out that task. *PtB* I, 68–82, 88–90, 93–96, 100–02, 109–10, 573–606.

Peter's correspondence contains many derogatory references to the infidels, there was almost no reference to Christianity in the decorative program of the entry. Peter's world of reference was already beyond that of the traditional Russian court culture. One of the engravings he had made for the victory at Azov showed himself sitting between two columns with the motto "Plus ultra rosseanum," an obvious reference to the emblem of Charles V, "plus outre," with its suggestions of conquest in the name of faith.⁴⁶

After Peter's return he sat down to decide what to do with Azov, and formulated a series of questions for the boyars. The form of written questions may have been new, but the answers came with the old formula: *prigovorili* (consented). The decision was to fortify the place anew, placing troops from the lower Volga and financing the enterprise from the Great Treasury. The boyars also agreed to build an ocean-going fleet to protect the fort from the Turkish ships in the Black Sea. The ships were a new item in the Russian budget, and a new "tax" was devised. The church would build one ship from every 8,000 peasant households, and the boyars and other secular landholders would build one from every 10,000. The *admiralteets* Protas'ev was put in charge of the building at Voronezh, where the admiralty would be. Volunteers were named to go to Europe to learn the art of navigation.⁴⁷

On 6 December 1696, came the official announcement of the great embassy to Europe. The ambassadors were to be François Lefort, the boyar F. A. Golovin, and the Duma secretary P. B. Voznitsyn. Golovin had successfully negotiated the 1689 treaty of Nerchinsk with China, and served in the second Azov campaign where his younger cousin A. M. Golovin had a major command. On the eve of the embassy's departure, F. A. Golovin also received the Armory into his care. Voznitsyn had served in the Ambassadorial Chancellery in various capacities since 1667, including a stint as the Russian resident in Warsaw. The embassy included another group of some thirty volunteers to learn navigation and shipbuilding, among them Petr Mikhailov (the tsar incognito) and Alexander

⁴⁶ Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 344–50. The only Christian reference was a picture of the defeat of Maxentius by Emperor Constantine, the defeat of heresy by Orthodoxy (in the Middle Ages Islam was considered a Christian heresy, and this imagery seems to have come to Russia through Baroque Europe).

⁴⁷ *PiB* I, 111–18. "Volunteers" was the usual expression at that time for aristocratic young men who served with an army, often another sovereign's, to learn the trade.

Menshikov.⁴⁸ Before he left, Peter arranged to secure Azov and build the harbor. In November he appointed the Duma gentleman and former musketeer officer Ivan Tsykler to take charge of the building of Taganrog, and on 6 January 1697, he named the commanders of the army: Shein again as supreme commander and simultaneously head of the Artillery, Mercenaries' and Cavalry Chancelleries. On the southern line, Prince Luka Fyodorovich Dolgorukii would have Sevsk and his brother Iakov Fyodorovich would command in Belgorod, replacing B. P. Sheremetev, for whom Peter also had plans. A month later the boyar Matvei Stepanovich Pushkin received the post of governor of Azov.⁴⁹ Virtually all of these appointments, like the nomination of volunteers to study abroad, would have unexpected consequences.

Before the great journey could get under way, two political cases erupted, one of them, the Tsykler–Sokovnin affair, being the first serious case of opposition to Peter on the part of the court elite. The earlier of these cases to arise was the affair of the monk Avraamii, which only peripherally involved the aristocracy. Avraamii was a monk of the Andreev Monastery on Sparrow Hills southwest of Moscow, a foundation of the *okol'nichii* F. M. Rtishchev from about 1650. Starting about 1690, the musketeers, tradesmen, and soldiers who came to the monastery for prayer began to complain to Avraamii about the tsar. He heard more complaints during a stint in the Trinity Monastery (1692–94), and began to compose a petition to Peter himself listing all the complaints. A typical product of traditional Russian political thinking, it remained entirely in the moral realm: Peter did not pay enough attention to the church, he was stubborn and did not listen to the advice of his mother and wife,

⁴⁸ Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 365–72; Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 129–34. Both Aleksei Petrovich and Mikhail Petrovich Golovin received the rank of *okol'nichii* in November 1676, Mikhail going on to boyar 29 August 1682, and Aleksei two years later. F. A. Golovin (1650–1706) was promoted from *stol'nik* to *okol'nichii* on Christmas 1685, and to boyar on 22 October 1691. F. A. Golovin's only particular connection to Peter was through his cousin's service as commander of the guards regiments. His appointment as head of the Armory came on 19 February 1697. Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnia*, III, 106–08; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 98–99; Crumme, *Aristocrats*, 200, 206–08; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 29v. Joseph Sebes, S.J., *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689): The Diary of Thomas Pereira*, S. J., Bibliotheca Instituti historici S.I. 18, Rome, 1961.

⁴⁹ RGADA, f. 210, Moskovskii stol, d. 255, ll. 352–55 (5 November 1696, order to Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii to replace B. P. Sheremetev); ll. 133–35 (27 January 1697, announcement to Sheremetev of his replacement in Belgorod); Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 388; DR IV, 1042; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 59, 138, 153; Barsukov; *Spiski*, 1.

there was too much bribery in the chanceries. Avraamii submitted the petition to Peter on 7 January 1697, supplemented by some of his own proposals in the same vein. The result was his immediate arrest, the charge being (apparently) speaking improper words against the tsar. He was taken out to Preobrazhenskoe, thus fulfilling Romodanovskii's prophecy about him: "the monk seemed a good man, but now he is climbing into jail himself."⁵⁰

Avraamii was not very forthcoming about his sources, but he did name two tradesmen, Roman and Ivan Pososhkov, the latter soon to become a writer of tracts on warfare, economics, and administration, highly unusual for a man of his class at the time.⁵¹ The Pososhkovs were not found to have committed any crime and were released, but Avraamii was imprisoned in the Golutvin Monastery in Kolomna. Only once did his petition touch on the aristocracy, when he listed the talk he heard in the Trinity Monastery, about Peter's boat building in Pereslavl', his trips to Archangel, and "about the end, that is, the death of the boyar Petr Avramovich and about the suffering of his brothers and all relatives and all his family." This was the case of Petr Avramovich Lopukhin men'shoi, who lost his position at the Great Palace in 1692 and died in 1694/95. Avraamii said that he had heard about Lopukhin from the boyar Matvei Bogdanovich Miloslavskii. They had eaten together at the Trinity Monastery and Miloslavskii said to him, "Petr Lopukhin was a good man and in his chancery made a surplus, but he was tortured wrongly because of a denunciation from Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin." Miloslavskii denied all this, though Avraamii added the details that the boyar had spoken to him alone when they went out on the staircase to cool off. Evidently, the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery was not convinced, for Miloslavskii went into exile on his estate in February, never to return.⁵²

⁵⁰ For the text of his petition, the "notebooks", see N. A. Baklanova, "'Tetradī' startsa Avraamiia," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 6, (1951), 131–55. The investigation is in B. B. Kafengauz, *I. T. Pososhkov: zhizn' i deiatel'nost'*, Moscow, 1951, 174–82 ("kazalsia de on, starets, chelovek dobryi, a nyne de on, starets, sam v strub lezet," 174).

⁵¹ Kafengauz, *Pososhkov*; and Marc Raeff, "Two Facets of the World of Ivan Pososhkov," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50, 1995, 309–28.

⁵² Kafengauz, *Pososhkov*, 174 ("Petr de Lophukhin byl chelovek dobroī i mnogo pribyli v prikaze uchinil, a zapytan de on naprasno po nanosu boiarina Lva Kirilovicha Naryshkina"), 181–82. M. B. Miloslavskii was the brother of Ivan Bogdanovich Miloslavskii (died 1681), a major figure of the 1660s and 1670s. M. B. held no major office, though if he had a military career it is unknown. He was named *okol'nichii* in June 1676, and boyar in June 1682, which only confirms that his known career followed that of his family. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 195, 199.

Avraamii's petition said no more about anyone from the great families, but the investigation did bring out another name, Peter's chamber *stol'nik* Vasilii Alekseevich Sokovnin. One of the witnesses was a subsecretary of the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery itself, Ignatii Bubnov. Bubnov testified that he had heard from Ivan Inekhov, the general scribe of the Preobrazhenskii regiment, a story about V. A. Sokovnin's participation in "comedies" in Izmailovo, the palace estate just south of Preobrazhenskoe. There he played a "prophet," and those who fell afoul of his prophecies were beaten with brooms. The comedy may be some sort of play or simply the *sviatki*, the traditional foolery and masquerades of the post-Christmas season in Russia. Years later Kurakin wrote that V. A. Sokovnin ("an evil man and full of all sorts of nastiness") had been the originator of these festivities at Peter's court. He remembered that Sokovnin had the title of prophet in these games.⁵³ Sokovnin was not at issue here but he was soon to find himself involved in a much more serious case.

On 23 February Peter went to the house of Lefort in the German suburb for yet another evening of festivities, but this time they were interrupted. An officer of the musketeer guard regiment, the *stremiannyi* (Ivan Konishchev) regiment, had denounced the Duma gentleman Ivan Tsykler, a former musketeer colonel, for the most serious crime of all, the intention to murder the tsar. Thus began the Tsykler affair, in later historiography a conspiracy of the "conservative" nobility against the reformer tsar, a conspiracy originating in the old Miloslavskii faction. One of the conspirators, the *okol'nichii* Aleksei Prokof'evich Sokovnin, was even supposed to be a secret Old Believer, adding to the conservative aura of the affair. Sokovnin's Old Belief sympathies, however, were mythical, the result of his sisters' actual role as Old Belief martyrs in 1675 and a statement in Matveev's history of Peter that Sokovnin was an evil schismatic himself.⁵⁴ The reality of the Tsykler affair was quite different.

⁵³ Kurakin's description of the *sviatki* stressed obscenity and brutality, which he blamed on Sokovnin. He also saw it as the beginning of disrespect for the old aristocratic houses (Kurakin's hobby horse), for which Sokovnin was an unlikely leader. He asserted that the Duma gentleman Miasnoi died as a result of the hazing, which points to 1691/92. Kurakin also asserted that "*znatnye liudi*" observed *sviatki*, presumably long before Peter. A decree of January 1691, suspended the work of the chancelleries for *sviatki*: *PSŽ* III, no. 1393, 88 (3 January 1691). As Kurakin's account suggests, the celebration of *sviatki* was part of the activity of the All-Drunken Council. Crummev, *Aristocrats*, 204; Kafengauz, *Pososhkov*, 178–79; Kurakin, "Gistoriia," 73–74.

⁵⁴ Matveev, who claimed that Sokovnin was an Old Believer, did not assert that this was the cause of his discontent, rather that he was never named a boyar nor enriched by the tsar.

The *piatidesiatnik* (commander of fifty men) Larion Elizar'ev had come with his denunciation to Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin, who immediately turned it over to Romodanovskii's Preobrazhenskii Chancellery.⁵⁵ Elizar'ev claimed that on 2 December 1696, he had visited the Duma gentleman Ivan Tsykler, who asked him if things were quiet among the musketeers. Elizar'ev answered that God had given it that they were, and anyone who started something would have it on his own head. Tsykler replied, "Now the great sovereign is going beyond the sea, and if anything happens to him, what will then be?" Elizar'ev in return just hoped for Peter's health, and pointed out that if anything happened to Peter, they had the sovereign tsarevich. Tsykler thought that the tsar would be whom God and the lady sovereign in the Novodevichii Convent (Sofia) chose.

This testimony was bad enough, though it contained nothing but predictions. But on 23 February Elizar'ev was returning from a visit to another musketeer, Grigorii Silin, with his host to the Kremlin past the Cathedral (Intercession, i.e. St. Basil's). Silin told him that he had been to see Tsykler, who had told him that it was possible to kill the tsar, either on the *Pozhar* (Red Square) or in Moscow (the Kremlin). Elizar'ev went immediately to L. K. Naryshkin, who sent him to Preobrazhenskoe with an escort.⁵⁶

Silin was arrested the same day, and confirmed the story, adding that Tsykler had said the words about killing the tsar to him after Christmas, and that Tsykler had also said that he had an attractive wife and daughter and that the tsar might attempt fornication with them. Tsykler confirmed that he had asked about the situation among the musketeers, but denied that he had said that God and Sofia would choose the tsar or any of the talk to Silin about killing the tsar. Even when confronted with Silin, Tsykler continued his denial, so the investigators put him to the torture (five blows). Here the investigation took a new direction, for Tsykler now confessed that he had spoken to another officer of the *stremiannyi* regiment, Vas'ka Filipov, and asked him about the cossacks, whether they were

Sokovnin's sisters were Feodora Morozova ("boiarynia Morozova") and her sister Princess Evdokiia Urusova. Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 97–98; A. I. Mazunin, ed., *Povest' o boiaryne Morozovoi*, Leningrad, 1979.

⁵⁵ What follows comes from RGADA, f. 371, opis' 2, d. 485, ll. 1–108. The fullest account is in Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 384–93. See also Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 544–48; and Golikova, *Politicheskie*, 87–100.

⁵⁶ RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 1–2.

satisfied with the sovereign's grace toward them. Filipov reported a conversation with a cossack named Demka, who told him that the cossacks were not grateful to the tsar, why should they be? Tsykler was surprised, for they had received 1,000 gold pieces. This was not enough, for they had nothing (meaning no booty) to divide among them. The cossacks were angry, and when Peter left, they would return to doing as they pleased, and though "you [the musketeers] interfered with us when there was Stenka Razin, this time there is no one." Filipov confirmed the whole story, with the exception of the name of the cossack, who was not Demka but one Petrushka Luk'ianov. He also added that Petrushka told him the cossacks were seriously discontented and were writing to the Turkish sultan for help. Filipov had also seen Tsykler, who asked where he would serve, telling him that they would be sent from Moscow with their wives. Tsykler continued, "now there is much disorder because the tsar is going beyond the sea and he is sending as ambassador Lefort and taking much treasure for that embassy, and there is much other disorder, is it possible for you to stand against it?" Vas'ka said it was not just their problem, but the cossacks too had little salary, as Petrushka Luk'ianov had told him.⁵⁷

Tsykler again denied all that Filipov had said, so he went back to the torture chamber. This time the case exploded, for Tsykler implicated the *okol'nichii* Aleksei Prokof'evich Sokovnin. Tsykler had been to buy a horse from him, and Sokovnin had asked him about the musketeers. On hearing that they were quiet, Sokovnin said, "Where have those whores' sons changed their shirts, you, where have they gone, it's possible for them to do anything, he [Peter – PB] goes around the streets alone where there are few people, dead drunk, he is on the *Pozhar* when there are few people, again those whores' sons are fools." Sokovnin told Tsykler that the musketeers were fools for they were perishing now and would continue to perish. Afterward Silin had come to his house and heard all this. Sokovnin at first tried to deny that he had said all this, but after ten blows he confessed. A. P. Sokovnin's sons Vasilii, Fyodor, and Petr were in the house when their father was talking treason to Tsykler, who thought they heard the conversation. They claimed that they did not hear it. Tsykler told more. He said Filipov told him, Tsykler, that he, Filipov, had been to see the boyar Matvei Stepanovich

⁵⁷ RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 2–8.

Pushkin, and the boyar's son Fyodor told Filipov that "He was sick of the sovereign, and how could he meet up with him, the sovereign? He would not depart whether he, Fyodor, lived or died." Fyodor Pushkin confessed, after five blows, to having spoken the words.⁵⁸

The investigation resumed three days later. Tsykler implicated other musketeers. Pushkin added, after ten blows, that he had said all that "because the sovereign's anger had fallen on his father, the boyar Matvei Stepanovich." Tsykler also said that it was Sokovnin who had spoken to him of killing the tsar when he rode alone near the ambassadorial courtyard. Then he reported a more political conversation. Tsykler asked Sokovnin,

if this happens, who should be tsar? Aleksei said to him, "there won't be a tsardom in any case." And he, Ivan, said to him, Aleksei, "what do you think about this?" And he, Aleksei, said to him, Ivan, "Shein here is without family, he has only one son and he is a good man." Ivan said to Aleksei, "Boris Petrovich Sheremetev has good luck, the musketeers love him." And Aleksei said to him, "I think the musketeers will choose the tsarevna [Sofia] as before, and the tsarevna will take the tsarevich, and when she comes in she will also take Prince Vasilii Golitsyn and Prince Vasilii will start to shout like before."

Tsykler expressed his doubts that the musketeers would choose Sofia, so Sokovnin said that they would elect him, Tsykler, as tsar. Tsykler protested that this was impossible, but admitted that he did talk to the musketeers about killing the tsar on Sokovnin's urging. The second time they met Tsykler told Sokovnin that the musketeers were too few in number, and that he, Tsykler, thought that they were afraid of the "play" troops. He also accused Sokovnin of inciting the musketeers but being afraid to do anything himself. The *okol'nichii* told him that he was not the only one to be discontented. In his own testimony he confirmed all of the Tsykler's words, except his protest at the suggestion of his own election.⁵⁹

The rest of the investigation, over 27 February–1 March, was devoted mainly to ferreting out the musketeers who had actually participated in the talk about killing the tsar, but it also added a few details about Tsykler, Sokovnin, and Pushkin. Tsykler reported (and F. Pushkin confirmed) that Pushkin had said "about Prince Petr

⁵⁸ RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 8–10. Vasilii Sokovnin was a chamber *stol'nik* of Peter (see above, p. 190), his brother Fyodor Alekseevich the same for Tsar Ivan: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, l. 118v; boiarskaia kniga 36, l. 17, 19v. Fyodor received the rank on 26 February 1693: DR IV, 768–69.

⁵⁹ RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 12–19. Quotation: ll. 15–16.

Golitsyn, he is a lively man and quick, we expected from him that he, Prince Petr, would do all that to the sovereign.” This Petr Golitsyn was presumably Petr Alekseevich, the brother of the powerful Prince Boris Golitsyn, whom Pushkin described a few moments later as “drunk himself and taught the Great Sovereign to drink.”⁶⁰ Sokovnin said he had no accomplices, however, and nothing happened to Petr Golitsyn. He was not even called in for testimony. Vas’ka Filipov reported (unconfirmed) words of Fyodor Pushkin to the effect that Peter lived carelessly, not like a Christian, and that there was no God or Christianity in him.⁶¹ In the next torture session Tsykler added, apparently to demonstrate that he had no grudge, that he had known Sokovnin for years, “he was an old acquaintance, through Fyodor Mikhailovich Rtishchev.” Similarly under torture Sokovnin added more about Fyodor Pushkin:

his son-in-law Fyodor Matveev son Pushkin came to him and said to him, Aleksei, about the sovereign, that he has ruined everyone, and for that reason it is possible to kill him, and it will not be sinful because he has ruined everyone and because the sovereign’s anger has fallen on his, Fyodor’s father. And his, Aleksei’s, son Vasili Sokovnin said, they are sending us beyond the sea to learn and it is unknown what.

Fyodor Pushkin confirmed all that, adding that he, not Vasili Sokovnin, had spoken the words about sending beyond the sea. Perhaps he was trying to cover for his brother-in-law. It did little good. Aleksei Sokovnin even under worse torture denied that either his sons or his brother Fyodor knew of the talk of killing the tsar, but Vasili Sokovnin admitted to the statement about not knowing why he was to be sent abroad, but said that he spoke the words “from simplicity.” The investigation was coming to an end. After eleven blows and the fire, Fyodor Pushkin gave his last witness against his father-in-law, reporting that “he, Aleksei, had told him, Fyodor, ‘the sovereign wants to mock your father at *sviatki* and kill him and destroy your house.’” Fyodor said that if that happened, he would kill the tsar. Sokovnin confirmed the words. Save a few more minor details from the musketeers, the case was complete.⁶²

The case came before the boyars in full detail with the statutes cited from the Conciliar Laws of 1649 (chapter 2, on threats against

⁶⁰ RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 25.

⁶¹ There was also discussion of the boyar Matvei Stepanovich Pushkin’s appointment as governor in Azov. RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 35–37.

⁶² RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 39–41.

the sovereign) and on 4 March the main culprits were executed. Two days later the sentence, confirmed by the boyars, was officially proclaimed: Tsykler, Aleksei Sokovnin, and Fyodor Pushkin, along with two musketeers (Filipov and Fedka Rozhin) and the Don cossack Petrushka Luk'ianov, were worthy of death. Other musketeers were to be beaten and exiled to Barguzin beyond Lake Baikal or to Belgorod or Sevsk. Some were released for lack of serious evidence. The boyar families were to suffer as well. M. S. Pushkin was to lose his rank of boyar and go to Eniseisk in Siberia an exile, but his property was not to be confiscated. Fyodor Prokof'evich Sokovnin was to be exiled to his farthest villages, where he died before the end of the year. Fyodor's sons were to go to Sevsk and serve in the Sevsk regiment at the same rank, while Aleksei Sokovnin's sons Vasilii, Fyodor, and Petr as well as Tsykler's sons were to lose their rank, the younger Sokovnins to serve at Belgorod and the Tsyklers at Kursk. They were not to come to Moscow without permission. The young Sokovnins were to lose all their estates except for twenty-five peasant households for Vasilii Sokovnin and ten each for his brothers and the Tsyklers. The sons of Fyodor Pushkin were to lose all property. All of the younger generation's wives and their sisters were to keep their own estates and part of their moveable property. Their serfs were to be freed. Peter rewarded Larion Elizar'ev, who got fifty households of Tsykler's estate, 1,000 rubles of his property and the rank of elder subsecretary in the Foodstuffs Yard near the Miasnitskii gate, one of the Palace supply offices.⁶³

At the execution the body of Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii was dug up, and brought to the place of execution, symbolically connecting it with the plot.⁶⁴ Was there really a connection? Early on the day of the execution, Tsykler was interrogated about his connection with the events of 1682. He denied knowing if Miloslavskii had any plans before the beginning of the troubles, and said that only after the boyars were killed did Sofia speak with him and get him to calm down the musketeers. After that, he claimed that twice, at the

⁶³ RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 485, ll. 96–105. The final sentence is dated two days after the execution of Tsykler and others on 4 March. Golikova interpreted this anomaly to mean that only the lesser culprits received their sentences on the sixth, the others earlier orally: Golikova, *Politcheskie*, 100, note 2. For F. P. Sokovnin's death see Poe, *Consular*, 1696–97.

⁶⁴ TKUA Rusland, B40, 30 April 1697 (brief report of plot and full translation of the sentence, with account of the execution on 5 March 1697, including the episode with I. M. Miloslavskii's body). Gordon, *Tagebuch*, III, 92–93.

outset of both Crimean campaigns, she tried to get him to kill Peter, but that he had refused. The second time she had accused him of turning his coat. All that he would admit to was long acquaintance with Miloslavskii: he was married in his house, and the bride was the daughter of the boyar Ia. S. Pushkin, that is, she was M. S. Pushkin's niece.⁶⁵ The comments of the accused on Sofia and Vasilii Golitsyn, however, were not particularly positive, giving the impression that they canvassed Sheremetev and Shein as possible tsars because they did not like the idea of restoration of Sofia, but needed someone to impress the musketeers. The involvement of Miloslavskii's body was the result of Peter's previous experiences, not the testimony of the investigation.

The family relations among the conspirators may explain a certain similarity of views, or at least why they all knew one another's business. The real question of the affair is, what were their political aims? Matveev's notion that Sokovnin was an Old Believer is simply wrong. The investigation turned up nothing about Old Belief and the subject was not even mentioned, even though everyone must have remembered the fate of Sokovnin's sisters. Further, the detail that Tsykler knew Sokovnin through the *okol'nichii* F. M. Rtishchev virtually excludes Old Belief sympathies. Rtishchev was the patron of the Ukrainian scholars, Epifanii Slavinetskii and others, who were the first wave bringing Western scholarship and culture to Russia in the 1650s and 1660s. Rtishchev was not sympathetic to the schism. After their sisters' open support of Old Belief in 1671, Aleksei and Fyodor Sokovnin served as governors in Ostrogozhsk (1673) and Chuguev (1675) respectively, which may have been a sort of exile, but they were not imprisoned, as would have been normal had they shared their sisters' religious convictions.⁶⁶

The actual statements of the accused are the only real evidence for their ideas. These views must be inferred to a large extent, for the investigation focussed on the legal issue, the intent to kill the tsar, and secondarily on the failure to denounce that intention by those who knew of it but did not share it. The Preobrazhenskii Chancellery was not interested in the general opinions of the accused. Thus it spent no time on the early reports of Tsykler's general opinions, his concern about the lack of order (*nestroenie*) in Russia caused by the

⁶⁵ ll. 48–50. Tsykler, Sokovnin, and Pushkin were all related by marriage: Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 388–91.

⁶⁶ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 192; Bushkovitch, *Religion*, 160–63; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 166, 217.

approaching departure of the tsar and the cost of the embassy. The core of the case, because it involved killing the tsar, was the statements about possible successors. Sokovnin feared that the musketeers would simply choose Sofia, an option he clearly disliked because it implied the return of Vasilii Golitsyn, even if both ruled in the name of the infant tsarevich, Aleksei Petrovich. He preferred A. S. Shein, while Tsykler supported B. P. Sheremetev. The two plotters thus hoped to put on the throne one of Peter's two principal military commanders in 1695–96, neither of them cultural conservatives.⁶⁷ Sokovnin was explicitly opposed to the return of Sofia and Vasilii Golitsyn, while Tsykler (in his unconfirmed statements) predicted it might happen if Peter died, but preferred Sheremetev. The Pushkins' main reason for discontent seems to have been real or imagined threats to the family honor, particularly to the boyar M. S. Pushkin.⁶⁸ Aleksei Sokovnin remained an *okol'nichii* and had no significant office after 1689, though his son Vasilii Alekseevich, however, remained in favor. Beyond his position as chamber *stol'nik* and "prophet" at the *sviatki* revels, he was governor of Iaroslavl', Rostov, and Pereslavl' in 1692–94. This was an important post, the more so since those were the years of Peter's boat building at Pereslavl'. Peter named him and his brother Fyodor to go to Venice, another sign of favor.⁶⁹ Whatever Peter's intentions, Tsykler, Sokovnin, and Pushkin believed themselves passed over and consequently began to consider plotting against the tsar.⁷⁰

Before Peter left he struck at his relatives the Lopukhins. There is no record of his motivation, but it is hard to believe that his impending divorce from Evdokiia was not the cause. The tsar sent

⁶⁷ Both Sheremetev and Shein were patrons of the Polish cultural fashions of the 1680s–1690s. Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 101–02, 111.

⁶⁸ In November 1696, Peter had appointed Tsykler head of the construction of the new port of Taganrog on the Sea of Azov, and M. S. Pushkin as governor of Azov. The importance of these posts to Peter does not suggest an intention to dishonor either of the two. Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 387–88; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 43.

⁶⁹ Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 196, 204–05; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, l. 118v; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 181, 287–88. By 1701 Vasilii and Fyodor are no longer in the list of chamber *stol'niki*, but their cousins Petr and Prokofii Fyodorovich Sokovnin were still serving in Sevsk at the tsar's favor: RGADA f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 45, l. 91.

⁷⁰ That the plotters were willing to commit the most heinous crime their world could imagine, killing the tsar, over such issues would seem out of place. It was normal, however, in seventeenth-century Europe. The duke de la Rochefoucauld recounts in his memoirs that one of his reasons for joining the Fronde, that is, helping to start a civil war and making a treasonous alliance with the king of Spain, was that his father did not get a certain office and was refused the right of *tabouret*: François, duke de la Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, Paris, 1964.

his father-in-law the boyar Fyodor Avramovich Lopukhin as governor to Tot'ma in the far north, then a prosperous trading area but still exceedingly remote. Evdokiia's uncle, the boyar Vasilii Avramovich, received a similar position in Charonda, not far from the Kirillov Monastery. Another of her uncles, chamber *stol'nik* Sergei Avramovich got Viaz'ma to administer, closer to Moscow.⁷¹ These appointments removed the older generation of Lopukhins from Moscow for the duration of Peter's trip to Europe.⁷²

TRAVEL AND REBELLION

Peter's departure left the same boyars in charge of the government and main offices as before, L. K. Naryshkin, Prince Boris Golitsyn, T. N. Streshnev, Prince Fyodor Romodanovskii to take care of Preobrazhenskoe and Moscow, and Vinius to keep Peter informed through the post. Besides Shein at Azov he replaced the disgraced Pushkin as governor of the new province with the boyar Prince Aleksei Petrovich Prozorovskii.⁷³

For most of the first year away things went smoothly at home. Shein and Prozorovskii built up the fortifications at Azov, the harbor and fleet went well, and the Turks were not able to threaten them. Prince Iakov Dolgorukii and Hetman Mazepa's campaign down the Dniepr was a more complicated story. In the previous campaigns Sheremetev and Mazepa had captured Tavansk and some smaller forts, and now had to hold on to them. Dolgorukii and Mazepa's army came down to meet the Turks, and managed to beat them off before they had to return for lack of food, leaving a large garrison. On their return, news came of Tatar attacks, and they had to send Dolgorukii's brother, Prince Luka Fyodorovich, and Patrick Gordon to the rescue. The garrison beat off the attack but the campaign

⁷¹ Vasilii Lopukhin had received the rank of *okol'nichii* (like Fyodor's boyar rank) in 1689, and boyar rank in November 1691. He died in the summer of 1697. Fyodor-Ilarion Avramovich was still in exile in his village when he died in 1713: RGADA, f. 210, op. 2, d. 60, boiarskaia kniga 1713 g., l. 4; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 209. Sergei Avramovich Lopukhin became a chamber *stol'nik* of Peter on 30 January 1689, also at the time of the marriage: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 96. Dolgorukov, *Russkaia rodoslovnaia*, II, 57.

⁷² Peter did send his brother-in-law Avram Fyodorovich to Venice: *PiB* I, 134, 611. Earlier he had served in the first *reitarskii polk* directly under the colonel Karl Riegemann in the 1694 Kozhukhovo campaign: Semevskii, "Kozhukhovskii," 66.

⁷³ A. P. Prozorovskii had received boyar rank in summer 1690. He was the first cousin of Prince P. I. Prozorovskii, the former *diad'ka* of Tsar Ivan. Crummey, *Aristocrats* 211; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia*, I, 191.

accomplished little. The reports came in to Peter in Amsterdam and his reaction was sharp: "yesterday the post brought us the very joyful news of the brave defense of the Tavansk garrison, and on this we should mutually congratulate ourselves, for the garrison alone is the cause of the victory."⁷⁴ Dolgorukii was not in good odor with the tsar.

A few weeks later a much bigger issue emerged than the poor performance of his generals. Prince Romodanovskii wrote the tsar on 14 June 1698, that trouble was erupting among the musketeers under the command of his relative Prince M. G. Romodanovskii along the Polish frontier, where they had been sent to support Augustus II in Poland. The soldiers were coming to Moscow with petitions and complaints. By mid-June things had gotten wholly out of hand: the musketeers had thrown off their officers and marched on Moscow. Gordon and Prince Masal'skii stopped them before the Monastery of the New Jerusalem on 18 June, and Fyodor Romodanovskii immediately reported the whole story to Peter. When the tsar received the letter he wrote back (16 July) that "the seed of Ivan Mikhailovich [Miloslavskii] is growing" and cancelled plans to go to Italy.⁷⁵ Instead he hurried home, stopping only to confer with Augustus II, the new king of Poland.

While Peter was rushing home worried about the musketeers, Patriarch Adrian and the Lopukhins were obstructing Peter's policies. The Imperial ambassador Cristoph Ignaz von Guarient reported that Adrian's discontent grew out of the tobacco contract Peter had awarded before his departure to Martyn Bogdanov Orlenok, a Russian merchant.

The Patriarch here has two weeks ago [June 3/13] publicly excommunicated a Russian merchant, his wife, children, and children's children, since he [the merchant] contracted for himself and bought a tobacco monopoly through a contract for 150,000 rubles made by the tsar before his departure, and laid an eternal curse on his profits. Which procedure, given the state of the country at that time, aroused dangerous pressure on the boyars and the most eminent ministers, as the tsar's majesty has just now conceded to some Englishmen on the basis of an accord the import, export, handling, and sale of tobacco in all lands subject to him for three years. Thereby Russian opinions are divided into two factions, one of which has taken the party of the patriarch, has proclaimed his action praiseworthy

⁷⁴ Kostomarov, *Mazepa*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, XVI, 464–72; *PiB* I, 217, 662, 664, 672–73.

⁷⁵ *PiB* I, 251, 266, 725–26, 742; Ustrialov, *Istoriia* III, 474–75; Buganov, *Moskovskie*, 363–97.

and holy, and even praise and approve this excommunication, indeed in order to avoid the many attendant evils and because [tobacco] is against their always famously practiced observance and salutary laws well preserved. The other and greater part wants to predict for the Patriarch an inevitable punishment and heavy disfavor on the return of the tsar because such boldness of a public curse. At the same time even without this he is in no special esteem or great consideration with the tsar and some boyars.

Guarient went on to describe Patriarch Adrian's response to another controversial issue, Peter's impending divorce from Evdokiia.

In spite of all this, the patriarch rejects the threatening disfavor of the tsar and still stands in daily consultation with many adherents of his faction, as to whether he should offer full obedience to that which is sent to him and the ministry by the tsar for the second time by sharply issued decrees, also that according to this order he himself or through his plenipotentiary should send the tsaritsa to a convent and perform the relevant ceremonies. Which commanded function is pursued by the boyars of the tsar's faction with no zeal or energy. Since then the tsaritsa takes such undeserved hard orders sadly to heart and her innocent suffering, and that she might ever have given the smallest cause for repudiation, has been bemoaned by friend and foe.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ HHStA Rußland 18, 27 June 1698: "der alhiesige Patriarch, widen den einigen Russichen Chauffmann, sein Weib, kinder und kinds kinder; Welcher den Tobackh Appalto durch einem mit den Czarn noch vor dero abreyß, aufgerichteten erdenck. Contract, gegen Erlang Jarh. 150/m Rubl an sich pactirt und gebracht hat, mit würckhlicher Excommunication vor 14. tagen öffentlich verfahren, und seinem hierdurch gesuchten Gewinn, auf ewig verflucht. Welche procedur bey dermahligen des Reichs verwührtem Conjuncturn, den Bojaren und vornehmsten Ministris, ein gefährliches nachdruckhen erwecket; massen die Czar. Maytt. erst jüngsthin dennen Engelländern vermög getroffenen accords, die ein- und zufuhr, handlung, und verkauff des Tabacks, in allen dero bottmessigkeit unterworfenen landten auf 3. Jahr concediret hat: Dardurch die Russische gemuther in 2. factiones zerthrennet worden; welche da eine des Patriarchens partie angenommen, seine action vor löb. und heylig außgesschrien, ja so gar wegen evitirung der hierdurch einschleichenden villen übeln, und ihrer jederzeit rüchlich geuebter observanz, auch heylsamben vorgesehenen gesätzen zuwider, diese Excommunication billichen und aproberen; die andere, und mehrere theil aber, will dem Patriarchen, wegen solcher köckheit des öffentllichen flueches bey zurueckkhunft des Czars, die unausbleib. straff und schwäre ungnadt allerdings vor- und wahrsagen; Zumahlen er ohnedem bey der Czar. Maytt. und etliche Bojaren, in keinem sonderlichen ansehen, oder grosser Consideration. Diesem allen uneracht, verwürfft mehrernenter Patriarch die antrohende Czar. ungnadt, und stehet noch mit villen seiner Factions Adhaerenten in täglichen consiliis, ob er deme, was von dem Czarn schon daß anderte mahl durch scharpf ergangene Decreta ihme, und dem Ministerio zugeschickt, die vollständige parition laisten, auch disen befehl gemäß, er selber, oder durch einem darzue gevollmächtigten die Czarissin, in das Clost stossen, und die dabey behörige Ceremonien verrichten solte. Welche anbefohlene Function zwar auch von dennen Bojaren der Czar. faction mit keinem eyffer und nachtruckh getriben wirdt. Sintemahlen die Czarissin solche unverdiente harte verordnung jedwedern wehemuethig zu herzen führet, und hierüber von freund- und feinden, ihres unschuldigen leidens, auch das sie einmahls die geringste Causam repudii gegeben habe inner. betrauert wirdt."

Adrian was not the only one opposed to foreign customs like the smoking of tobacco, for Evdokiia herself was firmly in the traditionalist camp. The Danish ambassador reported, "this nation loves the tsaritsa very much because of the hatred which she shows to foreigners and their customs and this is exactly the reason why she has made herself odious in the mind of the tsar."⁷⁷ For once, traditionalism and conservative opposition to foreign ways made an alliance of opponents of the tsar, Evdokiia, the Lopukhin clan and Patriarch Adrian, even if they were a minority among the boyars.

In order to obey the tsar's order, Evdokiia had finally agreed in principle to enter the convent, as long as her son Aleksei could come along to enjoy his mother's care. The boyars were divided on this issue along factional lines, becoming daily more disunited and embittered. The Lopukhin faction spread the news of Evdokiia's decision. At the most recent church ceremony the eight-year-old Tsarevich Aleksei himself had spoken up, calling Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin to him and reproaching him before the tsaritsa, the tsarevna, and some boyars:

'It is well known that you are the reason that I and my mother suffer so much, and must innocently bear so much. And yet I know that many heads are stuck up before the tsar's Kremlin who have not sinned so much as you. God will also give enough time to bring your vices to light to be properly punished.' During this speech the tsarevich became so angry that he fell into Naryshkin's hair and was immediately ordered out of the room, which led Naryshkin and other boyars to fear and greater energy. . .⁷⁸

⁷⁷ TKUA B 42 8 July 1698: "cette nation aimant [fort la Czar à cause de la] haine [qu'elle] temoigne [porter aux Etrangers et à leurs manières] et c'est justement par là [qu'elle se rend odieuse elle mesme dans l'esprit du Czaar]." In May, Streshnev had been confident the divorce would succeed: *P&B* I, 700. The character of Adrian's "conservatism" was very relative: Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 109–13.

⁷⁸ HHStA Rußland 18, 27 June 1698, ff. 109v–110: "Doch zu vollkommen gehorsamb des Czars befelchs, hat sie das Closter. leben, mit disem außtruch. vorbehalt, anzunehmen sich resolviret; wann der Prinz (welchen die Czar. Maytt. bey dero abreyß, ihrer Muetter. Sorgfalt ernst, und vätterlich anbefohlen) mit in das Closter volge, und ihrer getrewesten muetter. liebe nicht entzogen werde; über welches die Bojaren zu keinem ausspruch noch *de facto* kommen, sondern zeugen sich die Factions gemueter von tag; zu tag gegen einander mehrers verbittert, und uneinig; und obschonn diser obbenenter Czar. Prinz noch von unmündigen Jahren, so hat doch selbiger von dennen der Lobochin. Familie (aus welcher die Czarin) zugethanen Factionisten die vollständige nachricht, diser schwer benötigter Resolution seiner frau Muetter genugsamb vernommen: Dahero bey jüngst-vollbrachter Kürchfahrt dem Lew Kiriliowiz zu sich berueffen, und ihn unverhoffter weise in beyseyn der Czarin, Prinzessin, und 2. geheimben Bojaren dergestalten angefahren: es ist allzuwohl bekant, das du meist ursach bist, warumben Ich und meine frau Muetter so vill leyden, und

As a result Naryshkin left for his country estate on 11/21 June. Guarient went on to describe the revolt of the musketeers, noting that their rage was particularly directed against Shein and T. N. Streshnev, who between them headed most of the military chancelleries, and Prince P. I. Prozorovskii, the head of the financial chancelleries. To complicate matters even further, news had reached Moscow that Boris Sheremetev had had an audience with Pope Innocent XII, bringing grief to his family and the curse of the Russian people. Patriarch Adrian held back a public excommunication only because of his respect for the family.⁷⁹

Adrian might not have held back if he had known how close Sheremetev came to conversion. The Catholic issue was very high in importance in the summer of 1698, in part because Guarient's charge included the unofficial reestablishment of a Jesuit mission in Moscow to replace the Dominicans present since 1692. Two incidents added to the weight of the Catholic issue. Precisely in July 1698, came the condemnation of the deacon Petr Artem'ev for his conversion to Catholicism. Guarient did not mention the incident in his dispatches, but the Jesuits in his entourage knew about it.⁸⁰ The

unschuldig ertragen muessen. Wisse aber auch darbey, das vill Kopf vor dem Czar. Schloss Kremlin auffgesteckhet, die bey weitem nicht so vill pecciret, als du schon verdienen hast: Gott wird aber die zeit noch geben, daß auch deine laster thatten, werden am Tag kommen, und billig abgestrafft werden muessen: Wehrenden solchen anreden, wurde der Prinz dermassen ergrümmet, daß er den mehrbedeuten Nariskin, mit ungewöhn. Furie in die haar gefahlen, und sich alsobald aus dem zimmer zureteriren anbefohlen; welches den Nariskin und mehrere Bojaren, zur forcht und weitem nachdruckh verlaithet . . .”

⁷⁹ HHStA Rußland 18, 27 June 1698, ff. 110–11: After describing defensive preparations in the German Suburb, Guarient reported: “Zu obangeregter provianthierung, haben die abermahlig Rebellirende strelizen anlassend ursach geben, welche unter Commando des Romodonovsky in dennen Pohl. granizen gestanden, und sich . . . vor wenig wochen aufrührisch bezeugt, und anjetzo widerumb revoltiret, sich in grösserer anzahl bey Toropesk zusamben geschlagen, ihren officiers theils handt und fuß gebunden, theils von denen Regimenten in die flucht gejagt, anstatt derer, unter sich die Chargen außgetheilt, und nunmehr in wenig tagen mit ihren mitführenden stuckhen (welche sie aus dennen zeugheussern gewaldthätiger weise mit anderen notwendiger Munition und kriegszeug heraußgenommen) gegen Moscau anrucken wollen, umb ihre Rachbegürigkeit gegen dennen Bojaren, insonderheit dem feldherrn Schein, Cammer President Prossorowsky, und Bojaren Tichon Nikitowiz, verbittert außzulassen”; f. 113: “Das der Bojar Scheremet, bey Ihro Pabst. Heyligkeit audienz genommen, hat er seiner gemahlin unterbrech. weinen, seiner familie und den ganz Russ. volks aber allgemeinen fleuch auff sich geladen, und hat auch der Patriarch ob Respectus humanos, mit der angetroheten offent. Excumunication bis dato zuruck gehalten.”

⁸⁰ The two Jesuits in Moscow pretended to be merely Catholic parish priests and concealed their membership in the order. Bushkovitch, “Aristocratic Factions,” 102; Florovský, *Čeští jesuité*, 202–8; [M. O. Koialovich, ed.], *Pis'ma i doneseniia iesuitov o Rossii kontsa XVIII i nachala XVIII veka*, St. Petersburg, 1904, 1–16, 211–23.

second incident he did report, the story of Sheremetev's embassy to Malta and Rome and his audience with the pope. Neither he nor Adrian seems to have known that the universal expectation in Rome was that Sheremetev would convert to Catholicism (ultimately he did not) or of the actual conversion of his servant Aleksei Kurbatov, later famous as the author of projects of financial reform and a provincial governor in Archangel.⁸¹

Two other incidents demonstrate that the concern over Catholicism extended beyond Adrian and the Lopukhin clan. The first involved one of ambassador Guarient's additional headaches, the bishop *in partibus* of Ancyra, Pierre Paul Palma, who arrived in Moscow *en route* to Persia as a missionary. As he was going on down the Volga to Persia, Peter had given orders to the head of the Kazan' Chancellery, Boris Golitsyn, to take care of the bishop, which Golitsyn did but with great reluctance. Golitsyn was a faithful Orthodox believer with a strong dislike of Catholicism, and the Russians called him the "imitator of John the Baptist" because he had striven so hard to convert Catholics to Orthodoxy. Though he knew Latin well and had been one of the leaders of Peter's faction, he did not share the tsar's indulgent attitude toward Catholicism.⁸²

The second incident demonstrates that the fear of Catholicism extended to the closest associates of Tsarevna Sofia. A servant woman of one of the tsarenas (presumably not Sofia) had chanced to hear in a noble house talk that "if his tsar's majesty should change his religion, or incline too far towards the Catholics," they would find an officer in the embassy with Peter to poison him. Originally an attempt was made to cover up the report, and even to execute the woman before the story got out. Later, the nobleman's own servants and majordomo told the same story, and the man turned out to be one of the Narbekovs. His servants not only confirmed the poison story, but also declared that Narbekov was involved in the revolt of the musketeers. The only one of the three Narbekov brothers active

⁸¹ Kurbatov also spread exaggerated reports of Peter's own interest in Catholicism: E. Shmurlo, *Sbornik dokumentov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii tsarstvovaniia Imp. Petra Velikogo*, I, Iur'ev 1903, 359–62, 391; A. I. Zaozerskii, *Fel'marshal B. P. Sheremetev*, Moscow, 1989, 20–29.

⁸² HHStA Rußland 18, 12 August 1698, f. 156: Golitsyn was "Catholicis infensissimus"; f. 158: he was "je ein grösserer eyfferer der Russischen religion jederzeit gehalten, und keine andere Gloire hefftiger gesucht, als wan ein Catholischer durch ihn von dem wahren Glauben zu dem Russischen Schisma verführet worden, wie er dan in Moscovitischer sprach ein wahrer Nachfolger Joannis Baptistae durchgehends genennet wird."

at the time to disappear from view was Fyodor Savich Narbekov, and he is the most likely of the three.⁸³

Concern about Peter's tolerant attitude to Rome extended beyond Adrian, Golitsyn, and Narbekov. Guarient also reported that all information about the Russian army fighting the Turks on the lower Dniepr under Dolgorukii and Mazepa had been stopped. The army had done poorly against the Turks, and the losses "and the power of the strongly advancing enemy army had been spread by the ministry from a particular policy, so that this news and that of the rebellion would entirely hinder the tsar's intention of going back to Italy, and so that he would return to his Empire the sooner; for it is certain that this intended journey would place Russians, Calvinists, and Lutherans in great dismay and ever greater suspicion of an inward favorable inclination toward Catholicism." The report came from a Lutheran captain in the Russian army who was "much beloved by many boyars."⁸⁴

Peter returned to Moscow on 25 August to deal with the musketeers and the growing dissatisfaction among the boyars.⁸⁵ Virtually his first acts might seem to have increased that dissatisfaction, for he arrived in the evening and stopped first to see Anna Mons, not his wife or the boyars. The next day he received one and all, not just the great aristocrats, and he would not let his visitors bow to the ground, picking them up and greeting them as friends. To top it all off, he started shaving the beards of the boyars, beginning with Shein and Romodanovskii. The only ones to escape were Tikhon Streshnev, in

⁸³ HHStA Rußland 18, 27 June, 12 August 1698. Narbekov had carried out rather delicate missions for Sofia in 1689, and his brothers are known from later sources: Hughes, *Sophia*, 228, 233, 255; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 202–03, 207. Fyodor Savich Narbekov died in 1699/1700: Poe, *Consular*, 1699–1700.

⁸⁴ HHStA Rußland 18, 12 August 1698: "grosse macht der starck anruckender freindlichen Armée auß sonderer politic von dem Ministerio darumben aufgesprengen word, damit dise und andere Rebellions zeitungen des Czar Intention nach Italien zugehen, gantz verhindern, und selbig sich desto ehunder in seinem Reich einfinden mögte; massen alzugewiss, das dise unternehmende rayss Russen, Calviner, und Lutheraner in grosse bestürtzung, und noch grössere argwohn einer innerlich-guet führender propension zu dem Catholicismo täglich mehr setzen solte." Dolgorukii and Mazepa had moved south in July with an enormous army which accomplished nothing at all except to sail by the Turks and look at them from the river: Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XVI, 472–73.

⁸⁵ Guarient extensively reported the dissatisfaction among the boyars, but in publishing his dispatches N. G. Ustrialov omitted those touching on aristocratic discontent. As the contemporary Imperial diarist Johann Korb (Guarient's secretary) did the same in his *Diarium itineris in Moscoviam*, Vienna, 1700 for quite different reasons, the main bodies of published material on the events of fall 1698, give only half the story, the investigation of the rebel musketeers. See Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 98–109, 117–20.

respect for his services as Peter's tutor, and Prince Mikhail Alekukovich Cherkasskii, on account of his age. The next day Peter drilled the guards regiments, a sign of their increasing importance. A few days later he went to see his son Aleksei, and afterwards had a four-hour-long secret meeting with his wife and an interview with the patriarch. Adrian excused himself for not sending Evdokiia to a convent, blaming other clergy and "various boyars." Three priests were arrested, and Adrian would have to pay a large sum to avoid the tsar's disfavor. The next days were taken up with ceremonies, the new year on 1 September and the reception of the Imperial ambassador Guarient two days later.⁸⁶

The first conflict of the tsar with his boyars erupted the next day, 4 September, at a banquet at the house of Lefort. Peter accused Shein of making promotions of his clients in return for money. The tsar got so angry he left the room to ask the guards what promotions for money they knew of and returned with his sword drawn and banged it on the table. He shouted at Shein, "As I strike this table I will strike your regiment, and I will skin you to the ears!" Romodanovskii and Zotov tried to calm him down, the Prince getting a serious cut on the hand and Zotov a blow on the head for their troubles. Only Lefort could quiet him.⁸⁷

This often-recounted incident was more than just an instance of Peter's temper. At another banquet at the house of Lefort on 10 September Guarient heard the tsar's words:

A few days ago at Lefort's he [Peter-PB] said publicly as I stood by, "I am no tsar over men but over dogs and irrational beasts. And what even more afflicts my mind, I must now clearly confess that for a long time they have not only tried to ruin me, and indeed against (except two or three) carry the inward spirit of disloyalty and hourly think how they could bring such a thing against me." The boyar Naryshkin who had to hear all this, said to the tsar, "My lord, why do you bother yourself now? With your command alone all this can be easily remedied. Give over and place your thoughts on the scales of justice: if you recognize among your subjects disloyalty then do not spare their blood." The tsar said, "Lord, it shall happen and be done well according to your own advice very soon." The majority now hourly await this resolution that has been taken with trembling hearts and the general [Shein - PB] stands not in a little fear to be the first to make this beginning, for the tsar, on the basis of many people's reports holds him

⁸⁶ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, III, 621-23 (= HHStA Rußland 18, 12 September 1698).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 623-26 (= HHStA Rußland 18, 19 September 1698).

more suspect every day, that he immediately punished the chiefs of the rebel *strel'tsy* without sufficient careful examination, and against the advice of General Gordon and Prince Masal'skii removed them from investigation under torture and therefore from greater confession.

Peter began the investigation of the musketeers on 17 September in Preobrazhenskoe, a long process that would go on through the winter. He also sent a message to Prince Dolgorukii inquiring why the Belgorod army had retreated from Ochakov without his orders, and he began to look into the neglect of the fleet at Voronezh.⁸⁸

The investigation was actually the second, for Shein had conducted one right after the defeat of the musketeers and before Peter's return. At the conclusion he had executed 130 of the rebels, including the leaders Vas'ka Tuma and Boris Proskuriakov. All that they had confessed was anger at the boyars, mainly Romodanovskii, Streshnev, and Troekurov, for lowering their pay and for other oppressions. The new investigation, gruesome as it was, produced the expected information about the origins and progress of the revolt, the names of the leaders who had been already executed in the summer. The number of prisoners was so great that the investigation was divided among ten different groups, headed by Romodanovskii, Streshnev, Prince I. B. Troekurov, Zotov, Shein, Princes M. A. Cherkasskii, V. D. Dolgorukii, and P. I. Prozorovskii, and others. On the very first day the investigation turned up the name of Tsarevna Sofia, for several of the rebels reported that they had intended to make contact with her when they got to Moscow.

⁸⁸ HHStA Rußland 18, 26 September 1698: "[er hat] verwichener tagen [bey dem Le Fort] da ich selber gegen stunde [offentlich] gesagt [ich bin kein Tzar über] Menschen, sondern [über die hund und] unvernünftige Bestien. Was anbey in noch mehrern mein gemueth betrieht, mues Ich anjezt clar erkennen, [das sye mich lang nicht allein zu] ruiniren gesucht, ja so[gar gegen mir] selber (ausser 2: oder drey) das innerliche geist [der unthreue] führen und stündlich gedenckhen [wie sie] solches [an mich] bringen kunte[n] [der Bojar Nariskin welcher auch alles das] anhören muesste, sagte [dem Tzar, Herr, was] Wilstu dich disfahls beängstigen? [mit] deinen einzigen [befelch] kann alles leichtlich [remedirt werden], übergibe und lege deine gedanckhen auf die Waag schalle der gerichtigkeit; erkennest [du bey deinen] unterthannen [die untrheu] so verschonne [ihres blueths nicht, der Tzar sagte] herr [über wohlan es solte nach] deinen aigenen Rath eheistens also geschechen, und vorgenommen werden. Welche gefaste resolution, die mehreste nun stünd. mit zitterten hertzen erwarthen [und stehet der veldherr nicht /207v/ in geringer forcht der erstere disen] anfang zu machen [weilen der Tzar auf viller] angeben, Ihn täglich mehr [suspect] haltet [das er] Rebellium Streliziorum capita, sine sufficienti ex acuratori examine [also gleich abgestraffet auch wider die] einwilligung [des General Gordon und des fürst Massalzky der] peynlicher frage, und volglich dardurch einer mehrerer bekanntnuß entzogen hat."

They planned to kill the boyars who oppressed them and the Germans who were bringing tobacco, the shaving of beards, and the destruction of the faith. Some talked of killing Peter himself. They also intended to ask Sofia to enter the government. Peter immediately formed a series of questions for all the investigators to ask the musketeers, of which Sofia's role was the first. So far it seemed that these were only the rebels' ideas, not Sofia's. Then on September 20 one of the musketeers confessed to Boris Golitsyn that Vas'ka Tuma had brought back a letter from Moscow from Sofia. The various revelations about the letter led to the interrogation of the women servants of Sofia from the Novodevichii Convent by Romodanovskii himself. One of the servants also revealed that she had heard Tsarevna Marfa tell Sofia that the musketeers had come to put Sofia back on the throne, and when Peter interviewed Marfa on the same day she confirmed the story. Peter personally interrogated Sofia on 27 September about the letters she had supposedly sent in the spring to the musketeers, but she denied the existence of the letter and any knowledge of the rebels who had spoken to Tuma. With Tuma dead, there could be no easy confirmation of the story. The first large group of musketeers were executed on September 30.⁸⁹

The torture and interrogation went on, adding little more until finally on 7 October one of the servant ladies (*postel'nitsa*) admitted that she had been the intermediary for a letter for Va'ska Tuma in response to his petition. Questioned the next day about this, Tsarevna Marfa denied everything. Short of torturing his sisters, Peter could get no more. The story was enough evidence, and on October 21 Sofia became a nun, obviously not of her own free will. More mass executions took place on 17–18 October. On the seventeenth, Guarient reported, the boyars who signed the sentence, Shein, Golitsyn, F. A. Golovin, and others had to each execute one of the musketeers, and Prince M. G. Romodanovskii one from each of the four rebel regiments that had been under his command. Zotov had to execute one of the defrocked regimental priests. The next day forty-seven of the musketeers were hanged before the

⁸⁹ V. I. Bуганов and A. N. Казачевич, eds., *Vosstanie moskovskikh strel'tsov 1698 goda*, Moscow, 1980, 39–138; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, III, 1–69; Bуганов, *Moskovskie*, 397–407; RGADA, f. 6, op. 1, d. 12/121, ll. 1–4 (interrogation of Tsarevna Marfa and Tsarevna Sofia and the latter's servants Vera Vasiutinskaia, Princess Avdot'ia Kasatkina, Ul'iana Kolushkina, and the nurse Marfa Viazemskaia).

Novodevichiii Convent. Fyodor Romodanovskii sent a message to Sofia that since she was the cause of all this bloodshed, she could now look at her work at all hours. Nearly 1,000 musketeers were executed altogether, but no more connection with Sofia or any boyars emerged. Some of the musketeers mentioned that they had considered putting Prince Mikhail Iakovlevich Cherkasskii on the throne after killing Peter, but this plan does not seem to have been widespread. Most musketeers simply planned to turn to Sofia.⁹⁰ Neither Patriarch Adrian nor the Lopukhins had any connection with the rebels or with Sofia.

As the investigation came to its bloody close, Peter turned to other matters. He had already sent Evdokiia to a convent in Suzdal' on 23 September. When Peter asked her why she did not obey his orders from Amsterdam, she replied that she merely had wished for the tsar himself to decide who should take care of her son. Peter's sister Natalia took charge of Tsarevich Aleksei.⁹¹ More would come. The Danish ambassador reported that after the musketeers were dealt with, there would be changes: "it is believed that as soon as this affair is finished the Tsar will begin to reform the army, finances, and other arrangements in his states." Some of the boyars were not happy with this prospect.⁹²

After the last big series of executions Peter went south to Voronezh to inspect the building of the fleet. Both the Dutch vice-admiral, Cornelis Cruys, and the workmen had proved unsatisfactory, the ships being better suited for commerce than war.⁹³ Equally impor-

⁹⁰ RGADA, f. 6, op. 1, d. 6/59 (2–4 October 1698, interrogation of Matiushak Berestov *et al.*); HHStA Rußland 18, 31 October 1698 (Romodanovskii's message to Sofia; the boyars participation in the executions). Guarient's reports are so close to the official depositions in some places that he must have had very good sources, the most likely being the doctor Gregorio Carbonari, who had come to Russia in 1688 with the Jesuit Tobías Tichavský and met with Guarient socially: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, III, 626–31 (= HHStA Rußland 18, 17 October 1698); Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, III, 69–121; Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Factions," 106, 119–20; Florovský, *Čeští jesuité*, 133. For the plan to make M. Ia. Cherkasskii the tsar see Buganov, *Vostanie . . . 1698*, 101.

⁹¹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, III, 630; HHStA Rußland 18, 17 October 1698. The rumor was that Prince Boris Golitsyn would eventually take over the tsarevich.

⁹² TKUA B 42, 7 October 1698: "On crois qu' aussitot que cette affaire sera finie le Czar commencera à reformer la milice, les finances et autres dispositions dans ses estats." Also on unhappiness of boyars.

⁹³ On Cruys, who remained an important figure in the Russian navy see Eelko Hooijmaaijers, "Cornelis Cruys, a Dutch Rear-Admiral in Russian Service," *Baltic Studies* 4, Groningen, 1996, 29–34; and J. S. A. M. van Koningsbrugge, "The Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Russia 1697–1707 and the Secret Activities of Cornelis Cruys (1702–1704) and Johannus van der Burgh (1707–1708)," *Baltic Studies* 5, Groningen, 1998, 51–61.

tant, Peter decided to investigate in person Dolgorukii's excuses for his failure in the summer campaign of 1698. Peter's presence was necessary because Dolgorukii had sent too many presents to Lefort, and the tsar knew that "the soldiers and officers there had really gone over to the faction of the prince." One of Hetman Mazepa's servants also arrived in Moscow with information on Dolgorukii's misdeeds in the 1698 campaign.⁹⁴

There were also important diplomatic secrets afoot in Moscow. The boyars were saying that Peter planned to return to Moscow by way of Smolensk, and there assemble an army to help King Augustus II of Poland in his disputes with the Lithuanian magnates. The boyars were not enthusiastic about this plan. Boris Golitsyn also informed Guarient that Peter had conceived of a plan to educate Aleksei Petrovich at a foreign court, where he could not say, but he hinted at Brandenburg. This was Peter's plan, though "suprisingly many inwardly opposed it." Mazepa came to Voronezh to describe Dolgorukii's military operations, and the Saxon general Carlowitz, who had accompanied Peter south, brought back the news that Peter was planning to order Mazepa to Kiev as a demonstration in favor of Augustus. This idea as well caused consternation in Moscow among the tsar's ministers, who thought that more caution was called for. None of the Polish plans proved necessary, for Augustus reached a compromise with his opponents just at that time.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ HHStA Rußland 18, 12 December 1698: "vill verlauten, das der Tzar nach Biwilogrod und die Ozakowsche Confinien sich mit wenig persohnen in höchster geheimbe begeben, umb selbige orten des fürsten Dolgorucka in jüngster /251v/ Campagne geführten commando persöhnlich zu untersuchen, massen le Fort, welchem der Dolgerucka [durch?] verschikte reiche praesent, an sich erkaufft, dem Tzar die inquisition in loco vollzunehmen, darumb eingerethen, wol wissend das alle aldorth befindliche soldatesca und officier sich würckhlich zu des fürsten faction geschlagen, mithin er sich um aller leichtesten aldort justificiren könne."

Gordon reported (9 December 1698) that one of the hetman's servants had come to Moscow stating that he and the colonel of the Kiev Regiment, Konstantyn Mokiev's'kyi, would be relieved of their positions and wanted to have the misdeeds of the *voevoda* of Belgorod, Dolgorukii, in the last campaign investigated. Gordon, who knew the Ukrainian situation from the 1680s, did not say that the message was from the hetman. Mazepa had recently backed Mokiev's'kyi against rebellious subordinates, but in 1701 the colonel denounced the hetman's alleged disloyalty to Peter: Gordon, *Tagebuch*, II, 225; Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie*, 463; D. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii and O. Bodianskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, ChOIDR 1 (1858), pt. 2, 29–30. It would seem that Mazepa was not supporting the allegations against Dolgorukii.

⁹⁵ HHStA Rußland 18, 12 December 1698: "Sonsten gehet auch unter denen vornembsten Bojaren und anderen Ministern die geheimbe red, das der Tzar seine zuruck reisse von Veronisch über Smolensko gegen Littauen nehmen, und mit dem König in Pohnl wegen öffentlich ausgebrocher uneinigkeit viller Polhnischen, mehrer aber Littauischen Magnaten

As the year came to an end there was more talk in Moscow that Peter's support for Augustus might take the form of a treaty, but there were conflicts among Peter's close collaborators as well. Peter had returned to Moscow on 20/30 December, and on the very next day, the last of the old year, a feast at the house of Lefort was the occasion of an argument between Lev Naryshkin and Boris Golitsyn, the result of their ten-year-old rivalry and anger. Naryshkin, who was drunk, accused Golitsyn of bewitching the tsar to gain favor, and the prince replied that Naryshkin had always been disloyal and hungry to govern. The dispute enraged the tsar, who threw a glass of wine at Naryshkin's feet and pushed away Lefort when he tried to calm him. Peter left for Preobrazhenskoe in a towering rage and threatened both of them with the most serious punishment. Guarient commented:

Above all the tsar finds daily, more and more, that in the whole empire not one of his blood relatives and boyars can be found to whom he can entrust an important office; he is therefore forced to take over the heavy burden of the empire himself, and pushing back the boyars (whom he calls disloyal dogs) to put his hand to a new and different government.⁹⁶

sich unterreden wolle"; . . . "von dem fürst Boris Gallizin habe dieser tagen in grossen vertrauen vernommen, das nunmehr revolvirt seye den Tzarischen Printzen bey herzunahenden frühjahr auß Moscau an ein fürst. Hoff (unerachtet viel inerlich entgegen gewesen) zu verschiken, allein wolle er mir solches annoch nicht offenbahren, doch so weith abnehmen können, als ob es zu dem Churfürst von Brandenburg seyn solle." 26 December 1698: "Wie ich gestern von einen vornehmen hiessigen Minister vernommen muessen; Solle der Tzar. Mtt. den Veldhern Maseppa in Veronisch, mündlich scharffe ordre und befelch ertheillet haben, das selbiger auf allen fahl mit seinen unterhabenden Cosackhen corpo in Kiow, sich bereith und fertig halte; hingegen aber seindt die mehreste einer anderen meinung und rathgebens, sich mit den anruckhenden Moscovitischen Auxiliar völkchern, nicht so geschwindt und auf blosses zuschreiben gedacht. König. Ministers [illeg.] Königs selber, gegen dennen Littauschen gränitzen anzunähern . . ."

⁹⁶ HHStA Rußland 18, 16 January 1699: "Den eingevolgten 31.ten wurde von bedeuten Gral. Le Fort zu allergehorster. empfangung und freidens contestation der Czar. zuruckkhkhunfft, ein kostbahres festin zubereithet, deme die meiste geheimme Bojaren und Ministri beygewohnet. Nach deme aber des Lew Kirilowiz Nariskin wider den Kneiß Boris Alexiewiz Galizin eine geraume zeit her innerlich-tragende passionen in offentliche hitzigkeit ausgebrochen, das er nit allein der Czar. Mtt. erweisende propension gegen dem Galizin einen bezauberten Fascina zugeschriben und proclamirt, sondern auch ihn Galizin der höchst [] straffbahren Regiersüchtigen begürde und Unthrew angeklagt, haben zwar die Czar. Mtt. anfänglich sich simulirt, als ob sie solche in der trunckenheit vorgebrachte passion nit attendirten, durch des Nariskin öffter widerhollung aber, zu einer dermassen ergrimmender ungedult bewogen worden, das dieselbe, ein eben an die handt gestandenes glas Wein vor gedachtes Nariskin angesicht zu Boden geworffen, von der taffl alsobald aufgestanden, und der zur besenfftigung zugelloffenen General Le Fort /1v/ mit einem gewaltigen stoss zuruckh und abgeschafft. In solchen häfftig-angehaltenen verdruß mit grösster Furie nach Bebraschensko abgefahren, dahin durch aigenhändig-geschribener citation beede differenten eingevolgten tag unausbleiblich zuerscheinen befelcht, und

This new and different government came into being early in 1699, inaugurating a new phase in Peter's attempt to impose his will on the ruling elite and government of Russia. His new departure was the result of the disorder at the center of the state, the boyar rivalries, the repeated examples of elite and popular opposition to the tsar.

Who were Peter's opponents? The remains of the Miloslavskii faction still existed, and presumably wanted the return of Sofia to power, but they were small in number. In the case of the Lopukhins, by 1698 Patriarch Adrian shared their opposition to the divorce, and there seems to have been a general dislike of foreign ways shared by Adrian and the Lopukhin clan. Others were discontented with Peter as well, but not out of conservatism. Sokovnin and Pushkin were annoyed that they were not in Peter's favor, and wanted to replace the tsar with Shein, while Tsykler preferred Sheremetev. Foreign policy issues, dormant for a decade, contributed to the realignment at court. Among the boyars generally there was clearly great unease with Peter's desire to support Augustus in Poland, and Peter's most influential favorites, Lefort and Golitsyn, opposed the Danish treaty that would make possible the Northern War. Even though L. K. Naryshkin supported it, Peter still pushed him aside, for he had decided to ignore the boyar elite. The circumstances of the 1698 musketeer revolt made Peter suspect the boyars, who were in any case too quarrelsome for the young tsar. By the spring of 1699 Peter had in fact found new ministers of state and new favorites, Menshikov above all, and with them he would rule alone and go to war. The future was cloudy. Heins summed up:

If God gives his grace to the tsar to live a considerable time more, it is clear that he will put Muscovy on a footing such as it has never been before, but

selben auf das schärfste angetrohet wurde, das dise nunmehr 10.jährig-führende passionen, und von beeden gegen einander vorgeruckhte verräthereyen genau untersucht, vollsamm durch capitaler abstraffung des jenigen, auf deme die schuldt erledige, dermahleinstens ein end gemacht werden muesste; auch solte den Nariskin die nahe Czar. anverwandschaft keineswegs schutzen; zumahlen er Czaar täglich mehrers erfahre, das in seinen gantzen reich aus allen bluets-befreinden, noch auch unter Bojaren, nicht einer zufinden, Welchem er sich oder eine importante Ambts-verwaltung anverthrauen könnte: Sey dahero gezwungen, den schwären Reichs laast gänzlich auf sich zunehmen, und mit zuruckhsetzung aller Bojaren (die er unthreu hundert genannet) einer anderer und neuer Regierung die handt anzulegen. Oberwehnte untersuchungen der Nariskin. und fürst Galizin. piquanteririen, ist dem Kneiß Feodor Jurowiz Romadonowsky aufgetragen worden, mit beygesetzter schärffester ermahnen- und bedrohung, der Justicie nach, ohne ansehen oder hitzigen Respects zuverfahren, widrigen sich selber die unausbleib. lebensstraff aufbühen solte."

it is also true that this prince risks much and that human fatality, which Heaven forbid, would be capable of putting everything to rout: and into a state more deplorable than this country has ever been because of the disunity of minds and the jealousy that exists among the boyars and among all the people.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ TKUA, B42, 21 February 1699: “Si le bon Dieu fait la grace [au Czaar de vivre encore quelque temps considerable encore] il est apparent [qu’il mettra la Muscovie] sur un pied [ou elle n’a jamais esté] mais il est vray aussi que [ce prince s’hazarde] beaucoup [et qu’une fatalité humaine], que le Ciel veuille detourner, seroit [capable de mettre tout au deroute: et dans un estat plus deplora]ble [que ce] pays [n’a jamais esté à] cause [de la desunion des esprits et la jalousie qui] est [parmy les Boyars et] parmy [tout le peuple].”

CHAPTER 6

Peter and the favorites: Golovin and Menshikov, 1699–1706

In the wake of the critical months after his return from Europe in 1698, Peter changed his manner of ruling Russia entirely. The formerly most powerful ministers, Naryshkin and Prince Boris Golitsyn, remained in office, but no longer exercised important influence. Lefort died early in 1699, and Gordon at the end of the year, but neither had much impact on policy after Peter's return. The Boyar Duma had little role in legislation after 1698, and nothing emerged in its place. Though the boyars remained in charge of the main chancelleries, Peter made all crucial decisions alone with the aid only of a small number of close confidants, primarily his new favorites F. A. Golovin and Menshikov. The closest to a central coordinating office was the Privy Chancellery (*Blizhnaia kantseliariia*). Headed by Nikita Zotov and composed of the heads of the main chancelleries, it seems primarily to have exercised oversight over financial issues, though its decisions were still called "boyar decisions" (*boiarskie prigovory*). The result of the informal centralization of the government and court was to shift the rivalries to the army command, which was the setting for most of the intrigues of the next few years.¹ This manner of operation lasted until 1708, when the establishment of the "large gubernias" introduced more orderly procedures into government, and gave a major role not only to the favorites like Menshikov but also to scions of the great families.

¹ Peter's conscious decision to try to rule relying only on himself and his favorites was responsible for the changes in Russian government and administration in 1699–1708, not lack of planning or an impersonal crisis of the state system, as argued by Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 116–24; or Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 86–98.

WAR AND THE BOYARS

The decision to ally with Denmark and Poland against Sweden (arguably the most important decision of Peter's life), was taken by the tsar in almost complete secrecy. When Peter left for Europe with the great embassy in early 1697, his diplomatic purpose was to find further support for the continuation of the war with the Turks, the only project on the horizon. Then came the Riga incident, the lack of respect that he believed he had suffered at the hands of the Swedish governor of Riga, Count Erik Dahlbergh, in April 1697. Later on he asserted repeatedly that the insult was an important cause and justification of the war, implying that earlier such a war had not been intended.² Peter's negotiations and those of Golovin in Holland and England revolved around the Turkish war, and he was angry to learn in London that the emperor was beginning to seek peace seriously with the sultan. The Swedish ambassador in London, Count Bonde, reported that his reaction was to talk about his desire for a port on the Baltic. Such a port could only come at the expense of Sweden. Nevertheless, it seems to have been only the talks with Count Kinsky in Vienna (summer, 1698) which convinced him that the emperor was determined to make peace with Turkey and hence that he needed to plan for a change in foreign policy.³

The first definite move toward war with Sweden came at the meeting of King Augustus and Peter in Rawa Ruska in Poland, in August 1698. The idea of a Baltic port did not come completely out of thin air in Rawa, for the Danish ambassador Paul Heins' reported

² There is little evidence that Peter contemplated war with Sweden in 1697. From Riga he went on to Berlin, where he made a treaty with the elector of Brandenburg, a defensive treaty which did not seem to envision any action against Sweden. Among Russian papers a supposed secret article was later found that converted it into a league against Sweden. No copy exists of this article, or seems ever to have existed, in Prussian archives, nor any reference to it. Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 136–48; V. E. Vozgrin, *Rossia i evropeiskie strany v gody Severnoi voyny*, Leningrad, 1986, 60–80; Kurt Forstreuter, *Preußen und Rußland von den Anfängen des Deutschen Ordens bis zu Peter dem Großen*, Göttingen, 1955, 177–79; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, II, 88–97. Kaminski's revisionist argument that Peter did not care about the Polish election is not convincing, as he very clearly opposed a French (pro-Ottoman) candidacy and ordered his diplomats to support the Habsburgs: Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 148–49; V. D. Koroliuk, "Izbranie Avgusta II na pol'skii prestol i russkaia diplomatiia," *Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia Akademii nauk SSSR* 3 (1951), 176–219; Kaminski, *Republic*, 256–75.

³ Dahlbergh had reported as early as summer, 1697, that Peter had threatened to put a foot on the Baltic to foster Russian trade. Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, II, 477–78, 481–91, 497–506; Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 163, 197–98.

on 29 July from Moscow that he had heard “from good authority” that the tsar was very inclined to have a port on the Baltic “with time.” “With time” was the operative phrase. Heins heard of no concrete intentions, just a general wish. These wishes began to take concrete form in Rawa, for the two monarchs agreed on war with Sweden.⁴ Thus the core of the alliance system that brought the war was formed, and in a conversation of the two monarchs alone. Peter may well have discussed it beforehand with Golovin and Menshikov, but we do not know that.⁵ We only know of an oral agreement at Rawa which Peter brought back with him to Moscow as he confronted the results of the rebellion of the musketeers.

While he carried out the arrest, investigation with torture and execution of the rebels, Peter took the first formal steps toward a written agreement with Denmark against Sweden, the other major step toward war. The boyars were not involved, even though Lev Naryshkin had earlier expressed to the Danish envoy Heins his personal agreement with the Danish proposals. Heins had no idea what Russian policy would be until Peter returned, “the ministers of this court not being well enough instructed to speak positively of this sort of business, even the more so since I noticed that the true intention of the tsar is in large part hidden from them themselves.”⁶ Peter had his first business meeting with Heins in October, but not in any formal session. Peter went to Butenant’s house for the night and the next day locked himself in a room in the house alone with Heins and Butenant, who served as a translator. Peter could speak Dutch fairly well, reported Heins, but Butenant had to step in when he needed a word or phrase. Peter immediately took up Heins’ offer of a defensive treaty, but Heins had to tell the tsar that because of the new King Augustus in Poland, he needed to make sure that his

⁴ TKUA Rusland, B42, 29 July 1698; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 451; Solov’ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 604–05; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, II, 556–66; Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 200; V. D. Koroliuk, “Rech’ Pospolitaia i podgotovka Severnoi voyny,” *Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia Akademii nauk SSSR* 4 (1951), 190–211. Augustus’s final decision may have come a few months later: Jacek Staszewski, *August II Mocny*, Wrocław, 1998, 91–101. The Rawa conversation appeared in the preface to the formal Russo-Polish treaty of alliance in November, 1699: *PiB* I, 304–05.

⁵ As early as fall 1698, Peter seems to have handled communication with P. B. Voznitsyn, who was trying to negotiate a peace with the Ottomans at Karlowitz, through Golovin, not Naryshkin. This practice continued into the next year, effectively removing Naryshkin from any participation in Russian foreign policy: *PiB* I, 752–53, 755, 760–61.

⁶ Bushkovitch, “Aristocratic Faction”; TKUA Rusland, B42, 29 July 1699; Vozgrin, *Rossia*, 60–71; Wittram, *Peter I*, 196–211; *PSZ* III no. 1691, 636–38 (treaty with Denmark of 5/16 July 1699).

sovereign's intentions were the same. This would take nine or ten weeks, and Heins promised to bring the answer immediately to Peter's attention, even in Voronezh if necessary.⁷

Heins was not the only one trying to secure Peter's help against Sweden. The Saxon envoy Georg Carl von Carlowitz was in Moscow to formalize the Rawa conversation. Carlowitz went with Peter to Voronezh that autumn, and reported that Peter was interested in Narva. He was working closely with Heins, for his report to Heins of the tsar's intentions is the most explicit we have for the autumn of 1698. As Carlowitz was leaving Voronezh for Moscow, Peter gave him a glass of wine and asked "if he, Carlowitz, could not imagine that it must be very palpable – the more since his great inclination was for the navy – to see himself totally unjustly deprived of all the ports in the Baltic and to see the commerce of his subjects limited by that fact, to the great prejudice of all his states," and to want to revenge himself on Sweden. By January the news of Peter's contacts with Denmark and their general content had spread widely enough among the tsar's inner circle for Heins to report their reactions. Prince Boris Golitsyn and Lefort were jealous of Peter's private talks with Heins, but there was more than just jealousy. Lefort and Anna Mons were both against the Danish treaty, as was Lefort's ally Boris Golitsyn. They worked with the Swedish agent Kniper to defeat it, but Peter kept them at bay with his secrecy. Only Golovin was privy to the new policy.⁸

Heins got the answer he needed from Copenhagen by late February 1699, and set off for Voronezh, his negotiations moving

⁷ TKUA Rusland, B42, 28 October 1698.

⁸ Carlowitz was also in Moscow in late 1698 to secure Peter's support for Augustus in the Polish king's quarrels with the Polish nobles, also an unpopular move among the Russian boyars. Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 106–9. TKUA Rusland, B42, 16 December 1698, Moscow: Peter promises aid and friendship to Augustus, 20,000 troops to help him against his internal enemies, reassures him on his leaving, "En suite [le Czar luy demanda en luy portant un verre de vin si luy Carlowitz] ne pouroit pas s'imaginer, que cela luy devroit estre bien sensible, et d'autant plus que [ses plus grandes inclinations] estoient [pour la marine de se] voir [depouillé le plus injustement du monde de tous les ports de mer dans la Baltique et de] voir [par là le commerce de ses sujets borné et au grand prejudice de tous ses Estats] faisant en mesme temps connoistre que rien n'estoit plus naturel que [de songer à se venger un jour de cette injustice par les armes et à reparer la perte que ses prédecesseurs] avoient [faite et que pour cet effect] il feroit [tout ce qu'il pouvoit [pour affermir le Roy de Pologne sur le throne et pour s']asseurer [de sa constante amitié . . .]]", 8 February 1699 (opposition of Lefort, Kniper, Mons, and Boris Golitsyn to the Danish treaty). The boyars would be a problem because so few of them were even interested in foreign affairs at this point: TKUA Rusland, B42, 30 December 1698, 27 January 1699. Lefort was believed to be pro-Swedish much earlier: SR Livonica, 25 March 1697.

swiftly despite an interruption for Lefort's funeral. Peter returned to Moscow briefly to say farewell to his old friend and then hurried back to Voronezh. There discussions continued as before, behind locked doors with only the tsar, Heins, Golovin, and a translator. Peter did not want the boyars, especially Golitsyn and Naryshkin, even to know of the treaty, and they were angry when rumors of its existence began to spread. By 11/21 April Heins and Peter had reached agreement on the text. Boris Golitsyn knew so little that he tried to probe Heins at a banquet, without success.⁹

The war could not begin until Russia disentangled itself from the Turkish war, and that was not easy. Ukraintsev sailed off to Istanbul in August, but even his skill could not bring a rapid conclusion and Peter would not declare war on Sweden until August 1700, a year later. In the meantime, Carlowitz went back and forth from Dresden and Warsaw to Moscow, garnering Russian support for Augustus in Poland but also for the king's plans against Sweden. Carlowitz found an ally in Johann Reinhold von Patkul, the Livonian exile, who spurred both Augustus and Peter on to war with Sweden to recover the lost privileges of the Livonian nobility. Aided by Patkul, Carlowitz concluded a treaty in November 1699, with Peter that finally put in writing the Rawa agreement. The treaty specifically stated Peter's aim to acquire "a firm foundation on the Baltic Sea" like that of his ancestors.¹⁰ With the Polish–Danish treaties concluded shortly before, the finishing touches were on the alliance that would begin the Northern War. In none of these discussions were the Russian boyars consulted, and they had to content themselves with rumors.¹¹

While waiting for peace to be concluded with the Ottomans, Peter

⁹ TKUA, B42, 8 February 1699 (the Naryshkin–Golitsyn rivalry, Golitsyn and Lefort against the Danish treaty); 7 March (Peter does not want the boyars to know of the Danish treaty); 28 March, 24 April (boyars are angry at rumors of the treaty). Text of the treaty, confirmed on 24 August 1699: *PiB*, I, 295–302; *PSŽ*, III, no. 1690, 636–38. Christian V of Denmark died soon after, and the treaty had to be reconfirmed with Frederick IV (26 November 1699): *PiB* I, 317–18.

¹⁰ *PiB* I, 304–10. Patkul journeyed to Moscow with Carlowitz late in 1699: Yella Erdmann, *Der livländische Staatsmann Johann Reinhold von Patkul*, Berlin, 1970, 72–79.

¹¹ SRM 605, 20 November 1697; *Livonica* 353, 26 November 1697, Thomas Kniper to Erik Soop: "Es nun wohl seiner [Heins] seiten die Propositions höchst geheim gehalten werden, will doch verlauten, daß sie auf eine Alliance gegen die Cron Schweden ziehen sollen . . ." SRM 118, 22 November 1699 (Bergenhelm *et al.* to KXII, request for Patkul's extradition, Russia busy with Turks, Augustus needs Peter's support against Poles). Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, IV, 106–66; Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 209–18. Pleyer first reported Peter's intended moves against Sweden on 7 March 1700 as a rumor: "gehet die rede alhier, daß der Czar auf das Jahr auf Revel oder Narva gehen will, obschon mit Schweden der ewig frieden confirmiret worden . . ." *Ustrialov*, *Istoriia*, III, 651.

was not idle. He not only decreed the better-known financial reforms of January 1699, but also continued to build up the army and navy. He stripped Shein of the ability to make promotions, since in Peter's absence the general had promoted some 500 incompetent officers in return for bribes. Patrick Gordon took his place *ad interim*. The tsar planned to raise twelve regiments "*auf dem deutschen fuss*," that is, European-style infantry regiments to add to the existing four. Peter did meet with the Boyar Duma to decide to ignore the Imperial–Ottoman peace and pursue the war with the Turks for the immediate future. The shipbuilding at Voronezh continued apace.¹² In the summer Peter finally took his new ships out into more or less open sea, the Sea of Azov, and sailed them to Kerch' to send his ambassador Ukraintsev off to Istanbul. The new "general-admiral" of the fleet in place of Lefort was Fyodor Golovin, who thus added the navy to his previous responsibilities in the Armory complex of offices and *de facto* management of Russia's foreign policy. Back in Moscow, Lev Naryshkin had only formal meetings with the Imperial embassy and the Swedes. Shein and Prince Boris Golitsyn, however, retained some lesser tasks, the general taking command of the army in the south and together with Golitsyn negotiating with the Kalmyks. Golitsyn thus maintained his office and the affairs of the southeastern border, but he was no longer an influential favorite.¹³

During the course of 1699 the tsar's relationship with the boyars was not smooth. In February Peter ordered the boyars to take part in the last of the executions of the rebel musketeers, which ruled out any alliances such as that of Khovanskii in 1682. An anonymous denunciation warned him of further designs against him by the aristocrats. Sheremetev was said to be in disgrace and not permitted to come to Moscow from his country estate.¹⁴ In May, Prince Prozorovskii, the head of several Treasury offices, nearly precipitated

¹² HHStA Rußland 18, 16 January 1699 (Shein and Gordon, new regiments planned); 23 January 1699 (*Rahtsversammlung* on Turkish war).

¹³ Another sign of Golovin's favored position was his appointment as first known member of the new order of chivalry, the Order of St. Andrew. Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, IV, 11–12, 54, 78, 86; *PiB* I, 780–81. Lefort may have received the order the year before: G. V. Vilinbakhov, "K istorii uchrezhdeniia ordena Andreia pervozvannogo i evoliutsiia ego znaka," in G. N. Komelova, ed., *Kul'tura i iskusstvo petrovskogo vremeni*, Leningrad, 1977, 144–58.

¹⁴ HHStA Rußland 18, 18 February 1699. This is the same execution in which Guarient reported that Peter himself participated. It took place in Preobrazhenskoe, and Guarient was not personally present. His usual informant was Dr. Carbonari: Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 106, 119–20.

a revolt of the common people in Moscow by trying to prevent the tsar's postmen, the *iamskie liudi*, from brewing their own vodka and by confiscating their illegal brews. The government did not run smoothly in Peter's absence in Voronezh. General Gordon and the viceroy in Moscow, Prince Cherkasskii, did nothing at the time and merely wrote to Peter for further instructions. With the tsar in Voronezh, Naryshkin handled the formalities of foreign relations, such as congratulations on the marriage of Emperor Leopold's heir in Vienna, but he contributed nothing substantive "on account of Lev Kirillovich's known incapacity in public affairs." Both Guarient and Heins noted the disaffection of the common people and the inner conflicts among the boyars. Peter knew of this as well, and was not shy about letting it be known: at one of the banquets for the Swedish embassy his court jester mocked the boyars for their hypocrisy and lack of readiness to serve their sovereign.¹⁵ They were also unhappy with the rumor that A. A. Matveev, recently appointed as Russian ambassador to Holland, would take Tsarevich Aleksei there to be educated. Guarient had apparently warned Lefort about the dangers of such a journey, and Vinius later told the Austrian that the boyars had taken the warnings seriously and presented them to the tsar. In any case, Matveev left for Holland with his wife, the first Russian woman to go abroad, and many young noblemen, but without the tsarevich. Into the autumn, while negotiations with Denmark and Poland came to a conclusion, there were more rumors of conspiracies against Peter. One positive event for the tsar was the final move of Evdokiia to a convent in Suzdal' over the summer. A major source of aristocratic discontent seemed to have been removed.¹⁶

¹⁵ HHStA Rußland 18, 6 May 1699 (Prozorovskii's measures and their results); 17 June 1699 (reflections on Russia's internal weakness and "deren hoch alß Nidrigen stands Persohnen innerlichen Passionen"); 1 July 1699 (Guarient felt that Menshikov and Golovin's hostile account of the empire's relations with Turkey could not be opposed effectively because Ukraintsev was away and "wegen des Lew Kirilowiz wissentlichen incapacität in negotiis publicis"); 8 July 1699 (Naryshkin handles the ceremonies congratulating the emperor on his son's marriage). Heins saw the problem not just as opposition to the tsar but also disunity and hostility within the upper and lower orders toward one another and within those orders: TKUA, B42, 21 February, 1698. Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 213.

¹⁶ HHStA Rußland 18, 3 June 1699 (Matveev to be ambassador to Holland and go with his wife and eight "boyars' children"); 5 August 1699 (Guarient reports from Smolensk, on his way home on Evdokiia and the plans for the tsarevich); 25 October/4 November 1699 (anonymous but probably Pleyer's report from Moscow: continued conspiracies against the tsar; no news of the intended journey of the tsarevich); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, III, 645–46.

Peter's reforms of finance were another case of the tsar giving orders with little or no consultation of the elite. The decrees establishing the *ratusha*, which took the collection of taxes from townspeople out from under the supervision of the *voevody* and put it in the hands of the representatives of the urban elite, came from Peter alone, without the boyars. The stamped paper scheme of January 1699, was the result of a proposal by Aleksei Kurbatov, Sheremetev's Catholic servant, and led to the young man's appointment to the tsar's service and a long career, including heading the *ratusha*. The main reforming decrees of the next few years were also *imennye ukazy*, personal decrees of the tsar without the Boyar Duma.¹⁷

Peter's last decree of 1699 was to bring fundamental, if symbolic, changes in Russian life: the adoption of the Western style of dating the year, from 1 January and the birth of Christ rather than from 1 September and the creation of the world. He ordered the people of Moscow to put up the date 1700 on their houses and decorate them to celebrate the new year. Four days later he ordered the army, nobles, and merchants to adopt Western ("Hungarian" or "German") dress. Both decrees caused little immediate reaction, but both were to come up in cases of plebeian discontent until the end of the reign.¹⁸ Speeded-up recruitment and training of the army began over the winter, providing thirty-one new regiments, making some 30,000 to 35,000 men. The Swedish agent in Pskov reported to the

¹⁷ Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, III, 250–51, IV, 244–46. TKUA Rusland, B42, 7 October 1698 (Peter will reform his army and finances as soon as the investigation and punishment of the musketeers is finished; some of the boyars clearly oppose him); B43, 24 January 1700: "Depuis que le Czar a reformé ses finances, ayant créé des Bourguemaistres dans toutes les villes de ses Etats, qui se relevent les uns les autres suivant la maniere d'Hollande, et qui sont obligés de rendre conte aux Bourguemaistres Generaux icy à Moscou de toutes les revenues qu'ils recoivent sous ce nom là, l'on remarque que le thresor du Czar, pour me servir du terme du pays, s'est augmenté de la moitié, et Sa Majesté a trouvé moyen par là d'empêcher toutes les tricheries que les Woyewodes pratiquoient de toutes costez pour s'enrichir, mesme en ruinanat les sujets, et en verité ce changement est tres important." *Ratusha and burmistry*: PSZ III, nos. 1674, 1683, 1685–86, 1690, 1697–98, 1704, 1708–09, 1715, 1717: 598–600, 611–15, 642–48, 652–55, 667–69. Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 116–36. John Perry claimed that the boyars were opposed to the establishment of the *burmistry*. John Perry, *The State of Russia under the Present Tsar*, London, 1716, pp. 187–94; PSZ, III, no. 1673, 597–98; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, III, 235–335.

¹⁸ PSZ III, nos. 1775–76, 680–82; IV, no. 1741, 1; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, IV, 282–319. TKUA Rusland, B43, 24 January 1700 (clothing and new year). Another cultural innovation was his order to his sister Natalia and the court ladies to accompany him (and the tsarevich) to Voronezh in the spring: TKUA Rusland, B43, 6 March 1700; ARSG 7366 (1700–02), 25 February 1700. Aristocratic Russian women traveled only on pilgrimages and to country estates, not on trips for matters of state like the journeys to inspect the navy at Voronezh.

governor general of Ingria that Peter would draft every twenty-fifth man from the estates of nobles and monasteries and march on Nyenskans on the Neva. Kniper reported equally large levies, and Pleyer added that Peter was reducing the size of the administration, a move that was to be a regular feature of Peter's recruitment campaigns. What Peter lacked was a commander, for Gordon died at the end of 1699, and Shein in January 1700.¹⁹

There were other equally important new appointments as well in February 1700, all connected with preparations for the war. The death of Shein had vacated the leadership of the Mercenaries' and Cavalry Chancelleries, and Peter put them under the general-commissar Prince Iakov Fyodorovich Dolgorukii.²⁰ This was an important position for the prince, especially as he remained under a cloud. Streshnev remained the overall military coordinator with the *Razriad* under him, and Semen Iazykov (the son of Tsar Fyodor's favorite) received the new title of general-proviant, with responsibility for food supplies. Fyodor Apraksin became the "second *admiralteets*" under Golovin, the admiral, who was at last formally put in charge of the Ambassadorial Chancellery.²¹ The result was to

¹⁹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, III, 643, 646; 648–49; SRM 605, 31 January 1700 (heavy recruitment of Russian soldiers); 19 February 1700 (Thomas Herbers in Pskov to Vellingk on Russian recruitment and projected march on Nyenskans). P. P. Epifanov, "Nachalo organizatsii russkoi reguliarnoi armii Petrom I (1699–1705)," *Uchenye zapiski MGU*, vyp. 87 (Istoriia SSSR), 1946, 66–99; V. N. Avtokratov, "Voennyi prikaz (Iz istorii komplektovaniia voisk v Rossii v nachale XVIII v.)," in L. G. Beskrovnyi et al., ed., *Poltava*, Moscow, 1959, 228–45; L. G. Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armia i flot v XVIII veke*, Moscow, 1958, 19–33, 39–56, 128–46; M. D. Rabinovich, "Formirovanie russkoi reguliarnoi armii nakanune Severnoi Voiny," in V. I. Shunkov, ed., *Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii*, Moscow, 1969, 221–33.

Peter had already forgiven Shein his misdeeds and he went to the funeral, one in partly Western style in keeping with Shein's cultural tastes. The high point of the event was the funeral sermon by "a Russian priest" which impressed even Kniper. It also impressed Peter. The priest was the Ukrainian hegumen, Stefan Iavorskii, soon to be metropolitan of Riazan', and in the fall of the year, after the death of Patriarch Adrian in October 1700, Peter's chosen instrument as the administrator (*mestobliustitel'*) of the patriarchate of Moscow. TKUA Rusland, B43, 7 February 1700 (death of Shein); SR Livonica 360, 8 February 1700 (Kniper to Otto Vellingk, governor general of Ingria, on Shein's funeral); *PiB* I, 337, 798–9; James Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great*, Stanford, CA, 1971, 122–23.

²⁰ PSZ IV, no. 1766 (18 February 1700), 14–15; RGADA, f. 210, Moskovskii stol, d. 255, ll. 394–96 (29 May 1700, Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii ordered to Moscow and to hand over command to Major-General Christoph Riegemann); ll. 397–400 (18 June 1700, repeat of previous orders); ll. 403–08 (17 and 21 June 1700, informing boyar F. A. Golovin and *proviant-meister* S. I. Iazykov of the recall of Dolgorukii); ll. 409–10 (21 July 1700 to *General-kamisarius* Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii informing him that Riegemann now has the command). Epifanov, "Nachalo," 76; V. N. Avtokratov, "Pervye komissariatskie organy russkoi reguliarnoi armii (1700–1710 gg.)," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 68 (1961), 164–65.

²¹ *PiB* I, 790–91. Iazykov had been a Duma gentleman since 1688 and an *okol'nic'ii* since 1697; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 209. He died in November 1701 (*PiB* I, 881) and seems to have

enormously overburden Golovin, and to make things worse, Peter treated Golovin as *de facto* commander of the army, a post he would formally get for the Narva campaign in the fall. The result was that virtually everything but finance came under his purview, foreign policy, the fleet, the Armory personnel, border fortresses and garrisons in Pskov and Smolensk, and even fires in the Kremlin. No wonder Golovin complained in the middle of business on the time lost in the “gaiety of Venus.” Menshikov, in contrast, though clearly already a favorite, seems to have had no official positions other than that of supervising the education of Tsarevich Aleksei.²²

On the eve of the war, government in Russia had come to be the business of three men. The new Dutch resident Hendrik van den Hulst reported that he had much difficulty discovering Peter’s plans for war or peace, “the more since all affairs of importance are conducted by three or four persons, to wit, his majesty, Fyodor Golovin, Alexander Danilovich [Menshikov] and perhaps another unknown person.” When Peter spoke with the Danish ambassador the boyars did not even dare approach, in contrast to the older Russian custom where the tsars did not speak to foreign ambassadors except in the presence of the boyars. Peter’s removal of the boyars from active participation in politics made them a natural focus for discontent, even among the common people. In summer 1700, a townsman and book copyist named Grigorii Talitskii began to circulate a tract announcing the imminent end of the world and his

been replaced by Prince Petr [Ivanovich] Dashkov (*PiB* II, 257: October 9, 1703). His father was presumably the *okol’nichii* Prince Ivan Ivanovich Dashkov, who achieved that rank in 1685 and died soon after (Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 207). Prince Petr Ivanovich Dashkov was rewarded for supporting the government in 1682 (RGADA, f. 210 boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 162). By June 1705, the head of the provisions office was Prince Mikhail Grigor’evich Romodanovskii, a boyar since 1677 and the son of the Prince Grigorii who was a major commander in the 1670s and murdered by the musketeers in 1682 (*PiB* III, 367; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 201). It was the musketeers under Prince Mikhail’s command on the Polish border in 1698 whose mutiny began the musketeer revolt of 1698. TKUA Rusland, B43, 13 April 1700 (F. Apraksin replaces A. P. Protas’ev).

Golovin had also been head of the Armory since 1697: Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye*, 99.

²² *PiB* I, 334–39, 342–34, 802–05. The assertion found in many works that Menshikov was Peter’s orderly (*denshchik*) comes from G. V. Esipov, who interpreted a February 1700, letter (*PiB* I, 331) of Peter ordering Menshikov to look after his quarters in this light. Esipov did not take into account the very informal nature of Peter’s household, and his frequent similar commands to others, especially Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii. Esipov, “Zhizneopisanie,” *RA* 7 (1875), 234–35, and Pavlenko, *Poluderkhaznyi*, 23. Grund told the same story, but situated it in the period during or before the favor of Lefort (that is, the 1680s or 1690s). Obviously Grund had no way of knowing what happened at that period: Georg Grund, *Doklad o Rossii v 1705–1710 godakh*, ed. Iu. N. Bespiatykh, Moscow, St. Petersburg, 1992, 67.

discovery that Peter was in fact Antichrist, the eighth tsar and therefore the Beast (Rev. 17). Talitskii had sympathetic conversations about all this with many clergy and townsmen, as well as Bishop Ignatii of Tambov. He also talked to Prince Ivan Ivanovich Khovanskii, though not about Antichrist, only the shaving of beards and the prince's mistreatment at the hands of Nikita Zotov. Talitskii thought that another musketeer revolt might occur, and that the people would turn to Peter's Moscow viceroy during his absences, Prince Mikhail Alekukovich Cherkasskii, for he was a good man. Romodanovskii investigated the copyist in Preobrazhenskoe at some length, and the tsar and boyars condemned Talitskii and four others to death, a sentence carried out the next year. Ignatii went to the Solovetskii monastery, defrocked and a prisoner. Nothing happened to Cherkasskii, but Tsarevich Aleksei would remember the affair many years later and with sympathy.²³

THE NORTHERN WAR

Peter could not make war on Sweden until his peace with the Turks was secure, but Denmark and King Augustus had no such obstacles. The latter began operations in February with a surprise move against Riga which failed to take the city, but Denmark fared even

²³ AR SG 7397 (Secreta) 3 June 1700: van den Hulst's difficulty in discovering Peter's intentions, "te meer en dat al de saken van belangt door drie à vier personen verhandelt worden, te witen door syn Majesteit, Fiodor Golowin, Alexander Danilowitz en dan altemets noch een onbekent persoon." TKUA Rusland, B43, 13 April 1700, the boyars were surprised that Peter took Heins aside "[sans que personne d'eus nous] ait [osé approcher] au lieu qu'autrefois [les Czars ne parloient] [jamais aux Ministres estrangers qu'en presence de leurs Boyards.]" Heins was right about the past custom: see Iuzefovich, "*Kak v posol'skikh*", 123–25; Croskey, *Muscovite*.

On the Talitskii affair see G. Esipov, *Raskol'nic'h'i dela XVIII stoletia*, 2 vols, St. Petersburg, 1861–63, I, 59–84; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 100–102; Golikova, *Politicheskie*, 135–45; Zheliabuzhskii, *Zapiski*, 209–10; TKUA Rusland, B43, 5 August 1700 (Talitskii affair); SRM 605, 2 August 1700 (arrest of "Felistrat Constantinoff" [=Feoktist Konstantinov], merchant of Kadashevo settlement, and clergy for plotting against the tsar). The boyar I. I. Khovanskii (c. 1645–1701) was not the son of Prince Ivan Andreevich Khovanskii (the commander of the musketeers executed in 1682), but of the boyar Prince Ivan Nikitich Khovanskii (died 1658). He held no important office, but figured in the rare meetings of the Boyar Duma and various commissions of boyars in 1698–1700. Talitskii reported that he complained about the shaving of beards and that Nikita Zotov had compelled him to participate in a blasphemous parody of liturgy. Talitskii did not claim that Khovanskii shared the view that Peter was Antichrist. Khovanskii at first admitted all this, then withdrew his confession, whereafter he died "pod karaulem." Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 280–81; "Iz sobraniia . . . Khovanskikh," 20–21; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, IV, 198, 253, note 2, 405.

worse. Charles XII knocked the Danish king out of the war in a few weeks. Peter kept up the pretense in public that all was in order with Sweden, and no war was coming, even reassuring Kniper personally of his pacific intentions. Kniper could not quite believe that the war would really happen, but he dutifully reported the rumors that war was coming as well as Russian military preparations.²⁴ Peter could not be sure of the Turkish response, and so in April he decided on an ambassador to Sweden. The eventual choice was Prince Andrei Khilkov, a relative of Prince Romodanovskii and Golovin. Khilkov would have an even more difficult task than he expected, but at the time the rumor was not that he would have the post, but instead Prince Iakov Fyodorovich Dolgorukii, only a few months before in bad odor with Peter over the inadequacies of the campaigns in the south against the Tatars. Kniper went so far as to ask his brother Boris if the rumor was true, and prince Boris denied it: Prince Iakov had too little of the tsar's confidence for such an important post. Prince Boris was partly wrong, however, for Peter had originally chosen Iakov for the post, changing his mind a week later and appointing Khilkov.²⁵ Peter preferred to keep Prince Iakov with the army and he remained in the position of general military commissar. In the summer Peter replaced Lefort in his capacity as an army commander with General Adam Weyde and appointed the Georgian Prince Alexander Archilovich of Imeretia to command the Russian artillery.²⁶

²⁴ SRM 605, 29 February 1700 (Kniper congratulates Golovin on his new post at the Ambassadorial Chancellery, which he received 25 February); 14 March 1700 (Russian recruits joining the army at Novgorod, Pskov, and Smolensk; Golovin assures Kniper they will just strengthen the border); 20 April 1700 (news of Augustus' capture of Dünamünde and death of Carlowitz; four new regiments including the guards regiments alleged to march on Riga and Narva but Kniper unpersuaded).

²⁵ SRM 605, 20 April 1699: the rumor that Dolgorukii will be the new ambassador to Sweden: "Hoos bemte. Knäs Jacob Fedorowitz broder Knäs Boris Dolgoruka har jag mig befrågat om hans broder honom låtet förstå det han waro uthsedt till Stor Ambassadeur, hwartill han med hög förpligtelse neckar, sägande sig ey heller kunna troo at hans Z. Mt. lærer gifwa sin broder ett så important employ, effter han intet synnerln. wäl skall stå hoos hans Z. Mte." A draft letter of 17 April 1700 announced Dolgorukii as the ambassador and Khilkov as the foregoing messenger; on April 24 Peter eliminated Dolgorukii and appointed Khilkov. TKUA Rusland, B43, 24 April 1700; AR SG 7397 (Secreta 1700–32), 26 May 1700, 3 August 1700; *PiB* I, 355–56, 817.

²⁶ SRM 124, 13 June 1700 (appointments of Prince Alexander and Weyde). Weyde was a Dutch officer born in Russia who had served with the Imperial forces in Hungary and had been a major in the Preobrazhenskii guards; Bobrovskii, *Istoriia*, I, 205.

Dolgorukii was not the only aristocrat to receive a projected embassy. In the autumn Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn was to be sent to Istanbul, and his cousin Petr Alekseevich some months later was appointed ambassador to Vienna: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV,

After the official Russian declaration of war on 19 August, Peter lost no time in ordering his army to besiege Narva. The choice showed Peter's desire for a ready-made port, since Narva was not part of the lands lost to Sweden in 1617. It lay across the old border in the Swedish province of Estonia, and had been the object of Ivan the Terrible's wars in the sixteenth century.²⁷ The army command was a mixture of old and new. In June the story was that the supreme commander was to be Sheremetev, and the prince of Imeretia was to command the artillery. In August, however, Peter appointed as field marshal the boyar and admiral, F. A. Golovin, proven as a capable diplomat and administrator but hardly a military man. Sheremetev received the cavalry, largely the traditional gentry cavalry from Novgorod and some Ukrainian cossacks. Under Golovin the army was divided into three generalships under three full generals, Avtomon Golovin, Adam Weyde, and Prince Nikita Ivanovich Repnin. All three of them had served before in the Preobrazhenskii guards. The aristocratic Golovin was the same who had commanded at Azov, and before that the two guards regiments. Prince Repnin, who had served as a captain in the same regiment, was still on the road from Novgorod with part of his troops at the time of the battle, so Prince Ivan Iur'evich Trubetskoi replaced him in the line. Prince Trubetskoi was rather different from the former guards officers. A boyar since 1692, he had commanded part of the Azov fleet in 1696 and in 1699 was named governor of Novgorod. It was he who signed the messages to the Narva garrison asking them to surrender. As in the case of Iakov Dolgorukii, his relations with the tsar had been troubled, but in spite of that he too received a major command. In the middle of the siege Peter appointed another field marshal to carry out actual operations. This was Charles Eugene, the duke de Croy (1651–1702), an Imperial general originally from the southern Netherlands who was out of work after the peace of Karlowitz. De Croy was recommended to Peter by King Augustus with a group of

2, 544, 554; *RiB* I, 414–15, 432–33. Neither the exile of Prince V. V. Golitsyn nor the fall from power of Prince Boris Golitsyn could prevent the clan from remaining at the peak of power.

²⁷ Peter's intention to besiege Narva conflicted with his earlier agreements with Augustus II, who was nevertheless reluctant to reproach Peter after the defeat of Denmark. Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 214–18, 232–34; Koroliuk, "Rech' . . . podgotovka," 219–20; Koroliuk, "Rech' pospolitaia i nachalo Severnoi voyny," *Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia Akademii nauk SSSR* 5 (1952), 268–72, 279–93.

other foreign officers, and arrived when the Russian army was already before Narva.²⁸

For Peter the siege of Narva in 1700 became a famous disaster. Fresh from his lightning victory over Denmark, Charles XII landed in Estonia in October. As this news reached the Russians, Peter left the army with Fyodor Golovin to return to Moscow, putting de Croy in supreme command. On the next day, 19/30 November, Charles attacked in the snow, and to tremendous effect. He smashed the Russian army, capturing de Croy, A. M. Golovin, Trubetskoi, Weyde, Hallart, Dolgorukii, Prince Alexander of Imeretia, and other Russian generals. Only Sheremetev's cavalry, the guards, and some of the infantry escaped more or less intact. To Prince Repnin fell the job of reorganizing them and taking up position in Novgorod.²⁹

THE RISE OF MENSHIKOV

The next years after Narva were a time of rebuilding in the Russian army and gradual success in the Baltic. They were also the years of the rise of Menshikov to a preeminent position in the Russian state

²⁸ TKUA Rusland, B43, 22 May 1700 (Sheremetev and Prince of Imeretia), 22 June 1700 (appointment of the three generals), 26 August 1700 (Golovin field marshal-general); *PS* IV, no. 1811, 74–75. The other main commanders included Lieutenant General Ludwig Nicholas Baron von Hallart, also from Saxon service, a fortress specialist: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 539–41, 541–43; *PiB* I, 822, 834.

Repnin entered Peter's service as a chamber *stol'nik* by 1686 and was rewarded for his support of Peter in 1689. He was a captain of the Preobrazhenskii guards in 1696 and a lieutenant-colonel in the same regiment by 1698. He was first recorded as general in September 1700: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, l. 120, boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 88; *PiB* I, 391, 548, 605–06, 683. His father Prince Ivan Borisovich was a boyar from 1659 to his death in 1697. Prince Ivan Borisovich and his father before him headed a variety of offices, mostly financial and internal administration. The Repnins came from the Obolenskii clan: Dolgorukov, *Rodoslovnaia*, I, 270–1.

Prince I. Iu. Trubetskoi had been one of the first appointments of Peter in 1682 to chamber *stol'nik*, apparently moving to boyar directly from that rank in 1692. His brother Prince Iurii had also become a chamber *stol'nik* of Peter almost at the same time as his brother, but became a captain in the Preobrazhenskii guards. In June 1700, Peter sent him as ambassador to Berlin: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7/1, 116v–117; boiarskaia kniga 10, 83v–84; *RiB* I, 359–60, 822. Their father, Prince Iurii Petrovich Trubetskoi, had received boyar rank in 1672, was governor of Kiev in 1672–74, and died in 1679. Dolgorukov, *Rodoslovnaia*, I, 321; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 197–98; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 102.

²⁹ Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 235–40; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 544–46, 546–52; *PiB* I, 404–07, 841–2. AR SG 7397, 31 August, 19 September, 12 October 1700; SG 7366, 7 December, 20 December 1700; TKUA Rusland, B43, 23 September, 18 November, 8 December, 23 December 1700. Peter did not blame the duke de Croy for the defeat, as did many later historians. When the duke died in Swedish captivity in Reval in 1702, Peter was said to remark that if he had given him command of the Russian camp at Narva two weeks earlier, the Russians would not have been defeated: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 578.

alongside that of Golovin and of growing jealousy of Menshikov's role, among others on the part of Field Marshal Sheremetev.

In 1701 this was all in the future, and Peter had more immediate concerns. The boyars were not pleased with the defeat at Narva, blaming the Danish ambassador Heins for persuading Peter to break so suddenly with Sweden. Prince Boris Golitsyn was prominent among the discontented, not surprisingly as he had opposed the war from the beginning.³⁰ Fortunately, Charles had withdrawn to winter quarters, so the tsar had a breathing space to reorganize. Immediately after the defeat the tsar ordered Sheremetev with the cavalry to harry the enemy in Livonia. Peter recruited new troops and assembled more artillery and powder, and sent Tikhon Streshnev, the head of the *Razriad* and the new Military Chancellery, to the Swedish border to supervise. Repnin was assigned to take the remaining troops under his command and help Augustus in Poland. The tsar also took care of the financial basis of the war. In January he revived the Monastery Chancellery under Ivan Musin-Pushkin, with the charge of taking control of the monastery estates, giving a stipend to the monks and the rest to the war chest. He also ordered the churches to sacrifice some of their bells so as to make cannon from the metal. He established a tax on beards, which Pleyer at least saw as a revenue device, not merely a cultural matter. All of these financial moves had the potential to create discontent, especially among the clergy and the pious.³¹ These and other recent measures also demonstrated Peter's desire to move along in a more European direction, as Heins had noticed. Europe, he thought, ought to take care to go easy with Russia rather than reject it, for only time would tell what would become of the country under Peter's tutelage.³²

³⁰ TKUA Rusland, B43, 27 January/7 February 1701, Heins to king of Denmark (boyars angry at Heins for persuading Peter to fight Sweden); 27 January/7 February 1701, Heins to Monsieur [Sehested], Golitsyn complained to Butevant's son that Heins had "[pour] ainsi [dire] mangé les oreilles du Zaar pour l'engager dans la guerre presente . . ." Golitsyn is "un des plus grands de cette cour et que le Czaar considera tant qu'il vivra en consideration des services qu'il luy a rendu dans sa jeunesse."

³¹ Pleyer was very taken with Musin-Pushkin, whom he described as "ein liebhaber der philosophischen und theologischen wissenschaften" who had learned Latin from the Jesuits (in reality at the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy; see below, 437): Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 552–53, 554; TKUA Rusland, B43, 10 February 1701 (use of bells for cannon, taxing the monastery revenues, according to Heins not so much for revenue as to put the ecclesiastics in their place); *PSŽ* IV, no. 1829, 133; *PiB* I, 410–11, 423–24, 443–44, 449; Avtokratov, "Voennyi prikaz."

³² TKUA Rusland, B43, Moscow, 17 March 1701, Peter wants to govern Russia well, "Le quel [Peter] sans contradiction La Nature a distingué par une genie et des dons

In June 1701, Sheremetev was appointed the supreme commander of the Russian troops facing Livonia, clearly in the full expectation of war in the region with the king of Sweden himself. That was not to be, for in July Charles defeated the Saxons before Riga and moved south into Kurland, toward Poland, the object of his attention for the next five years.³³ Livonia was left alone to face Peter, and his forces did not wait long. While Charles was making his decision and Sheremetev assembling his army, the Swedish navy make an attempt on Archangel, but it was beaten off. The Swedish attempt reminded Peter of those who went to Egypt in search of mummies and were turned into mummies themselves by the sandy winds of the desert. In the next few years the cossacks, the Kalmyks, and Sheremetev's army would lay waste the land to Peter's great satisfaction. The Swedish commander Schlippenbach was able to win small gains against the Russians, but on 30 December 1701 Sheremetev won his first victory at Errestfer.³⁴ There were more to follow.

Peter was grateful to Sheremetev, for his ministers of state continued to be unhappy with the war. He sent Menshikov to present the field marshal with the new order of St. Andrew and other gifts. Sheremetev himself came back to Moscow to celebrate:

Before the last Easter holidays the knight [sc. of Malta] Sheremetev came here himself and in the past Easter week held a meal and ball, which the tsar with most of the Boyars and great men of the country attended, but since the tsar showed himself there to be disturbed and unsatisfied against

extraordinaires, et qui surpassent l'imagination, ce que toutes les gens droits sont obligé d'avouer sans aucun flatterie. Cependant à force de malfaire ils apprendront bien faire et tout changes icy de face de jour en jour, et il est constant que toutes les Puissances de l'Europe ont plus de raison de menager cet Estat que de le rebuter, ne sçachant pas ce qu'il en deviendra avec le temps."

³³ Sheremetev was promoted to field-marshal on 6 June 1701: *PiB* I, 862–63. Avtokratov, "Voennyi prikaz," 228–29. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 558–59 (Pleyer, 26 May 1701, Sheremetev appointed commander); 566–67 (19 August 1701, news reaches Moscow that Charles has gone south into Poland); Otto Haintz, *König Karl XII von Schweden*, 3 vols., Berlin, 1958, I, 52–54; Ragnhild Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden*, London, 1968, 155–89; Kh. Palli, *Medzhu dvumia boiami za Narvu: Estoniia v pervye gody Severnoi voiny 1701–1704*, Tallin, 1966, 119–45; Göran Rystad, "Ryssland eller Polen? Karl XII:s planer efter Dünaövergången; Några synpunkter," *Scandia* 2 (1961) B. 27, 298–336.

³⁴ Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 247–51; TKUA Rusland, B43, 8 July 1701 (Swedish attempt on Archangel); 8 January, 12 January, 2 February 1702 (Errestfer); ARSG 7366 (1701–02), 18 January 1702). Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 573; *PiB* I, 456–57. Palli, *Narvu*, 145–68; Iu. N. Bespiatykh, V. V. Bryzgalov, P. A. Krotov, eds., *Trevozhnye gody Arkhangel'ska 1700–1721*, Archangel, 1993.

his custom and soon left, the gaiety was rather disturbed and Sheremetev takes it much to heart.³⁵

Even success in war did not bring harmony to the relationship of field marshal and tsar, a state of affairs that may have reflected Peter's general dissatisfaction with the management and command of his army. The tsar's attempt to reorganize his army along European lines proceeded slowly, and the boyars were no help, for they were careless and lacked the necessary experience. Peter hoped for better things in the future, for he insisted that the young sons of the Russian princes and boyars go abroad to serve in foreign armies, not just to travel and observe. He considered plans to reorganize the administration of the Russian army into a German-type military commissariat, but for the time being left matters in the hands of the Military Chancellery.³⁶

Peter had infinitely more confidence in Menshikov. Until the trip to Europe Menshikov had been little more than a favored drinking companion, but he returned with the tsar's confidence. Though only a lieutenant in the Preobrazhenskii guards, he was already an important favorite and together with Golovin the principal proponent of the war with Sweden. In 1701, it seems, he was given an even more serious task, supervision of Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich.³⁷

³⁵ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 575–76 (Pleyer, 15/26 April 1702): “Vor denen Osterfeiertagen kame der ritter Scheremetow selbst alhier an und hielte diese vergangene osterwochen eine mahlzeit und Balle, welcher der Czar sambst denen meisten Bojaren und großen des landes beywohneten, weilen sich aber der Czar dabey wider seine gewohnheit turbiret und unvergnüget zeigete, auch bald davon ging, wurde die lust zimlich verstöret, und nimmet sich Scheremetow sehr zu herzen.” *PiB* II, 331. TKUA Rusland, B43, 9 September St. V. 1701 (ministers unhappy with Peter's desire to continue the war). Who were these ministers? Earlier on (7 February 1700) Heins listed some of Peter's “premiers Ministres et Boyars”: Boris Golitsyn, L. K. Naryshkin, Shein (who died soon thereafter), Golovin, Golovkin, Vinius, F. M. Apraksin. Since Golovin seems to have supported the war, then if Heins was correct on 9 September 1701, there were doubters beyond just Boris Golitsyn in Peter's inner circle. (Naryshkin, it should be remembered, also had supported the war, though Peter kept him away from the decision-making).

³⁶ GSAPK I, Repertorium XI, 13C, 34–40v, 7 March 1702 (Peter's difficulties in reforming the army and his orders to traveling noblemen); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 581.

³⁷ On Peter's return from Europe in 1698 he gave the tsarevich into the care of his sister Natalia and it was rumored that Prince Boris Golitsyn would have overall charge. This seems to have been accurate, as it was Golitsyn who told Guarient in December, 1698, that Aleksei would be soon sent to some European court for education. Golitsyn's fall from grace in January must have encouraged Peter to look for a new tutor. In early 1699 the plans to actually send the tsarevich abroad included sending Andrei Vinius to take care of him, but they came to nothing.

HHStA Rußland I, K. 18, 17 October 1698; 12 December 1698; 5 August 1699 (Guarient helped the boyars to persuade Peter not to send Aleksei with Vinius to Holland); 25 October 1699 (no more talk of sending Aleksei abroad).

From 1698 at least through the end of 1699 various plans had been considered to educate the boy abroad, but they were then dropped. The idea still circulated in Western Europe, and the Prussian ambassador Johann Georg baron von Keyserling arrived, in Russia at the beginning of 1702 with the possibility still in his mind. He found Menshikov the overall supervisor of the boy's upbringing, like the *diad'ki* to the earlier tsarevichi. He also encountered the heir's instructor (*informator*) in Latin and other sciences, one Martin Neugebauer of Danzig (1670–1758), who would play a fateful role during the next few years. Neugebauer had come to Russia on the recommendation of General Carlowitz, thus presumably before the latter's death at Riga in March 1700, or soon after.³⁸

Keyserling also pursued contact with Menshikov, whom he readily realized to hold great power, and thus became aware of the tension between the favorite and Neugebauer. He met the tsarevich at a formal audience for an exchange of courtesies under the eyes of Menshikov and remarked:

I noted at this occasion there must be a considerable jealousy between Neugebauer and the favorite, as I then later became aware that they had quarrelled with one another because Neugebauer is supposed to have pretended to be an independent tutor of the tsarevich, and Menshikov sees that he might lose such a strong hand, so he has preferred to go along with it.

Menshikov went on to ask how the crown prince of Prussia passed his time, and Keyserling took the occasion to praise the knowledge, both cultural and practical (*“in denen Scientiis . . . alß auch in denen Exercitiis”*) of the Prussian heir. All this was laying the ground for the education of the tsarevich and a possible marriage in Berlin. Aleksei Petrovich listened carefully to a translation of the conversation.³⁹ In

³⁸ Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 346–48; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 13C, ff. 21–28, 23 February 1702.

³⁹ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 13C, 42–45, 14 March (St. N.) 1702: “Ich merckte bey dieser Gelegenheit, daß eine ziemliche jalousie zwischen den Neubauer und den favoriten obhanden seyn wüste; wie ich dann nachmahlen in erfahrung gebracht, daß sie sich miteinander und zwar deßwegen weil Neubaur praetendiret haben soll independenter Hoffmeister vom Czarewicz zu seyn, ziemlich Brouilliret gehabt, weil aber der letztere siehet, daß er woll wieder so eine starcke partie verspielen möchte, so habt er sich lieber accomodiren wollen; vor meiner beuhrlaubung gab mir auch der favorit durch die Nachfrage, womit Ihre König. Hoheit unser Crohn Printz die zeit zubrächten, gelegenheit an die handt, die vortreffliche Education so Ihr. König. Hoheit hätten, und wie sehr daß sie so woll in denen Scientiis so einem großen Herrn nöthig wären, alß auch in denen Exercitiis profitirten, und was sie sich auch vor ein Plausible Passe-temps durch die gerichtete, und auß denen vornehmsten des Hoffes bestehende Compagnie, welche sie schon mit unglaublicher adresse zu exerciren wüsten, erwöhlet hätten, zu rühmen, welches

the summer of 1702, during Peter's trip to Archangel, the tsar took with him Menshikov, the tsarevich, and the heir's teachers. At Archangel Neugebauer fell into a quarrel with some of the Russian nobles in Aleksei's household, and was dismissed from his service. Menshikov saw to it that his protestations of innocence went unheard. Neugebauer was naturally in deep disgrace, and when he was able to leave Russia in 1704, he immediately joined the service of Charles XII. A new instructor for Aleksei Petrovich was found in Baron Heinrich Huyssen (1666–1739), a well-educated and sophisticated German nobleman who also proved his worth as Peter's pamphleteer in later years.⁴⁰ Neugebauer burned with resentment. He would be heard from again.

Trivial at the time, the incident demonstrates the growing power of Menshikov. Keyserling thought him so important that he pleaded with Berlin to send Menshikov presents, especially some sort of order to eclipse the one recently given him by the king of Poland. He was still not the overwhelming figure he would later become, and indeed some of the older boyars still exercised some functions. The Boyar Duma even met once more to decide what to do with a revolt of the Zaporozhian cossacks and their alliance with Crimea. The answer was to send a small army of the traditional Russian cavalry and strengthen the fortifications on the Dniepr to keep them in check.⁴¹

alles der Czarewicz, wie Ihm solches in Rußische sprache gesaget wurde, mit großer auffmerksamkeit anhörte, und mich nachmahlen mit vieler Gnad bezeugung vor sich gehen ließ."

⁴⁰ Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 347. GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 13C, 113–16, 4 July 1702 (Keyserling to Graf Ober Cammerherr [Wartenberg], disgrace of Neugebauer, who was useful to Printz and Polish envoy von Königseck); 132–34v, 25 July 1702 (Keyserling to King, Neugebauer still under arrest, the incident partly his own fault, he had been recommended by Carlowitz); 161–63v, 19 September 1702 (Neugebauer removed from his post) 176–80v, October 1702 (Neugebauer declared guilty of exceeding his authority, Peter grants him the right to leave the country, Menshikov prevented him from getting a hearing, Keyserling tries to get him a post in Berlin).

Keyserling kept track of Neugebauer until he left Russia, noting that he had some money but an uncertain fate (104–11v, 2 May 1703) and his final lack of prospects and replacement by Huyssen (200, 18 July 1703). Shortly thereafter Neugebauer returned to Germany and began writing propaganda pamphlets against Russia and Peter, which brought him to the attention of the Swedes. According to Keyserling, Patkul, and therefore the Russians, knew about his pamphlets by April 1705: GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 16B, 4–11v, Moscow, 22 May 1706. See also Heinrich Doerries, *Rußlands Eindringen in Europa in der Epoche Peters des Großen: Studien zur zeitgenössischen Publizistik und Staatenkunde*, Osteuropäische Forschungen, N.F., B. 26, Königsberg, and Berlin 1939, 54–57, 68–76.

⁴¹ GSAPK I, Rep. 11, 13C, 42–42, 14 March (StN) 1702 (Peter, Menshikov, and the tsarevich stay at Lev Naryshkin's estate); 58–61, 4 April 1702 (Menshikov's annoyance at the king of

The main events were not in the south, however. In summer 1702, Sheremetev defeated a Swedish army again at Hummelshof near Dorpat, and in the fall the whole Russian force moved for its first great prize, Nöteborg. The *voevoda* of Novgorod, Petr Apraksin (the tsar's brother-in-law), began the campaign by clearing the Neva of Swedish troops. Peter brought with him the two guards regiments, twelve regiments of infantry, and massive artillery, all under the command of Sheremetev. General John Chambers commanded the two guards regiments, Prince Nikita Ivanovich Repnin the rest of the infantry and Iakov Bruce the artillery. The siege began in October, and after a few days of fighting the Russian army entered the fortress on 14 October, its first major conquest of the war. The two guards regiments had borne the brunt of the struggle. The tsar ordered that the fortress bear a new name, not the old Russian name Oreshek but instead Schlüsselburg. Its fortifications were hastily prepared and a small exploratory expedition went down river to Nyenskans. Peter decided to postpone its capture to the following year. He set himself to return to Moscow and order new uniforms for the guards, but not before dealing with his commanders. Menshikov received the rank of general, his first important promotion since he became the supervisor of the tsarevich. Peter also cashiered both General Repnin and General Apraksin for corruption ("einige Malversationes") and for Repnin's refusal to serve under Sheremetev. These were the first of many such cases, and both generals were soon to return to important positions.⁴²

Prussia because he received no order adds to Peter's anger that he has received no support in the war); 113–16, 4 July 1702 (Keyserling asks for an order for Menshikov); 132–34v, 25 July 1702 (Persian ambassador speaks with Boris Golitsyn, who is in charge of affairs with Peter and Menshikov absent); 169–71v, 3 October 1702 (Keyserling receives an order for Menshikov but not sure if it is good enough, Golovin, Menshikov's rival, wants one too); 177v, October, 1702 (Neugebauer thinks that the order for Menshikov is not good enough); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 556 (Pleyer, 2 February 1701, Persian ambassador has audience with Boris Golitsyn, "welcher alß Vicere über das Cassanische und Astracanische Königreiche gesetzet ist"), 558, 593–94 (Pleyer, 20 December 1702, revolt of Zaporozhian cossacks: "Solche [Empörung] zu stillen wurde in einer geheimben Versamblung aller der fürnehmstgen herrn und Bojaren beschloßen, genugsambe Völker umb selbige Gegend zusambzubringen und ihr weiteres unternehmen zu verhindern").

⁴² Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 589–92; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 13C, 186–87v (7 November 1702, capitulation of Nöteborg 23/24 October NS, expedition to Nyenskans); 190–90v (21 November 1702, change of name of Nöteborg to Schlüsselburg, its fortifications repaired and capture of Nyenskans postponed, Peter to return to Moscow 14 or 15 November, promotion of Menshikov, cases of Repnin and Apraksin, new guards uniforms); *PiB* 2, 78–79, 81–85, 87–95, 99–110, 386–96, 402–23; *Zhurnal ili podennaia zapiska . . . Petra Velikogo*, 2 vols., St. Petersburg 1770–72, I, 55–66; RGADA, f. 9, otd. 1, d. 17 (Zhurnaly

Peter and the army returned to Moscow in triumph. He stopped near the city at Chashnikovo, Lev Naryshkin's estate. Keyserling and the Dutch envoy van der Hulst came out to meet him, standing in the snow by the side of the road as the tsar and his army approached. When Peter noticed them he galloped up and began to get off his horse to greet them, but they refused the honor and kissed his hand. Peter embraced them both and kissed them on head and mouth Russian fashion, and told them to follow him in their sled. The party stopped in the first village and went into a peasant's hut, one without a chimney, where Peter, Menshikov, and the ambassadors waited for the artillery to arrive. When Peter saw that the artillery had arrived, he took Keyserling and van den Hulst's head under his arms and showed them the guns through the windows of the hut, telling the story of each gun and its capture. With much wine and vodka the tsar told them the story of the battle, fining his listeners a huge cup of vodka if they forgot to use the new name, Schlüsselburg, in conversation. Tsarevich Aleksei soon arrived to join in the festivities. Underneath the general gaiety some tension did exist:

During the same evening the General Military Commissar here, Tikhon Nikitich [Streshnev], who is not too well seen by his Tsar's Majesty on account of his malice, even though the tsar gives him his best countenance, had the honor to have his pretty white beard shortened by his tsarish majesty's own hand, at which he made a pleasant and friendly appearance (though he feared that the shears would go into the flesh), as if the greatest favor had come to him, but if he had been given the choice, he would have preserved his beard with some thousands of Thalers.

In contrast, Menshikov's favor increased, for Peter made him governor of Schlüsselburg and promised him that he would be governor of Ingria when it was all conquered. That would come soon, for Peter himself told Keyserling that he must have Nyenskans the next spring or he did not want to live. The next day the army made its formal entrance, marching into Moscow with the captured guns and the Swedish prisoners.⁴³

shvedskikh sluzhb), ff. 1–7 (P. M. Apraksin); G. Timchenko-Ruban, "Vodvorenie russkogo vladychestva na beregakh Nevy i zalozenie goroda S. Peterburga," *Voennyi sbornik* 12 (1899), 5–47. John (Ivan Ivanovich) Chambers was a Scot whose father had already served much of his life in Russia. At the end of November Fyodor Apraksin wrote to F. A. Golovin to show mercy to his brother Petr: *PiB* 2, 443–44.

⁴³ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 592–93; AR SG 7366 (1703–04), s.d., 1703; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 13C, 197–201, 19 December 1702, 197v: "Weil aber Se. Czarische Mayt. nach einem kleinen frühstück von Chasnikow aufgebrochen ware, so treffen wir dieselben eine 4tel Meile von da unterwegs an, und da ich durch einen meiner vorangeschickten leute die

The new year brought the completion of the Russian conquest of Ingria, and with it the further rise of Menshikov and greater jealousy of his position in the state. This year the military operations were not so complicated. Menshikov continued work to improve the fortifications of Schlüsselburg and to build boats. By early spring Peter had a large army in the area, the main force under Sheremetev, Chambers, and Prince Repnin and a covering detachment under Petr Apraksin. Nyenskans fell on 1/12 May, and the other Ingrian towns, Iam and Kopor'e, in the course of the summer. The construction of the new city down the river from Nyenskans began almost immediately with the construction of a fortress. The new town would be St. Petersburg.⁴⁴

Nachricht erhielt, daß Se. Czarische Mayt. zu Pferde kämen, und unweit von uns wären, lies ich Meinen schlitten aus dem wege ablencken, und wartete Se. Czarische Mayt. ankunfft auf dem weg stehende ab. So bald wie Se. Czarische Mayt. mich und des holländischen Residenten gewahr wurden und auf uns zu Gallopirten, machten sie Mine, alß ob sie von dem Pferde steigen wolten, welches ich aber zueylende deprecirte, und Sr. Czarischen Mayt. mit gehorsambsten bewillkommung und unterthänigster felicitirung zu der victorieusen und glück. zuruckkunft nach der Stolize die hand küßete, welches sie gar gnädigst auffnahmen, mich umbarmeten und auf Kopff und mund küßeten, solche gnade auch dem holländischen Residenten wiederfahren ließen. Se. Czarischen Mayt. befahlen uns auch sogleich, daß wir unsere schlitten umbkehren und ihn folgen solten, deme wir dem gehorsambst nachkommen. Wie aber Se. Czarische Mayt. in das erste dorff anlangeten, saßen sie vom pferde ab, und führeten uns in eine ziemliche gutte Rauchstube, woselbst sich auch der favorit Alexander Danilowicz einfand, und mich mit besonderer freundtlichkeit und abgerechts elden? Complimenten ambrassirte, und müsten wir in erwartung biß die Artillerie kommen würde, etliche gläser Wein und brandtwein außleeren. Sobald alß Se. Czarische Mayt. erfahren, daß die Stücke bereits /198/ ankähmen, fasten sie meinen Kopf unter der rechten und der Residenten von Holland unter den linken arm, und hielten uns zu denen auß der Rauchstuben hinaußgehenden fenstern oder vielmehr rauchlöchen und ließen uns ein jedes stück absonderlich stehen, erzehlten uns auch dabey wor ein jedes genommen war, und was bey der gantzen belagerung von Notteburg (so aber jetzo bey straffe eines großen glases Schlüsselburg genandt wirdt) vorgegangen." 198: arrival of the tsarevich. 198v: "An selbigen Abend hatte der hiesige General Kriegs-Commissarius Tychin Mykytewicz [Streshnev], welcher seiner Malice halber nicht gar zu woll bey Sr. Czarischen Mayt. angesehen ist, ob sie Ihm gleich die beste Mine machen, die Ehre, daß Ihme sein zierlicher weißer Bart von S. Czarische Mayt. eigener hand abgekürtzet ward, wobey er aber auß furcht, daß die Scheren nicht ins fleisch gehen möchte, alß ob ihm die gröste gnade wiederführe, da er doch, wann es ihm frey gestanden, seinen barth gerne mit etliche 1000 Thlr. würde gelöset haben." 200: "Ihn [Menshikov] Se. Czarische Mayt. zum Gouverneur von Schlüsselburg decorirret auch gnädigst versprochen haben, erst wenn sie Ingermandlandt bekommen würde er Gouverneur von der gantzen Provintz seyn solte, zu welchen letzten er sich auch grosse hoffnung machet, daß er mir selbst gesagt: Er müste den kommenden frühling Neue Schantze haben, oder er wollte nicht leben." *PtB* 2, 115, 444–46.

⁴⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 601, 609–10, 612; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 14A, 45–51v, 1 March 1703 (Menshikov improving the fort at Schlüsselburg and building boats); 79–83v, 18 April 1703 (Russian army in the northwest is 36,000 under Sheremetev, 18,000 under Repnin, and 12,000 under Apraksin, believed to be intended for Kexholm); 138–39, 1/12 May 1703

Back in Moscow Pleyer reported talk of forthcoming rebellion. Supposedly Menshikov had put a tax on wood, even on wooden coffins, and the proceeds were going into his own pocket, not that of the tsar. Even more serious, the belief among some was that Menshikov had bewitched the tsar, and then there was the rumor that the favorite had pulled Tsarevich Aleksei's hair and the tsar had done nothing.⁴⁵

The conquest of Ingria and the founding of Petersburg was not only a major turning point in Peter's reign, it was also the turning point in Menshikov's fortunes. The favorite does not seem to have unusually distinguished himself in battle, but the story circulated later that he had convinced the skeptical tsar that the fortress would indeed fall, and it was this judgment that led Peter to promote him to major offices. Apparently for the first time, Peter and the court celebrated Menshikov's name day (23 November) with great magnificence, and it became an annual event to the end of the reign. From 1702 he was never without major offices and also never free of the hostility and rivalry that such positions engendered, and Keyserling noted in November 1703, that he grew in power every day. A few months later Pleyer wrote back to Vienna that Menshikov had come to the summit of power, that he could countermand the tsar's orders, and that the princesses themselves bowed nearly to the ground before him.⁴⁶ In the early part of 1704 Keyserling went into more

(news from Nyenskans of the capture of the fort); 164–68v, 20 June 1703 (surrender of Kopor'e); 206–08 25 July 1703 (Peter leaves for Olonets, putting colonel von Rönne in charge of St. Petersburg). *PiB* 2, 128–31, 135–40, 149, 151–60, 162–68, 170–71, 174–78, 182–184, 210–14, 220–21, 225–26, 467–81, 484–514, 519–40, 545–51, 555–56.

Menshikov's rise occurred at the same time as the fall of Andrei Vinius. Convicted of neglecting the army's artillery supplies and its medical services, he lost the Siberian Chancellery at the end of 1703. GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 14A, 100–100v, 25 April 1703 (Winius, the head of the "Artillerie-Prekaze ad interim" in place of the Prince of Siberia [mistake for Imeretia] has to answer for inadequate artillery for the campaign); 194–195v, 11 July 1703 (Winius, head of Siberian Chancellery and Artillery in place of "Mylitinsky" prince, has to go to "Schloßburg"); 217–20, 15 August 1703 (poor reception of Winius in St. Petersburg); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 615, 617; *PiB* 2, 256–57, 489–96, 608–09. Vinius later had a rather adventurous life, with an escape abroad in 1706 and eventual reconciliation with Peter in 1708; *PiB* 5, 312, 715–24. He died in 1717. See I. P. Kozlovskii, "Andrei Vinius, sotrudnik Petra Velikogo," *RS* 140 (November, 1909), 440–59; (December 1909) 659–66; 143 (August 1910) 203–19; 146 (April 1911) 177–211.

⁴⁵ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 613.

⁴⁶ TKUA Rusland, B43, 2/13 December 1703 (magnificent celebration of Menshikov's name day); GSAPK I, Rep. 11, 14A, 317–22v, 28 November 1703 (Menshikov's power); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 623; *PSŽ* IV, no. 1931 (10 May 1703, Peter and Menshikov awarded St. Andrew's cross). Menshikov is not mentioned in the official relation of the siege: *PiB* 2, 99–109, though the later official *Žhurnal* (I, 60–1) portrayed Menshikov as

detail on the situation at the Russian court when new taxes were being discussed:

a very great lamentation has therefore arisen and because the favorite is entirely for the project since he will get a new rank, so the hatred against him becomes greater from day to day; all the great of this country are also very discontented and it is a matter of concern that if the King of Sweden with his army came just to this border and gave a little air to the discontented, then probably a general revolt would follow.⁴⁷

Discontent with Menshikov was also widespread in the army. At the end of the previous year he had formed his own regiment of soldiers, a privilege unique in Peter's army, taking soldiers and officers from other regiments as well as the best recruits from among the house servants of the boyars. He also kept the best dragoon regiments with him in Ingria, and Sheremetev, marching that spring into Livonia, was not happy:

Two weeks ago the field marshal Sheremetev left from here completely discontented, since the favorite Aleksander Danilovich at his own pleasure not only sought out the best and most experienced officers from his [Sheremetev's] whole army and engaged them with his regiment, but also recently took the best dragoon regiments, which are supposed to remain under his command the whole time in Ingria, about which the field marshal himself, who tried to oppose the order brought by his majesty the tsar in person with some representations, had to swallow some very hard words.

There were other complaints that he had taken all fisheries under his control, even in the Ukraine. Indeed it was true that he administered many of the new taxes. In early 1704 there were a series of new minor taxes, on mills, bath-houses, and other items. The collection of all of them was put under the Izhora or Ingrian

providing aid to the real hero of the battle, Lieutenant Colonel Prince M. M. Golitsyn. The story of Menshikov's estimate of the weakness of the fortress is in the Danish ambassador Georg Grund's final relation, composed after his return home: *Grund: Doklad*, ed. Bespiatykh, 67, 134.

⁴⁷ GSAPK I, Rep. 11, 14D, 89–101v, 15/26 March 1704, 91: “[Es werden auch] allerhand [neue financiren er]funden [und ist] in kurtzer zeit nicht nur eine allgemeine [vermogens steuer] sondern auch [eine schwehre imposte auff alle muhlen im] gantzen [Reich item] auff alle [baadstuben] auch auf anderen [dinge mehr auff stapil] kommen, [es entsteht daher ein] sehr großes [lamentiren und] weil [der favorit] durchgehendes [vor den angeben das er neue rang] gehalten wird, so wird [die haine wieder ihn von tag zu tag] größer; alle [grosse dieses Reichs] sind auch sehr [malcontent und stehet zu besorgen das wen der König in Schweden mit seinter armée nur an] dieser [grentzen kachme und den malcontenten] ein wenig [lufft machte, so dan] wohl eine [general revolte] erfolgen dörrfte.”

Chancellery, at first located in Semenovskoe near Moscow. In reality, only some of the taxes were new, and others were only newly transferred to the Ingrian Chancellery, which supported several regiments from its revenues.⁴⁸

Menshikov's rise offended not only Sheremetev and the elite generally, it aroused rivalry even in those who supported and carried out Peter's policies. One of those was Golovin. Part of the foreign minister's discontent came from overwork, for he was almost solely responsible for the conduct of ever more complex foreign affairs, assisted only by Shafirov, as well as the ever-expanding fleet, of which he was the admiral. He found Peter's wild parties with Menshikov and others increasingly tiresome, and eventually, he lost patience and "begins to become rather irritable from jealousy of the great power of the favorite and his therefore increasing insolence." Business was neglected both in Moscow and in St. Petersburg, where Menshikov diverted himself and the tsar in drunken debauch with the women whom he had brought there. This notice from May 1704, is one of the first oblique references to Marta, the Livonian servant girl who was to become Empress Ekaterina Alekseevna.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 619; GSAPK I, Rep. 11, 14D, 102–05, 9 April, Moscow, 1704, 102v: "Der Feld Marchal Cheremethoff ist auch vor 14. tagen, aber gantz malcontent aufgebrochen, weil der Favorit Alexander Danilowicz ihm nach seinen gefallen nicht nur die beste, und erfährlichste officier aus seiner gantzen Armée ausgesuchet, und bey seinen Regiment engagiret gemacht, sondern ihm auch noch neulich die beste dragoner-Regimenter, so unter seinen Commando allezeit in Ingermanland, stehen bleiben sollen, abgenommen, worüber der Feld-Marchal, als er sich der ihm deshalb, von Ihr Czaar. Myt. selbst überbrachten ordre, durch einige vorstellungen widersetzen wollen, gahr harte worte einschlucken müßen. Die allgemeine plaintes wieder den Favoriten, werden von tag zu tag größer, weiln nun neulich auff /103/ deßen ordre alle freye fischereyen in diesem gantzen Reiche untersaget, und mit großen imposten beschwehret worden, und weil diese ordre auch bis über die Cosakische Provinzien extendiret werden soll, so wollen einige eine üble Suite von ihren mißvergnügen befahren." *PSŽ* IV, nos. 1937, 1951, 1956, 1958, 1959, 1965; 223, 230–32, 243–45. Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 206–21. The Ingrian Chancellery eventually was officially renamed Semenov: *PSŽ* IV, no. 2010; 208–01, and Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 90–91. By 1711 the Ingrian Chancellery supported eighteen of fifty-two infantry regiments and one regiment of cavalry (of thirty-three): Avtokratov, "Pervye komissariatskie," 167, 169, 171.

⁴⁹ GSAPK I, Rep. 11, 14D, 123–28v, 7 May 1704: Golovin "aus [jealousie] über das große [pouvoir des favoriten und] seiner dahero zunehmenden [insolence] ziemlich verdrießlich [zu werden anfanget] . . ." Marta was in the company of the two Arsen'ev sisters, Dar'ia and Varvara Mikhailovna and Anis'ia Kirillovna Tolstaia, who seems to have been a sort of chaperone, in March 1705. By that time Peter's first son by Marta had appeared, implying a connection back to spring 1704. The Arsen'ev sisters were among the *boiaryshni* (ladies-in-waiting) of Peter's sister, tsarevna Natal'ia. Menshikov later married Dar'ia Arsen'eva and Tolstaia became one of tsaritsa Ekaterina's ladies in waiting (*stats-dama*). The Arsen'ev sisters were the daughters of the *stol'nik* Mikhail Arsen'ev, governor of Iakutsk in 1697. *PiB* 3, 283, 769–70, 816; Esipov, "Zhizneopisanie," *RA* 13 (1875), no. 7, 237; Barsukov, *Spiski*,

The appearance of Marta “Skavronskaia” came simultaneously with the fall of Anna Mons, the last person left over from the pre-1698 group of influential figures at court. Mons clearly had no more political influence, for her faction, that of Lefort and Boris Golitsyn, had already lost with the decision to go to war with Sweden. The break came while Peter was away in Voronezh in November–December 1703. At that time Mons made a formal engagement of marriage with the Prussian ambassador Keyserling, whom she had met a year and a half earlier in the company of Peter’s sister Tsarevna Natal’ia. The result was disgrace for Mons with her entire family (Mons and Colonel Balk, her brother-in-law), and the confiscation of her new palace. According to Heins, the boyars were thrilled to learn of the event, since they thought that with Mons gone they could once again persuade Peter to do what they wanted. Heins doubted that, and he proved to be right.⁵⁰ The boyars were

283. Marta’s origins are obscure, but she was a servant when she fell into the hands of the Russian army with her master, Pastor Glück, at Marienburg in 1702. The pastor arrived in Moscow in January 1703, where he was to start a school: GSAPK I, Rep. 11, 14A, 89–90v, 18 April 1703 (the Polish ambassador Königseck had intervened on Glück’s behalf, who had persuaded Peter that he was better equipped to teach Russian youth than the Jesuits, who had attracted the children of the great lords); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 127–53.

⁵⁰ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland, 13C: 121–23, 10 July 1702, Moscow (Keyserling wishes to pay his compliments to Natal’ia); 126–27v, 18 July 1702 (Natal’ia sends a message to Keyserling by Mlle. Mons that she is ill, but when she recovers she will meet Keyserling at the house of Mons); 135–38v, 14 August 1702 (Keyserling meets Natal’ia at the Mons house for Anna’s name-day celebration). TKUA Rusland, B45, 9/20 February 1704: Keyserling is in poor odor because of his arrogance and bragging about the strength of Prussia. “Tout cela n’est encore rien, mais il a tout à fait perdu son Credit à l’égard de sa personne, par ce qu’il [s’est engagé pendant l’absence du Tzar avec une Dame icy, qu’on appelle Mademoiselle Mons, que le feu General le Fort a mis en grand credit aupres du Tzar, et que sa Majesté Tzarienne par une] grace particuliere [a preferée jusques à present à tout ce qu’il y avoit de Dames à Moscovie. Le Tzar ayant cet engagement l’a fort desaprouvé, et cette Dame] avec toute sa famille [est tombée en disgrâce en sorte que le Tzar luy a fait oster] ces jours passéz [son Palais qu’il luy avoit fait] construire [et une terre qui a esté desja [donnée à un autre qui] valoit bien 40 à 50–m escus; Ainsi [par la mauvaise conduite de cet envoyé, toute cette famille] pourroit estre rendu [misérable et la bonne Dame] est fort à plaindre puisqu’il n’y va pas tant de sa faute. Comme c’est un affaire quifait beaucoup de [bruit à cette cour et dont tous les Boyards] paroissent [ravis, à cause de la jalousie, qu’ils] avoient [conceue de ce qui le Tzar s’attachait si fort à la] conversation [de cette Dame et qui par] la chute de celle, ils croyent mesme [reussir dans leur dessein, de porter le Tzar à se manier, pour une seconde fois] (dont je doute pourtant fort encore) . . .” Peter was in Voronezh from mid-November to mid-December 1703, then in Moscow to late February 1704: TKUA Rusland, B44, 2/13 December, 1703 (Peter in Nikol’skoe on 10/21 November 1703); 12/23 December 1703 (Peter returned to Moscow 9 December, a few days’ mistake); 29 February St. V. 1704 (Peter leaves Moscow); *PiB* 2, 306, 307–08; 3, 1–2. Mons had received the estate in January: Semevskii, *Tsaritsa*, 28–31. Keyserling formally asked permission to marry Mons on 25 July 1704: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 147–49.

dreaming, as Mons had possessed no political influence since the death of Lefort.

The disorder in the management of foreign affairs did not extend to the war. Whatever the logistic and organizational difficulties, the Russians advanced. In the summer of 1704 the Russian army scored more success in the Baltic theater, for Sheremetev took Dorpat and Narva fell a few weeks later. As before, these successes did not come without conflicts, this time not so much among the Russian commanders as with the new Scots–German field marshal whom Peter had just hired, Baron Georg Ogilvy. Ogilvy had arrived in Russia only that spring, and immediately had been given the title of field marshal, which made him the equal of Sheremetev. After the capture of Narva a dispute broke out between the two field marshals over precedence. Menshikov, who had his own disagreements with Ogilvy, remained neutral and Peter let Sheremetev lead the entrance of the Russian army into the town. These victories stabilized the Russian position on the Baltic and showed how effective the Russian army had become in just a few years.⁵¹ The only cloud on the horizon was the continued discontent with Menshikov and his high-handed behavior. Another great celebration of the favorite's name day at Narva could only add fuel to the flames. Keyserling, who increasingly disliked Menshikov, thought Peter's love for him "seems more than that of a marriage, indeed entirely supernatural."⁵²

With the capture of Dorpat and Narva in 1704 the easy phase of the Northern War for Russia ended. While Peter methodically took the Swedish forts and towns in Ingria and Estonia, Charles XII pursued his goal of deposing Augustus from the Polish throne. In July he called together the Polish opponents of King Augustus in

⁵¹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 629–37; GSAPK I, Rep. 11, 14D, 159–63, 18 June 1704, Moscow: Apraksin besieges Narva (12,000 men) and Sheremetev Dorpat (27,000 men); 205–14v, 25 August 1704, Narva: disagreements of Menshikov with Ogilvy, Ogilvy–Sheremetev dispute. The first negotiations about hiring Ogilvy took place as early as summer, 1703: *PiB* 2, 241, 264–66, 689; ARSG 7366 (1703–04), 3 September, 17 October 1704 (capture of Narva); *PiB* 3, 99–112, 117–24, 171–78; Palli, *Narva*, 224–66.

⁵² TKUA Rusland, B45, 20 November St. V. 1704 (Menshikov's name-day). GSPAK I, Rep. 11, 14D, 260–64v, 27 November 1704, Narva: Russian army in good shape due to Ogilvy, hatred of Menshikov, illumination on 4 December (St. N.) for the favorite's birthday, "[der Tzaar vermag ihm] nichts [abzuschlagen und [scheunet deßen [liebe vor diesem mignon mehr [als ehlich ja] gantz [übernatürlich zu seyn.]" Wittram misinterpreted a similar passage in a later report of Keyserling to mean that the Prussian envoy thought the tie of Peter and Menshikov was erotic. Keyserling here is specifically denying that interpretation in favor of the popular Russian explanation of sorcery recorded by Pleyer (above): Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 270–71.

Warsaw, and under the watchful eye of the troops they declared Augustus deposed, and elected a new king, Stanisław Leszczyński, to be the Swedish puppet. This political success, combined with Charles' successful defeat of Augustus' armies, created a critical situation in Poland. Peter had to go to the aid of his ally, and starting in 1705 the main focus of military operations shifted to Poland and against a much more formidable opponent, the Swedish king himself.⁵³ At the same time, the financial burden of the war was beginning to tell on Russian finances.

The Azov campaigns and the first year of the Northern War had already brought the new form of tax collection in the *ratusha* and the Monastery Chancellery. New taxes were needed, for the ruble had lost half its value against the Reichsthaler. The treasury was raising money by adulterating the currency. In the spring of the next year the ruble was a bit better, only about thirty percent less than its pre-war value, but was still going to make problems supplying the Russian army in Poland. An attempt to secure the banking services of a group of Polish Jews to supply the Russian army was a failure, since the ruble was too low in value to make the transaction possible. Peter was able to get around the problem in part by arranging for supplies to be purchased and collected at Smolensk, where they were cheaper than in Moscow, and then shipped by river to the Russian army operating in Poland. More taxes and monopolies came in, the most important the state monopoly of salt sales on 1 January 1705. Manpower was becoming more of a burden as well. In 1699–1700 more than half of the new regiments had been raised with volunteers from free peasants or artisans, but from 1703 most were drafted, and increasingly from among the working peasantry, a double drain on economic resources.⁵⁴

The war demanded greater coordination in government, especially since Peter himself was so often away from Moscow with the army. In 1700–03 he seems to have conducted affairs by correspondence and through a series of *ad hoc* arrangements. The ministers left back in Moscow were supposed to assemble periodi-

⁵³ Józef Feldman, *Polska w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej 1704–1709*, Cracow, 1925, 1–74; Feldman, *Stanisław Leszczyński*, Warsaw, 1959, 27–32; and Lydia Scher-Zembitska, *Stanislas Ier: un roi fantastique*, Paris, 1999.

⁵⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 576, 630, 640–42; Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 8–9; *PSZ*, IV, no. 1912, 196–97, no. 2009, 279–80; 2015, 282–83. Avtokratov, “Voennyi prikaz,” 228–29. The salt monopoly was under the control of the Estates Chancellery headed by the secretary Avtomon Ivanov: *PiB* 4/1 430; 4/2, 1171–180.

cally to make necessary decisions, their meeting place being in Zotov's Privy Chancellery either in the Kremlin Palace or the General Court in Preobrazhenskoe from at least early 1703. At first the Privy Chancellery was largely an accounts office but it soon took over general oversight and kept records of the meetings of the ministers. In 1705, for example, it spent much time on supply for the artillery, which went beyond simple accounts, but not until 1706 or even early 1707 would this arrangement acquire a more definite institutional form. Peter continued, however, to send messages to the heads of the main chancelleries directly.⁵⁵ Orders to the Privy Chancellery in contrast were rather rare.

MENSHIKOV AND SHEREMETEV

Peter was not only entering on a new and more difficult phase of the war with shaky finances, but with growing dissension in the country. There was simmering popular discontent, increasing rivalry among the great men of the state, and general hostility by the nobility to Menshikov. Judging from Keyserling's and other reports, much of the grumbling was expressed by assigning the blame to the favorite for all unpopular moves, especially new taxes.⁵⁶ Keyserling and Pleyer, who spoke primarily to disaffected aristocrats and Menshikov's rivals within the government, repeated the talk that Menshikov was behind all the new taxes, but there is no evidence that this was the case. As far as we know, the inspiration came from various quarters, and Peter followed his own instincts. The only connection of Menshikov with the new taxes was that he administered them through the Ingrian Chancellery. Other new imposts, like the salt monopoly, went by him entirely, and his correspondence with Peter almost never touches on financial issues. For the time being, at least, opposition to Peter's policies followed the ancient and universal fable of the good ruler's evil advisor.

⁵⁵ The ministers, most of them still boyars in rank, meeting together did not even have a definite name, though such terms as "consilium" do appear, and their decisions are called *boiarskii prigovor*. See Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 22–28; Tokarev, "Blizhnaia," 45, 47–48. For early references to the *Bliznaia kantseliaria* see *PiB* III, 8, 188, 776, 791, 892 (18 August 1705, Prince P. I. Prozorovskii using the old term "*boiare prigovoril'*").

⁵⁶ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 15A (vol. 1), 11–15, 28 January 1705, Moscow, 13v: "[Alhier ist die] schädliche [jalousie und der Hass zwischen die grossen] auch nicht geringen, und macht absonderlich [des favoriten unbeschreibliche] große [gewalt] so er aber [gantz ubel nur zu anderen leute unterdrückung anwendet] das gantzte [land] welches mit täglich [neuen und] sehr onereusen [imposten beschwehret] wird, [seufze und] mißvergnüget."

Whatever the reality of policy, the rivalries were real, and Keyserling and other diplomats were inevitably drawn in. Early in 1705 the Prussian envoy returned briefly to Berlin and was able to present a very long and unusually frank report to his king. It revealed both the situation at the Russian court and his own networks. Golovin's position was particularly difficult:

I have left behind the tsar's ministry, as opposed to the cabinet of state, in considerable confusion, for although Count Golovin carries the name of Prime Minister and Chief President of Foreign Affairs, his power is so very limited by the uncommonly great ascendancy which the favorite Alexander Danilovich Menshikov has attained over the tsar's mind, that he is able to execute and decide little or almost nothing without the foreknowledge and agreement of the latter [Menshikov], and because therefore the Prime Minister, who has repeatedly but every time in vain begged the tsar very actively to take the management of affairs of state from him, only works unwillingly, and in all these things has no assistance other than from the privy translator and state secretary Shafirov, and besides [Golovin] is extremely occupied with marine affairs as admiral of the tsar's fleet, so that all foreign correspondence goes so slowly and badly that the foreign envoys receive no or very late resolutions on their memoranda, and the Prime Minister often shoves it off on the favorite, and the latter back to the former, so that most of the time they remain true *opposita penes se posita* [opposites placed together].

Keyserling thought that "presents" to all concerned Russian officials would be needed, though he warned the king that he must not expect too much from them. He thought Golovin was fairly well inclined to him and Prussia, and had won over the increasingly important G. I. Golovkin by arranging for his two sons, who were studying in Leipzig, to spend the summer at the Berlin court. He considered Sheremetev and Ogilvy both his good friends.⁵⁷ Like-

⁵⁷ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 15A (vol. 1), 20–29v, 11 April 1705, 22: "Das Czaarische Ministerium absonderlich vom Staats Cabinet, habe ich in ziemlichen Confusion zurück gelaßen, dan obschon der Graff Gollowin den Nahmen vom Premier Ministre und Ober Praesidenten der Außländischen Affaires führet, so ist doch sein vermögen durch das ungemein große Ascendant, so der Favorit Alexander Danilowicz Menzikoff, über des Czaaren Gemüth gewonnen, so sehr enge eingeschräncket, daß /22v/ er ohne vorbewust und zustimmung des letztern wenig oder gahr nichts auszurichten und zu decidiren vermag, und weil also der Premier Ministre, welcher den Czaaren schon zu unterschiedenen mahlen, doch allezeit fruchtloß gantz beweglich gebethen, ihm das maniment der Staats-Affairen abzunehmen, nur à contre coeur arbeitet, und in allen diesen dingen keine andere Assistenz, alß von den geheimbten dolmetscher und Staats-Secretario Schaphirow hatt, über dem auch alß Admiral von der Czaarischen Flotte mit den Marinsachen gahr sehr occupiret ist, so gehen alle außländische Expeditiones so schwehr und übel von statten, daß die frembde Ministri auff unterschiedene eingegebene Memorialien entweder gahr keine,

wise, Pleyer's reports were very friendly to Sheremetev and hostile to Menshikov.

The rivalries and discontent among the Russian elite, in Keyserling's view, could have extremely dangerous consequences for the stability of Peter's rule. Keyserling thought that Charles XII's preoccupation with Poland had left Livonia dangerously exposed to Peter's troops, but the tsar's own situation was no less dangerous.

Just as the King of Sweden puts himself to such great risk in the present situation, so the tsar would also stand exposed to no less danger if the King of Sweden should be the victor in a main battle, for in that case it would be to suppose that the King of Sweden would not go to Livonia and busy himself with the recovery of the fortresses but would invade the interior of the Muscovite state, which could happen most easily toward Smolensk, for this city is not at all secure and would be able to offer little resistance and nothing could later prevent the King of Sweden from pushing through right to the residence of Moscow where there is also no defensive works, and to cause the Muscovite state so much more dangerous a disaster because all the best families are cooking poison, gall, and revenge in their hearts because of the dishonorable execution some years back of their nearest relatives, whose corpses they still see daily on stakes and wheels before their eyes, also because they secretly and passionately demand a change under the hard oppression and daily exercised insolence and cruelty against them on the part of the favorite . . .

The Prussian envoy confused the execution of the musketeers with the Tsykler-Sokovnin affair, but he saw the danger. It was not limited to the elite, as time would soon show:

also the whole country is inclined to revolution because of their abolished customs, shorn beards, forbidden clothing, confiscated monastery property, their divine service which has been altered in some places, and the new heavy taxes that are invented daily and whose names they did not even know before. Therefore this so very vexed nation could well come to meet the King of Sweden with a welcome at the contrary fortune of this now hated government: divide and rule. In so far that the tsar has a victorious army in the field, he need fear no revolt in his country, for although the clergy in the monasteries leave little undone to foment sedition, and might well dispose the ordinary man to it, but the great are so very intimidated by

oder doch sehr späte Resolutiones erhalten, und schiebet es der Premier Ministre zum öfftern auff den Favoriten, und dieser es wieder auff jenen, da sie indeßen doch mehrentheils wahrhaftige Opposita penes se posita bleiben" 22-23v, need for bribes and Keyserling's list of friends. His position at the Russian court was considerably complicated by his marriage in 1704 to Anna Mons, the former mistress of Peter. The marriage did not endear him to Peter or Menshikov: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 634.

the terrifying traces of their executed relatives that they will provide no leaders.⁵⁸

Fortunately for Peter, his army was in good shape as it marched west into Poland to confront the Swedes, even though the rivalry among the field marshals and Menshikov continued. In March 1705, Menshikov and Sheremetev were still arguing about the respective division of forces, but Peter seems to have supported the field marshal over the favorite. Rivalry between Menshikov and Field Marshal Ogilvy was even more intense, since Ogilvy formally out-ranked the favorite but Menshikov had enormous power.⁵⁹ While Peter himself and the main body of troops under the command of Ogilvy headed for Wilno and Grodno, an expeditionary corps under the command of Sheremetev moved northwest into Kurland to cut off Charles from his possessions in Livonia. Though defeated at Gemauerthof near Mitau in July, Sheremetev occupied the whole of Kurland. Peter was in Mitau in September when the news of

⁵⁸ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 15A (vol. 1), 20–29v, 11 April 1705, Berlin, 26v: “In so großen Hazard sich nun der König in Schweden bey so /27/ gestalten sachen stellet, so würde doch auch der Czaar nicht minder gefahr exponiret stehen, wan der König in Schweden in einer Haupt-treffen den Meister spielen solte, dan es stünde auff den fall wohl zu vermuthen, daß der König in Schweden sodann nicht nach Liefßland gehen, und sich alda mit recuperirung der festung occupiren, sondern in viscera Imperii moscovitici einbrechen würde, welches am füglichsten gegen Smolensko geschehen könnte, dan weil diese stadt gar nicht feste, so würde selbige wenig Resistenz zuleisten wißen, und könnte nachmahlen dem Könige in Schweden nichts hindern, gar biß an die Moscovitische Residentz so gleichfals wo gar keine Defension ist, durchzudringen, und dem Moscovitischen Reiche ein so viell gefährlicheres Catastrophe zu causiren, weil nicht nur alle vornehmste Familien wegen der, vor einigen Jahren geschehene schmählichen hinrichtung, Ihrer nechsten anverwandten, derer leichname sie noch täglich auff Pfahl und Radt vor Ihren augen sehen, giff, galle und rache in hertzen kochen, auch über dem unter des favoriten harter oppression und noch täglich an sie ausübenden Insolence und Cruauté heimlich nach einer veränderung sehnlich verlangen, sondern auch das gantze Land, wegen Ihrer abgeschafften sitten, geschornen bärte, verbothene kleidung, eingezogenen Klostergüter, in vilen stüken veränderten Gottesdienst, und der von tag zu tag neu inventirter schwehren auflagen, davon Ihnen auch die bloße benennungen vorhin unbekandt gewesen, zur revolution sehr geneigt ist, daher dan diese [?] so gahr mortificirte Nation, bey wiedrigen glücke Ihrer jetzigen odieusen Regierung, dem Könige in Schweden wohl mit dieser bewillkommung entgegen gehen könnte: divide et impera. Im solange der Czar eine victorieuse Armée im felde hatt, darff /27v/ er keinen auffstandt in seinem Lande fürchten, dan obschon die faffen aus den Klöstern, Ihnen nicht wenig angelegen seyn laßen, ein Sed[it]ion zu fomentiren, den Gemeine Man auch noch wohl dazu zu disponiren seyn möchte, so sind doch die Großen durch die schreckende fußtapffen Ihrer hingerichteten Anverwandten so sehr intimidiret, daß sie Ihnen keine Chefs abgeben wollen.”

⁵⁹ The issue seems to have been that Sheremetev wanted command over all the cavalry, while Menshikov wanted Peter to assign some cavalry and infantry to each of them. Peter argued to Menshikov that Sheremetev was right, and not merely concerned to preserve his power: *PtB* III, 265–66, 286–97, 745, 771–72. ARSG 7366 (1705–06), 27 May 1705, rivalry of Menshikov and Ogilvy.

Astrakhan' reached him. It was Prince Boris Golitsyn who sent the news in a letter Peter thought mad: "he does not know himself what he is writing." The news was soon confirmed, however, and Peter now had two major issues to solve, the disposition of his army and the revolt on the Volga. He dealt with the army first. Ogilvy apparently wanted to continue moving slowly west, avoiding battle until the main Russian forces could join up with Mazepa and King Augustus. He would base the army on Wilno and Merez. Peter and his "ministry" (Golovin, Golovkin, Menshikov, Shafirov, Nikita Zotov and Romodanovskii) were skeptical of the plan. Ogilvy was trying to support the "interest" of King Augustus, and even tried to convince Peter to subsidize him. The German field marshal had little credit at the Russian court by this time, and his plan was rejected. Instead, the Russian army fell back on Grodno, farther to the south and east, making a fortified camp to stay the winter.⁶⁰

The other main issue was the revolt in Astrakhan', complicated by a revolt among the Bashkirs in the southern Urals. Keyserling's analysis had been proved correct, for it was taxes, the new clothing, and the enforced shaving of beards, all complicated by Old Belief among the population and soldiers, that were the spark of the Astrakhan' revolt at the end of July.⁶¹

Sheremetev arrived in Moscow in late October, ostensibly to recover from wounds sustained at Gemauerthof. In a few weeks he left for Astrakhan', taking four regiments of troops to suppress the rebellion. Command of the cavalry in the main army in Poland went to Menshikov. Peter himself left Grodno for Moscow in December, leaving Menshikov and Ogilvy to quarrel over precedence. The

⁶⁰ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 641–42, 644–48; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 15A (vol. 1), 139–48v, Wilno, 22 August 1705 (Ogilvy's plans and the ministry's opposition); 197–206, Wilno, 12 September 1705 (composition of Peter's "ministry," order to Ogilvy to fall back on Grodno, his support of Augustus' interest and lack of credit at Russian court). *PiB* III, 404–06, 417–18, 428–29, 441 (10 September 1705, Peter to Golovin: "Knez' Boris sumosbrodnym pismom zelo nas v sumnen'e privel; a cho pishet, sam ne znaet."), 452–53, 904–06, 931–34. On the whole episode, including Ogilvy's ties to Augustus, see Captain [M. K.] Marchenko, "General-Fel'dmarshal leitenant baron Ogilvii: Dva goda deiatel'nosti v riadakh russkoi Armii (1704–1706)," *Voennyi sbornik* 255 (October 1900) 1–24, 256 (November 1900) 23–47 (December 1900), 249–268.

⁶¹ N.B. Golikova, *Astrakhanskoe vosstanie 1705–1706 gg.*, Moscow, 1975, 74–78, 90; Golikova, *Politicheskie*, 296–319. Golikova stressed the economic and administrative oppression by the local authorities over the religious discontent among Orthodox and Old Believers. The summary of the case in RGADA, d. 17 ("O astrakhanskomo bunte"), l. 9, gave the causes in a different order: "Mezhdotsobie uchinilo'sza bradobritie i za nemetskoe plat'e i o to mnogikh voevody Rzhevskogo i polkovnikov i nachalnykh liudei vziatkov nalog i obid."

belief was that he was concerned about the revolt, as indeed he was. Charles was not asleep either, and began to move toward Grodno. In February 1706, the Swedish success at Fraustadt left the Russian army facing the enemy alone, and Peter ordered a retreat on 2 March. The Russians fell back toward Kiev. The next few months were quiet for the Russians in Poland, which gave them breathing space to deal with Astrakhan'.⁶²

The rebellion in Astrakhan' was a serious affair, and seems to have genuinely frightened both Peter and the upper classes in the winter of 1705–06. The tsar even ordered that the decrees on beards and foreign dress be held back in the lower Volga towns.⁶³ The revolt came at a time when Peter's relations with the Russian elite had not improved. The new Danish envoy Georg Grund reported that the rebellion was bad enough, but to make matters worse, "the nobility shows no great enthusiasm for the war, and believes that it is putting out great effort and running danger in vain and meanwhile would better stay at home to take care of its own affairs." It grumbled about the high taxes and the outflow of gold that led to the debasement of the coinage by nearly a third. The conclusion was that "this entire war rests purely and solely on the tsar's own person and his command, to be sure a master who directs everything through his principles and manners to his own aim . . ." Peter's simplicity of manner played a role here. Peter went about the army with no suite and virtually no guard, spending much of his time with foreigners and getting to know shipbuilding and military arts like fortification. His manner was extremely familiar and at dinners he served himself, even at banquets.

⁶² Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 646–49, 651–54; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 15A (vol. 2), 127–34v, Grodno, 14 November 1705 (Peter leaves Grodno quickly, most people think because of the Astrakhan' revolt); 16A, 44–55v, Moscow, 27 January 1706 (Peter's conversation with Keyserling about the prospects for the war); *PiB* III, 444, 449, 454, 458–59, 486, 492, 516, 527, 540, 961–63, 965–66, 975–81, 988–90, 1002, 1018, 1021–22, 1024, 1033–34; IV, 16–17, 19–20, 25–26, 113–23, 132–34, 674–82. Ogilvy was reluctant to retreat from Grodno in January–February 1706, Marchenko, "Ogilvii," *VS* 256, 32–47. TKUA Rusland, B45, 5 December 1705, Georg Grund to king of Denmark, conflicts of Menshikov and Ogilvy. Paul Heins had died the previous summer, and Grund was his replacement. Kurakin, *Arkhiv* . . . *Kurakina*, I, 303, remembered a rumor in fall 1705, that Sheremetev returned to Moscow because he had been relieved of his command.

The Bashkir revolt actually began in 1704, and was sparked by the new taxes of that year administered by Menshikov, the only known case of popular revolt over these exactions: V. I. Lebedev, "Bashkirskoe vosstanie 1705–1711 gg.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 1 (1937), 80–102.

⁶³ *PiB* III, 492, 1024.

But if some of the princes and boyars wanted to stand on their dignity, then he disturbed them by means of his court jesters (of whom he takes many of various types with him) who express his opinion in their immodest manner, and when they [the boyars] afterwards change, he embraces them, and gives them a small wooden beaker which he makes in their presence, and things of this sort. Those who are not to be corrected in this manner, have to conduct themselves according to the orders of his favorite Alexander Danilovich, however harsh they might be, and the jester behaves as if he did not even know. Contrarily he has abolished many habits which have crept in and accustomed his nation to others which he saw in Europe.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ TKUA Rusland, B45, 11 December 1705: after discussion with Golovin and Shafirov, Grund thought "daß sie eben nicht das größte vertrauen zu der sache haben, weiln sich nun und dan einige rebelliones in Ihren Landen, als diesen sommer zu Astrachan, heranthun, weshalben, der Tzar auch seinen Printzen, mit dem Gral. Tzeremeteff wider nach Moscow hat schicken müßen; Zu dem, die noblesse keine große lust zum Kriege zeigt, sondern glaubet, daß sie große Mühe und Gefahr umbsonsts ausstehet, das sie indeßen beßer zu hause leben, und das Ihrige anserviren könnte, drittens auch die contributions sehr vergrößert werden müßten, so für einen so largen nation sehr verdrieslich, und dan 4.tens auch viel Gold aus dem Lande gehet, und die Münzte an sich selbst so sehr in Abgang kömt, daß die selbige für diesem mit dem Albertus Thaler in gleichen valeur gewesen, nun schon bey einem dritten Theil vergeringert, und ein ducaten in specie der für diesem nur 100 copeken gegolten, anjetzo mit 160, ja in campagne öfters noch höher bezahlen werden mues. Also das dieser gantzen krieg blos und alleine auf des Tzaren eigner persohn, und deßen befehl ankömt, so zwar ein herr, der durch seine maximen und manieren alles zu seinem Zweck dirigiret als daß er sich gantz simple in Kleidung afführet, und nur als ein Capitaine in einem kleinen hause logiret, auch keine andere Wache und Aufwartung, als ein solcher Officier, hat, hingegen seinen Favoriten einen Printzliches Staat in allen stücken führen läßet, auch bey denselben stets spiset, und daselbst gerne mit främbden speiset, so Er theils seiner eigenen bequemlichkeit willet thut, und dan daß er glaubet, daß wan er nach dem exempel seiner Vorfahren als ein Tzar der Reußen zu felde gehen, und sich aufführen solte, Er eine train auf die orientalische manier haben müste, wozu nicht allein ein gahr große würde erfordert werden, sondern es müße alsdem auch mit der armée bey den alten maniren bleiben, weshalben er hierin, wie in allen anderen stücken die menage in acht nimbt; als, weiln Er ein sehr curieuseur Herr, der gerne selbst alles wißen und kennen will, als die schiffbauerey, die Feuerwerknkunst, den Festungsbau, und abzeichnung derselben, solches alles aber von främden lernen, und also einen jeden so Ihme etwas neues darin verbringen kan, gros Gold geben solte, so gemeinet er die Gemuthen durch die familiarité, könt bey sie zu eßen, selbst sich dar, wie ein ordinaire Gast, serviret auch wohl, wan es Hochzeiten, mit zur Taffel, und erweist solchen gestalt seinen Zweck. Hingegen wan einige Knesen und Bojaren auf Ihre hoheit bestehen wollen, so incommodiret Er die selbe durch seine Hoffnarren, deren er viele, von unterschiedlichen caracteres mit sich führet, die Ihnen seine meynung, nach Ihrer Arth unbescheidenlich sagen, und wan sie sich nachgehends ändern, so embrassiret er sie, beschenket sie mit einem kleinen hölzernen becher, so er in ihren gegenwart drehet, und dergleichen; die aber so solchen gestalt auch nicht zu corrigiren sein, müßen sich nach dem befehl seines favoriten Alexander Danilowitz richten, Es sey so scharf wie er immer wolle, und der Narr stellet sich, als wan er es fast nicht einmahl wiße, hingegen bringet er auf diese weise viele eingescheckte Gebräuche ab, und gewohnet seine nation algemählig wie andere, die Er in Europa selbst gesehen." Grund also noted that he had not observed the violence which had been claimed for Peter abroad, in spite of many opportunities provided by rebels and army deserters.

Peter could succeed at all this, if he had time enough, but the problem was that everything rested on him. If he fell ill or died, all the reforms and the war would come to an end. Unfortunately this would probably mean the end of the throne for Aleksei Petrovich, since he "was not so brought up that his subjects have any respect for him." The universal favorite was Sheremetev, "of whose great qualities all Russia was persuaded," especially the former boyar opponents of the throne (this must be a reference to the Tsykler plot confused with the 1698 musketeer revolt). They also liked Sheremetev "because he is a great general and his father and grandfather were already their commanders, and thus he is in all respects the most distinguished among them."⁶⁵

Grund reported Sheremetev's fame and support as the opinion of "the Russians". Keyserling, who counted Sheremetev among his friends, sent rumor-filled reports that conveyed little of the real events on the Volga but revealed very much of the oppositional atmosphere around the field marshal's name. Thus Menshikov was supposed to be one of the causes of the revolt, because of the heavy taxes he laid on the district and his poor treatment of the Tatar, that is, Bashkir, princes. A false early account of the rebels' defeat came with the report ("it is said") that Sheremetev had twelve regiments with him (he actually had four) and that his reputation was so great that it caused the rebels to send a deputation to the tsar. Supposedly Sheremetev pardoned them and enrolled them in the regular army. Later, when deputies really arrived, it was he who counselled a pardon and examination of their complaints. Keyserling's opinion was that the field marshal was so long away not because of the

⁶⁵ TKUA Rusland, B45, 11 December 1705: "Also daß aus dieser Regierung für das gemeine beste zwar viel guthes zu hoffen, wan es dem höchsten Gott gefallen sollte, Ihre Tzarische Majestät bey langen leben zu erhalten, weiln sie aber auf den continuirlichen reisen sich wenig selbsts menagiren, und Ihnen deshalb leicht unvermuthlich etwas menschliches zukommen könnte, so ist im gegentheil auch dieses das vornemste (?) so bey diesen gantzen Kriege zu befürchten, dan man es auch nur eine krankheit wäre, so sie hindern sollte die campagne zu thun, so ist gewis, daß man auch weiter nichts vernehmen würde, wie man es zu Anfange dieses sommers klärlich geschehen, da die armée, wegen eines fiebers, so Ihre Tzarische Majestät zugestoßen, viele wochen zu Wilna gantz stille gestunden, solten sie aber solchen Gestalt gahr mit tod abgehen, so würden nicht allein alle främde Ministri und Officers in Gefahr Ihres lebens sein, sonder vielleicht der Erbprinz selbe in Gefahr lauffen den Thron zu erben, weiln der Herr nicht so erzogen wird, daß die Unterthanen einige Respect für Ihn haben, hingegen gantz Rusland so sehr von des Tzeremettoff seinen großen qualiteten persuadirte, daß auch viele von denen in der großen rebellion für syben Jahren, torquirten Bojaren schon bekend, sie hatten Tzeremettoff und niemand anderes zu Ihren Tzaren haben wollen, weiln er ein großer General und seine Vater und Großvater schon Ihr Feldherr gewesen, also daß er auf alle weise der vornehmste unter Ihnen wäre."

rebellion but because he wanted to form his own party in the Volga and return to impose on Peter by force satisfaction for Menshikov's many affronts to him. When real news finally reached him, the Prussian envoy had to report simply that Sheremetev fought his way into the town and the rebels surrendered.⁶⁶ In reality Sheremetev's attitude to the rebels was somewhat harsher than that of Peter and Golovin.⁶⁷ The tsar did show a certain distrust of Sheremetev, for he deputed Mikhail Shchepot'ev of the Preobrazhenskii guards to watch the field marshal and make sure he followed orders. What

⁶⁶ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 15A (vol. 2), 127–34v, Grodno, 14 November 1705, 130: “[Die Rebellion] /130v/ hatt sich in dem [Königreich Astracan daher entsponnen] weil [der Favorit nicht nur] ungemein [schwehre auflagen in ihren lande eingeführet] sondern auch [die daselbstige Tartarische fürsten gar übel und sclawisch tractiren] laßen. [Der Favorit versichert aber daß dis] nichts zu bedeuten, [und das sich die Rebellen schon daselbst] miteinander [veruneinigt und die ganze Cavallerie] sich bereits [wirk. vor den Tzaren declariret] hätte,” 179–82v, Königsberg, 21 December 1705 (false report that the rebellion is suppressed, Sheremetev's reputation and pardon); 16A, 73–77v, 13/24 February 1706, Moscow, rebels send deputies, Sheremetev for pardon and examination of their complaints); 147–54, Moscow, 5/16 April 1706, 149: “Was [der Feldmarschal Cheremetoff] sich auch noch /149v/ immer [in dem Königreich Astrakan] unter dem Praetext [wie seine Abwesenheit] daselbst noch [höchst nothig währe umb die] kaum [befriedigte Rebellen im zaum zu halten arretiret scheint] auch zimlich [suspect zu seyn] und halte ich vielmehr davor, daß weil [der Affront so] ihm zu unterschiedenen mahlen [von der favoriten widerfahren] bey ihm [altamente repostum geblieben] ist, er ihm [dort wohl eine starcke Parthey zu machen und den Tzar] vielleicht [par force dahin zu obligiren suchen] werde [den favoriten] seiner [vengence aufzuopfern].” This would be the only way to reconcile the tsar and the nation, 159–70, Moscow, 30 April 1706, Sheremetev stormed Astrakhan' and took it.

⁶⁷ Prince Boris Golitsyn and the boyars then in Moscow offered the rebels mercy if they would surrender in August 1705. In October, Peter sent substantially the same message but in a harsher tone, which the rebels refused to believe was his. The third such message which Peter sent out in December worked, and caused the rebels to send a deputation to him. Sheremetev had nothing to do with all this, and it so happened, did not even meet the delegation, which went straight to Moscow. Golovin with Peter's approval sent off a conciliatory message, that reached Sheremetev and the rebels on 9 March. It was too late. In February, Sheremetev had sent the rebels an ultimatum from Tsaritsyn which was wholly different from Peter's promises, as it held out no hope of forgiveness. It was this ultimatum that decided the rebels to fight. Some of the rebels believed the conciliatory message and opened negotiations with the field marshal, but were quickly ousted by a more militant party. The storm of the town followed. Following Peter's instructions, Sheremetev arrested some 300 rebels whom he was able to identify as leaders and sent them to Moscow, where they were later executed. The rest of the soldiers and musketeers were transferred to other regiments and posts. Golikova, *Astrakhanskoe*, 171–74, 205–07, 272–74, 276–77, 287–88, 291–92. Sheremetev had taken a more conciliatory stand on the Bashkirs when he passed through Kazan' in December and January, enraging the *voevoda* of Kazan' Kudriavtsev: Zaozerskii, *Fel'dmarshal*, 82–86. Peter's main concern was that Sheremetev was too slow and cautious in his movements, and that he would be too harsh and threatening to the rebels in Astrakhan': *PiB* IV, 188–90, 757–75. Sheremetev justified himself to Golovin by the fear (prompted in part by the Kalmyk Khan Ayuka) that the rebels would join the Kuban Tatars and the Karakalpaks: [N. Golovin, ed.] *Perepiska fel'dmarshala Fedora Alekseevicha Golovina i Borisa Petrovicha Sheremet'eva v 1705 i 1706 godakh*, Moscow, 1850, 42–43.

Keyserling's inclusion of the favorite as a cause of the uprising actually demonstrated was that the favorite's unpopularity was reaching new intensity precisely in 1705–06.⁶⁸

The Russian army's withdrawal from Grodno was accompanied by constant disputes between Ogilvy and the Russian commanders and endless rumors about the latter.⁶⁹ Menshikov interfered with Ogilvy's orders and (the Moscow rumors said) had engineered Sheremetev's command against the rebels to be able to take over the army himself. Menshikov, already in command of all the cavalry under Ogilvy, also supposedly made the retreat more difficult. Mazepa and the Ukrainians were angry at Menshikov, and in addition to his regiment he was establishing a personal guard. By July there was talk that Ogilvy would resign. Though Ogilvy had no supporters in the Russian army or court, and the rumor of his impending resignation was true, Menshikov's behavior, real or imagined, was attracting increasing hostility. In the withdrawal from Grodno to Kiev, Ogilvy was probably more at fault than Menshikov, but the favorite continued to attract censure. The taxes and mistreatment of the aristocrats increased their bitterness and hatred for the favorite and the danger of a lost battle. Commerce suffered as well from the taxes, but Peter would not listen to anyone but Menshikov "from inborn distrust" of others. All was not exaggeration: Menshikov's power increased as Peter added Novgorod and other towns to his jurisdiction. Sheremetev returned from Astrakhan', and it was believed that he would excuse himself from the campaign. The rumors in Moscow were that Sheremetev and Menshikov would each get a separate corps. The Moscow talk presented Sheremetev as in harmony with Ogilvy, again trying to paint Menshikov as the only trouble-maker. The reality was not so rosy. Peter put Sheremetev as first field marshal over Ogilvy, assigning the latter several regiments as a separate corps. When Sheremetev joined the army at

⁶⁸ Zaozerskii, *Sheremetev*, 82–83; *PiB* IV, 7 (PI to Shchepot'ev, 9 January 1706). Golovin was skeptical of Shchepot'ev, at least in writing to Sheremetev. Sheremetev also reported that Shchepot'ev was trying to cause arguments between the field marshal and Menshikov: *Perepiska*, 44–45, 53.

⁶⁹ Captain Marchenko, "Ogilvii," *VS* 256, 237, 41–42. The most serious dispute broke out in January 1706, over the Russian reaction to the Swedish approach: should they evacuate Grodno or not? Menshikov, Repnin, Hallart, and the Saxon major-general Venediger, were for retreat while Ogilvy wanted to hold the position. Peter sided with the majority. *PiB* 4, 19–20, 51–52, 57–60, 535–42, 586–87, 591–601, 894–96. TKUA Rusland, B45, 12 December, 19 December 1705 (disagreement over strategy between Menshikov and Ogilvy).

Kiev at the end of August, Ogilvy would not obey him, which displeased the tsar as well. In a few weeks Peter let the Austrian go. Ogilvy left for Saxony in October.⁷⁰ No one regretted his departure, for his "Austrian arrogance, his uncommon and high stinginess and the very rude and brusque manner with which he met all officers without distinction, even the tsar's favorite" meant that Peter, his court and government, and the army were glad to see him go.⁷¹

By the end of the summer the Russians had learned that Charles XII was moving west into Silesia, relieving the pressure on them, so Peter left the army for St. Petersburg. The dark predictions of great conflict among the commanders did not materialize. Menshikov and

⁷⁰ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 652, 654, 656–58; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 16A, 147–54, Moscow, 16 April 1706, 149: the army is in good shape "hingegen aber [nimmet das allgemeine misvergnügen im gantzen lande wegen des] immer [verhöheten auflagen gar sehr zu und] weil dis alles durch [den favoriten und] durch seine [Creaturen betrieben wird er auch] noch nicht unterläßt die gröbsten [im lande sehr übel zu tractiren] so wird auch [der has und die verbitterung gegen ihn von tag zu tage großer] welch sich dann auch wohl mit der zeit, absonderlich [bey unglücklichen success in Littauen auf des Tzaaren seite eussern und in gefährliche suite ausbrechen] dürfte . . . /149v/. . . [siehet es in diesem Reich] gar nicht [wohl aus dan die Commerciën gehen fast] gänzlich [zugrunde und das gantze landt wird] /150/ durch [die viele schatzungen sehr apouvriret und die grosse menge] weggenommenen [und unter das gewehr gebrachte bauren] zimlich [envolcket]. Und weil auch [der Tzaar aus angebohrnen mefiance keinen] außer [den favoriten viel gehör giebet er ihm auch] und solche [subjecta so ihme gute conseils zu geben und] mit [convaincanten raisons zu begleiten wissen fehlet so herschet die confusion in allen dingen . . .]"; 16B 12–14v, Moscow, 29 May/9 June 1706, conflicts of Menshikov and Ogilvy, "[das geschrey des gantzen landes wieder diesen insupportablen mignon von tag zu tag grosser wird]"; 23–25, Moscow, 12/23 June 1706, Sheremetev returning from Astrakhan', claims that he will not serve to avoid Menshikov; 31–35v, Moscow, 19/30 June 1706, Ogilvy asks to resign, Sheremetev and Menshikov to have separate corps, Sheremetev gets on with Ogilvy; 36–42v, Moscow, 26 June/7 July 1706, Ogilvy's resignation will be accepted, 52–54v, 10/21 July 1706, news that Charles marches to Volhynia, Menshikov blackens Ogilvy's reputation and wants to be field marshall. *PiB* IV, 147, 312, 378–79, 696–99, 975–76, 1014–15. TKUA Rusland, B45, 23 June 1706 (Sheremetev supposedly delaying his return from Astrakhan because of Menshikov's and his creatures' interference with Ogilvy's orders, fearing the same for himself); 30 June 1706 (Ogilvy wrote to Peter saying he could no longer serve); 21 July 1706 (Menshikov does not want foreign ambassadors to know so much of his arguments with Ogilvy; the latter's resignation assured); 28 July 1706 (more on Ogilvy and Menshikov).

⁷¹ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 16B, 162–68, 13/23? October 1706, 167v: "Weiln [der Feldmarschall Ogilwi] welher nun schon wohl bey [dem Könige Augusto seyn wirdt] nicht mit [gar guter grace aus hieisgen Diensten geschieden] indem er sich [bey den Tzaaren bey dem gantzen Hoff und Ministerio auch bey der gantzen Armée] durch seinen [Österreichischen] unerträglichen [hochmut] ungemeine und nicht [basse filtzigkeit] auch sehr [rude und brusque manier] mit welchem Er allen [Officiëren ohne] unterscheid, auch so gar [des Tzaaren Favoriten selbst zu begegnen pflegen sehr verhasset gemachtet] so wird [dem Tzaaren und] seinem gantzen [Ministerio sehr lieb und angenehm seyn . . .]" if the King of Prussia is not very polite to him on his way to Vienna. Huyssen may print a pamphlet against him.

Sheremetev marched through the Ukraine toward western Poland. Sheremetev's command over the infantry was very popular in the army, at least among the officers. Kurakin later told the story that Peter chanced to ask some soldiers who they wished to have as commander, and they unanimously asked for Sheremetev. General Repnin continued to serve under him, even though he had provoked complaints from the soldiers. He was a friend of Menshikov, however, and the favorite interceded successfully on his behalf. The departure of Baron Ogilvy, who got along with almost no one, allowed Peter to make what turned out to be a largely successful compromise.⁷² For several months, no more was heard of conflicts and rivalries in the army.

While Peter was reorganizing the high command of the Russian army, he also had to replace his chief minister and head of foreign affairs, for Fyodor Golovin died suddenly at Glukhov in the Ukraine on 30 July 1706. His death created a real crisis, for Golovin was one of the very few who knew anything about foreign affairs and he had had many other responsibilities.⁷³ His admiralty affairs went to Fyodor Apraksin, then the *admiralteets* and governor of Voronezh where most of the shipbuilding was centered, and the foreign affairs *ad interim* to Golovkin, *postel'nichii*, and increasingly influential. The solution was only temporary, for some weeks later he was still refusing to take on the position permanently as it would make him an instant enemy of Menshikov. The final and formal appointments

⁷² GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 16B, 98–103, Moscow, 28 August/8 September 1706, Charles moves toward Silesia, Ogilvy to remain only to end of campaign; 106–10v, Moscow, 4/15 September 1706, Sheremetev may get command, as the whole army desires, Repnin forgiven his misdeeds on intervention of Menshikov; 111–18v, Moscow, 11/22 September 1706, Sheremetev will get the command, Shafirov says Ogilvy will quit (which implies that much of the Keyserling's information on the army conflicts came from Shafirov), Sheremetev might defeat Charles: "Von seinen [Subalternen und ubrigen Generals] hatte er ihme wohl nicht [viele hülffe von allen Officiern und gemeinte aber große liebe und confidence zu versprechen]." *PiB* IV, 1075. TKUA Rusland, B45, 8 September, 13 September (Ogilvy will resign, Menshikov will join King Augustus), 15 September 1706 (Ogilvy will resign, Sheremetev has arrived and Peter promised him the command on request of the soldiers). Kurakin, "Russko-shvedskaia voina," *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 305–06.

⁷³ According to Grund, Peter had replaced Boris Golitsyn with Golovin in the Kazan' Palace: TKUA Rusland, B45, 24 February 1705. At Golovin's death later that summer, the Dane reported that the event left vacant the governorships of Siberia and Astrakhan': TKUA Rusland, B45, 18 August St. V. 1706. Peter appointed Prince M. P. Gagarin to head the Siberian Chancellery at that time, and in December, 1706, P. M. Apraksin governor of Astrakhan'. Prince M. Ia. Cherkasskii remained governor of Tobol'sk: *PiB* IV, 487, 978, 1232; K. B. Gazenvinkel', *Sistematicheskii perechen' voevod, diakov, pismennykh glav i podiachikh s pripisiiu v Sibirskikh gorodakh*, Tobol'sk, 1892, 14.

of F. Apraksin and Golovkin came only after Golovin's funeral in March 1707, and Golovkin received only the office for foreign affairs, not Golovin's title of chancellor (*kantsler*) which Westerners conveyed as prime minister.⁷⁴ Golovkin remained in charge of foreign affairs for the rest of the reign, acquiring the title of chancellor in 1709.

As Peter settled these matters of command and office to the relative satisfaction of the men involved, if not the aristocracy as a whole, events were moving swiftly on the battle fronts. Menshikov's expeditionary corps, moving well ahead of Sheremetev's main army, joined up with Saxon and Polish troops. They met the Swedes under General Mardefelt at Kalisz on 18/29 October and won a crushing victory. The victory was largely that of the Russian troops and of Menshikov's leadership, and for the first time over substantial Swedish forces. Peter's trust in his military abilities was stunningly confirmed, for Mardefelt was an experienced general, and Menshikov's Polish-Saxon allies were not of much use.⁷⁵ The battle demonstrated that the Russian army was indeed progressing rapidly toward European standards, but its larger effect was cancelled out by events farther west.

Charles XII and his army had entered Saxony weeks before the battle, and forced on Augustus a treaty signed in the town of Altranstädt on 13/24 September. Kept quiet for the moment under the cover of a ten-week truce, the treaty signified the surrender of King Augustus. In return for keeping the honorific title of king, he acceded to his removal from the Polish throne in favor of Leszczyński and left the war. Russia was now alone to face Sweden, with no allies

⁷⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 656–57; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 16B, 79–82, Moscow, 7/18 August 1706, death of Golovin, Golovkin to be appointed in his place and “/81/ wäre [mir dieser auch der liebste weil er unter allen /81v/ Russen noch der redlichste,” though no special friend of Prussia and will need Shafirov to guide him; 83–86v, Moscow, 14/25 August 1706, Petr [mistake for Fyodor] Apraksin gets admiralty, Golovkin foreign affairs, Shafirov remains; 114v, Moscow, 11/22 [sc. 23] September 1706, Golovkin refusing the position; HHStA Rußland I, K. 20, 18–18v, Moscow, 5/16 March 1707, funeral of Golovin, F. Apraksin proclaimed admiral, Golovkin heads foreign affairs but not prime minister. TKUA Rusland, B45, 18 August (death of Golovin), 25 August (foreign affairs given to Golovkin, “weiln er in diesen sachen viel schon gebrauchet worden, Ihre Tzarische Majesteten geheimbste Nachrichten desfalls mit in Verwahrung gehabt. Er ist dabey ein sehr umgänglicher und honesten Mann weswegen alle Främde über diese Zeitung desto mehr erfrewet sein.”

⁷⁵ *PiB* IV, 1193–99. ARSG 7366 (1707) 24 November 1706 (news of Kalisz). TKUA Rusland, B45, 24 November St. V. 1706 (news of Kalisz). GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 17B, 1–2v, 13/24 November 1706, Moscow, news of Kalisz, Keyserling spoke with Menshikov's courier, who reported that the Saxon troops did little and Menshikov was very discontented with them.

and in a state of considerable political ferment. As Keyserling wrote, "It is easy to expect that the favorite, because of the good fortune he had against the Swedish general Mardefelt, will insinuate himself so much the better with his majesty the tsar and increase his power so much the more, which is not at all pleasing to this whole nation, which thoroughly hates him." Menshikov's house in Moscow burned down in December, and many people took it as a premonition, as shortly before his fall, Prince Vasilii Golitsyn's house had burned as well.⁷⁶ Menshikov's (and Russia's) success on the battlefield only led to more dissension at home.

Peter had accomplished a great deal in the first six years of the Northern War. He had recovered from his defeat at Narva, conquered a good part of the Baltic coastline, and begun the construction of St. Petersburg, his new port. At home, his situation was not so auspicious. His victories had not brought him greater popularity, for they required more and more revenue, which the common people resented. That resentment, combined with popular discontent with Peter's cultural reforms, burst forth in Astrakhan' in 1705 and would produce even more dangerous results on the Don two years later. The aristocracy was no more content than they had been in 1698, indeed much less so. The rise of Menshikov gave Peter a competent and loyal administrator and military commander but also produced massive envy and disaffection among the aristocracy at large. For the moment, the focus of much of this oppositional sentiment was Field Marshal Sheremetev, whose hatred for Menshikov was no secret. To top it all off, all of these elite hatreds and rivalries as well as the parlous state of Russian popular opinion were perfectly well known to the king of Sweden. Precisely in the fall of 1706, his strategy against Peter would come to revolve precisely around the internal Russian political situation, and present Tsar Peter with the greatest threat to his throne of the entire reign.

⁷⁶ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 660–61; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 17B, 17, 28 November/8 December 1706, Moscow, "Es ist leichtlich zu erwarthen, daß der Favorit, durch das gehabte Glück wieder die schwedischen General Mardefeld sich so viel beßer bey Ihr Czaar. Mayt. insinuiiren und festsetzen auch sein Potere sich umb so viell mehr vergrößern wird, welches aber diese gantze Nation, so Ihme durchgehend gehäßig, gar nicht angenehm ist." TKUA Rusland, B45, 6 October St. V. 1706 (news of Swedish invasion of Saxony).

Menshikov first heard of the truce by 28 November 1706, though the Russian agent in Berlin had got wind of it by 2 October. Neither Peter nor the army command in Żółkiew heard of the Altranstädt treaty until the very end of December: *PiB* IV 1104–05, 1162, 1233–35. The news spread quickly, for Grund reported it in early January: TKUA Rusland, B45, 5 January St. V. 1706.

Poltava and the new gubernias, 1707–1709

From the end of 1706 Russia faced Sweden one to one. As Peter wrote to *Admiralteets* Apraksin, “the war has come to rest with us alone.”¹ The new situation made the internal rivalries of the Russian elite and its relations with Peter even more critical, for the danger existed that Sweden would try to exploit these rivalries and dissensions to its own advantage. There was nothing unexpected or unusual in such a move in the Europe of the early eighteenth century. Spain had tried to use the *frondeurs* against Mazarin and the young Louis XIV, and Louis himself funded expeditions against his English rivals many times, sending fleets and troops to Ireland and Scotland in the hope of encouraging a rebellion against King William and Queen Anne. Peter himself had begun his war against Sweden in contact with Patkul and other discontented Livonian noblemen. In later years both Peter and Charles XII would simultaneously intrigue with the Jacobites against George I of England. Any dissension, whether dynastic, aristocratic, political, religious, or regional, was fair game for intrigues in time of war. Peter could not expect Charles to be any different, and in fact he was not. From the very moment that Charles disposed of Augustus II, if not before, he intended not merely to defeat Peter but also to encourage a revolt that would end in the overthrow of Peter or the reorganization of the Russian state. This was a threat that Peter had to take into account.²

¹ *PiB* V, 5 (3 January 1707): “siia voina nad nami odnemi ostalas’.” Apraksin was promoted to *Admiral i Prezident Admiralteistua* on 22 February 1707: *PSŽ* IV, no. 2141, 375.

² Since Harald Hjärne’s *Karl XII:s Omstörtningen i Östeuropa, 1697–1703* (Stockholm, 1902) Swedish and other historians of Charles XII in this century have ignored the political aspects of his campaign, caught up as they have been in the debates over his military planning. The earlier historians, F. F. and Ernst Carlson, were aware of the political plans and regarded them as important. Ernst Carlson considered the Swedish aim to be the overthrow of Peter: F. F. Carlson, *Sveriges historia under konungarne af pfälziska huset*, 8 vols., Stockholm, 1855–1910, VIII (by Ernst Carlson), 98–106. For later views see Haintz, *König Karl XII*, I, 188–90; and Hatton, *Charles*, 239–45.

In January 1707, the imperial emissary to Russia, Otto Pleyer, sent home to Vienna his usual report with a passage in cipher that was far from usual:

A secret party, which is coming together in favor of the tsarevich against the favorite [Menshikov – PB], can be detected here, for it seems that the uncommon inclination of the tsar for the latter could make great confusion for the tsarevich at some time when something might occur, since the favorite is making the entire army dependent on him and inclined toward him.

The heir was going to Kiev, and the Austrian believed that Aleksei's journey to Kiev instead of to the Russian army was an attempt to divide the party that had formed in his favor and allow better observation of the heir's actions.³

Pleyer's explanation of Aleksei's journey reflects the alarmist notions circulating among the enemies of Menshikov with whom Pleyer associated. In fact Peter began to try to integrate his son into the government of Russia precisely at this time, when the boy was just turning seventeen. Aleksei did not remain in Kiev, for Peter had ordered him to join the headquarters at Żółkiew. In the spring the tsarevich went on to Smolensk with his first real assignment, to collect grain for the town's garrison. He remained there supervising preparations through August.⁴ As usual, Pleyer also exaggerated somewhat the influence of Menshikov, which would be shown to have definite limits in 1707. His account of the court party in favor of the tsarevich against the favorite, however, revealed another stage in the evolution of opposition to Menshikov that had been growing since at least 1703.

³ HHStA, Rußland I, 27 January 1707: "[Es hat sich alhier eine heimlich Parthey verspühren lassen, welche en faveur des Cron Printzes wider den favoriten sich zusammen thate, weilen es scheint, als dörffe die ungemeine neigung des Czaren gegen denselben dem Printzen dermahleneins bey ereignenden fall und veränderungen grosse Confusion machen, weilen der favorit die armée gantz von sich dependirend und ihm geneigt machet: aber der Printz ist alsbaldt von hier nacher Kiow abgeruket worden, ohne daß er zu der armée kommet, sonder in Kiow bleiben muss, dardurch die Parthey getrennet, und des Printz actiones besser observiret werden können.]" Pleyer also reported rumors in Moscow that some Poles favored the election of the tsarevich as king of Poland to replace both Augustus and Leszczyński, while Menshikov hoped for the position himself. These rumors were false, though widespread in Moscow. None of the Polish leaders were interested in either Russian candidate: Andrzej Kamiński, *Konfederacja Sandomierska wobec Rosji w okresie poaltrandsztadzkim 1706–1709*, Polska Akademia Nauk, Oddział w Krakowie, Prace komisji nauk historycznych 23, Wrocław 1969, 78–79.

⁴ *PiB* V, 14, 656, 726–27; N. Murzakevich, ed., *Pis'ma tsarevicha Alekseia Petrovicha*, Odessa, 1849, 7–18.

At the same time, the political situation for Peter and Menshikov was not entirely bleak. The Danish ambassador Grund reflected more the point of view of Peter and Menshikov, and reported a less alarming situation at the news that Augustus had left the war against Sweden: "The princes and boyars here were at first rather disturbed at the news, now that they show almost more zeal than before for the war, and therefore numerous recruits will be assembled for the army against the coming spring."⁵ The situation was fluid, with growing opposition and at the same time a certain consolidation among Peter's supporters.

In itself, the new configuration of opinion among the Russian elite was just another moment in a continuing struggle at the court. It was Charles XII who introduced a new and extremely dangerous element, for the surrender of King Augustus of Poland to the Swedish king created a mortal threat to Peter and to Russia itself. The threat was not purely military, the danger of defeat of the Russian army and the end of the tsar's Baltic plans. It was a political threat as well, for the king of Sweden had far-reaching plans to encourage political upheaval in Russia. These plans have remained largely unknown to Russian historians, and outside most twentieth-century histories of the Swedish conqueror-king. Nevertheless, they were not completely unknown, for the great Swedish historians of the nineteenth century mentioned them. French observers stationed with the Swedish army in 1707–09 described Charles' plans in detail, and other diplomats, English and Imperial, gave similar information. Finally, a detailed memorandum outlining a plan of campaign for Sweden survives, the work of none other than Martin Neugebauer, the former teacher of Tsarevich Aleksei.⁶

The memorandum offered an answer to the new problem for Charles, what precisely to do with Russia. Peter had occupied most of Sweden's Baltic provinces except for the two capitals of Riga and

⁵ TKUA Rusland, B45, 5 January St. V. 1706: "Die hiesige knesen und Bojaren sind zwar über diese Zeitung zu erst etwas bestürzt gewesen, anjetzo aber zeigen sie fast mehr Eyfer als zo forne zum Kriege, und werden also gegen zukünftige Frühjahr considerable recrüten für die armée zusammengebracht werden."

⁶ F. E. Carlson published the memorandum in 1888, albeit in Swedish translation and misattributed: "En plan til Karl XII:s tåg mot Moskva," *Historisk tidskrift*, 1888, 275–79. In 1939 Helge Almquist identified this memorandum as the work of Martin Neugebauer, the former teacher of Tsarevich Aleksei, but Haintz and Hatton only briefly noted the existence of the document. Helge Almquist, "En avslöjad anonym: Martin Neugebauers plan till ett svenskt fälttåg mot Moskva (1706)," *Karolinska förbundets årsbok 1939*, 7–14.

Reval, and still had many supporters and an army in Poland. Until the fall of 1706 Charles had concentrated his attention on Polish problems, and simply ignored the Baltic and the pleas for help from Swedish commanders in the area. Essentially he had two choices of direction for his forces, one toward the Baltic provinces, with the presumed aim of recovering them, and the second toward the main Russian army in Poland. But if he chose the latter, what would be the aim? To secure the throne for Leszczyński and recover his own territorial losses or a more thorough defeat of Russia? Charles engaged in various discussions with his own ministers and generals, and met with many foreign diplomats in that winter, but in his usual fashion made his decision largely alone, leaving even his closest advisors in the dark.⁷

By the end of the winter in 1707 he seems to have decided what he intended to do when he marched against Russia. His plans were of intense interest to European diplomats, for he had deposed Augustus in the middle of the War of the Spanish Succession and both sides hoped he might join them and feared he might join their opponents. They were all relieved to slowly uncover his designs against Peter, and kept trying to find out more information just in case. Consequently, Charles' plans, in their general outlines, could not remain entirely secret. The Imperial envoy Sinzendorff and the French agent Groffey came to know of them, both from the official communications of Count Piper, Sweden's minister of foreign affairs, and Olof Hermelin, Charles' secretary. Back in Stockholm, the English agent Robert Jackson heard the same story:

All private Letters from the Swedes army in Saxony continue to assure that the King has no other design than to prosecute the War against Moscovy and to oblige the Czar to make satisfaction for all the Damages the Swedish provinces have sustained since this War began. And I have seen a Letter from a very good hand which adds that if the Czar continue to encourage the Poles to Elect another King, His Swedish Maj.tie will certainly proceed against the Czar in the same Method, which seems to import in my humble opinion that the King of Sweden will endeavour to set up some other person in Moscovy in order to Dethrone the Czar, and it

⁷ Archive du ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris (hereafter AME), Correspondance politique (hereafter CP), Suède 107: 203–04, 29 December 1706, Kuist near Leipzig (secret meetings of Charles XII and Augustus, rumor among foreign ambassadors that the meetings concern future peace terms with Russia); 221–24v, 1 January 1707, Kuist (departure of Augustus, end of rumors of Swedish–Russian peace, Hermelin says Charles will fight Russia and thus not have time for European affairs).

is the common opinion here, that his subjects are so very uneasy under his harsh government that they will readily join with the Swedes in such a design.⁸

The plans which the diplomats came to report correspond very closely to the proposals of Martin Neugebauer. Neugebauer had come to the attention of Hermelin and other Swedish officials in 1705–06, after he had left Russia and started a pamphlet campaign against Peter. He joined the Swedish camp around this time, and accompanied the army to Poltava and beyond, serving Sweden until his death in 1758. We do not know precisely how and when his memorandum entered the discussion around the king, but it is only typical of Charles XII's style of decision-making that no formal record exists of such a discussion.⁹

The memorandum got right to the point, dissuading the king from marching on Ingria. The Russian army had made real progress, and Ingria was hard to capture, but more important, it was not necessary to march on Ingria. The proper aim for the army was not Ingria, but Smolensk and then Moscow, and the reason was not military but political: Peter could be overthrown just as King Augustus was in Poland. In terms recalling those of Keyserling and other observers in previous years, he noted that Peter had made himself hated among his "subjects" not only by his "avarice and cruelty" but also by his many innovations, new clothing, the shaving of beards, disrespect for the clergy and church, and "thousands" of other things. These "subjects" could not revolt because Peter had given more freedom to the peasants (this must refer to the permission to volunteer for the army in 1700–02). Neugebauer was a bit unsure whether Charles needed just to get inside the border or actually take Smolensk or even Moscow, but he was sure that a revolt would break out quickly. Charles needed to remember to treat the clergy well, as they would also be a valuable ally.

⁸ Public Record Office, London, SP 95/16, 242–42v, Stockholm, 16 January 1707. Groffey was the French agent assigned to attend the Swedish king and army to supplement the more formal representation of Borelly and Bonnac. Charles wanted no foreign ambassadors with his army.

⁹ Neugebauer ended his days in Swedish Stralsund as a baron and former chancellor of Pomerania: Gustav Elgenstierna, ed., *Svenska Adelsns Ättartavlor*, 9 vols., Stockholm, 1925–36, V, 422; Helge Almquist, "Patkul och Neugebauer – rysk värvning och ryskfientlig agitation i Europa 1702–1705," *Karolinska förbundets Årsbok*, 1938, 1–83; Doerries, *Eindringen*, 55–61. The lack of records was also aggravated by the unwillingness of the king to communicate the details of his plans to the government in Stockholm and the loss of the field archive after the defeat at Poltava.

Neugebauer gave a lot of practical advice, noting the difficulty of supply in Russia and that the most loot would be in the capital. Smolensk was not much of a fort, but it would probably have a strong garrison. At that point Peter might venture a battle, but his army was not strong enough. He had enough in numbers, but not in skilled men. Peter might also repress some of his greatest aristocrats, but Charles should remember that he already had as a prisoner from Narva Prince Iakov Fyodorovich Dolgorukii, whom he might use. The prince “had a great family and is of great authority and fame among the Russians.” In the meantime, he should be well treated in captivity, though (he added in a marginal note) it might be necessary not to tell him for what purpose. Another possible supporter was “the old Prince Golitsyn,” evidently Boris Alekseevich. He was “always a great friend of the Swedes and never wanted to consent to the present war.” He had a great dislike for the tsar, who did not recognize his merits. Golitsyn could supposedly raise 40,000–50,000 “subjects” as soldiers. He had a particular hatred for Menshikov, who allegedly had beat him in his own house. The favorite was an illiterate, *ex fece plebis*. Charles should give the Russians the appearance (*zum Schein*) that they could elect whatever tsar they wanted, and Golitsyn or Dolgorukii could then simply bribe enough people to ensure an outcome. There could be great violence against Peter, but it would be better to have him and his sister sent to a monastery, as their ancestor had been patriarch in the Orthodox Church. He gave further details about managing the population, including the clergy, and restoring the old rituals to attract the people. Peter’s relatives did not seem to Neugebauer to be of much use or harm. He discounted both Tsarevich Aleksei and Romodanovskii, in part as exile had made the Lopukhins too weak to help the heir. Most of the Naryshkins as well were not wealthy enough, and the greatest among them, Lev Kirillovich, had died the year before.¹⁰ The Saltykovs also did not need to be taken into consideration since the death of Tsar Fyodor (did he mean Ivan?). He concluded with some explanation of why no other European powers would object to such Swedish domination of Russia, and recommended annexation of Novgorod and Pskov.¹¹

¹⁰ L. K. Naryshkin died 28 January 1705, which dates Neugebauer’s memorandum to 1706. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 208.

¹¹ SR, Krigshistoriska samlingen, Karl XII:s tid, Handlingar rörande Nordiska Kriget XIIB, Stora Nordiska Kriget, XIX, M 1378.

This was a remarkable document. Much of it echoed very precisely the talk recorded by Keyserling, Pleyer, or other foreign diplomats. Neugebauer listed the same complaints, the cultural Westernization policies, the lack of respect for the clergy and church traditions, the heavy taxes (avarice), and various incidents of real or alleged mistreatment of aristocrats. In some respects the document reflects the moment when Neugebauer left Russia, 1703, for the tsarevich plays little role and Menshikov, though mentioned, does not have the high profile that he acquired in oppositional talk subsequently. Sheremetev was not even mentioned, and the main possible leaders against the tsar are Princes Iakov Dolgorukii and Boris Golitsyn, both prominent earlier (Dolgorukii was also convenient as a prisoner of war in Sweden).

The French agent Groffey reported Swedish assumptions about the coming conflict as early as February 1707. The Swedes were determined not only to defeat Peter, but to take complete control of Russia's trade with the West and compensate past losses with Novgorod and Pskov. They discounted the Russian victory at Kalisz and were confident of their future success. If the Russians would not fight in Poland, then Charles would pursue them into the heart of Russia. "It is known that the tsar is loved only by his soldiers and is mortally hated by the nobility and the people, both because of his cruelties and of the innovations which he has introduced in the manner of life and of clothing." Charles would place Aleksei on the throne for in Russia "the peoples will not refuse from his hand a prince who is already dear to them both by the danger in which he is of losing his life by the cruelty of his father and by the aversion and contempt which he has for foreigners." The king of Sweden fears no obstacle from other powers, since Russia is too far away from the rest of Europe to excite any interest.¹² Groffey's report of what "is known" in the Swedish camp was essentially Neugebauer's memorandum with the substitution of Tsarevich Aleksei for Golitsyn or

¹² AME, CP Suède 110, 33–34v, Quest, 19 February 1707, [Groffey] to Monseigneur, 34: "On scait que le Czar n'est aimé que de ses soldats et qu'il est mortellement hai de la Noblesse et du peuple, tant à cause de ses cruautés que de ses nouveautés qu'il a establies dans la maniere de vivre et de s'habilier. Le Roy de Suède qui a fait en Pologne son apprentissage dans le metier de dethroner les Roys, l'exercera en Moscovie avec plus de facilité et de succès, et les peuples ne refuseront point de sa main un Prince qui leur est deja cher, et par le peril où il esté de perdre la vie par la cruauté de son pere, et par l'aversion et le mepris qu'il a pour les estrangers."

Dolgorukii as Peter's replacement. By looking toward the heir, the Swedes had immeasurably raised the stakes of the conflict.

Did Neugebauer and others in the Swedish camp have any basis for their claims? Certainly the diplomats report a great deal of dissatisfaction with Menshikov, and a general dissatisfaction with Peter's cultural reforms among the people. In fact, there is evidence for some cultural dissatisfaction among the aristocracy in Moscow at this very time, in 1707. In January of 1708 an anonymous letter appeared in Moscow asserting that one Venedikt Danilov had a suspicious conversation about the tsar with Princess Anastas'ia Troekurova (the daughter of Vasilii Avramovich Lopukhin). The case went through the *komendant* of Moscow Prince Gagarin to Tsarevich Aleksei and Grand Duchess Natal'ia, but little was done other than to arrest Danilov, who languished until 1710. Danilov petitioned in June of that year to have the case dealt with, and investigations revealed what had been going on in 1707–08. Apparently Gagarin took it up, and informed Peter himself, who ordered the records sent to him in St. Petersburg, where Zotov continued to investigate it in the Privy Chancellery. As a case of disrespectful words about the tsar, it had no merit. The letter turned out to be the work of a priest on the command of Akilina, the wife of Nikita Pushkin, who had a lawsuit with Princess Troekurova. Akilina even appeared in St. Petersburg and confessed, apparently on Peter's orders. What the investigation did reveal was some of the reactions among the aristocracy, particularly the women, to Peter's cultural reforms, as well as some possible corruption. Whether the families involved were simply too powerful, or their talk just not dangerous enough, Zotov seems not to have done anything with the case, and Danilov was still in prison with the case unresolved in 1713.¹³

Danilov's connections were not the best from the point of view of loyalty to Peter. He grew up in the house of Vasilii Avramovich Lopukhin, and was acquainted with Tsykler, Sokovnin, and Fyodor Pushkin as well as Petr Lopukhin. The women who did not like Western dress were the wives of Aleksei Saltykov (she was the ringleader), Prince Petr Dolgorukii, Avram Lopukhin (Peter's brother-in-law), Ivan Musin-Pushkin, Ivan Buturlin, Tikhon Streshnev, Iurii Neledinskii, and the Princesses Nastas'ia Troekurova,

¹³ "Delo Blizhnei Kantseliarii o podmetnom pis'me," in Esipov, ed., *Raskol'nic'h'i dela*, II, 109–60; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 343–44; *PiB*, X, 320–21, 323–24, 392–93, 712, 745.

Agrafena Bariatinskaia, and Feodos'ia Dolgorukova. They and their husbands also supposedly engaged in other misdeeds, hiding runaway peasants, stealing from government offices and manipulating the recruitment of soldiers in various ways. Avram Lopukhin was more political, and had been particularly open about it. At the house of Aleksei Saltykov he was asked if the Troekurov sons were to go abroad, and Lopukhin laughed: "the person is not born who can send us unless Avram Lopukhin is dead." He had told the person who gave him this information to give the necessary bribes, but the money had gone to buy a saddle for Menshikov's wife. Lopukhin and Prince Peter Dolgorukii had a lot to say that was detrimental to Princess Menshikova and her sister-in-law.¹⁴ All this, and the evasion of the clothing decrees by provincial officials came out very clearly. Ultimately the personal spite over land also came out, and none of this talk was against the law: it did not involve the tsar's person, and was not any sort of plot against him, so the whole affair died.

What the affair does tell us is the mood among the aristocrats back in Moscow, and important aristocrats, all intermarried. The Lopukhins, Saltykovs, Streshnevs, and indirectly almost all the others were relatives of the tsar. Aleksei Saltykov, I. I. Buturlin, Streshnev, and Musin-Pushkin were ministers who met in the Privy Chancellery, and Iurii Neledinskii headed much of the recruitment for dragoon regiments. Musin-Pushkin was also in charge of the printing press and helped to select the books to be printed. Avram Lopukhin was Peter's brother-in-law and the uncle of the tsarevich.¹⁵ Certainly the whole of the aristocracy did not share these views. Prince P. A. Golitsyn, for example, was a prominent exception, and even his wife (if not his whole female household) adapted to the new clothing and the new ways.¹⁶ Nevertheless it is easy to

¹⁴ Esipov, *Raskol'nic'ii dela*, II, 126–27.

¹⁵ Saltykov, Streshnev, and Buturlin were important enough for Peter to command them to attend him in St. Petersburg in March 1708: *PiB* 7, 450–51. Musin-Pushkin and Neledinskii were included in the Privy Chancellery in July 1708 (responding to Peter's request to alert the government to Swedish calls to revolt): *PiB* 8/2, 479–80. Musin-Pushkin's cultural role: *PiB* 8/1, 76; 8/2, 569–72.

¹⁶ Daniel L. Schaffly, "Filippo Balatri in Peter the Great's Russia," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45 (1997), vol. 2, 181–98. Weber reported under the year 1716 that most older nobles (*die Vornehmen*) in Moscow wore European clothes but were uncomfortable in them and many only trimmed rather than shaved their beards and did not wear wigs. The younger nobility, including the women, at court was European in dress, but the women were rather shy about their new roles: F. C. Weber, *Das veränderte Rußland*, 3 vols., 2nd ed., Frankfurt, and Leipzig, 1738, I, 151–52.

see why Neugebauer and the diplomats thought that discontent was rife. The question would be whether this would take an overtly political form or remain on the level of cultural dissonance and lesser court intrigues. Peter seemed to think the latter, for he never pushed Zotov to resolve the case and punish the malcontents in any way. They all remained in prominent positions for the coming years.

While the Swedes were discussing and planning their coming campaign, Peter prepared to meet them. Over the winter the Russian headquarters was in Żółkiew, in Polish Galicia near Lwów. It was here that Peter consulted with his military council and decided to withdraw to the Russian border, devastating the land before the Swedes but not giving battle until Charles reached the frontier. At the same time he prepared his defenses, ordering fortifications at Pskov and Kiev. By early March, Keyserling had the general outlines of Peter's strategy, to gather his army and retreat east to the Russian border, leaving devastation behind him. In Moscow, fear spread with the spring, and many foreign merchants planned to escape to Archangel and on to Europe, for it was murmured everywhere that there would be a great revolt in response to the increased taxation and the growing power of Menshikov. This growing power was real: in May all the chancelleries under Menshikov were given an experienced head, the Duma secretary Avtomon Ivanov.¹⁷ Keyserling personally shared the fear that Peter would end like King Augustus, for the tsar's finances were in disorder and his army tired. It was not nearly as large as reported, for the officers had many men with their baggage and serving as domestic servants. Peter was ordering a new draft. In June the Prussian joined the Russian army in Lublin and acquired more precise information from the major general of cavalry von Pflug. There were really only about 45,000 effectives in the Russian army; to make matters worse, Menshikov and Sheremetev were still feuding and inexperienced in establishing the army in a regular order of battle. Peter, however, was resolute, and spoke of losing two, three, or even ten battles rather than surrendering the lands lost by his grandfather, Tsar Michael. He ordered Moscow and the Kremlin

¹⁷ Avtomon Ivanovich Ivanov had run the Estates Chancellery (*Pomestnyi prikaz*) since 1681, as well as other offices, until his death in 1709: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 209; Veselovskii, *D'iaki*, 202.

fortified, and new taxes to pay for it. Menshikov was blamed for all this, and the talk of revolt continued.¹⁸

In Lublin, Keyserling also learned that Menshikov was not so all-powerful as it seemed back in Moscow. Earlier, during Easter, at one of the wild parties, Peter became so angry at Menshikov that he nearly pulled out his sword. The exact cause was obscure, but there was plenty to be angry about: Menshikov looked after the cavalry that was his charge and made all sorts of difficulties for Sheremetev's infantry. In spite of the conflict at Easter, Peter made Menshikov a prince, something unheard of in Russian history, for princely titles until then could only be inherited. He was now most serene prince of Ingria (*svetleishii kniaz' izherskii*). The newly minted prince continued to be a difficult character. At the banquet for Peter's name-day (29 June), he got into an argument with Keyserling over Anna Mons, whom both Peter and Menshikov called a whore, much to the Prussian's indignation. The exchange of insults turned into a fight, and when Keyserling was ordered out of the house some of Menshikov's guards set upon him and beat him. After a few weeks and the mediation of General Rönne, a compromise was proposed and Keyserling accepted it on orders from Berlin. Rönne also confirmed that the Russian strategy was to retreat before the Swedes through Lithuania via Minsk.¹⁹

In August 1707, his army rested and his negotiations with the Empire completed, Charles XII left Saxony heading for the Russian army encamped around Warsaw. As the Swedes moved east, new conflicts erupted between Peter and Menshikov. A big blow-up took place on 11/22 August, which Keyserling could not at first explain,

¹⁸ HHStA, Rußland I, K. 20, Moscow, 26 January 1707 (fortifications in Pskov and Kiev); Moscow, 26 May/7 June 1707 (fear of Swedes in Moscow, Menshikov and taxes, recruits); Moscow, 15 July 1707 (fortification of Moscow, Menshikov and taxes); GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 17B, 89–94, Moscow, 11/22 March 1707 (Peter's strategy); 114–17, Moscow, 2/13 April 1707 (Keyserling's fears for Peter, state of the army); 127–42, 15/26 June 1707 (Keyserling's report of von Pflug's information, state of Russian army in detail).

¹⁹ Shafirov thought that Menshikov's guards should be punished, another case of disagreement with the favorite. GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 17B, 158–71v, Lublin, 9 July StN 1707 (Easter incident, Menshikov and Sheremetev); 172–90v, Lublin, 11, 13, and 16 July 1707 (= "Georg Iogann fon-Keizerling, prestavitel' korolia prusskogo pri dvore Petra Velikogo," RS, V, 1872, 804–29); 196–99, Warsaw, 23 July StN 1707 (Rönne's mediation); 200–01, Berlin, 2 August 1707 (order to Keyserling to accept a compromise); 206–11, Warsaw, 30 July StN 1707 (Rönne's description of Russian strategy and state of army); 233–35, Warsaw, 16 August 1707 (confidential report on Shafirov's views of the incident); HHStA, Rußland I, K. 20, 62–65v, 15 July 1707 (Menshikov's title); 66–67v, 12 September 1707 (Keyserling–Menshikov incident in Lublin overcome); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV, 2, 138; *PiB* 5, 284–90, 345–46, 760–63.

for all the foreigners had been ordered to leave. "The tsar in the greatest anger was running around the field beating his naked breast and threatening with all sorts of misfortune the favorite, who finally managed to fend off his danger with weeping and entreaty." The Prussian was not sure of the reason, but he did know that there had been increasing dissension between tsar and favorite over the latter's participation in the pillaging of Polish estates. The situation was so bad that the pro-Russian Poles in Lublin wanted to send the tsar a deputation, since Menshikov had tried to conceal his actions, which in turn threatened Peter's limited support in Poland.²⁰

A few days later Keyserling learned that the cause of the most recent dispute had not been the pillaging of Polish estates, but rather the conflict between Menshikov and Sheremetev. The field marshal was coming to Warsaw for a council of war, and Menshikov was trying to disgrace him in advance. The favorite tried to convince Peter that Sheremetev had neglected the infantry in his charge so seriously that it would not be able to aid the cavalry in a battle with the Swedes. The field marshal had refused to give a regiment to one of Menshikov's clients without an order from the tsar; Peter flew into a rage when he heard of the incident.

As the tsar would not agree and pointed out that Sheremetev had performed so many considerable services for him [=Peter] and that it would also be a very dangerous thing if he would offend this man who is in such great credit with the whole nation, the favorite nevertheless is supposed to have pressed him [=Peter] with such obstinacy that they finally

²⁰ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 17B, 242–44v, Warsaw, 23 August StN 1707, 242: "Sonst [gestern wiederumb zu gedachter Blonie ein] großer [Verdruß zwischen dem Tzaaren /242v/ und dessen Favoriten entstanden so, daß der Tzaare im größten emportement auf dem Felde herumbgelauffen und] mit offenen [Brust-Schlagen dem Favoriten] welcher doch letztlich [mit weinen und flehen seine Gefahr abzuwenden] gesucht, [alles Unglück angedrohet]. Es haben sich auch alle frembde die es anfangs mitangesehen reteritren müßen, endlich aber ist der Tzaare] gleichwohl bewogen worden ihn] wiederumb [zu embrassiren und gestern Nachts mit ihm in Wagen hieher zurück zu fahren. Was das] eigentliche [sujet von dieser facheusen rencontre gewesen, kan] noch nicht [wissen, doch] wird solches wohl bald zu erfahren seyn. Es fallen nun öfter als jemahls [dergleichen Chagrins zwischen dem Tzaaren und seinem liebbling vor und dürffte der letztere endlich einen fatalen dessein nicht entgehen] vielleicht dürffe auch wohl dieses [eine dangereuese suite vor ihn haben, daß das Lublinsche Conseil] eine eigene [Deputation an dan Tzaaren] zuschicken willens ist, welche nun bloß [die duplicitet des Printzen Menschioffs und, daß er an alle] im gantzen Königreich Pohlen [geschehene exorbitantien Schuld hätte, in dem er zu] dergleichen [desordres stets connivirte und] selbst [von der Pillage profitirte dem Tzaare aber die Wahrheit deguisirte] und dadurch so wohl seiner [reputation] alß auch [dem mit der Republique jetzt gemeinsahnen interesse] gar sehr [nachtheilig fiehle vortheilig] machen will." Peter had issued a decree to his troops against pillaging in Poland: *PiB* 5, 296–99.

argued in manner described in my last most humble report, though they soon were reconciled.

Nothing happened to Sheremetev, who began the retreat of the infantry toward Brest a few days later.²¹

The Russian ministers and the cavalry soon followed, moving east toward Polotsk. Without Peter's firm hand internal squabbles in the cavalry continued, but otherwise the ensuing months were quiet. Charles remained in the Warsaw area for the winter. In October, Peter left the army for St. Petersburg, at about the same time giving orders to fortify Moscow and putting the Tsarevich Aleksei in formal charge of the fortification works in his father's absence. The young tsarevich was to oversee the preparations of Prince Gagarin, the *komendant*, and attend the meetings of the Privy Chancellery.²² Peter

²¹ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 17B, 245–47v, Warsaw 27 August [StN] 1707, 245: “[die] letztmahls [zwischen den Tzaaren und seinen favoriten entstandene] Mishelligkeit dahergekommen das weil der] letztere gewußt, [das der Feldmarschall Cheremetoff] chestes tages [zum grossen Kriegs conseil] hieher kommen sollen, jener also diesem [zuvor bey dem Czaar discreditiren und in verdacht setzen wollet] vorgebende, daß [der Cheremetoff] es nicht [redlich mit dem Tzaare meine und der die Infanterie] durch seine wenige sorgfalt /245v/ in so schlechten zustande] gerahten wäre, [das wenn es] einmahl [zur bataille mit Schweden kommen solte die cavallerie von] jener sehr [wenig secondiret] werden würde, welches er mit einem [brief von einem gewissen obristen den] er zu [der infanterie] geschicket [beweisen] wollen. Und weil [der favorit] auch durch gedachten [obristen an den Cheremetoff eine absolute ordre geschicket] ihm [dem Obristen] sofort einen [von den Regimenten zu geben, jener] aber darauff gar nicht [reflectiren wollen und den obristen] damit abgewiesen, daß er [von keinem als von dem Tzaare] selbst solche [ordres anzunehmen] hätte, worauß dann der [obrister] welche sonder dem eine gantz eigene [Creatur von dem favoriten ist und] nur bloß auß der Intention [den Cheremetoff zu chicaniren und] ihn zur [infanterie geschicket] worden, belegenheit genommen, unterschiedene [dinge wider den Feldmarschall zu überschreiben] so hatt [der favorit den Tzaaren bereden] wollen [ein kriegs raht über den Cheremetoff und] erwehten [obristen zu verordnen] auch den ersten gar [seiner charge zu entsetzen und ihn den favoriten zum / 246/ General Feld Marschall von der gantzen armée zu declariren]. Wie aber [der Tzaar darin nicht willigen] wollen [und] vorgestellet [das] ihm [der Cheremetoff] so viel considerable [dienste geleistet hatte und das] er auch eine sehr [gefährliche sache] wäre [wann er diesen Mann der bey der] gantzen [Nation in grossen credit würde disgustiren solte der favorit aber] doch mit vieler [opiniatreté in ihn gedrangen so sind sie] endlich jüngst allerunterthänigst berichte maßen [miteinander zerfallen und] doch [bald wieder ausgesohnet worden]”; 262–66, Warsaw, 3 September 1707 (Sheremetev retreats to Brest).

²² GSAPK I, Rep. XI, 17B, 308–312, Warsaw, 11 October 1707 (Russian ministers leave for Brest); 320–26, Brest, 1 November 1707 (Peter has left for St. Petersburg); 18A, 1–2v, Minsk, 14 December 1708 [= 1707], 2: “ohne des Czaaren selbsteigenen Gegenwart, dem bey der Cavallerie, durch allerhand Broulleries und Unordnungen mehr und mehr einreißenden übel, über welches sich auch das Ministerium selbst gar sehr beschwehret, unmöglich remediret werden kann”; HHStA Rußland I, K. 20, 71–73, Moscow, 28 November 1707 (Aleksei and Moscow's fortification); *PiB* VI, 3, 23; Murzakevich, *Pis'ma*, 19–21.

The cavalry was under Menshikov, whom Keyserling hated, perhaps influencing his report.

put his son in charge of Moscow even though it was generally believed that he was not friendly to the foreigners his father continued to bring to Russia and much attached to traditional Russian religious devotions.²³

The fortification of Moscow was not a luxury, for Charles continued to have the Russian capital as his goal. The French ambassador to Sweden, Besenval, wrote from Danzig, when he had received letters from Hermelin:

The news which they receive in the Swedish army about that of the Muscovites is that it is in the area of Polotsk on the Dvina, resolved to continue its retreat as the Swedes approach, which makes trouble for the latter who were hoping to meet their enemies on the borders of Muscovy. They flatter themselves nevertheless that the subjects of the tsar will revolt against this prince as soon as their [=the Swedes'] army arrives in his states, by the means of manifestoes which the King of Sweden will have published, with his intention to deliver them from the yoke of slavery.

In one respect Charles' expectations were coming true, for in Moscow the first rumors of contacts between the Swedes and Hetman Mazepa were beginning to circulate as the year ended.²⁴

Presumably the rumors reflected the contacts Princess Dolska and Stanisław Leszczyński had made with the Hetman in October.²⁵ For the time being Mazepa kept his options open, informing the tsar of the feelers from the Poles. His letter seems not to have survived, but

²³ TKUA Rusland, B45, 7 December 1707: Grund spoke to Petr Shafirov about marriage prospects for the tsarevich in Wolfenbüttel, noting in cipher that he realized from Shafirov's words that the Russians were not too happy with the prospect of a foreign marriage that would bring more foreigners to Russia "[indem der Tzarische Printz bis dato nur wenig affection für die frembde zeigt und bloß an die Devotion] nach Russischer Arth [attachiret ist . . .]. Grund went on to comment that the difference in attitude could cause much annoyance.

²⁴ AME, CP Suède 111, 402–04v Danzig, Besenval to Louis XIV, 24 December 1707, 402: "Les avis qu'ils recoivent à l'armée suédoise de celle des Moscovites sont qu'elle doit estre aux environs de Polock sur la Dune resoluë de continuer sa retraite a mesure que les suédois arriveront, ce qui fait de la peine aux derniers qui esperoint de joindre leurs ennemis sur les frontieres de Moscovie. Ils se flattent neautmoins /402v/ que les sujets du Czar se revolteront contre ce Prince des que leur armée sera arrivée dans ses estats moyennant des manifestes que le Roy de Suede fera publier, de son intention a les delivrer du joug de leur esclavage." HHStA Rußland I, Karton 20, 28 November 1707: "[Es ist alhier in geheimb eine red, daß Schweden durch den König in Pohlen an die Ukrainische Cossacken hat lassen offeriren, wan sie von Moscau abtreten, und sich unter Pohlen widerumb begeben, und wider Moscau den krieg führen wollen, sie alle ihre vorige alte freyheiten genießen sollen, die sie vorhero unter Pohlen gehabt haben. Derowegen alhier ein grosse sorg ist, weilen man wol weiß, daß man sie eine zeit hero in ihren rechten sehr benachteiligt hat, sie also solchen offernten leicht gehör geben.]"

²⁵ Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XIV, 564–71.

Keyserling reported it in his dispatches from Minsk with the Russian army: "The Cossack Hetman Mazepa . . . also reports that King Stanisław through many emissaries one of whom Mazepa also had arrested is trying to make the Cossacks defect from the tsar and again to bring them under Polish rule . . ." At the same time, Mazepa already put the blame on the *nakaznyi het'man* Vasyl' Kochubei and Ivan Iskra, the colonel of the Poltava regiment, a few months after Kochubei's first attempt to inform the tsar that it was the hetman himself who was disloyal:

. . . already two of the most prominent Cossack commanders very much are beginning to waver; he, Mazepa cannot bring them to reason with force because they have too great a following and power with the nation and therefore he must only try by gentle means and favors to bring them around as much as possible.²⁶

Thus began the Kochubei affair. Peter's officials investigated the charges and believed Mazepa's denunciation so completely that they turned the two over to the hetman. Mazepa executed his rivals in July 1708, clearing his way to move into the Swedish camp the following autumn.²⁷

While plots and counterplots formed in the Ukraine, there was plenty of dissension in Peter's army in Poland. Peter wrote to Menshikov in October that he had ordered Sheremetev to Minsk, but the latter had chosen to interpret the order as suggesting a move to Borisov, "which he did for the sake of his old usual lies." Keyserling reported continuing rivalry between the field marshal

²⁶ GSAPK I, Repertorium XI, Rußland 18a (1708), 6 January 1708 NS: "[Der Cosaken Feldherr Mazeppa hatte] auch gleichermäßige kundschaftten davon [of the Porte – PB] eingeschicket und] zugleich berichtet das der König Stanislaus durch viele emissarios] derer einen [der Mazeppa] auch [handfeste machen laßen] sich bemühet [die Cosacken von dem Tzar abtrunnig zu machen und] wiederumb [unter Pollnische devotion zu bringen] welches auch [inso weit reussiret ware, das schon zweene der vornehmsten Cosackischen Woywoden] gar sehr [zu hinken anfangen er der Mazeppa] dörfte selbige [nicht mit gewalt zur raison bringen weil sie gar zu grossen anhang und pouvoir bey der nation hatten und] muste er also nur suchen [durch gellinde Mittel und wollthatten so viel möglich zu rectificiren]. Solte nun [die Cosacken welche] mit jetzigen [Moscowitischen Regierung gahr malcontent sind und nur noch durch gute conduite des Mazeppa im Zaum gehalten werden auch zu revoltiren anfangen. So wäre gewis vor den Tzaar eine funeste catastrophe zu vermuthen." Kochubei sent a monk to inform Musin-Pushkin of Mazepa's intended treachery in August 1707: Bantysh-Kamenskii, "Istochniki," *ChOIDR* 1, (1859), 61–66; Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XIV, 588–89.

²⁷ Keyserling's report suggests that Mazepa was trying to present Kochubei and Iskra as disloyal to Peter before they denounced the hetman in January, 1708, in contrast to sources known to earlier historians: Bantysh-Kamenski, "Istochniki," *ChOIDR* 1 (1859), pt. 2, 85–155; Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XIV, 583–610; Ohloblyn, *Mazepa*, 288–301.

and the favorite, to the point that there was little communication between the infantry and cavalry. The Prussian believed that the general hatred against Menshikov was so great that the Russians would prefer an upheaval in the country to continued domination by the favorite. The general talk, he claimed, was that Menshikov was the instrument of the country's misfortune. The arguments between Menshikov and Sheremetev continued to the end of the year.²⁸

THE NEW GUBERNIAS

Unfortunately for Charles, Peter was one step ahead of him. As his dispute with Menshikov over Sheremetev showed, Peter was aware of the need to preserve good relations with great and popular aristocrats. He also began to feel the need for a more coherent conduct of government, especially as he was away with the army or in St. Petersburg during most of these years. The meetings of the ministers in the Privy Chancellery seem to have become more regular in 1707–08, with some seventeen of them usually in attendance. The Privy Chancellery was not just another version of the Boyar Duma, for almost all of its members were heads of major offices.²⁹ The ministers dealt with more routine matters, and Peter

²⁸ *PiB* VI, Peter to ADM, 2 October 1707: "kotoroe on uchinil radi staroi svoei obyknovennoi lzhi"; GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland, 22 December 1707 NS, Minsk, Keyserling to Friedrich I: "Und ist dieses nicht weniger [ein grosses malheur vor den Tzaren, daß der Fürst Menschikoff und der Feld Marschall Scheremetoff gar nicht mit einander d'accord sind,] weßhalben dann einer bey [der Infanterie, der andre bey der Cavallerie] ohne nöthiger [Communication disponiret und] jeder gegen [den andern auch] mit großem [Schaden der Tzaren tort zu fügen] würden. Es ist auch die allgemeine [haine wieder den Fürsten Menschikoff bey der] gantzen [Moscowitischen Nation so groß daß sie lieber] ein ehester [bouleversement ihres] großes [Reiches als die längere Herschung dieses Favoriten erdulden] wollten [und scheuen sich die vornehmsten nicht fast öffentlich zu sprechen, daß woferne ja der Tzaare und] deßen [Reich unglücklich werden] müßte, [der Fürst Menschikoff das] gewißeste [instrument hierzu wäre. . .]"; Minsk, 6 January 1708 NS, "[der Fürst Menschikoff bey] seiner jüngsten [anwesenheit sich] zu unterschiedenen mahlen [mit der Feld Marschall Cheremetoff auff's neue brouilliret habe] und sind sie auch, [der Fürst Menschikoff] dieses wiederumb [nach seiner Haupt Quartier zurück gängen] mit weniger [satisfaction von einander geschieden. . .]."

²⁹ Streshnev headed the *Razriad*, Musin-Pushkin the Monastery Chancellery, Prince F. Romodanovskii the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery, Plemiannikov was head of the Admiralty in Apraksin's absence, A. P. Saltykov ran the Moscow Judicial Chancellery, I. I. Buturlin the Land Chancellery, Prince P. I. Prozorovskii the Great Treasury, Prince M. P. Gagarin served as Moscow *komentant*, and Avtomon Ivanov was in charge of the Estates Chancellery. Streshnev, Musin-Pushkin, Saltykov, and Prozorovskii were also boyars. Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 23–26. Anisimov sees it as similar to the *ad hoc* boyar "commissions" of the seventeenth century.

clearly did not think this system was working well. He tried to make the ministers more accountable, ordering in October 1707, that "all the ministers who come to the consilium should write down the affairs they discuss and each minister should sign with his own hand, which is very necessary, and they should not decide anything without this, for in this manner the foolishness of each will be revealed."³⁰ A few months later he repeated the order to sign their decisions, and also commanded them to establish regular days for the meetings.³¹

The ministerial meetings in the Privy Chancellery were only a temporary solution. The men who came were also rather a mixed bag, a combination of old aristocrats and new men, some clients of the great and some apparently their own men. The list included two rather elderly boyars, Saltykov and Prozorovskii, both left over from the old Naryshkin faction. Prozorovskii had run the Treasury since 1690, and Saltykov the Moscow Judicial Chancellery since the capture of Prince Iakov Dolgorukii at Narva. Neither was particularly important politically, but they were certainly aristocratic. Also part of the original Naryshkin faction was the boyar T. N. Streshnev, head of the *Razriad* since 1690.³² Another boyar was I. A. Musin-Pushkin, who was the first member of his family in the Duma, becoming an *okol'nichii* in 1682 and a boyar in 1698. His father, however, had been a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsar Aleksei, and had married a Savelov, that is, one of the relatives of Patriarch Ioakim, and thus acquired I. I. Buturlin the elder as his brother-in-law. One of the best educated in the elite, Ivan Alekseevich came naturally to his role in supervising the church.³³

³⁰ *PiB* VI, 129, 7 October 1707: "Ob'iavit' na s'ezde v palate vsem ministram, kotorye v konziliu s'ezzhauitsia, chtoby oni vsiakiye dela, o kotorykh sovetuuiut, zapisyvali i kazhdyi by ministr svoeu rukoiiu podpisyvali, chto zelo nuzhno, nadobno i bez togo otniud' nikakogo dela ob'iavlialo, ibo sim vsiakogo durost' iavlena budet."

³¹ *PiB* VII, 249.

³² A. P. Saltykov (died after 1724) was a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsar Aleksei and Tsar Fyodor and a boyar since 1682: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7, l. 92v. and "Saltykov, Aleksei Petrovich," *RBS*, Sabaneev-Smyslov, St. Petersburg, 1904, 73–74. On Prozorovskii and Streshnev (died 1718) see chapter 5.

³³ I. A. Musin-Pushkin was *voevoda* in Smolensk (1689) and Astrakhan' (1695): Barsukov, *Spiski*, 12, 211; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 205. Ustrialov thought that he was "Metropolitan Ioannikii" in the All-Drunk Council: *PiB* II, 464; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, IV/1, 223; He and I. I. Buturlin the elder were married to sisters, Mavra Timofeevna and Marfa Timofeevna Savelov, both of them nieces of Patriarch Ioakim (Ivan Petrovich Savelov): Savelov, "Savelkovy i Savelovy XV–XX vv.," 14–16, 21–22. He studied in the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy: Chrissidis, "Creating," p. 132 note 103. The rise of Musin-Pushkin was due to his connection with Ioakim, not his mythical birth as the son of Tsar Aleksei's mistress (Tsar Aleksei had no mistress). Aleksei Musin-Pushkin was one of nineteen *komnatnye stol'niki* of Tsar Aleksei in

I. I. Buturlin, evidently the younger, not the elder, a general in Swedish captivity at this time, was a younger son of a fairly aristocratic family. The Buturlins had been in the Duma in the seventeenth century, if not terribly prominent. The younger Buturlin, a chamber *stol'nik* of Peter, participated in the 1695 Azov campaign, coming to head the Land Chancellery sometime after 1700. He met a rather inglorious end in August 1710, as a guest at a banquet in the house of Prince Masal'skii, which collapsed on the revellers.³⁴

Plemiannikov and Prince Gagarin, by contrast, were not terribly aristocratic. Neither had had ancestors or relatives in the Duma, and had come to the fore comparatively recently, Plemiannikov as a *vovoda* in Kiev in 1693 and then in the admiralty in 1700. Gagarin came up through Siberian administration in the 1690s, but was also a great favorite of Menshikov, something that undoubtedly contributed mightily to his career. He received overall charge of Siberia in 1707. Plemiannikov, in contrast, had worked under Fyodor Apraksin and seems to have been close to the Dolgorukiis (Vasilii and Mikhail Vladimirovich).³⁵ The closest to Peter, and certainly an aristocrat,

1652, and disappears from the records in 1654. In 1675 his wife Irina was involved in a mysterious incident with one of the palace silver workers that led to her exile in her Suzdal' village, and the temporary disappearance of Ivan Alekseevich, who reappeared in 1678 at court ceremonies: *DR* III, 149, 291, 1288, 1301, 1325, 1423; IV, 97. This incident may have given rise to later rumors that she was the tsar's mistress. The existing documentation provides no evidence whatsoever of that claim.

³⁴ The Buturlins are a complex story, as there were three Ivan Ivanovich Buturlins in Peter's time as well as Petr Ivanovich Buturlin (died 1724), *kniaz'-papa* in the All-Drunken Council after 1717. The article "Buturlin, Ivan Ivanovich," *RBS*, Betankur-Biakster, St. Petersburg, 1908, 649–51, concerns the elder, the general, but occasionally adds facts from the life of the other two. *PiB* I also confused them regularly in the index. I. I. Buturlin the elder (the major general) returned from Sweden in June 1710 (*PiB* X, 216), so the I. I. Buturlin in the correspondence for 1700–10 is not the major-general, the elder, but his cousin, I. I. the younger. On the latter's death in 1710 he was not replaced in the *Žemskii prikaz*: *PiB* I, 32; VII, 909–91; 10, 307, 310, 326, 707. Both I. I. Buturlins were chamber *stol'niki* of Peter in 1686, and the elder (presumably) was one of the principal commanders at the maneuvers at Semenovskoe (1691) and later of the Semenovskii regiment in 1695: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10, 89v, 90v; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, I, 125, 127–30, *PiB* I, 523–24, 530–33. The third I. I. Buturlin headed the College of Commerce from 1722 and later became a senator. He was a simple *stol'nik* in 1692. See Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia*, II, 151–65; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 51.

³⁵ Barsukov, *Spiski*, 104. Gagarin and Menshikov are in Pleyer's 'Allerunter thänigste Relation von dem jetzigen moscowitischen Regierungswesen,' 1710 account of Russian government in Ernst Herrmann, *Zeitgenössische Berichte zur Geschichte Rußlands*, I [= HHStA Rußland I, Karton 21/4, ff. 135–45v.] Leipzig, 1880, 136. Pleyer gave the composition of the ministerial council as Gagarin, Shreshnev, Buturlin, Musin-Pushkin, Iu. S. Neledinskii (as substitute for Shreshnev), Romodanovskii, S. A. Golovin (evidently M. A. Golovin, head of the *Iamskoi prikaz*), and Kurbatov (*ibid.*, 136–40). This may reflect the situation at the end of 1709, when Pleyer left Russia for Vienna briefly and wrote the report.

was Prince Fyodor Romodanovskii, though his tasks seem to have narrowed since the 1690s to an exclusive concern with the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery. None of these men had the power of Menshikov or Golovin, or perhaps even that of Field Marshal Sheremetev and Golovkin, but they did run the country until the establishment of the new provinces.

Peter's fundamental revision of Russia's government structure began in December 1707. This was the establishment of the nine (later eight) "large" gubernias which replaced the *prikaz* system and lasted for the next decade. Peter's reasons for the change seem to have been frustration with the "divided authority" (*roznonachalie*) of the previous system. There are two statements from his pen on the issue, both from 1709, as the new system was being installed. The first was a reply to Kurbatov, who objected that the new system would bring too much divided authority. Peter replied that it could not be worse than the divisions in the existing arrangements, which required countless signatures for simple tasks and required Moscow offices to make decisions on issues occurring at great distances. The second comment came after he made a quick inspection tour to Azov and the new harbors at Taganrog. He was not impressed with the results of earlier efforts and wrote back to Fyodor Apraksin in Voronezh:

On the situation here I will report briefly that besides the main wall at Azov, and that excluding the river, I found nothing completed, but in ancient chaos, the cause of which is divided authority, for the governor complains in everything about the Moscow chancellery chiefs, and they administer by annotating written extracts, so this whole business is a back and forth like with Pilate and Caiaphas.³⁶

The new gubernias differed from old provincial administration under the *voevody* in two ways.³⁷ First, they were much bigger. They

Gagarin received the rank of *General'nyi Prezident i Sibirskikh provintsii sud'ia* early in 1707: PSZ IV, no. 2136, 366–67. On Plemiannikov and the Dolgorukiis see chapter 8. Plemiannikov was head of the Admiralty Chancellery from March 1700, and Apraksin's associate (*tovarishch*) *admiralteets*: PiB I, 799; II, 152, 524–25.

³⁶ PiB IX/1, 105; IX/2, 725–27; IX/1, 166–67 (3/4 May 1709, Peter to F. M. Apraksin: "O zdeshnem obiaviaiu vkratse, chto, krome Azovskogo glavnogo valu, i to oproch' reki, nichego v sovershenstve ne obrel, no v drevnem khaose, chemu vina roznonachalie, ibo gubernator vo vsem zhalobu prinosit na moskovskikh sudei, a onyia praviattsia pometoiu vypisak, i tak sie delo, kak u Pilata s Kaiafoiu, vse v peresylkakh.").

³⁷ Little has been done on the period of the "large gubernias" since P. Mrochek-Drozдовskii, *Oblastnoe upravlenie Rossii XVIII veka do uchrezhdeniia o guberniakh*, I: *Oblastnoe upravlenie epokhi pervogo uchrezhdeniia gubernii (1708–1719 gg.)*, Moscow, 1876, and Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 291–363.

included vast territories with many towns and large districts under the new governors. Not all were the same size and population. The Moscow province was enormous in size but especially in population, for it included most of central Russia. Since the old Moscow chancelleries were mostly turned into divisions of the provincial chancellery, the Moscow province involved much greater responsibility and a much larger staff than the others. The Archangel province included almost all the thinly populated but wealthy north of Russia with Russia's main point of trade with Europe at Archangel itself. The governors of the Archangel province thus had a special responsibility for supervision of the country's most lucrative foreign trade. The other provinces were to a large extent border provinces: St. Petersburg (which included Ingria, Novgorod, and Pskov), Smolensk (the smallest of the new provinces), Kiev (including the Belgorod area), Azov, Voronezh (with its naval yards), Kazan' (the whole Volga basin and the Terek frontier), and Siberia.³⁸

Second, the new governors were more powerful than the previous *voevody*. The *voevody* were normally appointed for a certain term, renewable to be sure, but Peter appointed the new governors without a time limit, and they appointed their own subordinates, both in their chancellery and in the many towns and districts of their province. At first Peter excepted the *komendanty* of the fortresses, but after 1712 he handed these appointments over to the governors as well. The governors thus controlled the local garrisons, a system that gave them a modest military force. One of their principal duties was supervision of military recruitment, sending the new soldiers from their homes directly to the waiting regiments. They collected the food and fodder for the army, mostly by subcontracting it to local merchants, a fertile field for all sorts of corruption. The governors also had financial control over their districts, thus replacing the Moscow *ratusha* and chancelleries. The governors sent out tax collectors to the villages, took the reports and the money from the townsmen who collected the sales tax and ran the tavern monopoly, and then sent the cash to the central government offices.³⁹ Central

³⁸ Mrochek-Drozдовskii, *Oblastnoe*, 18–26, 210–11.

³⁹ Mrochek-Drozдовskii, *Oblastnoe*, 27–71, 90, 97, 99, 149–84, 193–208, 216–19, 265. LeDonne's characterization of the new system as "military rule" in the provinces considerably exaggerates the military power of the governors unless they had some other position (e.g. Menshikov): LeDonne, *Absolutism*, 68–74. Fundamentally it was administration and finance that gave them power.

government came to consist of the army and navy, government service issues, foreign affairs, and the tsar's household. The chronology of the reform and its earliest manifestations suggest that it grew out of the needs of the frontier regions, exposed to both depredations from across the border and internal unrest. The consequence of the reform, if not its original purpose, was to place power again in the hands of the aristocrats.

The gubernia reform grew out of steps taken earlier in 1707 in the Volga, the southern frontier, and St. Petersburg. The first moves came in the early months of 1707, when General P. M. Apraksin was appointed to be the *voevoda* of Astrakhan'. This had been a necessity since Sheremetev's defeat of the rebels in the spring of 1706, and in December Peter reminded Tikhon Streshnev of the problem and proposed P. M. Apraksin. Apraksin went down to Astrakhan' but not before Peter had informed Kurbatov that Apraksin would have control of the grain trade "like in Archangel" and that Kurbatov should give him a copy of the regulations for Archangel. Still in Moscow, the general sent Peter a report about the disposition of garrison troops but also requesting that he be given the Terek to govern as well, that he have control over the tolls (elsewhere the task of the local *magistrat* and the *ratusha*) and that he have the title of *gubernator* "like in other countries." Peter agreed to the Terek and the financial control, but rejected the title of *gubernator* because "the provinces are not yet determined" (*ponezhe eshche gubernatsii ne opredeleny*). The new system was still under discussion, but one aspect was already clear, the financial control of the governor and the loss of power by the *ratusha* and its network of local merchants to the aristocratic governors. In accepting Apraksin's proposal he replied (7 February 1707): "On this an edict has been sent to the *Ratusha*, it has been ordered that you be in charge of all income just as Mr. Musin was in charge." Musin was I. A. Musin-Pushkin, who had been *voevoda* of Astrakhan' in 1695–96, before the establishment of the *ratusha*. By the end of the year Apraksin did manage to receive the taxes in Astrakhan'.⁴⁰

The expanded financial powers for the new governors did not proceed easily, for Kurbatov at the *ratusha* seems to have dragged

⁴⁰ *PiB* IV, 487; V, 67, 86–90 (Apraksin's report with Peter's comments: 19 February 1707: "O sem ukaz poslan v Ratushu, veleno vse dokhody vedat' *vam, tak, kak gospodin Musin vedal*"), 91, 108, 181, 504–06; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 12; *PiB* VI, 171–76; Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 356–62.

his feet. Peter repeated the command to transfer authority over tolls and taverns at Astrakhan' to P. M. Apraksin several times, and also had to repeat (in March 1707) his charge to transfer Solikamsk in the Urals and Iarensk in the north to Prince M. P. Gagarin at the Siberian Chancellery, soon to be transformed into a *gubernia* administration.⁴¹

The other early prototypes for the new gubernias were Ingria (St. Petersburg) and Kiev provinces. In January 1707, Peter exempted Menshikov's St. Petersburg province from the jurisdiction, both judicial and financial, of the Moscow chancelleries.⁴² At the same time, Prince D. M. Golitsyn received the Kiev province together with Belgorod. A few weeks later Peter ordered him to be titled governor of Kiev "for the honor" and spelled out that Kiev and the Ukrainian towns were to be taken from the Little Russian Chancellery and put together with Belgorod under Streshnev's *Razriad*. As Golitsyn's district also included Sevsk, this looks like movement toward the larger provinces, though there was yet no hint of greater authority over taxation and finances as had been the case with Astrakhan'. Of course, Golitsyn's authority was limited by the autonomy of the Ukrainian hetmanate, which limited him to a largely military role. Only farther east, around Belgorod, did he exercise the same power as his colleagues.⁴³

The first more general indication of the new policy came with the brief decree of 18 December 1707, ordering that the Russian towns be assigned to Kiev, Smolensk, Azov, Kazan', Archangel, and by implication Moscow. Over the next weeks, while Peter was with the army, the boyars in the *blizhnaia kantseliariia* were empowered to work out the details, and in the process they consulted N. A. Kudriavtsev,

⁴¹ *PiB* V, 123–24, 131, 539. Gagarin headed the Siberian Chancellery from at least August 1706: *PiB* IV, 97; Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 356–62.

⁴² *PSŽ* IV, no. 2135, 364–66 (17 January 1707). The decree appointed Iakov Rimskii-Korsakov *landrikhter*, to run the civilian affairs of the province under Menshikov. Rimskii-Korsakov was to have no part in military affairs. Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 341–56.

⁴³ *PiB* V, 56, 107, 274, 530–31, 581–82; *PSŽ*, IV, no. 2140, 374–75. Isabel de Madariaga, "Portrait of an Eighteenth-Century Russian Statesman: Prince Dmitry Mikhaylovich Golitsyn," *Slavonic and East European Review* 62 (1984), 36–60. Golitsyn replaced two purely military figures, the *komendants* of Kiev, Iu. A. von Mengden (1701–04) and A. A. Gulitz (1704–07), both German mercenary officers; V. I. Shcherbina, "Kievskie voevody, gubernatory, i general-gubernatory ot 1654 do 1775 g.," *Chteniiia v Obshchestve Nestora Letopistsa* 6 (1892), 123–48; and V. I. Ikonnikov, "Kiev v 1654–1855 gg. (Istoricheskii Ocherk)," *Kievskaiia starina* 86 (September 1904), 213–74; 87 (October 1904); 1–64 (November 1904), 155–216; (December 1904), 516–685.

voevoda of Kazan', and Prince D. M. Golitsyn.⁴⁴ Once again, the frontiers seem to have been the main issue. After the December 1707 decree nothing further happened, however, until May 1708, when Petr Apraksin was formally ordered to move to Kazan' to take over his new duties. Peter sent him a list of towns under his control, which included the whole of the Volga region south of Nizhnii Novgorod, the western Urals including Ufa and the Bashkir lands, and the Terek river frontier. He also told him to leave the collection of taxes as it was until the end of the year, but from the beginning of 1709 on he was to take them under his control. Peter later postponed this measure to 1710, apparently in connection with the wholesale establishment of the new provinces.⁴⁵

The other provinces seem to have continued on the old basis, and the central chancelleries remained intact through the year 1708. Only Moscow itself was a little different, for in the seventeenth century it never had a *voevoda*, civil administration being under the *Zemskii prikaz* until 1700. In April 1707 Peter appointed the elderly Prince Mikhail Alekukovich Cherkasskii as *voevoda*, and simultaneously Prince M. P. Gagarin as *komendant*, that is, military commander. Cherkasskii's appointment seems to have been largely symbolic, and in any case the appointment of Tsarevich Aleksei in fall 1707, placed a much more important symbolic head on the Moscow government. Menshikov's favorite Gagarin had headed the Siberian Chancellery and Armory since 1706, after many years of building canals and sluices. Putting him in charge of the Moscow garrison and later of Siberia was typical of Peter's administration in those years (combining various offices under one man).⁴⁶

The final decrees came at the beginning of 1709. A decree of 18 December 1708 gave detailed outlines of the new boundaries, and a series of orders in February 1709 named the new governors and outlined their duties.⁴⁷ They were to acquire the necessary records in Moscow and the localities and start taking control of the finances from the beginning of 1710. Peter even had to restrain Petr Apraksin

⁴⁴ Decrees of 18 December 1707: *PSZ* IV, nos. 2176 (18 December, 1707), 597; 2218 (misdated to 18 December 1708, actually 1707); 436–38; *PiB* VI, 191 (= *PSZ* IV, no. 2108), 550–55; 8/1, 393; 8/2, 1080–82.

⁴⁵ *PiB* VII, 170–72, 750–55; 9/ 30–31, 593–96.

⁴⁶ *PiB* V, 190, 606–07; V. Korsakova, "Gagarin, kniaz' Matvei Petrovich," *RBS* Gaag-Gerbel' St. Petersburg, 1914, 75–82.

⁴⁷ *PSZ* IV, 2218 (18 December 1708, incorrectly dated, see footnote 44, above); *PiB* 8/2, 1080–82; 9/1, 67–72, 91–96.

from starting early. There were other sorts of difficulties, for in the north local authorities refused to accept the new powers of the Archangel governor, Prince Petr Alekseevich Golitsyn.⁴⁸

The *prikazy* and the *blizhnaia kantseliariia* formally remained, the latter through the end of 1709 and 1710 until the establishment of the Senate in early 1711. The *Razriad* had a similar fate, folded into the Senate the same year. The remaining *prikazy* came to be called *kantseliarii*, though some new chancelleries existed (Ingria) as well. More and more business was conducted with the governors, the new Moscow province in particular taking over many functions of the old *prikazy*. The nine governors thus instantly became a new ruling group alongside the heads of the old offices and competing with them. Of the heads of the chancelleries only Golovkin and his foreign chancellery maintained the importance it previously had. Others (Streshnev) became governors or remained clerks (Avtomon Ivanov in the Estates Chancellery). Even the Military Chancellery ceased to be as important as before, since recruitment issues increasingly went to the governors and supplies came to be handled by independent bodies.⁴⁹ The nine governors were a mixed group, but the predominant element was aristocratic.⁵⁰

The governors of 1709

Petersburg	Prince A. D. Menshikov
Archangel	Prince P. A. Golitsyn
Moscow	Tikhon Streshnev
Smolensk	P. S. Saltykov
Kazan'	P. M. Apraksin
Kiev	Prince D. M. Golitsyn
Voronezh	F. M. Apraksin
Azov	I. A. Tolstoi
Siberia	Prince M. P. Gagarin

All but three of these men were aristocrats. Streshnev and Saltykov still had the old boyar title, P. M. Apraksin was an *okol'nichii*, and

⁴⁸ *PiB* IX/1, 102–03, 105, 111, 133, 696–98, 717–19.

⁴⁹ *Blizhniaia Kantseliariia: PiB* IX/1, 457, 468; Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 28, 86–98; Avtokratov, “Voennyi,” 232.

⁵⁰ LeDonne, “Ruling Families,” 256; *PiB* IX/1, 67–72. Miliukov asserted (*Gosudarstvennoe*, 478, note 2) that Tolstoi was Admiral Apraksin's subordinate and that there were only eight *gubernias* from the start. On 18 February 1709, however, Peter sent descriptions of the provincial boundaries to both F. Apraksin and Tolstoi, clearly indicating two different provinces.

became one of the last to get the rank of boyar in 1710. Streshnev and the Apraksins were relatives of the tsar, as was Saltykov. As first cousin of Tsaritsa Praskov'ia, he owed his high rank more to that fact, since he and the tsaritsa came from the junior line of Saltykovs who had not been prominent before her marriage to Tsar Ivan.

Most of the governors also had had a connection with the tsar's household. The two cousins, the princes Golitsyn, belonged to the pinnacle of the aristocracy, Prince Petr being the younger brother of Prince Boris Golitsyn, the Naryshkin faction leader of the 1680s. By 1686 both of them were chamber *stol'niki* of Tsar Peter. At the end of the decade both were diplomats, Petr in Vienna and Dmitrii in Constantinople.⁵¹ The two Apraksins had become chamber *stol'niki* of Tsar Fyodor when he married their sister early in 1682, and transferred to Peter by 1686, Petr attaining the rank of *okol'nichii* in June 1689.⁵² P. S. Saltykov had been a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsar Ivan Alekseevich from 1682 until he acquired boyar rank in 1691.⁵³ Streshnev and Menshikov had also been part of the tsar's household, as was Tolstoi through his wife, for he had married Maria Apraksina, the sister of Tsar Fyodor's second wife (and of Petr and Fyodor Apraksin).

The two governors of more humble origin (Gagarin and Tolstoi) seem to have been clients of the great. Both Gagarin's and Tolstoi's fathers had been provincial governors, but Gagarin's family never rose above *stol'nik*. Tolstoi's father managed to make Duma gentleman in 1668 and *okol'nichii* in 1682.⁵⁴ While Petr made a diplomatic

⁵¹ Golitsyns: RGADA, f. 210, op. 2, d. 36, boiarskaia kniga 6203–204 gg. [1694–6], ff. 20v–21; [Ivanov], Alfavitnyi, 92–93. Prince Dmitrii's brother Mikhail, later the prominent general, was also a chamber *stol'nik* in that year. Mikhail served in the Semenovskii guards, first distinguishing himself at Nöteborg in 1702. Prince Dmitrii was sent to Venice to study in 1697 and briefly to Istanbul as ambassador in 1701. By May 1704, he had become the *ober-kommissar* of the Russian troops in Saxony, a position that was ended with Augustus' withdrawal from the war at the end of 1706. Peter appointed him governor first of Belgorod and then Kiev in January 1707. When Prince Petr Alekseevich (1660–1722), the younger brother of Prince B. A. Golitsyn, became a chamber *stol'nik* to Peter in 1686 he was also the wealthiest of all the 1,938 men of that rank, with 1,029 peasant households on his estates. He went to Venice in 1697 as well, and to Vienna in 1701, staying there until November 1704. He became governor of Archangel in March 1709. *PiB* I, 134, 415–16, 432, 611, 858; III, 203–04, 614; IV, pt. 2, 1165; V, 56; Airapetian, "Stol'niki," 78; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 286.

⁵² RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7, l. 105; boiarskaia kniga 10, 86v, 87v.

⁵³ RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 7, l. 115v; boiarskaia kniga 10, l. 77v.

⁵⁴ Tolstoi and Gagarin: Barsukov, *Spiski*, 84, 151, 184, 272; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 196; *RBS*, "Gagarin, Kniaz' Matvei Petrovich"; *PiB* IV, 191, 978.

career, Ivan was appointed to Azov in 1702 after serving that year as an adjutant to B. P. Sheremetev at the field marshal's request. The Tolstois never had a household appointment, though Ivan's wife, the Apraksin sister, gave them a connection here. If I. A. Tolstoi kept up his relationship with Sheremetev, that makes two of the governors with patrons, the other being Menshikov's favorite, Gagarin.⁵⁵ The new gubernias were not merely larger units or a new structure for local administration. What Peter had done was to devolve much of the responsibility for government from the central administration to the new governors. While foreign policy and the army remained centrally directed and under the tsar's personal supervision, financial and judicial matters became the affairs of the governors. These new governors not only had new responsibilities, they marked a new balance of power with the aristocracy. Peter had placed aristocrats at the heads of most of the nine new provinces. By leaving Ingria (St. Petersburg) under Menshikov and giving Siberia to Menshikov's client Gagarin, the tsar ensured that the aristocrats were balanced by his own favorites. The new arrangement's personnel signified a compromise, but one that tilted the balance toward the aristocracy in comparison with the domination of the favorites in 1699–1708.

THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The new balance in the government gave Peter political stability, but day-to-day throughout 1708 the tsar remained preoccupied with the movements of the Swedish army and the revolt on the Don.⁵⁶ The latter, the most serious episode of popular rebellion in the reign, began in October 1707, when Kondratii Bulavin and a few hundred cossacks attacked a military detachment sent to register and return runaway serfs in the Don area. The colonel in command of the detachment, Prince Iurii Vladimirovich Dolgorukii, was killed when

⁵⁵ *PiB* II, 24–25 (Sheremetev asks Peter for I. A. Tolstoi as an adjutant), 98; 5, 611. On the Tolstois, see "Tolstoi, Ivan Andreevich," and "Tolstoi, Petr Andreevich," *RBS* Tobizen-Totleben, New York, 1991, 64–65, 79–95; and Ol'shevskaiia and Travnikov, eds., *Puteshestvie*, 251–91 (to be used with caution). Ivan Tolstoi died in 1713, shortly after returning Azov to the Turks.

⁵⁶ On Bulavin see *Krest'ianskie i natsional'nye dvizheniia nakanune obrazovaniia Rossiiskoi imperii: Bulavinskoe vosstanie 1707–1708 gg.*, *Trudy istoriko-arkheograficheskogo instituta Akademii nauk SSSR* 12, Moscow, 1935; E. P. Pod'iapol'skaia, *Vosstanie Bulavina, 1707–1709*, Moscow, 1962. GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland, 22 December 1707 NS, Moscow, the beginning of the Bulavin revolt.

the cossacks defeated his detachment (9 October 1707).⁵⁷ The defeat and death of the Prince was followed by the defeat of Bulavin and a lull in the revolt. Bulavin and a few followers fled to Zaporozh'e. When they returned to the Don at the end of the winter, the revolt heated up again. Peter appointed Prince Vasilii Vladimirovich Dolgorukii, the dead man's brother and "a gentleman much in the Czar's favour," to command the troops he was sending to suppress the revolt. In this, Vasilii Dolgorukii was successful: his army defeated the rebels in June and shortly after (8 July 1708) Bulavin was killed by his erstwhile followers. The persistent rumor was that he had committed suicide.⁵⁸

While it lasted, the rebellion was a serious problem for Peter, and he dealt differently with it than with the earlier revolt in Astrakhan'. Against the Astrakhan' rebels in 1705 the tsar sent the aristocrat Sheremetev in spite of his own persistent distrust of Sheremetev's military talents and the rivalry with Menshikov. Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, though also an aristocrat, had risen through proximity to the tsar, for he was not only a major in the Preobrazhenskii guards but in the months prior to his appointment was an adjutant to Peter himself.⁵⁹

The Bulavin revolt, together with rumblings on the Volga, aroused all sorts of fears of a more general rising in the face of the approaching Swedes. That this general rising never occurred does not change the fact that it represented a real worry. Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn's reports from Kiev claimed that while in Zaporozh'e, Bulavin had tried to arouse support and that the Zaporozhian

⁵⁷ Peter learned of the revolt by 3 November 1707 from Prince D. M. Golitsyn in Kiev: *PiB* VI, 145, 429–31. Prince Iurii and his subsequently more famous brother Vasilii were both captains in the regiment of Fyodor Balk in November 1703, and by 1707 Iurii was commander of his own regiment while Vasilii had served as a major in the Preobrazhenskii Guards. *PiB* II, 280–81; 5, 309, 419, 587, 706. Fyodor (Friedrich) Balk's regiment was formed in 1700 and renamed the Voronezh Infantry Regiment in 1708: Rabinovich, *Polki*, 36–37.

⁵⁸ Pod'iapol'skaia, *Vosstanie*, *SRIO* 50, 9 (Whitworth to Harley, 5/16 May 1709 on Prince V. V. Dolgorukii).

⁵⁹ In January 1708, Peter sent V. V. Dolgorukii with various messages to General Repnin, commander of one of the main Russian detachments in Lithuania facing the Swedes. *PiB* VII, 5–7, 32.

The grandfather of the two brothers Iurii and Vladimir was Prince Dmitrii Alekseevich (*okol'nichii* 1651, boyar 1671, died 1673), who married the sister of Tsaritsa Maria Miloslavskaia, the wife of Tsar Aleksei. Their father Vladimir (*okol'nichii* 1674, boyar 22 October 1676, died 1701) was thus the first cousin of Tsar Peter: Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia* I, 88–91; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 190, 198; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskii spisok 45 (1701), l. 1.

cossacks had been relatively favorable, but had urged him to get support from the Belgorod Tatars, the mountain Circassians, the Kalmyks, and other peoples along the southern Russian border. He later sent on a message from Bulavin claiming that the Tatars would support him. As Bulavin's followers got as far north as Tambov, Menshikov (whose estates were attacked) began to worry that the flame would spread.⁶⁰

Peter's government was not the only group worried about the revolt. All the foreign ambassadors wrote home regarding their own worries. Keyserling at first was inclined to dismiss Bulavin's force as too small, but by early 1708 he had changed his mind and was taking it seriously. He was not the only one. Keyserling cultivated Peter's "ministers" with the army in Minsk (Golovkin, Shafirov, Prince Grigorii Dolgorukii and others) and wrote:

since the Muscovite Ministers stand in good friendship and confidence with me, they do not much refrain from revealing their concern which consists in extreme worry that if the enemy ever comes to their border, they must fear a rebellion by this very discontented nation and at the same time everywhere to be overwhelmed by the Tatars, Cossacks, and Poles. For this reason they advise the tsar not to avoid battle here in Lithuania.

Bulavin's revolt could become part of a general collapse of the Russian state like the Time of Troubles. Keyserling continued to report on the Don revolt in almost every one of his dispatches.⁶¹ Other ambassadors were not so lucky: Pleyer had great difficulty with his mail for the first half of the year, and was able to send out a

⁶⁰ *PiB* VII, 207–09, 425–26, 532, 587, 597 (ADM to Peter, calling for action "chtoby siu iskru do velikogo plameni ne dopustit'," 3 April 1708), 601, 611.

⁶¹ *GSAPK* I, Rep. XI, Rußland, 18a, 1708; 22 December 1707, Minsk (Keyserling discounts Don revolt); 19 January 1708, Minsk (revolt flares up again); 14 February 1708, Minsk ("weil [die Moscovitische Ministri mit mir] in guter Freundschaft und Confidence stehen [so scheuen sie sich] nicht sehr [mir ihr Anligen zu entdecken] welches in der eußerster [sorge besteht das wann der Feind] einmahl [bis an ihre Gränzen kommet sollte sie dann einen allgemeinen Aufstand von der sehr mal-contenten nation] und zugleich von den Tatern Cosacken und Pohlen] überall [accabliret zu werden befurchten müssen]. Weßwegen sie dann auch [dem Tzar] eyfrigt [rahten eine bataille noch hier in Lithauen] nicht [zu evitiren]."); 10/21 March 1708, Moscow, (Bashkir revolt continues); 31 March/11 April 1708, Moscow (defeat of Bashkirs, Kalmyk khan Ayuka aids Russians); 21 April/2 May, Moscow (Bulavin's rebels will not get to Moscow); 28 April/9 May and 5/16 May, Moscow (Bulavin's men reach Tambov, Dolgorukii sent against him); 12/23 May 1708, Moscow (Prince G. I. Volkonskii defeats some rebels); 9/20 June 1708, Moscow (Bulavin's movements); 16/27 June, Moscow (more troops against Bulavin and Bashkirs); 23 June/4 July 1708, Moscow (Bashkirs negotiate); 7/18 July 1708 Moscow (Don rebellion continues); 21 July/11 August 1708, Moscow (Dolgorukii defeats Don rebels).

more detailed report only in July, noting both the Kalmyk ruler Ayuka's help to Peter against the rebels and the danger Bulavin posed with the approach of the Swedish army. Grund seems to have chosen to accent the bright side in his reports through the spring, recounting the events but stressing every positive development.⁶² The full seriousness of the events came upon him in June, when he and Pleyer began to hear rumors that a revolt in Moscow was planned on Sts. Peter and Paul's day, directed against the *pribyl'shchiki*, the farmers of the taxes. From then on Grund took the event much more seriously, and reported in greater detail.⁶³ The Bulavin revolt turned out to be only the most serious manifestation of genuine popular discontent.

The unrest among the people was matched by murmurings at the top, mainly directed at Menshikov. In January, "the most eminent and reasonable" ministers noted that Menshikov had been warned that the tsar was looking into his finances, and wondered how long he could continue to deceive Peter. A few months later, at the council of war in Beshenkovichi (east of Wilno) of 3–10 March, Peter asked Menshikov for his views on the strategy to confront the Swedish army as it moved east toward Russia. Menshikov proposed strategic retreat to the border, harassing the Swedes all the way, but also for an independent cavalry corps commanded by himself. Sheremetev opposed the independent command for the favorite, but had no overall plan to offer. Peter went with a modified version of Menshikov's proposal, leaving him the independent command but requiring closer coordination with Sheremetev's infantry. The story that reached Moscow was that Sheremetev and the ministers tried to convince him that Menshikov lacked the courage, experience, and firmness needed for military command. Peter ignored them, calling forth the old charge that the favorite had used supernatural means

⁶² HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 20: 23 January 1708, Moscow (Bashkir revolt); 12 July 1708, Moscow (obstruction of mail, danger from the Don rebels as the Swedes approach, Ayuka sends troops to help). TKUA Rusland, B45, 25 January 1708, Moscow (news of Dolgorukii's death and beginning of revolt); 21 March 1708 (Bashkir revolt quelled); 2 May 1708, Moscow (rebels on Don and Volga quiet); 16 May 1708, Moscow (rumor that rebels near Azov and Taganrog have collected again); 20 June 1708, Moscow (Bulavin writes to Peter demanding old payments); 4 July 1708, Moscow (submission of Bashkirs).

⁶³ TKUA Rusland I, B45, 11 July 1708, Moscow (end of rebellion on Don, fears of revolt in Moscow, relief that it does not materialize); 25 July 1708, Moscow (Dolgorukii reports definitive defeat of rebels); 1 August 1708, Moscow (death of Bulavin). Keyserling reported the rumor of the planned revolt in Moscow as well, giving Pleyer as his source: GSAPK I, Rep. XI Rußland 18a: 30 June/11 July 1708, Moscow.

to ensure the tsar's love for him.⁶⁴ The tsar also caused discontent among the "princes and boyars" because he ordered them to send men to build houses in St. Petersburg, enrolled their sons in the army as private soldiers and sent some to England and Holland to serve as sailors.⁶⁵

The continued ferment and intrigues among the ministers and aristocrats in the first half of 1708 took place against the movement of the Swedish army through the Grand Duchy of Lithuania toward the Russian border. Charles was convinced that Russia was ripe for rebellion, and he began to encourage it, putting out leaflets in Russian encouraging the people to rise against the tsar. Peter in Poland and the Privy Chancellery back in Moscow, under the presidency of the tsarevich, took measures to warn the population against the leaflets and to have them picked up. Coming in February 1708, when Bulavin was still strong, this naturally caused Peter some uneasiness.⁶⁶ No one as yet took any action. Bulavin's only attempt to contact foreign powers seems to have been with Turkey.⁶⁷

Charles had taken Grodno at the end of January, quickly moving

⁶⁴ A. Z. Myshlaevskii, *Severnaia voina 1708 g. ot r. Ulyi i Berezhiny za r. Dnepr*, Materialy dlia istorii voennogo iskusstva v Rossii, St. Petersburg, 1901, 6–39, prilozhenie 3–10; GSAPK I, Rep. XI Rußland 18a, 1708, 19 January 1708, Minsk (Menshikov's finances, his future doubted by "denen vornehmsten und vernünftigsten [Ministris]"); 10/21 March, Moscow ("[Die Moscovitische Ministri] und der Feld Marschall Cheremetoff auch nicht unterlaßen [von der guten occasion zu profitieren und den Tzar die nöthige repraesentationes zu thun] wie es [dem Fürsten Menschikoff an fermeté. experience, courage und] aller anderen einem [general] nöthiger [qualitäten fehlete so zwang sich doch der Tzar seinen chagrin nur innerlich zu verbeißen und] bemühet sich nicht wenig [die offenbahre fehler seines favoriten] bey den anderen [zu entschuldigen] welche dann auch darüber [den Muth sincken lassen und nur stillschweigende ihr unsicheres sort abwarten müssen] wohl sehende, daß [der Tzaar sein selbst nicht mächtig und] auß [übernaturlichen Liebe vor dessen favoriten] zu keinen [recollection zu kommen] noch heylsam [Rathschläge anzunehmen vermögend seyn].")

⁶⁵ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland, 18a 1708, 14/25 April, Moscow ("Kneesen und Bojaren" ordered to build houses in St. Petersburg, discontented over their sons' service as privates and sent as sailors to England and Holland); *PiB* VII, 121–22, 142–43, 633. One rumor that seems to have circulated more widely was that Prince Boris Golitsyn would once again be put in charge of the Volga, or at least relations with the Bashkirs, since they preferred him as a more conciliatory administrator. GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland 18a, 1708, 23 June 4 July 1708, Moscow (Bashkirs quiet after Peter assures them that B. A. Golitsyn will administer them); TKUA Rusland, B45, 21 March 1708 NS, Moscow (B. A. Golitsyn appointed over Bashkirs again). In November 1708, Golitsyn was clearly in charge of the Kazan' Chancellery, but the published correspondence relates mainly to the Kalmyks, and continued into 1709: *PiB* VIII/1, 305; VIII/2, 956–58; IX/ 83–84, 139, 187, 195.

⁶⁶ *PiB* VII, 77, 411–18.

⁶⁷ *PiB* VIII/2, 428.

on to Smorgoń. After a few weeks rest he moved into Minsk. With his departure from Minsk toward Mogilev on 7/18 June, the campaign really began. For Peter the situation was not good. To be sure, he could now be fairly certain that the Swedes would not move north toward Pskov to cut off St. Petersburg. At the same time, he retreated before them in accord with the plan worked out in Żółkiew and Beshenkovichi and the retreat was messy. At Golovchino (Hołowczyn) on 3/14 July Charles attacked Repnin's corps suddenly and badly mauled it. The Swedish king touted it as a major victory, and both Repnin and Lieutenant General Chambers were court-martialed and degraded in rank as a result.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the Russian army did not break and even continued to improve. A small battle at Dobroe (30 August/10 September) showed the Swedes that their opponent was gaining experience. The English captain Jeffreys, who accompanied the Swedish army, wrote home to London:

The Swedes now own the Muscovites have learnt their lesson much better than they had either at the battles of Narva or Fraustadt, and that they equal if not exceed the Saxons both in discipline and valor, 'tis true their cavalry is not able to cope with ours, but their infantry stand their ground obstinately. . . .⁶⁹

This did not portend well for Charles.

By this point the Swedish army was not in good shape. It had marched for hundreds of miles east through countryside always sparse in settlement and food and largely burnt over and stripped of useable provisions by the Russians. The continuous small encounters drained their supply of ammunition. By 10/21 September, however, Charles had finally reached the Russian border at the village of Starishi. There he stopped on the road to Smolensk. In Charles's plans, as the French diplomat attested so often, this was the crucial moment, for the Russians were supposed to rise against Peter at the first sight of the Swedish army. Nothing happened, and indeed Charles faced only a burned-over landscape, Peter's army, and the circling Kalmyks and Cossacks, harassing his flanks and rear and draining his army of troops and precious supplies. Löwenhaupt, with the relief column and supplies from Riga, was weeks away.

⁶⁸ Myshlaevskii, *Severnaia*, 100–86; *Trudy Russkogo voenno-istoricheskogo obshchestva*, I, St. Petersburg, 1909, 153–82; Tarle, *Severnaia*, 158–67.

⁶⁹ Ragnhild Hatton, ed., *Captain James Jeffreys's Letters to the Secretary of State, Whitehall, from the Swedish Army 1707–1709*, *Historiskt Magasin*, 1 volymen, *Historiska Handlingar* 35/1, Stockholm, 1953, 59.

Charles turned south, toward the Ukraine, on 14/25 September. Whether he knew for certain that Mazepa awaited him we cannot know, but he must have known that the probability that the hetman would join him was very high. He did not wait for Löwenhaupt to join him, in retrospect a fatal error, but a perfectly logical move for a man counting on revolt and treason within Russia to bring him victory. As Charles struggled south with his army, Peter moved to intercept the supplies coming from Livonia. Taking the two guards regiments and Menshikov with the cavalry, he managed to catch Löwenhaupt at Lesnaia (28 September/9 October 1708). As victories went, it could have been greater: the larger part of the Swedish army escaped, but strategically it was a disaster for Charles. Peter captured all of the supply train, and even the escape of most of the Swedish troops south was a mixed blessing. Charles had more troops, but also more mouths to feed and more guns to load, with no extra supplies.⁷⁰

The rejoicing was not universal. While Peter had commanded the infantry himself and Menshikov the main cavalry (with separate corps under Lieutenant-General Bauer), Sheremetev was left with the main army watching Charles. After the battle he sent a message to his son in Moscow, which was immediately passed on to Keyserling (confirming that the Sheremetevs remained one of the main sources of information for the Prussian). The field marshal complained that the victory was not so great, that the tsar had taken all his best troops and that 8,000 Russians had been killed or wounded. This latter figure was a wild exaggeration: the actual casualties, killed and wounded, were only about half that number. Gloomily the field marshal predicted a fresh battle soon to come, and in Moscow the story was that Mazepa had sent 30,000 cossacks and perhaps the Russians with their help would simply blockade the Swedes in Gomel'.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Tarle, *Severnaia*, 185–214.

⁷¹ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland 18a, 27 October, 7 November 1708, Moscow “[die] letztere [von dem Tzaare gewonnene Victorie eben] nicht [so groß seyn musse] alß mann selbige [alhier publiciren laßen] solches [haben nun] auch auß [einem von dem Feldmarschall Cheremettoff] selbst [an seinen] allhier [kranck liegenden sohn geschriben und mir en confidence] communicirt worden brieffe mit mehrerem vernommen [und ist] selbiger [von] folgenden [inhalt: Wier haben zwar eine victorie wieder General Lewenhaupt erhalten] doch [kostet uns] selbige auch nicht [wenig] denn [unsererseits gleichfals bis acht tausend theils geblieben] theils [blessirt worden und weil der Tzaar mire die beste und] älteste [trouppen hierzu abgenommen] gehabt [so hat] auch nicht [verhindert werden können daß der Kön. in Schweden nicht bis Starodub in unsere gräntzen eingedrungen] wäre, bevorab

What actually happened was quite different. Mazepa with some 8,000 cossacks moved toward the Swedish army on the Desna river, giving the impression that his movements were by Peter's orders. On 25 October, 1708, he crossed the river with only half of his cossacks and informed the Swedish generals that he was going over to the side of Charles XII. Menshikov found out the next day, and immediately informed Peter. The tsar was stunned: "We received your letter on the totally unexpected evil occasion of treason from the Hetman with great astonishment." Mazepa had dispersed the Russian troops in the area, and not mobilized most of the Ukrainian cossacks, leaving only a garrison loyal to him in his capital, Baturin. Menshikov moved in with speed, taking and destroying the town already on 2 November. Peter moved quickly to secure the election of the colonel of the Starodub regiment, Ivan Skoropads'kyi, as the new hetman. The Ukrainian cossacks, including most of the officers, did not follow Mazepa. Four senior officers (*heneral'na starshyna*), Pylyp Orlyk, Chuikevych, Lomykovs'skyi, Sulima, and four of the ten regimental colonels, Horlenko (Priluki), Zelens'kyi (Lubny), Mokiev'skyi (Chigirin), and Apostol (Mirgorod), followed him, though Apostol soon returned to Peter's side with the *heneral'nyi khorunzhyi* Ivan Sulima. The peasants rose against both Swedish requisitions and their own local officials. Within a few weeks, the Mazepa crisis had largely passed.⁷² Charles and Peter both took

[da der Tzaar mir auch] außdrücklich [verbotten vor seiner] zurtückkunft [die Schweden nicht anzugreifen. Der General Lewenhaupt soll doch sechs à sieben tausendt mann zu seinem Könige durchgebracht haben. Ich stehe] anjetzo [nur eine Meile von Feinde und wann die trouppen so der Tzaar bey sich hat zu mir kommen werden] so glaube ich daß es noch wohl bald wiederumb zu einer neuen bataille kommen dörfte." Otherwise Keyserling heard in Moscow that Mazepa's 30,000 troops had arrived and that the Russians would block up Charles at Gomel'.

⁷² Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, 16, 626–69; *PiB* VIII/1, 237 (27 October 1708, Peter to Menshikov: "Pismo vashe o nechaiannom nikogda zlom sluchae izmeny getmanskoï my poluchili s velikim udivleniem"); Borys Krupnyts'kyi, "Shvedy i naselennia na Ukraini v 1708–1709 rr.," *Mazepa: Zbirnyk*, Pratsi ukrains'koho naukovoïho instytutu 47, Warsaw, 1939, 13–23; Ohloblyn, *Mazepa*, 331–45; V. E. Shutoi, *Bor'ba narodnykh mass protiv nashestviia armii Karla XII: 1700–1709*, Moscow, 1959. Kurakin testified to the peasant rebellions in the Ukrainian hetmanate in his autobiography (written c. 1710): *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, 1, 281–82.

Others of the cossack *starshyna* also made it back to the Russian side, including the *heneral'nyi osavul* Hamaliia: Ohloblyn, *Mazepa*, 335–36. Ohloblyn argued (*ibid.*, 312–13) that Mazepa's support among the cossack officers was greater than appeared. Kostomarov believed that Mazepa was isolated among the elite as well as the people: Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie sochinenii*, XV, 640–43, 651–52, 657.

winter quarters in the Ukraine, watching one another and maneuvering for position.⁷³

The first months of 1709, while Peter was reorganizing Russia's government, were relatively quiet among the army command. In January there was some dissension among the officers, especially among some of the German mercenary officers. They were tired of the war, afraid for the future, and did not like the winter quarters where they had to pay for subsistence. Peter gave extensive leaves to some to get rid of them. Two of them, Major General Mikosch and Brigadier Stolz, eventually left to join Leszczyński some months later. Both of them appear to have been cavalry officers under Menshikov's command.⁷⁴ These incidents did not help to keep the army stable, but they also do not seem to have had any connection with intrigues or dissension among Russian commanders or high dignitaries.

Such dissension did arise, or at least Peter was afraid it would. In January, Keyserling reported that Peter did not trust too much in his successes of the fall, and that "the internal ferment in his country troubles him and especially after the unexpected defection of

⁷³ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 20, 16 November 1708, Moscow (news of Mazepa's defection to Charles); 12 December 1708, Moscow (news from the armies); GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland 19a, 1708/1709, 10/21 November 1708, Moscow (news of Mazepa's defection, Peter's countermeasures, Keyserling's opinion that Mazepa might succeed); 17/28 November 1708, Moscow (Menshikov takes Baturin, success of Peter's countermeasures in the Ukraine); 24 November/5 December 1708; 8/19 December 1708; see also Borys Krupnyts'kyi, "Z donesen' Kaizerlinga 1708–1709 rr.", *Mazepa: Zbirnyk*, II, Pratsi Ukrain's'koho naukovoho instytutu 47, Warsaw 1939, 25–30; TKUA Rusland, B45, 21 November NS 1708, Moscow (defection of Mazepa, aiming at sovereignty over Kiev and the Cossack land); 12 December NS 1708, Moscow (spies report that Charles will try to link up with Don rebels); 26 December NS 1708, Moscow (armies in winter quarters).

⁷⁴ TKUA Rusland I B45, 23 January 1709 NS, Moscow ("great disunity" among the generals, many foreign officers think the situation is too dangerous); 30 January 1709 NS, Moscow (Mikosch and Stolz released. Grund also reported that Lt. General Pflug and von Kirchen had been given extensive leave to go home for six months. In fact, Pflug was sent on a diplomatic mission to King Augustus. Von Kirchen, the Lt. colonel of the Preobrazhenskii guards, did have a leave from which he was recalled in February. Grund also reported completely erroneously that Brigadier Ifland had been arrested). All of these men seem to have been cavalry officers (except von Kirchen) and thus normally under Menshikov's command. Grund's reports seem frequently to come from sources close to Menshikov. See *PiB* VIII/2, 430, 650, 653–5, 670–72; IX/1, 85; 9/2, 675, 962. GSAPK I, Rep. IX, Rußland 19a, 1708–1709, 5/16 January 09, Moscow (Russian and foreign generals tired of war, latter want to quit since they must live in winter on money as there is nothing to plunder). Krupnyts'kyi, "Z donesen'," 32. Peter was very careful about plundering in Ukraine that winter. A number of officers were shot for plundering in Romny: *PiB* VIII/2, 1033; IX/1, 10; IX/2, 538–39.

Mazepa he begins to doubt the loyalty of almost all his Princes and Boyars," and was himself getting tired of the war to boot.⁷⁵

Whatever doubts he may have had in January, Peter soon shook them off. He spent most of the winter in Sumy, giving orders to the army and reorganizing Russia's government and provinces. He then went off in the spring for an inspection tour of Voronezh and Azov. The dissatisfaction among the officers in January seems to have abated by the spring. More contentious points came up between Peter and Sheremetev, who had been sent in February with the Preobrazhenskii guards and some cavalry to dislodge the Swedes from Gadiach and other towns. Peter was dissatisfied with a raid on Swedish forces in Rashevka which led to the death of one of Peter's adjutants, an incident that seems to have no political overtones. Perhaps more political, at least potentially, was the dispute between tsar and field marshal over measures against Zaporozh'e. After he went over to Sweden, Mazepa sent emissaries to the Zaporozhian cossacks and received support on 12 March not only from the Koshevoi (Zaporozhian) hetman Kost' Hordienko but also from most of the rank-and-file cossacks on the Dniepr. This was a much better result than in the Ukrainian hetmanate itself, and gave Charles and Mazepa a short-lived hope of greater local support, climaxed in a treaty between Sweden and Hordienko at the end of March.

Peter immediately ordered Sheremetev to cut off communication between Zaporozh'e and the Hetmanate, occupying the districts in the south toward Zaporozh'e, around Perevolochna along the Vorskla river. Peter repeatedly had to press the fieldmarshal to actually detach the troops and get them moving, and ultimately it was the expedition Menshikov sent down the river to the Zaporozhian headquarters (the Sech') that quashed the movement. Sheremetev's delay looks like his usual dilatory behavior, always too slow for the tsar, rather than anything else, but it must have made Peter nervous. The field marshal argued (besides various technical difficulties) that the Zaporozhians were in any case not such a great threat,

⁷⁵ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland 19a, 1708/1709: 20/31 January 1709, Moscow ("Vielmehr ist mir nur allzwohl bekannt, daß [der Tzaar seinem] in verwichenem Herbst [gehabtem Glücke] nicht allerdings [die fernere Betändigkeit zutrauet, die innerliche Unruhe in seinem Lande besorget und] absonderlich nach [unvermutheten Abfall des Mazepa die Treue] fast aller [seiner Kneesen und Bojaren] in Zweyffel [zu ziehen anfanget,] auch sonst [des Krieges schon so müde und überdrüssig ist, daß er] dahero [die persuasion zum Frieden] mehr mit plaisir als [Wiederwillen anzuhören sich disponiret findet.]"), Krupnyts'kyi, "Z donesen'," 33.

for the colonel of the Mirgorod regiment, Danylo Apostol, had told him that they would not stick with Sweden, for most of them were opposed to Hordienko and only out for loot. Whatever the reasons, Peter's forces dealt with the Zaporozhians quickly and with small detachments of troops. They were pushed out of Perevolochna and the Sech' fell to a Russian expeditionary force on May 14.⁷⁶

News penetrated to Moscow that Menshikov did not always support Sheremetev's moves as he should have, as well as reports that many cavalry officers, presumably loyal to Menshikov, were similarly uncooperative with the field marshal. There was also a rumor that Anton Devier, one of Menshikov's adjutants and a Portuguese Jew by origin, had secretly brought notice to the tsar of various unspecified misdeeds of the favorite.⁷⁷

The situation of the two armies radically changed on 1 April when Charles brought his forces to lay siege to the town of Poltava. As the Swedes gathered around the town for a regular siege, Sheremetev informed Peter of the new situation (4 May). As it became clear that Charles had committed himself to a major action, Peter ordered the Russian forces to assemble across the Vorskla river from the town (9 and 15 May). Ten days later they arrived. In the next month there is no more talk of dissension in the Russian officer corps. Peter himself arrived to take charge, and the Russian army moved to a fortified camp on the west side of the Vorskla River (where lay Poltava and the Swedish camp), north of the town. In the

⁷⁶ Kostomarov, *Mazepa*, *Sobranie sochinenii* 16, 669–79, 681–83; Ohloblyn, *Mazepa*, 345–52; *PiB* 9/1, 30–31, 97–98, 117–18, 123–24, 128, 151, 191–92; 9/2, 667–68, 745–46, 756–60, 762–65, 767–70; 778–80, 822–24, 904–14.

⁷⁷ TKUA Rusland I, B45: 6 March 1709 NS, Moscow (Sheremetev's household expects he has something ahead of him); 13 March 1709 NS, Moscow (Menshikov's Adjutant-General Baron von Heyden informs Grund of the situation); 20 March 1709 NS, Moscow (Sheremetev's attempts to cut off Charles at Gadiach not supported by Menshikov); 27 March 1709 NS, Moscow (previous story confirmed, but at "Regefka"). GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland 1708/1709: 26 March/6 April 1709, Moscow (cavalry officers under Menshikov disobey Sheremetev); 31 March/10 April 1709, Moscow (K reports that Bauer told "meinem guten freund auß der Armée" that "ein gewißer Portugiese [nahmens Anton] welcher gar jung in dies land gebracht und [bey dem Fürsten Menschikoff in der Moscovitischen Religion aufgezogen worden] auch deßen [confidence ihme so wohl] zu erwerben gewußt [daß er sich] in einer zeit von dreyen jahren [vom Cammerdiener bis zum Obristen von] gedachten [Fürsten Leib garde avanciret gefunden]" had gone secretly to Voronezh to warn Peter of Menshikov's "viler unverantwortlichen Sachen." "Anton" is obviously Devier. There appears to be no confirmation of the story of Devier's trip to Voronezh, but the other information about him is accurate. Devier had earlier brought the news of Golovchino to Peter: Myshlaevskii, *Severnaia*, 181.

Sheremetev attributed his lack of use of the cavalry (at Rashevka, instead of the Preobrazhenskii guards) to their poor mounts and many new recruits: *PiB* IX/2, 769.

early morning of 27 June Charles marched his army north toward the Russian camp, meeting heavy resistance from hastily built Russian field fortifications and then Menshikov's cavalry. At about ten o'clock in the morning the Swedes had regrouped and wheeled eastward to face the Russian camp, where the infantry stood under Sheremetev's command. Peter brought the Russian infantry out in front of the redoubts. Charles ordered his men, in perfect eighteenth-century fashion, to move forward toward the Russian line, into Peter's guns and waiting lines of troops. The Swedes had done it so many times before; and it had always worked, they had broken their enemies. This time, the Russian lines held. As the Swedish line wavered, Peter ordered the Russians to charge, and the Swedish army collapsed, most of it running in panic back to the camp. It was not yet noon. The Russians pursued them methodically, chasing them down the Vorskla to Perevolochna, where Charles hoped to find boats to cross the Dnieper west into Poland or Ottoman territory. The boats were gone. The Swedes were trapped, and nearly the whole of Sweden's field army surrendered to the Russians. Charles escaped with his entourage and guards across the river to five years of exile among the Turks. Sweden had ceased to be a great power, and Peter enjoyed the greatest triumph of his life.⁷⁸

Poltava was in virtually every respect the turning point of the war. More than most battles, it decided not only the outcome of a war but also the outcome of Peter's reign, for it enormously strengthened his hand. As for most other monarchs of the early modern era, nothing did as much for his power and prestige as stunning military victory. The outcome of the campaign also revealed that the endless oppositional talk among the aristocrats was not going to lead to actual treason or dealing with the enemy. Peter certainly had some fear that such things might occur. His reaction to the Swedish leaflets in early 1708, and his reported brief despair over the potential disloyalty of the Russian elite in the wake of the Mazepa affair, demonstrate such worries. That Mazepa should arouse such fears about the Russian aristocrats is not as strange as it might seem, for Peter knew very well that ties existed between Russian boyars and

⁷⁸ Tarle is unreliable on Poltava, mixing accounts of varying origin: Tarle, *Severnaia*, 383–437. See Peter's own account in *PiB* IX, 227–28, 258–76; N. L. Iunakov, *Trudy*, IV, v–vii, 161–90; and Peter Englund, *Poltava: berättelsen om en armés undergång*, Stockholm, 1988, which unfortunately uses only Swedish sources.

Ukrainian cossack officers. He must have remembered the alliance between Samoilovych and the Naryshkins in the 1680s, and that of Golitsyn and Mazepa in 1687. The Samoilovych clan was also related by marriage to Sheremetev, and it was Sheremetev who seems to have shared his oppositional notions with the Ukrainians more than any other of the Russian aristocrats.⁷⁹

Whatever ties the field marshal may have had in the Ukraine, Sheremetev ceased to be the object of hope among discontented aristocrats after Poltava. In the years that followed immediately on Peter's victory, oppositional talk seems to have quieted down, and is much less prominent in the reports of the diplomats. The prestige of Peter's victory and subsequent successes in the Baltic provinces played a role in calming the grumbling, but other factors were at work. Around this time Peter began to show favor to Prince Vasillii Vladimirovich Dolgorukii, an undoubted aristocrat, who for a while came to equal or exceed Menshikov in influence. The establishment of the new gubernias, a whole new system of government, also returned the aristocrats to greater power than they had exercised in the previous decade. Peter's relations with the ruling elite seemed to be entering a new and more cooperative phase.

⁷⁹ B. P. Sheremetev had connections with the Ukrainian elite from youth, as his father had been *voevoda* in Kiev, and he was attached to the Polish-Ukrainian culture of the area. There are a number of stories of his relations with the Ukrainians from 1701–02 as well as the comments attributed to him in the Orlyk letter. Bantysh-Kamenskii, "Istochniki," *ChOIDR* 1 (1859), pt. 2, 29–30. Kostomarov, *Mazepa, Sobranie*, XII, 520; "Pis'mo Orlyka k Stefanu Iavorskomu," *Osnova* (September 1862), 1–29; original in RGADA, f. 6, d. 153, ll. 1–43. Though frequently used by historians of Mazepa, the letter has never been subjected to a thorough analysis. Translation: Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Eighteenth Century*, Boulder, CO, 1981, 178–205. The only historian to explore in detail Sheremetev's Ukrainian connections is Ohloblyn, *Mazepa*, 281–83, unfortunately relying on the evidence of the early nineteenth-century *Istoriia Russou*, a Ukrainian political-historical tract.

The Senate and the eclipse of Menshikov, 1709–1715

After Poltava the pace of change quickened. From the first of the year 1710 the new gubernias were in place and operating, and early in 1711 Peter established the Senate in place of the Privy Chancellery. Henceforth the Senate was the center of Russian government, and Peter directed most of his important correspondence and decrees to that body. Furthermore, the years from 1710 saw the rebuilding of a court, this time on the European model, that formed much of the setting for Russian politics.¹ In the war with Sweden these years were ones of continuing success, the conquest of the Baltic provinces and Finland, along with the acquisition of allies in Denmark and Prussia in addition to the old Saxon–Polish alliance. These were also the years of the pinnacle of Menshikov’s power and his fall from grace in the scandals that began in summer 1713.

Temporarily a new coalition at court challenged his influence and power, and seemed to be poised for victory. The leaders of this coalition were the Dolgorukiis, above all Prince Vasilii Vladimirovich, Peter’s trusted adjutant, and his uncle Prince Iakov Fyodorovich in the Senate. Around them grouped others, including Sheremetev and his family and clients, and eventually Iaguzhinskii, all of whom hated Menshikov for one reason or another. Two events played the major role in the fall of Menshikov after 1713: his conduct of foreign policy during the Pomeranian campaign of that year and Prince V. V. Dolgorukii’s investigation of the corruption on the part of Menshikov and his clients that began at the end of 1714.

¹ Pleyer thought that the reception in the Kremlin on 5/16 February 1710 for the English ambassador Whitworth, who presented Queen Anne’s apologies for the treatment of Matveev in England, was the first really magnificent ceremony he had seen since before the capture of Azov. Pleyer had been in Moscow since 1690: Otto Pleyer, “Relation,” 129–30; Just Juel, *En rejse til Rusland under tsar Peter*, Copenhagen, 1893, 177–84; *SRIO* 50, 316–21.

By the summer of 1715 Menshikov seemed to have been defeated and replaced in Peter's favor by the Dolgorukii clan.

In the immediate aftermath of Poltava Peter had little time to spend on the new governors or similar affairs. The Russian army rapidly moved west into Poland, where Augustus II came back to the throne, entering Poland on 19 August. Leszczyński fled to Pomerania. Peter sent a separate corps under Menshikov after him and the main Russian forces under Sheremetev to Riga, simultaneously ordering Fyodor Apraksin to lay siege to Reval. Negotiations with Augustus, Denmark, and Prussia led to a series of agreements that inaugurated a new phase in the Northern War, one of continued Russian conquest in concert with its old and new allies. In 1710 the Russians overcame both the last Swedish resistance and a devastating plague: Riga surrendered on 4/15 July, Reval on 29 September/10 October.² Even before the victories in the Baltic provinces, Viborg fell to a combined naval and land operation in June. St. Petersburg thus acquired a much better defensive perimeter to the northwest, and the whole of the Swedish Baltic provinces were in Russian hands. Peter wrote to Romodanovskii and the other ministers and governors that "on the left side of the Eastern Sea the enemy has not only no cities, but not a step of land."³ The short-lived war with Turkey in 1711 would only be a parenthesis in this progress in northern Europe.

The conquest of the Baltic provinces also brought a new element into the Russian court and aristocracy, the German nobility of Livonia and Estonia. Masters of the land since the crusades of the thirteenth century, the Baltic nobles had gone with Poland and Sweden following the dissolution of the Livonian Order in the sixteenth century. Swedish conquest, and later Swedish absolutism, had brought all of them outside of the tiny duchy of Kurland (a Polish vassal) under the increasingly heavy hand of the Swedish kings. Poltava indicated the future of the Baltic provinces, and many nobles began to go over to Peter, especially as the tsar confirmed the

² Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 323–54. Peter got Riga in spite of his agreements with Augustus II. In the 1699 treaty with Augustus, Peter had ceded Livonia to him, and in 1709, when the alliance was renewed in the treaty of Thorn (9–10/20–21 October 1709), this provision remained. *PiB* IX/1, 400–07; IX/2, 1273–85; X, 457–60, 774–76. Nevertheless, Sheremetev took the surrender in the tsar's name, over the objections of Löwenwolde, and ordered the people to swear loyalty to their new sovereign Peter. *PiB* 10, 200–01; *PSŽ*, IV, nos. 2277–79, 501–26.

³ *PiB* 10, 361, 363–66.

traditional privileges of the towns and noble corporations in late 1710, after the conquest was completed.⁴ The most important of these Baltic nobles was Gerhard Johann von Löwenwolde, a former ally of Patkul and servant of Augustus II. In 1709 he went over to Peter (swearing loyalty to Augustus even after) and Peter appointed him plenipotentiary and head of the commission in charge of setting up the new order in Livonia. He remained at the post until 1713, at which time he went to St. Petersburg, the first of many Baltic nobles who from this time onward occupied major positions in the Russian empire.⁵

By January 1710, Peter was back in Moscow, celebrating his triumphs and continuing to reorganize the new form of government. He established the general size of revenue from each of the new provinces and assigned it among the four remaining Chancelleries, War, Navy, Artillery, and Foreign Affairs.⁶ Virtually all domestic affairs were now the province of the governors. Through the ensuing year, Peter wrote to them mainly about drafting workers for St. Petersburg and the harbor at Azov, not the endless detailed orders for recruits, ammunition, and military equipment that marked earlier years. The remaining offices disappeared into the Moscow

⁴ *PiB* X, 354–55, 376–77. Peter's policy in the Baltic provinces was thus radically different from his attitude to the Ukrainian hetmanate after Mazepa went over to Sweden. To Ukraine he sent Andrei Petrovich Izmailov, Russian ambassador to Denmark 1700–07, to watch over Hetman Skoropads'kyi, his loyalty, and his foreign correspondence, and to ensure that he made no appointments to high cossack offices without the tsar's approval: Bantysh-Kamenskii, "Istochniki," *ChOIDR* I (1859), 228–30; *PiB* IX/1, 313–14. Izmailov lasted only until late 1710, his replacement being the secretary A. A. Vinius and Fyodor Protas'ev. Skoropads'kyi's position improved somewhat when he married his daughter to Petr Tolstoi in 1718, but after the hetman's death in 1722 Peter appointed an administrative board, the Little Russian Chancellery, to take over the hetman's traditional tasks. Attempts to get the tsar to restore the hetmanate met no success, and earned their instigator, *nakaznyi* hetman Pavlo Polubotok, imprisonment in the fortress of Sts. Peter and Paul. The hetmanate was restored only in 1727, after the death of Catherine I. In these years the Ukrainian colonels seem to have been unpopular with Prince Golitsyn in Kiev, but also with Sheremetev, who even wrote a letter denouncing four of them early in 1713. Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 345–50, 588–96.

⁵ Löwenwolde was an ambiguous character. In the 1690s he publicly professed loyalty to Patkul and the cause of Livonian privileges but provided information to the Swedish authorities. In 1710, while serving Peter, he sent many letters to Augustus II expressing the hope that Livonia would fall to him as specified in the treaty of Thorn. Only after that option closed at the end of 1710 did he seem to settle into service to the tsar. He became steward (Hofmeister) to the wife of the tsarevich, Charlotte, in 1713, and died in 1721: Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 326–27, 332–34, 337–39, 351–53; *PiB* X, 372–76; D. Korsakov, "Levenvold'e, Gergard-Iogann," *RBS* Labzina-Liaschenko, St. Petersburg, 1914, 127–28.

⁶ *PiB* X, 12, 17–18, 24–26, 29, 42–43, 46–47; *PSZ*, IV, no. 2214, 471; no. 2247, 472; no. 2250, 476–77.

province or lost some of their functions. The part of the salt monopoly previously handled by Musin-Pushkin's Monastery Chancellery, for example, was transferred to the main office responsible, the Estates Chancellery, now a unit of the Moscow province, and Musin-Pushkin retained only supervision of the church.⁷ The Privy Chancellery remained as a coordinating body through 1710: the budget for that year was worked out with Peter present in Preobrazhenskoe at a Privy Chancellery meeting on 27 January and 9 February 1710.⁸ Later in the year there are no such records of meetings, but they must have continued: in June Peter ordered Gagarin to discuss a recruitment issue "in the meeting in the Privy Chancellery," which implies they continued to meet with some regularity.⁹ With the new provinces, their attendance must have been smaller, but the institution remained.

It was this combination of the new provinces and the continuing ministerial meetings in the Privy Chancellery which Pleyer described in his 1710 account of the Russian government.¹⁰ Since he left the country for a year at home early in 1710, it reflects the situation of that moment. Pleyer noted the continued existence of the Privy Chancellery, Privy Council or *Geheimrat* in his terminology, but he saw the new governors as clearly more powerful than the ministers in the Privy Chancellery. The new governors, he thought, replaced a system where execution of the tsar's orders had been difficult since the many *voevody* reported directly to the tsar. The new governors came from among Peter's boyars and had power over the other lesser governors, whose mistakes they could correct and whom they could judge.

Pleyer also gave his impressions of the specific tasks that the new governors performed and of some of their political and religious views. Streshnev, he noted, had control over the military office, supply of horses, administration of the province, and the tsar's household and court. He had little to say on foreign policy but was sympathetic to the emperor rather than to France. Of the foreign religious communities in Russia, Streshnev favored the Catholics. Menshikov, in contrast, showed no inclination to support the

⁷ *PiB* X, 106, 398–99, 698–99. Peter continued to write to Musin-Pushkin about the Monastery Chancellery or church questions in 1709 and 1710, e.g. *PiB* IX/1 115, 344; X, 61–62, 462.

⁸ *PiB* X, 24, 42; Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 380–85.

⁹ *PiB* X, 246: "Si ob'iavi v sobranie v Verkhnei kantseliarii" (19 July 1710); *PSŽ*, IV, no. 2266, 484–85, nos. 2268–71, 492–94.

¹⁰ Pleyer, "Relation," 121–22, 134–36.

emperor and was frankly unfriendly to the restored Augustus II in Poland. The favorite, Pleyer thought, was as much out for himself as for the tsar's interest, and showed no sympathy for either Protestants or Catholics. Of Saltykov in Smolensk he knew less. He believed that remaining at Smolensk he had little role in any larger public affairs and followed Peter's inclinations. He was not, in any case, hostile to Catholics. Fyodor Apraksin, he reminded his readers, was also Russia's admiral, and stayed out of other councils of state. He was in Pleyer's estimation "insincere and arrogant" (*falsch und hochfärtig*). His brother Petr was of somewhat better temperament (*ist etwas besseres von Gemüth*) but like Saltykov remained in his province and did not join the councils of state. His views of foreign religions were indifferent. Prince Petr Golitsyn, the former ambassador to Vienna, he knew only to be favorable to the Emperor's cause in European politics and very favorable to foreign Catholics. In his 1710 report Pleyer could say of Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn in Kiev only that he was a former ambassador to Turkey. In his political views Golitsyn was inclined to whoever was the tsar's friend, neither harmed nor supported foreign religions and lived mostly in Kiev. Pleyer encountered Golitsyn more closely on his subsequent return from Vienna and gave a more specific and much less bland portrait. The prince "is considered a monster on account of his brutality and frequently occurring capriciousness, in which he does not spare his own child." Golitsyn's extensive reading and culture had no impact on his behavior, it seems.¹¹

The meeting of the ministers in the Privy Chancellery, which Pleyer called the Privy Council, was much less important. He thought that it dealt largely with specific financial issues, sent troops and munition to the army, and took care of urgent matters while they were being sent to the tsar. The ministers never made final resolutions, preserving that prerogative for the tsar himself. In contrast to the seventeen or so ministers who appeared in the Privy Chancellery in 1707–08, Pleyer named only some eight men: Prince

¹¹ Pleyer substituted a "Prince Cherkasskii" for Gagarin, the *komendant* of Moscow and governor of Siberia. "Prince Cherkasskii" was the *voevoda* of Tobol'sk Mikhail Iakovlevich, in that position with his son Petr Mikhailov from 1697 to 1710: Gazenvinkel', *Sistematicheskii perechen'*, 14. On D. M. Golitsyn see HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 14–25 May 1713: Pleyer held up by formalities in Kiev "von dem russischen gouverneur fürsten Dimitrio Michailowitz Golitzin (welcher wegen seiner Brutalität und manchemahl einfallenden Caprice in welcher er auch seiner leiblichen kind nicht verschonet, für ein Monstrum gehalten wird) . . ."; and Madariaga, "Portrait."

M. P. Gagarin, T. N. Streshnev, I. I. Buturlin, I. A. Musin-Pushkin, Iu. S. Neledinskii, Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii, S. A. (obviously M. A.) Golovin, and A. A. Kurbatov. Though Buturlin's and Golovin's functions (*Zemskii* and *Iamskoi* Chancelleries) were also put under Streshnev, yet they remained in Pleyer's list.¹² Musin-Pushkin was the administrator of church properties because the tsar did not want a new patriarch of the Orthodox church in Russia. Pleyer believed that he was better inclined to Catholics than to other foreign religions, a somewhat more restrained statement than that the Austrian had made in 1702. He supported the Habsburg party in West European international politics. Gagarin, in addition to being Menshikov's favorite and *komendant* of Moscow, was very corrupt. Fined 80,000 rubles, he supposedly said that the fine had cleaned the dung and dust from his strongboxes. He did not involve himself in foreign affairs, and was very insincere (*gar falsch*). On Neledinskii and Golovin, Pleyer had little to say other than to describe their offices, and he was curiously uninterested in Romodanovskii, noting only that he was in charge of the tsar's hunt. Kurbatov's *ratusha* had replaced Prozorovskii's Treasury Chancellery in importance, he claimed, because the latter had been too stingy to Peter in his youth. The *ratusha* was a complex structure that had provided Peter's army with the necessary monies.¹³

Finally, there was the institution Pleyer called the Council of State (*Staatsrat*), which was simply the ministers with the tsar, that is, Golovkin, Shafirov, and Nikita Zotov. Pleyer had great respect for their caution and abilities, and could not make out where they stood in relation to the interest of his master, the emperor. He was very clear that Golovkin and Shafirov owed a great deal to Menshikov. Golovkin, he said, owed his elevation to the tsar alone to be sure, but could not neglect Menshikov if he wished to keep it. Shafirov was also high in the favor of the tsar and Menshikov, and in his detailed understanding of the Russian court and European affairs more capable than his boss, so that Golovkin had come to follow his advice in almost everything.¹⁴

¹² Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 96. Peter did write directly to Golovin ordering him to provide transportation as late as 28 November 1710: *PiB* X, 420.

¹³ Pleyer, "Relation," 122, 136–38.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 122–23, 138–39. In the term *Staatsrat* Pleyer gave institutional form to what was simply an informal gathering of Peter with his secretary and ministers in charge of foreign affairs.

Pleyer left too early to note the appearance of two new faces at Peter's court who were to play a major role in the years to come. Strictly speaking, Prince V. V. Dolgorukii was not new, but it was at this time that he ceased to be merely one of the guards officers who had the tsar's favor and became an important figure at court. According to Prince Boris Kurakin, V. V. Dolgorukii "found his fortune" when Charles XII took Grodno from Ogilvy in January 1706, and Peter found himself in Moscow with only one battalion of the Preobrazhenskii guards. Dolgorukii moved up to major in August–September 1706 when Peter dismissed Ogilvy and put the army under Menshikov and Sheremetev. After his leading role in suppressing Bulavin, Dolgorukii was promoted from major to lieutenant colonel (*podpolkovnik*) of the Preobrazhenskii regiment, making him equal in rank to Mark von Kirchen, a professional soldier who had commanded the regiment since 1706. After Poltava it was Dolgorukii who took the official notice to Tsarevich Aleksei and Prince Fyodor Romodanovskii. Dolgorukii received the rank of major general of the army (keeping the lieutenant colonel rank in the guards, which had a different hierarchy).¹⁵ The prince's new-found favor was on public display at the triumphal entrance into Moscow to celebrate the victory at Poltava on New Year's day, 1710. Peter rode in the procession with Menshikov riding on his right hand and Dolgorukii on his left. Dolgorukii's status received a further enhancement by sheer accident a few months later when von Kirchen drowned after drinking too much at one of Peter's banquets in St. Petersburg, leaving the prince the senior commander of the senior guards regiment of Russia.¹⁶

The other new face at court was another officer of the Preobrazhenskii guards, Pavel Ivanovich Iaguzhinskii. Like Menshikov, Iaguzhinskii was both plebeian and exotic. Iaguzhinskii was born in

¹⁵ On the ancestry of VVD (1667–1746) and earlier service see chapter 7 and *PiB* II, 281; IV/1, 24. Kurakin claimed that both von Kirchen and Dolgorukii *sebe fortunu nashli* [found their fortunes] in January 1706: Kurakin, "Russko-Shvedskaia voina," *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 310. Peter's correspondence confirms that by January 1706, V. V. was a captain in the Preobrazhenskii Guards: *PiB* IV/2 1141; VIII/2, 899; IX/1, 29; IX/2, 1020–22. VVD was married to a Kurakin in 1689 (Maria Fyodorovna, daughter of Tsar Fyodor's *d'adka*) and later to a Sheremetev, a distant cousin of the field marshal: Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 91; "Rodoslovie kniazei Kurakinykh XIV–XIX vv.," *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 359–60. Peter told Juel in July 1710, that he and Dolgorukii were married on the same day and both had the bad luck to have terrible wives (*skams qvinder*): Juel, *Rejse*, 255.

¹⁶ Peter was celebrating the capture of Korela (Kexholm) at the occasion when von Kirchen drowned. *SRIO* 50, 292; Juel, *Rejse*, 140, 288; *PiB* X, 335.

Poland in 1683 and his father was a musician in one of the Lutheran churches in Moscow. He owed his first career steps to the patronage of F. A. Golovin, who made him a page. From 1701 Iaguzhinskii served in the Preobrazhenskii guards, and by 1706 was performing minor personal tasks for the tsar. His first greater promotion came after Lesnaia, where he was made captain and he often served as courier for Peter, including after Poltava, usually carrying letters to the inner circle of the government.¹⁷ When Danish ambassador Just Juel encountered him in June 1710, he was already highly prominent, *kammerdiener* to the tsar as well as captain in his guards.

This Iaguzhinskii was born of insignificant German [*sic*] parents in Moscow, was in great grace with the tsar and that so much that Prince Menshikov hates him very much because of it. But he is already so fast in the tsar's favor that it seems that he might live to the day when he replaces Prince Menshikov in the tsar's affection and favor, especially since the same Prince has in addition many enemies.¹⁸

Thus a new configuration was forming at court just when Peter's triumphal march through the Baltic provinces and southeastern Finland was coming to a close for the winter. Events then took a new turn. Just before Christmas 1710, Peter learned that the Porte had declared war on Russia, and he hurried to redeploy his armies to the south. The news meant not only a new war, but also greater complications for the Russian government. If the war went poorly, anything could happen. Even if Russia were successful, its armies could end up deep in the Balkans and cut Peter off even more than before from the business of running his country. At the time the war broke out, the tsar was already struggling with the combination of the ministers and the new provinces his previous rearrangements had produced. In the autumn of 1710 he had ordered the governors to meet him first in St. Petersburg to discuss the budget for the new year and other matters, then moved the meeting to Riga. The war

¹⁷ *PiB* IV/1, 17 March 1706; VIII/1, 169, 331; VIII/2, 737; IX/2, 1013, 1016; X, 324, 326, 329, 332, 419. V. Fursenko, "Iaguzhinskii ili Iaguzhinskii, graf Pavel Ivanovich," *RBS* Iablonovskii-Fomin, St. Petersburg, 1913, 7–28. Iaguzhinskii died in 1736.

¹⁸ Juel, *Rejse*, 246. Around 1710, Iaguzhinskii also married the wealthy heiress Anna Fyodorovna Khitrovo, which included him by marriage in the clan of Tsar Aleksei's erstwhile favorite. Anna Fyodorovna was the granddaughter of Aleksandr Sevast'ianovich Khitrovo (Duma gentleman 1671, *okol'nichii* 1676, died 1686). His father Sevast'ian was the first cousin of the favorite Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo. Anna Fyodorovna turned out to show serious signs of mental illness, and in 1723 Iaguzhinskii divorced her, marrying G. I. Golovkin's daughter Anna: Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Russkaia*, II, 317–20, 322; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 197; Fursenko, "Iaguzhinskii," 8, 23–25.

with Turkey moved all operations southward, and in early 1710 Peter met with the resident ministers in Moscow, complaining that the governors never sent him their financial statements on time, if at all. They were generally dilatory. "They imitate the crawfish in the course of their affairs, for whom the deadline is Thursday in the first week, so I am going to deal with them not with words, but with my hands." One of the principal offenders was Menshikov: "I know nothing about your province, as if about another country," wrote the tsar.¹⁹

Keyserling, in one of his last reports before he left in summer 1711, described the tsar's difficulties with the governors. Even during carnival and Ash Wednesday, Peter had not omitted

to diligently continue the councils with the ministers and governors from the provinces on the necessities for the war, and although the above-mentioned governors make good promises to pretend to provide on time everyone his due in men and money, so the tsar seems not to count on this securely since the assurances made by these governors come more from fear of the tsar's vigorous disgrace than that these dues fully agree with the possibilities of their provinces.

The problem, he continued, was that the provinces were so distant and the recruits would never make it to the army in time, so that Peter could scarcely collect more than 40,000–50,000 soldiers to fight the Turks.²⁰

¹⁹ *PiB* X, 342–44, 398–400, 431, 440–41, 442–43; XI/1, 35, 45, 58 ("gubernatory zelo raku posleduiet v proiskhozhdenie svoikh del, kotorym poslednii srok v chetverg na pervoi nedele, a potom budu ne slovom, no rukami so onymi postupat"), 60–61, 70 (19 February 1711, PI to ADM, "o vashei gubernii ni o chem ne vedaem, budto o inom gosudarstve").

²⁰ *GSAPK* I, Rep. XI Rußland 21a (1711): 15/26 February 1711, Moscow: "Ihr Czar. May. nahan inzwischen doch nicht unterlaß, auch bey dessen bißher stets vorgefallenen Gastereyen, mit Ihren Ministren und denen Gouverneurs auß den Provinzien, die Consilia, wegen der aufzubringenden Kriegs benötigungen, fleißig zu continuiren [und obzwar erwehnte Gouverneurs gute promessen thun einjeder dasjenige so von Ihm an Volck und Geld praetendiret worden zeitig beyzuschaffen so scheint es doch das der Tzar darauf keine] sichere [Stat] darauf [zumachen] habe [weil die von denen Gouverneurs geschehende] vertröstungen [mehr aus furcht vor des Tzaren] vigoureusen [Ungnade] herrühren alß daß solche [mit dem Vermögen ihrer Gourvernements] völlig überstimen solten. [Die grosseste difficultät ereignet sich] deßfals mit [aufbringung der recruieten, weil die Provinzien so weit] außeinander gelegen, daß [es den Gouverneurs fast unmöglich fallen] will [von den eloignirten orten die Mannschafft in so] kurtzer zeit [zu der Armée fourniren zu können] wannmehr dann [der Tzar wohl schwerlich in dem stande sein] dörrfte [mit angehender Campagne mehr als vierzig à] 50,000 [Mann regulirter Troupen gegen die Türken ins Feld zu stellen] zumahlen da [der Tzar auch ein Corps regulirter Troupen so wohl in Astracan] alß auch [an den Tanais strohm gegen die Tartarey] zurück behalten muß." Keyserling's figures were exact, for in his army in July Peter had about 45,000 men: Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 382.

The situation with recruits was indeed serious. After the devastating plague in the Baltic provinces in 1710, Peter's army was way under strength, and he demanded 12,000 men for the field army and 10,000 for units stationed in Livonia. As of 1 February Menshikov in St. Petersburg, Saltykov in Smolensk, and Apraksin in Kazan' had supplied their quota, but Archangel, Siberia, and particularly Moscow had failed to meet the deadline, especially for the field army (Kiev and Azov had very small quotas, which they met). Keyserling, who was in Moscow at the time and had extensive contacts with the Sheremetevs, reported that Peter was so angry at Streshnev, Prince P. A. Golitsyn, and Prince Gagarin that he clapped them in irons and put them in prison for two days, after which their friends persuaded him to release them. The tsar, he commented, had to keep after these people, or there would be no end to their improprieties and delays.²¹ Peter was so enraged at the failure to provide recruits for units in the Baltic provinces, five months after his orders to do so, that he threatened to punish the governors "like traitors and betrayers of the fatherland."²² In the tsar's absence things could only get worse.

Peter found the solution to these problems on 22 February 1711. He decreed the establishment of the Senate to conduct the business

²¹ GSAPK I, Rep. XI, Rußland 21a (1711): 5 March St. N. 1711 [= 22 February OS], Moscow: "Einige Gouverneurs auß den Provinzien haben diesen Tagen, wegen saumseiligen Beyschaffung der Recruiten, und auch der, zu remontirung einiger Regimenten, nöhtigen Anzahl Pferde, einen harten stand halten müßen, unter welchen der Gouverneur von Moscau, Tzchin Mikitewitz, der von Archangel Knees Galitzyn, und der von Syberien, Knees Gagarin mit schweren Gefängnüß und Feßeln belegen gewesen, worauß sie doch nach 2 Tagen durch vermittelung ihrer guten freunden befreyet worden, da sie dann nachgehends, so fort eine gute Anzahl Pferde gelieffert, und auch wegen der Recruiten gute Promessen gethan. Ihre Czaar. May. finden sich genöhtiget, gegen diese Leute bißweilen rechten Ernst blicken zulaßen, weil sie sonst von Ihrer malversation und Trägheit nicht ablaßen, und bey ihnen nohtwendig Timor Domini Initium Sapientiae seyn muß." Keyserling heard news of the Russian army "[auß dem Hause deß General FeldMarschall Cheremetoff]"; 3/14 May 1711, Moscow. The English agent Weisbrod wrote to London 22 February/5 March 1711: "Last Saturday on the 24th the Czar caused three lords to be impeached and put in prison among the common rogues, viz.: the governor of the province of Moscow, Tichon Nikitowitz; the governor of the garrison of Moscow and the province of Siberia, knias Gagarin, and the governor of Archangel and the district belonging thereunto, knias Galitzin. It is said the chief reason to be that their several recruits of men and horses were not ready at the time appointed; but the first was released the same evening in consideration of his age upon intercession; the second Sunday, and the third Monday following." Weisbrod also heard that Golitsyn would be removed and Vasilii Ershov sent in his place, and that Bogdan Gagarin, the vice-governor of Moscow, was also in trouble. Peter had briefly imprisoned the two Gagarins the previous year for failing to provide for the Swedish prisoners: *SRIO* 50, 292, 409–10.

²² *PiB* XI/1, 54 ("iako izmenniki i predateli otechstva").

of government in his absence. A week later (2 and 5 March) a series of decrees defined its responsibilities and powers. All of Peter's subjects in his absence were to obey the Senate as if it were himself. The Senate itself was to conduct a just court and punish unjust judges. It was to look after the state's finances and eliminate unnecessary expenses while collecting taxes, "for money is the artery of war." It was to draft young noblemen and literate servants into the army. It was to administer and look after bills of exchange, the farming of state monopolies of goods (especially salt), and the trade with China and Persia. Peter ordered the senators to sit in the order he named them and to make unanimous decisions, and finally he established the system of *fiskaly*, the first of many institutions borrowed from Sweden. Headed by an *ober-fiskal* named by the Senate, the *fiskaly* were to look for wrong-doing in the courts and the collection of taxes and report it, collecting half of the fine if the complaint were upheld. They were also to publish all the decrees of the Senate.²³ Few decrees of Peter's were to be of equal importance as the establishment of the Senate, and few were to be as controversial as the institution of the *fiskaly*.

The Senate in 1711 was not a random group of lesser officials. The list of nine senators whom Peter appointed began with two familiar names, Musin-Pushkin and Streshnev.²⁴ The former now acquired a political importance far greater than he had had before as the head of the Monastery Chancellery. Streshnev had always been a major figure, in the *Razriad* and then the Moscow gubernia. Now he was a senator, and Vasilii Ershov was appointed to administer the Moscow gubernia. After Streshnev came Prince Petr Golitsyn, whose gubernia of Archangel also acquired a new head in the form of Kurbatov, with the title of vice governor. The next in order was Prince Mikhail Vladimirovich Dolgorukii, a figure about whom virtually nothing is known other than his rank: chamber *stol'nik* and captain in the Preobrazhenskii guards. Besides his rank, we know only that he could not sign his name, for Grigorii Plemiannikov signed it for him.²⁵ Prince Mikhail Dolgorukii had one

²³ *PiB* XI/1, 72–73, 99–104; *ŽAI* I, 197–205; S. Petrovskii *O Senate v tsarstvovanie Petra Velikogo*, 30–37, 98–156; *PSŽ*, IV, nos. 2321, 2327, 2331, 2342, 2407; 627, 642–44, 652–54, 719–20; *Istoriia . . . Senata*, I, 47–344; Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 28–41, 240–69.

²⁴ *ŽAI*, 197–98.

²⁵ In 1703, with his brothers Iurii and Vasilii, Prince M. V. Dolgorukii was a captain in the regiment of Fyodor Balk: *PiB* II, 281. Prince Mikhail does not occur again in Peter's correspondence or any other known sources until he was appointed senator in 1711. After

crucial qualification: he was the brother of one of the new favorites, Prince Vasilii Vladimirovich Dolgorukii.

Prince Mikhail Dolgorukii played little role in politics and could only have been his brother's creature. The five senators coming after him in order were also the creatures of someone, not independent actors like Musin-Pushkin, Streshnev, and Prince Petr Golitsyn. Grigorii Andreevich Plemiannikov (1658–1713) had held only the rank of *stol'nik* in the 1690s and from 1700 had worked under Fyodor Apraksin in the admiralty. Since he signed for Prince M. V. Dolgorukii, it is reasonable to conclude that he had some connection with the prince and his more important brother.²⁶ Prince Grigorii Ivanovich Volkonskii had been governor of Iaroslavl' province (including Tver' and some other towns) since 1703, which put him under Menshikov when the new provinces were established. He seems to have been Menshikov's creature.²⁷ Mikhail Mikhailovich Samarin (1659–1730) entered the Senate with the army rank of general military paymaster (*generalkrigstsal'meister*), a position estab-

1711 his fate followed that of his brother Vasilii, exile in 1718 and in 1730. He was married to Evdokiia Iur'evna Odoevskaia and died in 1750: V. Korsakova, "Dolgorukov, kniaz' Mikhail Vladimirovich", *RBS*, Dabelov-Diad'kovskii, St. Petersburg, 1905, 543–44. His inability to write has caused historians to assume that he was illiterate: Petrovskii, *O Senate*, 50; *Istoriia . . . Senata*, I, 644. It was highly unusual for a military officer to be illiterate, and in spite of his more than eight years of military service Russian historians have never considered the possibility that he had sustained a wound in battle that prevented him from writing. His "illiteracy" is a presumption, not fact. M. D. Rabinovich, "Ofitserskie 'Skazki' i posluzhnye spiski nachala XVIII v.," *Aktovoe istochnikovedenie*, Moscow, 1979, 108–22.

Ershov was a *pribyl'shchik* and former serf of Prince Mikhail Iakovlevich Cherkasskii, and had worked in the Palace Chancellery since 1704. In 1710 he headed a separate office for cavalry uniforms: *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 270; N. Pavlov-Sil'vanskii, *Proekty reform v zapiskakh sovremennikov Petra Velikogo*, Zapiski Istoriko-filologicheskogo fakul'teta imp. S.-Peterburgskogo universiteta 42, St. Petersburg, 1897, 93–94; Avtokratov, "Pervye," 184–85. He seems to have been appointed not only to stand in for Streshnev but to replace Prince Bogdan Gagarin, (M. P. Gagarin's nephew), whom Weisbrod reported about to fall into disgrace about the same time and who disappears from the record after February 1711.

²⁶ B. Garskii, "Plemiannikov, Grigorii Andreevich," *RBS* Plavil'shchikov-Primo, St. Petersburg 1905, 67; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 321.

²⁷ *PiB* XI/1, 363. Iaroslavl' and Tver' were included in the Ingrian province of Menshikov: *PiB* VI, 551–52.

The princes Volkonskii were a prolific clan, with some thirty-five males in each generation in the seventeenth century. Eight were in the Duma at various times, though only one lived long enough to make boyar (several became *okol'niche* at the end of the century, and thus did not have the opportunity). Many never achieved high rank. Prince G. I. Volkonskii was only a *stol'nik* from 1688 and his father, Prince Ivan Timofeevich, held the rank of *striapchii* from 1629 until 1686, when he too became a *stol'nik* and then disappeared from the record. The grandfather, Prince Timofei Mikhailovich, was a Tula gentleman promoted to Moscow gentleman, who died in 1636/37. Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 259–60; *Alfavitnyi*, 75, 77; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 26, 181, 184, 186, 197, 205, 207, 212.

lished in 1708. Samarin had never risen above *stol'nik* in court rank, but had served in virtually every Russian war since the Chigirin campaign of 1677. More importantly, he was Sheremetev's adjutant from 1703 to his new appointment in 1708. Soon after, he was sent to Moscow to run the Chancellery of Uniforms as well. Samarin never became a major figure, and gradually Peter moved him into the supervision of construction in and around St. Petersburg. The best interpretation of his position in the Senate was as the contact for Sheremetev.²⁸

Another such Sheremetev contact may have been Quartermaster General Vasilii Andreevich Apukhtin. His father's rank had only been that of Moscow gentleman and he himself was only a *striapchii* in 1686, moving up to *stol'nik* in 1689. In 1702 Sheremetev proposed Apukhtin for promotion to colonel of dragoons, but Peter rejected the idea. Vasilii Andreevich soon joined supervision of the mint to his other duties, and his peculation earned him punishment as part of the great corruption case of 1714–15. In 1711 Apukhtin's only known contacts were with Sheremetev.²⁹ Nazarii Petrovich Mel'nitskii, head of the Military Chancellery, was totally obscure, for in spite of his position in the Military Chancellery he does not appear in Peter's voluminous correspondence on military affairs. He disappears from Senate records in 1712.³⁰ Finally, the secretary of the new Senate was to be Anisim Shchukin, previously the head of the Ingrian Chancellery, and thus one of Menshikov's closest collaborators. Peter was perfectly aware that he was taking personnel from Menshikov's province in appointing Volkonskii and Shchukin, and did the favorite the courtesy of personally informing him.³¹

The opening of the campaign against Turkey brought with it a return of the Sheremetev–Menshikov rivalry, which seems to have

²⁸ P. Samarin, "Samarin, Mikhail Mikhailovich," *RBS* Sabaneev-Smyslov, St. Petersburg, 1904, 131–33; *PiB* VIII/1, 63–67; VIII/2, 542–44; 10, 19; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 366. Samarin's duties in supplying uniforms replaced those of the Ingrian Chancellery in 1704–08, which continued to supply some regiments with uniforms, along with the Chancellery for cavalry uniforms under Ershov: Leonid [archimandrite], "Petrovskie i drugie bumagi," *ChOIDR* (1874), 2, smes', 12–19; Avtokratov, "Pervye," 183–85.

²⁹ Barsukov, *Spiski*, 433; *PiB* II, 15; XI, 43; Rummel' and Golubtsov, *Rodosloynyi*, I, 84; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 506; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 307.

³⁰ Petrovskii, *O Senate*, 50; *Istoriia . . . Senata*, I, 123; *PiB* II/1, 383. Presumably Mel'nitskii was in charge of the Military Chancellery, since it grew out of Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii's chancellery of 1700, which he was unable to direct as he fell into Swedish captivity at Narva. When Mel'nitskii took over is unclear.

³¹ *PiB* II/1, 106. The Ingrian Chancellery to be located in the "Potesnnyi dvor" (Preobrazhenskoe) under Anisim Shchukin: *PSZ*, IV, no. 2191 (4 March 1708), 403.

lain dormant the previous year. The Habsburg ambassador Weltzeck, clearly using Pleyer's Sheremetev connections, reported that Menshikov, now that he was in charge of the new provinces, took all the recruits and tax revenues in order to show the tsar how indispensable he was.³² During the course of the campaign, Menshikov remained behind in St. Petersburg precisely to look after the new provinces and the new city. Supreme power, however, rested with the Senate, and since Sheremetev commanded the Russian army as it moved into Moldavia, the two rivals were too far apart to create much trouble. In any case, a new star had risen in the court besides Menshikov, Prince Dolgorukii, Iaguzhinskii, and the Senate: Ekaterina Alekseevna, Peter's mistress. The day the tsar left Moscow he publicly announced his intention to marry her. There would be a new tsaritsa, a power that could now be acknowledged and a new source of patronage. The new power also came from years spent among Menshikov's wife, sister, and sisters-in-law, and she would remain firmly in Menshikov's camp to the end of her life.³³

The Turkish campaign was a disaster almost from the start, and on 12/23 July Peter had to sign a preliminary peace with his enemy, giving up Azov but retaining his army and free passage out of Ottoman territory.³⁴ Peter gave up Azov, the great prize of his youth, with a heavy heart, but at least he now had his hands free to continue the struggle against Sweden. Here events moved quickly. In August, just as Peter was extricating his army from Moldavia, the Danes landed in Swedish Pomerania and began to besiege Stralsund. Peter ordered several regiments, including the two guards regiments, north for the campaign in Pomerania and left Sheremetev to watch the Turks while the final treaty was worked out in Istanbul. Peter himself went on west through Poland to Karlsbad to take the waters and recover from the exertions of the summer. He also stopped in Torgau, in Saxony, to be present at the marriage of his son Aleksei to Princess Charlotte of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel.³⁵ Yet another

³² Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 371; This was a considerable exaggeration: the Ingrian Chancellery paid for only about two fifths of the army in 1710–11: Avtokratov, "Pervye," 171.

³³ *PiB* XI/1, 230, 496. GSAPK I, Rußland, Rep. XI, 21a (1711), 26 April/7 May 1711, Moscow, reporting from a letter of Ostermann that Peter "[nebst seinen maitresse] oder vielmehr albereit [declarirte Gemahlin und Czarin]" is near Łuck.

³⁴ Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 362–95.

³⁵ Peter had sent Aleksei to Saxony soon after Poltava. He spent most of the time from then until his wedding in Poland, Saxony, and other German places.

new element entered the court, a new princess, and the possibility that Peter's son might also produce an heir.

While Peter was still struggling in Moldavia against the Turks, he received a letter from St. Petersburg that must have seemed like a bolt out of the blue. On 30 June 1711, Prince Iakov Fyodorovich Dolgorukii wrote to the tsar to announce to him his escape from eleven years of captivity in Sweden. The prince had fallen into Swedish hands at Narva, and had spent years in Stockholm. At the end of the previous year there had been some discussion of exchanging him for Swedish prisoners, and he and other Russian prisoners had been taken north to the Finnish side of the Gulf of Bothnia. In the spring, when the ice melted on the water, the Swedish authorities decided to move them to Umeå, at the head of the gulf. They put them all on a boat at Nykarleby and set sail. Prince Dolgorukii and his companions saw their chance and seized the ship, forcing the captain to take them back south toward Stockholm.

and getting within ten miles of Stockholm, we turned toward the island of Dagö near the Estonian islands which have been conquered by your victorious arms. And our skipper and pilot knew the route to Stockholm, but from Stockholm across the Baltic Sea they knew nothing and had never been there and had no sea charts with them. And we crossed that sea with no knowledge, directed by the ancient helmsman for those who sail in misery, the great father St. Nicholas, and that helmsman took us to the very island to which we intended to come.

Peter wrote back: "I received with great amazement your letter about your miraculous escape from the hands of the Christian barbarians," for the event allowed him to see the prince and use him for the good of Russia. These were not mere words. Iakov Dolgorukii had been the general military commissar before his capture, and Peter immediately restored him to the office. In two weeks the tsar sent him his new orders, but also the news that he would join the Senate. On the same day he also congratulated Prince V. V. Dolgorukii with his relative's escape. He told him the news and added, "and I congratulate you with this. And I was not mistaken, the Dolgorukiis are sea people, as happened in this case."³⁶ Among the small body of senators, this appointment would be crucial, for Iakov Dolgorukii was no one's client. The eldest of the large

³⁶ *PiB* XI/2, 53–54, 97, 381–82.

Dolgorukii clan, he would join Musin-Pushkin, Streshnev, P. A. Golitsyn and his cousin Mikhail Dolgorukii among the Senate's aristocrats. With V. V. Dolgorukii commanding the senior guards regiment and a new favorite of the tsar, the Dolgorukiis had come back into power with greater strength than at any time since 1682.

The Senate came to St. Petersburg at the beginning of 1712 to meet with the tsar for the first time. The result of six weeks of deliberations were no less than thirty-seven decrees to the Senate, covering everything from trade policy to gentry inheritance and the defense of the southern frontier. Peter also defined the powers of the Senate more closely. *Fiskaly* in the provinces and their estates were not to fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial governors, only under that of the *ober-fiskal* and the Senate. Governors were not to impose any taxes without the knowledge of the Senate.³⁷ Peter also made some changes in the governors, for the departure of Streshnev to the Senate left the enormous Moscow province under Vice Governor Ershov. In January Peter appointed Prince M. G. Romodanovskii to the post of governor of the Moscow province with Ershov remaining as vice governor. The prince was an old aristocrat who had been a boyar since 1677 and fought in the Chigirin campaign the next year. The appointment partially restored the proportion of aristocrats among the governors lost by the departure of Streshnev and P. Golitsyn to the Senate. It did not mean that Romodanovskii got on with the Senate, for much of his year in office (he died in 1713) was taken up with conflicts with that body over who could get what staff.³⁸ The Senate then returned to Moscow, and Peter went on to something equally important, his public

³⁷ *PiB* XII, 17–26; ARSG 7367, 1712, 26 January 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (arrival of senators); 6 February 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (Senate busy with new regulation of tolls for Baltic ports); 15 March 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (Senate adjourns without making a new regulation of the tolls). The latter two reports may refer to Peter's order to the Senate to form a College of Commerce, a project that seems to have been abandoned and only came to fruition seven years later. The governors were ordered to send their accounts to the Senate: *PSZ*, IV, no. 2481, 802–04.

³⁸ Romodanovskii held a number of provincial governorships and other posts in the 1680s and 1690s. It was among the troops under his command on the Polish border in 1697–98 that the musketeer revolt of that year began. This incident seems to have put a damper on his career, for his next appointment (1700) was to the short-lived and ineffective commission to revise the law code. By 1703 he had a military command again, and in 1705–08 served as head of the Provisions Chancellery. He commanded an old-style gentry cavalry unit deep in reserve during the Prut campaign and was appointed governor on 23 January 1712. He seems to have died in 1713, and P. S. Saltykov replaced him. Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 201; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy*, IV, 192–95; Mrochek-Drozdevskii, *Oblastnoe*, 37; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 449–51; *PiB* II, 194; III, 367; VIII/2, 530–31; XI, 9, 333; XII, 89.

marriage to Ekaterina Alekseevna, his mistress since at least 1704. The wedding took place without full splendor, since Peter chose to be married as rear-admiral of the fleet rather than as tsar. "Mr Kykin, a lord of the admiralty, and adjutant-general Jagusinsky, two persons in a good degree of favour," invited the guests, which did include the great aristocrats, but at the wedding the roles were divided among the naval officers such as Admiral Cruys, who took the role of Peter's father. The ceremony took place in Menshikov's private chapel, and the banquet in his palace. The Dutch resident Jacob de Bie noted that there was no coronation, as was the custom in western Europe.³⁹ Menshikov's role was appropriate, for the new tsaritsa was a long-time ally and a potential problem for the tsarevich as well. Aleksei had as yet no children, whereas Ekaterina had two living daughters who even played a small part in the wedding. One of them, then only three, was the future Empress Elizabeth. As the girls were too young to last out the ceremony as bridesmaids, their aunts and female cousins took their place, one of them Anna of Kurland. The small chapel thus held three future empresses of Russia.

Once he had attended to these matters, Peter turned to the more pressing matter of the war. While he had been occupied in Moldavia, Frederik IV of Denmark had sent an unsuccessful expedition against Swedish Pomerania. For 1712, with a real Russian contingent and more coordination among Denmark, Russia, and Saxony, there were higher hopes.⁴⁰ Peter gave supreme command of the Russian forces to Menshikov but also went off to Pomerania himself. Prince V. V. Dolgorukii was already in Poland as commander of the guards.⁴¹ Starting in June the Russians blockaded Stettin at the mouth of the

³⁹ The fullest description is Whitworth's: *SRIO* 61, 143–46; *PiB* XII/1, 83, 360–61; ARSG 7367, 1712, 22 February 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (wedding imminent); 5 March 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (description of wedding, "sonder croning"); 15 March 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (Peter orders crowns brought to the new capital, leading de Bie to think there might be a coronation of the tsaritsa). Ekaterina's coronation took place only in 1724.

⁴⁰ There is no satisfactory account of the Russian side of the Pomeranian campaigns. See Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 7–45; Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 239–45, 255–72.

⁴¹ During 1712–14 Sheremetev commanded the observation corps on the southern border, a danger spot in view of the long delay in the negotiation of a final treaty with Turkey, which came only in June 1713. The physical separation and widely different responsibilities of Menshikov and Sheremetev prevented much direct conflict over military issues in the years after Poltava.

Dolgorukii supervised several Russian regiments in winter quarters in Poland in 1711–12, sharing responsibility for provisions with the Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich: *PiB* XI/2, 158, 191–93, 221–22, 425; XII/1, 41–42, 45, 79.

Oder, while the allied forces surrounded Stralsund. Neither siege progressed much, since neither army had heavy siege guns. The bulk of the Danish army went farther west, taking the Swedish possession of Stade and aiming at Bremen and Verden. Then on 13/24 September 1712, the Swedish Field marshal-General Magnus Stenbock landed on the island of Rügen with some 12,000 troops.

The succeeding events were secondary to the larger history of Peter's struggle with Sweden, but formed a major part of the causes of Menshikov's eclipse in 1713–16. Stenbock's expedition started well, but was quickly pushed west into Holstein, defeated in the field, and surrounded until the little duchy's government allowed him to retreat to the fortress of Tönning on Holstein soil just north of Hamburg. Peter, seeing the Swedes' defeat coming, had already left the army in the charge of Menshikov and made his way back to Russia, stopping for several diplomatic exchanges in Hanover, Dresden, and Prussia.⁴²

The Duke of Holstein, Karl Friedrich, was a minor in 1713 and the major figure at the Holstein court was one Georg Heinrich Baron von Görtz (1668–1719), and it was he primarily who made the decision to let Stenbock into Tönning. Görtz was also the broker of Stenbock's surrender in May, at which Menshikov disobeyed Peter's orders. The issue was the division of the prisoners: Peter had ordered Menshikov to take the largest group, as the Russian contingent was the largest among the allies and Peter wanted to use them to exchange for the Russians captured at Narva. Instead, the Saxons, Danes, and Russians received equal numbers of prisoners, and rumors circulated that Görtz had bribed Menshikov to agree to all this.⁴³ Worse was yet to come.

⁴² Over the previous years the little duchy of Holstein had become a major player in northern politics. A loosely bound vassal of Denmark at the end of the Middle Ages, Holstein strove to loosen the Danish overlordship and began to achieve some success from the end of the sixteenth century. Another major step in this direction for the dukes was the marriage of the duke's sister, Hedwig Eleonore, to Karl X Gustav of Sweden in 1654. Thus Sweden, Denmark's mortal enemy, now had an ally in the Danish rear. The result was a series of conflicts, military and diplomatic, lasting through the ensuing decades. In 1702, Duke Frederick was killed fighting for Charles XII in Poland, leaving a minor son, Karl Friedrich, under the care of his uncle, Christian August, the prince-bishop of Lübeck.

⁴³ Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 255–57; Helge Almquist, *Holstein-Gottorp, Sverige och den Nordiska Ligan i den politiska krisen 1713–1714*, Skrifter utgifna av kungliga humanistiska vetenskaps-samfundet i Uppsala 21, Uppsala, 1918, xxxix–l; *PiB* XIII–1, 63–64, 383–86. In an undated (but probably 1715–16) letter to Peter Menshikov confessed that he had taken 5,000 rubles from Holstein, from Hamburg 10,000 chervonnykh and from Lübeck 5,000 of

Menshikov took the bulk of the Russian army to besiege Stettin in the spring, and with heavier guns it was only a matter of time until it fell. While Menshikov conducted the siege the same Görtz went on to negotiate a deal with Prussia to hand over Stettin to the Hohenzollerns under a joint Prussian–Holstein sequestration arrangement for Pomerania to last until the final peace. Peter was happy to give Stettin to Prussia, but Holstein wanted to use the occasion to acquire Prussian support of its claims against Denmark. The city fell to Menshikov in September 1713, and the Prussian army occupied the town but handed it formally to Holstein.⁴⁴ Peter, however, had no intention of supporting the Holstein claims against his Danish ally.⁴⁵

The arrangements over the surrender of Stenbock and the sequestration of Stettin were the first major policy disagreements between Peter and Menshikov. The favorite's moves had exceeded his instructions and endangered the Danish alliance, which Peter regarded as crucial. Moreover, Menshikov lied to Peter, claiming that he knew nothing of the June Holstein–Prussian agreement to support the duke's claims against Denmark. Since Golovkin reported quite differently from Berlin, making it clear that Menshikov knew all about it, and Menshikov's pledge to Holstein to support its interests against Denmark survives in the Russian archives, it must be presumed that Golovkin and Peter knew that Menshikov had lied.⁴⁶ The tsar's reaction was immediate: as soon as he learned the full extent of the Holstein–Prussian agreement he wrote a sharp letter to Friedrich Wilhelm in Berlin refusing to ratify Menshikov's agreements on Stettin unless Prussia pledged in writing to drop the attempt to restore the Holstein dukes' position against Denmark.⁴⁷ Berlin saw one last chance, and sent a joint Prussian–Holstein mission to St. Petersburg to try to convince Peter to change his mind. In this they failed: as earlier, Peter was willing to give Stettin

the same to prevent destruction of the territory. Apparently in the same campaign he took 10,000 kurant-taler from Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 1,000 from Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and 20,000 from Danzig for the same purpose: RGADA, f. 198, d. 49, ll. 1–3v (ADM to PI, undated).

⁴⁴ Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 18–34; Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 253–65; Almquist, *Holstein-Gottorp*, 1–56, 73–117; Hans Bagger, *Ruslands alliancepolitik efter freden i Nystad*, Copenhagen University, Institute of Slavonic Studies, Studier 4, Copenhagen, 1974, 84–98.

⁴⁵ Peter to Menshikov, 19 and 21 September 1713, in Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 21–22.

⁴⁶ *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, II, 87–90 (Menshikov's excuses); Pavlenko, *Menshikov*, 71–75; Bagger, *Ruslands*, 91–92.

⁴⁷ Almquist, *Holstein-Gottorp*, 135–38.

to Prussia, but only without any obligation to support Holstein by Prussia or Russia, and the Prussians had to consent to these terms. The Holstein representative von Bassewitz had trouble even seeing Peter and quickly found that Menshikov was afraid to help him. He only made Peter's suspicion of Menshikov greater, as the mission confirmed Peter's view of Holstein policy which aimed (among other things) at a split between Russia and Denmark.⁴⁸ Peter regarded the Danish alliance as crucial to make up for the weakness of the Russian high seas fleet against Sweden, and in spite of many problems with Frederik, stuck to it.

Simultaneously Peter had been growing suspicious of Menshikov's administration of the newly conquered Baltic provinces and even of St. Petersburg. In May 1711, the tsar rebuked him for making light of the depredations of Russian soldiers in Poland, and in leaving for Pomerania in 1712 he warned Menshikov not to allow similar misdeeds in the coming campaign.⁴⁹ The Baltic situation was more complex. After the Russian conquest in 1710 Menshikov had solicited the tsar for the position of governor-general of the new provinces but Peter resisted. In October 1710, he vested Baron Löwenwolde's commission with supreme authority, also appointing Major-General Iakov Vasil'evich Polonskii as *ober-komendant* of Riga. As Polonskii was Menshikov's "creature" the favorite retained much purely military authority over the area. More serious issues emerged by the time Menshikov and Peter met in Riga at the end of 1711, on their way back to St. Petersburg. In Riga one Metsue controlled all the trade in timber down the Dvina and as Menshikov's factor paid no tolls. Oversight of the trade was in the hands of Polonskii, and since he was the "favorite" of Menshikov, Löwenwolde could not oppose him, leading to endless abuses. In Reval the *komendant* Vasilii Zotov (the son of Nikita) was equally oppressive toward the Dutch, the townspeople, and the local nobility. Even though Menshikov was hostile to the father at court, he tried to make a deal with the son to split the proceeds.⁵⁰ The English envoy Charles Whitworth and

⁴⁸ The only friend to the Holstein projects was Löwenwolde. The rest of the Russian government was frankly hostile: Almquist, *Holstein-Gottorp*, 147–88; Bagger, *Ruslands*, 93–98; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 30–33. TKUA Rusland, B48, 21 November, 9 December 1713 (Senate investigation and Menshikov's desire to have Peter receive Holstein's ambassador).

⁴⁹ *PiB* XI/1, 215; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 500.

⁵⁰ ARSG 7397 Secreta 1700–32, 2 February 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (Metsue and ADM's "gunsteling" Polonskii, Zotov in Reval, Zotov's father is "hoffnar van syne Majt. en voert

others reported rumors that Menshikov wanted to acquire the duchy of Kurland for himself, though Peter's policy in Kurland was simply to support the claims of the widowed duchess, his niece Anna Ivanovna. About this time the tsar finally agreed to appoint Menshikov governor of Estonia and Livonia, adding important new responsibilities to his existing governorship of St. Petersburg province. Löwenwolde was still in charge of his commission.⁵¹

In the Baltic provinces Peter seems to have had relatively little trouble with the *Ritterschaften* (the noble corporations) or with most of the towns.⁵² In Riga, however, the situation in the city was not good, complicated by a new epidemic. Polonskii reported that the Riga citizens were not cooperating with the Russian authorities, hiding Swedish soldiers and guns and hoarding foodstuffs. Peter's response was to appoint a Russian merchant from Moscow, Il'ia Isaev, as president and inspector of the Riga magistracy, with orders to supervise tax collecting and various operations of the port and to require arms dealers to lock up their weapons and sell only to Russian soldiers. Not Polonskii but Isaev, the Senate, and Löwenwolde were to deal with the problems. Whitworth remarked that "several complaints have been made against Major-General Polonsky, who has the chief command of the forces in this town and province, the Czar has let him know that he shall be removed in a little time." This did not happen, but Peter does seem to have entrusted the problems to people other than Menshikov's creature. Whitworth also wrote that Peter had countermanded Menshikov's

den naam van Patriarch, t'is waar dat S. Mt. veel complaisance voor den oude geck heeft, maar daarentegens so weet ik dat de Vorst [=ADM] hem seer vyandt is en soude by gevolge te dugten syn dat hy den soon niet moet toegedaan wesen" but the prince is trying to make a deal with Zotov). On 12 March 1712, Peter reconfirmed Reval's privileges, ordering the Russian official to observe them: *PSZ*, IV, no. 2501, 819.

⁵¹ *SRIO* 61, 117–18, 234–35; *ARSG*, 26 April 1712 NS, St. Petersburg (rumor from Riga that Menshikov took over the duke of Kurland's servants the previous winter, Löwenwolde returns to Livonia to take charge); Wittram, *Peter I*, I, 354–61, II, 79–82. De Bie took a particular interest in Menshikov from the moment he arrived in Russia, perhaps because of the prince's role as administrator of St. Petersburg and the Baltic, where much of the Dutch trade was centered: *ARSG* 7367, 1711, 10 December 1711 [Riga], de Bie to SG (de Bie learns that he must make contact with ADM as governor general of the Baltic provinces); 7367, 1712, 9 February 1712, St. Petersburg (interview with ADM).

Anna Ivanovna (the future empress) married Duke Friedrich Wilhelm of Kurland at the end of 1710, but the duke died at the end of January 1711. She arrived in the Duchy early in 1712.

⁵² Peter did receive complaints early in 1712 from the nobility of Livonia that Löwenwolde did not consult them to the degree which they considered their right: *PSZ*, IV no. 2496, 810–17.

instructions to the "first commissioner of trade," presumably Isaev.⁵³ Thus Peter's relations with the favorite were strained even before the Stettin sequestration incident. Their first major conflict, however, would soon come to turn on Menshikov's massive misappropriation of the revenues of the tsar's treasury for his own purposes. The beginning was the case of Kurbatov and Solov'ev, which erupted in 1713.

The Kurbatov-Solov'ev case was not the first major attempt to correct corruption among the very great. The first was the denunciation filed by the *ober-fiskal* Mikhail Zheliabuzhskii with his colleagues Aleksei Nesterov and Stepan Shepelev on 14 April 1712. The issue that the fiskals raised was twofold. The basis of it was corruption in the salt monopoly: apparently in buying salt from the Stroganovs the state was paying too much and thus making less profit. More serious was that important people in the government were in league with Stroganov and preventing the fiskals from uncovering the misdeeds. These important people were the boyar Aleksei Petrovich Saltykov, whom the fiskals describe as the relative (*svoistvennik*, a relative by marriage) of the Dolgorukiis (plural). In the Senate itself it was Prince Iakov Fyodorovich and Grigorii Plemiannikov (the signer for prince M. V. Dolgorukii) who would not do anything about the corruption and even mocked the fiskals for their efforts.⁵⁴ While there is no evidence that Zheliabuzhskii was connected in any way with Menshikov, Nesterov had worked in the Ingrian (Semenov) Chancellery under Menshikov. A. P. Saltykov, it will be recalled, was one of the ministers present at the councils called in the Privy Chancellery in 1707-08, and it was his wife who was the ring-leader in the wearing of traditional dress and the criticism of Menshikov in the same years. Peter ordered the Senate to look into the salt question, but for the time being did nothing about the delay in the Senate's consideration of the denunciations.⁵⁵ The Dolgorukiis and

⁵³ *PiB* XII/1, 252-60, 555-61; *SRIO* 61, 235; ARSG 7367, 1712, 10 July 1712 NS, Riga (Isaev). The appointment of Isaev was Peter's major violation of the traditional rights of the Baltic provinces during his entire reign: Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 83-89. Polonskii was still *ober-komendant* in Riga in spring 1713, but died by the end of the year: *PiB* XIII/1, 330-31; ARSG 7367, 1713, 13 October 1713 NS, St. Petersburg (mentions Polonskii as dead).

⁵⁴ *PiB* XII/1, 415-16. A. P. Saltykov's son was married to Anastas'ia Dolgorukaia, a distant cousin of Iakov and V. V. Dolgorukii: LeDonne, "Ruling Families," 282-83. Earlier denunciations of Stroganov misdeeds from 1705-10: *SRIO* 11, 179-80.

⁵⁵ *PiB* XII/1, 142. Nesterov was a former serf of Aleksei Khrushchov, and in 1704 had been appointed to farm certain taxes in the Volga area under Prince Boris Golitsyn and later

their clients were safe. Given the hostility between them and the favorite, the future was uncertain.

The first sign of serious trouble for Menshikov came with Kurbatov's complaint in June 1713, at the same time as the Prince of Ingria was carrying out the actions in Pomerania that were to so displease his master. There had been complaints about Kurbatov since his appointment as vice-governor of Archangel in 1711, and he seems to have decided to strike back. He wrote to the tsar accusing the merchant Dmitrii Solov'ev of selling grain to the Dutch in contravention of the law and also to the detriment of the treasury's own trade in grain. Solov'ev was not just any merchant. He and his brother Osip first came to Peter's attention as Menshikov's agents early in 1708, Dmitrii apparently in Russia and Osip already in Amsterdam, in the matter of supplies of tar for the navy. Dmitrii was commercial *ober-commissar* in Archangel by 1710. From at least 1711, Osip was the Russian government's commercial commissar in Amsterdam, and carried out various tasks for the treasury such as the transfer of money and the purchase of various supplies. The third Solov'ev brother, Fyodor, was the steward of Menshikov's estates and property. Kurbatov was clearly striking at Menshikov rather than just the Solov'ev brothers. Major Mikhail Ivanovich Volkonskii of the Semenovskii guards was sent to investigate, but insufficiently for Kurbatov. At the same time the Dutch resident de Bie brought a complaint against the vice-governor himself on behalf of Dutch merchants who claimed that he had mistreated them.⁵⁶

While Kurbatov was trying to get the Solov'evs investigated for their illegal practices, Peter was covertly looking into Menshikov's administration of his province of St. Petersburg, and he chose his son Aleksei to do it. The Danish envoy Peter Falck reported that:

The tsarevich departed from here several days ago by order of the tsar to inquire in what state are the provinces between here and Moscow. It is

worked in the Ingrian Chancellery: *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 270; Pavlov-Sil'vanskii, *Proekty*, 92–93.

⁵⁶ Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 502–04; *PiB* VII, 505; Osip Solov'ev's (1671–1747) official duties, e.g. *PiB* XI/1, 398–99, XII/1, 333–34, XII/2, 438. Dmitrii: *PiB* X, 110–11. The Dutch merchants Hanning and Daniel Pell complained that Kurbatov had confiscated 6,000 rubles they were holding for Russian merchants: ARSG 7367, 1713, 6 August, 20 August, 12 September 1713, St. Petersburg. By at least May 1716, the head of the investigation was Prince V. V. Dolgorukii: Veretennikov, *Istoriia*, 56–58. On M. I. Volkonskii's investigation see Pavlenko, *Petr*, 499–501. Prince Mikhail Ivanovich was a *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Praskov'ia in 1686 and a distant cousin of the Senator Prince G. I. Volkonskii: *Alfavitnyi*, [Ivanov], 76; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnai*, I, 259–60; *SRIO* XI, 279.

claimed that most of them are ruined by the conduct of Prince Menshikov and his creatures. The day before yesterday his majesty the tsar having paid a visit to the crown princess made excuses to her that he had caused the absence of her husband. The princess responded that she was well content to know that the tsarevich's trip had been made by his order, something that the tsarevich had concealed from her. To this the tsar said that he had expressly forbidden the tsarevich to speak of it to anyone but that he wanted to confide to her as to his dear daughter the subject of this trip, that he had discovered that he was served by rogues and traitors, that the greater part of his people deceived him and that no one was faithful enough to him to tell him the truth. This was why he had sent his own son to make a precise inquiry of the state of his country. Since this inquiry is being made particularly in the province of Prince Menshikov it certainly seems that it is against this prince that it is being made. It is assured that he has a lot of important enemies who work at his destruction.

Falck heard all this from Baron Löwenwolde, who heard it from Crown Princess Charlotte herself. Indeed Aleksei was traveling around Novgorod and Staraia Ladoga, though the surviving correspondence refers only to cutting logs for ship timber.⁵⁷

Nothing is known about the results of the tsarevich's investigation of St. Petersburg province. One of the tsar's actions that summer that does seem to be a blow at Menshikov was the creation of the province of Riga, from late 1711 under the favorite's administration. The creation of Riga province was part of a series of reorganizations of the provinces. In March Peter replaced P. S. Saltykov, the longtime governor of Smolensk, with Prince Aleksei Grigor'evich Dolgorukii, the son of Peter's ambassador to Poland. A. P. Saltykov took over in

⁵⁷ Murzakevich, ed., *Pis'ma*, 68–69; TKUA Rusland, B48, 2 August 1713, St. Petersburg: “[Le prince Czarewicz partit d’]icy il y a quelques jours [par ordre du Czar] pour [inquirer en quel estat les provinces entre icy et Moscovie se trouvent]. On veut que [la plupart est ruinée par la conduite du Prince Menchikoff et de ses creatures avant hier Sa Majesté Czarrienne] ayant donné [une visite à la princesse Czarwicz luy fet des excuses sur ce qu’il étoit cause [de l’absence de son epoux. La Princesse repondoit qu’elle] etoit [fort contente de] scavoir [que le voyage du Prince] etoit [fait par son ordre] ce que [le Prince] avoit [caché devant elle.] La dessus [le Czar luy] dit qu’il avoit expressement [defendu au Prince d’en parler à personne] mais qu’il vouloit [bien confier à elle] comme [à sa chere fille le] sujet [de ce voyage qu’il avoit decouvert qu’il] [etait servé par des Schelms et Traîtres que la] plus[part de ses gens le trompaient et] que personne [ne luy estoit assés fidel] pout [luy dire la verité.] C’étoit pourquoy il avoit [envoyé son propre fils] pour [faire une exacte inquisition de l’estat de son pays] comme [cette inquisition se fait] particuliere[ment dans le gouvernement du Prince Menchikoff] semble bien que c’est [contre ce Prince qu’elle se fait.] Il est assure qu’il [a icy force d’ennemis considerables qui] travaillent [à sa perte] c’est [le baron de Lewenwolde qui m’a fait cette confidence et qui l’a de la propre bouche de la Princesse]” Löwenwolde and Iaguzhinskii were Falck's main informants for most news, e.g. TKUA Rusland, B48, 9 June, 4 August 1713.

Moscow on the death of Romodanovskii, seconded by Vasilii Ershov, with whom the new governor immediately began to quarrel. The rumor was that Saltykov got the position by the efforts of Senators Musin-Pushkin and Dolgorukii (presumably Ia. F.). Then in July, Peter established the province of Riga under Prince P. A. Golitsyn, who ceased to serve in the Senate.⁵⁸ Thus the governors continued to be aristocratic in origin, Menshikov was removed from power in the Baltic provinces, another Dolgorukii had joined the group of provincial governors, and a friend of theirs governed Moscow.

In early 1714 the Danish envoy Falck could report to his king: "It is sure, Sire, that this Prince is no more what he was and that the tsar always shows him a good face, it is claimed, however, that his authority diminishes from day to day." Menshikov fell seriously ill that spring but his enormous physical stamina carried him through, and he was much better by the summer.⁵⁹

The prince recovered more than his health that spring. Though Kurbatov survived the conflict with the Dutch merchants with restitution and a fine, the first result of the larger investigation by Prince Mikhail Volkonskii went against him. In May, Peter replaced Kurbatov with P. E. Ladyzhenskii.⁶⁰ Menshikov seemed to have been fully restored to Peter's favor, in spite of Stettin. Perhaps not

⁵⁸ PSZ V, no. 2703, 49. Romodanovskii claimed that the Senate persecuted Ershov as well as himself in 1712. Thus Saltykov's conflict with Ershov seems to be the result of the latter's old conflict with the Senate. Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 451–52. Mrochek-Drozdovskii, *Oblastnoe*, 22, 28. The death of Polonskii in 1713 also further lessened Menshikov's influence in Livonia.

⁵⁹ TKUA Rusland, B48, 7 January 1714, St. Petersburg ("Il est seur, Sire, que [ce Prince n'] est plus [ce qu'il a este et quoy que le Czar luy fait] toujours [bonne mine, l'on voit] pour[tant son autorite se diminue de jour en jour]."; 3 April (illness of Menshikov, Falck suspects it is diplomatic); 7/17 April 10/21 April (Menshikov still ill); 11 May (Menshikov's illness is real); 21 May (Menshikov so ill he received last rites, the general opinion is that he will not live long). ARSG 7367, 1714, 12 and 15 May 1714, St. Petersburg (Menshikov's illness); 9 June 1714 NS, St. Petersburg (Menshikov recovering). Pavlenko, *Menshikov*, 77–78, Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 505–06.

⁶⁰ Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 504–06, 613; ARSG 7367, 1714, 26 January 1714 NS (Kurbatov arrives in St. Petersburg); 2 February 1714 NS, St. Petersburg (Volkonskii heard complaints against Kurbatov from foreign and Russian merchants at Archangel, Kurbatov to be replaced); 16 February 1714 NS, St. Petersburg (the Senate would convict Kurbatov and order him to restore the money and pay a fine, his other misdeeds would be investigated); 14 April 1714 NS (Pell-Kurbatov case drags on in Senate, even though some of the money Kurbatov took turned out to be the tsaritsa's, Kurbatov decides to settle to avoid further harm); 29 June 1714 NS (de Bie complains to Golovkin about Kurbatov's administration of tolls at Archangel and hopes the new vice-governor will have better instructions).

The Ladyzhenskii's were not a distinguished family. Only one, Fyodor Abrosimovich, made Duma rank with appointment to Duma gentleman in 1676. A very distant cousin, Evfim Maksimovich, never rose above *striapchii*, but his son Petr Evfimovich was a chamber

unconnected with Menshikov's return to favor was the disappearance of the tsarevich from any more government duties. After the mysterious mission to inspect Menshikov's province he falls from view until the spring of 1714, when he was first reported (and really was) seriously ill, with an "apoplexy" on the right side of his body. In the summer he went off to Karlsbad to take the cure, first borrowing 3,000 rubles from Prince V. V. Dolgorukii.⁶¹

Thus the summer of 1714 was a quiet one for Menshikov, it seemed.⁶² Early in the year Peter had begun moving the main government offices, including the Senate, from Moscow to St. Petersburg, a move that would not only increase Menshikov's responsibilities, but also his influence on events. Peter took the opportunity to require the Senate to actually keep records of its discussions, and to decide matters by majority vote.⁶³ While Peter and Admiral Apraksin completed the conquest of Finland (begun the previous year) and capped it with the "small, but important" naval victory at Hangö point (27 July/7 August 1714), Menshikov remained in St. Petersburg for the first time in years, nursing his health

stoĭnik to Tsar Ivan and a guards officer by 1707: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 198; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 237; *PiB* V, 596; Rummel' and Golubtsov, *Rodoslovnyi*, I, 484, 486, 488.

⁶¹ RGADA, f. 198, d. 299, ll. 16–16v (6 June 1714, ADM to "Gospodin Kontr-Admiral" [=PI], two days ago AP left for Karlsbad, ADM's fears for his safety); Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 318; TKUA Rusland, B48, 21 May 1714 (illness of Aleksei Petrovich, who is spitting blood); 29 June 1714, St. Petersburg: "Le Prince Royal est parti d'icy avec une suite de 4 à 5 personnes pour aller se servir des eaux de Carlsbad. Son depart a été fort secreté et encore on en fait du Mistere." ARSG 7367, 1714, 5 May 1714 NS, St. Petersburg: AP suffers from "eene specie van Apoplexie op de rechter zyde"; 29 June 1714 NS, St. Petersburg (AP departs for Karlsbad). *SRIO* XI, 59–60.

⁶² The only hint of dispute came at the end of July, involving not Menshikov himself but his ally Tsaritsa Ekaterina. At the baptism of Tsarevich Aleksei's daughter, Margarita, Ekaterina wanted to be one of the sponsors, and Charlotte was agreeable, but Aleksei expressly forbade the participation of the tsaritsa. Peter's sister Natal'ia performed the duties instead: TKUA Rusland, B48, St. Petersburg, 5 August 1714.

⁶³ *ЖА*, 207–10; Petrovskii, *O Senate*, 77, 333–43; HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, Moscow, 28 January/8 February 1714: "Es scheint nun aus allen, daß der Czar seine Residenz künftigt aldar [St. Petersburg – PB] halten werde, weilen all Bojaren, russische herrn, und gemeine leute, auch fast alle handwerker dahin berueffen werden, also daß in kurtzer zeit die statte Moscau gleich alß desoliret und wüst werden wird, die abgebrauchten häuser nicht repariret und aufgebauet werden, die stehenden und alten meist eingehen lassen. Die fürnembsten Senatoren seund auf ordre dahin verreiset, und will man sagen, daß ihre familien auch in sorgen stehen, gleich anderen dahin sich begeben zu müssen, dahin vill menschen wegen der unbeschreiblichen teurung, und villfaltigen wasser gefahren, müeheselligen unterkommen, dafür so grosse menge volk noch so wenig wohnungen erbauet, auch wegen allenthalbigen morasten und stinkenden villen neblen und winder auf der see sehr ungesund luft, alle menschen sich fürchten, und ville gemeine crepiren." Peter also ordered the merchants, Russian and foreign, to move to the new capital. See also Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 63–64; Cracraft, *Architecture*, 180.

and looking after his province.⁶⁴ In Pomerania the siege of Stralsund continued, and Sheremetev remained in the south watching the Turks and Tatars. When Peter returned in triumph to St. Petersburg, he organized a huge celebration in which Menshikov and virtually every other grandee took part. A high point was the promotion of Peter himself to vice-admiral by the now elderly Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii, the *kniaz'-tsesar'*.⁶⁵ In spite of the good cheer, all was not well for Menshikov.

Only a very few days ago [=late September] the tsar asked General [=Prince V. V.] Dolgorukii why Menshikov did not bombard Tönning and heard with attention the story which the General told of the intrigues of Menshikov with Flemming and Baron Görtz. It was the general himself who told me. The enmity between Menshikov and the above mentioned general continues and many people are of the opinion that the latter has the ascendant over the tsar. It is very advantageous for him to only have the prince [=ADM] for an enemy and the latter is to the contrary hated by everyone.⁶⁶

In Falck's report, it was V. V. Dolgorukii who was now leading the intrigues against Menshikov.⁶⁷ At the same time, the prince of Ingria felt that the formal alliance with Prussia reached in the summer had silenced his enemies and put an end to the "persecution" he had suffered since his return from Pomerania.

Now, said his excellency, they are all silent. The sequestration was supposed to ruin me and now the same sequestration is the reason that the King of Prussia, in order to keep the beautiful and well placed city, has made a tight

⁶⁴ TKUA Rusland, B48, St. Petersburg, 20 August 1714: "une petite, mais fort importante victoire." HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 9/20 August 1714, St. Petersburg; P. A. Krotov, *Gangutskaia bataliia 1714 goda*, St. Petersburg, 1996.

⁶⁵ TKUA Rusland, B48, 17 September, 24 September 1714, St. Petersburg; HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 10/21 September 1714, St. Petersburg.

⁶⁶ TKUA Rusland, B48, 4 October 1714 (NS), St. Petersburg: Peter was angry at Prince Vasilii Lukich Dolgorukii, the Russian ambassador to Denmark, for his part in Menshikov's intrigues at Tönning and Stettin. "Il n'y a que fort peu [de jours que le Czar a demandé au General Dolgorouky] pour[quoy Menchikoff] n'avoit pas [fait bombarder Tonningen et] écouté avec attention [le recit que ce General luy fist des intrigues du Menchikoff avec Flemming et le Baron Gortz. C'est le general luy]meme qui me l'a raconté. [L'inimitié entre Menchikoff et le dit General] continue toujours et bien de gens sont d'opinion que [le dernier a l'ascendant chés le Czaar]. Il est fort avantageux pour luy de n'avoir pour ennemi que [le Prince] et celuy cy est au contraire [hais de tout le monde]."

⁶⁷ Another strand in the web of intrigues was the sudden support by Crown Princess Charlotte for the king of Poland's desire for the cession of Livonia. Falck reported that Augustus II's ambassador Count Vitzthum and Löwenwolde (since 1713 the head of Charlotte's court) had convinced her to visit Tsaritsa Ekaterina as an excuse to speak to Peter in favor of the king of Poland: TKUA Rusland, B48, St. Petersburg, 3 December 1714 (NS).

treaty of alliance with his majesty the tsar, these are now the fruits of his bad conduct . . .⁶⁸

Menshikov spoke too soon.

The explosion came at the end of November. Rumors that massive corruption had been discovered circulated throughout the month. The Habsburg ambassador Pleyer reported that funds were running short. The Ambassadorial Chancellery was virtually out of money for its embassies in the coming year. St. Petersburg was ruining the entire country, for many of the workers coming to build the new city died and others ran away. One colonel G. S. Rozhnov from Sheremetev's army in the Ukraine, who had been earlier accused of plundering in Poland, denounced Sheremetev for bribery and other misdeeds and claimed that various great men were involved. Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii, who had jurisdiction as military commissar-general, had to withdraw from the case and more investigation was to be undertaken.⁶⁹ In St. Petersburg information began to come in

⁶⁸ ARSG 7397 Secreta 1700–32, 15 October 1714 NS, St. Petersburg: "Vorder me S. Dt. [=ADM] sprekende over allerley saaken so extendeerde S. Dt. sigh verr over de vervolginge, de naar syne teruggekomst uyt Pomeran, in sonderheyt van Deensche zyde, wegens de Sequester van Stettin hadde uytgestaan. Nu, seyde S. Dt. swygen sy alle. Det Sequester soude en moest my ruineren en nu is het zelve Sequester oorzaak dat de Coning van Pruisen, om de schoone en wel gelegene stadt te behouden, een nauwen Tractat van Alliantie met S. Cz. Mt. heeft gemaakt, daarby voegende, dat syn nu de vruchten van syne quade conduitte; maar wat heeft Denemk. dit jaar gedaan? Niets en maar S. Cz. M. geabuseert, ende nu geen landing in Schoonen doet . . ." The lack of a landing would leave Swedish troops free to attack Bremen or Holstein.

⁶⁹ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 26 November/7 December 1714, St. Petersburg: "Übrigens aber so höret man alhier [von vertrauten leuten, daß der grösste kummer anjezo allhier umb das geld seye, dan in welche man nur kombt, nirgends geld zu finden. Für die Gesandtschaft Canzley] seyndt nun [mehr] als 1700 [species ducaten und] 5000 [rubel und kupfer geld und] hat [von dem Senat von] zwey Jahren her 100/m [zu fordern für Ihrer gesandten ausgaben. Der Senat] saget, er habe [nichts derowegen nun auff das neue Jahr alle gness aus dem ganzen Reich anhero beruffen umb zu rathen wie geldt zu bekommen. Das gantze land ist durch Petersburg ruiniret und halb wüst bey dem] einzigen [rüstungsbaue alhier in Cron Schloß und insel Ritusar bey] 300/m [man von arbeit, hunger, und frost crepiret, theils unterthanen aus Rußland nach der Tartarn] gegen Sibirien [verloffen,] theils [welche man an]hero [in die] Ingermanlandische und finnische [dörffler, und die hiesigen in die Russischen versetzt] hat, seind [beederseits entloffen, und also hier und dort] villerorten [lehr]." The colonel from Sheremetev's army plundered the baggage and villages of a Polish nobleman, even the church, and brought to St. Petersburg, "[Bekennet] er [daß er] schon destwegen [in der Inquisition] gewesen ware, [weilen er nicht] allein [dabey] interessiret, [oder] allein von dem gut genossen, und] so gar [ein und anderer grosser davon participiret], hatte der General Kriegs Commissarius von der sachen ablassen] müssen." The colonel was supposed to meet Sheremetev and Menshikov, and twenty officers were to be sent south to investigate and the tsar was to examine the matter himself. This is clearly the Rozhnov case, which began in 1712 with Rozhnov's arrest and continued with his 1714 denunciation of Sheremetev. The field marshal was very worried

anonymously describing how the treasury was being robbed and who was doing it. Peter put up an announcement promising anonymity and amnesty to anyone who could provide information. As he was working on his ship with his sailors, someone crept in and threw him a note with the names.⁷⁰ The storm clouds were gathering.

Menshikov's name day, was 23 November (OS) the feast of St. Alexander Nevskii, and it had been celebrated as a major festival of the court since 1703. The event took place in Menshikov's recently improved palace on Vasiliev Island, and Falck thought the celebration the most magnificent ever in Russia, even more magnificent than for the name day of the tsar himself. Peter appeared to enjoy it all and gave no hint of what was to come. As the river was full of ice, the evening ended earlier than usual and Peter asked Menshikov to accompany his party back across the Neva to the Winter Palace. When they arrived, Peter immediately took everyone off to the house of one of his English shipbuilders. When he saw Menshikov there he turned on him:

'Well Aleksandr! Today I saw the marks of your faithlessness. I raised you up from nothing but you are raising yourself above me; I knew well that you were robbing me and I permitted it, but now I am well informed that you have not only stolen hundreds of thousands but millions and just this year you have stolen more than a million.' Prince Menshikov wanted to excuse himself and said, among other things, that he saw well that after the complaints which Your Majesty [=the King of Denmark] made against him, the tsar no longer loved him. The tsar responded that he had no more excuse and that he knew very well what he had done in Holstein and that he had not yet pardoned him for it. The tsaritsa wanted to interpose herself, but the tsar told her, 'Madame, this is not your business. I am not angry but I speak the truth and this is in earnest.' Prince Menshikov seeing no other help began to weep and begged his tsarish majesty to take everything, adding these words, 'father, everything is yours.'

about this: Zaozerskii, *Sheremetev*, 13–12, 212; *SRIO* 61, 315. Juel thought in 1711 that Rozhnov was one of the "politest and best" persons he had met in Russia: Juel, *Rejse*, 425.

⁷⁰ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 13 24 December 1714, St. Petersburg: "Was ich letztsen von [einer Inquisition] allerunterthänigst vermeldet hab, so seind [vieler orthen aus gestreute zetteln gefunden, und zum Zaren gebrachte worden, worinnen] geschrieben, [in was, umb wieviel, und wer ihn eine zeither bestohlen und das land ruiniret hat, daß sich die summa auf 570000 rubeln belauffe; der Zar liese alsobald eine schrift affigiren, wer da mit grund und warheit etwas wisse anzuzeigen, der solte es sagen,] er solte [nicht kund werden und eine gnad bekommen; darauf sich einige] unvermerket, [als der Zar bey] seinem [schiffe mit] seinen [Matrosen arbeitete hinschleichte, und wiederumb schriften bey die schiffe] wurffen, [worinnen kurtzlich alles auch die nomina waren.]"

Peter spoke for two hours in front of at least twenty people, so the reports were many. Falck could also report that Peter had not drunk anything that evening. The Dane had sat across from him at the banquet in Menshikov's palace and observed that Peter restrained himself, pleading the press of business.⁷¹

Some weeks later Pleyer gave more details of the two-hour harangue.⁷² In his version, Peter began to speak to Menshikov in anger and said:

You, prince, always build well: at the end of the summer you had half of your house torn down but before the winter it was built up again not like the old one, but better and higher. You also began a guest house at the end of the summer that is bigger than mine, and yours is over half finished, but mine is not.

The tsar had ordered him to finish one of the bulwarks while he was away in Finland with the navy, and when he found it unfinished

⁷¹ TKUA Rusland I, B48, St. Petersburg, 7 December 1714 (NS): "Les derniers jours passés ont été entremelés de festins et des accidents sérieux. Mardy passé étant le jour d'Alexandre le Prince Menchikoff traita dans son superbe Palais qui a été batti et meme achevé en peu de mois. Le festin étoit le plus magnifique qu'on a jamais dans ce pays icy. Les jouissances et les honneurs lesquels on celebra ce jours surpasseront tout ce qu'on a accoutumé à faire aux jours de naissance du Czaar et [sa Majesté Czarrienne parut fort contente et fit semblant d'admirer tout] ainsi [que personne soubconne ce qui arriva le meme soir]. Comme la riviere étoit pleine de glace ainsi qu'elle n'étoit pas à passer sans danger le festin se finit de bonne heure et Sa Majesté en allant nous pria Elle meme pour le jour suivant. [Il pria] aussi [le Prince Menchikoff de passer avec luy] à fin qu les glaces n'empechassent le passage le lendemain. Aussitot [que le Czar étoit de retour il se rendit] aupres [d'un Maître de batiments de vaisseaux Anglois de nation, fut suivi de la Czarrienne et du Prince Menchikoff ayant vu le dernier il luy dit] d'abord [Ha? ien! Alexandre] aujourd'hui [j'ay vu des marques de ton infidelité je t'ay élevé de rien] mais tu t'élève au dessus de moy, J'ay bien] sçu [que vous m'avez volé Je l'ay permis, mais à present] je suis bien informé que [vous ne m'avez pas] seulement [volé des cent milles mais des Millions] et encore cette année [vous m'avez volé plus d'un million. Le Prince Menchikoff] voulant [s'excuser et dit entre] autres choses qu'il voyoit bien que depuis [les plaintes que Votre Majesté] avoit [fait contre luy, le Czar ne l'aimoit plus. Le Czar repondit, qu'il n'avoit plus [d'excuse] qu'il sçavoit tres bien [tout ce qu'il] avoit [fait en Holstein et] qu'il ne le luy avoit pas [encore pardonné. La Czarrienne] voulant s'y [entremettre, le Czar luy dit Madame ce n'est pas votre affaire.] Je ne suis pas [en colère] mais je dis [la verité et c'est tout de bon. Le Prince Menchikoff] ne voyant plus de ressource se mit à pleurer et pria Sa Majesté Czarrienne de prendre tout] ajoutant ces paroles [Mon pere, tout est tien.] Comme [cette scene s'est passé] dans la presence de 20 personnes differents, je n'ay eu de la peine à [estre informé de] susdites [particularités, il s'est dit bien d'autres choses car le Czar a prêché deux heures entiers] mais je me contente de rapporter en toute satisfaction ce que je juge le plus important. Il est necessaire de remarquer que [Sa Majesté Czarrienne n'avoit rien bu ce jour] et j'ay observé moy meme ayant la grace d'estre vis à vis d'Elle à table [qu'il se menageait.] Elle eut encore la grace de nous dire qu'il ne pouvoit pas faire, son tête étant travaillé de diferentes pensées d'importance."

⁷² The Dutch resident de Bie reported the events in virtually the same words. Solov'ev followed de Bie's account: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 505–06, 613.

at his return the builder told him Menshikov had taken all the men and money.

‘You are getting rich, I am getting poor. All the people, the entire land complains against you. You are a robber and a thief. The city of Hamburg has already complained about you, the Emperor and others. If you think that you have taken everything away from me, remember that I still have axe and block and I can have all the thieves executed.’ To which the Prince bowed down and said, ‘Father, everything that I have is yours, take it.’

Admiral Apraksin tried to defend him, joking that,

‘Father, if you want to execute all the thieves in the land then you must also execute your admiral and all your great lords and clerks, for I also stole from you.’ The tsar asked him why he stole, since he had fine estates. He said, ‘I have estates, and from them Apraksin can live but not the admiral, why don’t you pay your officers better so that they can also live.’ At this the tsar was silent and went in another room, and the gentlemen gradually left.⁷³

Peter moved immediately from words to deeds. The next day was the feast of St. Catherine, the tsaritsa’s name day, and it passed

⁷³ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 13/24 December 1714, St. Petersburg: “[In kurtzen tagen darauf, alß die] meisten [von denen grossen herrn bey dem Zaren aufwarteten, sasse er gantz zornig, und fangete] endlich [zum fürst Menschikof also zu reden; du fürst du bawest immer braw darauf; du hast zu ende dieses sommers dein halbes hauß herunter reissen lassen,] es ist aber noch [vor dem winter, nicht] allein nach [dem alten, sondern noch höher und grösser als es vor diesem gewesen, widerumb auffgebawet; du hast einen gast hoff] zu ende des sommers auch [angefangen dir zu bawen, der grösser ist als] meiner [und] deiner [ist] über [die helfte fertig, meiner nicht; ich hab mir ein bolwerken der vestung zu bauen befohlen] noch [als ich in die see Campagne gienge, da du wol weist, daß die vestung zu nutzen der Cron des gantzen lands und Reich gedeyet, und] solches ist noch [nicht fertig; Wan ich den bawmeister frage, warumb er nichts gemacht hat? so saget er du hast alle arbeiter zu deinem bau] genommen, [und] es seye auch kein [geld da; du wirst reich, aber ich arm; alles volck, das gantze land klaget wider dich, du bist ein rauber und ein dieb.] Es hat schon [die stadt Hamburg] auch [der Kayser und andere mehr über dich geklaget; wan du nun aber] schon [vermeinst, daß du mir] alles weggenommen [habest, so wisse dannoch, daß ich] noch [heil und block übrig behalte, und kan ich] noch woll [alle dieb hencken lassen, worauff der fürst sich buckete, und sagete Vatter alles was ich hab,] ist ohne dem [dein, nehme es hin. Der Admiral aber saget in schertz, wan du vatter alle dieb in dem land wilt hencken lassen, so muß du] deinen [Admiral auch mit hencken lassen, und alle deine grosse herrn und schreiber, dan ich hab dir auch gestohlen. Der Zar fragete ihn warumb er gestohlen] hab, [er habe ja] schöne [land güter. Er saget, ich] hab [land güter davon kan der Apraxin aber nicht der Admiral leben,] warumb [zahlest du deine officiers nicht besser, damit sie auch leben könnten. Worüber schwig der Zar still, und gienge in ein anders zimmer, die herrn] nach und nach [weg].”

Pleyer, writing some two weeks after the events, clearly conflated several incidents together, since Admiral Apraksin only returned from the Finnish campaign on 28 November/9 December, at noon, five days after the encounter of the evening of Menshikov’s name day, 23 November: TKUA Rusland, B48, 10 December 1714 (NS), St. Petersburg.

quietly. Menshikov attended, his face revealing the gloom of his heart, but Peter was more content than he had been for a long time. The following day, 25 November/6 December, the arrests began.

Yesterday His Majesty the tsar had arrested four persons of distinction, all of them devoted to His Highness the Prince Menshikov. The vice-governor of the province of St. Petersburg, named [Iakov Nikitich] Rimskii-Korsakov, the general commissar Iulian Seniavin, the lord of the admiralty Kikin, and the marshall and first favorite of the Prince Menshikov. They are supposed to have conspired to rob the tsar of many millions, all under the protection of Prince Menshikov. One can no longer guess what will happen to Prince Menshikov; he is in great fear and runs a risk.⁷⁴

The interrogations began immediately. Peter set up a commission of investigation under Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, commander of the Preobrazhenskii guards and his personal favorite and rival of Menshikov.⁷⁵ Peter sent officials, including some other guards officers, into the provinces to investigate and to arrest Prince Gagarin, the governor of Siberia. Golovkin and Admiral Apraksin

⁷⁴ TKUA Rusland, B48, 7 December 1714 (NS), St. Petersburg: "Le lendemain etant le jour de Ste. Catherine nous fusmes traittés dans la maison du Czar. La journée se passa avec tant de contentement que celle auprès du Prince s'estoit passée avec magnificence. [Menchikoff se trouve] mais sa triste contenance montre suffisamment l'assiette de son coeur. S. M. le Czar se montra si gay et content qu'il n'a pas été depuis longtemps. Hier Sa Majesté le Czar a fait arreter quatre personnes de distinction, tous dévoués à S. Alt. le Prince Menchikoff. Le vice gouverneur du gouvernement de Petersbourg, nommé Korsikof, le general commissaire Julian Senavin, le seigneur de l'Admirauté Kicken, et le maréchal et premier favori du Prince Menchikoff. Ils doivent avoir concourir à voler le Czar pour plusieurs millions tout sous [la protection du Prince Menchikoff.] On ne peut rien encore juger de ce [qui arrivera au Prince Menchikoff, il est en grande crainte et court risque]." ARSG 7397, Secreta 1700–32, 14 December 1714 NS, St. Petersburg: "D'Admiraliteys heer K'kin, did men altoos als een favorit heeft angesien gehad, en die zeedert eenige jaeren 't geheel bewindt van de Admiraliteyt heeft gehad, wierdt ook te gelyk in hechtenisse gebracht . . ." *SRIO* 61, 316–19.

Iakov Nikitich Rimskii-Korsakov held various administrative positions around St. Petersburg, as *landrikhter* from 1707 until his appointment as vice-governor in 1711: *PSŽ*, IV, no. 2135, 364–66; *PiB* IV/1, 375, IV/2, 1052–53. He may have been the nephew of the metropolitan of Tobol'sk Ignatii Rimskii-Korsakov (1692–1701) and was certainly a relative: Ignatii Rimskii-Korsakov, *Genealogia*, ed. A. P. Bogdanov, Moscow, 1994, 132, 147. Ul'ian Akimovich Seniavin had been head of the Chancellery of Construction for St. Petersburg since 1706, and *Oberkommissar* since 1711: *PSŽ*, IV, no. 2488, 807–08. His brother Naum was a lieutenant in Peter's navy. De Bie claimed that four years before Ul'ian Seniavin had been merely a servant ("knecht"): ARSG 7397, Secreta 1700–32, 14 December 1714 NS, St. Petersburg.

⁷⁵ The records of Dolgorukii's efforts are scattered throughout the archives: RGADA, f. 9, otd. II, kn. 25. l. 464 (undated list of money owed, probably 1714, in which ADM owed 107,647 rubles, Apraksin 28,750, Golovkin 26,261, Kikin 125,936, and Seniavin 61,519). It is unclear if these are sums stolen or fines owed. Menshikov eventually owed a total of 455,923 rubles. For this and others' misdeeds: RGADA, f. 9, otd. II, kn. 25, ll. 501–11.

were rumored to have also dipped into the funds, but their future was less certain. The story that Menshikov's "marshal," his steward Fyodor Solov'ev, had been arrested turned out to be false. The fourth person taken into custody was none other than Menshikov's client, Senator G. I. Volkonskii. Arrest orders went out for Senator Apukhtin and Kurbatov.⁷⁶

The vice-governor was examined the day before yesterday [=27 November/8 December 1714] in the presence of the tsar by the prince [=Menshikov] and general [=V. V.] Dolgorukii who is the president of the commission. At the beginning he did not want to answer at all, he only asked to speak with Menshikov, which was not permitted, but being then put to the torture, he is supposed to have confessed all, excusing himself to have done nothing without the order of Menshikov. The Senator Volkonskii also suffered the question and confessed everything. The two others have not yet been examined. It is said that their crime consists principally, first in preventing the merchants from coming to St. Petersburg to sell their grain and other goods, but they forced them to sell them at Novgorod and elsewhere to their factors for a small price and afterwards had them brought here at the expense of His Majesty the tsar; they delivered part to the storehouse for double the price and part to the inhabitants of the city for two times more. Second, for having allowed to die many million [*sic!*] peasants who came here annually to work, and this for lack of food, having given them only half of what the tsar allotted, that is 12 kopecks instead of 30 per month. Third, to have used two thirds of the said peasants for their own use and profit.

Naturally Peter was deeply disturbed by all this, for his closest confidants had betrayed him. The investigation would continue, even though Rimskii-Korsakov's arm was broken in the torture and Kikin suffered a stroke.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Peter ordered Gagarin to appear in St. Petersburg to render accounts on 7 December 1714: *SRIO* 11, 184. De Bie reported that Vasilii Zotov in Reval and Kirill Alekseevich Naryshkin in Narva would also be investigated: ARSG 7397 Secreta 1700–32, 24 December 1714 NS, St. Petersburg, de Bie to [Heinsius]; 7367, 1715, 11 January 1715 NS, (order to Gagarin to come to St. Petersburg). Later on similar orders went to the governors of Kazan' and Smolensk (Prince A. G. Dolgorukii): ARSG 7367, 1715, 1 March 1715 NS, St. Petersburg. Arrest of Apukhtin and Kurbatov: *SRIO* 61, 317.

⁷⁷ TKUA Rusland, B48, St. Petersburg, 10 December 1714 (NS): "[La grande inquisition] dont j'ay eu l'honneur de parler dans ma tres humble Relation du 7 de ce mois [est de plus grandes suites qu'on n'avoit pas crû] au commencement. [Presque tous les grands de Moscovie y sont interessés, le Czar a envoyé des officiers en] pres[que tous les gouvernements pour arrester les gouverneurs et les mener icy. Le Prince Gagarin gouverneur de Sibirie] est [du nombre, on regarde le Prince Menchikoff] comme [le Principal Chef et Protecteur de cette cabale] et peut etre que [le grand nombre des complices] diminuera [la punition.] On dit pour certain que [le Grand Chancelier et l'Admiral General ont trempé] dans cette affaire, mais il faut attendre quelques jours avant que de pouvoir [juger de ce qui

Within only a few days the investigation took a turn toward conciliation. Admiral Apraksin and Golovkin were forgiven their crimes. In part on the tsaritsa's intercession, Peter agreed to make a deal with Menshikov, allowing him to pay a huge sum toward returning what he had stolen, and forbidding him to intercede for the four men arrested as his accomplices. His steward Solov'ev was interrogated, as were his secretaries Volkov and Veselovskii. The arrangement would remove the immediate danger to Menshikov, but Falck believed that it would not restore him to his previous favor. The Dane was right, for Dolgorukii's commission of investigation continued to work for four more years, and even beyond, turning up more and more evidence of Menshikov's corruption and providing a basis for ever more fines from the favorite. Peter also replaced Kikin and Rimskii-Korsakov with G. P. Chernyshev at the Admiralty and Brigadier Volkov as vice-governor of St. Petersburg. The appointment of Chernyshev, a client of Menshikov's ally general Repnin, softened the blows, but Peter was never again as intimate with Menshikov after this incident.⁷⁸

arrive aux deux derniers.] Dans ma tres humble Relation j'ay mande l'arrestement de quatre personnes de distinction à sçavoir du vice gouverneur Korsikof, du Sr. Kicken, du general commissaire Senawin, et du Salowiof Marechal du Prince Menzikof, mais Votre Excellence me permittra de dire que j'ay été mal informé quant au dernier et que le quatrieme est un Senateur nomme Wolkonsky. Le Vice Gouverneur fut avant hier examiné en presence de S.M. le Czar par le Prince et General Dolgorouky qui est le President de la commission. Au commencement il n'a voulu rien repondre, demanda seulement [de parler avec Menchikof] ce qui ne fut pas accordé, mais étant en suite mis sur la torture, il doit avoir confessé tout s'excusant de n'avoir rien fait [sans ordre du Menchikoff.] Le Senateur Wolkonsky a aussi souffert la question, et a confessé tout. Les deux autres n'ont pas encore été examinés. On dit que leur crime consiste principalement 1o d'avoir empeché les marchands de venir à Petersbourg vendre leur bled et autres denrées, mais les ont obligé de les vendre à Novgorod et ailleurs à leurs facteurs pour un petit prix et apres les avoir fait venir icy aux depens de S. M. le Czar, ils les ont livre partie dans les magazins pour le double, et partie aux habitants de cette ville pour deux fois autant. 2o d'avoir laissé crever plusieurs millions de paisans qui sont venu icy annuellement pour travailler, et cela faute de subsistance, ne leur ayant donné que la moitié de ce que le Czar a ordonne, à sçavoir 12 Copekens au lieu de 30 par mois. 3o d'avoir employé deux tiers des dits paisans à leur propre usage et profit. Cette affaire travaille beaucoup l'esprit de S. M. Czarienne qui par cette decouverte se trouve pour ainsi dire [trompé et trahy par ceux en qui Elle a eu son entiere confidence, mais je] crois que [les grande sommes qu'Elle gagnera la consolera fortement].

Le Vice Gouverneur a eu un bras rompu mais je ne crois pas que cett' accident arretera les procedures."

⁷⁸ TKUA Rusland, B48, 14 December 1714 (NS), St. Petersburg: "La grande inquisition va toujours son train. Cependant [le Prince Menchikoff a obtenu son pardon. Les conditions de l'] accomodement sont [secretées mais] je sais de bonne part [qu'il est obligé à payer une grande somme] au moins [de trois cent milles rubles] et au reste S. M. le Czar luy a defendu d'interceder pour aucun des autres complices. [Quoy que l'affection personnelle que le Czar

The other accused were not so lucky. Kikin and Seniavin were condemned to exile and to pay huge fines. Their houses were confiscated, Kikin's for the admiralty and Seniavin's for the tsaritsa. Kikin soon seems to have been able to have his fate moderated, the result of Admiral Apraksin's entreaty to the tsaritsa. By the end of December only exile to Kazan' was spoken of, and Peter was said to have spoken to him on the eve of his departure with much grace and complained that justice alone prevented him from giving him a pardon. Senator Volkonskii and Rimskii-Korsakov remained in prison.⁷⁹

luy a porté] jointe [à l'intercession de la Czarrienne] luy conserve pour cette fois [les honneurs et dignités il est] pour[tant assuré que son crédit et faveur sont ruinés, malgré le dit pardon.] Le maréchal Salowiof, les secrétaires Wolkof et Wesilofsky sont appelés aujourd'hui devant la Commission, pour a ce qu'on dit, être examinés et rendre compte de leur malversation pendant leur service auprès de S. A. le Prince Menzikof, et il est fort croyable que ces Serviteurs payeront chers leurs crimes [et encore ceux du Ministre. L'admiral general a aussi son absolution et le Grand] Chancelier [qui n'a] trempé dans cette affaire [que pour six milles rubles, pourra] aussi [se tirer d'affaire, mais à l'arrivée du Secrétaire d'Etat Schaphiroff, il] aura encore un choqu à soutenir qui pourra bien devenir rude.

On compte [?] le Seigneur Kickin pour perdu sans ressource. Et on dit que S.M. le Czar a déjà disposé de sa charge en faveur du Major de Prebrasindsky, nommé Glebof. On s'est aussi saisi de sa maison et tous ses biens." A notice had been put up of the crimes of Rimskii-Korsakov, Seniavin, and Volkonskii. *SRIO* 61, 323, 327–28.

Pleyer told the same story with different details. In his version, Menshikov offered Peter 200,000 rubles collected from the money he had stolen. ("Batzka, oder vatter du nennest mich einen dieb, da hast du 200/m Rubel"). He and Golovkin were pardoned the next day, but Kikin, Rimskii-Korsakov, and Volkonskii were arrested. HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 13/24 December 1714, St. Petersburg: ARSG 7367, 1715, 21 December 1714 NS, St. Petersburg (return of Menshikov to court, Apraksin and Golovkin fined and forgiven, Kikin to be exiled and replaced by Chernyshev, Korsakov by Brigadier Volkov, "een seer braaf en ryk man" becomes vice-governor of St. Petersburg, and ADM's steward Solov'ev will be investigated for misdeeds involving the will of Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin). Brigadier M. Ia. Volkov had recently distinguished himself at the battle of Hangö Point: Krotov, *Gangutskaia*, 133. Chernyshev served at Azov and received the rank of brigadier after Poltava. The appointment was not such a blow for ADM, since Chernyshev was a client of general Repnin and ADM himself. He served briefly in the Military College in 1724 and died as a count and major-general in 1745: *PiB* XIII/1, 395; "Zapiski grafa G. P. Chernysheva 1672–1745," *RS* 5 (June 1872), 791–802; *PSŽ* V, no. 2880, 140–41 (20 January 1715, Chernyshev's report to Peter on the Admiralty).

Prince A. M. Cherkasskii, formerly governor of Tobol'sk, replaced Seniavin as head of the Chancellery of Construction (*Kantseliariia gorodovykh del or ot stroeniia*) in 1715, lasting until 1719: James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Architecture*, Chicago, 1988, 175–76.

⁷⁹ TKUA Rusland, B48, 28 December 1714, St. Petersburg: Menshikov, Golovkin and Admiral Apraksin are forgiven, but had to pay huge fines, and, other criminals are brought from the provinces. "On croyoit le Seigneur de l'Admirauté quitée en payant 60/m rubles d'amende mais il est seur qu'il partira après demain pour aller en exile à Casan. Hier il a la grace de parler au Czar, qui l'a congedie fort gracieusement et meme s'est plaint d'être empêché par la justice de luy faire grace." Rimskii-Korsakov and Volkonskii destined for a shameful death. *SRIO* 61, 323–34, 330.

According to Pleyer, the tsaritsa's attempts to intercede for Menshikov put Peter into a

The investigation went on through the winter, amid rumors of discontent among the guards and anonymous letters found in the streets cautioning the tsar to be moderate.⁸⁰ Peter issued decrees to prevent similar corruption in the future, forbidding any officials of whatever rank from taking contracts to supply the government and establishing an officer to oversee such contracts in each province, an officer who would be subject to the Senate alone, not to the provincial governors. About the same time (March 1715) Peter began to consider a complete reorganization of Russian central government, replacing the system of chancelleries under the governors with administrative colleges in the capital on the Swedish model. He invited one Heinrich Fick to Russia, a Hamburger who had served in the Swedish administration in Livonia and later in Pomerania, to provide expertise. The new colleges would not come to fruition for several years, but when they did come into being they would provide not only a more regular administrative structure but in their personnel a compromise between aristocratic leadership and professional bureaucracy.⁸¹ This was all in the future.

rage in which he was said to have struck her twice and accused her of flirtation with Menshikov and some sort of deal with him. He invited her to come to the torture chamber and hear the confessions. The amount of money involved had risen to 2 million rubles, of which 800,000 were to be returned by Rinskii-Korsakov alone. The rumor was that Menshikov had allowed one of his Moscow servants who had promised to tell Peter the truth to escape from prison and then had him killed and put under the ice in the river: HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 24 December 1714/4 January 1715. ARSG 7367, 1715, 18 December 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (exile and punishment of Kikin and Seniavin).

⁸⁰ Pleyer reported that more and more names, many of them officers from the guards regiments, were drawn into the investigation. An anonymous denunciation even appeared warning Peter against the guards officers, who were frightened of their fate if the investigation continued. By March the sting seems to have started to go out of the proceedings, and Pleyer even wondered if Peter was not mainly concerned just to fill the treasury, as he had assembled nearly 3 million rubles. Kikin was partially forgiven, in that he was relieved of exile in Siberia and merely ordered to Moscow, where he was gambling and having a good time, and expected to return soon to the capital. Menshikov, however, had fired many of his own courtiers and musicians, but if he could get the command of the armies in Livonia back, he would just hire them again. HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 28 January/8 February 1715, St. Petersburg (reports on guards officers; Sheremetev also accused of corruption by a Greek merchant); 14/25 March 1715, St. Petersburg (Peter fills the treasury, fate of Kikin, Menshikov). Mackenzie confirms his story about the guards officers, and de Bie reported anonymous letters advising moderation in government to Peter. *SRIO* 61, 342; ARSG 7367, 1715, 15 January 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (anonymous letters and a story that Peter ordered Dolgorukii to end the investigation); 18 January 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (anonymous letters); 7397, *Secreta* 1700–32, 25 January 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (continuation of the investigation).

⁸¹ *PSŽ* V, nos. 2871–72, 135–37; 2894, 151–52 (15 March 1715, Captain Gerasim Koshelev of the Preobrazhenskii Guards to oversee all subcontracting); *ŽA* 210–13; Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe*, 424–25; Claes Peterson, *Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms*:

As the winter drew to a close the final outcome of the investigation remained unclear. Sheremetev arrived in February and Mackenzie could report that "the Czar had about two days ago fully forgiven all past to field-marshal Sheremeteff," that "he has since been more caressed than ever, and has a promise, that all care shall be taken for his honour, and that the delator should be exemplary punished." By mid-February the belief was that Rimskii-Korsakov and Senator Volkonskii would go into Siberian exile, but that Kikin would only be sent to Moscow and Menshikov would even get command of the army for the coming campaign. Menshikov's supporters were convinced that Rimskii-Korsakov would be forgiven and even restored to his post, while he, Volkonskii, and Apukhtin were even allowed out of prison to visit their relatives and friends, accompanied only by an officer of the guards.⁸² The optimism on the part of Menshikov's friends was mistaken.

The final punishments of the lesser criminals came on April 6/17, 1715 at ten o'clock in the morning. Rimskii-Korsakov and some of his servants were publicly whipped. Senator Volkonskii had his tongue burnt for lying during the investigation and was branded; Senator Apukhtin received the same punishments. All three grandees were condemned to have their property confiscated and go into exile in Siberia but had their sentences reduced to eliminate the exile without hope of honorable employment in the state.⁸³ Besides

Swedish Antecedents and the Process of Reception, Skrifter utgivna av Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning 29, Stockholm, 1979, 62–67; Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 110–16.

⁸² *SRIO* 61, 342, 354; *TKUA* Russland, B48, 19 April 1715, St. Petersburg (prisoners allowed to walk about). ARSG 7367, 1715, 22 February 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (torture of Rozhnov, his charges from envy and revenge, Rimskii-Korsakov and Volkonskii to Siberia, Kikin to Moscow, ADM to get command).

⁸³ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 12 May 1715 (NS?), St. Petersburg: "endlich dieselben Senatoren und Canzley bedienten, wider welche de Czar bishero wegen begangener veruntreuung am proviant, und anderen sachen also scharf inquiriret, ihren Sentenz und execution erhalten haben, vermög welchen der vice gourverneur alhier, und zwey seiner Secretaire auf öffentlichen Markt mit der knut peitschen 6 andere Canzley bediente mit zöblein, die Battogi genandt, auf blossen ruckgrad geschlagen, zwey Senatoren aber, welche erstlich in dem examine nichts bekennen wolten, und falsch schwuren, bis sie endlich villfältig überwiesen, sich schuldig gaben, mit glühenden eysen über die zungen 3 mahl gebrandt worden, andern wurden mit einer darzue sonderlich verfertigten 3 ekgten zönglein die seiten theil, oder lapplein haut an der nasen bederseits ausgezwiket, und zu schelmen gemacht, und endlich diese sambt denen vorigen dreyen nebst confiscirung alles haabs und guets naher Sibirien verschicket zu werden condemniret, nach dem aber so weit widerumb begnadiget, ohne mehr am hoff, und zu einer honorablen bedienung zu komen, sich aufhalten dorfen."

None of the diplomats mentioned Seniavin, but he was replaced in 1715 by A. M. Cherkasskii (see above, note 78). Volkonskii and Apukhtin never returned to the Senate.

the three principals convicted for corruption, Colonel Rozhnov was also punished for his misdeeds and information against Sheremetev:

A certain colonel, also a man of birth and quality, had his nostrils slit by a knife, as one does to Tatar horses in this country, and was condemned to the galleys for the rest of his days. He had made himself the informer against the person of Sheremetev, without having been able to prove anything, as most people say; others pretend to know that having been convicted of various malversations he decided to denounce some things against Sheremetev in the belief that he would save himself at the expense of his field marshal.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ TKUA Rusland, B48, 19 April 1715 NS, St. Petersburg, Westphal to Sehested: "J'ay cru, ne devoir pas inserrer dans ma tres humble Relation au Roy l'exécution rigoureuse que le Czar fit faire avanthier, le jour même, qu'il eut la bonté de me donner audience dans Son Conseil, sur plusieurs personnes accusées, et convaincues, de l'avoir trompé, divert ses deniers, si bien que la Solde et les vivres de Ses Soldats et matelots a leur propre usage; de s'avoir laissé corrompre par de presents de donations à favoriser en fait de procès, contraire à toute humanité, droit, et justice, les riches contre les pauvres, et protégé de sorte le vice, en supprimant l'innocence, et la vertus, sur tout celle du zele pour le Service du Maitre, et de la Patrie, de la fidelité à l'épreuve, et du desinteressement. Mias comme il y entre en tout cela certaines circonstances, qui doivent etre sçues chey nous, je me croye obligé d'en faire mon rapport à Votre Excellence en particulier.

Deux Senateurs de ce pais cy, Conseillers Privés du Czar, l'un s'appelle Wolkonsky, et l'autre Opuchin; le Premier étant né Prince de ce Pais cy, fameux mangeur des crucifixs, qui (Sa Santé et Le Service du Maitre le permettant) ne manquoit jamais de se trouver aux messes, et aux autres Services divines, qui sont etablis par L'Eglise grecque, avec cela, tres exacte observateur de toute la vigueur des jeunes ordonnes parmi les russes; mais tout cela non obstant, reconnu depuis longtemps de par grand nombre de gens d'honneur (qui à cause de sa secrete liaison avec [Menschikoff] n'osoient contre luy lever tête) d'etre en effet grand et habile Maitre à deguiser les dehors, mais au reste âme vile, interessée, et corruptible; bref tres malhonnet homme, et par consequence tres mechant Chretien; l'autre issu de même d'illustre extraction. Ce deux hommes furent avanthier au matin ver les dix heures menés au lieu du Suplice, et livrés (après qu'on leur eut lue leur Sentence qui porte degradation d'honneur et dignité d'em(ploy?) et disgrace eternelle en egard à leurs descendents, confiscation des biens, et enfin punition de mort, la hache ayant été porté à cet effet, et après leur avoir fait Sentence lue; intimé La grace du Czar, quant à la vie, et les biens) entre les Mains du bourreau qui leur ayant bandé les yeux, leur fit entendre l'un après l'autre, qu'ils eussent à allonger leurs langes, ce qu'ils ayants faits, le bourreau leur en brusla le bout par l'application d'un fer chaude; cela fait, il leur fut indiqué, que le Czar leur laissoit la jouissance de leurs biens, mais qu'ils passeront le reste de leur vie en exile, et leurs enfants jusque à la mort en detention. Le troisieme homme de distinction fut le vice gouverneur de St Petersburg, nommé Corsakoff cy devant intime amy et creature du Prince Mentzikoff qui est jusqu'icy de cette Capitale le Gouverneur. Celuy cy après qu'on luy eut leu Sa Sentence, qui portoit la même peine que celle des deux Senateurs; on luy annonca qu'à son egard la volonté du Czar (qui luy faisoit grace de la vie) etoit, qu'il y eut à souffrir les Knuti, que ses biens seroient confisqués, qu'il mouriroit infame, et passeroit sur ce pied là employé au gros travail comme esclave du Czar le reste de ses jours, et que pour cet effet il seroit envoyé en Siberie. Il fut dabord depouillé de ses habits, les Knuti luy furent appliqués, et je le croye à l'heur qu'il est en chemin pour la Siberie: Un de ses secretaires eut le Nez coupé, ce qu'eut de même un Commissaire de l'artigillerie. Un certain colonel, aussi de Naissance, homme de qualité, eut par un coup de couteau les Narines fendues, comme on le fait dans ce pais cy aux cheveux tartares, et condamné en gallere

After so many years of playing second fiddle to Menshikov, the field marshal was on the rise.

In all respects these cases seemed to end badly for the prince of Ingria. Rinskii-Korsakov and Volkonskii were his clients, so he had thus lost his "right hand" in the St. Petersburg province, and a valuable ally in the Senate. The favorite had no more men in the Senate whom he could consider friends, and among the governors his client Gagarin had also been found guilty of corruption.⁸⁵ The *ober-fiskal* Zheliabuzhskii, who had the previous year denounced the Dolgorukiis and their allies for covering up corruption, was replaced on 17 April 1715 by his subordinate Nesterov, who immediately denounced the prince for keeping 80,000 rubles given him for secret correspondence.⁸⁶

Only Admiral Apraksin, still governor of faraway Voronezh but as

pour le reste de ses jours, celui s'étoit erigé en delateur contre la personne de Schermetoff, sans avoir pû à ce que la plupart de gens disent, rien prouver, d'autres prétendent de sçavoir que convaincu qu'il étoit déjà de plusieurs malversations il s'avisait de denoncer plusieurs choses contre Chermettoff, dans la croyance que par ce moyen il se sauveroit au depens de son Feldmarchal. Il est à remarquer, que cette execution s'est faite au milieu d'assurance générale ou tout le monde étoit, que les crimes de ces malheureux étoient pardonnés, et oubliés, plusieurs creatures de [Menchikoff] m'ayants même assurés, que la personne du vice gouverneur de cette Capitale rentreroit non seulement en grace, mais dans l'exercice de sa première charge; en effet ils étoient sortis de leur première prison et remis seulement à la garde de quelque officier de Prebrashinsky avec lesquels ils se promenoient même par la ville, rendans visite et divertissans avec leurs parents et amis. Il y a encore à l'égard de cet affaire une autre chose à remarquer qui est, qu'estant à Berlin, j'ay entendu dire à Schlippenbach qui revenoit de Petersbourg ou il a conclu le connu Traité de Garantie entre le Czar et le Roy de Prusse, que de tous ceux qui composoient le Senat de la Grande Russie, il n'y avoit que certain Prince Wolkonsky, à qui les interets du Dannemarc étoient indifferents, les autres étoient tous danois à brusler." ARSG 7367, 1715, 12 April 1715 NS, St. Petersburg, De Bie to SG (Rozhnov condemned to galleys); 19 April 1715 NS, St. Petersburg, de Bie to SG (punishment of Rinskii-Korsakov, his secretary, Senator Volkonskii); 26 April 1715 NS, St. Petersburg, de Bie to SG (more details on punishments, also on Apukhtin). Rozhnov's estates went to Major Fyodor Glebov: *SRIO* 11, 287–88.

⁸⁵ ARSG 7367, 1715, 8 March 1715 NS. St. Petersburg (Gagarin still expected in St. Petersburg, the caravans from China are to be sealed and brought in for inspection). On the Gagarin case, which involved China trade, subcontracting, and appropriation of sums destined for Swedish prisoners, see M. O. Akishin, *Politseiskoe gosudarstvo i sibirskoe obshchestvo: epokha Petra Velikogo*, Novosibirsk, 1996, 186–204.

⁸⁶ Petrovskii, *O Senate*, 105; ARSG 7367, 1715, 10 May 1715 NS [= April 30], St. Petersburg: "Aan den Vorst Menchikoff is voor eenige tagen door den Fiscal geinsinueert dat 80/m Roeblen sal hebben te restituieren die in twee jaaren voor gehyme correspondentien hadde genoomen, maar S. Mt. heeft dese somme op de halfte gereduceert." Nesterov was much more active than his predecessor, particularly in uncovering the misdeeds of Prince Gagarin: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 486–88, 492–95. If his earlier work under Menshikov had made him the prince's client, he had now betrayed his patron.

general admiral one of the most important men in Russia, was a firm ally. Furthermore, the punishment of Rozhnov publicly demonstrated Sheremetev's return to favor, reinforced by the field marshal's command over the St. Petersburg garrison. It is not surprising that Falck reported Menshikov as in a state of lethargy. He also reported another move against Menshikov, the appointment of his former secretary Avram Veselovskii as resident to the court of Vienna.

So that this matter does not give an incorrect idea of the power of Menshikov I must tell your excellency [=Christian Sehested] that this Mr. Veselovskii is a relative of Shafirov and that it is he who got this position for him, partly to advance him and partly to remove him from the service of Menshikov where the job is not as lucrative as before.⁸⁷

The rats were leaving a ship that appeared to be sinking.

Menshikov's main accomplices in corruption had now been punished: Volkonskii, Apukhtin, Seniavin, Rimskii-Korsakov, and Gagarin.⁸⁸ Gagarin returned to his post under a cloud, and the only one to escape was Aleksander Kikin, admiralty counsellor and long both a creature of Menshikov and a favorite of the tsar. Kikin was back in St. Petersburg by May, wrote the new Danish ambassador, Hans Georg von Westphal: "a certain Mr. Kikin, who was involved in the first disgrace of Prince Menshikov and other great lords of this land and sent into exile, has returned to favor and is now here. It is said that he is one of the shrewdest and craftiest of the Russians."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ TKUA Rusland, B48, 19 April 1715, St. Petersburg: "Monsieur Weselofsky avoit été nommé pour etre Resident à la Cour Imperiale. A fin que ce chose ne donne pas une injuste idée [du pouvoir du Prince Menchikoff] je dois dire à Votre Excellence que ce Monsieur Waselofsky est [un parent du Schaphirot] et que c'est luy qui l'a fait obtenir cet employ, partie pour l'avancer, partie pour [l'oster du service du Menchikoff] ou les charges ne sont pas si [lucratives] que par le precedent." Lethargy of Menshikov, Sheremetev's command over the St. Petersburg garrison, punishment of Rimskii-Korsakov "[la main droite de Mentzikoff]," Apukhtin and Volkonskii; a dozen other commissars punished, none with death, since theft is not considered a mortal sin in Russia.

⁸⁸ TKUA Rusland, B48, 16/27 May 1715, St. Petersburg: Menshikov found guilty again in the Gagarin case and fined 40,000 rubles. Apukhtin survived until 1720, when his sins were forgiven: Petrovskii, *O Senate*, 50–51.

⁸⁹ TKUA, Rusland, B48, 31 May 1715, St. Petersburg: "un certain Mon. Kikin qui avoit été enveloppé dans la premiere disgrace du Prince Mentzikoff et autres grands seigneurs de ce pais-cy, et envoyé en exile, est rentré en grace et se trouve presentement icy, on dit que c'est un des russes le plus fin et le plus rusé." ARSG 7367, 1715, 31 May 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (return of Kikin). By June there was talk that Peter would send Kikin on a mission to the European courts to request recognition of an Imperial title for the tsar: HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 20 June 1715 NS, St. Petersburg, Pleyer to Karl VI. Gagarin returned to his post as governor of Siberia until he was arrested again for corruption in 1719 and hanged in 1721: V. Korsakova, "Gagarin, kniaz' Matvei Petrovich," *RBS Gaag-Gerbel*, St. Petersburg, 1914, 75–82.

He did not get his position at the Admiralty back, and events would prove the Dane even more correct than he could have ever dreamed. How Menshikov reacted at the time to Kikin's return is not known. In the meantime, the prince of Ingria continued to fight for his position with only limited success. As early as 1714 he had sent a Colonel Manstein to Poland to look into Dolgorukii's doings in the hope of finding that his enemy could be accused of malfeasance.⁹⁰ In February, Prince G. F. Dolgorukii, past and future ambassador to Poland and younger brother of Senator Prince Iakov, had married his daughter Aleksandra to Vasilii Fyodorovich Saltykov. "The Prince Menshikov, who is doing everything to gain the friendship of a family which one can now consider the favored family, put on the wedding with an extraordinary magnificence and at his own expense."⁹¹ The worst for Menshikov must have been the rumors then circulating that he would lose his position as governor of St. Petersburg and that the office would go to the tsarevich, Aleksei Petrovich.⁹²

Ingratiating himself with the Dolgorukiis could carry Menshikov only so far. In the summer there was to be another allied campaign in Pomerania and the king of Prussia was pressing Peter to name

⁹⁰ RGADA, f. 198, d. 104, ll. 82–83v; letter of Prince Grigorii [Alekseevich] Urusov to Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, Riga, 1715, confiscated at the arrest of VVD in 1718. The letter warns VVD that Colonel Manstein had stopped in Riga on his way to Poland "last year" and told people that ADM sent him to look for *obidy i vziatki* on the part of VVD when he commanded Russian troops quartered there. Manstein claimed that ADM's and Admiral Apraksin's troubles came from VVD together with Golovkin and that Kikin knew about these moves.

⁹¹ TKUA Rusland, B48, 25 February 1715, St. Petersburg: "Un seigneur Saltikof, frere de la Czarienne douairiere du Czar Iwan, espousa hier une Princesse Dolgoruky, fille du Conseiller privé de ce nom et cy devant Ambassadeur à la Cour de Pologne. Le Prince Menzikoff, qui fait tout pour gagner l'amitié d'une famille qu'on peut à present regarder comme la famille favorie fit les noces avec une magnificence extraordinaire et à ses depens. Je crois que nous aurons bientot les noces d'un fils du meme Dolgorouky avec la fille ainée du Baron Schapiroff." V. F. Saltykov (died 1730) was indeed the brother of Tsaritsa Praskov'ia. He was the *kravchii* to his brother-in-law Tsar Ivan (before that chamber *stol'nik*) from 1690 onwards. He was made captain in the Preobrazhenskii Guards by 1712. Aleksandra's brother Sergei Grigor'evich did indeed marry Marfa Petrovna Shafirova: Poe, "Composition," 189; LeDonne, "Ruling Families," 269, 282–83; *PiB* XII/1, 275, 572, XII/2, 53. *SRIO* 61, 350.

⁹² ARSG 7367, 1715, 8 February 1715 NS, St. Petersburg: "My is in vertrowen gezeght dat de Vorst Menchikoff mogelyk zyn gouvernement van Ingermenland zoude konnen verliesen en dat de Croon Prins het zelve; zulx geschiedende; opgedragen zoude worden; 't welk de tyd zal uytwyzen; het is altoos waar dat zyne vyanden siende dat hem niet naar wensch konnen ruineren, tragten zullen hem van S.Mt. en bewind van zaken te eloigneren; S. Dt. maakt eene groote reforme in zyn hoff, zyn de zyne voorige Magnificentie zeer vermindert."

Menshikov the commander. In February, however, Field Marshal Sheremetev arrived in St. Petersburg, now that peace with Turkey had brought relative quiet to the southern border. Peter was keeping his own council on the question of the future commander, but by May it was clear that it would be Sheremetev. The Danish ambassador lobbied to exclude Menshikov, and the attempts of Saxony and Prussia to support the prince were in vain. Peter made the formal appointment on 27 July, giving the task to Sheremetev. Menshikov had lost again.⁹³

For the first time since the death of Golovin in 1706, a new constellation had emerged at Peter's court, one in which the Dolgorukii family held the first position, not the prince of Ingria.⁹⁴ The Saxon envoy J. A. von Loss summed it all up in July. Peter was beginning to show more friendship for Menshikov in public than he had for months, but the prince had still not recovered his position: "his power is still extremely limited." Tsaritsa Ekaterina was Menshikov's firm supporter, but her support cost him dearly in presents, as she was a very "interested" woman, in the terminology of the time. Besides, she had to be careful and take account of Dolgorukii so as not to harm Menshikov with the tsar. For it was Prince V. V. Dolgorukii and his clan who were now the most powerful.

The family of the Dolgorukiis believes itself to have the right to pretend to the first rank in the graces of the tsar since none of them had any part in the deceptions of the other great men of this state. This entire family has an implacable hatred against Menshikov and the Lieutenant General who commands the Preobrazhenskii regiment [=Prince VVD] is especially hostile to the Prince. As this man is extremely bold and says whatever he wants to the tsar, who loves to hear him very much, he is in a condition to do great wrong to Menshikov and one can say that of all his enemies it is

⁹³ TKUA Rusland, B48, 18 February 1715 (arrival of Sheremetev, Peter will not say who will command in Pomerania, king of Prussia supports Menshikov); 29 March 1715 (NS), St. Petersburg, Westphal to Sehested (Menshikov thinks he will receive the command, Peter says nothing and is cold to Menshikov at the birthday celebration for the tsarevich); 14 June 1715, Kronschlott, Westphal to Wibe (Westphal tries to exclude Menshikov from the command in Pomerania); 20/31 July 1715, Reval (Sheremetev gives Westphal advance notice in confidence [*im Vertrauen*], that his commission for Pomerania is signed and sealed); HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 20 June 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (Prussian envoy presses Peter to give the command to Menshikov, but he has decided for Sheremetev); ARSG 7367, 1715, 29 July 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (Sheremetev to get command of troops in spite of Prussian objections); Zaozerskii, *Sheremetev*, 134.

⁹⁴ Symptomatic of his new position was VVD's appointment to oversee the Demidov iron works in the Urals from his personal chancellery: *PSZ* V, no. 2903 (13 April 1715), 154–56.

this one who counts the most with the tsar, with whom he is always strongly in credit.

The tsaritsa had managed only to recruit Admiral Apraksin, who had managed to retain the tsar's favor in spite of his own involvement in the corruption scandals.

The Dolgorukiis had two important supporters. Iaguzhinskii was working closely with them, and they had picked up the support of Field Marshal Sheremetev.

Sheremetev is entirely attached to Dolgorukii who has rendered great service to the former, for without him he would not have gotten off so easily and would never have gotten out of the investigation which had been made of the field marshal.

If Sheremetev obtains the command of the troops destined to go to Pomerania, as is believed that he will, then it is by the means of Dolgorukii who has cleverly insinuated to the tsar that Prince Menshikov will sacrifice the whole army to please the King of Prussia if the tsar gives him the command and these sorts of insinuations do not fail to make an impression on the mind of so suspicious a prince as the tsar.

Loss had heard rumors that Dolgorukii's influence was on the wane, supposedly because the investigation of Menshikov's corruption, which Dolgorukii had initiated, had not produced enough money. The Saxon did not believe the rumors, as he suspected they came from Menshikov's followers.

The only complexities for Dolgorukii were with Golovkin and Shafirov. Dolgorukii wanted to remove Golovkin and give his post to his uncle, Prince Iakov Dolgorukii, "a man of intelligence but sly as a monkey." In this he had not succeeded, even though Golovkin had no credit with the tsar and neither the Menshikov nor the Dolgorukii party considered him useful enough to cultivate. Nevertheless, he inclined toward Dolgorukii out of mortal hatred for Menshikov.

Shafirov, in contrast, had courted Dolgorukii on his return from Istanbul in 1713, but had some sort of quarrel with him which led him to seek Menshikov's friendship. Effectively he was neutral, and like Golovkin had little credit with the tsar, which limited his usefulness. Shafirov in turn had to fear Petr Tolstoi, also former ambassador to the Porte, who wanted Shafirov's post and was "a man of intelligence but deceitful."⁹⁵

As far as policy went, the dominance of the Dolgorukiis had one

⁹⁵ P. A. Tolstoi spent the years 1702–14 in Istanbul, after 1710 in the Yedikule prison while the Ottomans were at war with Russia. On his embassy see Pavlenko, *Ptentsy*, 128–78; and

sharp limit, namely that Peter made his decisions himself and consulted no one. He distrusted his ministers and did not consider them particularly competent. Peter was also the object of little love on the part of his subjects, great or small. The only thing keeping their discontent from exploding was the army, which was entirely devoted to the tsar.⁹⁶ This was the first time since before Poltava that

M. R. Arunova and S. F. Oreshkova, eds., *Russkii posol v Stambule: Petr Andreievich Tolstoi i ego opisanie Osmanskoi imperii nachala XVIII v.*, Moscow, 1985.

⁹⁶ SHSA, Geheimes Kabinett, Rußland, 3635/2, 15 July 1715, St. Petersburg; "Après tous les chagrins qu'on a fait essuyer au Prince Mentzikow il semble qu ce favoris commence peu a peu rentrer dans les graces du son maitre, du moins, il est certain qu le Czar luy fait bien plus de caresses et qu'il fait paroître en public beaucoup plus d'amitié pour luy qu'il ne faisoit il y a quelques mois. Ce pendant son pouvoir est encore extremement limité. La Czarienne Epouse du Czar soutient fortement le prince Mentzikow et se donne beaucoup de peine pour le retablir entierement dans les grace du Czar son epoux. Cet appui de la Czarienne ne laisse pourtant pas de [couter cher au Prince Mentzikow] car come [c'est une femme] extremement [interessée] il est obligé [a luy faire souvent des presents considerables] pour l'entretenir [dans ses interests]. C'est par le moyen de la Czarienne que le General Admiral Apraxin s'est joint au [Mentzikow] pour l'opposer aux cabales de la famille Dolgorouky]. L'amitié d'Apraxin pourra etre de quelque utilité [au Prince Mentzikow] car non obstant que le premier ait aussy eu part [au fraude commis] touchant [la livraison du bled] il ne laisse pas d'avoir du credit auprès du Czar.

La famille des Dolgorouky croit etre en droit de pouvoir pretendre le premier rang dans les graces du Czar puisque aucun d'entre eux a eu part aux tromperies des autres grands de cet etat. Toute cette famille a une haine implacable contre [Mentzikow] et le Lieut. Gen. qui commande le regiment de Brebrasinsky est sour tout fort animé contre [le Prince]. Comme cet homme est extremement hardi et dit tout ce qu'il veut au Czar, qui aime beaucoup a l'ecouter il est en etat de faire beaucoup de tort [a Mentzikow] et l'on peut dire que c'est celuy la de tous ses ennemis qui luy est le plus auprès du Czar auprès de quel il est toujours fort en credit.

Il est vray qu'on a debité il y a quelque temps que le credit de Dolgorouky avoit baissé et cela pourses que la derniere recherche n'avoit pas fait entrer tant de sommes dans le coffre du Czar que Dolgorouky qui est l'auteur de cette recherche luy avoit fait esperer. Mais pour dire la verité je crois que c'est un faux bruit repandu par le parti opposé de Dolgorouky et a en juger selon les apparences il est tousjours encore bien en credit auprès du Czar que Mentzikow puisque S. M. le met de toutes ses petites parties de plaisir, et qu'Elle ne peut pas etre un jour sans luy, il faut voir si cela continuera.

[Czeremetoff] est entierement attaché [à Dolgorouky] qui a rendu de grands services a ce premier car sans luy il n'en auroit pas été quitté a si bon marche, et il ne se seroit jamais si bien tiré de la recherche qu'on faite contre [ce Feldmarchall].

Si Czermetoff obtient le commandement des troupes destinés pour aller en Pomeranie comme l'on le croit qu'il obtiendra c'est par le moyen de Dolgorouky qui s'insinue adroitement au Czaar qui le prince Mentzikow sacrifiera toute son Armée pour complaire au Roy de Prusse si le Czar luy confie le commandement et ces sortes d'insinuations ne laissent pa de faire impression sur l'esprit [d'un Prince soupconneux qu'est le Czar].

La Czarienne quoyqu'elle se soit declarée en faveur du Prince Mentzikow ne laisse pas de garder des mesures avec Dolgorouky de crainte qu'il ni luy nuise auprès du Czar.

Jagosinsky entre dans toutes les vues de Dolgorouky et ces deux s'entre soutiennent auprès du Czar.

Je sçai qui Dolgorouky travaille à faire oter la charge de Gr. Ch. au Comte de Gollofkin et a la faire donner a son oncle le vieux Dolgorouky premier Senateur homme d'esprit [mais malin comme un singe], mais jusque ici il n'a pas pu reussir quoyque d'ailleurs le Gr.

any of the diplomats had the impression of such widespread discontent.

As the summer drew to an end, the dominant position of the Dolgorukiis was unchallenged.⁹⁷ For the first time since the beginning of his rise, Menshikov had been replaced as all-powerful favorite, and by a great aristocratic clan. The Dolgorukiis had

Chancelier n'ait aucun credit aupres du Czar, et qu'il soit egalement meprisé des deux partis, chacun le considerent comme un homme incapable de leur rendre service. Cependant il s'attache plus aux Dolgorouky qu'au Prince Mentzikow qu'il hait mortellement.

Schaphiroff s'attacha debord a son retour a la famille des Dolgorouky mais du depuis il y a en a ce qu'on m'a dit de la brouillerie entre le Leut. General de ce nom et luy qui a extremement alterée la bonne harmonie qu'il y a avoit entre eux, et depuis ce tems le Schaphiroff commence a rechercher l'amitié du Prince Mentzikow. Cependant il semble qu'il garde jusques ici une certaine neutralité et qu'il tache de garder des mesures avec l'un et l'autre parti. Au reste [son credit aupres du Czar n'est pas extremement grand]. Il court des bruits sourds [qu'on pourroit bien] aussy [intenter une recherche contre luy pour le faire rendre compte de l'argent] dont il a eu [la disposition] pour en faire [de presents et pour [l'employer ou corrompre les Ministres de la Porte pendant son ambassade] et dont on soupçonne qu'il doit avoir [mis une bonne partie dans ses poches]. La temps nous fera voir si les bruits sont fondés.

Tolstoy homme d'esprit [mais fourbe] autant qu'il se peut qu'a été en meme temps avec Schaph. Ambassadeur a la Porte et du quel le Czar fait beaucoup de cas doit etre un de ceux qui travaillent a [decrediter Schaphiroff] et cela dans la vue [d'obtenir son poste] après l'avoir culbuté; on dit que [la haine qui] Tolstoy [a contre Schaph. dont] il ne temoigne pourtant rien exterieurement provient de ce que le dernier s'attribue tout l'honneur et la gloire de l'heureux succès de leurs negotiations a la Porte.

J'ai crû de mon devoir Monseigneur de rendre compte a Votre Excellence de ces petits particularités et j'y ajouterai que de tous les personnages que je viens de nommer il n'y a aucun qui ait assés d'autorise [sic] et de pouvoir [sur l'esprit du Czar] pour pousser [une affaire] a la quelle le Czar n'est pas porté de soy meme ou assés de hardiesse [pour oser contredire a ses sentiments quoiqu'ils voyent qu'il donne à gauche].

[Le Prince] ne prend presque plus [de Conseil] de personne, il se defie [de tous ses ministres] et il est si prevenu de sa propre capacité qu'il se tient beaucoup [plus habile que ces ministres qu'il traite souvent d'ignorants].

Au rest [le Czar] est extremement [craint et peu aimé de ses sujets qui] sont tous generalement [mecontents depuis les plus grands au plus petits et qui peut etre auroient deja fait eclatter leur mecontentement si la crainte de l'armée qui est entierement devouée au Czar ne les retenoient pas].

Depuis un certain temps [Dolgorouki a] recherche mon amitie. Il proteste qu'il est zele serviteur du Roy et qu'il a une estime particuliere pour votre Excellence la quelle il soutenoit toujours fortement aupres du Czar. Il m'a meme chargé d'insinuer a v. E. de sa part qu'elle feroit bien d'ecrire de temps en temps a Sa Maj. Z. et de leur envoyer ces lettres qu'il auroit soin de remettre entre les mains du Czar, et que v. E. verroit bientot le bon effet que cela produiroit. Bien que je [ne me fie pas beaucoup aux protestations de Dolgorouky] je ne laisse pas pourtant de le menager." Excerpts of this dispatch appear in German translation in Herrmann, *Zeitgenossische*, II, 198–201.

⁹⁷ SHSA Geheimes Kabinett, Rußland 3635/2, 15 September 1715, St. Petersburg: "Le parti [des Dolgoruki] est toujours le plus fort." HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23: 15 September 1715, St. Petersburg (Danish envoy brags that he prevented Menshikov from getting the command in Pomerania in spite of efforts by Saxony and Prussia).

picked up as allies Sheremetev and other lesser (and more plebeian) favorites such as Iaguzhinskii. Menshikov had only two allies, the tsaritsa and Admiral Apraksin, but they seemed unable to affect Peter's distrust of Menshikov. In the Senate, Menshikov faced two Dolgorukiis and their client Samarin, two old aristocrats in Musin-Pushkin and Streshnev, and Admiral Apraksin's brother Petr, who had just left the governorship of Kazan'.⁹⁸ In spite of the admiral, Petr Apraksin would go with the aristocrats rather than with his brother. The return of aristocratic influence was short lived, however, and that was the result of Peter's rapidly deteriorating relations with his son, Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich.

⁹⁸ P. Apraksin was appointed to the Senate 9 June 1715: Petrovskii, *O Senate*, 51. His replacement in Kazan' was the former governor of Smolensk and Moscow, P. S. Saltykov.

CHAPTER 9

The affair of the tsarevich, 1715–1717

By summer 1715, the full disgrace of Menshikov seemed to have been checked, but his power was still curbed and his ill-gotten gains in the process of restoration. A certain balance had been established at court to the advantage of Menshikov's enemies. Events in the next year, however, would conspire to restore Menshikov to favor and to put in the forefront of opposition to both the favorite and his master the tsar a person who had hitherto lurked in the background of court and politics, the Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich.

The tsarevich had been involved with oppositional currents at court as early as the 1690s, at the time of Peter's divorce from his mother. By 1707 some thought him a potential rival to Menshikov, and he had figured in the plans of Charles XII to exploit discontent among Russian aristocrats. Nothing came of all this, and the boy grew to manhood serving as a sort of logistics assistant for his father, keeping supplies flowing from Moscow in the critical years before Poltava. In these years Aleksei also received an education, and not a bad one. The original plan of his education drawn up by Baron Huyssen around 1703 reflected the priorities. He was to study the Bible and Russian grammar, as well as mathematics and history. The 1703 plan called for French, but in fact he only learned German well enough to speak it and apparently some French, Polish, and Latin. As for statecraft, he was to start with Diego Saavedra Fajardo and Fénelon's *Télémaque* and then move on to Puffendorf. Some of all this he clearly absorbed, as his library shows, with its many Western books on history, politics, and religion. As for Orthodoxy, Aleksei was no traditional "Muscovite conservative": he corresponded with archimandrite Ioannikii Seniutovich, and read the books sent him directly from Kiev and through its governor, Prince D. M. Golitsyn. His church history came not from the Russian *Khronograf* or the Orthodox lives of the saints, but from Cesare Baronio S.J., that is,

from the Catholic Counter-Reformation. Aleksei's cultural world was a sort of Moscow baroque, heavily influenced (especially in religious matters) by Ukrainian Orthodoxy, with its particular combination of Orthodox dogma and Catholic spirituality.¹

After the great victory at Poltava his father sent him to Germany to be married, and he had stayed there and in Poland until the end of 1712. While he was away his name again came up in connection with political discontent, in the sermon of 17 March 1712 by Metropolitan Stefan Iavorskii. The metropolitan's sermon was something unheard of in Russia since Nikon's time, an expression of disapproval by the head of the church. Stefan attacked the *fiskaly* as irresponsible slanderers, but also raised more sensitive matters. He attacked those who put away their wives and did not observe all the Orthodox fasts, a group that included the tsar himself. At the end, he called on St. Alexius, whose feast-day it was, not to forget his namesake, the tsarevich: "You left your house, he also wanders among alien houses; you left your parents, he also; you were deprived of slaves, servants, subjects, friends, relatives, acquaintances, he also; you are a man of God, he is also and a true servant of Christ. Let us pray, saint of God, protect your namesake our only hope." The next day the senators present came to him to complain that he was encouraging rebellion and touched the tsar's honor, to say nothing of the question of the *fiskaly*. The metropolitan begged Peter's forgiveness, claiming rather disingenuously that he had intended no specific reference.² For the moment, the incident seemed closed, but later on it would return to help implicate the church in Aleksei's fate.

In Germany, Aleksei's Wolffenbüttel marriage was not unproblematic, in spite of Peter's desires. With the exception of the younger Golovkin (Ivan Gavrilovich), Aleksei's immediate entourage was largely against it, as they opposed all of Peter's innovations and any marriage with a foreigner. The principal opponent of the marriage was Prince Iurii Iur'evich Trubetskoi, whose sister the Germans believed to be the object of the tsarevich's affections. The Russian

¹ Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 347–49; Doerries, *Rußlands*, XXVI, 54–56, 68–76, 170–71; *Pis'ma russkikh gosudarei i drugikh osob tsarskogo semeistva*, 5 vols., Moscow, 1861–96, III, 26, 56; Bushkovitch, "Power," 194–95. The 1703 plan in Russian translation: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 298–304. Huyssen left for Western Europe to serve Peter as a diplomat early in 1705, giving him only about two years with the tsarevich: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 17.

² Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 573–75. For the full sermon see RGADA, f. 9, otdelenie I, d. 31, ll. 3–18. S. G. Runkevich, *Arkhierei petrovskoi epokhi v ikh perepiske s Petrom Velikim*, St. Petersburg, 1906, 156–58.

party nevertheless had a good time in Dresden, where Charlotte had grown up under the tutelage of her cousin, Christina Eberhardine of Bayreuth, the wife of Augustus II of Poland. Whatever he thought of his future bride, Aleksei attended the French theater in Dresden and flirted with the local ladies. In spite of Trubetskoi's opposition to the marriage, Peter's will prevailed and it took place in Torgau, in one of Christine Eberhardine's residences, in the fall of 1711.³ Aleksei passed the year after his wedding working for his father in Poland by collecting supplies for the Russian army, rather to the discomfort of his bride.⁴

Aleksei seemed to fit in well in Germany, not surprisingly given his upbringing and languages. When he returned finally to Russia, he soon acquired a rather different reputation. Pleyer reported in August 1713, that he had learned from believable sources that "the tsarevich had brought little German inclination and customs back from Germany and passed most of his time with Muscovite priests and bad common fellows, and at the same time was strongly given to drink."⁵

Whatever his cultural views, Aleksei's behavior was a problem to Crown Princess Charlotte. A more serious problem was that she inherited Aleksei's enemies at court. Menshikov supposedly told the tsarevich that he did not like her for her arrogance, especially over her relationship with the empress her sister in Vienna. He also told Aleksei that Charlotte did not love him, but that it was no surprise given the way the heir treated his wife. As Charlotte wrote to her mother, Menshikov was right: Aleksei did not love her. Tsaritsa Ekaterina was no friend either, and Charlotte could rely only on

³ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 311–12; *PiB* II/1, 121; Waldemar Guerrier [i.e. V. I. Ger'e], *Kronprinzessin Charlotte von Rußland, Schwiegertochter Peters des Grossen, nach ihren noch ungedruckten Briefen 1707–1710*, Bonn, 1875, 32–29. Also in (under censorship) *Vestnik Evropy*, 1872, 5–6; Manfred von Boetticher, ed., *Braunschweigische Fürsten in Rußland in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Veröffentlichungen des niedersächsischen Archivverwaltung 54, Göttingen, 1998, 48–51.

⁴ Aleksei Petrovich was short of money during his stay in Poland in 1712, and Charlotte had to speak to Menshikov for relief. She discovered to her relief that Menshikov spoke quite good German, which allowed her to speak to him alone without an interpreter: *Kronprinzessin*, 66–67.

⁵ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, Moscow, 19/20 August 1713: "Diser tagen bekommet man alhier nachricht, daß der Czar widerumb von Petersburg nach Finnland verreiset, den Cronprintzen aber bey seiner gemahlin zuruckgelassen habe; anbey habe von glaubwürdigen leuthen erfahren, [daß der Cronprintzen wenig teutschen sinns und sitten auß Teutschland mitgebracht, dan seine meiste zeitvertrieb mit Moscovitischen Pfaffen und schlechten gemeinen kerlen haben, und dabey auch dem trunck anjetzo starck ergeben seyn solte, deswegen die Prinzessin sich heimlich sehr betrübet, doch es öffentlich nicht merken lassen, viele ihre teutschen bedienten von sich entlasset, welche es nur begehren]."

Golovkin and Peter himself. The court intrigues and Aleksei's health problems (a suspicion of tuberculosis) led by June 1714 to a trip to Karlsbad, where he took the waters and bought books in German and other languages. He read Baronio's history of the church, noting passages about tyrannical rulers and their persecution of the clergy. After his return, just before New Year's Day 1715, he fell out of sight, rarely referred to in diplomatic correspondence.⁶

Wherever Aleksei was spending his time, Peter spent much of the summer in Reval with the fleet, awaiting developments in Pomerania and on the Baltic. In August, Peter and the court returned to St. Petersburg in expectation of the deliveries by both the tsaritsa and Crown Princess Charlotte. Peter turned to the supervision of the building of his capital, ensuring straight streets paved in stone and a regular grid. A change in the wind caused another enormous flood which occupied both tsar and inhabitants in September, lasting several days and drowning both people and animals. It receded in time for the tsar to celebrate the anniversary of Lesnaia on 28 September (OS) as he did every year, and he celebrated it in a grand manner in Menshikov's palace on Vasil'ev Island. He gave no sign that his host was returning to favor, and contented himself with a patriotic speech and the usual heavy drinking of Hungarian wine. The investigation into corruption of the last winter seemed to have played itself out, and many of those convicted were now back at their old posts. Yet Menshikov was not out of the woods. The Senate was demanding a huge "loan" from him, and others from the recent

⁶ Boetticher, 79–81, 83–85. Charlotte also reported home that Shafirov and Löwenwolde were her enemies: Ger'e, *Kronprinzessin*, 86–87, 95, 149–50. There is an undated letter from Peter to Charlotte (probably from summer 1714) saying that he sent Aleksei abroad to stop the gossip. Her replies seem to confirm the date and Peter's reasons: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 319–27. HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23 (1714): St. Petersburg 25/5 June 1714: "Der Cron Prinz ist alhier gar immer unpäblich und geben ihm die medici zum langen leben schlechte hoffnung, dan er eine vollkommende schwindsucht haben solle. [Die Cron Prinzessin lebe in großer betrübnus so wohl wegen des Cron Prinz] beständigen [unpäblichkeit, als wegen villen verdrießlichkeiten, die sie ausstehen muß . . .]", involving her housing and servants; St. Petersburg, 25 June/6 July 1714 (Aleksei left for Karlsbad but recalled on Saxon affairs); St. Petersburg, 24 December 1714/4 January 1715 (Aleksei Petrovich returned to St. Petersburg 21 December 1714 OS). In spite of the recall, Aleksei was in Berlin by 2 July: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 319 (Golovkin to Peter, 18 July 1714). Aleksei remained in St. Petersburg the whole year 1715, as his letters to his friend the Ukrainian monk Ioannikii Seniutovich show. He congratulated Ioannikii on his appointment and consecration as archimandrite of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves, and thanked him for sending him books and icons: *Pis'ma russkikh gosudarei*, (vol. III), 58–60. M. P. Pogodin and G. V. Esipov, "Dokumenty po delu tsarevicha Alekseia Petrovicha," *ChOIDR* 3 (1861), pt. 2, otd. 2, 144–63; and Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 324–26.

investigation were also afraid they too would have to pay again.⁷ In public Peter's relations with Menshikov remained only correct. In early October Peter went out to Schlüsselburg to celebrate the anniversary of his victory in spite of continued attacks of colic. Peter showed the foreign diplomats the fort and told the story of the battle, while Menshikov acted as host for the banquets. As the party returned home on the river, a messenger arrived with the news that Charlotte had given birth to a son.⁸

On 12 October 1715, the crown princess indeed gave birth to a son, soon to be baptized Petr. His birth was the first of a series of events that would eventually lead the tsarevich to disaster and Menshikov to recovery. Charlotte was not happy at the time of the birth of her son. She was glad to have given the country an heir, but she had been distraught for some time at the small amount of her living expenses, among other things. At the birth of her son "she noticed jealousy at the tsar's court because of the birth of her prince

⁷ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 26 August (NS); 11 October 1715 (NS), St. Petersburg, describing the festival and the flood: "Nun ist auch daß letzte aus dem Senat, und allen anderen Canzleyen aus Moscau mit allen schrifftler gar anhero zu komen beordret worden, daß also die statt meist lähr seyn wird. Aus meinen vor einiger zeit übergeschribenen relationen werden Ewer Kay. und König. Cathol. May. allergnädigst beliebt haben sich fürtragen zu lassen, die einige monath hindurch alhier über die am Czarischen schatz von einigen russischen grossen und mittleren herrn und bedienten verübten untreu, ergagnenge inquisition, und darauf erfolgten bestraffung, Nun solte allerunterthänigst-treuehorschambst berichten, daß meist alle dieselbe mit unterschiedlichen leibs- und geldstraffen castigte widerumb theils mit- theils wider deren willen, und wunsch in die vorige bedienung eingesetzt werden: Nach deme auch unter anderen der Czar [dem fürst Menschicoff nach erlegtem straff, zuruknembung] einiger ihm gegebenen [kostbahren jubelen] wiederumb [sich gnädig] erzeiget, hat er noch ein anderes mittel erfunden von denselben [das eine zeit] her [zusambgescharten grossen geld von ihn mit] gueter manier herauszubekomen, in deme [von dem hohen Senat an ihn] abgeschiket worden, [umb von] ihn [ein darlein von eini]gen [Millionen zu begehren, welches] er [auch nicht] abschläge, [weilen er] leicht errathete, wie solches zu verstehen wäre, [aber von der zeit] her immer [höchst bestürzet] ist, wegen dergleichen [anforderungen] stehen noch mehrer [in grossen sorgen] und seind auch noch etlicher, welche verwichen Jahr [sich purgirt zu haben] vermeinen, ordre bekomen, von ihren gütteren künftigen winter widerumb anhero zu komen. Sonsten gehet alhier [in geheimb die rede, daß der Czar diesen winter] gewiß [nacher Pommern reisen, von dannen in das Carlsbad] gehen werde."

⁸ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 14/25 October 1715. St. Petersburg (trip to Schlüsselburg): "Die tauff solte übermorgen als künftigen sonntag geschehen, dem jungen Printzen wurde aber gleich nach der geburt mit den namen seines herrn Grossvatters Peter Alexieewitz benennet. Weilen nun (ungeachtet bey antretung dieser lustreiß man keinen augenblik der niderkunft halber mehr sicher ware) eventualiter keine anstalt wegen lösung der Canonen gemacht wurden, und so woll der gouverneur als Commendant mit den Czaren worden, so wurden nach des Czaren ankunft hernach 12 Canonen gelöset. [Worüber so die Russen als frembde ihre glossen machen, weilen verwichenen jahr bey der geburth einer Printzessin des fürst Menschicoff fünfzehn Canonen gelöset wurden]." ARSG 7367, 1715, 25 October 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (festival at Schlüsselburg, birth of Peter's son).

and knew that the tsaritsa tried to persecute her secretly.” Her grief did not last long. Two weeks after the boy’s birth, Charlotte died of the complications of childbirth.⁹

Behind the alternation of joy and grief at court relations between the tsar and his son were about to erupt. Peter had written a letter to Aleksei chastizing him for his inattention to military affairs and general unfitness to rule and even threatening to disinherit him in his will. The letter is dated 11 October, and thus would seem to have been written before the birth of Petr Alekseevich. The tsar did not deliver the letter until 27 October, however, on the day of Charlotte’s funeral.¹⁰ The day after Peter delivered the letter, Ekaterina gave birth to a boy as well, also quickly named Peter. This event changed the whole dynastic situation, for there were now three possible heirs to the throne.¹¹ Peter was happiest about his own new son. He had the cannons salute at the fortress of Sts. Peter and Paul, and went in a chair to pay a visit to Admiral Apraksin. From there in a small boat he went on to see his sister Tsarevna Natal’ia, the widowed Tsaritsa Praskov’ia, and Menshikov. The tsar, Apraksin, and Menshikov put out huge casks of free beer and vodka on the streets and the people “got inhumanly drunk,” reported Pleyer. The whole city was illuminated at night for two days before the baby’s baptism and the festivities resumed immediately with greater force, with Peter making the rounds and ending the evening with Menshikov. “The joy at this birth among the great and persons of the lesser or low

⁹ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 4 November 1715 NS: on Charlotte’s death: “[Zu diesen todtfall har gar viel gohofflen der vielfältige chagrin, welchen diese Prinzessin] imer [ausgestanden, daß geldt welches ihro jährlich zu unterhald bestimmet war, wurde also gesparsamb und mit solcher mühe heraus]gebracht, [daß sie also in einer] immerwährenden [armut lebete, und ihre bediente nicht beyahlen] kunte. [Bey] allen [kauffleuten] seind [von Ihro und ihren hoff bedienten schulden hinterlassen. Sie vermerkte eine jalousie am zarischen hoff gegen sich wegen der geburt ihres Printzen und wuste daß sie die Zarin] suchete sie [heimlich zu verfolgen,] wegen diesen allen [war sie in einen] stätten [kumer.]” (= Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 342–43). SHSA Geheimes Kabinett 3635/II, St. Petersburg, 25 October 1715 (NS): “La princesse Czarewitsza est accouché d’un prince le 23 d’oct: le matin entre 4 et 5 heures ce qui a causé bien de la joye au prince son Epous et au commun peuple [mais j’ay remarqué que le Czar a reçu cette nouvelle avec indifférence]. La Czarienne qui est aussi enceinte [n’a pas temoigné beaucoup de joye non plus, comme v. E. le juge bien Elle-meme].” ARSG 7367, 1715, 1 and 4 November 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (illness and death of Charlotte). TKUA Rusland B48, 23/12 October 1715, St. Petersburg (birth of AP’s son); 25 October/4 November 1715, St. Petersburg (death of Charlotte).

¹⁰ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 346–48.

¹¹ Aleksei’s son was healthy from the first, while Peter and Ekaterina’s son was rather sickly. Ekaterina had lost several children before, but had two healthy daughters, Anna (the future Duchess of Holstein) and Elizaveta (the future empress of Russia). Petr Petrovich would die in 1719.

estate is indescribable, they just sleep it off to drink again and drink to sleep it off. Anyone who is sober pretends to be drunk among the drunk and in all houses the tables are always covered and full of food. The tsar calls this prince his real crown prince.”¹² At the

¹² HHStA Rußland I, Karton 23, 1/11 November 1715, St. Petersburg: “nach Mitternacht vom achten zum 9.ten hujus die Czarin mit einen jungen Prinzen darniderkomen ist. So bald derselbe nur auf der welt komen ist, wurde ohne anstand, und alsbald in der nacht auf der Admiralitet 33 canonen auf der vestung aber 31 canonen abgefeuert, der Czar erzeugte darüber solche freuden, daß er selbst in Person alsbald auf einer kleinen chaise zu Admiral fahrete, von ihm sezete er sich auf eine chaloupe, und fahrete zu seiner schwester der Prinzessin Natalia, und zu der verwittibten Czarin, von danen zu den fürsten Menschicoff, und überbrachte also selbst die froliche zeitung. Gegen Mittag liesse der Groß Canzler in nammen des Czaren allen frembden Ministren diese geburt notificiret, und wan wir dem sprechen, und Completmentiren wollen, wir umb 2 uhr nachmittag im Winterhaus mit gefärbten kleyderen erscheinen, auch bis nach der kindestauff, welche künftigen donnerstag geschehen soll dieselbe nicht ablegen sollen. Umb mittage wurde bey des Czaren, des Admirals, und fürsten Menschicoff hauseren brandwein, und bier in grossen kuffen auf die strassen dem volk frey gesezet, da sich alles unnmenschlich besauffete, und schlugte, das gantze Petersburg wurde des nachts auf allen Insulen illuminiret, welches bis zum kindestauff dauern wird. Es ware so woll untern grossen, als gemeinen man schon umb mittag fast alles trunken, der Czar fahrete von einen ort zum anderen bis in die nacht herum, alwo er tractiret wurde, derowegen wir den ersten tag als sonabend ihn nicht zusprechen bekometen. Gestern als sonntag wurde uns kurz vor der Mahl Zeit zu wissen gemacht, daß wir den Czaren aus der kkirchen abwarten, und mit ihn speisen solten, da wir bey seiner ankunft ihn an den aussersten zimmer gratuliren, und er uns zu der Czarin hineinführte, bey welcher wir auch unsere glückwunscht ablegeten, darauf ein silbernes praesentier thäller mit kleinen becherten voll brandwein gebracht, welches der Czar, und die Czarin zusambhielten, und jeden unter uns eines davon auszutrinken angebothen wurde, darauf man zu disch giengte. Über der Mahlzeit fangete der Czar alle gesundtheiten selbst an, als er aufstunde, invitirte er uns mit ihn zu wasser spaziren zu fahren, namme uns frembde zu sich auf seine chaloupe, und fahrete nach der statt in die Hosterie alwo seine Ministri, und Senatores ihn erwarteten; aldar wurde bey 2 stunde lang getrunken, von denen gieng man zu fuß zu den groskanzler, alwo widerumb die dischen gedeket, gessen, und getrunken wurde. Nach einer gueten weil gieng man von diesen, zu einer anderen alten frau, die Igumena, oder abtessin schertzweiß genanndt, aldort wurde wiederumb eine weil tractiret, von denen zu den vicekanzler Baron Schaphyoff, nach einer stund, als man aldort trinkete, und essete, erhebet sich ein kleiner wind, darauf sich alles auf Bujer verfügete, auf den wasser eine guete weil hin und her lavirte, schwürmer, und wasser kuglen worffe, und endlich eine stund vor mitternacht zu des Czaren schwester, Prinzessin Natalia zum abendessen kamen, welche selbst umb alle dischen herumgang, und tractirte. Eine stund nach mitternacht gieng wiederumb alles auf chalouppen, der Czar zum fürsten Menschicoff, die anderen aber naher hauß. Bey den abschied beordert der Czar, daß sich heutigen tages alle nach 3 canonen schüsse in der Hosterie widerumb einfinden sollen. Diese spazirfahrten, und tractamenten werden sich zur kindertauff continuiren, nach welchen die traur widerumb angezogen wird. Die freud über diese geburt ist bey grossen, und kleinen, oder nidrigen standes personen unbeschreiblich, man schlaffet nur aus, damit man widerumb trinke, und trinket, damit man widerumb schlaffe, welcher auch nuchtern ist, stellte sich bey denen trunkenen, trunken an, in allen hausern stehen die dische immer gedeket, und mit essen besezet. [Der Tzar heisset diesen Printzen seinen rechten Cron-Printzen.] Der junge Printz heisset Peter Petrovitz.” ARSG 7367, 1715, 11 November 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (funeral of Charlotte, birth of Petr Petrovich on 9 November, “De vreugde is so groot en so universeel, dat het niet mogelyk is die te beschryven”).

baptism of the “real crown prince” the celebration reached a climax. Fireworks illuminated the sky, cut short only by the snow and rain of a Petersburg November. Menshikov got so drunk he lost a jewel-encrusted order of knighthood, a present from the king of Prussia. Fortunately a common soldier found it the next day and returned it to him. His political fortunes, however, were not so bright. Peter planned to lead the next year’s campaign in Pomerania himself, leaving the Senate at home to rule in his name, and leaving Menshikov behind merely as governor of St. Petersburg province, with no special powers. A few days later Peter agreed to forgive Menshikov half of the 87,144 rubles he had been ordered to return to the treasury and to end the case, a decision that could not last long.¹³

In the midst of the rejoicing, Aleksei answered his father’s letter on 31 October, agreeing that he was too lacking in intelligence and physical strength to rule, too “rotten.” He asked his father to remove him from the succession in favor of his new-born brother, Petr Petrovich.¹⁴ Peter did not reply. Part of the reason was that he was very ill all autumn with colic. He was also troubled about the succession problem he now faced.

At one of the celebrations for the birth of his son (in Shafirov’s house) he had a long talk with the Danish ambassador Westphalen about the regency after the death of Louis XIV, who had died only two months before. Peter brought up the subject, and told Westphalen that Louis XIV was clearly the greatest king France had ever had, and that he had admired his great and heroic actions. He could not, however, admire the arrangements he had made for his succession, the regency of the duke of Orleans for the young Louis XV. If Louis XIV had uncovered evidence of a future capability to rule in his great-grandson, he should not put him in the hands of a man who

¹³ HHSStA, Rußland I, Karton 23, 14/25 November 1715. Loss recorded a whole series of rumors at the end of the year about Dolgorukii and Menshikov in December, but none seemed to him reliable enough to draw firm conclusions about the status of the prince or his enemies: SHSA Geheimes Kabinett, 3635/I, 13 December 1715 (NS), St. Petersburg (rumor that Peter was feigning illness to avoid giving the order of St. Andrew to Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, Loss’s comment that Peter was really ill); 27 December 1715, St. Petersburg (Loss hears a rumor that Menshikov wants to become grand duke of Lithuania as the result of various Polish intrigues, but Peter uninterested in the scheme, Loss would ignore this rumor if it came from Menshikov’s enemies, but it came from his household, so Loss does not know what to believe). ARSG 7368, 1716, 30 December 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (Dolgorukii will get order of St. Andrew). RGADA, f. 198, d. 41, ll. 2–3; Pavlenko, *Menshikov*, 102.

¹⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 348–49.

could easily poison the boy and take the throne for himself. If the duke was himself worthy to be king and Louis XV as unworthy as was being reported, Louis XIV should have just proclaimed Orleans the successor. Westphal replied that the French fundamental laws obliged Louis to put the regency into the hands of the closest princes of the blood until his heir grew to maturity. The king of France could not just name anyone king, the act would be null and void, and besides could lead to civil war. The Dane's answer set off a tirade from Peter, one that explains more even than his letters to his son what were his thoughts on the future in autumn 1715:

Well, replied the tsar, then a prince who, to form for himself a state that is prosperous and redoutable has exposed his life a hundred times, sacrificed his health and brought to a conclusion by his application, by his care and by his skill, his affairs to such a point as to make himself and his state respected and feared by all his neighbors would then according to your hypothesis be absolutely obliged to have pass the fruits of his labors into the hands of a fool so that he would begin the destruction of them. In truth I am not of your sentiments. It is not, it seems to me, right that a monarch kills himself to enlarge his states, makes them prosperous and makes himself feared during his lifetime, it is necessary that he knows how to preserve his work after his death as well, which he will be able to best effect in taking great care to have a successor who is capable not only of preserving his acquisitions and establishments but as well of executing the rest of his plans, and if he has to choose one from among his subjects, you, he continued, do you tax him with cruelty? if a prince to save and to preserve his state, which should be more precious than all the blood in his veins, would contrive to alter the succession of blood? And me, I would call it committing the greatest of cruelties to immolate the safety of the state to the simple established law of succession. I suppose that he who proclaims this law has not the qualities required to rule. The monasteries are the right places to house weak princes and to cover up their stupidity but the throne is not their business. David, for example, had many sons but since he did not find among the older ones the qualities with which it was necessary that the kings of Israel be provided, he subjected them all to the youngest whom he chose for successor and God approved his choice, although he should have blamed him for disregarding the law of primogeniture which did not cease to be in great reverence among the Jews. If gangrene starts in this finger (having me [= Westphal] touch the end of his [PI's] thumb, would I not be obliged, even though it is part of my body, to have it cut off and if I did not do that would I not be the murderer of myself?¹⁵

¹⁵ TKUA Rusland, B48: 31 October/11 November 1715, St. Petersburg (birth of Peter's son, discussion of succession at the celebration); 4/15 November 1715, St. Petersburg, Westphal to [Sehested]: "[j]'avois eu occasion de penetrer les sentiments du Czaar en esgard à sa

The issue in Peter's mind, as he said in his letters to his son, was Aleksei's competence to rule, to carry out Peter's work, foreign and domestic. Unfortunately the tsar's alternate candidates were both

Direction et que je communiquerois là dessus de particularités, dont Votre Excellence seroit surprise]. Il est donc Monseigneur necessaire que vous sachiez, que [me trouvant Dimanche passé à table avec Sa Majesté Czarienne chez son Vice-Chancelier, ou Sa Majesté me faisant de la grace de discourir et de raisonner avec moi de diverses affaires] il arriva que [la vie du feu Roy de France] etant devenue [le sujet du discours, le Czaar dit] certes si [la France a été jamais gouvernée par un grand Roy elle l'a esté de notre temps] aussi ai-je de la peine à croire qu'il [y ait jamais eu un plus grand Roy en France que Louis Quatorze] cependant quand je considere [le peu de soin que ce Prince a pris pour conserver son ouvrage après sa mort, je n'ay plus pour sa memoire la meme estime] que j'avois eu justques la [pour les grandes heroïques actions. Louis Quatorze] se trouvant si [avancé en age que deja depuis quelques années] il ne pouvoit naturellement s'attendre à autre chose qu'à [une mort subite] si ayant decouverts dans [cet enfant qui devoit devenir Roy après luy des marques d'une capacité future pour regner] pourquoi remettre [cet enfant entre les bras d'un homme qui] ne manquera pas de luy faire [avalier quelque pilule] affin de s'assurer du [throne de France] pourquoy ne pas exclure le Duc d'Orleans entierement des affaires du Gouvernement] ou bien si trouvant [le dit Duc d'Orleans d'un genie superieur comme il] doit estre, [et son arriere petit fils] à cause de sa [grande jeunesse et à cause de quelque infirmité corporelle] comme on le debite [incapable de regner] pourquoi pas faire et declarer [un si habile homme que doit estre le Duc d'Orleans Roy à la place de l'Enfant] par la il auroit conservé [son grand ouvrage aussi après sa mort] au bien qu'il y a à present grande apparence, que [tout ira en France sans dessus dessous. Je luy repondis que les loix fondamentales de la France instituants] en cas de la [minorité du Roy, le premier Prince du Sang Regent du Royaume; Feu Roy de France ne pouvoit exclure le Duc d'Orleans de la regence pendant que le jeune Roy sera mineur et de declarer l'Edit du Roy à sa place de celui à qui la Commission appartient.] Ce seroit faire violence à [son propre sang, enfreindre et fouler sous les pieds la loy de la Succession] dont [un Roy de France ne peut pas absolument pas dispenser, qu'une action pareille outre qu'elle seroit en soy meme nulle et d'aucune valeur elle] seroit censée [cruelle et inouïe, et donneroit lieu et occasion à une guerre civile] qui est selon mon opinion de tous les [fleaux dont Dieu se sert dans son colere pour punir un Estat le plus affligeant.] Or, [repliqua le Czar, un Prince qui aura, pour se former] un Estat florissant et redoutable [exposé cent fois sa vie, sacrifié sa santé et porté à la fin] par son application, par ses soins, et par son adresse [ses affaires à un point de se faire, et son estat considerer et redouter de par tous ses voisins] seroit donc selon [votre] hypothese absolument obligé de faire passer [entre les mains d'un fou] à cause qu'il seroit [son plus proche du coté du sang les fruits de ses travaux] affin qu'il en precipitât la destruction. Je ne suis pas en verité de [vostre] Sentiment. Il n'est pas ce me semble aisé qu'un Monarque se tue pour aggrandir ses Estats les rendre florissant] et se faire redouter [pendant sa vie, il faut qu'il sçache conserver son ouvrage aussi après sa mort] ce qu'il ne scauroit mieu effectuer, qu'en prennant grand soin d'avoir [un successeur qui soit capable non seulement de conserver ses acquisitions et ses etablissements mais d'executer aussi le reste de ses desseins, et dut il [en choisir un] au milieu de [ses sujets, vous, continua-t-il, taxe de cruauté, si un Prince pour sauver et] pour conserver son Estat qui luy doit estre plus cher que [tout le sang de ses veines, entreprendroit à alterer la Succession du sang] et moy [j'appelle commetre la plus grande de toutes les cruautés] d'immoler le Salut de l'Etat au [simple droit d'une succession etablie]. Je suppose que celui la, qui peut clamer ce droit [n'a pas les qualités requises pour regner, les couvents sont des lieux propres à loger les Princes foibles et pour couvrir leur imbecilité] mais le [throne n'est pas de leur affaire. David par exemple avoit plusieurs fils] mais comme il ne trouvoit pas dans [les ainés les qualités] dont il falle que les [Rois d'Israel fussent munis, il les assujettit tous au plus jeune le quel il choisit pour son Successeur et Dieu approuva son choix] bienloin qu'il la dut avoir

infants, and that was a major problem.¹⁶ In this situation he could only try to get a decision from Aleksei, and hope for the best.

Peter replied to his son only on 19 January 1716:

Last reminder.

Since I could not give a resolution because of my illness, now I answer: I read your letter answering my first letter, in which you only mention the succession and put up to me everything which is always mine. And why did you not give an answer, as in my letter? for there I wrote much more about your lack of will and desire for affairs than about bodily weakness, which you alone mention. Also, you neglect and ignore the fact that I have been dissatisfied with you for years, even though I wrote a lot about that. For this reason I think you do not pay much attention to your father's order. Which moved me to write this last: for if you do not fear me now, how will you keep my testament after me? That you will swear an oath is impossible to believe because of your hardness of heart. Besides that there is the word of David: every man is a lie [Psalm 116, 11]. Also, even if you truly wanted to keep it, the big beards, who are not in influence now because of their idleness, and to whom you are now very inclined, will be able to incline you and force you. And besides, with what will you return to your father for your birth? Will you help in my unbearable griefs and labors, when you acquire such a perfect age? No, not at all! What is known to all is that you rather hate my tasks which I perform for my people without sparing my health, and finally you will be the destroyer of them. For this reason it is impossible for you to remain as you are, neither fish nor flesh; but either

blamé de n'avoir point eu esgard au [Droit de la Primogeniture qui ne laissoit pas d'être en grande reverence parmi les Juifs]. Si la [Gangrene se mit à ce doigt] me faisant [toucher le bout de son grand doigt] ne serois je pas, non obstant qu'il [fait parti de mons corps] oblige de [le faire couper et si je ne le faisois pas ne deviendrois-je pas le meurtrier de moy meme]? Enfin Monseigneur [je comprens à present la raison de la Loy que le Czar a introduite dans ses Etats] la quelle [adjuge tous les biens immobiliers d'une famille à un seul enfant masle] mais qui laisse pourtant [aux Peres l'autorité absolue de choisir son heritier universel] sans s'arrester à [un Droit de la Primogeniture] et je ne doute absolument plus que [le Czar n'aye dans son coeur decreté l'exclusion de son aîné de la Succession et que nous ne le verrons un jour à l'improviste rasé et fourré dans quelque cellule pour y passer le reste de ses jours à prier Dieu et chanter les hymnes.]” In a postscript Westphal noted that Peter seemed in better health, but Dr. Areskine was afraid he had been too excessive in celebration over the birth of his son. The boy's baptism would take place soon.

¹⁶ Westphal was also concerned about Russia's fate at that moment, fearing that Peter's illness might prove fatal to Denmark's most reliable and closest ally: TKUA Rusland B48: 17/28 October 1715, St. Petersburg: After noting Peter was too ill to attend the baptism of Petr Petrovich, “Helas quel desastre pour la Ligue du Nord, et quel coup de bonheur pour le Suède, si ce prince viendrait à mourir dans ce temps-cy, Dieu veuille nous garder d'un funeste événement [son fils n'ayant en verité pas le moindre qualité pour regner. Entre autres il est trop sordidement avare pour se faire aimer et trop foible pour se faire craindre. Tout iroit dan ce pais cy sans dessus et dessous.]” In December Peter was seriously ill with the colic; SHSA, Geheimes Kabinett, 3635/II, 13 December 1715, St. Petersburg: Peter was so sick that the St. Andrew's order festival was not celebrated and he stayed in bed, even taking the last sacraments at one point.

change your ways and sincerely make yourself worthy to be the heir, or be a monk; for without this my spirit cannot be quiet and especially now that I am not very healthy. To this give immediately your decision when you receive it, either in writing or by speaking to me. And if you don't do that, I will treat you like a malefactor.

Aleksei answered the next day in a letter of only a few lines that he chose to become a monk. Peter gave him time to think it over.¹⁷

A week later Peter left St. Petersburg for Western Europe by way of Riga and Danzig to marry his niece Ekaterina Ivanovna to Duke Karl Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin before the summer's campaign against Sweden.¹⁸ The concern about the "big beards," that is the clergy, which he expressed in his letter to Aleksei was certainly real, and in various ways Peter tried to conciliate them. The rumor was that there was a plan to elevate Stefan Iavorskii, metropolitan of Riazan', to the patriarchate, vacant since the death of Adrian in 1700. This was a surprising choice, reported Pleyer, since Stefan had opposed the marriage plans with Mecklenburg, complained about violation of fasts and was so obstructive that he refused to come to court, in spite of the tsar's approval of his sermons.¹⁹ Peter's other

¹⁷ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 349–51.

¹⁸ Peter signed the marriage treaty with Mecklenburg on 22 January/2 February 1716 in Petersburg. The marriage took place and a treaty of alliance with the duchy was signed in April: Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 273, 276–78. This proved a major issue in future Russian foreign policy: see also Walther Mediger, *Mecklenburg, Rußland und England-Hannover 1706–1721: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des nordischen Krieges*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Niedersachsens 70, 2 vols., Hildesheim, 1967, and Michael Hughes, *Law and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Germany*, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1988.

¹⁹ Pleyer did not mention the incident of Stefan's sermon of March, 1712. HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, 16/27 March 1716, St. Petersburg: "der Czar bey seiner abreis von hier den Metropolit von Pereslaw Resan, welcher von Pohlischer extraction in Catholischen schulen studiret, und ein gelehrter man ist, öfters vor den Czaren cum applausu geprediget, ihm auch so woll in dieser letzten heurath als eigen übertretung der fasten, und anderen sachen der religion öftermahl so contrair gewesen, daß er doch auf czarische berueffung von seine bistumb naher hoff nicht komen wollen auf anligen, und bitten der Czarin zu Patriarchen ernennet, er wurde zwar noch mit keiner ceremonien darzue installiret, derowegen man es mehrer für ein gewöhnliches scherz hielte, anjezo aber hat er vom Czaren die schriftliche Confirmation bekommen, die installation aber bleibt bis zu des Czaren ankunft verschoben. Vermuthlich aber wird er dennoch mehrer den titul, als der vorigen Patriarchen gewalt, und derer grosse reiche gütter bekomen. Er dringet sehr auf die schuelen, und academies, und ist denen Catholischen sehr geneigt." The latter comment refers to Stefan's attitude to the foreign Catholic communities in Russia, which were under Pleyer's watchful eye as representative of the emperor.

Pleyer went on to report that Peter also planned to establish a monastery a mile out of Petersburg that would act as the central source of future Russian hegumens and would be populated by learned monks who had studied in Greek schools. This must be the Alexander Nevskii monastery, founded in 1712–13 by Feodosii Ianovskii: S. G. Runkevich, *Aleksandro-Nevskaia Lavra 1713–1913*, St. Petersburg, 1913, 14–16.

reported actions were not rumors. In January–February 1716 he ordered double taxation for the Old Believers and allowed the Senate to condemn Dmitrii Tveritinov (under investigation since 1713) for his heretical beliefs, both partial victories for Stefan Iavorskii. He also sent Iavorskii a letter which specified behavior for new bishops on their consecration and which included much of the traditional reform measures supported by churchmen, such as the requirement for monks to stay in their monasteries and restrictions on new miracle cults and private churches. It also commanded them to be careful with anathemas and to treat opponents with humility.²⁰ As Peter's letter to his son demonstrates, he believed that a connection existed between the tsarevich and his opposition to Peter's work and the church.

Meanwhile, Peter's relations with Sheremetev were again deteriorating. As the Russian army marched through northern Poland toward Pomerania in the autumn of 1715, the field marshal received frantic messages from Prince G. F. Dolgorukii, Peter's ambassador in Warsaw. Ambassador Dolgorukii asked Sheremetev to use his troops to support Augustus II, which, if he agreed, would violate his orders from the tsar, which were, to proceed to Pomerania. Sheremetev hesitated, leaving some regiments in Poland and slowly moving on westward. On 31 October, Peter sent an order to move on to Pomerania as swiftly as possible. There Charles XII himself was leading the defense of Stralsund, the chief Swedish possession in Germany. The city surrendered on 11/22 December with almost no Russians present, and Charles sailed back to Sweden. For Sheremetev the result of this imbroglio was serious anger on the part of Peter. In December the tsar sent Prince V. V. Dolgorukii to the Russian army in Pomerania to "help" the field marshal. Sheremetev was never again in Peter's good graces.²¹

²⁰ PSŽ V, no. 2985, 193–94 (bishops' letter); nos. 2991, 196 (8 February 1716, double tax on Old Believers), no. 2996, 200; P. V. Verkhovskoi, *Uchrezhdenie dukhovnoi kollegii i dukhovnyi Reglament*, 2 vols, Rostov na Donu 1916, II, 109–13. Tveritinov was a Moscow doctor (*lekar'*) who apparently held semi-Protestant views of the communion and of the saints: *Žapiska Leontii Magnitskogo po delu Tveritinova*, *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti* 38, St. Petersburg, 1882; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 561–68; Cracraft, *Church*, 132–33, 141–42; *SRIO* 11, 301 (Peter prescribes death for the unrepentant and imprisonment for those who recant). The warning about treatment of opponents may be a reference to the Tveritinov affair as well. The letter attracted the attention of the Dutch resident de Bie, who sent a translation of it to the Hague: ARSG 7368, 1716, 8 May 1716 NS, St. Petersburg (translation of decree of 22 January 1716 on the church).

²¹ ARSG 7367, 1715, 18 November 1715 NS, St. Petersburg (Polish envoy Loss tries to get

The purpose of sending the Russian army to Pomerania was not only to assist in capturing the last Swedish fortresses but also to put troops in position for the invasion of Skåne in southern Sweden planned for summer 1716. Peter arrived in Copenhagen in the summer after disposing of his niece to Mecklenburg and prepared for the invasion, which relied heavily on Danish naval cooperation. Among mutual recriminations, increasing opposition from George I of England (and elector of Hanover), and a warning to Peter from Menshikov on the danger of the enterprise, the expedition failed to materialize. Peter's generals and diplomats advised against the landing and in September Peter formally abandoned the plan.²² Sheremetev and his troops spent much of their time in various quarters, with the field marshal further spoiling his relations with Peter by various depredations on Polish estates to support his gigantic baggage train (horses alone numbered 300).²³

It was just as well that Peter called off the landing for the supply problem was serious, both for the landing itself and the diversion planned farther north. The military failure was important not so

Peter to send Sheremetev to help Augustus II); 7368, 1716, 6 January 1716 NS, St. Petersburg (Dolgorukii goes to Kurland); 6 January 1716 NS, St. Petersburg (Polish delegation complains against Saxons, Dolgorukii may have powers to treat the situation); Zaozerskii, *Fel'dmarshal*, 134–40. On the Polish crisis and Russian policy see Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 417–32; IX, 42–51; J. A. Gierowski, *Między saskim absolutyzmem a złotą wolnością: Ż dziejów wewnętrznych Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1712–1715*, Wrocław, 1953. Ambassador Dolgorukii saw his role as support of Augustus II, while the Russian resident Dashkov was much more sympathetic to the complaints of the Polish opposition and very suspicious of the king's secret dealings with France and possibly Sweden. The Saxon minister Flemming even told Dolgorukii that Dashkov was agitating the Poles against the Saxons. Peter saw Charles XII as higher priority.

²² George I, elector of Hanover since 1698, became king of England on Anne's death in 1714. Fully occupied with the 1715 rising in favor of the Stuarts, he turned to Baltic affairs in 1716. Particularly unhappy about the Russian marriage to the duke of Mecklenburg, George followed both narrow Hanoverian interests and larger British ones to become Peter's principal diplomatic antagonist in the ensuing years. There is a large literature on this issue. See Ragnhild Hatton, *George I: Elector and King*, London, 1978; James Chance, *George I and the Great Northern War*, London, 1909; Mediger, *Mecklenburg*; Solov'ev, *Istoriia* IX, 45–55; Wittram, *Peter I* II, 265–93; L. A. Nikiforov, *Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia pri Petre I*, Moscow, 1950. RGADA, f. 198, d. 305, ll. 38–40 (10 August 1716, ADM to PI, in cipher, that Charles XII had left Norway to return to Sweden, was concentrating 40,000 men in the south, and had ordered a *pospolitoe rushenie* (the Polish term for gentry militia) formed. ADM stressed that a landing *protiv desparatnogo nepriatelii* [against a desperate enemy] had many dangers). General Weyde provided Peter with a detailed rationale against the invasion, but he also had the support of Golovkin, Sheremetev, Prince Dolgorukii (V. V.), Repnin, and Bauer. The final decision came on 7/18 September: Inger Haxlund, "When Tsar Peter Changed His Mind – A Momentous Incident in the Northern War," *Scando-Slavica* 43 (1997), 5–17.

²³ Zaozerskii, *Fel'dmarshall*, 140–43.

much for the war as for Russian court politics, for the Senate's foot-dragging with supplies allowed Menshikov to restore his favor in Peter's eyes. The diversion was to be a naval expedition under Admiral Apraksin, composed of the galley fleet and troop transports, to Finnish Åland, which served as a base for Russian raids along the Swedish coast around Stockholm. At the beginning of the campaign season even the Skåne expedition was problematic. In March the Russian fleet lay at Reval fitting out, yet it was far from ready, lacking especially the necessary monies. In April, Peter had to write threatening letters to Admiral Apraksin, who turned to his brother Petr, a Senator since the previous year, sending on the tsar's letter. Petr Apraksin turned to Prince Iakov Dolgorukii "who is a very intractable person," wrote Pleyer, "and came to hard words, threatening to accuse him of treason to the tsar because his stubbornness and delays could hold up the opportunity of a great campaign and happy accomplishment to the greatest harm of the country and the public. After which the money was released." A month later Peter was still demanding supplies from the Senate.²⁴

In April the Russian high seas fleet was able to sail to Denmark. It may have accomplished nothing, but at least it returned more or less unscathed. The Finland expedition was another story. Already at the end of June the news filtered back to St. Petersburg that supplies were inadequate.²⁵ The Russian army on Åland lacked salt and

²⁴ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, 13/24 April 1716, St. Petersburg: "der Czar dem Admiral aus Danzig so harte brief zuschikte, umb die beschleunigung der ausrüstung, und versorgung derselben wegen, daß er mit schwerd, galgen, und spieß bedrohete; worauf der Admiral an seinen bruederen, so ein Senator, und general ist, gleicherweiß nebst angefügte copie des czarischen briefes hart geschrieben, daß er daß benötigte, und assignirte geld vom Senat auswürken, und ihme unterweilet zuschicken solte; derowegen er mit dem Præsidenten des Senats dem fürsten Jacob Fedorowiz Dolgoruky, welcher ein rechte untractabler man ist, also hart zu worten komen, daß er ihn eines verraths bey den Czaren zu beschuldigen bedrohete, weilen er durch solche seine hartnäckigkeit, und verzogerung die gelegenheit einer ganzen campagne und glüklichen verrichtung zu grösten schaden des landes und publici verabsaumen könnte, worauf endlich daß geld folgte." Pleyer was very well informed about Admiralty affairs through the Siberian tsarevich, Vasilii Alekseevich, and possibly others such as Kikin himself. RGADA, f. 9, opis' 1, kn. 10 (Zapisnaia kniga ukazam 1716 g.), l. 119v (PI to Senate for grain for navy), l. 122–3v (PI to ADM on same).

²⁵ A large part of the problem in 1716 was the result of Finland's general poverty, which made it impossible for the Russian army to live off local resources. Though the Russians collected much more than Finland had given to support the Swedish army, they still had to bring supplies by boat from St. Petersburg. In addition, 1716 was a particularly bad year. See Christer Kuvaja, *Försörjning av en ockupationsarmé: Den ryska arméns underhållssystem i Finland 1713–1721*, Åbo, 1999, 151–82; and Antti Kujala, "The Breakdown of a Society: Finland in the Great Northern War 1700–1714," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 25 (2000), nos. 1–2, 69–86.

proper food, was sick with scurvy and melting away. Menshikov wrote to Peter that he had requested supplies repeatedly from the Senate, but they paid little or no attention.²⁶ By 4 July the situation had reached a crisis, and Apraksin decided to retreat to continental Finland. On 9/20 July 1716, in response to desperate appeals from Admiral Apraksin, Menshikov went to the Senate and created a governmental crisis to match that in the field in Finland:

the Senate met on Monday last, the twentieth of this month, and the Prince appeared in it and reproached the illustrious body very strongly for its great carelessness, over which heavy disputes arose, the Senate saying that it was not their fault that the ships sent with provisions had not arrived, that there was no money in the treasury, and the country was entirely exhausted and finally that his majesty the tsar could not ask the impossible of them.

To this the prince reproached them that they only amused themselves with trifles, and neglected the tsar's service, that they frequently had means available to provide the army in Finland with food supplies now and then.

The Senate replied that they represented the person and power of the tsar and could arrest Menshikov. He paid little attention to their threats, left the building and ordered 200,000 rubles worth of flour and other food supplies to be taken from the warehouses of Russian merchants and sent to the army. The Senate accused him of trying to create a scarcity and make a profit on the sale of his own grain. Both Menshikov and the Senate sent complaints to Peter, but de Bie believed that "it is to be believed that the Prince will prevail, for it is clear that without his vigorous action the army in Finland must have disappeared or returned here."²⁷ The Dutchman was right, for on 2

²⁶ RGADA, f. 9, otd. I, opis' 2, ch. 1, d. 22, "Zhurnaly g. Admirala grafa Apraksina 1716—go, 1717—go, 1718—go i 1719—go godov", l. 60, Apraksin writes (18 June 1716) from Åland to the Senate, Musin-Pushkin, and P. Apraksin requesting food supplies; f. 9/2, kn. 28, ll. 72–2v (ADM to PI, 15 June 1716) (Cf. *SRIO* XI, 319, PI to Senate ordering supplies for Copenhagen, 22 May 1716). HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 24: 22 June/3 July 1716, St. Petersburg (lack of food for army in Finland, outbreak of scurvy); 16/27 July 1716, St. Petersburg (Russian army at Åland, salt too dear, little food, scurvy); ARSG 7368, 1716, 12 June 1716 NS. St. Petersburg (hunger and disease in the Russian army in Finland, Menshikov supervises food shipments); 22 June 1716 NS, St. Petersburg ("misere" of Russian troops in Finland continues).

²⁷ RGADA, f. 9/1, op. 2, ch. I, d. 22, l. 60v (4 July 1716, military council and Apraksin's decision to retreat). ARSG 7397, Secreta 1700–32, 24 July 1716 NS, St. Petersburg: Apraksin had written to both the Senate and Menshikov describing the situation. "Hier op is den Senaat op maandagh voorl. den 20n deser, vergadert geweest, en is den Vorst in den zelve verscheenen en heeft dat Illustre corps seer hevige dese groote nalatigheyt verweeten, waar over seer sware disputen syn ontstaan, den Senaat seggende dat het haar schult niet waar dat de onthodene scheepen met proviant als nog niet aangekomen waren, dat geen

July Peter had sent the Senate a message: "The lord admiral Apraksin writes us that he has come to Åland and will continue following orders, but not a single bushel of food has been sent so that the campaign has come to a stop. In this matter it is you who will be required to answer."²⁸

As the summer wore on, the army was still in bad shape, even though some supplies had reached Apraksin on 13 July. Menshikov went again to the Senate on 20 July (OS) but got nowhere. Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii simply accused Apraksin of shifting the blame for his own failures on to the Senate. A few weeks later the Senate replied to Peter, again blaming the admiralty, that is, Apraksin.²⁹

Menshikov struggled on to supply the navy with money, food, and other supplies, "for which purpose I went repeatedly to the Senate but could not get a single definite decision." By September, every ship in Petersburg had been commandeered, food brought in, and the cargoes of all the foreign merchant ships bought up so that not even a

geld by Cassa was, dat 't ryck door gaans uytgeput was en eyndelyk dat S. Cz. Mt. 't onmogelyk van haar niet soude vergen; hier op heeft den Vorst haar verweeten dat sy sigh niet als met beuselingen amuseerden en des Czaaren dienst versuimden, det haar meenigmaal middelen aan de handt geweest hadde om de Finsche armée by tyts met proviant te voorsien; den Senaat zulke reproches hoog opneemende heeft den Vorst geantwoort dat behoorde te weten dat haar Collegium S. Cz. Mts. persoon en mach verbeelde, en dat by gevolg met meerder ontsag 't zelve diende aan te spreken, of anders denken dat bequaam was hem Vorst in arrest te laten neemen en by S. Cz. Mt. om voldoeninge aanhouden, welke dreygementen den Vorst weynig achtende, so is S. Dt. uytgegaan en heeft aanstonts propria autoritate voor omtrent de waarde van 200/m Roebels aan meel en andre vivres uyt der Russe Coopluiden hunne packhuizen laten wegneemen, die nu ook actueelyk op omtrent 60 tialken en Bergantins met aller spoet worden gescheept om eerstdaags naar Abo te verzeylen; Dit doen van den Vorst heeft den Senaat nogh meer verstoort, seggende dat S. Dt. syne eygene magazinen vol graanen hebbende die van de particuliere Coopluiden neemt, om hier in Pietersborg duurte en hongersnoot te brengen, en naderhandt de syne tot overgroote pryzen te verkoopen, zulk ontkent de Vorst en segt dat syn doen haar spyt om dat sy ider in hun particulier interest hebben aan die goederen die weg genoomen heeft, en dat sy sigh zelfs wel sullen betaalen." Both sides had written complaints to Peter. "het is te geloven dat den Vorst sal prevaleren, want sonder syne vigoureuse resolutie is het seer apparent dat de armee in Finlant soude hebben moeten vergaan of herwartz keeren . . ." Apraksin wrote to ADM on 1 July complaining of lack of food supplies: *Materialy dlia istorii russkogo flota*, II, St. Petersburg, 1865, 90.

²⁸ RGADA, f. 9, op. 1, kn. 10, l. 149, postscript to letter to the Senate, 2 July 1716: "Pishet k nam Gospodin Admiral chto on k Alantu prishel i poidet po ukazu dalee, a proviantu k nemu ni edinogo chetverka ne prislano nezheli pokhodu ego uchinitisia ustanovka v tom prinuzhdeni budete vy otvechat"; l. 151v (10 July 1716, PI to Senate ordering money and grain for fleet in Copenhagen); 152 (10 July 1716, PI to Apraksin informing him that he had written to the Senate ordering them to send him supplies) (= *Materialy* . . . *flota*, I, 94).

²⁹ RGADA, f. 9/1 op. 2, ch. I, d. 22, l. 61v (Apraksin appeals for more food on 12 July); l. 62 (Apraksin meets supply ships near Helsingfors); *Materialy* . . . *flota*, II, 98–99 (ADM to Apraksin, 27 July 1716); 113 (Senate to PI, 10 August 1716).

lemon could be found in the city. All this was to go to the Russian fleet in Denmark. The army of the Finnish expedition had accomplished nothing and, wracked by disease, returned to Åbo in October.³⁰

The supplies for the Russian forces in Denmark and Finland recovered for Menshikov his position in Peter's eyes.

here there is the impression that the Senate, which for some time has represented the tsar and has the power in all matters of governance, will decline and according to the secret talk Prince Menshikov, whose power and previous great authority had fallen greatly since the last investigation, is supposed to rise again and perhaps be soon declared viceroy over the whole Russian empire. This is presumably to happen since the prince, seeing that the Senate, in order to live comfortably, kept all the provisions brought here last summer and took them for themselves under the pretext of fear of hunger here and wanted to let the army and fleet in Finland starve and die, and did also many other things; which actions the prince alone prevented, in that now and then, from here, Riga, and Reval he sent some food there and thereby the army and fleet there were saved to some extent from complete ruin. The prince has also in other connections often had sharp encounters already with the senators on account of neglect and obstruction of the tsar's true interest, and besides that because of their perverted governance, the great confusion they have caused, their carelessness, and also continuous stubbornness, against which the tsar's sharpest orders now have no effect, he has brought to the tsar important and heavy complaints.

Besides that, the death of Tsarevna Natal'ia the previous June allowed him to take charge of Peter's young children, Anna, Elizaveta, and Petr and thus cultivate the tsar's favor.³¹ If there was

³⁰ RGADA, f. 9/2, kn. 28, ll. 112–13 (ADM to PI, St. Petersburg, 3 July 1716, difficulties with Senate). Apraksin returned to Åland by July 20 and sent a small reconnaissance raid in early August on the Swedish coast, which lead him to conclude that a more serious effort was too dangerous. The army stayed on Åland through September, but with winter returned to Åbo “ponezhe mnogie saldaty stali bolet”: RGADA f. 9/1, op. 2, ch. 1, d. 22, 62v–68; *Materialy . . . flota*, II, 100, 106–09. 120–21. ARSG 7368, 1716, 18 September 1716 NS, St. Petersburg (Apraksin in Lemland on Åland, can accomplish nothing against Sweden from weakness and lack of provisions, returns to Åbo); HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 24, 17/28 September 1716, St. Petersburg (ships built and commandeered, food assembled for Denmark, army in Finland accomplished nothing and returned to Åbo).

³¹ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 24, 1/12 October 1716, St. Petersburg: “Übrigens bekomet es alhier daß ansehen, als ob der Senat, welcher zeit her den Czaren repraesentirte, und in regirungs sachen allen pouvoir hatte, auch widerumb herunter komen, und laut noch alhier in geheimb gehenden reden der fürst Menschicoff, dessen macht, und vorige grosse autoritet von der zeit der lezt gehaltenen Inquisition, gar umb viles gefahlen gewesen, widerumb empor komen, und villeicht nechstens viceroy über daß ganze russische reich erkläret werden dörfte. Welches vermuthlich daher komen möchte, weilen der fürst, da der Senat alle anhero gebrachte vivers, umb selbst bequemblich zu leben, unter praetext zu beförchtender hiesigen hungers noth hat alhier diesen sommer behalten, und an sich ziehen, die armee, und floten aber in Finland ganzlich verschmachten, und crepire lassen

any doubt whom Peter blamed for the failure to supply Apraksin, Peter removed it in his letter to the Senate of 13 October, where he ordered them to prepare for another expedition to Åland, "but do not fall asleep as in the present campaign."³²

Menshikov was back in power, and just at this moment Tsarevich Aleksei left the city and then disappeared. This sensational turn of events was precipitated by Peter's letter to him of 26 August. Peter wrote to the tsarevich from Denmark telling him that seven months was long enough for him to make a decision about the throne. If he was going to remain the heir, he would have to join Peter in Denmark and participate in whatever campaign took place. If he chose the monastery, Peter wanted to know when and where he was going. The tsarevich left on 26 September, after telling Menshikov that he was going to join the campaign.³³ In reality he was going to Vienna, a move which he had been planning for some time, with the encouragement of none other than Alexander Kikin, the erstwhile

wollen, auch ville andere demarchen begangen, der fürst aber allein noch solche anstalten vorgekehret, daß dennoch dan und wan, von hier, von Riga, von Reval einige lebens mitteln dahin gebracht, und dadurch die armée und flote aldort noch einige massen von ganzlichen ruin errettet worden ist. Es hat auch der fürst in anderen angelegenheiten mit denen Senatoren wegen vernachlassigung, und verhinderungen des wahren Czarischen interesse oft, und harte rencontres schon gehabt, und darüber wegen ihrer verkehrten regirung, verursachten grossen confusionen und fahrlässigkeit, dabey aber noch beständig führenden hartnäckigkeit, wider welche oft des Czaren schärfste ordnen anjezo nichts gefruchtet hat, and den Czaren wichtige schwäre klagen geführt, anbey aber zu bezeugung seiner allenthalbigen wachsamkeit nach absterben des Czaren schwester der Prinzessin Natalia, so befindet sich der fürst ohnnachlässlich bey der jungen herrschaften und sonderlich bey den jungen Prinzen, also daß er gar selten in seinen Pallais, sonder fast alle nacht in des Czaren seinen nahe der jungen herrschafft schlaffet und also alle möglichste sorgfalt und obachtsambkeit zeigt, wodurch er sich vermuthlich widerumb beym Czaren in die vorige gnade setzen dürfte."

³² "net inogo sposoba tol'ko cho ot Alanda nepriiatelia utesnit', k chemu vsiakoe prigotovlenie chinite, a chto o tom vam budut ob'iaivat' g. Admiral i g. kniaz' Menshikov, tol'ko ne usnite tak kak v nyneshnei kompanii . . ." *Materialy . . . flota*, II, 137. Apraksin later wrote to Peter that Menshikov had saved the situation of the Russian army in Finland in 1716: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 508; M. Borodkin, *Istoriia Finliandii*. St. Petersburg, 1910, I, 228.

³³ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 351; RGADA, f. 9/2, kn. 28, l. 181–22 (ADM to PI, St. Petersburg, 24 September 1716: "Sego chisla pri samom moem siuda vozvrashchenii [from Oranienbaum] izvolil u menia byt' syn vash i ob'iavil mne o vospriiatoi svoei rezoliutsii, chto nameren on po ukazu vashemu ekhat' v pokhod . . ."); l. 139–40 (ADM to PI, St. Petersburg, 28 September 1716: "Syn vash otkhal otkudy 26 sego mesiatsa v put' svoi"). HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, 1/12 October 1716, St. Petersburg: arrival of Peter's letter for AP. "Dieser [= AP] zwey tag hindurch hat er sich sehr bemühet allenthalben zuforschen, und forschen zu lassen, zu was ende er hinaus berueffen werde, ob es eine heurath, und mit wem, oder waß es anderes anbetreffen möchte, könnte aber nichts erfahren." ARSG 7368, 1716, 9 October 1716 NS, St. Petersburg (arrival of courier on 5 October NS from Peter ordering Aleksei to join him, rumor that Menshikov will become viceroy, giving a clear sign Peter approves his conduct and is dissatisfied with the Senate).

favorite of Menshikov and the tsar alike. As Aleksei took his farewell of the Senate, he whispered to Prince Iakov Dolgorukii, "don't abandon me."³⁴ The tsarevich left with a suite of only four people by the post coach toward Riga.

Behind him Aleksei had left the Senate, in conflict with Menshikov and the tsar, but in his mind a potential source of support for his schemes. The Senate in 1716 had changed considerably in composition from the original body Peter had appointed five years before. The obscure Mel'nitskii had fallen from view, and Volkonskii (Menshikov's client) and Apukhtin had been convicted of crime and expelled. Prince P. A. Golitsyn had gone to Riga as governor. Peter had added Prince Iakov Dolgorukii in 1711 (as first senator) and Petr Apraksin in 1715. Thus the Senate was reduced to six men, the two later appointees and four of the original group, Prince M. V. Dolgorukii, the Sheremetev client Samarin, Musin-Pushkin, and Tikhon Streshnev. It no longer included any of Menshikov's clients, and, except for Samarin, had become a group exclusively of aristocrats and hostile to Menshikov. It would remain thus until the establishment of the Colleges, and the decree of December, 1717, ordering the presidents of the Colleges to be included in the Senate.³⁵

Two days after the departure of Tsarevich Aleksei, on 28 September /9 October, Menshikov celebrated the anniversary of the victory at Lesnaia with the usual pomp. At the banquet he spoke at length to the Dutch resident. De Bie reported:

I had the good fortune to sit next to his Excellency the Prince Menshikov, who showed me much courtesy and among other things related that Lieutenant General Prince Dolgorukii, who a year ago was the head of the well-known great investigation of his Excellency and his creatures, at the moment has fallen into great disfavor, such that he cannot come to court any more; that his Majesty the Tsar now has clearly seen that he was deceived by this gentleman and that great injustice was done to him, Prince Menshikov, and others, which should be proven when his majesty returns.

De Bie took all this with a grain of salt and offered his own explanations for Dolgorukii's fall from grace.

I must believe that there is nothing to doubt about the disgrace of the new

³⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 509.

³⁵ *ЖА I*, 216–21. The presidents of the Colleges were to sit in the Senate from 1718 on, as part of the fundamental reform of government in December 1717. See Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 110–16, and below. Petr Apraksin received his appointment to the Senate on 9 July 1715: Petrovskii, *O Senate*, 51.

favorite [= V. V. Dolgorukii], but I cannot be sure if his Excellency gave me the real and strongest grounds; but I am well aware that Prince Dolgorukii from the first was not judged capable to carry out so great an undertaking, first because Prince Menshikov (at whose entire ruin he aimed) was too deep in his majesty's favor and that of the tsaritsa on account of his great presents and other political grounds, secondly from the lack of abilities as were ever employed in political matters, either foreign or domestic; additionally I have been assured that the prince did not at all neglect his own interest; but the negligence of the Senate (in which are two of the prince's near relatives [= Princes Ia. F. and M. V. Dolgorukii] and who until now have had the most power), the negligence, I say, of the Senate in respect of the supply of food and other necessities for the army of Finland, which from lack of these has noticeably decreased, and indeed until now has not been in a condition to do anything against Sweden, and the watchfulness of Prince Menshikov to save the same by his own authority and partly at his own expense, I believe were his Majesty's strongest motives and it is undoubtable that the tsaritsa shall have contributed to them, this is ever the feeling of those who know best this court and its nature.

Menshikov even bragged that the king of Denmark, normally his enemy, had complained to Peter of his absence from the army assembled to invade Sweden.³⁶ Menshikov may have been antici-

³⁶ ARSG 7397 Secreta, 16 October 1716, St. Petersburg: "OP dien zelven [= 9 October 1716] namiddag hadde de eere door S. Dt. den Vorst Menchikoff op een banquet genodigt te worden om 't verjaardagh van de by Leszno bevochtene victorie op den Sweedsen General Grave Leeuwenhaupt te vieren: Ik hadde 't geluk naast aan S. Dt. te sitten, die my veel beleeftheit bewees en onder andre saaken vertelde dat den heer General Luitenant Vorst Dolgerucki, die voort jaar 't hooft van de bekende groote inquisitie ever S. Dt. en des zelfs creaturen is geweest, tegenwoordig in groote ongenaade was vervallen, sodanig dat niet meer ten Hove mogte komen; Dat S. Cz. Mt. nu klaar saght dat door dien Heer was verleit geweest en dat hem Vorst Menchikoff en andre groot onrecht was wedervaren, 't geen ook by S. Mts. retour soude bewysen; Aan de disgratie van dien nieuwen gunsteling moet ik geloven dat niet te twyffelen is, maar of S. Dt. my de eygentlyke en sterkste beweegredenen van de zelve heeft gesegt, zulk kan niet verzeekeren, maar wel dat my bewust is dat die Vorst Dolgerucki van den begin aan niet bequaam is geoordeelt soo een groote onderneeminge te kunnen uytvoeren, eensdels om dat de Vorst Menchikoff (wiens geheele ruine in sonderheyt beoogde) te diep in S. Mts. gunste en in die van de Czarizza door syne groote vereeringen en andre politique reedenen was, anders deels uyt gebrek van bequaamheden als syn de nooit in politique saken noch binnen noch buyten 's landts ge-employeert geweest; boven dien so is my verzeekert dat die Heer by die inquisitie geensints syne eygene belangen heeft verwaarloost; maar de negligentie van den Senaat (in den welken twee van dien Heer syne naaste bloedvrienden syn en die tot nogh toe 't meeste gesagh hebben gehadt) de negligentie segge ik van den Senaat omtrent 't besorgen van vivres en andre nootsaakelykheeden voor de armée van Finlant, die uyt gebrek van dien merckelyk is vermindert, jaa tot dato niet in staat is geweest om iets op Sweeden uyt te voeren, en de vigilantie van den Vorst Menchikoff om de zelve propria autoritate en ten deele op eygene kosten te redderen, gelove dat S. Mts. sterkste motiven syn geweest en dat de Czarizza hier toe 't haare sal hebben bygebragt, is ontwyffelbaar, altoos dit is het gevoelen van die geene, die dit Hoff en des zelfs gesteltheit alder best kennen"; ADM also

pating his victory a bit, but elsewhere in Russia the Dolgorukii allies also lost power: A. P. Saltykov lost the governorship of Moscow on corruption charges, his replacement being Kirill Alekseevich Naryshkin.³⁷

With or without Menshikov, the invasion of Sweden was cancelled, but Peter decided not to return to Russia but to travel instead in Germany to take the waters. He also stopped in Havelberg to see the king of Prussia, where he strengthened his alliance, and found plans afoot for a Russian–Prussian–French agreement. These plans and his health took him to Pyrmont and Spa and then to the Netherlands. He took with him Golovkin and Shafirov, but also P. A. Tolstoi, Iaguzhinskii, Prince V. V. Dolgorukii and the general, I. I. Buturlin. In Amsterdam he learned that the tsarevich was in Austria, and wrote to Emperor Karl VI requesting his return, to no effect.³⁸ Nevertheless, in the spring Peter went on to France, his first opportunity to see the great capital, albeit no longer under the firm hand of its great king, Louis XIV. With no firm news of his son, Peter talked to French officials and inspected the city, the palaces and the gardens.

After some weeks in France, he went on to Amsterdam for more diplomacy. In the Netherlands again his party encountered Görtz, by now no mere Holstein official but the trusted minister of Charles XII himself. Görtz was proposing a peace conference, to which Peter agreed. This was the first such offer in many long years from the Swedish side. Görtz still had to get Charles to agree, but when he returned to Sweden he succeeded in swaying the stubborn king, and by December a conference had been set to meet on the Åland islands. This was a definite success on the diplomatic front, and Peter returned to St. Petersburg, arriving just before the end of the year.³⁹

told de Bie that the landing in Skåne was postponed indefinitely, that the king of Denmark regretted his absence, and the Swedish army could be a problem with the absence of a landing.

³⁷ Kirill Alekseevich Naryshkin had been a chamber *stol'nik* of Peter, one of two *kravchie* since 1690, and *ober-komendant* of Pskov, working under Menshikov. In 1717 Naryshkin immediately had conflicts with Senate and was soon also charged with corruption: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 452 and see below. Poe, 189. K. A. Naryshkin was a distant cousin of Peter's mother: Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Rodoslovnaia*, II, 5–8.

³⁸ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 358–59. Menshikov had heard of the flight of the tsarevich about the same time, in a letter from Grigorii Skorniakov-Pisarev of 9 December 1716. Skorniakov-Pisarev wrote from the Russian camp at Schwerin in Mecklenburg that Aleksei had reached Frankfurt am Oder under the assumed name of Lieutenant-Colonel Kokhanskii. His route from there was yet unknown: RGADA, f. 198, d. 872, ll. 1–2.

³⁹ Wittram, *Peter*, II, 293–328.

While Peter was traveling through Europe trying to recast the diplomacy of the Northern War and hasten a solution, the flight of his son to Vienna had produced a major crisis at home. During the whole period from autumn 1716 until autumn 1717 Peter made no effort to return, an example of strong nerves if there ever was one.

What precisely was Aleksei trying to accomplish in Vienna? The Russian historian N. G. Ustrialov's 1861 publication of some of the relevant documents created the false impression that the flight of the heir was merely a cowardly attempt to hide from his father.⁴⁰ Ustrialov created that impression by falsifying the crucial documents stemming from Aleksei's presence in the Habsburg lands. It seems that immediately upon Aleksei's arrival in Vienna on 21 November, 1716, the Imperial Privy Conference offered him the emperor's protection. A few days later "one of the ministers" interviewed the refugee in more detail about his discontents and the sources of his support. Austrian records are silent about the decision then taken and remain so for the next year, either because the decision was not recorded or the archive was later cleaned.

The only records of the Austrian decision come from December 1717. As the tsarevich and his small suite passed through Austria and Moravia under the watchful eye of Petr Tolstoi, the government in Vienna decided to have one last discussion of the issue. It ordered the authorities in Moravia to stop the party there until they received further word on how to proceed. Back in Vienna, the Imperial Privy Council received two memoranda on what to do, our only real sources on Austrian intentions, and the documents Ustrialov so successfully falsified for so long. The two memoranda came from the Imperial vice-chancellor, Friedrich Karl Count von Schönborn and the court chancellor, Philipp Ludwig Count von Sinzendorff. Schönborn as vice-chancellor had charge of relations with the empire and with Northern Europe (including Russia), had taken charge of Aleksei on his arrival, and was besides all that an important figure at the Imperial court, almost as important as Prince Eugene himself. Schönborn argued that the emperor had already been extremely generous to Aleksei, but the latter had not been grateful. Indeed the favor shown was dangerous to the emperor, given the instability of the tsarevich. To make matters worse, the Russian army still in

⁴⁰ For what follows see Bushkovitch, "Power and the Historian"; 177–212; and Bushkovitch, "Istorik i vlast'", 80–120.

Poland (the Pomeranian expeditionary corps) could overwhelm the Habsburg lands at any time they chose. He continued: "in the Tsar's lands, however, it is not impossible for us to gain something, that is, to support any rebellions but Your Imperial Majesty is to be informed that this tsarevich has neither courage nor reason enough to be able to derive real hope or use from the same [= rebellions]." Sinzendorff confined himself to the issues of Tolstoi's relations with the authorities in Moravia, and Schönborn's advice prevailed. The tsarevich was not a strong enough person to count on to lead a rebellion against Peter, so the emperor let him proceed on home.⁴¹

From the point of the view of the empire, Aleksei was a lost opportunity. Imperial-Russian relations had been slowly deteriorating for years, but Peter's April 1716 treaty with Mecklenburg seriously frightened Vienna into thinking that the victorious tsar wanted to play a major role in the empire. Aleksei had presented them with the possibility of forcing Peter back, either by overthrowing him or by the threat of such a move led by his son. Vienna, however, was not the only capital with such schemes afoot. In August, 1717, a French officer named Durés showed up at the lodgings of Baron Görtz, the erstwhile Holstein minister, who had been representing the interests of Charles XII in Holland since 1716. Durés brought documents from Aleksei requesting protection and help from Sweden. Görtz was enthusiastic, but needed authorization from Charles, and that took him a long time to get, for he did not make it back to Sweden until December. By then it was too late, but the instructions Charles approved to negotiate with Aleksei were revealing: Aleksei was to be offered a Swedish army at the head of which he could invade Russia and mount the throne. He was to be reminded that Sweden was much better placed to carry out such a scheme than Austria:

One must examine which of the two is most interested in support for the tsarevich . . . the King of Sweden or the Emperor.

The situation of the states of the latter removes any means of interesting him by the acquisition of some provinces. They are too far from one another, so that if the tsarevich wanted to cede some provinces to the emperor, they would only be a burden to him. The tsarevich will have no money to give, besides there will be need of immense sums to supply an army which will have to march more than two hundred leagues to go only

⁴¹ Bushkovitch, "Power," 184-85, 206-08.

from one border to another. The tsarevich will need himself what little he could extract from his well-intentioned subjects.

The emperor is still continually involved in all the affairs of Europe, which renders his assistance very accidental and uncertain.⁴²

The Swedes were too late, but they did not give up hope. As Aleksei faced the torture chamber, the Swedish foreign minister von Müllern wrote to Görtz: "I believe that what you mention has been done to the tsarevich will only be favorable to us, as long as he remains alive."⁴³

Peter had found out that his son was probably in Austria by December 1716, and wrote to Emperor Karl requesting his return. The official response was that Vienna had no idea where he was and therefore could not be accused of protecting him, though by March 1717, he was already in hiding in Castle Ehrenberg in the Tirol. Peter sent A. I. Rumiantsev, a captain in the guards, to find out his son's whereabouts, and Rumiantsev quickly succeeded. The result was that Aleksei was transferred to St. Elmo near Naples in May. In July, Peter sent Petr Tolstoi to bring him back. The emperor seems to have begun to have doubts about the value of protecting Aleksei. Formally he told Tolstoi and Rumiantsev that they could travel to Naples, and speak with the tsarevich, but privately his "Spanish" ministers convinced the emperor to write to General Daun, the Habsburg viceroy in Naples that he should encourage Aleksei to leave. By 3/14 October Tolstoi was able to convince Aleksei that Karl VI was too fully occupied with the Turks to concern himself with his refugee, and the tsarevich decided to return, making a slow journey home with a stop at the shrine of St. Nicholas in Bari.⁴⁴

As Aleksei made his way home under Tolstoi's watchful eye, the intrigues around him continued. Augustus II of Poland-Saxony, ever fond of complex plots, had his own designs. His ambassador von

⁴² *Ibid.*, 185–86, 208–12.

⁴³ SR, Görtzka sammling E3800, Müllern to Görtz, Lund, 17 March 1718: "Vous scavés, Monsieur, que l'on s'étoit bien attendu ici à la nouvelle de quelque mauvais traitement à essuyer pour le Czarowitz après son arrivée en Russie; je crois pourtant, que celui, que vous avez fait mention de lui être fait, ne pourra que nous être favorable, pourvu qu'il demeure en vie."

⁴⁴ Wittram, *Peter I II*, 346–405; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 105–91; Pavlenko, *Petr*, 381–410; Ustrialov *Istoriia*, VI, 358–59, 398–400, 402–05, 406–09 (no place, undated, Tolstoi to unknown, perhaps Menshikov: Spanish ministers convinced Karl to write to Daun telling him to get Aleksei to leave). The "Spanish" ministers were those whom Karl employed in Spain in 1703–11 in his ill-fated attempt to keep that country in the Habsburg line, that is Anton Florian, prince of Liechtenstein, Rocco Count Stella, and Ramon Perlas de Vilan, marquis of Rialp: Max Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen: eine Biographie*, 5 vols., Munich 1963–65, III, 63, 68–70, 244. Their interest was not in northern affairs.

Loss had returned in the fall with bland instructions to observe the situation and broker a compromise if trouble broke out. The Saxon-Polish ambassador, however, soon found himself the object of a proposal: "The tsarevich having to pass by Dresden, a certain friend believes that it is in the interest of the king [of Poland] to have him secretly informed of what is being prepared for him in order to make him change the resolution which he has taken to return to Petersburg."⁴⁵ The "certain friend" remained unnamed, but soon after von Loss entered into discussions with Kikin, whom he must have already known to be Aleksei's principal advisor. "Kikin told me that the best would be if the imperial court could persuade the tsarevich to return to Rome where he would be entirely safe from the tsar's pursuit. His father also told me that there could be entire confidence in Bauer."⁴⁶ This was a careful conversation, and von Loss was quick to reassure Augustus' minister Ernst Manteuffel that he had made Kikin no definite promises.⁴⁷

In St. Petersburg the absence of the tsarevich had already been noticed in December, 1716. According to Pleyer, no one paid much attention to his disappearance at first because his movements normally took place without much pomp. It was only when Tsarevna Maria Alekseevna (Peter's half-sister) returned to Petersburg from taking the waters in Western Europe that the news began to spread. Maria had met Aleksei on her way back, and exchanged sympathetic words (which Pleyer seems not to have known) and upon arrival went to visit Aleksei's children, saying to them, "you poor orphans, you have no father or mother." The rumor spread in the city that Peter had required a renunciation from the throne of his son before his own departure in early 1716. This, as we know, was accurate, for Pleyer continued:

⁴⁵ SHSA, Rußland Geheimes Kabinett, 3552, St. Petersburg, 10 December 1717: "Le Czarewitz devant passer par Dresden, certain amy croit, qu'il est de l'intérêt du Roy de le faire avertir secretement de ce qu'on tourne contre luy a fin de luy faire changer de resolution qu'il a puise de retourner a Petersbourg." See note 57, below.

⁴⁶ SHSA Rußland, Geheimes Kabinett, 3552, St. Petersburg, 27 December 1717: "Kykin m'a dit que le meilleur seroit si l'on pouvait porter la Cour Imperiale à persuader le Czarowitz de s'en retourner à Rome ou il seroit entièrement à l'abris des poursuites du Czar. Son Pere m'a aussi dit qu'on pourra avoir une entiere confiance en Bauer." "Bauer" was evidently General Rudolf Bauer, whom Aleksei later confessed to consider a friend. Kikin did not have a living father, and Loss must have meant his father-in-law Shafirov, whom Aleksei also later implicated.

⁴⁷ SHSA Rußland, Geheimes Kabinett, 3551, St. Petersburg, 3 January 1718: "Je me flatte que V. E. ne desaprovera pas qui [j']ai écouté Kykin, sans entrer en rien avec luy] d'autant plus que j'ai sie bien pris mes precautions [en tout ce que je lui ai repondu] qu'il ne nous en scauroit resulter aucun prejudice [de quelle manière que les choses tournent]."

already various great lords have come to me and other foreigners and asked if we have no news of him in our correspondence, and two of his servants came to me to ask about him, who wept bitterly and said that the minister gave him 1000 ducats for the journey and he took two thousand in Danzig and wrote an order to them to sell his furniture secretly and pay the bills of exchange from that. After a while they heard nothing from him.

The servants had heard two conflicting rumors: that Aleksei had been kidnapped and taken to a monastery in Russia, and that he had taken refuge in Hungary or the Habsburg hereditary lands. The story was that the cause of all this was a secret trip to visit his mother near Moscow the past summer (this was false). The city was rife with rumor. Pleyer also heard that the guards regiments in Mecklenburg were plotting to kill Peter and put Catherine and her children in a monastery and a convent. The rumor continued that the tsar had found out about all this and asked Menshikov for a list of all of Aleksei's companions, high and low. Supposedly Peter would not return so as not to bring the guards home where they might stand together with

the great men and clergy of the country to ask for their Crown Prince and make a rebellion, to which everything here inclines. The great and the little on their own speak of nothing else but the contempt for themselves and their children, who all have to become sailors and ship builders, however much they might have learned of languages and exercises abroad and however much money they cost.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 24, 11 January 1717: "weilen nun [mit diesen Prinzen alhier] kein [geprang] jemahlen gemacht werden, hat sich auch erstlich [die alte Prinzessin Maria des Zaren Schwester aus dem Baad] zuruk anhero kommen, [und die kleine herrschaft des Cron Prinzen besucht, dabey aber] sehr [geweinnet, und gesaget, ihr armen weysen, die ihr kein vatter, noch mutter] habet, [ich beklage euch] ferner [da] weder [frembde] noch [einheimische] brief, und nachricht bekommen, [daß er] weiters als [Canig komen] seyn, [dabey auch] anjezo für gewiß will gesaget werden [daß der Zar] vorhero alß er verwichenes jahr [von hier abreiset, von dem Cron Prinzen eine schriftliche renuntiation auf die Cron erpresset] haben soll, und nicht leyden will, [daß ihn jemand den Cron Prinzen nenen,] sondern [den zarischen kleinen Prinzen also tituliren] solle; so [fanget nun jederman an umb den alten Cron Printzen zu fragen, und] haben schon unterschiedliche [grosse herrn zu mir und] anderen [frembden heimlich geschicket, und gefragt, ob wir in unseren brieffen] keine nachricht [von ihm hatten, zu mir sind auch zwey von seinen bedienten kommen mich zu fragen umb ihn, welche bitterlich weinten und sagten, daß Ihm der Münster] 1000 [ducaten] habe [auf den weg geben, und in Danzig hab er zwey tausend ducaten] gehoben, [und ihnen ordre hieher] geschrieben, [seine mobilien heimlich zu verkaufen, und davon die wechsel zu bezahlen, nach der zeit] hätten [sie nichts von brieff aus Danzig, welche melden, daß er] unweit [der statt von einiger zarischer mannschaft enleviret und naher Rußland in ein andere landt Ewer Kay. May. Erbländer Salviret] habe, [die ursach solte sein, daß er diesen sommer heimlich] solte nach [Moscau, und zu seiner Mutter gereist] seyn. Wegen dieser verschikung aber] solten auch die leib regimente, welche] meistens [von] ein Complot in Mecklenburg] gemacht haben, [den Zaren zu

In February Pleyer picked up more stories. He heard (correctly) that Peter had ordered his ambassador in Vienna, Veselovskii, to ask for the tsarevich from the emperor, but many thought that was a blind to cover Aleksei's abduction. He also reported that the rumor of his abduction was fading before the talk that Aleksei had indeed gone to Vienna to seek help from his imperial relatives to secure his rights to the throne. Another "reliable friend" told the Austrian that only Menshikov and Apraksin had countersigned Aleksei's renunciation and the Senate had refused. This information was false, for Aleksei had never renounced the throne, but it reflected opinion on the divisions in St. Petersburg. Pleyer also reported what he considered fact: in Petersburg there was fear of a general uprising when the guards returned from Germany, for the great men, the Senate, and clergy would unite with them. Prince Iakov Dolgorukii, whose family feared the degradation of their clan, told one of his friends, "our dwelling will not remain here long."⁴⁹ After these reports

tödtén, die Zarin auf ein schiff zu sezen, hieher zu bringen, und sie mit ihren kleinen Printz- und Printzessinen] naher [Moscau und von dannen in dasjenige Closter zu stecken,] worin [die vorige gemahlin verstossen] worden, [uns dieselbe heraus nehmen, und dem] rechten [Cron Prinzen die Regierung zu übergeben, welches aber ein Granadierer Hauptman dem Zaren in geheimb entdeckt] haben solle: [der Zar] solle auch ein ordre an den fürst Menschicoff] geschicket haben, [umb genau] nach[zuforschen, und eine Lista] ihm [einzusenden von allen denen russischen herrn] hohes [und mittleres standes, welche mit dem Cron Prinz vill seind umgangen, welche ohne erlaubnuß von hier nach Moscau verreiset, elche ohne berueffung anhero komme, und welche anhero berueffen, aber nicht] noch [kommen sind]. Es vermeinen ville daß der Zar [auch nicht so baldt hieher kommen] werde, [damit die leib regimenten mit] denen anderen [edelleuthen alhier mit denen grossen und geistlichkeit des landtes nicht zusamb] stehen, [und umb] ihren [Cron Prinzen fragen und ein aufstand] machen möchten, [worzu alles alhier] sehr [geneigt] ist, [die grossen und kleinen von sich reden von nichts anderen als von ihren und ihrer kinder verachtung, welche] alle nur [zu matrosen und schiff bauer werden] müssen, obschon sie noch so vill [in der frembde in sprachen und exerciciren gelehret, und] ihnen [geldt gekostet] haben."

⁴⁹ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, 22 February 1717: "[Man hat der zeit das spargement, daß der Zar seinen residenten aus Wien zu sich in Holland beruffen, umb ihn] 20000 rubl [anzuwenden beordert habe, umb den Cron Prinzen aus zu fragen für eine politique und blendung alhier gehalten umb etwan die spargirte enlevirung und verstekung in das closter dem volk zu verbergen], derowegen man hat angefangen [die gefaste schwärigkeit immer stärker zu äussern]; nachdem aber [das gerücht von dessen genomener flucht in Ewer Kay, und König. Cath. May. erbländer mehrten als dessen spargirte aufhebung continuiret, wie dan auch der fürst Menschicoff solle brief bekommen] haben, [daß er Prag passiret und erketet worden seyn, so scheint es, daß man sich [widerumb damit in etwas vergnüge, daß dadurch dem Prinz von heimlichen, durch meuchelmörderischer hand oder gift denselben auf des Zaren ordre aus den weg zu raumen, umb den jungen prinzen der succession zu versichern,] wird [bewahret, und] dermahleins [durch seinen hohen anverwandten hilf zu seinem natürlichen recht] wird [befördert werden. Ich hab nun von einen zuverlässlichen freund] weiters vernommen, daß [die dem Prinzen abgenötigten renuntiation nur allein der fürst Menschicoff und der General Admiral als favoriten unterschrieben, der Senat aber

Pleyer conveyed little of the political situation in Russia, perhaps because he realized that he was himself too deeply involved, and he certainly knew that his sovereign was indeed hiding the refugee heir to the Russian throne.

Fortunately, other diplomats were not so careful. The Danish envoy Westphal was away, but his legation secretary Peter Iverson Tyrholm took his place as Denmark's informant, cheerfully informing his king that bribing the Russian lower civil servants was the best way to find out what was happening in the Senate and the offices of Menshikov.⁵⁰ In April, he reported the conflict between Menshikov and the Senate and the rumors about the tsarevich:

There appears still much misunderstanding between the Senate and Prince Menshikov, which causes confusion that cannot be corrected save by the presence of his majesty the tsar. The public are kept asleep by spreading the rumor that the tsar is expected here any minute, the more since the nobility, the clergy, and the third estate have murmured a great deal over the absence of the hereditary prince whom some believe to be in Italy. I have been assured that the most considerable men of this court helped him to the sum of 60,000 ducats and assured him that they would not deviate from his interests.

Peter, Tyrholm continued, would put his son by Catherine on the throne.⁵¹

solches zu thun absolut recussiret] habe . . ." Peter's recently deceased sister Natal'ia always took Aleksei's side and told him to take refuge with the Emperor . . . "Sonsten aber [ist alhier jederman in grossen sorgen für einer allgemeinen aufruhr, so bald die trouppen,] sonderlich [die leib regimenten aus Deutschland zuruck kommen, weilien die grossen und der Senat mit der geistlichkeit sich mit ihnen vereinigen dörfen, wie dann der alte fürst Dolgoruky welcher praeses im Senat] ist, [und deren familie auch ihr ernidrigung förchtet, zu] seiner [guten freunden einen gesagt hat, alhier solle unser wohnung nicht lang] mehr [dauren]." There has been also a serious harvest failure. St. Petersburg, 26 March 1717 (Aleksei's children in good health, Peter's son can hardly walk).

⁵⁰ TKUA Rusland, B49, St. Petersburg, 10/21 June 1717 (success of policy of bribery, need for more money). Little is know about Tyrholm, who mysteriously disappeared with unpaid debts in December, 1721: Emil Marquard, *Danske Gesandter og Gesandtskabspersonale indtil 1914*, Copenhagen, 1952.

⁵¹ TKUA Rusland, B49, St. Petersburg, 18/29 April 1717: "Il paroît toujours beaucoup de la mesintelligence entre la Senat et le Prince de Menzikoff ce qui cause une confusion qui ne peut etre corrigé que par la presence de sa Majesté Czarienne; L'on endort le Public en faisant courrir le bruit que ce Prince est attendu icy incessamment, d'autant plus que la Noblesse, le clergé et le Tiers Estat ont beaucoup murmuré de l'absence du Prince héréditaire, que quelquesuns croyent estre en Italie. L'on m'a assuré, que les plus considerables de cette cour l'ont aydé d'un secours de 60/m ducats et luy ont protesté qu'ils ne se departiront pointe de ses interests." Peter would prefer his son by Catherine over Aleksei's son for the succession. Tyrholm also remarked that Menshikov's troubles over corruption did not appear entirely over, for there was a rumor that the prince had sequestered a large sum at the Bank of Amsterdam and Peter made him return it.

The situation in St. Petersburg was rendered more unstable by the poor health of Petr Petrovich, which caused great alarm to Menshikov. As the summer approached, Tyrholm began to see that the rumors in the city were part of the struggle over Aleksei, put about for particular purposes:

It is said here that the hereditary prince is staying at Innsbruck and that the nobility speaks more freely of him than it has before, insinuating to the people and the clergy that the disgraced prince is not capable of succeeding to the crown after the tsar. They attribute to him faults which should deprive him of the succession, including suspect and illegitimate birth. I believe that this argument is the effect of the cabals of the party of the reigning tsar and of the young prince Petr Petrovich, at the head of which is Prince Menshikov; and they want to make the clergy understand (to animate it against the above-mentioned hereditary prince) that the motives of his journey and refuge at Innsbruck is in the view of assuring himself the protection of the Catholic sovereigns to ascend the throne and pledge himself to embrace their religion and establish it in Russia.⁵²

To make things even more complicated, the rivalries among the great men in other areas were heating up, with mutual charges of embezzlement and corruption. The *landrat* Apukhtin was brought in chains from Moscow on such charges, and there was a story that Musin-Pushkin and Samarin would be arrested for corruption.⁵³ By August the charges had become more serious: there was an accusation against Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii of stealing some 200,000

⁵² TKUA Rusland I, B49, 26 March/7 April 1717, St. Petersburg (ill health of Petr Petrovich and concern of Menshikov); 7/18 June 1717, St. Petersburg: "L'on dit icy que le Prince Héréditaire se tient presentement a Inspruck, et que la Noblesse parle plus librement de Luy, qu'elle n'a fait jusqu'icy, en insinuant au Peuple et au Clergé, que le Prince disgracié n'est pas capable de succéder a la Couronne après le Czar, On luy attribue des deffauts, qui doivent le Priver de la Succession, jusqu'a rendre Sa naissance suspecte et illegitime. Je crois que ce raisonnement est l'effet des Cabales du party du Czar regnant, et du jeune Prince Pierre Petrovits, a la tete du quel se trouve le Prince Menzicow, et l'on veut faire entendre au Clergé pour l'animer contre le sus dit Prince Héréditaire, que les motifs de son voyage et refuge a Inspruck est dans la veue de s'assurer la protection des Prince Souverains Catholiques pour monter sur le Trone, en s'engageant d'embrasser leur Religion et l'Etablis en Russie."

⁵³ TKUA Rusland I, B49, St. Petersburg, 7/18 June 1717: "L'on a observé que lorsque M. le Prince Mentzicow a célébré l'anniversaire de la naissance du Czar l'on a beu la santé du Jeune Prince Petrovits, et non pas celle du Prince Hereditaire;" rumors of revolt; "Cela pourroit bien arriver, a considere que les Esprits des Grands sont fort animés les uns contre les autres, jusqu'a s'accuser reciproquement des crimes de concussion et autres malverasations, ce qui augmente fort le trouble et le desordre, et ne puet estre apaisé que par le prompt retour de sa Majesté Czarienne. Plusieurs Personnes de Consideration sont aux arrets, mait on en parle que secrettement. M. Apousching (Land raet) a été amené de Moscow icy enchainé, l'on dit que Plusieurs a Cazan et autres lieux auront le meme sort." St. Petersburg, 23 July 1717 (arrest of Musin-Pushkin and Samarin).

rubles, a conflict between Menshikov and the Senate over taxation in Novgorod, and an attempt by General Golovin to inform on Menshikov.

The differences which reign between the principal nobility of this court continue to grow. The president of the Senate [=Ia. F. Dolgorukii] accuses the Admiral Apraksin, his brother [=Senator P. Apraksin] and another person of distinction [=Menshikov?] of having appropriated great sums to the prejudice of the tsar their master. Both sides engaged in the quarrel write to the monarch, but his prudence requires him to decide nothing during his absence and to put off the examination of things until his return to his states.⁵⁴

The accusations of corruption were still weapons in a factional battle inside the ruling elite.

The factional struggle was so intense that it was undermining the stability of the state. With the rulers disunited, anything could happen with a discontented populace. The situation was so uncertain that, on the eve of Peter's return, Tyrholm decided that he had better give his sovereign a summation of the situation in proper order. The Danish secretary saw two groups in Petersburg, one was the "triumvirate," as he called them, of Menshikov, Admiral Apraksin, and Petr Apraksin. The latter played a curious role, for Petr Apraksin, according to Tyrholm, obstructed his senatorial colleagues even when he agreed with their views. This group was the same as that which he had earlier called "the party of the reigning tsar." Their opponents were the party of the Senate, which was the same as that of the supporters of Tsarevich Aleksei. Tyrholm's lengthy report gave the fullest possible description of the political situation in Petersburg on the eve of the return of both Peter and his son Aleksei at the end of 1717:

The approaching return of his majesty the tsar, which puts all the people of distinction there are in expectation, is the ordinary subject of conversation of the most qualified persons of this court. One does not doubt at all that this prince will be forced to come to some extremity with many of his principal subjects, because by their continual animosity they put the state

⁵⁴ TKUA Rusland I, B49, St. Petersburg, 12 August 1717 (accusations against Dolgorukii and Menshikov, dispute over Novgorod taxes); 27 August 1717: "les differents qui regnent entre la principale noblesse de cette Cour vont en augmentant; Le President du Senat accuse L'Adm. Apraxin son frere et un autre personne de Distinction de s'estre approprié des grosses sommes au Prejudice du Czar leur maitre. Les uns et les autres engagés dans ces brouillerie ecrivent a le Monarque, mais Sa Prudence l'oblige a ne rien decider, pendant son absence et a remettre L'examen des choses jusqu'a son retour dans ses estats."

in combustion, and because the two parties even form the attention of individuals who involve themselves more or less according to their obligations and interests. They do not cease to persecute one another reciprocally; the president of the Senate exploits as much as he can the triumvirate and their supporters, the latter [= triumvirate] every day makes new discoveries to cover itself by the counterweight of the accusations it makes against the other part.

In a word, to explain things the most fully, I am obliged to give your majesty some enlightenment on the present situation. Your majesty will not be unaware that I have already had the honor to inform him in previous letters that the Prince Dolgorukii, president of the Senate and his supporters (which are believed to be those of the Tsarevich Aleskei Petrovich), by the great animosity which they have, put everything to use to ruin the credit of that [party] of the Prince Menshikov, and since the latter knows that the tsar has very strong reasons not to disgrace him, and the more since his interest requires it so, so that without surprise and in this trust he would like to be part of the most considerable body of this empire; I have the honor to explain in this regard that interests want it thus, because having been critically ill the winter before his departure for Germany, he [= Peter] was obliged to make his will, which, contrary to the expectation of the greatest part of his subjects, left as the heir of the empire the young prince his son Petr Petrovich to the prejudice of the tsarevich his eldest son and of the past treaty with the house of Wolfenbüttel on the subject of his marriage.

Now since the tsar pretended that his will would be executed after his death, and seeing that there would be almost insurmountable difficulties to achieve that, he considered it proper to put Prince Menshikov, the admiral, and his brother Count Apraksin in singular favor, and that is the better founded since the first has the command of the land armies, the second the sea, and the third as member of the Senate spies on the actions of his colleagues and obstructs them even when he considers them proper, which is why I have called these three lords by the name of the Triumvirate. I do not doubt that this is the principal instrument to serve for the execution of the last will of this monarch, for it [= the triumvirate] will not be able to change in favor of the tsarevich without going to their own ruin.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ TKUA Rusland, B49, St. Petersburg, 8 October 1717: "Le retour prochain de sa Majesté Czarienne qui met tout ce qu'il y a de Gens de distinction en attente; est le sujet ordinaire des conversations des Personnes de cette cour les plus qualifiées; L'on ne doute point que ce Prince ne soit forcé d'en venir à quelque Extremité avec plusieurs de ses Principaux Sujets, puisque par leur continuelles animosités, ils mettent l'état en combustion, et que les deux partis font meme l'attention des particuliers, qui s'engagent plus ou moins selon qu'ils se trouvent obligés et qu'ils y ont plus d'interet, Ils ne cessent de se poursuivre reciproquement, Le President du Senat exploite tant qu'il peut le Triumvirat et ses partizans, celui cy fait tous les jours des nouvelles découvertes, pour se metre à couvert par le contrepois des accusations qu'il intente à la partie. En fin pour metre la chose dans une plus grande evidence, je suis obligé de donner à Votre Majesté quelque eclarcissement sur

The relations of Menshikov with the Senate, the accusations of corruption, and the fate of the tsarevich, were inextricably entangled.⁵⁶

All through the summer various rumors continued to circulate about Aleksei's whereabouts. Pleyer heard from a "great lord" that Peter was angry at Ekaterina for chasing his son away: this was simply not true, but showed how rumor portrayed the tsaritsa. Tyrholm reported that the talk was that Aleksei would be sent to a monastery, a more likely story. Whatever the reality, the situation was pretty well known in Europe. King Augustus sent his envoy von Loss back to St. Petersburg with instructions to keep his wits about him if serious conflict broke out in Russia and to try to broker a compromise between the parties. All this talk came to an end when Peter returned on 10/21 October 1717.⁵⁷

Tsar Peter's return to St. Petersburg did not bring universal joy.

la conjuncture presente, Elle n'ygnore pas comme j'ay deja eu l'honneur de L'en informer par unes precedentes, que le Prince Dolgoruky President du Senat et ses partizans, que l'on croit etre ceux du Prince Royal, Alexeis Petrowitz, par la grande animosité qu'ils ont, mettant tout au usage pour ruiner le credit de celuy de M le Prince de Menzikow et comme celuy-cy scait que le Czar a des raisons tres fortes pouor ne pas le perdre, d'autant mieux que ses ynterets le veulent ainsy, cela fait que sans s'etonner, et dans cette confiance, il aure [ame?] etre le parti du corps le plus considerable de cette Empire, j'ay l'honneur d'expliquer sy dessus que les ynterets le veulent ainsi, par ce que ayant ete malade a l'extremite l'hyver avant son depart pour l'Allemagne, il feut obligé de faire son testament, qui contre l'attente de la plus grande partie de ses sujets, laissait heritier de l'Empire le jeune prince son fils Pierre Petrowitz, au prejudice du Prince Royal son ainé et du contract passé avec la maison de Wolfunbutel au sujet de son mariage; or comme le Czar pretendait que sa volonte fut executée apres sa mort, et voyant qu'il y a auroit des difficultés, presque insurmontables pour en venir a bout, Il jugea à propos de metre le Prince Menzikow, l'amiral et son frere le comte Apraxin dans un faveur singulier, et cela est d'autant mieux fondé que le premier a le commandement des Armees de terre, le second la mer et le troisieme comme membre du Senat epie les actions de ses collegues et les contrecare meme lorsqu'il le juge à propos, cet qui fait que j'ay appellé ces trois seigneurs du nom de Triumvirat, je ne doute pas que ce ne soit le principal instrument pour servir à l'execution de la derniere volonte de ce Monarque puis qu'il ne scauroit changer en faveur du Prince royal, qu'ils ne court a leur propre ruine."

⁵⁶ TKUA Rusland I, B49, St. Petersburg, 8 October 1717 (Menshikov accused of corruption in the salt works at Bakhmut, the commander being his client. An informant applied to Dolgorukii, who had him whipped, and he named Menshikov, the two Apraksins and Kikin as his accomplices; Menshikov claimed to discover massive graft by Dolgorukii).

⁵⁷ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24: St. Petersburg, 4 June 1717 ("von einem grossen herrn" that in Holland Peter reproached Catherine with the flight of Aleksei); TKUA Rusland I, B49: St. Petersburg, 30 July 1717 (talk that Aleksei would be sent to monastery); SHSA, Geheimes Kabinett, Rußland, 3551, f. 221, 15 October 1717, "Ajouté à l'Instruction du Chambellan de Loss. S'il venoit à s'élever des troubles en Russie, le Chambellan de Loss se conduira en pareille circonstance, avec beaucoup de precaution, et prendra bien garde à ne donner aucune prise sur nous, mais il tachera de trouver des accommodements pour ajuster les deux partys. Datum ut in Instructione le 15e. Octobre 1717."

Immediately on his arrival the news spread that he would inaugurate a large investigation of official corruption. The ceremonial greeting of the tsar at the Winter Palace was gloomy. Peter now had the opportunity to observe the poor health of his son Petr Petrovich. The great men of the country, other than Menshikov, arrived in old worn clothes, and Peter remarked on the lack of joy among them at his return. Pleyer observed that the senators, especially Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii, were downcast and pale, whispering to one another. Well they should be, for it seemed that one of the main subjects of the investigation would be the state of the army, a bone of contention between Menshikov and the Senate since the summer of 1716. And another rumor was that Dolgorukii would have to head the investigation. Most serious of all, Peter would also investigate:

in the sharpest manner, who advised the tsarevich to flee, for the tsar knows well that the people, the clergy and the great men of the land hold together and he perhaps should take care at such a strict inquisition of what thereby could easily be aroused, he in such a case would have the army here quickly on land to suppress the troubles, to take the guilty by the head and to entirely exterminate the old families.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 24, St. Petersburg, 22 October 1717: "Man hat alhier schon vorlauffig einige zeit her von grosse vorseynenden veränderungen und ansezung einer inquisition geredet, welche der Czar auf den fuß der französischen justizcammer des herzogs Regenten aufzurichten sich fest entschlossen hat, und ist bey seinen ankunft remarquiert werden, daß der zuelauff des volks nicht so gross gewesen, als er bey den anderen begebenheiten pfelet zu seyn, ist auch, ausser von denen matrosen den werff kein freuden geschrey gehört worden über des Czaren ankunft, alle grosse herrn ausbenommen der fürst, seind in schlechten glatten, und fast alten kleydung erscheinen, daß auch der Czar selbst gesaget hat, wie es sehe, daß seine herrn über seine ankunft sich wenig freueten. Und ich hab selbst in der zimmer bey den Czaren observiret, daß alle die Senatoren sonderlich aber der Praesident des Senats das alte fürst Dolgoruki, ganz bestürzt, und verblasset dort gestanden, und einige von ihnen bald diesen, bald jenem in die ohren gewischlet . . . [Dan er Zar soll in Berlin sich verlauten lassen, daß er alsbald alher eine Justitien Cammer und Inquisition anstellen wolle, worinen er alle Monopolia, Renten, und seiner unterthanen Commercium mit denen ausländ, und wie ein jeder, welcher groß vermögen, von etlichen jahren her darzu komen ist, auch warumb die Armée in Finland also geschmolzen seyn, und wer den Cron Prinzen in die flucht gerathet hat, auf das schärfeste untersuchen wird; weilen nun der Zar woll weiß, daß das volk, die geistlichkeit, und grossen des lands zusamben halten, und er vielleicht besorgen dürfte bey solcher strengen untersuchung, welches sich leicht, dabey erregen könnte, er in solchen fall die armee geschwind zur land habe, die troublen zu dämpfen, die schuldigen beym kopf zu nehmen, und die alte familien gänzlich zu vertilgen." TKUA Rusland I, B49, St. Petersburg, 12 November 1717 (Dolgorukii to investigate corruption in army supplies). De Bie reported that Lieutenant General Prince V. V. Dolgorukii was to investigate the corruption charges against Osip Solov'ev: ARSG 7397 Secreta, St. Petersburg, 5 November 1717. Peter had written to the Senate earlier in 1717 from France demanding an investigation of the corruption: E. V. Anisimov, *Podatnaia reforma*, Leningrad, 1982, 42.

Once again, Pleyer was reporting the thoughts of his contacts, overwhelmingly the adherents of the tsarevich. For the first time in his report the tsar's enemies appear to be the "old families" – not the "party of the Senate" in the Danish reports. In this phrase Pleyer conveyed back home a first hint that Peter's opponents were beginning to create a myth of ancient aristocracy as an oppositional platform.⁵⁹

While the aristocracy grumbled and dreamed, Peter had other issues to attend to. The launching of a new ship was the occasion for the tsar to display his evident favor for Menshikov. V. V. Dolgorukii kept up the pressure on Menshikov for corruption, but Peter now kept Menshikov in favor while planning to soak him for corruption. Menshikov's vices no longer affected his status.⁶⁰ The death of Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii earlier in the year required a new head for the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery. Peter appointed the deceased's son, Prince Ivan Fyodorovich Romodanovskii, in his father's place.⁶¹ The death of the elder Romodanovskii left other vacancies, for he had been the "prince-emperor" in the All-Drunken Council, and after his funeral in Moscow his son Prince Ivan received that position as well. Another member of the All-Drunken Council had also just died, the elderly Nikita Zotov, Peter's old tutor and secretary of his early years as tsar. To replace Zotov the All-Drunken Council elected P. I. Buturlin to the new "dignity" of "prince-pope."⁶² Bizarre as they may seem, these were important household appointments.

The most overwhelming of the problems facing Peter (other than that of his son) was the massive corruption that he had found in the

⁵⁹ Relations between Menshikov, Admiral Apraksin, and the Senate did not improve in the following weeks. Tyrholm observed that the admiral and the senators did not even greet one another in public: TKUA Rusland B49, St. Petersburg, 12 November 1717 (Admiral Apraksin and the Senators).

⁶⁰ The talk in the capital was that Tsarevich Aleksei had demanded the favorite's dismissal as a condition of his return. Though false, the rumor reflected the general belief about the relations of Menshikov and Aleksei. TKUA Rusland I, B49, St. Petersburg, 1 November 1717. Dolgorukii's letters to ADM demanding his accounts on Gagarin's supplies of furs and P. M. Apraksin's tax collections: RGADA, f. 198, d. 99, ll. 1–2 (5 and 6 November 1717).

⁶¹ *ŽAI*, 181–82 (decree of 21 February 1718).

⁶² TKUA Rusland B49, St. Petersburg, 15 October 1717 (death of Romodanovskii and Zotov). HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, 20 January 1718 (funeral of Romodanovskii in Moscow, new "Prince-Caesar"); M. I. Semevskii, *Slovo i delo! 1700–1725*, St Petersburg, 1884, 286–87. Buturlin had received the rank of boyar in 1712, the last ever raised to the rank: Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 214. Buturlin had been a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Natalia in 1676 and of Tsaritsa Evdokiia, Peter's wife, in 1692: [Ivanov] *Alfavitnyi*, 52. He was also "Petersburg bishop" in the All-Drunken Council 1706–17 and died in 1723.

state ever since the discovery of Menshikov's corruption in 1714. Peter continued to pursue the favorite's misappropriation of funds, but there were many other suspected embezzlers. On 13 December before Peter left for Moscow to meet his son Aleksei, the tsar established six investigative chancelleries [*rozysknye kantseliarii*] under majors of the guards regiments: Ivan Il'ich Dmitriev-Mamonov, G. I. Koshelev, Prince Iusupov, Prince Petr Mikhailovich Golitsyn, Mikhail Volkov, and Semen Saltykov. The most sensitive issues fell to the chancellery of Golitsyn (the younger brother of Prince D. M. Golitsyn, governor of Kiev, and the general Prince M. M. Golitsyn), whose charge was the corruption cases of the Moscow governor Kirill Naryshkin, the vice-governor Prince Putiatin, Aleksandr Kikin, Menshikov himself, and his *protégés* Iakov and Vasilii Rimskii-Korsakov.⁶³

The charges varied in character. Naryshkin was supposed to have used harbor workers for his own needs, collected taxes from the peasants without authorization, seized admiralty supplies and private property as well as taking protection money in Dorpat, and visited various thefts on foreign merchants. Putiatin had allegedly misused *podvody* (corvée transport) and fixed subcontracting prices for supplies. Kikin's illegalities involved contracts in Archangel and using a phoney name (Barsukov) to make other contracts. Kikin and Admiral Apraksin had made illegal profits on contracts for horses in Finland. Vasilii Rimskii-Korsakov and other officials in Belozero had fiddled accounts on grain purchases and imposed improper taxes. His brother Iakov's accounts in the St. Petersburg Chancellery were not in order. The most numerous and spectacular charges were against Menshikov himself. Much of it revolved around subcontracts (*podriady*) as in 1714. The favorite had supposedly overpaid for them and kept the profits, given out state villages on *obrok* but kept the proceeds, overcharged the treasury for bricks, profitted illegally from

⁶³ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, St. Petersburg, 27 December 1717 (PI goes to Moscow to investigate corruption, to demonstrate his health, and dispel rumors that he would destroy Moscow). Dmitriev-Mamonov was to investigate the case of the merchants Evreinov, Koshelev the cases of Kurbatov and Solov'ev, and Semen Saltykov that of vice-governor Kolychev. V. I. Veretennikov, *Istoriia tainoi kantseliarii petrovskogo vremeni*, Khar'kov, 1910, 29–52. Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 286–87. Prince P. M. Golitsyn got Kirill Naryshkin; RGADA, f. 248, kn. 51, l. 39 (17 December 1717). Dmitriev-Mamonov also had charge of "Senator Dolgorukii" (Mikhail or Iakov) and Prince M. P. Gagarin: RGADA, f. 248, kn. 51, ll. 41–42 (18 December 1717). The investigative chancelleries under the majors were abolished in 1724: *SRIO* XI, 534.

grain shipments from Kazan' and Nizhnii Novgorod and generally kept false accounts.⁶⁴ Field Marshall Sheremetev had also fallen into disgrace with Peter for corruption, and the tsar had ordered him to Moscow.⁶⁵

The most dramatic result was the execution by firing squad of the Semenovskii guards Major Prince M. I. Volkonskii, who had allegedly ruled unjustly in the 1714 case of Kurbatov and Osip Solov'ev, the Amsterdam factor. Volkonskii was executed on 9/20 December, and the body remained on public view for three days with his crimes enumerated in a statement nailed to a nearby post. This act put fear into many, but the "common man" took it to Peter's advantage, especially since the Senate had not taken petitions or denunciations for over a year. The arrest of Solov'ev, who was brought to St. Petersburg, added another culprit to the list and another one of Menshikov's clients. In the coming year both Kurbatov and Solov'ev would be found guilty of stealing enormous sums, though Menshikov was able to protect the latter to some extent.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ RGADA, f. 248, kn. 51, ll. 34–36v (14 December 1717).

⁶⁵ TKUA Rusland, B49, St. Petersburg, 12 November 1717 (rumor of Sheremetev's disgrace). Sheremetev was in Poland in summer, 1717, slowly returning from Pomerania. *SRIO* 25, 457–62; Veretennikov, *Istoriia*, 44–46; Zaozerskii, *Sheremetev*, 144–46, 162, n. 279, 230. Pleyer believed that Sheremetev was returning to his estates: HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, St. Petersburg, 22 October 1717.

⁶⁶ In the 1722 Senate trial pitting Shafirov and Skorniakov-Pisarev against one another Shafirov said that he would not put his neck in the noose for Menshikov like Volkonskii and Gagarin had done: Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 461. HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, St. Petersburg, 12 November 1717 (return of Solov'ev, the brother of Menshikov's steward and commissary); St. Petersburg, 27 December 1717: "Die ursach einer inquisition aber dörfte unter alles die der größten seyn; dan nachdem der Czar nacher haus komen ist, hat derselbe alsbald von der anderten leib regiment, Wolkonsky, welchen er sonst aber aufrichtigkeit und treu zuegetrauet hat vor 4 jahren nacher Archangel verschicket, aldort einen streit und process zwischen den dasigen gourverneur Kurbatow und einen commissario Solovieff einen brueder dessen, welcher der Czar aus Amsterdam heimlich wegnemen lassen, und anhero gebracht hat. Weilen er aber dieses Major decision für unrecht gehalten, hat er ihm vergangen wochen condemniret zum todt; und archibuseren lassen, dadurch denen ungerechten richteren ein exempel zu zeigen zumahl er sich keine treu seiner leute mehr verlassen köne. Worüber aber alles volk alhier in grossen bestürzung gesezete, und untergeschlagene gemachter verspüret werden. Indessen so nennet der gemeine man diese strenge justiz zu seiner vorthail und keinen hafftig? darunter vill herfür, von welchen der Senat über ein jahr lang keine suppliquen anemen, und justiz ertheilen wollen, erwarten den Czaren von den Senat, und geben ihm selbst die suppliquen in der hand . . ." TKUA Rusland I, B49, 17 December 1717, St. Petersburg (Peter leaving for Moscow to avoid execution of Volkonskii and other corrupt officials); 24 December 1717 (execution of Volkonskii); TKUA Rusland, B50, 1 January 1718 NS, St. Petersburg (Menshikov and Solov'ev to be examined further, but Solov'ev's family begins to recover its position); 28 January 1718 NS (arrest of Fyodor Solov'ev, ADM's steward, his rapid release, and arrest of Dmitrii Solov'ev, commissar at Archangel). ARSG 7397 Secreta, DATE,

The problem of massive graft as well as the larger financial problems of the state were obvious not just to Peter and his officials, they were well known in the capital. The new Prussian ambassador Gustav Baron von Mardefeld explained the situation with thoroughness and clarity. Peter had returned to St. Petersburg extremely disturbed about the administration of finances in his realm. His feelings came out in public at one of the festivals shortly before his departure for Moscow when one of the senators asked him for a favor, evidently a monetary favor. Peter jumped up in great excitement and said:

that wherever he was asked, some one sought to ask him for pensions or estates, but when it was a matter of his service they robbed and betrayed him as best they could, and he left with these words: "You have taken the very clothes from me, I advise you, do not come to me with this business or your heads will fly," whereby his majesty drew his sword and said, "I did poorly the last time to fine you with money. If I had taken your heads off I would have the money, I don't know whom I can trust now, everything is conceived for my ruin, I have only traitors around me." Whereby his majesty left the *prazdnik*.

This was a true story, Mardefeld continued, and Admiral Apraksin and the whole Senate were present.⁶⁷

1717, St. Petersburg (condemnation of Volkonskii); 24 December 1717 (execution of Volkonskii); Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 511–12. The Kurbatov–Solov'ev case was the task of the Koshelev Chancellery, which had taken over from V. V. Dolgorukii: Veretennikov, *Istoriia*, 40–44, 56–58. Weber believed that the arrest of Solov'ev and execution of Volkonskii were the result of the weakness of Menshikov: Bodleian Library, Oxford, French, d.35, f. 25v; St. Petersburg, 23 January 1718 (arrest shows decline of Menshikov); fs. 34–34v; St. Petersburg, 7 February 1718, Weber to Robethon (case of Solov'ev explained). Weber's source was probably Shafirov, whom Weber described in a later dispatch as the friend of England-Hanover, in contrast to Menshikov, Tolstoi, Iaguzhinskii, the Prussian envoy Mardefeld and Peter's doctor Areskine: Bodleian French d.35, fs. 156–59v, on board the ship Egodil near Kronschiess (Kronstadt) 23 July 1718. Dr. Areskin, as a Scottish Jacobite, was unfriendly to Weber. Some of Weber's reports, excerpted and in translation: Herrmann, *Zeitgenossische*, II, 1–155.

⁶⁷ GSAPK, Repertorium XI, Rußland 24d, St. Petersburg, 7 January 1718: he could report that "Se Tzar. May. bey Ihre retour von der administration ihren finanzen über die maaßen mißvergnüget geweshen, und bey einem gewissen prasnich kurtz vor Ihro abreise, alß einer von dem Senat eine Gnade zu erhalten gesucht in großen eyffer aufgesprungen und gesagt, daß war? er wohin gebeten wurde suchte ein jeder pensiones oder guter von Ihnen zu erbetteln, wan es aber an seinen dienst gienge bestöhlen und betrögen sie ihn wie sie daß beste könten, ist auch mit dieser worter fortgefahren, Ihr habt mir den rock außgezogen, ich rahte euch kommet mir an daß handel nicht oder were köpfe sollen fliegen, wobey Se. Maj. zugleich den degen entblöset und gesaget ich habe übel gethan euch daß letzemahl an geld zu straffen, hatte ich euch die köpfe genommen, hatte ich daß geld doch bekommen, ich weiß nicht wehm ich mehr trawuen soll, alles ist auff mein verderben bedacht und ich habe lauter verräther umb mich, womit Se. May. von dem prasnich

The reform of the state administration and its finances were unavoidable, and Peter took measures in that direction before he left for Moscow to confront his son. The most important of these was the establishment of the Colleges, a move which Peter had been planning for nearly three years. Mardefeld reported the Colleges as a reform directed against the Senate, and that the tsar even planned to abolish the Senate entirely. The Prussian was exaggerating, but there was certainly an anti-aristocratic element to the new structures.⁶⁸

The establishment of the Colleges began with the decrees of 11–15 December, 1717. The Colleges were to be eight in number, and covered the main areas of administration. In structure they were largely borrowed from the Swedish model, and for the first time in Russia they were given a written set of instructions and a fixed structure anchored in the written decrees of the tsar. They were in that sense a major step toward legal order and administrative efficiency, toward a rational state in the modern sense. They also implied a different sort of role for the ruling elite. Each college had a president (to be a Russian), vice-president (who could be a foreigner), four Russian advisors and four Russian assessors and one foreign advisor. Decisions were to be reached by the vote of the majority of the college. Peter ordered the Colleges to set up their organization and work toward a starting date of 1 January 1719 for the new system. The tsar's choice for presidents of the Colleges was announced right away: Foreign Affairs – Count Golovkin (Shafirov as vice-president); Revenue (*Kamer-Kollegiia*) – Prince D. M. Golitsyn; Justice – Andrei Matveev; Audit (*Revizion-kollegiia*) – Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii; Military – first president Menshikov, second president general Adam Weyde; Admiralty – Admiral Apraksin; Commerce – Petr Tolstoi; Treasury (*Shtats-kontor*) – count I. A. Musin-Pushkin;

weggegangen. Dieser ist eine warhafte Historie und ist der Admiral Apraxin und der gantze Senat zugegen gewesen."

This incident seems to be the same as that reported by Tyrholm with fewer details, but naming the greedy Senator as Musin-Pushkin. In this version, Peter was angry at Musin-Pushkin, and Petr Apraksin tried to excuse his senatorial colleague only to receive his sovereign's reprimand. The admiral tried to intercede for his brother but was only told to be quiet. TKUA, Rusland B49, St. Petersburg, 22 November 1717.

⁶⁸ Fick had been secretly in Sweden to collect the necessary material: Peterson, *Reforms*, 67–84. GSAPK, Repertorium XI, Rußland 24d, St. Petersburg, 7 January 1717: "Ew. König. May. werden aus beylegenden Schemate allergdst. ansehen, wie Se. Czar. May. projectürt haben, den Senat zu suppressiren und 8. andrer Collegia zu erigiren umb dadurch dehnen bisherigen desordres vorzubeugen;" Peter plans in Moscow to take care of finances and the church may suffer as a result.

and Mines and Manufactures – Quartermaster General Iakov Bruce.⁶⁹

Of the eight new presidents, three of them came from the old aristocracy: Senator Prince Iakov Dolgorukii, Musin-Pushkin, and Prince Golitsyn, the governor of Kiev. The most prominent of the “party of the reigning tsar,” Menshikov and Apraksin controlled the whole of the military establishment on land and sea. Peter’s long-standing loyal diplomat and supporter (and future historian) Andrei Matveev appeared for the first time in the ranks of the governing elite, as did Petr Tolstoi, fresh from his success with the tsarevich. A number of them had previously raised suspicions, and with good reason, of their financial probity, but Peter appointed them anyway.⁷⁰ The new presidents were a balanced group in terms of their factional alignments. Menshikov and Admiral Apraksin were there “the party of the reigning tsar,” but Prince Iakov Dolgorukii was their greatest opponent. Peter had put among his new administrators two great rivals. Soon the investigation into Aleksei’s flight would show that Dolgorukii was also sympathetic to the tsarevich, though not one of his active supporters. Prince D. M. Golitsyn had taken a similar

⁶⁹ *ЖА I*, 216–21; *ПСЗ V*, nos. 3128, 3133, 525, 527–28; Anisimov, *Gosudarstvennye*, 115–18; Peterson, *Reforms*, 84–94; Michael Schippan, *Die Einrichtung der Kollegien in Rußland zur Zeit Peters I*, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 51, Wiesbaden 1996; GSAPK, Repertorium XI, Rußland 24d, 7 January 1718, St. Petersburg (establishment of colleges on Swedish model, list of presidents); TKUA Rusland I, B49: St. Petersburg, 17 December 1717 (establishment of colleges); TKUA Rusland, B50: St. Petersburg, 1 January NS (names of presidents of colleges).

⁷⁰ The Hanoverian resident F. C. von Weber commented in his letter to Robethon, the secretary of George I of England (and elector of Hanover): “Vous aurés vu dans la liste des colleges que le Czar veut etablir plusieurs personnes don la conduite est fort suspecte au Czar, et qui sont actuellement accusés des grands crimes. C’est un trait de politique, qu’il les a mis sur les rangs, il les veut endormir.

On ne peut pas encore dire positivement sur qui l’orage tombera. L’Admiral et sa famille sont du nombre de ceux qui l’ont à craindre. Le desordre icy est extreme, et cette ville est devenue funeste par tant d’accusations.” Weber believed the corruption problem at this point to be so serious the tsar would have to postpone the case against Aleksei. Bodleian Library, MS French, d.35, Weber to Robethon, St. Petersburg, 7 January 1718.

Bodleian MS French d.35 is a separated volume of the letter book of Jean Robethon, a French Huguenot clerk to King George since 1697 who followed him to London and worked in his *Deutsche Kanzlei* there. It thus partly replaces the Hanoverian dispatches lost in the Second World War. A related source is Weber’s later account of Russia: *Das veränderte Rußland*. Written after Peter’s death, it represents a somewhat different view from his contemporary dispatches to Robethon. In the book the supporters of Aleksei are portrayed clearly as xenophobic conservatives, a note not absent in the dispatches, though the latter emphasize more the succession question.

TKUA Rusland B50, St. Petersburg, 10 January NS 1718: the presidents of the colleges were appointed by “un trait de politique,” and many of them will be investigated for corruption by the commissions under the guards officers.

position politically toward Aleksei, and was also something of a friend, lending him books and passing on greetings. Some years later (1727–30) this Golitsyn emerged as the main spokesman for a change of government to an aristocratic oligarchy. Peter retained a balance among his favorites and the aristocracy as he had done in 1708–12, but this time the balance was tipped more in favor of the favorites and the professional soldiers and officials like Bruce or Matveev. This particular formula would remain until the end of Peter's life.

In spite of the rumors, Peter did not abolish the Senate in 1717–18 or at any later time, but he did look extensively into the mismanagement of Russia's finances in the year and a half of his recent absence. Mardefeld reported that the five new investigative chancelleries were to work without respect to persons: the rumor was that Prince Iakov Dolgorukii and the Apraksin brothers were chief suspects.⁷¹ Mardefeld thought that Russia's finances were certainly disordered. The government officials worked against one another, not for the good of the state, and sought to enrich themselves. The tariff policy discouraged trade by discriminating against foreign merchants. Russia also entirely lacked *Policey-wesen* in the German of that time, that is, good administrative order. The "great" manipulated the market for food in the capital and caused enormous inflation in St. Petersburg. The senators did nothing in Peter's absence, spending their time drinking and eating ham. If anyone proposed action, they replied, "Brother, do what you will."⁷²

⁷¹ This rumor was correct as to Dolgorukii. Dmitriev-Mamonov was to investigate Dolgorukii mainly for bribery involving wool contracts: RGADA, f. 248, kn. 51, ll. 41–42 (18 December 1717).

⁷² GSAPK, Repertorium XI Ru land 24d, 14 January 1718, St. Petersburg: "Daß der Czaar. Maj. vor der abreise die Officierien von Preobrazhensky oder der Garde zu Commissarien ernennet, daß sie die Inquisition über des Senats conduite in allen Departementen vorzunehmen, und Se. Czar. Maj. bey Verlust ihrer lebens unpartheyisch und ohne Ansehen der Person davon referiren sollen. Sie gehen damit starck fort, und sagt man, daß bereits große Personen als der fürst Dolgorukii und die beyde brüder Apraxin mitimpliciret seyn sollen, so daß man sich vermuthet, daß bey Se. Czar. Maj. retour eine große execution vorgehen möchte. Gewiß ist es daß diese Staat an vielen heimlichen krankheiten laboriret, das russische ministerium es sey in Krieg, und friedens sachen ist gantz uneinig und gegen einander, ein jeder suche seine bourse zu machen, und wo sie worinnen einig sind, so ist daß sie ihren Herrn ihr spiel und den üblen zustand des gemeinen wesens verbergen, oder die schuld auf die frembden, daß wo man einen sieth, so schlägt er die hände zusammen, und wünscht aus dieser Galere zu seyn. Anstatt daß die Handwercksleute animiret, und die Commerciirenden angefrischet werden solten, so sind die Imposten auf die frembden gegen die Russen zu 15 pro cento gegen 7 aufgelegt, und versichert mir der Holländische Resident daß die Holländer von etlichen wahren bis 40 pro cent geben müßen, und auch so reburtiret werden, daß sie dem handel aufgeben wolten.

Das Policey-wesen ist hier gar nicht bekannt, und da es sonsten noch ziemlich wohlfeil

The building of the capital required every year several thousand peasants as workmen, but the officials in charge were so corrupt that many died. This was bad for the rural economy, thought Mardefeld, as was the practice of Russian noblemen of bringing their own peasants to St. Petersburg to build their new houses. To add to all this, the taxes were too high on the peasantry and the lack of *Policey* brought inflation and the resultant discontent. Tyrholm largely agreed: the army, navy, and foreign experts and officers were very expensive, and combined with the poor state of trade, this meant that Peter was short of money.⁷³ The Hanoverian resident F. C. von

hier gewesen, so ist durch vorkauffereyen, durch die Eingriffen der Großen, und daß man von alles profitieren will, eine so horrible Theurung, daß man vor einen hasen Anderthalb Rubel fordern darff, und ich selbst vor ein sehr mittelmäßig kalb 6. rubel bezahlen müßen, und weil Se. Czarr. Majt. die Magazins gantz leer befunden, und die selbe nun auf einmahl wieder vor 40/m Mann angefüllet werden sollen, so geschiehet es mit einer solchen Desordre, daß alles was zur Stadt kömbt, wann es auch particuliere von ihre Güther kommen laßen, ohne Unterscheid weggenommen wird, und schätz man daß der Haber mit nechsten die kouhle welchen 1 1/2 [?] ist, auf einen Ducaten kommen werde . . . Man hat mire versichert, daß der Senat in Se. Czaar. Majt. Abwesenheit so wenig seine function gethan, daß sie in der versendung die meiste zeit mit Brantwein trinken und Schinken essen zugebracht, und wan einer was proponiret, haben sie geantwortet: Brüderchen mach, wie du wilt." On *Polizeiwesen*, see Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia 1600–1800*, New Haven, CT, 1983.

⁷³ GSPK. Repertorium XI, Rußland 24d, 21 January 1718, St. Petersburg: "habe in Meiner Allerunterstn. Relation von 14.ten hujus fortgefahren von dem innerlichen Zustand dieses Reichs, und ins besondere von dem Zustand dieser Stadt und des Senats zu berichten, womit wie folget Allerunterst. continuire, daß gleich wie nun Petersburg an dem Ruin der Stadt Moscow und deßen handels schuld ist, alß ruiniret es auch das platte land bis nach Siberien und Astracan, und solches geschiehet folgender gestalt. Es werden zu diesem und dem Cron Schlotttschen, wie auch Peterhoffschen Bau, alle jahr 7. bis 8000 bauren verschrieben, welche ein Teil von Siberien auch aus Astracan zu fuß hieher reisen, solche sollen haben täglich ein kopeiken deren 100 auf ein Rubel gehen, und 1 1–2 scheffel Mehl monatlich. Dabey müßen sie Egyptische Arbeit thun, und dieses behalt wird ihnen von denen Bau-Directeurs unterschlagen, und die Arme Leute von hunger und misere so hingerichtet, daß mir von glaubhafften Persohnen eydlich versichert, daß keine 700 von viel tausend zu hause kähmen, und die wären so extenuiret, daß Ihnen noch viele unterwegs crepirten, und würden die Register der Chirurgorum und derer die die Inspection über die Hospitälér hätten, zeigen daß in etlichen Jahren über 100/m bauren crepiret, und wären bey erbauung der Vestung alhier über 40,000 geblieben. Diesen abgewichenen sommer seynd über 6000 bauren umbkommen, abschon das Werck woran sie gearbeitet hätten übell angeleget, das Waßer dadurch gedrunken, und völlig wieder überhauffen gangen. Diese Bauren nun seind nicht allein Se. Czaar. Majt. sondern auch der Edelleute ihre, und wird nach der Anzahl bauren auch das Revenue von den Gütern gerechnet, mit der Difference, daß mann der Bauer dem Edelmann 1. Rubel gibt, muß er an Sr. Czaar. Majt. wohl 8. bis 12. geben. Wie weit nun diese Bauren niederlage das land entkräftet, kan man an diesem Exempel urtheilen; Es ist hier ein Russischer Obrister welcher abgedancket hatte, weil er 3000 Bauren in Rußland hatte woran er leben konte, er hat sich hieher transportiren müßen, und seynd seine 3000 Bauren durch itzgemelte frohndienste bis auf 800 geschmolzen, von welchen er noch 300 Rubel, jährlich genießet. Ewr König. Majt. können versichert seyn, daß in diese Erzehlung nichts exaggeriret ist, sondern daß diese

Weber added that popular discontent was so great that it was whispered about that if Peter died, civil war was inevitable. Weber thought that the grave situation of Russia was the reason Peter sought peace with Sweden.⁷⁴

Ultimately, the solution to the financial problem would come from a rearrangement of the tax basis among the peasantry. The eventual outcome was the decree of 26 November 1718 beginning the process of establishing the "soul tax" on the peasantry, the payment of a direct tax per male peasant (per male "soul") rather than per household.⁷⁵ The financial problems of the Russian state, however serious, were not the most immediate issues. The first serious peace

Umbstände jedermann alhier bekant seyn; hierzu kombt noch, daß die Bojaren und andere wohl habende leute, welche per force ihre Wohnung in Moscow quitiren und hier bauen müßen hier fast nichts an bauen Geld verzehren, sondern auf mehr als 100 Meilen von den Bauren ihre provisiones herbringen laßen, welches der Stadt nichts hieffft, die Bauren aber hinrichtet, und dabey dieser umbstände so wohl as da in meiner vorigen gemeldten übeln Policy es sehr in einem Jahre doppelt so theuer geworden wie vorher, und alles auf die frembde geschlagen wird, so nimbt die Haußmiethe und die Theuring der Victualien den Handwerkern allen profit weg, welchen sie sents verdienen, daher das Mißvergnügen ungemein groß ist, und dencket alles auf die retraite, ich will schweigen daß es unangenehm vor die frembde, daß keiner des Abends über die Gaße gehen kan, ohne Gefahr assassiniert zu werden, wo von alle Nächte exempel vor handen, und bey solchen entsezlichen Armuth als hier durchgehends ist es wohl nicht anders sein kan." TKUA Rusland B49, St. Petersburg, 24 December 1718 (bad state of Russia's finances). Miliukov, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, 496–504, confirmed the bad state of Russia's finances in 1717–18. Prince A. M. Cherkasskii, head of construction in St. Petersburg, proposed in November 1717, to abandon recruiting 32,000 peasants a year for building the city as too expensive (nearly 100,000 rubles a year, by his count) and subcontract the work to the merchants. Cherkasskii thought that since 1714 about 1,000 a year had fallen ill and another 1,000 a year died or ran away: *PSŽ V*, 3124, 522–23. Peter agreed with Cherkasskii's proposal, replacing all but the St. Petersburg peasant workers with a monetary tax early in 1718: P. N. Petrov, *Istoriia Sankt-Peterburga*, St. Petersburg, 1884, 57–62, 143–44.

⁷⁴ Bodleian French, d. 35, f. 24, 23 January 1718, St. Petersburg, Weber to Robethon: "J'ay touché dans me precedentes sur l'état present de la Russie, et j'ay dit que les finances en sont epuïsés, le peuple en general fort apauvri, le commerce in decadence, et le peuple mécontent, et icy joint à l'invasion que les Coubans menacent de faire et à la santé chancelante du Czar, sont les veritables raisons qui l'engagent à chercher paix. On dit à l'oreille que ce Prince venant à mourir, une guerre civile est inevitable." Earlier on Weber had reported that an unnamed foreigner whom he met had stopped in his journey through Russia in a village where a priest in his cups had delivered to him a tirade on Peter's oppression of the people by the abolition of beards, the violation of laws, and the tyranny of foreigners: Bodleian French, d. 35, 10 January 1718, St. Petersburg, Weber to Robethon. This sort of information is both a testimony to the real popular discontent in the winter of 1717–18 and the difficulties foreign diplomats (and later historians) had in gauging its extent. In fact no popular disturbances of any sort actually broke out from 1709 to the end of the reign. Years later Weber admitted that the common rumors of imminent revolt in that winter were unfounded, for the mob had no potential leaders. Weber, *Rußland*, I, 252.

⁷⁵ *PSŽ V* no. 3245, 597 (26 November 1718); Anisimov, *Podatnaia*, 54–60. The resulting system lasted until 1887 and served as a major institution of the state, not only as the basis of its revenue but as a marker distinguishing privileged from unprivileged classes.

negotiations with Sweden since the beginning of the war were about to begin, largely as a result of the initiative of Baron Görtz in Sweden. Peter sent Iakov Bruce and Heinrich Ostermann to Åbo in Finland to represent Russia and establish a place to meet the Swedish delegation, Baron Görtz and Count Carl Gyllenborg. For the first time, it seemed that Charles XII might make some concessions and that peace might come.⁷⁶ While that was going on, Peter still had to deal with his son.

⁷⁶ Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 326–30; K.-J. Hartman, *Ålandska kongressen och dess förhistoria*, 5 vols., Acta Academiae Aboensis 2–5, 7–8, Åbo, 1921–31; S. A. Feigina, *Ålandskii kongress*, Moscow, 1959. HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 20 January 1718 (Peter sends Bruce to Åbo to negotiate peace with Sweden amid great secrecy).

CHAPTER 10

The end of Aleksei Petrovich, 1718

As Tsarevich Aleksei returned to Russia, the looming dynastic crisis outweighed the country's grave financial problems and widespread corruption. Peter had received regular reports from Tolstoi on the course of Tsarevich Aleksei's journey back to Russia, but they were kept very secret. The diplomats recorded much talk about the tsarevich, but most did not know exactly where he was until he actually appeared in Moscow at the end of January 1718. The talk which the other diplomats recorded was not encouraging from Peter's point of view. The Imperial ambassador Pleyer was the most thorough in recording the support for the tsarevich. Pleyer's "confidant" told him in December, 1717, that Peter had said to Menshikov that he would take revenge on the emperor for harboring the tsarevich, to which Menshikov replied that revenge would have to wait, since after the recent victories over the Turks the emperor was too strong. Supposedly, Peter grabbed Menshikov and said that he was in league with Aleksei and the emperor. Menshikov threw himself at his feet and said that he seemed to be unfaithful whatever advice he gave. The rumor was that Menshikov would go to Karlsbad to persuade the tsarevich to return.¹ As the year drew to a close, there was still no news, though in fact Tolstoi and Aleksei had reached Breslau and were about to enter Poland on the last leg of the journey home. By mid-January they were at Riga, where Weber spoke to Aleksei with the permission of Tolstoi. Weber attested that the tsarevich was very sad and pensive. The story in Riga was that at Aleksei's last interview with Karl VI he wept, for the emperor told him to throw himself on the mercy of his father, while the tsarevich had never believed the emperor would let him leave the Habsburg lands.²

¹ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 24, 6 December 1717; TKUA Rusland B49, 24 December 1717.

² RGADA, f. 198, d. 963, ll. 65–65v, Petr Tolstoi to ADM, Riga, 11 January 1718 (arrival of AP in Riga on 10 January, order to go on to Moscow); Bodleian French d.35: Riga, 12/23

Finally the news of Aleksei's return began to spread:

On the surface people show joy at the court at the news of the return of the tsarevich, but many Russian lords who wish him well do not like it and desire that he remain abroad, for they fear that he will be sent to a monastery and put out of the way. The lords of the country, the clergy, and the people are in the greatest degree inclined to him and they are all glad that he stayed in the lands of your Imperial Majesty. When the common people pass by and see his little prince [= Petr Alekseevich] in the windows, they call out "God bless our future lord" and fall on their knees. The tsar asked here [= Moscow] the metropolitan of Riazan' [= Stefan Iavorskii], whom he otherwise esteems and loves, what he thought of the fact that the tsarevich had fled and given himself to foreign protection; to this he [= Stefan] answered, "because he had nothing more to do here, so perhaps he wants to gain experience abroad and to learn more." To which the tsar looked sharply at him and said, "If you are saying this to comfort me, so be it, otherwise this is truly the language of Mazepa," at which the man was so shocked that he now lies sick in bed.³

True to his circle of contacts, Pleyer saw things through the eyes of Aleksei's supporters.

Other diplomats had different sources of information. Weber reported a division in the court:

The arrival of the tsarevich causes as much joy to some as sadness to others. Those who take his side rejoice before his return in the hope that some revolution, with which this empire was menaced, would take place.

January 1718, f. 33: "Le Prince est icy et J'ay eu l'honneur de le voir hier par le moyen de M. Tolstoy. Il m'a paru fort triste et pensif et si vous voulés vour resouvenir de discours que nous avons eu ensemble dans mon sejour à Petersbourg, vous en pouvez deviner la raison, on m'a dit qu'à la dernière audience eue de l'Empereur il a versé des larmes ses voyant exhorté de Sa Majesté a se metre dans les bras d'un pere aussy genereux et bon comme le sien, n'ayant jamais cru que l'Empereur l'eut du laisser partir." During those days Tolstoi, Aleksei Petrovich, and Prince Petr Alekseevich Golitsyn, the governor of Riga, received orders to go to Moscow. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 427–28.

³ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, Moscow, 20 January 1718: "Man [zeigt bey hoff äusserlich eine freud über die nachricht von der zurukkunft des Cron Prinzen] aber ville [russische herren welche] ihm [wohl wollen sehen] es [nicht gern, und wünschen, daß er draussen bleibe,] dan [sie fürchten, daß er in ein kloster geschicket und] gar [aus dem weg gebracht werden dörfte. Die herren des landes, die geistlichkeit, und das volck ist ihm alles höchst geneiget, und seynd alle erfrewet gewesen, daß er in Ew. Kay. May. landen sich aufgehalten. Wan die gemeine leut vorbey] gehen, [und sehen dessen kleinen Prinz in fenstern so ruffen sie Gott segne unseren künftigen herrn, und fallen auf die erden nieder. Der Czar hat] alhier [den Metropolit von Resan, welchen] er sonst sehr [aestimiret, und liebet, gefragt was er davon halte, daß der Cron Prinz entwichen, und in frembden schutz sich begeben habe, darauff er geantwortet, weilen] er [hier nichts zu thun] hat, so will er] vielleicht [sich draussen versuchen, und] noch [lehren] darauff [schauet] ihn [der Czar] stark [an, und sagte, redest du dieses mir zu mein trost,] so [gehet] es noch [hin] sonst seind [dieses] rechte [Mazepische reden, worauff der man also erschrocken ist, daß er jetzt krank darnider liget.]"

Now everything is changed, policy takes the place of discontent and everything is frozen in expectation of the outcome. The Prince passed by here incognito, as they say, in the company of Tolstoi and Prince Golitsyn, governor of Riga, in appearance out of honor but rather to watch his conduct and answer for his person. His return is generally disapproved of because it is feared that he will have the same fate as his mother. They blame him that before his return he did not insist on the abolition of the testament of the Tsar in favor of his brother. . .⁴

Surrounded by international and domestic intrigue, Aleksei returned to Moscow on 30 January/11 February 1718. He arrived on Friday, 30 January, and on Monday Peter assembled the nobility and clergy in the Kremlin to hear Aleksei's renunciation of the throne. There is no direct record of what transpired over the two days in between, but the manifesto Peter published announcing Aleksei's renunciation gives some hint. In recounting the story of the flight of the tsarevich Peter announced that in Naples Aleksei had bragged to Tolstoi that the emperor would support his claim to the throne by arms. This claim we know to be true, but it does not figure in any of Tolstoi's letters. Peter must have learned this crucial fact when he met Tolstoi in Moscow on 1–2 February, thus finding out the full seriousness of the situation.⁵

Early on Monday, 3/14 February, Peter assembled the ministers of

⁴ Bodleian French d.35, ff. 36–36v, St. Petersburg, 7/18 February 1718: “L'arrivée du Czarewitz cause autant de joye aux uns que de tristesse aux autres. Ceux qui prennent son party, se rejouissent avant son retour, dans l'esperance qu'il arriverait quelque revolution dont cet Empire etoit menacé. Presentement tout est changé, la Politique prend la place du mecontentement et tout est immobile dans l'attente de denouement de l'affaire. Ce Prince a passé incognito icy a ce qu'on dit, accompagné de M. Tolstoy et du Prince Gallizin Gouverneur de Riga par honneur en apparence mais plutot pour veiller à sa conduite et repandre de sa personne. Son retour est generalement desaprouvé [car on craint qu'il n'ait le mesme sort que sa mere.] On le blame qu'avant son retour il n'a pas insisté sur [l'abolition du dernier testament du Czar en faveur de son frere] . . .” The rumor was that Peter might give the throne to one of the Naryshkins if his other son died. Weber, *Rußland*, I, 236–7. Weber's portrait of the divisions at the court presumably reflects in part the views of his main ally and informant at Peter's court, Shafirov. Later in the year Weber offered Shafirov 30,000 ducats to “destroy” Peter's physician, Robert Areskine, as a Scottish Jacobite a threat to Weber's master George I. Bodleian French d.35, St. Petersburg, 24 and 27 June 1718, ff. 124–25v and 128–29v. He later described Shafirov's enemies as “our enemies” and these were Menshikov, Tolstoi, Iaguzhinskii, Areskin, and the Prussian envoy Mardefeldt: Bodleian French d.35, St. Petersburg, 15 July 1718.

ARSG 7368 (1718), St. Petersburg 24 January 1718 (Peter's ambitious projects had caused discontent among nobles, merchants, peasants, much affection in the land for Aleksei). TKUA Rusland B50: 17 January 1718 NS, St. Petersburg (discontent of Peter's subjects).

⁵ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 409 (Tolstoi to unknown Russian dignitary, possibly Menshikov, saying he did not want to burden the tsar with a long despatch, “K tomuzh bez tsifrov pisat' opassia”), 438–44.

state and the higher clergy in the grand Dining Hall of the Kremlin Palace. He took no chances. Three battallions of guards were ordered (under pain of death) to appear with their muskets loaded with powder and shot and to patrol the surrounding streets in groups of five and ten to look out for any crowds that might assemble.⁶ Present were seven metropolitans and archbishops, five archimandrites, Senators Musin-Pushkin and Streshnev, Field Marshal Sheremetev, Admiral Apraksin, Chancellor Golovkin, Lieutenant General I. I. Buturlin, ten of the old boyars and *okol'nichie*, Prince I. F. Romodanovskii, many other officers and officials down to colonels and *landraty* and the chief merchants. Peter appeared in the hall first and explained the reason for their meeting. Aleksei was brought into the hall as a prisoner, without his sword. Peter then made a long speech, recounting all that he had done for the tsarevich, only to receive his son's ingratitude with the flight to Vienna and the slanders Aleksei recounted there. Aleksei fell on his knees, admitted guilt and begged for his life and the tsar's favor. Peter asked what he wanted, and Aleksei repeated his request: Peter told him to stand up, and that he would grant all that if the tsarevich renounced the throne and named those who had advised him to flee. Aleksei went into a nearby room with his father, named names and promised his renunciation.

At this point Shafirov read out the document of renunciation and Peter declared his second son Petr Petrovich the heir to the throne. All then went to the court chapel, where Aleksei swore to uphold the renunciation and signed it, followed by the dignitaries and clergy, and all swore to be true to the succession of Petr Petrovich. At the signing Admiral Apraksin wept, as did many others as if they were at a funeral. Metropolitan Stefan Iavorskii looked at heaven and

⁶ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, 14 February 1718, Moscow (arrival of Aleksei in Moscow 1/11 February, brief report of assembly of nobility and clergy meeting with Aleksei on 3/14 February, Doctor Areskine tells Pleyer it concerns the succession); 17 February 1718, Moscow: "der sonntag wurde mit allerhand anstalten zu einer grossen versamblung passiret, und alle hier anwesende geistliche auf den montag als den 14.ten auf den schloß in den grossen sall zuerscheinen befelchet, denen officiren von denen 3 mitgekommenen Battailonen leibgarde angesaget, ihre sambliche manschaft frühe in paratschaft zuhalten mit expresser ordre, welcher soldat soll gefunden werden, dessen gewehr nicht voll geladen, oder seine Patronen mit pulver, und kugeln, nicht wohl versehen seyn solte, dest todtes sterben müste, die manschaft wurde zwar nicht ordentlich auf plätzen postiret, sondern sie gieng theils zu fünften, theils auch zu zehen man alle gassen, und zuegänge zu schloß umbher, und schauete, oder kunschaffete, ob nicht irgends eine zusambrattirung zu vermerken wäre, welche aber umb so vill weniger so bald geschehen kunte, als kein mensch ausser drey oder vier Ministri vorherio die geringste nachricht davon hatte."

sighed, "Oh tsar!" Peter answered him, "You owe me obedience!" and Stefan replied, "I am signing out of obedience," though he could hardly write for his tears. Peter supposedly told Aleksei later that the emperor's protection would have done him no good. The tsar claimed that he had been ready to invade Silesia with 50,000 men if necessary. Finally, they all went to the Dormition Cathedral for a thanksgiving prayer, and Aleksei remained under Tolstoi's guard.⁷

On the very next day, 4 February, Peter began the investigation of Aleksei's deeds by compiling a series of questions for him. Thus

⁷ Pogodin, "Dokumenty", 317–20; HHStA Rußland, Karton 25, 10 March 1718, Moscow: "Nach deme der Cron Prinz gegen Moscau sich genähert, komete der geheimbe Rath Tolstoj voraus alhier bey den Czaren an, aber nach etwa 2 oder 3 tägigen hiersey, und gepflogener unterredung kehrte er widerumb zum Czarewitz zuruck, welcher fast bey 14 tagen 36 meilen von hier in der statt Twer sich aufhielte, von danen kometen endlich beyde zusamb am 11.ten Feb. abends ganz spatt anhero, worauf daß ministerium des anderen tages in höchster frühe versamblet, und herrn, und adel, wie auch alle die fürnembste geistlichkeit beruffen wurden am Montag als den 14.ten auf den schloß in den audienzsaal zuerscheinen, dessen ursach aber niemanden, ausser denen officiren von den 3 Bataillons leibgarden anbefohlen, folgenden tages ihre manschaft mit allen gewehr, pulver, und kuglen voll versehen parat zuhalten Montags gegen 8 uhr versamblete sich schon alles auf den schloß in den grossen saal, da der Czar mit seinen ministris bald darauf auch sich einfande, und endlich der czarewitz ohne degen auch hinein gebracht wurde; worauf der Czar anfangete, und dem Prinzen nach der läng her all sein verbrechen, die auf ihn zur information angewendete mühe, und fleiß, den ungehorsamb gegen ihn, und seine informatores, die incapacitet zur regirung, und genomene flucht auf das härteste ihm fürhielte (wie solches in einen gedruckten Manifest weiltäuffig ausgeführt, und vom Vice Canzlern laut ablesen, hernach aber öffentlich verkauffet worden, dessen translat ich hiemit sambt den russischen druk allerunterthänigst beygeleget habe) darauf er den Czarewitz fragete, ob er nicht den todt verwürket hätte? Welcher sich darauf den Czaren weinend zu Fußsen warffe, umb leben, und gnad bittete; worauf der Czar gleichsamb mit der hand ihn widerumb aufrichtend leben und gnad ihm versprache, wofern er die jenigen, welche ihm zu dieser flucht gerathen, offenbahren und auf die Succession renunciren wolle: welches beydes er alsbald versprache, den Czaren auf die seiten nambe, und ihm dieselbe nennete." After this Peter, Aleksei, and the assembled nobles and clergy went to the palace chapel and signed the manifesto and from there to the cathedral for a Te deum. 17 February 1718, Moscow: "[A]ß der General Admiral welcher der erstere war, so das instrument unterschreiben solte, weinete er die bitteren träner und in der kirchen das weinen von allem volck als in einem trauhaus der fürnembste Archierei von Resan hebete die augen gegen den himmel seufzend und wägte, ach Zar dem] aber [der Zar gleich antwortete, du bist mir gehorsamb schuld, worauf] er [antwortet, ja aus gehorsamb unterschreibe ich] es [auch, könte [in dem zimmer] allein [gesagt haben zu dem Cronprinzen, du hast bey dem Kayser schutz gesucht, ich wolte dich] aber [wol gefunden haben, wan ich mit fünfzig tausend man in Schlesien kommen] wäre, [dich zu suchen; dan wolte einer thun, da alle vor mir zitteren die in Deutschland seind.]" Bodleian French d.35, ff. 48–49v; St. Petersburg, 14/25 February 1718 (Aleksei's renunciation of the throne, danger of revolt in St. Petersburg averted by firm stand of Menshikov and Peter). ARSG 7368 (1718), Moscow, 17 February 1718 (description of ceremony of renunciation). TKUA Rusland B50: 10/21 February 1718, Moscow (later account of same; Kikin and Naryshkin involved in AP's flight). Manifesto announcing AP's abdication: *PSŽ* V, no. 3151, 534–39.

began a long and complex investigation that lasted until the end of the year, but climaxed with Aleksei's condemnation and death in June. To run the interrogations Peter did not use the Preobrazhenskii Chancellery, under its new head, but set up a special investigation committee under Petr Tolstoi, A. I. Ushakov, G. G. Skorniakov-Pisarev, and I. I. Buturlin. This committee was the beginning of the Chancellery of Secret Affairs.⁸ The investigation actually had two parts to it, one, that of Aleksei, and the other the related case of his mother. Exactly how Evdokiia became involved is not clear: it seems that Peter sent Skorniakov-Pisarev to inquire whether or not she knew of Aleksei's flight, and Skorniakov-Pisarev told Peter that she had abandoned her nun's habit. This led to a wider investigation, which found that she knew little if anything of Aleksei's flight and also that her contacts were with a circle largely different from Aleksei's. This case came to a head quickly, and several people were executed in March.⁹

The case of Aleksei Petrovich evolved in two distinct stages. The first ran from the day after the renunciation (4 February) to late April. In this first phase Aleksei implicated a relatively small number of people, some of his household, Aleksander Kikin and Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, so shortly before Menshikov's chief rival for the tsar's favor. After mid-April, in the second phase, the circle of suspects widened, especially after 16 May when Aleksei revealed that he had counted on the whole of the Senate and many others to support him. In the first phase, Peter tried to find out exactly who was involved and to what extent, and punish most of them. After 16 May, he essentially wound up the case and did not pursue the new leads to any great extent. Finally, in June Aleksei was formally tried and condemned, with many of those he had named as sympathizers signing his death warrant. Before the sentence could be carried out, he died, and the case was largely closed.

The first phase of the case began with Peter's questions to his son on 4 February. Peter wanted to know who knew about his correspondence over the abdication back in 1715–16, who knew about the flight abroad and how long it had been planned, whom he communicated with from abroad, and other details. In the days that

⁸ Veretennikov, *Istoriia*, 76–91; Pogodin, "Dokumenty," 106–28.

⁹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 458–60; S. V. Efimov, "Evdokiia Lopukhina – posledniaia russkaia tsaritsa XVII veka," in S. V. Lobachev, and A. S. Lavrov, eds., *Srednevekovaiia Rus'*, St. Petersburg, 1995, 136–65.

followed the tsar got enough information to send to St. Petersburg and order Menshikov to arrest Aleksander Kikin, Aleksei's valet (*kamerdiner*) Ivan Afanas'ev, Senator Samarin, the Siberian tsarevich (Vasilii Alekseevich), and Avram Lopukhin, Evdokiia's brother. Menshikov and Prince P. M. Golitsyn arrested Kikin on the evening of 6 February.¹⁰ On 8 February Aleksei gave his first deposition. He claimed that in 1715–16 he had shown Peter's letter only to Aleksander Kikin and his old tutor Nikifor Viazemskii, and requested Admiral Apraksin and Prince V. V. Dolgorukii to ask Peter to replace the monastery with exile in his village. The tsarevich claimed at this stage that Viazemskii and Kikin had advised him to go to a monastery and abdicate, Kikin adding that "a monk's cowl is not nailed to the head." Apraksin had promised to speak to Peter, and Prince V. V. Dolgorukii actually did speak to Peter, claiming to Aleksei "With your father I took you from the executioner's block." Prince Iu. Iu. Trubetskoi and the Siberian tsarevich knew about Peter's letters, but did not see them. The only one who advised him to flee, at this telling, was Kikin.

Aleksei claimed that Kikin had advised him to flee *before* the letters from Peter, that is, before autumn 1715. Supposedly Kikin had advised him to stay abroad when Aleksei went to Karlsbad in 1714. If true, the information implied that Kikin supported Aleksei before his own disgrace for corruption at the end of 1714, though at that point his advice to the heir was merely to stay abroad for a while. He was also urging reconciliation with Peter. By early 1716, however, Kikin had bigger plans. He went to Karlsbad and Vienna himself at that time, while Peter was in Europe and Aleksei in St. Petersburg. He told Aleksei as he left that he would look for a place for the heir to stay, and then in Vienna made contact with the Habsburg court through the Russian ambassador Veselovskii, and got a promise from Schönborn and Karl to shelter Aleksei. At least that is what Kikin

¹⁰ Peter wrote to ADM ordering Kikin's arrest on 3 February, the letter arrived at eleven o'clock in the evening of 6 February: Pogodin, "Dokumenty," 308–11 [= RGADA f. 5, d. 26, l. 300–07]; *SRIO* 11, 365, 369. News of the arrests became known in the city in two days: TKUA Rusland B50: "relation" after 31 January 1718 NS, St. Petersburg (division of court into supporters of Petr Petrovich and AP; arrest "avant-hier" of Kikin, the maitre d'hôtel of AP [= Afanas'ev], one of AP's gentlemen [probably = Everlakov], and the Siberian tsarevich). The Danish ambassador, von Westphalen, reported that Kikin had been arrested "yesterday" for corruption: TKUA Rusland B50, 8 February 1718, St. Petersburg. The date must be old style. Von Westphalen later corrected his error, reporting that the charge was involvement in AP's flight, not corruption: TKUA Rusland B50: 10/21 January 1718, Moscow.

told Aleksei that he had done in Vienna. Kikin also told Aleksei that Prince Vasilii Dolgorukii had told Kikin that the tsar would never let Aleksei enter a monastery, he would work him to death.

The tsarevich reported various other comments. Senator Samarin expected a change, and the Siberian tsarevich agreed with him, and asked Aleksei if he would be good to him later, when things got better. Prince V. V. Dolgorukii told Aleksei in Pomerania that when Peter's cruel mood came around he [VVD] would have deserted to the Swedes in Stettin had it not been for the presence of the tsaritsa. After Peter's illness in winter 1715–16, Semen Grigor'evich Naryshkin, one of Peter's diplomats, expressed sympathy with Aleksei's plight, as the heir had been passed over for the throne, unlike the hereditary princes in Prussia and other states. Later on, Naryshkin met Aleksei between Memel and Königsberg as the tsarevich fled to Vienna, and Naryshkin told him that he had not needed to leave since "we faithful ones thought about you." Peter's half-sister Mariia met the heir a bit earlier at Libau in Kurland and told him to get in touch with his mother, that Petersburg would soon be empty. She also described Evdokiia's visions, that there would be disturbances (*smiateniia*) and Peter would take her back, and by implication Aleksei. Aleksei sent letters from Riga through the governor, Prince Petr Alekseevich Golitsyn, but he did not know about the flight. He implicated many others from his household and friends besides Viazemskii: the priest Iakov Ignat'ev, Fyodor Dubrovskii, Ivan Naryshkin, and several others.¹¹

In the days after Aleksei's deposition Fyodor Everlakov, Kikin, and Afanas'ev were questioned. Everlakov, an artillery officer who had served in Aleksei's household, had little yet to say other than that Ivan Afanas'ev had some sort of code with him the previous summer. He also implicated Prince Bogdan Gagarin, whom he claimed had said that the tsarevich was returning "for no reason" (*naprasno*).¹² On the eleventh the interrogation of Kikin and

¹¹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 445–58 [= RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, 2–53v].

¹² RGADA, f. 6, d. 45 (Everlakov), l. 1–3, 7–7v (21 and 28 February; Everlakov at first said Prince Aleksei Gagarin but corrected it to Bogdan). Fyodor Borisovich Everlakov joined the service of the tsarevich in 1705 from the artillery, serving without a salary. In 1692 he had been a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Praskov'ia. In 1717 along with many others from Aleksei's household he was sent to another service, in his case back to the artillery: RGADA, f. 198, d. 83 ("Spisok sluzhitelei tsarevich Alekseia Petrovicha opredelennykh v roznye sluzhby, 17 April 1717"), l. 2; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 486.

Afanas'ev began.¹³ Afanas'ev admitted that Aleksei had told him that he was fleeing to Rome, and that only he and Kikin would know about it. Aleksei further told him that Kikin had already been in Vienna to prepare the ground. Afanas'ev went to Schwerin while Aleksei was in hiding, and saw there the Tsarevna Ekaterina Ivanovna, duchess of Mecklenburg, but made no major contacts. Afanas'ev met a Greek priest, Liverii Ivanovich Koleti (Liverios Koletis), whom he used to make contact with Aleksei, and told Aleksander Petrovich Lopukhin of the tsarevich's flight. On his return to Petersburg he admitted meeting Kikin and Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, who were interested in the communication codes.¹⁴ The order went out to arrest Dolgorukii.¹⁵

Six days later (17 February) Afanas'ev followed up his deposition with more information, this time implicating much bigger names than Kikin.

Ivan [said] that before his departure [sc. for Schwerin] at the invitation of the Siberian tsarevich he was in his house and he said to him that the tsarevich should do to us as he was saying to me that Petr Matveevich Apraksin said to him, "When your father is angry, it would be better to go away somewhere." And he, the Siberian, was saying that, we were in company with the imperial resident [= Pleyer] and Prince Odoevskii (he does not know his Christian name) and the imperial resident said to him, the Siberian tsarevich, "Why do you not write to the tsarevich [= Aleksei]? Avram Lopukhin writes to him, and I send those letters to the tsarevich."¹⁶

¹³ Ivan Afanas'ev-Bol'shoi, who had previously worked in the Apothecary Chancellery as a bonesetter (*kostoprav*), joined Aleksei's service in 1706. He was the highest paid of the servants, receiving 200 rubles a year, and in April, 1717, was left in the service of the tsarevich when the rest of the household was largely broken up: RGADA, f. 198, d. 83, l. 2.

¹⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 462–67. On Koletis see below, note 28 and A. E. Karathanassis, "Contribution à la connaissance de la vie et de l'oeuvre de deux grecs de la diaspora: Athanasios Kondoidis et Athanasios Skiadas (18e siècle)," *Balkan Studies* 13, no. 38 (1978), 167. (I owe this reference to Nikos Chrissidis.)

¹⁵ Pogodin, "Dokumenty," 312 (= RGADA, f. 5, d. 26, l. 310).

¹⁶ RGADA, f. 6, d. 48 (Ivan Bol'shoi Afanas'ev), l. 1–1v: "Ivan Afanas'ev v 17 den' fevralia [in margin: O Voronove] v rosprose skazal pri otezde de svoem iz Piterburkha za tsarevichem obiaivilsia on d'iaku Fedoru Voronovu chto tsarevich poekhal ne k ottsu no v nemetskuiu zemliu, i on de Voronov skazal to de khorosho i dal emu Ivanu [= Afanas'ev] tsyfir' i skazal chtob s nim Voronovym toiu tsyfir'iu on Ivan perepisyvalsia eshche de govoril ezheli de tsarevichiu budet trudno i on Voronov sluzhit' gotov, i s nim perepisyvaet a kogda on Ivan pred otezdom svoem po prizyvu tsarevicha Sibirskogo byl u nego v dome i on emu govoril chtob de nam delal tsarevich tavo kak mne skazyval [in margin: O Apraksine] on chto de emu govoril Petr Matveevich Apraksin a govoril de emu kogda na tebia otets serdit lutche budet kudy ushel on zhe Sibirskii skazyval byli my v kompanii kupno s rezidentem tsesarskim i s kniaz' Odoevskim imeni emu ne znaet i rezident tsesarskii emu Sibirskomu tsarevichu govoril dlia chego ty k tsarevichiu ne pishesh, a Avram de Lopukhin k nemu pishet i ia de ta ego pisma k tsarevichiu posylaiu." Ustrialov omitted this deposition.

Afanas'ev went on to say that when he returned from Schwerin Fyodor Dubrovskii told him that Avram Lopukhin wanted to see him. Afanas'ev saw Lopukhin in his house, and Lopukhin asked him if he knew where Aleksei was. The valet replied that he was in the Habsburg lands (*tsesarskaia zemlia*). Lopukhin then revealed that he knew the tsarevich was in the Tirol, and Afanas'ev admitted that Aleksei had told him that he was going not to Peter in Denmark but to Vienna at the time of his departure. "Avram said to those words, 'Here the tsarevich has done well.'"¹⁷

Afanas'ev then recounted what another servant of the tsarevich, Ivan Pogrebov, told him.¹⁸ Pogrebov told Afanas'ev that Kikin called in Pogrebov, revealed that he often saw Aleksei and that when the latter returned from Karlsbad (December 1714) he did not see Kikin but frequently went to the house of Prince V. V. Dolgorukii and the prince visited Aleksei as well, frequently late at night or early in the morning behind closed doors. Aleksei's steward, the secretary F. D. Voronov told Afanas'ev that Dolgorukii repeatedly complained that Aleksei should not have believed Peter's promise to let him marry his mistress Evfrosin'ia and return from Italy.¹⁹ All of these reports were hearsay, but they indicated that besides Kikin, Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, Senator P. M. Apraksin, Avram Lopukhin, and the Siberian

¹⁷ RGADA, f. 6, d. 48, l. 1v (17 February): "a kogda de on Ivan priekhal iz Shverina v Piterburkh govoril de emu Ivanu Fedor Dubrovskoi zhelaet de tebia videt' Avram Lopukhin, i po tem zhe Dubrovskogo slovam byl [?] tam v dome u Avrama Lopukhina i on de Avram sprashival evo vedaet li on Ivan gde obretaetsia tsarevich i on de Ivan skazal Avramu chto tsarevich v tsesarskoi zemle a on de Avram emu govoril chto tsarevich v Tirole i pri tom de on Ivan emu Avramu obiavil iasno, chto tsarevich pri otezde svoem emu Ivanu skazal chto edet ne ottsu no bezhit v tsesarskuii zemliu i Avram de na te slova govoril siia de on tsarevich delal dobro i budet de emu v nyneshnoe vremia bez vsiakikh [?], Slava de Bogu chto Bog evo unes."

¹⁸ Pogrebov was the son of the *vice-komendant* of Staraia Rusa and taken into Aleksei's household in 1713, and in 1717 he was sent to the navy as a sailor. RGADA, f.198, d. 83, 3v.

¹⁹ RGADA, f. 6, d. 48, ll. 1v–2v: "On zhe Ivan Afanas'ev skazal prizyval de k sebe Kikin sluzhitelia tsarevicheva Ivana Pogrebova, i govoril emu chob on ne skazyval nikomu, chto on Kikin k tsarevichiu chasto ezzhival, on zhe Ivan Afanas'ev skazal kogda tsarevich vozvratiasia is Karlsbata v Piterburkh i ne zaezzhival de k sebe na dvor proekhal priamo v do Knzia. Vasilia Vladimirovicha Dolgorukova, i potom de on Knz'. Vasilei chasto k nemu tsarevichiu ezzhival a nam pache v to vremia kogda gdr. k nemu tsarevichiu prisylal pisma o nasledstve i tsarevich de po nevo Knzia Vasilia mongozhdy posylival v vecheru pozno i po utru rano i kogda se k nemu priedet sizhival de dolgo dvoia zapershchis'; emuzh de Ivan skazyval d'iak Voronov skazyval de emu Voronovu taino knz' Vasilei Vladimirovich edet de siuda durak tsarevich dlia togo chto de otets emu posulil zhenitsia na Afrosine zholv emu ne zhenitba budet i naprasno on siuda edet. . ." On Voronov, see Serov, "Zametki," 101, 105–06.

Tsarevich Vasilii Alekseevich were certainly more sympathetic to Aleksei than Peter and might be involved in more serious matters. Afanas'ev's testimony also implicated the imperial ambassador Otto Pleyer.

Kikin's own testimony revealed largely the same picture. When Menshikov and General Prince P. M. Golitsyn arrested him in Petersburg he gave a deposition under torture (11 February 1718). He said that Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii also advised Aleksei in 1716 not to go to his father in Denmark, that the tsarevich went to the emperor on his own advice, adding that he told him if the emperor refused to help him to go to the pope, and that he had earlier advised him to enter a monastery but realized that such an act could be revoked. He denied the particular words about a monk's cowl not being nailed to the head. Kikin admitted that he had advised him to write to Prince V. V. Dolgorukii and that he kept the letter himself but did not deliver it since he was not sure when Aleksei would return.²⁰ The commission assembled all the various reports on Kikin and brought him to Moscow in chains. They questioned him there a week later. Kikin did not add much, even under torture (twenty-five blows of the whip), admitting only that he had gone to Vienna early in 1716 and talked to Veselovskii about asylum for the tsarevich. In his final deposition on 22 February, Kikin changed his tune. While not precisely denying his advice to the tsarevich to flee, he now tried to claim that Aleksei himself had come up with the idea of flight to Vienna, and that his own role had been largely passive. He confirmed that Prince Iakov Dolgorukii had advised Aleksei to enter a monastery, but denied Aleksei's report that he, Kikin, had said that a monk's cowl was not nailed on the head. He also denied writing to or speaking with Pleyer.²¹

²⁰ Pogodin, "Dokumenty," 308–9; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 460–61, 461–62 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 42, ll. 19–21, 42–43v); TKUA Rusland B50; 18 February/1 March, Moscow (Kikin arrived in Moscow under guard and in chains; he had been a favorite of the tsar, arrested for corruption three years ago, but the Tsaritsa Ekaterina saved his life, but he repaid them with ingratitude).

²¹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 468–9 [= RGADA, f. 6, d. 42, ll. 45–55v], 470–73 [= RGADA, f. 6, d. 42, ll. 60–63v]; RGADA, f. 6, d. 43, ll. 64–66v (denies contact with Pleyer after four blows of the whip). Bodleian French d. 35, 50–51v, St. Petersburg, 17/28 February 1718: rumors from Petersburg that Kikin is interrogated and faces execution. "On dit qu'il sera condamné à avoir les mains et les pieds coupés et à être pendu ensuite, pour avoir séduit et trompé le Prince Alexie Petrovitz par des pernicieux conseils puisque ce Kikin de concert avec d'autres seigneurs ont cultivé l'esprit de ce pauvre Prince pour le façonner à leur mode, dans la vue de le mettre sur le throne soit avant ou après la morte se son Pere pour l'emparer de toute l'Autorité Royale et pour rétablir les choses sur l'ancien pied, d'une

Other than Afanas'ev and Kikin the most important interrogation was that of the Siberian Tsarevich Vasilii Alekseevich, whom Tyrholm described as a person of limited mind, whom it was surprising to find capable of joining the party of the tsarevich. Westphalen was even more critical: Vasilii Alekseevich was about forty years old and of good appearance, but a great good-for-nothing, a drunkard, an evil tongue, corrupt, and reluctant to serve in war or politics. He was also always in the party of the tsarevich.²² The Chancellery asked him about his conversations with Mikhail Samarin about "changes," about his contacts with Aleksei before and after the flight, Afanas'ev's testimony about Petr Apraksin, about his contacts with Pleyer, and about his own statements to Afanas'ev that many people praised the flight of the tsarevich and that Aleksei had given him money to keep safe. At the end of February in the first deposition, Tsarevich Vasilii denied everything, including the reports about Samarin and Apraksin, and gave a much more innocent account of the meeting of Pleyer, Avram Lopukhin, and himself at the house of Prince Aleksei Odoevskii, the brother-in-law of Prince M. V. Dolgorukii. In his account, it was Odoevskii who

maniere que ce Prince n'auroit que le nom du Czar. Le Pere ayant bien remarqué les inclinations de ce Prince, concut de l'aversion pour luy et forma le dessein de faire ce qu'il vient d'exécuter." The notion Weber advanced here, writing from St. Petersburg and with no concrete information of the proceedings of the investigation, that Aleksei was misled by Kikin and unnamed noble conservatives, was one that he continued to hold in the 1738 second volume of his work on Russia. In this case he could have been influenced by Shafirov, who was in Moscow at the time. See Weber, *Rußland*, II, 46, 50.

²² Vasilii Alekseevich was the descendant of the Khans of Siberia, conquered by Yermak's cossacks in the 1580s. Vasilii and his brother Grigorii participated in the coronation of tsars Peter and Ivan on 25 June, 1682 and the "Kozhukhovo campaign" of 1694. Afterwards he worked in the Admiralty. Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VII, 346; Bogoslovskii, *Petr*, I, 196; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, III, 53–55; "Sibirskie kniaz'ia," *RBS* Sabaneev-Smyslov, St. Petersburg, 1904, 393–94. Menshikov arrested the Siberian tsarevich in Petersburg on 11/22 February, along with Ivan Kikin (Aleksandr's brother), Senator Samarin, and Avram Lopukhin. A. Kikin was already in custody. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 460–61. TKUA Rusland B50: "relation" 31 January–7 March 1718 NS, St. Petersburg: "avant-hier on a arreté le Prince Simberskii Czarowitz; celuy-cy est à plaindre; son grand pere a été Roy de Siberie, il se refugia dans cet Empire pour éviter d'estre massacré par les sujets rebelles avec ses enfants. L'ayné desquels a continué sa residence à Moscou, ou le Prince susnommé a pris naissance. Il estoit aymé du Czar; son esprit borné ne luy permettoit pas de penser à remonter sur le Throne de ses ancetres, et l'on ne peut qu'être surpris, qu'il ait été capable d'être du Prince hered[itaire]." TKUA Rusland B50; 13/24 March 1718: "Le Czaarewicz Sybersky, qui a été de tout temps attaché aux interests du prince dégradé, doit avoir souffert trois fois la torture à Petersbourg"; his ancestors were kings of Siberia; "C'est un homme de quelque 40 ans, d'assez bonne mine, mais au meme temps aussi un grand vaut rien, un tres grand biberon, mauvaise langue, et vilainement intéressé, n'estant d'ailleurs appliqué qu'à ses affaires domestiques, sans avoier eu l'ambition de servir ny à la guerre, ny dans les affaires politiques."

said to Tsarevich Vasilii that Pleyer knew that Tsarevich Aleksei was friendly to Tsarevich Vasilii and wondered why he did not write as many others did. He repeated all this under torture and then again on 3 March (fifteen blows each time).²³ The one thing the Siberian tsarevich did not deny was the involvement of Pleyer, and the accumulated evidence very quickly produced the beginnings of a major diplomatic incident over Pleyer's involvement with the tsarevich and his supporters.²⁴

During the rest of February the investigation dealt mainly with small fry. Aleksei's old tutor Nikifor Viazemskii denied all the charges against him, saying that he had nothing to do with Aleksei's flight or any other way encouraged him against his father, and was released for lack of evidence.²⁵ Fyodor Dubrovskii contributed little other than the news that he had (apparently) cited the False Dmitrii to Aleksei as a precedent.²⁶ The Greek priest Liverii (Liverios) testified to trying to get a letter from Afanas'ev to Aleksei while he was in the Tirol, but maintained that he never delivered it.²⁷ On the nineteenth

²³ RGADA, f. 6, d. 68, ll. 1–5v. “A u Odoevskogo kniazia byl on u Alekseia i rezident de tsesarskoï tut byl zhe i kniaz' Aleksei de Odoevskoi emu Sibirskomu govoril rezident tsesarskoï govorit emu Kniaz' Aleksei vedaet de rezident chto k tebe tsarevich milostiv dlia chego ty k tsarevichu ne pishesh a inye pishut i on Sibirskoi govoril nu Avram li de pishet, i takikh slov chto Ivan Afanas'ev napisal ne govarival.” (l. 4v) Prince Aleksei Iur'evich Odoevskii was the son of Prince Iurii Mikhailovich Odoevskii (boyar 1676, died 1707), nephew of the more prominent Prince Iakov Nikitich Odoevskii. Prince Aleksei's sister Evdokiia (1675–1729) married Prince M. V. Dolgorukii. Prince Ia. N. Odoevskii had no children, and the clan continued in the descendants of Prince Iu. M. Odoevskii. Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaiia*, I, 55–56, 91.

²⁴ The Habsburgs also made countercharges about Tolstoi's behavior in Moravia, which Pleyer received on January 31/10 February 1718 and afterwards presented to Golovkin. HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, 10 February 1718, 14 and 17 February, 10 March 1718 (Pleyer made the complaints about Tolstoi to Peter himself on 9/20 February).

²⁵ After the death of Aleksei, Viazemskii was questioned again on 3 and 5 July, and again denied all statements by the tsarevich and Avram Lopukhin, and also pointed out that Aleksei had been physically and verbally abusive to him in 1711–12 during the stay in Germany. On 27 November 1718, the commission sentenced him to be “exiled without punishment” (*soslat' bez nakazaniia*) in Archangel. RGADA, f. 6, d. 44, ll. 1–35v.

²⁶ Dubrovskii told Aleksei that many of his “brothers” had saved themselves by flight, though not in Russia, and “tsarevich izvolil [?] skazat', a to de bylo v Rossii velikogo kniazia Dmitriia syn begal v Pol'shu”: RGADA, f. 6, d. 46. l. 5v–6. The words of Dubrovskii about the brothers were taken as encouragement to flee, and earned him a death sentence on 14 March. Dubrovskii testified before the Senate in June as well. His death sentence was confirmed 28 June 1718: RGADA, f. 6, d. 46, ll. 12–19. Fyodor Petrovich Dubrovskii was a *stol'nik* in 1678 and 1692: [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 122.

²⁷ RGADA, f. 6, 71, ll. 1–7v (interrogations of 8 February, 4 March, sentence 16 March 1718). Father Liverios had been living in Halle. He became Aleksei's confessor (*dukhovnik*) in Germany in 1711 and later on his trip to Karlsbad in 1714, after which he stayed in Berlin. He then got permission from Aleksandr Golovkin, the Russian ambassador to Prussia, to go

it was the turn of Semen Grigor'evich Naryshkin. As a Naryshkin he was a distant relative of Peter's mother, as well as the son of a boyar, and an occasional diplomat. Naryshkin confessed only that he met Aleksei after his own return from England and discussed the right of inheritance in various countries. Naryshkin said that generally the oldest sons received the succession, as in Prussia and the empire, and the younger sons were discontented. Think about yourself, he told the tsarevich, the tsar may give the succession to your younger brothers. Supposedly, Aleksei said that it was in the tsar's will, and Naryshkin replied, "Well, that is annoying for you." Whatever else he said, Naryshkin could not remember, it was too long ago and he had been drunk. The commission sent him into exile "in his distant village" for his bold words.²⁸ Peter's half-sister Maria Alekseevna admitted that she had met him in Libau and told him of his mother's vision that he would be tsar, and that she had discussed the succession with Natal'ia Alekseevna, but nothing more.²⁹ The most important of the interrogations at the end of February, however, was that of Peter's brother-in-law, Avram Fyodorovich Lopukhin. Some of this had to do with the case of his sister Evdokiia, and the only matter of interest to emerge was the admission that he, Lopukhin, told Prince

to Venice, where the priest had relatives. Before leaving for Venice he went to Schwerin to pay his respects to the Duchess Ekaterina Ivanovna, and there met Afanas'ev. The valet convinced him to look for Aleksei and take a letter to him, but Liverios claimed that he did find out that the tsarevich was in the Tirol, but told neither Afanas'ev nor Aleksandr Lopukhin about it. He further claimed that he did inform Aleksandr Golovkin of Aleksei's whereabouts. Liverios was sentenced to eternal exile in the Solovetskii Monastery. In 1720 the sons of the exiled Hospodar of Moldavia, Demetrie Cantemir, petitioned Peter to release Liverios to employ him as a teacher: Karathanassis, "Contribution," 167, note 38. The attempt failed, and Koleti only was released from the Solovetskii Monastery in 1729 as the monk Evfimii. He became the archimandrite of the Novospasskii Monastery and a member of the Synod in 1730, during the time of the Supreme Privy Council. In 1732, by then archimandrite of the Kremlin Chudov Monastery, he was arrested for his connections with the Dominican Ribeira, who was trying to spread Catholicism in Russia and defended Stefan Iavorskii's *Kamen' vry*, the metropolitan's attack on Protestant teaching. Defrocked and interrogated in 1735, Koleti died in the fortress of Sts. Peter and Paul in 1738 or 1739: I. A. Chistovich, *Fefan Prokopovich i ego vremia, Sbornik statei chitannykh v ORIA Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk*, IV, St. Petersburg, 1868, 376–9, 416–17, 425, 431–34, 674.

²⁸ RGADA, f. 6, d. 49, ll. 1–12 (exile on 12 March 1718). Peter's mother's grandfather and SGN's grandfather were first cousins. S. G. Naryshkin was a chamber *stol'nik* in 1692: [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 281; Kammerherr, Adjutant General, major of Preobrazhenskii Guards in 1712: *PiB* XXI/1, 79, 356; RGADA, f. 210, op. 2, d. 60, l. 13 (SGN as captain). The testimony says only "Semen Naryshkin." The Naryshkin in question must be Semen Grigor'evich, since the only other Semen Naryshkin in that generation was Semen Fyodorov Naryshkin who died in Solikamsk in 1694/5. SGN died in 1747: RGADA, f. 210, op. 2, d. 36, 20v; Barsukov, *Spiski*, 178; Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Rodoslovnaia*, II, 7.

²⁹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 473.

Mikhail Vladimirovich Dolgorukii, the senator, that there were too many burdens in Russia and no order. He denied knowing Pleyer and also Afanas'ev's statement that he had asked the Siberian tsarevich why he did not write to Aleksei while a guest in the house of Prince Aleksei Odoevskii, claiming Afanas'ev had asked that of the Siberian tsarevich. Lopukhin was not intensively questioned again until June, but his deposition moved Peter to order the arrest of the Senator Prince M. V. Dolgorukii.³⁰

In March, attention to Aleksei's case slacked off. The commission investigated another Lopukhin, Aleksandr Petrovich, who confessed to meeting some of Aleksei's associates in Schwerin in 1716, but otherwise only to saying that "when the tsarevich is on the throne, it will be good for us," but claiming that he said it "from simplicity." These words earned him penal servitude.³¹ Nikifor Bogdanov, Aleksei's clerk (*podd'iachii*) knew nothing and was eventually released on bond.³² Prince Bogdan Gagarin managed to fight off Everlakov's accusations, but in the process he reported a conversation with Prince V. V. Dolgorukii: "Prince Bogdan Gagarin said, Prince Vasilii Dolgorukii told him at home in his bedroom, 'did you hear that the fool tsarevich is coming here and they are bringing Evfrosin'ia. He will get a stick, not a marriage.'"³³ Indeed Prince V. V. Dolgorukii,

³⁰ RGADA, f. 6, d. 47, ll. 1–17. "s rezidentom tsesarskim obkhozhdienie ne imel i nyne ne imeet i chrez ego i ni chrez kogo pisem ne posyl'val a v domu u nego ne byval i u nego Avrama on ne byval zhe tolko de skazyval emu Ivan Afonas'ev, govoril de emu Ivanu Sibirskoi tsarevich, chto de oni byli v gost'iakh u kniaz' Alekseia Odoevskogo i govoril de emu Sibirskomu dlia chego de ty k tsarevichu ne pishesh, khotiab de i Avram k nemu pisal ia b de poslal i on de Avram tsarevichu Sibirskomu o tom govoril i penial dlia nego on na menia takuiu bezdelitsu zatevaet, i on de Sibirskoi emu skazal ia de govoril da ne tak a kak ne pomniu" (l. 3). Pogodin, "Dokumenty," 314 (= RGADA f. 5, d. 26, l. 318, PI to ADM, arrest order for M. V. Dolgorukii, 11 March 1718).

³¹ "vechnaia katoga": RGADA, f. 6, d. 56–, ll. 1–8. Aleksandr Petrovich Lopukhin (died 1728) in 1692 was a *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Evdokiia. He was also the son of the boyar Petr Bol'shoi Avramovich Lopukhin (died 1701; Evdokiia's uncle): Ivanov, *Alfavitnyi*, 239; Dolgorukov, *Rodoslovnaia*, II, 57–58.

³² Bogdanov knew nothing about Aleksei's flight, and was released *na poruki* [on surety] 22 July, 1718, but rearrested in November. He had been a subsecretary in the Military Chancellery and entered Aleksei's service in 1713 to administer his estates and keep his estate records. He had been allowed to stay in Aleksei's service in 1717. RGADA, f. 6, d. 58, ll. 1–8v; f. 198, d. 83, l. 2v.

³³ RGADA, f. 6, d. 67, ll. 1–3v: "A kniaz' Bogdan Gagarin skazal, govoril de emu kniaz' Vasilei Dolgorukii v dome u sebja v spalne slyshal de ty chto durak tsarevich siuda edet i Afrosin'iu vezut, zhold' de emu, ne zhenit'ba" (l. 1v). In 1717 the fiskal Nesterov accused Prince Bogdan Ivanovich Gagarin (1673–1722) with his brother Vasilii of involvement with their distant cousin Prince M. P. Gagarin's misappropriation of funds. In 1709 Tsarevich Aleksei was dining with Prince B. I. Gagarin in Moscow when the news came of the victory at Poltava. Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, VIII, 495; *PiB* IX/2, 990. In 1704 B. I. Gagarin was

once the rival of Menshikov for the tsar's favor, was the most important suspect to emerge. There was a great deal against him by now, from Kikin, Afanas'ev, and Aleksei himself as well as Gagarin. He was questioned on 10 March, and confronted with his accusers, the whole time without torture. Basically he denied everything, but the commission found him guilty anyway, deciding to accept the testimony of the witnesses. His sentence came on 14 March, and it was deprivation of rank and all property, moveable and immoveable. Field Marshal Sheremetev, Golovkin, Senators Musin-Pushkin and Streshnev, Admiral Apraksin, Prince P. Prozorovskii, Shafirov, A. Saltykov, and V. Saltykov all signed the sentence.³⁴ This was serious enough, but even graver charges against Dolgorukii would come later.

By early March, news of the investigation had begun to circulate widely in Moscow and reached the ears of Otto Pleyer, already himself deeply implicated though he apparently did not know it. His first extensive report on the case came on 10/21 March, in which he conflated the cases of Aleksei and Evdokiia:

Meantime a terrible conspiracy against the tsar in favor of the tsarevich has been uncovered through the deposition of the same tsarevich, and for the last five weeks more and more prisoners have been brought in, among them six principal persons. The first is the lieutenant colonel of the guards and lieutenant general of the army, always a favorite of the tsar but an enemy of the Germans, General Vasilii Dolgorukii; the second, the admiralty lord Aleksander Kikin, also a former favorite, a metropolitan and learned man [= Bishop Dosifei of Rostov], the tsar's former wife [= Evdokiia], and his half-sister Mariia, besides some others the General Kurakin [probably a mistake for P. Apraksin – PB], who is now under arrest and because of his old correspondence locked up so that he receives no news and cannot be tempted.³⁵

polupolkovnik under Sheremetev and in 1705–06 full colonel under Bauer: *PiB* 3, 631, 1029; 4/2, 686. Prince V. I. Gagarin seems to have been a chamber *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Praskov'ia in 1686 and 1692: Ivanov, *Alfavitnyi*, 86. Dolgorukov, *Rodoslovnata*, I, 241–42.

³⁴ RGADA, f. 6, d. 55, ll. 1–15. Bodleian French d. 35, 52–53v, St. Petersburg, 20 February/3 March 1718 (arrest of Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, Senator P. Apraksin in Petersburg). F. C. Weber later reported the charges against Prince V. V. Dolgorukii quite accurately, as well as the Prince's justification. Bodleian French d.35, St. Petersburg, 14/25 April 1718, ff. 94–96v. TKUA Rusland B50: 3/14 March 1718, Moscow (General Prince Dolgorukii was involved in an attempt to maintain AP as heir).

³⁵ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, Moscow, 10/21 March 1718: "Indessen [ist durch des Cron Printzens aussage eine erschreckliche conjuration wider den Czaren in favor des Printzen entdecket und von fünff wochen her immer gefangenen eingebracht worden; unter denselben seynd sechs principal Personen. Der erste is der Obrist lieutenant von der Garde und General lieutenant bey der armée und allezeit ein favorit des Zar /76/ aber ein feind der teutschen General Basili Dolgorocki; der andere der Admiralitets herr Alexander

Peter himself had been present for the investigations under torture, and the previous Tuesday (5/16 March) had called the nobles and clergy to the Kremlin to hear about the misdeeds of the circle around Evdokiia.³⁶ There was also a rumor that the “general,” apparently Dolgorukii, was planning to stir up the army and Peter thought that this was the worst plot he had ever faced. Pleyer said that all was done in great secrecy and it was hard to find out the circumstances.³⁷ Yet he would do very well at finding them out, for only a week later he had more details. “the tsar himself is very disturbed at these events and he is not happy at this business for he sees that the more he investigates, the more he gets into it and almost no great family has remained outside the plot that has been made against him.” Petr Apraksin had been brought in for getting money from the Senate for the tsarevich, ostensibly for his trip to Copenhagen but really for the escape, but he was released.³⁸

On 15 March Peter ended the case of Evdokiia by the execution of Stepan Glebov, accused of being her lover as well as other crimes, and two days later the former archbishop of Rostov Dosifei met the same fate for wishing the death of the tsar. Of the principals in the

Kikin, auch ein gewester favorit, ein Metropolit und studirter man, des Czaren vorige gemahlin, und seine halbschwester Maria, nebst anderen vielen der General Kurakin, welcher] nun [in verhaft, und wegen seiner alte correspondenz gesperret ist damit er keine nachricht bekommen, und herein könnte geloket werden.”]

Tyrholm wrote that some twenty-eight “grands seigneurs” had been sent under guard to Moscow, P. M. Apraksin, V. V. Dolgorukii, Samarin, Lopukhin, one of the Naryshkins (evidently S. G.). Some were sent for corruption, such as Prince Gagarin, and Menshikov’s secretary Volkov was in the fortress, apparently on similar charges. In the capital there were elaborate security precautions, such as temporarily forbidding peasants to come into town for the market: TKUA Rusland B50, 7 March 1718 NS, St. Petersburg. Cf. PSZ V, no. 3168, 17 February 1718, 541 (St. Petersburg closed); no. 3189, 28 March 1718, 557 (St. Petersburg reopened).

³⁶ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 477–87; HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, Moscow, 21 March 1718.

³⁷ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, Moscow, 21 March 1718.

³⁸ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, Moscow, 28 March 1718: “[der Czar selbst bey diesen conjuncturen ganz consternirt und ihm bey der sach nicht wohl ist, weilen er sihet daß je mehrer er inquiret, je weither er hinein kommet, und fast keine grosse famili ausser den complot gebliben, welches wider ihn gemacht ist worden.]” [= S. G.] Naryshkin and Petr Apraksin had been arrested, and there were accusations against Prince P. A. Golitsyn. Pleyer heard that the plot had begun with Aleksei’s trip abroad, when he asked various people whether he should flee or not and they gave him no positive answer, but they did not reveal the plan to the tsar (this was exactly the issue in the early interrogations). Pleyer then went on to give a slightly different list of the six principal suspects. Dolgorukii, Kikin, and Bishop Dosifei were the same, but now he had the priest of Suzdal’ from Evdokiia’s case (Fyodor Pustynnyi), Stepan Glebov, and again Kurakin, whom he realized was not in Russia. The account closed with a description of Glebov’s execution. Bodleian French d.35, Moscow, 13/24 March 1718, ff. 77–80v (Russians inclined to revolt, Aleksei had fallen under bad influences).

case of Aleksei, Aleksandr Kikin met his end as well that day, broken on the wheel and taking a day to die. Westphalen commented that Evdokiia herself had been in danger of her life: “if the tsar knew the history of King Henry VIII [of England] I would not bet fifty ducats on her life.”³⁹ Two noblewomen, Princess Anastas’ia Troekurova and Varvara Golovina were beaten with the knout for their involvement with Evdokiia. Princess Golitsyna was also brought into Preobrazhenskoe for interrogation in connection with the case of Aleksei, where she was beaten with *batogi* and sent back to her husband Prince Ivan Alekseevich, who sent her on to her father, Prince Petr Prozorovskii. Her connection with the case seems to have been through the household of Tsarevna Mariia.⁴⁰ Tsarevna Mariia herself was sent to the fortress of Schlüsselburg.⁴¹

³⁹ ARSG 7368, 1718: Moscow, 17/28 March 1718 (execution of Glebov); TKUA Rusland B50: 3/14 March 1718, Moscow (“Si le Czar scavoit l’histoire du Roy Henry huit je ne parieray pas cinquante ducats sa vie”); 17/28 March 1718, Moscow (execution of Glebov); 20/31 March, Moscow (more detail on execution of Glebov, Dosifei, Kikin); 15 April 1718 NS, St. Petersburg (execution of Glebov).

⁴⁰ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 29 April 1718 (“wurde eine grosse fürstin, welche einige jahr bey hoff mächtig ware, und gemahlin eines Galizin, eine leibliche tochter des alten fürsten und schatzmeister Prosorowsky, welcher bishero der execution hat zusehen müssen, widerumb nach Probraschensky gebracht, aldort in dem general- oder inquisitions hoff in gegenwart etlich 100 soldaten und anderen menschen von einigen trommelschägenen auf der erden hingelegt und auf blossen rüken mit stäblein oder Battoggen sehr hart geschlagen, und ihrem man zuegeschicket, welcher sie dem vatter naher hause sendete”); The interrogation of Princess Golitsyna produced some ambiguous words with Prince V. V. Dolgorukii beyond her connection with Tsarevna Mariia. The chancellery’s sentence was whatever punishment the tsar decided. RGADA f. 6, d. 57 (Princess Anastas’ia Golitsyna), ll. 1–5v; d. 114 (Princess Anastas’ia Troekurova); d. 125 (Varvara Golovina). Princess A. P. Golitsyna’s husband Ivan Alekseevich (1655–1722) was the brother of Prince P. A. Golitsyn, the governor of Riga, whom Aleksei considered a supporter (see below) and Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn, the erstwhile leader of the Naryshkin faction in the 1680s and major figure in the 1690s. Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 286. Westphalen reported that Golitsyna had been part of the suite of Tsaritsa Ekaterina in Denmark (1716), where she had been a “grande amie du comte de Calembourg”: TKUA Rusland B50: 13/24 March 1718, Moscow; 20/31 March 1718, Moscow (Princess Golitsyna whipped). Apparently not all of Evdokiia’s supporters among aristocratic women were traditionalists.

⁴¹ Pogodin, “Dokumenty,” 314 (Peter to ADM, Preobrazhenskoe 17 March 1718, order to prepare Schlüsselburg for Maria Alekseevna); Bodleian French d.35, St. Petersburg, 28 March/7 April 1718, ff. 88–89v (Tsarevna Mariia brought to St. Petersburg); St. Petersburg, 14/25 April 1718, F. C. Weber to Robethon (Mariia in Schlüsselburg); TKUA Rusland B50: 15 April 1718 NS, St. Petersburg (Mariia in Schlüsselburg). Mariia died in 1723. According to Westphalen, one of the princesses Cherkasskii (“la plus belle femme de toute la Russie”), who was part of Tsarevna Mariia’s suite, was also implicated and risked punishment. He asserted that she was the daughter of the brother of “our ambassador,” presumably Prince V. L. Dolgorukii, ambassador to Denmark. The brother was Prince Aleksandr Lukich, neither of whose daughters married a Cherkasskii. Whom he had in mind remains unknown.

While the case of Evdokiia came to an end in death and imprisonment, the case of Aleksei proceeded more calmly. In the first week of March, Peter released two of the senators, Petr Apraksin and Mikhail Samarin. These two cases are mysterious, for there is no surviving record of their interrogation in the archive of the Chancellery, but Peter announced their release to the Senate in a letter on 7 March, enclosing a very brief extract from the interrogation. Judging from that extract, neither was tortured. In fact, there is other evidence that suggests that Apraksin at least was guilty of support for Aleksei and probably of knowledge of his flight to Vienna. This evidence is the correspondence of his brother the admiral with Menshikov. On 17 December 1717, while Aleksei was still *en route* for home through the Habsburg lands, Admiral Apraksin wrote: "I ask your brightness not to abandon my sad brother, as I saw him at my departure in bitter grief that he was so abandoned. However in my opinion it is better to concede in time than to die unseasonably . . ." A few weeks later, 4 January 1718, the admiral wrote again to Menshikov, this time in cipher, telling him that he had a note from Petr Tolstoi to the effect that "a certain person," evidently Aleksei, was on his way home. Five days later he was a bit less cryptic:

Yesterday I received with much sadness Your Brightness' letter of 1 January written from Petersburg with the additional note, and I marvel greatly at my brother's answer which does not agree with you, and I think this cannot pass without sensible difficulty. However, in hope of your unchanging kindness to myself I ask, do not allow him in that [answer], stop him with healthy discourses to the common utility and whatever happens I ask you in advance please do not leave me without news. . .

Menshikov was clearly trying to help Apraksin to get out of trouble, and the relationship implied reflects that of the reports of Tyrholm and others about Petr Apraksin's position in the Senate, working for Menshikov and his brother while sympathizing more with the views of the other senators, their opponents. On 2 February, after Tsarevich Aleksei had arrived in Moscow and begun to talk, the admiral wrote again to Menshikov, "give him healthy advice according to your own high deliberation since he writes to me that he is crushed by cruel and unceasing difficulties and I am afraid that he will die unseasonably. . ." After Petr Apraksin's arrest, his brother wrote again to Menshikov not naming the cause of his despair but

conveying his hopes in Menshikov's justice, God, and the "high mercy of our all-gracious monarch."⁴²

Petr Apraksin was clearly in great despair from December, 1717, onward, that is, from the time that Aleksei's return was becoming generally known, and the sequence of letters indicates that the issue was that for which he was arrested on 17 February, the case of Tsarevich Aleksei. He was released on 7 March on the grounds that the Siberian tsarevich had not confirmed Afanas'ev's story about his views. Yet the Siberian tsarevich had testified that Aleksei told Petr Apraksin on his departure that he was not coming back soon, which implied that he was defying his father to stay abroad. Apraksin even confirmed the testimony, adding only that he told Menshikov about it. Others of the accused were convicted merely by their knowledge of Aleksei's escape. In the case of Samarin, it was Tsarevich Aleksei himself who had implicated the senator, and the Siberian tsarevich who exculpated him, yet there was no confrontation of Aleksei with the Siberian tsarevich or further investigation. Petr Apraksin wrote to Menshikov on 4 March, the day after the last interrogation of the Siberian tsarevich, conveying his hopes that he would be justified, and on 8 March the admiral informed Menshikov that his brother had been released.⁴³ Peter had decided in these two cases to be merciful and ignore evidence similar to that which sent others into exile or worse. This was a policy he would find reason to continue in the coming months.

Peter and his suite left Moscow on 19/30 March. When the tsar returned to St. Petersburg with the court, his son, and Tolstoi's Chancellery, he put Aleksei in a house near his own under strong guard, with both houses guarded by small cannon loaded with canister. Soldiers stood by with burning matches. Aleksei accompanied his father to church, but otherwise saw him rarely and was himself not easily seen. At Easter he begged Tsaritsa Ekaterina to

⁴² RGADA, f. 198, d. 352 (General-Admiral Fyodor Apraksin to ADM), ll. 139–54v; Bushkovitch, "Power," 191–93; Bushkovitch, "Istorik," 96–97.

⁴³ RGADA, f. 198, d. 353 (Petr Apraksin), ll. 2–2v, 6; f. 6, d. 68, 5v, 15–16; *SRIO* 11, 369–70 (7 March 1718, order to release P. Apraksin and Samarin, with summary of relevant testimony; apparently from Senate archive). Bodleian French d.35, St. Petersburg, 18/29 March 1718, ff. 61–82v (release of P. M. Apraksin); TKUA Rusland B50: 6/17 March 1718, Moscow (Samarin and P. Apraksin freed); 15 April 1718 NS, St. Petersburg (P. Apraksin and Samarin declared innocent). In 1720 Peter put Samarin back in charge of building on Kotlin island (*SRIO* XI, 409–10) where he served until 1726, four years before his death: N. Samarin, "Samarin, Mikhail Mikhailovich," *RBS* Sabaneev-Smyslov, St. Petersburg, 1904, 131–33.

convince Peter to let him marry his mistress Evfrosin'ia.⁴⁴ By this time the investigation had established that Kikin and Aleksei had discussed flight to Vienna as early as the winter of 1715–16, and that they had been in sympathetic contact for at least two years before that. Few others, however, could be found who actually had encouraged Aleksei to flee, but there were plenty who were glad he did it and were generally sympathetic. It established that Peter's sisters Mariia and Natal'ia were to varying degrees on the side of their nephew and that Avram Lopukhin, the Siberian Tsarevich Vasilii Alekseevich, the imperial resident Otto Pleyer had kept some sort of contact with Aleksei in Vienna and Naples, and that Prince V. V. Dolgorukii was at least inclined to the cause of the tsarevich. While all of these revelations were serious, they seemed to implicate only a small circle around Aleksei, and a very few sympathizers. Soon everything changed.

Sometime in April, Peter learned something that caused him to resume the investigation all over under new and much harsher conditions. He went to the wedding banquet of Musin–Pushkin's son (20 April/1 May), where all the foreign ambassadors were present and much of the discussion revolved around the Swedish-Russian peace negotiations that were just about to begin on the Åland Islands. Then he stood up from the table and took aside Menshikov and his own secretary Makarov and gave new orders, whispering into the favorite's ear. Menshikov began to look very sad, and soon after Princes Vasilii and Mikhail Dolgorukii, Avram Lopukhin, Ivan Afanas'ev, Evfrosin'ia, and her brother were all brought into the fortress of Sts. Peter and Paul. Before they had been merely lodged in some sort of quarters, but now they were brought in separately, not allowed to see one another, and the fortress was closed for the duration of the investigation. The next day Peter met with Musin–Pushkin, Golovkin, and Tolstoi and ordered them to begin the

⁴⁴ HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 18/29 April 1718 (guard for Aleksei's quarters; his appeal to Ekaterina). Pleyer also repeated his earlier information that the "conspiracy" had "glimmered" for seven years but started up more seriously when Aleksei fled. The "archbishop" (presumably Stefan) told Peter that the clergy and people regarded Aleksei as the heir. Pleyer believed that the poor health of Petr Petrovich was a comfort to the "entire Russian nation." TKUA Rusland B50: 20/31 March 1718, Moscow (Peter left for St. Petersburg yesterday); 7/18 April 1718, St. Petersburg (AP kept as in Moscow; Evdokiia in prison, Mariia *en route* to St. Petersburg); 15 April 1718 NS, St. Petersburg (AP in a house near the palace under guard).

investigation anew and much more rigorously. Golovkin and Musin-Pushkin begged off, and Peter gave the task to Tolstoi alone.⁴⁵

The new Chancellery of Secret Affairs under Tolstoi resumed the interrogations. The priest Iakov Ignat'ev, once Aleksei's spiritual father (*dukhovnik*), replied under interrogation that he did not know of Aleksei's intention to flee, nor did he get any letters from him while he was away. More serious allegations would arise later.⁴⁶ Among the first to be interrogated in late April were two Naryshkins, the tsar's cousins. In the earlier interrogations, Aleksei's valet Afanas'ev had reported that another Naryshkin, Ivan (Ivanovich), a chamber *stol'nik*, had said that when the tsarevich returned, he would get rid of Menshikov and also his teacher (Nikifor Viazemskii),

⁴⁵ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 9 May [=29 April OS] 1718: "[Alß der Tzar bey der hochzeit von der taffel] aufgestanden und die ehrentänzer] verrichtet hat, [ruffete er den fürst Menzickoff und seinen geheimen schreiber auf die seithe zu sich, ertheilte dem ersten befehl in das ohr, dem anderen aber in die feder dictirend. Worauff an den fürsten ein ungemeine traurigkeit verspühret wurde; nachdem aber der schreiber weggegangen sahe man bald darauff die armen arrestanten alß den General Lieutenant Dolgorukii Wassili und seinen bruder Michael der gewesten Tzarin ihren brudern Abraham Lupochin einen bey der höchstselig Cron Prinzessin hernach bey dem Cron Prinzen] vor dessen [abreiß] gewesen [cammerdiener welche der Tzar mit eigener hand geknutet und gepeiniget hat] gleichermassen auch des Cron Prinzen Maitresse mit ihren brudern und] endlich [einen schreiber, welcher die außsag und andere urkund instrumenta für den Major Wolchonski welcher laut meines] allerunterthänigst sub dato den 27 Decembris 1717 jahres [ist archibusiret worden verfälschet und also den menschen unschuldig zum todt gebracht, geschlussen einen nach den anderen, doch so weit voneinander daß keines das andere sehen oder erkennen könnte nach der vestung aus ihren quartiren in welchen sie von zeit an daß sie] aus Moscau zurekgebracht worden, [gesessen seynd in chalouppen über den fluß bringen in die rechte gefängnuß. Des anderen tages frühe rüffete der Tzar den Senator graff Musin Puschkin den Groß Canzler Graff Goloffkin und den geheimen rath Tolstoy und tragete ihnen die scharffe frag und peinigung der arrestanten auff, welche aber solche deprecirten, worüber er sich hefftig erzürnete, die ersten zwey entliesse und dem Tolstoy allein selbte antruge welcher sie dan annamte und mit dem Tzaren fortsetzet da allezeit, so lang es währet, die vestung umher versperrte wird.]" Peter's private "clerk" must have been Makarov, and the "cammerdiener" (valet) was clearly Ivan Afanas'ev-Bol'shoi. Fyodor Voronov was interrogated in the case of Aleksei (RGADA, f. 6, d. 53) and was involved in the Volkonskii affair.

Sometime after returning to Petersburg, Peter formally established the Chancellery of Secret Affairs: Veretennikov, *Istoriia*, 84. V. V. Dolgorukii was again under arrest by 11/22 April: ARSG, 7368 (1718), St. Petersburg, 22 April 1718; St. Petersburg, 6 May 1718 (wedding of Musin-Pushkin's son on 1 May 1718 NS). De Bie knew of the earlier testimony about him, that Aleksei need not stay in a monastery if he went there: ARSG 7397 (Secreta), St. Petersburg, 20 May 1718. The Russian delegation to the peace conference had arrived 30 April/11 May on Åland, the Swedes came a week later: Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 331.

⁴⁶ RGADA, f. 6, d. 54, ll. 10–13v (interrogation of 28 April, 1718). Aleksei's relations with father Iakov had been poor. In a letter to the tsarevich probably from 1714 he complained of verbal abuse and counseled him to imitate the piety of his grandfather Tsar Aleksei. RGADA, f. 6, d. 54, ll. 1–9v [= Pogodin, "Dokumenty," 129–32].

“who sold him [Aleksei] to the Prince [Menshikov].” Naryshkin tried to deny all this, but finally allowed that “he did not remember if he said the words which Ivan Afanas’ev reported, but it may be that he said them from simplicity.” In the summer he was exiled to Riazan’ for “improper words” (*nepristoinye slova*). I. I. Naryshkin had served at the court of Peter’s sister Tsarevna Natal’ia from at least 1711 until her death in 1716, and his words confirm the earlier suggestion in Tsarevna Mariia’s deposition that Natal’ia and her court were at least to some degree sympathetic to Aleksei.⁴⁷ His distant cousin, the new governor of Moscow, Kirill Alekseevich Naryshkin was questioned because he had a letter of I. I. Naryshkin about the tsarevich, but it proved to be old and irrelevant. K. A. Naryshkin was released.⁴⁸ Princess Mariia Alekseevna L’vova, the daughter of Aleksei Sokovnin, the plotter of 1697, was brought in on 29 April. Everlakov had testified that she told Prince Aleksei Gagarin in his house that Petr Tolstoi had made the tsarevich drunk and deceived him. Princess L’vova denied this at first, then allowed that she had heard the words from Kikin’s wife Nadezhda Ivanovna, a relative of hers, and repeated them to Prince Gagarin. Kikina denied ever saying them. The Chancellery did not believe L’vova’s excuses and ultimately she was exiled for her “improper words” to a convent in Ustiug Velikii.⁴⁹ Finally, there was the interrogation of Prince Mikhail Dolgorukii. There were two questions for him, one

⁴⁷ Order to arrest Ivan Naryshkin (18 February 1718): Pogodin, “Dokumenty,” 312 (=RGADA f. 5, d. 26, l. 315). Interrogation of 22 April 1718: “Ivan Naryshkin govarival kak siudy tsarevich priedet videt on tam ne vo vse budet to de on togda uberet svetleishego kniazia s protchimi, chiau de dostanetsia i uchiteliu s rozneiu, chto on ego tsarevicha prodaval.” RGADA, f. 6, d. 59, ll. 1–15v (quotation ll. 2–2v). I. I. Naryshkin was the son of I. I. Naryshkin senior, a *striapchii* in 1676, chamber *stol’nik* of Peter by 1686, an *okol’nichii* in 1689, who died in 1693. I. I. Naryshkin senior was sufficiently closely identified with the Naryshkin faction to be exiled by the musketeers in 1682: Buganov, *Vosstanie . . . 1682*, 52–3, 171; RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10 (1686/7), l. 91. His son I. I. Naryshkin junior (died 1726) was an ordinary *stol’nik* in 1686/87, a chamber *stol’nik* of Peter in 1692–94/5. He still held that rank in 1711 when he was sent to join Prince M. G. Romodanovskii’s regiment in Belgorod at the time of the Prut campaign, but by from 1713 served Tsarevna Natal’ia Alekseevna: RGADA, f. 210, boiarskaia kniga 10 (1686/7), l. 364v; f. 210, op. 2, boiarskii spisok 36 (1694/5), l. 20v; f. 210, op. 2, boiarskii spisok 60 (1713), l. 7; Crummey, *Aristocrats*, 210; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 281 (confusing father and son); *PiB* 11/1, 450. Thus he was part of the old palace apparatus. Lobanov-Rostovskii, *Rodoslovnaia*, II, 6, 8.

⁴⁸ RGADA, f. 6, d. 60, ll. 1–4v.

⁴⁹ RGADA, f. 6, d. 64, ll. 1–21v. The Prince Aleksei Gagarin in question must be Aleksei Matveevich, who married the daughter of baron P. P. Shafirov and was the son of the Siberian governor Prince Matvei Petrovich, executed in 1721 for graft. Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 242.

ultimately stemming from Ivan Afanas'ev's assertion that Dolgorukii had been involved in spreading rumors that Peter had a mistress in Europe. The other was about Avram Lopukhin's report that Dolgorukii told him that there were great burdens on the people and no order. Prince Mikhail denied any knowledge of the mistress story, then and later. On the matter of his words with Lopukhin he was more evasive. He claimed he knew nothing about the flight of the tsarevich and that he was not good friends with Lopukhin. He did remember talking about the burdens on the peasantry with Lopukhin, who asked him why he did not report to Peter about it. Dolgorukii claimed that he replied that the Senate would first have to get reliable information from the provincial governors since the tax rates varied, and that indeed in the provinces there was no order. For the time being the case rested there.⁵⁰

What triggered the new direction seems to have been a deposition from Aleksei's mistress Evfrosin'ia. Peter had long been suspicious of his son's contacts in Russia and asked her a series of questions about Aleksei's activity in Austria and Italy: who wrote to him, whom he praised and on whom he counted, and which of the bishops he praised. Her answer was that the tsarevich did not tell her very much. He did receive news that there would be a revolt in the army (probably Pleyer's report of such rumors). He thought "everyone" tried to do him evil except Shafirov and Tolstoi but that he would return "with joy." He wrote to at least two bishops and was glad that the Senate obstructed Peter's measures. "He had hope in the senators, but who in particular he did not say." When she tried to ask him who his friends were in Russia, she received a rude answer. He complained that his father had made him stand in the cold when ships were launched and deprived him of his inheritance. She also told Peter that his son said that when he was the tsar, then he would live in Moscow and St. Petersburg would be an ordinary city; he would abandon the ships and not keep any, he would just keep enough of an army for defense and have no wars. He expected a revolt in St. Petersburg momentarily, and when he read in newsletters that St. Petersburg was quiet, he interpreted the news as favorable: everyone was just waiting. If Peter died his wife would

⁵⁰ RGADA, f. 6, d. 62, ll. 1–6v; Pogodin, "Dokumenty," 314 (Peter to ADM, 11/22 March 1718, order to arrest Prince M. V. Dolgorukii); Bodleian French d. 35, St Petersburg, 18/29 March 1718 (arrest of Prince M. V. Dolgorukii).

come to power, making Russia a “woman’s kingdom” (*bab’e tsarstvo*), and the country would divide between himself and her son.⁵¹

Aleksei’s deposition on 12 May said little about his general goals and stuck to the detailed charges, and here he denied much of what Evfrosin’ia had said. He claimed that he did not write to any bishops directly, only general letters to be delivered to them secretly. He did complain about his father. He confirmed the words which his mistress had reported about the Senate, but then immediately claimed that he had no hope in anyone in particular. He admitted to seeing Pleyer’s letter sent to him with notes from Schönborn, but claimed the emperor’s secretary made him write to the Senate and bishops. Some of the statements attributed to him he asserted were correct, but he had just forgotten to mention them, others he denied or claimed that he had said them while drunk. He admitted to criticizing Archimandrite Feodosii Ianovskii (Alexandro-Nevskii Monastery) for allowing Peter and the people not to observe the fasts. He admitted that he said, “Two men in the world are like God, the Pope of Rome and the Moscow tsar, they do what they want,” but denied the comment about the tsar referred to “one man” (obviously his father) and claimed it referred to all of them.⁵²

Two days later Aleksei began to open up, mainly about his relations with the bishops. He first admitted again that he did count on the Senate but would not name names. He denied having any particular relations with Stefan Iavorskii, but did admit that he had heard of the 1712 sermon while he was in Pomerania, and had later obtained a copy of it from Peter’s secretary Makarov. He claimed Tsarevna Mariia told him about the visions of the monk Iisus, and also, he heard from Prince Boris Alekseevich [= Golitsyn] to the effect that his mother would return from Suzdal’. He had tried not to incriminate the senators or the bishops too much, mindful of the fate of the bishop of Tambov and the Talitskii affair. Aleksei’s contacts had also told him that Talitskii had been a clever fellow,

⁵¹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 498–501 (=RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, ll. 71–74v, 164–71). Ustrialov conjectured that the undated deposition from Evfrosin’ia was made in February, but the more logical date is April, for the first results of the new turn in the investigation were Aleksei’s responses to her information on 12 May. In *delo* 32 the questions to Evfrosin’ia and her answers are still included with material from Aleksei’s deposition of 12 May 1718. Pleyer recorded the fact of her interrogation only in early May: HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 9/20 May 1718. De Bie also reported that Evfrosin’ia was brought to Petersburg in late April: ARSG 7368 (1718), St. Petersburg, 29 April 1718.

⁵² Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 501–05.

even if he had been caught. The tsarevich had borrowed books from Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn in Kiev, who told him that the Kievan monks loved him. Stefan Iavorskii also sent him his *Kamen' very* through Fyodor Polikarpov, but that was Aleksei's idea: he had already read a copy obtained from Musin-Pushkin and wanted his own. Aleksei also began to implicate the great men of the court and state. He reported that B. P. Sheremetev told him to have an informant at court, otherwise he would never know what was happening. Prince Boris Kurakin warned him in Pomerania (in 1712) that when Ekaterina had a son of her own she would not be kind to Aleksei. He reported sympathetic words from Semen Naryshkin and Musin-Pushkin.⁵³

It was the interrogation of 16 May that opened the floodgates. On that day he began to name names, and they included most of the ruling elite. Aleksei admitted that he counted on the Senate and particularly on Prince Iakov Dolgorukii because he thought that if Peter died when his brother Petr Petrovich was a child, then Menshikov would be the regent. Dolgorukii and the others would prefer to be under him, Aleksei, than under Menshikov, one of their own. Prince Iakov Dolgorukii had always been kind to Aleksei, so he counted on him when he returned. Even more, Aleksei reported that on the eve of his flight he had whispered to Prince Iakov, "Do not abandon me." The prince replied, "I am always glad, but do not say any more, the others are looking at us." Aleksei knew that Prince Iakov was on bad terms with Menshikov, and the tsarevich expected that all the other Dolgorukiis would support him.

Aleksei had hope in the other senators and ministers, Golovkin, Shafirov, Petr Tolstoi, Admiral Apraksin and his brother the Senator Petr Apraksin, Musin-Pushkin, Tikhon Streshnev "and others," all out of jealousy of Menshikov. At the very least they would make him regent for his brother instead of Menshikov. He also counted on Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn, who told him that he would always be a faithful servant. Prince Dmitrii's brother Mikhail, the general, was also a friend to Aleksei. There were more concrete plans.

During my flight, at that time [General R.] Bauer was with his corps in Poland, he was also a friend to me and if after the death of my father (which I expected to be soon from hearing that he was seriously ill from epilepsy, and they said on that account that if the disease occurs in

⁵³ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 505–09 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, ll. 172–76v).

someone advanced in years, they do not live long, and for that reason I thought that it would be much if his life lasted a year or two) I went from the Habsburg lands to Poland, and from Poland with Bauer to the Ukraine, then there would be Prince Dmitrii [Golitsyn] and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Ioannikii Seniutovich] who was to me and to him a spiritual father and friend. And the whole Ukraine believes in the archimandrite and the monastery, as in God, also the metropolitan of Kiev [Ioasaf Krovovskii] is known to me, then all would join me.

I expected that in Moscow all the bishops and Tsarevna Mariia would join me.

And in the Finland corps Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich [Golitsyn] and in Riga Prince Petr Alekseevich [Golitsyn] is also a friend and would not desert his own.

And so all the border with Europe would be mine and all would accept me without any opposition, although not directly as sovereign, certainly as regent.

And in the main army Boris Petrovich [Sheremetev] and many of the officers are friends to me.

And about the simple people, I have heard from many that they love me.

Also I expected, though without great confidence, that Tsaritsa Praskov'ia would be inclined toward me, knowing that she is very good to me.

Also I hoped for the late prince-caesar [Prince F. Iu. Romodanovskii] and pope [Nikita Zotov], as on friends.

With all this he denied that he planned to come back to lead such a revolt while his father was still alive. He also denied that he had communicated any of his plans to any of the people he named, except the metropolitan of Kiev, to whom he wrote from Naples. He also now admitted that his contacts with Stefan Iavorskii had not been as formal as he had previously maintained, for Stefan had once told him to take care of himself, for "they" (presumably the clergy) would not permit Peter a second wife and an heir was needed. Peter then questioned his son again, asking if he had discussed rebellion with anyone. The answer was no, with Iakov Dogorukii and others he only discussed the burdens of the people. He specifically denied that when he heard about the possible revolt in the army in Mecklenburg, he had intended to join them while Peter was alive. He expected that his father would die, and he would be called.⁵⁴

Peter now had two crucial sets of facts. One was that his son had counted on widespread discontent with Menshikov to push most of

⁵⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 509–14 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, ll. 177–84).

the ruling elite in St. Petersburg into Aleksei's camp. The group on which the tsarevich counted essentially fell into two subgroups. One was the Senate, which every diplomat since 1714 had seen as locked in struggle with Menshikov. Coming along with them were other Dolgorukiis not in the Senate, that is Prince V. V. Dolgorukii, Menshikov's archrival. Outside the capital Aleksei clearly counted on the army, not only on Sheremetev and Prince M. Golitsyn but also on General Bauer. Bauer was even more critical because it was his corps which Aleksei counted on to begin the revolt that he so clearly planned. Von Loss had recently named Bauer as someone in whom confidence could be maintained on the subject of Aleksei, so this was not a fantasy. Of the other army commanders, Sheremetev had been a rival for years, and was still known for oppositional views. The Ukraine played a major role in Aleksei's plans, though not the Ukrainian cossack emigration, the Mazepists, or the cossack nobility of the hetmanate, but the church and Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn, the governor of Kiev. Finally, Aleksei expected Apraksin, Golovkin, Shafirov, and Petr Tolstoi to support him out of pure jealousy of Menshikov.

The one question that remained was the one on which Peter naturally insisted: did Aleksei plan a revolt while his father was still alive? The son tried to maintain that he had expected his father to die of natural causes, but that information was contradicted by his excitement at the news from Pleyer of an expected revolt in Mecklenburg. Peter did not put it explicitly in his question to Aleksei, but it is obvious that if a revolt did break out in 1717 in the Russian army in Mecklenburg and Aleksei joined or led it, he would be moving against his father who was then still alive. Further, Peter did not know the exact content of Aleksei's conversations with the Imperial court or with Sweden, but in neither case was there any talk of waiting for Peter's death. The plans implied in that conversation indeed suggested that an army marching from either the Habsburg lands or Sweden would not find much opposition from either Bauer's corps in Poland or Prince Mikhail Golitsyn's in Finland. Peter's suspicion seems not unfounded. The evidence suggests that his son hoped for a revolt to occur soon, from which he would benefit if not lead, and that such a revolt would be directed at the tsar, not at Menshikov as regent after Peter's death.

With all this evidence accumulated, Peter could have gone on with the investigation to find out further details, and to see if he could

confirm all of Aleksei's allegations. At first it seems as if he did, though the Russian records for the period 16 May to 13 June are silent. From Russian records the only new investigation of importance was that of the Ukrainian church. On 19 May, Peter ordered Bogdan Grigor'evich Skorniakov-Pisarev to go to Kiev, seize and seal Metropolitan Ioasaf's papers and bring him to St. Petersburg. A few days later Tolstoi ordered him to bring along Archimandrite Ioannikii Seniutovich as well. As the metropolitan had been central to Aleksei's plans, this could have been a crucial new element, but the metropolitan was old and ill and died *en route* in Tver' on 1 July, after seeing Field Marshal Sheremetev in Moscow.⁵⁵ Pleyer knew about the arrest of Metropolitan Ioasaf, but he also reported that many others already in prison had been recently tortured and that the estates of Prince Vasiliĭ Dolgorukii already had been confiscated and his household broken up. There was a rumor that Dolgorukii could have commanded the loyalty of 2,000 of the guards and 10,000 soldiers in the army. Peter went on a Sunday to one of his country houses with Aleksei and had Evfrosin'ia brought out to them and questioned her again. At the very end of May, Pleyer was able to report that more noblemen had been arrested and brought to the fortress and that the whole army was implicated.⁵⁶ The only case of a new arrest in the records of the Chancellery of Secret Affairs, besides that of Metropolitan Ioasaf, is that of Prince Ivan L'vov. He was arrested because of correspondence found among the papers of the tsarevich that mentioned him, but he explained that it concerned

⁵⁵ RGADA, f. 6, d. 75/1, ll. 291–358. Ioasaf signed as a witness to Sheremetev's will while in Moscow in late June: Zaozerskii, *Fel'dmarshal*, 148–9. Sheremetev, it will be remembered, had many connections in Kiev.

⁵⁶ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 19/30 May 1718: "Sonsten [fähret man noch immer mit der inquisition allhier fort und seynd die arme arrestanten diese wochen widerumb grausamb gepeiniget worden, des fürst und general lieutenant von der Armée und obrister lieutenant von der garde Dolgorukii ligende güter seynd] schon [confisciret, das silber und meubles geschätzt und versiglet, die bediente, welche] schon bey jahren frey gelassen, die jüngere aber zu soldaten] genommen. [Anjezo die arrestanten auch auf die Miliz außsagen und bey denen leib regimentern zwey tausend bey der armée aber] schon [zehn tausend man auf des fürst Dolgoruki winck parat in faveur des Cron Prinzens waren.] Es [sollen vierzig mann davon eingezogen seyn.] . . . Verwichen sonntag, alß der Tzar des vorigen tages auf ein lusthauß verreiset, und den Cron Prinzen welchen er niehmal weit von sich lasset, mit sich genommen hatte, lassete er auch dessen Maitresse auß der vestung hir in ein verdeckten chalouppen dahin bringen beyde vor sich name und selbst von allen unterfragete in geheimb.] nach dem aber [sie widerumb hierauff in die vestung schikete.]" This was the first of Pleyer's dispatches which the Russians intercepted and copied: RGADA, f. 32 (Austrian affairs), 1718, d. 13, ll. 8–12.

the prince's liturgical compositions made when he was in Amsterdam in 1711. This statement was accepted and he was freed.⁵⁷

There is no record of any other arrest in Russian sources, but that may have been the result of a change of direction on Peter's part. The Dutch resident de Bie reported that V. V. Dolgorukii had been put to torture and that:

I have been told in confidence that the first gentleman [= VVD] has been tortured twice and that his confession has disturbed his majesty and made him doubt whether it would not be better to cease investigating the abyss of intrigues and projects, the more since now it is supposed to have been found that the general [= VVD] has sowed dangerous sentiments in the corps of guards . . .⁵⁸

De Bie told Pleyer that he had heard from one of his confidants that Peter realized that this business would never end and told Tsaritsa Ekaterina (who had been begging him to stop and not make himself hated by the people and cause a revolt) that he would either have to exterminate the Moscow lords and the clergy or gradually let the whole thing die down and quietly exile the prisoners. He could find nothing among them to suggest that they had planned to kill him, only that they planned to wait until his death and put Aleksei on the throne rather than Petr Petrovich. Aleksei remained under strong guard, though not yet in the fortress.⁵⁹ A few days later a note was

⁵⁷ RGADA, f. 6, d. 63, ll. 1–1v (26 May 1718). Prince L'vov was arrested later in June after Aleksei's death as a result of new testimony from Avram Lopukhin. See also ARSG 7397 (Secreta), 4 July 1718, St. Petersburg (Prince L'vov, earlier arrested and freed, was arrested again and found guilty).

⁵⁸ ARGS 7397 (Secreta), St. Petersburg, 3 June 1718, "Men heeft al een begin gemaakt met het verkopen der mobilien van den Luitent. General Knees Dolgorucki en zulk sal ook met die van syn broeder en die van den Heer Lopouchin geschieden: My is in vertrouwen gesegt dat de eerste Heer tweemaal is gepyniget en dat syne confessie S. Cz. Mt. heeft ontsen en in twyffel gebragt of niet beeter soude syn op te houden met het ondersoeken van desen afgrondt van intrigues en projecten, te meer dewyle nu soude hebben bevonden, dat die General onder syn corps van de Guardes gevaarlyke sentimenten hadde gesaayt, weswegens al eeniege Soldaten van het zelve vast syn geset, en waarlyk niets kan gevaarlyker syn als een opstant onder dat corps in t'welk seer veel adel is en welkers voorbeelt by de andre militieen veel ingres soude vinden. Zulk oordeele de reederen te syn, waaromme men segt dat die drie Heeren in stilte in ballingschap syn gesonden, andersinten twyffel met of souden wreek? tot voorbeelt opentlyk syn gestraft geworden." The story in St. Petersburg was that Dolgorukii had heard his sentence read by two Senators, that his goods had already been confiscated, and that he would be exiled to Siberia or even Novaya Zemlia: TKUA Rusland B50, 2/13 June 1718, St. Petersburg. Russian sources do not confirm the torture of V. V. Dolgorukii.

⁵⁹ HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 30 May/10 June 1718 (= RGADA, f. 32, 1718, d. 13, ll. 19–27v): "hat [mir der holländische resident] gesaget, [das er von einem seiner besten vertrauten gehöret, weilen der Zar sehe, daß] er [in dieser sache zu] keinen [end kommen kan, und] er [entweder] alle [Moscowitische herrn und die ganzen

On Saturday, 14 June 1718, Peter assembled the Senate, the ministers of state, other officers and officials, and the clergy for a church service to pray for aid from the Holy Ghost. Then he took them to the Senate building and announced to them the crimes of his son. He brought in a box of letters as evidence and asked them to judge him and pronounce sentence. Needless to say, among them were dozens of men implicated by the tsarevich in his depositions. It is not known if Peter communicated to them, formally or informally, the content of Aleksei's most recent confessions. Peter left the windows of the building open, and the diplomats picked up the

Ekaterina was also pregnant again and thus might have another son in place of the sickly Petr Petrovich. Among other considerations, she had reason to hope for a compromise once Aleksei was officially removed from the succession so as to guarantee a calmer future for her children: TKUA Rusland B50, 14/15 April 1718, St. Petersburg.

⁶⁰ RGADA, f. 32, 1718, d. 13, ll. 44–46v; 20 June 1718, St. Petersburg: “[Es seid unlängst bey des Cron Prinz quartier vor denen fenstern ausgeworfene zetulen gefonden worden worinen geschriben das zwar das ganze land und volk für ihn stehe dennoch aber weder er noch des Zaren kleiner prinz dermahleins den thron besteigen sondern sein kleiner prinz allein der erb sein] solte, [worauf der Cron Prinz alsbald in die vestung gebracht worden alwo anjezo ein commern von holz für ihn aufgebauet werden vermuthlich ihn darinnen lebenslang eingesperet zu halten und sonderlich darumb weilen man solte erfahren haben als solte er fast ein mittel parat gehabt haben widerumb zu echappiren. Übrigens] so [verspüret man(?) allenthalben eine grosse bitterung der nation das es gewis an nichts als an einen anführer fehlet] so [würde alles in völlige aufruhr ausbrechen . . .” Tsarevna Mariia now in Schlüsselburg, Evdokiia somewhere near Staraia Ladoga and in a convent. TKUA Rusland B50: 6/17 June 1718, St. Petersburg (AP has not been at court or in the churches for some time, yesterday taken to the fortress under guard).

charges that Aleksei had planned a rebellion which would end in Peter's death.⁶¹

Three days later, on 17 June, Peter brought Aleksei before the Senate again. The official report gave only a brief account of Aleksei's testimony which appeared very limited in content. The tsarevich repeated the information that he had which implicated Avram Lopukhin in contacts with Pleyer over his flight to Vienna. Then he took aside Menshikov, Shafirov, Tolstoi, and I. I. Buturlin and told them that "he had hopes in those people who loved the old ways like Tikhon Nikitich (Streshnev)" [*imel on nadezhdu na tekhn liudei kotorye starinu liubiat tak, kak Tikhon Nikitich*]. He had also derived hope from the words of Prince Vasili Dolgorukii, who said to him that he was cleverer than his father, that his father was clever, but did not know people. "You," said Dolgorukii, "will know clever people better." He heard from others that Dolgorukii had cursed the tsar obscenely, but he did not hear it himself. He had always counted on the people (*narod*) and on Stefan Iavorskii after his sermon of 1712. That was all, though he referred also to a "first letter" which the Senators had seen.⁶²

The diplomats had a fuller story. Pleyer reported that Peter wept and again ordered the windows left open and the depositions and letters of the prisoners read out, with the common people listening in the street. Peter brought Aleksei forward and announced that his son had violated the oath he swore in Moscow the previous February to tell the truth and had been planning for a long time to carry out his plans. Aleksei then fell at his feet and begged for mercy. When the tsarevich could stand it no longer he stood up and accused Peter of ignoring his own flesh and blood, said that the tsar had not brought him up properly as an heir, never considered him the heir and raised

⁶¹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 515–17; Bodleian French d.35, ff. 128–29v, 16/27 June 1718, St. Petersburg (discovery that Aleksei plotted against his father's life); HHStA Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 27 June 1718 NS (brief account of the assembly of nobles and clergy to judge Aleksei). TKUA Rusland B50: 16/27 June 1718, St. Petersburg (clergy convoked for trial). ARSG 7397 (Secreta): 27 June 1718, St. Petersburg (Assembly on 14/25 June; church service; in the Senate Peter had papers from the investigation read and left the windows open. They showed a plot against Peter's life. Aleksei begged for his life, and Peter turned over the case to the clergy).

⁶² Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 517–18 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, ll. 99–100, 105, 186–88) (AP's deposition before the Senate, 17 June 1718). The only previous "letter" in the file is the deposition of 14 May 1718, where he named some important figures such as Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn and Sheremetev, but the information about them was still fairly bland. It is possible that Peter did not give the Senate the deposition of 16 May, where Aleksei had named them all and many more.

up lesser men who thought him a fool and a knave. Peter then asked him on whom he had counted, and Aleksei replied,

the whole country is with me, no one excepted, and I see that for you it is a matter of my life, and if you call me a thief, a rogue, and a murderer, I want to be one, and I am one and I will gladly die, but see what happens to you after my death.

Peter looked at the bishops and said, “who is amazed with me, and sees how stubborn he still is?” Aleksei seemed to be despairing and Peter took him and kissed him, a gesture which Pleyer believed to be the Russian form of a farewell. Peter then turned him over to the clergy and the ministers for sentence. De Bie thought nothing like it had been seen in Europe since the story of Don Carlos and Philip II.⁶³

After the trial talk of new arrests and suspicions continued to spread. The news circulated of the arrest of Metropolitan Ioasaf in

⁶³ RGADA f. 32, 1718, d. 13, ll. 51–55v [lacking in HHStA]: St. Petersburg, 8 July 1718, “Verwichenen sonabend wurden alle russische herrn und die hohe geistlichkeit auch die officir in den senat beruffen dahin auch der prinz in einer carosse aus der festung under begleitung einer officir und gemeinen wacht gebracht wurde da der zar in des prinzen gegenwart alle gefundene brieffe ablesen lassen darzu alle fenster offnen und dem gemeinen volk zu zuhören befolchen hat und dabey bitterlich geweinet darauf den Prinz fürgestaltet daß er ihm noch [in Moscau und alhier nun unlängst geschworen und die heilige abendmahl darauf empfangen] habe, [daß er nichts mehrers wuste als was er] schon ausgesaget jez aber widerumb betrogen falsch geschworen sondern die] schon [längst meditiertes verdambliches vorhaben von neuen zu ausführen getrachtet habe worauf der prinz seinen vattern mit thränen zu füßen gefahlen und umb gnad gebeten als er aber solche nicht mehrer halten können stunde er auf vol zorn und grim und hielte dem vattern für daß ungeachtet er sein fleisch und blut sey er den]noch [ihn niemahl] als sein kind und einzigen erb getractirt oder als einen prinzen auffgeführt zur unterweisung nicht wie] es [sich gehörete gehalten und niemahlen geliebet entgegen andere gerinde menschen ihm fürgezogen groß und mächtig gemacht welche ihn] nur [für einen narren und knecht gehalten und seiner gespottet hätten derowegen er solche unbild nicht mehr ertragen können sondern auch einmahl zeigen wolen wer er wäre und da ihn der Zar nochmal fraget auf wen er sich dan verlasse und wer mit ihm] noch [verwicklet wäre saget er daß ganz reich] ist [mit mir und kein mensch ausgenommen in sehe auch woll daß] es [dir umb mein leben zu thun] ist [und heisset mich einen dieb schelm und mörder ich wil] es [auch sein und ich bin] es [und wil gern sterben aber sehe zu wie] es [dir nach meinen todt ergehen wird woryber der Zar gleichsamb ganz erstaunend zu denen bischöffen sich gewendet und gesaget hat wer wundert euch mit mir und sehet wie trotzig er] noch [ist der prinz stellte sich aber als desperat warauf der Zar ihn namb und küsete welches alhier bey denen Moscoviten daß vale ist] und ybergabe ihn dem senat und großen geistlichkeit . . .” Bodleian French d. 35, ff. 130–31v, St. Petersburg, 20 June/1 July 1718 (astonishment at Aleksei’s lack of repentance). ARSG 7397 (Secreta): 4 July 1718, St. Petersburg (another description of the trial on 17/29 June; Peter listed Aleksei’s crimes, Aleksei with “standvastigheyt” agreed that he wanted to start a rebellion against Peter, and asserted that the whole land supported him, analogy with Don Carlos and Philip II). TKUA Rusland B50: 18 June/1 July 1718 [sic], St. Petersburg (trial of AP in Senate chamber, his condemnation, his “assez grande fermeté”).

Kiev. Sheremetev, it was believed, was also to be arrested. Pleyer reported (correctly) that Aleksei had named Sheremetev as a sympathizer, and also that the field marshal admitted that Aleksei had written to him that he, the tsarevich, wanted to change the current form of government, to bring religion and the laws back to their state before Peter had changed them, to help the great families and remove the burdens on the land. Sheremetev then told him that he would need an informant at court. Once again, Pleyer's contacts with the Sheremetev family came through. His report on Aleksei's statements on Sheremetev was so exact as to be almost a quotation from the depositions of 14 and 16 May. Suspicion had also fallen on Prince Boris Kurakin, Peter's emissary in Holland, because of a letter he had recently written to Avram Lopukhin, his own as well as Peter's brother-in-law.⁶⁴ Peter no longer pursued these threads, preferring to ignore them. As Westphalen put it:

Finally the number of those who would want the crown of Russia to remain in the line of the eldest prince [= AP] is so great that it will be necessary that the tsar take the part of dissimulation in relation to many people unless he would wish to cut off the heads of all his clergy and his old nobility.⁶⁵

Events demonstrated that Peter followed precisely this policy.

In the week that followed Aleksei's testimony before the Senate

⁶⁴ RGADA, f. 32, 1718, d. 13, ll. 53v–55, St. Petersburg [27 June]/8 July 1718, "[Es seind auch nicht allein dieser tagen wiederumb einige von neuen eingezogen sondern wiederumb mehrere naher Moskau und andere plazen geschicket worden selbte anhero zu bringen und wird für gewis gesaget daß der erzbischoff von Kioff mit anderen fürnembten geistlichen mehr und [?] feldmarschall Scheremetoff auch anhero gebracht worden welche alle mitimpliciret und von den letztern der prinz auf befragen ob auch dieser etwas davon wuste soll bekenet haben in] so [weit wuste derselbe davon da ere der prinz ihm zugeschriben hätte wie er in sin häte die jezige regimentsform umbzukehren und] so [woll seiner vorältern religion und reichs gesäze welche sein vater ganz umbkehre wiederumb in den alten stand zu bringen denen familien emporzuhelffen und die grossen trängnussen des land abzuschaffen was ihm davon deuchte worauf er soll geantwortete haben wofern er dieses thun wolte] so [musste er sich umb einen vertrauten getreuen und klugen menschen umbsehen welcher alle zeit umb den Zarn wäre auf all sein thun und lassen acht gebe ihm fleissig von allen berichte und er also sein tempo absehen muste." Weber had reported Kurakin out of danger earlier: Bodleian French d. 35, St. Petersburg, 3 June 1718, ff. 114–15v. De Bie confirmed that "Velt Marschalk Czeremetoff niet gehell buyten de zaak is" and the metropolitan of Kiev was to be brought a prisoner to the capital: ARGS 7397 (Secreta), St. Petersburg, 4 July 1718. Similarly Westphalen: TKUA Rusland B50: 23 June/4 July 1718, St. Petersburg (suspicion falls on Sheremetev and Kurakin). Sheremetev was genuinely afraid he would be arrested and asked Fyodor Apraksin and Menshikov to help him; Zaozerskii, *Fel'dmarshal*, 146–9, 214–15.

⁶⁵ TKUA Rusland B50; 27 June/8 July 1718, St. Petersburg: "[Enfin le nombre de ceux là qui voudroient que la Couronne de la Russie reste dans la Ligne du Prince aîné est si grande qu'il faudroit bien qui il Czar prenne la partie de dissimuler à l'égard de bien de gens à moins qu'il ne volut couper le cou à tout son clergé et à sa vieille noblesse]".

the interrogations resumed but with an extremely narrow focus. On 19 June both Avram Lopukhin and Aleksei's confessor Iakov Ignat'ev were interrogated. For Lopukhin the questions focussed exclusively on his relations with Pleyer. He denied that he and Pleyer had ever visited one another in their houses, but did admit to meeting him once on the street. He admitted that he had told Pleyer that he hoped they would not keep him in Austria, that people in Russia sympathized with Aleksei and that there might be some disturbances. He denied more specific words about a rebellion. He also reported that he had a conversation with one Kanbar Akin'ev, a *landrat* in the Kazan' province, who told him that Prince Iakov Dolgorukii wept so much he shook at the plight of the tsarevich. The next day he repeated the same deposition before the Senate, omitting the part about Prince Iakov Dolgorukii, who was presumably sitting there in the chamber.⁶⁶

The revelations from Father Iakov Ignat'ev were more serious for Aleksei. Aleksei had confessed that he had told Father Iakov that he wished for his father's death. Iakov was then unfrocked (*rasstrizhen*) so that he could be interrogated, and confirmed the story. Aleksei had told him in confession that he wished for his father's death and Iakov had as well. He added that people called Aleksei the "hope of Russia."⁶⁷ Aleksei's servant Fyodor Dubrovskii, speaking before the Senate on 19 June as well, admitted that he had indeed told Aleksei that Peter had epilepsy, but that he got the idea from the late Metropolitan Iov of Novgorod (died 1716). He also reported from his own personal knowledge that the Old Ritualist peasants living on Aleksei's estates loved him. He repeated all this after thirteen blows, and then on 24 June (after twenty-five blows) at the confrontation with the tsarevich confirmed all of Aleksei's testimony about Stefan Iavorskii, adding on his own that he told the tsarevich that Stefan "was entirely yours."⁶⁸

The most important of the accused interrogated after the appearance of Aleksei before the Senate was Prince V. V. Dolgorukii. Alone

⁶⁶ RGADA, f. 6, d. 47, ll. 18v–22v. In addition to Akin'ev, Lopukhin implicated Prince Ivan L'vov. He also denied having correspondence with Aleksei or knowing of the flight. The latter statement was clearly a lie. Too many people testified to his knowledge, and indeed in his own testimony he confessed to knowing of the fact from Pleyer. Akin'ev was interrogated only in July: RGADA, f. 6, d. 65, ll. 377–87. TKUA Rusland B50; 23 June/4 July 1718, St. Petersburg (Lopukhin, Ignat'ev put to the question).

⁶⁷ RGADA, f. 6, d. 54 (Iakov Ignat'ev), 14–15v (19 June 1718).

⁶⁸ RGADA, f. 6, d. 46 (Fyodor Dubrovskii), ll. 16–17v.

of the men of the ruling elite whom Aleksei had named he was reinterrogated on 21 June. The Chancellery confronted the tsarevich and Prince Dolgorukii, inquiring about all of Aleksei's statements, including one that Prince V. V. Dolgorukii had been among those "who loved the old ways." The prince admitted that everything Aleksei had said about him was true, except for the statement that Peter did not like clever people. He had not said that. Two days later the prince asked for mercy, alleging that he did in fact tell the tsarevich to send Peter a letter abdicating the succession. It was not only he who asked for mercy. Some time that year his cousin Prince Iakov Dolgorukii also petitioned Peter for mercy for the two brothers, Princes Vladimir and Mikhail (the senator) Dolgorukii. Prince Iakov asked the tsar not to allow such a disgrace to fall on the Dolgorukii clan. He cited their services back to the events of 1682, when Dolgorukiis were murdered by the rebellious musketeers for their loyalty to Peter. Again in 1689 he and his cousins had joined Peter at the Trinity Monastery. When Metropolitan Stefan had preached the subversive sermon of 1712, Prince Iakov had reproved him for his deed. Evidently the appeal worked, for both Vladimir and Mikhail were sentenced only to exile.⁶⁹

The official transcript of the interrogations of Aleksei himself for 19 and 24 June included some of this material. He was asked a whole series of detailed questions about his statements in the 16 May deposition, and on the 19 June he asserted that all his statements about the senators and others were true. He added the comment about telling Father Iakov about wishing his father's death, the comment that led to the interrogation of Father Iakov that day. Aleksei received twenty-five blows. On 24 June he made the statement about Dubrovskii's report of Metropolitan Stefan's favor toward the tsarevich (which led to Dubrovskii's interrogation that day) and also admitted that he had written to Metropolitan Ioasaf in Kiev asking him to start a rebellion in Ukraine. That day Aleksei received only fifteen blows at his first statement, but another twenty-five at the confrontation with Dubrovskii, and yet another nine at a

⁶⁹ Prince V. V. Dolgorukii was exiled on 5 July 1718, to Solikamsk. RGADA, f. 6, d. 55, ll. 16–19v (omitted in Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI). Letter of Prince Iakov Dolgorukii: Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 492–4 (= RGADA, f. 9, otd. I, op. 2, d. 58, ll. 570–70v). De Bie thought that the investigation of Prince V. V. Dolgorukii had been crucial in establishing the extent of Aleksei's support: ARSG 7397 (Secreta), 4 July 1718, St. Petersburg (letters found in the clothes of V. V. Dolgorukii showed the extent of the conspiracy throughout Russia).

reinterrogation of Father Iakov on the same day. None of them caused him to change his story. The official transcript of Aleksei's interrogation from 19–26 June omitted the confrontation with Prince V. V. Dolgorukii on 21 June.⁷⁰

After the interrogations on 19 June Peter was now satisfied of his son's guilt, and three days later he ordered Petr Tolstoi to go that day, after dinner, and ask Aleksei some questions, "not for the investigation, just for knowledge." The questions were very simple: why had he disobeyed his father and been so fearless of the consequences of disobedience? Aleksei replied that the origin had been in bad education. As a boy he had stayed with his mother, his tutor Nikifor Viazemskii, and Aleksei and Vasili (Fyodorovich) Naryshkin. From them he learned nothing but "peasant games" (*izbnye zabavy*), and by the time his father took him in hand and tried to bring him up as the son of a tsar, he was already spoiled. He could not learn well, and he was already practiced in hypocrisy. Then came Kikin, who merely put in motion what was already there in his soul. His lack of fear came from the same poor character. The rest was understandable. If the emperor had kept his promise to give him an army to overthrow Peter, he would have done it.⁷¹

On 24 June, the day of the last interrogation of Aleksei under torture, the Senate and the assembled officers and officials met to consider the sentence. Six days earlier the clergy had submitted their opinion, one wholly evasive, concluding that the Old Testament mandated punishment under the law and the New Testament mercy, and it was for others to chose. The grandees made no such evasions. They summarized the evidence for Aleksei's guilt and pronounced the sentence of death, turning the case over to Peter for the final decision. They then signed it, beginning with Menshikov, including virtually every person whom Aleksei had named as his supporter (except for the brothers V. V. and M. V. Dolgorukii, who were still in prison), that is, Streshnev, Musin-Pushkin, Samarin, Prince Iakov Dolgorukii, Petr Apraksin, Golovkin, Shafirov, Princes Dmitrii Mikhailovich, and Petr Alekseevich Golitsyn, and several Shermetev relatives of the field marshal, absent from the capital.⁷² Aleksei's supporters had abandoned him.

⁷⁰ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 523–27 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, ll. 113–31v).

⁷¹ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 527–29 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, ll. 133–36v).

⁷² Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 529–36; TKUA Rusland B50: 30 June/11 July 1718 (sentence of death on 24 June/5 July, announced next day, Wednesday).

The next day, 25 June, an official account of the interrogations, trial, and sentence appeared in print as a manifesto of the tsar. The document quoted many of the crucial interrogations *in extenso* and verbatim, but there were also omissions. Little appeared in the testimony about Peter's sister, Mariia Alekseevna, and most of the statements from Aleksei or others about the Senate and the aristocracy were also excluded. Some material remained, but the official version now made permanent in print gave the impression that the guilty parties were only the tsarevich, a few of his servants, Kikin, Avram Lopukhin, and some lesser folk. While the document repeated Aleksei's testimony about the military help offered him by Karl VI, the extent of Russian aristocratic and elite sympathy did not appear, and with the public approval of Aleksei's guilt and death sentence by that same elite, the manifesto gave an entirely false impression of the affair.⁷³ Thus began a legend of the case of the tsarevich as a family drama of Peter and his son with only secondary political overtones inside Russia.

The same day Peter sent Skorniakov-Pisarev to Aleksei to ask him about his excerpts from Baronio's history of the church: what were they for? The answer was that they were just for himself, he made them in Karlsbad in 1714 and showed them only to Viazemskii. They were not made to spread among the people. That was the last question.⁷⁴ The sentence of death was announced to the tsarevich, presumably by Skorniakov-Pisarev as well. One of Pleyer's confidants reported to him that the effect of the news was so great that the tsarevich suffered a stroke in the night and was rumored to have died from that or perhaps from other causes. He did not die yet but on the next day, Friday, 26 June, the end was clearly coming. It was a sunny day with a light wind, and Peter assembled the Senate, clergy, general officers, and the guards and told them that Aleksei was dying, and took them all to the fortress to assist his son with their prayers. They arrived about four o'clock in the afternoon. As Pleyer closed his letter to Vienna, a long letter which the Russians intercepted and never allowed to leave St. Petersburg, he received the news that couriers had been sent to Kurakin and also to Prince Dolgorukii in Denmark as accomplices of the tsarevich. The next

⁷³ Russian text: *Ob''iavlenie rozysknogo dela i suda po ukazu ego tsarskogo velichestva na tsarevicha Alekseia Petrovicha . . . sego Iunia v 25 den' 1718 vydano*, n.p.; German text: Weber, *Rußland*, I, 258–304.

⁷⁴ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 536–37 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 32, l. 138).

day was the anniversary of Poltava, which Peter celebrated by going to the evening service at the Trinity church.⁷⁵

The official notice of Aleksei's death recorded in the papers of the Chancellery of Secret Affairs gave the time of death as seven o'clock in the evening of 26 June, giving no cause and going on to describe the funeral four days later. The turnout was large, and those whom Aleksei had named as his supporters and who had signed his death sentence followed him to the grave, led by their chief rival, Aleksandr Menshikov, the prince of Ingria.⁷⁶ Among the stories that immediately began to spread, the official one that he had died of apoplexy and the unofficial stories that he had been killed, there is no way to decide. Many of the more fanciful stories come from later forgeries, but the truth is elusive.⁷⁷ There are too many red herrings across the trail. We do not actually know how and why Aleksei died, but in doing so he solved a major political problem for Peter and for Russia.

After the death of Aleksei there only remained to tie up the loose

⁷⁵ RGADA, f. 11, d. 53 (Podennnye zapisi Menshikova), ch. 2, 1718, 128v–129v (26–27 June 1718); TKUA Rusland B50: 30 June/11 July 1718, St. Petersburg (Peter assembles the elite at Aleksei's deathbed, W had learned of the events on 27 June/8 July).

RGADA, f. 32, 1718, d. 13, l. 55–55v: St. Petersburg, 28 June/8 July 1718, Pleyer to KVI: "[Indem ich jezo schreibe komet zu mir einer meiner vertrauten und berichtet mir in groster geheimb daß gestern dem Cron Prinz der todt angekündigt worden worryber er sich also entsetzet daß ihn diese nacht der schlag getroffen und er darauf verschieden sein solte wofern es wahr ist] so [laß man es dahin gestellet sein ob er von einen schlag oder durch ein anderes mittel zu leben aufgehöret und glaubet man davon] so [viell man will weilen jetzt wiederumb posten alhier und brieff nicht allzu sicher seind] so [hätte ich mit allen diesen nachrichten einen expressen abgeschiket es würde aber gleich einen argwohn auf dieses geheimnus gemacht worden sein und auch ohnedem mir kein passport für einen courier zu expediren.] Womit ich etc.

P. S. [Umb den Prinz Kurakin im Haag und den fürst Dolgoruky in Dänemark als complices sollen auch] schon [couriers abgeschiket seyn] gleich jezt vernembe ich, daß der vicecanczler Baron Schaphyoff als er von seinen haus herüber auf dieses seiten komen zu den tractament, so heut wegen der victori unter Pultava gehalten werden, denen deutschen officieren, und anderen menschen öffentlich gemeldet, daß der Cron Prinz umb 2 uhr nach Mitternacht todes verblichen seye". [Shafirov was wrong about the time of death.]

Bodleian French, d. 35, ff. 138–38v, St. Petersburg, 8 July 1718 (Aleksei's death; he was perfectly calm and expected the sentence to be commuted).

⁷⁶ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 537–40 (= RGADA, f. 6, d. 35); HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, 15 July 1718, St. Petersburg (Peter celebrated his name day; funeral of AP).

⁷⁷ Bushkovitch, "Power," 196–97. Weber, for example, believed that Dr. Areskine (his personal *bête noire*) had poisoned Aleksei and continued to hold the idea that the tsarevich was personally innocent: Bodleian French d. 35, ff. 162–5v, Narva, 2 August 1718, Weber to Robethon; ff. 168–71, Reval, 11 August 1718, Weber to Robethon; ff. 199–201, St. Petersburg, 19 September 1718, Weber to Robethon. In these letters Weber appears in the third person. He was in Narva and Reval to follow Peter's naval expedition of that summer and the letter may have been written by a secretary: Weber, *Rußland*, I, 306–08.

ends of the case. The foreign ambassadors most heavily implicated, Otto Pleyer and de Bie, were recalled on Peter's request, Pleyer with much mutual recrimination between St. Petersburg and Vienna.⁷⁸ In the succeeding months some of those most closely involved in the case (at least in the official version) went into exile. Prince V. V. Dolgorukii went on 5 July to Kazan' and some lesser folk a few weeks later: Ivan Naryshkin to Riazan' and Prince Ivan L'vov to his farthest village. Others were already in exile, Vasilii Alekseevich the Siberian tsarevich, Aleksei's servant Fyodor Everlakov, and Semen Naryshkin among them.⁷⁹ The same month three of the lesser members of Aleksei's household, Ivan Bol'shoi Afanas'ev, the now unfrocked priest Iakov Ignat'ev, and Fyodor Dubrovskii were sentenced to death.⁸⁰

The only interrogation to continue was that of Avram Lopukhin, which indeed went on into the fall. By the end of June Lopukhin had admitted various occasions of contact with Pleyer and discussion of Aleksei, but denied that he had written to him and asserted even under torture that the Siberian tsarevich had wrongly implicated him in correspondence. Through the succeeding months the interrogators relentlessly pressed him on this point, bringing in other witnesses, Prince Semen Shcherbatov from the case of Evdokiia, and the landrat of Kazan', Kanbar Akin'ev, whom Lopukhin had used to send messages to Pleyer. In spite of relentless torture, Lopukhin admitted very little, either in the matter of correspondence or of

⁷⁸ Pleyer had already been forbidden to come to court on 31 May/10 June. De Bie's papers were seized and he was informed of the tsar's desire for his recall on 2/13 July. Pleyer's recall came in late October/early November: HHSTA Rußland I, Karton 25, 10 June 1718, St. Petersburg; 20 June 1718, St. Petersburg (Pleyer forbidden the court); St. Petersburg, 15 July 1718 (de Bie); 26 July 1718, St. Petersburg (more detail on de Bie); St. Petersburg, 11 November 1718 (arrival of Pleyer's recall 27 October/7 November 1718); ARSG 7397 (Secreta), 14/25 July 1718, St. Petersburg (de Bie's full report on seizure of papers and conversation with Golovkin on his recall) (= Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 549–67).

⁷⁹ RGADA, f. 6, d. 59, ll. 14–15 (Ivan Naryshkin, 22 July); d. 63, 3–3v (Prince I. L'vov, July 22); d. 45, 25–6 (Fyodor Everlakov, after 5 May, exile to Tobol'sk); d. 68, 9, 17–7v, 22–39 (Siberian tsarevich to Archangel, 24 March; on May 15 he was still in Moscow, and died in 1724); HHSTA Rußland I, Karton 25, St. Petersburg, 26 August 1718 (exile of Dolgorukii). TKUA Rusland B50; 14/25 July 1718, St. Petersburg (exile of Dolgorukii, which Westphalen considered less serious than it would be in the West, as exiled or punished Russian nobles often returned to favor).

⁸⁰ RGADA, f. 6, d. 46, 18–19 (F. Dubrovskii, 28 June); d. 48, 43v–46 (Ivan Afanas'ev, 28 July); d. 54, 16–16v (Iakov Ignat'ev, 9 August). The servants who had accompanied Aleksei abroad, Peter Meyer, Iakov Nosov, Ivan Fyodorov, and the clerk Petr Sudakov were sent to Siberia on 22 July, "dlia togo, chto zdes' im byt' neprilichno." Their testimony in March and May had produced nothing of value or incriminating to themselves. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 236–37.

serious discussion with Pleyer. The case even went before the Senate in August, but all that had come out by the fall was that Lopukhin knew that his nephew was in the Tirol and did not report it, and that he rejoiced at the thought that a popular rebellion would take place. Perhaps Lopukhin was telling the truth – that his contacts with Pleyer were limited to talk and he had no correspondence with Aleksei – or perhaps he was trying to save his life. If that was his aim, it did not work, for ultimately he was convicted of wishing death to the tsar on the basis of his contacts with Bishop Dosifei of Rostov. The statutes were chapter 2, article 1 of the *Ulozhenie* of 1649 and chapter 3, article 30 of the Military Law of 1716. The sentence, passed apparently 5 November 1718, was death. Akin'ev escaped with exile to Siberia “without punishment.”⁸¹

In early December, Prince Mikhail Dolgorukii received his own sentence, that of exile to his village. On 9 December, the final executions took place which put an end to the case. On that day Avram Lopukhin met his end, followed by Aleksei's household: the priest Iakov Ignat'ev, his valet Ivan Afanas'ev-Bol'shoi, his gentleman servant Fyodor Dubrovskii, and his steward, the secretary Fyodor Voronov.⁸² The principals in the investigation received their rewards. Tolstoi received the order of St. Andrew and parts of the estates of Lopukhin (1,090 households) and Dubrovskii. A. I. Ushakov got part of the estates of Dubrovskii, V. V. Dolgorukii, and the Siberian tsarevich. I. I. Buturlin got the bulk of both the Dolgorukii estates and those of the Siberian tsarevich. A. I. Rumiantsev's reward for his role in returning the Tsarevich from

⁸¹ RGADA, f. 6, d. 47, ll. 23–68; d. 65, ll. 3–4, 377–93. Prince Semen Ivanovich Shcherbatov (died 1755) was the son of Prince Ivan Ivanovich Shcherbatov, a chamber *stol'nik* of Peter in 1692; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 112; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 483.

⁸² RGADA, f. 6, d. 62, l. 23; Weber, *Rußland*, I, 314; Bodleian French d. 35, ff. 264–65v; St. Petersburg, 19 December 1718; TKUA Rusland B50, St. Petersburg, 12/23 December 1718. Von Westphalen called Voronov AP's “thresorier” and Dubrovskii AP's “chambellan.” Voronov had also served in Prince V. V. Dolgorukii's investigation of Menshikov's financial abuses as well as in Koshelev's chancellery (see chapter 9, p. 374). An enemy of Menshikov, and a possible client of Dolgorukii as well, had disappeared: Serov, “Zemetki,” 105–06. Another minor figure to become involved in the case of Lopukhin was Prince Nikolai Shcherbatov, whose guilt was found to be minor. He was sentenced to be transferred from the Preobrazhenskii regiment to another regiment at the same rank: RGADA, f. 6, d. 70, ll. 1–23v. This must be Prince Nikolai Petrovich Shcherbatov (died 1758), son of Prince Petr Grigor'evich (died 1704), a *stol'nik* 1676–92; Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnaia*, I, 112; [Ivanov], *Alfavitnyi*, 483. According to Westphalen, he was the “jeune prince Scherbatoff, favorit du general Dolgoruky, et lieutenant des gardes, a eu les Knuthi et est chassé du regiment avec infamie,” TKUA Rusland B50, 12/23 December 1718.

Italy was the greater part of the Kikin estate.⁸³ The case of tsarevich Aleksei, to all intents and purposes, had come to an end.

The long investigation of the tsarevich had not produced evidence of a real conspiracy, in spite of early rumors to that effect. The only actual conspirators were Tsarevich Aleksei and the government of Emperor Karl VI in Vienna. Sweden had come into the affair too late, and inside Russia only Kikin seems to have known much about Aleksei's concrete intentions. The investigation did reveal that Aleksei's discontent was widely known among the Russian elite, as was his flight abroad. It also revealed extremely broad sympathy for the tsarevich. This opposition to Peter that crystallized around Aleksei Petrovich was not just a general feeling of discontent. Though Aleksei himself (in surviving records) admitted only to loving the "old ways," as did T. N. Streshnev, Evfrosin'ia had listed the particular goals in her deposition. They were to take power in the place of the infant Petr Petrovich, end the war with Sweden, move the capital back to Moscow, reverse the reform of the army, and by implication eliminate the navy. The Dutch ambassador de Bie had the same list of aims, and added the expulsion of the foreigners and the elimination of the influence of Tsaritsa Ekaterina and Menshikov, a necessary corollary. Pleyer added that Aleksei told Sheremetev that he wanted to restore "the religion and laws of his ancestors" and ease the burden of taxation.⁸⁴ This was the conservative platform, one notably vague in the cultural and religious area. It could be no more specific, for an opposition that included Stefan Iavorskii and the philo-Catholic Sheremetev could only retain the Ukrainianized Orthodoxy of the early years of Peter's reign, not pre-Petrine "traditional Orthodoxy." Such Kievan Orthodoxy was the religion of Tsarevich Aleksei as well. What the opposition wanted was the downfall of Peter's favorites and the reversal of his political, administrative, and military achievements.

Peter could not tolerate giving a major share of power to the

⁸³ Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, VI, 577–78; *SRIO* XI, 376–79; TKUA Rusland B50: St. Petersburg, 12/23 December (rewards of officials); Pavlenko, *Pentsy*, 196.

⁸⁴ ARSG 7397 (Secreta), St. Petersburg, 29 April 1718: "Tot noch blykt myns weetens niet dat eenig complot tegens S. M. leven eygentlyk is gesmeet, maar wel omby syn afsterven syn onter den outsten Prins op den throon te setten; alle vreemdelingen, als oorsaken van't invoeren van vreemde raaken, van kant te helpen, de vrede met Sweeden te maaken en de opgerechte militie aftedanken," and to put out of favor Tsaritsa Ekaterina and the current favorites (Menshikov). HHStA, Rußland I, Karton 25, 8 July 1718, St. Petersburg.

advocates of such notions, but neither could he remove, exile, or much less execute those who shared that platform. There were too many such opponents of his measures, and they were too high up in the Russian elite. Once Peter realized the extent of Aleksei's support at that level of society, he did not contemplate the radical repression of his opponents. Instead, what he did was to speed up the reorganization of government, keep some of his aristocratic opponents in office and power, and surround them with his favorites and with professional civil servants. After the death of the tsarevich in 1718 came the major results of the Petrine era, principally in government but also a continued reform of Russian culture. The case of Aleksei was the greatest spur to Peter's reform in the history of the reign, greater even than the Northern War.

Epilogue and conclusion, 1718–1725

ARISTOCRATS AND DIGNITARIES

The last seven years of Peter's reign, after the trial of Tsarevich Aleksei, saw the culmination of his efforts to reorganize the Russian state apparatus. In the wake of the trial the tsar once again reset the balance among the factions at court, which had increasingly polarized between the "great families" and the allies of Menshikov. Further impulses to reform came with the end of the war with Sweden in 1721 in the Peace of Nystad, which confirmed Peter's conquests and brought needed relief to Russia and its finances. Not that the peace was complete, for the next summer Peter launched a war against Iran to take control of the trading cities on the Caspian Sea. The Persian campaign was not on the same scale as the Northern War, but also came to a victorious end in September 1723.¹

Even before the case of Tsarevich Aleksei had concluded, Peter had turned with renewed zeal to the pressing matters of the reorganization of state, church, and society. The decree setting up a new census to establish the new "soul" tax, which would eventually transfer the peasants' main obligation from the household to the individual, came on 26 November 1718. The same month he pushed ahead the reorganization of local administration, ordering that all local officials were to receive instructions following the Swedish model. In December Peter realized that the Colleges were not yet ready, so he extended the moment for their commencement of

¹ Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 366–86; *SRIO* XI, 494–95, 497–501; P. P. Bushev, *Posol'stvo Artemiia Volynskogo v Iran v 1715–1718 gg.*, Moscow, 1978; V. G. Volovnikova, ed., *Poslannik Petra I na Vostoke: Posol'stvo Florio Beneveni v Persiiu i Bukharu v 1718–1725 godakh*, Moscow, 1986; Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, Cambridge, 1958.

operations to 1 January 1720. Serious work on the reorganization of the church began, spurred on by the revelation of the evident sympathies of Metropolitan Stefan Iavorskii and other hierarchs for the cause of the Tsarevich Aleksei. Sometime in autumn 1718, he ordered Feofan Prokopovich, Archbishop of Pskov, to compile a plan for a "Spiritual College." It would take several years, and by 1721 Peter was able to set up the Holy Synod to replace the patriarch at the head of the church. The Synod was a board of laymen and clergy appointed by the tsar, which gave the monarch a degree of control that would hopefully check any ambitions of the church to support the tsar's opponents.²

Even on the level of daily life, Peter tried to reform Russian society. Already in May 1718, he had established a police force in St. Petersburg under Anton Devier, a Portuguese-Dutch convert from Judaism. The new police force, in keeping with European models, was not so much to repress crime but to keep order and cleanliness, to civilize and Europeanize the capital. Devier also was to oversee the new forms of social life, the "assemblies," by which Peter hoped to introduce refinement and rational ways of passing the time to his countrymen. Not surprisingly, even the critical Weber thought this decree important, as it was part of a number of measures for the "police" of the state and the humanization of the people. The assemblies were also useful for the foreign diplomats to pass and receive news.³

In the next few years, Peter made some of his best-known and long-lasting alterations in the state apparatus. The Colleges finally came into being, and important statutes regulated their operations. By placing a committee, the president, and several assessors, at the head of each college, Peter hoped to suppress personal ties and favoritism, a goal that met with limited success. The *General'nyi reglament* for the Colleges of 1720 further strengthened regularity and legal order. The establishment of the office of *general-prokuror* of the Senate, held by Iaguzhinskii, like the removal of most senators from

² Anisimov, *Podatnaia*, 45–62; Peterson, *Reforms*, 94, 223–302; *PSŽ* V, nos. 3205, 3207, 3208, 3254–55, 572–75, 601; *SRIO* XI, 400; Verkhovskoi, *Uchrezhdenie*, 145–94; Cracraft, *Church*, 147–62.

³ *PSŽ* V, nos. 3203, 3246, 569–71, 597–8; *SRIO* XI, 372; Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 156–59; Bodleian French d.35, 16 December 1718, St. Petersburg: Peter had recently taken several measures "pour la police du ses etats et pour humaniser son peuple. Les assemblées en sont du nombre et fort utiles à nous autres pour faire valoir nos nouvelles et pour savoir celles du pais."

the colleges, was designed to lessen the work burden for the senators, and also to try to get more cases processed.⁴ The decree also gave Peter more influence over the Senate, in part because Iaguzhinskii was not associated with either Menshikov or the aristocratic faction.

The new institutional arrangements helped reset the balance at court. The original college presidents in 1718 included a minority of aristocrats, and a majority of men of presumed talent from the lesser gentry. As the college presidents were at first all Senators, the Senate acquired some new members (Petr Tolstoi and A. A. Matveev) who were less aristocratic than the senators of 1712–18. When Peter decreed in January 1722, that the presidents of the Colleges, except for War and Foreign Affairs, should not sit in the Senate, he needed some new presidents, and almost all the new appointees to the colleges came from lesser gentry families. (The exceptions were Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin, and later Petr Apraksin, who replaced Matveev at the College of Justice.)⁵ Time had eroded the proportion of aristocratic senators, though they did not disappear. The death of Tikhon Streshnev in 1719 and of Prince Ia. F. Dolgorukii in 1720 had already removed two prominent aristocrats, though Prince D. M. Golitsyn remained. The 1722 decree on college presidents also mandated the appointment of some of Russia's ambassadors to the Senate, and the result was the appointment of Prince Vasilii Lukich and Prince Grigorii Fyodorovich Dolgorukii. Since Prince G. F.

⁴ *ŽA* I, 218–19 (ordering the Senate to choose the presidents' subordinates "chtob ne bylo otniud svoistvennikov ili sobstvennykh kreotur"), 247–48, 300–11, 411–513. Mardefeld believed that Iaguzhinskii was appointed to encourage the colleges [and the procurors, a nuance which Mardefeld missed] to deal with a huge load of complaints and suits: *SRIO* 15, 202–03.

⁵ *ŽA* I, 243–48, 411–516; *SRIO* XI 447–48, 470. I. I. Buturlin (not the general of the same name) replaced Petr Tolstoi at the College of Commerce, and instead of Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn at the *Kammer-kollegiia* came Gerasim Koshelev, in 1716–17 head of one of the investigative chancelleries in corruption cases. Koshelev's father had been a *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Praskov'ia in 1692, but the family had never risen above Moscow gentleman and ordinary *stol'nik*: [Ivanov] *Ukazatel'*, 210–11. Petr Tolstoi left the College of Commerce to head Peter's campaign chancellery in the Persian war: Pavlenko, *Pletny*, 201.

Peter appointed Vasilii Iakovlevich Novosil'tsov to head the College of Manufactures (recently split off from Mines). His father had been a *stol'nik* of Tsaritsa Praskov'ia and his grandfather an ordinary *stol'nik*: [Ivanov], *Ukazatel'*, 204–09.

In place of the widely hated Musin-Pushkin in the *Stats-kontor* came Prince Vasilii [Iur'evich] Odoevskii, soon to be replaced by A. L. Pleshcheev: *ŽA* I, 247–48; Veretennikov, *Istoriia*, 40–04; LeDonne, "Ruling Families," 257–58. Prince V. Iu. Odoevskii was the brother of Prince Aleksei Odoevskii, who had been friendly with Pleyer, the Siberian tsarevich, and others implicated in the affair of the tsarevich in 1718. Dolgorukov, *Rossiiskaia rodoslovnai*a, I, 55–56. *SRIO* 15, 200 (Moscow, 15 January 1722, general dislike of Musin-Pushkin as the head of the "Etatscomptoir").

Dolgorukii died in 1723, only one member of the clan remained in the Senate at the end of Peter's reign. In 1723 there were twelve senators, three of them aristocrats (the two princes, Dolgorukii and Golitsyn), two of Peter's relatives (Petr and Fyodor Apraksin), five dignitaries risen from the middle gentry (Musin-Pushkin, the Golovkins, A. A. Matveev, Petr Tolstoi, plus Shafirov until his condemnation), one foreigner, James (Iakov) Bruce, and Menshikov.⁶ The result was a tilt away from aristocrats by origin, though Petr Apraksin certainly was in their camp, even if his own status came from his sister's long-past marriage to Tsar Fyodor.

If men of aristocratic origin were outnumbered in the central government, the provinces were different. The guberniias took new form in 1719 with their division into provinces and districts, again following the Swedish model. Below the eight large provinces Peter made fifty smaller ones, and the new provinces dealt with local affairs rather than forming a share of the central administration. The large provinces, if not as all-powerful as before, also remained more of an aristocratic preserve. In 1723 there were eleven large provinces, headed by St. Petersburg with Menshikov as before. Six of the governors were old Duma families: Princes I. F. Romodanovskii, N. I. Repnin, I. Iu. Trubetskoi, A. M. Cherkasskii, and the untitled P. V. Izmailov and A. P. Volynskii. The tsar's relatives A. P. Saltykov and F. M. Apraksin held two governorships. The ancestors of the remaining two, Iu. A. Rzhevskii and P. E. Ladyzhenskii, never rose above *okol'nichii*, and in the case of Ladyzhenskii only for a few months in 1676, at the beginning of the period of inflation of honors. Both held only the rank of vice-governor, though in their provinces there was no governor above them. Their lack of illustrious ancestry denied them the higher title. The provinces provided Peter with an opportunity to mend some fences with the aristocrats: in 1724 he appointed Prince M. V. Dolgorukii, in exile on his estates since 1718, governor of Siberia, in place of Prince

⁶ LeDonne, "Ruling Families," 256–58. Before he was twenty Prince V. L. Dolgorukii had accompanied Ia. F. Dolgorukii to France in 1687, and from 1700 he himself continuously held major diplomatic posts, Poland (1700–06) under his uncle G. F. Dolgorukii, ambassador to Denmark (1707–20), France (1720–22). He played a major role in the attempted aristocratic coup in 1730 and was executed in 1739. Prince G. F. Dolgorukii (born 1656), Iakov's brother, had been a chamber *stol'nik* of both Tsar Fyodor and Tsar Peter himself and had served in the Preobrazhenskii guards. He was Peter's ambassador to Poland in 1700–07, 1709–12, and 1716–21. V. Korsakova, "Dolgorukov (Dolgorukii), kniaz' Vasiliĭ Lukich," *RBS*, Dabelov-Diad'kovskii, St. Petersburg, 1905, 511–22; [anon.] "Dolgorukov, kn. Grigorii Feodorovich," *ibid.*, 531–32; [Ivanov] *Ukazatel'*, 117.

A. M. Cherkasskii.⁷

The Table of Ranks of 1722 capped the reorganization of administration by regulating the course of promotion by merit among civil servants and the army and establishing equivalencies in rank for the two forms of service.⁸ This measure both formalized the end of the old boyar and court ranking system of previous centuries, and provided a new formal framework for the service careers and hierarchy of the Russian gentry, including the aristocrats. Theoretically this framework was meritocratic, but in fact the same families remained in more or less the same positions for most of the eighteenth century. Even in the army, high command was disproportionately in the hands of aristocrats.⁹

The defeat of Aleksei's supporters in 1718 and the reorganization of government produced a new factional balance at court. Menshikov was restored to power, if not to the exclusive predominance of earlier years, but the rivalry of the Golitsyns and Dolgorukiis with Menshikov flared up again in 1722. G. G. Skorniakov-Pisarev, *ober-prokuror* of the Senate, complained of mistreatment at the hands of Shafirov and the *general-prokuror*, Iaguzhinskii. Skorniakov-Pisarev wrote a letter to Peter in the fall of 1722 on the matter, and a few weeks later the case led to a confrontation in the Senate between Shafirov on one hand, and Menshikov and Golovkin on the other. The occasion of the confrontation, on 31 October 1722, involved Shafirov and the post, but that was a cover. The real issue was Menshikov's illegal appropriation of property around his Ukrainian estate of Pochep, where Shafirov failed to support the favorite. Skorniakov-Pisarev was a favorite of Menshikov, and the complaint seems to have been an attempt by Menshikov to defend himself by attacking Shafirov on another issue.¹⁰ In the Senate, Shafirov shouted at Menshikov that he would not put his head in the noose

⁷ M. M. Bogoslovskii, "Oblastnaia reforma Petra I", *ChOIDR*, 3 (1902), 1–208; 4, 209–522, 1–46; LeDonne, "Ruling Families," 257; *SRIO* XI, 528.

⁸ *SRIO* XI, 414–18; *ŽPI*, 393–402; Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 145–50; S. M. Troitskii, *Russkii absolutizm i dvorianstvo v XVIII v.*, Moscow, 1974, 47–118; Peterson, *Reforms*, 117–22; Hughes, *Russia*, 109–10, 180–85.

⁹ In 1722 there were five full generals in the Russian army. Three of them, Prince N. I. Repnin, Prince M. M. Golitsyn, and I. I. Buturlin came from old Duma families. The other two, Hallart and Iakov Bruce were foreigners. The only field marshal in 1722 was Menshikov, since Sheremetev had died in 1719; *SRIO* XI, 440.

¹⁰ *SRIO* 15, 221 (Mardefeld, Moscow, 22 March 1723: Skorniakov-Pisarev a favorite of Menshikov). The Pochep case put Hetman Skoropads'kyi in the camp of the favorite's enemies as well, though the hetman had supported Menshikov in his early attempts to

for him, as Prince [M. I.] Volkonskii and Prince Matvei Gagarin had done. This time Shafirov triumphed, with the backing of Prince D. M. Golitsyn and Prince G. F. Dolgorukii. The two princely families in the Senate were united in this case in defense of Shafirov, the son of a converted Jew. Besides Skorniakov-Pisarev, Menshikov had only Golovkin and General Bruce on his side.¹¹

Ultimately Shafirov and the aristocrats lost. Only a few months later accusations against Shafirov caused Peter to form a special commission which met in Preobrazhenskoe to investigate the vice chancellor, headed by General Bruce, Musin-Pushkin, and Matveev.¹² The French envoy Jean-Jacques Campredon believed that Menshikov might suffer from the outcome, as his misdeeds and those of Skorniakov-Pisarev were far greater than any of Shafirov's. Besides, the highly influential Iaguzhinskii hated Skorniakov-Pisarev and held himself aloof from Menshikov. The stakes were high in the trial, and the outcome was mostly unfavorable to Shafirov. Not only Menshikov and Golovkin but also Bruce, Musin-Pushkin, and Matveev spoke in favor of his guilt. He was convicted of improperly raising his brother's salary, covering it up, and using the post for his own profit. Shafirov was sentenced to death, a sentence which Peter commuted to exile in Novgorod. His estates were confiscated and went to Prince V. L. Dolgorukii. Prince G. F. Dolgorukii and Prince Golitsyn were fined and placed under house arrest and degraded from their ranks. All but the fine was forgiven after they petitioned Empress Ekaterina. Punishment fell on Skorniakov-Pisarev as well, who also lost his position and his lands. Menshikov lost his presidency of the Military College, which then went to Repnin, but retained his other posts.¹³

The preponderance of Menshikov and the non-aristocratic dignitaries in the Senate did not lead to the marginalization of Prince Golitsyn and Prince Dolgorukii. As the Shafirov case shows, they fought back. Even though they lost, Menshikov could not successfully use Shafirov's misdeeds to further strengthen his position, for it

expand the Pochep estate at the expense of neighboring cossacks, who finally got their lands back in 1723: A.M. Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, I, *Polk starodubskii*, Kiev, 1888, 275–94; Pavlenko, *Poludierzavnyi*, 228–35.

¹¹ *SRIO* 49, 261–62; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 456–62; *SRIO* XI, 420–23, 433; *SRIO* 15, 207.

¹² *SRIO* XI, 502–03.

¹³ *SRIO* 15, 217–18, 220–21 (Mardefeld to FWI, Moscow, 22 March 1722); *SRIO* 49, 292–94, 299–303; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 462–66. Skorniakov-Pisarev received the rank of colonel and half of his property a year later: *SRIO* XI, 548; Wittram, *Peter I*, II, 495.

was no longer possible to use the corruption cases to further the aims of one or another faction successfully. Peter was too smart for them by now, since he realized that they were all more or less corrupt and that his task was to punish them as evenhandedly as he could, and construct a more orderly state. Even though Menshikov was now clearly back in power, the investigation of his various misdeeds continued, and he repeatedly had to repay stolen monies to the treasury when he was caught. In the last months of Peter's life, Menshikov was still under a cloud with new accusations of massive corruption.¹⁴

The problem which galvanized the court factions in the last years of Peter's reign was that of the succession. Petr Petrovich had died in infancy in 1719, leaving as the only possible heirs Peter's daughters and his grandson Petr, the son of Tsarevich Aleksei. Tsar Peter decreed in 1722 that the tsar had the right to choose his own successor, thus rejecting the European model he had already denounced in his 1715 conversation with the Danish envoy; but he did not go on to name the successor.¹⁵ Tsarevich Petr Alekseevich remained a possibility, but not by inheritance, only if the tsar explicitly named him. The general belief in 1722–23 was that Peter planned to name his eldest daughter, Anna Petrovna, the heir, but he never made the move. Anna Petrovna herself had no desire for the Russian throne, and even supported the claim of her nephew Tsarevich Petr Alekseevich.¹⁶ The tsar considered various marriages for Anna, including one with a French prince, but by early 1724 the choice fell on Karl Friedrich, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp.¹⁷ The choice seems to have been made largely on foreign policy grounds, since Karl Friedrich was a possible successor to the crown of Sweden, and had a powerful party in Sweden. Holstein would either become a friendly king of Sweden or remain a means of Russian pressure. By summer the decision was generally known, though the public engagement came only in November, with a marriage treaty

¹⁴ RGADA, f. 198 d. 41 l. 1 (18 February 1720, ADM owes treasury 1,571,019 rubles, proven in investigation of VVD and P Golitsyn); d. 684, ll. 3–422 (summary of some of the fines owed by ADM 1713 to 1723, e.g. 87–126, the 1713–14 Solov'ev case).

¹⁵ *ŽAI*, 174–76.

¹⁶ *SRIO* 15, 237–44.

¹⁷ *SRIO* 15, 211–13; *SRIO* 49, 53, 247. Karl Friedrich (1700–39) had been residing in Russia since early 1721, hoping that Peter would help him to attain his political goals in Sweden and Holstein (the return of Schleswig).

that specified that Anna and her husband would have no claims on the Russian throne.¹⁸ Influence at court was another matter.

By the beginning of 1724, if not before, Tsarevich Petr had a considerable faction behind him, the old faction of his father, Tsarevich Aleksei. One possible solution was a regency in his favor headed by Ekaterina, which Campredon thought would avoid disorders that might occur after Peter's death

if the tsarevich . . . were supported by the faction of his late father, the more important in that the principal lords (*seigneurs*) which compose it and especially the clergy hope to return under such rule to the rights and privileges which they have been deprived of.¹⁹

No such regency plan ever came to fruition, and the ambiguity about the succession remained. With the old faction of Tsarevich Aleksei supporting Petr Alekseevich, their opponents naturally supported Ekaterina and the duke of Holstein, a grouping which some diplomats now began to call the Holstein faction.²⁰ The leader seems to have been Tsaritsa Ekaterina herself, in part because she saw her daughter as a rival. Tsaritsa Ekaterina, crowned empress in her own right on 7 May 1724, had become a formidable figure, and thus was herself a possible heir to her husband. The Danish emissary Westphalen wrote in 1724 that "the tsaritsa is a woman of intelligence, an intriguer beyond any imagination; she has the heart of a lion, her ambition knows no bounds and is perfectly well advised."²¹

With Peter's death on 28 January/8 February 1725, the factional struggle came out into the open. The supporters of Petr Alekseevich were Petr Apraksin, Golovkin, and the Senators Musin-Pushkin,

¹⁸ M. Polievktov, *Baltiiskii vopros v russkoi politike posle Nishtadtskogo mira (1721–1725)*, Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo fakul'teta imp. St. Peterburgskogo universiteta 85, St. Petersburg, 1907, 132–75; G. A. Nekrasov, *Russko-shvedskie otnosheniia i politika velikikh derzhav v 1721–1726 gg.*, Moscow, 1964, 131–42; and Bagger, *Ruslands alliancepolitik*.

¹⁹ *SRIO* 52, 145–46 (Campredon to Morville, St. Petersburg, 9 January 1724).

²⁰ Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 534–37; Nekrasov, 171–92. In September 1725, the British secretary for the northern department, Charles Townshend, instructed ambassador Finch to support Prince Dolgorukii "a true hearted Old Russ" against the "Holstein Faction": Jeremy Black, "Anglo-Russian Relations 1714–1730: a Note on Sources," in Janet Hartley, ed., *The Study of Russian History from British Archival Sources*, London–New York, 1986, 83.

²¹ Ekaterina's position was not shaken by the discovery that her favorite and head of her estate chancellery, Willem Mons, had taken massive bribes, for which he was executed in November 1724: *SRIO* XI, 557; Solov'ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 537–40; Westphalen to Frederik IV, 4/15 January 1724, quoted in Polievktov, *Baltiiskii*, 286; *SRIO* 52, 200 (Campredon to Morville, Moscow, 26 May 1724: Ekaterina was anointed at the ceremony "en sorte que par cette cérémonie elle est reconnue régente et souveraine après la mort du Czar, son epoux.).

Princes D. M. Golitsyn, Prince V. L. Dolgorukii, and N. I. Repnin, as well as the commander of the army in the Ukraine, General Prince M. M. Golitsyn. Supporting Ekaterina (the “Holstein” party) were Menshikov, General I. I. Buturlin, P. A. Tolstoi, Admiral Apraksin, Iaguzhinskii, Peter’s secretary Makarov, and the guards regiments. The debate in the Senate lasted until four o’clock in the morning, with Tolstoi and Admiral Apraksin warning of the dangers of faction and the need for an adult ruler. Menshikov simply threatened to massacre his opponents, while some of the guards officers vowed to “break the heads of all the old boyars.” Eventually Golovkin and Repnin (who had recently had a falling out with his erstwhile patron Menshikov), switched sides, and the Senate finally proclaimed Ekaterina the sole and sovereign ruler.²² These were not newly formed alliances: General M. M. Golitsyn had been a supporter of the tsarevich for some time, as well as of the “old government.”²³

Once again, the aristocrats lost, and Peter’s wife came to the throne as Ekaterina I. The duke of Holstein briefly became an important adviser to Ekaterina, who used him to balance the power of Menshikov. With her death in 1727 the Holstein presence faded away, only to return much later in the eighteenth century.²⁴ It had been a useful tool against the aristocrats.

CULTURE AND POWER

The flight and return of Tsarevich Aleksei, his interrogation and death also brought to the surface the degree of Westernization of political thought in Russia among Peter’s opponents. It is during

²² *SRIO* 52, 430 (Campredon to Louis XV, 10 February 1726, “les vieux boiards”), 436–44; ARSG 7397, Secreta 1725, 3 March 1725; Solov’ev, *Istoriia*, IX, 554–59.

²³ *SRIO* 15, 250–56. General Prince M. M. Golitsyn was not only an aristocrat and successful general. He shared with his brother Dmitrii a distinct imperiousness and habit of mistreating subordinates and foreigners (see above, chapter 8). Mardefeld reported that as commander of the Russian army in Finland, M. Golitsyn connived in a trumped-up capital charge against one General Dupré in order to promote a Russian client and against the Count Douglas, the Russian governor in Finland: *SRIO* 15, 183–87.

²⁴ *SRIO* 15, 259. During her brief reign Ekaterina attempted to support Karl Friedrich’s attempts to recover Schleswig from Denmark, though the Russian government, Menshikov, P. A. Tolstoi, and Ostermann, were against the policy: Nekrasov, *Russko-shvedskie*, 230–61; Bagger, *Ruslands Allianscepolitik*, 162–251. Thus the “Holstein” faction that formed in 1724 had something of a misnomer, for only Ekaterina supported Holstein, Menshikov and others preferred Ekaterina over Petr Alekseevich. The marriage of Karl Friedrich and Anna Petrovna produced the future Peter III, the husband of Catherine the Great. Anna, the best educated and most beautiful of Peter’s daughters, died as the result of the complications of her son’s birth in 1728. On Anna see Mardefeld in *SRIO* 15, 239–40.

these events that we get the first sense of an aristocratic platform developing among the adherents of the tsarevich, one that took them on toward the attempt to establish an oligarchy in 1730 and beyond. In removing Aleksei from the succession, the events had also forced Peter to make some decisions about the future of his throne, which he made in part in the succession law of 1722. That law in turn prompted Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich to produce his famous defense of absolutism, a defense couched entirely in Western terms. Both of the principal streams of eighteenth century political thought in Russia had their immediate origins in the affair of the tsarevich.

Europeanized political thought was not possible without a more general europeanization of Russian culture. The fundamental changes that europeanization involved were not the invention of Peter alone, and were already beginning before he was born.²⁵ To a large extent it was the court that was the scene of these changes, brought by the Kievan scholars such as Simeon Polotskii. The boyars as well experienced some of these new impulses.²⁶ The 1680s and 1690s only saw an intensification of the process, though still along largely Baroque lines. The princes Golitsyn, V. V. Golitsyn and Boris Alekseevich, knew Latin, and younger people such as F. A. Golovin, the Princes Cherkasskii, Andrei Matveev, and Ivan Alekseevich Musin-Pushkin studied Latin. The study of Latin among the Russian boyars was not designed to replicate the full scholarly program of Renaissance humanism, even in Baroque form. Its aim was to convey a tool of communication. Not surprisingly we hear of the boyar Latinists conversing in the language, like Golovin with the Emperor of China's Portuguese Jesuit advisors at Nerchinsk (1689) or Prince B. A. Golitsyn with the Danish ambassador (1684). Later on I. A. Musin-Pushkin could do the same. The Latin classics they knew came from Polish translations put into Russian, such as Ovid's *Metamorphoses* from Otwinowski's Polish version.²⁷ The church was not isolated from these changes. Patriarch Ioakim supported the Greco-Slavo-Latin Academy, with its Jesuit curriculum, and the secretary of the "conservative" Patriarch Adrian, Karion Istomin, wrote verse epistles to the boyars and composed poems in their

²⁵ S. F. Platonov, *Lektsii po russkoi istorii*, 6th ed., St. Petersburg, 1909, 378–83.

²⁶ A. S. Eleonskaia, *Russkaia oratorskaia proza v literaturnom protsesse XVII veka*, Moscow, 1990; L. I. Sazonova, *Poeziia russkogo barokko*, Moscow, 1991; Bushkovitch, *Religion*, 140–5; A. M. Panchenko, *Russkaia stikhotvornaia kul'tura XVII veka*, Leningrad, 1973.

²⁷ Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change", 103, 106–10.

honor, two more genres borrowed from contemporary Polish literature. Ukrainian church builders began to erect Orthodox churches around Moscow following modified canons of Western Baroque architecture, an innovation which the traditionally sacred character of the form of the church in Russia rendered much more radical than it seems today. These churches appeared in the estates of the great boyars, such as the church at Dubrovitsy on the estate of Prince B. A. Golitsyn and the more famous Baroque church at Fili on one of the Naryshkin estates. Prince V. V. Golitsyn followed the same trend. Ukrainian church music followed, recasting the music of the liturgy itself.²⁸ For a few like B. P. Sheremetev the fascination with Ukrainian and Polish–Latin culture led to sympathy for Catholicism itself.²⁹

After 1700 Peter accelerated the pace of change in the church by placing Ukrainians in crucial positions.³⁰ In 1702 Peter nominated Stefan Iavorskii metropolitan of Riazan' to be *locum tenens* of the patriarchal throne after Adrian's death left it vacant. Peter and Stefan together brought a whole group of Ukrainian clergy to Russia, who came to occupy the most important positions in the Russian church, holding most of the bishoprics and heading the chief monasteries. The result was the Ukrainianization of the Russian church, the full flood of Baroque culture, and the temporary marginalization of Russian church traditions. The Ukrainian clergy, if they possessed a common background, were not agreed on all issues, and professed at least two different interpretations of the relevance of Western learning for the Orthodox church in Russia. The first and predominant tendency was that of Metropolitan Stefan Iavorskii, who took over not only Catholic spirituality but also a very Catholic conception of the high dignity and power of the clergy. Iavorskii's idea of the church could not fail to come in conflict

²⁸ Chrissidis, "Creating," 56–78, 115–41. S. N. Brailovskii, *Odin iz pestykh XVII-go veka*, *Zapiski akademii nauk* 5, series 8, St. Petersburg, 1902, 367–481; S. I. Nikolaev, *Pol'skaia poeziia v russkikh perevodakh*, Leningrad, 1989; Cracraft, *Russian Architecture*, 39–110.

²⁹ Zaozerskii, *Fel'dmarshal*, 167–240; E. Shmurlo, "Russkie katoliki kontsa XVII veka," *Zhupiski russkogo nauchnogo instituta v Belgrade* 3 (1931), 1–29.

³⁰ The Ukrainian or Belorussian priest Ivan Poborskii, was the priest of the palace chapel "Voskresenie na verkh" in 1687–1701, and Peter took him along to Europe in 1697. Later on his replacement was father Timofei Nadarzhinskii, a Ukrainian from Trostenets in the Sloboda Ukraine, who served in this position from 1703 until Peter's death, continuing with the same role for Catherine I. Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction," 93–94. In 1729 Nadarzhinskii entered a monastery in Akhtyrka and died that same year: Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe*, 313–14, 801–02; Bogoslovskii, *Materialy* I, II, 100.

sooner or later with Peter, whose comment on the Viennese court had been that it was run by priests, a remark not intended as a compliment. At first, Peter seems to have been satisfied with the metropolitan, but the 1712 incident over the sermon supporting Tsarevich Aleksei meant a parting of the ways. Peter began to shift his favor to other churchmen, primarily to Feofan Prokopovich, another Ukrainian who had come to Peter's attention in 1709. In Peter's last years Prokopovich was the dominant figure in the church and he remained so until the tsar's death. Prokopovich defended and helped design Peter's replacement of the patriarchate with the synod, earning him a reputation for "protestant" inclinations towards a state church.³¹ These "protestant" inclinations of Prokopovich had more of Peter's sympathies than Iavorskii's more traditional Kievan piety, but both were equally far from "old muscovite tradition."³²

Parallel to the rapid changes in the church after about 1700 there were rapid changes in the cultural world of the aristocracy and gentry. While the general process of cultural change, the institutional side in particular, is fairly well known, we have little concrete information on the former boyar elite and the new dignitaries' participation in it.³³ At the end of the seventeenth century Western education came from private tutors or, for a very few, from the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy, founded in 1686. Ivan Alekseevich Musin-Pushkin benefitted from the latter, as did some of the Princes Odoevskii, but Russia would not get a real school for young noblemen until the opening of the Corps of Cadets in 1732.³⁴ As Peter was going off to Europe, he ordered over a hundred young nobles to go to Venice, Amsterdam, and a few other places to learn navigation and also foreign languages. One was Prince B. I. Kurakin, Peter's brother-in-law and future diplomat. Kurakin had a

³¹ Iu. F. Samarin, *Stefan Iavorskii i Feofan Prokopovich* (1843–44, first published 1880) in *Izbrannye proizvedeniia*, Moscow, 1996, 15–408; Chistovich, *Feofan*; Cracraft, *Church Reform*, 49–62, 147–62, 165–218. HHStA Rußland 18, 4 March 1699.

³² Prokopovich's views were probably those of a minority among the clergy, including the Ukrainians, but he did have supporters, particularly Archimandrite Gavriil Buzhinskii and the archbishop of Novgorod (in 1721–25) Feodosii Ianovskii: Cracraft, *Church Reform*, 129–30, 166–69.

³³ P. P. Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura v Rossii pri Petre Velikom*, 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1862; Hughes, *Russia*, 203–247, 298–331; Cracraft, *Russian Architecture*; James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Imagery*, Chicago, 1997.

³⁴ Chrissidis, "Creating," 131–32; *PiB* 133–35, 610–12; Raeff, *Comprendre l'ancien regime russe*, 71–73.

Venetian mistress, and little real interest in navigation, but he acquired Italian and a good knowledge of European history and politics. Kurakin left among his papers an unfinished history of Peter, various political notes, and an unfinished autobiography which make clear his point of view. Kurakin's terms of reference were fully Western, as was his language, stuffed with Italian phrases and words. His notes of 1708, from his first return to Venice, analyzed the Venetian republic as composed of two social groups, the old nobility (*nobiltà*), which lived from its lands, and the new nobility enriched by commerce. He admired the efforts of the old nobility to prevent the new from taking power, but concluded that the decline of the republic was inevitable, for the new nobility was on the rise and lacked the martial spirit of the old. Kurakin's views reflected those of the older Venetian nobility, challenged in the eighteenth century by a newer commercial elite.³⁵

Kurakin followed his aristocratic principle in his notes on the political situation of Sweden and Russia from the same year. He noted that the "state secret" of Sweden (*segreto dello stato*) was the discontent of the "old families" (*i famigli vecchi*). The Swedish nobles had lost their lands in the "reduction," the policy of recovering previously alienated crown lands after 1680. According to Kurakin, the Swedish nobles since then received most of their wealth from the king as rewards for service. (This was a considerable exaggeration, but he was absolutely right that the reduction caused much discontent, particularly in the Baltic provinces.) In the Russian case, he believed that the great families (*velikie familii*) held their lands as full private property (presumably referring to the *votchiny*) and only took extra land from the tsar (the *pomest'ia*). Russian nobles were the descendants of sovereign princes whose territories had been taken by force (*ikh printsipal'stva anno preso per forza*). Who took their territories he did not mention, but he clearly meant the princes of Moscow. Kurakin's conclusion was that the political principle of Russia was

³⁵ Kurakin's views of Venice closely reflected some Venetian conceptions. Since the end of the sixteenth century the older Venetian noble families (whose origins were most certainly commercial) began to buy up landed estates. By mid-century they had created a myth that their origins were martial, not commercial. In the period 1646–1718 some new families were admitted to the nobility, but many of the older families sought to continue the exclusion of new families on the grounds of their commercial origins: James Cushman Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Ruling Class*, Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Sciences 80/2, Baltimore, 1962, 34–53, 106–25, esp. 107–08 (the 1646 debate on nobility); Jean Georgelin, *Venise au siècle des lumières*, Paris, 1978, 619–66.

the same as that of Poland: the nobles are hereditary proprietors with hereditary authority over the peasants. "One must always remember this secret" (*Questo segreto bisogna sempre ricordare*).³⁶

Kurakin was very proud of his "Polish" origin. He began his autobiography with the title "Vita del Principe Boris Koribut-Kourakin del familii de Polonia et Litonia," insisting on his relationship to King Michael of Poland (Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki).³⁷ Kurakin did not confine himself, however, to family pride, for he began to elaborate an aristocratic myth of Russian history, including that of his own time. In his history of Peter he asserted that it was the Naryshkins who began to oppress the old families, and that Peter had continued this policy. In this myth of old Russia, aristocratic, patriarchal, and virtuous in its piety, the later conceptions of Prince Shcherbatov and other conservatives of later ages took their origins.³⁸

The antithesis of Kurakin's history was the history of the early years of Peter's reign from the pen of Count A. A. Matveev, also one of Peter's principal diplomats.³⁹ For Matveev, the issue of Peter's reign was order, the struggle for order against the hydra of rebellion which he saw in the Musketeer revolts of 1682 and 1698. It was not only plebeian disorder he feared, for he also stressed the role of Sofia, Ivan Miloslavskii, and the plotters of the Tsykler-Sokovnin affair. The root of disorder lay in the nature of man, in the hatred put into the soul of man at creation, taking its origin from the snake that tempted Eve. This hatred continues through human history, from the time of Cain and Abel onward. Hatred can explode into strife at any time and destroy states and cities, both Christian

³⁶ "Gistoriia," *Arkhiv* . . . *Kurakina*, II, 194–202.

³⁷ Kurakin's relationship to King Michael was actually extremely distant, for the Kurakins were descendants of the prince Patrikei Narimuntovich who came to Moscow in 1408. Prince Patrikei's son remained in Moscow and quickly became a boyar, and was the founder of several Russian aristocratic clans. Kurakin and his contemporaries had only to consult the chronicles and the (*rodoslovnye knigi*) to find this story, but the Polish emphasis was something that emerged only late in the seventeenth century. See Bychkova, *Legendy*.

³⁸ Kurakin, "Gistoriia," *Arkhiv* . . . *Kurakina*, I, 64.

³⁹ Matveev's *Zapiski* was not a memoir. His own title for the work was "Gistoriia," which the editor of the first edition, I. P. Sakharov, simply replaced with his own title ("Zapiski") to fit the series he was publishing ("Zapiski russkikh liudei"). Sakharov made an autobiographical account out of a text intended as a history. See Russkaia natsional'naia biblioteka (Publichka), Osnovnoe sobranie, QIV.68 (Tolstoi Collection), QXVII.55 (Tolstoi collection), and others. Matveev wrote the work most likely toward the end of his life, certainly after 1716, for he mentions Tsarevna Natal'ia Alekseevna as dead ("Zapiski," 27) and she died in that year.

European states and Muslim ones, as the history (1622, 1703) of the Janissaries demonstrates. The Russian events, the revolt of the *strel'tsy*, are only another example of the hatred plaguing humanity from the time of Eve.⁴⁰ Thus political discord is the result of human nature.

Matveev also explained the disorder he feared by causes which came from a secularized understanding of the world which he derived from European political writers and historians.⁴¹ The musketeers rebelled, he claimed, because of their spirit of disobedience and self-will (*samovolie*), but that was a natural consequence of the commercial activity which they carried on alongside their military duties. According to Matveev, this self-will (*samovolie*) of the musketeers caused them to form a sort of republic and forget their service and its duties.⁴² Hence their rebellion.

Matveev's history had a more theoretical counterpart in the 1722 tract of Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich, *Pravda voli monarshei*, which defended Peter's succession decree by reference to the work of Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and other Western political writers.⁴³ His political thought included both historical and rationalist elements. While his *Pravda* is often cited as the first example of rationalism in Russian thought, it reveals other tendencies as well. It is perfectly true that he used certain ideas of Hugo Grotius and the

⁴⁰ Matveev, "Zapiski," 2–9.

⁴¹ At the very beginning of his narrative (5) Matveev refers to the "artful Spanish rhetorician" for his analogy of the infant Hercules for Peter's strength and courage in 1682. Unfortunately Sakharov misread the manuscript, or had a defective copy, for he gives the Spaniard's name as "Scudera," a non-existent person. The manuscripts in the Tolstoi collection of the Public library, which Sakharov claimed to consult, give the reading "Savendra." This is obviously correct, as Matveev's library contained the work of Diego de Saavedra Fajardo (1584–1648), *Idea de un principe politico christiano representada in cien empresas* (1642), in a Latin translation of 1659 (Polonskaia, *Biblioteka*, 164. See Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, *Empresas politicas*, ed. Francisco Javier Diez de Revenga, Barcelona, 1988). The reference in Matveev's text is to the first chapter of Saavedra's work, in which the author reflects upon the meanings to be found in the story of the infant Hercules strangling a snake. There may also be a reference to Machiavelli's *Prince* in the description of Sofia showing "Italian policy" in advocating sending Ivan Naryshkin to the musketeers on the ground that they would probably release him (in fact they killed him): Matveev, "Zapiski," 30.

Matveev also compared Ivan Miloslavskii to Cromwell ("Zapiski," 66) whose career he knew from Samuel Pufendorf's introduction to European history (published in Russian translation in 1718) or Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon's famous *History of the Rebellion*, both of which Matveev possessed (Clarendon in French translation).

⁴² Matveev, "Zapiski," 9: "sostavili svoiu respubliku, ili rech' popolituiu."

⁴³ Feofan Prokopovich, "Pravda voli monarshei," *PSŽ VII*, 602–43; Chistovich, *Feofan*, 119–21; G. L. Gurvich, *Pravda voli monarshei' i ee zapadno-evropeiskie istochniki*, Uchenyye zapiski imp. Iur'evskogo universiteta 11 (1915), i–ix, 1–112.

idea of natural reason, and that he certainly read Hobbes and Pufendorf. The result was a style of argument entirely new in Russia. At the same time, alongside European rationalism, Prokopovich treated the reader to a long series of historical precedents drawn from sacred and profane history, including Russian history. Both the theoretical and historical arguments aimed at the defense of hereditary monarchy against elective monarchy, on grounds of the greater utility to the state and to its subjects of hereditary monarchy. This was a long way from the moral personality of the tsar that was the central issue of Russian political thought before Peter's time.

Prokopovich was a scholar, but his writings were also aimed to convince. His ideas, like those of Matveev or Kurakin, were part of a political repertory of ideas that would have been familiar to any European nobleman. His terminology, like that of Matveev and Kurakin, was filled with neologisms taken from various European languages.⁴⁴ Notions like these did not exist in Russia in the 1690s, for they were the product of Peter's reign.

The histories and other writings of Matveev and Kurakin grew out of the political struggles at court as well as on the street. Matveev's long account of "hatred" in human affairs and his description of the boyars and gentry divided into two factions in 1682 was an obvious reference to the later years of Peter's reign. Kurakin was able to fend off suspicion of involvement in the affair of Tsarevich Aleksei and retain his diplomatic posts, but he did not hide his sympathies, even from English diplomats. Whitworth recorded in 1723 that Kurakin told him in a private conversation over dinner at Cambrai:

Prince Kurakin has given me a very dismal account of the condition to which his poor country is reduc'd by the Czar's continual exactions: He says the expedition on the Caspian sea has cost prodigiously both in Men and Money; and that the Czar's officers finding the peasant unable to pay the Taxes have at last seiz'd their Horses and cattle in several Provinces, which puts them out of a condition of plowing their lands; and this he says has brought them so low, that he has been able to draw only a thousand

⁴⁴ Matveev: "svetlye familii," "partii" (*Zapiski*, 4); Kurakin: "intrigi," "politichnye dela" ("Gistoriia," *Arkhiv . . . Kurakina*, I, 42); Prokopovich defined the words democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy for his readers. Democracy meant a republic, and his examples were Poland and Venice. By aristocracy he meant a form of government, not a form of society, and gave the Roman decemviri for an example. For monarchy his Russian equivalent was *samoderzhavie*, often with the nuance of absolute monarchy: *Pravda*, pp. 623–26.

Rubles this last year from his whole estate, which is none of the least considerable of the country. He seems persuaded that the Czar having no male issue, is grown very indolent as to the point of his succession, and does not care what becomes of it and his country when he is dead: His only ambition being now to get himself a name, and to keep up his reputation wilst he lives cost what it will; *Pereunte me pereat Mundus* [when I perish, let the world perish].⁴⁵

What both factions had concluded was that political affairs could be understood in the new European framework, and the older religious conception of politics and the state could be forgotten.

CONCLUSION

At the end of his reign, Peter left a country that had in many respects changed beyond recognition. The culture of the Russian elite was almost wholly different from that of his father's time, and the government had changed greatly in structure. The composition of the Russian elite, however, had changed much less. The pinnacle of power, in 1725 the Senate, the colleges, and the major military and diplomatic posts, still consisted of old aristocrats, relatives of the tsar, and a variety of newcomers. The aristocrats continued to play a central role in Russian politics for at least another forty years after Peter's death, and in some ways to the end of the century.

Peter did not try to systematically replace the aristocracy with meritocratic appointments. His most anti-aristocratic period was probably the years 1699–1708, when he ignored rather than replaced the aristocrats and tried to run the country through his favorites, the aristocratic Golovin and the plebeian Menshikov. From then on he sought a balance among the various components of the elite, favorites, his own relatives like the Apraksins, Naryshkins, and Saltykovs, and the old aristocrats. Menshikov was not the only favorite, and favorites could also be aristocrats. In the years 1699–1706 Golovin was more powerful than “Aleksashka” and the latter's predominance was balanced from 1710 to 1718 by the very aristocratic Prince V. V. Dolgorukii. The affair of the tsarevich left only Menshikov as a favorite, but Peter used the establishment of the colleges to reset the balance. In the last years of his life the Senate and college presidents were somewhat more “meritocratic” than

⁴⁵ British Library Additional MSS 37,392, ff. 153–53v, quoted in Black, “Anglo-Russian,” 75–76.

aristocratic, though in the diplomatic corps the aristocrats, Kurakin, the Dolgorukiis, and others, held sway. Similarly provincial governors still included mostly aristocrats and Peter's relatives, and the army command was fairly evenly balanced.

The more radical changes were in the mode of operation of the new formal institutions compared with the Duma and the chancelleries of earlier times. The earlier institutions of government were not arbitrary in their actions, but they were based to a large extent on custom rather than written procedure. They followed the Conciliar Law Code of 1649 and the many decrees of tsar and Duma, but much of their operations were still in the realm of orally recorded custom. Peter insisted on written rules of operation as well as adherence to written law. He also insisted on better record-keeping, particularly of the process of decision-making. After much prodding he forced the Senate to record not only its decisions but the process of debate that led to those decisions. This procedure was in sharp contrast to the oral, unwritten, and theoretically secret debates of the Boyar Duma. The careful records were not just a matter of bureaucratic thoroughness, they were part of the process of orderly and legal government which Peter had learned from observing Western practice.

The other aspect of politics that changed, even more radically, was the perception of political action on the part of the ruling elite. The cultural changes which Peter wrought were the source of more than just a general reorientation of political thought. In combination with the politics of the court, they produced two political groupings, which after 1718 to a large extent reflected the two factions at court. Both of these groupings conceived of politics in European, not traditional Russian terms.

The "Old Russians" conceived of themselves as striving to restore the good old times of Peter's father, creating a myth of past aristocratic predominance in the process. Not all aristocrats supported them, however, either in 1718-25 or in 1730. Further, their conception of the Russian past was something created out of reading European tracts on aristocracy or from Polish experience, not from Russian reality. As a political platform the aristocratic tendency was a failure, but it created a cultural myth that lasted into the nineteenth century. Some aspects of the myth surfaced in the Slavophile idea of pre-petrine Russia.

Their opponents formed the party of the tsar, the exponents of

“absolutism,” though they never used the word. They feared the rivalries, disorder, and weakness of the state that the aristocratic platform seems to threaten. The recent history of Poland and Sweden provided them with an object lesson, and European political thought with its emphasis on the origins of sovereignty gave them a powerful theoretical foundation. Peter himself drew similar conclusions. One of his last acts (11 September 1724) was to order the Holy Synod to find a translator for Samuel Pufendorf’s *De Officio Hominis et Civis* of 1673, a popularization of rationalist political theory in its absolutist variant.⁴⁶ Five months later Peter the Great was dead.

⁴⁶ З4 I, 148.

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