



Postcolonialism

AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Robert J. C. Young



Postcolonialism



In memory of my father
Leslie William Young
1919–2000

Thy loving kindness shall follow me all the days of my life

Postcolonialism

AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Robert J. C. Young



BLACKWELL
P u b l i s h e r s

Copyright © Robert J. C. Young 2001

The right of Robert J. C. Young to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2001

2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3 1

Blackwell Publishers Ltd
108 Cowley Road
Oxford OX4 1JF
UK

Blackwell Publishers Inc.
350 Main Street
Malden, Massachusetts 02148
USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Young, Robert J. C.

Postcolonialism : an historical introduction / Robert J. C. Young.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-631-20070-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-631-20071-1
(pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Postcolonialism—History. I. Title.

JV51 .Y68 2001

325'.3—dc21

00-010583

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Typeset in 10.5 on 12.5 pt Bembo
by Ace Filmsetting Ltd, Frome, Somerset
Printed in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents

Preface	vii
Acknowledgements	x
1 <i>Colonialism and the Politics of Postcolonial Critique</i>	1
Part I Concepts in History	13
2 <i>Colonialism</i>	15
3 <i>Imperialism</i>	25
4 <i>Neocolonialism</i>	44
5 <i>Postcolonialism</i>	57
Part II European Anti-colonialism	71
6 <i>Las Casas to Bentham</i>	73
7 <i>Nineteenth-century Liberalism</i>	88
8 <i>Marx on Colonialism and Imperialism</i>	101
Part III The Internationals	113
9 <i>Socialism and Nationalism: The First International to the Russian Revolution</i>	115
10 <i>The Third International, to the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East</i>	127
11 <i>The Women's International, the Third and the Fourth Internationals</i>	140
Part IV Theoretical Practices of the Freedom Struggles	159
12 <i>The National Liberation Movements: Introduction</i>	161
13 <i>Marxism and the National Liberation Movements</i>	167
14 <i>China, Egypt, Bandung</i>	182
15 <i>Latin America I: Mariátegui, Transculturation and Cultural Dependency</i>	193
16 <i>Latin America II: Cuba: Guevara, Castro and the Tricontinental</i>	204

17	<i>Africa I: Anglophone African Socialism</i>	217
18	<i>Africa II: Nkrumah and Pan-Africanism</i>	236
19	<i>Africa III: The Senghors and Francophone African Socialism</i>	253
20	<i>Africa IV: Fanon/Cabral</i>	274
21	<i>The Subject of Violence: Algeria, Ireland</i>	293
22	<i>India I: Marxism in India</i>	308
23	<i>India II: Gandhi's Counter-modernity</i>	317
Part V Formations of Postcolonial Theory		335
24	<i>India III: Hybridity and Subaltern Agency</i>	337
25	<i>Women, Gender and Anti-colonialism</i>	360
26	<i>Edward Said and Colonial Discourse</i>	383
27	<i>Foucault in Tunisia</i>	395
28	<i>Subjectivity and History: Derrida in Algeria</i>	411
Epilogue: Tricontinentalism, for a Transnational Social Justice		427
Bibliography		429
Index		473

Preface

In the cinema again. Earlier than last time though, in fact the first time that I ever went. Intense excitement as we walk out of the weak sunshine of late autumn into the aquamarine art deco building, through the lights of the foyer, and then down the red carpet into the darkness of the huge interior. The seats are laid out above me in the balcony; below me, the huge screen hiding behind a heavy folded curtain that is drawn back and forth at strategic moments. Before the film begins, the Pathé news-reel starts. Suddenly, huge black and white pictures of the streets of Budapest, bare trees punctuating the tall dark nineteenth-century apartment blocks. Tanks are rolling down the cobbled streets along the tramlines, people are rushing to and fro, children throwing Molotov cocktails at the tanks. It is November 1956, and Imre Nagy has in vain declared Hungary's neutrality and asked for help from the West. The State Department has assured Khrushchev that the US will not interfere, and the Russian army has moved in to 'save' the Hungarian people from themselves and democratic self-determination. The camera gives us a pause from these cruel hopeless scenes, and soon we are in Port Said, its bright sun bleaching the contrast from the picture. The sky goes dark as the camera switches to a blazing refinery. Then there is a dark strip going from upper-right to lower-left: the Suez Canal. British and French troops have landed to save it from Nasser's nationalization – even though the British left the India to which it leads almost ten years before. Suddenly, the British viewer, young or old, is on the other side, carried over by the metaphors of power. 'Our troops', as the announcer puts it in his crisp, full voice, have moved in to repress a nationalist rebellion and to save the world from the man whom Eden saw as another Hitler. After these two sequences in black and white of dark, militant troops impassively carrying out their tasks of domination by force, the main feature film begins in bright, dramatic colours, with lush musical sounds. It is Walt Disney's *Bambi*.

While writing this book, I have been haunted by two photographs. Black and white from the fifties, from the same contradictory years of my childhood. They are both photographs of Algerians. Both interpellate me with the transgendering force of colonial power, and the brute reality of its realization. The first I came across in a battered paperback entitled *La Bataille d'Alger* that I bought one hot summer

afternoon while wandering around the Arab quarter of Manosque with my small children. The book is not related to the film of the same title: it is a propaganda effort produced by the French *colons* – the French settlers in Algeria – in April 1957 while the battle of Algiers was still taking place. It includes a number of photographs showing the military in a positive light in their relations with the Algerian people. The frontispiece shows a smiling soldier with a rifle, walking along holding the hands of two young girls, the elder of whom wears a veil. Another photograph shows the same soldier, still smiling, standing beneath a battered traffic sign warning of a school, portraying two children crossing the road. He shakes the hand of a smiling toddler, whose mother, fully veiled, stands behind with two more smiling children: the caption reads ‘Nous retournons à l’école. Merci, Monsieur’. The photograph that haunts me, however, is of two older girls, still teenagers I would guess, unveiled, and apparently in western clothes, who stand side by side, looking up out of the picture to the side. Their look is intense and completely serious, while at the same time the very intensity of the close-up shot gives the photograph a slightly sensual aura. One girl has her hair up, slightly frizzy and unkempt, her hand on the zip of her raincoat, her fingers pulling it up over the layers of clothes beneath. Her mouth is shut, set firmly like her defiant eyes. The other has her hair let down to her shoulders, rimless glasses, a scarf tied neatly around her neck, between the lapels of her coat. Her lips are slightly parted, her gaze no less unyielding. The caption reads: ‘Les “porteuses de bombes” des stades: l’âge de Juliette, l’âme de Ravachol’. These are presumably photographs of Djouher Akhror and Baya Hocine, the young women arrested for planting the bombs at the stadium in Algiers and El-Biar on 10 February 1957. The bombings with which the battle of Algiers opened represented a major shock to the life of the *colons*, signalling that the war for independence was being brought against them in their everyday activities. The police quickly arrested what the book describes as ‘une sinistre collection de bandits, agrémentée de deux jeunes filles qui avait reçu mission, sachant qu’elles ne seraient pas fouillées, de porter les bombes jusqu’aux lieux du crime’. The author comments that by March, four of those arrested were condemned to death by a military tribunal. Were the young women among them? Were they submitted to the interrogation procedures and summary executions which, even in France, became known simply as *la torture*? Did they share the fate of Djamila Boupacha (de Beauvoir and Halimi 1962)? How different they look from those smiling children in the frontispiece photograph. Their solemn faces raised defiantly, the intensity of their gaze signalling their complete refusal to submit to their captors. Algeria unveiled indeed. How many liberation struggles, from Algeria to Kenya, from India to Ireland, from Vietnam to South Africa, were waged by women as brave and uncompromising as these?

Tough women in the first photograph, a feminized man in the second. I saw it in the second volume of a history of the Algerian war (Courrière 1968–71): I glanced at it only for a moment, but cannot erase it from my memory. The caption between it and a photograph of bodies below it reads ‘Victimes musulmanes des “Ratissages”’. The pictures are small, with poor contrast, slightly fuzzy, amateur. Many of them in this section show atrocities of various kinds: bodies and indistinguishable parts of

bodies, of children and adults, clothed, naked or burnt, lying on the ground. These 'nature morte' representations are interspersed with another which at first looks like a completely different scene, of four European men standing in an open field, smiling and laughing at the camera, clearly in great spirits, holding another up as if giving him 'the bumps', the boisterous homoerotic play of sportsmen. They wear wide hats, he does not. The man that they carry in their arms is naked, and is clearly Algerian. His legs are held spread apart, raised high in the air, his circumcised genitals brazenly exposed like a contorted 'spread-shot' in a pornographic magazine. His face is one of abject fear, misery and terror. Yet he looks at the camera for the shot, automatically perhaps, as if he were posing for any conventional photograph (if indeed he had ever posed for a photograph before), or was he appealing to its gaze and beyond that to the photographer whose eye it had become? What were the *colons* about to do to him, as he was posed for the photograph, poised between life and death? The possibilities are all too obvious, his vulnerability too self-consciously dramatized for there to be much doubt.

For me, the postcolonial remains always marked by these images, preserving the traces of the violence, defiance, struggles and suffering of individuals, that represent the political ideals of community, equality, self-determination and dignity for which they fought. One and a half million Algerians died in the war for independence. This photograph records the event of just one of them: the subject of violence, of colonial degradation, caught at the liminal brink of a gratuitous, inhuman death.

Acknowledgements

Versions of chapters of this book have been given as papers in lectures, seminars and conferences at many places over the past few years – I have very much appreciated all the responses, critiques and help that I have received in thinking through the issues involved. While not going quite so far as Walter Rodney in his acknowledgements to *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, where he refuses to take individual responsibility for mistakes, I would like to acknowledge the intellectual solidarity of collective intellectuals – individual friends, colleagues and students – who have assisted me in many general and specific ways. I have benefited immeasurably from discussions, whether on large points or on small. My warm thanks, therefore, to Isobel Armstrong, Nilanjana Banerji, Eitan Bar-Yosef, Geoffrey Bennington, Elleke Boehmer, Kingsley Bolton, Rosinka Chaudhuri, Ban Kah Choon, Arif Dirlik, Aida Edemariam, Maud Ellmann, Robin Fiddian, Kate Flint, Tadgh Foley, Giles Fraser, Indira Ghose, Luke Gibbons, Robbie Goh, John Gurney, Elaine Ho, Stephen Howe, Christina Howells, Christopher Hutton, Belinda Jack, Suvir Kaul, Douglas Kerr, Neil Lazarus, Gregory B. Lee, Ania Loomba, Matthew Meadows, Jon Mee, Bart Moore-Gilbert, Susheila Nasta, Bernard O'Donoghue, Lionel Pilkington, Bruce Robbins, Sara Salih, Rumina Sethi, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Harish Trivedi, Megan Vaughan, Gauri Viswanathan and Wangui wa Goro. Homi Bhabha, Lyn Innes, Lois McNay, Benita Parry, Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, Nicholas Royle and Else Vieira have given me the benefit of detailed critical appraisals of particular chapters in their own areas of expertise, and I am very greatly indebted to them for this. I also thank my colleagues at *Interventions*, particularly Alison Donnell, Ato Quayson and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, who have been a constant source of inspiration, support and orientation. Anita Roy, who encouraged me to begin this book, deserves particular gratitude. Ruvani Ranasinha has consistently engaged with me in an active political and theoretical interrogation of many of the issues discussed here, for which heartfelt thanks are due. Homi K. Bhabha has been close to this project since its inception, and has responded throughout with his characteristic warmth, acumen and intellectual solidarity – a *compañero* indeed. I owe a special debt to Rita Kothari who facilitated my research in India, translated texts from Gujarati for me, has patiently answered the many questions that

I put to her, and corrected me where necessary. My analysis of Gandhi is indebted to her throughout, but I would particularly mention the analysis of the term 'samās', for which she is the source of all the linguistic discussion. I would also like to thank Abhijit for his hospitality and Shamini for her friendship. In India, I particularly benefited from discussions with Siddharth Bhatt, Jitendra Desai of the Navajivan Press, and Tridip Suhrud who all generously gave me their time and helped me with their expertise. I have been very fortunate in having Andrew McNeillie as my editor. I am also very grateful to Jack Messenger for his careful copy-editing of the manuscript. My thanks to Badral Kaler for her generous support and forbearance, and to my children, Maryam, Yasmine and Isaac, my beloved early morning visitors during the writing of this book.

I am very grateful to the British Academy for providing me with research leave which enabled me to complete this project. The Oxford English Faculty and the News International Fund generously contributed to funding for my research in India. During the writing of this book, I have been very lucky in having access to the holdings of the Bodleian Library; I would particularly like to thank the librarians at the Indian Institute, Rhodes House and Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, who have been very helpful in assisting me with tracking down material. I am also indebted to the directors and librarians at the Sabarmati Ashram and the Navajivan Press in Ahmedabad, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murti House, and the National Gandhi Museum in New Delhi, for allowing me access to their archives and library holdings. Finally, I should like to thank the Warden and fellows of Wadham College, Oxford, for providing such supportive conditions in which to work.

A few paragraphs in chapter 27 appeared in a different form in 'Foucault on Race and Colonialism', *New Formations* 25 (1995), 57–65. An earlier version of chapter 28 was published in *Deconstructions: A User's Guide*, ed. Nicholas Royle (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 187–210, and is reprinted here by permission of the publishers. Throughout, all italic for emphasis in quoted material is reproduced from the original.

Colonialism and the Politics of Postcolonial Critique

In May 2000, Survival, a worldwide organization supporting the rights of tribal peoples, marked the 500th anniversary of the arrival of the first Europeans in Brazil by launching a campaign for land ownership for Brazilian Indians. Entitled 'Brazil: 500 years of resistance', Survival's publicity leaflets highlighted a *tristes tropiques* history of exploitation and genocide:

When the Portuguese set foot in Brazil, there were five million indigenous peoples. As the invaders introduced disease, slavery and violence, indigenous peoples were virtually wiped out. Today they number 330,000.

Indigenous peoples in Brazil still face eviction from their land, violence, and disease at the hands of loggers, settlers, goldminers and powerful politicians and business.

The contemporary gold rush in the Amazon has repeated the conditions of the rubber boom that occurred there at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1910, Sir Roger Casement, a former member of the British Consular Service, was asked by the British government to investigate allegations of atrocities committed against the Putumayo Indians by the Peruvian Amazon Company, a British company engaged in the extraction of rubber on the Brazil–Peru border. Casement was an Irishman who, with E. D. Morel, had earlier been instrumental in exposing the atrocities carried out in the so-called Congo Free State about which Conrad had written in *Heart of Darkness* (1899). Michael Taussig has argued convincingly that Casement can be linked to Kurtz in that novel (Taussig 1986). While in Africa, Casement became sceptical towards the idea of the civilizing claims of imperialism, a scepticism that was only increased by what he found in the Amazon basin.

Treatment of the tribal people

These are not only murdered, flogged, chained up like wild beasts, hunted far and wide and their dwellings burnt, their wives raped, their children dragged away to slavery and outrage, but are shamelessly swindled into the bargain. These are strong words, but not adequately strong. The condition of things is the most disgraceful, the most lawless, the most inhuman, I believe that exists in the world today. It far exceeds in depravity and

demoralization the Congo regime at its worst. . . . The slavery under which they suffer is an abominable, an atrocious one. . . . It is appalling to think of all the suffering so-called Spanish and Portuguese civilization has wantonly inflicted on these people. (Casement 1997: 294–5)

On his return, he submitted a report verifying the atrocities to the British government. In a fine historical irony, Casement, the urbane colonized subject, found himself at the centre of a campaign for the human rights of ‘free’ postcolonial indigenous Brazilians. That historical irony was to be reinforced six years later when the same British government which had knighted him and persuaded him to go to Brazil on its behalf, executed Casement on a charge of High Treason on 3 August 1916. He had been arrested on Banna Strand in County Kerry, on his return to Ireland from Berlin in a German U-boat, hours before the Dublin Easter Rising. It is not only Latin America, therefore, that has operated within the disjunctive time-lags of colonial and postcolonial modernity. Nor, as this story shows, was there necessarily any political disjunction between anti- and postcolonialism. Whereas postcolonialism has become associated with diaspora, transnational migration and internationalism, anti-colonialism is often identified exclusively, too exclusively, with a provincial nationalism. From the Boer War onwards, however, it rather took the form of a national internationalism. Like postcolonialism, anti-colonialism was a diasporic production, a revolutionary mixture of the indigenous and the cosmopolitan, a complex constellation of situated local knowledges combined with radical, universal political principles, constructed and facilitated through international networks of party cells and organizations, and widespread political contacts between different revolutionary organizations that generated common practical information and material support as well as spreading radical political and intellectual ideas. This decentred anti-colonial network, not just a Black Atlantic but a revolutionary Black, Asian and Hispanic globalization, with its own dynamic counter-modernity, was constructed in order to fight global imperialism, demonstrating in the process for our own times that ‘global-ization’ does not necessarily involve irresistible totalization.

By the time of the First World War, imperial powers occupied, or by various means controlled, nine-tenths of the surface territory of the globe; Britain governed one-fifth of the area of the world and a quarter of its population. ‘For the first time’, Lenin noted in 1916, ‘the world is completely divided up, so that in the future *only* redivision is possible’ (Lenin 1968: 223). With no space left for territorial expansion, the unsatiated empires turned inwards and attempted to devour each other. After the Great War, the two contiguous empires of Austria-Hungary and Turkey were broken up, and Germany was deprived of its overseas colonies. Germany subsequently tried to turn Europe itself into its colonial empire in an enormous act of migrationist colonialism reworked into the ideology of *Lebensraum*: it was the great Martiniquan writer, activist and statesman Aimé Césaire who first pointed out that fascism was a form of colonialism brought home to Europe (Césaire 1972; W. D. Smith 1986). For the colonial powers the cost of liberation or victory over Germany was the gradual

dismemberment of their colonial empires, while defeated Italy lost all its pre-war colonies in 1945. Japan, which had fought a war of imperialist rivalry with the European colonial powers and, particularly, the United States over Southeast Asia and the Pacific, was deprived of its overseas territorial possessions.

Aside from the colonies of the fascist regimes of Spain and Portugal (which had remained technically neutral during the war), the increasingly fascist apartheid regime of South Africa, and the expanded empires of the Soviet Union and the United States, decolonization by the seven remaining colonial powers of 1945 (Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand) occurred relatively quickly. Indian independence in 1947 began a process of European decolonization that is now largely complete, even if the list of colonies, dependent, trust and uninhabited territories, overseas departments, and other such names signifying colonial status in some form is still surprisingly long (still-extant colonies that enjoy a wide diversity of labels designating their subordinate status as dependent territories include British Gibraltar, the Falklands/Malvinas and a dozen other islands; Danish Greenland; Dutch Antilles; French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, St Pierre and Miquelon, off Newfoundland; US Puerto Rico, Samoa, Virgin Islands; Spanish Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands). Many of the islands of the Pacific remain colonies of France and the US. Although the United States, as a former colony, can according to Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (1989) claim technically to be 'postcolonial', it soon went on to become a colonial power itself. The USA, the world's last significant remaining colonial power, continues to control territories that, without reference to the wishes of their indigenous inhabitants, were annexed (Hawaii in 1898, indeed the entire USA from the point of view of native Americans), taken during wars (California, Texas, Nevada, Utah, most of Arizona and New Mexico, part of Colorado and Wyoming, Puerto Rico, Guam), or that were bought from other imperial powers, transactions which, on the analogy of the argument that the Elgin Marbles should be returned to Greece because they were bought by Lord Elgin while Greece was under foreign domination, can no longer be regarded as legitimate (the Louisiana purchase from France in 1803 (\$15 million), the purchase of Florida from Spain in 1819, Alaska from the Russian Imperial government in 1867 for \$7.2 million; in 1916, in what Tovalou Houénou described as a modern form of the slave trade, the Virgin Islands and their inhabitants were bought from Denmark for \$25 million).

The postcolonial era now involves comparable, but somewhat different kinds of anti-colonial struggles in those countries more recently occupied: East Timor, invaded by Indonesia when a Portuguese colony, now finally independent after a long war of resistance; Tibet by China, Taiwan by nationalist Chinese, Kashmir by India (since the initial dispute over the territory with Pakistan in 1947 was referred to the United Nations, India has stubbornly refused to carry out a UN recommendation to hold a plebiscite of Kashmir's largely Muslim population to determine whether Kashmir should become independent, or part of India or Pakistan; it continues to occupy the country by military force in the face of fierce local resistance); the Sarhaoui Democratic Arab Republic (Western Sahara) by Morocco, Palestine and the West Bank by Israel – and, as Rodinson (1973) argues, the state of Israel itself; those First

Nations seeking independence from sovereign nation-states (in Canada, Ethiopia, New Zealand, USA) or by indigenous peoples in border territories seeking independence (the Kurds, the Tamils, the Uyghur), or those suffering from the decisions of decolonization who seek union with an adjacent decolonized state (the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland who wish to join a united Ireland), or those tribal peoples who seek nothing more than their own survival, or those who were forcibly transported under colonial occupation, many of whom wish to but cannot return to their own country (the Koreans in Japan), or those fourth-world nations who seek the basic rights of legal and social equality (native Americans, the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, the so-called denotified tribes in India, the hill tribes in Bangladesh, the Ainu in Japan), or those suffering from the social stigma of caste exclusion (the Untouchables in India, the Burakumin in Japan), or disadvantaged ethnic minorities and impoverished classes in most countries of the world.

These struggles go on side by side while both Europe and the decolonized countries still try to come to terms with the long, violent history of colonialism, which symbolically began over five hundred years ago, in 1492: a history which includes histories of slavery, of untold, unnumbered deaths from oppression or neglect, of the enforced migration and diaspora of millions of peoples – Africans, Americans, Arabs, Asians and Europeans, of the appropriation of territories and of land, of the institutionalization of racism, of the destruction of cultures and the superimposition of other cultures (Chaliand and Rageau 1995; Ferro 1997). Postcolonial cultural critique involves the reconsideration of this history, particularly from the perspectives of those who suffered its effects, together with the defining of its contemporary social and cultural impact. This is why postcolonial theory always intermingles the past with the present, why it is directed towards the active transformations of the present out of the clutches of the past (Sardar, Nandy, Wyn Davies 1993). The postcolonial does not privilege the colonial. It is concerned with colonial history only to the extent that that history has determined the configurations and power structures of the present, to the extent that much of the world still lives in the violent disruptions of its wake, and to the extent that the anti-colonial liberation movements remain the source and inspiration of its politics. If colonial history, particularly in the nineteenth century, was the history of the imperial appropriation of the world, the history of the twentieth century has witnessed the peoples of the world taking power and control back for themselves. Postcolonial theory is itself a product of that dialectical process.

As a political discourse, the position from which it is enunciated (wherever literally spoken, or published) is located on the three continents of the South, that is, the 'Third World'. The disadvantages of the term 'Third World' have been well rehearsed. It has been subject to sustained criticism, either because identification with it has been perceived as anti-Marxist (Marxist states made up the 'Second World'), or because the notion of 'third' came to carry a negative aura in a hierarchical relation to the first and second, and gradually became associated with poverty, debt, famine and conflict (Hadjor 1993: 3–11). In this book, therefore, the term 'Third World' will be generally avoided, and the geographical, locational and cultural description of the 'three continents' and the 'tricontinental' (i.e. Latin America, Africa and Asia),

endorsed by Anouar Abdel-Malek after the first conference of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America at Havana in 1966, will be used instead (Abdel-Malek 1981, 2: 21; Gerassi 1971, 2: 745–60). It avoids the problems of the ‘Third World’, the bland homogenization of ‘the South’, and the negative definition of ‘the non-west’ which also implies a complete dichotomy between the west and the rest which two or more centuries of imperialism have hardly allowed. Above all, the tricontinental marks an identification with the great Havana Tricontinental of 1966, which initiated the first global alliance of the peoples of the three continents against imperialism, and the founding moment of postcolonial theory in its journal, the *Tricontinental*. The problems associated with the term ‘postcolonial’ will be discussed in chapter 5. Suffice it to say at this point that postcolonialism might well be better named ‘tricontinentalism’, a term which exactly captures its internationalist political identifications, as well as the source of its epistemologies.

Postcolonial – or tricontinental – critique is united by a common political and moral consensus towards the history and legacy of western colonialism. It presupposes that the history of European expansion and the occupation of most of the global land-mass between 1492 and 1945, mark a process that was both specific and problematic. The claim of this history is that there was something particular about colonialism: it was not just any old oppression, any old form of injustice, or any old series of wars and territorial occupations. Modernity theorists such as Ernst Gellner have objected that colonialism does not really merit particular attention in itself, in that its forms of oppression were really no different from those of any other conquest or assertion of power in the past, or indeed from those practised within either traditional and modern societies. Gellner argues that ‘the recent domination of the world by the west can be seen . . . as primarily an aspect of the transformation of the world by a new technology, economy, and science which happens, owing to the uneven nature of its diffusion, to engender a temporary and unstable imbalance of power’ (Gellner 1993: 3). On this reading colonialism was merely the unfortunate accident of modernity, its only problem resulting from the fact that the west mistook technological advance and the power that it brought for cultural superiority. To sweep colonialism under the carpet of modernity, however, is too convenient a deflection. To begin with, its history was extraordinary in its global dimension, not only in relation to the comprehensiveness of colonization by the time of the high imperial period in the late nineteenth century, but also because the effect of the globalization of western imperial power was to fuse many societies with different historical traditions into a history which, apart from the period of centrally controlled command economies, obliged them to follow the same general economic path. The entire world now operates within the economic system primarily developed and controlled by the west, and it is the continued dominance of the west, in terms of political, economic, military and cultural power, that gives this history a continuing significance. Political liberation did not bring economic liberation – and without economic liberation, there can be no political liberation.

Whereas western expansion was carried out with the moral justification that it was of benefit for all those nations brought under its sway, the values of that spreading of

the light of civilization have now been effectively contested. This process has been going on for much of the twentieth century, particularly since the two world wars, the effect of which was not only to show that the imperial powers were militarily vulnerable, particularly to the non-western power of imperial Japan, but also to cause them to lose the hitherto unquestioned moral superiority of the values of western civilization, in the name of which much colonization had been justified. The west was relativized: the decline of the west as an ideology was irretrievable. Colonialism may have brought some benefits of modernity, as its apologists continue to argue, but it also caused extraordinary suffering in human terms, and was singularly destructive with regard to the indigenous cultures with which it came into contact. For its part, postcolonial critique can hardly claim to be the first to question the ethics of colonialism: indeed, anti-colonialism is as old as colonialism itself. What makes it distinctive is the comprehensiveness of its research into the continuing cultural and political ramifications of colonialism in both colonizing and colonized societies. This reveals that the values of colonialism seeped much more widely into the general culture, including academic culture, than had ever been assumed. That archeological retrieval and revaluation is central to much activity in the postcolonial field. Postcolonial theory involves a political analysis of the cultural history of colonialism, and investigates its contemporary effects in western and tricontinental cultures, making connections between that past and the politics of the present.

The assumption of postcolonial studies is that many of the wrongs, if not crimes, against humanity are a product of the economic dominance of the north over the south. In this way, the historical role of Marxism in the history of anti-colonial resistance remains paramount as the fundamental framework of postcolonial thinking. Postcolonial theory operates within the historical legacy of Marxist critique on which it continues to draw but which it simultaneously transforms according to the precedent of the greatest tricontinental anti-colonial intellectual politicians. For much of the twentieth century, it was Marxism alone which emphasized the effects of the imperialist system and the dominating power structure involved, and in sketching out blueprints for a future free from domination and exploitation most twentieth-century anti-colonial writing was inspired by the possibilities of socialism. The contribution of tricontinental theorists was to mediate the translatability of Marxist revolutionary theory with the untranslatable features of specific non-European historical and cultural contexts. Marxism, which represents both a form of revolutionary politics and one of the richest and most complex theoretical and philosophical movements in human history, has always been in some sense anti-western, since it was developed by Marx as a critique of western social and economic practices and the values which they embodied. The Bolsheviks themselves always identified their revolution as 'Eastern'.

If the bulk of anti-colonialist activism and activist writing in the twentieth century has operated from a Marxist perspective, for the most part it is a Marxism which has been aware of the significance of subjective conditions for the creation of a revolutionary situation, and therefore a Marxism which has been pragmatically modified to suit non-western conditions and which does not, as a result, altogether coincide with

that of the classical mainstream. As a result of that history, postcolonial Marxism does not necessarily come in recognizable universal western forms – though, in being a flexible Marxism, able to transform itself continually in response to specific historical conditions, without ever becoming dogmatically fixed, it remains close to the spirit of Marx and, particularly, Lenin. Lenin's 'orientation toward Asia and Africa' after the Bolshevik revolution, as the great Trinidadian socialist George Padmore observed, 'was a violent departure from orthodox Marxist strategy' (Lenin 1988: 233; Friedland and Rosberg 1964: 225). Postcolonialism incorporates a Marxism developed outside, and generally neglected in the west; a flexible Marxism responsive to local conditions in the three continents. There is no need to call this 'post-Marxism' – after all, capitalism transforms itself often enough without becoming 'post-capitalism' (and, it might be added, enough capitalist states have collapsed without it being subsequently assumed that this signals the end of capitalism). Postcolonial cultural critique integrates its Marxism with the politics of international rights, in doing so focusing on the central problematic for Marxism as a political philosophy, namely how socialism can be developed in a popular rather than coercive form. Human rights, including peoples' rights, should be recognized as an area of activism that supplements and supports the basic presuppositions and objectives of Marxist political theory and its commitment to human justice. It operates as an adjunct to the now recognized history of oppression by non-democratic states of all political persuasions – capitalist, socialist, militarist and fascist, in all their varieties – while also drawing attention to other marginalized forms of oppression.

Postcolonial theory is distinguished from orthodox European Marxism by combining its critique of objective material conditions with detailed analysis of their subjective effects. For this reason, it has also played a significant part in the growing culturalism of contemporary political, social and historical analysis. Some regard this culturalist tendency as a typical symptom of contemporary capitalist culture rather than an analysis that provides a critical perspective on its underlying dynamics. In this account, postcolonialism at best describes the effects of contemporary social and economic conditions, but does little either to unearth their causes or to change their basis. However, such an emphasis is not exclusive to postcolonialism: even western Marxism has been marked by increasing interest in the Frankfurt School and the British cultural materialists. In the case of the postcolonial, this development is hardly recent. Cultural politics is itself the product of the notion of cultural revolution first developed by Third World socialists and communists – by Connolly, Mariátegui, Mao, Fanon, Cabral – as a strategy for resisting the ideological infiltrations of colonialism and neocolonialism. The need for what Mao in 1944 called 'The United Front in Cultural Work' signalled the inadequacy of western Marxist economism and class politics for tricontinental societies in those situations (Mao 1965, III: 185–7). Although cultural politics was first developed as the highly visible project of the Gaelic revival by Irish intellectuals more concerned with constructing an anti-bourgeois Irish identity than with Irish independence (Foster 1988: 455), it was subsequently adopted in Ireland and elsewhere as an important means of developing anti-colonial consciousness that would unify anti-colonial struggle. It was widely promoted in

various forms by the liberation movements, while in the 1960s, cultural revolution, inspired by the Cultural Revolution in China, was adopted as a political model by feminists and black activists in the west and in the three continents. In 1969, for example, the Organisation of African Unity's First All African Cultural Festival, held in Algiers, affirmed in its Manifesto the important role of African culture in the national liberation struggle, and in the economic and social development of Africa:

Culture starts with the people as creators of themselves and transformers of their environment. Culture, in its widest and most complete sense, enables men to give shape to their lives. It is not freely received but built up by the people. . . . Africa's struggle has provided both material and spiritual structures within which African culture can develop and thus prove the natural dialectical correlation between national liberation and culture. For the African countries which won their freedom and for those that are in armed conflict with the colonial powers culture has been and will remain a weapon. In all cases, armed struggle for liberation was and is a pre-eminently cultural act. (Langley 1979: 791–3)

There is nothing to apologize for in the idea of cultural politics – it has always been central to the practice of liberation, and radical activists still have much to learn from its demonstrated political effectivity in developing broad-based mass movements (Mazrui 1990). For those on the left, particularly those working predominantly from an academic context, it may seem that culturalism involves a move away from more direct kinds of political action, but there are many positive theoretical arguments to be made for it: the culturalization of academic knowledges marks a shift towards a consideration of the subjective experiences of individuals, and socialized aspirations of groups and communities, that complements the traditional modes of analysis of the political and economic systems of which they form a part. The culturalization of knowledge and politics also involves a recognition of transnational and often gendered cultural differences and the significance of different forms of knowledge for different communities. This has enabled the beginnings of an international political dialogue between exponents of different systems and perspectives that rarely occurred in previous eras (Robbins 1999). One example would be the ways in which it has begun to transform the agenda and practice of a mainstream political and economic activities such as Development Studies, where previously disregarded local knowledge and practices of indigenous men and women have at last begun to be taken seriously (Munck and O'Hearn 1999).

That dialogue often starts from a recognition that global power structures have not materially shifted since the end of the imperial era. Although this may seem to be self-evidently the case, this argument can run the risk of passing over the differences between the two eras, in particular by homogenizing 'the west' as well as the 'three continents' and undervaluing the economic, cultural and diasporic imbrication of the north with the south. Fanon followed Sartre's translation of Marx's dialectic of ruling vs. working classes, via Lenin's oppressed vs. oppressor nations, into a dialectic of colonizer vs. colonized. In a post-independence era this has sometimes been transformed into a further general global opposition between the first world (dominant)

and the third (subaltern). Apart from the extent to which the west includes millions of migrants, recent and not so recent, from the three continents, this simple division overrides and ignores the fact of class division within both: capitalism exploits western workers as it exploits migrant labourers, or workers in third-world factories. Postcolonial critics recognize that north–south divisions do not devalue the struggles of those oppressed through class or minoritarian status within the heartlands of contemporary capitalism. Colonialism always operated internally as well as externally, and the stratification of societies still continues. The radical political argument of a fundamental parity between those positioned at the same level in all societies was at the centre of the grand but simple internationalist slogan of the Communist Manifesto: ‘Workers of the world unite!’ With this injunction, Marx and Engels argued for a common approach to oppression that refuses the trap of getting caught up in nationalist oppositions and the elaboration of the narcissism of minor differences between the ideologies of nations and national identities, in favour of a collectivist activism by workers of subaltern classes around the globe. The liberation movements against the colonial powers worked in parallel, and in solidarity, with the struggles of the European working class in the metropolis, just as class struggle in India provided a historical model and well-developed practice for relations with the colonial and post-independence powers.

Today this historic international solidarity between workers against the forces of capitalism, central to any Marxist political practice, continues (Cohen and Rai 2000; Sinha, Guy and Woollacott 1999). It has also, however, often been abandoned through a simplistic assumption that ‘the west’ and all who live in it (including migrants who may have become postcolonial critics) are the agents of capitalism, while the non-west and all who live in it (including even the wealthy neocolonial elites) are not (Pasture and Verberckmoes 1998). This simplification is particularly evident in historical accounts of colonialism and imperialism, where it sometimes seems to be assumed that all Europeans were *ipso facto* imperialists, and all non-Europeans the victims of imperialism. In fact, the United States was the only democratic government which participated in colonial expansion (Schneider 1982: xix). In France, women did not get the vote until 1945. In the British case, a minority elite, the ruling upper class, controlled Britain as well as the British Empire well into the twentieth century: Britain and the British people were their first imperial realm (Riddell 1993: 69; Trotsky 1970). As Goldwin Smith, the radical Regius Professor of History at Oxford, argued in 1863, it was not the people but the parasitical ‘imperial class’ in Britain that benefited from the Empire (Smith 1863: 74). Universal suffrage was finally conceded in Britain in 1928, only three years earlier than it was granted in the colony of Ceylon, and historically coincides in fact with the beginnings of decolonization (de Silva 1981: 422). Even now, at the time of writing, Britain is not constitutionally democratic: the upper chamber of the British parliament (the House of Lords) still contains aristocrats whose right to vote on the affairs of the country is determined solely by the accident of their ‘noble’ birth. In the colonial era the British ruling class was as indifferent to its own working class as it was to colonized peoples: both were subject to persistent devaluation of their own cultures and both were used instrumentally for the creation

of private wealth. 'For what else was the British people', asks A. P. Thornton, '– in 1908 a population of 30 million, of which only 1 million earned above £3 a week, and wherein some 30,000 gentlemen owned 96 per cent of the land – but the largest "native race" of which imperialism had cognisance?' (Thornton 1985: 269). The oppressions carried out by colonial regimes on colonized peoples were callous and brutal, but no more so than the slaughter of millions of conscripted European soldiers – 'the mass destruction of the European proletariat', as Rosa Luxemburg observed – alongside hundreds of thousands of conscripted as well as recruited colonial soldiers from Africa and India, ordered by the European ruling classes during the First World War in the furtherance of their own interests (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 145).

In this situation, the Bolshevik revolution that emerged from the deprivation and destruction of the First World War changed the whole dynamic not only of European class politics, but also of imperial and colonial relations: for the first time, a government of a powerful state was explicitly opposed to western imperialism in principle and practice. It was Lenin's Comintern that in 1920 offered the first systematic programme for global decolonization in its 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions'. Since then, most Marxist states have been physically located outside Europe: in Russia, Asia, Africa and South America. Postcolonial critique incorporates the legacy of the syncretic traditions of Marxisms that developed outside the west in the course of anti-colonial struggles, and subsequently in the development of the further forms of emancipation, of gender, ethnicity and class, necessary for liberation from bourgeois nationalism. As a result, it is theoretically and historically fundamentally hybrid, the product of the clash of cultures that brought it into being; it is interdisciplinary and transcultural in its theory and has been in its effects (Bhabha 1994). Postcolonial critique is therefore a form of activist writing that looks back to the political commitment of the anti-colonial liberation movements and draws its inspiration from them, while recognizing that they often operated under conditions very different from those that exist in the present. Its orientation will change according to the political priorities of the moment, but its source in the revolutionary activism of the past gives it a constant basis and inspiration: it too is dedicated to changing those who were formerly the objects of history into history's new subjects.

The historical formation and theoretical production of these very diverse origins constitute the main subject of this book. Given the extensive range of material, this account makes no claim to be comprehensive: at best, it signals avenues for further study and research. The process of the full retrieval of revolutionary anti-colonial history still has far to go. These histories involve many distinct narratives, products of particular situations and contexts. If they have given rise to comparable political and theoretical accounts, then this is the result of the structural homology of domination by an exotic power. At the same time, since anti-colonial revolutionaries were themselves increasingly in touch with each other in different ways during the course of the twentieth century, a political and theoretical convergence took place that laid the basis for the field of 'the postcolonial'. What becomes clear from this history is that both intellectual and political positions have always been situated in relation to

contemporary entrenchments of power; when detached from these, theories do not necessarily carry their radical political effectivity with them. They must always be reshaped, resituated and redirected according to the specific, contingent location of the moment. The politics of theory conceived as a form of activism will always be that it intervenes in a particular institutional, social or cultural framework against the presuppositions or politics of its adversary. Once that context has passed, or been changed, then for the most part, the political impact of a strategic intervention is lost. Theories also have a history, and must be historically situated if their politics are to be understood. Without such directedness, postcolonial theory can easily find itself making anti-imperialist arguments that have already become part of the new dominant ideology of transnational capitalism. Theory cannot operate politically if it is conceived as operating only at a disembodied synchronic level, as if it exists in an atemporal space, without consideration of its impact in relation to specific conditions at a particular moment.

Postcolonial critique focuses on forces of oppression and coercive domination that operate in the contemporary world: the politics of anti-colonialism and neocolonialism, race, gender, nationalisms, class and ethnicities define its terrain. Interest in oppression of the past will always be guided by the relation of that history to the present. In that sense, postcolonial theory's intellectual commitment will always be to seek to develop new forms of engaged theoretical work that contributes to the creation of dynamic ideological and social transformation. Its object, as defined by Cabral (1969), is the pursuit of liberation after the achievement of political independence. It constitutes a directed intellectual production that seeks to articulate itself with different forms of emancipatory politics, to synthesize different kinds of work towards the realization of common goals that include the creation of equal access to material, natural, social and technological resources, the contestation of forms of domination, whether economic, cultural, religious, ethnic or gendered, and the articulation and assertion of collective forms of political and cultural identity. Above all, the assumption guiding postcolonial critique is that it is possible to make effective political interventions within and beyond its own disciplinary field by developing significant connections between the different forms of intellectual engagement and activism in the world today.

Part I

Concepts in History

Colonialism

1 COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM: DEFINING THE TERMS

The argument of this book is that postcolonial critique (and the historical basis of its theoretical formulations) is the product of resistance to colonialism and imperialism. Although it has been suggested that the 'post' of postcolonial is not simply a historical marker, and that the postcolonial includes any historical form of resistance to colonialism (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1989), that anachronistic argument will not be proposed here, except in relation to the anachronisms of history itself: many South American colonies, for example, became independent states before the formation of some of the European states responsible for the high noon of imperialism. The terms 'colonialism', 'imperialism', 'neocolonialism' and 'postcolonialism' will here be defined historically as well as conceptually. Knowledge of the histories that they name is essential for any engagement with postcolonial critique. The comprehensive Marxist analyses of these categories will be discussed more fully in chapter 8.

If the postcolonial represents a critical relation to colonialism in any epoch, how does that relate to imperialism? The use of the term 'postcolonial' rather than 'post-imperial' suggests that a *de facto* distinction is being made between the two, yet a characteristic of postcolonial writing is that the terms 'colonial' and 'imperial' are often lumped together, as if they were synonymous terms. This totalizing tendency is also evident in the way that colonialism and imperialism are themselves treated as if they were homogeneous practices. Although much emphasis is placed on the specific particularity of different colonized cultures, this tends to be accompanied by comparatively little historical work on the diversity of colonialism and imperialism, which were nothing if not heterogeneous, often contradictory, practices.

Both colonialism and imperialism involved forms of subjugation of one people by another. The world has a long history of such kinds of domination. Traditionally, forms of empire tended to concentrate on expansion within a single land mass; for example, the Chinese empire, or, even more striking, the empire of the Moors which, at its zenith, stretched from Vienna to northern Spain – the long way round, via northern Africa. Similarly, the Roman empire, which nineteenth-century

imperialists frequently invoked as the guiding model and moral justification for their own activities, expanded from the centre, Rome, and pushed outwards, gradually becoming so unwieldy that it fell in two, continuing in various subsequent incarnations, such as the Byzantine and Holy Roman empires, in the form of a single land mass. This geographical cohesion was dramatically changed in the sixteenth century by the technological developments of ocean-going caravels, together with the use of navigational aids derived from maritime Asia (Scammell 1989). For modern Europeans, ships were the key to colonization and the vast empires whose tentacles gradually crept across the world. Such vessels enabled not only the geographical expansion of populations, but also enabled such populations to stay in touch with their homelands. So, for example, the American colonists remained subject to the Crown of England in a way totally distinct from the indigenous population of America who had emigrated over the Baring Straits many centuries earlier. Initially, colonists such as those in England's first and always exceptional colony, Ireland, were hardly very far away, but the ability of Europeans to keep in contact with their colonists in America created a distinct political difference from earlier forms of migration. It meant that empires no longer had to be geographically coherent. For their part, the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Central and South America operated on two principles: the extraction of riches, and the conversion of the indigenous population. Spanish imperialism was based on a very traditional model, common to the Ottoman and Roman empires, of a tribute structure, albeit based on a Spanish Atlantic economy; the British Empire in India, which derived much of its revenues from land rents, could be said to have in part followed this same model. The militant Spanish drive for conversion to Christianity was an imitation of the Islamic *Jihad* that had been responsible for the Moors' colonization of Spain (Burkholder and Johnson 1998). The British Empire in North America, which was primarily about settlement, on the other hand, was colonial, as the name still given to its epoch in the USA still attests. It was not established by the centre because of any ideology of imperialism; rather, from the seventeenth century onwards there were continuing attempts to subject local authority to the control of the Crown (Bliss 1990). The Pilgrim Fathers were fleeing the established church, not sailing across the Atlantic on its behalf on an imperial mission. The different kinds of European establishment in America – Spanish, Portuguese and British – immediately therefore demand theoretical and terminological distinctions.

The term 'empire' has been widely used for many centuries without, however, necessarily signifying 'imperialism'. Here a basic difference emerges between an empire that was bureaucratically controlled by a government from the centre, and which was developed for ideological as well as financial reasons, a structure that can be called imperialism, and an empire that was developed for settlement by individual communities or for commercial purposes by a trading company, a structure that can be called colonial. Colonization was pragmatic and until the nineteenth century generally developed locally in a haphazard way (for example, the occupation of islands in the West Indies), while imperialism was typically driven by ideology from the metropolitan centre and concerned with the assertion and expansion of state power (for example, the French invasion of Algeria). Colonialism functioned as an activity on the

periphery, economically driven; from the home government's perspective, it was at times hard to control. Imperialism on the other hand, operated from the centre as a policy of state, driven by the grandiose projects of power. Thus while imperialism is susceptible to analysis as a concept (which is not to say that there were not different concepts of imperialism), colonialism needs to be analysed primarily as a practice: hence the difficulty of generalizations about it.

In historical terms, imperialism operated in two major forms: the Roman, Ottoman and Spanish imperial model, and that of late nineteenth-century Europe. Colonialism also took two major forms. French colonial theorists typically distinguished between colonization and domination, the British between dominions and dependencies; modern historians between settlement and exploitation colonies (Harmand 1910). This grim but straightforward distinction constitutes the fundamental difference within the practice of colonialism, namely between colonies that were predominantly established for the purpose of forms of settlement, such as British North America, Australia and New Zealand, French Algeria, or Portuguese Brazil, and those directly (or indirectly) administered ones, generally situated in the tropics, that were established for economic exploitation without any significant settlement, such as American Philippines and Puerto Rico, British India, Dutch East Indies, French India and New Caledonia, German Togo, or Japanese Taiwan. In his definitive analysis of the different configurations that colonialism took in historical terms, Jürgen Osterhammel (1997) has argued for the addition of a third category, which he names 'maritime enclaves', that is, those islands, harbours and other strategic points that were occupied as bases for the purpose of global military and naval operations, sometimes with the added purpose of trading and commercial interaction with a mainland (historical examples would include American Guantánamo, its naval base on Cuba, Guam, and Hawaii (all still under occupation), British Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Malta and Singapore, Dutch Batavia, French/British Mauritius, and Portuguese Malacca). The more the commercial activities of these bases developed, however, the more they generally developed into a variation of a domination colony. As these lists of various different kinds of colonies already indicate, colonialism involved an extraordinary range of different forms and practices carried out with respect to radically different cultures, over many different centuries. Think of the different epochs of British colonialism, for example: four hundred years in some parts of India, scarcely fifty years in some parts of Africa such as Nigeria; or consider the historical and geographical differences between the different ideologies of the various administrative systems of the colonial powers (British direct and indirect rule, French assimilation theory and the direct imposition of metropolitan culture). This extraordinary diversity, both historically and geographically, even within the practices of a single colonial power, or with respect to different historical epochs and successive colonial powers in the history of a single colony (for example, Sri Lanka), troubles the possibility of any general theory (Ajayi 1969; de Silva 1981).

The stress on the diversity of colonialism is strictly appropriate: it was imperialism that constituted a global political system. However, the question being addressed by postcolonial theory is whether at a discursive, ideological level, colonialism also

constituted a system of sorts that can be discussed, assessed and criticized – or could be resisted – according to general theoretical and discursive principles. The importance of the work of Edward W. Said was that he did provide just such a general theory (Said 1978). He demonstrated that the habitual practices, and the full range of effects of colonialism on the colonized territories and their peoples, could be analysed conceptually and discursively, and it was this that created the academic field of post-colonialism and enabled such a range of subsequent theoretical and historical work. The problem in the present context, however, was that his own discourse was so inclusive as to make no distinction between colonialism and imperialism, or the different forms that they took, or, within the theoretical model elaborated, to make an opening for the impact of anti-colonial resistance.

However, it would be unjust to blame Said himself for this tendency towards homogenization. There are other, legitimate historical reasons for it. Apart from Said, postcolonial theory is predominantly based on the work of Frantz Fanon, and it was Fanon who developed the analysis of colonialism as a single formation (Fanon 1967). In this he was following Sartre, who insisted on this aspect in his 1952 essay, 'Le Colonialisme est un système' (Sartre 1964). Both of them were describing French colonialism, which was indeed comparatively systematic. British colonialism, on the other hand, never was. It was just as eccentric and as idiosyncratic as any other British institution, as heterogeneous as the (unwritten) constitution of the United Kingdom itself. Broadly speaking, it could be said that what has occurred in postcolonial theory is that a theoretical base, derived largely from French anti-colonial theory, has been deployed upon examples drawn from the history of the British Empire which operated on very different principles. Such analyses are thereby left vulnerable to the charge from historians that they make generalizations with little historical knowledge of the actual specifics of colonial history (Moore-Gilbert 1999). On the other hand, this *franglais* mixture has enabled the development of a new disciplinary field and theoretical apparatus for the analysis of colonialism.

While insisting on the singularity of colonial practices, it is also worth recalling Fanon's comment on the tendency of colonial administrations to regionalize, split up, divide and rule: in emphasizing this aspect of colonialism, and in refusing to risk general statements about it, modern historians are only repeating colonialism's own strategy. A more dramatic way of putting this would be to say that the apparent uniformity or diversity of colonialism depends very largely on your own subject position, as colonizing or colonized subject. From the position of the ruling colonial power, its administrators, and from the perspective of historians of British colonial history such as John MacKenzie, Britain's different colonies do indeed look, and were, different in the ways in which they were acquired and administered (MacKenzie 1995). As has already been suggested, the British Empire was nothing if not heterogeneous. From the point of view of the indigenous people who lived their lives as colonial subjects, however, such distinctions have always seemed rather more academic. As far as they were concerned, such colonial subjects lived under the imposition of British rule, a view not discouraged by the imperial ideology of *Pax Britannica*. Anti-colonial practices of cultural resistance to the dominant ideology of

imperialism encouraged the critical analysis of common forms of representation and the processes of knowledge-formation. At another level, the links established between Irish, South African and Indian nationalists at the end of the nineteenth century were developed to share knowledge of anti-colonial techniques and strategies. An attack on a police station in Ireland functioned in a very similar way, and with very similar objectives, to an attack on a British barracks in India. The differences in colonial history, in administrative practices, or constitutional status – Ireland at that time was constitutionally part of Great Britain and therefore technically was itself the colonial power in India – made for very little difference as far as anti-colonial revolutionary strategies were concerned. From the point of view of anti-colonial political activists, the British Empire looked much the same everywhere. It hardly mattered to Indians that as late as 1861, the British did not regard India as a colony at all (Merivale 1861). Postcolonial critique tends to take the same point of view because it identifies with the subject position of anti-colonial activists, not because of its ignorance of the infinite variety of colonial history from the perspective of the colonizers. The difference between empiricist and postcolonial historians is therefore largely the result of identification with the different subject-positions. So much for the historians' objections.

2 COLONIZATION AND DOMINATION

Within its overall structure of domination, colonialism can be analysed according to the distinction elaborated above between its two main forms of colonization and domination, motivated by the desire for living space or the extraction of riches. All colonial powers tended as a result to have in practice two distinct kinds of colonies within their empires, the settled and the exploited, the white and the black, which would be treated very differently. Whereas settlement led ultimately to self-governing dominions, trading ports and posts in what were regarded as established societies tended to develop into the exploitative situation of domination colonies. Settlement also led to the creation of a category of colonial which gets blurred by the English word 'colonizer', which can be applied to settler and administrator indiscriminately: here the French term for the colonial settler or farmer, *colon*, now anglicized, preserves a useful distinction. The *colons* quickly found themselves in-betweens: neither the centre, the metropolitan government, which could both protect them and oppress them, nor the colonized, the indigenous natives whom the *colons* would for the most part slaughter, expel from their own lands, or exploit as a labour force, and from whose perspective the *colons* and the metropolitan government would be equated. This results in the ambivalent position today of those who descend from European settlers in former settler colonies: are the non-indigenous people in the former colonies of North America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand colonizers or colonized (Mukherjee 1990)? Today all former settler colonies are doubly positioned: on the one hand, they are colonies who have freed themselves from the colonial rule of the mother country, as with the United States, or (though constitutionally still not

absolutely) Canada and Australia. So today Americans or Australasians of European extraction now speak of themselves as having been formerly colonized. It is the marker of 'postcoloniality' that whereas in the past such people tended to identify themselves as colonizers, increasingly today they claim to constitute the colonized (an identification anticipated in the name of the Australian Natives Association, founded in 1871 to represent the interests of native-born white Australians). On the other hand, at the same time, the settlers who went to those regions – often it must be emphasized as a result of persecution, forced migration or simple poverty – themselves became the oppressors of the indigenous peoples who already occupied the land: persecuted minorities emigrating and then themselves persecuting minorities has been a common story of colonialism. Those indigenous peoples, such as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders of Australia or the Maoris of New Zealand, remain colonized peoples (Jacobs 1997; Rigney 1998). The postcolonial operates simultaneously as the colonial. Many of the countries of South America such as Chile or Peru, simply replaced Spanish colonial rule by a form of internal colonialism, the autocratic rule of a European settler minority.

Colonization, as Europeans originally used the term, signified not the rule over indigenous peoples, or the extraction of their wealth, but primarily the transfer of communities who sought to maintain their allegiance to their own original culture, while seeking a better life in economic, religious or political terms – very similar to the situation of migrants today. Colonization in this sense comprised people whose primary aim was to settle elsewhere rather than to rule others. Though in most cases it also involved the latter, this was a by-product of the former, the result of the land being already populated, though usually not 'settled' in the European sense. In Locke's influential formulation, those who did not cultivate the land had no rights to it; in 1849 Roebuck still confidently defined a colony as a land without indigenous people whose inhabitants looked to England as the mother country (Roebuck 1849). Later colonizers sought to retain a distinction between the colonizers and natives, rather than integrate with the local population as generally occurred with earlier migrations or with the early colonization of Portuguese and some Spanish America, in which colonization developed into a mixed, creole society. In other cases, Spanish and Anglo-Saxon colonizers of America and Australasia by contrast preferred to try to exterminate the indigenous people rather than rule them, and this attitude was continued after independence, for example in the USA and Argentina. Natives, if not exterminated, were moved out of the land which they had previously occupied, a process that also occurred in settlement colonies in Africa, such as Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa. The appropriation of land and space meant that colonialism was therefore, as Said has emphasized, fundamentally an act of geographical violence, a geographical violence employed against indigenous peoples and their land rights (Said 1993: 1–15). At the same time, where plantations required labour and the indigenous natives were found unsuitable, others (largely from West Africa, India and China) were brought in as slaves or indentured labourers who were allowed almost no rights, whose forms of social and political organization were removed, and who were therefore comparatively easy to control and to keep separate.

The first motives for the European expansion westwards are generally described as originating from the attempt to discover a shorter sea-route to the great civilizations of India, China and Japan. For some time, Columbus failed to get any backing from European rulers for his plans for a voyage westwards. It was after the fall of Granada in 1492 that Ferdinand and Isabella were attracted by the prospect of an anti-Islamic crusade that would make contact with the fabled Christian kingdom of Prester John in the east and deal a decisive blow to the Muslim enemy whose colonization of Spain they had just ended with the *Reconquista* (Bertrand and Petrie 1952: 163–5; Elliott 1970: 58; Williamson 1992: 6, 3; Sardar, Nandy and Wyn Davies 1993: 6–11). Given that the Moors were at the time still occupying parts of the Italian mainland, it was a far-fetched scheme. The fact remains, however, that the discovery of America was the result of what was intended to be the last crusade against Islam. It was funded by the wealth acquired from the expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Granada two months after Ferdinand and Isabella had secured the city. European colonial expansion began simultaneously with the institution of the Catholic Inquisition that replaced centuries of Islamic multiculturalism. It was a symptomatic beginning.

Alongside this crusading religious motive (the Spanish expeditions were authorized by the pope for the purpose of Christian conversion), the technological facility for modern colonization in terms of the development of ocean-going ships went hand in hand with the economic drive associated with the development of European capitalism, which broadly began with the commercial revolution of the sixteenth century. The primacy of economic motive given to colonization today by historians on the left would not have been widely disputed at the time. When Sir Walter Raleigh landed in Guyana, he was looking for gold. Early arguments for European exploration and colonization were fuelled by the need for gold and silver from America: the expanding commerce within Europe and the trade deficit with the Orient presented a liquidity problem in southern Europe, a ‘gold famine’ that was solved not only by the importation of precious metals from America but by the fact that the main recipient of such metals, Spain, then spent its booty on its war machine in Europe, thus conveniently distributing the new cash widely (Elliott 1970: 269–70). The need for gold was a primary motive of the remarkable maritime expansion eastwards and westwards in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, which saw Columbus and Vespucci exploring and establishing colonies in America, and Vasco da Gama providing the culmination to the search for a sea-route to the Indies by reaching India in 1497–8 (Williamson 1992: 7). For the British, the possibility of appropriating some of the booty was one reason for establishing an effective navy, a motivation accompanied by consideration of maintaining its own strategic interests *vis-à-vis* the Spanish dominions. Once a single colony had been established, then it could always be argued that strategic interests required more. This was a logic that was to be taken to an extreme with respect to the security of British India. Similarly, trade with such colonies was always held to be of advantage because it also had the effect of maintaining a large navy and training a large corps of seamen. When discharged from the navy, the availability of these seamen facilitated further commercial expansion overseas.

Unlike the Spanish, the British and Dutch did not initially justify colonization in terms of a Christian mission, though Protestant–Catholic rivalries between European powers provided a significant factor in the establishment or seizure of colonies. Colonization is often associated with notions of civilizing or missionary work but, aside from the Spanish and Portuguese expeditions to Central and South America, this cultural imperialism was really the later product of imperialism in its nineteenth-century form. More important for the British was the question of population, and the need to export people on the grounds of economic and political stability. The role of population theory in colonization has been consistently underestimated, perhaps because population control, now of the ‘third world’, is still a major issue for the west today. The idea of the colony as an outlet for surplus population was motivated by economics and politics. Centuries before Malthus, Britain was commonly reckoned to have too large a population for what it could sustain economically; it was therefore believed that the export of surplus population had the doubly beneficial effect of removing an apparent drain on resources as well as establishing new colonies with which the mother country could develop trade. For France, given its permanent shortage of population, colonization was more problematic: settlement in Algeria only really got going when the French lost Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans in 1871 and the local French population was forcibly removed to Algeria (the French government increased the ‘French’ population in Algeria further by extending French citizenship to the many settlers who came from Spain, Corsica, Sardinia, southern Italy and Malta. In 1871 French citizenship was also extended to the indigenous Jewish population). Settler colonies were in part the product of forced emigration of various kinds, a policy that became institutionalized in Britain after Malthus had characterized the potential evils of population excess. Surplus population as a motive for colonization reached its apex in the famine-stricken 1840s, and was carried over later in the century into a central justification for imperialism. In this view, colonization was regarded as a means of exporting social conflict, thus neatly intertwining the economic with the political: Lenin cites Rhodes’ comments to his friend Stead in 1895:

“I was in the East End of London” (working-class quarter) “yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for ‘bread,’ ‘bread!’ and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism. . . . My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter issue. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.” (Lenin 1965: 93–4)

The practice of the transportation of criminals, not stopped in Britain until 1867, was only one aspect of a wider policy of using colonization as a way of removing undesirables in the broadest sense of the term (the last convict ship to Australia had sixty Fenians aboard) (Shaw 1966: 358). This accounts for much of the class snobbery that developed in Britain and France towards white ‘colonials’.

Alongside settlement lay the simple economic motive of the desire for riches and commercial profit, together with an anxiety about the balance of trade. The European drive towards the establishment of a global trading network tended, in historical terms, to produce as a consequence exploitation colonies, the colonies of domination. Many such colonies were the not-always-intended product of the early trading companies, private enterprises that were given a monopoly to trade by the monarch from the fifteenth-century onwards, for example the British Joint Stock companies such as the Merchant Adventurers, Muscovy Co., Levant Co., Virginia Co., East India Co., Royal West Africa Co. The significance of this list is that it includes companies trading with areas that would never be colonized or controlled, such as Russia, as well as two which grew into colonial enterprises proper. But the difference between these two – the Virginia Company and the East India Company – signals the disparate results of these early enterprises. One developed into the North American Colonies, the other the Indian Empire.

Colonization in the early period up to the nineteenth century was rarely the deliberate policy of metropolitan governments: not until 1849, for example, did Wakefield propose a systematic system of settlement colonization (subsequently employed for South Australia and New Zealand) (Wakefield 1914); it tended rather to be the haphazard product of commercial interests and group settlements, a process which led Seeley in *The Expansion of England* (1883) to make his famous comment that ‘we seem . . . to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind’ (Seeley 1971: 8). However, by the eighteenth century, competition between European powers meant that many of the wars of the century were fought in the colonial arena with the purpose of acquiring the riches of each other’s colonies, a strategy in which Britain was particularly successful – sometimes to its own cost. It was the elimination of the French in Canada that removed any immediate threat to the thirteen British colonies and encouraged them to seek independence from Britain. Despite the heterogeneous forms of acquisition, however, as Bell and Morrell remark, ‘the old colonial system . . . provided one of the few examples in English history of a coherent administrative system directed over many years towards a definite end’ (Bell and Morrell 1928: xl). The Navigation Laws forbade the carrying of any goods to British ports except in British ships (except in the case of goods from Europe). In addition, high duties were imposed on any raw materials or manufactured products coming from foreign colonies, while the importation of colonial manufactures into Britain was forbidden. As a result, the early colonial economy of the importation of food crops and strategic military supplies developed into a systematic trading bloc based on importing raw materials and exporting British manufactured products to colonial monopoly markets. However, the need to supervise this trade, and the expectation that it would provide a dependable market for British goods (even if the prices were higher than world prices), in time led to the difficulties that would affect British thinking about colonization and industrial competitiveness right up to the twentieth century. By the 1830s this system had become obsolete and was gradually abandoned in favour of free trade. It was, however, reinstituted in a different form in the 1880s as part of a new imperial preference system.

Despite the heterogeneity of history, geography and administrative models, from the point of view of the colonized society, colonization of all forms brought about similar disruptive consequences. The effect of colonization is often described by historians in terms of the transformation of the indigenous economy – or in Deleuze and Guattari's terms (1977), decoding and recoding – particularly through the introduction of the economic and ideological effects of capitalism into non-capitalist societies by breaking down and transforming non-capitalist modes of production, a procedure that usually required territorial occupation. Colonization in the form of agricultural settlement for the most part took place where the indigenous society was nomadic or relatively sparse. From a European perspective, the land appeared empty because it was uncultivated and not settled; the introduction of farming then made the nomadic life of the indigenous people impossible. The plantation economies that were established in the Americas thus had the effect of radically restructuring the local economy, as well as involving oppressive socio-economic practices, particularly slavery. Where the non-European societies already possessed forms of industrialization, on the other hand, there was little settlement colonization; instead the local economy was transformed and impoverished by economic restructuring, often involving de-industrialization, according to the system that has just been described. As Marx was to note in 1853, the economy of Indian society was undermined by the forcible destruction of the textile industry in favour of imported British cloth. Whereas the economic transformation of the colony in order to serve the requirements of raw materials and markets for the colonial power was a first priority, there was relatively little desire to bring about the cultural and religious transformation of the local inhabitants. Missionaries were banned from India until 1813, and regarded with great suspicion by plantation owners in the Caribbean, on account of their opposition to slavery or, in the tradition of Las Casas, their humanitarian reformist beliefs. Both settlement and exploitation colonization were generally underpinned by a eurocentric set of values among those involved; but with the exception of Latin America, and arguably other plantation slave economies, these colonizers did not seek to impose European culture in any substantial forms upon colonized peoples (either because they were indifferent, or liberal relativists, or because racial prejudice meant that they preferred extermination to affiliation), nor did they justify their actions by recourse to an ideological rationale unless absolutely necessary. Colonization was not primarily concerned with transposing cultural values. They came as a by-product of its real objectives of trade, economic exploitation and settlement.

Imperialism

The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea – something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to.

Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*

Marlow's famously ambivalent comment in *Heart of Darkness* (1899) hinges on the brutal disjunction between the realities of colonization and the ideology of imperialism: a discrepancy so violent in the Belgian so-called Congo Free State that it was exposed directly in the British press shortly afterwards by F. D. Morel, Sir Roger Casement and others (Morel 1903, 1904a, 1904b, 1906). Conrad, to his shame, did not name the Congo Free State, but he did demonstrate how, by 1899, any differences between what is now characterized as colonialism and imperialism had become blurred; the first almost seemed to have become the practice of the second. If so, this was a retrospective interpretation after the event. The 'idea' of imperialism was to redeem the plunder of colonialism precisely at the moment when that plunder had been extended into a hegemonic world political system. What that 'idea' actually involved, however, was harder to say, and imperialism itself was correspondingly multifarious. Historically the meaning of the word 'imperialism' is almost as difficult to pin down as Conrad's attitude towards it. Koebner and Schmidt (1964: xii) suggest that between 1840 and 1960 the word changed its meaning no less than twelve times. For this reason, some historians have refused to use it at all (Bodelsen 1960). However, the history that Koebner and Schmidt chart itself tells a historical story of some significance for postcolonial theory.

The words 'empire', 'imperial' and 'imperialism' have different histories and different political resonances. The Spanish created the first modern European *empire*: the imperial project of the Spanish conquistadors involved the taking possession of much of the American continent by means of armies of occupation. This, however, was a pre-capitalist, highly bureaucratic form of imperial rule that initially operated on the Roman and Ottoman model of direct taxation of the people living in the occupied land, administered through a combination of military and political control (later it

gave way to income derived from mining silver using Indian slave labour). The British Empire – a term first invented by the Elizabethan ideologist John Dee – pre-dated British imperialism as such by several centuries (Hulme 1986: 90). It was customary from Elizabethan times to talk about the ‘British Empire’, but this was a descriptive term that did not carry the full ideological connotations of what was to become ‘imperialism’. Nor was there any sense that the empire as a whole constituted a political, economic and administrative machine whose problems could be discussed or criticized on the basis of its being a comprehensive entity. The description ‘the British Empire’ was employed in a restricted sense as a synonym for the United Kingdom, implying its sovereign independence, and this was common usage until as late as the 1850s (OED; Koebner and Schmidt 1964: 37–46). The term was also, however, used more expansively from the eighteenth century onwards to describe the British Isles and all overseas dependencies, particularly in discussion of the question of the relations between Britain and its settler colonies, and the relations between the so-called ‘Mother-country’ and the ‘colonies’ generally. Even then, there was little sense of the empire as an overall structural unit: administratively, until 1857 the British dominions were divided into two, the Colonial and Indian empires.

The word *imperial*, for its part, was widely employed to mean sovereign or transcendent, the ultimate seat of authority, or just as a synonym for ‘magnificent’. *Imperialism*, by contrast, was a word that only became current in English in the latter part of the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1987: 60).

Imperialism, as Baumgart put it, is ‘a hybrid term’, many-faceted, covering a wide range of relationships of domination and dependence that can be characterized according to historical and theoretical or organizational differences (Baumgart 1982: 1). The word has been used in English in two predominant meanings: it originally constituted a description of a political system of actual conquest and occupation, but increasingly from the beginning of the twentieth century it came to be used in its Marxist sense of a general system of economic domination, with direct political domination being a possible but not necessary adjunct (Williams 1988). A historicized version of this distinction would characterize it as the difference between French imperialism in the nineteenth century and American in the twentieth, or, as the British put it nostalgically in the late nineteenth century, between the old imperialism and the new. When people originally used the term ‘imperialism’ to describe a political system of territorial domination in the first sense, it did not necessarily carry critical connotations; its later use to denote the new broader meaning of economic domination, by contrast, always implies a critical perspective. This shift really registers changing global attitudes towards imperialism itself. In a similar way, the term ‘colonialism’, first used in English in 1853 in a neutral sense and only introduced into French at the beginning of the twentieth century, was revived in the anti-colonialist atmosphere after the Second World War as a derogatory term for the colonial system and the economic, political and social policies that it enforced (Strausz-Hupé and Hazard 1958). The hidden agenda behind this revival was to focus attention on colonialism rather than imperialism. By that time ‘imperialism’ signified an ideology and a system of economic domination, identified with the USA; ‘colonialism’, by

contrast, emphasized the material condition of the political rule of subjugated peoples by the old European colonial powers. Although the metaphorization of the term 'col-onialism' (together with 'colonial' and 'colonized') is today being increasingly attempted on the model of the long-standing metaphorization of imperialism, for the most part it has remained resistant to such semantic expansion and its reference has generally been straightforwardly factual: in this book it will be used in this literal way. This correlates with an equally straightforward understanding of the 'postcolonial' as an historical description of the global political situation of a world of nominally independent sovereign nation-states. The continuing operation of imperialism in its broader meaning explains why the term 'postcolonial' is generally used rather than 'post-imperial': despite the complacent claims of Becker et al. (Becker et al. 1987; Becker and Sklar 1999), history has not yet arrived at the post-imperial era. That moment is an ultimate aim of postcolonial critique.

Imperialism is characterized by the exercise of power either through direct conquest or (latterly) through political and economic influence that effectively amounts to a similar form of domination: both involve the practice of power through facilitating institutions and ideologies. Typically, it is the deliberate product of a political machine that rules from the centre, and extends its control to the furthest reaches of the peripheries: think of the Pentagon and the CIA in Washington, with their global strategy of controlling events in independent states all over the world in order to defeat communism or Islamic resistance and further US interests. For this reason, imperialism is also simultaneously subject to the paranoia of a world that is perpetually slipping from its grasp. Unlike colonialism, imperialism is driven by ideology and a theory of sorts, in some instances even to the extent that it can operate as much against purely economic interests as for them. Whereas exploitation and settler colonies were established according to pragmatic needs, and generally run according to the interests of business or settlers, imperialism was a very inefficient form of economic exploitation. D. K. Fieldhouse (1982) has argued against what he calls the 'myth of economic exploitation' by demonstrating how unprofitable modern empires were. This does not, as Anne Phillips has responded, mean that imperialism in itself was not the product of capitalism, but raises a further question: if so, why then 'were the interests of capital so ill-served?' Phillips suggests that imperialism was not a very successful form of economic exploitation because it failed, particularly in Africa, in almost all attempts to develop a free wage-labour market, while the colonial administrators and officials 'often luxuriated in what seemed anti-capitalist bias, glorifying in their self-proclaimed role as guardians of a pre-capitalist order' (Phillips 1989: 2–3). This explains why, rather than facilitating the expansion of capitalism, imperialism often rather blocked it, with all the consequences of underdevelopment. At the same time, international investment, which tended to be directed towards North and South America as much as the colonies, had the effect of diverting capital from investment in the domestic economy, with the result that British industry became increasingly uncompetitive (Davis and Huttenback 1986). Imperialism was a contradictory ideology – now characterized in the description of it being the product of 'gentlemanly capitalism' (Cain and Hopkins 1993a, 1993b). The problem, however,

was always that gentlemen were not capitalists, and capitalists were not gentlemen. This inherent weakness within European imperialism was a major reason for the abruptness of its end, and for the mess that it left behind.

As Conrad indicates, imperialism involved a general guiding idea as well as specific historical acts. As such, as has been suggested, it often operated retrospectively, after the event, a misleading, belated *nachträglichkeit* designed to give a cultural meaning to the historical practice of colonialism (Nandy 1983). This meant that there was a complete historical continuity between imperialism as it developed in the nineteenth century and the history of colonialism; the colonies remained colonies. For those who were already colonial subjects, imperialism brought little difference in their everyday experience, beyond a formalization of the administration, an increased separation between ruler and ruled, a visibly increased cult of masculinity in the rulers, and a corresponding proliferation of colonial monumental buildings, such as the grand arch called the 'Gateway to India' erected in Bombay (Mumbai) for the visit of the Prince of Wales in 1911. The change could be thought of in terms of a shift of addressee from the colonized subject alone to the colonized subject and the rival imperial power. Imperialism was always a product of, and always addressed to, global power politics: the increased rivalry and militarization of the main European colonial powers, together with the belated entry of the US, Germany and Japan as imperial powers; a heightened perception that the identity of the nation-state was in a substantial way bound up with its grander imperial identity, if only as a means of stifling domestic dissent and pressure for social reform; a greater requirement to operate the administration of the colonies systematically as an outlet for industrial manufactures and as a source of raw materials; a new tendency for governments themselves to appropriate colonies just in case they might come in useful later and in the meantime to prevent any other power from acquiring them; all justified by a translation of Christianity's missionary zeal into a mission to submit the rest of the world to the modernity of western civilization, conveniently putting all nations within the reach of western capitalism in the process. All these factors contributed to a systematization of the colonial structure into the dominant ideology of imperialism.

Imperialism emerged as the ideology of the imperial ruling classes in the very same period that the first substantial freedom movements were developing in the colonies. The more vocal the latter, the more bombastic the former; indeed, imperialism itself was in part a defensive response to the freedom movements. As an ideology, it was quickly attacked by liberal and Marxist critics in the west and in the east, and subsequently across the three continents. Those in the colonies were generally less immediately concerned with imperialism as such than with their own colonial status that they sought to end. Colonial rule of particular territories was challenged locally by those living under its dominance who were fighting for their freedom, and such local resistance was focused on the institutional and military fact of colonial rule. Imperialism as such was never the first target of anti-colonial struggle until the formation of the Comintern in 1919. It then became a very useful concept for the anti-colonial struggle, because the development of a general political concept of domination allowed those in different colonial territories to come together and unite in a

common cause against the oppressor. They were able to draw on the resources of a common anti-imperial politics in order to develop and co-ordinate popular support across different constituencies and thus to increase pressure on the occupying imperial power. Later in the Cold War era, imperialism almost more than capitalism as such became the object of communism's ideological war with the west and the general system of global domination by the United States. Postcolonial critique deploys the resources drawn from these histories against the imperialism and other forms of oppression of its own age. At the same time, the two distinct forms of imperialism demonstrate why postcolonial and earlier anti-colonial struggles, though symbiotically related, can never be simply the same or operate politically in identical ways.

1 THE FRENCH INVENTION OF IMPERIALISM

Just as, according to Philip Larkin, the British discovered sex in 1963, so in 1882 they discovered imperialism. British imperialism could be said to have been officially inaugurated with the government decision to bombard Alexandria, and invade and occupy Egypt. The term 'imperialism' has been subsequently used to describe many different phases of European colonial history. How did imperialists theorize imperialism themselves? The fact that the concept of 'imperialism' emerged as a specific political ideology in the second half of the nineteenth century means that it can be located more precisely historically. The word itself was first used in English in 1858 as a synonym for despotism, and subsequently as a derogatory term to describe the political system of the Second French Empire under Napoleon III. It continued to be used predominantly in this sense until around 1870 (OED; Kedourie 1971: 1; Koebner and Schmidt 1964: 10). Undoubtedly the best known use of 'imperialism' in its original French reference was that of Karl Marx, who, in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, uses the term to denote the French nationalism developed by Louis Bonaparte which looked back to the era of the First Empire and the figure of the first emperor, Napoleon (Marx 1973a: 157). Marx thus uses the term in a strictly non-Marxist sense, though he argues characteristically that Louis Napoleon's political system was developed as a specific response to the class antagonism evident in the revolution of 1848. 'Imperialism' therefore originally denoted a French political ideology, which, after the *coup d'état* of December 1851, consisted of a popular autocratic leader who provided domestic political stability and prosperity. Increasingly it also implied a policy of pursuing national prestige through conquest and territorial expansion abroad (Baumgart 1982: 2).

French imperialism may have been revivalist, but, whatever Marx may have thought, it was to be no farce. It was based on the idea of an active development of national pre-eminence, an attempt to recover the grandeur of its Napoleonic empire which had been established on the European land mass after France had lost its major colonies in India and North America at the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 (a strategy repeated by Hitler's fascist imperialism in the twentieth century for a Germany deprived of its overseas colonies in 1919). Napoleon III did not attempt to

reconstitute France's empire in Europe, but rather pursued France's imperial ambitions elsewhere through invasions of Algeria and Indochina. Subsequent expansion focused on the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, the Lebanon, Syria and Polynesia. The new imperial ideology reconciled the two historical imperialisms by proposing an image of a greater France through which the Mediterranean flowed in the same way as the Seine flowed through France itself. 'France' was simply globalized. A rapacious policy of imperial expansion, facilitated by technological developments such as the use of quinine and mosquito nets against malaria and the new Gatling and Maxim machine guns, was justified by the invention of the *mission civilisatrice*, whose task was to bring the benefits of French culture, religion and language to the unenlightened races of the earth, a convenient concept that other imperial powers quickly adopted (with suitable national adjustment) and which was placed at the heart of the moral argument for imperialism (Curtin 1989). Cultural and educational imperialism were its essential adjuncts (Said 1993). The *mission civilisatrice* functioned effectively as an ideological alternative to the weaker economic arguments for imperialism as a means of convincing contemporary anti-colonialists, such as Bugeaud, Comte or Bastiat (Merle 1969).

The *mission civilisatrice* was more central to French imperial ideology than any other on account of the French colonial doctrine of assimilation. As the image of the greater France implies, however far away the colonies may have been, they were administratively and conceptually treated as a part of mainland France. The French colonial system of assimilation was originally derived, via the French Revolution, from an Enlightenment belief in a common liberty, equality and fraternity for humankind. Despite the prevarications of French colonial politics, from Napoleon to Jules Ferry, assimilation remained the effective basis of French colonial policy throughout the nineteenth century; to abandon it would have meant also giving up the whole foundational ideology of the *mission civilisatrice*. There were many individual exceptions and modifications to this rule in actual practice, particularly in Indo-China and Algeria, but it remained the general principle and agreed basis of French colonial policy right up to the twentieth century (Betts 1961). As a result, the French colonies offered the best educational and cultural facilities, while at the same time also demanding that the colonized subject renounce his or her own culture and religion in order to benefit from them. The educational opportunities available explain why so many of the major anti-colonial intellectuals, from Senghor to Fanon, from Césaire to Ho Chi Minh, came from French colonies.

2 DIFFERENCES IN IMPERIAL IDEOLOGIES AND COLONIAL SYSTEMS

If imperialism in its nineteenth-century form was essentially a French invention, it was soon imitated by the other colonial powers that were increasingly drawn into a competitive global economic and political system. The ideological justification of the *mission civilisatrice* notwithstanding, the real aim of the nineteenth-century imperial

system was to combine the provision of domestic political and economic stability with the production of national prestige and closed markets in the international arena through conquest. All forms of imperialism, though varied in their specific national characteristics, operated according to this model and necessarily so, given that imperialism was fundamentally an international system of mutual rivalry for control of territories and resources between the different powers (Porter 1994). This was formally acknowledged in the notorious 1884–5 Berlin conference that resulted in the partition of Africa and – less often remarked – the carve-up of the islands of the Pacific. The conference also signalled Bismarck's conversion from British-style free-trade policies to ones of imperial control, and therefore the beginning of the high period of European imperial frenzy. Given that this system required continual national expansion overseas in pursuit of new markets and resources, and given the finite amount of territory available for conquest on the earth, it was always destined to produce wars between the imperial powers in which they tried to out-manoeuvre each other and appropriate each other's colonies. The First World War was the straightforward product of the imperial system; at the outset of the war, both France and Germany had a clear sense of specific imperial objectives (Andrew and Kanya-Forstne 1981). At the end of the war, as the victors carved up the colonial spoils at Versailles, Britain and France worked hard to gain the advantage over each other in the Middle East and the former Russian colonies in Central Asia. Imperialism was a dynamic, never a static system, and reflected in its international basis the expansive process of production and consumption that mature capitalism had introduced into the world economic structure.

Although its international basis meant that it functioned globally, the different imperial powers nevertheless all operated with distinct national identities and ideologies, even those such as Japan that were self-conscious imitations of other imperial powers. Postcolonial theory for the most part focuses on the British Empire, combined with some theoretical, if not historical, attention, to the French. Although France and Britain were the two pre-eminent imperial powers of the nineteenth century, a full understanding of imperialism as a modern political form would have to take the form of a comparative assessment of all the different imperial powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – Australia, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey and the United States – showing how the different economic and political forms of the state resulted in specific structures of colonality. Such a vast undertaking is outside the scope of the present book. I will therefore concentrate for the most part on the three dominant forms – those of Britain, France and the United States – not simply because they were dominant but also because they provided the key foundational models of the different forms of colonialism and imperialism. Historically, it was also largely the resistance to British, French and American imperialism that provided the foundation for postcolonialism as a theoretical and political practice.

France and Britain operated antithetical colonial regimes that provided the major alternative models of colonial systems and imperial government up until the twentieth century: the French system of assimilation, also followed by the Americans (as

colonists), Italians, Portuguese and Russians, and the British system of association, followed by the Dutch, the Germans and the Americans (as imperialists) (Scammell 1989). Apart from the more complicated situation of the USA, which was both settler colony and imperial power, these ideological and administrative differences largely reflect the degree of economic development of their respective practitioners, and the extent to which colonial expansion was centrally controlled or developed by private companies (Anderson 1962). As has been suggested, both major colonial powers divided their colonies into two categories, according to whether they were settlement colonies or what are now referred to as exploitation colonies – that is, colonies where there was minimal settlement and colonial occupation was effected for the prime purpose of economic gain (India would be the outstanding example here). In this respect, the French distinguished between what they called bluntly colonization and domination; the British, when they thought about it at all, more classically, decorously and obliquely distinguished between their Greek and Roman colonies (Adderley 1869: 191–5). While they shared this fundamental distinction at an empirical level, otherwise the colonial systems of the two powers were diametrically opposed. Broadly the French, as might be expected, operated a rational theorized system for their colonies based on the doctrine of assimilation, whereby the colonies were integrated within France itself as *départments d'outre mer* and were thus not technically colonies at all.

There was a further paradox contained within the assimilation doctrine: on the one hand, it was the most progressive of all imperial ideologies, to the extent that it assumed the fundamental equality of all human beings, their common humanity as part of a single species, and considered that however 'natural' or 'backward' their state, all native peoples could immediately benefit from the uniform imposition of French culture in its most advanced contemporary manifestation. On the other hand, this very assumption meant that the French model had the least respect and sympathy for the culture, language and institutions of the people being colonized – it saw difference, and sought to make it the same – what might be called the paradox of ethnocentric egalitarianism. Increasingly, in the course of the nineteenth century, successive writers – such as Joseph Arthur comte de Gobineau, in his *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (1853–1855), and Gustave Le Bon in his *Les Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* (1894), proposed the scientifically legitimated differentiation of the races into different types or species, whereby their differences were portrayed as absolute, which meant that education and other civilizing influences were useless or of limited value because of the intellectual and cultural differences, that is, incapacities, of primitive peoples. By the end of the century these arguments were developed as the means of attacking the whole basis of a French colonial policy predicated on the doctrine of centralized assimilation, which was contrasted unfavourably to the British practice of loose association of various sorts (Betts 1961).

In Britain too the imperial phase was intrinsically linked to the development of a cultural ideology of race from the 1860s onwards (Young 1995a). The idea of imperialism, and the notion of a civilizing mission, presupposed racial superiority, for the fundamental difference between civilization and savagery that justified and

required the civilizing mission assumed a basic differentiation between white and non-white races, and this was made in increasingly absolute and derogatory terms, signalled by the increasing use of the term 'nigger' for any non-European colonial subject. The British system of relative non-interference with local cultures, which today appears more liberal in spirit, was in fact also based on the racist assumption that the native was incapable of education up to the level of the European – and therefore by implication required perpetual colonial rule. Association neatly offered the possibility of autonomy (for some), while at the same time incorporating a notion of hierarchy for the supposedly less-capable races.

Although they did draw on the idea of the civilizing mission, the British preferred to justify their imperial mission by invoking the analogy of the Roman empire, even while admitting a difference regarding 'the greatest present-day difficulty of the British Empire – a difficulty which does not appear to have existed in the Roman Empire – the colour question' (Lucas 1912, I: 309). The great original of empire in the nineteenth century was always the Roman, which enabled people to identify with a concept of the benign spread of civilization over benighted barbarian tribes. 'And this also', as Marlow puts it, sitting in the gloom of Gravesend, 'has been one of the dark places of the earth' (Conrad 1923: 48). The Roman empire gave the British (and to a lesser extent, Europeans and Americans) a model through which they could justify their own, and which, in the language of Tacitus, afforded a significant precedent for the triumph of civilized races over barbarism and savagery. It gave them a sense of a historical as well as a moral duty to spread civilization, and this explains the otherwise irrational rationale for the continuing utilization of the language and history of classical culture as the basis of much of the educational curriculum in British schools and universities: Classics was employed as a means of indoctrinating the ideology of the imperial moment. It was no coincidence that those destined for the East India and Colonial Offices were required to read 'Greats' (i.e. Classics) at Oxford. The English upper classes remained shamelessly in love with the culture of their own conquerors of over a thousand years earlier and imitated them in their own cultural productions and educational institutions. They were the first mimic men.

The French colonial model of assimilation required an extreme degree of bureaucratic centralization. British practice – to dignify it with the name of model would imply a degree of theorization that would be hard to justify – was rather typically eccentric. Seeley's remark that the British Empire had been acquired in a 'fit of absence of mind' (itself a romanticized version of the Earl of Carnarvon's equally implausible claim in 1870 to the House of Lords that the empire was 'the child, sometimes of accident, and sometimes of mistake'), was a decorous, aestheticized way of describing the fact that much British colonization was carried out by private companies, and only subsequently placed in an *ad hoc* constitutional or administrative context by the state: even the regular colonies were looked after by three separate government ministries (the Colonial Office, the India Office and the Foreign Office), and almost every colony seems to have had a different status, and to have been run individually at the local level (McIntyre 1977: 20–4). There were so many different kinds of colony. The very question posed at a 1999 conference in Galway – was

Ireland a colony? – suggests the difficulty of definition at a conceptual level. Even when Ireland was finally given dominion status in the 1922 Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, the best minds in the British government were unable to define what a dominion was beyond saying that Ireland would have the same constitutional status as Canada. The Act could not say simply that Ireland would become a dominion, because different dominions were constituted differently, and had different rights, while some colonies such as Rhodesia were self-governing, though not dominions (Jenks 1937: 60). Even the system of eccentricity, as might be expected, was not practised consistently.

3 BRITISH IMPERIALISM

Although it was the greatest colonial power, and possessed the largest empire, in Britain in the 1850s and 1860s imperialism was regarded as antithetical to the British model of a monarchy presiding over a quasi-democratic system based on liberal institutions. Imperialism was initially regarded negatively as a rival model of domestic politics, and there was little sympathy for the French government policy of involvement in ambitious projects of colonial expansion. The term ‘imperialism’, with all its connotations of the hated French, was first used as a term of Liberal abuse against the bombastic politics of Disraeli – ‘that odious system of bluster and swagger and might against right on which Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues bestowed the tawdry nickname of imperialism’ as the *Daily News* put it in 1898 at what would now be considered the very height of the imperial era (OED). Despite this domestic suspicion and resistance towards colonialism and, especially, imperialism that will be described in chapter 7, and despite the attempts by some governments such as Gladstone’s to contain and even diminish the British Empire, British colonial history in the latter part of the nineteenth century was one of successive expansion. From the 1860s onwards there was an enormous increase in colonial conquests: between 1860–1900 the geographical area of the British Empire more than quadrupled (Porter 1991). Resistance at home, and the lukewarm enthusiasm of liberals notwithstanding, the British Empire turned into a decentralized military and administrative machine that was increasingly hard to control and contain. Especially in times of war, which were themselves often initiated by colonial adventurers, such as Rhodes and Jameson in Southern Africa, the Empire tended towards constant expansion, though usually on a piecemeal, ad hoc or strategic basis (Butler 1968).

Among a long list of significant dates in the history of British colonialism, two denote the two major influences on British colonial and imperial thinking: 1776 and 1857. The effects of the events denoted by these dates was to push the theory and practice into contradictory directions: the War with the American Colonies, ending in 1781, led towards ideas of free trade, and a federation of self-governing Anglo-Saxon dominions made up of settlers of the same race: Greater Britain. The Indian ‘Mutiny’ in 1857, by contrast, led to the end of commercial rule, progressive reformist policies, and the institution of imperial government with control from the

centre, the tenets of which would always over-ride commercial interests if necessary. As a result, the federation form of imperialism always coexisted with a very different one, that of the 'dependencies', the rule of subject races rather than settler colonies (all settler colonies, however, also ruled subject races). For anti-colonial movements this internal division was very convenient – the activists in the exploitation colonies such as India simply demanded the same liberal autonomy accorded to the settler colonies.

The British Empire was dualistic, and this division had the effect of constantly putting the Empire at the edge of dissolution, a doubled or split enterprise never reconciled to itself. Even within more enthusiastic circles, there was a wide discrepancy between those such as Disraeli who thought of imperialism primarily in terms of the Empire in the East, that is India, and those such as Dilke who conceived of it in terms of a Greater Britain, a federation of English-speaking colonists. There were two different versions of empire, and much British thinking about imperialism can be shown to be the product of the serious tension between the Anglo-Saxon alliance view of empire, and the rule of the various subject races. 'The British Empire is a heterogeneous collection in which a very small number of self-governing communities connive at the subjugation, by force, of a vast number of despotically ruled subject populations', remarked the Irish socialist and nationalist James Connolly shortly before his execution in 1916 (Connolly 1988b: 259). 'The great cardinal feature of the British Empire . . . is that it consists of two wholly different spheres', wrote C. P. Lucas less candidly four years earlier in 1912, 'the sphere of rule and the sphere of settlement' (Lucas 1912, I: 309). Just as it had had two different kinds of colony, so Britain had two imperial systems: not differentiated by form of settlement or trade as in the early colonial days, but by the race of the settled inhabitants.

Imperialism emerged in the 1880s and 1890s for the first time as a positive term in British culture by being linked to the idea of an imperial federation of people of British descent now living in settler colonies: it involved constituting a new British national identity that would encompass all people of Anglo-Saxon descent scattered all over the world. The initial dominant sense of imperialism with regard to the British Empire thus involved a union of the British diaspora, a vision of a constantly expanding, larger Anglo-Saxon federation encompassing the globe. This concept of a greater empire was haunted profoundly by the experience of American independence in 1776: it was assumed that settler colonies could not be ruled directly from London, and that they would seek to become self-governing autonomous dominions. The idea was persuasively developed in two influential books, Dilke's *Greater Britain* of 1868 and Seeley's *The Expansion of England* of 1883, and subsequently augmented by enthusiasts such as Froude in *Oceana: or, England and her Colonies* (1885), and a host of literary productions of colonial adventure stories of which those of Rider Haggard and Kipling are the best known.

4 GREATER BRITAIN

In 1866–7, shortly before he took up a seat in the House of Commons as a radical liberal, Charles Dilke had travelled around North America and the English-speaking colonies elsewhere – ‘England round the world’ as he put it. Despite the geographical dispersal of the peoples whom he visited, and the loosening of economic and political ties of which he was aware, Dilke was struck by a nationalistic pride in what he regarded as a common culture among peoples of the same race dispersed all over the world. This he called the ‘Greater Britain’, and thereby created the concept of cohesive racial and political structure for the global diaspora of an Anglo-Saxon race which continued to share the same language and institutions. The peoples of the British Empire and the United States, he was always to argue, were ‘not only in race and language, but in laws and religion and in many matters of feeling – essentially one’ (Dilke 1890: 3). Dilke thus substituted a new cultural and racial bond for the old mercantilist links of the now abolished Navigation Acts, or direct political rule of the colonies. *Greater Britain* had the effect of dividing the empire explicitly on racial grounds for the first time. Dilke himself was an enthusiast only for the brotherhood of Greater Britain and was positively unenthusiastic with regard to Britain’s tropical exploitation colonies. In 1868 he would have been quite content for Britain to divest itself of its non-Anglo-Saxon colonies and the benefit of their luxurious products. In fact, he showed a bizarre pathological antipathy to the banana which he regarded ‘with particular horror’, warning darkly that ‘in the banana groves of Florida and Louisiana there lurk much trouble and danger to the American free States’ (Jenkins 1965: 34). By 1890 he had reconciled himself to these potential hazards and had extended the notion of Greater Britain to the empire as a whole – a development that in itself encapsulates the trajectory of imperialism in Britain. Whereas in 1868 Dilke had written enthusiastically with regard to the treatment meted out to native Americans in the USA that ‘the Saxon is the only extirpating race on earth’ (Dilke 1868, I: 233), by 1890 he was attempting to reconcile the contradictions of the racial division of the empire by taking up a paternalistic concern with native rights (Dilke 1890; Jenkins 1965: 397–9). Dilke’s reformulation of the empire as a predominantly racial rather than commercial institution articulated a fundamental contradiction that could only be resolved within imperial ideology by the invocation of a paternalistic racial hierarchy. It was this guiding imperial idea that developed into the dominant ideology of British imperialism embodied in the outright jingoism of Chamberlain. Dilke’s combination of liberalism and racialism was to constitute the paradoxical core of British imperialism, contradictorily caught, as Dilke himself put it, ‘between the absolutism which prevails in India and the democracy of South Australia or Ontario’ (Dilke 1890: 1). His formulation enabled the simultaneous incorporation of the sentiments of an anti-colonialism that fully supported the notion of self-governing British or anglicized communities overseas, with despotic (or ‘paternalistic’) rule for other races, and thus incorporated and resolved what had hitherto been antithetical pro- and anti-colonial positions (Lucas 1912, I: 309).

Seeley's *The Expansion of England*, originally given as a series of lectures in Oxford, developed Dilke's ideas by giving them a history, rewriting the history of England so that its colonial activities became central to its history, rather than a peripheral add-on, as had hitherto been the case. As Seeley himself put it, 'The American Revolution and the conquest of India cease to be mere digressions, and take their proper places in the main line of English history' (Seeley 1971: 242). Looking at British history from a global perspective, Seeley compared the geographical dimensions of the British Empire to the two new empires of the nineteenth century, the Russian and American, and is often credited with remarkable percipience for recognizing that these would be the two major imperial powers of the next century. Seeley's grand historical scope added a new imperial vision to Dilke's account of an Anglo-Saxon global racial hegemony. Froude's *Oceana: Or, England and her Colonies*, which followed in 1886 (and which, like *The Expansion of England*, went into many reprintings in the first year of its publication), also envisaged an empire held together by 'common blood, common interest, and a common pride'. It was this racialized ideology of empire that constituted the popular basis of the new imperialism of the 1880s and 1890s (Froude 1886: 10; Rich 1986).

Seeley's book was also remarkable, however, for confronting an issue which Dilke's Anglo-Saxon enthusiasms had made starkly visible but had done little to resolve:

Of course it strikes us at once that this enormous Indian population does not make part of Greater Britain in the same sense as those millions of Englishmen who live outside the British Islands. The latter are of our own blood, and are therefore united with us by the strongest tie. The former are of alien race and religion, and are bound to us only by the tie of conquest. (Seeley 1971: 11)

In this way, Dilke's characterization of the Empire on racial grounds had exposed the contradictions of British imperial governance:

The colonies and India are in opposite extremes. Whatever political maxims are most applicable to the one, are most inapplicable to the other. . . . How can the same nation pursue two lines of policy so radically different without bewilderment, be despotic in Asia and democratic in Australia . . . ? (Seeley 1971: 140–1)

The contradiction can exist, Seeley argues, only because of the sheer public indifference to 'colonial and Indian questions', a subject that for the English was, as Macaulay had earlier observed, 'not only insipid but positively distasteful' (Seeley 1971: 141–2). It has recently become fashionable among historians to contest the idea that the British were relatively indifferent to their empire until Seeley's time. However, showing that the colonial margins occasionally impinged upon the consciousness of the centre only highlights the empire's marginality – one Bertha Mason does not make an imperial summer. A more useful place to look for a preoccupation with empire prior to 1883 would be in the realms of the stock market and emigration.

In an extended discussion of India that takes up half the book, Seeley's answer to the contradiction of despotism and democracy is not to emphasize the cultural ties

between the British and the Indians, but to mediate the 'tie of conquest'. He argues that this situation is an historical accident. 'Our acquisition of India', he writes, 'was made blindly. Nothing great that has ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, so accidentally, as the conquest of India . . . in India we meant one thing, and did another' (Seeley 1971: 143). Trade had been the object, acquisition the result. Seeley envisages the possibility that an Indian nationalism would make it impossible for the British to rule India, on the grounds that a popular nationalism would infiltrate the 'native army' on which British rule depended and by means of which the 1857 'Mutiny' had been suppressed: 'the mutiny was in great measure put down by turning the races of India against each other . . . the moment a mutiny is but threatened, which shall be no mere mutiny, but the expression of a universal feeling of nationality, at that moment all hope is at an end, as all desire ought to be at an end, of preserving our Empire. For we are not really conquerors of India, and cannot rule her as conquerors' (Seeley 1971: 184–5). In an ingenious argument, the fact that the Indian army was largely made up of Indians, and was used to suppress the 'Mutiny' means, Seeley suggests, that India 'is not for practical purposes a conquered country'. The tie is not one of conquest, but something else: British rule of India 'imposes upon us vast and almost intolerable responsibilities' (Seeley 1971: 146). Seeley therefore resolves the contradictions in the government of empire by reformulating despotic rule as a form of moral responsibility: not the *mission civilisatrice*, but duty, the white man's burden. It was to be Seeley's contention that the despotic rule of peoples with whom the British shared 'no community of race or of religion' found justification in the 'almost intolerable' moral responsibility that it incurred, which was to facilitate the further expansion of empire under the ideological guise of paternalistic duty (Seeley 1971: 140).

If duty offered a resolution to the contradiction of empire, imperial enthusiasts were often more exercised by a different division. In the more extreme versions of the idea of a global white Anglo-Saxon brotherhood propounded by enthusiasts such as Dilke or Cecil Rhodes, it was envisaged that the United States might in some way re-enter the fold, thus healing what Seeley characterized as the tragic 'schism in Greater Britain' (Seeley 1971: 113). It was for this reason that Rhodes specified in his will that the United States should receive more Rhodes scholarships than any country in the British Empire, the idea being that if the US elite came to study at Oxford they would recognize the profound ties that bound them to the larger framework of Anglo-Saxon civilization (for the same racist reasons, Rhodes specified scholarships for Germans; when these were discontinued during the Second World War, George Padmore made the then-radical suggestion that since Rhodes had made his millions from Africa, some Rhodes scholarships might be awarded to black Africans) (Padmore 1949: 47). The notion of a Greater Britain, and the idea of increasing British settlement, on the model of Wakefield's scheme of colonization, was able even to persuade J. S. Mill and other liberals to the stance of imperialism; with the collapse of free trade, it subsequently developed into the new 'empire and commerce' imperialism of the Liberal party under Chamberlain at the end of the century.

The colonial relation was thus reformulated into a new imperialist dream of a union of English-speaking peoples, a federation governed by an imperial parliament

in London. This idea was seriously discussed from the turn of the century to the 1920s (Walston 1920). It formally came into being in 1917, when an 'Imperial War Cabinet' was established with each dominion represented by its prime ministers; the people of India were represented by the Hon. S. P. Sinha, member of the Executive Council of the Governor of Bengal; the Maharaja of Patalia attended as spokesman for the Princes of India (Keith 1916: 501; 1932: 5). Initial demands for Home Rule, in India or West Africa, assumed explicitly that if the colony became a self-governing state, it would remain a dominion within the broader federation of the British Empire, as the Irish Free State was required to do when Southern Ireland became independent in 1922. The institution of the Commonwealth, created at the Imperial Conference of 1926, was the direct product of the original idea of a federation (McIntyre 1977). Today's repeated stress on the multicultural identity of the Commonwealth is in part designed to counteract the legacy of the historical fact that it was originally intended to be a whites-only affair.

The process towards self-government was not always straightforward, even for the white colonies. During the nineteenth century, while Canada achieved dominion status in 1867, the Australian colonies originally resisted a proposal made by Earl Grey in the late 1840s for the creation of a federal nation, and finally agreed to a change of status only in 1901 in the face of growing imperial activity in the Pacific by France, Germany and the US, and resentment at the refusal of the British government to uphold Queensland's annexation of New Guinea (the British government resisted Australian and New Zealand attempts to declare a Monroe Doctrine over the South Pacific) (McIntyre 1977: 147). By contrast, Home Rule was notoriously impossible to achieve for any 'non-whites' who wanted it, such as the West Africans or the Indians. The tensions produced by the contradictions between the different constituents of the British imperial system came to a head over Ireland, a country which seemed to rest uneasily within the boundaries of both. The Liberal government under Gladstone consistently pushed for self-government for Ireland, but was twice defeated by unelected conservative peers in the House of Lords (the income of many hereditary peers had been derived from Irish rents). The grounds for refusal were that the Irish, not quite proper Anglo-Saxons, were unfit for self-government, or already had self-government in so far as they were represented in the House of Commons, or that an independent Ireland would make the rest of Britain strategically vulnerable in military terms, and that it would encourage anti-colonial nationalism in the colonies generally. For its part, India constituted a very different kind of imperial possession, and one on which Britain increasingly depended economically during the course of the nineteenth century. Although debates about the governance of India from the time of Warren Hastings' impeachment onwards divided on the issue of whether Britain was simply ruling India and benefiting in economic terms, or had a larger missionary or civilizing purpose, the special status of India, under company juris-diction until 1857, meant that it could always operate as an exception to the main forms of colonial rule. After 1857, however, when the administration of India was taken over directly by Whitehall, the imperialistic, centralized forms developed for the East India Company increasingly

became the general norm for colonial rule and the bureaucratic basis of British imperialism.

With the Company gone, from 1858 the British were blatantly operating with two forms of imperialism simultaneously: the politically liberal Anglo-Saxon colonization of suitable, allegedly empty, parts of the globe, and the autocratic or 'paternalist' rule of subject races for purposes of economic exploitation, justified by notions of cultural and racial superiority, with only limited forms of internal or local assembly. This double system was affirmed in the heated debate that followed Governor Eyre's vicious repression of the Morant Bay uprising of 1865 (85 people were killed without trial, 354 executed after trial, and 600 flogged). Opinion was divided between those, such as Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Darwin, Stephen and others, who thought that the Governor should be brought before English justice for administering arbitrary punishment of executions and beatings on those involved, and those who argued that his actions had been justified. Eyre's defenders rejected the argument that non-white races should be treated equally before the law as those of British descent, and insisted that the Governor's actions were a necessary reaction to a challenge to colonial authority. In the event, although the matter was debated in parliament and elsewhere, Eyre was not prosecuted (Semmel 1962). This in effect laid down a benchmark that confirmed the military response to the Indian insurrection of 1857: henceforth British policy, justice and conduct were effectively divided upon racial lines, and colonies were distinguished accordingly.

Rather than admit to the contradictory nature of the British Empire as Dilke and Seeley had done, this allowed later theorists of imperialism to reconcile the two categories by putting them on different, racialized time scales, so that the white parts of the Empire were ready to operate their own democratic forms of self-government more or less right away, the black parts at some long-distant time in the future, with the imperialist power acting as 'trustee' in the meantime. Perhaps the most subtle finessing of this contradiction came in Lord Lugard's idea of the Dual Mandate: 'while on the one hand the abounding wealth of the tropical regions of the earth must be developed and used for the benefit of mankind, on the other hand an obligation rests on the controlling power not only to safeguard the material rights of the natives, but to promote their moral and educational progress' (Lugard 1922: 18). Imperial duty was now double: first to exploit for the benefit of others ('the civilized world') the available raw materials that would otherwise be left unused, and then to extend the culture of civilization to the society being exploited. The contradictions, however, between the ostensibly liberal values of the Empire and the practice of its autocratic rule in India and elsewhere, so clearly apparent in Mill's distinction in 1859 between the non-interference appropriate between 'civilized nations' and the interference required by a civilized nation's relation to its 'barbarous neighbours', was subject to increasing attention from liberal critics within Britain and anti-colonialist nationalist thinkers within the colonies (Mill 1984: 118).

By the 1880s, imperialism had become by general consensus a common policy in the British establishment, and the overall guiding strategy of British foreign policy. The British government, together with the other European and new imperial powers

of Japan and the USA, began to appropriate new colonies for non-economic or non-strategic reasons, sometimes merely as a pre-emptive strategy to prevent others from taking them or to take 'their' share. As with the original policy of Napoleon III, imperialism now also operated in popular terms in the broad sense of the public being encouraged by propaganda, colonial exhibitions and the like, to take a patriotic pride in the Empire. Public acceptance of this strategy (at least among those men who had the vote) is indicated by the fact that by the 1895 election, imperialism was for the first time the policy of both political parties in Britain; Joseph Chamberlain's conversion to imperialism, however, signifies a shift towards what was often referred to as the 'new imperialism', typified by his emphasis on the combination of empire and commerce. Chamberlain argued that the ever-expanding power of France and Germany had to be counter-balanced by a British Empire now conceived as a great economic unit, held together by the imperial preference system. While in the face of global power rivalries, this involved the customary pomposity of imperialism, together with imperialist expeditions of conquest for public consumption such as the notorious raid on Benin in 1898, British imperialism was now increasingly inflected towards the claimed economic rationale of the new imperialism, the empire of industry and its drive for captive markets. This new dimension of imperialism, signifying the extension of economic and commercial interests, was often – as it still is – characterized as American. Historically, it coincides with the economic critique of imperialism by liberal and Marxist economists and the shift of the meaning of the term from direct conquest to economic domination, a difference sometimes characterized as 'formal' and 'informal imperialism' (Louis 1976). From this time on, and especially with the Boer War (1899–1902), the apex and point of subsequent decline for British imperialism, 'imperialism' became a term of abuse to be directed not just against the French as in the 1850s and 1860s, but also against the British and the perceived designs of the wider Anglo-Saxon world, a threat fully exploited by the Nazis in the twentieth century.

5 AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

Many of the old-style imperialists, for whom imperialism had offered an inspiring and transcendent alternative to the contemporary world of utilitarian economics, regretted the shift towards the new-style American imperialism, which the British had in fact already been practising themselves in South America for a century. Thus did John Buchan, author of colonial fiction and governor-general of Canada, lament the change:

The dream of Imperialism – the closer union of the British race in one great pacific and organic commonwealth – lost something of its glamour. It tended to sink on its baser side to a form of race chauvinism or a scheme of commercial protection; the ideal, once so glowing, became a conventional peroration at public banquets; and the machinery of union was narrowed to perfunctory conferences of British and Dominions ministers. (Buchan 1921–2, I: 37)

'Race chauvinism' here meant only chauvinism between European races. The ideological basis of Buchan's lament for old-style imperialism becomes evident when it is recalled that after the defeat of the Boers in 1903, he rejected outright the possibility of instituting social and political equality in the proposed Federation of South Africa (as the British could have done), with the comment that 'between the white man and the black man there is fixed for the present an impassable gulf'.

American imperialism signified a new moment when, under the enthusiastic direction of McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt (the man for whom the children's nursery rhyme, 'The Teddy Bear's Picnic', was written in 1907 to mark the big game hunter's compassion in sparing the life of a single bear cub), a former colony had itself turned into an imperial power (Bull 1992: 156–83; Patouillet 1904). The high point of general jingoistic imperialism, from 1898 to the First World War, was the period in which the United States shifted its policy from the acquisition and assimilation of contiguous territory through a militarized form of settler expansion, to one of direct acquisition and control of colonies overseas on the European model. Its success in the Spanish–American War in 1898, enabled it to take over almost all of Spain's remaining colonies, notably the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico (Spain was left holding Spanish Morocco, Spanish Guinea, Rio de Oro, Ifni and Fernando Po). The USA then found itself in a position of repressing resistance, in Puerto Rico and by Huk guerrillas in the Philippines, to American rule by military force. All the same, as J. A. Hobson already observed in 1902, 'Cuba, the Philippines, and Hawaii were but the *hors d'oeuvre* to whet an appetite for an ampler banquet' (Hobson 1938: 78).

Osterhammel has suggested that 'the United States is a case of *imperialism without a major colonial empire*' (Osterhammel 1997: 22). While this allows for some colonies – the US began to acquire non-contiguous territory from the 1850s onwards, taking Alaska, the Aleutian and Midway Islands in 1867, American Samoa in 1878–99, Guam, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Hawaiian and Wake Islands in 1898, the Panama Canal Zone in 1903, the Virgin Islands in 1917, and occupying Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba and the Dominican Republic as 'protectorates' from 1903 to 1915 (Battistini 1955; Dennett 1963; Zavala and Rodríguez 1980) – it also accurately characterizes the primarily economic motive of US imperialism, which subsequently preferred forms of indirect rule and influence to direct colonial control. When the colonial powers themselves began to switch to this American form, giving their colonies independence but maintaining economic influence or control, colonialism was renamed neocolonialism. However, the former colonial powers only possessed a relative autonomy, for what was distinctive about US imperialism was that it was hegemonic (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 124).

The development of US imperialism put the United States in a category of its own. Its contradictory position was nicely brought out by the great French International Colonial Exhibition held in Paris in 1931. The exhibition enabled the metropolitan Parisian to walk down the avenue of French colonies and visit successively the sumptuous pavilions representing Madagascar, French India, the Catholic and Protestant missions, Indochina, French West and Equatorial Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (Miller 1998). In addition, there were pavilions representing the domains of

other colonial powers, specifically Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and the United States. The US was represented by a full-scale reproduction of George Washington's home, Mount Vernon, both symbolizing the American colonial achievement, and at the same time seeking to identify it closely with the colonial enterprises of the European powers (Braun and Cie 1931).

Neocolonialism

Neo-colonialism is . . . the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.

Kwame Nkrumah (1965: xi)

It could be said that, paradoxically, the liberation struggles helped the new imperialist system to break up the old one. The undermining of the imperial powers that had occurred with the First World War was consolidated with the Second. After 1945, the form of direct domination employed by the European imperial powers was no longer tenable – though it took them a decade or two to come to terms with the fact. The system broke up for three reasons: the resistance to the system from colonized peoples, now supported actively by the Soviet Union and subsequently China and Cuba; the inability of the European powers, exhausted by the war, to sustain a system that was increasingly expensive to maintain because of the widespread resistance to it; and the pressure from the other superpower, the United States, which saw the colonial trading blocs as a barrier to its own economic expansion. The new system that replaced it, however, was in many ways a more subtle, indirect version of the old.

The main point to be made therefore is that, in terms of the concepts outlined in the previous chapter, the postcolonial is *post*, that is, coming after, colonialism and imperial in its first sense of domination by direct rule. It is not, however, *post* to imperialism in its second sense, that is of a general system of a power relation of economic and political domination. Since the initiation of this second system after the Second World War, there have been all sorts of varieties of theorizations of this power relation and how to resist or transform it: from the left, neocolonialism, dependency theory, world systems theory, or, from the capitalist side, Keynesianism, monetarism, neoliberalism. The concept that functioned as a form of mediation between them was that of ‘development’: it was ‘development’ that was generally seen as the way forward after the successful realization of the anti-colonial struggles. It was only development which put tricontinental societies in the position of some form of economic agency; the failure of development projects in their original form in many areas of the world has led to a reassessment of its underlying assumptions which has begun to draw on the ideas of postcolonial critique. For development theory did not take on board the fundamental lessons of the Marxism of the liberation movements

that have been central to postcolonialism. The foundational concept here is the critique of eurocentrism and unreflective eurocentric assumptions, and the need to radicalize any politics or economics through constructive dialogue to accommodate the particularities of local cultural conditions.

Paradoxically, in the move between colonial rule and independence an essential factor was lost: agency. Anti-colonial struggles involved the assumption of a new level of agency by colonized people against the conditions in which they lived. Independence was the object of that struggle, and the assumption was that it would fully realize the ideal of self-determination. The reality was not always so simple. Kwame Nkrumah, for example, the man who had been able to transform the politics of Ghana and pressurize the British into leaving without a single shot being fired, found that with independence, in many ways his power was only nominal: he had political power, but he did not gain control of the economy. As Bretton observes:

Not only were export and import trade, banking, insurance, transportation, and communications essentially in expatriate (i.e. mainly British) hands, but the country's major source of foreign exchange, cocoa, was securely tied up in a maze of international financing, marketing and processing arrangements. (Bretton 1967: 16)

Africa may have been the source of resources, such as cocoa, coffee, diamonds, gold, timber or oil, but the markets for such commodities were centred and controlled in London and New York. Dr Azikiwe of Nigeria found himself in the same situation, and subsequently many leaders of newly independent countries confronted the same harsh reality. Independence brought to light an apparently new form of subservience, to the economic system of capitalist power, which had as yet been articulated only in socialist theory.

The earlier concept of neocolonialism as a general framework for analysis is sometimes invoked as a possible alternative to the preoccupations of postcolonial critiques. Certainly the word 'neocolonialism' was a fitting term to describe the immediate set-up of the postcolonial epoch. Although the formerly colonized territories gradually had their political sovereignty returned to them, they nevertheless remained subject to the effective control of the major world powers, which constituted the same group as the former imperial powers. Neocolonialism denotes a continuing economic hegemony that means that the postcolonial state remains in a situation of dependence on its former masters, and that the former masters continue to act in a colonialist manner towards formerly colonized states. Was there merely a change in form rather than substance? Decolonization in this analysis would really only correspond to the shift between what Gramsci called political and civil societies, that is from a society controlled by military force to one that no longer required such physical force because the hegemony of the ruling class was sufficiently established at a cultural, ideological, economic and political level for it to operate by means of prestige and active consent (Anderson 1976–7; Gramsci 1971). In the neocolonial situation, the ruling class constitutes an elite that operates in complicity with the needs of international capital for its own benefit. Effective international (i.e. US) control is maintained by economic means,

particularly access to capital and technology, together with the policing of world financial organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), or the International Monetary Fund. Where necessary, this is supplemented by military force, as in Nicaragua or El Salvador, either externally through invasion (or increasingly, bombing), or more typically, through the nation's own army and police force in a structure of what the Nigerian writer and civil rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa called 'monstrous domestic colonialism' (Saro-Wiwa 1992). The implication of this situation, therefore, is that national sovereignty is effectively a fiction, and that the system of apparently autonomous nation-states is in fact the means through which inter-national capital exercises imperialist control.

1 NEOCOLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM

The term 'neocolonialism' was introduced in 1961, just four years after Ghana had become the first African colony to win its independence. It was soon elaborated in theoretical terms by the Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah, whose book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* dates from 1965. Much of his analysis still provides the basic understanding of the term, and defines the assumed parameters of economic power in postcolonial theory. Nkrumah argued that 'The essence of neocolonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus political policy is directed from outside' (Nkrumah 1965: ix). Independence, therefore, is a sham. Historically, Nkrumah suggested that neocolonialism, like colonialism before it, represents the export of the social conflict of capitalist countries; in particular, the demands of western welfare states, with their comparatively high working-class living standards, meant that class conflict within the nation-state had been transformed into an international division of labour. The international division of labour would become a defining characteristic of the postcolonial era. At the same time, given its primacy in international finance capital, and therefore effective global political autonomy, Nkrumah argued that neocolonialism represented the American stage of colonialism, that is an empire without colonies. The 'so-called Third World' (this is how Nkrumah himself describes it – his essay of 1968 was to form one of the earliest attacks on the term), according to Nkrumah, was not helped by the rivalry between the first and the second worlds (Nkrumah 1973: 435–8). Rather than enabling any means of resisting them, instead it had a debilitating effect particularly through the supply of military aid. Resistance to neocolonialism, Nkrumah argued, would have triumphed in Africa when it became economically free and politically united. At this point, the international division of labour would cease:

The monopolists will come face to face with their own working class in their own countries, and a new struggle will arise within which the liquidation and collapse of imperialism will be complete. (Nkrumah 1965: 256)

What is striking about Nkrumah's text today is both the detail of the economic analysis (though it does not compare with that of a trained economist such as Amin, 1973), and the confidence that neocolonialism is a system that works to the detriment not only of the exploited but also the exploiting country: 'Neocolonialism is a millstone around the necks of the developed countries which practise it. Unless they can rid themselves of it, it will drown them'. He adds optimistically: 'neocolonialism is *not* a sign of imperialism's strength but rather of its last hideous gasp' (Nkrumah 1965: xvi, 253). His means of resisting it is centred on socialism and Pan-Africanism. In terms of the distinctions outlined so far, Nkrumah's text invokes the term 'imperialism' (in its second, broader sense) alongside that of neocolonialism somewhat problematically, in a way that prompts the question of what, if any, is the distinction between them.

The argument of Nkrumah's book is that neocolonialism is a continuation of traditional colonial rule by another means. Hobson's account of imperialism as a system of economic exploitation, in which the metropolitan centre drains the resources of the periphery while at the same time encouraging it to consume its manufactured products in an unequal, unbalanced system of exchange, essentially remains the model. Against the liberal notion of the benefits of investment in so-called 'underdeveloped' countries, Nkrumah argues on Leninist lines that

The result of neocolonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neocolonialism increases rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. (Nkrumah 1965: x)

Certainly, Nkrumah's prediction that the gap between rich and poor countries would increase has been borne out – although this has not taken place uniformly. Since he wrote, the international division of labour has developed so that cheap labour costs, as well as raw materials, are the primary resource of many non-western countries. The use of an international labour force also requires political stability, a trained and literate work force, and a functioning infrastructure, and it is this that leads western manufacturers to choose countries closely controlled by the state, such as China or Malaysia, as the site for the production of clothes, electrical goods and toys, rather than the many countries in Africa where these features are lacking. Here the states that still operate under the institutional, economic and political legacy of colonialism are not necessarily preferred over those offering the Asian form of modernity where technology is adopted without liberal institutions.

Nkrumah points to the way that trade agreements, foreign aid (particularly military aid), the operation of international US-controlled organizations (the World Bank, the IMF) as sources of capital for what were, in the early days of independence, often over-ambitious and even unnecessary industrial projects, as well as forms of cultural imperialism such as Christian evangelism, the Peace Corps, or control of the media, all have the effect of establishing and maintaining control. This analysis correlates closely with Latin American dependency theory, which adds further elements to

Nkrumah's account: the control of technology; the increasing number of often unsupervised non-governmental organizations, frequently funded by US foundations; pressures for population control; the relocation of production so as to escape western environmental controls; the targeting of third-world countries for the export not of surplus western consumer production, but of products regarded as unhealthy or more risky than the natural alternative – such as cigarettes and powdered baby milk (a bottle-fed baby is up to 25 times more likely to die from diarrhoea where water supplies are unsafe) – and the gross imbalance of the consumption of global resources between the west and the rest. In all the arguments deployed for his critique of neocolonialism, Nkrumah does not, however, challenge the notion of 'development' as such. No more does Samir Amin in his complementary analysis of neocolonialism in former French West Africa. He does, however, raise the provocative question of whether the neocolonial domination which Nkrumah describes is cause or effect of other structural factors, such as the balkanization of the West African economy at independence (Amin 1973: 273–4).

The term 'neocolonialism' remains useful in that it insists on a primarily economic account of the postcolonial system from a broadly Marxist perspective. It has allowed writers and activists, such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o, to develop a cultural and political analysis which, within the framework of the economic argument, lays emphasis on related continuing cultural effects such as cultural dominance, often perpetuated by the continuing presence of descendants of settlers, of the endurance of colonial languages such as English or French as a *de facto* national language, or of westernized educational, legal and political institutions that were originally set up during the period of colonization (Ngugi 1981, 1993). Ngugi has drawn on Fanon to add to Nkrumah's analysis the additional component of the neocolonial elite, the often western-educated ruling class who identify more closely with the west than with the people of the country that they rule; in return for an affluent life-style, they facilitate the exploitative operations of western national and multinational companies. Although Ngugi places great emphasis on forms of cultural resistance to this system, he also illustrates some of the problems of dependency theory. His stress on a continuing neocolonial dominance has the disadvantage of suggesting a powerlessness and passivity which underestimates what has been achieved since independence, including the independence movements themselves, perpetuating stereotypes of helplessness even while it implies sympathy, and reinforcing assumptions of western hegemony with the third world being portrayed as its homogeneous eternal victim. The invocation of neocolonialism can also at times become somewhat ritualistic (usually accompanied by ceremonial complaints about the World Bank and the IMF), masking ignorance of, and lack of curiosity about, the diversity and range of real contemporary material conditions and the political and economic situations which have produced them. Moreover, it can fail to distinguish between economic or military neocolonialism, which are products of contemporary power structures, and cultural neocolonialism which more often involves an historical inheritance. As a concept, neocolonialism seems more appropriate to the situation of certain former colonies, particularly ones in Africa, such as Ngugi's own Kenya, which remained very western

in orientation under Kenyatta after independence, than as a description of the general operation of the imperialism of economic power. It usefully describes continued forms of colonialist behaviour, such as the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, or the west's apparent belief that it has the right to bomb deviant nations, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Serbia or Sudan, as and when it chooses. What it does not do is to register and conceptualize the changing modes of resistance and cultural assertion that have developed in response to the political developments since the early years of independence. As a concept, neocolonialism is as disempowering as the conditions it portrays. Removal of the possibilities of agency is equally a problem of more recent theories of power operating through economic exploitation.

2 DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY THEORY

Since the restructuring of the world economic system with the Bretton Woods agreement after the Second World War on broadly Keynesian principles, the western world has seen a succession of economic theories come and go, and these have usually been exported to other countries operating outside the former Soviet sphere of influence. The keystone has always been the concept of 'development', which is a way of describing the assumed necessity of incorporating the rest of the world into the realm of modernity, that is, the western economic system, in which capitalism produces progressive economic growth. Hitherto, the colonies had typically been seen as providing resources to enable the development of western economies rather than as industrializing in their own right. From this perspective, they were seen as static and traditional, and outside the historical processes of the western economies. Development theory shared this view, but sought to transform them through a modernization that would break through the restraints of traditional institutions and social attitudes. This process was initiated by some of the colonial powers after the First World War, and was greatly accelerated after the Second (Havinden and Meredith 1993). A vast range of academic experts was deployed to provide information of all kinds about 'underdeveloped' societies, the better to facilitate their economic and cultural metamorphosis into modernity (Escobar 1995). The postcolonial nations in general initially accepted this prescription of the need for modernization in the desire to develop their own economies and to increase their wealth: the only question was how to achieve this. They could choose to align themselves economically with the west or the Soviet system, but both choices in fact assumed the desirability of development, albeit according to different models. The post-war capitalist economic world system assumed a theory of economic growth as a series of linear stages of development, given an impetus by large-scale industrial or infrastructure projects undertaken by a centralized state, enabling a country to 'take off' from a traditional agricultural economy to a 'modern' industrial one (Weiner 1966; Rostow 1960). Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' of 1958 was a version of the same concept on indigenous socialist lines. The aim throughout was to modernize, for which read 'westernize' (for which now read 'globalize'), the third world (Mehmet 1995). 'Development' of the non-industrialized nations was assisted

by loans from banks or western states designed to generate growth. However, for many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, when envisaged growth failed to take place, and inflation and devaluation of the currency followed, this strategy simply led to a debt crisis in which the debtor countries ended up repaying far more in interest than they had ever borrowed (George 1988, 1992).

Nkrumah, while himself utilizing the autocratic power structures that the system of development encouraged, also perceived how it kept the newly independent countries subservient to their more economically powerful former colonial masters. The African tendency towards socialism and affiliation with the Soviet Union or China upon independence was in part a response to an increasing awareness of a different neocolonial system that had been in operation for many years in the form of US intervention in Central and South America since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This was symbolized by the notorious 'banana republics' which were effectively run by US corporations (it is no coincidence that the trade war between the USA and the European Union in the late 1990s was focused on the US government's prosecution of the interests of the US banana multinationals against the EU preferential treatment for impoverished Caribbean farmers) (World Development Movement 1999). For this reason, it was in the Americas that the most substantial critiques of the development model were elaborated, starting in the late 1950s. These began with the American Marxist Paul Baran's *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957), in which he argued that the real problem of development was not the traditional infrastructure of the 'underdeveloped' society, but the tendency for any surplus to be taken as profit by international corporations rather than reinvested in the local economy for growth.

Underdevelopment in the three continents was therefore not an isolated phenomenon specific to traditional non-industrial societies, but operated as a symbiotic process with development in the west. Baran's critique of development theory was formally elaborated in the late 1960s into 'dependency' theory by Latin American and other Marxist economists, notably by Frank (1969), Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Furtado (1964) and Amin (1974, 1977, 1988). They argued that development theory did not acknowledge that western industrial growth had been achieved through a process of 'underdevelopment' of the colonies in the colonial era, whereby the west had destroyed local industries and kept the economies of the non-western nations in a condition of stagnation for its own interests, an economic principle which found its political equivalent in the notorious law, initially proposed by Senator Platt and subsequently passed by the US Congress, which stated that Cuba's independent constitution of 1898 must contain an amendment allowing the US the right to intervene in Cuba's political affairs, and to lease naval bases on the island – thus condemning it to a permanent condition of dependency until 1959 (the US still occupies part of Cuba as a naval base) (Castro 1972: 27–8; Frank 1969). These sorts of forced, advantageous conditions were not available in the 1950s and 1960s for the newly independent, so-called developing nations, which did not operate in isolation from the effects of their continuing subaltern place in the world economic system: though they were formally *independent*, they remained economically *dependent*. Moreover, since their

under-development was the complementary product of western development, it was argued that it remained in the interests of the western nations to keep them in that condition through a process of unequal exchange, or exploitation through trade (one response to this was to initiate policies of import substitution) (Emmanuel 1972; Kay 1989). These ideas, that poverty was not a question of an inert backwardness but the result of the process of capitalist accumulation, were quickly taken up in other areas, for example, in 1972 in Walter Rodney's classic *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Rodney 1989). Rodney cites Latin American development and underdevelopment theory to explain the condition of Africa as the consequence of deliberate under-development in the colonial period. Similar arguments were also invoked with respect to the deindustrialization of India and Egypt in the nineteenth century. Rodney's thesis was subsequently developed by another Africanist, Immanuel Wallerstein, into the general form of world system theory in which individual neocolonial exploitation of individual countries by former colonial powers was reconceptualized in terms of the needs of the world market, an internationalist perspective first broached in the theories of imperialism of Bukharin (1972), Hilferding (1981), Lenin (1965) and Luxemburg (1951; Luxemburg and Bukharin 1972), but closed down for much of the twentieth century by Stalin's stress on socialism in one country and the vendetta against Trotsky. By the mid-twentieth century, however, this global market was readily apparent, no longer the object of imperialist rivalry but subject to economic domination by the US and transnational corporations (Wallerstein 1961, 1974–89, 1975, 1979, 1984).

In contest here, therefore, are the western theories of global growth made up of unequal development along a common economic path, and originally Latin American Marxist theories of dependency which argue that economic growth in one place operates through impoverishment elsewhere. Marxist theories of imperialism in classical Marxism, which saw capitalism operating as a brutal but ultimately productive common force throughout the world (and which in themselves were not incommensurate with development theory), essentially structured by exploitation at the level of production, were replaced by dependency and world system theories where development at the centre is brought about at the expense of underdevelopment at the periphery through exploitation through trade. In 1980, in the Brandt report, the liberal capitalist constituency accepted the new form of Marxist argument by highlighting the unequal division of the world into what it characterized as the North and the South (Brandt et al. 1980). This has since become a discreet way of referring to the haves and the have-nots, the dominant and the dominated peoples of the world.

Dependency theory also provided the context for the economic position of the non-aligned movement of the third world, initiated at the Bandung Conference of 1955. However admirable the political aims of the non-aligned movement may have been, the problem was that the aim of a third way for the independent group did not coincide with a separate system at an economic level (indeed the claim to economic rights of the Group of 77 in 1967 suggested the very opposite), but consisted rather of an attempt to de-link the economy from a dependent relation to the world market through policies of import substitution, as in India, Tanzania, Jamaica and elsewhere

in Latin America. At the same time, some dependency theory also functioned implicitly as a critique of the hopes of non-alignment and a separate path of economic and social development for the third world (Alavi et al. 1982; Alavi and Shanin 1982). Despite the stance of neutrality and *swadeshi* economics, practically speaking most states in Africa and Asia had a choice between two economic and political systems upon becoming independent: either a western demand economy (the strong emphasis on the free market, privatization, abolition of exchange controls, etc. did not come until the 1980s), or a Sino-Soviet style centralized Marxist one. Despite political non-alignment, in practice many newly independent states followed a broad policy of state socialism. By the 1960s the move to radical socialism and increasingly communism appeared virtually unstoppable. But the oil crisis of 1974 floored capitalist and socialist economies alike. The stronger ones recovered, others did not.

3 CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY

Since 1965 a vast amount of work has been done in many different regions of the postcolonial world, that has successively redefined and developed the early analysis of neocolonialism by Nkrumah. Postdevelopment theory and postcolonial critical analyses are in part the product of that process, though postcolonialism both constitutes an analysis of the system of economic and political domination and develops means of resistance to it, as in the Latin American model. Nkrumah's argument rested on the idea that within the global system of economic imperialism, a special category – neocolonialism – was necessary to analyse the economic situation of formerly colonized countries. Today this differential argument still stands, except that it operates regionally as well as in terms of specific colonial history. Much of the 'economic miracle' of Southeast Asian countries was the long-term result of the fact that Japan was the only imperial power to industrialize its colonies. The dynamic economic development of Korea and Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule provides a significant counterfactual example to Baran's dependency thesis (Myers and Peattie 1984: 347–452). Similarly, the present-day differences between Ireland, which now has a per capita income higher than several other countries of Western Europe, and Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in the world, are too great for them to be discussed under the simple rubric of neocolonialism. While many countries in Southeast Asia have become a good deal richer, or have even moved into first-world status from the point of view of GNP or standard of living (e.g. Singapore), many countries of Africa are now poorer, with a lower income per head, than they were at the time of independence (Davidson 1992; Harris 1986).

Today, the concept of development is still employed by liberal economists, but the force of critiques of its earlier assumptions means that it is now conceived in a more holistic form that incorporates cultural, social and political factors in addition to the original narrow economic focus. It recognizes that development involves not only economic change but also involves qualitative processes of social transformation in which issues such as gender are primary. At worst this means that the whole fabric of

social life is subject to control, not just the economy. Nevertheless this shift towards local forms and differences also reflects the critique of Rostow et al.'s development theory as ethnocentric, always assuming the western model as the only possible paradigm (Hadjor 1993: 276–8; Leys 1996). The notion of the stages of development, in which non-western countries would pass through the same phases as had occurred in the history of Europe, was based on the same sort of assumptions as the earlier ethnocentric anthropological notion of different races and cultures being unequal in achievement, but all progressing on the same line of mental development. Just as the different peoples of the world were regarded as a living museum of the history of humankind, so the different nations of the world were a living museum of its economic history. Their only way forward was to imitate the west (Tucker 1999).

That imitation has also been required to follow the changes in the west's own ideas of how to achieve further economic development. The most spectacular example of such a shift in capitalist economic theory would be monetarism, an idea which was actually developed in Chicago and South America in the 1960s, put into practice in Chile under Pinochet in the 1970s, taken up by the US and Britain of Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, and subsequently forced on to non-western economies round the globe. With the advent of neoliberalism, or more narrowly monetarism, the abandonment of some of the major tenets of Bretton Woods, and the break-up of the alternative Soviet system, the debt accumulated by 'underdeveloped' countries since the 1970s, which has multiplied over ten-fold, has been used as a means of forcing them to programmes of 'structural adjustment'. Typically these involve restraints on state spending, a free-market system, a reduction of the role of the state, privatization, encouragement of private commercial investment in the state and social sector, abolition of exchange controls, and the replacement of international aid for state projects by inward investment by multinational corporations together with small-scale social projects run by non-government organizations funded by western charities and foundations. This economic agenda has usually (i.e. selectively) been accompanied by pressure on democratization and human rights issues. While organizations such as the World Bank have elaborated increasingly sophisticated quantitative models for classifying 'development', the symptomatic moment of the change in terms of economic prescription for how it should be achieved came in 1981 when the 'developing' world was reconceptualized and reclassified in economic terms by the International Finance Corporation, a World Bank affiliate, through the category of the 'emerging' market. This still in fact assumes the structure of development but sees the economy as a market, rather than something centred on state initiatives, in order to encourage direct foreign investment. The system on which this description is based applies equally to industrialized, semi-industrialized and non-industrialized countries: the significant factor is relative wealth.

Despite the differences between cultural and historical traditions, between industrialized societies such as Russia or South Africa and more traditional ones such as Mali, in economic terms the category of emerging market divides countries up according to whether their average income comes in at below or above the mean world income (the World Bank figure for 1995 was US\$8,626). This defines the material

gap between the 'developing' and the 'developed' world; it also facilitated the introduction of a third category of the 'least developed nations'. At its extreme the disparity between the most and the least developed is a fifty-to-one difference in per capita productivity, with a corresponding income differential. Economically, the difference between the two states of emerging and emerged is that emerged markets are technical innovators, while emerging markets utilize already available technologies (a sophisticated form, in other words, of the international division of labour). Contrary to the arguments of postmodernism about the abandonment of grand narratives, economists in this paradigm assume a process in which many markets with different historical traditions are fusing together to follow one general economic path ('globalization'), a perspective which shows that Rostow's assumption that all countries can follow a common path to development and modernity remains the norm. It has to be conceded that there are some ways in which the income-per-head measure usefully overrides sentiment about the cultural, historical and geographic differences of nation-states to point to the major difference between them: economic disparity, material impoverishment. Within that general measure, however, the per capita average income or GDP per head can hide enormous disparities of wealth: emphasis on the poverty of third-world countries can imply that it is simply a north-south difference, a division which hides wealth in the third world and poverty in the first: property prices in some areas of Mumbai, for example, are among the highest in the world, while houses in some areas of the north of England change hands for £1. Third-world countries typically have greater differences of income internally, between a wealthy elite and the rest of the population, and are fundamentally characterized by an unequal distribution of their wealth, or political reluctance to spend money on social projects (India can afford to have an ambitious space programme but the Indian government chooses to contribute just 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product to total spending on health care). Any readjustment of north-south economic relations would be of very little use without an accompanying social redistribution of wealth and the development of wider constituencies of both production and consumption.

This economic diversity, and the different rates of development of different non-western economies, have also been at the basis of critiques of dependency and underdevelopment theory (Blomström and Hettne 1984; Laclau 1971; Seers 1981; Törnquist 1999). The problem is that dependency theory, though reversing the structure of blame for underdevelopment from internal to external factors, does not really challenge the fundamental distinction of stasis vs. change between underdeveloped and developed economies that lies at the basis of development theory. It tends to present a uniform, static, immobile and essentially descriptive picture of a core-periphery relation that gives little practical scope for change, for recognition of what has been achieved, while not explaining the differences between 'periphery' nations that allow some to develop at a far faster pace than others. While it refuses to acknowledge significant responsibility in the dependent nation and places the blame for underdevelopment elsewhere, dependency theory remains unable to account for counter-examples of agency and self-transformation. This critique is made from the right and the left: the

most radical critique of underdevelopment and dependency theory has been voiced by the English Marxist Bill Warren, who argued (via Marx rather than Lenin) that

contrary to widespread populist–liberal opinion, the Third World has not been marked by stagnation, relative or absolute, in the post-war period. On the contrary, significant progress in material welfare and the development of the productive forces has been made. . . . The reality of this picture of vibrant, ‘grass roots’ capitalist development in the Third World is attested to by the abundant evidence of rapidly rising commercialization and the resulting social differentiation . . . coupled with the relative expansion of wage-labour at the expense of family or self-employment (including feudal-type tenuous relationships). (Warren 1980: 252–3)

Although his arguments are often over-corrective (they have, in turn, been answered by Ahmad 1996), Warren confronts the fact that not all third-world countries have remained stagnant economically since 1945 – they have rather moved in different directions. Development has been highly uneven, and, as Warren admits, socialist countries have not been among those that have prospered most. In an influential article, Laclau (1971) also contested dependency theory’s fundamental reorientation of the source of exploitation from production to trade.

With the apparent failure of socialist economies in the 1980s, the abandonment of nationalist for global perspectives in capitalist economic theory, which made socialist solutions such as the nationalization of banks and key industries more problematic, and the increasing division of what had been an apparently homogeneous (in economic terms) third world into nations with income per head differentials as great as those between first and third worlds, dependency theory itself has been viewed even by its own practitioners as having reached an ‘impasse’ (Munck and O’Hearn 1999; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). The demise of dependency theory led to new forms of critique of development theory which had survived in the forms outlined above, such as the demonstration in the work of Escobar and Tucker of its discursive and institutional basis in optimistic assumptions of a grand narrative of western-style economic progress. Dependency theory was simply a pessimistic version of the same thing gone wrong. In what has become known as Post-Development Theory, commentators such as Alvarez, Escobar and Brohman, faced with the continuing realities of poverty and unequal resource distribution, and inspired by the New Social Movements, have emphasized what they have called ‘popular development’, that is, development from below rather than above. This involves local (yet often internationally linked), people-centred movements directed towards human needs, that particularly include women’s and ecological movements, and emphasize concepts such as sustainability, self-reliance, cultural pluralism and rights (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Visvanathan et al. 1997; Wallerstein et al. 1990; Waterman 1998). In a related argument, critics such as Tucker, Manzo and Munck have suggested that the earlier failures of dependency theory were partly due to its excessive attention to economic and political forms of domination, and its failure to address adequately what Tucker calls ‘the cultural dimension of domination’. He goes on: ‘This was a crucial omission as cultural analysis is central to any understanding of

power and to any strategy of resistance or dependency reversal' (Munck and O'Hearn 1999: 12). The way forward in this respect, he suggests, is to learn from the more activist, critical and culturalist positions of postcolonial theory, whose multiple logics offer alternative forms of rationality to the Enlightenment rationality on which the concept of 'development' is based (Arndt 1987).

Development Studies has been one of the last fields to have become self-conscious as a discipline (though it is well ahead of Area Studies in this respect). The problematic of Development Studies has been its hitherto unquestioned immersion in eurocentric assumptions about the universality of progress and modernity in their western forms. In order to achieve what Paulo Freire, following Nkrumah, called 'conscientization', it has looked to the postcolonial critique of such eurocentric forms of knowledge as well as to postcolonial practices of an epistemological and ontological engagement with other, hitherto excluded non-western subaltern knowledges (Freire 1972: 15). Increasingly, the 'postcolonial' marks the site of the active convergence of the two political and culturalist discourses, one based in the social sciences, the other in the humanities (Apffel-Marglin and Marglin 1996; Darby 1997; Hoogvelt 1997; Sunder Rajan 1997). So, for example, the anthropologist Akhil Gupta, in *Postcolonial Developments*, has brought the different disciplines together in order to construct an analysis, as he puts it, of 'what the *postcolonial condition* means for the lives of rural people in north India'. At the conclusion of the book, in a discussion of peasant resistance, which hinges on the articulation of discourses of indigenous knowledge, development, global capitalism and biotechnology, Gupta argues that underdevelopment has become a form of identity in the postcolonial world:

Developmentalism, agrarian capitalism, and technological change fundamentally transformed not merely the structural and material conditions of the lives of rural people but, very important, their epistemologies and identities as well. It is this mix of ingredients that I have indexed with the notion of the *condition* of postcoloniality. (Gupta 1998: ix, 338)

It is this mixture of material, historical conditions and hybrid discourses, together with analysis of their cultural effects on peoples' identities and epistemologies, that captures the distinctive, constitutive feature of the postcolonial as a form of knowledge.

Postcolonialism

The term 'postcolonial' has been the subject of protracted and sometimes ingenious discussion (Appiah 1992; Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1998; Loomba 1998; McClintock 1994; Shohat 1992; Slemon 1994). Many of the problems raised can be resolved if the postcolonial is defined as coming after colonialism and imperialism, in their original meaning of direct-rule domination, but still positioned within imperialism in its later sense of the global system of hegemonic economic power. The postcolonial is a dialectical concept that marks the broad historical facts of decolonization and the determined achievement of sovereignty – but also the realities of nations and peoples emerging into a new imperialistic context of economic and sometimes political domination. The experience of that new sovereignty typically encouraged the development of a postcolonial culture which radically revised the ethos and ideologies of the colonial state and, at the same time, reoriented the goals of the independence movement towards the very different conditions of national autonomy. The postcolonial also specifies a transformed historical situation, and the cultural formations that have arisen in response to changed political circumstances, in the former colonial power. The term 'postcoloniality', by contrast, puts the emphasis on the economic, material and cultural conditions that determine the global system in which the postcolonial nation is required to operate – one heavily weighted towards the interests of international capital and the G7 powers. Postcoloniality can still register, however, the resistant pressure and agency of the postcolonial world within such conditions, demonstrating that there is no 'postcolonial condition' outside specific instances of complex interminglings of structural forces with local, personal experience.

More radically, *postcolonialism* – which I would prefer to call *tricontinentalism* – names a theoretical and political position which embodies an active concept of intervention within such oppressive circumstances. It combines the epistemological cultural innovations of the postcolonial moment with a political critique of the conditions of postcoloniality. In that sense, the 'post' of postcolonialism, or postcolonial critique, marks the historical moment of the theorized introduction of new tricontinental forms and strategies of critical analysis and practice. Unlike the words 'colonialism',

'imperialism' and 'neocolonialism' which adopt only a critical relation to the oppressive regimes and practices that they delineate, postcolonialism is both contestatory and committed towards political ideals of a transnational social justice. It attacks the status quo of hegemonic economic imperialism, and the history of colonialism and imperialism, but also signals an activist engagement with positive political positions and new forms of political identity in the same way as Marxism or feminism. With respect to the latter, the politics and theory of postcolonialism can be largely identified with the goals and practices of so-called 'Third World Feminism' (Park and Sunder Rajan 2000); with respect to Marxism, the difference is that it incorporates predominantly non-western forms of Marxism that have been developed to analyse the system and histories of imperialism and colonialism, their aftermath and their persistence. Drawing on these resources, its critique of contemporary power structures is combined with an interventionist methodology developed for the analysis of the subjective and material conditions of the postcolonial era articulated with active transformative practices. Postcolonialism therefore designates the perspective of tricontinental theories which analyse the material and epistemological conditions of postcoloniality and seek to combat the continuing, often covert, operation of an imperialist system of economic, political and cultural domination. The global situation of social injustice demands postcolonial critique – from the position of its victims, not its perpetrators. Tricontinental activist politics, committed to social transformation, can emerge on different sites in any region – the academic, the cultural, the ecological, the educational, the industrial, the local centre-periphery structure of the city and the rural hinterland, the market-place, the media, the medical in all its different manifestations, the mainstream political, the rainforest, and the social sphere. Its strength derives from the networks of configurations and common political identities, broaching epistemological, social and institutional boundaries, that are thus established and drawn together. Its popular attraction derives from the way in which postcolonialism gives equal weight to outward historical circumstances and to the ways in which those circumstances are experienced by postcolonial subjects.

1 STATES

Before postcolonial cultural critique was developed as a political and academic practice, the term 'post-colonial' (usually in the hyphenated form) was used in the social sciences with a specific Marxist reference, a usage that continues today in the language of contemporary area studies, economics, political science and international relations, and which can still be found in the discourse of politicians, for example, in the United Nations. In this earlier usage, the phrase 'post-colonial states' was widely used with reference to post-independence Marxist states (Hadjor 1993: 250–2); more recently, the description 'post-postcolonial states' has even been used to describe the many states from Albania to Vietnam that have since mediated Marxism in its various forms with a free-market economics. The term 'postcolonial' was, therefore, first identified with Marxist practice, which supports the argument for continuing to identify

them closely. However, it is important to recognize that anti- and post-colonial activism developed by transforming conventional political paradigms, including those of western Marxism.

World-historical conditions have not stayed still since the 1950s and 1960s when the term 'post-colonial' was first used. The years after the Second World War fall into two distinct periods, for which the break-up of the USSR in 1991 acts as the hinge, just as the Russian Revolution of 1917 acted as the fulcrum for the development of anti-colonial struggles. From capitalism's point of view, the postcolonial era involves the adoption and then the subsequent renunciation of the anti-colonial, anti-capitalist ideology of Marxism by many newly independent states. The first period was that of the Cold War, when states could align themselves with one or other of the competing sides, or, more dynamically (and optimistically), with the non-aligned movement initiated at the Bandung Conference of 1955 by Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno and Tito. In the second period, the conditions of postcoloniality were determined by the end of Soviet imperialism and the three-worlds structure, and the embracing of free-market demand-led capitalist principles by almost every country in the world, including those hitherto most resistant to it – Russia and the former nations of the Soviet Union, China, India, Vietnam, Albania. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the conversion of China to a form of controlled capitalist economy, there is today effectively little choice. *De facto* there is now only a single world economic system, and almost all states have been obliged to make some structural adjustment towards it. If communism collapsed, however, capitalist economic imperialism did not. The end of colonialism led to new forms of postcolonial domination: this objective was at the heart of the struggle for global mastery in the Cold War. Postcolonialism is not an endorsement of the new world system, but rather constitutes a critical response to its conditions. Today, postcolonial struggles for autonomy, real independence and self-determination have to contend with a complex adversary whose power is dispersed through a wide range of globalized institutions and practices.

Not all colonialism is over: apart from individual examples of still-colonized states that were mentioned in chapter 1, postcolonialism's central preoccupation is with the politics of the 'fourth world' still colonized within many officially decolonized countries (or, as in the case of the Ainu in Japan, or the gypsies in Spain, colonized within countries that have not been colonized in modern historical times). The problem is compounded by the fact that at independence power often passed to a native bourgeois elite produced during the time of colonialism that took on board many western presuppositions; for example, the idea of the nation-state itself. Power passed to those who identified themselves nationally rather than to those with international or local identities and allegiances. The homogeneity of the nation-state constructed and enforced at independence was quickly challenged by ethnic nationalisms, for example by the Kashmiris, the Sikhs and the Dalits in India, by the many different minority nations in Nigeria, and by ethnic groups that had earlier themselves been regarded as oppressors or privileged minorities, for example the Tamils in Sri Lanka, or the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Syria (Anthony Smith 1986, 1992; Connor 1994; Olorunsola 1972). The geographic boundaries of the state, and the legal and political structures

that are the legacy of colonialism, exist in a continual state of contestation by indigenous ethnic and fourth-world groups. Elsewhere, the colonialism of the past has given way to societies whose make-up still reflects the disjunctions of their specific colonial history: the formerly colonizing powers; settler societies with indigenous inhabitants as in North, Central and South America, South Africa, Taiwan, Australasia, whose settlers in historical terms often broach the boundaries between colonizers and colonized, and where settler-based national and cultural identities are under long-standing challenge – for example, by the Maori claim to ethnocracy in New Zealand.

Continuing internal colonialism notwithstanding, one objection to the term ‘postcolonial’ is that it over-emphasizes the significance of the impact of colonialism on the societies that were colonized (Ahmad 1992). It is certainly the case that for much of Africa, the period of colonialism was remarkably short. Even in a country such as India, with one of the most extensive colonial periods, stretching from 1757 (the battle of Plassey) to 1947, the colonial impact remains relatively restricted, and was predominantly experienced, in both positive and negative ways, at the level of the bourgeoisie. In countries where the colonial period was comparatively brief, it would clearly be ridiculous to suggest that the colonial era somehow constitutes the defining feature of their histories. Moreover, even in countries that were seriously affected by colonial occupation, that history may very well now be of comparative insignificance to the priorities of contemporary society. However, it is not clear that the historical marker of the postcolonial in fact makes any of these more extended implications. An historical definition of ‘postcolonial’ does allow for a corresponding use of the term ‘post-independence’ in nationalist contexts to describe the development of local cultures and societies in the modern, decolonized period. Placing the emphasis on independence rather than colonization, however, is in its own way as problematic, given that it too can be accused of implicitly erasing pre-independence indigenous cultures; it is also the case that the moment of independence was sometimes indeterminate, without a visible, theatrical moment of the transfer of power, that some colonies enjoyed internal self-government as dominions or protectorates and achieved independence through gradually pushing at the limits of their legal status (did Ireland become ‘independent’ in 1924 or 1948? Did Egypt become independent in 1922, 1936, 1954 or 1956?).

‘Postcolonialism’ commemorates not the colonial but the triumph over it. The ‘post’ marks the many remarkable victories that should not be allowed to fade into the amnesia of history. The postcolonial era in its name pays tribute to the great historical achievements of resistance against colonial power, while, paradoxically, it also describes the conditions of existence that have followed in which many basic power structures have yet to change in any substantive way. The origins of postcolonialism lie in the historical resistance to colonial occupation and imperial control, the success of which then enabled a radical challenge to the political and conceptual structures of the systems on which such domination had been based. Historically, therefore, postcolonial theory works from a number of different axes: a product of revolutionary Marxism, of the national liberation movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the political and cultural consequence of the

success of those movements, the tricontinental economic and cultural critiques of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and the historical effects of migration, past and present, forced or voluntary. It combines history with a theorized account of contemporary culture. History whose active dimensions remain the preoccupation of postcolonial writing, and involve historical acts of memory and of remembrance to retrieve the full dimensions of independence movements and the often anonymous participants of anti-colonial political acts. Theory, whose hybrid forms and incommensurable logics developed as a mode of resistance to the different imperial political and cultural systems against which anti-colonialism was directed, derives its political and epistemological grounding from the rich political and intellectual history of the independence movements. Postcolonialism refuses to reduce the history of the freedom struggles to a recalcitrant 'third-world nationalism'. The emancipatory narrative of a nationalism unmediated by socialism brought not the end of oppression, but oppression in new forms. In that sense, just as Lenin saw revolutionary communist movements detaching themselves from bourgeois nationalism after colonial liberation, so postcolonialism contests bourgeois nationalism on the basis of its divisive class and gender dynamics; it reconfigures the political field as nationalism predictably shifted at independence from helping to unify the people against the colonial oppressor to become an anti-democratic agency of (usually male) class domination over an heterogeneous state. As the term *tricontinentalism* suggests more effectively, postcolonialism always operates as a form of internationalism.

2 LOCATION

They hope to drown revolutionary syndicalism in the saliva of professors. (Sorel 1999: 43)

The complaint, that correlates with expressions of a provincial nationalism, that the 'postcolonial' involves looking at the world from a metropolitan point of view, would be more convincing if anti-colonialism itself had not been so thoroughly metropolitan. It connects more persuasively with the fact that, as several commentators have noted, in institutional terms (though not in terms of political practice) postcolonial critique is most visibly conducted from the universities of the contemporary imperial power, the USA, or that of the nineteenth century, Great Britain (Appiah 1992; Dirlik 1997; Mukherjee 1990; Robbins 1999). Even here, therefore, it seems that the power/knowledge axis does not let go so easily. Western economic dominance extends to the sites in which postcolonial theory is articulated. This suggests that ironically it is once again Europe and North America that call the shots in telling the other story, even that it is rather the west itself that now defines itself as postcolonial, in which case postcolonialism becomes the reconsideration and reformation of its own history and identity. If so, this could only be because the west itself is not homogeneous. In Europe and the US, it was above all minorities, particularly people of colour, who developed postcolonial theory for its radical political potential. In that field in

particular the institutional sites are largely occupied by intellectuals from the three continents. Many of the most influential theorists have been those, such as Ahmad, Amin, Appiah, Bhabha, Chakrabarty, Dirlik, Guha, Hall, Mazrui, Mudimbe, Said and Spivak, who have worked for extended periods in the western academy. This postcolonial transaction in turn begins to explain why some postcolonial theory has been regarded, particularly by nationalists in India, as a form of *trahison des clercs* who have dared to extend their focus beyond their own national boundaries, and why those who most vigorously articulate the implications of an internationalist postcolonial perspective, and argue for the interests of oppressed minorities whether in the west or elsewhere, are those who are themselves often most virulently attacked not only by those on the right in the west but also by those who situate themselves outside the west. Nationalist critics of postcolonial theory in this way ally themselves with the western right who reject altogether the idea of revising traditional western values, or received historical accounts, or indeed the idea that the modern global economy forms part of a new imperial era. However, the notion of location is not in itself clear-cut: whether individual academics are situated outside the west or not is itself hard to define given that you do not need to be actually working in the west to be thoroughly westernized in your perspective, or that some of those apparently based elsewhere do in fact spend much of their time working in the west anyway. Nowadays, no one really knows where an author 'is' when they read a book, apart from guarded information about institutional affiliations on the dust-jacket, and nor should it matter. The difference is less a matter of geography than where individuals locate themselves as speaking from, epistemologically, culturally and politically, who they are speaking to, and how they define their own enunciative space.

The institutional academic origins of postcolonial critique in the west are closely related to the history of post-war immigration: in Britain, with the arrival of the SS *Windrush* in London in 1948; in the US, with the changes Bobby Kennedy made to the US Immigration laws in 1965, which altered the immigration quota system from one directed predominantly towards Europe to one divided more equitably on a global basis; in Australia, with the abandonment of the 'white Australia' immigration policy as recently as 1972. Some migrants have been middle-class professionals, but in Britain at least this class provenance is far less typical than Ahmad (1992) or Dirlik (1997) suggest: many have come from impoverished circumstances in some of the poorest regions of the world, or have emigrated because they suffered religious, ethnic or political persecution of various forms. Some of those who migrated to the west, or their children, subsequently attended educational institutions with a still active sense of coming from what were then regarded as the cultural and political margins and peripheries. They did not respond by accepting the status quo and assimilating seamlessly into the culture in which they now found themselves: rather, armed with the aura of the activism and self-empowerment of the national liberation movements, they began to ask awkward questions about western history and the implicit assumptions of western knowledges, and to articulate their ontological engagement with tricontinental knowledge with forms of resistance to the racism and disempowerment that are part of the daily life of any immigrant.

This complicates the notion that postcolonialism is merely a western invention on account of its vibrancy in western academic institutions. The argument of this book is that that analysis is too simple. It is true that as a named field of disciplinary study within the academy, 'postcolonial studies' has emerged from Anglophone universities around the world, and that its instantiation and development as an academic field is a phenomenon that has occurred predominantly, though by no means exclusively, in western institutions. In many respects, however, this work was not only carried out by 'postcolonial subjects', those whose origins and cultural affiliations lay elsewhere, but also incorporated ideas and practices that had been developed for well over a century by intellectuals and activists in cultures that increasingly invented critical, analytic and politically assertive ways of resisting the west. Historically it was activists and intellectuals in or from the colonies and newly decolonized nations that most effectively articulated the opposition to colonialism, imperialism and eurocentrism; these critiques were allied to those developed in the west. What is so striking in retrospect is the sheer energy, volume and heroic commitment of the intellectual as well as political opposition to colonialism, and that productivity continued into the postcolonial period. Postcolonial studies has developed that work to give it a disciplinary focus, and foregrounds its significance. For the first time, in a move that was the very reverse to that which Said describes in *Orientalism* (1978), the power of western academic institutions has been deployed against the west. For the first time, in the western academy, postcolonial subjects become subjects rather than the objects of knowledge. For the first time, tricontinental knowledge, cultural and political practices, have asserted and achieved more or less equal institutional status with any other.

3 KNOWLEDGE

As soon as any contemporary intellectual or political movement is established, arguments always follow about its name. This is because naming involves important forms of political power structures, as is clear from the ways in which feminism, queer theory and black studies have had to wrestle with the implications of the naming process. The drawback for any name that ends in an 'ism' is that it will be taken to imply a set of shared ideas, and a single, homogeneous ideology. Such a characterization will of necessity be a broad generalization, produced after the event. The practice is always far more diverse and heterogeneous – think of Marxism, feminism, communism, liberalism, conservatism, even fascism: all names theorized political stances that involve a wide range of positions. Colonialism and imperialism were just as heterogeneous as concepts and as practices. It is pointless to attack the 'ism' as such as if it were a homogeneous totality, though it can be a convenient way of making a quick dismissal. It would be a mistake to assume that postcolonialism involves a unitary theory espousing a single perspective and position. The cultural, historical, intellectual and political needs of contemporary black British men and women, for example, are clearly not going to be the same as those of activists in Nigeria fighting the exploitation and eco-degradation of the multinational oil companies (Mirza 1997; Sivanandan

1982; Young 1999). Postcolonial theory involves multiple activities with a range of different priorities and positions; there would be a particular irony in assuming that it possesses a uniform theoretical framework given that it is in part characterized by a refusal of totalizing forms.

Moreover, postcolonial theory is not even a theory in the strict sense of the term, that is, 'the deduction, on the basis of a number of axioms, of an abstract model applicable to an indefinite number of empirical descriptions' (Foucault 1972: 114). What it has done is to develop a set of conceptual resources. As in feminism, there is no single methodology which has to be adhered to: rather, there are shared political and psychological perceptions, together with specific social and cultural objectives, which draw on a common range of theories and employ a constellation of theoretical insights. Postcolonialism's relation to feminism extends from methodology and politics, to its close interrelation with contemporary writing and history, and its active engagement with the dynamics of political practice. In some areas a part of feminism itself, postcolonial theory asserts in a similar way a politics that draws on a wide, often contested, range of theory from different disciplines in order to develop its own insights. As with feminism, this means that different theorists will weight their arguments according to particular priorities, and that it offers a range of positions with different emphases and possibilities. This includes, as with some feminisms, the possibility of a stance that is radically anti-theoretical, giving primacy to the value of individual consciousness and experience. For like feminism, postcolonialism is distinguished by the value and attention which it gives to the personal and the subjective, which is why, like feminism again, its institutional origins were often located in literature departments which provided the solitary space within academic institutions where subjective forms of knowledge were taken seriously. Before postcolonialism, for example, there were plenty of histories of colonialism. But such histories rarely considered the ways in which colonialism was experienced, or analysed, by those who suffered its effects.

As a form of knowledge-politics, postcolonial theory has developed dialogically in a syncretic formation of western and tricontinental thought, particularly anti-colonial emancipatory politics. Historically, many of its theoretical origins such as liberal rights discourse or Marxism began in the west, but these have been consistently transformed through their colonial contexts and reworked according to tricontinental preoccupations since the nineteenth century. What changed in the second half of the twentieth century was that this new knowledge began to infiltrate back to the west, marking western societies and their institutions with the revolutionary, insurrectionist histories of the independence movements. This inscription was first realized in the events of May 1968. Historically, May 1968 was a moment in which activists in Europe and the US sought to emulate the success of the tricontinental independence movements by extending their challenge to an assault on the political centres of the western imperial powers (Fink, Gassert and Junker 1998; Mercer 1994: 287–308). That process brought into political and academic institutions radical forms of knowledge and experience that had been created in earlier eras of resistance and struggle: for the first time, politicized collective-intellectuals were able to draw on the resources of the

anti-colonial theoretical work and cultural identities developed during the independence movements that had been elaborated for different forms of cultural nationalism and anti-colonial liberation. Postcolonial critique marks the moment where the political and cultural experience of the marginalized periphery developed into a more general theoretical position that could be set against western political, intellectual and academic hegemony and its protocols of objective knowledge (Smith 1998). While culture as representation of experience, and cultural critique as challenge of its determinants, has always constituted a central preoccupation for anti- and postcolonial theory, its emphasis on cultural issues is also the direct result of some unfinished business of anti-colonialism. The success of the anti-colonial movements did not fully re-establish the equal value of the cultures of the decolonized nations. To do that, it was necessary to take the struggle into the heartlands of the former colonial powers which retained a dominant economic, cultural and military role, in order to attack certain western ideologies and counter them with values and knowledges developed elsewhere. That is why it is so politically important for postcolonial critique to operate simultaneously inside and outside the west. To dismiss it on the grounds that it is itself western is to make a profound mistake – that is, to name the impact of non-European and anti-European thought on European thought as itself European.

Hostility towards postcolonial theory can also betray the symptoms analysed by Fanon of the mentality of colonial inferiority, whereby it is assumed that anything that figures significantly in the metropolis could not, by definition, have been generated from outside the west. Rather the reverse: postcolonialism has marked the beginning of the west's own undoing. Similarly, its curious combination of heterogeneous theories together with a counter-affirmation of the truth of experiential knowledge, is an articulation too easily characterized either as the postcolonial predicament or as a disjunction between the western academy and 'third world' conditions of existence, as if people in the third world can feel but not think (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993). Postcolonial theory operates on the very opposite assumption: that the intellectual and cultural traditions developed outside the west constitute a body of knowledge that can be deployed to great effect against the political and cultural hegemony of the west. For postcolonial theory is designed to undo the ideological heritage of colonialism not only in the decolonized countries, but also in the west itself. Once the process of political decolonization has taken place, then a cultural decolonization must follow: decolonize the west, deconstruct it. As the great Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o puts it, it is now a question of 'decolonizing the mind' and 'moving the centre' (Ngugi 1981, 1993). This necessarily involves a decentring of the intellectual sovereignty and dominance of Europe, the critique of eurocentrism, that is, challenging the limits of western ethnocentricity, and the assumption that the white male western point of view is the norm and the true. The dislocation and displacement of western knowledge includes academic knowledge, and involves reappraising its links to colonialism and racism, challenging the form of western historicist history as an ordered narrative that subsumes all other histories of the world, questioning the literary, historical, philosophical and sociological canons for their exclusions of writings that have not stemmed from the metropolitan centre, and developing contestatory

dialogues between western and non-western cultures. Postcolonial criticism forms part of a critique of European civilization and culture from the perspective of the cultures of the tricontinental world. For the cultures seeking to extricate themselves from the history of imperial dominance, postcolonial theory involves utilizing, strengthening and developing the resources of their own histories and political and intellectual traditions. The forms of tricontinental knowledges and cultures must be reassessed and foregrounded. Postcolonial theory also engages in acts of historical retrieval. Just as the west itself has always generated its own self-critique (above all in Marxism), western anti-colonialism is itself as old as colonialism, and much of its diverse intellectual work as well as the history of its forms of resistance remains comparatively little known. The same can be said for many aspects of the dynamic histories of anti-colonialism in those societies that were subjected to colonization: some of the most significant writings are very difficult to find; the work of major figures such as Lamine Senghor or even Fanon remains uncollected. This book marks a beginning in this process of reappraisal, with the aim of rearticulating postcolonial critique with the full scope of its historical genealogies.

Postcolonial critique incorporates political and theoretical practices whose reach extends back into the history of the colonial past as well as the day-to-day realities of the postcolonial present, practices which seek to contest the legacies of that past as well as to challenge the priorities and assumptions of its political heirs. Postcolonialism, therefore, operates through the dimensions of time or history, and space, both geographical and the other, third space of cultural reconceptualization, the reordering of the world through forms of knowledge reworked from their entanglement in long-standing coercive power relations (Bhabha 1994). It names the activities by which new subaltern histories, new identities, new geographies, new conceptualizations of the world – transnational rather than western – are fashioned and performed, and seeks through them to redress current imbalances of power and resources in the pursuit of more just and equitable societies. Postcolonialism is defined by this particular combination of historical practice extended into a politics of translation designed to transform the conditions of the present. Its key issues include the colonial, imperial and anti-colonial past, the postcolonial present, the international division of labour (starting with child labour), peoples' and cultural rights, emigration and immigration, forced migration, migrancy, nomadism, settlement and diaspora in both western and tricontinental societies. Postcolonial critique is also concerned with the role of culture (academic, literary and popular) in the operation of imperialism and in the subsequent formations of national resistance; past and current liberation struggles; the role of religions and culture in new nationalisms; state violence; the contemporary politics of identity; race and ethnicity, class, gender and sexuality; of anti-racism and liberal multiculturalism, of disempowerment and the economics of neocolonialism; the repressions of indigenous fourth-world cultures and the often hidden histories of oppression of other indigenous minorities and nomadic peoples. A commonality of experience brings these together in concern about the violent injustice of the disparity in levels of material well-being of the different peoples of the world and the need for radical social change at a transnational level.

4 LANGUAGE

Postcolonial theory has developed in the past thirty years as a sometimes idiosyncratic set of issues, debates and, increasingly, articulation of points of political intervention. In part at least as a result of its being a theory still in the process of formation, developed in a syncretic manner from diverse sources, in the work of some of the best-known writers the language used is often opaque and dense. This is not simply a question of style: although largely based in cultural studies, postcolonial theory has drawn its conceptual vocabulary from a wide range of disciplines and theoretical agendas, including anthropology, feminism, history, human geography, Marxism, philosophy, poststructuralism, psychoanalysis and sociology, and has been inspired by diverse groups of dissident western and radical tricontinental thinkers. At the same time, it has inflected this material to its own ends so as to develop new theoretical concepts and instruments, with the result that the very disciplines from which it originally borrowed its ideas are now turning to it for inspiration and intellectual energy.

Few of those coming to postcolonial theory, whether as students or as academics from other disciplines, find it easy to negotiate the syncretic topographies of its vocabulary. This aspect means that those encountering postcolonial theory for the first time can be intimidated or baffled by the terminology, concepts and apparently cryptic language being used. Paradoxically, given its populist, critical role, the language of postcolonial theory can seem as opaque and difficult as any of the theory that has swept the global academic system in the past forty or so years. Why does the language of postcolonial criticism often seem so impenetrable? Moreover, why, if the project of postcolonial criticism is to perform a critique of eurocentric thinking, does postcolonial theory itself seem to be so densely involved in high European theory? What justification can there be for using such an alien discourse in a cultural critique designed in opposition to eurocentrism?

Marxism, which has provided the main political and theoretical vocabulary for anti-colonial theory, provides the first answer. Postcolonial theory's use of European theory is centred on Marxism and Marxist existentialism that has a long and impressive history of involvement, development and adaptation, in anti-colonial struggles, and equally a vast, impressive range of theoretical, philosophical and political conceptual vocabulary. This does not, however, for the most part, cause the greatest difficulty. The problem is typically raised with respect to the influence of the 'high theory' of poststructuralism which for some years appeared to be Marxism's theoretical adversary, although it is closer to the truth to say that the intellectual position of Marxism was so dominant that most 'theory' developed in the west since the Second World War evolved in close symbiotic relation to it. In the first instance, this form of theory was not as straightforwardly western as is often assumed. In fact, the 'high European theory' of structuralism and poststructuralism is of broadly non-European origin: structuralism was developed by the Prague school as an anti-western strategy, directed against the hierarchical cultural and racial assumptions of

imperialist European thought. Many of those who developed the theoretical positions known collectively as poststructuralism came from Algeria and the Maghreb. Though structuralism and poststructuralism were taken up and developed in Europe, both were indeed alien, and fundamentally anti-western in strategy. Postcolonial thought has combined the radical heritage of such theory with further ideas and perspectives from tricontinental writers, together with other writers who have emigrated from decolonized tricontinental countries to the west. During the course of its long theoretical–historical trajectory, postcolonial critique has accumulated a whole range of arguments and positions, which are now layered on top of each other in a productive palimpsest. Many of the concepts that it employs, from diaspora to the subaltern, have been purloined from other sources, but characteristically postcolonial theory has translated and transformed these into its own political instruments.

In historical terms, therefore, postcolonial theory has developed from western and tricontinental anti-colonialism of the past. It is not in any sense simply a western or even metropolitan phenomenon, but the hybrid product of the violent historical interactions of the west with the three continents in historical, political, cultural and conceptual terms. Resistance against the west has always involved resistance from within it as well as outside it, that is, beyond its permeable and porous boundaries. Postcolonialism is neither western nor non-western, but a dialectical product of interaction between the two, articulating new counterpoints of insurgency from the long-running power struggles that predate and post-date colonialism. Many of the greatest anti-colonialists were educated in western institutions and encountered there the anti-imperialist Marxism and socialism which they then developed for their own specific needs – for example, Azikiwe, Cabral, Fanon, Ho Chi Minh, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor. Although postcolonial theorists have typically been selective with respect to their interest in third-world anti-colonial thinking of the past, they owe everything to these critiques of western imperialism and the ideological systems that underpinned it. It is these that have enabled the development of a distinct postcolonial ideological critique: Spivak's rereadings of Marx belong to this political–intellectual tradition (Spivak 1999). Bart Moore-Gilbert has recently demonstrated how cultural concepts of postcolonial theory have been developed from those of Caribbean writers such as J. J. Thomas and Kamu Brathwaite (creolization), Naipaul (mimicry) and Wilson Harris (cross-cultural imaginative spaces) (Moore-Gilbert 1997: 169–84). Such theory has tended to layer and combine a heterogeneous array of western and non-western thought, to draw on theoretical positions that are already irredeemably a mixture of the two, such as that of Gandhi, or on work that reinterprets and reinfects western theories according to the perspective and experience of the colonized, such as that of Fanon. Both Gandhi and Fanon's dislocating and relocating discourses of anti-colonialism utilized the fact that the culture and ideology of Europe was never homogeneous but riven with contradictions and ambivalences. Both began by drawing on western auto-critiques; in Gandhi's case, an eclectic mix of the New Testament, Carpenter, Ruskin, Spengler, Thoreau and Tolstoy; for Fanon, in Ashis Nandy's formulation, the two great internal critiques of the west, psychoanalysis and Marxism, particularly existential Marxism, in its

objective and subjective dimensions (Nandy 1983). This strategy has been continued in postcolonial cultural critique, most notably in the work of Homi K. Bhabha (1994) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1993, 1999).

The kinds of theory from which postcolonial cultural critique has developed are thus derived from earlier founding moments of anti-colonial thought, which was itself a hybrid construction. The term has emerged to describe a set of critical concepts, and oppositional political identities and objectives, that have been developed out of the continuing reverberations of the political and cultural history of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The theory and practice of postcolonialism has thus a long history of varied genealogies that form the subject of this book. As a result, postcolonial theory produces a curiously fragmented and hybrid theoretical language that mirrors and repeats the changing forms of a central object of its analytic experience: conflictual cultural interaction. Whether it be through colonial domination and the transmutation of indigenous cultures, or the hybridization of domestic metropolitan cultures as a result of immigration, postcolonial theory is always concerned with the positive and negative effects of the mixing of peoples and cultures. Its own language that it uses to analyse these phenomena is similarly mixed: it constitutes a theoretical creole. This heterogeneity and conceptual fluidity notwithstanding, the overall political project of postcolonial critique remains coherent and urgent. First, investigating the extent to which not only European history but also European culture and knowledge was part of, and instrumental in, the practice of colonization and its continuing aftermath. Second, identifying fully the means and causes of continuing international deprivation and exploitation, and analysing their epistemological and psychological effects. Third, transforming those epistemologies into new forms of cultural and political production that operate outside the protocols of metropolitan traditions and enable successful resistance to, and transformation of, the degradation and material injustice to which disempowered peoples and societies remain subjected.

Part II

European Anti-colonialism

Las Casas to Bentham

The rulers of Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost, immense expense, without being likely to bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it has been shown, are, to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of profit. . . . If the project cannot be completed, it should be given up.

Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*

In the following two chapters I will examine the historical, political and theoretical context of postcolonial theory with respect to the European anti-colonial theory which developed into forms of anti-imperialism in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I shall argue that postcolonial theory, though in certain respects distinct, nevertheless operates in a symbiotic relationship to that tradition, which broadly divides into three different positions that I shall call the humanitarian, the liberal and the Marxist. Marx himself draws on the first two; postcolonial theory draws on all three. Marx's position on colonialism was a dialectical synthesis incorporating much from the humanitarian and liberal traditions of anti-colonialism, including their own contradictions. Within these, it is possible to find both humanitarian and economic anti-colonialism as well as a liberal-idealist imperialist enthusiasm for colonization's civilizing mission, of the ultimate benefits of bringing modernity to the world by force (Semmel 1993). In the same way, Marx was also both pro- and anti-colonial. If this complicates a Marxist critique of postcolonialism, for its part postcolonial theory depends on the far larger body of political and cultural theory about colonialism and imperialism developed by the many anti-colonial Marxisms of the twentieth century. Postcolonial theory implicitly presupposes a whole range of Marxist critical and theoretical concepts, and is therefore best situated within that larger body of theory. A major difference comes in its more sceptical attitude towards modernity, and this has already been reflected in the critiques of development theory.

I shall begin by looking at the basis of anti-colonialism before Marx, and then consider the ways in which he decisively reoriented it. Before Marx, there were two main traditions of anti-colonialism, one a moral, and the other an economic

argument. What Marx then did was to combine the two and restructure the basis of anti-colonial theory by drawing on attitudes characteristic of the liberal idealist/imperialist advocates of colonialism. The surprising part of the story, and the major innovation in terms of general presuppositions about colonialism and imperialism, is that until Marx it was the liberal political economists, capitalists, as it were, with their gloves off, who were the most articulate critics of colonialism. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, there was a strong tradition of anti-colonialism in the Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a radical tradition that some of the more blimpish representations within postcolonial writings today of the ideology of imperialism neglect. In some accounts of imperialism in the nineteenth century, it seems to be assumed that the nineteenth century was monocultural, imperialism entirely hegemonic, the whole of European culture entirely lacking in self-criticism, and today's postcolonial critics the very first to expose its glaring deficiencies. Partly because of the dominance of attention given to colonial discourse and the degree to which the notion of a discourse, certainly in Said's formulation in *Orientalism* (1978), does not really allow for antithetical ideologies, there is a tendency to produce a level of ideological uniformity that is certainly a travesty of the historical record. While many accounts of imperialism show how its hegemony was resisted at the colonial level by those under occupation, it was always also being challenged within Europe itself. Bernard Porter's (1968, 1975, 1983) remarkable work has demonstrated the extent to which the empire was always contested at a political level within Britain, and how, for example, British liberal ideas of the empire possessing a tradition of operating on a non-racial basis came into conflict with attitudes of the white populations in the colonies themselves (Porter 1975: 185). If there is one consistent misrepresentation in postcolonial writing it is that the subject of Europe, the European self, was a single, unquestioning imperially minded entity. Postcolonial critical and historical writing, despite its emphasis on difference, has tended not only to identify colonialism with imperialism but also to hegemonize them both as a unitary, unproblematic totality, with a single drive and object. Imperialism itself was heterogeneous, and without a single, coherent guiding ideology. There was never a complete hegemony within British political culture. That culture was nothing if not conflictual, and increasingly so. It is as simplistic to assume that the colonizers were uniformly pro-colonization as it is to assume that those being colonized were uniformly against it – many of the latter's upper classes and comprador bourgeoisie did very nicely out of colonialism. Even in the late nineteenth century, imperialism in Britain was always subject to an internal, anti-imperialist critique and the necessity or economic advantage of colonies was repeatedly questioned in the public domain. Liberal politicians, political theorists and economists associated with the 'Manchester School', from Adam Smith to Cobden, Bright, Gladstone, Hobson, Morley and Goldwin Smith, successively challenged the need for colonies at all.

At both a practical and theoretical level, anti-colonialism goes back to the beginnings of colonialism itself. In many ways, colonization from the very first carried with it the seeds of its own destruction. The long, dynamic history of active resistance to colonialism and revolt and rebellion against it – an extraordinary history of an

indomitable refusal – is well known: the sheer numbers of slave rebellions, forms of resistance to conquest and the extent of anti-colonial struggles are as moving as they are empowering (Blackburn 1988; Thomas et al. 1994: 44–5). Historically, the more colonialism operated on a definitive military advantage, the more ideological and cultural strategies came to supplement militarized and civil resistance to it. By the time of the independence movements, the ideological and material forms of resistance were interlinked so that they could be deployed strategically either independently or simultaneously. The interactive relationship between the two itself constitutes the subject of much of the intellectual work produced by independence movements activists – a complex situation that required major readjustment in the postcolonial period. Anti-colonial ideology began with the wide range of forms that anti-colonial sentiment took within the colonial metropolitan countries themselves. From the onset of modernity (in its historical sense), western culture has always carried with it a self-critical component of which, in general terms, Marxism has been the greatest example, but which has always also included indigenous European anti-colonialism.

1 THE HUMANITARIAN OBJECTION

The humanitarian moral objection to colonialism, as Peter Hulme (1986) has suggested, is more or less as old as European colonialism itself. Opposition to colonization began in Europe in the sixteenth century. The founding father of European anti-colonialism was the Catholic bishop Bartolomé de Las Casas, who, in *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies* (1542), written only fifty years after Columbus's original expedition to the new world, first questioned the moral and legal basis of the Spanish occupation of America. Las Casas is best known for his humanitarian protest; he also, however, raised other questions that were to continue to haunt colonialism until its dissolution. In the first instance Las Casas, who himself had first-hand experience of the horrific practices of the conquistadors, drew attention to the genocide that had been practised in the name of the Spanish king and through him, the pope, who had originally authorized the Spanish and Portuguese missionary expeditions to America. Given the *de facto* situation of Spanish rule, he suggested that the Indians had thereby become subjects of the Spanish king and therefore should have the benefit of the same rights and forms of protection as Spanish subjects at home. Las Casas went further to argue that the papal authorization of the expeditions was concerned only with conversion rather than conquest. In this way, he laid the basis for the two major alternatives in arguments about colonialism that could be termed reformism and radicalism: in the first instance, he made the argument for assimilation, to be subsequently adopted as the French mode of colonial rule, whereby the colony is simply made into a part of the home country, and (theoretically) benefits from the same administrative and legal framework. In the second, he questioned the whole legal basis of European rule and in doing so endorsed the legitimate basis of resistance to it. Las Casas's writings were to remain the most influential polemics against colonial rule right up to the eighteenth century. In the sixteenth century, as Pagden observes, Spain remained

'overwhelmingly concerned with the need to defend its claims to sovereignty (imperium) and property rights (dominium) in America before an increasingly hostile world', a story that would end with the successful challenge to its authority by Simón Bolívar at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Pagden 1990: 13–14). Las Casas's account of the massacre of innocent Indians by corrupt conquistadors formed a significant contribution to the development of the theme of the noble savage in the sixteenth century, who was generally contrasted with the dissolute and immoral European, as in Camoëns's *The Lusíads* (1572). At the same time, his argument that Indians should be entitled to the same rights as Spanish subjects was assimilated into the notion of the universal rights of man. Las Casas's affirmation of the full humanity of the Indians and his denunciation of the 'social sins' of conquistador rule, has led Gustavo Gutiérrez to identify him as the originator of twentieth-century Latin American liberation theology (Gutiérrez 1993).

Las Casas's writings were soon applied to local European anti-colonialism, being translated into Dutch during the revolts of the Netherlands against Spanish rule which began in 1566. By the eighteenth century, his arguments had been developed into a fully-fledged political discourse of theories of equality and human rights that formed the basis for anti-colonial sentiment within Europe, particularly France. The humanitarian *philosophes* developed the idea of the noble savage into a model that nature itself offered to European societies, a motif most associated with the political writings of Rousseau, but one extensively employed in the anti-slave trade movement and also evident within the literary sphere in the work of the British Romantic poets Southey and Wordsworth. In many cases, the concern for the noble savage was more preoccupied with the consequences for European society than denoting a serious interest in other non-European peoples. However, the myth sustained the attack on absolutism and monarchical tyranny in which the *philosophes* denounced the exercise of arbitrary power over any peoples, including colonial abuses. Voltaire, Montesquieu and others all invoked the writings of Las Casas in denunciations of the violence involved in colonial conquest. More significant, by this time, however, was the critique of the abuses of the colonial regime in the name of human rights. The belief in the fundamental equality of human beings became a more powerful argument than the notion of the noble savage in generating critiques of discriminatory practices in colonial regimes, particularly the hypocrisy of the 'civilized' reducing to slavery those who had until then never been tainted by European civilization. Voltaire, Montesquieu and Necker all denounced slavery and forced labour; just before the French Revolution, Brissot was to found the *Société des amis des Noirs*.

In Britain, the most vociferous form of anti-colonialism in the eighteenth century also stemmed from the anti-slavery movement which, fuelled by Evangelical fervour and radical dissent, was more active than in France – with good reason, of course, because Britain was itself far more heavily implicated in the slave trade. Slavery was the first major reason for the growing voice of anti-colonialism in Britain. Objections to slavery began to be articulated during the seventeenth century, developed during the dispute with the American colonists and reached their first apex with the founding of the Abolition Society in 1787. The arguments of the anti-slavery campaign

were developed on two counts which were effectively identical to those of anti-colonialism: in the first place a humanitarian objection, which led to the situation of Methodist missionaries in the West Indies being actively involved in resistance to the plantation-owners (and thus complicating any simple equation of religion and missionary work with cultural imperialism), and in the second an economic objection. The anti-slavery campaign in Britain meant that the main moral humanitarian opposition to colonialism was directed not so much at colonialism *per se*, or even the oppression of indigenous people by the effects of colonialism (although there was a noticeable literature of sentiment on this theme from the seventeenth century on), as to the practice of slavery. Slavery, not colonialism, thus constituted the real object of the humanitarian critique and provided an analogy that was then subsequently applied to liberal arguments regarding the position of women, factory workers and child labour. The anti-slavery campaign was strongly supported by women activists and represents the major moment when women activists, and gender issues, formed a significant part of the European anti-colonial movement – in contrast to the later liberal Colonial Reform movement in which gender issues often figured prominently but which was not anti-colonial as such (Ferguson 1992; Midgley 1992, 1998; Semmel 1960; Ware 1992). The anti-slavery movement, however, was not consistently anti-colonial. The ‘principles of humanity’ of the anti-slavery campaign could be turned into a pretext for colonization on the grounds of it enabling Britain to halt the trade – an argument that was frequently voiced in relation to the slave coast of West Africa by Wadstrom (1794) and others after him (Marx’s defence of colonization was a later refinement of a similar argument). As Porter observes, anti-imperialists and colonial reformers were seldom the same (Porter 1968: 19). The humanitarian concern with the maltreatment of natives implied interference rather than withdrawal: after the formation of the Aborigines Protection Society in 1837, the treatment meted out to aborigines by settlers was invoked as the grounds of objection to colonization, particularly in Australia (Baumgart 1982; Napier 1835); on the other hand, it could also be deployed as a rationale for further ‘protective’ colonization, which was the argument of the founder of the Aborigines Protection Society, Thomas Hodgkin, who was himself the author of a number of books on colonization which he advocated partly on humanitarian grounds (Hodgkin 1833, 1834; Porter 1968: 18–25). Colonization could be transformed into a liberal requirement of a moral duty towards native peoples; so, for example, the British annexation of Fiji in 1874 was partly motivated by the desire to protect Fijians from the unsavoury practices of the British settlers who had already established themselves there; the Congo Reform campaign of 1903 onwards was based on the same humanitarian concern for native rights after the exposure of the Congo scandal by E. D. Morel (McIntyre 1977: 145; Porter 1968: 239–329). At the beginning of the twentieth century, some socialists, including German and Dutch socialists and the British Fabians, argued that a socialist style of colonialism was necessary in order to protect the inhabitants from themselves and from the effects of capitalism, a position which allowed the Second International to move towards a position supporting colonization at its 1905 Congress (Braunthal 1966: 304–12; Lee 1988; Porter 1968: 109–23). This humanitarian style of argument

resurfaces regularly today, forming the basis for the rationale for interventionist incursions into Somalia or Serbia (Kosovo).

As a result of the issues debated during the American War of Independence, in eighteenth-century Britain, the main moral and political objection voiced with regard to colonialism was focused not on colonialism as such but on the lack of political rights given to colonial settlers. This was also highlighted in the debates on the Quebec Act of 1774, concerned with the administration of the territory that had been acquired in the settlement of 1763 that ended the Seven Years War. Despite its formal acquisition, a body of opinion continued to advocate its return to France, largely because it was recognized that without the menace of the French in North America, English colonists would strive for independence (Knorr 1944: 115). British rule of Quebec also raised for the first time outside Ireland the problem of administering a conquered territory inhabited (in part, in the case of Quebec) by Catholic Europeans. The greatest and most consistent defender of colonial rights, distinguishable from all others because this subject formed the basis of his major political intervention, was Edmund Burke. Although today best known for his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1793), Burke began by defending Quebecois and US colonists against the abuses, real and potential, of the British Crown, and then spent many years attacking the moral standards of the conduct of the East India Company by moving the impeachment of Warren Hastings in the British parliament (Burke 1981, 1991; Whelan 1996). To this degree, he not only laid the foundations for standards of conduct of administrators of tropical exploitation colonies, but also for the notion of the rights of British emigrants in settler colonies. In a speech to the House of Commons in 1775, Burke advocated conciliation with America, and in doing so aligned himself with the radical Charles Fox to argue that the true-born Englishman had as much right to his liberty abroad as in England itself. To deny Americans the same condition of freedom enjoyed by the English would be to break the bonds of the Empire, an institution that Burke evoked with the same majestic and transcendental language that he would use later in the *Reflections*:

Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses, are the things that hold together the great contexture of this mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the spirit of the English constitution, which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the empire, even down to the minutest member. (Bennett 1953: 42)

The idea of extending the British constitution to the settler colonies of the Empire would also be proposed by Adam Smith the following year, though hardly in Burke's language of organic spirituality.

Burke's enthusiasm for the English constitution as an imperial model to modern eyes sits rather oddly with his apparent anti-colonialism. He argued for colonial freedom but within the orbit of metropolitan responsibility; he advocated trusteeship rather than independence as such. With respect to the North American colonies, his

rhetoric failed to persuade the government to make any substantial concessions, however, in part because the policy-makers themselves, as Koehn suggests, 'could not resolve their collective ambivalence toward empire' (Koehn 1994: 146). The 'revolt' of the American colonies in the following year, the first successful anti-colonial rebellion, was one consequence of this. Most of the anti-colonial revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while anti-colonial, were in fact settler rebellions, as in the case of the American colonies, or in South America (Simón Bolívar 1825) or even in Ireland (Wolfe Tone 1798), on the American model. When successful, the colonists typically set up a new regime of an internal colonialism which itself then required a second war of liberation or a Civil Rights Movement (in some countries in the Americas, this has yet to be achieved). Until the late nineteenth century, anti-colonial nationalism itself almost always originated from settler colonists, typical later examples being the Boers in South Africa and the nationalists in Australia (Jebb 1905; Eddy, Schreuder and MacDonagh 1988). Its politics can be readily assessed by the fact that it was often accompanied (as in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa) by legislation (or illegal practices of enforcement) against Indian or Chinese immigration (Dilke 1890: 528–36). Though more liberal in disposition, the legacy of settler anti-colonial nationalism can still be found animating some postcolonial cultural work today, as for example in the notion of the empire writing back. It may be writing back, but apparently it is still the empire.

The revolt of the American colonies affected subsequent British attitudes towards the administration of its colonial territories very profoundly: the second British empire was always haunted by the loss of the first. Already by 1776, Turgot claimed that the example of the United States meant the end of European control of their colonies. British attitudes towards the thirteen colonies were also affected by a further anti-colonial argument that focused on the vulnerability of unlimited expansion – the home government preferred a concentration of population given that it assumed the duty of protecting the colony from foreign powers. This was one reason for the British prohibition against the American colonists expanding westwards; the other was the establishment of a vast reserve for native Americans to the west of the thirteen colonies. After 1776 this was immediately abolished, and settlers quickly occupied the land hitherto reserved for native Americans by the British administration. American 'liberty' also meant the liberty to displace and exterminate native Americans, particularly those such as the Iroquois who had made the unfortunate mistake of fighting on the British side during the war. The humanitarian concern for the treatment of indigenous people provides one of the links between Burke's attitude to the situation in America and in India. Burke must also, as Sara Suleri has observed, 'be credited for being one of the first voices to articulate the possibility that India comprised cultures and societies as yet unread by the West' (Suleri 1992: 46).

In his impeachment of Hastings, Burke concentrated on the corruption of the East India Company administration, and in his extraordinary, impassioned opening speech, dwelt at length on its officers' abuse of native Indian subjects. By stressing the need for moral and political rectitude, and thus establishing standards for subsequent colonial administrations, Burke showed himself as a reformist, not a supporter of

liberty. His critique of colonialism was not addressed to the legitimacy of the Empire as such, but rather towards abuses of power and intolerance towards the norms, social practices and institutions of other cultures (Mehta 1999). His invocation of the British constitution as the model for imperial rule was based on its ability to provide different political, legal, educational institutions for different constituencies within the overall framework of the sovereignty of the Westminster parliament. His model for this was not the situation of Ireland – Burke was fiercely critical of the Penal Laws and the discrimination against Catholics that had established what was effectively an apartheid state. Burke looked instead to the situation of Scotland, which after the destruction of its Highland culture after 1745 and the Clearances, had been successfully assimilated within the British state while retaining its own distinct legal and educational systems. In advocating that in any situation of colonial rule, local legal, educational and cultural institutions should not be interfered with, Burke effectively laid down the liberal principle of minimal or non-interference which constituted the ideological basis of the British imperial system. This was not derived from any theorized notion of cultural rights, although as Luke Gibbons (forthcoming) shows, Burke's arguments for the role of custom, history and tradition can be interpreted in that way in the context of modern debates about multiculturalism. At the same time, Burke himself recognized that his conservative political position in the metropolitan centre, with its ideas about the binding strength of custom and cultural traditions, resistant to ideologies imposed from above, could function very differently – as a radical anti-colonial argument – for dominated peoples in the colonial periphery.

Much subsequent attention to the practices of British colonialism in the nineteenth century, such as that of Macaulay, Mill, Bright or Fawcett, was similarly reformist in orientation without being hostile to the notion of colonies as such (Maccoby 1938, 1953). Burke's objection, however, was not purely altruistic: he argued that the toleration of oppressive colonial regimes abroad would sap and eventually infect the practices of domestic British institutions, and therefore ultimately threaten British liberty at home. He argued with respect to Canada in 1774 that 'When that country cannot be governed as a free country, I question whether this can. No free country can keep another in slavery. The price they pay for it will be their own servitude' (Bennett 1953: 38). This argument of the revenge of history would later be reinvoked by Cobden and, with regard to imperialism, by Hobson (1938: 150–1). At the same time, as Marx pointed out, Burke's intervention in India formed part of the long struggle between different British political factions since Pitt's India Bill of 1784 for political control of the East India Company, particularly between the aristocracy and manufacturing interests, with the aim of curtailing its use as an instrument of patronage and opening it up for free trade. Burke, like Smith, argued that any metropolitan-colonial relation ought to be founded on the mutual benefits of free trade.

By the eighteenth century, the humanitarian objection had been supplemented with a less paternalistic political argument based on the belief in the equality of humans as a consequence of natural law. This anti-colonialism received a further boost at the time of the French Revolution, when the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity were theoretically extended by its proponents to all races. It was the logic of

the concept of natural equality which led the revolutionary French National Assembly to liberate its colonies – for a brief period. As in the United States at the time of its independence, the dictum of all men being created equal was often assumed to refer only to white men. Political radicals in France, like their British counterparts, tended to concentrate initially on the question of the rights of blacks and the emancipation of slaves. It was in this context that Robespierre made his famous statement: ‘Let the colonies perish, if they must cost you your honour, your glory, your liberty’ (Merle 1969: 192). This did not mean, however, that the revolutionary assemblies immediately extended political rights to colonial populations. It was only in 1792 that civil and political rights were extended to freed blacks, and 1794 when the convention, under the direction of Danton, abolished slavery in the colonies – a measure that proved ineffectual and also came too late. The first successful slave revolt in the new world led by Toussaint L’Ouverture in French San Domingue (Haiti) in 1791 meant that there were now precedents for anti-colonial revolts by both plantation and settler economies (Blackburn 1988; James 1980). Instead of decolonization, however, the revolutionaries generally thought in terms of the extension of the rights of man so as to assimilate the colonies within the civil and administrative structures of metropolitan France; only a few such as Brissot or Condorcet envisaged the eventual breaking of ties with the colonies. Because they were interested in extending human rights as they conceived them, the revolutionaries rather championed a procedure of political and cultural assimilation that became the model for later generations of liberals and French colonialism generally. This idea of bringing the benefits of French civilization to the world coalesced with the growing Romantic stress on nationalism and national culture that led writers such as Herder to characterize colonies as inorganic excrescences that would sap the strength and purity of the nation. Far from motivating decolonization, however, this led to attempts to integrate the colonies more fully within French domestic culture, the assimilationist dream of turning all colonies into part of metropolitan France (even today France still claims that its nuclear testing in the Pacific is a domestic matter), or, at a more general level, the civilizing mission of imparting the assumed benefits of European culture and religion to the rest of the globe.

The notion of universal human rights, for both men and women, and the nascent notion of the right of self-determination for individual nations and indigenous peoples, that lay at the basis of revolutionary sentiment in both France and Britain, clearly anticipated and indeed laid the ground rules for the political basis of the colonial liberation movements, as well as much contemporary postcolonial theory which is concerned both with the critique of the oppressive colonial ideologies and regimes of the past, and with the assertion of the rights of political and cultural self-determination and self-representation for non-European peoples in the present. In its concern with human rights violations, postcolonial theory can be affiliated with the long tradition of the humanitarian and political objection to colonialism that began with Las Casas. This tradition has tended to concentrate on political and cultural reform rather than the issues of the anti-colonialism of the economic tradition. It has been argued that there is an inherent contradiction in this position: in so far as human

rights themselves were developed as an Enlightenment European theory, then even the humanitarian political tradition represents an affirmation at a universal level of what were originally European values. However, non-European anti-colonialists were quick to assimilate the idea of global, universal human rights and to assert them against the political and economic practices of colonialism and subsequent abuses in the post-independence era. The question is, rather, what function the discourse of rights plays today in the global capitalist economic system that produced it.

2 THE ECONOMIC OBJECTION

As Marx correctly argued, the key motive for colonization from the first had been economic. But economists increasingly began to dispute the necessity of actual colonization, in the sense of the physical occupation, administration and defence of foreign territory, and to argue for free trade instead. Though this was a separate argument, it did not find itself in conflict with the moral-political objection to colonialism, and many writers professed both. The British Utilitarians of the revolutionary period in particular were emphatic in their opposition to colonialism, not only on moral grounds but also questioning the financial benefit of colonies. Their arguments were more radically anti-colonial than anything which emerged on the other side of the Channel from the French Revolution. The key argument was economic, challenging the assumption that colonies were profitable, and attacking the protectionism of the mercantilist system with objections that would become equally applicable to the imperial preference system a century later. The major theoretical intervention was made by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776). Smith's book was written during the American War of Independence, and it is clear that he was one of the many British liberal intellectuals who were sympathetic to the colonists' demands (Sainsbury 1987). It is doubtless for this reason that in the substantial chapter which he devotes to colonies in *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith concentrates his discussion on the case of British North America. He begins, however, with a history of European expansion – the motives for establishing new colonies, the reasons for their prosperity, and their advantages for Europe and for Britain in particular. Smith argues that colonies have not arisen as a result of 'the wisdom and policy' of European governments, but rather as an effect of their 'disorder and injustice'. Governments have greatly benefited from them, however, because the expansion of trade and markets which colonies brought about increased the production of European industries. At this point Smith makes a distinction fundamental for his argument: 'We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and those of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful' (Smith 1910, II: 104). Smith therefore does not object to colonization as such; but he does object to attempts by the mother-country to maintain economic and political control of the colonies. Free-trader that he is, Smith argues that the monopoly relations of European countries to their colonies have made the increase of production smaller and less abundant than it would otherwise have been,

by cramping the industries of all other countries and of the colonies themselves. The monopoly relation, he suggests, diverts capital from other branches of trade elsewhere, causing them to decay; the apparent increase in trade is less an addition than a diversion from areas now neglected. The home industries become restricted, distorted and vulnerably dependent. Although the colonial trade is more profitable, by the same token this makes industry less competitive, and enables others to undersell it elsewhere – an accurate prediction, in fact, of what was to happen to the British economy from the late nineteenth century onwards. The protective mercantilist system, in short, depresses industry from its full potential.

Smith makes the same argument with regard to the economics of slavery, which he disapproves of not merely on humanitarian grounds but also on the economic ground of its inefficiency. The plantation slave economies were also part of an economic system in which the colonies were protected by the old Navigation laws and the system of protective duties. Traditionally, it had been assumed that slavery was economically beneficial, in a whole range of ways (in the seventeenth century some had even argued that a complementary advantage of the slave trade was that by moving Africans from a tropical to a temperate climate, they would then require British wool to clothe them). The vast wealth flowing from the West Indian slave estates certainly was conspicuous by the eighteenth century – William Beckford, author of the famous orientalist gothic novel *Vathek* (1786), received an annual income of £165,000 from his estates. Smith did not deny this, but rather turned the argument on its head by arguing that far from being a necessary part of the system, slavery was only sustainable because the profits from sugar and tobacco were so large: only the sugar and tobacco plantations, as he put it, ‘can afford the expense of slave-cultivation’ (Smith 1910, I: 345). In the case of colonies generally, Smith puts forward an argument that focuses on a prime source of the contemporary conflict with the American colonists, and which would be repeated by radical anti-colonialists for the next two hundred years, namely that though monopoly relations with colonies produced wealth, that benefit was more apparent than real because of the cost of protecting them. If the military and naval expenses incurred both in peace time and in times of war – the recent Seven Years War was, Smith observes, like most wars of the eighteenth century ‘altogether a colony quarrel’ (ibid.: 112) – were considered as an expense incurred solely by the mother-country to protect the profits of its trade monopolies with its colonies, then the apparent economic advantages of those monopolies were illusory. While every country of Europe had attempted to engross to itself all the profits of the trade with its colonies, it had succeeded only in engrossing to itself the cost of protecting that trade. ‘Under the present system of management, therefore’, Smith concludes, ‘Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies’ (ibid.: 112). In making this argument, he was aligning himself with other radical economists such as Dean Tucker, who asserted the unprofitability of the colonies and therefore advocated separation from them (Knorr 1944: 117–25; Semmell 1993: 59–62). Smith too follows his conclusion by proposing the radical solution that ‘Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies’ (Smith 1910, II: 112). However desirable he may consider this to be,

Smith admits, however, that Britain is unlikely to take his advice. He therefore proposes an alternative. Given his argument about the cost of empire, Smith reasons that the colonies should be required to contribute towards the expenses of their defence and local administration. However, he recognizes that contemporary events suggest that this too would be hard to bring about. Mindful of the American demand of no taxation without representation, he therefore proposes a constitutional union of Britain with her colonies, with a federal assembly to run it. Smith's alternative to decolonization, a liberal imperialism of a federal empire, was to be developed as a serious proposal right into the twentieth century.

According to Smith, 'the discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind' (ibid.: 121). The effects of the revolutionary new global economic system that followed, he considered enormous and incalculable. Though economically beneficial, he also considered that 'to the natives . . . both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from these events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned'. He looks ahead to a time when the native peoples of these countries may grow stronger, 'and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another'. Smith argues that 'this equality of force' will only be brought about by the 'mutual communication of knowledge' that results from international commerce (ibid.: 122). Commerce visits misfortune upon non-Europeans, but only commerce will restore their integrity, equality and power: in this, Smith closely anticipates Marx's arguments about colonialism. Smith's enthusiasm for the development of capital and industry through world trade, however, is based on a very non-Marxist model of free-market economics of efficiency. The colonies were a distortion of and impediment to this, acting as an impediment to capitalist expansion and the development of international commerce. He argues vigorously for the removal of all impediments to free trade between the colony and the home country, attacking in particular the monopoly trading rights of the East India Company (which as a company, incidentally, did in fact pay for its own defence, and, at great expense, the East India Office in London). However, considering colonies for the most part in the sense of settler colonies, he did not comment separately on India's anomalous status as a colony of a private company. Smith established the basis for the most substantial anti-colonialist sentiments of the nineteenth century, particularly those of the Manchester School and liberal isolationists such as Gladstone. The monopoly system was commercially inefficient, expensive, and a microcosm of the whole colonial system which operated as a corrupt system of patronage. While the liberals succeeded in establishing free trade with the colonies in 1846, the colonies themselves began to institute tariffs against British goods in 1859 and the monopoly system would be re-instituted towards the end of the century under the aegis of imperialism in the form of protectionism (Bell and Morrell 1928: 322). Imperialism, Smith would have doubtless argued against Lenin, was not the highest stage of capitalism, but a rather retrogressive

reversion to outdated and inefficient mercantilist principles (Porter 1968: 7). To the long-standing moral and humanitarian objection to colonialism and colonial practices, Smith therefore added a devastating economic critique of the colonial system that attacked the very basis of its existence.

Given that Smith was a Scot, writing from Edinburgh, the question inevitably arises of how Smith's anti-colonial stance related to the position of Scotland *vis-à-vis* England. When Smith published *The Wealth of Nations* it was only thirty-one years since the '45 rebellion. Smith was himself more cosmopolitan than nationalist, and does not consider Scotland or even Ireland in his chapter on colonies. He quite casually remarks at one point in his discussion of the idea of an imperial federation that if the American colonies eventually surpass Britain economically, as he fully expects them to do, then it would be logical for the seat of empire to move westwards (Smith 1910, II: 121). Equally, since the Scots were represented in parliament and there were no tariffs in the trade between England and Scotland, there were no economic grounds for objection in the relation except for one: Smith's economic critique of colonialism is based on the complaint that vested, usually aristocratic interests, in the metropolis were prolonging an outdated system of mercantilism that operated through patronage rather than efficiency and excluded enterprising capitalists of the kind later typified by the Edinburgh financiers who built up large financial institutions through investments in North and South America. James Mill and Hobson were also later to argue that the colonies were maintained for the benefit of a privileged minority ('a vast system of outdoor relief for the upper classes' as Mill put it) and brought nothing but trouble for the nation at large. In this respect, the grounds Smith develops are very similar to those of his critique of the antiquated, restrictive English universities: in each case, the ultimate test is that of utility (Young 1996: 205–14). At the time Smith was writing, moreover, as Colley has shown, rather than resisting the English, many Scots were busy infiltrating the army and government positions, determined to share in the Empire's advantages. The complaint was not so much that they were part of the Empire, but that they were not getting enough of its booty (Colley 1992: 117–32). The British Empire was in fact to depend increasingly on active Scots and Irish participation (Jeffery 1996): not for nothing was Glasgow known in the nineteenth century as the second city of the Empire. All the same, it is clear that Smith shared some of David Hume's hostility towards the 'barbarians who inhabit the banks of the Thames', even if he did not go as far as Hume's gleeful *schadenfreude* at the prospect of colonial revolt in 1768: 'O! how I long to see America and the East Indies revolted totally & finally, the Revenue reduc'd to half, public Credit fully discredited by Bankruptcy, the third of London in Ruins, and the rascally Mob subdued' (Hume 1932, 2: 184).

Less than twenty years after Smith, at the time of the French Revolution, Jeremy Bentham added a third, political objection to the possession of colonies, and so effectively completed the scope of the arguments that would be deployed in the metropolis against colonialism from that time onwards. In his extraordinary, radical pamphlet of 1793, 'Emancipate your Colonies! Addressed to the National Convention of France' (Bentham 1843), Bentham followed Smith in insisting that profits from colonies were

at best illusory, given the expense of protecting them and the cost of the international conflict that they provoked, and that trade was more profitable without colonial monopolies. For the first time, however, he combined these economic arguments with the discourse of rights and justice, arguing that the French should logically give to colonial nations the rights of liberty and equality that they had just achieved for themselves:

You choose your own government: why are not other people to choose theirs? So you seriously mean to govern the world, and do you call that *liberty*? What is become of the rights of men? Are you the only men who have rights? Alas! my fellow citizens, have you two measures? (Bentham 1843, IV: 408)

Bentham's pamphlet turned the American Declaration of Independence into a credo for colonial liberation: now that the French themselves had adopted the discourse of universal rights, they could no longer consistently remain agents of colonial domination. Paine's *Rights of Man* (1791–2) was equally applicable not only to women, but also to colonized societies. Henceforth, the concepts of equality, liberty, the rights of man, and national self-determination, would form the justification and very foundation of anti-colonial struggle. Despite their liking for rationality, the French did not, however, take too enthusiastically to Bentham's remorseless logic. Bentham's final question here regarding the 'two measures' also anticipates the defensive strategy that would be deployed increasingly by imperialists during the course of the nineteenth century, namely the racist argument that there were indeed two (or more) measures of the human, and only European humans were fully human and fully capable of liberty and self-government. Here Bentham goes further than Smith in overtly extending the idea of decolonization to India, but even Bentham himself has a moment of hesitation when he wonders about the translatability of the discourse of rights, asking whether the tree of liberty would grow in India if planted there: 'Would the declaration of rights translate into *Shanscrit*? Would *Bramin*, *Chetree*, *Bice*, *Sooder*, and *Hallachore* meet on equal ground?' Bentham had the opportunity to have his question answered in the affirmative when he met the great Indian reformer Rammohan Roy in 1831. Even though from the point of view of the European the moral position is clear – 'give up your colonies – because you have no right to govern them, because they had rather not be governed by you, because it is against their interest to be governed by you' (Bentham 1843, IV: 417) – the degree to which European rights discourse is a universal that can be transposed to any society caused the Bentham of 1793 a hesitation that would be extended in J. S. Mill's well-known adoption of 'two measures' regarding the suitability of liberty to India. In 1859, two years after the 'Mutiny', Mill wrote with reference to the English in India, and the French in Algeria:

The sacred duties which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality of each other, are not binding towards those to whom nationality and independence are either a certain evil, or at best a questionable good. . . . To characterize any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows

that he who so speaks has never considered the subject. A violation of great principles of morality it may easily be; but barbarians have no rights as a *nation*, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one. (Mill 1984: 118)

Despite such ingenious arguments, the discourse of universal rights was a resource that would not go away, and was employed with increasing power in the anti-colonial movements of the twentieth century. It was formalized in the Universal Declaration of Rights in 1948 and remains a basis for minority struggles all over the world (Shivji 1989; Wallerstein 1995).

Nineteenth-century Liberalism

1 NINETEENTH-CENTURY ANTI-COLONIALISM IN FRANCE: ALGERIA AND THE *MISSION CIVILISATRICE*

In the eighteenth century, humanitarian protest found itself in alliance with liberal economic values: colonialism and its attendant practices could be condemned as wrong on both humanitarian and economic grounds. This fortunate if unexpected alliance held together for much of the nineteenth century in Britain until as late as the 1870s, and also presented a potential problem for Marx. In France, on the other hand, it broke down quickly as a result of the different situation at the end of the Napoleonic wars. By 1815 France had effectively lost the majority of its colonies and was hardly a colonial power (similar to Britain in certain respects after 1776); new colonization, particularly of Algeria and North Africa, offered a means for recovering national pride and lost military glory. In 1830, in an effort to save his throne, the unpopular King of France Charles X invaded Algeria. He lost his throne, but the French 'limited occupation' was begun, though it was not consolidated until 1847. This allowed ample time for debate on the questions of the legitimacy of the invasion, the methods employed, particularly those of the punitive expeditions of the French general Bugeaud, and the administrative set-up. The hope of commercial gain was always a major driving force behind the French incursions, but there was little to show for it. Other reasons therefore had to be invented. The invasion was supported by Romantic idealists such as Lamartine and Hugo, attracted by the prospect of national glory and exoticism; opponents to the monarchy, struggling for the old revolutionary principles of liberty, democracy and equality, were equally zealous in their defence of the colonization of Algeria. This developed in the 1850s into the imperialism of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte III, who embarked on further imperial expansion in West Africa and Indochina. For both idealists and republicans, the invasion of other lands was justified by the notion of the *mission civilisatrice* which brought together nationalism with the desire to offer 'backward' populations the benefits of a progressive French culture which rested in an unquestioned supremacy of knowledge, technology and prosperity. Under the July monarchy of Louis Philippe (1830–48), the revolutionary

enthusiasm for extending French political principles to those subject to French rule was converted to the invention of the great imperial ideology of the nineteenth century. This was put into practice under the imperialism of Napoleon III as a result of the French yearning, as Marx put it evocatively, 'to return from the dangers of revolution to the fleshpots of Egypt' (Marx 1973a: 149). The French ideology of the *mission civilisatrice* was subsequently taken up by all the European colonial powers. This notorious project, which the evangelical British characteristically turned into a question of duty, and eventually into the suffering martyrdom of the white man's burden, is customarily held up to derision without detailed examination of what was involved or indeed why it was needed. The confidence of universal values that paradoxically needed to be imposed on the rest of the world because they were not in fact at that time universal, was a legacy of Enlightenment thought. In its distortion into a civilizing mission, the revolutionary notion of universal human equality was turned into an oppressive form of cultural imperialism which required the practice not so much of traditional colonialism as imperialism proper (Ageron 1973; Leroy-Beaulieu 1874).

Why, however, was the *mission civilisatrice*, the cultural revolution that Europeans were determined to unleash upon the world, invented in the first place? In France it was contrived by Romantic nationalists and liberal republican idealists precisely to provide an alternative – in this case a culturalist argument – against the economic strictures of the liberal economists and radical parliamentarians such as Bastiat and Reybaud who were opposed to the military conquests in North Africa. The civilizing mission had to be invented, ironically, out of radical Enlightenment egalitarian arguments in order to provide a new and different reason justifying colonialism in the face of liberal opposition against it on economic and financial grounds. This meant that in France the two liberal principles of the eighteenth century separated and became opposed to each other: the civilizing mission versus free trade. Even the revolutionary project of Marx himself can potentially be numbered among those who unthinkingly privileged their own culture and assumed its inevitable destiny of superseding all others. Against this is the fact that it was the capitalists in particular who were arguing against colonialism in favour of free trade. Decolonization itself could therefore be viewed as the triumph of economic liberalism – which, equally, would necessarily demand a readjustment to ideas of neocolonialism. The possibility emerges that nineteenth-century imperialism was in certain respects a deviation from capitalism, that it could even be seen as a bourgeois form of resistance to it. In the late nineteenth century, British profits from trade and investment declined as its empire expanded. Far from decolonization being necessarily anti-capitalist, the freeing up of world markets, a process which is still going on today, represents the final historical triumph of the arguments of Adam Smith.

2 NINETEENTH-CENTURY ANTI-COLONIALISM IN BRITAIN

In nineteenth-century Britain, the situation was almost the reverse to that in France. The two liberal traditions took much longer to separate. It is true that despite the

growing evangelical and liberal opposition to colonialism towards the end of the eighteenth century, after two colonial wars and the loss of the American colonies, Pitt the Younger took every opportunity during the course of the Napoleonic wars to increase British colonial possessions (Bayly 1989). From the Congress of Vienna in 1815, however, to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Empire only expanded incrementally (Porter 1991). From 1815 onwards the current of opinion became increasingly hostile to the idea of extending colonies by annexing and occupying foreign territory on the French model – indeed, there was substantial hostility to any colonization at all. It has already been described in chapter 3 how ‘imperialism’ was originally used in the mid-nineteenth century as a term of abuse in Great Britain and the ambitions of French imperialism regarded with great suspicion. The public response to Disraeli’s development of imperialism in its British version (initially muted in his political stance of the 1850s, but already envisaged in his novels *Coningsby* (1844) and *Tancred* (1847)) can be measured by the widespread revulsion towards his 1876 Bill granting Queen Victoria the title of Empress. She was herself keen to be known as Queen and Empress generally, but after widespread, increasingly republican opposition, Disraeli limited the new title to Empress of India, the colony on which his own imperialistic ambitions for Aryan union were centred (Disraeli argued that Jews were also Aryans).

However, this resistance to imperialism was not to last. Lenin was later to comment on the strange reversal of British sentiment in the nineteenth century from anti-colonialism to imperialism (a shift directly paralleled in the switch from Prichard’s liberal anti-racism to the dominant racialism of late nineteenth-century British culture) (Young 1995a):

In the most flourishing period of free competition in Great Britain, i.e. between 1840 and 1860, the leading British bourgeois politicians were *opposed* to colonial policy and were of the opinion that the liberation of the colonies, their complete separation from Britain, was inevitable and desirable . . . in 1852, Disraeli, a statesman who was generally inclined towards imperialism, declared: ‘The colonies are millstones round our necks.’ But at the end of the nineteenth century the British heroes of the hour were Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, who openly advocated imperialism and applied the imperialist policy in the most cynical manner! (Lenin 1968: 225)

Lenin was certainly correct that in the earlier period, many politicians were opposed to colonialism in principle (if not in practice). This period of distrust of empire is now often forgotten. In a rare example of unforced colonial withdrawal, in 1863 Palmerston, famed for his gunboat diplomacy and now often described as an imperialist, voluntarily handed over the Ionian Islands (granted to Britain in 1815) to Greece. Even Disraeli, as we have seen, was initially affected by the temper of the times, though it was he, of all politicians, who was subsequently most responsible for developing a new imperial mode: by the early 1870s, as Thornton puts it, he ‘thought the time right to insert an ideology of empire into the comfortably domestic atmosphere of the English political scene’ (Thornton 1985: 19). Gladstone was actively anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, but as time went on increasingly found himself forced into antithetical

policies in Egypt, South Africa and Afghanistan by what he regarded as a sense of national responsibility and duty. 'It is not the habit of the English people to set out with their eyes open on a career of conquest and annexation. The conquests which we make are forced upon us' opined the liberal *Manchester Guardian* in 1884 of Britain's reluctant imperialism (Porter 1975: 111).

How did this reversal of sentiment on which Lenin comments come about? Apart from the political ideologies of the leaders themselves, commentators usually point towards increasing imperial rivalry and a range of other factors to explain this abrupt change of position. In retrospect it is clear that events such as the uprising in India in 1857, the Morant Bay rebellion in 1865, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 set the course for a rise in imperial sentiment which meant that by 1880 the most vocal liberal opposition to colonialism had largely disappeared in favour of anxiety about international imperial power structures. There was also, however, a curious and in certain respects more interesting movement whereby the very sentiments of anti-colonialism transformed into their opposites. Since Smith, many such as McCulloch (1837) advocated a liberalization of the mercantilist colonial structure towards a free-trade system. The increasing trade with the USA and with the recently liberated countries of South America appeared to justify the arguments of the Manchester School for the benefits of free trade over controlled monopolistic colonial markets (Schuyler 1945). The great liberal triumph of the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 signified the end of the colonial preference system, and the end therefore of much of the rationale for having colonies at all. By the 1850s the notion of decolonization was actively canvassed: in April 1851 the *Edinburgh Review*, for example, ran an article entitled 'Shall We Retain Our Colonies?' (an article to which Lord Grey, Russell's Colonial Secretary, responded at length) (Adderley 1861, 1869; Grey 1853). Cobden, Bright, the economists of the Manchester School, and Goldwin Smith, Professor of History at Oxford, known as the 'little Englanders', argued that the Empire should be disbanded, portraying it as a useless and expensive burden which could not be justified in economic terms. Colonial wars, such of those of the New Zealanders against the Maoris from the 1840s to the 1860s, and the protection of Canada during the American Civil War, encouraged attention to the unwelcome economic costs of colonies. By contrast, it was claimed that the end of all colonial protective trade tariffs would enable the expansion of British commerce. In 1870 Cobden argued that 'liberty of commerce would give us access to the entire world market. In abandoning the monopoly of commerce in our colonies, we would exchange a miserable privilege for a privilege of trade with the entire world' (Merle 1969: 36). Cobden could simultaneously be anti-colonialist, while advocating a politics of imperialist commercial expansion. Here, as Viswanathan remarks of Annie Besant's radical anti-colonialism, 'the sentiments of anti-colonialism and imperialism become virtually indistinguishable' (Viswanathan 1998: 207). Paradoxical as it may seem, anti-colonialism was not, therefore, incompatible with what would later be described as economic imperialism, that is, imperialism in its second sense of economic rather than direct colonial dominance; indeed, as in the case of the USA after the Second World War, it could be used actively to promote it. Even in this radical period, then, Britain still pursued

imperialistic trade policies, as Marx pointed out with respect to British policy in the Far East, particularly the Opium Wars of 1839–42, which showed that it could engage in wars to force China to open to European commerce, just as the US was to do with respect to Japan a decade later in 1853. In other words, a distinction was developed between colonial policies and those designed to facilitate and protect British commerce (Semmel 1970). Or, to put it in today's terms, one kind of imperialism was substituted for another.

However imperialistic they became, the Cobdenite radicals, however, remained opposed to colonies. Their arguments were gradually overtaken from the 1830s onwards by the different liberal ideas of E. G. Wakefield, which were to become dominant in the imperial period and which in certain ways anticipated those of Marx (Semmel 1993: 31). Wakefield argued that Britain's surplus of capital meant that its rate of profit tended to decline; it therefore needed to be invested more profitably abroad where production could be expanded, and the social unrest produced by declining profit avoided. This required an empire and the promotion of colonization. Wakefield's ideas were accepted by the leading liberals of his time, in particular J. S. Mill, with the result that the liberal position of granting established colonies commercial and political autonomy was not necessarily incompatible with the promotion of colonization as such. The Colonial Reformers, led by Wakefield and Buller, advocated colonization, on systematic principles and on the basis of self-government, as a 'subsidiary to free trade', solving what they saw as the problem of surplus capital and population by creating a new market for British goods by 'planting population and capital in the vast untenanted regions of our colonies; and calling into existence markets, which . . . would go on continually extending the means of employing an increasing population at home' (Wakefield 1914: 471–2). Liberal anti-colonialism had become, simultaneously, liberal colonialism.

In addition to the doctrine of free trade, the armed uprisings in Upper and Lower Canada in the 1830s encouraged the formulation of liberal solutions embodied in the Durham Report of 1839, which suggested (and initiated) the transfer of powers from Britain to the colony and the establishment of internal 'responsible' self-government (Lucas 1912; Wrong 1926). Here the example of the American colonists supported the idea of the inevitability of autonomy for settler colonies. In 1865, in contrast to the imperial appropriations of nineteen years later, a Parliamentary Select Committee recommended that, with the exception of Sierra Leone, Britain should pull out of West Africa. The liberal climate even extended to Ireland: in November 1867, Marx wrote: 'I used to regard Ireland's separation from England as impossible. I now think it inevitable, although *federation* may follow separation' (Marx 1974: 158). Marx's new optimism was the result of the fact that Canada had just been given dominion status (i.e. internal autonomy). This imperial constitutional development immediately set up the possibility of similar moves for other white settler colonies and even tropical colonies such as India and parts of British West Africa (constitutional independence movements were thus active in the Empire even before some countries had been annexed as colonies). To the evident alarm of some, the possibility began to be mooted of the British Empire in effect deconstructing itself. In 1870 the Earl of

Carnarvon challenged the government's foreign policy in the House of Lords, remarking that 'There are whispers abroad that there is a policy on foot to dismember this empire. . . . If there is such a policy, in God's name let us know it' (McIntyre 1977: 19). It was of this period that Koebner and Schmidt comment that 'Whether they hailed the development as a sign of progress or watched it with gloom, most thinking men in those days had little doubt about the impending dissolution of the British Empire' (Koebner and Schmidt 1964: 83). The British ruling class did envisage during this period at least the possibility of renouncing its formal control of those territories which it had colonized. From a political point of view, it seemed that at the very least, diasporic free-thinking Englishmen would have to be given the liberties which they enjoyed at home. It was argued that granting the colonies liberty would in fact help to protect and augment cultural and commercial ties.

There was considerable support for the logic of federal decolonization in the 1850s and 1860s (Kendle 1997). In 1859, for example, Sydney Smith Bell, recalling Adam Smith's advocacy that Britain should give up her colonies, commented that 'sound reason and principle support the assertion, in regard to all colonies, but especially in regard to colonies founded by a government so popular in its elements as that of Great Britain, and by the inhabitants of a country enjoying such liberal institutions as those of Great Britain, that sooner or later they will achieve their independence of the mother country' (Smith Bell 1859: 393). The logical extension of this view was that the British Empire would in effect deconstitute itself with its constituent parts developing into a federal system of independent states still belonging to an overall imperial system, so that, as Smith Bell put it, 'Great Britain would . . . be reproduced in three quarters of the globe' (*ibid.*: 469).

As Peel recognized at the time, the Canadian example provided a constitutional precedent for decolonization that could always henceforth be invoked by any British colony (Koebner and Schmidt 1964: 61). Equally significant for the whole movement of colonial nationalism in the white settler colonies, and anti-colonial nationalism in general, was the development of nationalism itself in Europe and the anti-imperial nationalism of the 1848 revolutions and, particularly, the emancipation of Italy in 1859–60. At the same time, one effect of the success of the anti-colonial arguments, in particular the abolition of the formal economic and political ties that had hitherto bonded the Empire and kept its different parts together in a structure of economic interdependency and reciprocal commercial privileges, and the subsequent challenge to the necessity of empire at all, was the development of a new, less materialistic concept of empire designed to keep it together even if the individual countries within it became politically and economically autonomous: the ideology of imperialism. From this perspective, imperialism can best be understood as a form of extended nationalism (which explains why nations, upon achieving nationhood, so easily become imperialistic). Paradoxically, the fundamental readjustment required was already spelt out by the anti-imperialist Gladstone in 1846, when he redefined the new relation of Britain to its colonies in terms of a commonality of cultural as well as material affiliations, resting 'upon common traditions of the past and hopes of the future, – upon resemblances in origin, in laws, and in manners, – in what inwardly

binds men and communities of men together' (Bell and Morrell 1928: 345). These ideas were to be fully developed in two key texts later in the century (already discussed in chapter 3), that were to be instrumental in the formulation of a new concept of empire as brotherhood of nationally autonomous white Englishmen: Dilke's *Greater Britain* of 1868 and Seeley's *The Expansion of England* of 1883.

As has been suggested, the scheme of a Greater Britain allowed some very different conceptions of empire. On the one hand, it consisted of an English-speaking Anglo-Saxon white brotherhood, with native peoples always maintained in a subordinate role of 'equality under paternal despotism' as Dilke quaintly put it; in the case of Dilke and Rhodes, who tended to project the idea as a form of global English male bonding, this included the USA and (for Rhodes) Germany. On the other hand, it was advanced as a more equitable notion of an empire of free nations founded on a common culture without racial or other distinctions (an idea advanced at various times by, among others, Queen Victoria, Salisbury, Cromer, Curzon, Chamberlain and Milner). Even the second model, however, was constrained by ideas of the current unsuitability of particular native peoples to self-rule (Mill 1984: 118–20). Some, such as Lucas, went so far as to affirm explicitly that the principles of the Durham Report were not intended 'for the whole British Empire, or for coloured races, or for non-British white races' (Lucas 1912, I: 315). Others such as Froude were even more explicit: 'Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, will not be found enthusiastic for the extension of self-government in the West Indies, when they know that it means the extinction of their own white brothers who have settled there' (Froude 1909: 325). Anti-colonialism even among liberals was always predominantly focused on the white settler colonies and was thus typically selective. Although autonomous self-rule for the whole Empire was increasingly envisaged as a theoretical goal, it was generally projected into a future in which all the subjects of the British Empire would have become entirely anglicized in their social and political cultures. However, the model of an imperial federation did also allow the development of the first claims for home-rule, along constitutional lines that had already been established, in India and elsewhere.

Home rule, not independence, was initially the object of most indigenous anti-colonial movements, as the names of groups such as the Indian Home Rule League, formed by the radical feminist Annie Besant, suggest. In the context of imperial rivalry, the rationale for annexation and the setting up of protectorates and the like in the late nineteenth century was increasingly the fear that if, say, Britain did not annex Papua New Guinea, the Polynesian Islands, Micronesia and Melanesia, as the New Zealanders and Australians urged the imperial government to do, then the Germans, the French or the Americans would (Hudson 1971; McIntyre 1977: 147). In this context, nationalist movements in the colonies did not generally seek complete independence from the colonial power, which would simply have made them vulnerable to annexation by another, but rather, in the case of the British Empire, home rule. In the case of French colonies, the desire was often for full constitutional assimilation so as to achieve the political rights that would bring with it. Before (and in some cases even after) the First World War, the immediate objective of the Irish, Indian, West

African and South African nationalist movements was to become self-governing dominions within the federation of the British Empire, on the Canadian model. British imperial theorists foresaw a time when the whole of the British Empire would operate in this way, run by a federal parliament in London or somewhere else in the Empire. Home rule activists could simultaneously be enthusiasts for the British Empire – as Gandhi was before the First World War, or Isaac Butt was in nineteenth-century Ireland. By the time of the Boer War in 1898, sentiment in the Dominions was often more imperialist than in Britain. Largely because the colonists against whom it was fought were white and already politically independent, the Boer War became the first moment in which an international opposition to imperialist practices developed. The contradiction between imperialism's two policies of democracy and despotism became painfully visible (Porter 1968: 123–37). The iconic public visibility of this contradiction came with Major John MacBride's formation of the celebrated Irish Brigade to fight for the Boers. Those on the other side included Mahatma Gandhi and future leader of the ANC, Sol T. Plaatje. Towards the end of his *Mafeking Diary*, as the Boers began to capitulate, Plaatje observed: 'The effects of the war are going to be bitterer still – no matter what the result' (Plaatje 1990: 122). At an ideological level, British imperialism never recovered. 'It is the beginning of the end', wrote the Irish socialist, James Connolly, with some accuracy, in 1899 (Connolly 1988a, II: 29).

3 INDIA

Ireland, India and Canada dominated the colonial politics of nineteenth-century Britain. While the British government encouraged the white settler colonies of Canada (or rather, individual states within what is now Canada), South Africa, Australia and New Zealand to develop autonomous government and economic and military self-reliance, it was less sanguine with respect to emancipatory claims from India and Africa. While Mill was sceptical, even Goldwin Smith excepted India from his strictures on British colonialism (Smith 1863: 292). For the most part, with regard to India the majority of anti-colonialists in Britain followed Burke's example and limited their objectives to reforms. This was the case, for example, even with Bright's proposals for India, as Marx noted pointedly. Together with Henry Fawcett, Bright was an active member of the liberal pressure group, the East India Association, formed in 1866, with branches in both Britain and India. Only a small number of radicals such as Cobden or the Chartist leader Ernest Jones responded to the Indian 'Mutiny' in the same way as Marx, by criticizing British rule in India altogether (Jones 1857; Marx 1973a; Sturgis 1969). In 1857 Cobden was shocked to discover from, as he put it, 'some ladies who have lately returned from India', that 'the common epithet applied to our fellow-subjects in Hindostan is *nigger*'. His response to the news of the 'Mutiny' was to declare that

Hindoostan must be ruled by those who live on that side of the globe. Its people will prefer to be ruled badly – *according to our notions* – by its own colour, kith and kin, than to submit to the humiliation of being better governed by a succession of transient in-

truders from the antipodes. . . . It is impossible that a people can permanently be used for their own obvious and conscious degradation. The entire scheme of our Indian rule is based upon the assumption that the natives will be the willing instruments of their own humiliation. (Morley 1893: 671–3)

Cobden's views got nowhere, though the reformists did succeed in introducing limited forms of representative local government. After Cobden's death in 1865, it was the socialist H. M. Hyndman who continued the critique of the whole basis of British rule in India as such (Hyndman 1907). While active resistance to British rule in India had been continuous in different forms up to 1857, the nationalist movement that developed in India in the 1880s during the heyday of British imperialism differed by focusing on the new possibility offered by federalism of a political solution, and obligingly sought home rule through constitutional means. This found significant support in Britain: in 1889, four years after the founding of the Indian National Congress, the British Committee of the Indian National Congress was started by sympathizers and those such as Sir William Wedderburn who had already been involved in the setting up of the Congress Party in India. The British Committee was dissolved only in 1920 after the Amritsar massacre and Gandhi's decision that the Indian nationalist movement should follow the example of Sinn Féin and stand alone. Given that the Congress Party had adopted much more militant tactics after 1900, it was surprising that the British Committee lasted so long. After its dissolution, the campaign for Indian independence in Britain was taken over by the communists in the League Against Imperialism, particularly the brilliant Indian Labour left-wing MP, Shapurji Saklatvala. While the British offered a certain amount of – often divisive – constitutional reform and representation, Indian independence was only achieved by Indian political activism and resistance. Yet the particular forms of Indian anti-colonial strategies, such as non-violent resistance, were in part conditioned by the established constitutional possibility of colonial home rule.

4 IRELAND

The big decolonization issue in the second half of the nineteenth century as far as the British government was concerned was, of course, Ireland. The Young Ireland and Fenian movements in the 1840s and 1860s, the famine and its aftermath, Isaac Butt's Home Government Association (which became the Home Rule movement in 1873), the land war and agricultural crisis of the late 1870s, the terrorism of the Invincibles and their associates in the 1880s, together with the brilliant tactics of Parnell's nationalist Home Rule party in parliament in the 1880s, meant that Irish politics were never far from the centre of English political life (Parnell's parliamentary tactics even laid the foundations for the organization of modern British political parties). Whereas a federal solution for Canada and even India was conceivable, home rule for Ireland was always regarded by the English upper classes as a threat to the integrity of Britain itself – even Goldwin Smith opposed it, while Lucas argued that had Lord Durham written his

Report on Ireland rather than Canada, he 'would not have recommended Home Rule for Ireland, but would have contended that it has self-government already' (Lucas 1912, I: 324; Kendle 1989). Paradoxically, Irish home rule was seen as something that would destabilize the unity of the Empire. It menaced the centre of Greater Britain, and raised difficult questions about who the 'British' of the British Empire really were (questions that duly resurfaced in the era of devolution over a century later). These arguments meant little to the Irish themselves, who simply wanted an end to British and, particularly, British landlord domination. Nor did they mean much to ordinary people in Britain. As a result of Irish migration, the British and Irish radical movements were always closely allied; towards the end of the century, there would also be links forged between Irish, Indian and Boer nationalists, for example, through the Irish militant activist Sister Nivedita in Bengal (Jayawardena 1986: 94). The repeal of the 1800 Act of Union with Ireland was, as Foster observes, part of the Chartist agenda in the 1840s (Foster 1988: 365). This continued a long radical populist tradition within Britain: opposition to Cromwell's repression of the 1641 rebellion in Ireland had formed part of the Levellers' agenda in the mid-seventeenth century (Aylmer 1975; Brailsford 1961).

When Gladstone became prime minister in 1866, Britain found itself with its first overt anti-colonial leader, whose affirmed special mission was to resolve the Irish issue. Gladstone disestablished the Church of Ireland (1869), passed two Irish Land Acts (1870, 1881), but twice failed to get a Home Rule Bill passed (he was consistently defeated by the non-elected Tory House of Lords), and split his own party in the process (Lubenow 1988). Sinn Féin was founded by Arthur Griffith after the failure of the second Home Rule Bill of 1893. Once the Liberals had finally succeeded in removing the veto of the Tory-controlled House of Lords in 1911, a Home Rule Bill was introduced for Ireland and Scotland the following year and by 1914 received the Royal Assent. However, the violent reaction of the Protestant Ulster Unionists scared the government and with the declaration of war, the Bill was abandoned. As in India, liberal moves towards limited home rule for Ireland had come to nothing; only active resistance by the Irish themselves would bring about independence. The Easter Monday Uprising of 1916, in which Pearce announced the declaration of a Provisional Government of the Irish Republic on the steps of the Dublin Post Office, followed by the execution of the leaders, ensured that nothing less than complete independence for the whole of Ireland would henceforth be demanded. In the violence of the following years the British administration broke down, much as it was to do in India before 1947: the two colonies finally became ungovernable. In the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, Ireland was partitioned between Ulster and Southern Ireland, and fell into civil war between those prepared to accept the dominion status of a divided Ireland and those who refused to betray the ideals of the 1916 insurrection. In 1922, Ireland was not given full independence, but became a 'free state', that is a dominion within the British Empire. The Free State became a Republic in 1948, but the violence continued: the division of Ireland remains the continuing legacy of three hundred years of English Protestant colonialism. British federalism thus only worked fitfully: some such as the Canadian states, Australia and New Zealand had independence thrust upon them, some such as India had to argue for it and resort to increasingly

violent measures of non-cooperation to achieve it. The Irish, because they were constitutionally part of the United Kingdom, tried the constitutional way to independence, but in the end, they simply had to fight for it. As the British case (in these significant, but limited number of examples) shows, imperial governments never operated in a uniform manner towards the independence movements – and for this reason, the anti-colonial movements never operated uniformly either.

By the time Liberals took over government from the Unionists in 1905, after twenty years in the political wilderness after Gladstone had split the party over Irish Home Rule in 1886, they had revoked their earlier radical anti-colonialist politics and had become committed as a party to the Empire, although even then, as Havinden and Meredith observe, ‘considerable political divisions and uncertainties’ remained: ‘There were convinced imperialists in all the major political parties, but in no party could they always be sure of consistent support’ (Havinden and Meredith 1993: 21; Porter 1975: 202). By that stage, opposition to colonialism had long been taken over by the socialists such as William Morris’s Socialist League and, from 1893, the new Labour Party under Keir Hardie (though, partly from the influence of the paternalistic Fabians, the first Labour government under Ramsay MacDonald was hardly to put these principles into practice) (Halévy 1951; Howe 1993). Principled opposition to British imperialism remained, but direct political analysis of colonialism or imperialism as such was limited. With the defection of the Liberals, the old anti-imperialist arguments had been defeated. The critique of imperialism needed a radical new ground.

5 J. A. HOBSON’S *IMPERIALISM: A STUDY*

The development of such a new ground formed the basis of the social philosophy of the ‘New Radicals’, who were led by J. A. Hobson, a university extension lecturer whose ideas were based in the liberal tradition of Smith and Cobden (J. M. Keynes would, in turn, be a disciple of his). Hobson developed the first comprehensive ethical critique of imperialism, founded on an objection to the claim for the universal superiority of western culture in a scale of civilizations; he argued instead that civilization has to be conceived as ‘multiform’ (Porter 1968: 181). His primary focus, however, was economic, and in 1902 he published the results of ideas that he had been developing since the 1890s: *Imperialism: A Study* (Hobson 1938). Hobson’s study represented the first theoretical analysis of imperialism as an economic, political and institutional practice which, he contended, was fundamentally irrational. In the context of the jingoism of the Boer War, Hobson provided an unsurpassed economic and ethical critique of the ideology of imperialism which was freely utilized by the Labour Party in its campaign against the war (Porter 1968: 123–37). Hobson focused on the period of the ‘new imperialism’ of the late nineteenth century, characterized by inter-power rivalry. By providing a comparison of the cost of imperial expansion since 1870 with a detailed analysis of the relatively minor amount of trade conducted with the territories acquired since that date, Hobson demolished at a stroke the ‘trade follows the flag’ argument of the imperialists. He also argued forcefully that the ‘civil-

izing mission' argument was nothing but a pretence: 'Our expansion was almost wholly concerned with the acquisition of tropical and sub-tropical countries peopled by races to whom we have no serious intention of giving self-government' (Hobson 1938: 37). In demonstrating the huge economic cost of imperialism, however, Hobson did not simply argue for the more effective option of free trade, but re-invoked Smith's observation that what was unprofitable overall was nevertheless very profitable to a privileged elite. Hobson suggested that the cost of imperialism, in terms of wars, armaments, military and administrative apparatuses, though uneconomic and irrational in absolute terms, had provided a great profit to a minority of industrialists who profited from such expenditure: this was what he called 'the taproot of imperialism': 'Irrational from the standpoint of the whole nation, it is rational enough from the standpoint of certain classes in the nation' (ibid.: 47). Moreover, while the profits from military expenditure were significant for a small minority, the profits from pure capital investment generally were increasingly large: imperialism operated as a public guarantor of private financial investments abroad. Hobson therefore concluded that

The economic root of Imperialism is the desire of strong organized industrial and financial interests to secure and develop at the public expense and by the public force private markets for their surplus goods and their surplus capital. War, militarism, and a 'spirited foreign policy' are the necessary means to this end. (Ibid.: 106)

The effect of imperialism domestically, meanwhile, was to debase and restrict democracy and, Hobson argued, to impede social reform.

Hobson's arguments on the significance of capital investment rather than trade, together with the integration of finance capital in the hands of banks and trusts, were subsequently developed in a series of substantial Marxist analyses of imperialism that appeared in the early years of the twentieth century, particularly Hilferding's *Finance Capital* (1910) (Hilferding 1981) and Bukharin's *Imperialism and World Economy* (1918) (Bukharin 1972). Hobson's book was also used extensively by Lenin in his own well-known pamphlet on imperialism of 1917. After Hobson, it was in the work of international socialists that the enabling theoretical critique of the whole colonial system was developed in the twentieth century. In demonstrating the in-efficient economics of colonialism, the benefits accrued by a minority of capitalist interests whom he characterizes as 'the economic parasites of imperialism' (as commentators have noted, Hobson here shows himself an anti-Semite), and in providing an ethical critique of the accompanying ideology of colonialism in terms of civilizing mission, racial and cultural superiority, and social Darwinism, Hobson laid bare the basis of the imperial system as a cynical 'calculating, greedy type of Machiavellianism, entitled "real-politik"' which 'remodelled the whole art of diplomacy and erected national aggrandizement without pity or scruple as the conscious motive force of foreign policy' (Hobson 1938: 61, 13; Semmell 1993: 110–21).

Hobson's critique was thus soon supplemented by Marxist analyses of imperialism that would be developed into a state policy for world revolution. Within three years, however, a new factor had entered upon the global stage: the 1905 Russo-Japanese

war. Although Japan was itself by this stage a new, rapidly developing imperial power, its victory over Russia also constituted the first successful assault on European imperialism from outside the west, the implications of which were not lost on nationalist leaders in Asia. The triumph of an invading Oriental nation over what was regarded as a European one provoked, remarks Abdel-Malek, 'a visible radicalization in national movements throughout the world. 1905 is a critical date in the ideological development of all national movements without exception' (Abdel-Malek 1981: 82; Jayawardena 1986; Spector 1962). The Russian defeat by the Japanese in 1905 was followed by a domestic revolution, whose international significance was almost as great. As Zinoviev put it in 1923, 'The revolution of 1905 did not triumph, but it did awaken the peoples of Asia, and blew a fresh wind of freedom even into Europe' (Riddell 1986a: 43). The 1905 revolution in Russia brought the nationalist question to the foreground, and was soon followed by revolts in Iran (1906), Turkey (1908) and China (1912). Lenin observed: 'Following the 1905 movement in Russia, the democratic revolution spread to the whole of Asia – to Turkey, Persia, China. Ferment is growing in British India. A significant development is the spread of the revolutionary democratic movement to the Dutch East Indies, to Java and the other Dutch colonies' (Lenin 1962: 59). The First World War and its aftermath increased nationalist unrest to global proportions.

The period from the 1880s onwards was also marked by increasing intellectual as well as political resistance to colonialism in the colonies themselves, and it was colonized peoples that henceforth spearheaded anti-colonial sentiment, to much greater effect than European anti-colonial activists had ever achieved. In part this was a product of the impact of colonial rule itself: the disruption that capitalism brought to trading and industrial relations in the colonies created a class of bourgeoisie that utilized the knowledge learnt at the new educational institutions introduced under colonial rule, the spread of literacy, and the increase in newspapers, in order to combat feudal and imperial rulers alike. The first strategy was to adopt a version of liberal or Second International socialist reformism, and initiate constitutional movements for home rule on the Canadian and Irish models. As has been seen, the Indian and Irish movements began as nationalist organizations broadly operating within, or against, federalist solutions of home rule for dominions within the British Empire on the lines of the white settler colonies. This was also the political context in which the South African National Congress and the National Congress of British West Africa were originally formed (in some cases, it continued until the 1920s and 1930s; see, for example, De Graft-Johnson 1928). Self-government within the Empire was still the anticipated end. After 1917, however, anti-colonialism soon took a new direction. In 1890, Dilke could write confidently that 'there is in the colonies little or no Revolutionary Socialism of the European type' (Dilke 1890: 526). It would not be long before anti-colonial activists began to utilize the third, most powerful strain of resistance to colonialism and imperialism to emerge within Europe which created a significant impetus beyond its boundaries: socialism and communism. With the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Comintern by Lenin in 1919, together with the League Against Imperialism in 1929, communism would develop into the primary politics of anti-imperialism in the twentieth century.

Marx on Colonialism and Imperialism

1 COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM IN MARX

Marx was himself the product of the liberal anti-colonial climate of the 1840s. A symptom of his own historical context was that he did not analyse ‘colonialism’ or even ‘imperialism’ as such – it was rather Marx’s writings that encouraged subsequent accounts of them as oppressive practices subject to critical analysis. Marx used the term ‘colonization’ and ‘colony’ in the sense of settlement (‘we are dealing here with true colonies, i.e. virgin soil colonized by free immigrants’); his only sustained analysis of colonization is devoted to Wakefield’s *A View of the Art of Colonization* (1849), a theory which was put into practice in Australia and New Zealand, which Marx however is most interested in because, as he says, Wakefield ‘discovered not something new *about* the colonies, but, *in* the colonies, the truth about capitalist relations in the mother country’ (Marx 1976–81, I: 931–2). Wakefield proposed that the colonial government should itself reserve land in the colonies and sell it at a price higher than its market value in order both to create a surplus of wage labour and to pay for the transport of further emigrants. ‘Landed property’, as Marx observes, ‘is here artificially made more expensive in order to transform the workers into wage labourers, to make capital act as capital, and thus to make the new colony *productive*; to develop wealth in it, instead of using it, as in America, for the momentary deliverance of the wage labourers’ (Marx 1973b: 278). Wakefield’s colonial scheme therefore confirmed Marx’s central theoretical insight that the general creative basis of capital is wage labour. However, as he recognized, if this artificial project revealed the basis of capitalist relations it did not in any sense produce an insight into the truth of colonization. It was colonialism, rather, that revealed the truth of capitalism:

The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. (Marx 1973a: 324)

Marx therefore discussed colonial expansion in relation only to its role in the historical development of capitalism, or to specific circumstances of the British Empire, for the most part Ireland, India and China, on which he commented fully in response to contemporary events. He also wrote on Burma, Egypt, Tunisia and Persia (Marx and Engels 1968). A productive tension operates in his writings between theory and historical specificity, which in this respect serve as a primary model for all subsequent analyses, particularly the postcolonial. At the same time Marx's writings on colonialism have also been notoriously problematic, particularly with respect to India. This may explain the degree to which, contrary to what might have been anticipated, postcolonial theory and critique have rarely drawn directly on Marx's – as opposed to Marxist – analysis. Marx, moreover, offers no emancipatory programme specifically for colonial revolution in the mode of Lenin, Mao or Fanon.

When writing *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848, Marx and Engels gave a significant direct role for colonialism and imperialism in its broadest sense as part of the development of a capitalist global economy which they appealed to the workers of the world – not just those of Europe – to rise against. Colonial expansion is given striking prominence in the description of the development of the new commercial system of the bourgeoisie:

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development. . . .

Modern industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. The market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. (Marx and Engels 1952: 42–3)

Marx and Engels see European global expansion as both cause and effect of the development of capitalism. European global expansion here functions as an integral part, even the engine, of the dynamics of the new economic system: colonial expansion provides the key to the development of capitalism through the increase in markets, which in turn works as a revolutionary force against the old structures of feudalism. For Marx and Engels, colonial trade operated as part of the same general conditions for capitalism at home, namely the need for markets, for raw materials, and for investment, but it was colonial expansion which enabled the bourgeoisie to accumulate enough capital to revolutionize the whole economic and social system on a global scale – an observation which would later be developed into world-system theory (Wallerstein 1974–89). What is striking is the extent to which this is portrayed as a cataclysmic movement, a disruptive upheaval throughout the world that bursts old feudal relations asunder and turns traditional stasis into a process of transformation:

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations

of society. . . . Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. . . .

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. (Marx and Engels 1952: 45–6)

Here Marx and Engels portray capitalism as taking every opportunity on offer, with the result that colonialism became necessary to each specific moment of its historical development. Colonialism operated within the same general conditions as for capitalism at home. At home, it is emphasized that this caused enormous disruption to the indigenous social and economic system; abroad, it could be both disruptive and stunting, producing underdevelopment as in Ireland. In their anachronistically postmodern description of revolutionary expansion, it is noticeable that Marx and Engels stress that the capitalist revolution does not require colonialism as such, in the sense of military occupation and administration, but rather settlement and the development of a global economy. Marx did not offer any general reasons why capitalism should involve direct military conquest and occupation, though reasons can be deduced from his analyses, primarily the need to overcome the resistance which Marx characterized as the Asiatic mode of production (force ‘is itself an economic power’, Marx observes; Marx 1976–81, I: 916). The Asiatic mode of production is generally regarded as a highly dubious concept; the most productive way to regard it is as the name for an indigenous form of resistance to the intrusion of western capitalism. According to Marx and Engels, capitalism sweeps it away, forcing changes through the commercial advantages afforded by technology:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production, it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. . . .

Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made the barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West. (Marx and Engels 1952: 47–8)

Colonialism is thus not specifically different from the other processes of the industrial economy. The bourgeoisie is a revolutionary force, pitilessly tearing apart older feudal and social ties, leaving no other relation ‘than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”’ – though saving the population, at least, ‘from the idiocy of village life’. The bourgeoisie has drowned the ideologies of religion, chivalry,

sentimentalism, the family, 'in the icy waters of egotistical calculation', substituting only the 'naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation' of free trade. It compels all other nations to become like itself, but at the same time to become dependent on itself, achieving this through its cheap prices rather than its heavy artillery (though 'on pain of extinction' implies the possibility of alternative methods) that destroy established local industries. Here Marx and Engels implicitly propose a radical theory of economic imperialism, in which the dynamic capitalist global economy creates and enforces both development and dependence. More problematic, on the other hand, is the clear cultural distinction between the civilized and barbarian nations. This cultural chauvinism, this apparently unthinking assumption of the superiority of western civilization so typical of its period, is most explicit in Engels, who at times wrote enthusiastically of the French conquest of Algeria and the American invasion of California in the 1845–7 war with Mexico. Marx, however, is by no means free of it, taking over from Hegel the distinction between historic and unhistoric nations, which for him meant those with and without revolutionary potential, and showing humanitarian but little cultural sympathy for the world's nations subjected to the disruptions of bourgeois capitalism.

It is for this reason that Marx's specific writings on colonialism, the best known being the articles on India and China, are productive if problematic. In terms of the traditions of anti-colonialism outlined above, Marx did not in a sense produce any new anti-colonial arguments, and in many respects follows Utilitarian critiques (Turner 1974). In *The German Ideology*, the *Grundrisse*, *Capital* and elsewhere, Marx is consistently critical of colonialism on moral grounds: he supplements his description of the history of conquest, plunder, and the extirpation of indigenous peoples in the colonies ('these idyllic proceedings' as Marx describes them with characteristic irony), with details of atrocities taken from Howitt's *Colonization and Christianity* (Marx 1976–81, I: 915–16). At the same time, often through examples taken from the history of the East India Company, he always emphasizes the fundamental economic motive of colonialism of producing exorbitant, unjustified profits. In this, he was therefore opposing the arguments of the liberal economists who suggested that colonialism was economically unprofitable. At times, however, Marx seems to come close to this argument himself, citing at the end of his article on the East India Company John Dickinson's observation that 'as the case stands, as it would ruin England to lose her Empire in India, it is stretching our own finances with ruin, to be obliged to keep it' (Marx 1973a: 315–16). The distinction Dickinson makes is significant here, namely that while empire increasingly became crucial to the national interest, in economic terms its profitability decreased: imperialism in a nutshell. In his articles on India, Marx clearly articulates the ways in which different interests in Britain had different objectives with regard to India, and how the whole history of the East India Company had been determined by its need to straddle this domestic political tension. The Company's abolition after the 1857 rebellion, and the transfer of India to the responsibility of the Crown, only confirms the terms of his analysis, marking the moment when economic interests ceded to national ones.

Marx was faced with the range of contemporary arguments with respect to colonialism that have already been described: the pro-colonialists generally claimed that

colonialism was economically profitable, but added the moral duty of the *mission civilisatrice* to their arguments as a defence against the liberal anti-colonialist charge that colonialism was unprofitable. Marx's problem was that while he wanted to point to colonialism's significance for the capitalist drive for profit, in his anti-colonialist position he paradoxically found himself in consort with the arch-capitalists, Smith and Cobden, themselves. How, therefore, did he extricate himself from this situation? He solved it only by leaving a problematic legacy, namely by drawing on a version of the argument of the imperialists who advocated colonization on the grounds of its necessary destiny of a civilizing mission. His analyses were naturally not exactly identical to theirs; indeed, could hardly be, given the way he produced a resolution of antithetical positions. What Marx did, in terms of the two traditions outlined above, was to combine the moral humanitarian critique with his own version of the economic critique of colonialism. In reconciling the two he then distinguished himself from the radical liberals by affirming the progressive effects of colonialism and affiliating himself with the idealist tradition in which colonialism was a necessary instrument for the introduction of modernity (a position already anticipated in fact by Smith in his remark that only commerce can repair the destructive effects of commerce outside Europe). The problems of this legacy were fought out in the extended discussions of the Second International and left unresolved. The Third International, by contrast, was little bothered by the identification with modernity, and even most of the leaders of the liberation movements were untroubled by it; Cabral, for example, affirming the historical necessity, and historical mission, of imperialism itself on these grounds (Cabral 1969: 80). Today, by contrast, Marx's position appears in many ways more problematic.

Writing some eighty-odd years after Smith, Marx regarded colonization and global trade as playing a much more significant role as part of the necessary process of the transformation of the world economy from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production (Marx 1976–81, I: 915; III: 450). In a letter to Engels of 1858, he argued that

The specific task of bourgeois society is the establishment of a world market, at least in outline, and of production based upon this world market. As the world is round, this seems to have been completed by the colonization of California and Australia and the opening up of China and Japan. The difficult question for us is this: on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will immediately assume a socialist character. Is it not bound to be crushed in this little corner, considering that in a far greater territory the movement of bourgeois society is still in the ascendant? (Marx 1977: 341)

Here, colonization is portrayed as an integral part of the development of capitalism, and also with a suggestion that in completing the span of the earth, it has reached a new, in effect imperialist, stage. However, Marx suggests here that the transfer of capitalist economies outside Europe will actually have the effect of preventing the socialist revolution in Europe, since in global terms the bourgeois revolution is still in the process of occurring. Marx saw the globalization of the world economy, with its attendant phases of colonialism and imperialism, as a means through which the bourgeoisie could avoid socialist revolution at home. Its function thus becomes

crucial. It was in this context that the Indian Marxist M. N. Roy suggested that revolution in Europe would in fact have to start in the colonies. Marx's greatest claim in this regard was made with respect to China in 1853. The weak Chinese central government was effectively controlled by European interests at that time. The Taipeng rebellion of 1851, Marx argued, was a direct result of the 'dissolving agencies' that the British opium trade had produced in Chinese society; the contemporary rise in the price of tea, and the contraction of the Chinese market for manufactured goods would then have a knock-on effect at home: 'it may be safely augured', wrote Marx, 'that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long-prepared general crisis, which, spreading abroad, will be closely followed by political revolutions on the Continent' (Marx 1973a: 331). While the Europeans instituted 'order' in China, China would send disorder into the western world. The fact that this nicely balanced correlation subsequently failed to occur – though this was to happen with the colonial liberation movements of the mid-twentieth century – made Marx more cautious about the effects of colonial revolution and more insistent on the need for analysis of the actual political possibilities in the specific situation of the time, though he continued to regard the colonies as a key component of the metropolitan economic system. Marx himself, though highly critical of the East India Company's response, was relatively unenthusiastic from a political point of view about the rebellion of the sepoys in India in 1857. Despite his description of India as the 'Ireland of the East', he considered that the material and social preconditions for independence, let alone socialism, had not yet fully come into existence in India (Marx 1973a: 301). In this sense, Marx was not interested in detecting signs of resistance for its own sake, but only where there were viable political conditions of which it could make use. Equally, he was contemptuous of bourgeois national anti-colonial revolutions such as that of Simón Bolívar (Marx and Engels 1982, 18: 584–5). This highlights a difference from some postcolonial writing, where there is a tendency to validate anti-colonial resistance for its own sake, without addressing its specific political ends or effects. Historically, this may work as a means of affirming the widespread presence of anti-colonialism, but if considered in relation to political objectives, it becomes necessary to distinguish between different kinds of resistance, and different degrees of effectivity.

Marx's attitude to colonial revolt also suggests his lack of enthusiasm for nationalist sentiments in relation to the emancipatory project of communism. In the *Manifesto* Marx and Engels clearly posit communism against nationalism, and stress the internationalist political foundations of their programme for emancipation. Between 1848 and the 1860s, however, both Marx and Engels became more sanguine about the possible relation of nationalism to internationalism, and more willing to apply their own account of class relations, such as they had developed in *The Communist Manifesto*, to the distinction that would be fully developed by Lenin between 'oppressed and oppressor nations' (Lenin 1968: 596). 'Any nation that oppresses another forges its own chains', declared Marx in 1870 (Marx and Engels 1971: 163). This change occurred as a result of Marx and Engels' increasing sympathy with Irish nationalism in the 1860s (their writings on Ireland run to over four hundred pages). In 1869 Marx

announced to the General Council of the First International that 'he considered the solution of the Irish question as the solution of the English, and the English as the solution of the European'. 'The only point where one can hit official England really hard', he wrote in the following year, 'is Ireland', adding that 'it is a precondition to the emancipation of the English working class to transform the present forced union (i.e. the enslavement of Ireland) into equal and free confederation if possible, into complete separation if need be'. 'The national emancipation of Ireland' thus becomes the essential precondition for English emancipation and demands pragmatic support (Marx and Engels 1971: 161–3, 294; Munck 1986: 15–20). This constituted, as Marx himself admitted to Engels, a major revision of his own convictions:

Quite apart from all phrases about 'international' and 'humane' justice for Ireland . . . it is in the direct and absolute interest of the English working class to get rid of their present connection with Ireland. And this is my fullest conviction, and for reasons which in part I cannot tell the English workers themselves. For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working-class ascendancy. . . . Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland. The lever must be applied in Ireland. This is why the Irish question is so important for the social movement in general. (Marx and Engels 1971: 284)

Marx thus effects a major shift with regard to the political role of the colonies. Instead of waiting for liberation from the working class of the imperial power, colonized peoples should now play a key, active role in initiating European and world revolution from the colonies. Nationalism thus here became the key to the revolutionary potential of a colony which must become nationalistic in order to provide the catalyst for international revolution. Engels subsequently developed this argument a year later:

In a case like that of the Irish, true Internationalism must necessarily be based upon a distinctly national organization; the Irish, as well as other oppressed nationalities, could enter the Association [First International] only as equals with members of the conquering nation, and under protest against the conquest. The Irish sections, therefore, not only were justified, but even under the necessity to state in the preamble to their rules that their first and most pressing duty, as Irishmen, was to establish their own national independence. (Marx and Engels 1971: 303)

This concept of a nationalist internationalism, subsequently endorsed by the Second International at the Brunn Congress of 1899, is less pronounced in Engels' well-known letter to Kautsky of September 1882, where he equivocates between the idea that the revolutionary proletariat must take over the colonies and lead them to independence, and the possibility that the colonies may break out in a revolution of their own accord, which, he adds, 'would certainly be the best thing *for us*. We shall have enough to do at home' (Marx and Engels 1934: 399).

Marx, no more than Engels, was not entirely hostile to colonialism as such. He saw the object of colonialism as either the breaking down of the non-capitalist mode of

production (for example, the textile industry in India) and transforming it into a capitalist one, or, in the case of Ireland, the prevention of such a process of transformation in order to preserve the supply of industrial labour for British factories – an early instance of underdevelopment (Marx 1976–81, I: 854–70; Marx and Engels 1968: 273–90). The effect of British rule in Ireland was thus regressive, though potentially revolutionary given the development of Irish bourgeois nationalism; whereas, for Marx, its ultimate effect in India was positive, though not as yet, even in the 1850s, revolutionary (an argument he also applied to the Czechs in 1848) (Fox 1974; Marx and Engels 1971; Marx 1973a: 323). The latter view was consistent with his argument that the achievements of industrialization under capitalism, in material terms, were in themselves progressive: the problem lay only with who was benefiting from them, and the destruction and disruption that the reorganization for the capitalist mode of production required. So while highly critical of British rule in India, Marx nevertheless praised British achievements there, specifically its innovations of consolidating India's political unity, organizing and training the India army, introducing a free press, and introducing railways and steam vessels (Marx 1973a: 320–1). Marx thus argued that colonialism was both a bad and a good thing at the same time: 'England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating – the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia' (Marx 1973a: 320). In providing a dynamic framework for the analysis of colonialism as both destructive and transformative, Marx clearly went against the grain of any assumption that colonialism was necessarily an evil. On the one hand, Marx speaks of the intense misery inflicted by the British occupation of India, which is the result less of invasion and conquest than of their breaking down 'the entire framework of Indian society' through the introduction of industrial competition and free trade (Marx 1973a: 302). However sickening this may be to witness, at the same time he argues that it had the advantage of breaking up the 'undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life' of the caste-ridden passive existence of the inhabitants under Oriental despotism. It is in this context that he makes his famous remark of 1853:

England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. (Marx 1973a: 306–7)

For Marx then, the moral and humanitarian argument against colonialism is ultimately less important than the benefits of its effects – the world historical movement towards socialism. Just as Hegel had claimed that Africa had no history, so Marx casually dropped the extraordinary remark that 'Indian society has no history at all' (Marx 1973a: 320), and that Britain's mission was in effect to precipitate her from an unchanging society into history. Marx's simultaneous condemnation and

justification of colonialism left a difficult legacy for Indian Marxism, which for a long time tried to hold to Marx's position and in the process itself initiated the tradition of ambivalence that has become so central to postcolonial theory. Marx's stance raises directly the question of colonial modernity, and the degree to which it can be regarded as beneficial or destructive (Barlow 1997). Marx forces contemporary readers to face up to the question of how much critiques of colonialism are driven by a form of longing for a pre-industrial way of life altogether. He forces his readers to specify whether they are luxuriating in a nostalgia for a lost indigenous rural way of life, in the manner of a Rousseau or a Rider Haggard, or arguing for a form of modernity that is beneficial and productive rather than oppressive. Those who do not have access to modernity generally want it when they get the chance. Those who reject it on ideological grounds are often those who already have it. Much of what now draws protests relates to the misery that follows from capitalist reorganization; a stage that Marx himself, while by no means being oblivious to its horrors, saw as the necessary precondition to the benefits of socialism.

The violent introduction of capitalist modes of production, according to Marx, broke down the archaic 'barbarian' systems of 'Oriental despotism' which only reinforced a brutalization and degradation of human beings subjugated to external circumstances. It was capitalism that thus prepared the way for the elevation of man 'to be the sovereign of circumstances'. Or to put it the other way round, for Marx the argument that the stage of colonization and the introduction of the capitalist mode of production was destined to be transcended by socialism was a way of redeeming the past, of redeeming the oppressions of history itself. Colonialism, therefore, for Marx, was fiercely dialectical: both a ruthless system of economic exploitation and a significant positive move towards a utopian future. In making this argument, however, he did not leave a clear legacy of the right form of political action in the colonial situation. Should, for example, colonialism be resisted and overthrown if it risks returning the country to pre-capitalist, archaic economic and social systems? Should the dominant form of resistance from the nationalist bourgeoisie be regarded as enemy or friend? With respect to nationalism, Marx himself took different positions at different times in relation to specific political situations. These were the issues debated with such intensity by Bukharin, Kautsky, Lenin, Luxemburg, Roy and Trotsky and others in the Second and Third Internationals.

2 MARXIST THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM

Some postcolonial theory can at times appear to treat colonialism or imperialism as self-evident entities – if not quite as natural phenomena, then as the misguided product of colonial ideology – rather than seeing that ideology as the necessary product of the economic system that produced colonialism and imperialism in the first place. Any Marxist theory of imperialism must by contrast account for it as a part of 'a coherent theory of the evolution of capitalism on a world scale' (Brewer 1980: 23). Marx himself did not write on imperialism as such, largely because he died in 1883

when the high period of imperialism was only just beginning to develop. Within Marxist theory there are different theories of imperialism developed out of his writings, which broadly speaking share the assumption that imperialism was a product of finance capitalism and the circulation of commodities, driven by the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the consequent need to incorporate more and more markets, involving unequal power relations and interaction of countries with very different dominant modes of production. Theories of modern neocolonialism do not differ radically in this respect. The different Marxist analyses of imperialism develop the differences that can already be found in Marx himself: namely, imperialism as a particular stage of capitalism, a particular formation in the relations among advanced capitalist countries and between themselves and non-capitalist countries, or imperialism as the general description of a more static economic system structured according to the economic domination and exploitation of the one group by the other. As Warren points out, Lenin inaugurated a major shift of emphasis which accounts for the subsequent dominance on the left of Lenin's view of imperialism (Warren 1980: 48). Whereas Marx had seen the effect of capitalism in the colonies as ultimately progressive, for Lenin imperialism was a purely negative mechanism of capitalist exploitation, viewed from the political perspective of the present. The advantage of imperialism as a concept in this immediate sense is that it removes the double-edged aspect so fundamental to Marx's position on colonialism.

There are many Marxist theories of imperialism, but broadly speaking they divide up between classical and dependency or world-system kinds. This split was really initiated by the differences between Kautsky and Lenin. The major issue between them lay in the kind of connection between the politics and economics of imperialism. Lenin, following Hilferding and Bukharin, always portrayed imperialism as involving the relation of the metropolitan imperialist and colonized or semi-colonized countries at a particular historical stage of capitalism. This consisted of a monopoly capitalism compelled to expand geographically by the falling rate of profits at home, always in pursuit of new markets, resources and labour which produced intense rivalry and conflict between the ruling-class interests within the different imperial powers themselves, a process which was nevertheless part of the necessary precondition for the final form of socialist society. Lenin's view of imperialism, though differing in emphasis, thus did not diverge essentially from that of Marx on colonialism, in which one mode of production was violently imposed on another, but with the eventual beneficial result of socialism. In this model, the whole world economy is on an evolutionary scale of dynamic capitalist development which will continue to increase in the future. Whereas Marx and Lenin expected full capitalist development to be achieved throughout the so-called underdeveloped world, its lack of immediate realization after the slump inter-war years led to the increasing influence of Kautsky's thesis. Kautsky argued, by contrast, that imperialism should be understood not as rivalry between the capitalist nations, but as the form of relationship between advanced capitalist and so-called undeveloped countries, a relationship which did not necessarily require, therefore, formal political control of their territories. In that respect, Kautsky was able to accommodate the extent to

which industrial capitalists had in practice been opposed to the protectionism of both mercantilism and imperialism (Kautsky 1975; Munck 1986: 34–5). In suggesting a collusion between capitalist interests *vis-à-vis* the non-developed world, he set up the basis for post-war theories of imperialism, such as those of Baran, Frank, Wallerstein, Emmanuel or Amin, which portray it as a relatively static system of exploitation by the west of the non-west, variously of unequal exchange, dependency or underdevelopment.

So there are two general theories of imperialism in Marxist theory, but they are not in any substantial way contradictory. The first, Leninist theory sees imperialism as a particular stage of capitalism, marked by intense rivalry between centres of capital, particularly after they have run out of space for geographical expansion: ‘for the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future *only* redivision is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one “owner” to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an “owner”’ (Lenin 1968: 223–4). Those countries not technically colonized are nevertheless placed in various forms of ‘dependence’, one of which would be the ‘semi-colony’, another that of ‘financial and diplomatic dependence’ (ibid.: 230). In this model, the whole world economy is on a gradual scale of dynamic competitive capitalist development which will continue to increase in the future.

The second general theory of imperialism in Marxist theory, following Kautsky and Frank, sees imperialism as the relation of domination and exploitation, characterized by a world system of developed and underdeveloped economies, in which the latter, far from being developing, are essentially static, or even forced into decline. This view of imperialism as an unequal dialectic of centre and periphery has been widely accepted by postcolonial critics, who tend to use the term ‘imperialism’ not in Lenin’s historical sense, but in the more everyday use of ‘international relations of dominance and exploitation’. According to Brewer, ‘advanced and underdeveloped countries . . . are the complementary halves of a very unequal world system, which is the product of a development that stretches back centuries’ (Brewer 1980: 10). For postcolonial theory these halves, however, are not calmly complementary but fiercely dialectical – in Adorno’s words, ‘Both bear the stigmata of capitalism, both contain elements of change. . . . Both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which however they do not add up’ (Bloch et al. 1977: 123; Young 1996: 21–2). The torn halves of imperialism have become the means through which to portray the whole basis of the historical power relationship between centre and periphery, involving not a one-way power relation of dominance but an agonistic antagonism.

If we consider the historical role of Marxism itself, the story of a similar structural relation emerges – one in which if the centre changes the periphery, then the periphery also transforms the centre. While Marxist theory is designed to cash out at the level of political intervention, a distinction must be made between Marxist analyses of colonialism and imperialism at a theoretical level, and the historical role of anti-colonial struggle. From a Marxist perspective, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism have always formed part of the more general struggle against the system of global capitalism. From an anti-colonial perspective, however, Marxism formed part of the

particular struggle against colonialism and could be combined with and adapted to other resources, in particular nationalism. Although this came to prominence in the liberation struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, the relation of Marxism to nationalism had been central to Marxist positions on colonialism from the first.

Part III

The Internationals

Socialism and Nationalism:

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL TO THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

1 THE FIRST AND SECOND INTERNATIONALS

Marx himself was centrally involved in the founding of the International Working Men's Association in 1864, which immediately affirmed in its provisional rules the principle of justice for 'all men, without regard to colour, creed, or nationality' (Marx 1974: 83). The First International initiated a movement that formed a contemporary counter-politics to colonialism and imperialism: socialist internationalism. It was the international perspective of the early socialists that enabled the first critiques of imperialism and the colonial system in general as part of the global system of capitalism. Although both Marx and Engels fully integrated all colonial relations into their critique of capitalism, the preoccupations of the First International until its collapse in 1872 were focused largely on examples of European colonialism within Europe – in particular Ireland, and the Russian occupation of Poland. Under the Second International, formed in 1889, it was above all Russian and Austrian imperial relations to European nations that were to condition and define socialist and Marxist theory on the national question. Kautsky, Luxemburg and Bauer therefore concentrated on issues relating to multinational empires. In 1896 the Second International for the first time endorsed the right of national self-determination, expressed its sympathy with the workers of any country suffering from despotism, and denounced capitalist colonial expansion (Riddell 1986a: 4). Three years later, under pressure from the Austrian Marxists, the Brunn Congress endorsed a position of nationalist internationalism as a way of dealing with the political and cultural demands of socialist parties in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bauer also proclaimed the revolutionary significance of what he called the awakening of the nations without history. Accordingly, an enthusiastic reception was given to Dadabhai Naoroji, the founding president of the Indian National Congress (the Indian revolutionary Bhikaijee Cama was given a similar response at Stuttgart in 1907 when she unfurled the Indian flag during her speech; Jayawardena 1986: 103). Typically for the period, the resolution endorsing Indian home rule assumed that it

would continue to operate under British sovereignty (Goode 1978: 102–35; Löew 1979; Riddell 1986a: 5).

The sense of a common experience of oppression between the working classes in Europe and colonial peoples elsewhere, and increasing awareness of colonial outrages, particularly after the partition of China, the Spanish–American War of 1898 (which led in the USA to the establishment of the League Against Imperialism, in which Mark Twain was active (Twain 1992)), the Boer War, German genocide against the Hereros in German southwest Africa in 1904–7, the exposé by Sir Roger Casement and E. D. Morel of conditions in the Congo (Morel 1903, 1904a, 1904b, 1906), together with the Russo–Japanese war of 1905, the 1905 Russian, 1906 Iranian, 1908 Turkish, and 1910 Mexican revolutions, and the Italian invasion of Tripoli in 1911, led the Congress to give increasing attention to colonial and nationalist issues from 1900 onwards. The main subject of debate focused on whether the socialist condemnation of colonialism should be total, on the grounds of its complete incompatibility with socialist principles, or whether opposition should be more qualified on the grounds that it did open up the exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of humankind generally and also ushered pre-industrial economies and cultures into the realm of modernity as a necessary stage before socialism. At the Brussels Congress of 1904, the English socialist H. M. Hyndman went so far as to deplore the English rule of India on the grounds of its destruction of Indian wealth and culture and to argue that ‘socialism itself is less important for western Europe than the prevention of this large-scale atrocity’ (Carrère d’Encausse and Schram 1969: 127). It was, however, to be in the 1907 Stuttgart Congress, held in the context of the strikes and uprisings that followed in the wake of the 1905 Russian Revolution, that the major debates took place on colonialism. However, many of the positions were far from progressive. Racist attitudes towards colonial peoples were mirrored by diatribes against Asian immigration to the United States by US socialists. Among European socialists, Kautsky vigorously opposed colonialism and imperialism altogether and argued that the notion of a ‘Socialist colonial policy’ proposed by the German and Dutch socialists Eduard Bernstein, Eduard David and Hendrick Van Kol, was a contradiction in terms (Kautsky 1975). ‘Europe needs colonies. It does not have enough of them’ David had argued, proposing an amendment stating that ‘Whereas socialism aims to put the productive forces of the entire world in the service of humanity and raise peoples of all colors and languages to the highest level of civilization, the congress regards the colonial ideas as such as an integral part of the Socialist movement’s universal goals for civilization’ (Riddell 1986a: 7). Although this was rejected, the final resolution that was adopted endorsed Kautsky’s condemnation of capitalist colonial policies, and the so-called civilizing mission, while also including a statement that anticipated Lugard’s ‘dual mandate’ argument, namely the affirmation of the necessity of socialism for all nations and of a peaceful policy which develops the world’s natural resources in the interests of the whole of humanity, an argument that was repeated by the British Labour politician, Ernest Bevin, after the Second World War. Lenin, who attended the 1907 Congress, was scornful of socialist concessions to a racist policy in which, as he put it, ‘the bourgeoisie was introducing virtual slavery into the colonies and sub-

jecting the native populations to untold indignities and violence, “civilizing” them by the spread of alcohol and syphilis’ (Carrère d’Encausse and Schram 1969: 134). This compromise internationalist position did not survive the outbreak of war, and the Second International itself became further discredited when many of its members promptly supported their own sides in the conflict. Only a few – Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and James Connolly among them – maintained the integrity of their internationalist socialist position and consistently identified the war as the product of imperialist rivalry and as an opportunity for revolutionary civil war – a position identified after 1915 with that of the Zimmerwald Left (Braunthal 1966; Haupt 1972; Munck 1986: 33–9; Riddell 1986a: 276–383).

2 ‘BIN GAR KEINE RUSSIN, STAMM’ AUS LITAUEN, ECHT DEUTSCH’: SOCIALISM AND NATIONALISM

Until the appearance of the Bolshevik government in 1917, those struggling against colonialism in the world of high imperialism of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries had no substantive support from a major world power. The old European states, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and even the newly formed nations of Germany and Italy, were all trying to increase or at the very least maintain their imperial control. The two new non-European powers of the nineteenth century, the United States and Japan, were also following deliberate imperialist policies, often in direct competition with each other in the Pacific and East Asia (if the First World War was essentially a war between the European imperial powers, in the east the Second World War was a war between the imperial powers of the Pacific). Because of the homogeneity of the imperial system, small individual autonomous nations were not regarded as viable entities outside Europe. Imperial annexation was often explained as a means of protecting them either from other imperial powers, or from the uncontrolled depredations of traders and settlers. With the exception of Ireland, whose position within Europe lying alongside Britain put it in a special position, few on either side seriously considered the idea of colonies becoming freestanding independent states. Everyone knew that if Britain pulled out of, say, the Gold Coast, and gave it independence, it would very likely be appropriated in some form by another colonial power, hungry for more territory overseas. There was no consensual global political system whereby peoples could protect their independence. Even in 1919, at the Treaty of Versailles where there was much talk of the principle of national self-determination, it was only applied to Europe, not to the semi-colonies, such as Iran whose delegation demanding independence was ignored (it became a British protectorate instead), nor in the colonies where, as in Europe, there had been mutinies and rebellions in the territories of all the major colonial powers. The end of the war brought the victory of the major colonial powers, Britain, France and the United States, who took the opportunity to extend dramatically their overseas empires with the spoils of victory, particularly with respect to former Ottoman territories in the Middle East, while presiding over the formation of the

new European nations that emerged from the disintegration of the multinational states Austria–Hungary and Russia (Stalin 1936: 271–2). Although former parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire achieved independence, the idea that Germany's colonial possessions should be made independent was not even discussed (Andrew and Kanya-Forstne 1981: 182). Instead, they were redistributed among the victors, or their new joint organization, the League of Nations, designed to guarantee the terms of the Versailles agreement – described as a result by Lenin as the 'thieves' kitchen'. The First Congress of the Third International accurately characterized it as designed to counteract 'the idea of an International of revolutionary workers' republics' (Adler 1980: 55).

The immediate effect of the weakening of political stability brought about by the First World War had not been to encourage revolt in the colonies outside Europe, but in those nations within Europe that remained under the control of the old multinational empires. The 1916 Dublin uprising had also made nationalist unrest in local colonies a problem for the British, while the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia and Britain's main opponent allied to Germany, was riven with the problems of national minorities fighting openly for their independence. Since 1848, the year of 'the war of the races', ethnic nationalisms had been asserting their forces of disruption against steadily weakening imperial power within Europe (Young 1995a: 120). To encourage ethnic nationalisms in their enemy was, therefore, for any European power a dangerous card to play, but the Germans, who were less vulnerable to its threat, did not hesitate to encourage agitation by national minorities after the success of their offensives on the eastern front in 1915 held out the possibility of the disintegration of the Russian state. They therefore gave support to Ukrainian and Baltic groups, and became involved in plans to unite the national movements within the Russian Empire in order to effect its break-up. They also saw the encouragement of national movements as a way of containing the evident threat from socialism. From the opening of the war, the German government had seen the ending of Tsarist domination over non-Russians as a war aim; in 1916 it announced that none of the territories it had conquered would revert to Russian domination. It even set up a League of Non-Native Peoples that presided over a conference of colonized peoples, organized by the Union of Nationalities, at Lausanne in June 1916 (following an earlier world conference that had been held in 1910; Carrère d'Encausse 1992: 50–6; Lenin 1968: 248). Its Swiss venue was logical given Switzerland's status as first place of resort for all émigré political activists, including, at that time, Lenin. Since Germany was itself an imperial power, and given the nationalist problems of its ally the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German organizers worked hard to restrict the focus of the participants for the most part to attacks on Russian colonialism. The effect of the conference, however, was to demonstrate vividly that the apparently isolated struggles of individual minority national groups were in fact a common, shared political position. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse characterizes it thus:

The solidarity of the oppressed, which made its first appearance on the world stage at Lausanne, foreshadowed the third world Marxism of Sultan Galiev, at the Baku Con-

ference, and of Mao Zedong. The idea that the class struggle was not the only historical link uniting people of different nations, but that a worldwide chasm separated 'proletarian peoples' – oppressed as peoples – and oppressor peoples, first took root in 1916 in a peaceful Swiss city. Nearly forty years later, the Bandung Conference was to echo these themes first advanced on the banks of Lemman lake during the First World War. (Carrère d'Encausse 1992: 58)

It was only fitting that in 1922, in a poem lamenting the break-down of western civilization, T. S. Eliot should write that 'By the waters of Lemman I sat down and wept' (Eliot 1948: 56).

Perhaps, however, the arch-conservative Eliot did not need to be quite so distressed. For the fostering of the solidarity of the oppressed through the Lausanne conference, though complicating things for the Tsar, was carefully directed to the bourgeois nationalist movements, not to the revolutionary internationalists. In the end, however, it was the Germans themselves who injected the revolutionary communist component into the Russian situation. In April 1917, after the deposition of the Tsar, the German High Command arranged for Lenin to be transported from Switzerland to Moscow in the famous sealed train. In August, the Germans outflanked the provisional Russian government by signing a separate peace treaty with the Ukraine, which had declared its independence. The Bolsheviks, however, who had invented the general distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations, were soon to show themselves well prepared for the problems of uniting a nationalist desire for self-determination with the fight against capitalism. They brought the two together in the common struggle against imperialism.

Ever since 1848, the communist ideal of proletariat revolutionary solidarity had existed in competition with the more politically successful nationalist movements, in which Mazzini was undoubtedly the greatest and most representative figure. Anti-colonialism within Europe, in Italy, Austria-Hungary, Ireland, and elsewhere looked first and foremost to nationalism rather than communism or socialism. The question for Marxism – which remains in a sense its question even up to the present day – has always been whether to ally itself to nationalist movements or work separately from them. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels clearly spelt out their own position on the relation between the two. As Lenin was to recognize, that relation must be dialectical:

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. . . .

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the

exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. (Marx and Engels 1952: 71–2)

Communism, which unites, therefore puts an end to nationalism which divides: the task of communists is to point out and bring to the fore ‘the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality, in the national struggles of the proletariat of different countries’ (Marx and Engels 1952: 61). Internationalism will bring an end to national and colonial exploitation. In terms of political strategy and practice, the difficult question for Marxism has always been how far it should ally itself to individual nationalist struggles, which it regards as bourgeois. Even Marx and Engels, as has been shown, became more sympathetic to nationalism with respect to Ireland in the 1860s. The question of the competing priorities of national self-determination and socialism was intensely debated from the mid 1890s onwards among Austro-Hungarian and Russian Marxists, such as Kautsky, Bauer and Bakunin, among Polish socialists, such as Rosa Luxemburg, among the Ukrainian Slavic Federalists, and the Georgian Social Democrats. Broadly speaking, whereas the Russian and Polish social democratic parties favoured the idea of the transnational interest of the working class, a position identified above all with Luxemburg, the socialist parties of the national minorities preferred Otto Bauer’s thesis of federalism, guaranteeing full cultural autonomy and minority rights. This led to a serious division between the central parties, who saw national differences disappearing, and those on the peripheries who saw socialism as the means through which the autonomy of national minorities could be restored. In the Russian and Austro-Hungarian context, federalism was envisaged as the means of reconciling the classic Marxist priority of the class struggle with that of a minoritarian nationalism. These dialectics would continue to be played out in the broader realm of anti-colonial struggle.

3 THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

One result of the Russian Revolution was that for the first time a major state was anti-imperialist, and this dramatically changed the dynamics of global politics. In its own way, the Russian Revolution itself had emerged from a context of anti-imperialist resistance. Since the mid-sixteenth century, the Russian Empire had expanded in a muted form of migrationist colonialism westwards to incorporate Poland, Finland and the Baltic states, eastwards to Siberia, and southwards to the Black Sea in Crimea, Georgia, the Caucasus, and Turkestan. By 1897, over 55 per cent of the Tsar’s subjects were *inorodtsy*, or non-natives; many of them were Muslims, Buddhists, or practised syncretic local religions. The people of the Russian Empire and subsequently of the Soviet Union made up an extraordinarily heterogeneous, vast linguistic and ethnic conglomeration, the complexity of which was daunting for any government, revolutionary or imperialist. There was no simple – or even complex – correspondence between language, culture and nation. In 1926 the new Soviet

state, committed to rectifying the harm done by the Tsarist regime's ruthless policy of Russification, officially recognized 150 languages. The Russification programme of the authoritarian, centralized imperial administration had done little to assimilate such diverse peoples into a single dominant culture; if anything, resistance to it had increased attachment to minority identities. Whenever central control was relaxed, as in 1916 under pressure of the war, or in 1987 when Gorbachev assumed office and reinvented Lenin's concepts of *perestroika* (reconstruction) and *glasnost* (openness), the centrifugal forces of ethnic nationalisms reasserted themselves: reconstruction turned into imperial deconstruction.

In the years before the revolution there had been intense debates about the question of national and linguistic minorities. In 1913, Lenin had commissioned Stalin to write his *Marxism and the National Question* to sort the issues out, probably under his own guidance (Stalin 1936). It remains one of the most brilliant analyses of the problems of the relations between nationalism, culture and language – so outstanding, in fact, that Trotsky suggested that it must have been effectively written by Lenin (Trotsky 1941: 156–7). For all the formalism of his famous, if derivative, definition of what constitutes a nation, Stalin showed himself acutely aware, from his own knowledge of the situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, of the complex correlations between diverse ethnic groups, language, and cultural factors, particularly religion, that in many cases disallowed straightforward identifications of national identities on the European model (Stalin 1936: 48–9). For his part, Lenin was more pragmatic and strategic than most of his colleagues in the party. On the one hand, he rejected all ideas of federalism; he was opposed to any notion of cultural autonomy, and dismissed the idea of a national culture as bourgeois. On the other hand, against Bukharin and others, he defended the right of national self-determination, and actively advocated the right of nations to secede and form an independent state. He rejected the position that nationalism as such was simply a bourgeois phenomenon of no significance to the proletariat, and argued rather that the proletariat should fight in conjunction with it against colonial oppression. He resolved this apparently contradictory position with the belief that nationalism was a stage to be transcended, that national states were simply a transient phenomenon, which would be superseded by the internationalist solidarity of the working class. If the nation were given a free choice of secession or unity, the working class would counteract the divisive effects of bourgeois nationalism with a demand for the unity of a larger proletarian state. It was up to a centralized party to educate the workers into the desire for a unified transnational proletariat. In that sense there were two possible forms of self-determination: the bourgeois national, and the working class, which was at once national and international. In this he was, as has been suggested, in fact following the dialectical formulation of Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*. Instead of Renan's question, 'what is the nation?', Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's was rather, 'who is the nation?' The nation was not identified as a single entity, but always as made up of two national cultures according to its fundamental class division.

This dialectical view of nationalism was at the heart of Lenin's position, which meant that, broadly against the party line, he was able to support it but expected it

properly then to dissolve itself at a second stage, as bourgeois nationalism gave way to working-class internationalism. Stalin's view was somewhat different: he tended to assimilate national minority culture with proletarian culture, equating race and class into a cohesive whole that gave the outward signs of both. Since he did not see this as a transitional stage, he advocated a form of federalism that would allow the creation of national autonomy within a larger structure, with individual nations represented in a federal government, and this broadly was the form of the constitution adopted in 1924. The formal position of the party on the issue of nationalism, language and self-determination, adopted before the revolution in April 1917, had incorporated Lenin's and Stalin's position, stating that 'the right of all nations forming part of Russia to freely secede and form independent states shall be recognized'. However, the position statement had gone on to say that this right should not be confused with the question of 'whether it would be expedient for any given nation to secede at a given moment'. That would be settled by the party of the proletariat from the position of the struggle for socialism as a whole. Lenin, in a famous analogy, likened the right of national independence to divorce: it was important for it to be legally possible, but the fact that the right existed did not mean that individual nations had to choose it. The statement makes no mention of federalism, which Stalin favoured, but advocates 'wide regional autonomy', with the abolition of any compulsory state language. It rejects, however, 'national cultural autonomy' that would control education and other aspects in order to create a 'national culture' which would have the effect of allying the workers with the bourgeoisie. It argues that there should rather be common transnational political, trade union, co-operative and cultural organizations. Finally, the statement also demands that there should be a law 'nullifying all privileges enjoyed by all nations whatever and all violations of the rights of national minorities' (Stalin 1936: 269–70). This incorporates Lenin's deep and increasing suspicion of Russian chauvinism and ethnocentrism, which he recognized always ran the risk of developing into domination and thus reducing minority nations to a quasi-colonial status as in the time of the Tsar (Lenin 1964: 164–5). The formal declaration of the Soviet government on the rights of peoples of Russia the following November, signed by Stalin and Lenin, explicitly affirmed the 'unhampered development of national minorities and of ethnographic groups inhabiting Russian territory' (Riddell 1993: 248).

The logic of Lenin's position, though coherent, was somewhat tortuous: in the event, after the revolution and particularly during the period of the civil war and the White Russian invasion, despite the Bolsheviks' almost immediate creation of a Commissariat of Nationalities in 1917, many national minorities did secede. With the treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918, Russia lost her former colonies of Poland, the Ukraine, the Baltic states and Finland. Subsequently, it faced nationalist revolts in Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and other areas in the Caucasus and Siberia (Carrère d'Encausse 1992: 79–98; Suny 1998: 96–120). The Bolshevik government, in the person of the Commissar of Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, responded to this pragmatically, allowing secession on the basis of the existence of national minorities, or for strategic reasons or because it had no choice, but refusing where it

could if the economic role of the region was significant for the Soviet state. It then took the opportunity of the withdrawal of the foreign troops and the establishment of its own power from 1921 onwards to reassert its control where it could, by treaties or military means if necessary. Although Bolshevik interventions against national governments (for example in the Ukraine and the Central Asian republics) have been seen as a betrayal of the original principle of national self-determination, such actions also need to be seen in the context of the civil war in which several such governments had sided with the counter-revolutionary White Russians and Entente powers in an effort to overthrow the Bolshevik regime (Pipes 1997). The reincorporation of such states enacted in formal terms Lenin's processual structure of seeking national self-determination in order to renounce it in favour of a worker's international union: the various states having seceded, and in some cases having been recognized as independent, their communist parties then applied to affiliate their countries with the non-nationally defined Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In order to achieve this, Lenin had to concede the federal structure that he had always hitherto adamantly refused. In 1922 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was born: Lenin had succeeded in changing Stalin's original scheme of 'autonomization', which institutionalized Russian dominance, into one in which other autonomous states would join the RSFSR into a union of Soviet republics in which each enjoyed equal status (Lenin 1964: 164–70). This was never conceived of as a conventional federal national state; rather, it was a non-national federation of socialist states which in time, it was envisaged, would become a global union of the working class: 'federation', Lenin wrote, 'is a transitional form leading to the complete unity of the working people of different nations' (Riddell 1993: 268). While 'an international federation of soviet republics', as the Comintern was to put it, was the long-term goal, in immediate terms, federation formed a block of resistance to the surrounding capitalist states that were seeking to overthrow communism (Adler 1980: 414). It also effectively meant that national liberation became an obligatory component of the aims of communist parties in the colonies, for the federal structure required the prior existence of a nation-state for it to become part of the federation. In practice, however, after the rise of Stalin no autonomous state sought to do this of its own accord; even the east European states after 1945 remained distinct from the Soviet Union.

The federal structure, which then remained until the dissolution of the USSR, was made up of a federation which the individual nations had freely joined at the request of their parties. Regional autonomy was allowed, but this centrifugal force was balanced by an increasingly tight centripetal force in terms of the centralized control of the local party. Although steps were taken to make the local party more representative of the local indigenous people, this structure in effect meant that Russians retained the dominant role that Lenin had wished to guard against. Whereas Lenin had argued that 'under no circumstances' should the party 'immediately propagate purely and strictly communist ideas in the countryside' (Lenin 1968: 688), in the Stalinist era, it also meant that regional economic and cultural autonomy was subjected to centralized forces of collectivization and modernization. A significant example of this would be the Muslim states: in 1917 the Soviet government abolished the two-tier

system of law which incorporated Koranic law; by 1930 Koranic teaching in schools had been suppressed. This was accompanied by equal-rights legislation attacking Islamic patriarchal structures, particularly with reference to marriage and divorce. Such measures also led to many scenes of women being forcibly unveiled in public (Carrère d'Encausse 1992: 162–8). In the ethnically diverse Muslim regions of central Asia, under Stalin's initiative the Soviet government solved the minority problem by creating various largely artificial nations precisely in order to inhibit the unification of peoples on a religious or ethnic basis. While each nation was allowed its own national language, many states were in fact multi-lingual; linguistic and ethnic criteria were invoked as a way of separating religious and even national communities. After the Red Army's invasion of Georgia in 1921, the deposition of the Menshevik government, and the setting up of a Transcaucasian Federation of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, to which even the local Georgian Bolsheviks objected, together with the effective incorporation of Outer Mongolia in 1924, it became clear that the Bolshevik principle of the right to national self-determination encountered its limits in central Asia. If Stalin was most responsible for this development, Trotsky and Lenin were also both accountable at the level of policy. To his credit, Lenin eventually prepared a thoroughgoing critique of Stalin's ever-more chauvinist policies with regard to the national question ('The Question of Nationalities or "Automization"'). However, he was prevented by his stroke from confronting Stalin and betrayed by Trotsky to whom he then entrusted the task. Trotsky, faced with the 'first troika' against him, quickly compromised with Stalin (Deutscher 1970; Lenin 1964: 164–70; Lewin 1969; Munck 1986: 82–5).

The Soviet government thus adopted a contradictory position, which was a pragmatic distortion of Lenin's view, in which it realized and gave expression to national self-determination and at the same time repressed it when it was in the interests of the state to do so. An alternative version adopted with respect to countries which were ceded, and then allowed, independence, such as Finland, was to recognize its independent government while simultaneously supporting local communist party initiatives to overthrow it. Constitutionally, after 1922 the Soviet Union was made up of individual republics, but at the same time was subject to uniform legal, educational and cultural institutions controlled by the centralist apparatus designed to destroy individual national cultural differences. The central control of the party counteracted the strong centrifugal forces of the many minorities and minority nations. The immediate re-emergence in the 1990s of demands for nationalist self-determination as soon as Moscow's grip was relaxed is an indication of their enduring strength.

With regard to the old Russian Empire, therefore, the Soviet government was at once anti-colonialist and colonialist. With respect to other empires, the position was not altogether straightforward, but less contradictory. It was largely Lenin himself who changed the situation described earlier, in which in 1914, few colonized countries could realistically seek complete independence. Anti-imperialism was central to Lenin's political philosophy. This is best known from his famous pamphlet, *Imperialism – the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), but it also infuses all his work on international relations, particularly with regard to national and colonial questions. In 1916,

in a reproof to Rosa Luxemburg, who believed that only 'the workers of the advanced capitalist countries . . . can lead the army of the exploited and enslaved of the five continents', Lenin had written that it was a mistake 'to ignore the national movements against imperialism', adding

National wars waged by colonies and semi-colonies in the imperialist era are not only probable but *inevitable*. Some 1,000 million people, or *more than half* of the world's population, live in the colonies and semi-colonies (China, Turkey, Persia). Here, national liberation movements are either already very powerful or are growing and maturing. Every war is the continuation of politics by other means. The continuation of the policy of national liberation by the colonies will *inevitably* lead them to wage national wars *against* imperialism. (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 145)

Here Lenin suggests a dialectic of the national with the international: the national war will be waged against the international system of imperialism. In his address to the Second Congress of the Communist International in July 1920, he aligned himself with the great Indian Marxist M. N. Roy in characterizing the effect of imperialism as the division of the world between 'oppressed and oppressor nations', with the former category comprising 70 per cent of the world's population (Lenin 1968: 596). Because he identified imperialism as central to the dynamics of capitalism, Lenin put colonial revolution at the forefront of the priorities of the new communist government, regarding it as a central factor in the Soviet fight against capitalism, and thereby irrevocably changed the dynamics of anti-colonial resistance around the world. For the first time, anti-colonial struggles could be articulated within a wider framework and, more importantly, could look to a major world power for organizational, material and military support. Lenin's view of the right of nations outside Russia to self-determination was thus always bound to his critique of imperialism as a form of capitalist oppression; at the same time, his own internationalist viewpoint was predicated on his view that capital itself was already 'international and monopolist' (Lenin 1968: 154). In itself, therefore, nationalism would not be enough to fight the broader system, as post-independence nations were to discover when they found themselves subsequently subject to neocolonialism. In his 1916 essay on the right of nations to self-determination, Lenin points out with respect to the advanced capitalist countries of western Europe and the United States that 'every one of these "great" nations oppresses other nations both in the colonies and at home' (Lenin 1968: 163). There was therefore a fundamental alliance between the proletariat exploited within an imperialist nation and the colonized peoples exploited by that nation. Since communists were against all forms of oppression, they were against colonial domination; the demand in the colonies for national self-determination was an intrinsic part of the fight of the proletariat against the capitalist world. Moreover, during the time of the civil war with the White Russians and the extensive Allied (British, French, Finnish, Czech, Polish, US and Japanese) invasions, Lenin and his colleagues, particularly Stalin and Zinoviev, increasingly regarded the colonized countries of Asia as potential strategic allies for the Soviet Union. 'The emancipation of the peoples of the East is now quite practicable', he wrote. Recognizing that Russia, as he put it, 'constitutes a

frontier between Europe and Asia, between the West and the East', Lenin was to forge a fundamental political bond between the revolution against capitalism in Russia and the national liberation of the occupied countries of the east (Lenin 1968: 504, 502).

In November 1918, Stalin accordingly published an article in *Pravda* on 'The October Revolution and the National Question', concluding with a statement on 'The International Significance of the October Revolution'. This announcement was to change for ever the political disempowerment of the world's colonized countries. Stalin wrote:

- (1) It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating national oppression into the general question of emancipating the oppressed nations, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism;
- (2) It has opened up vast possibilities and revealed the proper way of achieving emancipation, and thereby greatly helped the cause of emancipation of the oppressed nations of the West and the East, having drawn them into the common channel of the victorious struggle against imperialism;
- (3) *It has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East*, having created a new line of revolutions *against* world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian revolution, to the oppressed nations of the East. (Stalin 1936: 76)

The Third International, to the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East

1 THE FORMATION OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

Prompted by his resolute internationalism, Lenin was responsible for drawing together the nationalist and colonialist issues in Marxist political theory and affirming the right of self-determination in both. He found the time and energy during the chaotic years immediately following the revolution to set up the Third International, the Communist International, or Comintern as it was generally known – an institution for world revolution for which he had first called in September 1914 after the Second International descended into the imperialist sectarianism of the First World War. The formation of many communist parties after the outbreak of revolution in central and western Europe, and central Asia, in the autumn of 1918 encouraged the beleaguered Bolsheviks to try to organize these incipient revolutionary forces into a new international. In December, large internationalist rallies were organized in Moscow and Petrograd. The Petrograd rally, chaired by the socialist novelist Maxim Gorky, included speakers from India, Iran and central Asia, together with captured soldiers from Britain and the USA who spoke in favour of the Soviet revolutionary government (Riddell 1986b: 436–7; New York State Legislature (1920) 1, I: 421–58)

The First World Congress of the Communist International, designed to unify the ‘revolutionary parties of the world proletariat and thereby facilitate and hasten the victory of the Communist revolution throughout the world’, was held four months later in March 1919 (Trotsky 1945, I: 19). As a result of the Allied blockade, many of the delegates from the thirty-nine invited communist parties and revolutionary socialist groups were unable to attend – only nine representatives from communist parties within Europe made it. Among the European parties, the eligible Irish groups were specified as James Connolly’s Irish Socialist Republican Party and the Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union; from outside Europe, only US, Australian and Japanese groups were formally invited, but a few of the forty-two other repre-

sentatives were made up of activists from colonial countries who were already in Russia. Unlike the Second International or the Lausanne conference, only those socialist parties deemed to be committed to revolution rather than reform were eligible to attend, a radical intervention which irrevocably split the world socialist movement into two, despite all subsequent united and popular fronts (McDermott and Agnew 1996: 12–13). In Europe, the result of this in many cases was to marginalize communist parties. In the colonial arena, however, where the ruling powers were more intransigent, it encouraged the transformation of the reformist movements seeking home rule or greater representation in the metropolitan centre into the revolutionary armies of national liberation.

The First Congress was mainly preoccupied with events in Europe, particularly the revolutionary situation in Germany, despite the failure of the Spartacist uprising in January 1919, which the Bolsheviks at that time saw as the key to their own political survival. Its manifesto, however, drawn up by Trotsky, and addressed 'to the Proletariat of the Entire World', drew attention to the contradiction in the talk at Versailles between the rights of self-determination for Europe and the continued oppression of the colonies, the battle for which had largely been the reason for the war in the first place. The manifesto also highlighted the further contradiction that the colonial populations had themselves been drawn in to the war to fight on behalf of their colonial masters: 'Indians, Africans, Arabs and Madagascans fought on the territories of Europe – for the sake of what? For the sake of their right to continue to remain the slaves of England and France'. While it pointed to the recent insurrections in Ireland, Madagascar, Indochina and elsewhere, and the strikes in British India, the central principle of European political primacy and the subordination of the role of colonial revolution was, however, affirmed when the manifesto declared that 'the emancipation of the colonies is only possible in conjunction with the emancipation of the working class in the metropolises': the power of the imperial states must first be overthrown by the urban proletariat in England and France in order for 'the workers and peasants not only of Annam, Algiers and Bengal, but also of Persia and Armenia' to gain their independence. At that point, a 'socialist Europe will come to the aid of liberated colonies with her technology, her organization and her ideological influence in order to facilitate their transition to a planned and organized socialist economy.' The manifesto comments that 'even now the struggle in the more developed colonies, while taking place only under the banner of national liberation, immediately assumes a more or less clearly defined social character' (Adler 1980: 31–2). 'Only under the banner of national liberation' makes it very clear that the national liberation struggles were not in themselves regarded as synonymous with colonial emancipation which, it was hoped, was increasingly assuming a class character: the question of reconciling nationalist and communist aims would become central to debate at the Comintern congresses.

The Third International was to be definitively marked by that single issue. On the one hand, the history of the Comintern corresponds to a simple linear history, determined by the chronology of the seven congresses that followed each other at irregular intervals. On the other hand, the same history operated in a very different form, as a

constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces, with representatives from the colonies resisting the imposition of a standard political strategy designed to work universally in a global dimension, pushing for the political necessity of a recognition of their own cultural identities, the sometimes radical differences of their own ideological heritages, and even for the creation of a separate Colonial International. In doing so they staged a constant challenge to the communist centre; Stalin's attempt to repress them brought only disaffiliation from the Comintern and communist parties around the world, and encouraged the development of positions based on alternative models, such as Trotskyism, Islam, bourgeois nationalism, or fascism through political affiliation to Germany and Japan. The key enabling moment, however, for the second phase of revolutionary national liberation of the three continents was to come with the first successful 'third world' revolution in China, in 1949.

2 THE SECOND CONGRESS, JULY–AUGUST 1920

At the time of the First Congress, the circumstances for revolution in Europe looked propitious: aside from the volatile situation in Germany, communist parties were rapidly being formed in France, Germany and Italy, many of the various socialist parties elsewhere had declared their support for Bolshevism, and very soon afterwards, Soviet republics were (for a short time) established in Hungary, Bavaria, Slovakia and Gilan (Iran). By the time of the Second Congress, held in the summer of 1920, the leading Bolsheviks, Lenin, Zinoviev, Radek and Trotsky, recognized that after setbacks such as the collapse of Bela Kún's communist government in Hungary (overcome by Romanian troops in August 1919), the prospects for immediate European revolution were beginning to wane. Against this, the Red Army was proving militarily successful against the allied invaders and had beaten the Polish army back to Warsaw – Stalin was not to forget this Polish invasion in 1945, when he was liberating Poland from the Nazis. In this situation, Lenin was encouraged by Sultan-Galiev, the highest ranking and most influential Muslim official in the party with a substantial popular following in central Asia, to identify the countries of the east as being of more potential revolutionary significance. In 'Social Revolution and the East' (1919) Sultan-Galiev had suggested that Soviet policy towards the east required 'serious amendment'. Up to that point 'world revolution', he pointed out astutely, had really meant revolution in the west, and the east had been entirely neglected or accorded only platonic support. 'The socialist revolution', he argued, 'will never be able to triumph without the participation of the East'. Given the economic dependence of the imperial powers upon their colonies in the east, his claim was that if they were deprived of them, they would be ruined (Kedourie 1971: 564, 569). The Comintern accordingly directed increasing attention to the countries and peoples of the east as potential allies, and indeed many subsequently commented that the Soviet victory over the White Russians and their Entente allies would have been impossible without the regiments of the Muslim Red Army. In the context of the encirclement of the Bolshevik regime by the armies of the imperialist powers, Lenin extended his plea for solidarity

with the proletariat of all countries to 'all national liberation movements of the colonies and oppressed peoples', broadening the struggle against capitalism to 'the victory of Soviet power over world imperialism' (Riddell 1991, I: 285). If the Bolshevik revolution was presented to the European workers as a victory over, and continuing war against, the European ruling classes, to the workers and peasants of the east it took on the aspect of a revolutionary war against the double oppression of the tyranny of the ruling classes and of world imperialism. 'At this [second] Congress', Lenin announced,

we see taking place a union between revolutionary proletarians of the capitalist, advanced countries, and the revolutionary masses of those countries where there is no or hardly any proletariat, that is, the oppressed masses of colonial, Eastern countries. It is upon ourselves that the consolidation of unity depends. World imperialism shall fall when the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited and oppressed workers in each country . . . merges with the revolutionary onslaught of hundreds of millions of people who have hitherto stood beyond the pale of history and have been regarded merely as the objects of history. (Riddell 1991, I: 123–4)

The First Congress, as Zinoviev later characterized it, had been largely 'a propaganda society' directed against imperialism (Riddell 1993: 49). This Second Congress, in many ways the real founding conference of the Third International, was dedicated to the more radical project of turning those who had hitherto been the objects of history into its revolutionary subjects. The Congress took place in a euphoric atmosphere as the ever-more successful international Red Army advanced upon Warsaw. Its two hundred delegates were drawn from thirty-seven countries, largely from Europe, but also from the US and Australia and including more than thirty from China, Dutch East Indies, India, Iran, Ireland, Korea, Mexico and Turkey. With Lenin's encouragement, delegates gave sustained attention to the colonial question, in particular the current situations in Ireland and the Dutch East Indies, where an active Communist Party was already operative. For the first time, anti-colonial activists from all over the world assembled together to debate a common strategy against imperialist power. The debates that were developed in the Second and later Congresses began to stake out the whole range of different positions of the socialist national liberation movements, present and future, juxtaposing for the first time the different demands of particular local contexts within a general framework of a shared commitment to radical socialist politics. For the first time, a political forum was developed to stage the dialectic of local politics' relation to a globally defined situation. A full account not only of the history of the Comintern's relation to the colonial world, but also of the substantial, wide-ranging material on colonial issues published by anti-colonial intellectual politicians from the colonies in the various organs of the Communist International has yet to be written. Such a study would dramatically transform assumptions about the scope of anti-colonial critique before the Second World War and demonstrate the extent to which analyses of particular colonial situations were made within the context of a broader political and theoretical framework. This demonstration would be highly relevant to postcolonial studies that are now sometimes criticized,

on the grounds of differences of history and culture, for doing exactly that, as if it were an ill-informed and illegitimate innovation. In fact, it rather shows postcolonialism's affiliation to a radical political genealogy.

At the Second Congress, the immediate fundamental theoretical and political questions were articulated in the famous debate between Lenin and M. N. Roy, from India. Roy came from a revolutionary nationalist background in Bengal, and had been involved with German attempts to import weapons into India, before becoming associated with revolutionary émigré Indian groups in California and New York. Fleeing the US after the arrests that led to the Hindu Conspiracy Case in San Francisco in 1917, he moved to Mexico. It was from Mexico that Roy, accompanied by his American wife Evelyn, an activist who had worked with Lala Lajpat Rai, leader of the Home Rule League in New York, came to Moscow, nominally as a delegate of the Mexican Communist Party. In fact Mexican radicals had already established a Communist Party themselves, so in order to qualify as a delegate to the Communist International, and in a curious foreshadowing of the division into two of the communist parties of India, Roy formed another (Overstreet and Windmiller 1959: 25). Roy initiated what Lenin himself described as 'a lively debate' over the question of what should be the communist position *vis-à-vis* the colonial nationalist movements. Their first ground of disagreement was tactical: Lenin's view was that where possible communists should support, and work with, bourgeois democratic movements in the colonies in their common fight against imperialism. This was a position that he had already elaborated in 1913 in an article entitled 'Backward Europe and Advanced Asia', where he took the view that in contrast to the situation in Europe, all bourgeois democratic movements in Asia could play a progressive role:

Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement is growing, spreading and gaining in strength. There the bourgeoisie is *still* siding with the people against reaction. *Hundreds* of millions of peoples are awakening to life, light and freedom. (Lenin 1962: 62)

Roy, on the other hand, with his Bengali revolutionary nationalist background, was fiercely opposed to the prospect of having to collaborate with the Indian National Congress party, which he contemptuously described as a debating society. With remarkable pluck for someone who had first turned to socialism only two years earlier, he challenged Lenin's willingness to work in alliance with bourgeois liberation movements, emphasizing the contradiction between the objectives of the bourgeois democratic movements which were nationalist in pursuit of their own class interests, and the mass of workers and peasants who sought 'liberation from all sorts of exploitation' (Riddell 1991, I: 221). Given the relative weakness of the bourgeoisie in the colonies, he argued, the masses should be led from the first by a revolutionary party that would eschew nationalism in favour of social revolution and the overthrow of foreign capitalism. The second ground of disagreement with Lenin was strategic, and concerned the importance of Asia in developing world revolution. Roy modified Marx's position on Ireland to assert that because of the economic dependency of imperialist powers on their colonial structures, 'the fate of the revolutionary movement in

Europe depends entirely on the course of the revolution in the East. Without the victory of the revolution in the eastern countries, the communist movement in the West would come to nothing'. Lenin argued that the idea that the fate of the west depended 'entirely' on revolution in the east went too far, and obliged him to remove this claim from his theses (Riddell 1991, II: 848). Moreover, despite the vast numbers of potentially revolutionary peasants and proletariat in India, Lenin remarked pointedly to Roy that the Indian communists had not yet succeeded in establishing a Communist Party in India, which meant that in practical terms Roy's strategy was as yet an abstraction that had little relation to political reality (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 152). In the end, Lenin and Roy compromised and substituted the description 'revolutionary liberation movements' for Lenin's original 'bourgeois-democratic movements' in the text of the theses, emphasizing that the form of alliance between them and the Communist International would depend on the relative development of the communist and liberation movements in each country.

Lenin's 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions', and the 'Supplementary Theses' which Roy submitted, comprise a cogent and direct statement of communist views of colonialism and policy towards them. They remain one of the most powerful general analyses of the structure of colonialism, of the forms of exploitation that it involved, and the means by which it must be removed through a globalized struggle. The most important, fundamental idea contained in them, as Lenin himself observed, was 'the distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations', which represented a significant modification of the doctrine of the overriding importance of class antagonism (Lenin 1968: 596). The theses begin with a critique of the formal notion of equality, particularly national equality, enshrined in bourgeois democracy as opposed to the material equality envisaged in communism. In the same way, they affirm that the Communist Party should not consider the national question according to formal principles, but should first base its policy 'on an exact appraisal of specific historical and above all economic conditions'. Second, it should clearly differentiate between the interests of the oppressed classes and 'the people' – which in practice means the interests of the ruling classes. Third,

it should with equal precision distinguish between the oppressed, dependent nations that do not have equal rights and the oppressor, exploiting nations that do, in order to counter the bourgeois-democratic lies that conceal the colonial and financial enslavement of the immense majority of the entire world population by a narrow majority of the richest, most advanced capitalist countries. (Riddell 1991, I: 284)

Colonialism was an institutionalized system of national inequality. In the war of 1914–18, the governments of both sides claimed that they were fighting for freedom, national liberation and self-determination; however, the Treaty of Versailles showed rather that their object was to obtain the loot of each other's colonies. Even where equality between nations and the 'rights of national minorities' were formally recognized, the war showed that in practice the capitalist countries repeatedly violated this condition. In those cases where such equality had not been conceded, the theses

stated clearly that 'all Communist parties must directly support the revolutionary movement among the nations that are dependent and do not have equal rights (for example Ireland, the Negroes in America, and so forth) and in the colonies' (Riddell 1991, I: 286).

For the first time, a state in its declared international policy here aligned the situation of African-Americans with the struggles for colonial emancipation and announced its support for them. The situation of African-Americans would continue to represent a major interest of the Comintern. In the face of the demonstrable coincidence of oppression within the capitalist countries themselves as well as in their tyrannical dominance over other colonized nations, the theses argue for the indissociability of the struggle against capitalism and imperialism, concluding that

It follows from these principles that the entire policy of the Communist International on the national and colonial questions must be based primarily upon uniting the proletarians and toiling masses of all nations and countries in common revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Only such a unification will guarantee victory over capitalism, without which it is impossible to abolish national oppression and inequality. (Riddell 1991, I: 285)

From a global perspective, oppression is essentially class-based and resistance to it must therefore be internationalist in its overall aims. The key issue here, which defines the difference between anti-colonial movements, is whether anti-colonial struggle should be simply concerned with the removal of colonial power, as in the bourgeois liberation movements, or whether anti-colonial struggle is regarded as a fundamental part of a wider struggle to overthrow the basis of national and individual inequality and oppression enshrined in capitalism itself. For Lenin and Roy, without question the war against imperialism involved the latter. The bourgeois liberation movements, they argued, were 'creating state structures that pose as politically independent states, but are economically, financially, and militarily totally dependent upon the imperialist powers' (Riddell 1991, I: 289). Bourgeois liberation movements, in other words, are but the prelude to dependency and neocolonialism.

However, given that at this stage it was the bourgeois liberation movements that were most fully developed in the colonies, this raised the question over which Lenin and Roy differed, namely what the communist attitude should be towards non-communist liberation movements. The position finally agreed in the theses was that while in capitalist countries the party should constitute the vanguard and fight against nationalism in the cause of internationalism, in the non-capitalist or 'more backward' nations, 'all Communist parties must support with deeds the revolutionary liberation movement in these countries. . . . The Communist International should arrive at temporary agreements, and yes, even establish alliance with the revolutionary movement in the colonies and backward countries. But it cannot merge with this movement' (Riddell 1991, I: 288). Despite Roy's reservations derived from his absolute distinction between the bourgeois nationalist and revolutionary mass movements, given the at-best embryonic position of most communist parties outside Europe in 1920, this was probably the only possible strategy from a practical point of view

(Riddell 1991, II: 851–5). Lenin's position, emphasizing the potential revolutionary role of the peasantry in colonial countries over that of the proletariat, and the potential repressive role of the bourgeois elite after independence, in many ways anticipated the pluralist approach of the post-war national liberation movements, starting with that of Mao in China, which developed a radical reappraisal of the relation of national to socio-economic liberation, and emphasized the necessity of making Marxist principles responsive to the specificities of local conditions, particularly in relation to the role of the peasantry and the agrarian question (Riddell 1991, I: 214). Roy by contrast refused to modify Marxist principles towards colonial, or tricontinental, conditions, although his perspective, as Lenin suggested, was predominantly determined by his perception of the situation in India, which remained his primary focus. Almost as hostile towards nationalism as he was towards 'foreign domination', he vehemently opposed any notion of a 'united front' with the bourgeoisie. Claiming that India was sufficiently advanced industrially for a European-style proletarian revolution, he consistently emphasized the revolutionary role of 'the masses' rather than that of the peasantry (Riddell 1991, I: 223; Roy 1922). Roy's most significant contribution was to anticipate the dangers of supporting local nationalist movements which were solely aimed at the overthrow of imperial power, the problems of which he was himself to experience at first hand in China. At the same time, his refusal to acknowledge the differences produced by local conditions, his assumption that a local party not following a strict Comintern line was merely evidence of lack of discipline – Roy described Mao Zedong as 'an undisciplined opportunist' – was to result in the Comintern's loss of control of the Chinese Communist Party altogether in 1927 (Haithcox 1971).

3 THE BAKU CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER 1920

Though Lenin never went as far as Roy with respect to assigning a primacy to colonial revolution over revolution in Europe, the Second Congress marked a decisive strategic move in which the Bolsheviks actively aligned themselves with the global struggle against imperialism. Its immediate step was to set up a Central Asiatic Bureau of the Comintern at Tashkent. Roy left Moscow for Tashkent with two trainloads of arms and gold bullion in order to set up an Indian liberation army, which he hoped to form from the Indian expatriates, led by Mohammed Abdur Rabb Barq and Muzaffar Ahmad, who had left India in order to join the pan-Islamic Khilafat movement in Turkestan and had set up an Indian Revolutionary Association, first established in Kabul (Minault 1982). Although some training was carried out, including the use of aircraft, Roy, an upper-class *bhadralok* Brahmin, was not accepted as the leader of the Muslim *muhajirun* and was unable to create an effective liberation army. On 20 May 1920, Lenin had sent a message to the Indian Revolutionary Association, transmitted in English by radio:

I am glad to hear that the principles of self-determination and liberation of oppressed nations from exploitation by foreign and native capitalists . . . have found such a ready

response among progressive Indians, who are waging a heroic fight for freedom. . . . We welcome the close alliance of Muslim and non-Muslim elements. . . . Long live free Asia! (Lenin 1962: 248)

Lenin's welcome for a close Muslim-Hindu alliance proved over-optimistic.

Along with the establishment of a Central Asiatic Bureau, the Second Congress also issued a call for a special conference designed to develop a communist alliance with the workers and peasants of central Asia in their common fight against imperialism. The First Congress of the Peoples of the East was held in the Muslim city of Baku, then as now the centre of the oil industry in the Caucasus, in September 1920. The Baku Congress was a remarkable event in the history of anti-imperialism. Although the Allied powers, and the neighbouring republics of Armenia and Georgia, did their best to prevent delegates from attending, over two thousand people arrived in the city in answer to the call that had been sent out by radio from Moscow on 29 June 1920. This was one of the earliest, if not the first, uses of radio technology for bringing a common anti-imperialist message to liberation fighters over a vast geographical area comprising many countries. The call concluded:

May the congress proclaim to your enemies in Europe and America and in your own countries that the age of slavery is past, that you are rising in revolt, and that you will be victorious.

May this congress proclaim to the workers around the world that you are defending your rights, that you are uniting with the mighty revolutionary army that is now fighting against all injustice and exploitation.

May your congress bring strength and faith to millions and millions of the enslaved throughout the world. May it instil in them confidence in their power. May it bring nearer the day of final triumph and liberation. (Riddell 1993: 40)

Unlike the congresses of the Comintern, or the earlier All-Russia Congresses of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, there was no requirement that those attending should already subscribe to a revolutionary socialist politics, although about 60 per cent were in fact communists. The majority of delegates were from the Muslim countries of central Asia, including many from Turkey and Iran, as well as from the new Soviet Central Asian republics, including the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Khiva. There were in addition Indian, Afghani, Chinese, Korean and Arab delegates, as well as radical anti-imperialist representatives from the imperial powers, Britain, France, Germany, Holland, the USA and Japan. At Baku, activists from different national territories which had all been subject to colonial rule or persistent foreign intervention, came together under the common banner of anti-imperialism.

The project of the conference was to unite workers and peasants in colonial countries with the European proletariat 'in order to struggle against the common enemy' (Riddell 1993: 40). As the call to the congress had urged its delegates:

Workers and peasants of the Near East! If you organize yourselves and set up your own workers' and peasants' government, if you arm yourselves, uniting with the Russian

workers' and peasants' army, you will subdue the British, French, and American capitalists, get rid of your oppressors, and find freedom. (Riddell 1993: 39)

The recent Allied military interventions in central Asia, now largely repulsed (Baku itself had only been recently liberated from Turkish and then British occupation in which the leaders of the first Baku Soviet had been summarily executed), and the dramatic extension of British and French imperial control in the Middle East after the Versailles treaty, meant that the common enemy was easily defined as British and French imperialism, and by extension British, French and American capitalism. Zinoviev, as Chairman of the Congress, responded to the constituency of the conference by introducing a call for a 'holy war, above all against British imperialism'. This was received with overwhelming enthusiasm, and extended by some delegates to a *jihad* against Zionist activities in Palestine (Riddell 1993: 78). The final manifesto would focus almost exclusively throughout its twelve pages on invoking resistance to British imperialism, concluding with the invocation:

Wage holy war against the last citadel of capitalism and imperialism in Europe, against the nest of pirates and bandits by sea and land, against the age-old oppressor of all the peoples of the East, against imperialist Britain! (Riddell 1993: 232)

This enthusiasm was the product of its time: the success of the Soviets in many former Russian Asian republics, such as the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Khiva, as well as in Gilan (Iran), anti-colonial resistance against British and French occupation in the Middle East in Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia (Iraq), as well as in Afghanistan where the British had been forced to accept the declaration of independence by Amanullah Khan, the victories of the Red Army on the western and southern fronts against the encircling forces of the Allied powers now forced into retreat, together with mass protest movements in India and China, meant that the Baku Congress convened in a triumphalist atmosphere. The delegates responded to the Second Congress's announcement of full support for the liberation movements by identifying in turn with the Soviet struggle against the invading imperialist powers, announcing that 'The war against Soviet Russia is a war against the East' (Riddell 1993: 143). As Mariátegui observed from Peru in a lecture of 1923, 'The foundations of an Inter-national of the East were established at this congress – not a socialist International, but a uniquely revolutionary and insurrectionary one' (Mariátegui 1996: 38).

The main object of the conference was to forge, for the first time, a radical ideological, and ensuing political, alliance between the working people of the oppressing imperialist powers, the communist workers and peasants now in control of the Russian state, and the workers and peasants of the oppressed colonized nations of the world. In this spirit Zinoviev amended the invocation of the *Communist Manifesto* to 'Workers of all lands and oppressed people of the whole world, unite!' Many of the often powerful, emotional speeches were designed to encourage such a spirit of solidarity, and as a result often gave more emphasis to an awakening of political con-

sciousness and the denunciation of British imperialism than to consideration of practical steps of how to create a revolutionary, anti-imperialist struggle. Nevertheless, the issues raised in the conference were substantial. A common political situation was established by a general division between oppressor and oppressed nations; the solidarity of a revolutionary working class in Europe and the USA with anti-colonial activists in colonized countries was affirmed in the declaration of a joint project which would be offered political and material support by Soviet Russia. The Comintern was to operate as a fulcrum of this global alliance, while the task of communists in both oppressor and oppressed nations was to win over the workers and peasants to communism while working in alliance with non-communist liberation movements. At the same time, delegates again and again affirmed that the enemies of those in colonized societies in immediate terms were the local upper classes, landowners and the like, who operated as functionaries of the colonial power in order to exploit the people and peasants for their own benefit and privileges. Within the general distinction between oppressor and oppressed nations, therefore, an international political solidarity operated between oppressor and oppressed classes. The delegates were often as a result suspicious of forms of nationalism which glossed over internal class conflict. Class conflict in colonized countries, it was recognized, was generally not between an industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but rather between landlords, tax gatherers and an indebted peasantry. In foregrounding the agrarian question, and in affirming the necessity of developing a revolutionary peasantry rather than proletariat, the conference established the basic tenets of a political philosophy that was to be put into practice by Mao Zedong and subsequently by liberation movements across the three continents.

There was a general consensus that revolution in the east would help to overthrow capitalism in the west, on the grounds that its foundation lay in the exploitation of the east (the Indian delegate, Mohammed Abdur Rabb Barq, Chairman of the Indian Revolutionary Association of Tashkent, who had been part of the Soviet delegation to Kabul in 1919, went so far as to claim that 'India, and India alone, is the real cause of serious conflicts in this world. History has shown more than once that freedom for India means freedom for the world and an end to all wars'). Different speakers defined the conference's constituency of 'the east' variously to include all peoples of the world oppressed by western imperialism (which is how the Bolsheviks themselves used the term), or Asia and Africa generally, or, most often, as the countries of Asia and North Africa united, despite their diversity, 'by common features in their culture – by Islam' (Riddell 1993: 121, 159). The general agreement of the delegates was that the east meant 'the Muslim east', whose geographical expanse extended from Muslim Africa to parts of China. The Congress thus endorsed the alliance of Islamic nationalism with socialism already identified with the position of Sultan-Galiev (he attended the Second Congress but not that at Baku). As early as December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars had issued an appeal, signed by Lenin, 'To all toiling Muslims of Russia and the East', seeking their support for the revolution after the repression that Muslims had suffered under the Tsar, and declaring:

Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are declared free and inviolable. Build your national life freely and without hindrance. It is your right. (Riddell 1993: 251)

Lenin himself always emphasized the need to respect Islamic culture and beliefs; although his 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions' condemn the pan-Islamic movement inspired by the ideas of Jamal ed-Din al-Afghānī, these ideas are defined as those which try to utilize the liberation struggle against western imperialism with the defence of an imperialist regime such as that of Turkey (Riddell 1991, I: 288).

At the same time, Stalin took steps to co-ordinate the burgeoning Muslim Communist organizations that were developing independently in the regions. In 1918, under the auspices of Stalin's People's Commissariat for Nationalities, Sultan-Galiev played a leading role in establishing a Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party, known as the Musburo, intended to co-ordinate the activities of Muslim organizations under the direction of the Russian Communist Party. At the same time, Sultan-Galiev had himself founded the independent Muslim Communist-Socialist Party. In November of that year, at a congress in Moscow, Stalin forced Sultan-Galiev's party to become a Muslim section within the Communist Party (Bennigsen 1958: 405–6; Carrère d'Encausse 1992: 141). Despite this, Sultan-Galiev continued to encourage through the Musburo a specifically Muslim nationalist form of communism, developing the tendency to stretch communism towards local, Muslim, concerns that would come to characterize tricontinental Marxism in Asia, Africa and elsewhere. Sultan-Galiev's position reflected the fact that before the revolution there had been a consensus among Muslim political leaders in Russia that Islamic Russia represented a single group, the ancient Islamic *umma*, which, though divided geographically and linguistically, nevertheless shared a common pan-Turkic historic, cultural and religious tradition. At the pan-Russian Muslim Congress of May and June 1917, opinion was divided only between those who sought a Muslim nation with a unified administrative and political structure, and those who conceived of such a nation in federal terms. The Bolsheviks, who had participated in the Congress, originally accepted the idea of a Muslim nation, specifically creating a separate Muslim army, administration, and even party, and treating the Muslim regions effectively as a single Muslim state. Despite this, in 1919 Lenin refused to condone Sultan-Galiev's proposal for a unified Tartar-Bashkiria republic, and ordered the creation of two separate autonomous states. It was in 1924, however, that the dream of a unified Islamic Soviet was crushed by Stalin's demarcation of Soviet Central Asia into six separate nations, according to the criteria laid down by Stalin in 1913. The division of the *umma* was effected by the creation of separate cultural and political traditions for each state, and above all by the institution of one privileged local language as the language of the state (and its literature), in place of the former situation of multiple languages and the general use of Arabic, Persian and Chagatay as the common languages of the Central Asian region. This decision encountered fierce local opposition; however, the enforcement was remorseless. In 1923, Sultan-Galiev,

who had increasingly come into conflict with the Soviet leadership on the question of a Muslim nation and his dream of a Republic of Turan, was arrested on account of his 'national deviations' and alleged links with the Basmachi, a conservative Muslim guerrilla resistance movement – a move initiated by Stalin but condoned by both Lenin and Trotsky (Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay 1981: 269–75; 1986; Bennigsen and Quelquejay 1961; Bennigsen and Wimbush 1979; Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 183–4; Monteil 1982; Stalin 1936: 173–4; Sultan-Galiev 1984). Sultan-Galiev was subsequently released, and went on to create a network of underground secret organizations in all Muslim regions of the Soviet Union (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983: 85). However, in 1928 a far-reaching purge of the Muslim republics was initiated against the Muslim leadership and intelligentsia. Sultan-Galiev was rearrested and, sharing the fate of many other pan-Islamic/Turkic leaders, eventually executed in 1937. The pressure against alternative formations, though most oriented towards pan-Islamism, was also deployed upon pan-Asian movements. Pak Chin-sun, the Korean delegate to the Second Congress, who spoke on 'The Revolutionary East and the Next Tasks of the Communist International', affirming the policy of alliance with nationalist elements, was relieved of his Comintern duties in 1922 (Riddell 1991, II: 858–62).

By contrast, the kind of doctrinal flexibility urgently called for by Lenin, in which Marxist political ideas were responsive to the specificity of the particular culture into which they were introduced, was fundamental to the thinking of the Baku conference and was to resurface with the Marxist nationalism of the post-Second World War liberation movements. At the Second Congress, Lenin himself had demonstrated such flexibility by developing a distinction at the level of strategy between communist policy for capitalist and for predominantly agrarian colonial or semi-colonial nations. Comintern delegates had endorsed as general Comintern policy Lenin's position, developed after the failure of Béla Kun's Soviet republic in Hungary in 1919 and elaborated in *'Left-Wing' Communism – An Infantile Disorder* (1920), of the universalization of the Bolshevik model in which the party, rather than workers' Soviets, played the key role of revolutionary vanguard. However, with respect to so-called 'backward' countries where no urban proletariat as yet existed, Lenin put forward the idea of the absolute importance of forming peasants' Soviets instead, operating in a much looser relation to the Party (Lenin 1968: 514–15, 598). This idea had already been anticipated in the First Congress's 'Manifesto to the Proletariat of the Entire World', drafted by Trotsky, which affirmed the Soviets, the workers and peasant councils as the agents of revolutionary intervention (Adler 1980: 33; McDermott and Agnew 1966: 13–16; Riddell 1993: 162). At Baku delegates spoke enthusiastically of the revolutionary power of peasants' Soviets and were comparatively uninterested in the role of the Party. Moreover, despite the official emphasis decrying nationalist ideology, in practice most delegates assumed a nationalism of a kind such as Sultan-Galiev's, within the context of a larger international solidarity of oppressed and exploited peoples.

The Women's International, the Third and the Fourth Internationals

1 THE INTERNATIONALS AND THE COMMUNIST WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

A similar though more ideologically acceptable congruence had always also operated between the socialist and the women's movements. Since 1905 in particular, socialist women's movements had struggled against their bourgeois counterparts and sought to affirm the necessity of socialism as an essential component for the successful resolution of women's struggles. In 1913, the Bolsheviks had organized the first International Women's Day in Russia; the following year they launched a women's newspaper that was supported financially and distributed by women factory workers. Inessa Armand, Aleksandra Kollontai and Clara Zetkin, Bolshevik leaders, had been responsible for initiating the anti-war International Conference of Socialist Women in Bern in 1915, and had been actively involved in formulating and distributing its 'Women of the Working People' Manifesto (Riddell 1986a: 267–79). The delegates, however, had rejected a Bolshevik proposal condemning the Second International and calling for a revolutionary struggle against the war.

The uprising that was to topple the Tsar began with demonstrations on International Women's Day on 8 March 1917. After that auspicious start, the Bolsheviks made equality for women a priority for the revolutionary government. The First Comintern Congress had passed a resolution on the 'need to rouse the broadest masses of proletarian women to class consciousness'. The Executive Committee duly set up an International Women's Secretariat as a section of the Comintern, with Clara Zetkin as secretary. The Secretariat in turn called the First International Working Women's Congress, which was held simultaneously with the Second Comintern Congress. It was attended by about two dozen delegates from twenty countries, the best known of whom, apart from Zetkin, were Aleksandra Kollontai and Sylvia Pankhurst. The appeal, 'To the Working Women of the World', adopted by the conference, made a radical identification between the goals of communism and the interests of women,

arguing in particular that political suffrage for women in itself, which was being granted by a number of European countries and the United States at that time, was not adequate to ensure their full interests: 'they throw us a miserable sop, a meagre bone, such as voting rights for women. But even now more than half the women in the world do not enjoy equal political rights. Women will never have equal rights under capitalism' (Riddell 1991, II: 973). Only communism, it was argued, would abolish women's 'political, economic and spiritual slavery', organize public childcare, and produce freedom from poverty and war. The appeal ends with a special, somewhat vague address to 'the peoples of the east', which calls on the women of the east to work for the end of their enslavement, but this is not defined in gender terms. The Secretariat was clearly wary at this point of offering the end of exploitation from eastern men as well as western imperialists. The impressive 'Theses for the Communist Women's Movement', however, which were adopted by the Congress, are much more specific and contain a special section for women in pre-capitalist societies. Here, the priority is given to women's freedom and equality, before working together with men for communism:

- (i) Fight to overcome the prejudices, morals, practices, and religious and legal rules that reduce women to men's slaves at home, at work, and sexually. This effort will require educating not only women but also men.
- (ii) Strive for the full legal equality of women with men in education, in the family, and in public life. (Riddell 1991, II: 992)

This demand for equality was, ironically, disregarded at the Baku conference, held later that year, where the Proceedings and the Presiding Committee were dominated by men. In deference to Muslim practices, men and women sat separately, the women being literally marginalized to the balcony. In the fifth session, however, Zinoviev found himself obliged to respond to pressure from the fifty-five women delegates, and proposed that 'in order to underline the aspirations of the Congress and hasten the emancipation of women in the East', the delegates should elect three women to the Presiding Committee (Baluch from Dagestan, Najiye Hanum from Turkey, and Shabanova from Azerbaijan). Rising to an ovation, Hanum spoke and received loud and prolonged applause. No doubt symptomatically, her speech was one of the few of the Congress that was not translated and therefore not recorded in the proceedings. However, her address to the final session, translated by Shabanova, does survive. Hanum argued for the integrity of the women's movement in the east 'as a vital and necessary consequence of the revolutionary movement taking place throughout the world' and at the same time as an essential component of its success. Women of the east, she affirmed, were not, like the 'frivolous' bourgeois feminists, merely fighting for the right to dress without the *chador* (veil), which as an issue, she considered came last in priority. Rather, they were fighting against the injustice against women in Muslim countries and were seeking absolute equality as a fundamental constituent of a classless society. Women of the east, Hanum argued, were doubly oppressed, both by the bourgeoisie and upper classes, and by 'the despotism of their menfolk'; they

would, if necessary, wage war on both, with, as she put it, 'a bloody life-and-death struggle to win our rights by force'. Hanum set out the women's demands, which included complete equality of rights, rights of access to education, to employment, in marriage, together with the abolition of polygamy and the establishment of women's committees for the rights and protection of women. Declaring her complete assurance in women's right to raise these demands, Hanum then affirmed that it was only the communists who had fully acknowledged them: 'In recognizing that we have equal rights, the Communists have reached out their hand to us, and we women will prove their most loyal comrades' (Riddell 1993: 204–7). In making this statement, Hanum, like Bibinur from Turkestan who spoke after her, made it clear that women's rights were self-justified, existing in their own autonomous sphere, and that their alliance with communism was based on its unparalleled recognition of the oppression of women as one of the major forms of oppression in the world and its affirmation of their liberation as part of its programme of universal equality. Women's emancipation, and the reinscription of gender relations, was thus fundamental to the objectives of communism. The abolition of class hierarchy was inexorably interlocked with the abolition of gender hierarchies as well as that between oppressor and oppressed nations. Apart from the force of her arguments, Hanum's contribution is significant because it was made in 1920, three years before Mustafa Kemal would establish the Turkish Republic: her radical feminism gives a very different representation of contemporary feminism in Turkey to the view that it was generally discussed within the limits laid down by Islam and Turkish nationalism, and subsequently imposed 'from above' by Kemal as part of his spectacular modernization programme (Abadan-Unat 1981; Jayawardena 1986: 33–42).

Delegates to the Baku Congress also recognized that racial oppression was fundamentally a manifestation of imperial ideology, while the American representative, John Reed, author of *Ten Days That Shook the World*, reminded them that it also operated as a version of class oppression within capitalist countries, particularly with regard to African-Americans in the USA (Riddell 1993: 273–5; 133–4). Communism was the first, and only, political programme to recognize the interrelation of these different forms of domination and exploitation and the necessity of abolishing all of them as the fundamental basis for the successful realization of the liberation of each. The removal of one form of oppression in itself would not affect the continuing operation of the other forms of oppressive domination. Political opposition to oppression, therefore, must always involve the simultaneous contestation of hierarchical power and exploitation in all its diverse manifestations. In stressing this mutuality, the emphasis of the women delegates at the Baku conference was subtly but significantly different from the position subsequently outlined during the Third Congress, in which the Second International Conference of Communist Women pointed out 'to the working women of the whole world that their liberation from centuries of enslavement, lack of rights and inequality is possible *only through the victory of Communism*', which, by corollary, meant that the first priority of women must be 'a firm commitment to engage in the revolutionary class struggle'. As with anti-imperialism, the communist women's movement's role was henceforth to subordinate its own politi-

cal demands and in the face of 'the great passivity and political backwardness of the female masses', to educate women to the higher cause of the common goals of their class. While the equality of women always continued to be affirmed, and the significance of women as a political constituency always emphasized, the Comintern opposed separate women's associations within the parties, and hence the autonomy of women's organizations and all that that implied. The goal was rather defined as 'educating the broad mass of working women in Communist ideas and drawing them into the struggle for Soviet power for the construction of the Soviet workers' republic'. In the case of what was described as 'the Economically Backward Countries (The East)', the first priority was placed on the responsibility of the communist parties and the departments of working women to ensure that everyone recognize the equal rights of women and that the principles of women's equality be carried through into the spheres of domestic and public life. Beyond that, it was argued that 'the raising of the general cultural level' of women through education and 'emancipation through self-activity' would have the effect of 'dispelling the doubts they have about their own abilities and drawing them into practical work in the sphere of construction or struggle'. Women's emancipation was allied to the raising of class awareness, and was to be carried out on a class basis. 'The departments have to show that the feminists are incapable of finding a solution to the question of female emancipation' (Adler 1980: 212–25). Women's emancipation was thus not structurally linked to the emancipation of colonized peoples other than through the goal of the unity of the international proletariat. Despite the somewhat patronizing assumption that the great mass of women were ideologically enslaved and incapable of generating their own emancipation without the direction of the party, the communist commitment to women's equality was consistent and thoroughgoing, and one without question unmatched by any other political party then or since.

2 THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN, JUNE–JULY 1921

One of the decisions of the Baku Congress was to set up an ongoing Council for Propaganda and Action. It rapidly began to train activists and to publish pamphlets in a variety of Asian languages that capitalized on the shock waves that the Congress created in the east. In 1921 the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Afghanistan calling for 'the liberation of the peoples of the East'. In the same year, however, it also signed commercial treaties with the Polish and British governments. The latter, alarmed at reports of the events in Baku, included a condition that the Russian government cease all propaganda that might threaten the British Empire, particularly in Asia. With this began the notorious dual policy of the Soviet Union in which the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs engaged in diplomatic negotiation with the governments of foreign powers, while the Comintern simultaneously worked for their overthrow (Hudson 1971: 81). In the very same month as the commercial treaty, the Comintern launched a desperate attempt to extend the revolution in Europe by provoking an

armed insurrection in Germany, which was quickly defeated by a *Reichswehr* that had ironically been secretly trained by the Red Army, at great cost both to workers' lives and to the German Communist Party itself. The dual policy was also evident with respect to the nationalist movements in the east which highlighted the very problems that Roy had foreseen. In Turkey, after Mustafa Kemal had established a revolutionary nationalist government in 1920, the Soviet government supported him on the grounds of a common anti-imperialist alliance between the workers of Europe and the peoples of Asia and Africa. In January 1921, Kemal suppressed the 'Green Army', a peasant guerrilla force who were his former allies; he also executed seventeen leaders of the Turkish Communist Party; many of those Turks who had attended the Baku conference were arrested and executed (Samim 1981). Although the Third Congress made a statement of protest about the executions, Radek showed the Soviet government's contradictory position by calling upon Turkish communists to continue to work alongside the national government (Adler 1980: 318–20; Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 193–4). As Secretary, Radek, together with Zinoviev as Chairman, used his position to enforce on the Comintern policies of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of which they were both members, thus effecting a personal union between the two, theoretically separate political entities. The Third Congress thus initiated the policy that would dominate Comintern priorities until its demise in 1943 (when the Allies were able to persuade Stalin to abolish it altogether), namely *real-politik* demands in defence of the Soviet Union and the shift of Soviet international policy from world revolution to accommodation with the western powers in pursuit of Soviet interests.

The events in Turkey meant that the Third Congress met in a situation that was very different from that at Baku. The defeat of the revolutionary movements in Germany and Italy in the autumn of the previous year meant that the prevalent mood was one of retrenchment and accommodation in the face of capitalist consolidation. The Comintern's former priority of international offensive was subsumed to the defence of Bolshevik power at all costs and the need to centralize Communist Party organization (Adler 1980: xxviii, 234–60; Carr 1966, III: 383–97). Although Trotsky was to affirm in his draft theses that 'the Revolutionary peoples' movement in India and in other colonies is today as much an integral part of the world revolution of the toilers as is the uprising of the proletariat in the capitalist countries of the old and the new worlds', in practice no resolution was passed that could be seen as harmful to the interests of the British Empire, and both Trotsky and Zinoviev downplayed the significance of the role of revolution in the east (Adler 1980: 194; d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 41–2). This was in stark contrast to the overwhelming emphasis of the Baku conference. Colonial questions were relegated to the last day of the Congress, and delegates were told to make their speeches no longer than five minutes. Roy and others protested against the sudden and arbitrary 'liquidating' of the eastern question but the Congress, and its Executive Committee made up entirely of representatives from western countries, remained apparently indifferent (Collotti Pischel and Robertazzi 1968: 62; Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 187).

3 THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1922

By the time of the Fourth Congress, by contrast, deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and Britain meant that there was no longer any reason to limit Comintern activities against British imperialism. This, together with the situation developing in China, meant that the Congress returned its attention to colonial questions, a shift that had already been anticipated by the holding of a Congress of the Toilers of the Far East early in 1922 (Congress of the Toilers of the Far East 1970). The Executive Committee of the Comintern, following the initiative of the Politburo, proposed the adoption of the new 'United Front' tactics favoured by Lenin and Trotsky in the face of the rising fascist movements in Europe. This policy change, which was fiercely resisted by some of the European parties who questioned the sudden reversal of the original policy of the Comintern itself in splitting the reformist from the revolutionary socialist movements, dominated the Fourth Congress. In fact, however, the policy of accommodation with radical bourgeois parties had already been in place with respect to the colonies since the Second Congress and had been the very tactics against which Roy had already argued so consistently. The Fourth Congress therefore effectively extended the policies of the east to the west. Nevertheless, a crucial difference remained, namely that while the United Front policy was a strategic one to enable communist parties in the west to adopt leadership of wider movements on the left, in the colonies, where communist parties were often as yet virtually non-existent, the view became increasingly dominant that colonies were unsuitable for an immediate transition to socialism; the national liberation movements were therefore merely regarded as the first stage towards socialism, with socialism following subsequently at a later stage after independence and full industrialization. This meant that the first priority was given to assisting nationalist movements of any kind, as in Turkey, on the basis of the wider political impact of their anti-imperialism on the western imperial powers. By contrast, the Comintern representatives from the colonial countries tended either to argue that socialism was possible for primarily peasant agrarian economies without going through the full process of capitalist industrialization, as in the Soviet Union itself, or, as Roy claimed somewhat optimistically, that colonial countries such as India were already industrialized and contained a substantial proletariat that offered immediate revolutionary potential. Roy's argument, however, drew a sceptical response from Radek who, drawing attention to his own lack of success in developing communism in India, highlighted the attitude of the Executive Committee: 'if our comrades complain that we do not take much interest in their work, I must reply that the interest aroused by a party depends on its acts' (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 194).

As Radek's testy response here suggests, the Fourth Congress was notable for the articulation of differences between the positions taken by the delegates from colonized countries and the tactical line developed by the Comintern Executive Committee. Already, before Stalin had formally imposed the policy more generally, there

was a form of communism from above being practised by the Comintern in contrast to the messages that were being received from those 'below'. At the Fourth Congress, the tension between European perceptions of Muslim populations, and concepts of a Muslim socialism, such as that expounded by Tan Malaka, leader of the Communist Party of the Dutch East Indies, was readily apparent. In his discussions with Roy at the Second Congress, Lenin had advocated collaboration between communists and nationalists, but qualified this under pressure from Roy by excepting what were regarded as reactionary nationalist movements, such as pan-Islamism. Tan Malaka, by contrast, now argued for the necessity of accommodating revolutionary socialism to the special cultural conditions of eastern nations, particularly Islam, which was of such fundamental significance to ordinary people in the east. Since such national struggles centred on pan-Islamism were anti-imperialist, he suggested, they were *ipso facto* progressive. Malaka was speaking from the specific experience of the Sarekat Islam (Islamic League) which had developed a large popular following in Java. His own Communist Party had successfully collaborated with it until 1921, when a scission had taken place, partly as a result of the condemnation of pan-Islamism by the Second Congress. He argued forcibly that Congress had mistaken the nature of pan-Islamism in the east and that it should not be dismissed as a reactionary movement:

Just what does Pan-Islamism mean? Formerly it had a historical signification, namely that Islam should conquer the whole world sword in hand. . . . At present Pan-Islamism has in fact a quite different meaning. It corresponds to the national liberation struggle, for Islam is everything to the Muslim. It is not only his religion, it is his state, his economy, his nourishment and all the rest. Thus Pan-Islamism now means the fraternity of all the Muslim peoples, the liberation struggle not only of the Arab people, but of the Hindu and Javanese peoples, and of all the other oppressed Muslim peoples. This fraternity now means a liberation struggle directed not only against Dutch capitalism, but against English, French, and Italian capitalism, against the capitalism of the whole world. That is what Pan-Islamism means today in the Indies, among the oppressed colonial peoples; it is in these terms that they have secretly propagated it, namely as a struggle against the various imperialist powers in the world. There is here a new task for all of us. Just as we wish to support national wars, we also wish to support the war of liberation of the 250 millions of extremely active and extremely combative Muslims against the imperialist powers. (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 189–90)

The Comintern was unpersuaded: five months after the Congress, the Muslim nationalist Sultan-Galiev was arrested. In 1926 Malaka organized a revolt in Java and Sumatra which lasted until 1927, when it was violently suppressed by the Dutch. Malaka himself was then reproved by and expelled from the Comintern, after which he was often characterized as a Trotskyist. He continued to be actively involved in the independence struggle, forming the Murba (Proletarian) Party, for which he was rewarded by being executed by the new Indonesian Republican government in 1949 (Kahin 1952; McVey 1965; Törnquist 1984).

Although Lenin was to urge sensitivity to Muslim beliefs, and Sultan-Galiev was

strategically if briefly promoted by Stalin to effect a bridge between the Bolsheviks and secessionist Muslim states, the Comintern itself never demonstrated any serious interest in a wider alliance with Islamic nationalists. At the same time, it remained committed to trying to appeal to the Muslim constituency and alert to the intrusion of racist attitudes towards colonized peoples. There was much critical discussion, for example, of a letter from the French communists in Sidi-bel-Abbès in Algeria protesting against the appeal of the Comintern to the Muslims of French North Africa (described as the 'colonial slaves' of French capitalism) on the grounds of their being yoked to a regressive 'Muslim feudalism', and exploited above all by their own nationalist religious leaders and landed proprietors (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 197). Despite being categorically condemned by the Congress, the Algerian communists' proposed policy of not conceding independence to the colony on the grounds of Muslim resistance to progressive ideas, relying instead on the success of the Communist Party in France to establish communism in North Africa, was to be the *de facto* policy of the Algerian party right through the Algerian revolution (Adler 1980: 354). In 1937, for example, the Communist Party in Algeria, arguing that the interests of colonized peoples lay in their union with France, had supported the notorious Blum-Violette plan for reforming the colonial state (Munck 1986: 95). This conflict of interests between communist parties in the imperial metropolis and revolution in the colonies was exacerbated by the Comintern's own reliance on the communist parties of Britain and France to organize anti-colonial revolution in their country's respective colonies. The PCF, however, did set up a branch in Tunis, and supported the nationalist Rif Revolt in North Africa in 1924–5 and the uprising in Syria in 1925–6 against French imperialism (Rodinson 1979: 88). After Roy's evident failure to establish an effective Communist Party in India, on the Comintern's instructions the Communist Party of Great Britain sent a delegation to Calcutta in 1927 and 1928. However, it achieved very little (Spratt 1955).

In the debate that took place in the Congress with respect to a new set of draft 'Theses on the Eastern Question', Roy, Malaka and others themselves differed on the question of the relation of the communist movement to nationalism. Malaka spoke strongly in its favour. Roy, by contrast, himself a Brahmin, was contemptuous of all attempts to ally Bolshevism with Muslim aspirations: he dismissed the Baku conference as 'a wanton waste of time, energy and material resources' (Roy 1954: 98). He stuck firmly to his position, outlined at the Second Congress, that there was an absolute separation between national liberation and revolutionary movements. This time, he attempted to persuade the Comintern by emphasizing the diversity of social development in what were known as the 'colonial and semi-colonial countries'. Roy categorized the eastern countries by dividing them into three categories: those in which capitalism was relatively developed (India, China); those in which capitalism had begun but remained at a relatively low level, leaving feudalism still dominant, in which case the bourgeoisie was 'objectively revolutionary' and did comprise 'the vanguard of the revolution' (Turkey); and those 'where primitive conditions are still primary, where society is still governed by feudal patriarchalism'. Revolutionary tactics, Roy insisted, must vary according to the differences in the dominant social

structure. He had little to say about the last category of feudal societies, but in the case of countries in the first, where capitalism was relatively developed, he argued that the national bourgeoisie was already aligning itself with the imperialist powers against the proletariat and peasantry: 'for this reason the national revolutionary movement . . . where millions sigh for national liberation and must liberate themselves economically and politically from imperialism before they can progress, will not be successful under the leadership of the bourgeoisie' (Gruber 1974: 302, 299, 305; Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 190–1). In practice, Roy worked within the terms of Comintern United Front policy, though without success (the fledgling Indian Communist Party was to be given a rough ride in the same month at the Indian National Congress Conference at Gaya). Roy continued to try to change Comintern policy by making the same argument, but by the Fifth Congress, he was condemned by Manuilsky, who was upholding the official Comintern line, and his position was formally rejected (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 44; Gruber 1974: 316–19; Overstreet and Windmiller 1959: 44). Roy's argument, that 'there is a dual struggle in the colonies, a fight that is directed both against foreign imperialism and against the native upper classes which support directly or indirectly the foreign imperialists', was finally to be accepted at the Sixth Congress of 1928 when the United Front tactics were reversed to one of 'class against class' and Gandhi was denounced as 'a prime agent of British imperialism' (Gruber 1974: 303; Munck 1986: 94). Ironically, by that time, however, the Comintern had become impatient with Roy's inability to form the mass party of the proletariat that he had advocated – in 1934, fourteen years after Roy had first challenged Lenin's policy over the possibility of mass parties of the proletariat in the colonies, the Communist Party of India had no more than 150 members. Forced, for the most part, to work from abroad, Roy's activities were efficiently limited by British Intelligence (Overstreet and Windmiller 1959: 62, 357). In 1927 Roy was despatched as a Comintern delegate to China in order to support its policy of collaboration with the nationalists, an action also partly designed to remove him from involvement in communist activities in India and to facilitate the Communist Party of Great Britain taking control of the Indian Party. The strategy backfired when Roy revealed Stalin's secret plan to reorganize the nationalist party and initiate a peasant revolution to its Chairman, Wang Jingwei, who in turn informed Chiang Kai-shek. They immediately intensified their suppression of the peasant movements and expelled the communists from the Wuhan government; all the major power groups in China then united against the communists (McDermott and Agnew 1996: 175–7; North and Eudin 1977; Roy 1938). Roy was recalled to Moscow and expelled from the Comintern in 1929.

In 1922, however, this was not yet the attitude of the Comintern. The Congress, which necessarily devoted much attention to the strategic implications of its new United Front policy, was obliged to develop a new set of 'Theses on the Eastern Question'. The theses, while clearly defining the new Comintern policy, are also remarkable for their tone of flexibility concerning the different positions that had been advanced in the debates. Though they speak in general terms of 'the whirlwind growth of the national revolutionary movements in India, Mesopotamia, Egypt,

Morocco, China and Korea', the 'great diversity' of the revolutionary movements in different colonies was acknowledged for the first time, and the possibility of different tactics for each at particular moments of the struggle, elaborated in language that reflected the position of both Roy and Malaka, as well as the relation of the colonial question to restrictive immigration laws based on 'racial hatred' in the US, Canada and Australia (Adler 1980: 417–18). A whole section considers the question of agrarian reform and the use of famine in the colonies as a regulator of social production. It also notes how, in their own interests, bourgeois national liberation movements in feudal or semi-feudal societies tend to avoid or compromise over the key question of land redistribution and therefore condemns on these grounds 'the bankruptcy of the tactic of passive resistance ("non-cooperation") in India' – a condemnation of Gandhi that entirely reflects Roy's own position (Adler 1980: 412). Roy, like many Bengalis, was hostile towards Gandhi; he had been furious when he had called off the non-cooperation movement in 1920. Although the theses end by affirming the necessity of an expedient policy of developing a united front with all anti-imperialist liberation movements, they also warn of the danger that formal independence negotiated by the indigenous ruling classes can still leave a colony exactly where it was before – 'a semi-colonial buffer state, the puppet of world imperialism' (Adler 1980: 416).

4 THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN, JULY 1924

This combination of flexibility and expedient response to particular conditions, in the context of a generally defined policy, was never to appear again in Comintern documents. The Fourth Congress was to be the last one attended by Lenin. To the end of his life, he remained convinced that the success of the Russian Revolution was inextricably bound up with revolution in the east. Although the east, 'with its hundreds of millions of exploited working people, reduced to the last degree of human suffering', remained militarily subdued to the west, Lenin argued thus:

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And during the past few years, it is this majority that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured. (Lenin 1968: 702)

By the time of the Fifth Congress, of July 1924, however, Lenin was dead. The last attempt at revolution in Germany had been defeated the previous October, and it was at this point that Stalin, who had been previously uninvolved in Comintern affairs aside from setting up a League for the Liberation of the East, designed to unite nationalist imperialist movements in Asia under a common anti-imperialist federation, while he was Commissar of Nationalities, intervened for the first time to effect

a significant change of strategy. Lenin and Trotsky always thought in terms of world revolution, and regarded revolution in the Soviet Union as the catalyst of a revolutionary movement that would spread beyond its borders. In 1915 Lenin had written that after an initial victory of socialism in one capitalist country, then 'the victorious proletariat of that country will arise *against* the rest of the world – the capitalist world – attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries' (Lenin 1968: 155). Stalin, by contrast – foreshadowing the ideology of the Cold War – thought in more dialectical terms of an ongoing struggle between the capitalist imperialist and socialist powers. For Stalin, therefore, the destiny of world revolution was dependent on the fate of the Soviet Union, whereas for Lenin the fate of the Soviet Union had been dependent on world revolution. This conceptual reversal lay at the basis of his initiation of the notorious policy of 'socialism in one country' which formalized the object of the Comintern as assisting with the consolidation of power in the Soviet Union rather than promoting world revolution as such. Despite an apparent increase in attention to colonial matters, the underlying emphasis changed to the extent that Ho Chi Minh, attending his first congress, found it necessary to remind the delegates – in terms rather more forcible than Roy's – of the very existence of the colonial question (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 199–200; Gruber 1974: 308–10).

The effect of Stalin's increasing intervention in Comintern affairs and control of communist leaders abroad was most directly reflected in its policy on China. Chinese delegates had attended Comintern congresses since 1919, though, like those from Japan such as Sen Katayama, their contributions did not create the same friction with the Comintern Executive as those of Malaka or Roy. Initial Comintern efforts in the Far East had focused on Japan, which as an industrialized nation appeared to offer the best conditions for revolution; however, the Communist Party there was soon made illegal and subject to stringent police surveillance and intervention, which, as in India, made it almost impossible for it to operate (McDermott and Agnew 1996: 159). The situation in China, however, a 'semi-colony' burdened with the presence of all the world's major imperial powers, was much more volatile after the revolution of 1911 and Sun Yat-sen's proclamation of a Chinese Republic in 1912. The history of China from 1911 to 1949 is extremely complex: it is impossible here to go into the full, tortuous details of events (see Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank 1967; Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969; Dirlik 1989; Fairbank 1983; Luk 1990). The revolutionary elements in China were made up of recognizable factions: the bourgeois nationalist movement of the Guomindang, led by Sun Yat-sen, and a small, though by no means insignificant, Chinese Communist Party. The General Secretary of the CCP, Chen Duxiu, exhibited many of the best characteristics of tricontinental Marxism. Committed to a consensual, democratic form of socialism, he was independent and flexible in his attempts to accommodate Marxist ideas to the specific conditions of the situation in China and develop them into local forms of political practice. Although critical of the Comintern, Chen nevertheless accepted a 1922 Comintern directive, initiated by Radek, to enter into a United Front policy with the much more powerful Guomindang. The Comintern made it clear that, given the economic and social situation, they believed the Guomindang to be the principal revolutionary

movement in China. Partly as a result of CCP misgivings about this possibility, and because of its determination to continue its existence as a separate party with distinct socialist objectives, the Soviet Union also established direct accords with Sun Yat-sen and sent as many as ten thousand 'advisers' into China. A fundamental tension remained, however, between Guomindang assumptions that the CCP would be subordinated to its control, and the CCP objective of gaining control of the party apparatus by working from within it.

Soviet influence meant that the Guomindang was increasingly trained by Bolshevik military advisers and organized on the Bolshevik model. The influence of Bolshevik political theory, though apparent, was to prove less lasting. In 1925, at the very moment that Stalin was assuming greater power and control of Comintern policy, Sun Yat-sen died and the Guomindang effectively split into two nationalist bases led by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei (whose government was based in Wuhan). Despite clear signals, such as Chiang ordering the arrest and confinement of all political military advisers, and the expulsion of communists from all senior posts in the party in 1926, the Comintern continued to support Chiang despite ever increasing CCP reservations. This was largely at the insistence of Stalin, in the face of opposition from Trotsky (Trotsky 1932). In April 1927 Chiang took Shanghai, the major international city in China where the CCP was at its strongest. With the growing confidence of his military strength, he abandoned all pretence of the United Front policy and massacred thousands of communists in the city. The Comintern, under Stalin, however, refused to change its policy, and in May despatched Roy to China to ensure that the CCP continued to implement its policies with respect to the Wuhan government. Once again this put the CCP in a contradictory position, since while it was committed to agrarian reform and land nationalization for the peasants, the Wuhan government largely represented the interests of the landed classes and had even established an organization specifically designed to suppress peasant revolt. A land distribution scheme proposed by Mao Zedong, in his *Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, was rejected by the CCP and Mao himself was removed as Director of the CCP Peasants' Department (Mao 1965, I: 23–59).

As has been seen, it was in fact Roy who – perhaps deliberately – precipitated the dissolution of the United Front tactics, by revealing to Wang Stalin's plans for reorganizing the Guomindang. Wang responded by expelling the communists from the Wuhan government, intensifying the suppression of peasant movements, and joining with Chiang Kai-shek and a powerful warlord against the CCP. Against virulent opposition from Trotsky and Zinoviev, Stalin, unable and unwilling to admit the errors in his policy, continued to insist that members of the CCP remain in the Guomindang. In August 1927 there was an insurrection against the Wuhan government by communist units in the army; in December Stalin finally conceded the dissolution of the United Front and ordered the CCP to take control of its remaining urban stronghold, Guangzhou. The uprising was ruthlessly suppressed by the Guomindang in three days.

5 THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH CONGRESSES OF THE COMINTERN, 1928 AND 1935

The reaction of the Comintern at its Sixth Congress in the summer of 1928 to what was a political disaster evident to all was first to blame the leaders of the CCP, and then to change its own tactics generally from the United Front to that of the ultra-left position of 'class against class'. In many respects, the 'class against class' tactic was an equally disastrous policy, since it was not effective against the Guomindang in China, and encouraged communist parties in Germany, Latin America and elsewhere to attack other parties on the left, which both facilitated the rise of fascism and created an atmosphere of mistrust when the Comintern reversed its tactics yet again at the Seventh Congress in 1935 and adopted a new anti-fascist policy of the Popular Front.

In the colonies this meant once more supporting the recently vilified national liberation movements. The Stalin–Hitler pact of 1939, and then Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, brought further abrupt reversals, leaving communist parties in anomalous positions: in India, for example, while the National Congress used the advent of the Second World War to put additional pressure on Britain with tactics such as the Quit India movement, the Indian Communist Party supported the British war effort (in Latin America, for the same reason, communist parties supported the USA). With Stalin's doctrine of socialism in one country, Comintern policy was subordinated into an instrument for the furtherance of foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union rather than world revolution. Directives from Moscow, frequently inappropriate to local conditions, were ruthlessly enforced. The submission of colonial revolutionary movements to Stalinism was signalled by the fact that Stalin's purges after 1937 included many of those who had been most active in Comintern politics, such as Zinoviev, Radek, Kún and Sultan-Galiev; two-thirds of the delegates to the Second Congress who were still living in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s were executed or died in prison (Riddell 1991, I: 9). Stalin did not confine his attention to those from the Soviet Union. Thousands of communists from the German, Swiss, Yugoslav, Polish, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Austrian, Greek, Turkish and Baltic states parties perished; so too did thousands of those from colonized countries who, together with their families, were studying in Russia or living in exile – Indians, Iranians, Koreans, Chinese and others. This created 'an atmosphere of panic' among the foreign communists; a contemporary Hungarian activist wrote in 1938: 'many foreigners gather up their belongings every evening in expectation of arrest. Many are half mad and incapable of working as a result of constant fear' (McDermott and Agnew 1996: 149). The high revolutionary moments of the Second Congress and Baku degenerated to a demoralized state of panic in the face of the murder of communist activists from the colonies in the Soviet Union in 1937–8. The persecution of tricontinental communists during Stalin's purges, and the political somersaults of Stalin's abrupt policy reversals, resulted in the marginalization of communist parties in Latin America and Asia, and a widespread disillusionment with the official communist movement in the colonies, particularly in Asia where it had been strongest

(Ali 1984). By 1933, two-thirds of the delegates to the great Second Congress of 1920 from outside the Soviet Union had left the Communist International (Riddell 1991, I: 9). It would be many years before the high point of the Baku conference would be regained. The next time, however, the political initiative was sustained – at Manchester in 1945, at Bandung in 1955, and Havana in 1966.

Although the Comintern is widely supposed to have abandoned its interest in the colonial world in 1928, in fact this was far from the case. In the programme of the Communist International elaborated at the Sixth Congress, a discussion of the situation of dependent (Argentine, Brazil), semi-colonial, and colonial countries, ended by affirming that for the latter 'the central task is to fight for national independence' (Comintern 1929a: 41). The new characterization, which argued that the colonies 'represent the *world rural district* in relation to the industrial countries, which represent *the world city*', meant that independence was now seen as a preliminary stage in the path to socialism, rather than a means for its immediate achievement (Comintern 1929a: 41; Comintern 1929b). Accordingly, the Sixth Congress revised the 1920 theses on the colonial question, producing a new substantial *Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies* (Comintern 1929c). This provides a detailed account of the policy of the Comintern, and analysis of the situation in individual countries, together with prescriptions for future action. The effect of this was that the Comintern subsequently placed much more emphasis on detailed forms of practical activism within individual nations and colonies than general anti-imperialist theses that aspired towards world revolution. As a result, Comintern activity, particularly in relatively neglected areas such as Africa, increased to a considerable degree at a grassroots level.

Stalin cannot be blamed alone for the Comintern's failures. The disastrous policy followed in China had already been foreshadowed in Turkey and Iran before Stalin's involvement. Even the United Front policy of the early years brought out the problem already isolated by Roy in debate with Lenin regarding nationalist movements in the colonies: the Comintern found itself supporting bourgeois and even feudal anti-imperialist leaders who themselves were often hostile to communism (as, for example, with Chiang Kai-shek in China, with King Amanullah in Afghanistan, or with Abd-el-Krim in Morocco), sometimes, as with Kemal in Turkey, siding with them in strategic alliances against the local communist party and tolerating the massacre of its members with apparent equanimity. In countries such as Iran, the Comintern's work was also hampered by the fact that anti-colonialism in Caucasian regions had traditionally involved being anti-Russian; in 1921 the Soviets anyway abandoned their republic in Ghilan as the price for a strategic alliance with Iran. In Palestine, since the Zionists were regarded as allies of Britain, the Comintern supported the Arabs, despite the Jewish labour movement being more sympathetic to its politics and the existence of a small Jewish communist group. However, Comintern hostility towards Muslim nationalism meant that it played only a relatively limited role in the Arab national movement in Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and the Middle East (Behbehani 1986; Claudin 1975; Laqueur 1959; Rodinson 1979; Spector 1958).

All this seems to support the general view of political historians that from the perspective of the colonies, the Third International developed important theoretical

positions but in practice was not very successful. Its greatest apparent success, in China, succeeded despite the instructions of the International. Although several examples have already been given that support this argument, historians have also been keen to dismiss the Comintern as part of a commitment to a general ideological attack on the east, a perspective that persisted into the years of the Cold War. The Comintern cannot be dismissed as easily as Borkenau's characterization of it in 1938 as a complete failure in the colonies and semi-colonies, or Claudin's claim that 'the Comintern was to end its life without having succeeded in establishing solid and influential bases in the great majority of the countries under imperialist domination' – a judgement that has never been seriously disputed (Borkenau 1938: 289; Claudin 1975: 194). In the first place, despite Stalin, the Comintern represented the first great anti-imperialist organization, whose very existence dramatically changed the dynamics of anti-imperialist politics in the colonies. It produced the first international discussion and elaboration of methods of resistance to imperialism in general, which could then be subsequently drawn on and adapted to the demands of individual localities. However, as Stalin himself observed, theoretical discussions in themselves were not enough: 'theory becomes aimless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illuminated by revolutionary theory' (Stalin 1939: 28). The theoretical debates of the Comintern are easier to trace than its practical arm in the work of the international communist parties around the world, developments of which Borkenau was clearly unaware in 1938 (for example, he characterizes the influence of the Comintern in South Africa and India as 'none' – at the very moment when the communists were establishing a solid power base in both countries) (Borkenau 1938: 287–8). The founding of communist parties around the world with support from the Soviet Union, together with the establishment of a Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTVU) in Moscow in 1920 to provide education and training for anti-colonial activists, along with the publication of journals such as the *Novyy Vostok* (*New East*) and the Comintern's *Inprekorr*, enabled and facilitated the development of an organizational and political infrastructure that provided a foundational material and ideological support for political activity. Activists received training in the operation of party discipline, as well as the importance of setting up study groups, women's and youth organizations, and social and cultural institutions. From the perspective of achieved anti-colonial revolution, the Comintern and its affiliated parties around the world may not seem to have got very far in the years leading up to the Second World War. However, the 1928 Sixth Congress, which gave renewed attention to colonial issues, instituted a whole series of new initiatives as a result of which many activists laid the ground work for future successes: put simply, the rapid successes of the anti-colonial movements after the war could not have occurred without there being an established political infrastructure already in place (Comintern 1929b, 1929c). This was particularly the case in Africa and India. It is thus important to consider the practical mechanisms of anti-colonial resistance, the means through which ideas of resistance were put into place at an organizational level and turned into practice. Even at the level of guerrilla warfare, a social and political machinery had to be established simultaneously with military

campaigns, as in the case of China or Cuba. With the emphasis on the need to establish a party with mass support, communist activists spent much time and energy on the development of political infrastructures. This work would bear fruit after the Second World War. With the involvement of local activists, communist parties were often more successful when they were less effectively controlled by the Comintern (the outstanding example here would be China). Such achievements have often been dismissed because peoples in the tricontinental countries had a tendency to develop, as Borkenau dismissively remarks, 'a communism of their own making' (Borkenau 1938: 287). A communism of their own making was, however, precisely the accomplishment of left activists in the colonies and semi-colonies. These theoretical and organizational achievements therefore properly belong to an account of the national liberation movements themselves.

6 TROTSKY AND THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

During the worst years of Stalinist conformism, many internationalist revolutionary activists in colonial countries shifted their allegiance towards Trotsky. This was not so obvious a move to make as it might seem: from the perspective of the colonial countries, Trotsky's own role in the Third International had been minimal, even though he had been involved with it from the first. His interests were firmly centred on the main focus, European revolution (officially he was responsible for the Comintern's relations with Spain, Portugal, Italy and Latin America, none of which figured largely in its deliberations, though communists were very active in Latin America from 1919 onwards); references to colonial issues in his speeches were relatively few (e.g. Trotsky 1945: 125, 139, 236–7). Trotsky regarded the colonies as the least important site of revolution: according to him, any revolution there would be a by-product of revolution in Europe. Trotsky did not participate in the Comintern discussions on the Eastern Question; while he was later heavily involved in contesting Stalin's policies in China, his own assumption that China was primarily a capitalist society was hardly better informed (Trotsky 1932). A committed internationalist, he regarded nationalism as a bourgeois fiction, and as a result remained indifferent to the national element in the liberation movements (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 41; Munck 1986: 61, 84–5; Trotsky 1934: 889–913).

Trotsky's Fourth International was founded in 1936, seven years after he went into exile; one of the two delegates from Britain was C. L. R. James. Though dedicated to the internationalist revolutionary cause after Stalin had abandoned internationalism in favour of socialism in one country, the Fourth International lacked the economic and logistical support of a major national power. As an internationalist movement, it continued Trotsky's own indifference towards the question of national self-determination that had allowed him to make his first fatal compromise with Stalin, avoiding the confrontation proposed by Lenin over the brutal Soviet reoccupation of Georgia (Deutscher 1970: 91–6). Nevertheless, Trotsky's position on the colonies was in many respects close to Lenin's. Like Lenin, Trotsky upheld the role of a

peasantry which owned no land as a potential revolutionary force against the Comintern insistence on either proletarian revolution, in which a proletarian avant-garde would lead an exploited peasantry, or collaboration with bourgeois liberation movements. At the first conference of the Fourth International, he argued somewhat problematically that the colonies and semi-colonies were 'backward by their very essence', but were also 'part of a world dominated by imperialism'. As a result, they were a prime example of his thesis of combined and uneven development: 'the most primitive economic forms are combined with the last word in capitalist technique and culture', a description which in itself remains an accurate characterization of many tricontinental cultures (Alexander 1991: 279). At a political level, this meant that the struggle for democracy and for socialism had to occur simultaneously, and the transition from one to the other effected by means of permanent revolution. Here the complex relations between Trotskyism, Maoist cultural revolution and urban revolution in China and elsewhere become evident (Benton 1996; Fields 1988; Zhang 1991).

Trotsky's political ideas have always been more influential than the political groups that take his name. Histories of the Trotskyist movement are notoriously unreliable. Although Trotskyist groups developed in almost every country in the world, apart from most colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, for the most part, given their extreme factionalist tendencies, they operated in situations of political marginality across the three continents. The major exceptions to this rule were in Latin America (particularly Chile and Mexico in the 1930s, Bolivia in the 1950s, and Argentina in the 1960s) and in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where from 1935 the Lanka Sama Samaja Party played a significant role in national politics (Alexander 1973; Coggiola 1986; Gall 1991; Jayawardena 1988; Lerski 1968). In Vietnam, unusually, a substantial Trotskyist group worked together with the Communist Party, until 1945 when its members were liquidated by Ho Chi Minh (Van 1995). In Algeria, a number of Trotskyists were appointed as ideological advisers to Ben Bella's regime at independence (Jackson 1977: 139). The vibrant, if still marginal, Trotskyist parties of South Africa and India will be discussed in chapters 17 and 22. There, as elsewhere, any groups or individuals who broke away from Comintern affiliations, as in the case of Tan Malaka in Indonesia, were considered to be, or characterized as, Trotskyist (Kahin 1952; McVey 1957, 1965). In a general sense, therefore, it would be possible to argue that many revolutionary socialist parties and liberation movements in the three continents were strongly identified with the Trotskyist position of an alternative form of communism to that of Stalin and the Soviet Union. In the 1930s and 1940s this was endorsed by the overt Trotskyism of figures such as C. L. R. James (James 1937).

The national liberation movements took over and developed what had always been a central Trotskyite (and Leninist) argument, namely the necessity to adapt Marxist theory to the exigencies of local contexts. At the same time, Trotsky's example of the formation and training of disciplined military cadres in the Red Army, his insistence on 'revolution from below', on the active political participation of the people through the formation of Soviets, and his view that the fundamental tasks in colonial countries were national independence and agrarian revolution, meant that at

the level of political ideology and revolutionary practice, many of the liberation movements could be said to have displayed Trotskyist tendencies. That this did not often develop into anything more than what could be called ideological affiliative tendencies was the result of one major difference with respect to Trotsky's cosmopolitan internationalism, namely the liberation movements' identification with nationalism. Here, paradoxically, their politics were in many respects much closer to the language of Stalin (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 87). It was to be the political position developed by Mao Zedong, breaking with the Comintern with respect to the role of the peasantry, while identifying the liberation movement as a national as well as a socialist struggle, that came to represent the tricontinental 'third way' after his spectacular victory in China in 1949, the first example of the victory of a socialist national liberation movement in the three continents. After 1956 and the China-Soviet split, many of the liberation movements in the three continents aligned themselves ideologically with China, resuscitating the revolutionary spirit of 1848, 1905 and 1917. Despite continued Soviet involvement, largely motivated by Cold War politics, it was also to be China that would offer the most substantive support to them, particularly in southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Donaldson 1981; Feuchtwanger and Nailor 1981; Harris and Worden 1986; Mazrui 1993; Neuhauser 1968; Saivetz 1989). The newly independent tricontinental socialist countries, however, were also careful to announce their independence from Soviet or Chinese control with the formation of the non-aligned movement at Bandung in 1955 (Allison 1988). The strategy of the non-aligned movement was to exploit the rivalries of the Cold War and to derive benefits from both west and east, both first and second worlds.

Part IV

Theoretical Practices of the Freedom Struggles

The National Liberation Movements: INTRODUCTION

The memory of that revolutionary heroism shall remain.

Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 28)

Anti-colonialism on both sides of the colonial divide, at both a practical and theoretical level, goes back to the beginnings of colonialism itself. Most of those subjected to colonialism resisted from the first moment of European incursions, from the Caribs in the Caribbean, to the Indian Mughal rulers, to the Maoris in New Zealand. Few colonists, be they European, Japanese, Jewish or Russian, have been able to establish colonies in lands already occupied by others without encountering continued resistance from those who were already there. The history of colonialism is characterized throughout by intransigent opposition to conquest and rebellions against alien domination and loss of sovereignty. The soil of North and South America, of Africa, of South and Southeast Asia remains rich with the blood of resistance. Anti-colonial rebellions against established European rule began with the slave and maroon rebellions in the Caribbean (there were nearly a hundred major uprisings between 1519 and 1844; at times in Cuba they were an almost annual event), were followed by the American Revolution, colonial and slave revolts in the Caribbean and Latin America around the time of the French Revolution, continued in the many uprisings in the nineteenth century (particularly in Ireland, India and Africa), becoming ubiquitous in the twentieth century. The greatest of these acts of resistance are well known, from the first black liberation war of 1791–1804, led by Toussaint l'Ouverture in Haiti, to the 'Kaffir' wars (1799–1878), to the South American liberation movement led by Simón Bolívar (1817–29), to Nat Turner's Slave Rebellion (1831), to the Indian Mutiny (1857), to the Maori wars (1860–72), to Morant Bay (1865), to Wounded Knee (1890), to the 1916 rebellion in Ireland, to the Long March of the Red Army (1934–5), to the Mau Mau uprisings (1952–9), to the Hungarian uprising (1956), to the Vietnam War (1960–74). The number and extent of such rebellions were quite extraordinary. To invoke sub-Saharan African resistance to colonialism alone, and to cite only some of the most obvious examples, there were wars or revolts in South Africa from 1799–1906 (the last armed uprising was by the Bambatha in Natal in

1906), by the Asante 1821–34, 1873–4, 1895–6, 1900, Ndebele resistance to the Boers 1837, Basutoland 1851–2, 1858–68, 1879–81, El Hajj Umar's resistance to the French in West Africa 1854–64, Angola in 1860, 1902, 1907, 1913, Zulu resistance to the British 1870–1906, Barue resistance to the Portuguese 1870–1917, the Makuta rising of 1878, Abushiri's rebellion 1880–90, the First and Second Mandinka Wars 1882–6, 1891–8, the Massingire rebellion of 1884, Somalia and Ethiopia 1886–1920, Samori Ture's resistance from 1888–98, resistance to German expansion in East Africa from 1888–91, Baule resistance 1889–95, 1908–16, the Hehe War 1891–8, the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893, Mozambique 1895–9, the Ndebele-Shona War 1896–1903, the Cambuemba Sena-Tonga insurrection of 1897, Sierra Leone 1898, Madagascar 1898–1904, Nandi revolt 1900, the 1901 Makanga rising, the Herero-Nama Rising (and subsequent extermination) 1904–7, the Cameroons 1904, the Shona rebellion 1904, the Maji Maji Uprising 1905–7, the French Congo 1905, Kenya 1905, 1908, 1914 (Ajayi 1989; Boahen 1985; Bute and Harmer 1997; Crowder 1971; Iliffe 1995; Robinson, Gallagher and Denny 1981).

Between the two world wars, in addition to further examples such as the Dinka and Nuer risings in the Sudan, revolts in the French and Spanish Rif, French Mauritania and Italian Libya, or 'terrorist' campaigns in India, resistance increasingly began to operate in agrarian and industrial political forms such as the 1929 general strike in Nigeria (which developed out of the head-tax protest by market women), agitation by cocoa farmers in Ghana, Hamallist opposition in French West Africa, attacks on tax collectors in Kenya, strikes in Senegal, uprisings against the labour regimes operated in the railway construction projects in French Equatorial Africa in the late 1920s, and the widespread unrest in the West Indies during the years 1935–8. Resistance was also increasingly articulated through developed intellectual cultures of journalism and publishing: in Boahen's words, 'newspapers, books, pamphlets, petitions, protest migrations, strikes, boycotts, the ballot box, the pulpit and the mosques' (Boahen 1985: 575). The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s encouraged anti-colonial dissatisfaction, but by the end of the decade the whole colonial situation was transformed by the Second World War. From the point of view of colonized people, whatever the outcome, the most significant factor lay in the defeat of the imperial powers in southeast Asia by Japan, a non-white, Asian power. The turmoil and erosion of colonial authority and control during the war meant that many colonies, such as India, Burma, Ghana, Tunisia and Libya, were subsequently able to demand and achieve independence. Where pressure for constitutional decolonization achieved little response, or where colonial powers attempted to reassert political control over peoples who had developed forms of autonomy, armed liberation wars followed, such as those of the PLAF ('Vietcong') in Vietnam, the Mau Mau in Kenya 1952–60, UPC, CNO guerrillas in the Cameroons 1955–62, the ANC and PAC in South Africa from 1964 to 1991, FNLA, MPLA, UNITA in Angola 1961–76, PAIGC, led by Cabral in Guinea-Bissau 1963–74, ELF in Eritrea 1963–91, FRELIMO in Mozambique 1964–76, ZAPU, ZANU in Zimbabwe 1966–80, SWAPO in Namibia 1964–90 (Boahen 1985; Ajayi 1989; Bute and Harmer 1997; Mazrui 1993).

The anti-colonial rebellions that are well documented in the history books are generally speaking those that caused greatest trouble to the occupying powers. Countless others, which were repressed more successfully and therefore silently through ever more active and oppressive forms of imperial policing, or which developed different, more local forms of resistance, now have to be retrieved from the historical archives. The number of military incursions and expeditions required to maintain colonial occupation and rule are probably too numerous to detail comprehensively. A single image brings home the extraordinary extent of these uprisings: in the *Third World Atlas* there is a map of the world, inscribed to bursting point with the dates and locations of anti-colonial and slave rebellions, from 1519 to the present (Thomas et al. 1994: 44–5). This vast history tells a remarkable story of an indomitable refusal.

The forms that resistance took were also extremely varied. Thomas et al. (1994: 44) divide them into five categories, which can be described as follows:

- 1 *Resistance to conquest*: wars of reaction to European invasion. These themselves comprise a wide range of military responses, from formal military engagements of professional armies, to sporadic forms of resistance by poorly armed groups of indigenous peoples.
- 2 *Rebellions against European rule*: this includes the gamut of anti-colonial resistance, from slave revolts to violent risings and rebellions, to mass movements of non-violent protest, strikes and civil disobedience.
- 3 *Movements of religious revivalism*: anti-colonial discontent articulated through religious movements that assert a traditional indigenous culture in the name of a utopic decolonized future.
- 4 *Nationalist constitutional moves towards decolonization*: typical of white settler communities such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
- 5 *Nationalist liberation struggles*: armed guerrilla resistance, particularly since the Second World War.

The history of anti-colonialism comprises the histories involved in all these five categories. The second needs to be subdivided into rebellions by indigenous or other majority peoples and early rebellions by European colonists against European rule, as in North and South America. The latter join the most ambiguous category, number 4: as Ferro remarks, 'one may view this series of struggles for independence as the most advanced stage of white colonial expansion' (Ferro 1997: 211). The least widely studied, and the one which postcolonial theory has only begun to take seriously since the work of the Comaroffs and other recent African historians, is number 3, the movements of religious revivalism. These would include different versions of Islamic and Hindu nationalism, the *Mahdi* movements in East Africa and South Asia, together with prophetism and messianic movements in East, Central and South Africa, as well as Java, Burma, India and New Zealand (Adas 1979; Andersson 1958; Boahen 1985; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1997; Kedourie 1971: 106–27; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 324–31; Sundkler 1961). Much work remains to be done in the area of prophetic rebellion as a form of anti-colonial protest, particularly in relation to

its use of indigenous ideologies but also in its articulation with forms of modernity. Though often inspired by traditions drawn from indigenous culture, as a form of nationalism religious revivalism also tends to institute its own procedures of oppression. When it is combined with some of the objectives of socialism and feminism, however, as in certain forms of Arab nationalism, it can link positively to the politics of postcolonial critique.

Anti-colonial struggles took varied forms in response to heterogeneous conditions. In the case of long-established white settler colonies such as Canada or Australia, these involved the gradual development of forms of participatory government – for the white settlers. Settler colonies where there was a white minority, such as Algeria, Kenya or Rhodesia, inevitably presented a more complicated situation for the majority of the population, and in most cases they had to be defeated by force, for example by the FLN, SWAPO or ZANU. Elsewhere, in non-white exploitation colonies, as a broad generalization the more developed the economy and education, often accompanied by Reform movements, as in India, the more likely it was that political agitation by the bourgeoisie constituted an effective form of campaign for independence. Examples would be India/Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Ghana, all of which possessed a developed educational system, economy and effective trade union structure, together with a social system rigidified by the hierarchy of caste or class. In these countries, a class of native elite was ready to take over the reins of power. In the situation of non-white, non-settler so-called ‘underdeveloped’ colonies, depending on the colonial power in question, matters were often less straightforward and local resistance had to be more militant. Apart from white settler colonies, it was the colonial powers caught up in the ideology of ‘assimilation’, such as the French or Portuguese, who most forcibly resisted anti-colonial movements. Colonial intransigence therefore forced anti-colonial activists to resort to the waging of war by national liberation armies, such as those of the Vietcong, or FRELIMO.

Postcolonial analyses can sometimes give the impression that the dynamics of power were above all textual, minute, and that colonized people were rarely empowered in substantive ways. Histories tell otherwise. The fact that much pre-twentieth century resistance took the form of physical resistance and rebellion means that outside the chronicle of history, its politics are now largely silent. It was not until the nineteenth century that anti-colonialism also began to be formulated in specific political, cultural and theoretical positions. The central role of culture in such elaborations constitutes a particular feature of the history of anti-colonialism: cultural activism, often deployed alongside the development of modes of resistance with which to meet force, was designed to counter the ideological assumptions, justifications and sense of inferiority that colonists propagated upon subject peoples. In ideological terms, these forms of political resistance can be divided into those that drew upon indigenous culture and those that identified with forms – colonial or western – of modernity. By the twentieth century, these had become heavily interrelated and most drew on a combination of the mixture of two. They remained significant ideological polarities however.

Wherever it emerged, anti-colonialism expressed a common project. That common project involved the reversal of a structure of power. The means through which

that subversion and inversion could be achieved, or conceived, however, was entirely specific to the historical conditions of the colony in question and could take many different forms. Anti-colonialism, therefore, as Füredi suggests,

seldom expressed itself in pure anti-imperialist terms . . . there was no pure imperial/colonized relationship, imperial rule being mediated through a range of institutions, including local collaborators. (Füredi 1994: 22)

Because of this local mediation, anti-colonial sentiment could often be expressed through communal or ethnic violence. Collaborators, arguably, included the colonial army of occupation. The rank and file of colonial armies were generally composed of local soldiers, sometimes of different nationalities or ethnicities to the people whom they controlled. Their loyalty was to the colonial power (Thema Khumalo reported, for example, that in the Zimbabwean freedom struggle, 'since the country was being ruled by whites, the black soldiers had to do what they wanted and, in order to please the whites, the black soldiers were actually responsible for unspeakable beatings and tortures'; Staunton 1990: 77). Everything depended on maintaining the absolute loyalty of the troops. It is perfectly reasonable to argue with Savarkar (1947) that the 'Indian Mutiny' was a liberation war; but it is not incorrect to call it a mutiny, given that it was generated by a rebellion in the ranks of local Indian troops (the 'sepoys') who turned against their English officers. Certainly it became more than that, but to elide the Mutiny in favour of a general term such as 'revolt' or 'insurrection' downplays just how radical an event it was. As Marx emphasized, a mutiny was, in a sense, much more serious than any uprising: the army was the foundation, the *sine qua non*, of colonial power, and it was, of course, trained and well armed.

200,000,000 natives being curbed by a native army of 200,000 men, officered by Englishmen, and that native army, in its turn, being kept in check by an English army numbering 40,000 only. On first view, it is evident that the allegiance of the Indian people rests on the fidelity of the native army, in creating which the British rule simultaneously organized the first general centre of resistance which the Indian people was ever possessed of. (Marx and Engels 1959: 39–40)

A mutiny was the most serious possible form of subversion of British colonial power.

As postcolonial critics have adeptly shown, anti-colonial resistance could surface in any number of ways, in any number of contexts, in any number of practices. Anti-colonialism as a theorized political position, on the other hand, took a relatively restricted number of forms. The main types of political, ideological and military resistance to colonialism can be characterized as follows:

- 1 European moral and humanitarian objection (Enlightenment, anti-slavery campaigns; rights theory).
- 2 European liberal economic objections (Smith, Cobden, Bright, Bastiat).
- 3 European/non-European rivalry between imperial powers (e.g. Britain–France–Germany–Russia, USA–Japan–Russia).

- 4 Assertion of political rights to self-determination in settler colonies (e.g. USA, Canada, Bolivia, Transvaal/Orange Free State).
- 5 Colonial nationalism (bourgeois, cultural, religious) (e.g. India, Pakistan, Ireland, Scotland, Poland, Turkey, Egypt, Kenya, China).
- 6 Anti-colonial internationalism (e.g. pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, the *Khilafat* movement, the *négritude* movement, African Socialism).
- 7 Industrial strikes, agitation over land reform, communalism, protest-migration, peasant revolts, etc.: these were often either displaced forms of a resistance to the colonial power as such, or activities that were transformed into an anti-colonial stance, usually in combination with communism and/or nationalism
- 8 Marxist internationalism and the armed national liberation movements (e.g. China, Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, Mozambique).

Historically, postcolonial theory is the product of all these. However, it also makes its choices between them. In broad terms, it affiliates itself with 1, but not 2 and 3. One constituency of postcolonial theory situates itself in 4. Those still linked to the legacy of 5 have often been most keen to distance themselves from postcolonial theory, and to characterize it as 'western'. Category 6 finds few supporters today, even though it was central to the thinking of many liberation ideologies, and often not incompatible with the last category, 8, where a politics of national liberation developed within the larger framework of a Marxist internationalism. A renewed interest in internationalism is emerging, however, in some current postcolonial thought (Brennan 1997; Robbins 1999; Sinha, Guy and Woollacott 1999). There were, therefore, many different ideologies and forms of resistance to colonialism, as category 7 suggests, and postcolonial theory itself necessarily in certain respects bears the historical traces of them all. Some of the tensions in postcolonial theory continue to erupt from traditional sources of conflict within the liberation movements themselves – above all between bourgeois (and bourgeois diaspora) nationalisms and a more engaged politics with objectives of social justice and equality, based on various versions of tricontinental socialist revolutionary thought, and inspired by the memories of resistance.

At the Political Bureau of the Fourth Zone of Resistance

I have travelled the thirteen districts of Kwangsi Province,
 And tasted the pleasures of eighteen different prisons,
 What crime have I committed, I keep on asking?
 The crime of being devoted to my people.

(Ho Chi Minh, 1962: 85)

Marxism and the National Liberation Movements

Citing Engels' dismissal of the revolt in Algeria of Abd el-Kader against the French forces from 1832–47 as the 'hopeless' struggle of 'the barbarian state of society', Bryan Turner observes that 'classical Marxism does not appear to be a promising source of revolutionary theory for movements of national liberation' (Turner 1978: 5). Published in the same year as Said's *Orientalism*, Turner's *Marx and the End of Orientalism* was designed to achieve the 'decolonization' of the European Marxist tradition, a project which has remained central to postcolonial theory. For some, postcolonial theory's relation to Marxism has remained its central political enigma. Some commentators, such as myself, have analysed it from the perspective of its transgressive emergence from the projects of French post-war Marxism in the context of the Algerian War of Independence; others, such as Ahmad, have berated it for straying from a nationalist Marxist-Leninism (Young 1990; Ahmad 1992). Such arguments are not wholly opposed to each other, for they both bear witness to the fact that postcolonial theory remains Marxist in orientation but at the same time has always defined itself through its deviation from orthodoxy, disorienting Marxism in its Stalinist, or subsequent Communist Party versions.

This process of deviation from the centre has always operated within Marxism itself, which is nothing if heterogeneous. As David Forgacs has observed:

Marxist thinking, however rigorous in itself, tends to have a hybrid character. Marxism has taken shape by scrutinizing and sharpening itself not only on the real world and not only on its own texts but also against non-Marxist thinking. Marx's own thought developed in a critical dialogue with that of thinkers like Hegel, Ricardo and Proudhon. (Forgacs 1982: 134)

Just as Lenin described Marxism itself as a product of 'German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism', so anti-colonial Marxism developed as a hybrid of east and west (Lenin 1968: 20). Such hybridization has always been a characteristic of Marxism, which, throughout the twentieth century, as a philosophy and as a political practice has always interacted productively with other disciplines,

geographies, cultures, and political contexts. In the colonial or tricontinental arena, Marxism developed according to the demands of different social and cultural contexts in ways that remained often unrecognized in the west.

Early twentieth-century Latin American Marxists, particularly José Carlos Mariátegui, were the first to raise the problem of Marxism's eurocentrism. This does not constitute an objection to Marxism as such, but rather an objection within Marxist theory, implying the need for its revision and reorientation. Anti- and postcolonial thought has always been engaged in a process of reformulating, translating and transforming Marxism for its own purposes, and this has operated as a critical dynamic tradition within Marxism itself. Postcolonial theory is a product of Marxist as well as Marx's thought. Marxists in Europe or orthodox Marxists elsewhere have generally only taken limited account of, and barely acknowledged, the importance of the non-European forms of Marxism. Marxism also has its own relations of centre and periphery, its own forms of domination, of resistance and subversion. If postcolonial theory is the cultural product of decolonization, it is also the historical product of Marxism in the anti-colonial arena. For many of the first generation of postcolonial theorists, Marxist theory was so much their starting point, so fundamental to what they were doing, so dominant in contemporary intellectual culture, that it was assumed as a base line prior to all further work. Moreover, their acquaintance with communist revolutionary politics was entirely tricontinental: China, Vietnam, Cuba.

Some might object to the centrality of Marxism in any account of non-European anti-colonialism on the grounds that even if it constitutes the great self-critical discourse of European culture, it is still a European (or even a German) one. After Lenin, anti-colonial Marxism was, however, largely the creation of the Third World: it took the preoccupations of tricontinental politics to turn it into a different instrument that could be deployed against entrenched European and American imperial power. Marxism was central to the thinking and practice of probably a majority of the national liberation movements in the three continents after 1917. Anti-colonial movements were already in existence in Africa, Asia and, with respect to US imperialism, in Central and South America at that time. With the exception of the Middle East, ideological alliances or adaptations quickly took place in many colonies between the existing national or anti-colonial movements and the new radical political and social agenda of communism (Laqueur 1956; Rodinson 1979; Turner 1978). At the same time, the date 1917 explains why Ireland, and less straightforwardly also India, whose independence movements were formed in the nineteenth century more on the lines of the prestigious bourgeois nationalism of Garibaldi and Mazzini, were the major exceptions to this rule. In India, communists and ultra-left groups, which for the most part refused to combine with the Indian Congress Party, allowed nationalist sentiment to be appropriated by Nehru's socialist secularism, Jinnah's reformist Islam, and Savarkar's religious communalism. Elsewhere, most African nationalisms after the Second World War, from Nkrumah and Fanon onwards, were combined with versions of Marxism or socialism, and most communist parties in Asia, such as those in China and Vietnam, started as communist parties which then incorporated nationalism within their agenda.

With some exceptions, Marxism historically provided the theoretical inspiration and most effective political practice for twentieth-century anti-colonial resistance. Its great strength was that its political discourse constituted an instrument through which anti-colonial struggle could be translated from one colonial arena to another. Far more than nationalism, which by definition was self-centred and in dialogue only with its own constituency, Marxism supplied a translatable politics and political language through which activists in very different situations could communicate with each other; it offered a universal medium through which specificities could be discussed in a common forum of anti-colonialism. This was initiated by the Leninist doctrine of the universal Bolshevik model, which could be dialectically modified to suit colonial conditions. The alliance between Marxism and nationalism in the anti-colonial struggles has typically been regarded more as a form of nationalism than of Marxism; Marxism is considered to have deviated into a form of nationalism. The reverse argument is being made here, namely that nationalism was a subsidiary element in a more politically and theoretically innovative practice, whereby the very translatability of Marxism was itself subject to a process of translation that was necessarily not entirely transparent. In a dialectical antithesis to Lenin, tricontinental Marxism has emphasized what one might call the untranslatability of revolutionary practices, the need for attention to local forms, and the translation of the universal into the idiom of the local. This was set against the Bolshevik thesis of the universality and universal translatability of its revolutionary model, Stalin's 'revolution from above', and also the corresponding American assumption that, as Fidel Castro put it in the Second Declaration of Havana in 1962, revolution is just another commodity in the world market:

Cuba is an exporter of revolutions. In their sleepless merchants' and usurers' minds there is the idea that revolutions can be bought, sold, rented, loaned, exported and imported like some piece of merchandise. (Castro 1972: 144)

Tricontinental Marxism, therefore, can be defined, anticipating Fernando Ortiz's suggestive term, as a transculturation of Marxism, which was subsequently to provide the foundation for postcolonial theory.

1 ABDEL-MALEK ON MARXISM AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

From 1917 onwards there were clear pragmatic reasons why the Soviet bloc was regarded as the effective source of anti-colonial struggle. Historically, the material and military support of countries such as the Soviet Union, and later China and Cuba, in the struggle against colonialism meant that the practical and theoretical were consistently overlaid even if they were never identical. Throughout the twentieth century, through the Third International and into the post-war period (with the exception of 1935–45), communist states of different Marxist ideologies operated

directly as suppliers of material aid, inspiration and the guiding political philosophy of the anti-colonial struggle for most colonial liberation movements until paradoxically the Soviet Union itself became the last surviving great empire, its dissolution destined to coincide non-coincidentally with that of the last major colonial regime, South Africa. The twentieth century is marked by an extraordinary degree of resistance to capitalism and the power of the west, whether in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in Russia, and through it to Eastern Europe and China, or in the anti-colonial liberation movements of Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, in the course of which one third of the world's population succeeded in breaking away from the capitalist world system in the age of late imperialism. At some points, at the time of the 'domino theory', for example, during the war in Vietnam, it did indeed seem to many as if Marxist resistance was winning out. The Vietnam War, as Ahmad has suggested, represented the apex of anti-colonial resistance:

Revolutionary anti-colonialism; the most advanced socialist political practice in the most backward economies; the direct prolonged combat between socialism and imperialism; the utterly unequal balance of forces – was condensed in the Vietnam war. (Ahmad 1992: 28)

In 1963, Simone de Beauvoir wrote: 'Che Guevara had predicted to the United States: "You are going to lose the whole planet," and his prophecy was coming true' (de Beauvoir 1968: 520). Anti-colonial victory, however, was subsequently turned into socialist defeat. The fact that much socialist resistance subsequently collapsed, and that tricontinental socialism itself fell into difficulties in the chaos of the aftermath of anti-colonial war, does not nullify its extraordinary historical achievement, nor necessarily mean that such resistance is over. In the meantime, it transformed the nature of capitalism itself. Whether embodied or not in an alternative economic system, Marxism and the ideals of socialism continue to constitute a form of internal resistance to capitalism in its most exploitative mode.

The question of Marxism's relation to the national liberation movements was astutely addressed by Anouar Abdel-Malek in an essay written in 1970. Formulated during the high point of anti-colonial and anti-imperial activism in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, Abdel-Malek's contribution has never been surpassed at the level of its theoretical discussion and analysis. Expressing a sentiment that can be found at the centre of many tricontinental discussions of Marxist political theory, Abdel-Malek regards Marxism as a dynamic movement rather than as a fixed body of doctrine, arguing that nothing in Marx or Lenin suggests that their work should be taken as a 'rigid scheme to be directly applied at every conjuncture' (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 106). This relates to the central problematic addressed in Abdel-Malek's essay, which involves what he humorously calls 'Marxism among the aboriginals', or Marxism in the three continents of the 'underdeveloped world': that is, the relations between Marxism and the national liberation movements and the effect of their interaction upon Marxism itself as practised in the three continents. This Marxism, warns Abdel-Malek, is not at all the same thing as the Marxism of Europe. Moreover,

he argues, between them 'at present there is not even the possibility of dialogue, let alone synthesis'. If these conditions did not exist in 1970, the space in which dialogue and constructive synthesis subsequently occurred outside the mainstream of European Marxism is now constituted by postcolonial theory. Postcolonialism has mediated and continued to develop the Marxism of the liberation movements whose particularity of cultural location operates dialectically within the general paradigm of the world systems theory developed by economists of the Middle East (Amin), Latin America (Frank), and Africa (Wallerstein) (Frank 1969; Wallerstein 1974–89, 1975, 1979, 1984; Amin 1974, 1977, 1988).

In 1970, from the point of view of the three continents, Marxism in Europe was seen to be in crisis: 'There has been scarcely any theoretical renewal', remarks Abdel-Malek, adding pointedly that 'what theoretical work has been done has had little relation to revolution' (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 79). From a European perspective, on the other hand, tricontinental Marxism appeared 'as a form of radical nationalism, quite unlike the Marxism developed and institutionalized – at least until the crisis in the Comintern – by the thinkers and the men of action, the activists of the West'. Abdel-Malek thus sets up a dialectic of Marxisms, broadly speaking between that of the Russian and European communist parties and the Marxism developed outside Europe that has never been accepted by western Marxists (whether working inside or outside the CP). He links this to the traditional hegemony of the European parties over the international socialist and communist movements, itself grounded in a long-standing European cultural and political hegemony. Western Marxists have preferred to marginalize what took place in the non-European world, despite the fact that that is exactly where Marxism successfully developed its practical revolutionary dynamics and achieved political power.

Abdel-Malek's relaxed account of tricontinental Marxism's appearance as an apparent form of 'radical nationalism' is striking. Whereas in the west, left intellectuals have agonized over the relation of Marxism to nationalism, this has never been a problematic issue for tricontinentals who have generally regarded them as interrelating ideologies (so did the colonial powers, who readily labelled any form of indigenous dissent 'communist') (Munck 1986; Nimni 1991; Soekarno 1969). From an anti-colonial perspective, Marxism and nationalism had a shared objective: 'National liberation', Rodinson remarks, 'is as much part of the socialist ideal as social liberation' (Rodinson 1979: 119). This is not at all to say that nationalism as such is part of the Marxist ideal. Marxism constitutes a political philosophy, committed to a more just and equitable society. Nationalism has no such project. The emancipatory demand for national liberation is very different from nationalism as such. The two are, however, routinely assimilated, and this is at the core of the problem that has concerned commentators such as Parry (1987) and Lazarus (1999). Postcolonial critics in their critiques of nationalism may indeed at times have also disparaged some nationalist discourses of resistance, as Parry and Lazarus suggest (Parry 1987: 35; Lazarus 1999: 120). If so, this is because, as has been apparent since the issue was first highlighted by Lenin and M. N. Roy, anti-colonial nationalisms are by no means all the same, an issue that has been of particular significance for women. 'Some are

progressive, others are not', as Ahmad succinctly puts it (Ahmad 1992: 102). What those in the west call 'third world nationalism' has never been successfully analysed by theorists of nationalism because it never operated according to a general model, or even ideology. 'Anti-colonialism is one of the main forms of nationalism' remarks Breuilly (1993: 156). It might rather be said that anti-colonialism usually employed some form of nationalism in the service of national liberation. Such nationalism, however, was, as for Fanon, a nuanced strategic way of articulating an anti-colonial hegemony. It did not necessarily comprise the oppressive forms and practices that occur when nationalism is pursued as an end in itself. This is the important distinction that has been a central concern of postcolonial critique.

Although he did not state it in so many words, the innovation of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983) was that, rather than attempting to define nationalism through a list of variables, as in Stalin's 1913 essay (Stalin 1936), Anderson moved to a more Saussurean account of nationalism as a kind of language. In Saussurean terms, as a language, nationalism achieves its meaning diacritically, as form rather than substance. (This is why post-independence attempts at so-called 'nation building', which make the mistake of assuming nationalism to be a substance rather than form, are more or less doomed, or at least can only operate coercively.) Füredi makes the same point in a more pragmatic way:

Nationalism is seldom an independent variable, but rather a *form* through which a variety of responses, aspirations and interests are expressed. Its force is not internal but depends on the intensity of sentiment of various social groups. That is why self-conscious nationalist politicians never get very far unless they can harness the aspirations of the masses for a better life. Those who isolate the problem to an examination of self-conscious nationalism risk neglecting the underlying social dynamic which may eventually come to cohere itself through some form of comparable collective identity. (Füredi 1994: 21)

As Füredi demonstrates in the cases of British Guyana, Kenya and Malaya, elite forms of nationalism as a self-conscious ideology often only connected up rather belatedly with unrest that had developed as a result of specific issues such as land rights that were of more immediate concern to peasants or workers. The fact that, in a colonial situation, in such struggles they were opposed to colonial settlers or the colonial authorities was enough to make them also 'nationalist' issues. For ordinary men and women peasants and workers, however, nationalism was often a means towards some more specific objective, such as land, a fair wage, and the removal of oppressive forms of taxation. Füredi's analysis would apply even more appropriately to India, where historians ever since independence have puzzled over the apparent gap between the nationalist programme of the Congress Party intellectuals, and the strikes and agrarian unrest of the masses that were only uncertainly mediated to the nationalist cause through the figure of Gandhi, if at all. Attention to nationalism as a form, as a language (a link to Lacan's account of the unconscious as a language would be interesting to pursue in this respect) rather than some sort of separate pre-existing substance that needs to be analysed in itself, cuts through no end of inconsequential ruminations and anxieties.

Historical examples show that, however tenuous the connection between 'nationalism' and its apparent forms of expression really was, this was of little moment in political terms because it did function as a language. When, for example, the colonial authorities in British Guyana faced militant unrest from the sugar workers, it had the political effect of a nationalist movement. For the colonial authorities, strikes and agitation were not just strikes and agitation: they were the language of a nationalist anti-colonialism. In the same way in Kenya, when the colonial settler authorities were faced with resistance by the so-called squatters at being moved out of the White Highlands, they invented a nationalist movement to describe it: 'Mau Mau'. Once characterized thus, any act of resistance became a nationalist anti-colonial statement. As a result, Mau Mau as a movement henceforth did in a sense exist. In defeating 'Mau Mau' as it claimed it did, the British army that was called in had really only defeated the colonial authority's own invention – as the swift decolonization that followed amply illustrated. The real question was one of control and domination, and these examples show how, in a colonial situation, the contest for power could easily translate from a local to a national level by drawing on the language of nationalism. Whatever it may 'be' or have been in Europe, nationalism, therefore, in a tricontinental context, has always been the language in which the power struggle between colonizer and col-onized for domination or self-determination operated, functioning as a concept through which a cluster of specific issues and grievances were brought together and politicized. As long as the power structure is there, you can put anything into it that you like (such as the variable constituent elements of nationalism). That power structure, however, Fanon notwithstanding, was rarely a simple binary. The colonial power may have been relatively coherent, before the first gin and tonic at least, but anti-colonial opposition was typically fragmented and various, and came from different quarters and classes that were in turn often competing with or opposed to each other. The key issue was therefore to push the struggle to such a pitch that lesser differences would be set aside in the cause of the greater difference, as Mao was to argue. The solidarity of that revolutionary moment before independence would then subsequently move on to the other power struggles of any society's political life. To women's liberation, for example. Or to socialism.

Just as nationalism could function as a convenient siphon for the representation of a variety of discontents, a means through which they were funnelled into a metaphoric meaning beyond themselves, so too could Islam and Marxism. Many revolutions, as has been observed, though sometimes characterized as communist, were not very substantially Marxist at an ideological level and never subsequently developed into forms of socialism. Fanon notwithstanding once more, Algeria would be a good example. It would also be a good example of the fact that Islamic nationalism functions in exactly the same way as other nationalisms – the fact that Islam is socially and culturally embodied simply makes it function better. In other cases, such as Vietnam, the anti-imperialist position of communism was enough to ensure an organized communist party popular support, so the revolution became communist. In other cases still, such as Cuba, the popularity of the revolutionaries supported a move towards communism that came after the revolution. In historical terms, therefore, the

liberation movements were heterogeneous, and form no single 'tradition'. The relation of Marxism or socialism to them, on the other hand, will always be overdetermined not only because it was the dominant ideology, but also because, with the main exception of Gandhi, it was Marxist anti-colonialism that operated as an intellectual as well as a political movement, and produced a remarkable, very substantial body of theoretical knowledge that can still be put to work. Some freedom struggles, like some uprisings and rebellions, are so to speak simply history, though the understanding of such uprisings, such as those by the peasantry, may now form the most urgent task for a postcolonial history. In other cases, the rewriting of history itself formed a significant part of an anti-colonial movement, which reinforces the point that some anti-colonial movements were also monumental discursive productions, whose analyses continue to reverberate down to the political and cultural situations of today.

2 PERIOD ONE: TO 1928

Abdel-Malek argues that the alliance between Marxism and national liberation can be divided into three successive stages: the first runs up to the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928. For the second period, during which there were no successful socialist revolutions (up to the end of the Second World War), Abdel-Malek claims that there is 'little or no available material' and that the oscillating positions of the Comintern produced only 'the ghetto of the massacred' (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 87). This effectively blocked all developments of Marxism in relation to the national liberation movements, he argues, and left them fragmented, operating only in a dialogue with the metropolis. The triumphant third period, post-1945, saw the emergence of a distinctive theoretical elaboration of Marxism in the three continents, particularly after the Chinese Revolution of 1949.

The history of Abdel-Malek's first stage, of the Comintern period of national liberation up to 1928, has already been examined in some detail. Here the important factors centred on the extension of the revolutionary struggle to the east, and the elaboration in discussions in the Comintern congresses of the strategic relation of communism to the national liberation movements. In chapter 10 we have seen how a different Marxism, enriched by its encounters with the problems of the three continents and translated into a local idiom, was first elaborated at the Baku conference, and was subsequently developed in the pioneering work of Malaka, Roy and Sultan-Galiev. As Abdel-Malek points out, these three figures represent a spectrum of possible positions with respect to the relation of communism to non-European nationalist movements: Malaka presented the most nationalistic thesis, in which communism and the anti-colonial movements were identified because they had the same object, but without necessarily sharing the same social politics. Roy, by contrast, took the opposite position in which all forms of nationalism were abjured in favour of a rigorous application of Marxist theory to the colonial situation, inflected towards giving a greater prominence to the hitherto marginalized economic role of the colonies in the world imperial system. Sultan-Galiev, Abdel-Malek argues, 'was to lay the basis for

what became from then on the Marxism of the three continents' (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 84). This began with his adaptation of Marxism to local cultures.

What was most original in Sultan-Galiev, writes Alexandre Bennigsen, was that, 'starting from the Marxian theory created in reaction to Western industrialism, he modified and adapted it to the needs of an Asiatic, and essentially agrarian, society' (Bennigsen 1958: 401). As has been shown in chapter 10, Sultan-Galiev criticized the early neglect of the political potential of the east by the Bolsheviks. Identifying with the revolutionary pan-Islamism of al-Afghānī, he also emphasized what was to become a fundamental political identification of tricontinental societies, dividing the world into the oppressors and the oppressed. Sultan-Galiev argued that colonized peoples were necessarily all proletarian because dominated by a foreign power, and that by that token, their liberation movements were socialist and progressive. His disciple, Hanafi Muzaffar, put it as follows:

The Mohammedan (colonial) peoples are proletarian peoples, for they are the only people genuinely oppressed. They are more authentically proletarian than are the English or the French proletariat. One may therefore affirm that the national movements in the Mohammedan lands have the character of a true social revolution. (Laqueur 1958: 401)

Sultan-Galiev pushed this even further, proposing a new 'Colonial International', comprising a union of colonized peoples against the industrialized nations, which he considered effectively bourgeois instruments of a metropolitan tyranny. This internationalist impulse was, however, generally less evident than his Muslim sympathies. Though it is hard to make direct connections, Sultan-Galiev's socialist form of pan-Islamism was less a precursor of the kind of ideology that formed the basis of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 than that of the original Islamic Marxist Mujahedin in Iran of 1965. Its greatest significance, however, was in founding the description of a colonized country as a proletarian nation. The identification of exploited nations as proletarian peoples would many years later become, as Abdel-Malek argues, the central thesis of tricontinental Marxism, most forcibly embodied in Mao's and Guevara's global campaign against imperialism. Guevara spoke, however, not in the name of a particular nation or people, but like Fanon, internationally, in the name of the wretched of the earth.

3 PERIOD TWO: 1928–1945

While he acknowledges the development of a new heterogeneous form of polycentric Marxism, that would become of particular significance for anti- and postcolonial theory, in the work of Gramsci and Togliatti in this period, Abdel-Malek makes the common assumption that little progress occurred either theoretically or practically on the communist anti-colonial front between 1928 and 1945. His emphasis on the weakness of theoretical material in this period needs to be qualified in one important

respect: substantive advances were in fact taking place at both a practical and theoretical level in the development of a distinctive, tricontinental Marxism. It was by no means the case that communist anti-colonial activism disappeared after 1928. In fact, the 1928 Comintern Congress, held after a four-year gap, placed more emphasis on the colonial liberation movements than ever before, perhaps as a result of Stalin's complete control of the Comintern apparatus. It rebuked the European communist parties for their 'indifference' towards mass movements in the colonies, and gave instructions that such movements should be energetically supported both in the metropolitan centres and in the colonies themselves (Comintern 1929c). The Sixth Comintern Congress also initiated a series of strategic, practical and organizational initiatives. These were less legible or visible than the earlier debates of the Comintern congresses, but were in many ways more useful at a local political level, being concerned with the practical building up of a party and related national organizations, trade unions, women's and youth groups that would provide the resources and mass support necessary for the socialist independence movements which were to emerge fully-formed, as it were, after the Second World War. To take a specific and important example, it will be argued in the following two chapters that, contrary to widespread assumptions (e.g. Wallerstein 1961: 146) that the Bolsheviks and the Comintern neglected Black Africa in the pre-war period, in fact Soviet involvement was significant from the late 1920s on, and laid the basis for the orientation of many post-war anti-colonial movements, and subsequent independent African states, towards the communist bloc.

The first of these moves directed by the Comintern had already been anticipated in February of the previous year with the holding of the 1927 Anti-colonial Conference in Brussels, organized by the International Labour Defence, a communist organization run by the German communist Willi Münzenberg. This remarkable conference was attended by about 180 delegates from thirty-four countries from five continents, including Max Bloncourt, the Antillean Parisian lawyer from the Union Inter-coloniale (Section des vieilles Colonies et Peuples noirs), Virandranath Chattopadhyaya of the Indian National Congress, Clements Dutt, brother of R. Palme Dutt, the Cambridge-based Indian theoretician of the British Communist Party, J. T. Gumede, President of the South African National Congress, Messali Hadj, founder and leader of the (then) radical Algerian anti-colonial movement Etoile Nord-Africaine, Mohammed Hatta of Indonesia, Ho Chi Minh, founder of the Union Inter-coloniale in 1922, Ali Jinnah, Jomo Kenyatta, Garan Kouyaté, Secretary General of the Ligue pour la Défense de la Race Nègre, J. A. La Guma, the communist ANC leader, R. B. Moore, variously described as representing Garvey's UNIA or the American Negro Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru, the radical Marxist and pan-African nationalist Lamine Senghor, Chairman of the LDRN, Ibrahim Yousseff from Egypt – as well as western sympathizers such as Albert Einstein. Other countries from as far afield as Syria, Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico, Haiti and Peru were also represented.

As a result of this successful inaugural conference, the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (subsequently known as the League Against Imperialism), with Jawaharlal Nehru as its honorary president, was established in Berlin

(Germany being judged the most suitable European base, since it was no longer an imperial power), with offices in London and Paris, and branches in India, Mexico, North Africa and China. Fenner Brockway, the well-known anti-imperialist British Socialist MP (Independent Labour Party), and former Joint Secretary of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, was elected chairman. The League took over some of the functions in the realm of anti-imperialism that had previously been the responsibility of the Comintern and the now disbanded League for the Liberation of the East. While the Comintern produced a news bulletin, *Inprecorr*, and the Union Inter-coloniale a pro-communist journal *Le Paris*, the League published *The Anti-Imperialist Review*, as well as an *Information Bulletin*, the *Journal des Peuples Opprimés*, *Châînes*, and many radical pamphlets and broadsheets on colonial topics. A second conference was held in Frankfurt in 1929 (Geiss 1974; Hooker 1967: 11; Jones 1996; Langley 1973: 304–12; League Against Imperialism 1931, 1935; Padmore 1956; Wilson 1974). Being based outside the Soviet Union was in many ways a more practical arrangement, facilitating freer contact with activists in the imperial centres and the colonies, and creating a public pressure group on colonial matters in the capital cities of the imperial governments. The League established links directly with anti-colonial activists in the colonies, as well as through liaison with the European communist parties. It also enabled the Comintern to decide that it would no longer leave anti-colonial activities to the initiative of communist parties operating in the imperial centres, but would take over their organization itself. At the same time, a number of training institutes were set up in Moscow. A special African Studies programme was instituted at the Moscow Scientific Research Association for the Study of National and Colonial Problems for training Soviet and African students. This, together with the University of Toilers of the East (KUTVU), and the Academy of Red Professors, provided an important institutional facility for linking with, and training, anti-colonial activists in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Lenin University, which was attended mostly by students from the west, also counted many black Americans, including some Garveyites, among its number (Padmore 1956: 318; Wilson 1980: 79). Chinese students went to Sun Yat Sen University, including (bizarrely) the son of the nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, who was subsequently responsible for liberalizing the nationalist regime in Taiwan.

The international basis of the Moscow campuses was not in itself unusual. In an informal way, the same thing occurred in London, Paris and Lisbon, as well as in Harlem in New York and universities elsewhere in the United States. Much anti-colonialism was conducted in Europe and America by expatriates who came to the metropolitan capitals either for university education or because they were forced to live in exile, because of their political activities, in the more liberal regimes of the imperial centres (trade unions and communist parties, for example, were often outlawed in the colonies but legal in Europe), or because their participation in the armies of the Great War deprived them of the right to return home. In the conditions of much greater political freedom of expression and availability of 'seditious' literature that existed in the metropolises than in the colonies, their experience of exile had the same effect as on more recent postcolonial diaspora communities: it encouraged them

to define their own political and cultural identities, and enabled them to develop the theoretical and philosophical basis for their politics. 'The revolutionaries of that period', as Abdel-Malek puts it, 'lived within the framework of . . . a *dialogue* with the metropolis; and it was with the left within that metropolis that the discussion began' (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 89). The Brussels anti-colonial conference was in large part made up of such diasporic activists. Anti-colonialism, like postcolonialism, was partly driven and predominantly articulated by these diasporic figures, the product of the movements across borders of intellectual-politicians who typically incorporated the experience of western as well as indigenous ideas into their thinking. The focus of their interest in western ideas was, it goes without saying, anti-colonial struggle, and they demonstrated an extraordinary ability to make use of any available arguments that could be adapted to anti-colonial ideologies.

Some colonial subjects, such as Fanon and Gandhi, studied in the capital and then moved to work in other colonies where they developed their fundamental anti-colonial stance. Others, such as Ben Bella of Algeria, received their military training in colonial armies before participating in the liberation struggle (Ben Bella served as a sergeant in the French army in Indochina). This situation had one other particular effect, namely that it meant that the anti-colonialism developed strategically by exiles outside the home colonized country tended to be almost entirely dominated not just by men, but as a result, by male perspectives. While women were active in nationalist movements, few of them left, or were obliged to leave, their home countries. While abroad, the anti-colonial activists, as Nkrumah recounts, were often assisted by sympathetic left-wing European women. Where they were socialists, when the exiles returned they cemented any alliances that had been forged between feminist and nationalist movements. In other cases of returning political leaders, for example Gandhi or Kenyatta, the issue was more complex. The rest, as they say, is history: postcolonialism has been in part driven and defined by the need to continue women's liberation struggles after the first victories of national liberation.

4 PERIOD 3: AFTER 1945

While 1917 marks the moment when the status quo of imperial power politics was irretrievably shattered, the Bolshevik revolution did not bring about any immediate reversals to the situation of colonized peoples, and, imperial Russia aside, no colony apart from Ireland gained independence between 1917 and 1945. The conditions, however, were certainly more propitious: apart from the Soviet Union, other powers such as Germany and Japan offered material and moral support to indigenous anti-colonial organizations. German interest in following national emancipation movements in the colonies goes back to the 1880s; as Lenin notes, these were documented in the journal *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (Lenin 1968: 248). The Germans were active in supporting Irish and Indian nationalists during the First World War. After the First World War, Afrikaner nationalists became increasingly sympathetic to Nazi Germany which presented itself as resisting the Anglo-Saxon hegemony that had been

achieved after the war and now appeared to have Europe surrounded. The Nazis followed German imperial tradition in giving active encouragement to anti-colonial resistance groups in British colonies, cultivating cells of resistance in Baghdad, Jerusalem and other cities in the British Middle East, as well as establishing links with the IRA in Ireland (Koebner and Schmidt 1964: 290; Dillon 1994; W. D. Smith 1986). Aside from discussions of the career of the Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, however, Nazi anti-imperialism perhaps predictably receives little attention today. Even in Europe, an anti-imperialist stance by no means *ipso facto* implies a leftist position: in fact the political inclinations of the regime at times made very little difference, as was the case in Britain, or in the Soviet Union, where Stalin ended by rehearsing the forms of the old Tsarist imperialism. As political ideologies, liberalism and Marxism differed from Nazi opposition to imperialism to the extent that though ideological (anti-Anglo-Saxon hegemony), it was deliberately constructed in the service of its own strategic imperialist designs. The bourgeois nationalist movements in the colonies were no exception.

Nor was Japan. As has been noted, the Japanese defeat of the Russian Empire in 1905 onwards had been heralded as an anti-colonial victory. After the so-called Tanaka Memorandum of 1927, the Japanese set out to establish a sphere of economic and political domination in Southeast Asia, called the 'sphere of prosperity', starting with the invasion of Manchuria. As they swept into the European colonies of Southeast Asia, the Japanese presented themselves as combating British, American and Dutch imperialism in the Far East, with their own conquests as liberations which would allow participating countries to operate within the Japanese Pacific economic zone. In some countries, they were welcomed as liberators during the Second World War, for example by Burmese nationalists, and by Sukarno in Indonesia (Kahin 1952; McVey 1965; Myers and Peattie 1984; Törnquist 1984: 48). In the United States, a number of African-American activists, including W. E. B. Du Bois, looked to Japan and Japanese nationalism on racial grounds as the leading nation working in a common cause against white imperialism (Lipsitz 1997: 329). Füredi remarks, 'many Africans, Asians and Caribbeans were delighted by the spectacle of a coloured nation dishing it out to Europeans' (Füredi 1994: 27).

After the Second World War, Tunisia and Libya, which had been occupied by Italy, were given independence by the allies (having first made sure that the regimes there would be 'moderate'), but elsewhere, it was apparently business, or empire, as usual, and colonies taken by the Japanese were returned to their former imperial masters. The resounding defeat of British, Dutch and French imperial power in the east by the Japanese, however, nevertheless raised expectations of ultimate self-rule, and the European powers were never able to re-establish their former imperial hegemony. During and immediately after the war, there was widespread unrest comparable to that which occurred during the First World War, ranging from rioting to the invasion of India by the Indian Liberation Army, in Algeria, British Guyana, the Bahamas, Buganda, Burma, India, Kenya, Malaya, Nigeria, the Solomon Islands and Zaire (Füredi 1994: 36–52). At the end of the war, demands had risen to a new pitch that would not countenance the kind of reassertion of control that had occurred in

1919. Britain had already promised independence to India, and in many British colonies, Gandhi's *satyagraha* appeared as the way forward, even if the British government kept trying to draw the line at India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana and so on. Other imperial powers, notably France, Holland and Portugal, were considerably more reluctant to cede independence to anyone. After the Japanese defeat, Ho Chi Minh, one of the founders of the French Communist Party, had declared Vietnamese independence; however, the country was soon retaken by the French with British and American help. They never subdued it wholly: Ho Chi Minh's army, that had formerly been fighting the Japanese, simply continued the fight against the new colonial power. This kind of continuity was also evident in Malaya, where the MPAJA (Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army) having resisted the Japanese, was quickly transformed without difficulty after 1948 by the Malayan Communist Party into an army (the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army, MPABA, later to be called the MRLA, Malayan Races' Army) to fight the British attempt to regain full control of the autonomous regions. As with the Mau Mau, the British claimed victory in 1954, and left three years later. The still illegal Malayan Communist Party then continued to operate against the independent Malayan government (O'Balance 1966). Similar complex histories operating across different colonial and independent regimes could be told of guerrilla movements in the Philippines and elsewhere (Rafael 1995).

Abdel-Malek's account of this third period could well have begun with the 1941 Atlantic Charter, in which Roosevelt and Churchill declared that they respected 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them'. When asked whether this referred to the British colonies, Roosevelt and Churchill subsequently disagreed as to whether the imperial colonies, as well as the European states colonized by the Nazis, were included. Whether he intended to or not, however, Churchill had signed the death warrant of the British Empire (Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994; Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims 1942; Parliamentary Peace Aims Group 1941). From the moment of the establishment of the UN at the San Francisco conference in 1945, anti-imperialism and decolonization became major issues on the international agenda (Ferrari Bravo 1981). Subsequently, despite the declaration of the Atlantic Charter, the USA played an ambivalent role, supporting independence movements while at the same time attempting to suppress them if they showed leftist leanings. It did finally agree to the establishment of a neocolonial republic in its own colony the Philippines in 1946. It was also effectively the US that defeated Britain and France at Suez. Above all, though, it was the Soviet Union and then communist China that supported the ever-growing national liberation movements around the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. These took different forms, in the sense that in Africa anti-colonialism was largely directed against white settlers and the old imperial powers. In Asia, on the other hand, the presence of communist China and the Korean War of 1950–3 meant that the liberation struggles became part of a different context of Cold War power struggles (into which the African liberation movements were eventually drawn). This resulted in the United States playing a very different role in the two continents. While it was content

to see African states become independent, it took a very different attitude to those countries in its own imperial domain in Asia and Latin America. It was the conjunction of the attempt to maintain these interests, notably in the war in Vietnam, with its continuing stance of supporting (or setting up) corrupt autocratic governments in South America for its own business interests against a whole series of populist movements, that led to the United States becoming the primary focus for anti-imperialist campaigns in the 1960s. This coincided in two continents: Asia and South America. In Asia, the campaign was led by China and Vietnam. In South America, by Cuba.

The Second World War did not end war outside Europe. Abdel-Malek emphasizes how, for tricontinental societies,

the war continued everywhere. . . . That explains why the notion of 'world peace' after 1945 seems so remote, exotic even, to the peoples of the three continents. At peace, with whom? . . . Imperialist hegemony has hardened progressively in a climate of generalized violence from one end of the world to the other. (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 91)

However, this violence was also a symptom of the fact that the tide was turning – not only with Indian independence in 1947, but in many ways more significantly, the revolution in China in 1949. The colonial situation was decisively transformed between 1947 and 1957. The success of the communists in China in 1949 had a similar kind of effect in colonial countries that the Bolshevik revolution had had in Europe. For the first time, a non-white, formerly semi-colonized country achieved an independent communist government through a military campaign: national liberation and socialist revolution had been brought together. The success of Mao Zedong, after many years of struggle against both the nationalists and the Japanese, put new energy and resources into anti-colonial struggles in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. As Stalinism rigidified in Europe, the transformation of Marxist ideology outside Europe was facilitated by the development of an alternative tricontinental communism in China within the Chinese Communist Party. The reversals and disasters of Comintern policy in China had ended with the accession to power of someone who had also fallen from official favour, if not actually expelled from the party: Mao Zedong. With the Long March of 1934–5, the CCP removed itself to Yenan and consolidated its autonomy. By the time that Mao became Chairman of the Party in 1937, the Comintern was powerless to intervene against him. The development of Mao's form of Chinese communism, rooted in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry rather than the urban proletariat, was to have a profound effect on tricontinental nationalism on the left. For the first time, here was a Marxism in power that had been reconstructed in response to the realities of tricontinental societies. No longer would communists only have one 'official' model, which had to be applied in contexts to which it bore little relation.

China, Egypt, Bandung

1 MAO AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

With the problems of the Comintern, the tricontinental anti-colonial movements had become disparate and politically less effective in international terms, even if struggles continued at a local level. This situation changed dramatically with the triumph of Mao Zedong against the armies of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. For the first time, a socialist revolution had taken place outside the west (Russia being a Europeanized border state between west and east). China, of course, had never been formally colonized by the Europeans and the US, or completely colonized by the invading Japanese (despite many military successes, they never occupied the whole country). Nevertheless, its semi-colonial status meant that in practice Mao's victory operated as an inspiration both to political activists in colonized countries and to those in other semi-colonies, particularly those of Latin America. Mao's revolution was anti-imperialist rather than anti-colonialist, in the sense that it was first fought against the invading armies of Imperial Japan, and subsequently against the forces of the landlord classes and bourgeois nationalists who were supported by the United States and Britain. This fact both dominated his ideas and his rhetoric and was shared with, or transmitted to, other tricontinental revolutionaries, in comparable situations, such as Il-song Kim, Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara. The Chinese Revolution was also particularly important in emphasizing how in the 'semi-colonies' of China and Latin America, nationalism could represent the forces of reaction as well as liberation and required a further revolution if political sovereignty was going to be accompanied by social and individual emancipation. Mao developed a radical reappraisal of the relation of national to socio-economic liberation, and emphasized the necessity of making Marxist principles responsive to the specificities of local conditions, particularly in relation to the role of the peasantry and the agrarian question. Mao's commitment to the cause of the peasants against the landlords was accompanied by a revision of communist politics that would transform the revolutionary potential of peasant societies throughout the three continents. It was in this sense that Mao represented for many both the example and the possibility of tricontinental revolution on its own

terms. After Mao, liberation movements in Asia, Africa and America were increasingly inclined to identify with the peasantry rather than the urban proletariat and to present themselves as peasant revolutions. The communist commitment to the urban proletariat as the only vanguard revolutionary force had been a constant impediment to its political success in the predominantly rural tricontinental societies.

In chapter 11, where the disastrous policy of the Comintern in China was briefly outlined, we left Mao at the point at which he had been dismissed as Director of the Chinese Communist Party Peasants' Department, on account of his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, which had argued for the primacy of the peasantry as a revolutionary force. After the decimation of the Communist Party in 1927, and the ensuing Long March, Mao assumed leadership of the party, and, relying largely on guerrilla tactics, led it into an uneasy alliance with the Guomindang against the Japanese. Always distrustful of each other, after the defeat of Japan by the US they proceeded to wage war on each other. Mao was eighteen at the time of the Chinese Revolution in 1911. All of Mao's adult life took place in a situation of war: war with the Japanese, war with the Guomindang, who were not entirely defeated but evacuated to Taiwan, and indirect war with the Americans, who supported the Guomindang, the Guomindang in Taiwan, the South Koreans (Mao's son was killed in the Korean War in 1950) and the various puppet regimes in South Vietnam, where the Americans were defeated only the year before Mao died. Consequently, much of Mao's five-volume *Selected Works* are concerned with these wars. His experience of a life of war, war within China, followed by war in the nations on China's borders, was to have a profound effect on his thinking, which always operated from a basic scenario of antagonistic battle lines drawn up between opposing forces, either internal versus external, or internal versus internal.

Neither Stalin nor Trotsky in Moscow were able to grasp the radical division within Chinese society between the cities, which possessed a small urban proletariat, and the countryside which was still ruled by a powerful landlord class which held sway over the poor peasantry – so ingrained was this difference that, despite fifty years of communism, the deep dichotomy in Chinese society between the country and the city continues to obtain in China today (despite Mao's claim that it would be abolished in a communist society; Mao 1965, I: 345). In Mao's day, even this division simplified the complex heterogeneity of the social structure of Chinese society, which also contained an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, an army of bureaucrats, intellectuals, professional soldiers, bandits and the dispossessed rural poor, all of them subject to the authority of the clan system as well as local and state forms of political power. In this situation, Mao's insight was to recognize that the rural peasantry rather than the urban proletariat constituted the fundamental revolutionary force and power base in China. Mao's divergence from the Comintern's attempt to impose classical Marxist categories on tricontinental societies was already present in his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* (Mao 1965, I:23–59). The Comintern recognized the significance of the peasantry and considered it important to mobilize them: Lenin himself had argued in 1920 that 'peasants' soviets, soviets of the exploited, are a weapon that can be employed, not only in capitalist countries but also in countries

with precapitalist relations . . . this includes backward and colonial countries' (Lenin 1968: 598). However, the peasants were never considered in themselves as a potential vanguard of revolution, and it was assumed that they could never lead or win a war in a mixed economy of rural peasantry and sophisticated industrialized urban society which appeared to resemble that which had existed in Russia in 1917. For this reason, Comintern emphasis was always placed on the role of the party and the urban proletariat. However, the Japanese invasion, the powerful role of the nationalist Guomintang war lords, whose armies the Comintern had itself helped to train, meant that the situation in China was very different. In his rejected *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, Mao reported on the widespread spontaneous peasant organizations that had been established to fight the primary form of tyranny in the countryside, that of the landlords. The Guomintang had condemned these organizations that arose from the very poorest groups of peasants as 'a movement of the riffraff'. Mao glossed this comment as follows:

In short, all whom the gentry had despised, those whom they had trodden into the dirt, people with no place in society, people with no right to speak, have now audaciously lifted up their heads. They have not only lifted up their heads but taken power into their hands. They are now running the township peasant associations (at the lowest level), which they have turned into something fierce and formidable. (Mao 1965, I: 29–30)

These 'riffraff', these destitute, subaltern peoples, Mao argued, possessed the real power for revolutionary change in China, and it was they who had been in the vanguard of revolutionary change in the overthrow of the forces of feudalism; correspondingly, they were most responsive to a Communist Party leadership which believed in their movement and their many achievements (Mao listed fourteen). With the subsequent debacle of Comintern policy, Mao proceeded to align the Communist Party with the masses of the peasantry in his struggle against the Japanese and the Guomintang. Mao never lost his fundamental belief in the power and worth of the peasantry: it was he who stopped regarding them as a problem, a constituency that needed to be politicized for a progressive politics, as the Bolsheviks had done, and recognized them as a powerful, radical political force for change. This shift towards the peasantry gained an immediate response in all colonial and dependent non-industrialized countries where revolutionary models based on the existence of an industrial proletariat were rarely appropriate.

2 CONTRADICTION IN MAO

Mao also inflected Marxist theory in a populist, Chinese direction. This is most evident in his two essays on contradiction of 1937 and 1957 (Mao 1965, I: 311; V: 384), in which he, according to Althusser, also provides the fullest account of the specificity of Marxist dialectics (Althusser 1977: 182). In Mao, dialectics are theorized as an uneven contradiction of internal antagonistic forces which produce change: 'external

causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change . . . external causes become operative through internal causes'. He explains this through the example of the Russian Revolution:

The October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new epoch in world history as well as in Russian history. It exerted influence on internal changes in the other countries in the world, and, similarly and in a particularly profound way, on internal changes in China. These changes, however, were effected through the inner laws of development of these countries, China included. (Mao 1965, I: 314)

Corresponding to this emphasis on the production of change through inner forces, Mao emphasized the role of subjective as well as objective forces in history, a significant revision of classical Marxist theory which opened the way for the idea of a new non-individualist humanism under tricontinental socialism developed by Fanon and Che Guevara – as well as the basis for Althusser's essay on 'Contradiction and Overdetermination' (Althusser 1977: 87–128). It was Mao too who first made the radical argument for the power of the superstructural elements in society to change the base:

In certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. . . . The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, 'Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement'. . . . When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes becomes principal and decisive. (Mao 1965, I: 336)

Mao's argument thus works both ways. He is not simply proposing the significance of cultural factors in bringing about change: he is also suggesting that cultural and political factors can help to obstruct change, and themselves therefore require a cultural revolution to be directed against them. This radical theoretical reorientation was grounded in Mao's belief in the agency and power of the masses and in the cultural and political intelligence of the peasantry. Against Stalin, Mao believed in the spontaneity of the masses, emphasized their ability to turn their weakness into power, and argued that the peasants possessed forms of knowledge inaccessible to intellectuals (Mao 1965, IV: 243). His theory of the 'mass line' represented an extension of his fundamental belief in the necessity of incorporating the participation of the people in the political process (Mao 1965, V: 50). At the same time, the mass line was about reaching the masses, mobilizing them, translating the ideas of the party into the actions of the masses and making the party responsive to the contributions of the people. This emphasis on the active participation of the people was particularly attractive in the context of the Russian descent into bureaucracy and party elites remote from the hardships of everyday life. One of the most revolutionary aspects of Mao, still subject to reactionary dismissals, was his belief in the culture of ordinary people.

Behind this affirmation in the role of ordinary people, particularly the peasantry, lay Mao's awareness that the communist victory did not in itself make the divisions that had operated so fiercely within China since 1911 suddenly disappear. The necessity of forging alliances with potential enemies against a common enemy had led him to develop a more nuanced view of the operations of dialectics within a society than a simple class division. For Mao, it was not simply a question of locating the contradiction within Chinese society, but of isolating the principal contradiction among many at any strategic moment. Mao saw contradictions within society as themselves uneven, and therefore the principal contradiction could itself exhibit principal and non-principal aspects. At both the political and military levels, it was therefore a question of determining tactics and strategies in a complex environment. Mao's analysis of the situation in China was far removed from the straightforward western concepts of class war, and in theoretical terms came much closer to the heterogeneous diversity of postcolonial societies. In the 1930s, Mao identified imperialism as occupying the principal contradiction in China, with contradictions such as that between feudalism and the popular forces of the peasantry as secondary. By the 1950s, he argued that the principal contradiction lay within the Chinese people themselves. In his important 1957 speech, 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People', Mao admitted that 'class struggle is by no means over', and considered the different antagonisms still operating within Chinese society. He sought to distinguish between overt counter-revolutionaries, whom he argued should be repressed, and the politics of differences between different groups, such as the working class, the peasantry, industrialists and businessmen, intellectuals, and national minorities. Mao argued against the imposition of a party line that stifled criticism, arguing that Marxist thought was strong enough, and, in a free environment of discussion, would develop further 'through struggle'. Mao thus advocated tolerance of a heterogeneity from which the truth of Marxist ideas would emerge and be recognized by all. For this reason, he also held that 'different forms and styles in art should develop freely and different schools in science should contend freely'. The slogans, 'Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend', and 'Long-term coexistence and mutual supervision', gave expression to Mao's attempt to reformulate a Leninist democratic centralism 'in the light of China's specific conditions' (Mao 1965, V: 408–11; Mao 1989: 131–89). These ideas, however, were subsequently honoured more in the breach than the observance in China: in practice it was hard for the state and local political activists to draw the line between counter-revolutionaries and non-antagonistic dissent, particularly in the face of resistance to policies of collectivization and the like.

3 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

'Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative' (Mao 1970: 120). Mao's belief in peasant wisdom sustained his campaign against continuing counter-revolutionary bourgeois culture and bureaucratic systems in China. His insistence

that the forces of reaction survive changes in the economic base and must be countered through further superstructural revolution was developed, with Lin Piao, during the power struggles of the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1968. The Cultural Revolution realized Mao's radical revision of the precepts of orthodox Marxism which held that a change in the economic base would transform the cultural superstructure: 'The aim of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution is to revolutionize people's ideology and as a consequence to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in all fields of work' (Mao 1970: 125–6). Mao was always concerned with the problem of how social practices and ideology continue despite the change to socialism and the consequent transformation of the economic base. He was quite realistic about the continuation of anti-revolutionary forces within the social fabric. Though also a product of a power struggle within the Chinese leadership, the cultural revolution signalled the necessity for a second revolution that would transform the fabric of society – a concept that activists in the west and elsewhere found attractive. It also led theorists such as Althusser to redefine ideology (leading to his famously problematic identification of ideology as eternal), and to consider the ways in which institutions and other elements of the social fabric operated as forces resisting change (Althusser 1971). Maoist theory became highly influential among radical left intellectuals in the 1960s, and was particularly marked in the work of Althusser and the Parisian *Tel Quel* group (Barthes, Kristeva, Sollers, Derrida), whose iconoclastic work has been taken to mark the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism (Culler 1975). The profound influence of Maoist theory and the politics of the Cultural Revolution on Althusser's work has been demonstrated by Gregory Elliott; the degree to which French poststructuralism more generally involved what amounted to a Maoist retheorization of European political and cultural theory, as well as its complex connections to Indian postcolonialism, which has also been deeply affected by Maoism, remain as yet unexplored (Althusser 1966; Elliott 1987). The Cultural Revolution can also be traced in its effect on Mao's own writing, which shifted from the elegant, classical style to be found in the *Selected Works* to a much more radical form. During the Cultural Revolution, instead of making policy statements, he issued a succession of abrupt, imperative directions, providing a theoretical input to the masses on a day-to-day basis that established a close link between his ideas and day-to-day practice. At the same time, his older discursive works were re-edited into a collection organized by topic, the famous Little Red Book of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung*. Mao's ideas were thus dispersed and disseminated as terse observations and fragments. This was in itself an example of the policy of the mass line, making his ideas at once accessible and sententious. Millions of copies of the Little Red Book were printed. The demonstrators of the Cultural Revolution would famously be seen brandishing the red plastic cover of the thoughts of Chairman Mao in the air, transforming them into a reified weapon in the ideological war, and giving Mao's thought iconic status as a physical signifier of political will and social truth.

The problem with the Cultural Revolution lay with the difficulty already outlined between the doctrines of letting flowers bloom and eliminating counter-revolutionaries. On the one hand, the sixteen Articles of the Resolutions of the

Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP (1966), argued that 'a strict distinction must be made between the two different types of contradiction: those among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy. Contradictions among the peoples must not be made into contradictions between ourselves and the enemy. . . . It is normal for the masses to hold different views. Contention between different views is unavoidable, necessary and beneficial' (Mao 1970: 121). On the other hand, the Articles themselves encouraged a view of the Cultural Revolution as a largely negative project based on the presupposition that

although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a come-back. The proletariat must do just the opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. (Ibid.: 117–18)

The struggle, it was argued, would 'take a very, very long time'; the Cultural Revolution was merely the first in a process of 'uninterrupted revolution'. This perspective encouraged the reification of divisions, with proletariat culture apparently fixed for the moment in a single antagonism of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary classes designed to sweep away the superstructural elements impeding the transformation of the economic base (Amin 1981; Dirlik, Healy and Knight 1997; Milton, Milton and Schurmann 1977; Schram and Bastid, 1973).

After 1956 and the China–Russia split, much of the Third World allied itself ideologically with China. Its revival of the revolutionary spirit, its willingness to give apparently disinterested substantive support to liberation movements or hard-pressed front-line tricontinental states, particularly in Mozambique, South Africa, Southwest Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, its populist orientation towards the peasantry and the need for an agrarian revolution, towards struggle from below, and its emphasis on guerilla warfare and armed struggle against imperialism, was a major change which affected and encouraged all liberation movements in the three continents, particularly in Latin America (Mazrui 1993: 804–6). Mao's peasant revolution laid the basis for the tricontinental reorientation of Marxism in Fanon, Cabral and Guevara. The mild socialist nationalism of the bourgeois elite practised by Nasser and Nehru was already surpassed.

4 EGYPT

Some of the most significant revolutionary movements of this early period were not national liberation movements proper – in the sense of wresting independence from a colonial power. This aspect was certainly originally present in China with respect to Japan, but the real revolution operated against the Guomindang. Similarly, the political significance of Egypt did not derive from an anti-colonial revolution, for theoretically it had been independent since 1922. Nevertheless, Egypt had long been the

emblem of anti-colonial resistance. From 1805 onwards, Egypt under Muhammad 'Alī had been the model of a colonized nation (at that time under the Ottoman Empire) that had been able to achieve a wide degree of political independence by developing a successful army and a strong industrial and agricultural economic base. In political terms, Egypt oscillated between a desire for autonomy within the empire, full independence, and becoming an imperial power itself. In practical terms, under Muhammad 'Alī, and subsequently his grandson Ismail, Egypt developed an advanced economy, a modern infrastructure of port facilities, roads, railways and telegraphs, a highly developed national educational system, a flourishing press and international literary and cultural environment, as well as a powerful military machine. In response to the increasing interventions of the European powers, beginning with the Treaty of London in 1840 and ending with the British invasion of Egypt in 1882, Egypt developed a powerful cultural nationalism that consistently resisted British domination, even if its army was unable to resist the power of the Gatling gun. Despite the British occupation, and Cromer's subsequent deindustrialization which converted the country into an economic satellite of the Lancashire cotton industry, Egypt's procedures of successful economic, military and cultural self-empowerment provided a model of secular modernization for all nations, either already colonized, such as India, Ireland or those of the Maghreb, or threatened with colonization, such as Japan or Turkey (Ajayi 1989: 355; Mitchell 1988). It was the Egyptian nationalist intellectual Duse Muhammed Ali, London editor of the pan-Africanist *African Times and Orient Review* (1912–18), and author of the fiercely nationalist *In the Land of the Pharaohs* (1911), who was to provide one of the main sources of inspiration to Marcus Garvey.

5 NASSER

Britain formally declared a protectorate over Egypt in 1914, but nationalist resistance led by Sa'd Zaghlūl, leader of the al-Wafd al-Misri party, culminated in the 1919 revolution which succeeded in mobilizing all sections of Egyptian society, including women who campaigned with public demonstrations, against British rule. In March 1922 Britain recognized Egypt's declaration of independence, which had been formally declared the previous month. However, under the rule of King Fu'ād I Egypt effectively remained under British jurisdiction, the more so as a result of his bitter disputes with the Wafd (Boahen 1985: 585; Vatikiotis 1991). Nasser's revolution in 1952 against a compliant monarchy had therefore been long in coming. It was relatively slow in evolving: directly influenced by Gandhi's non-violence, Nasser refused to authorize the execution of King Farouk on the grounds that 'a revolution born of blood will die in blood' (Mazrui 1993: 116). In 1954 Nasser assumed full political control and negotiated the withdrawal of British troops. His major intervention, and achievement of real independence for Egypt, however, came in 1956. Distrusting Nasser's nationalist regime, the US and UK decided against financing the Aswan Dam: Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal. The Suez Crisis, in which the Israelis, British and French successfully invaded Egypt but were then forced to

withdraw after pressure from the US and the USSR, for the British at least marked the first moment of clear colonial defeat in the modern period (the French, who sought to strike a decisive blow at Nasser, whom they regarded as the main source of support for the FLN in Algeria, took solace in the fact that for once they had at least initially achieved a colonial military victory) (Clayton 1994: 124–5).

The Suez Crisis turned Nasser into an international hero among the three continents overnight, one of the undisputed leaders of the non-aligned nations, and the central figure contesting western domination of the Middle East, particularly after the Iraqi accommodation with the west in the Baghdad Pact of 1955. As with Castro and other revolutionary leaders, the longer he was in power, the more socialist Nasser became. His socialism took the form of nationalization designed to ensure economic independence, together with policies of land and wealth redistribution, an increase in health care and the de-Anglicization of the education system, all of which went a good deal further than the policies of Nehru in India. Nasser's *Philosophy of Revolution* (1954), written during the Palestinian War of 1948, gives little suggestion of a fundamental socialist approach, beyond the declaration that 'Every nation on earth undergoes two revolutions'. The first, he argues, is the political revolution of national liberation. 'The second revolution is social, in which the classes of society would struggle against each other until justice for all countrymen has been gained and conditions have become stable' (El-Nasser 1954: 23). According to his idea of concentric circles of influence expanding out of Egypt, Nasser combined pan-Arabism with pan-Islamism and pan-Africanism. Like Nkrumah with pan-Africanism, he briefly put his ideas of Arab unity into practice by joining with Syria to create the United Arab Republic in 1958.

Nasser's was a predominantly secular ideology, promoting modernization; he banned the radical Muslim Brotherhood soon after coming to power. By the time of his death in 1970 his socialism seemed limited compared to that elsewhere in Africa, while his secularism had been challenged by al-Qadhdhafi's establishment of a theocratic state in Libya after a coup, which had been modelled on Nasser's own, in 1969. Nasser's attempt to solve the problem of the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza strip ended with Egypt's disastrous defeat by Israel in the war of 1967 (Mazrui and Tidy 1984; Vatikiotis 1978). Like Nehru, despite his indisputable political and historical impact, Nasser did not develop a form of socialism that could be described as an ideological or theoretical advance for an Egyptian Marxism or a Marxism of the three continents. Although Egyptian himself, Abdel-Malek (1981) ascribes Nasser little significance in terms of the larger historico-theoretical trajectory that he develops. Rodinson shows how the political developments in the Egyptian state from the revolution onwards were generally pragmatic and responsive to circumstance: this was equally true of Nasser's close political alliance with the Soviet Union, which allowed him to combine an Arab deist socialism with autocracy, but did not enable him to develop an independent, tricontinental socialist position (Rodinson 1979: 186).

From that perspective, Ba'thism, the pan-Arab nationalist movement originally conceived as a form of Islamic socialism, which rebelled against the United Arab

Republic in 1961, represented a more original and important development. Pan-Arabism has ebbed since but has never entirely gone away. It has been a major influence on reactions to the Palestinian questions, as well as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Eikelman and Piscatori 1996; Hassan 1999). Nasser was also active in encouraging revolution in Africa, giving material and moral support to the national liberation movements. Cairo radio was a constant sore point for the British and the French, broadcasting supportive messages to the FLN in Algeria, EOKA in Cyprus and the Mau Mau in Kenya (Baulin 1962; Thompson 1969). Politically, however, Nasser's role as a leader of anti-colonial pan-Africanism always remained somewhat tenuous; after 1957 in that dimension, he was overshadowed by Nkrumah.

6 THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE OF 1955

Prior to Suez, the most significant symbolic event in Nasser's career from the point of view of the liberation struggles came with the Bandung Conference of 1955. Twenty-nine African and Asian countries participated; the leaders included Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno, Nasser and, odd-man-out geographically, though not geopolitically, Tito. The Bandung Conference gained its great symbolic power from the fact that it was effectively the first postcolonial international conference held by the newly independent countries of the former colonial world. It was, as Abdel-Malek puts it, 'the first blueprint for solidarity between the colonized countries' (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 108). The involvement of President Tito of Yugoslavia at Bandung was a statement of his independence from the Soviets. Like Tito, many of the leaders present at Bandung were socialist in inclination but determined to form a new political order oriented towards their own needs. The conference ended with a declaration calling for closer economic, cultural and diplomatic links between the countries of Africa and Asia, affirmed the principles of human rights and self-determination, and called for the end of all colonial rule in all its manifestations. Its main function at that stage was to act as a co-ordinated pressure group in order to bring this about; the conference achieved immediate political impact by inviting a representative from the FLN in Algeria (Appadorai 1955; Asian-African Conference 1955; Kahin 1956; Padmore 1956: 442-51; Romulo 1956). Although they declared that they were not intending to form a regional bloc, the *de facto* assertion by the Bandung participants of being a distinct political group constituted the first public statement of the creation of an independent transcontinental political consciousness in Africa and Asia. As the formation of a potential new power bloc, of a new 'Third World' perspective on global priorities, political, economic, and cultural, the Bandung Conference of 1955 could be said to represent a foundational moment for postcolonialism. Bandung in many ways marked the beginning of the production of 'the postcolonial' as an ideological and political position, beyond its historical descriptive reference. Indeed, 'Bandung' and 'post-colonial' sometimes function as almost synonymous terms – even to the extent of its restriction to Asia and Africa and its exclusion of Latin America.

At Bandung, the delegates also set up the institutional basis of what was to become the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which was formally initiated in 1961. The Non-Aligned Movement represented an attempt to create a new power bloc, the 'Third World', in the face of the increasingly polarized global situation between the first world, the west, and the second world, the Soviet bloc, during the Cold War. As priorities moved from decolonization to inequalities between nations, the Non-Aligned Movement also made a concerted attempt to readjust the exploitative economic relations pertaining between the west and the rest. The Non-Aligned Movement sponsored the proposal for a New International Economic Order which was then taken up at the United Nations, and subsequently incorporated into the 1974 UN Declaration and Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New Economic Order. It also provided the basis for the Group of 77, which first formed at the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and emerged as a UN caucus on development issues (Jansen 1966; Jinadu and Mandaza 1986; Müller and Sauvant 1993; Singham and Hune 1986; Willetts 1978). It cannot be claimed that as a political institution, the Non-Aligned Movement was any more successful than the Group of 77 has been at effecting a major rebalancing of the world economy, though the principles laid down have not diminished in significance and remain the goal which must be worked for and achieved. The problem with the Non-Aligned Movement was that the power structures of the Cold War in practice made non-alignment almost impossible, while the solidarity of the movement as a bloc was consistently weakened by intranational disputes. It never became, as one anxious British commentator claimed it would, 'the colour curtain' (Wright 1956). The shift towards economic priorities was a recognition of the fundamental postcolonial experience that political independence did not mean economic independence. This perception of continued forms of dependency in a world still dominated by economic imperialism contributed to a subsequent radicalization at the Havana Conference of 1966. It was at Havana that for the first time the three continents of the South – the Americas, Asia and Africa – were brought together in a broad alliance to form the Tricontinental. In contrast to Bandung, the Havana Tricontinental marked the formal globalization of the anti-imperial struggle.

Latin America I:

MARIÁTEGUI, TRANSCULTURATION AND CULTURAL DEPENDENCY

We are a product of 500 years of struggle.

Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) Manifesto

So-called 'Latin' America – but what else to call it, apart from Latin Americas? – occupies a special place in the history of anti-colonialism and its relation to postcolonial theory. Latin America's early liberation from European rule means that much of it has now been postcolonial for nearly two centuries, that its postcolonial era began before many territories became colonial, before some European imperial powers, such as Germany and Italy, had even become nations themselves. The history of resistance to Spanish and Portuguese imperialism, of anti-colonial movements in the early nineteenth century and anti-imperial movements in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries is complex, and of vast duration, stretching back over five hundred years. In terms of the independence movements, on the other hand, the significant period was comparatively short, lasting from 1808–25, although it was only in the postwar period that the Latin American colonies facing the Caribbean, such as Honduras, British and Dutch Guiana, achieved independence (Kinsbruner 1994; Lynch 1986; Lynch and Humphreys 1994; Prago 1970; Williamson 1992). And French Guiana remains French Guiana. Moreover, in a parallel fashion to the history of the US and Britain, in the twentieth century, Brazil became a far greater economic and cultural power than its former colonial master, Portugal. Such freedom in Brazil's case was tempered by its transition to a dependent relation on Britain and then the US.

The Zapatista Manifesto describing five hundred years of struggle alludes to Eduardo Galeano's powerful argument in *The Open Veins of Latin America* (1973) that the continent has been pillaged by foreign interests and their local representatives for the past five centuries without interruption. The importance of *The Open Veins* was that it developed the perspective of this *longue durée* for Latin American history – the book is subtitled *Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* – which assimilated the many different forms of exploitation that it had suffered into a common experience. As a result, instead of the relatively clear divisions between colonized and decolonized conditions, leaving the postcolonial in the time-lag of colonial modernity, in Latin America, as Alejo Carpentier famously suggested in *The Lost Steps* (*Los paros perdidos*)

(1953), there is a tendency towards the simultaneous existence of political and cultural times that elsewhere in the world follow a more typical chronological path. The simultaneous juxtaposition of feudalism and modernity, and the presence of characteristic 'third world' conditions of sometimes huge GNPs hiding inordinate inequalities in the distribution of wealth, is not so very different, however, from the conditions that obtain on other continents. Colonial modernity, as Fanon observed, always incorporates a 'time-lag' within its structures whose dynamic energy is fuelled by its transforming effects on what Roberto Schwarz calls 'misplaced ideas'. In Latin America, the contortions of the 'tricks of time' are particularly marked (Stern 1999: 135).

Since the promulgation of the Monroe doctrine of 1823, Latin America has been subject more than any other region in the world, even Southeast Asia, to neo-colonialism in the form of US imperialism: military, political and economic. The result of this domination has often involved a sense of political and economic powerlessness, and corresponding lack of cultural identity, whose ramifications and alternatives have been fully explored in Latin American Dependency theory. The response to imperialism has rarely involved a straightforward nationalism, since foreign political interests have characteristically operated in tandem with forms of internal colonialism, a feature that became particularly obvious when covert counter-revolutionary interventions by the CIA, deployed after the abject failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of revolutionary Cuba in 1961, helped to topple Goulart in Brazil in 1964 and Allende in Chile in 1973 and impose right-wing dictatorships in their place. Liberation from European rule during the years 1811 to 1825 by no means meant that the general population was restored to liberty and able to exercise self-determination in any sense. These were colonial bourgeois revolutions, carried out by *criollos*, white European settlers, as in the USA. In some countries, such as Argentina, a US-style policy of European immigration and extermination of the indigenous inhabitants facilitated the establishment of a predominantly European society. Elsewhere, for the majority of the indigenous inhabitants, things changed very little with 'independence'; for the slave population, the story was much the same (slavery was not abolished in Brazil until 1888) (Wade 1997: 31). Since then, the conditions of the peasantry, of local indigenous peoples, have if anything deteriorated with urbanization and social division; the agrarian problem of landlessness, and the deprivations of extreme poverty, have become increasingly acute. The result has been that peasant revolutions have been a constant feature of Latin American history over the past two centuries, and continue today throughout the continent. It was the Cuban revolution which brought together these different facets of South American political conditions. The revolution was achieved through the support of the peasantry. When in power, the government redistributed the land (something yet to be achieved in Brazil or Peru), confronted the situation of economic dependency which had enforced such conditions and sought to transform them. It was also the Cuban revolution which, because of its international perspective, first articulated anti-imperialism in South America and Southeast Asia with the global anti-colonial struggle at the great Havana Tricontinental of 1966.

1 MARXISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Marx and Engels' own apparent indifference to Latin America was reciprocated by a Latin American preference for the doctrines of anarchism over Marxism in the late nineteenth century. However, after the Russian Revolution communist parties were rapidly founded, in Mexico in 1919, in Argentina in 1920, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay in 1921, Ecuador and Cuba in 1925 (by Julio Antonio Mella and Carlos Baliño, the close collaborator of José Martí), and in Peru in 1930 (by José Carlos Mariátegui). From the Comintern's perspective of world revolution, Latin America was never regarded as a prospect of major significance, even if it was a revolutionary arena. Its affairs were discussed by the Latin Secretariat in Moscow, which was the responsibility of Trotsky; Gramsci was a member of the committee. The history of communist parties and the interventions of the Comintern in Latin America is complex and has been widely written about, although unfortunately the major studies predate the release of Comintern documents (Aguilar 1968; Alexander 1957; Caballero 1986; Dillon 1962; Poppino 1964). Communist parties in Latin America were no more spared the internal divisions, factionalism, opportunistic changes of policy and consequent denunciations, expulsions and purges for deviation, than communist parties elsewhere. If anything, in fact, they were more extreme, as they attempted to follow the vagaries of Comintern policies through the Revolutionary vs. Reformist split, the United Front with the nationalist bourgeoisie, Class against Class, and the Popular Front strategies. Here we are less interested in the tortuous attempts of the official communist parties to adapt to the changing line from Moscow, than in the development of forms of Marxism which reflected the specific conditions of the different Latin American societies and cultures. The founders of Latin American Marxism, as opposed to those who transmitted Stalinism to Latin America, include Recabarren of Chile, Julio Antonio Mella of Cuba, Aníbal Ponce of Argentina, and José Carlos Mariátegui of Peru. Of these, Mariátegui was the most significant.

The support of the Comintern was very much a mixed blessing for the communist parties of Latin America, as elsewhere. It was only when communist parties in the colonial, semi-colonial or dependent countries disobeyed Comintern policy, and freed themselves from it, as Mao was to do in China, that they met with any success. In South America Mariátegui remains the outstanding figure who recognized and worked against the limits of the parameters of the Stalinist model. In a speech to the First Latin American Communist Conference of 1929, Mariátegui provided a far-reaching analysis of the then recently discredited United Front tactic by which the communists in China had been required to collaborate with the nationalist Guomindang party of Chiang Kai-shek, with disastrous results. Over a year previously, that is at about the same time as the policy reversal at the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928, Mariátegui had split with the Aprista group and opposed the creation of a Latin American Guomindang. What was significant about Mariátegui's position was that unlike that of the Indian Marxist M. N. Roy, who claimed that India was sufficiently industrialized by the 1920s to develop a proletarian revolution on the classic Bolshevik model,

and therefore had no need for nationalist alliances, Mariátegui emphasized the specific conditions obtaining in Latin America, particularly the persistence of feudalism and the exploitation of indigenous peoples. The necessity of developing Marxist theory in conjunction with the particular conditions of different cultures, a position held at times by Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin but not identified with their political practice, was the central strategy of the emancipatory Marxism developed after the Second World War in the three continents. Starting with Mao's intervention in China, evident in the earlier positions of Mariátegui and Julio Antonio Mella, and fundamental to the thinking of Che Guevara, this creative and flexible form of Marxism above all focused on the role of the peasantry, either separately or in conjunction with an urban proletariat, in revolutionary movements.

2 MEXICO 1910

Mao's peasant revolution was by no means the first, even if it was the most successful. In many ways Zapata's Mexican rebellion of 1910 was the true precursor of tricontinental insurrections against exploitative power, be it colonial or neocolonial, as well as providing a continuity with postcolonial struggles in the 1990s rebellion of the Zapatistas against the Mexican government (Díaz Polanco 1997; Huizer 1973; Pineda Gómez 1997; Wolf 1971; Womack 1972). The rebellion had its origin in the local struggles of the peasantry against the big landowners, the *hacendados*, who had expropriated their land. The Zapatista struggle for land restoration, whose aims and organization coincided sympathetically with contemporary urban anarchist unrest, showed the potential power of the peasantry – together with the limits of that power in their unwillingness to make military moves out of their own territory. However, their radical aims of agrarian reform were communicated to Pancho Villa, leader of the military revolt in the north. The Zapatistas and Villistas then together called for 'liquidation of the latifundia system, the return of lands to the Indian communities, the nationalization of lands held by enemies of the Revolution and foreigners, [and] a program of land reform' (Wolf 1971: 39). Although the Zapatistas and Villistas were defeated, their programme laid down the political agenda for the victors. In 1915 the Constitutionalist General Salvador Alvarado entered Yucatan and abolished debt peonage within the state; in 1934 General Lázaro Cárdenas initiated massive land reform and labour organization, abolished the political power of hacienda owners and distributed their land among peasantry as communal village land, and nationalized the oil fields and railways. Cárdenas's combination of land redistribution and nationalization provided the model for many subsequent tricontinental socialist regimes (Galeano 1973: 139). The Mexican peasant rebellion, like many South American peasant rebellions since, was an example of what Fanon would characterize as the strengths and weaknesses of spontaneity. Unlike the revolutions in Russia, China or Vietnam, it was not led by a tightly organized revolutionary party that was capable of organizing discontent in a focused way; it was this deficiency that Guevara and Castro set about to repair. According to their *foco* strategy, a small rebel guerrilla group

would operate in the mountains among the peasantry who would slowly join them; gradually, the success of the campaign would galvanize the discontented masses, until they were finally joined by the urban proletariat (Debray 1967; Guevara 1972, I: 136–46). The alliance of vanguard intellectuals and the peasantry would be a central feature of South American radicalism and revolutionary movements to this day. The architect of that alliance was Mariátegui.

3 MARIÁTEGUI

Mariátegui was one of the most nuanced and innovative Marxist political and cultural theorists of his time. His Marxism was derived from a solid grounding in classical Marxist thought, but became more heterodox in part as a result of his awareness of contemporary developments in radical circles in Italy which he learnt about during a trip to Europe in 1919, at a time when communism was at its most empowered and innovative. In Italy he met Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, and was attracted to the voluntarism of the Turin *L'Ordine Nuovo* group which they founded in the same year. The *Ordine Nuovo* group, and Mariátegui after them, was also influenced by Sorel's ideas on morality and violence, and the neo-Hegelian idealism of Croce (Femia 1981: 81–101). Despite this, Lenin himself twice declared in 1920 that the position of *L'Ordine Nuovo* was 'in complete conformity with all of the fundamental principles of the Third International' (Gramsci 1989: 139). Mariátegui also developed an interest in the work of the radical liberal Piero Gobetti (who was himself influenced by the same intellectual sources), whom he followed in attempting to understand what he considered Peru's cultural backwardness as a product of its lack of economic development (Chavarría 1979: 68). Mariátegui maintained an internationalist perspective throughout his life, writing perceptive essays on Gandhi, Ireland, and the revolution in China. His work is centred, however, on his articulation of the cultural consequences of the economic situation of his native Peru, viewed from the perspective of Latin America more generally. It was Mariátegui who first formulated the problem of cultural dependence; his solution was influenced by *L'Ordine Nuovo* ideas (absorbed through Gobetti) of the necessity of moral regeneration and cultural renewal, and of developing a strong, revolutionary consciousness as the basis for class struggle. For Mariátegui, 'heroic' socialism in this form offered the way out of both cultural and economic dependence.

Mariátegui's position follows a clear line of argument outlined in his best-known work, the *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, published in 1927 (Mariátegui 1971). The economic evolution of Peru, he argues, provides the best means for understanding the process of the formation of the Peruvian nation from the time of the conquest to the revolution of independence to the present. 'The existing Peruvian economy, the existing Peruvian society, maintains the original sin of the conquest, the sin of having been brought forth and formed without and against the Indian' (ibid.: 59). The specific nature of Peruvian society, he argues, is the result of a bourgeoisie in league with the interests of foreign capitalists in control of the banks and

industry, who operate in alliance with the latifundistas controlling a feudal land system that exploits the indigenous peasantry. As a result, even reformist governments had failed to effect any significant improvement in conditions. The relation of the *criollos* to the peasantry, who form the vast majority of the population, is one of internal colonialism. This relation is regarded as that of an advanced (i.e. superior) to a backward (i.e. inferior) race, with the former acting in the best interests of the latter, trying to help them improve themselves. Mariátegui rejects this altogether. It was socialism, Mariátegui argues, that enables a true understanding of the realities of the situation. The problem of the Indian, as it is generally conceived, is not racial, cultural or moral but fundamentally socio-economic: 'The problem of the Indian is rooted in the land tenure system of our economy' (ibid.: 22). 'Socialism', he said, 'has taught us to pose the indigenous question in new terms. We have stopped considering it abstractly as an ethnic or moral problem' (Mariátegui 1996: 82). That was how the latifundistas, the feudal landlords, saw it, drawing on the discourse of coloniality to argue for a fundamental racial distinction according to which the Indian was primitive, weak, and had to be 'saved' by the whites. In fact, Mariátegui suggested eloquently, the Indian 'problem' was simply the consequence of their economic and social exploitation. The 'race' problem was the product of feudalism and peonage. Mariátegui's analysis of what he regarded as the fundamental problem of Peru, that of the Indian and the land, thus avoided racialization – or its liberal antithesis, the romanticization of the native.

Mariátegui was one of the first to recognize the wider implications of the revolutionary movement among the people of the east, represented by the 1920 Baku Conference: 'The revolutionary tide', he wrote in 'East and West', published in 1925, 'has not only affected the West. The East is also convulsed, restive, stormy. One of the most current and transcendent realities of modern history is the political and social transformation of the East' (Mariátegui 1996: 39). Mariátegui was one of the few communists to emphasize the political advantage and historical need for socialism of the uprising of colonial peoples, and to locate the revolutionary element in Peruvian society in the indigenous peasantry in terms of a similar revolt against an essentially colonial relationship: 'The close relationship between the indigenous movement and the world's revolutionary movements is too obvious to document' (ibid.: 81). Socialism brought him to a recognition of the importance of the Indian. Rather than looking to the urban working class, Mariátegui recognized in the long history of Indian insurrections against the feudal landowning class, a revolutionary tradition that was essentially socialist in character, in so far as it was based not only on the demand for an end to exploitation but also for a return to the communal, co-operative living of the Incan past. Like the African socialists, Mariátegui regarded the pre-colonial culture as communist before communism. This allowed him to stress the international rather than European basis of socialism, and, significantly, the possibility of developing an indigenous Marxism, a socialism responsive to the needs of Latin American societies:

Socialism is ultimately in the American tradition. Incan civilization was the most advanced primitive communist organization that history has known.

We certainly do not wish socialism in America to be a copy and imitation. It must be a heroic creation. We must give life to an Indo-American socialism reflecting our own reality and in our own language. (Ibid.: 89)

American socialism would be distinct because it would combine a common colonial culture with a radical, moral indigenous tradition that fuelled a spontaneous revolutionary consciousness. That tradition, Mariátegui argued, was not a nativist alternative but a continuing dynamic culture which was absorbing socialist ideas: 'The hope of the indigenous people is absolutely revolutionary' and it was this revolutionary impulse that provided the foundation for Marxism in Latin America (ibid.: 81). The recourse to Indian culture as a form of cultural resistance was a common feature of the *indigenismo* movement in Latin America in the 1920s, particularly in Mexico, Bolivia and Peru. Whereas other versions tended to romanticize the Indian and to promote a communal Indian life as a Tolstoyan or Gandhian return to rural culture in the face of modern industrialization and city culture, Mariátegui alone emphasized the modernity of the Indian and the social revolutionary potential of an Indian culture that had developed in response to the conquest and its aftermath.

In an exploration of the political-intellectual links between Gramsci and Mariátegui, Timothy Brennan has noted how the latter seems to translate Gramsci's notion of a domestic colonialism to Peru, so that 'the language of class wears the garments of race and ethnicity, where each of those categories corresponds to a sub-population with its own histories and traditions possessing unequal potential in providing a basis for a not-yet-realized national culture' (Brennan 1989: 47). Socialism, and a new cultural tradition, Mariátegui argued, would be built on what he called 'the new Indian'. In the journal that he founded, *Amauta*, Mariátegui proposed

the reconstruction of Peru on an Indian foundation. The new generation is recovering our true past, our true history. . . . The revolutionary *indigenistas* show an active and concrete solidarity with today's Indian.

This *indigenismo* does not indulge in fantasies of utopian restorations. It perceives the past as a foundation, not a program. Its conception of history and its events is realistic and modern. It neither ignores nor slights any of the historical facts that have modified the world's reality, as well as Peru's, in these four centuries. (Mariátegui 1996: 71)

Much of Mariátegui's writing is concerned with the attempt to construct a new Peruvian tradition at a political and cultural level in the broadest sense. Mariátegui argued that Spanish colonialism destroyed indigenous cultures and 'standardized the ethnic, political and moral physiognomy of Hispanic America. The Spaniards' methods of colonization solidarized the fate of its colonies' (ibid.: 113). Yet politically, Spanish-speaking America was Balkanized, with the result that economically each individual country functioned as a colony of Europe and North America, while 'the continent's intellectual production lacks its own characteristics. It does not have an original profile'. The cultural renewal which Mariátegui proposed assumed the dissolution of the economic and political division between the Europeans and the Indians in Peru, a dissolution that would be effected through a revolutionary socialist

framework involving the overcoming of the power of the exploitative European classes, the landowners and the urban bourgeoisie.

After his death in 1930, Mariátegui's ideas slipped into comparative obscurity until his works were republished in the 1960s. Their evident confluence with Maoism, particularly with regard to the primary revolutionary role of the peasantry, meant that his ideas were then taken up very widely on the left and exercised a major influence on the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Che Guevara, who learnt of both Mao and Mariátegui from his first wife Hilda (Becker 1993; Gadea 1973: 20; Vanden 1986). *Indigenismo* has remained a central feature of political and cultural life in a continent where hundreds of indigenous peoples, such as the Caribs, Arawak, Tupi-Guarani, speak hundreds of languages and occupy territories that extend indiscriminately across national boundaries. In certain respects rather like Gandhi in India, Mariátegui was able to draw peasant movements that had hitherto predominantly been fought on local issues, into a larger framework of radical politics. That incorporation also allowed him to make an important move in the resistance to cultural dependency, as a part of the framework for a political commitment to the many different subaltern peoples on the continent that looks forward to Darcy Ribeiro's vocal commitment to what he has termed *sobrantes*, the left-overs of society to whom Paul Freire has devoted his pedagogy of the oppressed (Freire 1972; Ribeiro 1977, 1978a, 1978b).

4 CULTURAL DEPENDENCY

To a plutocratic, imperialist North America, we can effectively counterpose only a socialist Latin or Ibero-America. (Mariátegui 1996: 89)

By the early twentieth century, the term 'dependent' was already being used specifically to describe Latin American countries in Marxist discourse – in the Sixth Congress of the Communist International of 1928, for example, discussions on the Colonial and National Questions included what were called 'the semi-colonial countries (China, India) and dependent countries (Argentine, Brazil)' (Comintern 1929a: 40–1). In 'Anti-Imperialist Viewpoint', Mariátegui begins by asking 'to what degree is the situation of Latin American republics similar to those of the semi-colonial countries?' (Mariátegui 1996: 130). He denied the similarity to the extent that there was no nationalist bourgeoisie whose anti-imperialism could be allied to an insurrectionary peasantry as in Asia. It was this perspective that caused Mariátegui to reject the Comintern argument for an alliance of the party with nationalist groups in the common cause against imperialism. In Peru, the bourgeoisie, he argued, were quite content with their nominal independence, as they profited from the country's economic subservience. This assertion of difference, he argued, was part of the need, as he put it, to 'avoid Eurocentric plagiarism and to accommodate our revolutionary activity to a precise appreciation of our own reality. . . . The nationalist factor . . . is neither decisive nor basic to the anti-imperialist struggle in our environment' (ibid.: 131).

Mariátegui argued that anti-imperialism allied to nationalism, the general Comintern prescription for the colonized, semi-colonized and dependent countries in the three continents, was not the appropriate policy for a South America whose fundamental situation was made up of class antagonism and the struggle against feudalism. 'We are', as he put it, not 'leftists (or socialists) because we are anti-imperialists . . . we are anti-imperialists because we are Marxists, because we are revolutionaries, because we oppose capitalism with socialism' (ibid.: 132–5).

Mariátegui's criticisms of what he regarded as the overestimation of the anti-imperialist movement, and his rejection of the notion of a 'struggle for a "second independence"', were based on his insistence that the realities and problems of South America were its feudalism as well as its exploitation by an external power. The basic Comintern party line emphasizing anti-imperialism outside the west would, however, survive into the period after the Second World War and develop into what is probably the best-known aspect of Latin American social and political theory, Dependency theory. Latin American Dependency theory was a counter-discourse to the theory and practices of Development that had been initiated so enthusiastically by Truman in 1945.

Latin American Dependency theory has already been discussed in chapter 4. The fact that it was brought in at that point as a necessary part of any account of postcolonial conditions signals the extent to which it is not regarded as regionally specific, but as one of the fundamental theoretical concepts of the postcolonial condition. In fact, what is remarkable and in many ways largely unacknowledged is that Latin American Dependency theory is the one theoretical innovation that has become part of mainstream Marxism, the one area in which the revisionary reach of tricontinental Marxism has been accepted by the upholders of orthodoxy and the so-called classical tradition. Its extension into world systems theory, again of particular interest to those living outside the west, has been less widely accepted. Having said that, the intervention of Dependency theory has for the most part been restricted to the economic sphere. Its cultural adjunct has not received anything like the same degree of attention, even though its pertinence to tricontinental societies remains substantial.

Though underdevelopment may have been from one perspective an accurate description of an economy, there was no simple correlation between economic underdevelopment and a cultural underdevelopment. In the nations of South and Central America, cultures were highly developed and approached any legacy of dependency from a much more robust activist position (Adelman 1999). The critiques of development theory in Latin America are notable for generating resistance to the phenomenon of dependency: at a political level this was symbolized by the Cuban revolution in 1959 against the corrupt regime in thrall to US interests. Revolutionary activity in South America, which has a long history, has been accompanied by a wider range of cultural writings which have challenged dependency, and concentrated on the articulation of forms of cultural autonomy through concepts such as transculturation, hybridity and, in the lively Modernist period, anthropophagy. All these concepts share a preoccupation with cultural contact and mixing, but of a very specific kind. In Fernando Ortiz the concept of transculturation operates as a product of the people;

Ortiz rejects the term 'acculturation' because it implies the assimilation of indigenous groups to the dominant culture: 'the real history of Cuba', he declares, 'is the history of its intermeshed transculturations', the effects of cultural translations through processes of geographic migrations' (Ortiz 1995: 98). Transculturation does not describe cultural contact as such, nor the cultural synthesis that may be its eventual product, but the moment of passage from one culture to another in which different heterogeneous cultures collide and ferment in a concoction or stew (Pérez Firmat 1989: 22–7). This disarray also enables the reinvention and reinscription of cultural materials that may have been transmitted by a culturally dominant group, so that forms of modernity, for example, can be refashioned and reinflected. The seething turmoil of the concoction, according to Ortiz's brilliant neologism, describes the cultural and political situation of Cuba. In *Transculturación narrativa en América Latina* (1982), Angel Rama rejects notions of intercultural transfers which emphasize the dominant role of the transferring culture, whether externally and internally, and instead adopts Ortiz's concept of transculturation in order to demonstrate the impact of indigenous texts on other kinds of Latin American narratives. Martin Lienhard has shown how the practices of Andean popular culture emerge in a cultural diglossia whereby 'the language, discourses and icons of the colonial power serve to disguise and preserve a forbidden native content' (Lienhard 1991; Rowe 1995: 72). Brazilian and Hispano-Caribbean writers whose societies are rather different from those of the Andes, such as Roberto Fernández Retamar and García Canclini, on the other hand, have emphasized hybridity as a central feature of Latin American culture that facilitates 'strategies for entering and leaving modernity' and cultural empowerment in the process (Canclini 1995: 1). This disjunctive relation to modernity through forms of cultural mobility contrasts with the more dialectical position taken by South Asian cultural theorists such as Chatterjee and Nandy. For Retamar, on the other hand, the hybridity of a Latin America situated at the geocultural periphery of the world involves a marginalized otherness that conceals its revolutionary potential (Retamar 1989).

This body of work links the analysis of colonial and postcolonial identities to their neocolonial conditions and the development of forms of resistance to them. Though distinct and highly innovative in its own cultural and political trajectory, it cannot now be simplistically disassociated from similar notions developed in postcolonial theory elsewhere, and a certain amount of theoretical transculturation is taking place. So, for example, Roberto Schwarz begins with the experience of the ideological subordination and cultural imitativeness that accompanies Latin America's economic dependence: 'We Brazilians and other Latin Americans constantly experience the artificial, inauthentic and imitative nature of our cultural life'. His work, however, is designed to transform the sense of alienation attached to this secondariness, this failure to produce an authentic imitation of European culture, into something else, something distinctively (if always inauthentically) Brazilian. The negative view of the malaise of the Brazilian cultural condition is only the perspective of the cosmopolitan elite of the upper classes. Imitation, Schwartz argues, also involves the translation of 'cultural transplantation', and the productive generation of 'misplaced ideas'. Brazilian culture can be seen to be made up, not of pale imitations, but of active off-centre

transformations such as tropicalism (Schwarz 1992: 1, 15, 140–2) This process applies equally to the realm of concepts and ideas where recognition of the use of what Partha Chatterjee calls a derivative discourse is accompanied by an equal, if as yet unachieved, insistence on its transformation:

Ideas are in place when they represent abstractions of the process they refer to, and it is a fatal consequence of our cultural dependency that we are always interpreting our reality with conceptual systems designed somewhere else, whose basis lies in other social processes. In this sense, libertarian ideologies themselves are often ideas out of place, and they only stop being so when they are reconstructed on the basis of local contradictions. (Schwarz 1992: 39)

This reconstruction of ideas out of place on the basis of local contradictions has been central to Latin American Marxism. Such transformations could be said to characterize postcolonial theory itself. The proposition that ideas and practices when out of place (the literal meaning of ‘exotic’) become modified, mixed and subject to forms of transculturation that create new identities and resources from in-between, hybrid states, detecting and articulating the resonances of indigenous cultures while tropicalizing Anglophone influences, has for many years been at the centre of the work of writers such as Schwartz, Ortiz, Retamar and Rama, as well as Haroldo da Campos, Silviano Santiago and others (Beverley, Oviedo and Aronna 1995; da Campos 1986; Santiago 1978; Vieira 1999).

Latin America II:

CUBA: GUEVARA, CASTRO AND THE TRICONTINENTAL

I know that when the great dividing spirit cleaves humanity into two antagonistic halves, I will be with the people. And I know it because I see it imprinted on the night that I, the eclectic dissector of doctrines and psychoanalyst of dogmas, howling like a man possessed, will assail the barricades and trenches.

Che Guevara (1995: 152)

At a political level, Dependency theory now has a long history, even if the general context is unchanged. The problems with which it has grappled are central to those of postcolonial theory. The critique of western development theory as underdevelopment and dependency was answered by socialist and nationalist ideas of economic and, increasingly, cultural autonomy. What is sometimes forgotten today in critiques of Dependency theory is that it was not merely counterposed to western models of development, in a somewhat passive manner, but that it implicitly complemented what might be called 'Independency theory', or 'Interdependency theory', namely the great Latin American contribution to socialist revolutionary history represented by Cuba and its outspoken claim for an international solidarity of the oppressed in terms that had not been heard since the great internationalist days of the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s. The political theory of Castro and Guevara, predicated on the model of development and underdevelopment, offers alternative procedures out of the impasse and impotency of dependency that, in their emphasis on the adaptation of Marxism to a specific cultural context and local conditions, on dialogistic and popular forms, anticipates at the local level many of the tenets of a popular development theory, though in a far more radicalized version (Guevara 1971, III: 61–86). In fact Guevara went further to claim that the Marxism of the Revolution first emerged out of its indigenous conditions: 'This Revolution, if it happens to be Marxist – and listen carefully, I say Marxist – is thus because it discovered by its own means the paths that Marx pointed out. . . . That is why I tell you today, studious youth of Latin America, that if we do that which is called Marxism it is because we discovered it here' (Guevara 1969: 247–8). Guevara's position was that political independence was merely the first stage of true autonomy. In 'Political Sovereignty and Economic Independence', he argued that Cuba

achieved its political independence and immediately afterward set out to win economic independence . . . If a country does not have its own economy, if it is penetrated by foreign capital, then it cannot be free from the tutelage of the country it is dependent on. . . . The pillars of political sovereignty, which were put in place on January 1, 1959, will be totally consolidated only when we achieve absolute economic independence. (Guevara 1987: 85–9)

This second stage of the struggle, Guevara warned, may be even more difficult than the first, and much of his writings and speeches are preoccupied with the problems and objectives of a post-independence society. In his critique of dependency and increasing emphasis on world subjection to imperialism, Guevara anticipated the general framework of the world system theory of Amin and Wallerstein. If imperialism was a world system, Guevara articulated the refusal of the three continents to be subject to it and saw socialism as the means for delinking their economies and their cultures from its grasp. In focusing on the problems of a post-colonial society, Guevara therefore highlighted the limits of independence without other related forms of autonomy. He was never in doubt about Cuban or Hispano-American cultural autonomy; but he realized the importance of economic and institutional transformation if radical change was going to be established effectively. Dependency was his enemy, but he was not concerned with the problems of a derivative discourse in the manner of later postcolonial thinkers, because his perspective was international rather than national and was not focused on, or troubled by, intrinsic or apparent cultural divisions between the west and the three continents, but on the ending of a different inside/outside division, that of centre and periphery that produced poverty, injustice and other related effects of imperialism, by the most effective means possible (Chatterjee 1986). Like Fanon or Gandhi, he took ideas from any source if they were politically progressive. The values of all three were international, because all three dared to lay claim to the human as a first principle.

1 COMPAÑERO: CHE GUEVARA

‘Song to Fidel’

You said the sun would rise.

Let’s go

along those unmapped paths . . .

. . . our

brows swept with dark insurgent stars

We shall have victory or shoot past death. . . .

When your voice quarters the four winds

reforma agraria, justice, bread, freedom,

we’ll be there with identical accents

at your side.

(Guevara 1968b)

Like Fanon and Gandhi too, Guevara was a romantic figure who has become one of the great political icons of the three continents. Born on 14 June 1928 in Rosario, Argentina, Guevara's Irish grandfather, of the name of Lynch, had emigrated from Mayo in the west of Ireland in the nineteenth century. Apart from the aura of his charismatic personality which emanates so powerfully from every photograph, and the rhetorical power of his speeches, what comes across are Guevara's human qualities, the steadfastness of his belief in moral values, beginning with the principle of human equality and justice, his compassion, and his warm personal relations with ordinary people. Near the famous copper mine of Chuquicamata in Chile, he encounters a starving married couple, who are communists, looking for work:

In the light of a candle, drinking maté and eating a piece of bread and cheese, the man's shrunken features struck a mysterious, tragic note. In simple but expressive language, he told us about his three months in prison, his starving wife who followed him with exemplary loyalty, his children left in the care of a kindly neighbour, his fruitless pilgrimage in search of work and his comrades who had mysteriously disappeared. . . .

The couple, numb with cold, huddling together in the desert night, were a living symbol of the proletariat the world over. They didn't have a single miserable blanket to sleep under, so we gave them one of ours and Alberto and I wrapped the other round us as best we could. It was one of the coldest nights I've ever spent. (Guevara 1995: 59–60)

It is hard to find a photograph of Guevara alone, except for such occasions as his standing alone at the podium delivering a speech to the United Nations. Even then, he manages to look as though he is speaking on behalf of all the oppressed people of the world. In photographs of the Cuban Revolution, again and again both Guevara and Castro are photographed not speaking or lecturing but mixing with the Cuban people, talking to them, engaging with them, holding their hands, smiling with them. If he sits in a group, someone will put his arm round his shoulder with an easy intimacy. Guerrilla fighter, doctor, intellectual, Guevara was also a man of the people who always put their values and interests first. Their values were his values. Characteristically, he explained the economic concept of 'underdevelopment' through an image of a human being whose growth had been deformed by deprivation and a distorted diet (Guevara 1972, III: 66). During the revolutionary war, in each little village or hamlet that the guerrilla column passed through he would set up a consulting station. It was, he wrote, monotonous work, for he had few medicines to offer and all the conditions of the people were similar: women prematurely aged with the hard labour of their existence, children with swollen bellies, parasites, rickets and malnutrition.

The people in the Sierra grow like wild flowers, untended and without care, and they wear themselves out rapidly, working without reward. There, during those consultations, we began to feel in our flesh and blood the need for a definitive change in the life of the people. The idea of agrarian reform became clear, and oneness with the people ceased being a theory and was converted into a fundamental part of our being. (Guevara 1996: 156)

It is a testimony to Guevara's clinics in the Sierra that Cuba now has some of the most advanced hospitals and best health care in the world. After the revolution, he would spend his day off each weekend not relaxing but labouring in the sugar fields or factories. Shortly after the revolution, the University of Las Villas made him an honorary professor in the School of Pedagogy. In expressing his gratitude for the distinction, he also gave radical instructions to the distinguished university professors: 'become black, mulatto, a worker, a peasant; go down among the people, respond to the people, that is, to all the necessities of all of Cuba' (Retamar 1989: 45). Though always alert to differences of ethnic identity, Guevara was primarily concerned with combating the forms of oppression common to them rather than elaborating their differences. In common with the great predecessors whose work he continued, Martí and Mariátegui, Guevara considered the first task in this respect to be the combating of the racism so fundamental to the forms of systematic exploitation in Latin America (Graham 1990; Wade 1997). The 'Indian problem' in Latin America, as Frank was to put it, 'does not lie in any *lack* of cultural or economic integration of the Indian into society. His problem like that of the majority of people, lies rather in his very exploitative metropolis-satellite *integration* into the structure and development of the capitalist system which produces underdevelopment in general' (Frank 1969: 142). This exploitative integration, as Mariátegui argued, was explained away by the invocation of an argument of racial inferiority. Only by denying the basis of essential racial differences would the real basis of the exploitation become clear. On the other hand, this anti-racism led Guevara to underestimate the ways in which ethnic identity among indigenous peoples would lead them to resist other forms of identification based on common oppression – a perspective that was finally to cost him his life in his failure to establish forms of solidarity with the Guaraní Indians in Bolivia. With scrupulous honesty he recorded in his diary that 'the peasant mass aids us in nothing and is turning into informers'. The very last entry of the diary reads:

October 7

We have completed the eleventh month since the guerrilla [war] began. It was a day without complications, even bucolic, until 12:30, when an old woman herding her goats entered the canyon where we had camped and we had to take her prisoner. The woman has not given us any trustworthy news about the soldiers, saying to every question that she doesn't know, and that she hasn't been past here for a long time. She only gave us information about the trails. . . . At 17:30 Inti, Aniceto and Pablito went to the old woman's house, where she had one crippled and one dwarf daughter. She was given 50 pesos and charged with not speaking a word; we don't have much hope that she will keep her promises. (Guevara 1968a: 156)

As Paolo Freire observed, even Guevara's unmistakable style of narrating his contacts with the peasants 'reveals this remarkable man's deep capacity for love and communication' (Freire 1972: 138). Ironically, after Guevara's death a popular cult of 'Saint Ernesto of La Higuera' quickly developed among the same people who had remained indifferent to him in life (Guevara 1998: ix). Trained as a doctor, and with a serious asthmatic condition, he actively sought to immerse himself in the conditions of the

workers and peasantry and in that way to communicate and to identify with them. His own description of what a Marxist ought to be, in 'Building a Party of the Working Class', well describes Guevara himself, and shows the extent to which he put his ideas into practice:

Always keep it in mind, *compañeros*, engrave it in your memories as the most effective weapon against all deviations. A Marxist must be the best, the fullest, the most complete of human beings – but, above all, a human being. He must be a party member who lives and vibrates in contact with the masses; a leader who shapes into concrete guidelines the masses' sometimes unformulated wishes; a tireless worker who gives all to his people – a self-sacrificing worker who gives up his hours of rest, his personal tranquillity, his family, or his life for the revolution, but who is never a stranger to the warmth of human contact. (Guevara 1987: 195)

Guevara was never a stranger to the warmth of human contact: rather, he drew people to him and sought out their company. In 'Socialism and Man in Cuba' (1965), which remains one of the great political and cultural texts of the twentieth century, he risked the bold statement: 'Let me say that the true revolutionary is guided by great feelings of love' (Guevara 1987: 258–9). Few revolutionaries would dare to say such a thing, nor to argue that the revolutionary must make an ideal of the love of the people in order to avoid dogmatism, and to ensure that 'this love of living humanity is transformed into actual deeds, into acts that serve as examples, as a moving force' (*ibid.*: 259). Love becomes also a love of the revolution, of its necessary adjunct, camaraderie, the pleasures of social bonding, between same and different sexes (Guevara 1972, III: 322). Guevara cites Castro's speech of 11 April 1962:

Who says that Marxism is the renunciation of human feelings, comradeship, love for a *compañero*, respect for a *compañero*, consideration for a *compañero*? Who says that Marxism means not having a soul, not having feelings? Indeed it was precisely love of man that gave birth to Marxism. It was love of man, of humanity, the desire to combat the distress of the proletariat, the desire to fight poverty, injustice, suffering, and all the exploitation of the proletariat, that gave rise to Marxism from Karl Marx's mind precisely when it had become possible for Marxism to emerge. It arose precisely when a real possibility emerged – and more than a real possibility, the historical necessity – of the social revolution, of which Karl Marx was the interpreter. But what made him become that interpreter if not the abundance of human feelings of men like him, like Engels, like Lenin? (Guevara 1987: 194)

For Guevara, 'the revolution is made through man': through a continuing struggle for a society constructed on human values. To build communism, Guevara argued, required not only a change at the level of the economic base, not only a cultural transformation, but also a need for changing the human.

2 NEW MAN

Though he was among the first to proclaim the need for a 'new man', and was fully committed to the achievement of gender equality in revolutionary Cuba, the gender politics that Guevara learnt from his wife Hilda Gadea was primarily one of the injustice of inequality, not the need for the questioning of forms of gender identity as such (Gadea 1973). Nevertheless, he shows here that however apparently macho his personality, with his beard, cigar and battle fatigues, he was not afraid to make himself vulnerable by talking about the need for feelings in politics, and to define socialism in terms of an ideal of human love and a society organized according to human values. He was often to talk of the difficulties for a (male) revolutionary activist in terms of his necessarily more distant relation with his family, and particularly his children, but emphasized that this was something the individual should always fight against:

If a man thinks that dedicating his entire life to the revolution means that in return he should not be distracted by such worries as that his child lacks certain things, that his children's shoes are worn out, that his family lacks some necessity, then with this reasoning he opens his mind to infection by the germs of future corruption. (Guevara 1987: 259)

The germ of corruption would be the hardening of the heart and the loss of contact with ordinary human individual needs and aspirations. At the same time, Guevara argues that neither should his children have anything more than other children. Guevara's moving letters to his children while on his guerrilla campaigns show this same combination of tenderness, affection and concern for the details of his children's everyday life, conjoined with a constant emphasis on the importance of larger issues and the need for self-sacrifice for the greater good of others. 'Be very revolutionary' he wrote affectionately, in a letter to his daughter Hilda: 'You must know that I am still far away and will be gone for quite some time, doing what I can to fight against our enemies. Not that it is a great thing, but I am doing something' (Guevara 1997: 351; 1972, III: 322).

The Cuban Revolution, Debray famously argued, effected a revolution in the revolution (Debray 1967). It symbolized a fundamental break with the increasingly bankrupt role of bureaucratic communist parties controlled by Moscow and the achievement of a new form of socialism founded on the revolutionary agency of local people, in the first instance the peasantry rather than the urban proletariat, led by a small vanguard who had shown that they could defeat much larger conventional forces ranged against them. The Cuban Revolution showed that a different sort of revolution was possible. In this radical break with Soviet ideology and the impasse of its opportunistic policies, it was Guevara who symbolized the move away from doctrinal communism towards a society that was fully founded on human values. Socialism, for Guevara, could be defined simply as the abolition of the exploitation of humans by other humans (Guevara 1971, III: 268). In this respect, his position was sympathetic to that of African socialism; like José Martí whom he often cited, Guevara

was more internationalist in his perspective, but he also endorsed local values, particularly the value of Hispanic cultures as a form of social assertion in a world of Anglophone domination. Like Cabral, his understanding of the needs of the people was based on extended encounters in the field, though necessarily he remained a stranger to the indigenous peoples with whom he sympathized. His involvement in the Cuban Revolution came at the end of his third extended trip through the countries of Latin America, in which he saw and experienced at first hand the hard realities and forms of exploitation in the lives of people throughout the continent (Guevara 1995). In 'Socialism and Man in Cuba' (1965) he outlined his vision of Cuba's new revolutionary socialism, which returned to the human values which had been lost in the Soviet Union. The essay is particularly directed towards attempting 'to define the individual, the actor in this strange and moving drama of the building of socialism, in his dual existence as a unique being and as a member of society' (Guevara 1987: 249). This attention to the two dimensions of the individual, lost in both the commodified relations of capitalism and the equally impersonal mechanisms of Stalinist state socialism, was central to Guevara's thought and practice. Whereas Sartre, whom, along with Freud, Guevara read enthusiastically, began with the individual but gradually moved out to the necessity of the individual's engagement in the realm of the social, Guevara always held the two together simultaneously, insisting on the dialectical importance of both (Gadea 1973: 36–7). He was probably the only Marxist political leader who spent so much of his effort campaigning for socialism from the level of the individual, arguing that the solitary individual remains incomplete, unfinished, without active participation in a social creativity. At the same time, he argued, a communist society can only be constructed through the agency of the 'new man' who will be its conscious motor, fully understanding the 'opportunities for expressing himself and making himself felt in the social organism' (Guevara 1987: 253). In this way, the role of art, which in capitalist countries had been consecrated to providing an escape in the realm of aesthetics for particular alienated individuals and a passive audience that identifies with them, and which in socialist countries of the eastern bloc of the 1950s had been reduced to the single reflective aesthetic of realism, could be transformed into heterogeneous forms of revolutionary expression in the cultural field (*ibid.*: 257). It was the great poet and essayist Roberto Retamar, professor of philology at the University of Havana, who was most notably to develop this possibility of a new distinct form of artistic expression through a Calibanesque vision of a distinct *mestizo* Latin American culture, of what José Martí had memorably called 'Our America' (Martí 1977: 84–94; Retamar 1989: 17). *Our America*: to be able to say that had defined the historical importance of the second Cuban war for independence that began in 1895. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 was a revolution that sought to establish the independence and autonomy that previous revolutions had not yet achieved. Guevara's achievement was that it was once more possible to speak of 'Our America'.

'In this period of the building of socialism, we can see the new man being born' (Guevara 1987: 252). Although this can be achieved through moral and material incentives, the consolidation of such a reconstruction, according to Guevara,

'requires the development of a consciousness in which there is a new scale of values. Society as a whole must be converted into a gigantic school' (Guevara 1987: 251). When Castro and Guevara rode into Havana on 1 January 1959, 50 per cent of Cuban children did not go to school; Cuba now has the lowest illiteracy rate in Latin America. Education and a wider notion of empowerment through self-education became a central value for revolutionary Cuba, opening up a liberating potential that was subsequently to be developed in Brazil in Paulo Freire's 'pedagogy of the oppressed' (Freire 1972). The radical power of education to break down the barriers of class and other forms of social oppression for the underprivileged has always constituted a central principle of Cuban socialism.

3 THE TRICONTINENTAL

Above all, like Fanon, Guevara's sights were set on the global reach of injustice. Having been instrumental in effecting the Cuban Revolution, he chose to go to the Congo in 1964 to head an Internationalist column in support of the popular Lumumbist forces, and three years later to Bolivia in order to initiate the armed struggle there (Gálvez 1999; Guevara 1968a). This was a putting into practice of a position which he consistently took: it was Guevara who joined together the global struggle against the remnants of European colonialisms and the growing forces of US imperialism into a radical tricontinental politics which was based in, and led by, the three continents.

All this without forgetting that the breadth of our emotions in the face of the aggressors' outrages and the peoples' sufferings cannot be limited to the framework of Latin America, nor even to the framework of Latin America and the socialist countries together. We must practise true proletarian internationalism and feel as an affront to ourselves every aggression, every insult, every act against human dignity and against man's happiness anywhere in the world. (Guevara 1987: 195)

In a speech to a UN Conference on Trade and Development, Guevara criticized the divide between the developed capitalist countries whose domination of the markets was based 'on the hunger and exploitation of the dependent world' (Guevara 1987: 302). The only way to redress this balance, he argued, was to eliminate the exploitation of the second group by the first, 'with all the consequences that implies' (ibid.: 303). It was in his speech to the United Nations on 11 December 1964, 'Colonialism is Doomed', that Guevara delivered his most public, most frank and far-reaching analysis of the continuing oppression of Cuba and of many other tricontinental societies. He prefaced his account with the fundamental message of the Cuban Revolution which encapsulated its significance for oppressed societies across the five continents – 'showing by its actions, its daily example, that in the present conditions of humanity the peoples can liberate themselves and can keep themselves free' (ibid.: 322). Against this hard-won dignity, the survival of which was constantly threatened by US sanctions and military interventions, Cuba asserted its autonomy. After decades of

domination and dependency at all levels, the significance of this defiant national self-assertion – ceaselessly invoked with the slogan ‘*Patria o Muerte!*’ – for Cubans, and for the whole of Latin America, cannot be underestimated. Guevara was not content, however, to stop at the situation of Cuba. While Castro remains a nationalist internationalist, in the tricontinental revolutionary spirit, Guevara was a proletarian internationalist. Cuba’s affirmation of peaceful coexistence between countries, Guevara declared, ‘does not encompass coexistence between the exploiters and the exploited, between the oppressors and the oppressed. That is why we express our solidarity with the colonial peoples of so-called Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, who have been massacred for the crime of demanding their freedom’ (ibid.: 323). Guevara moved remorselessly from one site of imperialist oppression to another – from Cambodia, to Laos, Vietnam, Cyprus, Puerto Rico, Korea, Panama, British Guyana, Guadeloupe and Martinique, South Africa, the Congo, Rhodesia, Southwest Africa (Namibia), Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Somalia, Palestine ‘and to all peoples in conflict with imperialism and colonialism. We reaffirm our support to them’ (ibid.: 326). Finally, Guevara turned to US operations in Latin America, criticizing its repressive interventions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Columbia – and Cuba. For Guevara the United States was the prime agent of imperialist exploitation, its fundamental fields the three continents of America, Asia and Africa. The war in Vietnam symbolized its attempt at global domination. In ‘Create Two, Three, Many Vietnams’, Guevara’s famous Message to the Tricontinental of 1967, Vietnam assumed a pivotal, symbolic role:

What is the role that we, the exploited people of the world, must play? The peoples of three continents are watching and learning a lesson for themselves in Vietnam. . . . Attack hard and without letup at every point of confrontation – that must be the general tactic of the peoples.

But in those places where this miserable peace that we endure has not been broken, what shall our task be? To liberate ourselves at any price. (Guevara 1997: 317)

As Abdel-Malek points out, something fundamental has happened here. Whereas the *Communist Manifesto* or the Comintern Resolutions were addressed to the workers of the world, Guevara effects a fundamental change of subject position: ‘we, the exploited people of the world’. ‘We, the dispossessed’ (Guevara 1997: 326). We, postcolonial subjects. With Guevara’s Message to the Tricontinental, the epistemology of the postcolonial subject had been born. Though he spoke for them and to them, even Fanon was never able to assume the speaking voice of the generalized mass of the world’s subaltern peoples. Guevara was effectively extending the position of Sultan-Galiev who had argued that the Muslim peoples of the east were proletarian nations. ‘The important formulation here is “we, the exploited of the world” – not “we communists of the Three Continents”. *We* who are, and can be globally considered to be, the proletariat of the underdeveloped countries of the West’ (Abdel-Malek 1981, II: 94). There are not three worlds here, but two: ‘There is just one world in which the oppressors and the oppressed struggle, one world in which, rather sooner than later, the oppressed will be victorious’ (Retamar 1989:

55). Guevara's final political statement, the Message to the Tricontinental of 1967, constitutes the first moment where a general internationalist counter-hegemonic position was elaborated by a dispossessed subject of imperialism, powerfully and persuasively invoking others throughout the three continents to open up new fronts of resistance, in a global strategy of guerrilla warfare conceived from an internationalist perspective.

In a related way, the Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, held in Havana in January, 1966, in many ways represents the formal initiation of a space of international resistance of which the field of postcolonial theory would be a product. The Bandung Conference of 1955, which is much better known today, as the first major conference of independent African and Asian states, represented a coming together of recently decolonized nations and a strategic decision of non-alignment with respect to the major two powers of the Cold War (Appadorai 1955). The difference of the Tricontinental of 1966 was in the first place that it gathered together representatives from the entire non-western world, the three continents, and secondly that it aligned itself with a radical anti-imperialism located firmly in the socialist camp, though emphatically independent from any direction from the Soviet Union or China. The *Tricontinental* journal, established as a result of this conference by OSPAAAL, the Afro-Asian Latin American People's Solidarity Organization, subsequently performed the important political, cultural and intellectual task of putting much of this work together, for the first time establishing a syncretic body of writing that would provide the theoretical and political foundations of postcolonialism. In the pages of the *Tricontinental* we find for the first time the conjunction of tricontinental social, theoretical and cultural political thought: Guevara, Cabral, Fanon, Ho Chi Minh, and many others are for the first time brought together as a coherent body of political work. Postcolonialism was born with the *Tricontinental*. In the first issue of the *Tricontinental Bulletin*, a complementary publication which reported on contemporary political events in the three continents, Salvador Allende observed that the results of the conference were of 'the greatest historical importance, representing as they do the consolidation of our common struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism'. 'The creation in free and socialist Cuba of a Tricontinental Organization of unity and struggle is one of the most far-reaching – if not the greatest – defeats that the peoples who struggle for their national liberation have inflicted upon imperialism, particularly the US imperialist', stated Amílcar Cabral, Secretary General of the PAIGC. He added: 'Our task now is to carry out the resolutions in practice and strengthen the struggle to accelerate the liquidation of imperialism and old and new colonialism'. Luis de Azevedo, leader of MPLA (Angola) commented: 'The Tricontinental Conference has achieved, for the first time in the history of mankind, the union of the peoples' liberation movements in the common struggle against the exploiters'. Similar statements were made by leaders and representatives of Zaire, ANC, ZAPU, Venezuela, Columbia, Guatemala, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Chile, Vietnam, Laos, China, Cambodia, USSR, Guinea, Angola, Congo, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Republic of Guinea (*Tricontinental Bulletin* 1, 1966: 6–7).

In his Message to the Tricontinental, Guevara stressed the necessity of self-sacrifice and of international struggle:

And let us develop a true proletarian internationalism; with international proletarian armies; the flag under which we fight would be the sacred cause of redeeming humanity. To die under the flag of Vietnam, of Venezuela, of Guatemala, of Laos, of Guinea, of Columbia, of Bolivia, of Brazil – to name only a few scenes of today's armed struggle – would be equally glorious and desirable for an American, an Asian, an African, even a European.

Each spilt drop of blood, in any country under whose flag one has not been born, is an experience passed on to those who survive. (Guevara 1998: 172)

Guevara himself was captured and executed by a CIA-trained unit of the Bolivian army the following year. He was just thirty-nine. After his death, Guevara was transformed into the icon of the radical, compassionate left, emblematic of a selfless dedication to underprivileged and exploited people without geographical boundary, his image famously fused with that of Jesus Christ. More recently, there has been a concerted effort to debunk the legend, to write him off as a political failure, and to discredit his *foco* theory of guerrilla warfare which was always conceived as part of a strategic intervention in the conditions of his particular historical moment. In larger terms, this forms part of the still continuing effort by the United States to destroy the Cuban Revolution and to deny the freedom that Cuba promises to a world in economic bondage to the US. Guevara himself would have been the first to have admitted that there were failures in his life. He never claimed to be more than human. In his writings on the Cuban Revolution, he constantly considered the mistakes that had been made since coming to power, and demonstrated his eagerness to learn from them for the future. He himself judged his campaign in the Congo a failure, although in the larger picture it formed part of the support given by the Cubans to the peoples of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa against colonial and mercenary armies which constituted a significant factor in the final defeat of colonial rule in Southern Africa (Gálvez 1999: 293). If Guevara's final expedition to Bolivia was also a failure, it was conceived out of a desire to alleviate the poor of that country from a system of oppression, exploitation and deprivation. It is no advantage to anyone other than their oppressors that it did not succeed. Recognizing the difficulties that such campaigns faced, Guevara was both philosophical – 'what do the dangers or the sacrifices of a man or a nation matter, when the destiny of humanity is at stake?' (Guevara 1998: 175) – and ultimately confident:

It does not matter in the final count that one or two movements were temporarily defeated because what is definite is the decision to struggle which matures every day, the consciousness of the need for revolutionary change, and the certainty that it is possible. (Ibid.: 158)

Guevara's own name and image live on, still powerfully symbolic of the principles he fought for, despite his final defeat. None of his apparent failures can eclipse his success

in the Cuban Revolution and what it has meant to Latin America, to the tricontinental world, to African-American militant resistance, to the oppressed and the dispossessed (Davis et al. 1971). Its extraordinary achievements even in the face of a vindictive US oppression over decades which has vindicated Guevara's position again and again, are a permanent indication of what could have been. Against all odds, Cuba has survived, and still speaks defiantly for the principles for which Guevara fought. Guevara himself stood for a principled compassion, a dialogic form of liberation, a revolutionary argument with systems of exploitative domination that remained at the vanguard of Latin American socialist movements, of radical North American groups such as the Black Panthers, and the continuing revolutionary peasant and guerrilla movements in Guatemala, Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico; of alternative forms of social liberation such as Freire's, and even of the radical liberation theology that has put a primacy on redemption not from individual sin but the sins of society – poverty, injustice and oppression – and on a preferential bias towards the poor (Gallet 1972; Gott 1973; Gutiérrez 1988; Huizer 1973; Marighella 1971; Singelmann 1980; Stavenhagen 1970). None of these have simply repeated Guevara's ideas or strategies without modification or development; the history of the Shining Path, among others, demonstrates that peasant struggles are under certain conditions more linked to forms of ethnic identity than Guevara ever envisaged (Stern 1998; Gorriti Ellenbogen 1999; Guevara 1998: xiii). Despite the eclipse of groups whom he influenced, such as the Tupamaros and the Montoneros, he continues to inspire Latin American revolutionaries, such as the Colombian ELN and the FMLN in El Salvador (McClintock 1998). The Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico, led by Subcomandante Marcos, a postmodern Guevara, demonstrates that there is little difference in the principles for which they are fighting, and for which Guevara remains the outstanding symbol and role model (Campa Mendoza 1999; Duhalde 1994; Marcos 1995; Moguel 1998; Ronfeldt 1998).

'Colonies do not speak', Castro once remarked. 'Colonies are not known until they have the opportunity to express themselves' (Castro 1972: 28). Guevara often invoked what represents the foundational text of the Cuban Revolution and, it could be argued, the legacy of that revolution for postcolonial politics, the defiant 'Second Declaration of Havana' of 4 February 1962, signed by 'The People of Cuba, Havana, Cuba, Free Territory of America' and addressed to the world. Guevara considered the Second Declaration of Havana as 'a guide for the proletariat, the peasantry, and the revolutionary intellectuals of Latin America' (Guevara 1987: 195). It is hard to believe that he was not one of its authors. This declaration is distinctive in the ways in which it simultaneously presents historical, economic, cultural and moral arguments for the Cuban Revolution in answer to the post-colonial imperialist record in Latin America, specifically to the Platt Amendment which ensured that independence from the Spanish after 1898 was turned into a form of forced dependence on the US, the US economic blockade after the 1959 Revolution, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and the US-inspired expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States in 1962 (Pérez 1986). It was this statement which formed the political foundation of 'interdependency' theory, a foundation which more recent critiques of development

have relegated to the level of, at best, a political unconscious. At the same time, the declaration is also about a transformation of power relations, a reversal in which the dispossessed of the earth have begun to seize power and write their own history:

Future history will be written by the hungry masses of Indians, of exploited workers; it will be written by the progressive masses, by the honest and brilliant intellectuals who abound in our unfortunate lands of Latin America, by the struggle of the masses and ideas: an epic that will be carried forward by our peoples who have been ill-treated and despised by imperialism, our peoples who have until now gone unrecognized but who are awakening.

This toiling humanity, inhumanly exploited, these paupers, controlled by the whip and overseer, have not been reckoned with or have been little reckoned with. From the dawn of independence their fate has been the same: Indians, gauchos, mestizos, zambos, quadroons, whites without property or income, all this human mass which formed the ranks of the 'nation', which never reaped any benefits . . . which continued to die of hunger, curable diseases and neglect, because for them there were never enough essentials of life – ordinary bread, a hospital bed, the medicine which cures, the hand which aids – their fate has been all the same.

But now . . . this anonymous mass, this America of colour, sombre, taciturn America, which all over the continent sings with the same sadness and disillusionment, now this mass is beginning to enter conclusively into its own history, is beginning to write it with its own blood, is beginning to suffer and die for it. . . .

Yes, now history will have to take the poor of America into account, the exploited and spurned of Latin America, who have decided to begin writing history for themselves for all time. (Castro 1972: 165–6, translation modified)

Africa I:

ANGLOPHONE AFRICAN SOCIALISM

Probably no people in the world have suffered so much, and been exploited so much in the past as the people of Africa.

Jawaharlal Nehru, 1938 (Nehru 1941: 275)

1 PRE-COMMUNIST AFRICAN ANTI-COLONIALISM

The African critique of colonialism, in the form of an intellectual, political, philosophical and cultural response to the imposition of European colonial rule, began long before communism exerted any influence on sub-Saharan African thought and political practice. To do anything like full justice to African anti-colonialism would require a history of African political and military resistance, a short version of which was provided by C. L. R. James in his *History of Negro Revolt* (1938), a longer one by Rotberg and Mazrui (1970), together with a history of African anti-colonial and nationalist thought from the late eighteenth century onwards (for the latter, accessible collections of some material can be found in Langley 1979 and Bragança and Wallerstein 1982). In West Africa alone, a substantial number of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century activist intellectuals, who operated as the vanguard of the Pan-African movement, demonstrated increasing resistance to the European colonial system and in a variety of ways advocated values drawn from African cultures. Key figures from this vibrant intellectual and political culture would include James Africanus Hortus, author of *West African Countries and Peoples: A Vindication of the African Race* (1868), William Fergusson, the first black governor of Sierra Leone, William Grant, merchant, economist, and founder of the *West African Reporter*, the politician George W. Johnson, the philosophers Edward W. Blyden and Alexander Crummell, both émigrés (from the US Virgin Islands and the USA), the historians Samuel Johnson and C. C. Reindorf, the Gold Coast lawyer John Mensah Sarbah, journalists John Payne Jackson and Louis Huchard, notable for their critical attitudes towards British and French colonialism respectively, the nationalists Herbert Macaulay and Blaise Diagne, and the lawyer Joseph Casely Hayford. Of these the pan-West African cultural nationalism of Blyden and his disciple Casely Hayford, author of *Ethiopia Unbound* (1911) and founder of the West African Congress, achieved the most immediate political impact and has correspondingly received the most attention (Geiss 1974; July 1968; Langley 1973: 37–40). Léopold Senghor, and subsequently V. Y. Mudimbe, have

also regarded Crummell as a precursor of *négritude* and Pan-Africanism, while Gilroy has argued that he was the originator of the concept of Black Zionism (Gilroy 1993; Mudimbe 1988). The many activists of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, such as the two Senghors (Lamine and Léopold) from Senegal, Kwame Nkrumah from the Gold Coast, and Sékou Touré from Guinea, already had the benefit of a long and substantial tradition of African political and intellectual resistance. As the presence of Blyden and Crummell also indicates, the contact between African, African-American, and African-Caribbean and Latin American radical intellectuals was considerable. In terms of political history, the Black Atlantic operated as a region whose individual constituencies cannot be separated from each other: the history of North and South America and the Caribbean is inextricably bound up with that of Africa, and the reverse is also true (Gilroy 1993).

In general, like postcolonialism, tricontinental anti-colonialism has always been a diasporic production, an amalgam of the local and the cosmopolitan, a revolutionary combination which was the product not just of the diaspora itself, but of differences in the degree of repression in colonial and metropolitan territories. It was the international dimension of African anti-colonialism that differentiated the interwar period from political movements of the earlier period. International contact between activists in America, the Caribbean and Africa was facilitated by the Pan-African congresses, which were never allowed to be held in Africa itself. The first was organized in London in 1900 on the initiative of the Trinidadian, Henry Sylvester-Williams, founder of the African Association; the Pan-African Association was formed as a result. The language of the conference's 'Address to the Nations of the World', already unmistakably that of W. E. B. Du Bois who was a delegate and contributor – 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line' – is noticeable throughout for the equal attention paid to the situation of Africans both in Africa and in the countries of the African diaspora (Du Bois 1989: 10; Langley 1979: 738). This was also evident in two further African congresses held before the First World War, the Universal Races Congress held in London in 1911, and Booker T. Washington's Pan-African 'International Conference on the Negro' held in Tuskegee, Alabama, the following year and attended by Casely Hayford and representatives from British East Africa, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Portuguese East Africa and South Africa (Boahen 1985: 768; Langley 1973: 31–2). African nationalism, perhaps more than any other anti-imperial movement, was always distinguished by its internationalism and the degree to which it was developed co-operatively by Africans in Africa, America, the Caribbean and Europe. Those living outside Africa, whether diasporic or in exile, always managed to remain in contact with the black political organizations within Africa that were formed in the twentieth century: the African National Congress in 1912, the Destūr and Neo-Destūr in Tunisia in 1920, the National Congress of British West Africa founded by Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast and Dr Akiwande Savage of Nigeria in 1920, the Kikuyu Central Association of Kenya in the 1920s, the Socialist Federation of Senegal and the Comité d'Action Marocaine in the 1930s, among many others (Wallerstein 1961: 55). Tricontinental anti-colonialism always involved an embodied politics and theory: a politics and theo-

retical critique developed at an ideational level but at the same time put into practice through material strategies and practices.

The mechanics and production of African liberation thus took the form of an intercontinental movement, never operating in isolation from a significant US and Caribbean involvement (the later Cuban intervention in Angola, far from being a radical departure, was conceived in the same spirit). To set up a division today between postcolonial diasporic and indigenous African politics has little meaning historically. Since the Black Atlantic was first created, the Africans who were separated between the two continents have never allowed that scission to keep them apart. In the twentieth century, activist diasporic African intellectuals organized political groups while abroad, edited newspapers, wrote books and articles, and subsequently became heavily involved in political activity in their homelands after the Second World War. Close links were also developed between Anglophone and Francophone activists: while in London, for example, Nkrumah twice travelled to Paris to meet the African members of the French National Assembly – including Sourous Apithy and Léopold Senghor – and spent long hours with them planning a Union of West African Socialist Republics. Apithy and Senghor subsequently came to London to represent French West Africans at the West African Conference of 1948 (Nkrumah 1957: 47–9). Later, in 1968, Nkrumah observed: 'The Black Power movement in the USA, and the struggles of peoples of African descent in the Caribbean, South America and elsewhere, form an integral part of the African politico-military revolutionary struggle' (Nkrumah 1968: i). Nkrumah's own entourage when he returned to Ghana was itself a model of Black Atlantic affiliations, including economists and politicians from the US and the Caribbean, although this aspect of his regime was not popular with many in his own party.

2 THE INFLUENCE OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND AFRICAN-CARIBBEAN RADICALS

African nationalism was significantly augmented by the First World War, in which African troops were conscripted to fight in East Africa or in Europe and as a result were given a new international perspective on their own situation and the vulnerability of their colonial masters. Returning soldiers came back manifesting an impatience with the authority of traditional chiefs who co-operated with the colonial powers, and initiated strike action and the demand for representation if not independence. President Wilson's Fourteen Points, with their affirmation of the right of self-determination, were particularly important in encouraging new forms of political assertion (Boahen 1985: 305–6). At this time, another figure originally from the Caribbean also came to play a highly significant role in African liberation politics: Marcus Garvey. In the 1920s, West Africans had direct dealings with Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association during the negotiations for the establishment of a first African homeland for African-Americans in Liberia. Although these ended in acrimony, the ideology of Garvey's Black Zionism – Garvey himself was elected in

New York as the first 'Provisional President of Africa' – became almost as famous in Africa as in the US. Garvey's UNIA became by far the best known of contemporary African-American political movements among ordinary Africans (Langley 1973: 306). 'Garvey's voice reverberated inside Africa itself', observed C. L. R. James, recounting how Jomo Kenyatta had told him how

in 1921 Kenya nationalists, unable to read, would gather round a reader of Garvey's newspaper, *The Negro World*, and listen to an article two or three times. Then they would run various ways through the forest, carefully to repeat the whole, which they had memorized, to Africans hungry for some doctrine which lifted them from the servile consciousness in which Africans lived. (James 1992: 300)

The popular black nationalism and sense of black pride was developed by Garvey from his reading of Booker T. Washington (*Up from Slavery*, 1899) and his encounter in Britain with the Egyptian nationalist intellectual Duse Muhammed Ali (author of *In the Land of the Pharaohs*, 1911). Aspects of Garvey's black nationalism and black pride, together with the UNIA's insistence in its Declaration of Rights that black people should not feel bound to obey discriminatory laws, have always remained at the core of African-American political culture, particularly in the militant separatist black nationalism of the black power movement identified with Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammed, Stokely Carmichael, Huey P. Newton, Bobby Seale, Angela Davis and more recently Louis Farrakhan (Franklin 1992; Van Deburg 1997; Wolfenstein 1981). Throughout the twentieth century the US Black Liberation Movement offered a constant source of inspiration to liberation movements in colonial Africa; for example, to Steve Biko's Black Consciousness movement in the South Africa of the 1970s (Biko 1978; Davenport 1991: 379; Fredrickson 1996; Sixth Pan-African Congress 1976: 222). As might be expected, African-American politics have tended to be less Marxist in orientation than in the Caribbean and Africa: Garvey was fully committed to capitalism and equally opposed to communism's non-racialism. The extreme nationalism of his movement, with its emphasis on black racial self-consciousness and overt antipathy to mixed-race African-Americans, was opposed on the left by the American Communist Party, which nevertheless admired Garvey's extraordinary ability to develop a mass constituency of support. Garvey, who went so far as to claim proudly that 'we were the first Fascists', was hostile to black activists on the left, attacking rival leaders such as Cyril Briggs (whom he claimed was not really black), and heaping personal abuse on W. E. B. Du Bois, who had been actively campaigning for black rights in the US since the beginning of the Niagara movement in 1905 (James 1998; Kelley 1994; Padmore 1956: 97; Von Eschen 1997; Weisbord 1973).

For his part, Du Bois gradually extended his domestic goals to elaborate an international programme for Africa based on ideas of self-determination, racial, social and political equality, and democratic socialism. After the First World War, Du Bois revived the Pan-African Congress: the first, held in Paris simultaneously with the Versailles Peace conference in 1919, was designed to act as a pressure group for the unrepresented colonized nations, with delegates from Africa (including Sol T. Plaatje

of the ANC), the West Indies and the United States. Du Bois, urging that 'Africa be ruled by consent of the Africans', hoped that the conference would mark the beginning of African self-determination, and that the former German colonies, together with those of Portugal and Belgium, would be governed by Africans under the international mandate of what was to become the League of Nations (Du Bois 1965: 8–12; Kedourie 1971: 373–6). The conference accepted the idea of the mandate, but mandated the German colonies to Britain, France and South Africa. At Versailles, Wilson's proclaimed principles of self-determination were applied only to European states. Du Bois persisted, however, and saw the Pan-African movement develop from the first post-war congress in 1919 through three further congresses held in 1921, 1923 and 1927. Du Bois presided over the famous Fifth Pan-African Congress at Manchester in 1945, where Nkrumah, George Padmore, Jomo Kenyatta and many other African and Caribbean leaders mapped out and established the political agenda for the subsequent successful decolonization of Africa (Geiss 1974; Hooker 1975: 31; Padmore 1963). Although he was against racialism in any form, Du Bois emphasized the raising of African consciousness and the empowering power of an African cultural identity. His notion of a double consciousness, of 'always looking at one's self through the eyes of others', constituted the first substantial African-American critique of the alienating effects of dominant white culture on black Americans, and anticipated Fanon's more thoroughly psychological analysis of the mechanisms of the production of inferiority effects among colonized peoples in a colonial culture in *Black Skin, White Masks* of 1952 (Du Bois 1989: 3; Fanon 1986).

Du Bois and Fanon both moved from analyses of the psychological effects of domination and disempowerment plotted in the terms of a Hegelian consciousness, to increasingly radical social and political demands for empowerment and self-determination. Analysis and reconstruction at both the psychological and political levels were articulated through the social realm of culture: these were the three nodal points through which black power was established. The nationalism and cultural self-empowerment of the African-American tradition, its drive for equal rights and self-determination through the formative strategy of a cultural renaissance of the African diaspora, increasingly affected Africans in the colonial world: black repression and liberation in the US and Africa have always had a symbiotic relationship. It would not be an exaggeration to say that all colonized peoples drew inspiration from the active and vocal struggle of African-Americans against discrimination and oppression in the United States. From the founding of the NAACP in 1909, to Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association, to the Black Power movement in the 1960s, the dynamic example of African-Americans inspired oppressed people the world over, particularly in Africa. Their struggles were integral. Perceiving this, Anglophone Caribbean political activists such as Padmore often chose to go to the US to study, rather than Britain. African Anglophone political activists such as Azikiwe, Nkrumah and Kamuzu Banda went for the same reasons, encouraged by the American-educated Gold Coast educationalist J. E. K. Aggrey, whose return visit to Africa was popularly viewed as constituting the vanguard of an impending African-American invasion of Africa to drive out the white colonists (Boahen 1985: 763–74). This

African apocalyptic fantasy of the deliverance of Africa from colonial domination by invading African-Americans was later to become the subject of George S. Schuyler's remarkable novel *Black Empire* (1937–8).

With the exception of Du Bois, activists on the left in the US were less influential in Africa, partly because they were less influential in the US itself, and partly because they were less interested in Black Zionism or Pan-Africanism and therefore in making the US–Africa connection. Communists regarded African-Americans as a potential vanguard revolutionary group within the US itself: from the time that John Reed had first spoken on the position of African-Americans at the Comintern Congress of 1920, Lenin had encouraged the Comintern to regard black Americans as a strategically important element for communist activity in the United States. The Comintern subsequently devoted much attention to African-Americans as the group with the greatest revolutionary potential in the US, encouraging a radical leftist position that integrated issues of race within the larger framework of class struggle. Following on from a similar decision at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern (or Red International of Labour Unions) in March 1928, the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928, frustrated at the lack of success of the American Communist Party with regard to African-Americans, issued a directive to the party to participate more actively in the 'negro liberation movement'. The US Communist Party tried a whole sequence of tactics to mobilize African-Americans: an unsuccessful infiltration of the Garvey movement was abandoned in favour of an equally ill-judged commitment (also applied to South Africa) to the setting up of a Black Belt State, an autonomous African-American state within the US which was intended to compete with Garvey's 'back to Africa' concept, while embodying Stalinist definitions of minority ethnic and racial groups as oppressed nations which should be given national autonomy. This initiative was followed by various short-lived front organizations such as the American Negro Labor Congress, the League of Struggle for Negro Rights, chaired by Langston Hughes, and the popular front body, the National Negro Congress. After the downfall of Garvey, communist organizations competed with a number of rival organizations, such as Cyril Briggs's African Blood Brotherhood, or the March on Washington Movement (James 1998: 155–73; Padmore 1956: 303–17). African-Americans often suspected that the Communist Party was only interested in them instrumentally, rather than because it was concerned with the problems and needs of African-Americans as such. Briggs's Blood Brotherhood was an attempt to combine Garvey's emphasis on black identity and consciousness with communist principles, a strategy that was in many ways similar to that of African socialism.

While the shifting positions of the Communist Party in America did little to ease black distrust of what was a predominantly white organization, many black Americans, of whom Paul Robeson was the most famous example, continued to admire the Soviet Union on the grounds of its extraordinarily tolerant and equitable racial attitudes. The famous Trinidadian cricketer, Learie Constantine, in his book *Colour Bar*, pointedly contrasts a photograph of a 'Negro being burned at the stake with kerosene at a lynching in Georgia, USA' with another photograph, this time of a young woman and a man, clearly members of ethnic minorities, sitting studying together; the

caption reads: 'equal education for minorities; zoology students in the State University of Tajik (USSR)' (Constantine 1954: facing 46, 70). Du Bois also commented that 'The record of Soviet Russia in the matter of racial tolerance has been extraordinary'. Very late in his life, after he had been dismissed from his post of Director of Special Research by the NAACP, Du Bois joined Paul Robeson's Council of African Affairs, and finally became a communist. It was the Council of African Affairs (whose members included Robeson, Max Yergan, Alphaeus Hunton and Du Bois), together with the NAACP (led by Walter White), that at the time of the Second World War for the first time made the liberation of Africa and internationalist anti-colonial discourse a central part of African-American politics. It was the experiences and perspectives of the Second World War, Walter White declared, that gave African-Americans a sense of kinship with the oppressed, colonized peoples of the world, and gave them the sense that 'the struggle of the Negro in the United States is part and parcel of the struggle against imperialism and exploitation in India, China, Burma, Africa, the Philippines, Malaya, the West Indies and South America' (Von Eschen 1997: 8). Much of the credit for this must also go to Padmore, who, from the late 1930s onwards, was writing regularly for the *Chicago Defender*, the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *Crisis*; during the Second World War Padmore was the African correspondent for the Associated Negro Press, and his reports were widely syndicated in black American newspapers. In this capacity, as Penny M. Von Eschen has remarked, Padmore 'had a profound impact on African-American thought':

Padmore, especially through his journalism, crafted a popular language for the international movement that animated black American discourse in the 1940s. . . . As a prolific journalist and essayist for African American, West Indian, West African, and British newspapers, he also facilitated communication among anti-colonial activists in the United States, Britain, the Caribbean, and . . . West Africa. (Von Eschen 1997: 13)

By the late 1940s the McCarthyite purges (whose targets included Robeson and C. L. R. James, who was expelled from the US in 1952 and imprisoned on Ellis Island) had effectively ended the political power of the Communist Party in the US and the influence of those such as Robeson and Du Bois who had connected it to African-American activist politics. By the mid-1950s the atmosphere of the Cold War, the political radicalization of the African liberation movements, and an increasing preoccupation with the domestic Civil Rights movement, combined to let the question of the liberation of Africa move out of the central focus of mainstream African-American politics. All this would change once more with the formation of the famous Che-Lumumba Club, the militant all-black collective of the Communist Party in Los Angeles in the 1960s, and the revival of a black socialism, self-consciously affiliated to tricontinental revolutionary struggle, by Stokely Carmichael, Leroi Jones and Huey P. Newton, leader of the Black Panthers (Davis et al. 1971; Gerassi 1971, 2: 675–742, 761–3). Castro, declared Carmichael, was 'the blackest man in the Caribbean' (James 1998: 246).

In the face of the experience of what was then known as 'the colour bar', the communist insistence on racial equality formed the basis for much of its attraction for

Caribbean intellectuals and political activists, particularly for C. L. R. James and his fellow Trinidadian Malcolm Nurse, better known as George Padmore. Nurse originally took on the pseudonym of George Padmore in 1928 while studying at Howard University in order to facilitate his increasingly energetic communist activities while in the US (Hooker 1967: 6–9). Like many of his peers from the Caribbean and the United States, Padmore too was attracted to communism for the fundamental reason that communists were anti-racist in both theory and practice, and offered the example of a modern society with universal equality, with no discrimination on racial grounds; they were also the only international group that were politically committed to national self-determination and the liberation of Africans in America and the colonies. Padmore's work for the American Negro Labor Congress, however, brought home how difficult it was to create inter-racial political unity among workers in the United States; the white workers tended to maintain racist attitudes, while black workers were suspicious of the Communist Party because of its domination by whites.

Like many African intellectuals, leaders and activists in the anti-colonial movements, Padmore was a diasporic figure who, during the course of his life, moved between Trinidad, the US, Moscow, Paris, London and Ghana. His energetic organizational and oratorical skills placed him in a complementary symbiotic friendship with C. L. R. James, whose political commitments were at times close to Padmore's, but whose personal work was initially oriented towards goals of writing fiction and rewriting history, not so much to retrieve a lost African culture, as in the case of Diop, but rather to retrieve a subaltern history of black resistance, and, subsequently, to put Africa at the centre of contemporary history. In 1932, Padmore had visited James, who had come to Britain to write a biography of Constantine, to try to recruit him as a Communist Party activist. James, as a Trotskyist, refused. James's political thought was still maturing at this time: there is a striking contrast between his rather measured essay on 'The Case for West Indian Self-Government' (1933) and the revolutionary *The Black Jacobins* of 1938. In one sense it could be described as the greatest Trotskyist historical work ever written, after Trotsky's own writings on the Russian Revolution. The achievement of *The Black Jacobins* was to create a new history in which black revolutionary struggle was central rather than at the margins. James also affirms, as E. San Juan puts it, 'the resourceful, spontaneous, and creative force of the masses, the political energies of the working people, of a collective power mobilized during periods of crisis' (San Juan 1998: 230). Despite the celebration of colonial revolt in *The Black Jacobins*, Trotsky's influence was evident in other writings of this period in which James showed a comparative indifference towards the colonial question. It is noticeable that his 1937 book *World Revolution* concentrates on events in Europe and refers to the colonial question in not more than a phrase or two – only the situation in China merits a sustained treatment (James 1937: 229–67). He himself attributed the change in his thinking to Padmore: 'I started the Trotskyist movement in European terms. Then Padmore came in. He said that he was a Marxist, but what about the colonial question? What about Africa? . . . He educated me and I carried it on' (James 1987: 5). James's position with regard to the African-American situation was never orthodox. He objected to the Comintern line that the correct position

with regard to the struggles of African-Americans was to support the black nationalist objective of an independent black state within the US; more significantly, James also regarded Trotsky, with whom he discussed the situation of African-Americans, as confused in his thinking in this area, after Trotsky had rejected attempts to persuade him that this was not the most productive way forward for them (Trotsky 1978). Citing Lenin, who increasingly became more central for him, James argued instead for the history, the autonomy and the social power of the African-American struggle, which he contended contributed to the development of the proletariat and in itself constituted 'a constituent part of the struggle for socialism' (James 1992: 182–3, 372). In retrospect, however, African-American militancy has not formed a significant part of any process towards a socialist revolution in the US. Just as socialism was being closed down as an option for African-Americans, however, in Africa, the Marxism of post-war African anti-colonialism was being developed in conjunction with the radical politics of the Caribbean and Europe. James was to turn to Pan-Africanism at last, as he increasingly saw African socialism in the vanguard of a new form of socialism that would restore the promise lost with the death of Lenin in 1924 (James 1969; 1977).

Key figures such as Nkrumah and Léopold Senghor always emphasized their debt to African-American as well as communist and socialist political writings; at the same time, they combined this with affirmations of African culture that drew on recent demonstrations of its rich complexity by anthropologists and historians from Africa, Europe and the US (Mudimbe 1988: 88–90). If African liberation was always a tricontinental exercise, this was also partly because repression in the colonies themselves meant that political radicals and intellectuals often had to live in exile in Europe and the United States (many African intellectuals live in exile today, for similar reasons). As a result, the imperial capitals of London and Paris were paradoxically vibrant centres and contact zones for African anti-colonialism, and afforded the freedom and opportunity for activists from different countries to meet and co-ordinate their activities, even if they were carefully monitored by the intelligence services (Robinson 1983: 369–75). Those from the Caribbean played a particularly significant role, especially in the 1930s and 1940s when the power of Garveyism and the Pan-African Congress had both sunk to a low ebb. In his notes on the life of George Padmore, C. L. R. James observed that 'it was largely the West Indians who made the African question a live question in British politics and this state of affairs continued until Nkrumah came to London in the early 1940s' (James 1992: 293). 'I discovered Africa in London', remarked Paul Robeson (Von Eschen 1997: 16). In his classic study, Cedric Robinson has also argued that it was activists of African origin from the Caribbean who were particularly influential in developing what became the distinctive African or black Marxist tradition: Robinson's list includes Toussaint l'Ouverture, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, George Padmore and C. L. R. James (Robinson 1983). Postcolonial theory is unusual in foregrounding this work as one of its central inspirations, and it is for this reason that the work of Stuart Hall, a contemporary representative of this tradition, is accorded a particular authority. Winston James (1998) has also emphasized the degree to which African-American radical activism was

developed by immigrants from the Caribbean – among whom the most eminent examples would be Cyril Briggs, Jesús Colón, Marcus Garvey, Hubert Harrison and Claude McKay. Like many of his generation, McKay was also in touch with progressive groups elsewhere: his novel *Banjo: A Story Without a Plot* (1929) gives the best account of what the world of African anti-colonial activists in the Paris of the 1920s was actually like (McKay 1929; Miller 1998: 21–3).

3 COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN AFRICA

If it was the case that the Communist Party achieved comparatively little with (or for) African-Americans, it was much more successful in Africa than has been widely assumed. It has often been claimed that minimal Comintern activism took place in Africa before the Second World War. In fact both the Anti-colonial Conferences and the 1928 Sixth Comintern Congress, when reactivating the anti-colonial front, emphasized that special attention should be paid to Africa. As a result, as Wilson shows in a superbly documented analysis of Russian involvement in Africa, much small-scale, but significant, activity took place (Wilson 1974). This was by no means altogether the ‘fruitless life’ that many have claimed that communism led in Africa between 1925 and 1939 (Bottomore et al. 1991: 353). Attention to this history also illustrates three related points: first, the significant success of the organizational activism of the Communist Party at a grass roots level in many colonies. Second, it confirms the extensive international links of the anti-colonial movements. Third, it shows how independence movements typically took the Marxist anti-colonialism of the Communist Party and transformed it creatively according to their own, already established political priorities. These factors in the African anti-colonial movements could be also demonstrated in different ways with respect to anti-colonial and imperial activism in Asia or Central and South America.

In 1930 the Profintern, the Comintern’s trade union organization, created the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUC-NW), and brought Padmore and the US Communist Party black activist James W. Ford over from the US to run its Department of Negro Propaganda and Organization. Accorded the status of senior party officials, they opened an office in the Kremlin, and began publication of the legendary journal *The Negro Worker*. In July 1930, on the instructions of Ford and the LAI General Council, Padmore helped to organize the first international conference of black workers in Hamburg, a small gathering of representatives from the US, the Caribbean, Latin America, South and West Africa, who discussed not only trade-union issues, but also more broadly the social and political conditions of black people everywhere, ‘as for example’, as Padmore put it the following year, ‘the expropriation of land by the imperialist robbers in Africa; the enslaving of toilers through Pass laws and other anti-labour and racial legislation in Africa; lynching, peonage and segregation in the United States; as well as unemployment which has thrown millions of these black toilers on the streets, faced with the spectre of starvation and death’ (Padmore 1931: 5; Ford 1938; Hooker 1967: 14–17). Although the

Profintern had largely had the US and South Africa in mind in setting up his department, Padmore quickly also established links with African nationalists elsewhere, including Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, Garan Kouyaté from the Sudan, Herbert Macaulay from Nigeria, E. F. Small from the Gambia, and I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson from Sierra Leone. These men, sometimes based in London and Paris, maintained active contacts and links with political organizations in their own countries, and were able to use the organizational skills of the Comintern to develop substantive political power bases, particularly within the trade unions and youth movements. Through the illicit circulation of *The Negro Worker*, which was banned in the British colonies (Garvey's *The Negro World* was proscribed in almost all colonies in Africa), via sympathizers in related activist organizations, such as the Colonial Seamen's Association and the International of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISHW), Padmore and his colleagues were able to spread anti-colonial propaganda and to communicate a sense of a global network of African resistance. This work was supplemented by the British Communist Party and its affiliate organizations in the colonies, particularly the Negro Welfare Association of British West Africa, which co-operated with international communist organizations such as the LAI, the International Labour Defence, Padmore's ITUC-NW, and the ISHW, which ran clubs and trade unions in African port cities.

These organizations supported the key work of African activists in the colonies, such as that of E. F. Small, editor of *Gambia Outlook*, a founding member of the National Congress of British West Africa, and organizer of the Bathurst Trade Union, one of the first (illegal) African trade unions, which led a successful general strike in 1929. I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson was also a particularly important figure in this connection: having attended the Moscow University of the Toilers of the East in 1931–2, he went on to organize a successful, illegal trade union in Nigeria (the African Worker's Union of Nigeria), and was also involved with the setting up of radical women's organizations. Forced to leave Nigeria in 1933 by the British colonial authorities, he moved to the Gold Coast (Ghana), where he established what soon became a major nationalist organization, the West African Youth League (WAYL). Of all the youth, ethnic and comparable organizations, the WAYL was by far the most radical in its demands. Wallace-Johnson worked in co-operation with fellow communist Bankole Awooner-Renner, founder of the Ashanti Freedom Society, together with Pan-African nationalists such as Nnamdi Azikiwe. Azikiwe had gone to the US from Nigeria to study at Howard University, where he met fellow-student George Padmore, and studied with Alain Locke, author of *The New Negro* (1925). He then moved to London in 1934, where he published *Liberia in World Affairs*. In the same year he moved to the Gold Coast, where he became editor of the influential newspaper the *African Morning Post*. He enlisted Padmore as a contributor; later in 1937 he was also involved with Padmore in establishing the African Service Bureau in London as a central anti-colonial directorate (aided by the LAI). Returning to Nigeria in 1937, Azikiwe joined the executive of the Nigerian Youth Movement and edited the *West African Pilot*. As President of the Nigerian National Council, he strongly advocated a federal constitution for an independent Nigeria; he became President of Nigeria in 1963 (Azikiwe 1968, 1970). For his part, Wallace-Johnson was

arrested in the Gold Coast on a charge of sedition, and returned to Sierra Leone in 1938, where he organized branches of the WAYL and started a newspaper, *The Sentinel* (Boahen 1985: 764, 629). At the instigation of the 1945 Pan-African Congress, he set up the West African National Secretariat in London with Kwame Nkrumah, the aim of which was to put the new Pan-African nationalism into action in West Africa. By 1946 they were publishing a radical monthly paper, *The New African*. As Wilson argues, it was through the work of these activists that nationalist groups in Africa developed party organizations, trade unions, women's and youth organizations, established newspapers and other forms of political machinery, that provided an infrastructure for many of the independence movements after 1945 (Wilson 1980). Although the African youth movements achieved very little in terms of political, legal or social reforms, together with the conservative constitutional political parties such as Herbert Macaulay's Nigeria National Democratic Party, they did establish a political culture which constituted a rich and effective resource for post-1945 nationalist movements. Though apparently achieving little by way of revolutionary success, the Soviet Union was able to give African activists the benefits of its techniques of party organization, as well as fostering nationalist sentiment with its material and moral support. The dividends for this came not between the wars, but in the rapid and effective articulation of nationalist demands for self-determination after 1945.

Nkrumah would not have been able to mobilize the trade unions and related organizations for the 1948 and 1950 workers' strikes, and establish a new radical political party (the Convention People's Party) so soon after his arrival in Ghana in 1947, had the long hard work of building organizational infrastructures not gone on for the previous two decades. Nkrumah's success was also built on his own recognition of the role of political organization, an insight drawn from the writings of Lenin. In the US, Nkrumah met C. L. R. James, then one of the leading Trotskyites in America, and 'it was through him', he recalled, that 'I learned how an underground movement worked'. He was also in contact with all the leading African-American organizations, for practical rather than ideological reasons: 'my aim was to learn the techniques of organization. I knew that when I eventually returned to the Gold Coast I was going to be faced with this problem. I knew that whatever the programme for the solution of the colonial question might be, success would depend upon the organization adopted'. In *Towards Colonial Freedom* (1942-5), Nkrumah's powerful Leninist anti-colonial pamphlet written during this period, in the final section 'What Must Be Done', asking how freedom and independence for the colonies could be achieved, he answered: 'First and foremost, Organization of the Colonial Masses' (Nkrumah 1973: 39). While in London for two years, with characteristic political energy Nkrumah was centrally involved in organizing the 1945 Pan-African Congress, the West African Students Union, the West African National Secretariat, a vanguard revolutionary group called 'The Circle', while also establishing the Coloured Workers' Association, a welfare organization for destitute African seamen and workers in Britain. On his return to Ghana, Nkrumah drew on the model of Comintern organizational tactics with which he had fully acquainted himself in the US and UK

(Bretton 1967: 10; Thompson 1969: 89–95). As General Secretary of the new United Gold Coast Convention, he quickly emphasized to his colleagues the importance of establishing a newspaper as an organ of the party; he purchased a ‘Cropper’ printing machine and began publication of the *Accra Evening News* in September 1948. ‘From the very beginning’, he wrote, ‘the *Accra Evening News* became the vanguard of the movement and its chief propagandist, agitator, mobilizer and political educationalist. Day by day in its pages the people were reminded of the struggle for freedom, of the decaying colonial system and of the grim horrors of imperialism.’ The following year, the *Morning Telegraph* and the *Daily Mail* were published in other Gold Coast cities. At the same time, Nkrumah also established a youth study group which later evolved into the national Committee on Youth Organization, through which he eventually took control of the more conservative United Gold Coast Convention and turned it into a mass party, the Convention People’s Party. Looking back in 1957 after the achievement of independence, he commented astutely that ‘it is worth noting that those who have built up a political organization against colonialism have quickly been successful’ (Nkrumah 1957: 76, 39). Success brought its own problems: Nkrumah’s political organization was so effective and thorough that after independence when the colonial power to which it had been opposed had withdrawn, the state itself was turned into an increasingly autocratic personal political machine.

Nkrumah’s political success was also the result of his forming alliances with indigenous groups who were opposed not only to the colonial authorities but also to the traditional elites that were used as the means for colonial control. This radicalism within the framework of the local political environment, often encouraged by communist activists, was typical of what occurred elsewhere in Africa. Youth organizations, though sounding innocuous to modern ears, had been the basis of nationalist movements since Mazzini’s Young Italy movement, founded in 1831, which was widely imitated around the world (Borsa and Brocchieri 1984; Gandhi 1997: 5, 27–8; Mack Smith 1994; Srivastava 1982). In sub-Saharan Africa, these groups included the Gold Coast Youth Conference Movement and Youth League, the Nigeria Youth Movement, the West African Youth League in Sierra Leone, the Young Kikuyu Association, and the Jeune Gabonais. In West Africa, in particular, a highly articulate newspaper and print culture allowed a limited expression of nationalist sentiment, which was augmented by the more radical anti-colonial papers and journals published abroad which were smuggled into the colonial territories (Boahen 1985: 575; Füredi 1994: 32–3). Such a culture was the product of the existence of a literate, educated, often elite professional class. The same class also formed the main target of Comintern activity, which sought to shift the assumption that constitutional change was the way forward into a more radical revolutionary attitude. Elsewhere, forms of local resistance that eluded all Comintern infiltration and which were also a good deal more troublesome for the colonial authorities, included peasant movements and particularly the emancipatory messianic movements, based on indigenous religions or Christianity or Islam – for example, Ethiopianism in South and East Africa, or Mahdism and pan-Islamism in West Africa, the Maghreb and Sudan. The millenarian independent churches in Central Africa preached the imminent collapse of colonialism,

sometimes through the arrival of a liberating force of black Americans which would effect either emancipation or the end of the world (the Kitawala, the Kimbanguist or Khakists movements); other independent churches included the African Orthodox Church in Uganda, and the Last Church of God and his Christ in Nyasaland. In East Africa such religious protest movements formed part of what was known in Kiswahili as *siasa* – agitation, activism, resistance – which were always mass movements that developed at a local level. They were very different in character from the elite commercial and youth associations which articulated local grievances such as the Kilimanjaro Native Planters (Coffee) Association, the Young Banganda Association, the Tanganyika African Association, Harry Thuku's East African Association, or the Kikuyu Central Association, of which Jomo Kenyatta became leader in 1927. As in other colonial territories, anti-colonialism therefore involved two very different positions; on the one hand a secular, often socialist nationalism, and on the other, a traditionalist religious patriotism or large-scale resistance by local groups over particular issues (Boahen 1985). These two forms of anti-colonialism often existed side by side, as in Algeria or Egypt, or operated in a difficult, uncontrolled alliance, as in the Mau Mau campaign of the 1950s, a spontaneous local form of resistance for which Kenyatta was held responsible by the colonial authorities and which, as an alternative form of struggle, will be considered more fully in chapter 25. The tensions between them begin to account for the consequent troubles in some postcolonial states.

4 SOUTH AFRICA

The situation in South Africa appeared to be very different from that in the rest of Africa: the mining industry in particular meant that it was partly industrialized, with a sizeable bourgeoisie. In fact, many of the same indigenous forms of resistance obtained as elsewhere in Africa: local peasant movements, the important Afro-Christian independent churches, and forms of constitutional political organization, above all the African National Congress, which was widely imitated in 'native associations' across Africa, in part as a result of labour migration. However, it was also the case that militant working-class movements were comparatively advanced in South Africa, and that widespread strikes and boycotts occurred in the Transvaal, Johannesburg and elsewhere between 1918 and 1920. For this reason, the Comintern always targeted South Africa as the most promising political territory in Africa. In 1921 the South African Communist Party (SACP) was formed out of a number of white labour movement and socialist groups, particularly the International Socialist League (ISL) led by S. P. Bunting, and affiliated to the Comintern. It was the first communist party in Africa. Two elements dominated its subsequent trajectory. In the first place, as in the United States, the South African Communist Party was a predominantly white organization, but recognized the need to work in conjunction with black political groups: the African National Congress (ANC), the first black nationalist political organization in South Africa, had been founded in 1912; in 1917 the ISL had assisted in the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa (ICU),

which became the largest black and coloured African industrial workers movement, led by Clements Kadalie from Nyasaland. The SACP subsequently co-operated with the ICU and the ANC, and a number of prominent individuals, such as George Champion, E. H. Khaile and J. A. La Guma, held simultaneous posts in the different organizations. After his election as President-General of the ANC, J. T. Gumede, who was not himself a communist, promoted sympathetic links with the Communist Party on the grounds that 'of all political parties of South Africa the Communist Party alone unreservedly advocates freedom and equality for the non-European people of South Africa with other races' (Meli 1988: 77–8). Although this brought the organizations together, it was also a source of friction within the ANC and the ICU. In 1926 the ICU purged the communists in its leadership. From 1928 onwards the SACP was itself subject to frequent purges, as it was required to reposition itself according to the changing policies and shifting political alliances of the Comintern. Locally, the most disastrous policy shift came with the proposal to establish a separate native republic, in the same way as the American Communist Party was required to declare itself in favour of a Black Belt State in the US, a move that put the SACP in the same camp as the South African extreme right even before the Soviet–German pact of 1939. As in the US, the problem with the SACP during this period was that it was very tightly controlled by the Comintern and was never able to establish its own policies in response to local or national conditions. At the same time, unlike communist parties in other settler colonies such as Algeria, which continued to operate according to the racist assumptions of the European colonists, the SACP established itself as the only party in which whites predominated that was non-racialist, actively encouraging African participation and fully committed to the cause of social and political justice for the majority population. With the establishment of *apartheid* as official government policy and as conditions in South Africa deteriorated, the SACP established a long-lasting alliance with the ANC. Correspondingly, to be a communist became *de facto* the only way for white South Africans to demonstrate a genuine commitment against apartheid (Boahen 1985; Davenport 1991; Fredrickson 1996; Roux 1948; Wilson 1974, 1980). The ANC leadership, for its part, trod the well-worn paths of African political activists to prison or exile in London.

Outside the strictures of the SACP, a revolutionary intelligentsia largely composed of disaffected communists developed Trotskyist affiliations. While the Yiddish-speaking club, Gezerd, was pro-Soviet, many of those involved in the Trotskyist groups were Jewish immigrants who had fled the Nazis. The fascinating history, characteristically dominated by internecine strife, of the different Left Opposition groups in South Africa from the 1930s onwards, notably the Communist League of South Africa (better known as the Lenin Club), the Workers Party of South Africa (WPSA, better known as the Spartacus Club), the Fourth International Organization of South Africa, the Workers International League, together with their forms of political activism (starting with the 1934 African Laundry Workers' Strike in Johannesburg), and the publications that they produced (notably the radical theoretical journal *The Spark* (1935–9), edited by 'Mr B', the Pole Yudel Burlak, leader of the WPSA, but also *Workers Voice*, *Socialist Action* and *Umlilo Mollo* (*The Flame*)) is briefly documented in

Hirson (1993). From the perspective of African socialism, the most significant development was the founding of the All African Convention of 1935 by members of the WPSA as the centre of a campaign against the Hertzog Native Bills which removed land and the vote from black South Africans. This group, led by Isaac Bongani Tabata, together with Goolam and Jaineb Gool, Ben Kies and others, was later to merge with a Coloured WPSA organization, the Anti-Coloured Affairs Department, or Anti-CAD, to form the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), which lasted from 1943 until the 1970s. Of all groups with Trotskyist links, the Unity Movement was the most significant, largely because it was the only one which was able to command some support from both the African and Coloured populations. Despite its name, it became increasingly opposed to the alliance between the SACP and the ANC, without ever being able to compete with the material as well as political support that the former was able to offer (Tabata 1974). Subsequent alternative Left forms of political opposition, such as Biko's Black Consciousness movement, were all too effectively repressed by the apartheid regime. In the end it was the SACP and above all the ANC, which, with global international assistance in the form of economic and cultural sanctions, succeeded. It is striking that though Mandela refused to renounce the armed struggle, his political strategies remained close to those of Gandhi's almost a century earlier. In this he was aided by the important women's movements in South Africa, which will be discussed in chapter 25.

5 PADMORE AND JAMES

It was not only in South Africa that much of the work of the militant communist anti-colonial organizations went into slow motion after 1933, when the Comintern, alarmed at the rise of fascism in Germany, switched to the popular front strategy, one condition of which was the cessation of anti-imperialist propaganda against Britain and France. James recounts how Padmore was informed that *The Negro Worker* had now to preach that the main enemy of the African was the fascists – even though Germany by then had no colonies in Africa – and that Britain and France were the friends of democracy (James 1992: 291–300). Although the popular front was a positive move within Europe, and support for anti-colonial activists in British and French colonies such as Wallace-Johnson quietly continued, Moscow's own more public ITUC-NW was disbanded, and support for the *Negro Worker* was withdrawn. Padmore denounced the move and found himself expelled from the party (Hooker 1967: 31–2). He left Moscow and went first to Paris, and then subsequently to London, where the British Communist Party subjected him to the kind of character assassination that, as Padmore later observed, 'has always been one of the most deadly weapons employed by the Communists' (Padmore 1956: 313). His break with the party brought out a feature that had always been a characteristic of African and Caribbean communism, and which it shared with many forms of tricontinental communism, namely the absence of doctrinal inflexibility so evident in western communist parties. Communist ideas were freely adapted to local and national priorities, and were not applied

in an abstract, immutable way. In particular, they were absorbed into, and at the same time reinflected, the self-reliant nationalism that formed the dominant anti-colonial ideology. 'It is high time for the Negroes to stop depending on other people to fight their battles' declared Padmore in a statement which encapsulated the end of his hopes for the Communist Party in the African world (Wilson 1980: 87). Yet although Padmore broke with the Communist Party, he still worked with his former comrades on the left and continued to admire the political example of the Soviet Union. In 1946, for example, he published with Dorothy Pizer *How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire: A Challenge to the Imperialist Powers*, in which the two dared both parties in Britain to follow Lenin's example with respect to the Tsarist empire and give up its colonies (Padmore and Pizer 1946). While he never lost his admiration for Lenin, his disillusionment with Stalin led Padmore increasingly to distance himself from the Communist Party, moving not towards Trotskyism as in the case of James, but rather towards embracing the socialist ideals of Pan-Africanism, and towards affirming his preference for a political philosophy that was not derived from either of the two major world powers. Padmore's move from communism to Pan-African socialism in many ways stands as an emblem of the shifts in the politics of left anti-colonialism from the 1920s to the 1960s (Padmore 1931, 1856).

Padmore's criticisms of the actions of the Soviet Union became even more justified when it was revealed that the Soviet Union had supplied Mussolini with oil for the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. As a result of this, the League Against Imperialism suffered a sharp decline in support. During the course of the Ethiopian crisis from 1935 onwards, Padmore, now in London, became involved with other activists in setting up the International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA). In addition to Padmore, its Executive Committee included Amy Ashwood Garvey, Marcus Garvey's first wife (treasurer), Jomo Kenyatta, General Secretary of the East African Association and the Kenyan Kikuyu Central Association (subsequently banned in 1939) (secretary), and C. L. R. James of Trinidad as chairman.

The IAFA established international links with other support groups in the Caribbean; in the US, they were in contact with the Provisional Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia (PCDE) in Harlem (Kelley 1994: 129–32). The invasion of Abyssinia, as historians have noted, produced the first instance of a global reaction by the black diaspora; the formation of new anti-colonial nationalist groups such as the Ethiopian World Federation signalled the growth of networks of centres of resistance, transforming the centre–margin relation into a spider's web in which the imperial powers were increasingly entangled (Mazrui and Tidy 1984: 9; Von Eschen 1997: 11). With the availability of modern communication systems, and dissident radio stations in Moscow, and later Cairo and elsewhere, news of a rebellion in one colonial country was able to travel with remarkable speed to other anti-colonial activists around the world. In turn, this allowed the first forms of co-ordinated response. As Füredi remarks:

The response of the Black Diaspora to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia showed at once the intensity of resentment towards imperialist domination and the aspiration of free-

dom. Ethiopia became a symbol of independence from Western control for the colonies, and their reaction to the invasion revealed a depth of passion which caught everyone unawares. Throughout Africa, Black America and the Caribbean, the invasion became a *cause célèbre*. What was unique about this response was its generalized character. This was probably the first instance of a Third-World reaction to an instance of Western intervention. (Füredi 1994: 23)

Mussolini's actions, and in particular the British response, became an urgent issue in London and New York as well as in Africa. As Füredi shows, in the Caribbean it became an event through which political consciousness was engendered, and local forms of discontent with the plantation system, and through that the whole imperial system, were articulated. This is illustrated by the fact that in British Guyana and Trinidad, the invasion of Abyssinia had an equal effect of radicalization on the East Indian as on the Afro-Caribbean community. In the context of Haile Selassie's David and Goliath struggle with Mussolini, the fact that Ethiopia was itself an imperial power was never an issue. Like Japan, whatever Ethiopia did or had done, it could do no wrong. In fact, as for Japan, it could be argued that Ethiopia had turned itself into an imperial power in an attempt to stop itself being taken over by a European one. In a typical example of the political complexities of the postcolonial era, after it had regained its independence, other freedom struggles would follow in turn, in Eritrea, in Tigray (Peberdy 1985; Fessehazion 1999).

The ways in which the invasion of Abyssinia encouraged the development of a larger framework for Pan-African resistance are illustrated by the fact that in 1937, members of the IAFA committee went on to form the International African Service Bureau (IASB) as a centre for the struggle for African emancipation. The principal officers of the IASB were Wallace-Johnson (general secretary), C. L. R. James (editorial director), Jomo Kenyatta (assistant secretary), T. R. Makonnen, from British Guyana, who later became General Secretary of the Pan-African Federation in Britain (treasurer), and Padmore himself as chairman (Padmore 1956: 145–6). The IASB was a leftist organization with an agenda of developing an independent African political identity; it established links with Du Bois's Pan-African Congress, and eventually became the Pan-African Federation, or the British section of the Pan-African Congress movement. The Federation was made up of more than a dozen African organizations from cities in Britain and Ireland, including Cardiff, Dublin, Edinburgh, Glasgow, London and Manchester, the number of which testifies to the widespread political activism of Africans in Britain in this period. The Federation also published a journal, *International African Opinion*, and many individual pamphlets dealing with specific colonial problems. Some of the leaders of the Federation also published other important works in the period – notably James's *The Black Jacobins* (1938) and *History of Negro Revolt* (1938), Kenyatta's *Facing Mount Kenya* (1938), and Padmore's *How Britain Rules Africa* (1936) and *Africa and World Peace* (1937). As the radical political agenda of these books might indicate, the Pan-African Federation effectively made the same demands as the Pan-African Congress: for self-determination and independence for African peoples and other 'subject races', equality of civil rights for African peoples and the

abolition of all forms of racial discrimination. The demands were framed so as to be applicable to Africans and peoples of African descent throughout the world.

In 1956 Padmore noted dryly, 'The association between Dr Du Bois's Pan-African Congress and the IASB was destined to have the most far-reaching consequences in Africa in the years following the Second World War' (Padmore 1956: 148). Much of the credit for this must go to Padmore himself, who was a driving force behind the Pan-African Congress and one of the architects of African decolonization and African socialism. It was Padmore who was the key figure in turning Du Bois's more academic middle-class movement into a practical organization for the liberation of Africa. Nkrumah, Padmore and James transformed Pan-Africanism into a fully socialist ideal, encouraging Du Bois himself at the end of his life to move further to the left. As has been seen, Padmore himself increasingly inclined towards a socialist Pan-Africanism that defined itself as an autonomous African political philosophy rather than one derived from the west or the east, opposing western economic domination and white colonization. While James remained essentially a revolutionary of the Caribbean tradition, Padmore moved towards a position which combined socialist ideas with an emphasis on the specificity of African culture and the political possibilities of activism on the Gandhian model. As a pair of international activists, Padmore and James can be compared in certain respects to Léopold Senghor and Fanon: in each case they worked within a shared intellectual and political position, but developed into reformist or revolutionary wings. In the case of Senghor and Fanon, their political differences of constitutional versus revolutionary independence struggles, were very much the result of the specific contexts in which they worked (West Africa versus Algeria). In the case of Padmore and James, though they both came from Trinidad, there was also a regional difference. While Padmore's interests shifted to Africa and Pan-African socialism after his arrival in London from Moscow and then remained there, James's focus moved to Africa only slowly, and returned to the Caribbean. As African socialism became increasingly problematic after the fall of Nkrumah, James saw the Cuban Revolution of 1959 as the apex of the Caribbean revolutionary tradition whose history he had been retrieving and writing about all his life.

Africa II:

NKRUMAH AND PAN-AFRICANISM

The concept of Pan-Africanism, first articulated in Africa itself by Tiyo Soga in the 1860s, grew as a cultural as well as a political idea with the Harlem Renaissance and the *négritude* movement in the 1920s and 1930s; by the 1940s Pan-Africanism had come to embrace a broadly socialist economic policy of industrialization and co-operative forms of agricultural production for independent Africa (Esedebe 1994; Soga 1983). Here we shall focus less on its gradual emergence as a political platform for colonial reform before the Second World War than on its political commitment to self-determination and socialism, the dominant ideology of those led by Nkrumah who were demanding decolonization for Africa after 1945.

In the English-speaking world, Pan-Africanism was defined by Du Bois and Padmore in very similar terms. Neither, strikingly, was actually born in Africa: 'the idea of one Africa uniting the thoughts and ideals of all native peoples of the dark continent', Du Bois observed, '... stems naturally from the West Indies and the United States' (Kedourie 1971: 372). Ideologically, both men travelled in different directions and met somewhere in the centre. Du Bois began conservatively as a professor of classics and moved gradually from a concern with racial discrimination towards humanitarian socialism and Pan-Africanism as offering wider solutions to the problem; after 1945 he became increasingly committed to communism on the Russian model. Padmore's Pan-Africanism, by contrast, developed as a result of his disillusionment with communism and his growing belief that African socialism must be African as well as socialist. In 1930 at the first International Conference of Negro Workers, Padmore had been warning against Pan-Africanism, and had denounced Kadalie and his associates in South Africa, Garvey as a 'dishonest demagogue', Gandhi as an agent of the class interests of the Indian bourgeoisie, and Du Bois as one of the 'American Negro petty-bourgeois reformists ... who are merely office-seekers and demagogues paid by the ruling class to befuddle the Negro masses in order to direct their attention away from revolutionary struggle' (Padmore 1931: 124–6). By 1934, however, after his contretemps with Stalin, Padmore was writing to Du Bois to invite him to a forthcoming Negro World Unity conference organized in Paris by French Africans in Paris, led by his friend Garan Kouyaté. Padmore wrote: 'Will you help us in trying

to create a basis for unity among Negroes of Africa, America, the West Indies and other lands?' (Hooker 1967: 40). On his arrival in Paris from Moscow, Padmore seems to have moved quickly towards the prevailing Pan-Africanism of the *négritude* movement of the 1930s while consorting with Garan Kouyaté and his associates, so that by the time he settled in London in 1935 he was firmly committed to African independence as a means of achieving the further aim of continental unity. The internationalism of the movement, in its operation and conception, is strikingly evident. Padmore makes the parallel with communism both in terms of the transnational character of the ideology of Pan-Africanism, which like Marxism was developed outside the country in which it was first incorporated as a political philosophy, and in terms of its political organization (Padmore 1956: 319); clearly the Communist International provided an infrastructure which both facilitated its early development and provided a model thereafter. The break that anti-colonial intellectual activists made with the Communist Party – Lamine Senghor, Garan Kouyaté, Padmore – had the disadvantage of leaving them outside the organizational political machine of the party. So they re-created it in their own image.

The current view of Pan-Africanism is summed up in Anthony Appiah's view that Pan-Africanist projects forget that 'Africa' is an invention of Europe and that local African cultures differ as much from each other as they do from the cultures of any other continent. Its association with *négritude* means that it stands condemned for essentialism (Appiah 1992). The greatness and the grandeur of the transcontinental Pan-African project has been lost. As a common strategy against white European oppression (whether anti-colonial or domestic, as in the case of the US), African and American Pan-Africanism gave both constituencies particular strength by virtue of a combined international solidarity and common political programme demanding representation, land rights, education, economic reconstruction, and an end to racism and institutionalized racist practices. Moreover, it developed as an independent project beholden to neither of the great world powers or their ideologies.

As V. B. Thompson points out, all the different strands of activism by people of African descent on both sides of the Atlantic, however different their political orientation, developed in a remarkable way in the first half of the twentieth century towards this one idea: (1) the 'Africa for the Africans' mass movement of Garvey; (2) Du Bois's more moderate, middle-class Pan-African Congress movement; (3) the intellectual and political activities of the communist-dominated West African Students Union, and Padmore's International African Service Bureau in London; (4) the activities of the National Congress of British West Africa and related organizations, as well as that of the African National Congress in South Africa; (5) and the activists in Paris and Francophone Africa of whom the best known was Léopold Senghor (Thompson 1969: 54). By 1945, the Pan-African Congress fully reflected these mixed currents in its own agenda and distinctive political blend.

1 THE 1945 MANCHESTER PAN-AFRICAN CONGRESS

The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress drew on the preparatory work of African and Caribbean intellectuals, particularly the two joint secretaries of the Organization Committee, Nkrumah and Padmore. The two men were brilliant organizers, and their feverish activity bore fruit in the path-breaking event of the Congress itself. Padmore had already published two books that were among the first general anti-colonial critiques of British rule in Africa (Padmore 1936, 1937). At the request of the Congress, Padmore wrote a further survey of the colonial situation in British Africa (*Africa: Britain's Third Empire*, 1949), paying particular attention to what Padmore described as the new Economic Imperialism (officially 'Colonial Development and Welfare') of the post-war Labour government.

The first Pan-African Congress in 1900 had laid claim to equal rights for Africans and people of African descent; the 1919 Pan-African Conference at Versailles also called for rights of education, just treatment from, and political participation in, the state. The 1945 Pan-African Congress was a very different gathering because, timed to coincide with the communist-led World Trades Union Conference of 1945, it had a much larger African contingent and was no longer dominated by intellectuals and reformers from the United States. The representatives present from the West Indies and Africa, being student workers who were part of the trade union movement, were already politically active on the left and working as part of the freedom struggle. As a result, the 1945 Congress went much further politically than its predecessors and for the first time clearly stated and enunciated the demand for independence and self-determination for Africa within the terms of an explicitly African nationalist and socialist agenda. As Nkrumah put it,

It was this Fifth Pan African Congress that provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for the Africans. (Nkrumah 1957: 44)

With the 1945 Pan-African Congress, Pan-Africanism was identified formally not only with the ideals of Pan-Africanism but also with the politics of African socialism. American Pan-Africanism had now been fully Africanized.

Just as the dominant ideology of Pan-Africanism had been modified from a racialist ideology into one of African socialism, so too the political tactics of the Pan-African movement were also redefined. Up to that point, the two alternatives had been the agitation and pressure for constitutional reform by the African National Congress and the West African Congress, or revolutionary Leninist doctrines advocated by the radical activists of the 1920s and 1930s. The 1945 Pan-African Congress declared itself committed to a programme of positive action without violence, based on the Gandhian technique of non-violent non-cooperation. The *satyagraha* methods introduced and practised by Gandhi, initially in South Africa, and subsequently by the Indian National Congress in India, were discussed at the Fifth Pan-African Congress and endorsed as

the only effective and acceptable means of making alien rulers respect the wishes of an unarmed subject people. In 1945, the by-then prestigious and demonstrably effective strategy of Gandhi against the British was widely perceived as the key instrumental factor in the prospective achievement of Indian independence, the first non-settler colony of the British Empire to be returned to self-rule. In Nkrumah's account,

the Congress unanimously endorsed the doctrine of African socialism based upon the tactics of positive action without violence. It also endorsed the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Human Rights and advised Africans and those of African descent wherever they might be to organize themselves into political parties, trade unions, co-operative societies and farmers; organizations in support of their struggle for political freedom and economic advancement. (Nkrumah 1957: 43–4)

'Your weapons – the strike and the boycott – are invincible' enjoined the Congress's Declaration to the Colonial Workers, Farmers and Intellectuals. The affirmation of non-violence was central to the organization of Pan-Africanism and African socialism and the human values that it represented. Gandhi's political influence, however, was largely confined to his political tactics and strategies: the common ideology of Pan-Africanism was a socialism that had been developed out of the Black Marxist tradition and communist anti-colonial activism.

2 AFRICAN SOCIALISM

The construction of African socialism created a political nexus which, like Senghor, Garan Kouyaté, Nkrumah and Padmore themselves, operated on the border or boundary lines of communist political activity and intervention. This flexibility was further facilitated by the development of the first alternative form of tricontinental communism in China by the Chinese Communist Party – the first instance of an embodied political counter-modernity. Padmore presented African socialism as a 'third way', comparing it to the creation of the non-aligned movement at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

In our struggle for national freedom, human dignity, and social redemption, Pan-Africanism offers an ideological alternative to Communism on the one side and Tribalism on the other. It rejects both white racialism and black chauvinism. It stands for racial coexistence on the basis of absolute equality and respect for human personality. (Padmore 1956: 379)

While it may have offered an ideological alternative to Russian communism, African socialism developed out of both an enthusiasm for and a resistance to Russian-style communism that can be figured most clearly in the work of Padmore and Du Bois; the same dialectic can be found in the humanist socialism of Senghor, who added the emphasis on the rich spiritual dimensions of African culture. Its identification with the goals of Pan-Africanism, its affirmation of a (currently unfashionable) new

humanism, and its subsequent apparent failure as a political project, means that today African socialism receives comparatively little attention. The form of communism that followed in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, which applied the Soviet or Chinese models more rigidly with diminished attempts to adapt to the specificities of the African context, has however brought out retrospectively the validity of the insights of African socialism and its version of counter-modernity. As a political and economic programme, it was partly modelled on Nehruvian socialism and that of the British welfare state instituted by the Labour government of 1945–51. Of all forms of socialism that have been developed in the twentieth century, these examples have stood out in their ability to launch lasting radical popular programmes within democratic frameworks. The achievements of the construction of the British welfare state still respond to the needs and expectations of ordinary people.

Pan-African socialism was never closely defined as a doctrine and sustained a range of different emphases. It involved a common commitment to anti-colonialism and self-determination, a rejection of violence as the means of achieving independence, social co-operation envisaged on the assumption that the class struggle did not operate in European terms in Africa, commitment to a general policy of economic centralization and nationalization, and a strong emphasis on the retrieval and revalidation of the African cultural inheritance and the development of a cultural unity. Its commitment to black nationalism rather than individual nationalisms was evidenced in its vision of Pan-African unity, the ultimate objective of which was the formation of a United States of Africa. In practice this was always easier to envisage within the context of Francophone and Anglophone territories, and while both groups called for a united Africa this always presented difficulties, not least because the old colonial powers left political infrastructures in place to keep the newly independent, or semi-independent, countries linked to Europe. Moreover, whereas under British and French colonial rule, vast territories, such as French West Africa, had been organized as a single overall colony, with decolonization a Balkanization took place that left a collection of separate states. The strategies of Pan-Africanism looked more possible from the perspective of the colonial than the modern map of Africa. Nkrumah argued that although nationalism was a necessary step in the liberation struggle, it 'must never be regarded as the final solution to the problem raised by the economic and political exploitation of our people' (Nkrumah 1968: 25). Nationalism in Africa was limited by the fact that it largely operated within the geopolitical framework of the historical arbitrary division of Africa into the different colonial states; the independent states that emerged from decolonization were neither African in form, nor, for the most part, economically viable. While they have struggled since independence to survive, the forces of neocolonial exploitation work to control them on a Pan-African scale through continental and multinational companies and the international commodity markets. The political domination and economic exploitation of Latin America, Nkrumah argued, acted as a permanent warning of the limitations of nationalism. In the postcolonial era, when contemporary African cultural and political theorists are questioning and challenging the basis and function of the nation-state, the alternative choices laid out by Pan-Africanism before decolonization show more intelligence

and foresight than they have been given credit for. The question arises of what political and ideological rationale lay behind the discrediting of Pan-Africanism as a political philosophy and goal. Only now can it be seen as a form of counter-modernity more necessary than its proponents could ever have envisaged.

Pan-African ideals did sometimes operate successfully in practice. When de Gaulle, for example, presented France's African colonies in 1958 with an ultimatum of remaining part of the French system or facing immediate and total withdrawal, France reacted to the courageous vote for independence by the people of Guinea by withdrawing almost overnight and leaving the country in chaos. Nkrumah immediately came to the aid of Guinea, and with Sékou Touré formed the Ghana–Guinea union (Touré, who was later to become even more autocratic than Nkrumah, was to return the favour when Nkrumah was later deposed). Like the later Ghana–Guinea–Mali union, or Senghor's Federation of Mali (Senegal and Mali), or Nyerere's Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa, the Ghana–Guinea union did not survive. Once independence had been achieved, the goal of political union of the whole continent, so dear to the first generation of African leaders such as Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda and Mboya, and earlier black nationalists of the African-American diaspora, lost its rationale over looser political and economic groupings, and more immediate commitments such as the freeing of those Southern African states that remained under colonial or white settler rule. Everyday political, cultural, regional and economic realities, whether differences of industrialization or of natural resources, supervened over the racialized dreams that had been conceived among diasporic Africans far from the practicalities of everyday African life, and precisely as an abstraction from the grim realities of African-American life. Individual states also divided up into different groupings according to cultural and political tendencies – for example, the radical Casablanca group, the more conservative Monrovia group, and the Brazzaville group of former French territories. However, the idea of Pan-Africanism remains a permanent possibility, still providing the basis for all supranational political, economic and cultural African institutions under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), formed in 1963 (Amate 1986; El-Ayouty 1994; Naldi 1999).

African socialism was the great achievement of twentieth-century African political theory. It was African, but also formed part of the global anti-colonial movement. In his 'Guide to Pan-African Socialism', written in Ghana in 1959 at the end of his life, Padmore remained committed to a view of the struggle for national liberation as 'part of the world-wide struggle for the assertion of the exploited and dispossessed against the status quo'. The colonial masses, he added, echoing Lenin, are "the oppressed of the oppressed" (Friedland and Rosberg 1964: 224). Padmore consistently invoked the precedent of Lenin's strategic orientation towards Asia and Africa after the revolution, which he described as 'a violent departure from orthodox Marxist strategy', as authority for the need to Africanize socialism:

It is for us, Africans, to subject Marxism to our own critical examination and see what there is in it which can be usefully applied to the conditions facing us in Africa in general and Ghana in particular. (Friedland and Rosberg 1964: 225–7)

Here Padmore approvingly cites Mao Zedong's remark that the great mistake made by many Marxists was to turn Marxism into a dogma rather than employ it as an instrument for intellectual understanding and as a guide for future social development; instead Padmore emphasizes how 'we must evolve our own form of socialism, suited to our own conditions and historical background. . . . Evolve new forms of socialist techniques applicable to our African environment and historical background'. So African socialism, as Padmore defines it, consists of the adaptation of socialism to the specific conditions of Africa. Its aims and objectives he defines as political, economic and social. Politically, its aim is democracy based on 'fundamental human rights, social justice, and the rule of law'. Economically, its aim is to promote the people's wellbeing through common ownership of the means of production and distribution, but with provision for mixed state and private (local and foreign) sectors. Socially, its aim is defined as 'from each citizen according to his ability' and 'to each citizen according to his needs'. Padmore envisages the creation of a welfare state which will involve both a change in the economic base and 'fundamental changes in the customs, habits, and institutions of the people as well as an overhauling of their mode of thinking. . . . It involves the complete reorganization, not only of the basic foundations of our society, but of the ideas, mental outlook, and the social habits of the people'. Socialism, he observes, is more than an economic system, and that, more than the economics, is both its strength and its problem. In practical terms, Padmore argues, 'the actual pattern must be founded upon the African base': the starting point of economic reconstruction must be the land (Friedland and Rosberg 1964: 229–34). The common programme for many African socialists was to raise the agricultural sector both to improve the conditions of the farmers and to generate a surplus that could be used for the development of the industrial sector, thereby transforming a trading economy into an industrial one. Like many post-independence countries, the socialist road was identified with the aim of economic self-sufficiency in order to produce an 'economic independence' that would mirror nominal political independence in order to achieve genuine independence. This was the consistent aim of postcolonial governments from Ghana to Cuba in the period of dependency economics.

3 NKRUMAH

The man who shattered forever the mould of colonized Africa was an African, Kwame Nkrumah. (Sixth Pan African Congress, 1976: 220)

While Padmore was known as 'The Father of African Emancipation', he characterized Nkrumah as the 'standard bearer of Pan-African Socialism' (Sixth Pan African Congress 1976: 222). Padmore's 'Guide' was written at an optimistic moment at the beginning of a new epoch when Nkrumah, his close friend, had recently become president of newly independent Ghana. The basis of Padmore's African socialism had been developed with Nkrumah when they worked together in London, and their

accounts of the aims of socialism in Africa closely resemble each other. Both former communists, the two men developed their ideas in political partnership. On becoming president, Nkrumah appointed Padmore as his personal adviser on African affairs (Hooker 1967: 132–3). After Padmore's death and the loss of his Pan-African ambassador, Pan-African ambitions and a scientific Marxist-Leninism began to figure more overtly in Nkrumah's own immediate priorities than the achievement of an African socialism. As his rule became more and more autocratic he generated increasing mistrust both inside and outside Ghana. When he was deposed in 1966, Africa lost the architect of Pan-Africanism, as well as its most charismatic leader of the independence era (Ikoku 1971).

Nkrumah's and Padmore's preoccupation with supranational Pan-Africanism undoubtedly related to the internationalism of their former communist days, and cannot be separated from their attention to the dangers of neocolonialism. In April and December 1958, shortly after Ghana became independent, Nkrumah called two important Pan-African conferences both held in Accra: the Conference of Independent African States and the All-Africa Peoples Conference. At the first, which was largely organized by Padmore, Nkrumah outlined a four-stage vision of Pan-Africanism based on a common commitment to end colonialism and racialism: 'national independence, national consolidation, the creation of transnational unity and community, and economic and social reconstruction' (Nkrumah 1961a: 125–30; Hooker 1967: 135). The conferences succeeded in establishing political bridges between states across Africa, ending with common resolutions in support of Fanon's FLN in Algeria, condemning *apartheid* policies in South Africa, and emphasizing that 'the struggle for the liberation of Africa is a task of the Africans themselves' (Sixth Pan African Congress 1976: 87). The high point of this programme came with the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. Pan-Africanism has been criticized and dismissed on the grounds that it was based on a mystical, racialized notion of Africanness rather than any political or practical need. For Nkrumah and Padmore, however, the eventual political and economic union of Africa was the means by which it could become an integral, self-sufficient socialist culture free from the continuing economic domination of western capitalism. These larger political ambitions proved Nkrumah's own undoing. One mistake was to prioritize political before economic union (the position adopted by the Casablanca group created in 1961 by the Union of African States (1960), Ghana, Guinea and Mali, together with Morocco, Algeria and Egypt): if he had been more sympathetic to the more pragmatic though less socialist position of the Monrovia group, and concentrated on the proposal for the formation of an African Common Market, for example, the story of the subsequent economic decline of many African states might have been very different – and as in Europe, political unification could well have followed as a corollary of the creation of a single market. Without economic or political union, many African states were left in a position of dependency in which their primary economic relation was to the west rather than to the states in their own region.

Paulin J. Hountondji has shown how, from a historical perspective, Nkrumah moved from an early 'Africanist' phase to a later, more conventional Marxist-Leninism. In

fact Nkrumah evinced Marxist-Leninism in his earliest US period: it was under the influence of Padmore that Nkrumah came to endorse an Africanist position; after Padmore's death he increasingly reverted to a universal scientific socialism which, as Serequeberhan (1994) has argued, subsumed the specificity of Africa back into the forms of European modernity. Writing from exile late in his life, Nkrumah dismissed the concept of an African socialism peculiar to Africa as 'an example of muddled thinking', proclaiming instead that the principles of socialism were universal and emphasizing the principles of class struggle in modern Africa (Hountondji 1996: 137; Nkrumah 1968: 28–9; 1973: 438–45). Nevertheless, even then he conceded that there could be different paths to socialism, and that the only way of achieving socialism is 'by the devising of policies aimed at the general socialist goals, each of which takes its particular form from the specific circumstances of a particular state at a definite historical period' (Nkrumah 1973: 444). Nkrumah's own original contribution to African socialism lay less in the socialist principles which he outlined according to basic socialist tenets, and which are always presented in pragmatic, practical contexts, than in his earlier attempt to provide a new philosophical and ideological basis for an African socialist society, thereby enabling its social consolidation in the difficult period after decolonization. 'The people', he stressed 'need to be stirred to a new awareness of their role in carrying forward the socialist reconstruction. They must be inspired with the same spirit which swept them into the battle for political emancipation which brought them into independence' (Friedland and Rosberg 1964: 263; Nkrumah 1961b). In his most original work, written towards the end of his Africanist phase, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization* (1964), Nkrumah reassessed Marxism and western philosophy in the context of their ideological function, and developed from them a philosophical position appropriate to African society: 'our philosophy must find its weapons in the environment and living conditions of the African people'. Nkrumah argues that 'the restitution of Africa's humanist and egalitarian principles of society requires socialism' (Nkrumah 1970: 77–8). Socialism in Africa, he suggests, is not revolutionary, because it restates in a contemporary idiom the fundamental principles underlying African communalism. Only socialism can restore the harmony of this traditional African society in the face of subsequent Islamic and Euro-Christian influences. In the first edition of 1964, Nkrumah had believed this could be achieved peacefully; by the last edition (1970), Nkrumah, like Fanon, rejects the idea that it is possible to return to an unsullied pre-colonial communalist culture. What is required instead is a new philosophical and ideological position appropriate to the antagonistic historical realities of a postcolonial state:

Such a philosophical statement will be born out of the crisis of the African conscience confronted with the three strands of present African society. Such a philosophical statement I propose to name *philosophical consciencism*, for it will give the theoretical basis for an ideology whose aim shall be to contain the African experience of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence as well as the experience of the traditional African society, and, by gestation, employ them for the harmonious growth and development of that society. (Nkrumah 1970: 70)

Consciencism, therefore, represents a cultural ideology appropriate for a postcolonial culture that has absorbed different, competing influences; instead of an attempt to put the clock back by rejecting carefully chosen elements that are perceived as non-indigenous, its role is to resolve these into a new emergent form. Consciencism, though conceived in national terms, at the same time therefore places the nation in an international, cosmopolitan environment. The major conflict for Nkrumah is not cultural *per se*, but economic, in the sense that he regards the western principles informing capitalism as conflicting with 'the socialist egalitarianism of the traditional African society'. Consciencism represents an attempt to formulate in philosophical terms the ideological revolution that must stand behind any social revolution such as Padmore describes. That revolution, Nkrumah argues, 'must find its weapons in the environment and living conditions of the African people. It is from those conditions that the intellectual content of our philosophy must be created':

Consciencism is the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest the Western and the Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African personality is itself defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society. (Nkrumah 1970: 78–9)

The 'African personality', as Nkrumah terms it in the spirit of *négritude's la personnalité nègre*, here in order to emphasize the humanist basis of African socialism, is currently in a situation of conflict as a result of the antithetical operation of different forces, that is 'the social hotch-potch bequeathed by colonialism': the goal of consciencism is not to attempt a harmonious resolution of these forces but to develop that dialectic in a positive and progressive direction. Nkrumah thus establishes a theory designed to deal with the inevitable situation of the hybrid multicultural colonial legacy of a decolonized state that anticipates many of the concerns of postcolonial theory. His account of social and philosophical difference is always designed for the difficult tensions of everyday life; his vision of a socialism responsive to the contours and needs of the 'African personality' remains among the most effective and challenging – however much it is qualified by his political fall after lapsing from his own democratic, Africanist principles and thus initiating the problematic of the subsequent course of Ghanaian history. Eclipsed during the 1970s and 1980s by the rise of Marxist regimes less concerned to adapt their policies to the specificities of African life, Nkrumah's African socialism of what could be called his Padmore phase, remains one of the essential inspirational texts of African political philosophy:

The socialism of a liberated territory is subject to a number of principles if independence is not to be alienated from the people. When socialism is true to its purpose, it seeks a connection with the egalitarian and humanist past of the people before their social evolution was ravaged by colonialism; it seeks from the results of colonialism those elements (like new methods of production and economic organization) which can be adapted to serve the interests of the people; it seeks to contain and prevent the spread of those anomalies and domineering interests created by the capitalist habit of colonialism;

it reclaims the psychology of the people, erasing the 'colonial mentality' from it; and it resolutely defends the independence and security of the people. In short, socialism recognizes dialectic, the possibility of creation from forces which are opposed to one another; it recognizes the creativity of struggle, and, indeed, the necessity of the operation of forces to any change. It also embraces materialism and translates this into social terms of equality. (Nkrumah 1970: 106)

If Nkrumah's *Towards Colonial Freedom* (1947), Padmore's *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* (1956) and Césaire's *Discourse on Anti-Colonialism* (1950) constitute what Mudimbe calls 'the great early liberation books of the post-war era', Nkrumah's *Consciencism* must occupy a central place among those works that contributed to the establishment of African cultural and intellectual autonomy (Mudimbe 1988: 90).

Nkrumah started off as a brilliant politician, but eventually became a bad one. His mistake was to assume that with independence, he could concentrate on the goals of economic freedom and African emancipation and unity ('the greatness of this objective so transcends all other purposes and its sublimity is so profound') at the expense of the very political freedom that he had worked so hard to deliver (Nkrumah 1961a: 221). The threat of neocolonialism, to which Nkrumah drew so much attention, also functioned as a means for repressing opposition at home, and for losing sight of the particular needs of a specifically African freedom (Serequeberhan 1994). As Mudimbe remarks, 'the best that can be said is that he simply failed to put his theory into practice. Yet his theoretical legacy remains, challenging and stimulating for the new generation of African Marxists looking for paradigms of revolutionary change and cultural dynamism' (Mudimbe 1988: 95–6). Nkrumah's fear that in standing alone, new African nations risked 'early and certain disintegration' was in many ways prescient (Nkrumah 1961a: 228). In 1972 Cabral, while emphasizing the positive aspects of Nkrumah's contribution to the history of Africa, argued that his failures need to be analysed in other than purely personal terms. His conclusion was that 'as long as imperialism exists, *an independent state in Africa must be a liberation movement in power – or else it will not be*' (Bragança and Wallerstein 1982, II: 109). It was to be Cabral himself who would formulate the fullest realization of a workable African socialism. The Pan-African legacy of a politics of tolerance, peace, non-violence and equality developed particularly for Africa more recently re-emerged in the South Africa led by a Mandela who himself formed a bridge to that earlier, humanistic and tolerant generation which sought to show the world 'that Africans can give a lead in justice, tolerance, liberty, individual freedom and in social progress' (Nkrumah 1961a: 82).

4 NYERERE

Similar principles were espoused and put into practice by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. Nyerere's socialism is less impressive in theoretical terms, but in many ways anticipates subsequent developments and appears in retrospect, as Mudimbe suggests, as 'probably the most pragmatic of all African socialisms', while Nyerere himself emerges

as 'one of the more credible political thinkers' (Mudimbe 1988: 94, 92). Like Padmore and Nkrumah, Nyerere emphasizes the fact that socialism is not in the first instance an alternative economic system, but rather a different social one: his vision is of a new nation based on shared values of mutual support, leading to a community of African nations sustaining each other on the same principles. Nyerere defines African socialism as *Ujamaa*, or communalism, and it is through that example of the caring environment of a group that he elaborates socialist possibilities: 'the foundation, and the objective, of African socialism is the extended family'. This suggests the necessity of a gendered account of African socialism that opens up a whole range of transformational possibilities, as well as providing an alternative model to the bourgeois small family structure that Engels rejected so forcibly. Since his socialism is African first, Nyerere is also not prepared to espouse an inflexible dogmatic form of socialism that does not take African realities into account:

Socialism – like democracy – is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare. (Nyerere 1968: 1)

Nyerere therefore also sees the first step of an independent African socialist state to involve both education and re-education, in order to regain an attitude of mind lost under the deprivations of colonialism: 'In our traditional African society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us. We neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow men' (ibid.: 6–7). In the important Arusha Declaration of 1967, Nyerere and his party defined their form of socialism by emphasizing self-reliance and the preferability of small-scale projects. In both economic and social terms, small-scale projects related to the situation of local agriculture and industry, he argued, were far more useful than grandiose plans aimed at developing large-scale modern industry: 'we have to think of what is available, or can be made available, at comparatively small cost, and which can be operated by the people. By moving into the future along this path, we can avoid massive social disruption and human suffering' (ibid.: 97–8). Nyerere's 'profoundly creative response to the African reality', as C. L. R. James put it, was further endorsed by Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who looked to the traditional African community as 'a mutual aid society' which was an accepting and inclusive community (James 1977: 219; Kaunda 1967: 5–6). Nkrumah by contrast increasingly advocated a scientific form of socialism based on nationalization and key government infrastructural projects, and this was followed by Soviet-style socialist ideologies in Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia, which instituted centralized programmes disdaining the needs of rural communities and focusing on large infrastructural projects of urban industrial expansion. In practice, this influence also contributed to large-scale nationalizations of economic institutions and businesses in Tanzania, even after the Arusha Declaration: Nyerere also failed to put his best principles into practice. It is only more recently, when non-African styles of socialism – and indeed of capitalism – have been discredited as viable possibilities for African societies, that Nyerere's perspective

emphasizing local, sustainable solutions, augmented by a new understanding of the complexity of political and economic relations in pre-colonial societies and the role of the different agents of economic and social transformation, has become accepted as the basis for debates about the most effective social strategy by economists, theorists and practitioners of contemporary African Development and Ecological Studies (Maddox, Giblin and Kimambo 1996; Shivji 1989).

5 FROM 'POSITIVE ACTION' TO VIOLENCE

African socialism, in part because of its association with Pan-Africanism, in part because its ideas are perceived as having been superseded, receives comparatively little attention today. The strong identification with non-violence no longer defines public perceptions of African politics. In 1945 the leaders of the Pan-African Congress could identify with the successful strategies of Gandhi that had been first utilized in South Africa. Nkrumah had absorbed the lesson from Gandhi of *Ahimsa* or non-violence, a strategy developed in the face of the difficulty of armed rebellion in the colonies which, without aid from a third party such as the Soviet Union, was likely to be crushed by military repression. The Congress's insistence on a strategy of non-violent resistance was subsequently deployed successfully by Nkrumah, Nyerere and others. Utilizing and drawing together the existing organizational infrastructure of disparate trade unions, women's and youth organizations, Nkrumah adopted positive action in Ghana which in 1957 became the first African country to achieve independence in the twentieth century.

With his revolutionary background, Nkrumah had always been aware that in following the Gandhian path, he was rejecting the alternative way of trying to achieve independence. In his 1949 pamphlet 'What I mean by Positive Action', he pointed out that there were two ways of achieving self-government: armed revolution or a Gandhian moral pressure through constitutional and legitimate non-violent methods.

We advocated the latter method. Freedom, however, had never been handed over to any colonial country on a silver platter; it had only been won after bitter and vigorous struggles. Because of the educational backwardness of the colonies, the majority of the people were illiterate and there was only one thing they could understand – action.

I described Positive Action as the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country. The weapons were legitimate political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and, as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India. (Nkrumah 1957: 92)

This strategy worked well in Anglophone and Francophone West Africa. At this time, no one wanted to consider the implications of the fact that in South Africa Gandhi's *satyagraha* had only succeeded in achieving or defending certain political rights for Indians, not majority rule in a settler colony. The deteriorating situation in South Africa, and the example of the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, however,

meant that the Pan-African non-violent position became increasingly harder to sustain.

Nkrumah believed that the 1958 All-Africa Peoples Conference would 'serve to inspire and encourage Africans in other parts of the Continent to follow in the footsteps of the Gold Coast along the road of non-violent revolution instead of Mau Mauism' (ibid.: 185). He was challenged by Fanon of the FLN, whose address on the necessity of violence subsequently became the first chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth*. To reinforce his message, Nkrumah called a further conference on Positive Action and Security in Africa, which opened in Accra on 7 April 1960, declaring adamantly: 'we decry violence and deplore it. We are devoted to non-violent positive action'. The conference, however, in fact effectively marked the end of positive action as a strategy. It was soon followed by French nuclear tests in the Sahara: Nkrumah called for positive action across Africa to protest against the test, arguing that 'the result could be as powerful and as successful as Gandhi's historic Salt March' (Nkrumah 1961a: 215). He had no specific proposal, however, to match Gandhi's brilliant strategy, and positive action was ineffectual. Its limitations had already been brought home with the Pidgiguiti massacre of August 1959 in Portuguese Guinea, when fifty dockworkers were killed when striking dockers were forced back to work. Its worst defeat, however, came with the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Positive action with non-violence in South Africa in defiance of the pass laws resulted in the brutal murder of sixty-nine peaceful protesters by the law and order forces of the South African government (Davenport 1991: 358). On 16 December 1961, the first organized acts of sabotage against the South African government by the newly formed armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation) took place. A manifesto announced a new policy of reciprocal violence:

Umkhonto we Sizwe will carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by new methods, which are necessary to complement the actions of the established national liberation movement. . . . The people's patience is not endless. *The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa.* . . . The Government policy of force, repression and violence will no longer be met with non-violent resistance only! (Meli 1988: 214)

A year later, in his statement to the court during his first trial, Nelson Mandela reinforced the same argument, arguing that 'we have been conditioned to our attitudes by the history which is not of our making. . . . Government violence can do only one thing and that is to breed counter-violence. We have warned repeatedly that the Government, by resorting continually to violence will breed, in this country, counter-violence amongst the people' (Bragança and Wallerstein 1982, II: 38). The decision was justified once more in an article, 'From Gandhi to Mandela', published in the ANC journal *Sechaba* in 1969, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of Gandhi's formation of the Natal Indian Congress. The article cites Gandhi himself in a statement of 1938 which is interpreted as an endorsement of the ANC decision to embark on violent forms of struggle: 'Where the choice is set between cowardice and violence',

Gandhi remarks, 'I would advise violence. . . . I would a thousand times prefer violence than the emasculation of a whole race. I prefer to use arms in the defence of honour than remain the vile witness of dishonour' (Bragança and Wallerstein 1982, II: 43). From Gandhi to Mandela: *satyagraha* was finished. Yet it would return, in the form of Mandela's uncompromising generosity.

Along with South Africa, the bulk of the remaining colonies at this time – Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Nyasaland, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Southwest Africa, Spanish Sahara – were either settler colonies or ones held by the intransigent colonial powers of Portugal and Spain. The taking up of the armed struggle in Algeria, Portuguese Angola and Guinea-Bissau and South Africa in the early 1960s definitively ended the strategy of positive action. In 1961 the CONCP, a united front to co-ordinate the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonies in Africa, was formed, and at the Khartoum Conference of 1968 this alliance developed links with other freedom organizations that had moved to armed struggle, notably the ANC, ZAPU and SWAPO of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Outside Africa, the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and escalating war in Vietnam signalled the changing tenor of the times; if it was possible to defeat an imperial power, why not a colonial one?

Today, non-violence receives little consideration compared to violence, for example in the writings of Fanon. In his very different stress on violence, Fanon, however, was operating in the context of the very long violent history of resistance to French settlement in North Africa: violence was demanded by the exigencies of the situation. It would be wrong to see these as absolute ideological or ontological differences. Fanon, like Mandela, hated violence. Conversely, many of those most opposed to violence in Anglophone Africa changed their position, including Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. Nkrumah's recantation from positive action to revolutionary warfare was already in place before his fall, although it was augmented by his own interpretation of the coup against him as a neocolonial conspiracy (Hountondji 1996: 135). Although he may have abjured his principles of positive action, he remained true to his ideal of Pan-Africanism: his *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* (1968) was conceived on a continent-wide scale and proposed the formation of an All-African People's Revolutionary Party and All-African People's Revolutionary Army which would take up arms against settler and puppet regimes alike in order to achieve the political unity of Africa. More remarkable in many respects was the recantation of President Kenneth Kaunda, who had led Zambia to freedom through a campaign of non-violence and had hitherto been a leading advocate of a Gandhian politics predicated on moral rather than physical force. However, with certain kinds of adversaries, impervious to condemnation by the rest of the world, and with an ineffective or absent internal liberal opposition, moral force alone does not work. The Rivonia trial in South Africa in 1963–4, and the declaration of UDI in Rhodesia by the white settler regime in the following year, made it clear to even the most passionate advocates of non-violence that the entrenched white settler regimes were blithely unsusceptible to the techniques that Gandhi had developed in South Africa over fifty years before. The traditional stance of the ANC, NDP and ZAPU in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe seeking negotiated constitutional reform had come to nothing. After the

formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the launching of the armed struggle in Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 1964 confirmed the new era in African liberation. The MPLA in Angola declared that under the militarized conditions of the Portuguese regime, guerrilla warfare was the only possible and valid form of struggle (Bragança and Wallerstein 1982, II: 74). On 18 April 1966, Zanu began its *Chimurenga*, armed struggle. Discussing the actions of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, Kaunda concluded:

If questions of justice, legality and morality *can* be swept aside, it seemed clear that if it was right to use violence to defend such a state, it could not be wrong to use violence to destroy it. (Kaunda 1982: 75).

By the time the Sixth Pan-African Congress was held, for the first time on African soil, in Dar es Salaam in 1974, discussion of African national liberation was dominated by the violent struggles taking place in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa, Spanish Sahara, Zimbabwe and Palestine. Non-violent resistance was now inappropriate, and Pan-Africanism was renamed Revolutionary Pan-Africanism. In his opening address Nyerere continued to affirm the two other values of African socialism: an end to economic injustice and the racialism that denied the humanity of non-whites: 'For one fact is fundamental to the future of this continent, and of the world. Humanity is indivisible. No man can live with self-respect, or deserve the respect of others, if he acquiesces in the humiliation of human beings on the grounds of colour or race' (Sixth Pan African Congress 1976: 9, 90–1). Three years later, even Nyerere himself was to use military force in order to depose Idi Amin of Uganda after eight years of violent dictatorship. The 1979 Monrovia Summit then however reaffirmed Nyerere's basic principles by adopting an 'African Charter of Human and People's Rights'.

Nevertheless, after 1959 the harder-line political options espoused by freedom fighters in Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe began to dominate even those regimes hitherto committed to African socialism and Pan-Africanism. Though there is no hard and fast rule (Sri Lanka proves it), the failures of the regimes after independence in Africa and elsewhere cannot be separated from the continuing effects of the violence that was necessary for the decolonization process. The front-line states were also subject to a process of continued destabilization by South Africa and the United States. In this context, it is striking that a contemporary version of African socialism has re-emerged in a South Africa that was finally liberated by a combination of moral, economic and military pressures exerted at a popular and international level, effectively integrating the two alternative possibilities. The liberation of South Africa showed that the choice of violence versus non-violence was not always an absolute one, and that the range of techniques deployed needed to be responsive to individual situations. In certain ways, the situation in South Africa was comparable to that of India, where the combination of different groups committed to violence and non-violence produced an effective dialectical instrument of counter-hegemony. Mandela succeeded because while refusing to abjure violence when faced

with an unjust regime, he was committed to non-violence as a fundamental principle. The enduring ideals of African socialism that live on in South Africa means that for the first time an economically powerful African state is in a position to define a new regime, and a new future, for African societies.

Africa III:

THE SENGHORS AND FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN SOCIALISM

The Black Atlantic was not just an English-speaking community: it was also French, Spanish and Portuguese. The construction of a new political and cultural identity for Africa was also the product of anti-colonial intellectual-politicians from the Francophone and latterly the Lusophone colonies. The shift from revolutionary communism towards Pan-Africanism and African socialism also occurred among Francophone and Lusophone African intellectuals. As Langley (1973) has demonstrated, even if the Anglophones dominated the great 1945 Congress, the Pan-African movement was as active in Francophone as in Anglophone African cultures in the first half of the twentieth century, with the *Union des Populations de Cameroun*, Senghor in Senegal and Mali, and, for a time, Houphouët-Boigny's *Rassemblement Démocratique* in the Ivory Coast. The irony for the inhabitants of Francophone Africa, however, was that Pan-Africanism was already being practised by the French themselves, in the sense that their empire was deliberately conceived as a vast dominion ranging from central Africa to the Mediterranean. The French possessions in Africa consisted simply of the federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa (Mazrui 1993: 60). As in Anglophone Africa, the territories governed from the metropolis and susceptible to constitutional pressure or positive action were balanced against the non-negotiable stance of entrenched local settler regimes. The outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954 showed that activists in such situations had no option but to turn to violence. The dialectic already observed with respect to Anglophone Africa between positive action and violence can thus be traced again here: in this case there were two dominant figures from the alternative domains representing the two possible polarities: Léopold Senghor and Fanon. As with Nkrumah or Gandhi, a consideration of the strategies of either without a consideration of the alternatives against which their position was defined, has the effect of suppressing the historical dialectic of their interventions.

Differences in the style of French colonization of Africa meant that politically, culturally, and in terms of options for self-determination, the situation in Francophone Africa differed significantly from that in the British colonies. Whereas the British

system was loosely based on a notion of empire moving towards a federation of independent dominions, a condition to which any colonized country could theoretically aspire, the French colonial system of assimilation meant that the whole empire was regarded as an intrinsic part of mainland France. As a result of the French revolutionary fervour for equality, the inhabitants of some older colonies such as Martinique and the four communes of Senegal (Saint-Louis, Dakar, Rufisque and Gorée) were constitutionally citizens of France and sent deputies to the French National Assembly. Even those from elsewhere who were simply French colonial subjects were, in theory at least, brought up to think of themselves as French. This policy was strikingly successful, particularly with respect to those from the Caribbean ('Antilles') and West Africa, and produced a different dynamics within the anti-colonial movement. Even though the official doctrine of assimilation (in varying degrees) to French civilization had been under attack since the beginning of the century in the name of a move towards the more hierarchical British or Dutch-style policy of 'association', its legacy remained intact in the much greater emphasis given to the acquisition of French culture and education by colonized peoples, together with the refusal to contemplate any constitutional path which would lead to political separation from France (Betts 1961). Complete assimilation worked for few, though it did succeed for a significant few, in particular the loyal deputies such as Blaise Diagné who went to Paris to represent their colonies in the French Assembly (in settler colonies such as Algeria, such deputies were always drawn from the settler population). Opponents to the terms of French rule in Africa began by defining themselves against the contentedly assimilated stance of their own 'representatives'. Given, however, that assimilation was not even legally encoded or enforced, the possibilities were somewhat different from those for British colonial subjects: activists could somewhat bizarrely equally advocate complete integration or complete independence. Only this explains why some French colonies eventually chose to remain as part of mainland France.

Paradoxically, therefore, in many cases anti-colonial nationalism, and political and cultural self-definition, were carried out within a broader unquestioned assumption of still being a part of Francophone culture. This attitude was reinforced by the propaganda accompanying the recruitment of colonial soldiers during the First World War, which claimed that all colonial subjects were French and wished to fight for France; the subsequent use of colonial troops during the war and, notoriously, after the war in the Rhineland, established the presumption of what was known as the *dette de sang*, a mutual obligation that France reciprocate the sacrifice that had been made on her behalf (Dewitte 1985). This argument was also made by the many servicemen from British African, Caribbean and Asian colonies who fought in the war, but it never achieved a public acknowledgement comparable to that in France (Tabili 1994). As a result of these differences, much political and cultural writing by French colonial citizens and subjects developed concepts of cultural and political self-definition within a continuing assumption of also remaining, if not part of France, at least part of French culture. Cultural mixture and a positive attitude towards modernity remained the norm. As Christopher Miller argues, early twentieth-century cultural theory from Francophone African intellectuals anticipates much of the postcolonial stress on cul-

tural hybridity and cross-cultural poetics, particularly the stress on *métissage* and *créolité*, which suggests a cultural, intellectual and political continuity with the present day that is often overlooked (Miller 1998: 3). This continuity is clearest in the figure of Edouard Glissant, whose own career, rather like that of Roman Jakobson, spans movements that are typically thought of as belonging to different generations (Glissant 1989, 1997). The politics of those, such as Léopold Senghor, who advocated forms of difference within French culture and, consequently, initially opposed independence, are today often regarded with suspicion. Césaire, by contrast, who occupied a more contradictory position of writing one of the greatest moral indictments of colonialism in the *Discourse on Colonialism* (1955) and then successfully leading a political party that advocated the political assimilation of Martinique with mainland France and a rejection of independence, seems to be regarded as less problematic, doubtless because the writings themselves are unequivocal and can be discussed separately from the political decisions to which, in the event, Césaire came (Césaire 1972). As a result, Césaire occupies a place in the postcolonial pantheon comparable to that of his student, Frantz Fanon. Both are examples of culturally assimilated intellectuals, their politics notwithstanding. Fanon's political radicalism developed fully only after his move to Algeria, the political context of which was very different from that of the Caribbean or West Africa.

In general terms, whereas Anglophone anti-colonial culture began with the object of self-government within the empire but, particularly after the Russian Revolution and the First World War, increasingly moved towards a goal of complete cultural and political independence (a transition embodied in the political career of Gandhi), Francophone colonial cultures remained more dialectically divided between those demanding complete independence, such as Ho Chi Minh and Fanon, and those such as Césaire and Senghor who sought to re-establish the metropolitan-colonial relation on more equitable terms, and, having done so, advocated remaining part of a broader French political and economic culture, whether constitutionally independent or not. It is curious that while (crudely speaking) endorsing Fanon and dismissing Léopold Senghor, postcolonial theory itself in many ways comes closer to the latter's exploration of interrelated forms of cultural difference than the Manichaean world of Fanon. Moreover, however radical in political terms, in many respects the more dialectical binary model of Ho Chi Minh and, arguably, Fanon represented less of an attempt to develop forms of politics and cultural politics out of the conditions of tricontinental cultures than the application of the universal model of European Marxism to the situation of non-European contexts (Ho Chi Minh 1967).

1 FRANCE BETWEEN THE WARS

While there were continual revolts and widespread incidents of resistance in the French colonies during and after the First World War (Boahen 1985), for the most part the anti-colonial movement as such was articulated at the metropolitan centre in Paris. This was partly because of the much greater political freedom available there

compared to the colonies, partly because activists from different colonized countries who had come to Paris met up and organized together, and partly because funding and other forms of support were easily available from the French Communist Party. Those involved were largely war-veteran activists who, attracted by the liberal atmosphere compared to the restrictive environment of the colonies, together with the educational and cultural opportunities available, had remained in Paris after 1918 (Langley 1973; Lawler 1992; Recham 1996). About 200,000 Africans were brought over to Europe to fight in the First World War, thanks in large measure to the recruiting efforts of the Senegalese Deputy Blaise Diagné, 'the walking embodiment of assimilation' in Christopher L. Miller's description, though Diagné's actions look less straightforwardly culpable when put in the context of the fact that in 1915 Gandhi was also recruiting soldiers to fight in the British army in India, famously declaring, 'I discovered that the British Empire had certain ideals with which I have fallen in love' (Conklin 1997: 142–50; Echenberg 1991: 45–6; Miller 1998: 17; Overstreet and Windmiller 1959: 19). In the first large-scale occurrence of immigration from North Africa, many Algerians were also brought over to France as workers to replace the men who had gone to the front. It was this that, in the context of the political freedom available, enabled Messali Hadj to found the Étoile Nord-Africaine among Algerians in Paris in the 1920s. One unforeseen effect of the war was to put together individuals from different colonies from Africa, the Caribbean and Indochina, creating new bonds across ethnic, cultural and geographical divisions, which facilitated the development of a general anti-colonial ideology at the very time when a universal one was on offer from the communists. As in the case of the British colonies, the ubiquitous imposition of French as the official language in every colony also had the unintended effect of making it easier for activists from different territories to communicate with each other. The first public manifestation of such co-ordination was the formation by Ho Chi Minh of the Union Inter-coloniale, a communist organization involving activists from all areas of the French Empire, particularly Indochina and the Antilles, which published a newspaper, *Le Paria*, which appeared from 1922 to 1926. The Union Inter-coloniale followed the official Comintern line that the liberation of the colonies would follow revolution in Europe, but its attentions were focused on denunciations of French rule in Indochina, the Antilles and Africa (Dewitte 1985; Langley 1973: 293). After 1928, and the revitalizing of the anti-colonial position of the Communist Party at the Sixth Comintern Congress, the French Communist Party established a Colonial Commission which published a *Bulletin Colonial* every month, and encouraged the development of communist parties or organizations in the French colonies, always supposed to be supervised by the Communist Party in Paris. As in Britain and the British colonies, Africans, like those from elsewhere, tended to resist such attempts at control by white Europeans, whose radicalism, though anti-racist and anti-colonial, rarely extended to the needs and perspectives of the Africans themselves. A non-communist alternative was already available in Garveyism. This and other forms of anti-colonial activism in Paris and the French colonies outside the immediate orbit of the PCF will be considered in the next section. The distinction, however, was never entirely clear-cut. As was often the case

among anti-colonial activists elsewhere, official and unofficial communist and anti-colonial nationalism were never absolutely distinct and were frequently confused by the governments and their intelligence agencies. This was understandable since individual party members, such as Garan Kouyaté, often belonged simultaneously to non-communist organizations, and vice versa, and the party also gave financial and other support to non-communist groups. The notion of the 'communist front organization' is often used to give a broad-brush sense of basic ideological affiliation.

2 ANTI-COLONIAL ACTIVISTS: HOUÉNOU, SENGHOR AND GARAN KOUYATÉ

There were three significant African anti-colonial political organizations in Paris in the interwar years that were outside direct PCF control, led by three figures: Tovalou Houénou (from Dahomey), Lamine Senghor (from Senegal) and Tiémoho Garan Kouyaté (from the French Sudan, now Mali). These all took an African, rather than a national, perspective. I shall concentrate on these diasporic figures, the organizations with which they were involved, and the anti-colonial ideologies that they developed, because they established a radical intellectual-political tradition that operated continuously, and productively, until the 1960s. It exerted a strong influence on the liberation politics of the whole of Francophone Africa, and feeds directly, through Fanon and others, into postcolonial theory. Local political activity in Francophone Africa in the pre-war period achieved less impact than in the Anglophone colonies. The major developments included the election in Senegal of the first black African Deputy, Blaise Diagne, to the French Chamber of Deputies by the four *communes*. Himself a reformer and – persuaded by W. E. B. Du Bois – the convenor of the 1919 Pan-African Congress in Paris, Diagne remained deputy from 1914 to his death in 1934 (Du Bois 1965: 9). He was soon regarded as being too ready to concede his own symbolic status and accept the gradualist policies of the French administration by Houénou, Senghor and Garan Kouyaté. The strength of his Republican Socialist Party and his enduring political influence in Senegal goes some way towards explaining the subsequent moderate stance of Léopold Senghor. After the First World War, various youth and social organizations were formed which provided a variety of political fora, though they were less widespread than in Anglophone Africa. Most effective at a local level were the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen in West Africa, and the Société Amicale des Originaires de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française led by André Matswa in French Equatorial Africa. Both of these organizations initiated strike action, but were effectively repressed by the colonial authorities when they did so.

3 TOVALOU HOUÉNOU AND THE LIGUE UNIVERSELLE DE DÉFENSE DE LA RACE NOIRE (LDRN)

In 1924 Tovalou Houénou, author of the extraordinary *Involution de métamorphoses et des métempsychose de l'univers* (1921), generally recognized as one of the major forerunners of the later theories of *négritude*, and by then himself a celebrated figure in the social circles of the Parisian left, was thrown out of a Montmartre café by some white Americans who, outraged to find themselves sitting at a table next to a black man, confidently assumed, with the characteristic cultural imperialism of the American tourist, that they were still in the Jim Crow world of the United States. This experience, an epiphanic moment comparable to Gandhi's reaction to his being thrown out of a first-class railway carriage soon after his arrival in South Africa, led Houénou to found the Ligue Universelle de Défense de la Race Noire (LDRN), which, as its name suggests, was based on Garveyite Pan-Africanist principles which at that time were highly influential in the Caribbean, West Africa and among members of the African diaspora in Paris. Notwithstanding the collapse of the movement, Garveyism suggested possibilities that continued to haunt the imaginations of political activists from Houénou through the *négritude* movement to the cultural agenda of *Présence Africaine* of the late 1940s. Houénou had already been associated with the Communist Party and also with Marcus Garvey's UNIA, which described him as the UNIA representative in France, and whose newspaper, *The Negro World*, Houénou helped to distribute in his native Dahomey, along with *Le Paria* (Boahen 1985: 646; Langley 1973: 293). In 1924 he went to New York to meet Garvey and speak at a UNIA gathering in which he claimed that Paris was now 'the heart of the black race'. That he was able to negotiate communism and Garveyism is indicative of the way in which, from the perspective of Paris or Dahomey, apparently incompatible political positions could be combined and reconstructed to generate the basis of new anti-colonial liberation cultures. For a short time the LDRN published a Pan-Africanist journal *Les Continents*, which espoused a new black pride across the countries of Africa and the African diaspora, protested against conditions in the colonies, and argued for colonial rights – demanding either absolute autonomy or complete assimilation. One of the other editors of *Les Continents* was the Martiniquan René Maran, whose novel *Batouala* (1921), a fierce critique of European colonialism and its civilizing mission in Africa, had already established the radical anti-colonial agenda of Africans in post-war Paris. In 1924 the journal lost a celebrated action for defamation brought against it by Blaise Diagne, whom it had called a collaborator. The trial served to polarize the differences between the conservative African deputies and younger radical African dissidents, and usefully allowed the public articulation of radical new political positions in court. Houénou himself was strikingly ambivalent in relation to the choices between them, calling equally for 'Absolute autonomy for the Colonies, with imperial relations to the Motherland on general questions; or otherwise total, complete assimilation without frontier – without distinction of race' (Langley 1979: 235). His *Involution de métamorphoses et des métempsychose de l'univers* is a curious

and obscure text which appears to be a philosophical account of the possibility of assimilation through a Joycean exploration of metamorphosis and metempsychosis in which, as Miller puts it, 'involution seems to represent an escape from a condition of difference that is oppressive and results from illusory distinctions' (Miller 1998: 52). At the same time, involution is haunted by the simultaneous revolution that its processes of transculturation bring about, and Houénou himself seems to have become increasingly militant in his attitudes towards the unyielding French colonial regime. Encouraged by Garveyites whom he had met in Harlem, and the return to Dahomey from Paris of his fellow radical Louis Hunkanrin, Houénou subsequently became involved in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate his native Dahomey, which had been in a condition of unrest since 1923. A series of riots and strikes developed into such a state of unrest that Houénou's nationalist group was run underground and its leaders arrested. For the rest of his life, until 1936, he remained in Senegal, where he continued to be actively involved in anti-Diagnist politics, preaching his involuted version of communist anti-racist anti-colonialism (Boahen 1985: 646–7; Langley 1973: 298–300).

4 LAMINE SENGHOR AND THE COMITÉ DE DÉFENSE DE LA RACE NÈGRE (CDRN)

In 1926, together with a dozen radical young Africans, the militant anti-colonial communist Lamine Senghor, a distant cousin of the younger Léopold Senghor, formed a successor to the LDRN, named La Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre (CDRN), and posthumously elected Lenin their honorary president. As this suggests, the CDRN was to move much closer to the Communist Party and the trade unions, and align itself with the Comintern. Lamine had joined the PCF in 1924 on his return from his native Senegal, where he had been refused permission to resettle after serving in France in the army during the war. This was done on a technicality, but was really the result of his having been active in the Union Inter-coloniale (Dewitte 1985). In 1925 he resigned from the party in frustration at its refusal to foreground the political issues around race – a policy that for him was too close to the position of Blaise Diagné for comfort. Under Senghor's leadership, the CDRN increased its grassroots membership, and supported the work of political activists such as Houénou in Senegal, while the trade-union section of the CDRN established organizational branches in the main ports such as Marseilles and Le Havre, with the object of radicalizing black sailors, workers and ex-servicemen. With the collaboration of Emile Faure and radical communist and LAI member, Garan Kouyaté, and with financial support from the Communist Party, the CDRN published a journal that was widely distributed in French Africa, *La Voix des nègres*, later renamed *La Race nègre*. In *La Voix des nègres* Senghor defined the policy of the CDRN as 'permanent collaboration with those organizations which are genuinely struggling for the liberation of oppressed peoples and for world revolution' (Langley 1973: 304). The journal reflected the militancy of their parent organization; fiercely critical of French colonial policy, it advocated full

independence for the colonies, Senghor and Garan Kouyaté adhering to the communist position that this could be achieved through a class war against imperialism, Faure increasingly advocating an anti-colonial independence movement that would bring a return to indigenous African political forms. The journal shared with *Les Continents* a wide range of interests concerning anti-colonial movements all over the world, and included writings by Ho Chi Minh on Indochina, reports on the activities of the Étoile Nord-Africaine, the West African Students Union in London, the Garvey movement and other African-American organizations in the US such as the NAACP (Langley 1973: 306).

Senghor himself was widely noted for the vehemence of his attacks on French colonialism and for his fierce nationalism. A good indication of his approach can be found in the speech that he made to the inaugural conference of the League Against Imperialism in 1927, printed in the second issue of *La Voix des nègres*. Senghor's speech shows that he shared many political positions with Houénou, as well as employing similar rhetorical techniques such as the citation of a disgustingly brutal incident or cruel punishment in order to provide graphic illustration of the real mores of the French colonial administration. Senghor's communism is apparent from his description of himself as dedicated to world revolution. Nevertheless, his priorities remain Afrocentric: he described the aim of the CDRN as

a comprehensive organization of young Negroes resolved to take steps to bring about the liberation of their race. You are perhaps aware that ours is the most oppressed race in the world. This is the race which is oppressed by all the imperialists on earth, and whose life and death lies in the hands of its enemies. (Langley 1979: 256)

Senghor went on to attack the atrocities in the colonies carried out in the name of bringing civilization; criticized forced labour and the selling of colonies by one imperial power to another as modern forms of slavery, attacked the injustice of strikingly different payments for war veterans between French citizens and French (colonial) subjects, and protested against the contradictions of assimilation policy in practice, whereby native inhabitants of French colonies were treated as French when recruitment was required for armies or labour forces. 'But', he added, 'when it comes to giving us rights we are no longer Frenchmen but Negroes' (ibid.: 260). While Senghor's speech impressed the delegates, it also impressed the French authorities, and he was arrested after his return to Paris from Brussels. Later released on account of his health, he died of tuberculosis before the end of the year.

The first of the two issues of the CDRN's *La Voix des nègres*, which appeared in 1927, contained a manifesto address 'A TOUS LES NEGRES DU MONDE', declaring that the nations of Africa must rise up and flourish once more, and emancipate themselves by their own efforts. The distinctive position of the CDRN was to combine a radical general anti-colonialism demanding independence for all colonial countries, comparable only to that to be found in Comintern declarations, with a politics, no doubt ultimately inspired by Garvey, based on the defence of the 'Negro race' throughout the world. The fact that the CDRN was supported by the Communist

Party financially shows that the PCF was putting into practice the general principles of the Second Comintern conference according to which communist parties were instructed to give assistance to anti-colonial revolutionary movements. This coalescence and transformation of communist principles for a specific African politics achieved by Senghor and his committee foreshadowed the transformation of Pan-Africanism into a socialist movement.

Senghor's radicalism extended to cultural as well as more mainstream political questions. In a major essay on his work, Christopher L. Miller has drawn attention to Senghor's renaming Houénou's Ligue Universelle de Défense de la Race Noire as the Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre: Senghor's emphasis on the word *nègre* in the changed title of the CDRN was highly significant. On the first page of the first issue of *La Voix des nègres*, an article appeared entitled 'Le Mot *nègre*' which argued, in Miller's words, for 'a rehabilitation of blackness through language – a project that generations since have attributed only to the Négritude of Léopold Sédar Senghor and Césaire' (Miller 1998: 33). The explicit project of the CDRN was to rehabilitate what it calls 'the dirty word of our times': to combat the class distinctions between 'hommes de couleur', 'noirs' and 'nègres' which the French used effectively to distinguish between the *évolué* 'civilized' African, the uneducated African worker, and the primitive peasant. The French discourse of race was thus simultaneously integrated with cultural class distinctions based on the degree of assimilation. The effect of this was to divide-up French Africans between themselves. As a political gesture of resistance, Senghor argues that the 'lowest' word negro/nigger should become the Pan-African term through which all Africans and those of African descent can identify together:

The youth of the CDRN have made it their duty to pick this word back up out of the mud where you have been dragging it, to make it into a symbol. This is the name of our race.

Since our lands, our rights, and our freedom no longer belong to us, we cling to that which, along with the lustre of our skin colour, is all that is left of our ancestor's legacy. This name is ours: we belong to it! . . . [W]e use it as a rallying cry: a banner. We do ourselves honour and glory by calling ourselves *Nègres*, with a capital N at the head. (Cited by Miller 1998: 35)

This statement that accompanies the first issue of a journal committed to the defence of the African race is particularly powerful and original, advocating a renewed identity based on the negation of the negative language of imperial domination. As many minority movements have since affirmed, the act of self-naming, of reappropriating labels of denigration (the very word 'denigration' betrays the history of racism in European culture) as the basis of a positive restored identity, constitutes a significant act of political defiance and empowerment. The CDRN manifesto elaborates for the first time the strategy to be developed by the *négritude* movement, even if here the source of renewal is political, linguistic and racial without the accompanying claim for a return to traditional African culture that Léopold Senghor and Césaire would advocate. Conversely, the powerful political strategy of Lamine Senghor's movement gives *négritude* a very different context of emergence from that which is provided in

the literary history books. *Négritude* did not develop simply as a cultural movement in 1930s Paris: it was conceived in a context in which Francophone Africans were already highly politicized, but as yet had not deployed the resources of cultural revolution within the panoply of the strategies of their liberation movements. As such, it provided the additional cultural component that would allow the development of the full range of African socialist political philosophies, in which ideas drawn from Marxism would be combined, in different ways, with the specific demands of African cultures.

Senghor was also the author of a short novella, *La Violation d'un pays* (1927), a powerful fable or parable of the intrusion and violence of western colonial power into the harmony of pre-colonial Africa and the first piece of Francophone African fiction to oppose colonialism and to describe its systems of domination and exploitation (Senghor 1927; Miller 1998: 25–8). Much of the book is taken up with a subject central to Senghor's concerns, the iniquity of recruitment of Africans for the French army and the subsequent shameful treatment that the veterans received. It ends, however, much more militantly with an apocalyptic eruption of a worldwide revolution of colonized peoples against the imperialist powers. The irony surrounding the production of this novel was that Senghor could write and publish it in the liberal political climate of Paris of the 1920s (although Senghor himself was under constant surveillance by the intelligence services). Its importation into Africa, by contrast, was forbidden and most copies sent there were intercepted by the authorities on arrival:

The gap between, on the one hand, active and organized resistance to colonialism in France and, on the other, the effective suppression of dissent within the colonized territories during this period is dramatized by this failed attempt. Exile in France allowed Lamine Senghor to formulate his anti-colonialism, and Communist support gave him the necessary means, but colonial power in Africa had no trouble in eliminating such threats. (Miller 1998: 28)

Exactly this difference also operated between a liberal London and the British colonies, and even between Lisbon and the Portuguese colonies. The forcibly and self-exiled activists all met up in the metropolitan capitals, quickly established contact with each other and developed anti-colonial organizations in the heartlands of empire. Their links with the colonies, though closely policed, were not necessarily made completely ineffective by police surveillance. Those intellectuals such as M. N. Roy of India, who relied on the postal service, were easily controlled; others such as Senghor and Garan Kouraté, who had developed political organizations both within France and in West Africa, and had also established close links with other sympathetic political organizations and trade unions, had less difficulty. Although few copies of *La Violation d'un pays* reached the population of Senegal, radical Paris-based newspapers and magazines, the production of which was virtually entirely repressed in the colonies themselves, circulated freely if illicitly in the colonial arena.

5 TIÉMOHO GARAN KOUYATÉ AND THE LIGUE DE DÉFENSE DE LA RACE NÈGRE (LDRN)

Like many anti-colonial movements, the membership of the CDRN was divided among different factions that advocated individual strategies of varying political priorities and degrees of radicalism. In the case of the CDRN, this was augmented by tensions between Antillean and African perspectives and priorities. As a result of such factional disputes, in the summer of 1927 Senghor and Garan Kouyaté left the CDRN, which then significantly changed its name to the Comité de Défense des Intérêts de la Race Noire, and formed the Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre (LDRN). Its magazine, *La Race nègre*, continued to affirm the politics of *La Voix des nègres*; its first issue took the politics of language a stage further by including an article written in so-called *petit nègre* patois (Dewitte 1985: 150–7; Miller 1998: 43–4).

In 1929, after Senghor's premature death, the leadership of the LDRN passed to Garan Kouyaté. Tiémoho Garan Kouyaté, from the French Sudan, was a literature student at the University of Paris. He was also a communist, and an activist in various political organizations which operated just inside, or just outside, the margins of the Communist Party. Garan Kouyaté became a close friend of George Padmore in the early 1930s, and it is easy to see that the two had much in common: communist in principle and in their sympathies, both men nevertheless resisted the central control of the party and formed organizations that put African political identities at the centre of their programmes. Garan Kouyaté seems to have belonged to a number of different organizations simultaneously, some of which were communist and some of which were not, with the result that even now it is difficult to keep track of his political activities: there is no biography of him, nor have his writings been collected. Under his leadership, the LDRN became closely associated with the Communist Party, Comintern and Profintern organizations and communist trade unions. In a vigorous campaign similar to that of Lamine Senghor, Garan Kouyaté toured the French ports such as Bordeaux and Marseilles and established branches, trade unions and discussion groups of the LDRN in the ports and in French Africa, where the LDRN was involved in the 1929 uprisings in the Congo. Through Garan Kouyaté, the LDRN was also associated with the communist Comité Syndical International des Ouvriers Nègres, with Padmore's *The Negro Worker*. The LDRN also worked closely with Messali Hadj's Étoile Nord-Africaine, the Association des Indochinois, as well as with organizations such as the Club International des Marins, through which forbidden revolutionary literature was passed to sailors who then circulated it in the colonies. It took a major part in the formation of the Rassemblement Coloniale, an important pan-nationalist political organization designed to unite the nationalist movements in the different French colonies in North and West Africa, Madagascar and Indochina (Padmore 1956: 335). In 1930, together with Emile Faure from Senegal, and Leo Sajous from Haiti (editor of the literary journal *La Revue du monde noir*, founded by Paulette Nardal), Garan Kouyaté also founded the Comité Universel de l'Institut Nègre de Paris, a similar organization to the West Africa Student Union in London.

The momentum of Garan Kouyaté's activities was quite extraordinary, and gives a good indication of how in practice theoretical and political positions in the anti-colonial movement were elaborated simultaneously with the grassroots activities of establishing viable political organizations and mass support. These diasporic activists were genuine 'border intellectuals', moving between cores and peripheries, centres and margins and establishing lines of force between them. At the centre, in the metropolitan capitals, they were themselves marginal but they were in no sense either specular or ambivalent (JanMohamed 1992). With them, there was no sense of distance, discontinuity and disengagement, except for their critical disengagement from the colonial ideology in which they had been assimilated through education and ideology. Their politics were committed, their position articulate, their objectives clear.

The LDRN's political programme was founded on the straightforward demand, which it shared with the Communist Party, for self-determination and independence for the colonies. It continued the attack, started by Houénou, on 'les nègres europeanisés', represented by the conservative black French deputies Diagné and Gratien Candace (from Guadeloupe), and attacked the doctrine of assimilation on the grounds that in practice it only produced political representation for the French settlers in the colonies (Langley 1973: 310–11). Garan Kouyaté's vigorous combination of anti-colonialism, nationalism and communism, operating proactively particularly through trade-union organizations, was fully reflected in the LDRN's monthly organ, *La Race nègre*, which from 1930 was edited by the president of its Central Bureau, Emile Faure from Senegal. Internationalist in its fiercely anti-colonial outlook, the journal maintained a Pan-Africanist perspective on the struggles of Africans in Africa and the Americas, campaigning on issues such as forced labour. After Garan Kouyaté's departure, *La Race nègre* became less concerned with global revolution. While continuing to demand independence for African colonies, it also became more intent on identifying a specifically African nationalist, cultural and racial politics (Dewitte 1985: 171–216).

In 1931 Garan Kouyaté, who was secretary-general of the Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre from 1927–30, left the LDRN after an internal schism, and with a number of colleagues went over to the more thoroughly militant Union des Travailleurs Nègres (UTN), which was more openly affiliated with the PCF. Through the Syndicat Nègre, Garan Kouyaté began publication of a new, even more militant journal *La Cri des nègres*, which relentlessly exposed the realities of French colonial practices (Langley 1973: 319–21). The UTN, while maintaining its independence, proclaimed its alliance with the Communist Party on the grounds that 'only the Communist Party has written into its programme Negro rights and aspirations to their political liberty and national independence' (ibid.: 320). In 1934, both Garan Kouyaté and Padmore were expelled from the Comintern, and the politics of both men became more explicitly Africanist but no less socialist in orientation. Through their mutual involvement in trade-union organizations, Garan Kouyaté had already established contact with Padmore and began to convince him of the necessity of a Pan-African politics. Five years earlier, Garan Kouyaté had invited Du Bois to Paris in 1929 (he received no

reply, since his letter was confiscated by the French police); in 1934 at Garan Kouyaté's suggestion, Padmore himself wrote to Du Bois to invite him to a forthcoming Negro World Unity Conference (Hooker 1967: 37–40; Langley 1973: 320). Du Bois's arrival in Paris, and his establishment of an alliance with the two radical activists, was a significant historical moment: in the three men from the US, the Caribbean and Africa were joined the American, Anglophone and Francophone African traditions, and their alliance signalled the beginnings of Pan-Africanism as a genuine political movement with roots in the whole of the African diaspora. Conditions in Paris, however, subsequently became more difficult for anti-colonial activists. *La Cri des nègres* was banned, and in 1937 the Étoile Nord-Africaine, the LDRN and the Rassemblement Coloniale were suppressed by the new Popular Front government under Léon Blum.

As with the Anglophone activists, despite all this feverish activity, in direct political terms, the different anti-colonial organizations had as yet achieved very little. From 1937, active anti-colonial nationalist organizations virtually disappeared from Paris. Garan Kouyaté was executed by the Nazis during the occupation. In fact, however, Houénou, Senghor and Garan Kouyaté and other such activists had laid much of the basis for the independence movements that emerged after the Second World War. They had established enduring political infrastructures and other forms of organization in the colonies themselves. No less important, they had also established an active political consciousness that challenged and transformed the ideology of French colonial culture. The means through which this lived on and developed from the late 1930s to the 1940s was through cultural politics. Direct political activity of the kinds outlined above was repressed, but its energies were challenged into alternative, more 'legitimate' forms of expression. Whereas the Anglophone activists tended to be political philosophers, the leaders of the anti-colonial revolution in the French Caribbean and Africa, Césaire and Léopold Senghor, were both poets.

6 THE CULTURAL TURN: NÉGRITUDE

The ferment of political activity sketched here was also the context for the emergence of the best-known African political and cultural movement of the 1930s: *négritude*. The term was first used by Césaire in *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal* (1939), but found its antecedents in the perspective of cultural journals of the early 1930s such as Sajou's *La Revue du monde noir* and the Marxist, surrealist *Légitime défense*, written by a group of Antillean students, a single issue of which appeared in 1932. Today, *négritude* is often attacked for its alleged essentialism, racialism, or lack of political radicalism signalled by its apparently accommodating attitude towards French culture. Such judgements can only be made, however, by considering it in a disembodied way outside the political and social situation within which it was conceived. Its specific contribution was precisely not to articulate an anti-colonial politics as such, because its own context and framework was one of an already existing political radicalism. 'Négritude', Sartre observed in a passage cited by Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, 'is dialectic':

The Negro . . . creates an anti-racist racism. He does not at all wish to dominate the world; he wishes the abolition of racial privileges wherever they are found; he affirms his solidarity with the oppressed of all colours. At a blow the subjective, existential, ethnic notion of *Négritude* 'passes' as Hegel would say, into the objective, positive, exact notion of the *proletariat*. . . . It is not by hazard that the most ardent of the apostles of *Négritude* are at the same time militant Marxists. (Sartre 1976b: 59)

All the proponents of *négritude* were adept at 'passing': not in terms of moving unnoticed into white society, but of moving between the concrete and particular situation of race and the more universal and abstract notion of class, seeking a third space in which the antithetical values of racism and anti-racism produce a society without racism and a new humanism in which the human would be at last universally defined. Francophone activists moved freely between these polarities. Some lingered in the initial stages, others moved boldly towards the moment in which such negative experiences would be reversed and surpassed. Like many such movements, those involved, including Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, Jean Price-Mars and Léopold Senghor, did not elaborate a fixed single position, but explored African cultural and political questions within the terms of the available spectrum of contemporary Parisian anti-colonial politics. The *négritude* movement was constructed within the context of the fluid and shifting mixtures of African-American nationalism and anti-colonial communism that have been outlined here. While its political agenda was initially confined to the constitutional claim for equal civil and political rights, increasingly from the 1940s its ideas were utilized in the service of the independence movement. *Négritude* was thus developed as part of an already highly articulate anti-colonial movement, whose considerable political strengths were weakened by an insufficient theorization and elaboration of an African political and cultural identity outside the complete assimilation of African culture into French. Although they all tended to move from a universal communist anti-imperialism towards a more Africanist position, and advocated the most radical solution of complete political independence, Houénou, Senghor and Garan Kouyaté themselves had never fully redefined the identity of their own West African cultures *vis-à-vis* that of France. Garveyism in itself did not articulate the specificity of their own cultures, and at that point divisions between activists from the Caribbean and West Africa tended to emerge. *Négritude* was developed to articulate a new form of cultural identity that would extend to both. It did this by developing the agenda of a re-establishment and affirmation of African culture within the context of the larger historic intellectual and cultural struggle by Africans in Paris and the French colonial empire against the *mission civilisatrice* ideology of French 'civilization' and its unquestioned superiority. *Négritude* was never simply a literary movement (Jack 1996; Langley 1973: 316; Markovitz 1969; Miller 1998).

The *négritude* movement did position itself clearly within the spectrum of available political positions. In 1934 an article in *La Race nègre* observed that diaspora African politics operated in three blocs: 'there will always be three kinds of *ligues*: one of exclusively radical essence and two others in which the Negro interests and those of

the white classes of the right and the left will be hopelessly mixed'. The question can be reformulated as one concerning the presence or absence of *métissage*. As Miller observes, on its reappearance in 1934 *La Race nègre*, while maintaining its radical anti-colonial stand and communist sympathies, became more race-oriented and disavowed all forms of *métissage*, whether physical or cultural (Miller 1998: 45). Avowing the first kind of *ligue*, the 'exclusively radical essence', its stance for independence became predicated on an assertion of independence. In this stance, even humanism and socialism were regarded as not derived from the west but from the traditions of African societies:

We wish to retain our political independence and to revive, by that means, our ancient Negro civilization. The return to the customs, philosophy and social organization of our ancestors is a vital necessity. . . . Our race is the champion of a human system, for which soon a great need will be felt.

We are a brotherhood, standing against the fierce individualism of the westerners. (Langley 1973: 323)

La Race nègre attacked the new *négritude* movement for its intellectual elitism, for its use of non-indigenous forms, but, above all, for its cultural syntheses, or, in effect, for not being essentialist enough (in fact, the very opposite of the complaint made against it today). Setting aside the conservative Diagnist possibility in which African interests are blended with those of the European right, the positions developed in the Paris of the 1930s sketched out the range that remains available today in terms of essentialism and cultural mixture: first, an African separatism; second, some kind of negotiation between African and European cultures. In the case of the latter, the key issue is what kind of negotiation. It may involve a Caribbean *métissage* in which the individual elements become fused to produce a new product of *créolité*, or, in Léopold Senghor's metaphor, an organic, if transgressive, grafting of the branch of French culture onto the African tree, an assimilation and transformation that reverses the flow of the dominant power structure in the manner of Fernando Ortiz's concept of 'transculturation'. Alternatively, more radically still, it may involve an unresolved violent, alienated cultural mixture. The history of African and Caribbean Francophone thought reveals a constant experimentation with forms of 'involution', to use Houénou's term (assimilation as translation, transmigration, or metempsychosis in a Joycean sense), with grafting, mixture, conjunction, and the creation of a new culture that is the product of the dialectical disjunctions of cultural difference. Miller observes that this rich theoretical archive of cultural politics in many ways anticipates very closely the issues that have been central to the preoccupations of postcolonial theory, though without, largely, being the subject of sustained historico-theoretical analysis:

The colonial world was, despite its 'Manichaeian' reputation these days, a place of ambiguities every bit as powerful as those that govern the apparently more complex postcolonial period. Forgetting colonialism is not without consequences: it allows one to think that certain models of culture (*métissage*, for example) are newer and perhaps more salutary than they may in fact be. . . . Only by delving back into history can we explore the

antecedents to such models, see how they were deployed in a colonial context, and broaden our understanding of their full implications. (Miller 1998: 3)

A new approach to the second position of complex cultural transactions was marked out in 1947 with the publication of Césaire's *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal*, and the appearance in Paris and Dakar of the review *Présence Africaine*, edited by Cheikh Anta Diop and published continuously to this day. The original object of the journal was 'to define African originality and to hasten its insertion into the modern world'. V. Y. Mudimbe glosses this as identifying 'a literary urge to build new systems of representation with their own rationality that could phase out a cultural alienation implemented by colonialism' (Mudimbe 1992: xxii, 5). It also promoted the concept of an African history, a project for which Diop himself was to establish a monumental foundation in his *Nations nègres et culture* (1954). After 1954 the journal became more nationalistic, combining its programme of cultural empowerment with increasing resistance to colonialism. It began from the position not of a return to authenticity, but as a self-conscious cultural mixture. Diop describes how the journal was the product of African students in Paris who 'formed a group to study the situation and the characteristics that defined us':

Being neither white, yellow, nor black, incapable of returning completely to our ancestral traditions nor of assimilating ourselves to Europe – we had the feeling of constituting a new race, mentally crossed [*mentalement métissée*], but which had not acquired an awareness of its own originality and had not made that originality known.

Were we then uprooted beings? To the degree that we had not defined our position in the world, we had abandoned ourselves between two societies, without a recognized meaning in either, being strangers to both. (Diop 1947: 186)

This sense of being a product of two cultures, elaborated in the curious metaphorical phrase with a strong literal racial undertow – '*mentalement métissée*' – and therefore an acceptance of a cultural and intellectual hybridity, has remained at the core of Francophone African and Caribbean writing – from Fanon, to Césaire, to Glissant, to Senghor. In the French context of assimilation, being themselves products of the French educational system, and therefore increasingly alienated from any indigenous culture in which they might have grown up, the idea of working from within this double influence to produce the third space of the diasporic or cultural migrant, using the French language against itself, was the mode in which activists of all persuasions operated. Although some of the radical journals had printed articles in patois and other forms, the use of French by Francophone activists was generally never in question and this, as Sartre observed in his preface to Senghor's *Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malagache de langue française* (1948), created particular problems, and solutions:

And since words derive from ideas, when the Negro declares in French that he rejects French culture, he takes in one hand that which he has pushed aside with the other. He brands himself with the thinking apparatus of the enemy as with an embossment. (Sartre 1976b: 23)

This dialectical – one could almost say deconstructive – position for the colonial subject seeking ‘to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value he criticizes’, remains central to Francophone African and Caribbean thought (Derrida 1978: 284).

7 LÉOPOLD SENGHOR

One contributor to Garan Kouyaté’s militant *La Cri des nègres*, the most radical Francophone communist journal, was Léopold Senghor, whose politics are rarely associated with this kind of political activism (Miller 1998: 46–7). Although Senghor’s cultural politics are frequently criticized as elitist, and his notion of *Africanité* dismissed as ‘nothing more than the ontologizing of eurocentric ideas projected and presented as the African’s own self-conception’, he shares with Fanon the recognition that a complete return to a pre-colonial tradition is probably impossible and that some sort of dialectical synthesis has to be achieved with, or against, the culture of domination (Serequeberhan 1994: 47). Socialism provided the fulcrum for this negotiation.

Despite its increasing cultural and even spiritual emphasis, in political terms French Pan-Africanism operated as firmly as Anglophone Pan-Africanism within a common commitment to socialism. Sékou Touré, President of Guinea, co-founder of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, was closest to Nkrumah in his advocacy of an African socialism that would lead to the development of a Pan-African unity (Touré 1959; 1976). Among the many Francophone African intellectuals and political leaders, for example, Mamadou Dia, the main oppositional voice in Senegal, author of *Nations africaines et solidarité mondiale* (1960), cited at length by Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, and important later volumes on Islamic humanism, Senghor remains the outstanding figure. After his election to the French National Assembly in 1945 and his election as President of Senegal in 1960, Senghor increasingly utilized his concept of *négritude* in the service of an African socialism, a socialism clearly defined by Senghor against the Stalinist model as an ‘open socialism’ (Senghor 1964a: 63; Vaillant 1990). He invoked the idea that Africa was in itself originally socialist in orientation, on the grounds that its cultures were largely communal (*communautaires*) rather than based on class differences and exploitation: ‘we had already achieved socialism before the coming of the European’ he wrote (Senghor 1964a: 49). African society had therefore anticipated European socialism, but its form of socialism had been destroyed by colonialism. This became a common position for Pan-Africanists and others sympathetic to its ideology, such as Senghor’s friend Aimé Césaire in *Discourse on Colonialism* (Césaire 1972: 23); Padmore similarly argued that African society had developed on the basis of a form of ‘primitive communism’ (Friedland and Rosberg 1964: 223); Nyerere, too, claimed that both socialism and democracy were rooted in African traditional society and that it was the cultural values of that society that provided the foundation and source of regeneration (Nyerere 1968: 12).

Despite his emphasis on African cultural and spiritual unity, and his call for the creation of a United States of Africa in 1950, in practice Senghor was more guarded

with respect to Pan-Africanism as a political movement, and followed the emphasis of the Union Africaine et Malgache (made up of most of the former French territories of sub-Saharan Africa) on a multinational, horizontal solidarity between independent African states, operating in tandem with a 'vertical' affiliation to France and Europe; after all, he pointed out, the Anglophone African countries remained members of the Commonwealth after independence (Senghor 1964a: 64, 88-90). In practice, therefore, his Pan-Africanism was focused on the creation of a nation made up of the former French territories in West Africa. Unlike the Pan-Africanism of Padmore, whose aim was economic self-sufficiency, Senghor emphasized the international independency of states that, he argued, could not be disregarded: 'the modern state is *de-territorialized on the African continent as in all other parts of the world*' (ibid.: 63). In such a condition of deterritorialization, true independence was achieved through alliances and coalitions, which in practice meant through affiliation with other Francophone African cultures. The realities of this in the intellectual dimension emerge very clearly when Senghor's work, which is developed out of an exchange with contemporary French philosophical culture, is compared to Nkrumah's arguments in *Consciencism*, which operates very much within the Anglo-American philosophical context, ending with an appendix in which he develops a formal logical notation for the procedures of colonization, liberation, neocolonialism, and a socialism that embodies philosophical consciencism (so, for example, 'a liberated territory arises under the condition *lib.g (([D (na>pa)g ((pa>na)g])*' (Nkrumah 1970: 109).

The French intellectual context in which Senghor, Fanon and other Francophone political intellectuals operated explains why their work has been particularly influential within contemporary postcolonial theory, which has itself developed in part out of the dialectic of Marxist and French poststructuralist thought. The argument that the latter in particular is just a contemporary invention that has no connection to the history of anti-colonialism can only be made from an exclusively Anglophone perspective. Postcolonial theory has drawn on the full range of cultural and intellectual contexts in which anti-colonial theory developed: Francophone African socialism consists of one of its closest immediate precursors.

Among African intellectuals, it was Senghor who participated most fully in the post-1945 movement, pioneered by Sartre, of emphasizing Marx's humanism, foregrounding the earlier focus on alienation to the later determinism which operated, in Senghor's view, 'to the detriment of man and his freedom' (Senghor 1964a: 76; 1964b; 1983, II: 29-44; Sartre 1948). The emphasis on the necessity of maintaining an ethics of the dignity of man and human freedom was central to Sartre's existential Marxism that was to have such a profound effect on Fanon. Despite his political differences with Senghor, he too ends *The Wretched of the Earth* with the call for a new humanism that restores a full meaning to a concept that Europe had never in fact achieved (as Césaire put it, 'at the very time when it most often mouths the word, the West has never been further from being able to live a true humanism – a humanism made to the measure of the world') (Césaire 1972: 56). Like Fanon, Senghor also argued that if there was a universal, it had yet to be built. The new, 'open' humanism

which they, and following them Nyerere and Kaunda, proposed ('Man remains our first consideration: He constitutes our measure'), was decidedly not an abstraction, a universal norm of all times and places, but a dialectical concept in which 'one can grasp man's permanent features only through his historical, geographical, and ethnic background' (Senghor 1964a: 65, 78). That specificity means that the new African will incorporate but also transcend the residues of the cultural and political fact of colonialism and the humiliation of disempowerment. Like Fanon, Senghor was also attracted to Sartre's Hegelian Marxism, which emphasized being as alienation, for alienation was the permanent situation not only of the European working class but even more so of a culture and people subjected to the domination of colonialism, a condition which Fanon had already analysed in terms of its psychological effects in *Black Skin, White Masks*. Marx's concept of alienation afforded a dialectical concept in which that alienation could provide the basis for a new emergence, a new state and a new humanism which would achieve a political, economic, social and cultural disalienation.

Senghor, who was a Catholic, was also influenced by the humanist Christianity of Teilhard de Chardin, who also drew freely on Sartre's existentialism. This existential phenomenology, itself influenced by developments in the philosophy and history of science, particularly the work of Cavallès and Bachelard, was responsible for introducing many of the ideas that are today associated with poststructuralism and postcolonial theory, which were in fact already formulated and available in the anti-colonial period. In *On African Socialism* Senghor, for example, remarks on how

The discontinuous and the undetermined are revealed, after the most minute, most advanced, and most exciting research, to be at the bottom of everything. . . . In this new view of the world, the *real* itself – the same reality – seems multiple to us, at least with multiple, contradictory faces. (Senghor 1964a: 70)

The revision of realist ideas of objectivity, the abandonment of the assumption, still present in Marx, that it was possible to separate the observer from the observed, and its replacement by the idea that the researcher in unveiling his or her material, reveals it while revealing it, led to a reassessment and revaluation of the potential of the experiential forms of knowledge that were the customary basis of African knowledge systems. African Marxism, therefore, would develop as an existential system which 'exceeds it while integrating it'. African thought, Senghor argues, instead of objectifying the Other in the manner of the contemporary anthropology of Lévy-Bruhl and others, sympathizes with it: 'Immediately he is moved, going centrifugally from subject to object on the waves of the Other . . . abandons his personality to become identified with the Other, dies to be reborn in the Other. . . . Subject and object are dialectically face to face in the very act of knowledge' (Senghor 1964a: 71–3; cf. Mudimbe 1992) This is not simply the internalization of the European anthropological account of Africanness as otherness as Senghor's *Africanité* is sometimes described (Serequeberhan 1994: 49). Like Fanon, Senghor is also deeply engaged with being and alterity as elaborated in Sartre (Fuss 1994: 22–4; Sartre 1958). Senghor identifies

this ability to inscribe the Other in the self, so fundamental to the subsequent philosophical pursuits of Levinas and Derrida, as a particular instrument of African reason. This, he argues, must operate not against classical European reason but symbiotically with it, even if it challenges its basis on what today could be anachronistically described as Derridean grounds: 'Negro-African reason is traditionally dialectical, transcending the principles of identity, noncontradiction, and the "excluded middle"'. Rejecting the abstraction of European reason, including that of Marxist-Leninism, Senghor prefers the use of metaphor as a way of maintaining a hold on the concrete for the basis of African socialism. The abstraction of reason was itself a product of a historical European culture, and must not be taken over wholesale: 'In theory, one betrays Marx by using Marxian dialectics as it stands, without changing a comma . . . we would betray Marx by applying his method like a veneer to West African realities' (Senghor 1964a: 75–8).

The context for Senghor's readiness to be true to Marx by redefining Marxism for Asian and African realities was a disillusionment with the Stalinism of the Communist Party, evident also in Césaire's decision to leave the party in 1956. Like Sartre, Senghor expressed a resulting readiness to develop 'a constructive critique of socialism' in pursuit of the additional aims of an 'anxiety for human dignity and the need for freedom'. Senghor thus sought what he described as 'a *democratic socialism*, which goes so far as to integrate spiritual values, a socialism which ties in with the old ethical current of the French socialists. Historically and culturally we belong to this current' (Senghor 1964a: 45–6). In this return to the moral tradition of French syndicalist socialism, evident in the work of Sorel, Senghor followed Sartre, Lefebvre and others in developing a Marxism according to specific needs. In his case, the need included the demands of African culture: 'We must build our own development plan, based on European, socialist contributions and also on the best of Negro-African civilization'. Francophone African socialism shares with Anglophone African socialism this insistence that socialism must be grafted with the historical and cultural realities of African culture: Marxism must be rethought, Senghor argued, invoking Mao's example, '*in the light of African realities*' (ibid.: 48, 67). The first effect of this insistence is that the role of culture is given greater significance within the realm of political discourse. Culture for Senghor is 'at once the basis and the ultimate aim of politics . . . culture is the very texture of society'. In the case of Francophone African intellectuals, such as Senghor and Fanon, this emphasis on culture is aesthetic and philosophical as well as sociological. Above all, however, cultural independence is stressed as 'the necessary prerequisite of other independences: political, economic, and social' (ibid.: 49, 69). The first step, therefore, Senghor argues, is to return to 'our West African sources' and to conduct a form of assimilation that contemporary Brazilian modernists termed 'anthropophagism':

For us, socialism is a *method* to be tested in contact with African realities. It is basically a question, after choosing lucidly, of assimilating our choices. To assimilate is to transform foods that are foreign to us, to make of them our flesh and blood – in a word, to *Negrofy* and *Berberize* them. (Ibid.: 83)

African society, Senghor argues, is both 'economically and culturally mixed, with African and European contributions' (ibid.: 93): African socialism must therefore integrate the ideas of European socialism with the values of contemporary African society, and in that sense engage in a process of investigation and production in order to resolve the contradictions within African society. To do that it must engage with Marx, but also make use of new philosophical and scientific developments, along with new techniques and forms of knowledge in a process of research.

First and foremost, however we may be influenced by Europe, our realities are not identical. To remain faithful to socialism means that, facing these new realities, we must choose new methods, new techniques, and new means – the most modern and most perfected ones. (Ibid.: 103)

In his prose as in his poetry, which Sartre called 'the sole great revolutionary poetry' in the French language of his times, Senghor worked in the borderlands of theory and attempted to pass between the particularity of African realities and the universality of socialism, to put together the analysis of the objective determinants of a recently colonized culture with the subjective expression of a communal experience, of what Diop calls the 'social collectivism' of a matriarchal society (Diop 1989: 177). For many commentators, the ways in which Senghor defines *Africanité* are enough to dismiss his thought altogether. His arguments, however, like those of African socialism itself, are complex and wide-ranging, and show a constructive conceptualization always in process as he pursues the project of anchoring the universal in the local that operates dynamically within all African socialisms.

Africa IV:

FANON/CABRAL

1 FRANTZ FANON

‘The problem of colonialism includes not only the interrelations of objective historical conditions but also the human attitudes toward these conditions’ remarked Fanon (Fanon 1986: 84). Whereas Anglophone activists tended to focus their interventions on the objective realm, the realm of history, economic history, sociality and materiality, Francophone activists, from Houénou onwards, were distinguished by balancing attention to those aspects of the history of oppression and exploitation with a concern for the human attitudes towards them, in other words, with the subjective realm. This comprised a desire to articulate the cultural and psychological effects of colonialism as they were experienced by those subjected to them. ‘How does it feel to be a problem?’ as Du Bois put it (Du Bois 1989: 1). What was it like to find yourself transformed into a colonial subject? How does it feel to have your culture devalued and appropriated, your language debased into a vernacular, detached from all forms of power which are accessible and enacted only in a foreign tongue? What was it like to be a colonial subject? How does it feel today to be a ‘postcolonial subject’, whether in the three continents or as part of an immigrant minority in a dominant western culture? What in short has been the human experience of colonialism and decolonization? What are the psychological effects of colonialism – for both colonizer and colonized? How does it affect questions of gender – not just gender roles, but does colonialism involve a certain gendering and even transgendering of experience? And if it involves psychological effects on the individual, what are the epistemological and ontological means of resistance that can operate alongside the more visible means of political, military or guerrilla struggle? This combination of external and internal, this dialectical juxtaposition of the objective with the subjective, of seeing yourself as a subject who is also an object, amounts to what Du Bois described as ‘double consciousness’.

The subjective experience of the objective in many ways constitutes the realm of culture, and is often expressed most articulately in literature, as it was for Senghor and Césaire. It also comprises the realm of psychology, which attempts to provide an

objective account of the subjective. Whereas Senghor and Césaire chose poetry as a means of expressing a collective subjectivity, Fanon chose the discipline of psychology as his means of investigating and articulating the inner effects of colonialism on colonized subjects, and as a means through which they could be resisted, turning the inculcation of inferiority into self-empowerment. The concern in postcolonial writing with individual human experience and cultural identity alongside the more objective field of history is partly the result of the influence of Fanon himself, who has assumed a pivotal place in postcolonial theory. As its critics constantly point out, postcolonial analyses often tend to focus on the effects of the objective on subjectivities, but that is the point: it was Fanon who articulated militant anti-colonial activism with the tradition of psychological redemption and black empowerment central to the traditions of Garvey and *négritude*. The development of a distinctive postcolonial epistemology and ontology does not conflict with political activism. Rather, as the political-intellectuals and intellectual-politicians of the freedom movements showed, it enables it.

Fanon was born in Martinique in 1925, and left Fort de France to fight with the free French during the war. In 1945 he returned to Martinique to study philosophy. Martinique was in the middle of an election for deputies for the French parliament. Fanon underwent his first moment of political radicalization under the influence of the electoral campaign of Aimé Césaire, who had recently joined the Communist Party. Reinforced with the potent mixture of communism and *négritude*, Fanon returned to France to begin his formal studies in medicine, psychiatry and philosophy. He trained in psychiatry at Lyon, where he edited a black journal called *Tam-Tam*. After he qualified, Fanon first sought a posting in West Africa, but when this was unsuccessful he took a job as head of the psychiatry department at a hospital in Blida-Joinville in Algeria in 1953. In May 1945, the very month that the French celebrated their deliverance from German occupation, there had been a Muslim uprising in Sétif, in the Kabylia region of Algeria, which had been brutally suppressed by the French army at a cost of 45,000 lives. Algeria appeared under control. In 1954, however, the year after Fanon's arrival in Algeria, the French were defeated at Dien Ben Phu in Vietnam, and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale formally inaugurated a war of liberation. The experience of the Algerian War produced a second moment of political radicalization. Fanon became involved in the Algerian revolutionary movement, and in 1956 he resigned his post at Blida-Joinville. Becoming a member of the central committee of the FLN, he was soon expelled from Algeria and moved to Tunis to work as one of the editors of the FLN newspaper, *El Moudjahid*, in which much of his writing was published. He subsequently went as the FLN ambassador to Accra, capital of Ghana, and also to Mali, to organize support from black Africa for the anti-colonial fighters in the Maghreb. In 1961 it was discovered that he was suffering from leukaemia. He was first treated in the Soviet Union, but his Russian doctors then convinced him against his better instincts to go for treatment to the USA. On his arrival he was held without treatment and interrogated for ten days by the CIA. He died in December 1961 in a Washington hospital. Algeria gained its independence the following year.

2 FANON AND FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

More or less ignored until the 1980s by the orthodox eurocentric Marxist left in Europe and the States, which historically has always tended to marginalize the issue of colonialism, Fanon has assumed major status as the author of some of the central theoretical texts of postcolonial theory. Fanon's prominence in the postcolonial field is striking, compared to the many other intellectual activists discussed in these pages. As has been suggested, his distinctive marrying of the subjective and objective realms is characteristic of the Francophone African political and cultural philosophers of *métissage* (Sartre 1976b: 11). Fanon's difference is that he did this at a theoretical and psychological rather than poetic level, providing a psychopathology of colonialism. In intellectual terms he was the most thoroughly assimilated of Francophone colonial activists, and the person who most fully participated in contemporary French philosophical and literary culture, to a degree well beyond most of his African or Caribbean contemporaries. As an international activist, moving from Martinique to Paris to Algeria to Tunisia, from which he travelled frequently, his interest in local cultures was limited: while he manoeuvred his general Marxist perspective towards tricontinental priorities, unlike almost all Anglophone and Francophone Marxists, he did not attempt to graft it on to the specificities of African cultures, of which he had a relatively restricted experience. He always remained intellectually centred in Paris, and never resisted European thought as such, as much as he resisted European domination of the colonial world. A product of the western-educated colonial elite, Fanon used the resources of western thought against itself. What he did was to translate its epistemological location.

In this aspect, as in many others, Fanon looks rather different from most other Francophone anti-colonial writers. He operated within the orbit of the mainstream of Francophone African thought, but was never central to it. He was strongly influenced by his teacher, fellow Martiniquan Aimé Césaire, one of the founders of the *négritude* movement, whose *Discourse on Colonialism* (1955) functions as the underlying complement to Fanon's work, particularly in terms of its moral and cultural critique of the west and the double standards of western culture with respect to racism and humanism (Césaire 1972). Unlike most of the figures discussed in these chapters on Africa, Fanon was not a Pan-Africanist: he remained sceptical of Pan-Africanism, and above all of its guiding ideology of non-violent positive action (Fanon 1965: 127–8). Fanon was a revolutionary, whose radical position was entirely a product of his Algerian experiences and the Algerian situation. He did speak of 'African unity', but this he considered more in terms of revolutionary solidarity in the context of 'direct action' than Pan-Africanism: 'The slogan today must be: "Africans, men and women of Africa, to arms! Death to French colonialism!"' (Fanon 1967: 131). The Algerian War constituted one of the most chilling, violent episodes in the entire history of anti-colonial activism. Its hyperventilating violence always formed part of the original policy of the FLN campaign and equally of the French response (Clayton

1994: 114). The extent and degree of atrocities on both sides, carried out on men, women and children alike, makes sickening reading. Violence, in many ways, is too clean and cerebral a word, too surrounded with the dignity of philosophical conceptualization, to describe the raging, sadistic and sickening butchery of what went on in Algeria.

3 FANON AND ALGERIA

Fanon was a psychiatrist, a writer, an intellectual, who came to activist politics relatively late. He did not resign his post at Blida-Joinville until the summer of 1956, when the Algerian War was already well under way. His role in the independence struggle was very different from that of politicians such as Nkrumah or Senghor, or even activists such as Padmore. He took no part in the FLN military campaigns, apart from organizing a new supply route through Mali in 1960 (Fanon 1967: 177–90). Expelled from Algeria, he played a relatively minor role in the FLN and the war; in many histories, he is hardly mentioned, if at all. Fanon did, however, play a significant part in the international political campaigns which the FLN, more than the French themselves, realized was of almost equal significance to the physical struggle. Otherwise, his chief role was to supply war propaganda for the FLN newspaper in Tunis and formulate a socialist secular version of the ideology of a regenerative anti-colonial violence that was the distinctive hall-mark of FLN policy. In this respect Fanon, who as a non-Muslim generally affiliated with Marxists within the FLN such as Omar Oussedik, acted as the voice of the left, non-conciliatory wing of the FLN, dignifying its tactics with intellectual and historical rationale. His emphasis on the revolutionary role of the peasantry (of whom he had little experience) was subsequently to be influential on the 1963 post-independence policy of 'autogestion', or rural worker self-management, formulated by Mohammed Harbi, which was designed to organize the peasants into a mass political constituency. Despite splits with other political organizations, including Messali Hadj's constitutional nationalist Mouvement pour la Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), the FLN succeeded in establishing a broad basis of support among the Algerian population. It was Muslim without being doctrinally Islamic in orientation (its support from Egypt was on pan-Arabist grounds), and Marxist only to the degree that it was anti-colonialist (the FLN looked to China, Yugoslavia and Vietnam for inspiration with regard to guerrilla tactics and material military aid as much as ideology; the French in turn deployed their veterans from Indochina against the FLN) (Horne 1996: 404–7). In striking contrast to the situation in most African liberation movements, Fanon was one of the few intellectuals in the leadership, which otherwise developed no political philosophy comparable to the positions taken by Sultan-Galiev, al-Qadhdhafi, Lamine or Léopold Senghor. This was largely a reflection of the fact that because Algeria was a settler colony, there was no attempt by the French to develop any sort of native elite.

All these factors are reflected in Fanon's own writings, which are developed within a mixed political background. The main ideological position of the FLN was

pro-Muslim, anti-French and anti-*colon*, its main social promise, agrarian reform and land redistribution. It was these, and the ideological commitment to violence as the means to liberation, that provided the basis of solidarity in a divided, heterogeneous society in which the FLN itself constituted a highly disorganized and fragmented movement with a striking absence of mass party organization. What is noticeable about the FLN and Fanon's position is that it is predicated on an espousal of the virtues and necessity of violence, with little indication of what the free society that was to follow liberation was to be like. At independence, by which time the FLN had largely ceased to operate as an effective political organization, Ben Bella concentrated on establishing his own power base rather than giving any indication of political direction. Ben Bella did bring in a group of leftist intellectuals, of whom Harbi was the foremost, as ideologues by way of compensation for his own lack of knowledge about socialism (Jackson 1977: 136–40). However, Ben Bella himself survived only until 1965. In the event, the Algerian revolution developed an austere Islamic identity. For his part, Fanon's interest in his writings is focused far more on nationalism, on the pitfalls of nationalist consciousness, on the difficulties of articulating a productive nationalism through culture, than on the ideas of human equality and justice embodied in socialism. It is only Sartre in the preface to *The Wretched of the Earth* who affirms that 'in order to triumph, the national revolution must be socialist': it is hard to find a statement as explicit as that in Fanon himself (Fanon 1965: 10). Fanon's later work is Marxist to the extent that it is written within the broad framework of Marxist analyses of the exploitation by capitalism and colonialism of the Third World; within this discourse Fanon condemns the USA, for example, as a new imperialist 'monster'. His explicit engagement with Marxism, however, is limited. At the beginning of *The Wretched of the Earth*, published just before his death in 1961, he argues that the class division of European society becomes a racial division in the colonies:

In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem. (Fanon 1965: 32)

Fanon here shows that he situates himself within the mainstream of tricontinental Marxism in his recognition that the classical formulations must be modified in the colonial arena. However, in the first part of this argument, that there is no ideological masking of economic relations in the colonies, Fanon in fact is not stretching Marxist analysis at all. In chapter 8, I cited Marx's comment in *Capital* that

The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. (Marx 1973a: 324)

Where Fanon does modify Marx is in his second sentence, where he substitutes race for class identity, and in doing so in fact reverses the original move that Marx himself had made in transforming Amédée Thierry's racial analysis of French history in *L'Histoire*

des Gaulois (1828) into a class analysis (Young 1995a: 75–6). The division in the colonies, Fanon argues, is racial, between colonizer and colonized, whose status, role and function are predicated on their racial identities. The relation between them is tautological and consists of a form of exploitation based on an originary violence: you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. Although the division between these groups is economic, it is not in itself the product of economic disparity – rather of the political and racial differences which operate as the fundamental form of the system. In the paragraph that follows the lines cited above, Fanon goes on to revise Marx's analysis of pre-capitalist societies by distinguishing between the position of the serf and the colonized subject, contrasting the rule of the feudal knight with that of the colonial settler on the basis that the latter remains a foreigner. He seems to be unaware that this, however, was often the situation of feudal aristocracy, or that feudalism very often constituted a form of internal colonialism.

The racialized schema of Fanon's Manichaean world results in part from his coming to the colonial situation through the racial analyses of *Black Skin, White Masks*. Colonialism is a black and white affair. Oddly, such a perspective is also a reflection of the ideology of the leaders of the defending French army itself ('coloniale' and 'Légion'), who according to the precepts of the theory of the *guerre révolutionnaire*, saw the war against colonial revolution as a Manichaean fight against the forces of evil, against the native regarded 'as a sort of quintessence of evil', as Fanon put it, in which national liberation and communism were indistinguishably identified (Clayton 1994: 128–31; Fanon 1965: 33; Kelly 1965). The ruthless, inhuman efficiency of the French army units, in which the end always justified the means, constituted the enemy against which the violence of the FLN was directed.

Although in *A Dying Colonialism* (originally entitled in French *Year 5 of the Algerian Revolution*) Fanon provides a nuanced account of Algeria's European minority, in *The Wretched of the Earth*, for the convenience of his dialectical scheme, he chooses to pass over the existence of poor whites, or those of mixed or different race, who existed in relatively large numbers in Algeria, as well as that of rich bourgeois colonized, who did exist though not in anything like the spectacular way they did in India (Fanon 1980: 125–56). If there had been no indigenous bourgeoisie, on the other hand, then the whole of the chapter on 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness', a sustained and acute analysis of the dangers of the bourgeois nationalist being transformed at independence into a neocolonial elite, would have been redundant. All the same, it is here, in the reconstruction of class dynamics, that Fanon makes his most substantial revision of Marx, shifting class conflict into the divisions between colonizer and colonized. Although the class analogy for colonizer and colonized has since been generalized to a status comparable to Sultan-Galiev's distinction between capitalist and proletarian nations, Fanon's model remains appropriate above all for settler societies. In this context, it is worth noting that later in the book Fanon abandons the pure racialism of his original schema when he positions the peasantry, as opposed to the urban proletariat or colonial bourgeoisie, as the true revolutionary class. In doing so, he was following the basic precepts of the tricontinental Marxism of Mao (as was Guevara). In contrast with Mao, however, there is strikingly little explicit attention

to socialism in Fanon beyond the affirmation of a new humanism, which derives from the very Pan-African constituency from which he distinguished himself (Fanon 1965: 253–5). The final sentence of the book, in which he speaks of turning over a new leaf, of working out new concepts, is striking for its lack of reference to socialism generally, or to the African socialist ideals that were being elaborated at that very moment. What these new concepts might be remains unstated.

Fanon's strategic silence in this regard was doubtless influenced by his ideological resistance to the contemporary forms of African socialism, represented above all by Léopold Senghor (to say nothing of the orthodox communism of the French and Algerian communist parties which opposed independence from France). Fanon was opposed even to the more Marxist-Leninist socialism of Nkrumah on the grounds of its doctrine of 'positive action'. From the very different political environment of Algeria, one of uncompromising oppositional violence against the colonial regime, Fanon came to ally himself with the radical political alternative to Nkrumah and Senghor. He articulated this in the essay on violence that forms the opening chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth*. This was originally given as his dramatic and polemical intervention at Nkrumah's historic All Africa People's Conference held in Accra in 1958. It was directed less against Nkrumah himself than at the Francophone African leaders such as Senghor who had managed quietly to negotiate independence from France in the context of French fright at the situation in Algeria, and the recognition that France lacked the resources to fight another colonial war. This carefully negotiated independence meant that Senegalese expressions of support for the FLN in Algeria were kept to a minimum. Fanon's intervention at the conference was the first auspice of a new mood of militancy that would crystallize fully in the next decade. *The Wretched of the Earth* signalled a new moment in African politics. By the time it was published, a majority of African states were independent. Algeria and Kenya, which achieved independence shortly afterwards in 1962 and 1963, were strategic examples for those that remained: the surviving colonies were largely settler colonies, such as Rhodesia, the Portuguese African colonies, and South Africa, which would therefore only yield to violence.

4 FANON AND VIOLENCE

Fanon's chapter 'Concerning Violence', which forms such a substantial part of *The Wretched of the Earth*, operates in a paradoxical way. On the one hand, it forms the considered expression of the FLN position in Algeria, one determined by the unique historical and politico-social conditions of the Algerian revolution. On the other, Fanon writes at a high level of generality, with the result that *The Wretched of the Earth* reads as if it constitutes a general handbook of the experience and procedures for anti-colonial revolution. This, indeed, is how the book has been generally read ever since, and why it became a virtual handbook for leaders in contexts as different as Malcolm X in the African-American Black Power movement of the 1960s and Steve Biko in the Black Consciousness movement in South Africa in the same period (Malcolm X

1992; Mazrui 1993: 275, 715). Although he spoke of himself as an African and of 'the African revolution', Fanon was less concerned with the Africanization of socialism than with the abstraction of revolutionary principles to a general level of applicability. This characterizes even his books on the African and Algerian revolutions, which are more specific but demonstrate a constant tendency towards conceptual abstraction, be it psychological or sociological, from any empirical or historical material. Fanon's project, as he put it, was to articulate 'the common nature of the struggle of all the colonized' (Fanon 1967: 9; 1980). It is this deliberately universalized level of analysis that has led *The Wretched of the Earth* to become, as Stuart Hall has remarked, 'the Bible of decolonization'.

Fanon was one voice of the FLN, but this universal form of delivery meant that he was soon perceived, as Sartre put it, as the voice of the Third World (Fanon 1965: 9). Although situated so clearly in the Algerian situation, Fanon writes as if he is articulating the processes of history itself, opening *The Wretched of the Earth* with a grand, and in fact inaccurate generalization: 'decolonization is always a violent phenomenon' (ibid.: 13). Serequeberhan is certainly correct to defend Fanon from Hannah Arendt's charge that he glorifies violence for its own sake: the origin of the violence of decolonization is the violence of colonization, something with which Fanon would hardly identify (Serequeberhan 1994: 76). The response of violence which, according to Fanon, does enable a form of ontological empowerment for the colonized, nevertheless also becomes something of an abstraction at this point. Although he concedes that it forms an historical process, decolonization, according to Fanon, can be treated in the abstract. He speaks of 'that kind of *tabula rasa* which characterizes at the outset all decolonization'. Decolonization has no prior historical, cultural or political identity: it all begins from the same blank tablet as the mind in Lockean empiricism. From this, it follows that all colonial situations can equally be written about in common, as the dialectical struggle between the native and the settler, colonized and colonizer: 'the colonial world is a world cut in two' (Fanon 1965: 29–31). The result is that Fanon's arguments have been applied widely across all colonial situations, often on the apparent assumption – which Fanon himself invites – that they are all essentially the same. In terms of power and domination, they are of course all comparable. But in terms of specific politics, it made a difference whether the activist, to take the most obvious example, was dealing with a colonial power in a settler or exploitation colony. Fanon's influence has been such that the differences between the two have at times been elided. This distinctive universalized form of analysis has profoundly influenced the protocols of postcolonial theory.

At the same time, Fanon's abstraction of the Algerian situation into a general template of colonialism and of decolonization was also the result of the influence of the French Marxist philosopher whose preface frames *The Wretched of the Earth*: Jean-Paul Sartre. Fanon's 'colonialism' is very clearly derived from the Algerian situation. At the same time, his intellectual and philosophical context is clearly that of metropolitan Paris. Although he concludes the book with an invitation to his comrades to 'leave this Europe', Fanon's own theoretical formulations remain European in orientation, above all towards Sartre (ibid.: 252). Sartre was one of the very few European philosophers and intellectuals who made the issue of colonialism central to his work.

Such was his influence, and his concern for African issues, that Mudimbe has even described Sartre as an 'African philosopher' (Mudimbe 1988: 83). He was also personally, passionately involved in campaigning for the anti-colonial struggle, particularly those of Algeria and Vietnam. Although this aspect of Sartre now gets little attention in contemporary Sartrean circles, Sartre was extensively concerned with 'Third World' issues from 1948 onwards, from his first engagement with racism and *négritude*, to the colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, to the Cuban Revolution, the war in Vietnam, the Arab-Israel conflict, to French immigration. As Lamouchi (1996) has demonstrated in detail, Sartre's commitment to the 'Third World' operated at practical, political and philosophico-theoretical levels. Sartre stood out among all contemporary European intellectuals as the one voice of solidarity for those engaged in the freedom struggles.

It was not only that Sartre influenced Fanon: Fanon's articulation of the necessity of violence also influenced Sartre to the extent that he centres his chapter on colonial conflict in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, 'Racism and Colonialism as Praxis and Process', on the principle of violence (Sartre 1976a: 716–34). Sartre argues that the violence of colonization works in a dialectic way, determining subsequent history in a whole series of disjunctive displacements that emerge in a condition of ontological ambivalence for colonizer and colonized alike (ibid.: 724). At the same time, Fanon himself clearly writes within the framework of Sartre's own existential Marxism, and was influenced particularly by the latter's analysis of the situation in Algeria, particularly the essay which Sartre published in the spring of 1956 shortly before Fanon resigned his post at the psychiatric hospital, 'Le Colonialisme est un système' ('Colonialism is a System'). In this essay, Sartre is concerned to refute what he calls 'neo-colonialist mystification', which tries to argue that the problem in Algeria is a question of individual practices that need reform, or of separating the good from the bad settler. Sartre, by contrast, archly suggests that reform is a matter for the Algerians themselves after independence. The problem is colonization itself, which he points out is not merely a matter of individuals, but a system which was put in place in the nineteenth century and which is now rebounding upon the colonizing nation. Algeria, he argues, is 'the clearest and most readable example of the colonial system' (Sartre 1964: 27). He provides a short, pithy history of French colonialism in Algeria, emphasizing its economic as well as imperialist rationale, clearly articulated from the first in the theoretical formulations of the economist Jules Ferry. Designed as a form of exploitation for the benefit of the mother country, and putting the settler in a contradictory position whereby his loyalty is split between his country and his fatherland, Sartre argues that the colony has now become uneconomic and costs more than it brings. It remains, however, part of a system in which individuals are merely cogs. In a typical Sartrean mediation between objective and subjective circumstance, Sartre argues that it is the overall system, not the individual, that needs correction, but that it is nevertheless on the individual that the system rebounds:

And, when we speak of a 'colonial system', we must be clear: it is not a question of an abstract mechanism. The system exists, it functions; the infernal cycle of colonialism is a

reality. But this reality is embodied in a million *colons*, children and grandchildren of the *colons*, who have been formed by colonialism and who think, speak and act according to the principles of the colonial system.

For the *colon* is fabricated like the native: he is made by his function and his interests. (Ibid.: 43)

The two sides are equally the products of the same system, and as a consequence are implacably and irresolvably opposed to each other, as Fanon argues, linked in an impossible dialectic which neither can transcend. Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* provides a searching, complete analysis of the colonial system on this basis. Although it is undoubtedly the case that colonialism did form a system, it was not a universal one. The structure that both Sartre and Fanon analyse is that of French Maghrebian colonial settlement. Fanon's genius was to transpose that into the essence of 'colonialism' itself.

In doing so, he avoided the difficulties of articulating the dialectic of universal and local cultures that represents the greatest achievement of African socialism as a political theory. According to Christopher Miller, it was by confronting this dialectic, 'on the one hand his own ethics and political beliefs, which lead to a universal culture, and on the other, his desire to respect local, ethnic cultures within the larger plan', that left Amílcar Cabral 'caught between two imperatives' (Miller 1990: 47). At this point, the possibilities of Senghor's deconstructive concept of an African reason begin to emerge and demonstrate their strategic effectivity.

5 CABRAL: CULTURE AS RESISTANCE AND LIBERATION

From the perspective of African socialism, rather than the general principles of anti-colonial revolution, the greatest figure of those who were forced to resort to violence in order to achieve liberation was from neither a Francophone nor an Anglophone, but a Lusophone culture: Amílcar Cabral. It was during the Algerian War, in Paris in 1957, that Cabral, who was from Guinea-Bissau, together with Mario de Andrade and António Agostinho Neto of Angola, formed the Movimento Anti-Colonista of Africans from the Portuguese colonies. The three men subsequently worked closely together in Angola and set up the MLPA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which initiated what turned out to be one of the toughest anti-colonial struggles in Africa. Cabral used this organizational experience to set up his own independence movement in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde). The leaders of the liberation struggles against Portuguese power in Africa subsequently formed a joint organization, CONCP (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies), for the analysis, co-ordination and planning of their struggle. The Portuguese, like the French, practised an assimilation policy, and claimed that their colonies were an integral part of the mainland. There were, however, also substantial differences between the two colonial situations, and the defining of the specific problems of Portuguese colonialism,

and the explanation of why it was still firmly in place in 1960, was a major initial preoccupation of the CONCP. The most obvious difference was that whereas there was a relatively large amount of assimilation in Francophone colonies, this was not so in the Portuguese: the Portuguese themselves divided the Angola population into 'natives' and '*assimilados*', the proportions of which they estimated at 99 per cent and 1 per cent (Bragança and Wallerstein 1982, I: 75). This was partly the result of the fact that until the late nineteenth century, the Portuguese African territories constituted an informal empire, with the Portuguese presence confined to the coastline; they were not put fully under Portuguese control until the 1920s. There had, moreover, been a large amount of resistance to Portuguese rule, whether at the local level of armed or passive resistance (for example, migration) by the peasantry or the independent messianic churches, or by strike action in Laurenço Marques, or by elite educated groups who articulated their opposition in Luanda or Lisbon in literary and political forms (Isaacman and Isaacman 1976, 1983; Marcum 1969–78; Penvenne 1995; Vail and White 1980). A succession of nationalist groups – the Liga Ultramarina, the Liga Colonial, the Liga Africana (which was in contact with Du Bois's Pan-African Congress) and the Liga Angola, the Junta de Defesa dos Direitos de Africa, the Garveyite Partido Nacional Africano, the Gremio Africano, the Associação dos Naturais de Angola – had increasingly been repressed and subsequently succumbed to co-optation as supporters of the fascist Salazar regime (Boahen 1985: 695–711). The real difference, and problem, however, was the fact that Portugal itself, though once a grand imperial power, was now a poor, backward and still largely feudal state, run by a fascist dictator who had survived anachronistically long into the post-war period. This meant that Portugal was parasitically dependent on its colonies, considered itself too poor to risk losing them, and too ineffective both economically and politically even to try to readjust its rule to that of a neocolonial regime (Anderson 1962). For ideological and economic reasons, therefore, it clung on fiercely to its colonies, assisted above all by South Africa, which regarded Angola and Mozambique as protective, buffer states against the threat of a free Black Africa to the north. However, as the liberation wars progressed, the economic cost to Portugal of waging them itself began to take its toll, and eventually in 1974 the fascist regime was deposed by the army.

As secretary-general of the PAIGC, Amílcar led the people of Guinea-Bissau in the armed liberation struggle against the Portuguese, who were supported by Spain, NATO and the USA, as well as South Africa. The victory of the population of this tiny country against the vastly superior forces of the Portuguese colonial power and its allies ranks with the defeat of the US in Vietnam. In his early work, Cabral focused primarily on the practical issues of land rights and agricultural production, the assertion of political and cultural rights against the repressive forces of Portuguese colonialism, and the political developments necessary for uniting the people in the national fight for liberation (Chilcote 1972: 350–81). Cabral's theoretical formulations were a product of his political activism, the experience of which also enabled a greater cultural self-confidence. Like Agostinho Neto of Angola, Cabral argued that the military struggle was part of a wider political struggle which involved a social and psychological reconstruction (Agostinho Neto 1980; Andrade 1980, 1997). 'Gradually

overcoming the psychological complexes engendered by colonial exploitation', he wrote, the national fight for liberation 'enabled the "marginal" human beings who are the product of colonialism to recover their personalities as Africans' (Chilcote 1972: 375). Psychological reconstruction and cultural assertion, for Cabral, were not separate, discrete activities for colonized peoples, but processes inseparable from, both cause and effect of, the larger struggle for national liberation. His work stands out for the ways in which he extends his analyses from the practicalities of the creation of resistance movements, to the military strategies involved, to the vanguard role of the party in the formation of anti-colonial unity, to the forms by which cultural identity and dignity – for Cabral central and essential components of the liberation process – can be asserted. Fanon, who dismisses the revolutionary possibilities of indigenous cultures, asks 'in short, is the struggle for liberation a cultural phenomenon or not?' and suggests that the struggle creates a new culture. For Cabral, as for Mondlane, the issues are first and foremost political and material: the still living culture, that proved a prime instrument of resistance throughout colonial history, now forms an intrinsic part of the liberation movement (Chabal 1983: 182; Fanon 1965: 197; Mondlane 1969).

6 THE WEAPON OF THEORY

Cabral's major statements in this regard were made in three speeches, 'The Weapon of Theory' (1966), 'National Liberation and Culture' (1970) and 'Identity and Dignity in the Context of the National Liberation Struggle' (1972). 'The Weapon of Theory' was given as an address at the first Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, held in Havana in January 1966. Against any thesis of the universalization of the Bolshevik model, and in the face of the eurocentrism of most Marxist theories of imperialism, Cabral began by invoking the Second Declaration of Havana by way of emphasizing that 'national liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities': they are rather, he affirmed, specifically 'the outcome of local and national elaboration . . . essentially determined and formed by the historical reality of each people' (Cabral 1969: 74–5; cf. 1973: 53). As McCulloch observes, in Guinea-Bissau, 'a strategy such as that suggested [by Fanon] in *The Wretched of the Earth*, relying upon peasant leadership and spontaneous eruption in the cities, could not possibly have succeeded' (McCulloch 1983: 3). Cabral's emphasis on this empirical diversity and specificity in relation to revolutionary theory was based on his own detailed knowledge of the situation in Guinea-Bissau, which he had gained from conducting an extensive agricultural survey for the Forestry Department, and which gave him a lively sense of the inapplicability of models developed for the advanced capitalist economies of the west. Unusually for the leader of a liberation movement, he had a detailed knowledge of the political economy of colonial rule, the actuality of material and cultural life of the different ethnic groups region by region, of the relations between different classes within Guinea-Bissau, and a profound understanding of the needs of the peasantry, particularly peasant women who

worked the land. While recognizing the different conditions operating in different colonies, at the same time Cabral pointed to the ideological or theoretical deficiency of the liberation movements (cf. Abdel-Malek 1981: 105), arguing that enough had now taken place to enable the development of a general theory which would help to strengthen liberation movements in the future. Much of Cabral's writings were concerned with a detailed history of the guerrilla war against the Portuguese; his innovative theoretical work was an attempt to rethink the system of imperialism and the practice of colonialism, and with what he called '*the foundations and objectives of national liberation in relation to the social structure*' (Cabral 1969: 75). The two, according to Cabral, had to be thought through dialectically towards the conditions of the future.

Liberation according to Cabral had to be considered not just in political terms, but also in relation to 'the effects of imperialist domination on the social structure and historical process of our peoples' (ibid.: 81). Cabral followed Roy's refusal to characterize colonial nations as existing without classes, emphasizing the internal stratification of classes within colonial societies and their different interests *vis-à-vis* the colonial power. Roy, when conceding the necessity to work with the bourgeois liberation movements, emphasized the necessity of communist parties seizing the initiative as the vanguard of such movements, so as to effect a social revolution rather than a national revolution that was for the most part nominal. Roy, however, as members of the Comintern pointed out to him, was unable to put these ideas into practice with much success and it is noticeable that they always remained relatively abstract in formulation. Cabral, by contrast, developed his ideas while in the process of leading the liberation of Guinea-Bissau and was able to see the neocolonialism operating in practice in other African states which for the Comintern had always remained a theoretical prediction. This led Cabral to reformulate the whole relation of socialism to national liberation, a radical move that was also to provide the basis for the political philosophy of Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso (Sankara 1988). Although he was unwilling to identify the peasantry as the primary revolutionary class, Cabral was clearly influenced by the position of Mao, Castro and Guevara with respect to concepts of liberation. National liberation is defined by Cabral not just in terms of the formal aspects of political independence, not just as the end of colonial rule, but as freedom from foreign domination. Political independence as such is not its object, for this he regards as a fictitious independence: 'the principal aspect of national liberation struggle is the struggle against neo-colonialism' (Cabral 1969: 83). Cabral's 'weapon of theory' makes a radical intervention into the problem of the relation of national liberation movements to socialism. Instead of trying to conflate the two, he redefines what national liberation means. An independent nation has but two choices: to return to imperialist domination (capitalism, neocolonialism) or to turn to socialism. True national liberation operates in two dimensions, internal and external, involving violent social revolution within as well as the defeat of the colonial power. The revolutionary goal of liberation, which comprised both formal independence and socialism, required a break with both internal and external elements. This emphasis on the social and cultural aspects of revolution was characteristic of the ways in which revolution was redefined in the 1960s.

The first problem was that of class and class alliances. While the Comintern had continuously emphasized the dangers of the bourgeois-nationalist element in the liberation movements, which effectively aims to produce formal independence while leaving 'the country exactly as before – a semi-colonial buffer state, the puppet of world imperialism', and had called for a complete revolutionary break with such elements, the means for working with the bourgeois-democratic movements at the same time as working against them had never been clear nor, in practice, very successful (Adler 1980: 416). Aware that the party which led the independence movement would subsequently take control, Comintern directives urged communist parties to take the vanguard, while recognizing that in practice, in situations such as Turkey, in the post-independence situation the main revolutionary work would remain. Cabral reformulated this perennial procedural problem by differentiating independence from liberation, a distinction that has subsequently become central to the political premises of postcolonial theory: indeed, the object of postcolonial politics can be characterized, after Cabral, as the pursuit of liberation after independence. He argued that even in a situation where the vanguard party, in this case the revolutionary army, was successful in achieving independence, independence did not in itself produce true liberation. It was thus important to make a distinction between the colonial and neocolonial struggle:

The colonial situation (in which the *nation class* fights the repressive forces of the bourgeoisie of the colonizing country) can lead, apparently at least, to a nationalist solution (national revolution); the nation gains its independence and theoretically adopts the economic structure which best suits it. The neo-colonial situation (in which the working classes and their allies struggle simultaneously against the imperialist bourgeoisie and the native ruling class) is not resolved by a nationalist solution; it demands the destruction of the capitalist structure implanted in the national territory by imperialism, and correctly postulates a socialist solution. (Cabral 1969: 86)

Liberation thus involves two stages, a corporate struggle in which the nation forms a single class, and a second stage in which the working classes destroy the social and cultural fabric created by imperialism in order to create equality and true liberation from oppression. Nationalism is the solution to the first, socialism to the second. The first revolution then is external, the second internal with respect to the economic and social structure that has been created as a result of imperialist domination. Cabral was unusual among liberation movement activists in focusing attention less on the revolution itself, than on the means through which this would be part of a process of the restructuring of the state and the social fabric. To that extent, his work anticipates much of the analysis of the African state that emerged in the 1990s.

In the first stage of liberation, Cabral argues that the struggle against foreign domination is led by the petty bourgeoisie or middle class who are most in (usually humiliating) contact with the imperial power and most aware of the need to remove it. In the second stage, the petty bourgeoisie begins to share the vanguard role with the working class, but in this situation is most liable to act in its own class interests and, in order to retain the power which it has achieved, develop into the functionaries of a

neocolonial state and thus betray the objectives of national liberation. In order not to do this, the petty bourgeoisie, according to Cabral, has only one choice, namely 'to strengthen its revolutionary consciousness', rejecting the temptations of becoming more bourgeois and identifying itself with the working class. At this point Cabral comes to his most startling conclusion, a radical revision of Lenin's argument that the ruling classes do not give up power of their own free will:

This means that in order to truly fulfil the role in the national liberation struggle, the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong. (Cabral 1969: 89)

Cabral's stark choice – 'to betray the revolution or to commit suicide as a class' – has a number of contextual frames: the widespread perception from the early 1960s onwards of the operation of neocolonialism in independent states of the African continent; Castro's 'open door' policy in Cuba, which allowed those whose class interests were not served by the revolution the choice of leaving; Castro and Guevara's own negation of their class position and stress on 'the development of revolutionary consciousness' after the revolution; and the Cultural Revolution in China, which also emphasized the need for continuing post-revolutionary cultural and social renewal. Although the proposal is put by Cabral in a somewhat dramatic and alarming way, he is one of the few Marxist theorists of colonialism to give serious attention to the question of how to resolve conflicting class interests in a post-revolutionary situation. Cabral himself had already committed suicide in class terms, and recognized the key to such an action involved what he called 'cultural reconversion'. He described the process of his own intellectual liberation while a student in Lisbon as the 're-Africanization' of his mind, and considered 'a reconversion of minds – of mental set' an indispensable component of the integration of colonized peoples into the liberation movement (Cabral 1973: 47, 45). With that, members of the petty bourgeoisie would be enabled to identify with the culture and interests of the nation rather than their class, as a result of the liberation struggle having developed 'the *confluence of the levels* of culture of the different social groups available for the struggle' (ibid.: 53).

7 THE ROLE OF CULTURE

Cabral's moral and political objection to colonialism involved not only, as he put it, 'the concrete conditions of the life of our peoples – misery, ignorance, suffering of every kind, the complete negation of our most elementary rights', but also the fact that the colonialists had taken from African people the history that had hitherto been theirs:

The colonialists usually say that it was they who brought us into history: today we show that this is not so. They made us leave history, our history, to follow them, right at the back, to follow the progress of their history. (Cabral 1969: 63)

'To return to our own history': this is the object, as Cabral describes it, for which liberation was being fought in the armed anti-colonial struggle. The movement for emancipation was enabled by the endurance of the culture, defined as 'simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history': according to Cabral it was the survival, and then reaffirmation, of culture that generally provided the germ of the liberation struggle (Cabral 1973: 41–3). The full realization of a people's culture was the means through which they could return to their own history. From the first, Cabral was particularly concerned with the role of what he characterized as 'the indestructible character of the cultural resistance of the masses of the people when confronted with foreign domination' (ibid.: 59–60). Even during the period of guerrilla warfare, a party directive of 1965 contained the injunction: 'Oblige every responsible and educated member of our Party to work daily for the improvement of their cultural formation' (Cabral 1969: 71). He was always to lay great stress on the need for education, particularly for women. His emphasis on the significance of the cultural–historical dimension of the liberation struggle also meant that, as a corollary, he was obliged to challenge the Marxist argument that history only began with class struggle, and therefore, as a result, that the peoples of America, Africa and Asia were living outside history before colonialism, or indeed were still without any history to the extent that the influence of the colonialism to which they had been subjected was still slight. Since Cabral held that there were 'strong, dependent and reciprocal relationships' between the cultural and economic life of a society, he argued that the motor force of history comprises the mode of production rather than class struggle, in doing so creating a new inclusive historical model within a continued Marxist framework (comparable to the Althusser of *Reading Capital* (1970)). Having redefined independence, not as the right of self-determination, but rather as the 'right of every people to have its own history', the object of liberation could be reformulated and extended as the right of a people to its own productive forces, which means that it takes place when the productive forces of the nation are completely free of all forms of foreign interference or domination (Cabral 1969: 65; 1973: 43).

The attraction of Cabral's emphasis on the role of culture is the result of the way in which he defines its reciprocal relation with history and the economic life of a society. It never operates as anything remotely resembling its European guises as the leisure activity of the middle classes through which they maintain their class identity, or as the superstructure of an economic base. Its reciprocal function means that since culture is the product of a people's history, national liberation 'is necessarily an act of *culture*' and the liberation movement 'the organized political expression of the culture of a people who are undertaking the struggle' (Cabral 1973: 43–4). Liberation struggle was thus 'not only a product of culture but also a *determinant of culture*' (ibid.: 55). Liberation, according to Cabral, was both about ending foreign domination and about building a new social fabric through which the people would achieve both identity and dignity. At the same time, liberation was only possible because the people possessed these qualities already as a product of their own culture. Cabral noted that while classical Marxism placed an overwhelming emphasis on the realm of the economic in its revolutionary political strategies, imperialist capitalism paid an

extraordinary amount of attention to the cultures of the alien societies which it controlled. Cabral wrote:

The practice of imperialist rule . . . demanded (and still demands) a more or less accurate knowledge of the society it rules and of the historical reality (both economic, social, and cultural) in the middle of which it exists. This knowledge is necessarily exposed in terms of comparison with the dominating subject and with its own historical reality. Such a knowledge is a vital necessity in the practice of imperialist rule which results in the confrontation, mostly violent, between two identities which are dissimilar in their historical elements and contradictory in their functions. (Ibid.: 58)

In an argument that anticipates that of Said in *Orientalism*, he points to the degree to which imperialism engendered a desire for knowledge of other cultures, and how an unprecedented mass of information about other societies had been built up 'in the fields of history, ethnology, ethnography, sociology, and cultures concerning people or groups brought under imperialist domination'. Since the object of this knowledge was the achievement and perpetuation of domination, it was itself testimony to the strength of cultural resistance that continued even after a country was 'subdued' or 'pacified' in military terms. Cabral turned this drive for knowledge on its head, and drew out its implications for the cultures under observation. If all that work, expertise, vast institutional activity was going on in the west in order to study colonial cultures, that must be an indication of their strength, continuing power, and inassimilable reserves. He therefore revised his own idea of the necessity of 'reconversion', a 'return to the source', or cultural renaissance, as part of the strategy of cultural re-empowerment, to suggest that this was necessary only for the native elite, who had been drawn into the cultural and intellectual penumbra of the imperial culture, or for the culturally dispossessed 'colonial *diasporas*', because of the fundamental contradictions of their position. The general prescription of such strategies ignored, according to Cabral, 'the indestructible character of the cultural resistance of the masses of people when confronted with foreign domination' (Cabral 1973: 59–60). While imperialist domination seeks to understand indigenous cultures in order to manipulate, repress and destroy them, the people 'continue to resist culturally even when their politico-military resistance is destroyed'. Even if the elites have become assimilated, the masses, he argued, who remain largely untouched by a colonial power indifferent towards them, preserve their culture, in part through their own agency:

It is also the result of the effectiveness of cultural resistance of the people, who when they are subjected to political domination and economic exploitation find that their own culture acts as a bulwark in preserving their *identity*. (Ibid.: 61).

Even when persecuted and repressed, betrayed and humiliated, culture survives and maintains for the people the enabling power to return and make history. The dialectical form of identity which culture preserves is, in Cabral's account, very different from the performative kind of identity described by modern commentators. Identity, he argues, results from the place of an individual or group within the framework of a

culture that operates as a constant form of resistance, passive or otherwise. A cultural act is always necessarily a collective act which in itself marks a blow of resistance to colonial domination and subservience to other norms and practices. National liberation, therefore, does not have to create an identity, but is the product of an identity founded on a dignity and power that the colonized people have never lost. In Cabral's account, culture and identity are drawn together as the fulcrum of agency for both political and military resistance.

Cabral's arguments suggest a growing confidence in the cultural autonomy of black Africa; he remained anxious that the African nationalist movement was not sufficiently supported by a theoretical base grounded on local experience. He was not to see the fruits of his own tremendous labours in that direction. He was assassinated by a Portuguese hit squad in 1973, the year before Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde achieved independence.

At least Cabral did not have to live through the common experience of a gradual disillusionment with the African state after independence, the product of an encounter with the disjointed conditions of the decolonized state. The economic and political problems encountered in Africa since independence require more substantive treatment than can be given here. The point to emphasize, however, is that contemporary analyses by Africanists form part of a continuing process of political, economic and cultural understanding that began with the anti-colonial movements. Nkrumah's complaint that decolonization had operated on a divide and rule policy that had split Africa into tiny unworkable states is today being re-examined from a different and more dynamic perspective, focusing in particular on the problem of the state and the state apparatus with which Cabral had already been particularly concerned (Althusser was to learn from him in this respect). With the end of the ideal of Pan-African unity as an immediate political goal, and the increasing dysfunction of the state altogether in parts of Africa, the basis of the state as an institution is now being reconsidered. Basil Davidson, in *Black Man's Burden* (1992), has drawn attention to the disastrous after-effects of the imposition by the departing colonial powers of the form of nation-states which bore no relation to the peoples and cultures involved. In the place of Nkrumah's solution of Pan-African unity to this problem, Davidson focuses on how to transform the skewed relation of the state to ethnic configurations. In a related way, Mamdani (1996) has argued that the legacy of colonialism in Africa has amounted to a system of decentralized despotism operating through native authority and customary law, enforced through forms of ethnicity and religion. Resistance to the state has never been able to escape these conditions, never been able to generate the different notion of citizen and subject which African socialism assumed would be generated through the accession to modernity. The cult of personality – to which Nkrumah himself above all succumbed – demonstrated the way in which the postcolonial African state was also subjected to the impact of contradictory political systems (Quayson 2000: 15–16, 88–90). Jean-François Bayart (1993) has analysed the tragic failures of the state in Africa in terms of its difficulties in establishing political legitimacy in competition with other forms of affiliation and loyalty, even if, as he argues, ethnicity in Africa, like tradition, was invented. He makes the radical argument that Africa's

apparent inability to respond to the prescriptions of development economics is not so much outright failure as a willed resistance towards moving into alien modes of economic, social and cultural forms. Recent developments among Africanists such as these suggest that the self-critical theoretical apparatus, analysing the social, political and cultural issues faced by postcolonial countries, has been in a constant process of redefinition, change and development. Postcolonialism in Africa names only a further stage in that process, in which many of the earlier prescriptions of African socialism are being rediscovered and reworked in the context of the different conditions and assumptions of postcolonial modernity (Eze 1997; Grinker and Steiner 1997; Werbner and Ranger 1996).

The Subject of Violence:

ALGERIA, IRELAND

Revolutionaries throughout the world must choose between suffering violence or utilizing it. If they do not wish spirit and intelligence to be the subject of force, they must resolve to make force the subject of intelligence and spirit.

José Carlos Mariátegui (1996: 49)

1922. Baghdad. The dust settles after the activity of the morning markets. Groups of children are walking home from school. All over the city, people sitting down to eat intone 'Bismillah-ir-Rahmanir Raheem'. The quiet is broken by the sound of engines droning in the sky. A squadron of the British Royal Air Force passes overhead. Some minutes later, there is the sound of thuds in the distance. The planes are scattering bombs randomly over the villages in the hills. It is the first time that the new RAF has been deployed against a rebellious colonized people. The Iraqi tribesmen, promised freedom from the Turks during the First World War, but handed over to British rule at the 1919 Versailles Conference, are being pacified.

1998. Baghdad. 3 a.m., two days before Ramadan. Children and their parents are asleep in their beds. The drone of cars speeding around the city is interrupted by staccato bursts of anti-aircraft guns, the slower roar of anti-aircraft missiles. In four waves, US Navy EA-6B attack planes begin to bomb Iraqi air defences. In Europe and North America, people sit on their sofas watching eerie green TV pictures of Baghdad under fire. Their fire. The British government announces that the RAF is preparing for further bombing raids. Doctors in Baghdad hospitals report the first casualties. Iraq's military capacity is being degraded.

Colonial violence was carried out in the name of 'pacification'; postcolonial violence is carried out in the name of 'degradation', degrading the postcolonial subject back to subaltern status. 'This infinite passage through violence is what is called history' (Derrida 1978: 130).

The future lasts a long time.

1 SUBJECT, SUBJECTION

Who is the subject of this violence? The person subjected to it or the subject who carries it out? Violence makes the subject double, doubly subject, simultaneously subject and object, an outsider to his or her own being:

When I came nearer I saw that [the] Arab had returned. He was by himself this time, lying on his back. . . . On seeing me the Arab raised himself a little, and his hand went to his pocket. Naturally I gripped Raymond's revolver in the pocket of my coat. . . . I took . . . just one step, forward. And then the Arab drew his knife and held it up towards me. . . .

Every nerve in my body was a steel spring, and my grip closed on the revolver. The trigger gave. . . . I fired four shots more into the inert body, on which they left no visible trace. And each successive shot was another loud, fateful rap on the door of my undoing. (Camus 1983: 63–4)

Camus' insight is that violence also estranges, splits, the subject of violence. Let us follow Camus' interpellation into the long and bloody French 'pacification' of Algeria that initiated a dynamics of violence that still haunts both Algeria and France – a legacy that Hélène Cixous has dubbed 'Algériance'. Franco-Judaeo-Maghrebian theory, popularly known as deconstruction, has been one manifestation of that unforgettable possession.

1840. General Bugeaud, former fervent anti-colonialist, is now charged with subduing Algeria for the French, ten years after their initial invasion. He carries out a policy of *razzia*, scorched earth, erasure, on the resisting inhabitants, burning their crops, razing their villages to the ground. For those who resist the French invasion, the policy is one of extermination. In a famous operation a group of Algerian fighters are sealed up, encrypted in a cave, and then asphyxiated with smoke:

We were greeted with rifle fire. . . . I have all the exits [from the caves] hermetically sealed and I make a huge cemetery. The earth will cover the corpses of these fanatics for all time. No one went down into the caves; no one . . . other than myself knows that there are 500 brigands under there who will no longer cut the throat of Frenchmen. (Todorov 1993: 205)

In his analysis of French colonialism written during the Algerian war of independence, Sartre points out how the violent relations between the two contrasting societies of Algeria and France were defined from the first 'by Bugeaud's soldiers, and by the atrocious massacres perpetrated by [them]':

Violence and destruction were an integral part of the desired objective. . . . For the child of the colonialist, violence was present in the situation itself, and was a social force that produced him. The son of the colonialist and the son of the Muslim are both the children of the objective violence that defines the system itself. (Sartre 1976a: 717–18)

A hundred years after Bugeaud's campaign, the grotesquely named Lycée Bugeaud in Algiers will count among its best students Albert Camus, and Jacques Derrida, the 'little black and very Arab Jew', as he puts it, earlier expelled from school and then deprived of his French citizenship and degraded to the status of a French subject in Vichy Algeria in 1942. By that time, Louis Althusser's family had already immigrated back to the France from which his grandparents had been deported in 1871. But the son of the brutal *colon* – 'thereupon', says Althusser of his father, 'he went back to the front, leaving my mother robbed, raped, and shattered' – remained the child of violence, ending his life with the murder of his wife:

On this occasion I was massaging the front of her neck. . . . Hélène's face was calm and motionless; her eyes were wide open and staring at the ceiling.

Suddenly, I was terror-struck. Her eyes stared interminably, and I noticed the tip of her tongue was showing between her teeth and lips, strange and still. (Althusser 1993: 15–16)

'These children of violence were produced by the violent *praxis* of their fathers – which takes them back to the History from which they wished to escape' (Sartre 1976a: 719).

2 VIOLENCE, VIOLATION

Sartre, Memmi and Fanon all argue that colonial violence works dialectically at both the level of history and the individual: the agent of violence becomes subjected to it as much as the violated recipient. The torturer finds himself torturing his wife and children. Fanon's clinic in Blida-Joinville is filled indiscriminately with psychological casualties from both sides of the colonial divide. Violence, in fact, is what binds the two together in the historical dialectic of their mutual antagonism. 'No one' then, comments Derrida, 'could escape that violence and fear'. The trace of violence is the primary semiotic of the colonial apparatus, its means of communication. The bombers write messages on the casing of the bombs. 'Here's a Ramadan present from Chad Rickenberg' read the graffiti on one US missile fired at Iraq in 1998. The terrorist writes back in the colonizer's own language.

Fanon, too, reverses the terms of the 'violent hierarchy' of colonialism. Adapting the arguments of Georges Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* (1906) to the colonial arena, he suggests that it is by becoming a subject of violence that the dehumanized colonized subject becomes a subject for the first time; violence functions as a kind of psychotherapy of the oppressed. Violence offers a primary form of agency through which the subject moves from non-being to being, from being an object to a subject. Simone de Beauvoir recounts that it was while visiting Cuba after the 1959 revolution that 'Sartre had realized the truth of what Fanon was saying: it is only in violence that the oppressed can attain their human status' (de Beauvoir 1968: 606). For Fanon, the act of violence also creates an existential unity of a people against their oppressors.

When in 1956 . . . the *Front de Libération Nationale*, in a famous leaflet, stated that colonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat, no Algerian really found these terms too violent. The leaflet only expressed what every Algerian felt at heart: colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence. (Fanon 1965: 48)

Anti-colonial struggle becomes revolutionary war by any means possible.

3 NERVOUS CONDITIONS

Fanon's intervention as what Sartre described as the anti-colonial 'theoretician of revolutionary violence' marked the historical shift in tricontinental nationalism towards a violent indigenous cultural assertion that soon transformed the radical politics of Marxism even in the west, a shift whose initial culmination came in the events of May 1968 (Lumumba 1972: 3). Fanon's revolutionary violence also signalled the defeat of Gandhi's alternative form of anti-colonial struggle. Violence versus non-violence – that was the anti-colonial question. Despite the Ethiopian triumph over the Italian army at Adowa in 1896, and the early Boer successes in the South African War of 1899–1902, until the defeat of the colonial powers by invading Japanese forces during the Second World War (always symbolized for the British by the fall of Singapore in 1942), and the triumph of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the possibility of achieving liberation by military means appeared remote. In this situation, Gandhi's brilliant strategy of non-violence was designed to outwit the logic of a liberal British colonialism backed by the remorseless military force that had responded so violently to the uprising of 1857.

In fact, however, as in Ireland, where constitutional agitation and agrarian reform were combined with both violent rebellions and repressions and the passive resistance of boycotts and hunger strikes, in India, as Shahid Amin (1995) has suggested, it was really a case of a mixture of non-violent and violent, carrot and stick, strategies on both sides: for the British, the tactics involved a combination of the constitutional reform of the 1935 Government of India Act, with nervous violent repression such as at Amritsar in 1919. Indian nationalists for their part looked to the example of Ireland, and particularly to the example of Parnell, whose authority, as Sorel observed, 'did not rely only on the number of votes at his disposal, but mainly upon the terror that every Englishman felt at the merest announcement of agrarian troubles in Ireland. A few acts of violence, controlled by a parliamentary group, were very useful to Parnellian policy' (Sorel 1999: 67). Unlike Daniel O'Connell at Clontarf in 1843, Parnell never shrank from the politics of violence. For the Indians, the freedom struggle also involved the almost simultaneous combination of peaceful campaigns such as the Salt March of 1930 with the militant revolutionary tactics of the Chittagong Armoury Raid of 1930, when, true to the spirit of Easter 1916, Surjya Sen issued a Proclamation of Independence in the name of the Indian Republican Army. The

British may have pursued a policy of divide and rule, but they also faced the hybrid combination of the different strategies of Gujarat, Tashkent and Bengal; of the Indian Congress Party, the Anushilan Samity and Jugantar terrorist groups, and the *Hindutva* paramilitary RSS; of Muzaffar Ahmad, Subhas Chandra Bose, Gandhi, Nehru and Bhagat Singh.

After 1947, many nationalist leaders in Africa had declared themselves disciples of the tactics of Gandhi. Both Nkrumah in Ghana and Kaunda in Zambia led successful non-violent independence movements that built on the achievements of Gandhi's example. However, in time both leaders were forced to recognize that an antithetical strategy was required for settler colonies, starting with the overwhelming violence of Algeria (Kaunda 1982; Nkrumah 1968). The long and bitter struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia against the outlawed white settler colonial regime forced an anguished Kaunda to abandon the principles of a lifetime. Such a strategy was also always necessary for the French, who operated according to a very different theory and practice of colonial domination. In a bid to stifle revolutionary dissent and to reimpose its authority after the humiliations of the Second World War, France initiated violent repression and summary executions in Algeria and Indochina. In May 1945 the newly liberated French government responded to nationalist agitation in Algeria by killing over 10,000 Algerians in air raids over Sétif. Had Gandhi tried his campaign of civil disobedience in Indochina rather than India, Ho Chi Minh observed, he 'would long since have ascended into heaven' (Andrew and Kanya-Forstne 1981: 246). Kaunda was of the same opinion: 'Gandhi's fate would have been quite different if instead of being up against the British Raj he had faced dictators who did not play good-natured games with their opponents' (Kaunda 1982: 27). Even in India, however, the bloodshed of Partition proved a violence displaced from its anti-colonial target to be the most available means of agency to those subjected to the inequalities of domination, poverty and caste. The dramatic defeat of the French by the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the declaration of war in Algeria, the Cuban Revolution, marked the end of non-violence as an anti-colonial strategy. Its last outpost in South Africa ended with Sharpeville in 1960. In 1961 the victorious Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap published his *People's War People's Army*, described by the CIA as 'The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries' (Giap 1962). On 3 September 1965, Lin Piao published his 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', a declaration which soon became famous for proposing a theory of 'People's War' identified with revolutionary violence and a guerilla 'war of annihilation' achieved through the 'strangulation' of the cities (Gerassi 1971, 1: 70–90). In 1968, Nkrumah published his *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution* (Nkrumah 1968). 'Anti-imperialist pacifism is dying', Nkrumah, the former pacifist, announced: violent tactics were now necessary to defeat the new forces of imperialism that had come to dominate the globe by the 1960s. 'By any means necessary': violence had become universal, acceptable. 'I understand the need for violence' observed Monsignor Helder Camara, Archbishop of Recife in Brazil in 1968, 'I respect those men who have chosen to accept it' (Davidson 1969: 21).

Fanon, anticipating Arendt's disapproval, argues that non-violence was merely the doctrine of the accommodating westernized elite, never the practice of the people (Arendt 1970). He applauds the young Algerian women revolutionaries planting their bombs in the football stadia and fashionable cafés of the French Algerians. At the same time, he constantly worries about the psychological effects on the oppressed of being the perpetrators of violence, which become identical to those that he and Sartre had demonstrated so persuasively for French and German torturers. The overdetermined apex of *The Wretched of the Earth* in human terms comes in the moment when Fanon treats a European policeman in a depressed state privately at his own house. Wandering in the hospital grounds while he waits for Fanon, the policeman meets one of his own victims, an Algerian patriot suffering from stupor, following the shock of the torture. Fanon then comes across him:

A few minutes later as I was going home I passed him on the way. He was leaning against a tree, looking overcome, trembling and drenched with sweat. In fact having an anxiety crisis. (Fanon 1965: 216)

Fanon takes him home, and then returns to the hospital, where he searches for the patriot, whom he eventually finds in the toilet, trying to commit suicide. Soon the effects of the encounter with violence, its perpetrators and its victims, begin to work on Fanon himself. De Beauvoir goes to meet him at Rome airport:

We saw him before he noticed us. He was sitting down, getting up, sitting down again, changing his money, collecting his baggage, all with abrupt gestures, agitated facial movements, suspiciously flickering eyes. In the car, he talked feverishly: in forty-eight hours, the French Army would be invading Tunisia, blood would be flowing in torrents. (de Beauvoir 1968: 606)

'Perhaps I'm a paraphrenic', he volunteered one day, ambivalent to the last, subject to what Sartre, and subsequently Tsitsi Dangarembga, called colonialism's 'nervous condition'. Both Sartre and de Beauvoir record that, though an advocate of violence as 'the inescapable fate of a world fighting to free itself', Fanon was at the same time horrified by it (de Beauvoir 1968: 609; Lumumba 1972: 4). He never, however, articulated his celebration of a sublime violence to the political sublime of the socialism that it was supposed to bring about.

The agents of violence become subject to it, and nowhere more so than in heterogeneous and multi-ethnic post-colonial Algeria, where sectarian violence is now, we are frequently told, 'endemic'. Fanon was constantly pointing out the human legacy of France in Algeria, 'the psycho-affective consequences' for 'a whole generation of Algerians, steeped in wanton, generalized homicide' (Fanon 1965: 205). De Beauvoir suggests that Fanon did foresee some of the troubles ahead: predicting that victory for the FLN would cost a million lives, he added, perhaps thinking of India, that 'the aftermath would be "frightful"' (de Beauvoir 1968: 609). How far did he anticipate that the FLN would itself turn into the corrupt elite, an oligarchy kept in power by the army and the support of the French government, that a second revolutionary war

would be fought against the FLN, his FLN, itself? (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970). The violence of that war is still being played out. The politics of Algeria, and of what could be called the 'defrancification' of Algerian society, have moved a long way from Fanon's advocacy of an enabling politics of violence. Like the veil, his political strategies also have 'an oscillating value' when situated in history.

4 IRELAND: ASSIMILATION AND VIOLENCE

With what colours should I paint what astonished me, that is, the immensity of the injustice? An entire people, from a great civilization, wronged, humiliated, denied their identity. (Lyotard 1993: 170)

Cromwell at Drogheda in 1649, the Invincibles in Phoenix Park in 1892, the 1916 Rising, Bloody Sunday in 1972, Omagh in 1998. Violence has often been characterized as 'endemic' to Ireland also. Lloyd observes that 'With the possible exception of greenness, no quality has more frequently and repetitiously been attributed to Ireland than violence' (Lloyd 1993: 124). Why has there never been a comparable theorization of the politics of violence in Ireland to Fanon's analysis of the fundamental role of violence in colonial Algeria? The similarities between the cases of Ireland and Algeria have been meticulously analysed by Ian Lustick in *Unsettled States* (Lustick 1993). Although there are interesting parallels at the level of violence between Ireland and Algeria, at another level the two colonies ought at first sight to be strictly incomparable because they were possessions of the two colonial powers with opposing colonial systems, France and Britain. This difference, however, is largely theoretical, for both represent anomalies in their respective systems, both constituted the apparently assimilated colony that was never fully assimilated, in which the subaltern deprived of land and rights never renounced resistance. Like Ireland, Algeria was appropriated by force from its indigenous people for settlement by colonial settlers of a different religion who were given possession of the land by the colonial state. Both countries required violent rebellion to push the colonizing power towards decolonization, and in both cases the settled colonists then themselves resorted to paramilitary violence in order to stave off decolonization. The difference is that in the case of Algeria, France abandoned the *colons*, the white French settlers, and many of them re-immigrated to France, now providing some of Jean-Marie Le Pen's most fervent supporters. Unlike the British, the French had no system in place for the deconstruction of their empire, and the assimilation system meant that the only constitutional methods of resistance involved participation through submission to it on its own terms – the only constitutional means of opposition within the French colonies was, paradoxically, to submit to more assimilation. In the case of Algeria, for example, under the *code de l'indigénat* of 1881, in order to acquire French citizenship, civil rights and a local vote it was necessary for Algerians to renounce Islam for Christianity. Few Muslims ever did so, and as a result they remained without civil rights, for example trial by jury, or means of legitimate political participation until the

limited concessions of 1919 (Jackson 1977: 8–9). As Lustick points out, the absence of land reform in Algeria, *pied-noir* blocking of the Blum–Violette constitutional reforms of the 1920s and 1930s which left the Muslim population disenfranchised, and the violent French repression at Sétif in 1945 in response to Muslim protest, meant that there was no path of constitutional activism for Algerians to follow. Even after the very limited reforms of the 1947 *Statut de l'Algérie*, the elections were rigged by the administration in favour of the *colons*. Violence was the only option. As a result, the French lost their Algerian empire in military and political defeat by the FLN, just as they lost their empire in China in defeat by Giap and Ho Chi Minh, and just as the Portuguese in Africa were defeated by Cabral and the PAIGC, by Mondlane and FRELIMO, by António Agostinho Neto and the MLPA.

If the British were never decisively defeated in military terms in their colonies, Ireland represents one of the first examples of British withdrawal in the face of ungovernability as a result of popular and military resistance (there were to be many subsequent examples where a claimed military victory over the insurgents, as with the Mau Mau in Kenya, was quickly followed by political withdrawal). After the events of 1912–14, in which the militant Protestants of the north blocked the putting into effect of the Home Rule Bill that had finally been passed by the Westminster parliament, the British government gave up the attempt to produce a political solution for the whole of Ireland and resorted to its favourite decolonizing strategy, partition – a solution that seems to have come readily to the British because their own island has always been partitioned. In both Algeria and Ireland, the violence of the anti-colonial struggle continued in violence after independence. If that violence was sectarian in both cases, the difference is that in Algeria the different factions and diverse ethnic groups combined to make up the National Liberation Front, whereas in Ireland divisions within the population produced partition before national independence could be achieved. Although Ireland is by no means a straightforward parallel to Algeria, the similarities that do exist lead to a general question: did settlement colonies tend to involve more violence at decolonization than exploitation colonies? Assimilation always involves more violence: both at the level of initial integration, the transformation of the indigenous culture into that of the metropole, and then at decolonization, when disengagement is more painful, and resistance more plural and complex. The paradox here is that, as has been earlier suggested, assimilation is also at the same time fundamentally more liberal, in that it is based on an initial assumption of equality: in theory, at least, everyone becomes an equal subject of the state. The British policy of non-interference, on the other hand, of apparent cultural respect for indigenous cultures, of leaving indigenous institutions more or less intact, is predicated on an assumption of hierarchy and inferiority.

The British always disdained the French idea of colonial assimilation, but in fact they practised it with respect to contiguous territories within the British Isles, incorporating Wales, Scotland and Ireland in a succession of Acts of Union that integrated the separate kingdoms as parts of the British state. British assimilation, characteristically, always left some of the previous system intact (for example, the office of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland): although in constitutional terms, the subaltern British

nations sent representatives to the London parliament, they were not integrated at every level as remorselessly as in France, with the result that by the nineteenth century Britain effectively became a multinational bourgeois state run by the propertied classes. British liberal governments attempted to produce devolution in the form of home rule for Scotland and Ireland in the late nineteenth century on a similar model to that offered to other white settler colonies (the very same model was dusted down and wheeled out again for the devolutions granted to Scotland and Wales in the late 1990s) (Kendle 1989). However, the fact that the British had been practising policies of settlement and assimilation up to that point within the British Isles made home-rule proposals far more problematic than for Canada, South Africa or Australia. In the Irish case, Home Rule resembled more closely the situation in exploitation colonies such as India or West Africa, where the British encouraged indigenous resistance to imperial rule to move in the direction of constitutional reformist channels, actively participating in the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 for example, or in Annie Besant's Home Rule League, and holding out home rule, conceived as operating within the broader framework of an Imperial Federation, as the final but apparently always unrealizable prize.

The looser British system of association meant that the process of decolonization, starting with Canada in 1867 right through to Hong Kong in 1997, was generally easier to effect than for those colonies in the French system which had been more integrated and which, even after decolonization, tend to remain culturally and economically closer to France (for example, former French colonies in West Africa still use a common currency that is pegged to the franc). Once those in the British government had finally accepted the idea, most of the British Empire was easier to decolonize. Except, that is, for Ireland, where the belated constitutional move to the free state was thwarted in 1912–14 by a militarized Ulster Defence Force formed with the connivance of the British government.

5 IRELAND AND POSTCOLONIAL THEORY

Ireland has always been an anomalous state in an anomalous state (Lloyd 1993). It is not only because it has not yet been fully decolonized that Ireland occupies a relatively minor place in postcolonial theorizing today. It is partly because, as so often, Ireland does not seem to fit the general pattern. Postcolonial theory has grown out of a curious synthesis of Algeria and India, of Fanon and Gandhi, of Fanon's dialectic of colonizer and colonized locked in a violent struggle for mastery, combined with Gandhi's use of the resources of psychological games played to outwit the enemy. As a result, postcolonial theory actually operates dialectically within the polarities of the two colonial systems, which gives it a comprehensive reach, even if at times it feels as though it amounts to French theory developed by Sartre and Fanon deployed upon the very different historical example of British India, analysing India as if it were Algeria. Put another way, postcolonial theory has developed out of strategies developed to defeat French settler colonialism and British exploitation colonies. It is

perhaps not surprising that arguments within postcolonial theory focus on the dynamics of the relations between the polarities of this incompatible synthesis. Yet this is not only an academic, theoretical fusion. It also represents the *de facto* historical basis of the anti-colonial struggle in Britain's oldest colony, Ireland. Although among many postcolonialists Ireland tends to be regarded (as always) as a somewhat marginal case, in many ways its role has been central. This works at both a theoretical and historical level.

Technically, at times Ireland may not have been colony at all; but the forms of revolutionary and cultural activism developed by the Irish against the entrenched self-interest of its rule by the British aristocracy and bourgeoisie meant that it remained the standard bearer for all anti-colonial movements in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In particular, the simultaneous combination of the different strands of constant pressure for constitutional reform, affiliation with radicals in the metropolitan centre, the development of a vigorous and articulate cultural nationalism, together with general activist forms of passive resistance as in the Land wars and the hunger strikes (a strategy which Gandhi was to imitate to great effect), combined with strategic activist revolutionary terrorism and insurrection, provided a model for the most effective combination of tactics for all future anti-colonial struggle aside from those dependent entirely on military insurrection.

Earlier I posed the question of why has there never been a comparable theorization of the politics of violence in Ireland to Fanon's analysis of the fundamental role of violence in colonial Algeria. In fact, of course, much Irish writing has been preoccupied with very little else. The tradition of heroic martyrdom achieved through violence, of Wolfe Tone, Robert Emmet, the Manchester Martyrs, Pádraic Pearse, has for long worked as a national myth in Ireland. No theoretical account of the politics of violence, however, has achieved a general iconic status beyond Ireland comparable to that of Fanon. Although he was an active member of the FLN, Fanon's writings on Algeria have the advantage of his own lack of immediate involvement in the war. They are deliberately pitched to operate at a schematized and general level that is readily applicable elsewhere. Fanon held to the doctrine of the universal translatability of revolution developed by Lenin and Trotsky, against Castro's and Cabral's insistence on its untranslatability. Or rather, more accurately, Fanon paradoxically attempts to make the local, untranslatable principles of tricontinental Marxism translatable, universal. In the case of violence, Fanon transforms the historical fact that violence was the only political option in Algeria almost into a general philosophy of anti-colonialism, an existential form of colonial experience, and the means through which the colonized transcends the humiliation of his or her colonial condition: 'the colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence' (Fanon 1965: 67). In Ireland, it was Ernie O'Malley who came closest to Fanon in this regard: 'Only by fighting', he wrote, 'had Ireland ever gained its own self-respect or any practical advantage' (English 1998: 203). Notice the combination here, central also to Fanon, of violence providing both political advantage and the generation of self-respect.

6 'IRELAND LOST, THE BRITISH "EMPIRE" IS GONE':
JAMES CONNOLLY AND THE EASTER REBELLION OF 1916

The socialist James Connolly, by contrast, was less absolutist in his approach to violence, and provided, in his 1899 article, 'Physical Force in Irish Politics', a more measured assessment. Connolly was sceptical of those who advocated violence, or 'physical force' as he put it in the language of the Chartists, as the only possible option without a clear sense of the different kind of state that was being fought for. An independent Ireland without socialism, he argued, would simply find itself subject to English neocolonial rule. Connolly's attitude towards violence was altogether more historicized and pragmatic than Fanon's, shorn of any existential glorification, a position that he was perhaps able to take because socialism had already provided him with self-respect and the moral advantage evident in his powerful analyses of the hypocrisies of British imperialism:

Our position towards [physical force in a popular movement] is that the use or non-use of force for the realization of the ideas of progress always has been and always will be determined by the attitude, not of the party of progress, but of the governing class opposed to that party . . . if it has exhausted all the peaceful means at its disposal for the purpose of demonstrating to the people and their enemies that the new revolutionary ideas do possess the suffrage of the majority; then, but not till then, the party which represents the revolutionary idea is justified in taking steps to assume to powers of government, and in using the weapons of force to dislodge the usurping class or government in possession. (Connolly 1988b: 208)

This statement reads almost like a theoretical history of the Irish independence struggle in the nineteenth century as it moved from constitutional parliamentary aspirations to Home Rule to violent revolutionary politics. Connolly wrote this in 1899: by 1915 he had moved closer to Sorel's belief that working-class violence possessed 'an extraordinary efficacy' and had become more sympathetic to what the latter called 'the *direct and revolutionary method*': "those who live by the sword shall perish by the sword" say the Scriptures', Connolly wrote, 'and it may well be that in the progress of events the working class of Ireland may be called upon to face the stern necessity of taking the sword (or rifle) against the class whose rule has brought upon them and upon the world the hellish horror of the present European war' (Sorel 1999: 62; Connolly 1988b: 210–11). It was time for bourgeois force to be answered with proletarian violence. The strategic situation had changed significantly and at that moment Ireland, he believed, represented the weakest point of the British Empire, the colony from which most pressure could be exerted. As he marched towards the General Post Office, Connolly was well aware that he was walking to his death. At the same time, from an internationalist anti-imperialist perspective, Easter 1916 was not so naive a proposition as it was subsequently represented. By 1916 many of the eastern European nations colonized by Russia were also at the point of insurrection, and many colonies of the European empires were already in open revolt – for

example, the German Cameroons in 1914, Nyasaland in 1915, Dahomey, French Indochina and Niger in 1916, Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) in 1917, as well as Chad, Egypt, India, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda and, most successfully, Libya (Boahen 1985; Marr 1971). The year before the Easter Rising, Indian Sikh soldiers mutinied in Singapore and successfully took control of the city. They hoped that, with German help, they would then be able to drive the British out of the Malay peninsula and eventually from the whole of the Far East. With French and Japanese assistance, the British suppressed the revolt, court-martialled four hundred of the soldiers, and executed forty-one (Riddell 1986a: 383). In 1942, the story would be rather different.

Connolly's move to violence was never the product of glorifying it as an existential condition, or as a means for achieving heroic martyrdom as it was for Pearse, but rather that of a strategic move at a particular historical moment (Moran 1994: 128; Pearse 1917–22). From 1914, he recognized the contradictions of the colonized Irish, like the Indians, Africans and other colonial subjects of the British Empire, being asked to volunteer, or being summarily conscripted, to fight a war in the name of British imperialism to preserve the freedom of the Belgians, as well as the weakness of the British military position. He was also responding to the Home Rulers' support for the war after the abandonment of the Home Rule Bill, the collapse of his own party, the ILP, to say nothing of the collapse of the Second International whose members had all largely fallen into line in support of their own nations at the outbreak of the war – Connolly was one of the few socialists whose opposition to the war was unremitting. In this situation he recognized that it was necessary radically to transform the Irish nationalist agenda. The successful paramilitary resistance to Home Rule in Ulster showed the limits of the British willingness to decolonize (contrast de Gaulle's decision to quit Algeria in the face of a similar kind of armed opposition from the *colons*). The issue had to be forced – by the 'direct and revolutionary method'. Connolly founded the Irish Citizen's Army in the aftermath of the great Dublin transport workers' strike of 1913; in 1916 he was to form an alliance with the Irish Volunteers through the Military Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Terrible beauty or not, the 1916 uprising utterly changed the subsequent course of Irish politics, though in the event, by no means in a straightforward way. As Lustick observes: 'The Ulster Protestants, and the British government itself, continue to pay the price of having enjoyed a relatively easy escape from the regime crisis of 1914, and concomitantly of having forced the Irish nationalists to bear the political burden of compromise in 1921'. After 1921, and partition, the parallels between Algeria and Ireland cease. In 1948 British withdrawal and partition would throw another state into the orbit of settler violence, and casually leave a people dispossessed. 'Sweet earth of Palestine. . .',

Whose headless body is this
 Whose scarlet shroud
 Whose torn and wounded cloak
 Whose broken voice?

(Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Ahmad Faraz, in Jamal 1986: 32, 100)

Connolly's response to the politics of assimilation was reasoned, historical and strategic, and yet the brilliance of his move is little acknowledged in the pantheons of postcolonial theory and subaltern history (that he gets dismissed in revisionist history is less surprising; Howe 2000: 62–4). From the postcolonial perspective, it was Connolly – whose very name sounds like a wilful resisting reversal of the word 'colony' – who was among the very first to combine the politics of socialism with the demand for national self-determination in the colonial arena. His revolutionary anti-colonial violence always remained embedded within the larger political perspective of socialist objectives. As his trenchant analyses such as 'The Coming Revolt in India' (1908), 'The Friends of Small Nationalities' (1914), 'What is a Free Nation?' (1916) indicate, Connolly was also unusual in his time in seeing Irish politics within the context of the global panoply of British and European imperialism (Connolly 1973; 1988a, 1988b). He founded the Irish Socialist Republican Party in 1896, as he put it, 'to muster all the forces of labour for a revolutionary reconstruction of society and the incidental destruction of the British Empire' (Connolly 1973: 167). While the question of the competing priorities of national self-determination and socialism was intensely debated from the mid-1890s onwards in European socialist circles, Connolly was the first leader in a colonized nation to argue for the compatibility of socialism and nationalism, in doing so producing a position which would not only inspire Lenin and through him lead to the Third International, but which would subsequently become the defining characteristic of the triumphant tricontinental Marxism of the national liberation movements, including that of Fanon, but also that of Mao, Cabral and Guevara (e.g. Mao 1965, II: 195–211). This tricontinental Marxism, generally but misleadingly known as Marxist nationalism, could be better described, after Engels, as nationalist internationalism (Engels himself affirmed that the Irish 'are most internationalistic when they are genuinely nationalistic'; Marx and Engels 1971: 332). It was not a question of a choice between nationalism and internationalism, but rather, as Fanon was also to argue, an anti-colonial nationalism within an internationalist framework of cross-cultural solidarity (Fanon 1967: 199). In this context, Connolly was also the first to initiate what subsequently became almost a defining tradition, even literary genre, for tricontinental anti-colonial Marxism (others would include Mao, Giap, Nkrumah, Cabral and Guevara): the writing of essays, later collected into a volume, on the tactics of guerrilla warfare (Connolly 1968). In 1919–21, the Irish under Michael Collins would successfully turn to the tactics of a guerrilla campaign outlined so comprehensively by Connolly before his death (Coogan 1990). As with any socialists worthy of the name in his day, gender equality was also a central principle for Connolly. His belief in the necessity of the liberation of women in any anti-colonial struggle began with the recognition that as things stood, women in Ireland were doubly colonized – the slave of a slave, as he put it (Connolly 1988b: 191). That Connolly's Marxist nationalism was tailored to Catholicism, as some have complained, in fact only increases his centrality to the anti-colonial tradition (Garvin 1987: 126).

When Connolly's involvement in the 1916 uprising became known, many European socialists were reportedly baffled, unable to understand how he could have got involved with Irish nationalism. Connolly had in fact already elaborated with some

care his own position with regard to Sinn Féin in its original form under Arthur Griffith: though critical of bourgeois aspects of its ideology, he called for a political alliance between Sinn Féin and Irish socialists (Connolly 1977; Faligot 1978). After the Rising, which was dominated by the nationalists, stories circulated that Connolly had abandoned socialism; Connolly was forcefully condemned by the playwright Sean O'Casey on these grounds (Howell 1986: 141). In the context of the politics of the Second International, which had accommodated itself to support of the war, many socialists outside Ireland, for example Plekhanov, condemned the Rising. The support that developed for Sinn Féin in the wake of the Rebellion, with which it was popularly, though inaccurately associated, and the corresponding absence of socialism in independent Ireland, have also led commentators such as Hobsbawm to characterize Connolly as a failure (Hobsbawm 1977). Whole biographies of Connolly have been written to explain the supposed anomaly of his involvement in nationalism, or conversely to argue that Connolly 'liquidated his politics into the general nationalist movement' (Allen 1990: 159). Yet in rising against the British, Connolly was only following the prescription of Marx himself, who had written in 1870:

to accelerate the social revolution in Europe, you must push on the catastrophe of official England. To do so, you must attack her in Ireland. That's her weakest point. Ireland lost, the British Empire is gone and the class war in England till now somnolent and chronic, will assume acute forms. (Marx and Engels 1971: 290)

Connolly always argued that 'the movements of Ireland for freedom could not and cannot be divorced from the worldwide movements of the world's democracy' (Connolly 1973: 150). This was the political basis of Connolly's apparent relapse into 'nationalism'. Communist reactions to the 1916 uprising were more instructive: Trotsky was mildly supportive, Lenin far more so. In the face of socialist dismissals of the Rebellion, he wrote:

A blow delivered against the English imperialist bourgeoisie by a rebellion in Ireland is a hundred times more significant politically than a blow of equal force delivered in Asia or in Africa. . . . The dialectics of history are such that small nations, powerless as an *independent* factor in the struggle against imperialism, play a part as one of the ferments, one of the bacilli, which help the *real* anti-imperialist force, the socialist proletariat, to make its appearance on the scene. . . . It is the misfortune of the Irish that they rose prematurely, before the European revolt of the proletariat had *had time* to mature. (Riddell 1986a: 378–9)

Lenin thus emphasized the significance of the Rebellion from the perspective of revolutionary anti-imperialism, putting it in the context not only of Europe but also of the many revolts that had occurred in the colonies since the outbreak of the war. At the same time, Lenin by no means dismissed the nationalist basis of the Irish Rebellion, for the very reason that he prized its international significance, arguing that it operated as part of the larger, uneven process of the general movement through which the masses acquire the knowledge and expertise for successful revolution. For

Connolly too, the 1916 Rising was at once nationalist and internationalist – in the same way as the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, which it prefigured and rehearsed, would be in the dramatically different international context which had developed a year later (Howell 1986: 151). Today, Connolly is regarded as one of the founders of Irish socialism. Although he rarely figures within the dialectics of postcolonial theory, Connolly, together with those with whom he fought, ought rightfully also to be located in positions of central importance within the history of anti-colonialism and its theoretical traditions. It is, however, Connolly himself who can be numbered with the greatest of those engaged in anti-colonial struggles in the cause not only of national self-determination but also of justice, equality, the abolition of poverty and the right of all to human dignity.

No! the Republic I would wish our fellow-countrymen to set before them as their ideal should be of such a character that the mere mention of its name would at all times serve as a beacon-light to the oppressed of every land, at all times holding forth promise of freedom and plenteousness as the reward of their efforts on its behalf. (Connolly 1988b: 122)

‘We know their dream; enough / To know they dreamed and are dead’: Connolly’s vision of an Ireland that will act as a beacon for the oppressed of the earth will always remain haunted by the mundane brutality of the short narrative that ends every account of his life. Dying of gangrene from a gunshot wound in his leg sustained during the Easter Rising, he was propped up on his hospital bed and court-martialled. Three days later he was taken on a stretcher into the yard of Dublin’s Kilmainham Jail by the British military, tied to a chair to keep him upright, and shot.

They held our lands, our bodies ruled, and strove to rule the mind
And Hell itself could not surpass their evil to mankind –
And all who strove for human rights to break their cursed yoke –
The noblest of our race, my child, went down beneath their stroke.

(‘The Legacy: The Dying Socialist to his Son’; Connolly 1988b: 299)

India I:

MARXISM IN INDIA

1 THE UNIQUENESS OF THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

India, Ranajit Guha has argued, achieved independence without a national liberation movement (Guha 1997). The emancipation of India took a unique form – though quite what that unique form really consisted of remains a central subject of debate. The histories of the liberation movements were all individual, but the Indian freedom movement was unique in its operation as well as in the ideological range of its participants. In its broad contours, it was not dissimilar to contemporary liberation movements in other parts of the British Empire: after the uprising of 1857, the Indian anti-colonial movement for the most part aligned itself with the home rule strategy common to Ireland and other parts of the empire. Many elements were similar to other liberation movements: the beginning of a constitutional reform movement with the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885, the establishment of the Muslim League in 1906 and the impact of the Khilafat movement and other forms of pan-Islamism, the grasping of the radical alternative posited by the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the development of a Communist Party linked to the International, and the opportunistic exertion of maximum pressure after the defeat of the imperial powers by Japan during the Second World War. India's successful campaign of non-violent non-cooperation was then subsequently imitated by African and other anti-colonial activists, such as Nkrumah. Two factors, however, contrast with other freedom struggles: the existence of the Congress Party whose organizational structures, skills and ability to control its members deprived the Communist Party of an advantage which elsewhere it used to maximum effect; and second, the singular, eccentric and unique role played within and outside the Congress Party by the man who became by far the best known of all anti-colonial leaders, Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi achieved a popular following of a dimension that the Communist Party could not begin to rival. These factors had repercussions that continue in Indian political and intellectual life until the present, particularly for the left.

It is striking that, as a result of its resolutely anti-nationalist stance, some standard

histories of Indian nationalism scarcely feel obliged even to mention the Communist Party (e.g. Masselos 1993). However, Indian Marxists of orthodox and other varieties played a significant, if supplementary role in India's long independence struggle, which was predominantly fought through an Indian nationalism centred around the ideas of Gandhi and Nehru, organized through the Indian National Congress, and the surviving spirit of the Khilafat movement expressed through the Muslim League. Initially, the Indian National Congress was a moderate organization that affirmed loyalty to British rule. From about 1900, however, its leadership was challenged by radicals, led by Tilak and Ghose, who combined Hindu revivalism with a militant political activism and sought to turn Congress into a genuinely anti-imperialist instrument (Wolpert 1989). It was under their influence that in 1907 Congress adopted the goal of *swaraj* – self-government within the British Empire. Congress remained, nevertheless, an elite organization of bourgeois intellectuals until Gandhi assumed leadership in 1920 and developed a broad popular base. Even with Gandhi and Nehru, Congress was permanently in a situation in which it was trying to control and direct forms of organized or popular militancy that were constantly surging up from below, not only from the left, but also from paramilitary communalist organizations of the Hindu right such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and peasant movements such as Kisan Sabha (Curran 1951; Gupta 1982; Jaffrelot 1993; Madhok 1996; Malkani 1980; Rasul 1974).

2 INDIAN SOCIALISM: FROM SOCIALISM TO *SARVODAYA*

In addition, from its founding in 1934, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), the socialist wing of the Congress Party, was pushing Congress into taking on board left political issues and forms of mass mobilization (Bairathi 1987; Ghosh 1996; Sarkar 1989; Sharma 1984). It was the CSP that came to define an indigenous Indian socialism. Initially its major difference from the Communist Party of India (CPI) was its pro-nationalist stance. The socialist programme of the CSP, elaborated in the Meerut and Faizpur Theses of 1936 and 1937, remained the theoretical basis of the party until independence (Prasad 1974: 279–85). The 'Marxian Socialism' of the theses was in fact the product of Jayaprakash Narayan ('J. P.'), who was among the most Marxist of the early CSP leaders and only joined it on account of the CPI's anti-nationalist stance. Narayan had learnt about communism while in the US; as the theses indicate, for him, as for the CPI, anti-imperialism and socialism formed part of an integral programme.

Nehru was sympathetic towards the CSP, though he never joined it himself. Involved with radical communism since his early years as President of the League Against Imperialism and for Independence, his trip to the Soviet Union in 1927, and his radicalization in jail in the 1930s, and considered the 'high-priest of Communism' by the British, Nehru was always critical of Gandhi's economic ideas, which he characterized as a regressive anti-industrial socialism. In office, he was most committed to social reform. The Nehruvian state socialism that developed the political identity of

the Indian state, with its combination of policies of modernization, import substitution and strong centralized state planning and control, was closest if anything to that of the postwar British Labour government. Nehru was never able to give his economic nationalism, based on ideas of technological progress, planning and self-reliance, the kind of philosophical or moral basis that distinguished the African socialism of Senghor or Nyerere (Ali 1985; Chatterjee 1986: 131–66; Khilnani 1997; Nehru 1936, 1946; Sarkar 1989: 252–3). This was largely because of the pervasive influence of Gandhi, whose ideas increasingly dominated the philosophical basis of Indian social and economic thinking under Nehru's leadership. Nehru himself affirmed these by always also emphasizing the importance of the individual and 'the ethical and spiritual aspects of life which are ultimately the basis of culture and civilization' (Sampurnanand 1961: 77).

The CSP itself had always incorporated a strong Gandhian perspective, led by Ram Manohar Lohia (Arumugam 1978; Lohia 1978; Shastri 1985). While figures such as Narayan and Narendra Deva were originally more straightforwardly Marxist in orientation, others such as Lohia and Achyut Patwardhan were concerned to adapt socialist principles to the Indian situation which, in practice, meant primarily the incorporation of Gandhian thinking. Gandhi's 'socialism' predominantly amounted to that defined in *Sarvodaya* ('Welfare for All'), his free translation of Ruskin's *Unto This Last* (1862; Gandhi 1951). Ruskin's book inspired the indigenous British Arts and Crafts Socialist movement led by William Morris, whose dream was to return to a utopian pre-industrial cottage-industry society. To this thesis, Gandhi added his own stress on the importance of spiritual values and the necessity of non-violent moral reform and spiritual regeneration. There were also other influences that combined to push the CSP in this direction, notably the theosophy of Swami Vivekenanda, and increasing Vedantic leanings in Sampurnanand, the founder of the CSP (Biswas 1986; Sampurnanand 1961). The balance decisively shifted when, from 1940 onwards, Narayan himself moved in a Gandhian direction. While he had originally argued in *Why Socialism?* (1936) that there could only be one form of socialism – Marxism – by 1946 he accepted the idea that there could be an Indian Socialism, and agreed with Lohia by asking: 'Why should we not combine the Marxian thought with the thought and practice of Mahatma Gandhi and achieve a synthesis of our own?' By 1957, in *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, he was defining it in explicitly Gandhian terms (Mehrotra 1986; Prasad 1974: 146). After independence the CSP moved increasingly closer towards Gandhism, particularly after it merged with J. B. Kripalani's KMPP, to the point where all the leading socialists emphasized the need to incorporate Gandhian spiritual values. If Indian Socialism became Indian, this meant that it became more dominated by Gandhi's *sarvodaya* than socialism: socialism spiritualized and dematerialized. The realization of *sarvodaya* in independent India, based on Gandhi's dictum that 'in human beings renunciation is enjoyment', in practice was to continue the enforced impoverishment of the majority of the Indian people (Gandhi 1993: 381).

3 MARXISM IN INDIA

Marxism in India did not evolve into Indian Marxism. It always distinguished itself by remaining rigorously orthodox. This was the result, first, of its anti-nationalist stance, and second, its need to distinguish itself from the Gandhian, spiritualized 'Marxian Socialism' of the CSP. Unlike most other colonial arenas, therefore, where at some point either within or outside the Communist Party Marxism was combined with nationalism as a part of the process of the formation of the national liberation movements, there was no development of a specific Indian Marxist tradition, of a Marxism adapted and locationally redefined for the Indian context. While communist and socialist organizations were extraordinarily active within Indian political and social struggles, and Indian Marxist intellectuals such as Reboti Borman, R. Palme Dutt (who lived in Cambridge all his life) and Bhowani Sen (Secretary of the CPI) were very productive as writers, their Marxism never developed into a particular, local form in the way that African, Chinese, Latin American or western European Marxism did. Indian Marxism, as Baldev Raj Nayar put it, has always been more 'dominated by formulations by practitioners of politics in the Communist parties than by scholars' (Pantham 1995: 75). Given the tendency of the CPI to remain close to the official line of the Soviet Union, Indian Marxism remained strikingly conformist until the division of the Communist Party into the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)), which arose as a result of differing attitudes towards China after the war in 1964 (the latter then split into the CPI(M) and the Naxalite CPI(M-L) in 1969), after which powerful Maoist movements developed (Dasgupta 1974; Mohanty 1977; Sen Gupta 1979). The orthodoxy of Indian Marxism was augmented by the fact that India was one of the few colonized countries to whose situation Marx himself devoted sustained analysis: no local adaptation or translation was therefore necessary (Marx and Engels, 1959). Until the late 1970s Marxist intellectuals tended to concentrate on the use of classical Marxist categories for analysis of the specificity of Indian society, whether in the present or in the social formation preceding colonialism, rather than trying to develop their own distinctive Marxist theoretical tradition (e.g. Dutt 1940; Karnik 1957). This situation became even more extreme for the CPI when it split in 1964, after which it clung even more desperately to the Soviet line. However, the development of tricontinental Maoist Marxisms in India also opened up the possibility of theoretical as well as political innovation. Alongside the complex revolutionary movements led by the CPI(M), CPI(M-L) and other Maoist groups, a new culture of public debate, the most significant of which was conducted in the influential *Economic and Political Weekly*, increasingly indicated a lively theoretical environment which began to mark out its own theoretico-political trajectory focused not only on peasant resistance, but also on the applicability to India of concepts such as the Asiatic or feudal modes of production, Lenin's non-capitalist path to development (a concept promoted by the CPSU in the 1970s for tricontinental societies), colonial capitalism's 'conservation-dissolution' effect on pre-capitalist peasant societies, Gramsci's passive bourgeois

revolution, land redistribution, underdevelopment, and so on (Alavi and Shanin 1982; Bagchi 1982; Banerjee 1985; Byres and Mukhia 1985; Kurian 1975; Patnaik 1991, 1995; Sau 1978). At an academic level, such theoretical innovation and transformation was most marked by the emergence of the Subaltern Studies historians in the 1980s.

This came, however, only towards the end of almost a century of Marxism in India. It was thus an early but symptomatic moment when M. N. Roy took issue with Lenin himself over the latter's unorthodox idea that parties of the proletariat should support bourgeois national liberation movements (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 151, 162; Riddell 1991, 2: 851–5). The Indian communist's interventions at the Moscow Comintern Congresses, together with his unsuccessful military expedition to Tashkent, have already been discussed in chapter 10. Roy, whose real name was Narendra Nath Bhattacharya, began not as a communist but as an activist in one of the many Hindu terrorist groups that developed in Bengal during the period of the partition of Bengal and the *Swadeshi* movement at the beginning of the century (Anushilan Samity was founded in 1902, the Dacca Anushilan began operating in 1908) and rapidly developed international links, with revolutionary exiles founding cells abroad (Chandra 1979; Sarkar 1973; Singh and Singh 1986). The history of Indian terrorists, who were largely from elite backgrounds, and their interactions through revolutionary organizations in India and around the world is a fascinating story that is fortunately well documented (Bose 1971; Dublisch 1982; Hechs 1993; Sareen 1979; Sarkar 1989: 247–53; Sinha 1994). At this time Indian revolutionaries looked to Germany and subsequently the Soviet Union and Japan for support (Patnaik 1992; Sareen 1993). Roy was to visit some groups abroad when, having twice failed to rendezvous in Java with a ship carrying German arms, he moved into exile in the US. His first stop was in California, where he contacted exiles of the Ghadr (Revolt) Party, founded by the Indian revolutionary Har Dyal. The party was also active in Shanghai and Bangkok. In London the radical revolutionary movement based at India House in Highgate, established by Shyamaji Krishnvarma and subsequently led by the Hindu nationalist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, had been closed down after the political assassination of Sir William Curzon Wyllie in 1909 by Savarkar's associate. Despite repression and the difficulties of the war, several groups continued to operate, including the Home Rule League, within which Shapurji Saklatvala was particularly prominent (Hunt 1993; Ker 1973; Visram 1986: 102–12). There was also a branch of the Home Rule League in New York, led by Lala Lajpat Rai, who operated closely with the Irish nationalists. In Tokyo there was a group gathered around Rash Behari Bose, who had fled from India to escape trial in the Delhi–Lahore conspiracy case. In Paris there was a long-standing group led by S. R. Rana and Bhikaji Cama, the latter famous for unfurling the Indian national flag at the Stuttgart Socialist Congress of 1907. In Berlin the émigré colony was led by Virendranath Chattopadhyaya and Bhupendranath Dutta. The German government meanwhile invited Har Dayal to head the Berlin Indian Independence Committee – though no negotiations went so far as Sir Roger Casement's success in 1914 in securing international recognition for Irish independence through a public statement from the German Chancellor

supporting Ireland's 'national freedom' (Inglis 1973: 282). In Kabul the 'Provisional Government of India' was led by Mahendra Pratap and others, while in Tashkent a large contingent of the pan-Islamic Indian Revolutionary Association, led by Mohammed Abdur Rabb Barq and Muzaffar Ahmad, was preparing for an invasion of India through Afghanistan. It was they who were later joined by a largely unwelcome M. N. Roy, who arrived with his two trainloads of weapons and gold. All these different groups jostled with each other in trying to establish recognition as the primary Indian liberation organization from both the Berlin and Moscow governments. The international range of their bases abroad enabled increasingly important links between Indian and Irish nationalists, conducted largely through contacts in London, New York and South Africa (Brasted 1980; Hunt 1993; Jayawardena 1988: 94; Ker 1973; Overstreet and Windmiller 1959). Indian-Irish nationalist links between 'fellow subjects' and 'fellow sufferers' had begun to develop since the 1860s: the Irish had been highly impressed by the 1857 'Mutiny'; they had seen a repetition of their own imperial history of the 1840s in the Bengal Famine of 1874. They therefore pursued alliances with Indian nationalist groups, less out of altruistic support for Indian nationalism as such (though there were exceptions, such as Margaret Cousins) than on the basis of William O'Brien's popular principle of 'England's difficulty, Ireland's opportunity' (Brasted 1983: 89, 96; Sarkar 1989: 135, 144-7; Viswanathan 1998: 203-7).

Roy's attempts to create the Communist Party of India as an effective political force after 1922 met with little success: being organized from abroad it was easily controlled and repressed by the British CID in a colonial state practised for over a century in the gathering of intelligence information (Bayly 1996); by 1934 its membership had scarcely reached three figures. In response to Comintern directives, Roy attempted a form of entryism with the Congress Party, but was strikingly unsuccessful (Haithcox 1971). With his Yugantar Bengali terrorist background, he was particularly hostile to Gandhi and the principle of non-violence. Roy was furious when Gandhi suspended the non-cooperation movement on the grounds of the Chauri-Chaura incident. From his base in Berlin he arranged for the Comintern to send the following message to the 1922 Gaya conference of Congress, which he had in fact written himself:

British rule in India was established by force and is maintained by force; therefore it can and will be overthrown only by a violent revolution. . . . For self-defence, the people of India must adopt violent means, without which foreign domination based upon violence cannot be ended. (Overstreet and Windmiller 1959: 55)

After his evident failure to establish an effective Communist Party in India, the Comintern sent Roy as a Comintern deputy to China (where he was obliged to pursue the very policies of alliance with bourgeois nationalist groups that he had earlier argued against), largely to get him out of the way while a delegation from the Communist Party of Great Britain arrived in Calcutta to take charge. It was not until the formidable P. C. Joshi took control in 1934 that the CPI established itself as a serious party and membership began to grow. Roy himself re-emerged in the 1930s

to form a trade union organization of his own that was considerably more successful than his earlier political organization. One permanent legacy of Roy, which for the most part subsequently coincided with the Comintern line, was a distrust of nationalism and a distancing of the Communist Party from the nationalist movement during the freedom struggle (Bairathi 1987; Ghosh 1996). Unlike the situation in China under Mao, there was no break between Comintern policy directed by Stalin and the development of local communist nationalist perspectives.

The Communist Party was most successful in Bengal; paradoxically for the most part this was a result of the 'Communist consolidation movement' in the Bengal jails. The terrorists imprisoned by the British for taking part in such events as the Chittagong Armoury Raid of 1930 were allowed by the autocratic but simultaneously liberal British administration to read the works of Marx and Lenin whilst behind bars; they learnt about contemporary communism from communists who shared their cells. The subsequent result was the inclusion of former terrorists within the Communist Party who brought the basis of an organizational apparatus to the intellectual wing of the party represented by members of the Bengali *bhadralok* (Ahamada 1959; Franda 1971; Laushey 1975; Sarkar 1989: 336). The CPI in Bengal had originally been formed by Muzaffar Ahmad, Abdur Rezzak Khan and Abdul Halim, who had left India for Afghanistan and Tashkent during the Khilafat movement (Ahamada 1962). On Ahmad's return he was promptly arrested and jailed on the grounds of his links with the Communist International; the party, despite being banned by the British, continued to function under Halim by largely confining itself to publishing and study-group activities. These ventures, particularly the newspaper *Forward* and the journals *Lungal* (*The Plough*) and its successor *Ganavani* (*The Voice of the Masses*), together with the publication of books on communism and the translation of Marxist texts into Bengali from 1923 onwards, made a substantial contribution to the development of the party during the 1930s. In addition, the CPI benefited from the Comintern's emphasis on party organization and discipline which gave it the edge over the other factional parties on the left such as the Forward Bloc, the Bolsheviks and the Revolutionary Socialist Party. As in Africa and in Latin America, communist political skills were effectively deployed at the local level through the infiltration of left organizations. In January 1936, as a result of the Popular Front policy, the CPI affiliated with the Congress Socialist Party and began to take control of trade unions, peasant organizations and even the colleges. At the same time it began to disseminate its activities on an even broader grassroots level, and to create successful so-called front organizations. This included, in Franda's description,

the Indian People's Theatre Association, the Progressive Writer's Workshop, Friends of the Soviet Union, the Mahila Atma Raksha Samiti (a women's organization), children's societies, study clubs, gymnasiums, relief activities, and a host of other cultural and sports groups. . . . By December 1941 CPI members had captured the All-India Students Federation, by October 1942 they had complete mastery of the All-India Kissan Sabha (India's largest mass peasant organization); and by the late 1940s they had taken over the All-India Trade Union Congress. (Franda 1971: 28-9)

Cumulatively, these activities developed a broad mass base for the party.

Unlike comparable organizational activities by communist parties elsewhere, however, this did not feed directly into the independence movement, in part because, as has been suggested, the Indian Communist Party never assimilated nationalism into its anti-colonial cause, refusing to put the colonial conflict above that of internal class conflict. As a result, the Congress Socialist Party captured much support from the left and brought it within the larger framework of the most powerful organization dedicated to national liberation. Although the left outside the Congress Party in many ways appears to have been marginalized during the colonial period, in fact it did much to increase the political pressure upon the British – through the ‘Terro-Communism’ of leftist groups, widespread strikes, organized by various communists and trade union organizations, particularly in the railways, textile and jute industries in the early 1930s, as well as by means of general strikes held under a United Front policy from 1935, right up to the great Bombay naval strike by the Royal Indian Navy of February 1946, at which point India effectively become ungovernable. The Second World War, on the other hand, was something of a low point for the Communist Party: it originally opposed the British war effort on account of the Hitler–Stalin Pact; however, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the CPI then opposed the Quit India movement of 1942, and supported the British war effort against the Japanese and the Indian National Army led by former Congress leader Subhas Chandra Bose, for which it received the reward of legalization. During the independence negotiations, because the party upheld the Stalinist position of individual nationalities’ right to self-determination, it supported partition on the grounds that the Muslims were a separate nationality. As a result, the Indian Communist Party became unpopular and discredited in political terms (Chandra 1979; Masani 1954; Sarkar 1989: 413; Sen and Ghosha 1991). It finally achieved state power in its regional base of West Bengal in 1967, and later in Kerala, but, like the Revolutionary Communist and Revolutionary Socialist parties, or even the national Bolshevik–Leninist Party (BLP) established in 1942 (which did support the Quit India movement), it never came close to power at a national level (Alexander 1991; Kaye 1971; Namboodiripad 1994; Sen Gupta 1972).

The Indian Revolutionary Communist Party and Revolutionary Socialist Party were widely considered to be Trotskyist, even though neither ever affiliated with the Fourth International. Trotskyist parties developed in different regions in India initially as a result of a refusal to accept the switch of Comintern tactics to the Popular Front in 1935 (which required the Communist Party to support the Congress Party). With assistance from the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, a national party emerged in the 1940s; by the 1950s there were three Trotskyist parties, which subsequently combined to become the Revolutionary Workers Party and later reappeared in various manifestations as Socialist Workers Party and the Communist League of India (Alexander 1991). There was thus a great deal of communist activity in (and around) India during the last thirty years of the colonial period as well as after independence. The tendency was to use established political doctrine as support for a primarily practical political orientation, while eschewing any large-scale nationalist identification.

Although this political activity was in many ways impressive, the Communist Party and other parties of the far left never succeeded in establishing a basis of mass support to rival that of Congress or the Muslim League. Nor, given its practical bent and need to distinguish itself from the CSP, did the CPI leave a Marxist theoretical legacy comparable to those of many of the African liberation movements. The important theoretical innovations on the Indian left were to come after independence, with the break up of the CPI and the renewed outbreak of peasant rebellions. For the first time, Marxism in India began to develop tricontinental perspectives.

India II: GANDHI'S COUNTER-MODERNITY

The English have not taken India; we have given it to them.

Gandhi (1997: 39)

If we are to receive self-government, we shall have to take it. . . . Learn your lesson if you wish from the Boer War.

Gandhi (1958–84: 13, 216)

1 CULTURAL NATIONALISM

In stark contrast to the situation in much of the colonial world, Marxism in India therefore never assumed its own local form as the dominant political ideology, while the Communist Party remained relatively distant from the independence movement. India's liberation movement was led instead by a man whose views and practices were predicated on the prosecution of the freedom struggle in very different terms and through indigenous models: Mahatma Gandhi. In many ways, however, this was more a matter of presentation than authenticity. Gandhi's views, like everything else in his life, were irredeemably syncretic and often, despite his affirmations otherwise, dialectical in their operation. This constituted the secret energy of the powerful counter-modernity that he advanced.

Like so many anti-colonial and postcolonial activists, Gandhi was a diasporic product: he left India when he was eighteen and did not return to resettle there until he was forty-six. Completing his legal education in Britain, and spending twenty-one years of his life in South Africa, he, like many diasporic intellectuals, came to his understanding of his own culture, and developed the basis of his politics, abroad. Antoinette Burton has observed that

Gandhi's peripatetic youth, and the impact it had on creating, sustaining, and popularizing a nationalist consciousness, would seem to suggest that being a displaced subject of imperial rule was consequential to political action – that there was something about being in temporary or permanent exile that nurtured resistance by changing the terms, the very grounds, upon which the violence of colonialism was enacted. (Burton 1998: 73)

Burton's insight may also explain why so much radical postcolonial thought has been produced by diasporic intellectuals. Gandhi's political career began in South Africa in 1894 when he launched the Natal Indian Congress to fight for the civil rights of Indians (Gandhi 1950; Huttenback 1971). Despite the discrimination that he experienced, at that time, Gandhi was also a strong supporter of the British Empire (Guha 1997: 43–7). He thought of himself as a British rather than a colonial subject, and it was on that basis that he demanded justice for Indians in South Africa ('Our existence in South Africa is only in our capacity as British subjects. In every memorial we have presented we have asserted our rights as such. We have been proud of our British citizenship') (Gandhi 1950: 66; Tabili 1994). In order to prove that the Indians in South Africa were loyal citizens of the Empire and should therefore be treated equally with other South Africans as citizens of the country, Gandhi participated in the Boer War as a stretcher-bearer on the British side against the Boers and encouraged other South African Indians to do likewise (in striking contrast to the Irish nationalist, John McBride, who led an Irish brigade fighting for the Boers). The Boers' resistance, nevertheless, provided lessons that Gandhi never forgot. It was in South Africa that Gandhi developed the mechanisms of his political strategies of protest, whilst at the same time transforming the basis of his resistance into a campaign not simply against the laws of the racist state but against the fundamental premises of the western capitalism around which the state was organized.

Gandhi learnt much from the Irish anti-colonial struggle that, as has been seen, had already developed links with the Indian independence movement. On the Irish model of combining a campaign for Home Rule with a cultural revival (he even claimed that he would become the Indian O'Connell), Gandhi foregrounded the operation of cultural nationalism as a major strategy of anti-colonial resistance. While on the one hand he adapted Hindu values and morality, on the other hand he adopted the contemporary European ideology of degeneration to advocate a form of moral rebirth for India and the west alike (Pick 1989). This was the same ideology of degeneration that politicians on the right and the left would use in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s to condemn the contemporary state of society. The notion of a return to pure, indigenous traditions, with emphasis on certain forms of moral and ethical strength, was common to many forms of nationalism in this period. Gandhi argued that the degeneracy of India was in part due to the degree to which Indians had brought colonialism upon themselves and were complicit with its continued dominance of their lives in their everyday daily acts. They had absorbed and profited from western institutions such as medicine and the law, and had become dependent on western goods, above all the British manufactured cotton which had eliminated the Indian weaving industry. Even their established forms of resistance, he argued, particularly the advocacy of violence, were a derivative discourse drawn from western political models. Gandhi himself had experimented with imitative forms of resistance: in his early life, for example, recalling from a schoolboy poem the idea that the English were able to rule the Indians because of a superior strength resulting from meat-eating, he advocated that 'if the whole country took to meat-eating, the English could be overcome' (Gandhi 1982: 35). He subsequently reversed this strategy, suggesting that western

civilization, far from being the superior civilization that colonialism was bringing to the rest of the world for the benefit of the 'inferior races', was itself degenerate, degraded and diseased. The effect of British rule in India, therefore, far from being progressive, was one of contagion and consequent decay. Resistance to British colonialism must begin with resistance to its ideology and material practices. This would allow Indians to detach themselves and to experience a rebirth in which they would be able to reincarnate the cultural values developed during the long history of Indian civilization. Gandhi argued that only individual regeneration through personal self-rule would enable the political achievement of autonomous rule for India as a whole.

This radical cultural argument was developed from Gandhi's first encounter with indigenous Indian religious philosophy. Ironically, this occurred while he was staying in London, where he became acquainted with Indian philosophy in its anglicized, translated form. Having joined, and subsequently become secretary of, the Vegetarian Society, Gandhi met many of the counter-cultural figures of his day, and learnt about his own 'theosophical' culture through the very Orientalism that was subsequently to be the object of Edward Said's critique. He recounts that

Towards the end of my second year in England I came across two Theosophists, brothers, and both unmarried. They talked to me about the Gita. They were reading Sir Edwin Arnold's translation – *The Song Celestial* – and they invited me to read the original with them. I felt ashamed, as I had read the divine poem neither in Sanskrit nor Gujarati. . . .

The brothers also recommended *The Light of Asia* by Sir Edwin Arnold . . . and I read it with even greater interest than I did the Bhagavad Gita. Once I had begun it I could not leave it off. They also took me on one occasion to the Blavatsky Lodge and introduced me to Madame Blavatsky and Mrs Besant. (Gandhi 1993: 65–6)

Against postcolonial assumptions, therefore, in Gandhi Orientalism produced resistance to colonial domination. Annie Besant was to become the first woman President of Congress, and began the Home Rule for India League in 1916 (Besant 1915). Both Besant and Gandhi continued to cite Madame Blavatsky's teaching for the rest of their lives (even today, Gandhi remains an icon for 'New Age' politics). Without ever joining himself, Gandhi nevertheless consorted with the Indophiles of the Theosophical Society, the very same milieu frequented by Yeats and later Tagore. The group provided him with a ready-made critique of the materialism of contemporary western culture, against which were posited the spiritual values of the east. Gandhi immediately recognized the political potential of what the theosophists were doing. His ignorance of Hindu culture, which was in part a result of an education that had branded it as superstition, led him to question the Anglocentric basis of the Indian education system. While in London in 1909, Gandhi also became acquainted with Lloyd George's support for the reintroduction of the Welsh language into Welsh schools, from which he concluded, 'How much more need is there for Indians to preserve their languages than for the Welsh to preserve theirs, and how much more keen should we be?' (Gandhi 1997: 103). Henceforth, he advocated the use of indigenous Indian languages rather than English, himself almost always writing in his

native Gujarati, making a significant intervention in the politics of language, translation, culture and education debates in India, which continue unabated to this day (Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Dallmayr and Devy 1998; Gandhi 1956; Rahman 1996; Trivedi 1993; Trivedi and Mukherjee 1996). Gandhi's brilliance was to use theological thought to focus not on colonialism itself but to provide a critique of modern western civilization – of modernity as such (Nandy 1987: 127–62). He used other examples of contemporary western critiques of western culture (Ruskin, Thoreau, Tolstoy, Carpenter) to expose the weaknesses of the ideology upholding the government of British India. By arguing for the moral and cultural superiority of Indian civilization, Gandhi removed the main ideological argument used to sustain British rule – that India was incapable of ruling itself. He thus provided the first sustained, and in many ways still the most substantial tricontinental critique of both western colonialism and the culture that produced it. The legacy of Gandhi's critique of modernity, and his critique of an unquestioning, derivative use of western ideas, remains a powerful force in the thinking of certain contemporary Indian thinkers, particularly Partha Chatterjee (1986), G. N. Devy (1992, 1998), Ashis Nandy (1983, 1987) and Makarand Paranjape (1993). The paradox is that Gandhi came to this position in large part through an eclectic synthesis of western counter-cultural thinkers.

Alongside the aim of national self-rule, *swaraj* and cultural reaffirmation, Gandhi emphasized the notion of self-reliance, *swadeshi*, for the Indian economy. Gandhi did not invent or initiate any of these concepts: they were already central to the nationalist politics of the freedom struggle. However, from *Hind Swaraj* (1910) onwards, where he joined the concepts of national to individual self-rule, he developed his own interpretation of them and made them his own. He described *swaraj* and the *swadeshi* movement as being comparable in conception to the ideology of the Irish Sinn Féin (Our Own) (Gandhi 1997: 21). In resisting industrialization and technology, which he called, after Carlyle, simply 'machinery', and the dehumanizing effects of industrialization, Gandhi cultivated a model very different from the two dominant ideologies of the west, but which drew heavily upon utopian socialism and Ruskin's economics, particularly the advocacy of resistance to industrialization through espousal of crafts developed in *Unto This Last* (1862) (Gandhi 1997: 164–70). Gandhi considered Ruskin's book so important after he first read it in South Africa in 1904 that he translated it himself into Gujarati in a paraphrased Indianized version (the title *Sarvodaya* means 'Welfare for All'), subsequently retranslated into English (Gandhi 1951; Lakshmi 1965). More radically than Ruskin, whose high Tory rejection of commercialism was, as so often with the British middle classes, also a snobbish disavowal of the source of his own income, Gandhi resisted consumerism and wealth altogether, and advocated 'voluntary poverty'. He argued that human beings should only take the minimum resources necessary for their sustenance, a move that anticipated the environmentalist tendencies of the ecopolitics of the 1990s. Gandhi's ideas are now also accorded a significant place in Post-Development Studies (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997: 306–8). At the same time, Gandhi himself identified with those excluded from the public world of Indian national life, impoverished people who today would be described as subalterns – particularly the peasants and those excluded

from the caste system, the so-called untouchables. In his dress and cultural identifications Gandhi constructed an eccentric subject position at the outer limits of marginalization and social exclusion, a radical declaration against elitism and orthodox class politics alike. No anti-colonial leader identified himself more publicly and absolutely with the wretched of the earth than Gandhi. Chatterjee (1986) has argued that Gandhi's orientation towards the peasantry constituted a key move in the history of the Indian freedom movement, through which the struggles of the peasantry and subaltern classes, very often conducted against local *zamindars* rather than the British administration, were articulated with the independence campaign conducted by the national bourgeois elite. Certainly his foregrounding of the peasantry, who became his political power base, puts Gandhi firmly in the tricontinental ideological camp, even if some of his ideas, such as *ahimsa* (non-violence) or *shakti* ('soul force'), sit somewhat awkwardly with the tricontinental Marxism of his peers.

Gandhi's intervention into the nationalist politics of the bourgeois elite, whose neocolonial rule, he suggested, would be almost indistinguishable from the British, was similar in spirit to that made by M. N. Roy and later Fanon. His own position on nationalism was complex. In *Hind Swaraj* he speaks of Indian nationalism as the natural accompaniment to anti-colonialism. His ecumenical idea that the Indian nation would inevitably include all its diverse peoples and religions was, however, to break apart soon after his return from South Africa, where he had worked closely with the predominantly Muslim leaders of the Indian National Congress. In 1920 he captured the leadership of the Congress Party by declaring his support for the Muslim Khilafat movement which had already embarked on a course of non-cooperation with the British, despite the earlier concessions in which they had been granted a separate electorate. Gandhi's subsequent suspension of the Non-Cooperation movement, however, ended his alliance with the Khilafat movement and his hopes of generating a joint Hindu-Muslim national movement, hopes that were definitively destroyed by the Moplah revolt in 1922. At the same time, Gandhi's opportunistic support for the Khilafat Committee also destroyed the possibility of alliance with the moderate M. A. Jinnah, who opposed its tactics. Jinnah was later to build on the resources of the old Khilafat movement to create the Muslim League and the alternative, less-often heard history of Indian independence: that of the creation of a separate Muslim state, Pakistan (Bamford 1974; Chopra 1988; Hasan 1981, 1991; Jalal 1985; Khairi 1995; Minault 1982; Muzaffar Imam 1987; Ram Gopal 1959; Shakir 1970).

Gandhi was outstanding in his ability to raise popular support, but he was himself too petulant to have any success in reconciling different political factions. His response to Muslim separatism was to argue that the ideas of nationalism were not applicable to India, that India was not so much a nation as a civilization, and to that degree was able to incorporate diversity and multiplicity. This idea did not win through, and Gandhi later appears to have accepted the partition of India as inevitable, even though he opposed it. He did not protest against partition by fasting – his fasts were rather against the violence that it released. The paradox of India as a nation – that it was born as a secular state through a partition made on religious grounds – lives on in

the legacy of communalism and the continued Indian pre-occupation with the question of nationalism and the nation-state, particularly in the context of the right-wing reaction which has been to imitate the apparent holistic Muslim national identity of Pakistan by returning India to an imagined exclusive Hindu identity of the past (Hansen and Jaffrelot 1998; Jaffrelot 1993). In India the nation is doubly problematic: in the first place, it never came into being, as Guha has argued, since Indian independence and the form of the states that emerged were determined by communalist division (Guha 1982b). In the second place, haunted by this absence, subsequent attempts to construct the nation, which inevitably lacked the cohesive cultural and political transformation of a liberation movement, turned into forms of oppressive cohesion and exclusion. Most Indian intellectuals on the left, meanwhile, have in practice attempted to reformulate Gandhi's ideas of the diversity and heterogeneity of the different components of Indian culture into possible secular models of the nation – where the state's own federal structure encompasses different levels of belonging, supranational and regional, or, more simply, of a nation without nationalism (Chatterjee 1993; Guha 1982a).

Gandhi's nationalism was complicated by the fact that it was directed as much against western modernity as against British colonialism: Indian freedom required the rejection of both (Chatterjee 1986: 85). This also meant the repudiation of other political ideologies identified with modernity, particularly orthodox Marxism and feminism (although, as shall be seen, he encouraged women's political participation in his movement). In contrast to CPI policy, Gandhi's interests were oriented towards peasant struggles: on his return from South Africa he quickly took up the cause of the peasants who worked the indigo plantations in Champaran, in Bihar, and a little later that of those in Kheda and Bardoli (Hardiman 1981). Initially, Gandhi did also involve himself in working-class activism, particularly the mill strike at Ahmedabad in 1918, in the course of which he founded the Ahmedabad Labour Association. His position was complicated, however, by the fact that his own Sabarmati *ashram* at Ahmedabad was in fact financially supported by the most powerful mill owner who was a personal friend; Gandhi therefore acted as a mediator and negotiator. He subsequently gradually separated himself from industrial working-class activism, refusing for example to lead a strike by mill-workers in Bombay the following year, partly in order to distance himself from the Home Rule Leagues of Tilak and Besant, and partly because his strategy was to build up provincial, rural power bases, starting in Gujarat, away from Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta (Copley 1987: 40; Sen 1994: 33). Gandhi was noticeably not involved in the formation of the All India Trade Union Congress of 1920, the first national trade union organization in India – unlike Motilal Nehru, Annie Besant, M. A. Jinnah and his close friend C. F. Andrews. In fact, Gandhi's views on the relation of capital to labour seem to have been largely drawn from Ruskin (and consequently closely resemble those of Dickens). In 1925 he made a speech at Jamshedpur in which he declared:

my ideal is that capital and labour should supplement and help each other. They should be a great family living in unity and harmony, capital not only looking to the material

welfare of the labourers but their moral welfare also – capitalists being trustees for the welfare of the labouring classes under them. (Sen 1994: 96; Gandhi 1958–84, 28: 47)

The idea of the capitalist as a trustee here also puts Gandhi uncomfortably close to the position of colonial administrators, such as Lugard, who elaborated the same thesis with respect to the Empire (Lugard 1922). Gandhi did at least offer a more comprehensive political alternative than the Ruskin–Morris aestheticized paternalism of arts and crafts socialism: his different epistemology involved a whole social system, with its own economics, moral and spiritual culture. Combining elements of anarchism, socialism and a religious conservatism, Gandhi's political philosophy was almost equally opposed to capitalism and socialism, and was therefore frequently proposed as a 'third way'.

2 AHIMSA: VIOLENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE

The renunciation of violence is more romantic than violence itself. . . . Unfortunately, a revolution is not made by fasting. (Mariátegui 1996: 49)

Whereas Fanon was to move from analysis of the disabling effects of the psychological violence of colonialism to advocating military violence against the colonial regime, Gandhi combined strategies of non-violent non-cooperation with a more widespread psychological resistance, arguing that they were both more ethical and more effective than any kind of violence. The Non-Cooperation movement of 1920 also constituted a response to his argument about Indian complicity in the daily fact of colonialism. Gandhi first developed this strategy in South Africa under the influence of Thoreau's *Civil Disobedience* and, he suggested, the British suffragettes; it was also doubtlessly indebted to the fundamental distinction articulated in the British working-class Chartist movement of the 1840s between the political strategies of 'moral force' and 'physical force'. It had been in South Africa, where it was difficult to persuade Indians to withdraw absolutely from daily commercial and institutional life, that Gandhi had first developed his notion of civil disobedience as *satyagraha* ('truth force'), or 'passive resistance' as he originally called it. Opposed to violence in every form, Gandhi brilliantly developed the practice of *satyagraha* as an accompaniment to his moral critique of the west. He argued that despite his own initial use of the term, 'passive resistance' was in many ways a misnomer, since *satyagraha* always worked as performative, active opposition. As with the use of fasting as a means of political protest, which Gandhi adapted from Irish nationalists and the British suffragettes, *satyagraha* worked as a statement whose force was psychological. Like the refusal of communication through silence, fasting exerts a form of pressure and even power (Sunder Rajan 1993: 87). As a strategy it discomfited and embarrassed the colonial authorities, taking the form of a private demonstration that they were unable to control or repress, which nevertheless also worked very effectively as a public event. By this means Gandhi also took the moral high ground in his object of

achieving the moral regeneration of his British opponents. Like Fanon, he emphasized the damaging psychological effects on subjectivity, identity and sexuality that colonialism produced in colonizer and colonized alike, arguing that above all it was the colonizer who was degraded in moral and ethical terms by the precepts and practices of colonial rule.

At the same time, Gandhi's stance against violence assumed the realities of its daily presence: in that sense, non-violence worked in a negative dialectic with the perpetual possibility and reality of violence: communal violence, and colonial violence in response to *satyagraha* campaigns, as most infamously at Amritsar in 1919 – for which, characteristically, Gandhi blamed himself more than General Dwyer. And insurgent anti-colonial violence: his own drive against violence was mirrored in political terms by the attempt of the Congress Party organization to exert discipline and control on its supporters, trying to take away from them their own political agency and initiative, a centripetal force set against the constant centrifugal tendency of Gandhi's popular support to erupt into violent demonstrations, particularly in the face of violent repression, as at Chauri Chaura in 1922 (Amin 1995). Some argued in fact that Gandhi's politics produced the opposite of non-violence: *satyagraha*, claimed Annie Besant, 'opened the door to the revolutionaries', while in *Gandhi and Anarchy* (1922) Sir Chettur Sankaran Nair compiled an exhaustive list, over thirty pages long, of riots and disturbances in 1919–22 which he attributed to his influence (Phadke 1967; Sankaran Nair 1995). Even within Gandhi's own closest political entourage his prohibitions against violence were interpreted with some liberality, the understanding being that violence against people was unacceptable, but violence against property was permissible. In political terms Gandhi's position also served to distinguish him clearly from the violence of the Bengali Hindu, Maharashtran *chitpavan* Brahmin, and communist terrorists, such as the celebrated group under Surjya Sen that carried out the Chittagong Armoury Raid in 1930, the followers of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, or the charismatic Bhagat Singh's Hindustan Socialist Republic Association. Although this terrorism was carried out by small groups and never seriously endangered British rule, its militancy, its increasing frequency from 1930 onwards, and its popularity greatly worried the British Government of India and led to fierce repression (Chandra 1979; Franda 1971; Ram Chandra 1986; Sarkar 1989). It also made the government much more receptive to the liberal Congress Party that adopted Gandhi's stance of non-violence. As always in liberation struggles, militant 'extremists' encouraged the administration to negotiate with the moderates. In fact, Gandhi's own stance on militancy, if not violence, varied during the course of the campaign. In 1930, for example, he was much more tolerant of the violent incidents at Chittagong, Peshawar and Shalapur, than he had been of Chauri Chaura, and he made no attempt to call off the civil disobedience movement. In 1938, as the ANC in South Africa was to emphasize when it took up the armed struggle in 1961, Gandhi described circumstances in which violence was his preferred option (Bragança and Wallerstein 1982, 2: 43). The culmination of this was the fierce, uncompromising stance of the Quit India movement and Gandhi's famous 'do or die' speech of 8 August 1942. It was wholly typical of Gandhi that his most militant, combative phrase used against the British,

which he made his own, should have been taken from – of all places – Tennyson's poem, 'The Charge of the Light Brigade'.

Gandhi's dreams were by no means fulfilled at Indian Independence in 1947. His politicization of Hinduism as an anti-colonial, national identity for India helped to polarize a corresponding politicization of Islamic identity under Jinnah and the Muslim League. The resulting partition of India at independence, badly mismanaged by the British authorities, but equally demonstrating that the nationalist elite and even Gandhi himself had little control over the mass of the Indian population, produced intense communal violence in which more than a million died, many millions more were dislocated, and from which India has never since freed itself. The violence which, through Gandhi's influence, had often been avoided in the anti-colonial struggle, had already occurred at a local communal level but emerged in August 1947 with a force that made Indian national independence probably more traumatic than any other country's. Gandhi's own assassination was but a single manifestation of that agonizing event, and much contemporary Indian political and cultural thought can only be understood from its perspective. The experience of migration, separation and dislocation undergone by so many Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi families, suggests why the relevance of the cultural experience of the migrant is by no means confined to Indians who have moved from the subcontinent to the west. Migration and diaspora also constitute a defining historical experience within the Indian subcontinent itself.

3 GANDHI'S ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL STRATEGIES

3.1 *Resistance through gender*

Gandhi's politics, by transgressing conventional political categories and forms, and the normative distinctions between public and private spaces through which they operated, opened up possibilities that have been increasingly appropriated by the postcolonial left. His policy of non-violence, as commentators have noted, was accompanied by a strategic, transgressive role-playing at the level of gender which made it more difficult for the colonial government to respond in the ways with which it normally dealt with anti-colonial resistance.

The psychology of colonialism, Gandhi and later Fanon argued, operated within a single culture in which a mutually responsive state of mind developed between colonizer and colonized. For both, colonial culture demanded a specific mind-set, with its own ideology, codes and rules that had to be learnt, distinct from the indigenous cultures of both. In the case of late nineteenth-century British imperialism, the framework of colonial culture was sustained through an ideology of masculinity: Ashis Nandy was one of the first to note 'the homology between sexual and political dominance which western colonialism invariably used' (Nandy 1983: 4). With the expansion of the empire in the eighteenth century, there was a clear move in Britain to develop a particular Protestant stereotype of masculinity as the basis of British

political and socio-economic dominance. This patriarchal ascendancy, associated with action and the violence of colonial conquest, operated over an equally increasingly restricted 'home and colonial' ideology of women and femininity, a division which women themselves frequently challenged. Imperial culture was also augmented in the nineteenth century by racial theories that portrayed Europeans as masculine and non-Europeans as feminine races; the cult of masculinity became hegemonic. British public schools, the emphasis on sport, on game hunting, the outlawing of homosexuality, the founding of the Boy Scouts, even the fashionableness of male circumcision, all bear witness to a restrictive narrowing of gender identity during the era of militaristic imperialism (Hyam 1976, 1990). As a result, any sign of femininity in men came to be regarded as more dangerous than femininity itself. Through an analysis of specific political controversies in late nineteenth-century India, Mrinalini Sinha has argued that 'the emerging dynamics between colonial and nationalist politics in the 1880s and 1890s in India is best captured in the logic of colonial masculinity' (Sinha 1995: 1).

One Indian response to this cult of masculinity and its ideal of Promethean man, according to Nandy, was to create an answering ideology of masculinity in that of the martial races (Ksatriyahood) which he suggests can still be found today in militant Hindu and Sikh nationalism. It also sustained the collusive strand of the Indian army: throughout the centuries of British rule, the vast majority of what Forster calls the British 'army of occupation' in India were Indians – following the Romans, British colonial strategy was always to redeploy and reorient native masculinity in the military service of the empire, a device whose ironies were most apparent in the use of Irish regiments in India. In the Indian case, resistance through counter-violence was devalued as a strategy after the defeat of the 1857 rebellion. Although in nationalist terms 1857 was, as Savarkar first argued in 1909, a war of independence, the fact remained that the defeat was effected, as Seeley emphasized, through the use of Indian troops (Savarkar 1947; Seeley 1971). Despite the terrorist activism that has already been documented, military resistance never again became a serious threat to British rule in India. Nandy argues that rather than resisting the conqueror in his own terms, emulating or competing with British masculist ideals, an alternative Indian response was to develop a new definition of masculinity which in some degree corresponded to the western stereotype of the feminized Indian male, but which drew on the much wider spectrum of masculinity, femininity and androgyny intrinsic to Hindu culture. This reversal into indigeneity was accompanied by a shift of perspective in which the masculinized culture of the colonizer became regarded as morally and culturally inferior. It was Gandhi who succeeded in embodying this transformation and in developing it as a form of anti-colonial resistance, cultivating a deliberate childlike femininity while drawing on the resources of indigenous gendered cultural forms (Nandy 1983: 52–5). Even here, however, Gandhi drew on 'come outers' within the west who expressed ambivalence towards the culture and ideology of imperialism that could be exploited against it. Oscar Wilde's expression of his dissent through his homosexuality opened up a new arena of sexual politics, the possibilities of which Gandhi himself, to judge by his own interest in the work of Edward

Carpenter and R. H. Sherard (their books form part of the recommended reading at the end of *Hind Swaraj*), recognized early in his career. His adoption of suffragette resistance strategies, his support for certain feminist objectives, and his own self-conscious move in his public and private life towards an androgynous identity, all suggest the connections between his central thesis of non-violence and a gender politics in which he resisted British imperialism by subverting its hypermasculinity and playing on its responses to the feminine.

Gandhi, whose stance of anti-modernity was highly problematic for Indian feminism, also exploited and redeployed 'feminine' strategies in a political situation whose norms were emphatically masculine, and in doing so unsettled politics through gender. He introduced psychology as a weapon of the weak, in a more radical way than Fanon who was primarily concerned to expose the ideological basis of western ethnopsychology and for whom colonialism's nervous condition, which he articulated so powerfully, could only be healed through a masculist violence. In doing so, Gandhi opened up the whole realm of psychology as a means of agency for anti-colonial political practice that has been so fully developed in postcolonial historical reappraisals of the forms and means of anti-colonial resistance. He was also among the first to voice the political possibilities of alternative modes of resistance as what might be termed a civil form of guerrilla warfare, articulating what the oppressed, women, men and children, had been doing all along. Gandhi went much further than Fanon in utilizing gender identities as a part of his anti-colonial manoeuvres (in his case, these also extended into his wider social politics). Whereas Fanon responded to the feminization of the colonial subject by asserting a violent hypermasculinity, Gandhi engaged in a complex play between the two with his notion of *satyagraha*, or an apparently 'feminine' passive resistance; 'soul power', *shakti*, was also a feminine principle. By invoking the feminine in a political situation whose norms were masculine, he unsettled gender and colonial politics at once. While Gandhi feminized himself to western eyes, to Indians he assumed the culturally identifiable marker of androgyny. Locally, Gandhi emasculated himself rather than feminized himself: one reason for his popular mystique was his public renunciation of sexual relations with his wife. As will be argued in the following chapter, he also actively encouraged the political participation of women, identified with many feminist causes, and recognized the potential of feminist political strategies.

3.2 *Gandhi and the politics of dress*

One characteristic strategy of Gandhi's counter-politics involved the politics of dress. Despite his emphasis on the realm of the spirit, Gandhi in fact projected his body to a degree unparalleled by any other anti-colonial leader. His sartorial transformations, documented so impressively by Emma Tarlo, from the dress of a svelte English upper-class gentleman in 1888 to an upmarket version of the Kathiawadia dress of a Gujarati peasant by 1915, bristled with signification. Gandhi was a master of sartorial semiotics, which he wielded more effectively than sabre or rifle. While advocating a non-materialist lifestyle, few politicians took more care with the way that they dressed,

or wrote more extensively about how their dress should be interpreted (Tarlo 1996: 72–82). Taken together with his use of the spinning wheel as a practical symbol of sustainable development for India, Gandhi's dress was directed against the associated ideologies of masculinity and modernity. It reinforced his political and philosophical rejection of western for Indian forms, his commitment to the *swadeshi* movement; it also graphically marked his identification with the peasantry, whose support he enlisted to a degree that had eluded Congress and Communist parties alike. To the British, Gandhi's clothes signalled all these things, but also importantly a refusal of the norms of the political sphere and the consensual co-operation of an educated Indian elite which had absorbed British values. So Gandhi's arch-enemy back in the metropolitan centre, Winston Churchill, famously expressed his fury 'at the nauseating spectacle of a half-naked fakir striding the steps of the Viceregal Palace to parley on equal terms with the representative of His Imperial Majesty' (Desai 1995: 483). Distasteful it may have been to Churchill, but the tactic worked on him perfectly as spectacle. Gandhi's resistance through the violation of western decorum of appropriate dress for formal occasions (contrast the way in which the self-modernizing westernized Japanese adopted European morning dress at court) came to a head on his visit to England in 1931. As Gandhi set off for the Round Table conference, even his fellow Congress leader Subhas Chandra Bose wondered 'whether the Mahatma would be well-advised to visit Europe in his characteristic loin-cloth' (Bose 1997: 241). When Gandhi had an audience with the king, press interest beforehand was almost entirely concerned with what he would wear; in fact, the king had been reluctant to receive him partly because of his lack of proper clothes. Gandhi achieved a symbolic victory by refusing to compromise.

The embarrassment that Gandhi's sparse clothing and semi-nakedness caused his adversaries operated to maximum effect. Tarlo records how in the long narrative of Gandhi's sartorial transformations, it was with some hesitation that on 23 September 1921 he took the ultimate step of moving from the respectable *dhoti* to the loin cloth, the not quite full Monty. As he was well aware, this embarrassed not only his adversaries, but also his own supporters. It also had the inevitable effect of further alienating Muslims. To the eyes of the world, however, his increasing simplicity of dress and habits gave him the aura of an ascetic mystic, even of Christ – an identification that would be repeated in a rather different way with the murdered Che Guevara. Gandhi used his dress in the same manner that, according to Fanon, Algerian women used the veil, that is, instrumentally. His dress made him instantly recognizable, but this was precisely because everyone knew that though he dressed like one, he was no Gujarati peasant. The spectacle of his dress achieved its effect to the degree that it was always out of place, and relied for its effect on a recognition of the difference between how he was dressed and who he was (Tarlo 1996: 70–8). This attention to the image was all part of Gandhi's intimate and highly significant relationship to the media. The paradox was that, rather like Sarojini Naidu's oft-cited remark of how much it cost to keep him in poverty, without the technology of the image and representation, outside India what Gandhi looked like would have scarcely had any effect at all.

3.3 *Gandhi, technology and the media*

Eschewing violence meant that Gandhi had to be an adept practitioner of the alternative weapons at his disposal. His anti-modernist procedures in many ways themselves depended on the resources of a modernity whose technology remained largely invisible. Gandhi's attitude towards technology was always pragmatic: concerned, for example, about the supply of provisions for the 'pilgrims' on the Great March of 1913, Gandhi arranged beforehand with a European bakery to send bread by rail to each place along the way (Gandhi 1950: 273). Ironically, he had first been given Ruskin's *Unto This Last*, the book which 'brought about an instantaneous and practical transformation' in his life and led him to abandon his urban lifestyle for that of a rustic ashram, by a journalist friend as reading matter for the long railway journey from Johannesburg to Durban (Gandhi 1982: 274–5). Despite devoting a whole chapter in *Hind Swaraj* to an attack on the railways, the train remained a form of modern technology with which he felt comfortable and which he employed extensively, particularly for his political campaigns, which were based on the American presidential model of the whistle-stop tour, enabling him to reach huge audiences in a short period of time (Gandhi 1997: 46–50).

No more than the train, Gandhi clearly did not regard the printing press as a part of the technology of modernity included in his social critique. The Navajivan Press in Ahmedabad, which he founded, was resourced with one of the most up-to-date printing presses in India. Gandhi stinted himself on almost everything, but he never denied himself words. His followers record that he was constantly writing; he would get up every morning at 1.30 a.m. to write. Even on the days on which he took a vow of silence, he would write: 'writing is reaching *moksha*', he observed. Wherever he went, he kept writing. As he travelled across the country by train, his articles would be dropped off at stations on the way and given to couriers to take back to Ahmedabad; his assistants, particularly Desai, would correct proofs by telegram, a convenient technological resource. From the early days in South Africa, like many anti-colonial activists of the period, Gandhi understood the importance of producing a newspaper that could articulate his views and those of the community whose interests he represented. His various journals, *Indian Opinion*, *Satyagrahi*, *Young India*, *Navajivan* and *Harijan*, together with sympathetic papers such as *The Hindu*, subsequently became the means through which he communicated with the world on a daily basis. He recalled: '*Indian Opinion* in those days, like *Young India* and *Navajivan* today, was a mirror of part of my life. Week after week I poured out my soul in its columns, and expounded the principles and practice of Satyagraha as I understood it. . . . Satyagraha would probably have been impossible without *Indian Opinion*' (Gandhi 1982: 263).

The continued production of the paper therefore always remained a first priority. In 1913, when Gandhi 'contemplated sacrificing all the settlers in Phoenix', planning to send them all to jail, he excepted those necessary for producing *Indian Opinion* (Gandhi 1950: 253). When the British banned *Young India* and *Navajivan* in 1930, Gandhi instructed his followers to continue the newspaper by writing sheets out by hand, to be disseminated and then copied in turn. They subsequently produced it

illegally on a cyclostyle machine which was secretly carried about the countryside. The journals themselves never had a large number of subscribers: the articles in them, which articulated and publicized Gandhi's views, were syndicated without copyright throughout India and freely reproduced in most Indian newspapers; they were reported by Reuters to Britain, the States and elsewhere. By this means, they reached across India and the rest of the world. Few politicians of his time used the power of journalism to the same degree as Gandhi. He utilized the extensive print culture of India to maximum effect. His account of *Satyagraha in South Africa* shows in detail how he understood the power of the press and how he utilized it himself as a means of communication. Its particular advantage was that, with the help of Reuters, the press enabled him to communicate with different constituencies simultaneously: local groups, people at a national level, the colonial administration, and the government in Britain. Gandhi was living proof that the subaltern could, and did, speak. Gandhi was later to be criticized by his countrymen for making his important announcements through international news agencies rather than the local press, and for showing a preference for foreign journalists. He replied: 'What has happened with me and, so far as I am aware, with others too is that they and I have found it necessary in the interest of the common cause to get messages across the seas' (Bhattacharyya 1965: 61). The press reciprocated his favours. As a result of a series of articles in the *New York Times* and other news-papers and magazines from 1920 onwards, and several books including Katherine Mayo's controversial *Mother India* (1927), J. T. Sunderland's *India in Bondage* (1928), Bishop Frederick Fisher's *That Strange Little Brown Man Gandhi* (1932) and Haridas T. Mazumdar's *Gandhi Versus the Empire* (1932) (only the first of these was published in Britain), Gandhi became a celebrated figure in the United States and around the world. In later life he was less obliged to exert himself with respect to the media, as journalists came to him and whatever he did or said made news. His life became a publicity event. As a result, it is comprehensively documented in photographs, films and sound recordings: Gandhi must have been one of the most photographed politicians of the twentieth century.

The suffragette movement had demonstrated that non-violence, like violence, could operate equally as a form of communication with, and exert pressure upon, a dominant power by making itself into a public spectacle. Since an act of non-violence could not achieve military impact, it was essential that it exerted its effects through different channels. By the early twentieth century, the media was sufficiently advanced technologically to serve in this capacity. For Gandhi, soul-force was also media force: communication could be achieved almost instantly around the world, in print, photograph, radio and film. The role of the media, and Gandhi's use of modern technology associated with it, was essential to the success of his campaigns, even if apparently antithetical to his anti-modern stance. In Gandhi's hands the Indian liberation struggle took the form of the first media war, the first media revolution. Like Charlie Chaplin, whose comparable ambivalence towards the role of technology formed the basis of their discussion when they met in 1931, Gandhi conducted his campaign of non-violence by using the society of the spectacle as his secret weapon. Years later, Kenneth Kaunda related how he imitated this:

In one way, the Mahatma Gandhi and I were equally fortunate in facing a colonial power which fell far short of being a ruthless tyranny. Britain has always been very sensitive to public opinion – that is one of her glories. So the Viceroy who allowed reporters and even film cameramen into Gandhi's cell was inadvertently contributing to the effectiveness of the Mahatma's campaign of passive resistance. I too knew that all that happened to myself and my comrades during our non-violent struggle was shown within hours on British TV and reported over the radio and in the newspapers. I was able in this way to state my case not only throughout Zambia but also in London at the heart of empire. Had our struggle been in the Republic of South Africa or Salazaar's Portuguese African colonies, it might have been a very different story. (Kaunda 1982: 25)

Gandhi's methods worked because he was able to exploit the liberal dimensions of British colonial rule: the British Government of India made only occasional attempts to control his access to the media, with the exception of All India Radio, which was always government controlled (the revolutionary radio stations in Tunis, Cairo and Accra were later to be regarded as a major problem by the colonial powers) (Chatterji 1998; Fanon 1980: 47–75; Thompson 1969: 71). Gandhi was the first anti-colonial activist to use the contemporary media as a forum to stage his non-violent tactics of resistance, using high technology to facilitate the communicative power of the soul-force of *satyagraha*. As well as rumour, word of mouth, much of the effect of *satyagraha*, fasting and such strategies, depended upon the power of their media representation: despite his distrust of technology, wherever he could Gandhi used media technology to the full. The Dandi March of 1930, comprehensively documented by Weber (1997), can illustrate the significant role that the media played in securing Gandhi's political impact.

4 THE DANDI MARCH

Chaplin's challenge to Gandhi, demanding to know why he was so averse to technology *tout court*, was all the more pertinent given that they met the year after the Indian leader had launched his most famous campaign that had succeeded largely because it had been staged as an international media event. Gandhi had been looking for a way to revive the civil disobedience campaign announced by Congress when the failure of the Simon Commission meant that constitutional moves towards independence had reached an impasse. Having published a list of demands in *Young India*, after a month of reflection Gandhi announced that the Salt Tax, collected through a government monopoly on the sale of salt, would be the focus of the new campaign. The problem with the earlier drive for the wearing of khādī cloth, hand spun in India, rather than imported British manufactured cotton, had been that khādī was expensive: though coarse in comparison to ordinary cloth, only the middle and upper classes could afford to wear it (Gandhi himself solved this problem by spinning his own cotton). Wearing khādī worked effectively as a symbol at an everyday level – so, for example, the women of the Orange Brigade were able to make their protest simply by parading through Bombay in orange khādī saris in 1937 – but it was not a symbolic statement accessible to all (Tarlo 1996: 112). Gandhi himself increasingly preferred symbolic forms of activism to

more active forms of 'passive resistance' that always ran the danger of becoming violent or calling forth a violent response, as in the case of the *satyagraha* against the Rowlatt Bills that Gandhi ended in April 1919 after the Amritsar Massacre. The All-India Non-Cooperation movement, which followed in 1920, had operated very effectively at a non-violent level in terms of encouraging withdrawal of support by those involved in the colonial administrative machinery. However, as Gandhi increased the stakes, activism at all levels became harder to control, and at the point when, in the eyes of many, India was on the brink of revolution, he used a violent attack by peasants on a police station at Chauri Chaura to call off the whole movement. In Gandhi's eyes, it had produced unacceptable uncontrolled outbreaks of violence. He was always apprehensive of the violent tendencies of his own supporters, even when they flocked to greet him at his frequent railway stops (Amin 1995: 167–70).

The campaign against the government's Salt Tax, by contrast, was something in which everyone, men and women alike, without communal distinction, could participate without militancy, either collecting, making, manufacturing, selling or using illegal salt. The Salt Tax could be broken in so many ways, and the statutory penalties were relatively mild (Bakshi 1981). As with Gandhi's most successful campaigns, he had hit upon a grievance with which everyone could identify and which identified him with them ('Blessed are the poor . . . Ye are the salt of the earth' proclaimed Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, Gandhi's favourite text). Collecting salt from the sea was an act that anyone could perform – and millions of Indians did. However, it was the march to the sea, designed to represent a deliberate act of violation of the tax, that was the centre of the campaign and organized as a great symbolic act, an imitation of the Boer strategy of the Great Trek, which Gandhi had already utilized in South Africa in the Great March into the Transvaal of 1913, with its aura of a holy pilgrimage, and of Moses' journey of exodus to the promised land (Gandhi 1950: 278). Although peaceful, the march itself suggested a slightly martial self-assertion, reinforced by its all-male contingent of marchers, a self-affirmation of principles – being true to one's salt – and progress towards an anticipated future, which Gandhi dramatically increased by declaring that he would never return to the Sabarmati *ashram*. The strategy of the march was subsequently used to great effect by one of Gandhi's greatest admirers, Martin Luther King, in the 1963 March on Washington during the American Civil Rights struggle of the 1960s, and has remained a central tactic of American civil rights campaigning ever since (Kapur 1992).

The Dandi March itself was planned in advance in meticulous detail. The long circuitous route was carefully organized so that each town and village through which the marchers passed would be places whose communities were already known to be strongly supportive and loyal to Gandhi. Villages where Muslims formed the majority of the population were avoided. An Advance Guard of two or three men was always sent ahead the day before to warn villagers of the impending approach of the marchers, as well as to make arrangements for their food and lodging, and encourage village officials to resign their posts. Press interest in advance of the march was intense; the *ashram* was filled with scores of journalists from both India and abroad (as well as agents of the British CID). Gandhi and his associates did not need to go so far as to

organize the media coverage which they received, but they were well aware of it and gave their consent to it. The issues surrounding the Salt Tax were publicized through three articles in *Young India* and *Navajivan*. When the march finally began on 12 March 1930, Gandhi and his seventy-eight chosen *satyagrahi* were filmed departing the *ashram* by no less than three international film crews (Desai 1995: 445–58; Lyons 1937; Weber 1997: 519). The length of the march, 230 miles from Subarmati at Ahmedabad to Dandi, served to increase expectation as the journey proceeded and gave plenty of time for the news to spread around India and the rest of the world while the march was still taking place. As a result, the images of the marchers, apparently spontaneously welcomed with widespread enthusiasm wherever they went, and that of Gandhi, first striding out of the *ashram* and then finally arriving at the beach and walking into the sea to pick up a handful of salt in open defiance of the Government of India, was quickly transmitted in cinema news reels around the world (except in western India, where they were banned). The Dandi March was one of the great political media events of the twentieth century, attracting 'enormous publicity and attention from the whole country and even on a world scale' (Sarkar 1989: 286). It immediately came to symbolize the unstoppable Indian freedom struggle – and it was always planned to come across in that way.

5 GANDHI IN LANCASHIRE

Gandhi may have operated the first media war, but he was no virtual politician. Indeed, much of his attraction for the media was the result of his extraordinary ability to relate to a mass constituency of ordinary people in a personalized way. Aside from his fasts, or when incarcerated in jail, Gandhi was always extremely active in his campaigns – for example quickly touring India by train to get signatures for his first All-India Satyagraha campaign in 1919. When he came to London for the Second Indian Round Table Conference in 1931, Judith Brown notes that he set himself another task to fulfil beyond participating in the conference itself, namely

to publicize the Congress claim and to make himself well known in England; for it was the British electorate which ultimately would sway British policy towards India. He therefore seized every opportunity to mould British public opinion, eagerly expounding his views to the press and arranging meetings with individuals and groups. (Brown 1989: 259)

His publicity campaign was a good deal more successful than his political negotiations. Helped by English sympathizers, he was (reluctantly) received by the imperialistic King George V, spoke to sympathetic Labour MPs in the House of Commons, broadcast an address to the United States, his first radio speech, recorded by the Columbia Gramophone Company, wrote articles for the British press, lectured to the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the London School of Economics, spent a weekend in Oxford where he spoke to influential academics, as well as visiting the universities of

Cambridge, Manchester and Nottingham, and, extraordinarily, a number of 'public' schools, including Eton. He met Lloyd George, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the famous 'Red Dean', and spoke to a gathering of over thirty bishops and other church leaders, as well as Quakers and missionaries. Bose, who considered the whole visit a failure, records that Gandhi was so busy meeting people around the country that Indian members of the Round Table Conference found it hard to get hold of him (Bose 1997: 250). Gandhi was given a tremendous welcome by the British public. His campaign was conducted from his lodgings in the East End of London, the poorest area of the city where he had deliberately chosen to stay as an act of solidarity (compare Castro's later attachment to Harlem, and Harlem's to Castro). Some of the most moving photographs of Gandhi at this time show him being mobbed by the poor white working class among whom he stayed, each face lit up with excitement. Gandhi spent much of his time tirelessly going out to meet ordinary people in deprived areas of London; they received him with extraordinary enthusiasm. He went up to Lancashire to meet the cotton workers who had suffered from his *swadeshi* campaigns. Far from being hostile towards him, the women workers welcomed him with equal warmth. A remarkable photograph shows him standing surrounded by smiling women, the hands of young and old alike stretched up cheering in delight and exhilaration. These were the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the generation of cotton workers who, during the American Civil War, despite being reduced to near starvation by the blockade that prevented any cotton being exported from the American South, gave their unrelenting support to the North and its war against slavery. Gandhi's visit produced a rare insight into the attitudes of the British working class towards the British Empire: they supported and identified wholly with the Indian freedom movement. They had been long conducting a freedom movement of their own.

The Indian liberation struggle was so long drawn out that its forms were inevitably complex and sometimes contradictory. Gandhi was the most extraordinary phenomenon of a unique history. His intervention on his return from South Africa effectively set the liberation movement on a different course from that of a more conventional struggle involving an uneasy alliance of the far-left and the bourgeois nationalist elite of Congress. That individual history has been playing itself out ever since. If Gandhi facilitated the triumph of Congress at independence, much of the theoretical trajectory of postcolonial India took the form of reaction against its long-lasting political hegemony, either towards a reconstituted indigenous nationalist position or to a left politics that, while rejecting Gandhian ideology, has continued to absorb some of the political forms and techniques of what were then his counter-intuitive political strategies. With time, they seem to become increasingly modern and relevant to radical political practices of the twenty-first century. Gandhi's philosophy was based on a critique of modernity and technology, but *satyagraha*, his form of resistance to colonial power was, as he himself acknowledged, dependent for its success on free access to communication around the world by means of media technology and it was this which enabled him to exert political pressure simultaneously at local and international levels. In this respect, his counter-modernity proved to be the most modern of all those of anti-colonial activists.

Part V

Formations of Postcolonial Theory

India III:

HYBRIDITY AND SUBALTERN AGENCY

1 GANDHI'S INVISIBILITY

Despite being the most widely known anti-colonial leader of all time, despite his media fame in his own lifetime, and since through blockbuster films such as Richard Attenborough's *Gandhi* (1982) (Sofri 1999: 178), despite typically figuring in historical analyses of twentieth-century revolutionary leaders (Fischer 1947; Fülöp-Miller 1927a; Wolfenstein 1967), and despite a mass of theoretical and other writings that now run to a hundred volumes, Gandhi's name is not widely cited in postcolonial studies (for an exception, see Gandhi 1998). Unlike Fanon, his writings are not a *sine qua non* of postcolonial readers and anthologies. His assault on the legitimacy of British rule in India, his extensive cultural critique of western modernity, his espousal of a liminal form of cultural hybridity, his subtle political strategies for combating and resisting British power, his adept use of the technologies of the very modernity he was challenging, his questioning of patriarchy, of caste, of competitive capitalism, of the conditions of industrial labour, of the vast disparities of wealth in India – all these qualities might have been expected to put him at the forefront of the radical anti-colonial thinkers whose work is valued today.

Gandhi's apparent absence from the foreground of postcolonial theory is all the more curious given the dominance of Indian intellectuals in the postcolonial field (Dirlik 1997). His influence, however, is more far-reaching than the infrequent appearance of his name might suggest. What are the reasons for his invisibility? The historical legacy of the liberation struggles has been to foreground the later resort to a politics of violent revolution, represented by Fanon, over Gandhi's earlier non-violent resistance and, it could be added, resistance to all forms of conflict, including those of class and gender. This is augmented by Gandhi's unfashionable adherence to the 'spiritualization of politics' – the idea that the spiritual diffuses all aspects of everyday life, including the political, and should form the basis of the way humans live. Such is his sanctified status that much of the literature on Gandhi tends to be devotional rather than analytical, abstracting his thought and beliefs while downplaying the material aspects of his political practices. In India, though there have been significant

Gandhian movements led by J. P. Narayan, Vinoba Bhave, and more recently Baba Amte, Gandhi has also been appropriated by a culturally regressive *Hindutva* ideology (even if he was assassinated by a close associate of its inventor, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar), while his greatest admirers in the west (and sometimes in India too) have always tended to be Christians – interest in Gandhi in the United States increased significantly when his nationalist manifesto *Hind Swaraj* (1910) was republished in the US under the christianized title of *Sermon on the Sea* (Gandhi 1924).

Gandhi's anomalous position brings out the extent to which, as a result of its Marxist orientation, an absolute division between the material and the spiritual operates within postcolonial studies, emphasizing the degree to which the field is distinguished by an unmediated secularism, opposed to and consistently excluding the religions that have taken on the political identity of providing alternative value-systems to those of the west – broadly speaking, Islam and Hinduism. Postcolonial theory, despite its espousal of subaltern resistance, scarcely values subaltern resistance that does not operate according to its own secular terms (Chakrabarty 2000). Although Gandhi himself would never have wished to be identified with the extremists or so-called fundamentalists of these religions, his overall emphasis on spirituality means that he has at least as much in common with their positions as with secular approaches; his relation to communalism in India in his own time is a complex one. To put it at its most positive, Gandhi provides the greatest example of how a spiritual alternative could be developed as a form of anti-western political and cultural critique. His emphasis on political independence as a consequence of individual *swaraj*, or self-rule, his privileging of duties over rights, his adherence to the principle of non-violent resistance, his critique of western culture on the grounds of its obsession with materiality, are all radical notions that challenge prevailing presuppositions of postcolonial ethics and demonstrate, despite its affirmation of the value of difference, postcolonialism's ideological uniformity in its materialist commitment. While these unfashionable issues and apparently conservative attitudes were central to Gandhi's own thinking, many of his other ideas have determined the shape of Indian cultural and political thought in the postcolonial field, itself perhaps the indirect result of the deep permeation of Gandhi's ideas into the very fabric of Indian culture and political thought. This apparent paradox can partly be accounted for by the degree to which Gandhi created his own secularized, tolerant version of Hinduism. True to almost every other aspect of his life, Gandhi created his own religion, an idiosyncratic mixture of Hindu, Islamic, Buddhist and Christian ideas, which never became a formal communal set of beliefs. The result was that his ideas operated most widely not as a form of religion, although a relatively small group of acolytes did follow him in this respect, but rather as a set of cultural, spiritual, and political values. At the same time, his genius was that having created these, he was able to deploy them to great effect in key strategic moves in the public arena as a part of the anti-colonial struggle. Gandhi's originality involved his medium as well as his message.

2 INTIMATE ENEMY

The divisions within the Indian independence movement, between an orthodox Marxism, a Nehruvian socialism, and a populist Gandhism, have continued to play themselves out in postcolonial India. Far more than Gandhi, it was Nehru who developed the model of cosmopolitan secularism that, until recently, formed the dominant pattern for Indian intellectuals. These traditional ideological lines began to shift discernibly in the 1970s: although it would be simplistic to suggest any direct connection, much of the innovative theoretical and political renewal carried out by Indian intellectuals that has resulted in it coming to occupy a dominant position in postcolonial critique, began in the period that followed Indira Gandhi's notorious political experiment, the Emergency (1975–7). This was not simply the effect of the Emergency in itself, but also the result of the fact that the most vociferous and effective opposition to it came from the RSS and the Hindu right. Traditional political formations and divisions in India began to break down, and new positions on the left were developed which dared for the first time to transform the basis of the long-standing opposition between Indian socialism and Marxist orthodoxy. This was exemplified by a new internationalism in theoretical work. Aijaz Ahmad, for example, while clearly Marxist, defines himself broadly within an internationalist Marxist tradition that incorporates – against the grain of the CPI – forms of nationalism; his interest in Gramsci, as well as his location of his own political position in relation to the American left journal *Monthly Review* suggests a radical ideological and methodological flexibility (Ahmad 1992; 1996: 409). At the level of cultural analysis, this innovative epistemic break involved the work of Homi K. Bhabha, Partha Chatterjee, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and others; and, at the level of historiography, that of the Subaltern Studies historians. Such moves were largely initiated by incorporating and adapting new theoretical models that were being developed in Europe, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America.

This transformation also involved, for some, the reinterpretation and incorporation of a strictly secularized version of certain aspects of Gandhi's thinking in a far more radical form than had ever emerged from the highly spiritualized Gandhi–Marx synthesis of Indian socialism. This was largely brought about through the mediation of Ashis Nandy, whose articulation of Gandhi's counter-intuitive strategies was presented in a book published the year after the first Subaltern Studies volume, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (1983). Nandy's book comprised an analysis of the 'unheroic' ways that Indian intellectuals and politicians had dealt with the dominant power of British colonialism, and the ways in which Indians responded to colonial knowledge by creating 'an alternative language o[r] discourse. This was their anti-colonialism; it is possible to make it ours too' (Nandy 1983: xvii). Such counter-knowledge was developed through a reinterpretation of Gandhi's thought that introduced many of the elements that have become particularly associated with postcolonial theory. Though far less acknowledged than Said's *Orientalism*, *Intimate Enemy* was one of the books that contributed most to setting up the basic framework

of the theoretico-political environment of postcolonial studies in India, among diasporic Indian intellectuals, and through them across the whole field.

This orientation consisted of a fundamental emphasis on the significance of psychology and hybridity in Gandhi's thinking and political strategies. In making this move, Nandy effectively enabled the articulation of postcolonialism in India with the major anti-colonial Francophone tradition of Sartre and Fanon, which placed equal emphasis on the material and psychological, outer and inner, effects of colonialism. In this move, Nandy thus brought together two anti-colonial traditions that had hitherto, for the historical reasons that have been outlined in the earlier chapters on India, remained separate. Despite his fundamental differences from Marxist anti-colonialisms, like Fanon, Gandhi placed equal emphasis on the necessity of fighting colonialism by material and mental war. Nandy, however, emphasized the realm of psychology largely at the expense of material and spiritual factors, and this has ever since produced arguments about the relative role accorded to each. The major argument elaborated in the book contained a scandalous proposition: 'that colonialism is first of all a matter of consciousness and needs to be defined ultimately in the minds of men' (Nandy 1983: 63). Nandy's focus on the psychological effects of colonialism in both the colonial and the colonized cultures enabled an articulation with Said's discursive analysis of texts as a common formation of a dominant colonial culture. This combined emphasis on discourse and psychology was to have a significantly dematerializing effect on much postcolonial analysis. Nevertheless, Nandy's *Intimate Enemy* opened up new possibilities for thinking about the individual experience of colonialism and the range of possible forms of resistance to it, overt and covert, political, psychological and sexual. It was Nandy who focused on the issue of how the politics of resistance or of subsequent nationalism was constrained to operate within the terms of a derivative western discourse. This is the central problem which he emphasizes in his preface, and which he sees few, aside from Gandhi, as having surmounted. What Nandy recognized above all was the subversive radicality of aspects of Gandhi's counter-modernity.

Unlike Sartre and Fanon who always worked dialectically, Nandy's fundamental and most tendentious assertion, that 'colonialism is first of all a matter of consciousness', makes a claim for the priority of ontology over history, and clearly sets colonialism's effects on consciousness above the disruptive transformations to the world – material, military, economic and cultural – brought about by colonial expansion. One does not have to agree with Nandy's order of primacy, however, to recognize the significance of what he is arguing in its own terms. He acknowledges that Fanon himself had been among the first 'to point out the psychological dominance of the European middle class in the colonies' (Nandy 1983: 4n.). While a tradition of writers including Fanon, Octave Mannoni and Albert Memmi had analysed the interpersonal dynamics of colonial relations, Nandy differs from them to the extent that he follows Gandhi's argument that colonialism produced a cultural and psychological pathology in both colonizing and colonized societies as well as in individuals; for this reason, liberation had to begin in the minds of the colonized and colonizers alike. Here, Nandy draws on Adorno's analyses of the psychology of fascism in order to

understand the operation of authoritarian regimes (and in doing so, introduced Adorno for the first time into the postcolonial field) (Nandy 1980: 99–111). In the spirit of Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, Nandy argues that there were effectively two strains of anti-colonialism: first, Marxism, whose critique was constructed within the terms of the west's own autocritique – as part of a protest against the west by its own critical self, engaged in resisting its own imperial dynamic. In the second place, Nandy suggests, anti-colonialism took the form of a psychological resistance that allowed the construction of an alternative west. In order to analyse this second kind of anti-colonialism, which he characterizes as Gandhian, Nandy invokes the insights of that other dissenting, critical discourse of the west, psychoanalysis, though he chooses never to employ it as a systematic, dominant perspective.

Nandy could be credited with the introduction of the use of psychoanalysis in postcolonial theory. Its use, however, does not signify the importation of recent western theoretical apparatus: elsewhere, Nandy has pointed out that the theory and practice of psychoanalysis has as long a history in India as in Europe or America: for example, Girindrasekhar Bose founded the Indian Psychoanalytic Society in Calcutta in 1922, just three years after the British Psychoanalytic Society was formed (Nandy 1995: 96; Sheshadri-Crooks 1994). In deploying this double perspective, looking at psychological forms of resistance within a general framework of the more straightforward history of anti-colonial resistance that operated at the level of mainstream politics, Nandy enabled an assimilation of a psychological, ideological analysis within the general parameters of Marxist critique that has characterized postcolonial studies ever since – even if he himself positions himself against Marxism. It was in this context that Nandy also brought Fanon into the orbit of Indian theory.

Intimate Enemy consists of two juxtaposed essays, 'The Psychology of Colonialism: Sex, Age and Ideology in British India' and 'The Uncolonized Mind: A Post-Colonial View of India and the West'. By this means, the book brought together the legacies of the anti-colonial past with the concerns of the present. Nandy suggests that his book is 'primarily an enquiry into the psychological structures and cultural forces which supported or resisted the culture of colonialism in British India', but it is also, as he points out, implicitly 'a study of postcolonial consciousness' (Nandy 1983: xvi). In making this division, and connection, between the analysis of colonialism and postcolonialism, Nandy laid down the parameters of the double focus of postcolonial studies. His book established four of the major issues that have become central to the field: the psychology of resistance, the problems of resisting through ideas and strategies drawn from the very culture that is being resisted, the gendering of the ideology and praxis of imperialism and of resistance to it, and the possibilities of hybridization as a central intellectual and political strategy drawn from the Indian anti-colonial and postcolonial cultural experience. All of these topics are broached through a reading of Gandhi from a secular perspective. Nandy reinterprets Gandhi's emphasis on spiritual force towards a focus on the inner self of psychology, deploying the language and insights of psychoanalysis in place of those of *shakti*, or spiritual energy and power. In invoking Gandhi, Nandy at the same time therefore reinterprets him by emphasizing the psychological dimensions of his monistic philosophico-religious thinking.

Nandy begins by positioning himself in Gandhian terms against Marx's problematic affirmation of colonialism as part of a progressive western modernity. It is Marxism's universalist identification with modernity, not its social politics as such, that Nandy objects to, particularly Marx's argument that the violence and cultural dislocation of colonial modernity would ultimately operate as a force for liberation. Against this, Nandy invokes Gandhi's intervention: whereas earlier modernizers such as Rammohun Roy (1772–1833), or nationalists such as Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1838–94), had viewed the problem of India's colonial subjection in terms of her backwardness or lack of modernity, for Gandhi India's weakness was the result of her people having been too much seduced by the lure of colonial modernity. Nandy reinterprets the Gandhian problematic in Adorno's terms as the dominance of the western scientific view more generally. Following Gandhi's emphasis on the dark and violent aspects of modern western civilization, Nandy argues that world wars, colonial wars such as Vietnam, 'genocides, ecodisasters and ethnocides are but the underside of corrupt sciences and psychopathic technologies wedded to new secular hierarchies'. This causes him to question the affirmation of progress, with its attendant values of normality and masculinity, of the growth of science and technology, and to ask whether what he regards as the relentless attack on the continuing existence of 'non-modern cultures' is but a continuation of the ideology of western colonization. Modernity, he claims, may itself be 'the second form of colonization', which comprises an ideology that those in the colonial and postcolonial world have internalized as a necessary means to freedom:

... the one which at least six generations of the Third World have learnt to view as a prerequisite for their liberation. This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all. In the process, it helps generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and in minds. (Nandy 1983: xi)

Even those who struggled against colonialism, Nandy argues, often did so by 'guiltily' embracing and endorsing modernity: 'conventional anti-colonialism ... could be an apologia for the colonization of minds'. Colonialism managed to create 'a culture in which the ruled are constantly tempted to fight their rulers within the psychological limits set by the latter' (*ibid.*: xi, 3). Conventional resistance depended on core values culled from the colonial worldview; for example, the constitutional liberalism of the Indian National Congress. Nandy, by contrast, is concerned to look at modes of resistance to the second, psychological or ideological form of colonization, across the continuous time-span of the colonial and the postcolonial. Such resistance was never easy, given that the west had already constructed its own oppositional mode: much ideological resistance to colonialism, therefore, drew on the west's own anti-colonial tradition:

Let us not forget that the most violent denunciation of the West produced by Frantz Fanon is written in the elegant style of a Jean-Paul Sartre. The West has not merely produced modern colonialism, it informs most interpretations of colonialism. (*Ibid.*: xii)

Fanon's move was to form an alliance with the west's own critical, other self, the Dionysiac against the Apollonian, the two torn halves which, to invoke Adorno's terms, constitute the dislocated elements of capitalism that do not add up (Young 1996: 21). For Gandhi, too, there was no simplistic division between east and west, but rather a dialectical hybrid formation within and between each.

At the same time, Nandy contrasts this alliance with what he calls a certain non-complicit 'innocence' which, he claims, in the Indian case was what defeated colonialism. The 'innocence' of non-violence, according to Nandy, fabricated its own means of resistance to colonialism and modernity. Here, he invokes the example of Gandhi's strategy of *satyagraha*: the Indian experience suggests that resistance can also operate at the psychological level and that such forms of resistance can in certain contexts be more effective than militarized struggle. At the same time, countering Gandhi's original accusation that the British were in India because the Indians had invited them, and that they had then uncomplainingly and often self-interestedly accepted the daily fact of British rule, Nandy argues that throughout the time of colonization, there was a mental war being conducted even in times of apparent quiescence and acceptance of colonial rule. He extends this to a more general resistance to the ideology of colonialism which, unlike Fanon, he sees as having been countered and effectively resisted at a psychological as well as at a cultural level. Whereas Fanon for the most part separates psychology from a revolutionary practice of violent resistance, Nandy recombines the two. By taking seriously Gandhi's notion of internal resistance, Nandy complicates the dynamics of the colonial arena, and this manoeuvre allows him to introduce some of the thinking of psychoanalysis as a counter-intuitive strategy that looks forward to the work of Homi K. Bhabha (Bhabha 1994).

3 DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE

Gandhi's ideology of non-violent resistance leads Nandy to ask when and even whether it is most effective to counter colonialism in oppositional terms, according to Fanon's Hegelian dialectic of settler and native, answering the violence of the first with a corresponding violence from the second. This response, Gandhi argued, really amounts to an internalization of the values of colonialism – though Fanon was to counter with the argument that non-violence was itself a western colonial concept and favoured only by the colonists and the native bourgeois elite (Fanon 1965: 49). Nandy suggests that the strategic problem with conventional forms of resistance was that they adopted the structure and rules of the colonial regime, and could therefore generally be crushed effectively. Is it not better to play what we might now call a more deconstructive mode, and challenge the rules of the game – play by different rules that disorient the power structure that the colonial authorities have instituted? The most cunning and effective move can be to adopt different rules, outwitting the colonizer, disorienting him by playing his own game differently, by constantly changing the rules, by invoking or subverting other parts of his own ideology (for example, Christianity, the rule

of law, and masculinity in Gandhi). Nandy suggests that in a situation of domination, as long as you play by the other's rules, then you are unlikely to defeat him. With respect to the ideological and cultural forms of nationalist resistance, this means that if the colonized answer colonial occupation with nationalism, they are using a concept which keeps them both comprehensible and to that degree under the control of the colonial powers. The elite nationalists become what Nandy cruelly calls 'ornamental dissenters' (Nandy 1983: xiv).

In making this argument, Nandy emphasizes the Gandhian problematic of the 'derivative discourse', a topic developed more substantially three years later in Partha Chatterjee's *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (1986). Despite the generality of its title, Chatterjee's analysis is limited to the Indian example, where after 1857 military resistance was never the prime mover of the anti-colonial struggle. In many colonies elsewhere, of course, terrorism and anti-colonial guerrilla movements in fact operated with great success, derivative or not. Chatterjee, however, is primarily concerned to attack the basis of nationalism, arguing that nationalism in the colonial world only works by endorsing at one level the very schema whose domination it must necessarily challenge at another. Anti-colonial nationalism wants to assert sameness and equality with the colonial power, while at another level, that of national identity and national culture, it wants to claim difference from it. This means that anti-colonial nationalism asserts 'two conflicting and yet mutually indispensable tendencies'. Like Nandy, Chatterjee articulates this contradiction around the problem of modernity: traditionally, nationalism has been identified with the accession of the colonial state to the narrative of modernity. At the same time anti-colonial nationalism has taken the form – first developed in this way in Ireland – of a refusal of that modernity in the name of an indigenous national culture. This double claim is reinforced by the doubleness of its address: as Chatterjee puts it,

Nationalist texts were addressed both to 'the people' who were said to constitute the nation and to the colonial masters whose claim to rule nationalism questioned. To both, nationalism sought to demonstrate the falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world. Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also asserted that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining its cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse in which, even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination was based. (Chatterjee 1986: 30)

The induction into modernity, into ideas of development, into historical time out of tradition and stagnation, according to Chatterjee, marks the general assumption of anti-colonial nationalism from Marx to Nehru and beyond. Even for Fanon, the claims of anti-colonial nationalism, whether elite or popular, can only be sustained by assimilating the political ideology of modernity from the ruling nation. This move not only leaves the decolonized nation ideologically entrammelled, but also necessarily works in contradiction with the assertion of its cultural difference. In other words, by claiming to have a different national culture and to be a different nation, you are,

paradoxically, using the concepts of the very system and culture from which you are claiming difference.

Nandy thus invokes an issue which was a preoccupation of many colonized cultures; namely, how can the modernity of the west and its conceptual political apparatus be resisted in terms other than the advocacy of a return to tradition, to a largely fantasized pre-modern past? Fanon's argument that a new national culture emerges from the struggle and destroys the old in doing so is obviously not an entirely satisfactory solution in terms of resistance to modernity (Fanon 1965: 197). With respect to nationalism, Chatterjee has more recently proposed one solution in the deconstruction of the totality of the concept of 'the nation' (Chatterjee 1993). Other recent analyses have pointed to the development of forms of colonial modernity that were the product of colonial culture itself, not simply a response to the impact of the west: 'the modernity of non-European colonies', writes Tani Barlow, 'is as indisputable as the colonial core of European modernity' (Barlow 1997: 1; Burton 1999; Chatterjee 1995; Panikkar 1995). For Nandy, too, the answer lies in a dialectical view of modernity, in the creation of a counter-modernity through the transformative potential of the transculturations of gender and hybridity, creating new traditions that will not be a return to an imaginary pure, indigenous knowledge, but a repertoire drawn from a dialectical mixture of classical and folk knowledges, the pure and the mixed, the high and the low, the masculine and the feminine: modernity hybridized.

4 HYBRIDITY: AS FORM AND STRATEGY

You're the top
 You're Napoleon Brandy
 You're the top
 You're Mahatma Gandhi . . .

By the 1930s Gandhi was already famous around the world and was particularly celebrated in the United States (Bhattacharya 1969: 245–62). In the show *Anything Goes* which ran on Broadway in 1934, Cole Porter's song 'You're the Top' humorously compared Gandhi to other forms of sublimity which included the Mona Lisa's smile, Garbo's salary, cellophane, Pepsodent, a Waldorf salad and Mickey Mouse. Even if he was unaware of the inappropriateness of rhyming Gandhi with brandy, it was a suitably eclectic list. Gandhi's own paradoxical use of popular media as a means of projecting representations of his anti-colonial critique of modernity correlates with one further characteristic cultural strategy highlighted by Nandy: hybridity. Nandy describes Gandhi's peculiar achievement of staging a critical awareness of Hinduism as well as colonialism, together with a cultural authenticity, in the following terms:

The alternative to Hindu nationalism is the peculiar mix of classical and folk Hinduism and the unselfconscious Hinduism by which most Indians, Hindus as well as non-Hindus, live. It is that liminality which Kipling resented. It is that liminality on which

the greatest of Indian social and political leaders built their self-definitions as Indians over the last two centuries.

No better example can be given than that of the 'comic' and 'absurd' mix of the folksy and the canonical, and of the 'hypocritical' mix of effective protest and the 'minimum gesture of protest' in the political style of Gandhi, a man sometimes compared to Charles Chaplin and Micky [sic] Mouse less seriously than one wishes. (Nandy 1983: 104)

Nandy recognizes that Gandhi's political style, like his Hinduism, consisted in the showman's touch of mixing incompatible genres, cultures, castes and classes. This performative, hybrid mode was the secret of his popularity, of how he achieved the active and enthusiastic support not only of the Indian Hindu bourgeois elite, but also of the vast majority of the Hindu peasantry with whom he publicly identified – a peasantry whom no other politician or political party had succeeded before in mobilizing effectively at a national level. 'Liminality', according to Nandy, is not only the state of being of the diasporic postcolonial migrant, as Bhabha has since suggested, but amounts also to the authentic state of Indianness itself. By juxtaposing concepts of liminality and impurity, with the invocation of qualities of unselfconscious 'Indianness' to which he attached values of 'authenticity', Nandy is himself conveying something of a mixed political message. *Hindutva* as an ideology can be shown to be flexible and hybrid in its construction of its notions of authentic Indianness (Savarkar 1942); Nandy's extraordinary assertion, apparently untroubled by the divisions of caste or the effects of communal liminality on Muslims and other minority religions in India, that all Indians, non-Hindus as well as Hindus, live an 'unselfconscious Hinduism', raises the question of how much postcolonial Indian cultural critique remains implicitly Hindu in perspective even if ostensibly secular. At another level, meanwhile, by emphasizing the 'comic' and 'absurd' aspects of Gandhi, Nandy opened up a very different direction of political possibilities that were already present in Gandhi's own concept of cultural hybridity.

Gandhi always argued that his ideas never formed a system. His own thinking was always inherently anti-systematic, and operated as a kind of radical cultural eclecticism. He reinforced this at a conceptual level with a promotion of his interpretation of the Jainist idea of the many-sidedness of truth. Despite his denunciation of western modernity, of derivative discourses, he freely admitted that he had taken much from western thinkers and advocated a form of cultural and epistemological pluralism. Gandhi freely borrowed ideas from different religions, particularly Christianity, Buddhism, and more strategically from Islam, and was frequently criticized for allegedly corrupting his own Hinduism in doing so. What he produced was a creative synthesis of different aspects of different religious thought through an anti-systematic syncretism which broke down the institutional reification of individual religions. Rooted in Hinduism, he was open to all religious traditions, which he saw as ultimately derived from the same God. Gandhi theorized his diasporic receptivity to other ideas and cultural forms as a combination of rootedness and openness – rooted in the ancient heritage of his native Hinduism, but open to the spiritual inheritance of all the great religions of the world. 'May noble thoughts from all over the world come to us' was

one of his favourite maxims. In response to the objections made against Gandhi's eclecticism, Bikhu Parekh defends his method in this way:

Gandhi's dispute with his critics highlighted two very different approaches to religion and religious truth. For him religion was a resource, a body of insights to be extracted, combined, and interpreted the way he thought proper. His approach to religion was therefore profoundly ahistorical, uninhibited, anti-traditionalist, and liberal, and he made no attempt to read the scriptures and understand the religious traditions in their own terms. (Parekh 1997: 37)

This hybrid method also operates at a theoretical level in some contemporary Indian writing, in a mode that is often described as marking the influence of poststructuralism or postmodernism, and used as grounds for reproach for its alleged absorption of recent western modes of thought. The combination of cultural rootedness modified by openness to the available resources of one or more other cultures could also describe the cultural situation of the migrant. The objections to Gandhi's method anticipate those made against Nandy and Bhabha. If we substituted the word 'theory' for religion in Parekh's description of Gandhi, it would provide a good description of the methods of Nandy and Bhabha, who similarly raid theory and history for insights that are always interpreted according to their own conceptual priorities. Parekh continues:

For his critics a religion was a historical tradition, uniquely grounded in a specific historical event, possessing moral and spiritual authority, forming the basis of a specific community, and requiring a careful and faithful study of its basic texts.

Just as Gandhi reinterprets the scriptures, so Nandy and Bhabha reinterpret theoretical and political texts, encouraging the individual critic to be at the centre of the search for insight rather than accept received opinions or traditional dogma, and making space for transcultural dialogue, exchange, translation and transformation. Both critics in their writing characteristically violate the historical integrity of the theoretical tradition from which they draw, and thereby deinstitutionalize its scope. Bhabha himself speaks of his tendency to 'reckless historical connection', Nandy announces: 'I do not therefore hesitate to declare these essays to be an alternative mythography of history which denies and defies the values of history' (Bhabha 1994: 199; Nandy 1983: xv). The two methods, historical versus contemporary interpretation, as Parekh observes, at the deepest level regulate and sustain each other, providing the mutual but in many ways antithetical virtues of systematic, historical interpretation and intellectual freedom. Gandhi's critics were simply asking Gandhi not to be Gandhi, but rather to be a religious thinker within the boundaries of established conventions; in a similar way, if Bhabha changed his interpretative methods in response to the objections of his critics, he would no longer be Bhabha, the brilliant insights would be lost, and he would become a conventional cultural or historical critic.

5 SAMAS AND HYBRIDITY

I have become a queer mixture of the East and West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere. (Nehru 1936: 597)

In terms of political positions, Nandy in many respects remains quite close to Gandhi in the guise of the champion of indigeneity. Bhabha's politics are, it must be stressed, diametrically opposed to anything that might remotely be called Gandhian, being much more obviously located in relation to Nehru's cosmopolitan anti-colonial socialism. At the level of conceptualization and interest in alternative political strategies, however, the similarities between the syncretic theoretical methods of Gandhi and Bhabha are provocative. No more than for Bhabha, hybridity for Gandhi was not simply a matter of eclecticism or random mixture. In *Hind Swaraj* he argues:

India cannot cease to be one nation because people belonging to different religions [*dharma*] live in it. The introduction of foreigners does not necessarily destroy the nation, they merge in it. A country is one nation only when such a condition obtains in it. That country must have a faculty for assimilation [*samas*]. India has ever been such a country. (Gandhi 1997: 52)

Gandhi's Gujarati term translated here as 'faculty for assimilation', *samas*, in fact describes the faculty of linguistic hybridity, 'the grammatical technique of forming a new word by introducing two or more pre-existing words'. As a linguistic practice, *samas* typically involves connecting two words that may be juxtaposed colloquially because they sound alike or rhyme, even when the latter part is meaningless (e.g. *chabha* for tea). The force of Gandhi's example, however, points towards the related meaning of *samas* as the practice of joining two words denoting antithetical, strictly unassimilable categories, as in the word *sukhdukh* (happiness and sadness, meaning happiness–unhappiness). Although the predominant emphasis is on inclusion and assimilation, this aspect is not so strongly implied as in the associated word, *samavesh*. *Samas*, in etymological terms, derives from *sam*, meaning equal (*sam* is also commonly used as a prefix denoting states of equality and equanimity), and *aas*, to be together. *Samas* creates a structure whose emphasis, therefore, lies in its component parts being included on equal terms, juxtaposed but preserving their own distinctiveness within the assimilated whole. The structure of *samas* can be compared to the Sanskrit system of *sandhi*, meaning treaty, which in grammatical terms means joining two words by changing them from adverbs to adjectives or to verbs, etc., depending upon the inflection. The essential difference is that words necessarily undergo some modification in *sandhi*, whereas in *samas* they do not. In invoking the term *samas*, therefore, Gandhi is suggesting that in response to immigrants of differing religions, India has a cultural facility analogous to the formation of compound or portmanteau words. While *samas* refers to opposite words in the same language being joined together, Gandhi's example in fact brings it closer to the western philological structure of linguistic hybridity, in which a hybrid denotes 'a composite word formed of elements belonging to different languages' (OED).

Gandhi thus makes the link between a linguistic and cultural hybridity in the mixing of populations of different cultures that foreshadows Bhabha's central thesis of a disjunctive cultural hybridity, inspired by Bakhtin's account of 'intentional' linguistic hybridity (Bhabha 1994; Young 1995a). It is noticeable that the term 'hybridity' was introduced into postcolonial discourse by Bhabha and Salman Rushdie, both members of minority communities who were brought up in an India where racial purity and the social enforcement of racial difference between castes remain a central, institutionalized feature of the everyday social fabric; an institutional regime of 'purity' that Gandhi devoted much of his political energy to contesting, and refused in every aspect of his thought and ordinary life. Though no simple or unmediated link is being suggested, it remains the case that it is in the hybridized world of Gandhi's political thinking, where the pure has become impure and the impure pure, the untouchable touchable, that the material, historical and political contestatory force of the concept becomes evident. In his practice of hybridization, Gandhi challenged and articulated conflictual, yet dynamic aspects of Indian culture that Bhabha, in turn, was to transform into a way of reading modernity.

'He was a very difficult person to understand, sometimes his language was almost incomprehensible' Nehru complained of Gandhi (Nehru 1936: 73). While he adopted a simplified style in opposition to the widespread use of rhetorical flourishes and ornate language in India, Gandhi's language remained very colloquial and idiomatic. Commentators on Gandhi's writings, particularly his speeches, have often also drawn attention to the way in which they are themselves hybridized in form, consisting of an idiosyncratic, eclectic hotchpotch of disjunctive topics, seemingly almost randomly put together on the spot. A famous example would be the speech he gave at the opening of the Benares Hindu University in 1916 (Gandhi 1958–84: 210–16). His speech on economic and moral development in the same year cites, as his editor puts it, 'in one breath the New Testament, Shakespeare and A. R. Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the principle of natural selection' (Gandhi 1997: 156). As a result, Gandhi's thoughts, like Mao Zedong's, are most often read in collections of extracts from his writings (Gandhi 1993). The affinities between this difficult eclecticism of Gandhi's writings and the dense, opaque style of certain Indian postcolonial critics, such as Bhabha or Gayatri Spivak, are also striking.

6 THE HISTORICAL STRATEGY OF INDIAN POSTCOLONIAL THEORISTS

The similarities, therefore, between Gandhi's *strategies* and *method* of cultural criticism and those of contemporary Indian postcolonial critics extend at the level of *content* only to those aspects isolated by Nandy. While he himself positions these factors against Marxism and modernity (far more straightforwardly than Gandhi himself), most others, by contrast, have refused Nandy's privileging of ontology over history, and developed Gandhian insights and strategies rather in order to intervene in and transform the methodological premises and conceptual assumptions of Marxist

orthodoxy. In doing so, they have effectively juxtaposed, in what might be termed a characteristic tricontinental dialectic, elements drawn from the two historical strains represented by Gandhi and the Communist Party that, during the liberation struggle, had remained resolutely opposed to each other. With the decline of Indian socialism, new moves were initiated to develop the possibility of a Marxist–Gandhian alliance based on peasant–proletariat unity (Joshi 1986). The insistent intellectual framework, and political perspective, of Indian postcolonialism remains that of Marxism, but it is a Marxism now infiltrated not only with emphasis on the peasantry, low castes, tribals, and what Gandhi was wont to describe in general terms as ‘the underdog’, but also with more concern respecting questions of agency, gender and psychology than it was formerly accustomed to bear. Indian Marxists, it has been suggested, had hitherto predominantly operated within the interpretative framework established by Marx himself, which characterized Indian politics, and Indian history, as a conflict between the values of modernity and those of tradition, and identified Marxism and the course of Indian history itself with the progressive modernizing aspects of colonial modernity. This gave scant attention, as Sumit Sarkar has suggested, to the areas of social reform and culture where the question of modernity was most pressing for colonized Indians (Chakrabarty 1992; Chatterjee 1997: 9; Sumit Sarkar 1989). The dichotomy between the vanguard political elite and the masses, between classical Marxism’s adherence to the primacy of the proletariat and tricontinental Marxism’s recognition of the role of the peasantry, had remained intact. The shifting of Marxism among Indian intellectuals with the introduction of non-orthodox concepts only began decades after independence, partly in response to the developing prestige of tricontinental, particularly Maoist, Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s, partly inspired by the example of the successful peasant revolt at Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967 (initially condemned by both communist parties of India), and partly when the demise of the credibility of the Congress Party during the Emergency (1975–7) led to a renewed interest in left, and alternative left, alternatives. It was at this point that the limitations of the Indian nationalist historians’ portrayal of the Indian independence movement as the product of elite political leaders became particularly apparent. In order to effect this transformation, it was intellectuals working abroad, such as Ahmad, Bhabha, Chakrabarty, Guha, Spivak and Sunder Rajan, who drew on the time-honoured precedent of anti-colonial activists and responded to the challenge and opportunities of developments outside their own national boundaries, producing new Indian theoretical work that was defined by its absorption of internationalist perspectives.

Hostile commentators on Spivak’s and, particularly, Bhabha’s work have typically complained of their abstractness or lack of historical and material grounding (Parry 1994b). Such commentaries themselves tend to present such work as if it operated in a historical void and arrived fully formed from the clouds, paying scant attention to its Indian context. Spivak’s and Bhabha’s work is best understood, like that of the Subaltern Studies group, in relation to the problematics of Indian intellectual culture and its political history. They have all challenged the theoretical and political restrictions operating within Indian academic Marxism. By introducing the possibility of alternative conceptual frameworks on the left, drawing on the tricontinental critiques of

eurocentrism and the later theoretical forms of their emergence as 'poststructuralism', they have also contested the legacies of imperialism, one aspect of which is the Indocentrism of Indian intellectual life which continues to focus narrowly on India. It is symptomatic that even Chatterjee's critique of 'nationalist thought and the colonial world' in fact remains firmly nationalist in its focus, never looking beyond the boundaries of India itself. In the same way, some commentators consider that the observation that Spivak's or Bhabha's work does not always directly address conditions in India constitutes grounds for its dismissal. This profoundly par-ochial assumption that this is all that the intellectual production of all Indians, whether diasporic or indigenous, should ever do, suggests that Chakrabarty's project of 'provincializing Europe' could be in danger of being interpreted in such a context as less of a radical intervention than as the self-affirming gesture of a myopic intellectual nationalism (Chakrabarty 2000).

Recent Indian postcolonial theory has operated with a disruptive force because it has typically challenged such assumptions. It has carried out a revision and rehabilitation of a Marxism that, unusually, had been partly devalued in the Indian anti-colonial movement. What occurred elsewhere in the three continents as a part of the liberation process, that is, the translation, revision and adaptation of Marxism in order to effect its articulation with local social and political conditions and histories, while extending its remit beyond class politics to include other forms of liberation struggles, happened in India after independence and has provided much of the energy for the theoretical work of postcolonialism. The dominance of India in postcolonial theory is in part the result of this theoretical deferred action in which Marxism has been rewritten and transformed according to a trajectory indebted to the work of twentieth-century tricontinental political-activist theorists, reworking the same ground, and pushing at its implications, invoking and extending, for example, arguments about culture, commodities and the products of cultural transactions, as exemplified in Arjun Appadurai's writings (Appadurai 1986); or extending the range of political constituency, starting with the peasantry but also importantly focusing on women and indigenous minority groups and the theoretical reorientations which this demands, as in Spivak's work (Spivak 1993, 1999); or incorporating the long-standing if transgressive articulation of Marxism with psychoanalysis found in Sartre, Fanon and the Frankfurt School but absent, until Bhabha's work, from Marxism in India (Wolfenstein 1993); or involving the introduction of concepts drawn from more recently published material, such as that of the early Marx or Gramsci, or later tricontinental political theorists, such as Mao, as in the work of the Subaltern Studies historians. Much of this theoretical innovation took place more or less simultaneously, either in India or, significantly, outside the constraints of the Indian intellectual and political environment, creating a dynamic field of extraordinary intellectual energy that provided much of the cutting edge of postcolonial theory, effectively dominating its parameters.

7 SUBALTERN STUDIES

Both Spivak and Bhabha's theoretical innovations can also be understood, as I have argued in extended discussions of their work in *White Mythologies* (1990), as intervening in the problematic of the eurocentrism of the classical Marxist model by drawing on the theoretical resources of tricontinental counter-modernity. In this respect, their work in the cultural field is consonant with, and has been increasingly influential on, the pre-eminent modification in this direction carried out in the realms of historiography since the early 1980s by Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern Studies historians. The work of this group of largely Bengali Marxist intellectuals has now dynamically reconstructed the historical field itself and inspired sympathetic projects all over the world (e.g. Beverley et al. 1995: 135–46). The Subaltern Studies historians were themselves specifically addressing a local problematic in relation to India: the central question to which their project was addressed focused on the historical question of how, during the freedom struggle,

the numerous peasant uprisings of the period, some of them massive in scope and rich in anti-colonial consciousness, waited in vain for a leadership to raise them above localism and generalize them into a nation-wide anti-imperialist campaign. In the event, much of the sectional struggle of workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie either got entangled in economism or, wherever politicized, remained, for want of a revolutionary leadership, far too fragmented to form effectively into anything like a national liberation movement. (Guha 1982b: 6–7)

The project of Subaltern Studies was to come to an understanding of a history that never happened, the '*historic failure of the nation to come into its own*' – or, to put it another way, the unique form of the freedom struggle in India, which achieved independence without the radical social and political transformation that would have been effected by a national liberation movement that had successfully asserted the colonial subject's 'right to rebel' (Guha 1997: 47). A central aspect of this was the defeat of a national liberation movement by communalism and communalist factionalism, a defeat permanently institutionalized for many Indians (though not for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) by the partition of British India in 1947.

Gandhi's own highly debated relation to the determining effects of communalism on Indian independence has meant that few apart from Nandy have been prepared to endorse his politics without very substantial reservations. The Subaltern Studies historians were in many ways fundamentally sympathetic to Gandhi's anti-elitist position, and inspired by Gandhi's emphatic espousal of the cause of the peasantry, his identification with the poor, the Dalits, and all those pushed to the extreme margin of Indian society – subalterns, in a word. In other respects, they remained suspicious of Gandhi's political practices and priorities in a way comparable both to Ambedkar, who saw Gandhi as the communalist leader of the caste-Hindus, and to the leaders of the Workers and Peasants Party who distrusted Gandhi's close (and profitable) relation to Indian capitalists and his consistent attempts to suppress radical peasant

activism. For the Subaltern Studies historians, as Chatterjee has argued, Gandhi opened up the possibility of incorporating the peasantry into the political form of the new Indian state, but despite his sympathies and identification with the peasantry, and his promise of empowerment to them, in fact 'the peasantry were meant to become willing participants in a struggle wholly conceived and directed *by others*' (Chatterjee 1986: 124). The Subaltern Studies historians were thus concerned to focus on the very thing that Gandhi had most sought to control and contain: the autonomous agency of subaltern resistance.

Indian works focusing on the revolutionary significance of peasant resistance were in fact already available from the Gandhian Kisan (peasant) movement perspective, as well as the Naxalite rebellions by peasants and tribals whose cause was taken up in the 1960s by the CPI(M) and CPI(M-L) (Dasgupta 1974; Ranga 1949; Sen Gupta 1979). The Subaltern Studies historians were also clearly influenced by the radicalism of contemporary peasant and tribal rebellions. Their response in creating a 'Naxalite historiography' was to focus on those individuals and groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy in India, not only through available local perspectives but also through the priorities of a Marxism strongly influenced by a western Marxist whose ideas made much sense to radicals on the three continents: Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci, though presupposing the theoretical framework of the Communist Party of which he was a prominent leader, nevertheless developed concepts that sought to account for the specific political conditions of contemporary Italy – a country which had itself been formed as the result of a national liberation movement that in its time was the inspiration of anti-colonial activists in India as well as Europe. In Gramsci's day, Italy shared the complex material, social and cultural characteristics of divided tricontinental colonial societies, many of which, as Ahmad has pointed out, were particularly close to those of India, past and present (Ahmad 1996: 221–66). Gramsci himself, moreover, as Victor Kiernan has demonstrated, made extensive comparisons between Italy and India, as well as giving considerable attention to the situation in Latin America and elsewhere (Kiernan 1995: 171–90). His analysis of Italy in terms of the reduction of the agricultural south and its islands 'to the status of exploited colonies' by the industrial north – creating structures which Lenin characterized as 'internal colonialism' – strikingly anticipated the global divisions along the same lines in subsequent dependency theory. Gramsci also formulated the terms of the key problem for tricontinental Marxism; that is, how the proletariat can work in alliance with the peasantry (Gramsci 1957: 28).

One answer to this problem is provided through a reinterpretation of what Marx called the *lumpenproletariat*, and later commentators the 'underclass'. The central concept of the Subaltern Studies historians, that of the marginal 'subaltern', though accredited to Gramsci, was in fact considerably reworked by them. Gramsci uses the term 'subaltern' interchangeably with 'subordinate' and 'instrumental' in his class analyses. Its sense of 'inferior rank' means that it is particularly well suited to describe the diversity of dominated and exploited groups who do not possess a general 'class consciousness'. Its meaning in logic, of a particular rather than a universal proposition, also stealthily introduces one of the central theoretical components of tricontinental

Marxism. For Gramsci, in fact, subalterns are the in-between class – the lieutenants of the ruling class as opposed to the masses. The equivalent in India would be the Babus (i.e. the indigenous elite who speak English and were the principle mediators for the colonial power), not the peasantry. In the first issue of the *Subaltern Studies* journal, Guha extends this account to characterize subalternity as ‘the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other way’ (Guha 1982a: vii). Later the subaltern groups are defined as representing ‘the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as “the elite”’ (Guha 1982b: 8). Guha uses the terms ‘people’ and ‘subaltern classes’ synonymously, although in practice the focus of the articles in *Subaltern Studies* itself is very much at the bottom of the social scale on different groups within the underclass. Notwithstanding Guha’s definition above, Spivak found it necessary to insist on the extension of subalternity to women’s and gender issues; in postcolonial studies generally, the subaltern has become a synonym for any marginalized or disempowered minority group, particularly on the grounds of gender and ethnicity.

The extension of the project of analysis of agency and power dynamics to include the retrieval of subaltern consciousness had led the Subaltern Studies historians to an increasing interaction with the work of cultural critics such as Bhabha and Spivak, evident for example in the work of Chakrabarty and Prakash. The great strength of the concept of the subaltern, from a tricontinental perspective, is that it provides a social category and power structure a good deal less restrictive than that of class, and enables attention to be given to groups whose forms of resistance and struggle had been ignored by nationalist and Marxist Indian historians alike. Whereas in ‘The Modern Prince’ (1933–4) Gramsci himself was concerned to articulate links between the vanguard political party and the spontaneous resistance of the people, Guha used the concept of the subaltern to rewrite the Indian freedom movement so that the primary history of resistance to colonial power could be found in movements of peasant insurgency which were operating long before elite leaders such as Gandhi imposed their leadership upon them (Gramsci 1957; Guha 1983). From this more Maoist perspective, pioneered by Sumit Sarkar (1989), the history of Indian independence, conventionally written as the biography of a popular nation-state, in fact involved an essentially passive revolution, in Gramsci’s terms, of the feudal and bourgeois elite, who managed to absorb and control the revolutionary, transformative energies of the people that had been primarily directed against their own power. Indian independence consequently brought about not social transformation but a reinstatement of privilege through the reproduction of the apparatus of the colonial state, which continued to function in the service of capitalism. Many theoretical and historical questions have been raised with respect to the Subaltern Studies project, particularly relating to issues of subaltern consciousness, agency and hegemony, differences of gender and locality. Its critique of Marxist orthodoxy, nationalist historians and the Cambridge school, has fuelled extensive theoretical discussions and arguments that have been among the most significant within postcolonial theory (for a critical summary, see Moore–Gilbert 1999). What needs to be emphasized here is

that, as has been seen throughout this book, many of the political and analytical problems of translating Marxism from its original historical framework, focused particularly on what were certainly a clearly divided class politics in nineteenth-century industrialized Britain, to the very different social formations and power structures of tricontinental societies, converged on the problems of the proletariat as the sole revolutionary class. Guha's intervention provided the decisive theoretical and conceptual reformulation for what had already been the theoretical practice of many of the tricontinental national liberation movements. The concept of the subaltern ascribed a new dynamic political agency to those who had formerly been described as the wretched of the earth, the oppressed and the dispossessed. By means of the subaltern the oppressed assumed political agency to become the subject of history, no longer its abject object.

The work of Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern Studies historians, Shahid Amin (1995), David Arnold (1977), Partha Chatterjee (1986, 1993, 1997), Dipesh Chakrabarty (1989), David Hardiman (1981, 1993, 1995), Gyan Pandey (1978), Gyan Prakash (1990, 1995, 1999), Sumit Sarkar (1973, 1989), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1987, 1998, 1993, 1999), Susie Tharu (1993) and others, can therefore be seen as representing individual, different stances in the process of the late Indian detour away from Marxist orthodoxy. However far their positions may have moved, they all began in political and intellectual terms from a Marxist perspective and in many ways remain within its framework, responsive to its pressure. With the evaporation of Marxism in South Africa as the only credible form of intellectual opposition to *apartheid*, India could be said to be one of the few places where classical Marxism survives today. It is therefore no coincidence that some of the most vigorous criticisms of postcolonial theory as a form of tricontinental Marxist revisionism have emerged from the party loyalists of the subcontinent. The most cogent objection has been that precisely because the subaltern groups, as Guha points out, never did succeed in establishing a national liberation movement, emphasis moves from revolution to individual, or purely local, acts of resistance. The Subaltern Studies project, after all, involves the analysis of a failure. As Robert Stam has put it, 'the idea of a vanguardist takeover of the state and the economy, associated with the politics of Lenin, has long since given way to the resistance to hegemony associated with Gramsci' (Shohat and Stam 1994: 338). In this situation, unlike modern Gramscian political theory, for example the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), which concentrates on the development of new means of formation of counter-hegemonic political alliances, postcolonial theory has sometimes been more concerned with the articulation of resistance to hegemonic practices implicitly celebrated for its own sake. This tendency is particularly noticeable in some of the more rarefied analyses of literary forms of psychological resistance, acts of transgression, subversion and the like. Resistance has a clear function in the colonial situation, but it is not always clear in the postcolonial situation in the name of what resistance is being invoked. This is in part a result of the generalizing of the Subaltern Studies project centred on the absence of a national liberation movement in India and the reluctance of the bourgeoisie to rebel after 1857. Here Gramsci's own perspective on Gandhi, whose psychological strategies he

considered as preparatory moves in a 'war of position', could provide a useful political framework for rethinking the objectives of present-day forms of resistance: to be useful, resistance is but a strategic move in the larger struggle for power. Guha's reworking of subalternity into a Foucauldian dialectic of dominance and subordination, in which in the colonial situation, hegemony remains forever incomplete, has also moved further towards an emphasis on the overturning of power, even if he continues to be preoccupied with the historical example of the relative failure to achieve it (Guha 1997).

Whereas most left-wing anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements carried out their transformations of Marxism towards the needs of local historical, cultural and economic conditions in the course of the freedom struggle, this did not take place in India. The ideological divisions that developed within the party, leading to the emergence of Trotskyist and Maoist groups, reflected international splits within the communist movement rather than a transformation brought about through an alliance between Indian Marxist theory and political practice. In India it was through theoretical work developed at an academic level after independence that the redefinitions of political theory began to take place. This did not involve a new move into the academy, or a new extension in terms of the sites of political and intellectual activity – after all, R. P. Dutt had always made his contributions to communist political and historiographical analysis in India from the distance of Cambridge in England. What was new was the willingness to draw on the radical aspects of Gandhi's thinking and practice in order to construct forms of analysis more appropriate to the Indian situation, and to put them in conjunction with other theoretical developments, from Gramsci to Fanon. The Subaltern Studies historians, in other words, were prepared to reconsider all aspects involved in the history of the Indian independence movement, and to develop a new politics of the left that took into account those people which the rigidity of Marxist orthodoxy had hitherto excluded from its political calculations. Even here, however, the question of gender and the role of subaltern women were overlooked until Spivak's intervention in the fourth volume. As late as volume nine, Kamala Visweswaran noted that 'while the praxis of *Subaltern Studies* has originated in the central assumption of subaltern agency, it has been less successful in demonstrating how such agency is constituted by gender' (Visweswaran 1996: 85). Given the strength of the women's movement in India from the late nineteenth century onwards, this was a surprising omission.

8 SUBALTERNS OF THE SUBALTERNS: ENGENDERING NEW KINDS OF HISTORY AND POLITICS

The role of women in the anti-colonial movements will be considered directly in the following chapter. In anticipation of that, what should be stressed at this point is that women's struggles have prompted a transformation of the very forms of history in an even more radical direction than the Subaltern Studies historians themselves had already achieved. Feminist critiques of the Subaltern historians prompted the question

of how far colonialism and the adversary strategies of anti-colonialism were themselves gendered, and to what degree they were challenged and transformed by alternative practices and differently gendered histories. Spivak argued that there was a subaltern to the subaltern. At the same time, feminist activists demonstrated that by taking up other practices and priorities, women developed a *de facto* theoretical political position very different from the anxious narratives of liberation constructed by male nationalists at the vanguard of the political process. The history of women's participation in the anti-colonial nationalist movements tends to be more orientated towards socialized activities of the bourgeoisie or working class, focused on public group demonstrations, or operating at the individual level in life stories, in the processes of subject formation, and relating to local areas of activism and empowerment. At the same time, women's campaigns in the anti-colonial period, like those of the peasantry against landowners, or workers against factory owners, often focused on local rather than general national issues, or addressed specific areas such as medicine (Basu 1995; Vaughan 1991). These histories were not made up of the rhetoric of expansive political idealism, but were developed by ordinary women against specific forms of oppression, for the most part without the help of others beyond their own communities. For this reason they provide models that can be utilized by other minorities and carried over into different political conjunctures.

The history of women's activism in the liberation movements in many respects operates in a comparable way to the history of resistance by peasants, tribals, nomads and those of low caste (which were themselves often initiated by women): concerned to resist local forms of oppression, such movements only joined the larger forms of nationalism at strategic moments, if they ever did (Boahen 1985: 596, 638; Omvedt 1993; Roy 1992; Sen 1985). Such local, small-scale forms require an acknowledgement of the long history of indigenous resistance, which often, as in the case of women's struggles or guerrilla wars, for example in the Philippines, continued scarcely without interruption from the colonial to the independence period (Rafael 1998). Recognition of the value of small-scale movements and acts of opposition has produced an emphasis on resistance rather than larger forms of emancipation and liberation. This suits the women's movements for whom there can be no single revolutionary moment, but rather apparently unending sequences of battles that have to be fought. At the same time, in the colonial period, as in Algeria or Kenya, this counter-hegemonic activism was able to operate in conjunction with revolutionary violence towards the development of revolutionary consciousness that, at the strategic moment, facilitated a revolutionary situation.

The retrieval and understanding of these histories which challenge the conventional, large-scale accounts of the liberation struggles, have also had implications for the forms of historiography itself, opening up possibilities for different ways of writing the history of the anti-colonial movements, and of history generally. Moreover, they enable a new understanding and validation of the kinds of opposition that took place before or outside mainstream anti-colonial politics. In recent years historians have shifted their attention to the everyday forms of resistance among the peasantry and ordinary peoples in colonized territories which cannot be simply equated with

the larger anti-colonial movements, forms of resistance characterized by James C. Scott (1985) as 'weapons of the weak'. Many movements of peasant revolt and insurgency have been documented by Eric Wolf, Ranajit Guha and others (Cohen, Gutkind and Brazier 1979; Guha 1983; Hardiman 1993; Ranger 1985; Wolf 1971). Anti-colonial resistance often took more unorthodox forms, such as the forest fires started with daunting consistency by the displaced forest dwellers of Algeria throughout the time of the French occupation. An 1865 official report concluded: 'There is no disguising the fact that war by the arsonist's torch like that of the assassin's ambush or the rebel's gun originates from the same cause and aims at the same end: the ruin of the Colony' (Crummey 1986: 239). Other forms of resistance have been located in protest work songs, women's protest songs of spirit possession such as *Vimbuza* in Malawi and Zambia (usually directed against men), song-dramas (often developed independently by men and women workers) which celebrated an otherwise unrecorded history of resistance while, in the case of colonial workers, articulating grievances and demands against the company and the company system (Glassman 1995; Vail and White 1980: 339–71). Songs of these kinds constitute a widespread aesthetic in Southern Africa which operates as history, 'as a "map" of peoples' experience' to be remembered and passed down through the generations, and as a political intervention, when singers, as Vail and White put it, often sang songs in the presence of colonial officials which 'defined pungently and accurately the terms of their exploitation' (Vail and White 1991: 41). Allen and Barbara Isaacman have argued that anti-colonial opposition, outside rebellions and before the independence movements, fell into five broad categories of local resistance: day-to-day forms of resistance (including cultural practices, crime and a wide variety of forms of insubordination), resistance through withdrawal and migration, maroonage, social banditry and peasant revolts. In all these examples, groups and individuals attempted actively to modify or escape the existing colonial social order, for the most part without the larger political designs that characterize anti-colonialism as a national movement (Crummey 1986; Haynes and Prakash 1992; Isaacman and Isaacman 1976: 97–125; Wright 1993). Such non-revolutionary acts of resistance carried out by ordinary people have become increasingly prized as commentators have attempted to shift history away from the privileging of the national narratives towards attention to the kinds of local acts of resistance carried out by ordinary men and women.

These different kinds of history, often best demonstrated through examples drawn from individual case histories of resistance, would today be characterized as subaltern, and it is for this reason that the Indian Subaltern Studies group are in many ways the intellectual and political heirs of the liberation movements in terms of the writing of history as subaltern agency, even if they themselves have remained restricted in their consideration of the history of women's activism and the ways in which gender issues affect the writing of history itself. Originating from a country which achieved political independence without a social revolution, the Subaltern Studies historians have sought to reconfigure the struggles of ordinary people who had customarily fallen outside historical narratives, been characterized in general terms as the masses, whose resistance has been continuous and who have yet to achieve emancipation or social

equality. In that sense, subaltern histories are themselves accounts which contest the gendered values of masculinist history such as public/private, national/local, city/country, home/world, spiritual/material. Gandhi had already shown how far such oppositions also raise the question of the role of gender in colonialism and the anti-colonial movements, demanding a new understanding of the degree to which gender identities were a fundamental production of the colonial situation and could be utilized in the strategies of anti-colonialism. This then moves into the question of the ways in which issues of gender were inscribed within imperialism, racialism and anti-colonialism, and their subsequent histories (Grewal 1996; Radhakrishnan 1992). The implications of subaltern history remain radical and far-reaching. The histories of women's relations to the anti-colonial movements are scarcely less so.

Women, Gender and Anti-colonialism

There has been an increasing amount of material published in recent years on the roles played by women in the imperial era (Burton 1994; Callaway 1987; Chaudhuri and Strobel 1992; Davin 1978; Jayawardena 1995; Midgley 1998; Trollope 1983; Ware 1996). Much of this work has focused on the role of western women in the empire, rather than the activities of women subjected to imperialism. This is partly the result of metropolitan perspectives and the availability of archival material, but it is also because western women were more directly involved with imperial projects and institutions. Colonized women, by contrast, were not necessarily campaigning directly against imperialism: women in the colonial period often had other priorities; for example, education or civil rights. From the imperial perspective, examination of the role of women has gone some way to balancing the traditional historical representation that it was men who made empires, and that the empire was a field for the exercise, or imagining, of all sorts of forms of masculinity (Bleys 1996; Hoganson 1998; Rutherford 1997). In terms of conventional representations of its main historical protagonists, the history of colonialism was very much a male scenario, and the history of the freedom movements scarcely less so. Just as colonial history is dominated by men, the generals, the admirals, the viceroys, the governors, the district officers and so forth, anti-colonial history and the history of the liberation struggles is also dominated by the political theorists, communist activists, national party leaders, who were all largely (though by no means exclusively) male. So Griffith's *Men Who Have Made the Empire* (1897) or Strauss's *Men Who Have Made the New German Empire* (1875) were followed a century later by Tinker's *Men Who Overturned Empires* (1987).

Two landmark works initiated the feminist response to the absence of women in colonial and anti-colonial histories: Kumari Jayawardena's *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (1986) gave a comprehensive account of women's participation in nationalist movements in Asia and the Middle East from the late nineteenth century onwards; Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid's *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History* (1989) demonstrated the dialectical relation of feminism and patriarchy in the policies of the colonial state and in the liberation movements, posing the following questions: first, the degree to which the masculinist nature of colonialism and

anti-colonial struggles restricted the participation of women; and second, the extent to which subsequent historiography reproduced an absence of women in its historical narratives, as well as in the historical archives themselves. Such work articulated a clear need to produce new feminist histories and theory which would re-examine the role of women, articulate the forms of emancipatory politics in which they were engaged, and demonstrate their own kinds of agency.

Women's different profile in anti-colonial struggles stems from the gender-based inequalities that formed the origin of feminist politics. Such inequalities involved the often subordinate roles played by women in colonized societies, restricted education for women in their own countries as well as in the metropolitan capitals, their consequent lack of knowledge of international colonial languages such as English and French, limited access to publishing and the media, limited participation in educational and political institutions in the public sphere, together with the masculinist attitudes of the colonial rulers – and subsequently of historians. The nature of women's struggles, often conducted from positions of extreme marginality outside the space of national politics, means that their history cannot be written or understood in the same way as conventional anti-imperialism, and requires different archival techniques. For the same reasons, rather than developing a major theoretical culture, the women's movements focused above all on practical social and political issues affecting women. Inevitably, it is a story that operates to a far greater degree at the level of specific histories of local struggles and the life-histories of individual activists, few of whom had the kind of access to national politics and the media, or prominence in the public sphere, that enabled the male anti-colonial leaders to be so prolific in print and to elaborate such substantive theoretical arguments. No single figure registers particular feminist anti-colonial positions in the manner of a Gandhi or a Nkrumah. Even a woman such as Celia Sánchez, though playing a prominent organizational role in the Cuban Revolution and working closely with Castro in the subsequent political and social programme, did not produce a comparable public discourse, feminist or otherwise, to that of Castro or Guevara (Randall 1992). There were very few general theorizations of the relation of feminism to anti-colonial nationalism or socialism that could be subsequently developed by others for new contexts. The apparent absence of international public figures, leaders of national parties or political theorists until the post-independence era means that the role that women played in the liberation movements had often been passed over until recent years. The theoretical arguments are now being further developed in the aftermath of the historical struggles and their often problematic legacy for women, drawing on and transforming contemporary feminist postcolonial theory in order to understand the effects of colonialism on women in colonized territories and to produce gendered analytic accounts of the anti-colonial era. This has been pursued together with historical research which has created the basis of a new historical archive (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Etienne and Leacock 1980; Franco 1989; Jayawardena 1986; Lowe 1991; McClintock 1995; Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991; Omvedt 1993; Shepherd, Brereton and Bailey 1995; Spivak 1999; Strobel 1979; Tharu and Lalita 1993).

1 THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENTS

In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although they were less visible in terms of individual public profiles, women played an important, if in many ways complex role in the anti-colonial struggles – from involvement in military campaigns to less orthodox forms of resistance. In India, several women led armed rebellions in 1857–8, notably Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, the Rani of Ramgarh and Begum Hazrat Mahal. In later years there were many public political activists and politicians such as Pandita Ramabai and Kadambini Ganguli in the 1890s, the revolutionary activist Bhikaiji Cama in the early twentieth century, and Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya and Lado Rani Zutshi during the Civil Disobedience movement in the 1920s and 1930s; in Ceylon, Ezlynn Deraniyagala and in Indonesia, Raden Adjeng Kartini. In India women participated not only in the campaigns of Gandhi and the Congress Party (Sarojini Naidu was the first Indian woman to become President of Congress in 1925), but also formed their own political organizations affiliated to the Congress Party or the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, such as the Rashtriya Stree Sangha (RSS), Desh Sevika Sangha (DSS), the Mahila Rashtriya Sangha (MRS) in Bengal, the Nari Satyagraha Samiti (NSS) in Calcutta, and the Rashtriya Sevika (Rastra) Samithi (Sarkar 1995). Indian women were also active in various forms of ‘terrorist’ violence: Kalpana Dutt, for example, took part in the Chittagong Armoury Raid of 1930; Suniti Choudhry and Samiti Ghose shot the Magistrate of Comilla in 1931. The following year Bina Das made an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Governor of Bengal at Calcutta University, and Pritilata Waddadar, a schoolteacher, led a raid on the Pahartali Railway Officers Club in 1932, dying in action. Many women such as Aruna Asaf Ali, Sucheta Kriplani and Usha Mehta worked underground during the Quit India movement. In August 1942 Mehta helped to establish a secret free radio station, which began broadcasting as Congress Radio. It was not shut down until mid November. Lt-Colonel Lakshmi Swaminathan was made Commander of the Rani Jhansi Regiment in Bose’s Indian National Army; women’s sections were started in Singapore, Malaya and Burma (Bala and Sharma 1986; Forbes 1996: 121–56; Franda 1971: 17; Jayawardena 1986: 94–105; Kaur 1968). Elsewhere, just as women were prominent fighters for the FLN in Algeria, Palestinian women such as Leila Khaled were part of the PLO’s most active terrorist groups, and more recently, women have been very evident amongst the radical socialist Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka as part of a common response of resistance to the succession of government (and Indian) anti-Tamil pogroms and military onslaughts since 1977 – though whether some acts, such as restoring one’s honour by committing a suicide-bomb attack, mark an advance for women remains doubtful (Amrane 1994; Gadant 1995; Khaled 1973; Maunaguru 1995; Peteet 1991; Ponnambalam 1983; Uyangoda and Biyanwila 1997). Women played a major role in the anti-colonial war in Vietnam against the French and the US. The communist Vietnamese activists Nguyen Thi Nghia, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai and Minh Khai were all arrested, tortured and executed by the French.

Women also fought in Malaya, Cuba, Nicaragua and in many other countries of Latin America (Jayawardena 1986: 208–9; Taylor 1999; Yuval-Davies 1997: 98). In colonies such as Algeria, in an operation made famous in the film *The Battle of Algiers*, women were often able to exploit the way that the colonial authorities characterized them with less threatening, less visible, domestic identities, in order to perform tasks that were impossible for the men (Fanon 1980).

In Africa women's participation in anti-colonial movements ranged from leading military campaigns against European colonizers, as in the case of Mbuya Nehanda, the war chief whose troops attacked the forces and installations brought into Shona country by Cecil Rhodes (she was captured and executed in 1897), or the famous women warriors of Dahomey, finally massacred by the French in 1894, to the violent resistance to colonial taxation by the peasant and market women of West Africa (modern Nigeria) in the 1920s, to a wide range of forms of positive action, economic and cultural resistance throughout Africa, to participation in legal and illegal forms of civil rights campaigns as in South Africa throughout the twentieth century, as well as participation in the armed struggle in Angola, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997; Mba 1982; Ranger 1956; Schmidt 1992). In West Africa women often played a central role in local party organizations, in electioneering processes and political campaigns, and as elected representatives (Mba 1982). Kwame Nkrumah observed:

The women of Africa have already shown themselves to be of paramount importance in the revolutionary struggle. They gave active support to the independence movement in their various countries, and in some cases, their courageous participation in demonstrations and other forms of political action had a decisive effect on the outcome. (Nkrumah 1957: 89)

Nkrumah's sympathies with communist and socialist ideas were enough to ensure his tribute to the role played by women in the liberation struggle, but he is here acknowledging a very real debt. Ghanaian women, he comments, have been the chief field organizers who 'have travelled through innumerable towns and villages in the role of propaganda secretaries and have been responsible for the most part in bringing about the solidarity and cohesion of the Party'. It is noticeable, however, that Nkrumah assumes that women never operated at the level of revolutionary leaders, or even as named activists, but only as part of a supportive grassroots activism. Of all the English and African women whom he mentions, the only one whom he cites by name was a woman party member in Kumasi 'who adopted the name of Ama Nkrumah ("Ama" being the female equivalent of "Kwame")' (Nkrumah 1957: 89–90).

Resistance by women in territories where nationalist agitation could not centre on a combination of strike action and electoral struggles was remarkable, particularly in Kenya and Southern Africa. The social structures of African societies in which women were able to exercise a substantial degree of economic and social autonomy contributed to this: the primary role of women in agriculture, in processing grain, in tasks such as the carrying of water, collection of firewood and cutting grass for the animals,

and in trade and market economies, for example, meant that they were traditionally autonomous in many spheres, guardians of the land and producers of food, and, even more significantly from the point of view of guerrilla warfare, very mobile, and could not be confined to domestic space by the colonial authorities.

The result was that women were able to participate in the freedom struggle in a variety of different ways. In Zimbabwe, for example, as the war continued, both young men and women increasingly left home to join the guerrilla forces. Most women report that there were always some comrades who refused to accept women as freedom fighters, or who tried to exploit them in predictable ways, but they also affirm the general atmosphere of equality that prevailed:

There is something I want to say about life in the camps: there was no difference between men and women. If there was any job to be done, like fetching water or wood, both men and women were detailed to do it, although fetching wood and water is traditionally women's work. There was only one difference: men were better trained in the use of arms than women. They were also issued with more weapons. But a woman officer was treated with the same respect as a man. (Weiss 1986: 90)

Even here, the prospect of 2,000 men being placed under a 23-year-old woman camp commander was quite a shock for some guerrillas; the result was, as often in other forms of public life, that the women commanders felt it necessary to be even better than the male commanders. In retrospect many Zimbabwean women argued that, freedom fighters aside, women were more politicized and involved in the armed struggle than the men, who often worked or sought refuge in the towns. Indeed, as many women testified, it was the rural women who fed and clothed the freedom fighters, either directly in their houses, or by taking hot food to their hide-outs in the mountains, or, in more heavily policed conditions, by hiding food in carts or under their clothes, wrapping dried meat, for example, round their chests under their breasts. The traditional mobility of women meant that they could always produce a legitimate reason for being out of doors if challenged by government soldiers. The production of food, clothes and even services such as washing for the guerrillas was frequently well organized in a formal structure of branch committees, and carried out on a communal basis with individuals appointed as supervisors. ZAPU member Rhoda Khumalo commented:

This war would not have been won without the women. They did a great job during the war. The comrades would not have been able to shoot a gun if they hadn't been fed. We cooked for them, washed their clothes and even protected them, because it was we who gave them information about the security forces. Women worked hard. (Staunton 1990: 71–2)

Between the freedom fighters and those who remained in their houses feeding them, young men and women also worked in a more ambiguous category as *mujiba* and *chimbwido*. The male *mujiba* were scouts, messengers, lookouts, as well as informers on 'sell-outs', i.e. those who collaborated (or were alleged to) with the government

forces. The term for the young women, *chimbwido*, means both an errand-girl and, more suggestively, a wild fruit: in practice, they looked after the freedom-fighters by feeding and clothing them, and were also expected to sleep with them; they often became pregnant by them. Sometimes girls volunteered to become *chimbwidos*; at other times, when staying near a village the freedom fighters would simply choose girls to be *chimbwidos*, while requiring all the young people to sleep with them as a means of ensuring that the villagers would not inform the security forces where they were. When a daughter became pregnant, a villager dared not complain, even though, worst of all from their perspective, the name of the father would not be known. For security, the freedom fighters always used false names.

The formal political organization of most African societies was dominated by men; colonial reorganization often neglected the informal power structures of women and had the effect of enforcing a loss of autonomy for women and a new level of patriarchal control (Likimani 1985: 15). However, the disruption caused by the political restructuring of the colonial authorities could also have the effect of making political space available for women. The breakdown of the traditional political system among the Giriama in Kenya, for example, was one reason why, in 1913, a resistance campaign was initiated by a charismatic but otherwise hitherto unexceptional woman named Mekatalili. Drawing on the tradition of a nineteenth-century Giriama prophetess, Mepoho, who had foretold the disruption and destruction of Giriama society with the arrival of white men, Mekatalili urged the Giriama to resist the attempts by the British to extend formal control over them, in particular by challenging the jurisdiction of the traditional elders and the use of taxation in order to obtain labourers. After the visit of the colonial provincial commissioner to explain the new ordinances, Mekatalili called the women together and performed a ritual, warning that Giriama customs were being undermined, and that the men taken for labourers would never return. The movement drew in many women and young men from surrounding areas, powerful oaths were sworn, and the British administration ground to a complete halt – there were no porters, no headmen's councils, no taxes paid and no labourers. The colonial authorities responded by arresting Mekatalili, but by then the unity of the Giriama in their resistance to the colonial demands was such that open war broke out in August 1914, after the rape of a Giriama woman by a policeman (Brantley 1981, 1986).

Women played an important role in the Kenyan independence movement over a long period. The first major issue around which struggle was organized from the beginning of formal colonial rule in 1895 onwards was the use of forced labour. Women were active during the 1920s and 1930s in the opposition to the hut taxes, which affected women more heavily than they affected men, and other colonial taxes designed to compel Kenyans to perform wage labour on the coffee plantations. Starting in the 1930s, women organized strikes and work stoppages on the plantations without the aid of the male-dominated trade unions. Women actively participated in the militant anti-*kipande* (work registration) protest organized by the East African Association (EAA), led by Harry Thuku, in 1921–2. The most remarkable was Mary Muthoni Nyanjiru, who worked with Thuku in the association and led the protest

against his imprisonment in March 1922. The EAA called for a general strike to protest Thuku's arrest, while a crowd of seven or eight thousand gathered in front of the Nairobi police station where he was held demanding his release. Reproaching the men for inaction, Mary Nyanjiru galvanized the crowd into rushing the police station. As she advanced upon the prison to release him she was shot, along with between twenty and fifty-five others. The East African Association was banned, but the lesson of the advantages of militant protest had been learned. The other major issue around which protest was organized was the appropriation of land. During the so-called 'Mau Mau' revolt in the 1950s, which was really a continuation of the long-standing opposition to land appropriation and taxes enforced by the white settlers, village women were subject to displacement to 'controlled villages' designed to isolate them from the guerrillas; at one point 35,000 women were imprisoned: this only encouraged their resistance (Kanogo 1987; Presley 1992). Kikuyu and other women were active at a local level in a similar way to the later war in Zimbabwe, providing the backbone of the organizational infrastructure. Unlike Zimbabwe, however, the Mau Mau guerrillas were forbidden to have sex with the village girls. There was a Mau Mau committee in every village, whose main duty was to organize transportation of supplies to the forest camps, including food, medicine and ammunition, and also, reported one peasant woman interviewed after the war, 'to ensure the security of fighters in the ridge by organizing an elaborate system of spying' (Likimani 1985; Maina 1987: 124). Women who had taken one of the Mau Mau oaths would be selected to carry supplies to other women, who would relay them up to the front. 'We used clever methods: we put them in a *kiondo* (a Kikuyu traditional basket) and covered them with flour. If we happened to meet the enemy – homeguards – we would pretend we were coming from a maize mill and the homeguards could hardly suspect us; you know they were dumb and stupid' (Maina 1987: 123). Women also engaged in activities which brought about a transformation of gender roles: in particular, they were empowered to administer the oaths of loyalty; they also fought as guerrillas in the Land and Freedom army, as it was known to the Kenyans themselves. Elizabeth Gachika, who described herself as a 'freedom fighter', was a member of one of the guerrilla camps in the Nyandura forest, from 1953 to 1955; she reported that there was no strict division of labour between men and women: 'We were doing just like men. We could shoot and so forth. . . . I shot many [Europeans]. . . . I went with the men on the raids' (Presley 1992: 136). A number of women were also prominent in the army at a national level, the best known of whom was Field-Marshal Mboni Muthoni. The Kenyan authorities were taken aback by the strength of participation by women at all levels during the revolt. So many were arrested that special prison camps had to be built for them, where they were subjected to a harsh regime designed to 'cleanse' them, i.e. persuade them to renounce Mau Mau.

Of all freedom struggles, the longest and the most recently realized, that in South Africa, saw the most active intervention by women, who in many instances, particularly in their vehement opposition to the Pass Laws, operated at the forefront of resistance to the *apartheid* regime. Resistance to the Pass Laws for women began as early as 1913: on 28 May of that year, in Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State, after

a mass meeting six hundred women led by Mrs Molisapoli, described in the English-language newspaper the *Bloemfontein Friend* as 'a stout native Mrs Pankhurst', stormed through the town demanding to see the mayor. The next day they confronted the police. The *Friend* reported that

Crowds of dusky Abigails crowded around the native police station. Here they tore up their passes, threw the pieces on the ground, defied the police in language more forcible than polite, conveyed the intelligence that rather than carry a pass they would suffer untold agonies and imprisonment. (Wells 1986: 253–8)

This incident was typical of the way that women's activism was brought to bear on the specific issue which restricted their lives, while also functioning metonymically, standing in for and thus stating a general opposition to the system of which it was a particular manifestation. The Pass Laws, like the requirement to build contour ridges in colonial Rhodesia, came to symbolize colonial oppression altogether: resistance to them signified resistance to the whole system. 'The war was fought because of this' commented Anna Madzorera of the order to dig contour ridges (Staunton 1990: 117). The means employed by women – petitions, street demonstrations and singing, which functioned as empowering statements and experiences of solidarity, campaigns of passive resistance inspired by Gandhi's campaigns in South Africa and Gandhi's own source of inspiration, the suffragettes in Britain, boycotts recalling Mayo strategies of resistance in the Irish land wars – were very different from those of the ANC, but no less effective (Wells 1982, 1993). By 1920 the ANC had recognized this and created a women's section; by 1949 the ANC Women's League, run by Ida Mtwana, was actively militant, both in union activism and against the ever-more comprehensive and stringent Pass Laws (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997). The women's movement in South Africa was never simply a sub-section of the ANC; it worked closely with the Federation of South African Women which had been formed in 1954 as an organization for all women, designed to bring about the emancipation of women in South Africa. Together, they organized a huge protest campaign of resistance to the hated Pass Laws, which by 1963 applied to all South African women. Protest against the Pass Laws was staged at a national level – twenty thousand women assembled in the Union Buildings, Pretoria; while their leaders delivered a petition to the (absent) Prime Minister Strijdom, those outside sang:

Strijdom, You have touched the women
You have struck a rock
You have dislodged a boulder,
You will die.

(Meli 1988: 133)

Resistance also developed at a grassroots level through local organizations in the cities and the countryside; as a result of the uprisings at Zeerust in the Transvaal, Natal, Pondoland and elsewhere, and demonstrations that were then staged across the country, many women were imprisoned or deported to the Bantustans, and the national

organization, the Women's Federation, to which many of these groups were affiliated, was banned. It was the fact that women's resistance operated from below rather than from above, drawing on widespread popular support from ordinary women, that enabled the power and strength of women's resistance to continue even after the banning of the Women's Federation and the ANC in 1960. By the 1970s, activism took the form of increasingly militant trade-union activities by black, coloured and Indian women working in solidarity together against both exploitation by their employers and by men on the shop floor. This occurred above all in the textile industry, where the Garment Workers' Union of African Women, under the radical and militant leadership of Lucy Mvubelo, and the Natal Garment and Furniture Workers' Union, led by Harriet Bolton, were particularly prominent in the widespread strikes and protests that took place during the 1970s and 1980s (Berger 1992: 264–90). The significant role that women now play in the democratized South African government, and the foregrounding of gender-related issues in modern South African political culture, is testimony to the place that women occupied in the fight against *apartheid* and the exploitative practices which it institutionalized and legitimized (Bozzoli and Nkotsie 1991; Walker 1990, 1991).

Given the extent of their political activism, it is the more striking that little acknowledgement of women's contribution was made in the extensive publications of the male leaders and theorists of the anti-colonial movements. Discussion of gender issues is notable by its absence. This characteristic was clearly highlighted by contradictions evident at the Sixth Pan-African Congress of 1974. The call to the Congress, which elaborates the long history of the Pan-African Congresses since 1900, invokes the great names of the movement – Blyden, Garvey, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Césaire, Padmore, Fanon, James and others. It attests to the significance of struggles in the US and cites the activism of Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Elijah Muhammed, Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, George Jackson, Imamu Baraka – and, finally, Angela Davis, the first and only woman. The history of Pan-Africanism is presented as a history of great men. Many of these were diaspora figures or lived in exile. The demands of the men in exile and the women who remained at home were only brought together when the Pan-African Congress was finally held in Africa itself. It was not until the 1974 Sixth Pan-African Congress that women's issues were specifically addressed, and the Congress asked to reflect upon the role and needs of women. It was, moreover, a Caribbean Latin American delegation from Guyana that raised the question by speaking on 'The Contribution of Women to the Development of the Pan African World'. The speech hardly makes very radical demands, certainly compared to those of the Turkish feminists at the Baku Congress of 1920, or any of the Comintern Congresses. It begins with a recognition that in traditional African society women had been regarded more equally, as *muntu*, arguing that they had been deprived of their economic and agricultural roles under colonialism by European assumptions about male and female roles. In anti-colonial nationalism, on the other hand, it is argued, women had typically tended to be seen in traditional terms as the centre of indigenous culture and cultural practices, 'as mother, moulder of the nation'. At the same time, the Guyanese women argue for a recognition of the 'key

role' played by black women during the freedom struggle, citing in particular figures such as Camara M'balia and Carmen Pereira in Guinea-Bissau who had died in action. While conceding the nationalist argument that 'the black women's chief contribution to the development of the Pan-African World will be, as it has been, in the area of the home, in the area of influencing the moral growth of our nation', the delegates also advocate a changing of assumptions, attitudes and laws, suggesting that the contribution of women should not be limited to these areas (Sixth Pan African Congress 1976: 190–7). The concluding Resolution on Black Women opens out the larger argument that 'black women have historically been subjected to three kinds of oppression: racial, class and sex', and resolves that:

The Sixth PA Congress:

- 1 Decides to give its total support to the political struggles for equality undertaken by black women.
- 2 Above all, calls upon the states and organizations participating in the Congress to tackle the problems of the oppression of women thoroughly and profoundly. (Ibid.: 197)

In this resolution, as mild as it is unspecific, it is noticeable that the political struggles of black women, while supported, are still regarded as separate from the main activities and political objectives of the Congress and not intrinsic to them. The Guyanese intervention raises many of the key issues of the relation of women to the anti-colonial movements: women fought and died in them, and yet themselves often featured in regressive ways within anti-colonial nationalist ideology, the result of which was that their fight for equality needed to be reaffirmed and still fought for even after independence. The national liberation movements were increasingly the sites of women's resistance, activism and struggles. The question has always been how far women's struggles coincided with those of anti-colonialism, and how far they existed in tension with each other.

2 THE RELATIONS OF FEMINISMS TO THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE

The international nature of feminism as a political movement meant that there were some women who reacted to the patriarchal structures of their society by claiming that women had no nation, since the nation was itself part of the patriarchal system. With communism, feminism is among the most internationalist of political discourses. But unlike communism, feminism is not intrinsically anti-imperialist. The participation of women in the anti-colonial national liberation movements raises a number of theoretical and political issues, starting with the question of the relation of the women's movement to the nation for which liberation was sought. There is no intrinsic reason why the two should be related at all, even if historically they have often been in practice. The first recorded use of the term 'feminist' and 'feminism' in English, in

1894 and 1895 respectively, suggests a historical coincidence with the emergence of the political campaigns for colonial independence. Women could be nationalist and feminist; they could also be nationalist without being feminist, and vice versa. Women were positioned as colonial as well as gendered subjects: feminist resistance to patriarchy could be relatively indifferent to the national or ethnic differences between patriarchal oppressors, or, as in the case of many converts to Christianity, could locate in Christian ideology forms of freedom from local social forms of oppression. Krupabai Sathianadhan, for example, the daughter of Brahmin parents who converted to Christianity in the mid-nineteenth century, found in Christianity the basis of her criticisms of high-caste Hindu arranged marriages; these were focused particularly on women's roles within such marriages, including their restricted access to education. A strong sense of national identity, however, meant that she was never inclined to identify her position with that of the colonial government of British India. It was therefore more typical to attack both: in 1887, Pandita Ramabai, already well known for her criticisms of Hindu patriarchy, attacked the priests and patriarchal Hindus ('thousands upon thousands of young widows and innocent children are suffering untold misery and dying helpless every year throughout the land, but not a philosopher or Mahatma has come out boldly to champion their cause and to help them'), while also criticizing the colonial government for not defending Indian women, adding:

It is false to expect any justice for India's daughters from the English government, for instead of befriending her the Government has proved to be a worse tyrant to her than the native society and religion. (Kumar 1994: 102)

Some women, however, for example in colonial Algeria, did support or invoke the support of the colonial power on the grounds that it provided the means for achieving equality – a feature which the French were quick to exploit by appealing directly to Algerian women (many Algerian women, however, were also active in the armed struggle) (Gordon 1968). This brings out the dialectical relation of some feminisms to local and colonial forms of patriarchy. In the nineteenth century, the fight against patriarchy in the colonies became entwined with the struggle against forms of imperial oppression: the coincidence of the two was not arbitrary, given that the ideology of imperialism was itself highly patriarchal. At the same time, women continued to resist local forms of patriarchal oppression, making strategic use of the colonial agenda for reform, intended to substantiate its claim to be carrying out a civilizing mission. Women therefore became doubly positioned in a complex way. As women participated alongside men in nationalist struggles for the emancipation of their country, they also sought to win their liberation as a sex, by claiming rights, equality, access to public space and public activism, and to education. As long as these demands were compatible with those of the liberation movement (as they were in most socialist-based movements), the two worked well together in a complementary way. Where the liberation movement was not thoroughly socialist in its political agenda, however, for example in India, relations were more conflictual. Independence removed the colonial power, but by no means

guaranteed that the new state regarded women's emancipation as a primary component of its political agenda.

For many women in the anti-colonial era it should be acknowledged that what was at stake for them, was, in the same way as for men, political liberation from colonialism. The understanding was that independence was the political priority, and that the nation's freedom must come first. In this structure of deferral, developments after independence were often regarded by women as a betrayal, although it could be argued that such betrayal itself formed part of the larger failure of postcolonial governments to fulfil the promises of freedom.

In the final February insurrection in Tehran women were very active either as a back-up force for helping the wounded, distributing food, setting up barricades in the streets and preparing 'molotov cocktails', or actually taking up guns and taking over the police stations and other strategic points. . . . However, soon afterwards it became evident that women were not going to achieve further emancipation through the new regime and instead the inadequate rights and concessions granted by the previous regime could be reversed. The women's movement that emerged soon after the Revolution was in response to the negative attitude of the regime to women's particular problems. (Davies 1983: 144)

This was a story that could be told of the aftermath of freedom struggles throughout the three continents. Today it appears that the relation of the national liberation movements to women's movements was frequently one in which mutual support soon turned to antagonism once independence had been achieved. Although women were generally active in all independence movements, the position of women afterwards differed according to the different ideologies of the liberation movements. Schematically speaking, anti-colonialism followed three possible models: socialist, reformist and nationalist. The political relation of feminism differed with respect to each, depending on its own political identity. For the most part, the objectives of the socialist and self-modernizing forms of anti-colonialism were almost entirely compatible with the women's movement's own political objectives; the main issue came with respect to priorities and continuing unperceived forms of patriarchy. However, where anti-colonialism became allied to forms of indigenous cultural or religious revivalism, as in Iran, and claimed that the position of women was 'as mother, moulder of the nation', then things became more difficult, relations more fraught and contestatory. Women's emancipation was sometimes a casualty of the process of the turn to alternative forms of resistance to the west, at which point the direction of women's social reform agenda was no longer compatible with that of the liberation movement, or subsequently the state.

The three forms of anti-colonialism, resistance through anti-imperialist socialism, colonial modernity, or a nationalism ideologically based on a return to indigenous forms, were rarely completely distinct and many alliances and mergers were effected between them. For example, one form of colonial modernity was linked to a revival of traditional culture and its values, through which it was affirmed, from a reading of the ancient texts of Islam or Sanskrit, that the ancient civilization had in fact been

monotheistic (Hindu), or rational and scientific (Islam, according to al-Afghānī and his many later followers), or democratic, or matriarchal, or socialist (Senghor, Césaire and Nyerere all claimed that traditional African societies had been socialist; Mariátegui asserted the same for the Incas). It was also the case that there were many links and continuities between the projects of modernity and socialism, whereby socialism took over the homeopathic project of inoculating the colonized nation against the west by reform and self-modernization: socialism offered a form of modernity that was also a critique of the colonizer. Despite these convergences, in broad terms the three positions articulated the range of political possibilities, possibilities that have not changed substantially in the postcolonial era.

3 SOCIALISM

The development of the women's liberation movement in the west in the 1960s, though self-consciously referring in its name to the national liberation movements, suggests their separate, if related paths. The relation of feminism as an emancipatory movement to national liberation in many ways raises the same questions as that of both to Marxism, where distinct political projects overlap in certain areas but potentially conflict in others. The nationalist demand for self-determination and a democratic state typically also extended to demands for equal rights for women at the juridical and political level. Bourgeois feminists stopped at this point, satisfied with political changes that for the most part affected only the elite and did not put their own class privilege at risk. Socialist feminists, on the other hand, saw equal political rights as merely the first stage of a wider social reconstruction for all women that would challenge and transform local, industrial, social and familial practices in which women continued to be subordinated. Whereas nationalism involved no intrinsic connection to feminism, even if the two were often allied during the national liberation movements, Marxism, by contrast, did. As was shown in chapter 11, socialists and communists always fully supported and implemented rights for women, which were regarded as an essential part of the drive for equality. Communism's relations with feminism, though by no means as problematic as those with nationalism, nevertheless always involved the political and theoretical difficulty that it was necessary to distinguish socialist from bourgeois feminism which fought injustice against women but not injustices between women, or other forms of oppression. In affirming the necessity of communism for this fuller realization of women's emancipation, communism logically became the larger goal. This was increasingly seen as problematic, particularly in view of the fact that while communism always endorsed equality, in practice communist parties made decisions about priorities that did not fully reflect this. At the same time, it remains the case that in practice feminist objectives require some form of socialism if injustices between women, for example at the level of class and the international division of labour, are to cease.

Up until the resurgence of women's movements in the 1960s, it is striking how it was only men from the socialist or communist camps who regarded the issue of

women's equality as intrinsic to other forms of political liberation. Equally, it was only communist revolutions, such as in China or Cuba, where legal and social equality formed a part of the post-independence state programme. Despite this, many sites of inequality were overlooked. The main feminist effort therefore concentrated on challenging continuing oppressive social practices and attitudes. Anti-imperialism that took the form of socialism or communism was nevertheless the least problematic for feminism in general terms, in that as political philosophies they included gender equality, together with racial equality, as intrinsic to their vision of a just society. Whether locally at the level of resistance to a particular colonial power, or globally against the imperialist system, socialist forms of liberation struggles saw their objectives as essentially compatible with those of socialist feminism. Women worked alongside the men, and the women's movements formed an intrinsic part of the struggle.

The struggles against colonial rule were liberating in themselves. They contributed to changing women's social roles and produced a greater participation in public affairs. So Eduardo Mondlane, leader of FRELIMO, for example, wrote of how recruitment of women into the army effected social change:

By accepting women into its ranks, [the army] has revolutionized their social position. Women now play a very active part in running popular militias, and there are also many guerrilla units composed of women. Through the army, women have started to take responsibility in many areas; they have learned to stand up and speak at public meetings, to take an active part in politics. In fact they do a great deal of important work in mobilizing the population. When a woman's unit first visits a village which is not yet sufficiently involved with FRELIMO, the sight of armed women who get up and talk in front of a large audience causes great amazement. (Mondlane 1969: 47–8)

Mondlane records that 'the effect on the astonished men' of seeing a woman guerrilla who had been fighting the enemy was to galvanize them into volunteering *en masse*, though he remains circumspect about what exactly was encouraging them in this situation. It was not just in terms of role models that the army brought about significant social changes for both men and women: FRELIMO – like many other liberation movements – functioned as both a military and an educational institution, in particular teaching recruits how to read and write. Tainie Mundondo, for example, worked as a primary school teacher in a FRELIMO camp north of Tete in Mozambique at the same time as receiving military training; she was subsequently sent to Denmark for further education (Weiss 1986: 89). Despite the egalitarian framework of the FRELIMO campaign, the issue for women that remained was whether their participation in the nation's drive for liberation had been on their terms, or whether they had found themselves exploited as women by the men or had been treated as equals. As in the Soviet Union or China, socialism may institutionalize forms of equality but that does not transform the ideology of men's traditional patriarchal assumptions overnight. However, in principle there is no reason why the socialist state should not continue to work towards new objectives of a more far-reaching equality.

In Marxist or socialist anti-colonialism there was thus no substantive ideological conflict with socialist feminism. Where differences remained, socialist feminism's

objective has been to produce a transformative effect upon socialist thought and practice, just as, for example, women fighting in liberation armies also fought at the same time for equality within those armies (Maunaguru 1995). For socialist feminists, independence came to represent a means towards a greater end that had still to be worked for. The second form of anti-colonialism, that of colonial modernity, where emancipation was to be achieved through self-modernization and reform, was relatively unproblematic for both socialist and bourgeois feminism in so far as the goals of both movements were identified: the achievement of feminist objectives constituted one of modernity's defining features.

4 MODERNITY

In her path-breaking *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, Kumari Jayawardena shows in impressive detail how from the 1880s onwards many tricontinental feminists were also anti-imperialists active in the anti-imperialist struggle, in both civil and military contexts. She argues that Asian women's emancipation shared three common facets with national struggles against imperialism:

first, the desire to carry out internal reforms in order to modernize their societies, it being felt that this was necessary if they were successfully to combat imperialism; second, the dismantling of those pre-capitalist structures, especially ruling dynasties and religious orthodoxies, that stood in the way of needed internal reforms; and third, the assertion of a national identity on the basis of which people could be mobilized against imperialism. (Jayawardena 1986: 3)

Of these three common feminist and anti-imperialist objectives, it is noticeable that the first two do not directly involve an anti-imperialist objective as such, but are concerned with the issue of reform. Although from a postcolonial perspective the oblique method of resistance through self-westernization goes against the grain, the strategy of combating the west through reform and self-modernization was the dominant mode of early anti-colonial resistance, particularly in the face of western military superiority. Many aspiring leaders of colonized societies who travelled to the west brought back western ideas with them and the conviction that their own countries needed to modernize in order to achieve self-determination. This was typically accompanied by self-castigation of many aspects of indigenous culture, which were seen as the relics of a backward feudalism that had to be removed. Anti-colonialism was an economic, technological and cultural as well as a political enterprise. Outside India, a good instance of this way of thinking was the May 4th movement in China in 1919: its aspirations to modernity were most graphically represented in its project to romanize the Chinese script (Dirlik 1989, 1991). The outstanding examples of successful reform movements in the nineteenth century were Egypt and Japan, which, in Egypt under Muhammad 'Alī from 1805 onwards, and in Japan after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, achieved the feat of self-modernization to a remarkable extent in a strikingly short space of time, and it was their success which admiring Indians, Irish and others aspired to emulate.

Jayawardena's account of the development of feminist ideas within the Indian reformist movements, which, like those in Islamic societies, were initially often championed by men, notably Raja Rammohan Roy and Isvarachandra Vidyasagar, shows the length of feminism's active contribution to a specifically Indian political discourse (Jayawardena 1986; Mernissi 1985). The history of self-modernization, the aspiration towards modernity that characterized the reform movements, and the primacy placed on being 'modern', has been an issue in Indian society since the inception of the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal in the 1820s, and was essentially predicated on a belief that the success of the European powers must have been bound up with certain aspects of modernity – technology, rationality, the position of women, equality, education, secularism and so forth (Kopf 1979; Nanda 1976). In contrast to the various ideologies of Asian capitalism which have sought to develop the technologies of modern capitalism alongside and separately from western cultural norms, those in the reform movements made a determined effort to try to modernize their own cultures separately from any relation to capitalism, in order to move out of what seemed to them to be a state of irretrievable decay in their own societies. This involved the use of western dress and diet, hostility towards traditional institutions, particularly feudal rulers, religious functionaries, popular superstition, oppressive cultural practices such as *sati*, female infanticide, temple prostitution, and polygamy, and a desire for education and the teaching of English in schools and colleges. This early nationalism, which saw the way forward as progress through modernization, was generally compatible with the aims of women's emancipation, since women's emancipation was regarded as one of the essential features of western success. Here, therefore, there was no conflict for any kind of feminist in being nationalist and vice versa.

One substantive problem arising from the association of women's rights with modernization, however, was that reforms often did not penetrate further than the upper classes who increasingly defined themselves by being 'modern', while for lower-class women things went on much as before (Chatterjee 1993: 135–55). At the same time, social reform movements were never straightforwardly anti-colonial. Although in India, for example, women's campaigns for social reform and regeneration have traditionally been discussed in the context of the freedom struggle, the connection is relatively tenuous (Kaur 1968). A figure such as Pandita Ramabai was predominantly a champion of women's rights and education; her Christianity made her appear to many (men in particular) as sympathetic to the colonial power (Chakravarti 1998; Forbes 1996; Ramabai Sarasvati 2000; Viswanathan 1998). In fact, as Rosalind O'Hanlon argues in her introduction to Tarabai Shinde's *A Comparison Between Women and Men* (1882), for some Indian feminists in the nineteenth century, colonial rule was regarded 'as a source of many benefits for women', even though Shinde herself at the same time chided her contemporaries for abandoning Indian traditions and imitating English ways (O'Hanlon 1994: 47).

In India, where the reform movement had always been contested by hard-line nationalists, it was Gandhi who effected the transition whereby affirmation of indigenous culture became the dominant form of ideological contestation, visibly promoting and affirming the worth of Indian peoples and their culture, and rejecting

modernity as a concept. However, Gandhi also advocated his own reforms, for example of the caste system, and was always balanced politically by Nehru who was secular, modern, socialist and western-oriented. Gandhi himself recounts how in his early days he was influenced by 'the "zeal" for reform' and began to eat meat and adopt other western practices such as smoking, dancing and the clothes of an English gentleman (Gandhi 1982: 33–63). In subsequent years, he defined himself through nationalist *swaraj*, which amounted to the very reverse procedure, adopting local practices, affirming vernacular Indian cultural forms, and taking a public stance against some reformist and modernizing tendencies. This shift away from reformism created some problems for the alliance between the women's and anti-colonial movements. Gandhi's ideas and practices could certainly by no stretch of the imagination be called feminist. Nevertheless, as has been suggested, he identified with many feminist causes and recognized the potential of their political strategies. More unusually, from a contemporary anti-colonial perspective, a large number of women were involved in his movement: from his early years in South Africa onwards he encouraged women to participate fully in the *satyagraha* campaigns, increasingly considering them most suited to *satyagraha* technique. He also tried to move beyond the involvement of exclusively urban elite women towards supporting activism by peasant women and workers. It is generally recognized that the Civil Disobedience campaign marked a major step in the emancipation of women in India. The outstanding example of women's participation at the organizational level was the Bardoli campaign of 1928, where Bhaktiba, Sharda Mehta and Mithiben Petit, supported by many other women, played outstanding roles, and in which the women participants outnumbered the men. Gandhi's own entourage also had a high proportion of women supporters, the most prominent of whom were Miraben, Sister Nivedita and – the only Indian woman of the three – Sarojini Naidu. Naidu, along with many other women nationalists, was, however, highly critical of Gandhi's decision not to allow any women to participate in the Dandi March. Gandhi's adamant refusal to change his mind sits rather oddly with his later claim that 'my experiment in non-violence would be instantly successful if I could secure women's help' (Gandhi 1993: 387). Feminists have also made significant critiques of his ideas about sexuality and the role of women, which in many ways embodied traditional Hindu and puritanical Victorian concepts of women and femininity. His practice of sleeping with young female associates and relatives in order to test his purity also caused immediate and continued controversy (Bakshi 1987; Jayawardena 1986; Kaur 1968; Kishwar 1986; Mehta 1990; Nanda 1976; Parekh 1997: 22; Patel 1988; Sarkar 1989).

The cultural revival which he initiated was highly effective in terms of the Indian independence movement, but much more problematic with respect to the position of women, whom Gandhi tended to project in traditional roles, even while himself appropriating 'feminized' modes of struggle. The reform movement was continued primarily through socialism, represented above all by the figure of Nehru, who was comparatively progressive on women's issues (Jayawardena 1986: 95–9). The brilliance of the Indian independence movement was that the Congress Party managed to combine the two forces of modernity and recidivistic cultural revival through the

alliance between Nehru and Gandhi. One casualty of this hybrid politics, however, was that women's issues, which had occupied such a prominent place in debates over social reform in India in the nineteenth century, largely disappeared from public debate in the early twentieth century. Partha Chatterjee has argued that the reasons for this were that relations between the politics of nationalism and those of Indian feminism became problematic around this point; the women's question was therefore resolved in a way that made the two compatible:

The home was the principal site for expressing the spiritual quality of the national culture, and women must take the main responsibility of protecting and nurturing this quality. No matter what the changes in the external conditions of life for women, they must not lose their essentially spiritual (i.e. feminine) virtues; they must not, in other words, become essentially westernized. . . . There would have to be a marked *difference* in the degree and manner of westernization of women, as distinct from men, in the modern world of the nation. (Chatterjee 1993: 126)

Within this ideology, which was developed widely by nationalists outside India as well, women and modernity became separated from each other, and the identification of the two henceforth became a betrayal of the nationalist cause. Conversely, as Chatterjee observes, in relation to the social position of women in India, 'the story of nationalist emancipation is necessarily a story of betrayal' (ibid.: 154). The Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 offers a good example of the split between nationalists (many of whom opposed it) and feminists who, as Mrinalini Sinha has argued, supported it in the name of an "'Indian" modernity' (Sinha 1999: 207). Many of the problems for women in the postcolonial era could be said to have been initiated by this convenient but costly resolution. It was at the point where nationalism began to be expressed through notions of cultural revival rather than reform that feminists began to appropriate elements of modernity as their own, against nationalist arguments (Barlow 1997). It was not only in the most conservative states where women's objectives had to be reasserted at independence, and a new liberation struggle begun.

One new struggle prominent in postcolonial theory has been the critique of contemporary western bourgeois feminist theory by tricontinental women on the grounds of its eurocentrism. This breakdown of the alliance between feminism and (post)colonial modernity is characteristic of the powerful political questionings which characterize postcolonial thought. Drawing on similar critiques by African-American women, of which those by bell hooks have been the most prominent, the work of Mohanty, Spivak and others has interrogated assumptions that liberal positions which may be progressive for women in the west are necessarily the best for women elsewhere (hooks 1991; Mohanty 1984; Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991; Spivak 1987). The idea that women outside the west need to be saved by benevolent western feminists was at the heart of feminist imperial ideology (Midgley 1998). The challenge of postcolonial feminists has involved the demonstration of how far such views are culturally bound. Dress offers a good example: the stubborn adherence displayed by Muslims to remaining fully clothed is regarded in the west as a mark of their assumed

backwardness and repression. This is most overdetermined with respect to the practice of veiling: as Yeğenoğlu (1998) has demonstrated in a sympathetic analysis, the very dichotomy of veiling/unveiling is itself a construct of Orientalist thought that bears no necessary relation to the cultural experience, or politics, of Muslim women. As Fanon showed, in the Algerian Revolution the veil, far from being a fixed cultural form stubbornly anchored in the past and living on as a primitive cultural relic as Europeans often assume, was mobile, responsive, and was used instrumentally in the liberation struggle (Fanon 1980: 13–45). Women deployed the veil strategically, switching between western and Muslim dress in order to evade colonial control (in the same way, Saadi Yacef, FLN commander during the Battle of Algiers, regularly dressed as a Muslim woman in order to move freely around the city). Like western feminists, however, Fanon still operated with the same assumptions as the French colonial administration that identified unveiling with a progressive modernity. Many contemporary feminists, tricontinental as well as western, would still agree with this position. By contrast, Yeğenoğlu argues that the veil is a form of dress that articulates ‘the very identity of Muslim women. Only if we see the veiling of women in Muslim culture as a unique cultural experience, we can then actually learn about what it is to veil or unveil a woman, rather than simply resetting the liberal scene and repeating commonsensical and clichéd standards in the name of universal emancipation’ (Yeğenoğlu 1998: 119). Even here, it might be added, veiling is presented as a unitary phenomenon. Veiling in fact involves a whole range of very different practices in different cultures. Some of them may be oppressive; others not.

5 CULTURAL NATIONALISM

The relation of the women’s movement to anti-colonialism has been most fraught when the latter has manifested itself as a form of nationalist cultural or religious revival. Feminism’s relations to nationalism have always been as ambivalent as those of socialism’s, the more so given the significance of patriarchal ideas about gender in the creation of colonial nationalisms. European feminists could follow Pankhurst’s location of feminism with socialist internationalism, or Woolf’s identifications of feminism with pacifism and patriarchy with nationalism, and therefore assume the complete separation of the two, but things were not so easy in the colonial arena. The historical forces that facilitated the development of nationalism within the colonies were similar to those that enabled feminism. The two emerged alongside each other, though their aims and assumptions were sometimes conflictual. In practice, feminism as an ideology was often tolerated and endorsed as a way of encouraging the participation of women in liberation struggles. However, some forms of anti-colonial nationalism, for example in Central Asia, which were expressed as anti-modernist, anti-secular cultural and religious revivals, portrayed feminism as one of the incipient corruptions of colonial modernity. Afghanistan was nationalist without ever being reformist or ‘progressive’. For this reason, rather as politicians in Africa and Latin America preferred to identify with socialism in what they claimed was its precolonial indigenous

model, so women's movements in many tricontinental countries professed to follow their own cultural forms and goals, and disavowed any relation to western feminism or western modernity. It remains the case, on the other hand, that the attitude of any anti-colonial nationalist movement towards modernity, colonial or western, generally provides the key to its relations to local women's movements.

The relation of women's emancipation to nationalism depended on the specific forms which both took. For women, the problem centred on the fact that the conditions against which they were campaigning were the product of two kinds of oppression which put the antagonists of the nationalist struggle in the same camp: patriarchal systems of exploitation were common to both colonial regimes and indigenous societies. Women therefore had to fight the double colonization of patriarchal domination in its local as well as its imperial forms. In the lives of many women, the first was a good deal more immediate than the second. In some tricontinental societies, women were still subject to a variety of forms of domestic restriction, legal subordination at many levels, physical mutilation, or infanticide. As a result, feminists, such as those in Turkey or Egypt, identified with forms of social existence drawn from the example of western societies, and allied themselves with the pressure for modernization that was also espoused by nationalists resisting feudal or monarchical institutions that had submitted to imperial control in order to perpetuate or even increase their own power at a local level (Beck and Keddie 1978). This could also, however, work the other way. In Egypt under Mohamed Ali, and Turkey under Mustafa Kemal, at different times an autocratic regime promoted an ethos of modernization and equality for women, which then produced a popular reaction against it (Yeğenoğlu 1998). In Iran, feminism and nationalism coincided during the political events of 1905–11, but subsequently diverged after 1924 when the autocratic Shah, whose rule was supported by Britain and the US, forcibly imposed progressive legislation for women, including banning the use of the *chador* in 1936 (Halliday 1978; Keddie 1981). The consequence of this was that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was to identify such policies with imperialism. Where women had been more socially independent, on the other hand, as for example in parts of Africa, patriarchal assumptions by colonial administrations meant that women were often increasingly disempowered under colonial rule, for example losing their land rights (the Ndebele of Zimbabwe in Rhodesia, the Luo in Kenya), or as a result of the changes brought about by urbanization, severely policed in their activities in the informal economy (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997).

In the twentieth century the increasing assertion of national cultural identity became more problematic for feminists, since the affirmation of an indigenous cultural identity against the imposed culture of the colonizer tended to involve the reinvocation of more traditional forms drawn from the very social structures against which they were struggling; for example, the identification of women with *Bharat Mata*, Mother India, or the good Hindu wife, the *sati*. In some instances, such as dress, surviving elements of traditional culture could be employed strategically. In others, the consolidation of national identity involved the identification of women with roles upholding the traditional, familial values of society, which conflicted with the introduction of equal education and legal equality for women, or with traditional practices that were

oppressive to women such as polygamy, dowry, child marriage, the prohibition of widow remarriage, and female infanticide. All these were subjects of active concern to European feminists – a self-appointed political affiliation between women of dominant and dominated cultures that has continued in many respects to be problematic to this day (Burton 1994; Kim and Choi 1998; Mayo 1927; Mohanty 1984). The most spectacular of these, the Hindu practice of *sati-daha* or widow burning, has received extensive analysis on account of the ways in which it became subsumed in nationalist arguments in an extremely problematic way for women (Mani 1989; Nandy 1980; Spivak 1999; Sunder Rajan 1993; Weinberger-Thomas 1996). Although the British policy in India had been one of minimal interference in local customs and law, in the face of what James Peggs described as *India's Cries to British Humanity*, the British made an exception with respect to *sati* after the Chief Pandit had declared that it had no *shastric* authority, and formally outlawed it in 1829 (Peggs 1830). The result was that local Bengali reformist opposition to *sati*, such as that of Rammohan Roy and the Brahmo Saraj movement, was replaced by its celebration as a form of cultural nationalism by indigenous elites (Gaur 1989). As in the case of the British missionary's attempt to restrict female genital mutilation in East Africa in the 1920s, or the Government of India's Age of Consent Bill, which raised the legal age of consent for sexual intercourse for girls from 10 to 12 which was bitterly opposed by the Indian nationalist leader B. G. Tilak, colonial intervention had the result of transforming practices of abuse against women into ones identified with issues of nationalist resistance and the assertion of cultural rights (Hyam 1990; Jayawardena 1986). In *Facing Mount Kenya* Jomo Kenyatta gave a positive account of the practice of clitoridectomy and denounced missionary and other doctors who had opposed it as 'irresponsible' and 'more to be pitied than condemned' (Kenyatta 1938). Kenyatta's glorification of *irua* (clitoridectomy) illustrates the problematic relation of women's emancipation to an emancipatory nationalism: although often working in alliance with each other, the two cannot be identified. The involvement of the Kenyan nationalists in the controversy shifted it to an issue of colonial confrontation; the protest by women, from 1927 to 1933, was focused on their right to womanhood, to what they saw as an indispensable rite of passage to adulthood, marriage and full participation in Kikuyu society (Presley 1992: 89–93).

6 THE PROBLEMS FOR FEMINIST POLITICS AFTER INDEPENDENCE

At independence, many decolonized states guaranteed women equal rights in their constitutions, but this by no means meant that women enjoyed equality in practice, or that they did not continue to be subject to wide-ranging forms of social oppression. Political independence was not the end of the struggle and for this reason postcolonial critique has identified with campaigns for women's access to education, work, and many other areas in the social sphere which go beyond a constitutional political equality. As in the west, emancipation did not bring liberation for women.

Just as Che Guevara argued that political liberation must be followed by social and economic liberation, so feminists have held that national political emancipation must be followed by social and economic liberation for women. Independence in many cases constituted only a minor and often fragile achievement in relation to the main objectives of women's movements. Women's emancipation remains a major part of the unfinished business of the postcolonial era. In many arenas, its main adversary continues to be the ideologies of nationalism and religious fundamentalism that have continued to develop social practices and forms of cultural identity that can be oppressive for women (Ahmed 1992). For this reason tricontinental feminism constitutes a central, not marginal, part of postcolonial politics.

The case of Algeria illustrates forcibly how political independence could, in the longer term, also become a disadvantage for women in societies where the rulers took advantage of their power to reverse the secular forms of social advancement that women had already achieved (Knauss 1987; Lazreg 1994; Messaoudi and Schemla 1998; Moghadam 1994; Pérez Beltrán 1997; Vandeveld-Daillière 1980). In Egypt large numbers of women participated in the 1919 Wafd nationalist demonstrations against the British; they were compelled to demonstrate again when the new constitution of 1924 ignored women altogether. However, this achieved nothing, and women activists have been working ever since to change social institutions and attitudes (Beck and Keddie 1978; El-Sadaawi 1980; Jaywardena 1986; Mayer 2000; Wilford and Miller 1998). The expectations that feminist social objectives would be met as a reward for the selfless contribution of women to the independence struggle were often not realized. So Zimbabwean women freedom fighters observe that 'now we, the women . . . are forgotten', 'yes, women did a lot, but no one recognizes what they did'. 'Women played a very important role in the struggle. . . . Now women have to liberate themselves' comes as a common refrain among those women who had suffered greatly while supporting the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe (Staunton 1990: 156, 144, 66). The lack of gratitude, the assumption that women would return to their former roles without question, was an experience shared by many western women who fought in the Second World War. It formed, in turn, an exact parallel with the disappointed expectations of colonial soldiers after the First World War that the *dette de sang* would produce independence for the colonies. One of the arguments of postcolonial feminist analysis is thus that women were often empowered during the liberation movements, only to find themselves disempowered by the new state that they had helped to create. Even in countries such as Guinea-Bissau, where legal equality was protected by law at independence, and where women such as Ernestina Silà and Francisca Pereira formed a prominent part of the revolutionary PAIGC, in practice, as Cabral had foreseen, the necessary changes in the social structure were slow to take place and required further action (Urdang 1979). Attitudes and social behaviour had to be changed, as well as laws.

Though women could and did take part in anti-colonial activism, both constitutional and militant, it remains the case that the civil and social position of women in other kinds of newly formed nation-states often reproduced colonial, feudal or western structures of control and oppression (Chatterjee 1993; Kandioyoti 1991;

Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). As Yuval-Davies and many others have pointed out, the role of gender in formations of the nation has at best been a problematic one (Mosse 1985; Parker et al. 1992; Yuval-Davis 1997). Symptomatically, many of the prominent theorists of nationalism such as Gellner, Hobsbawm, Kedourie or Smith, do not consider the question at all. In terms of political struggles, the post-independence era brought a separation of feminists from nationalist ideology as nationalism reversed its role from the basis of anti-colonial struggle into that of state power. The new states frequently failed to adjust to new needs and priorities after liberation or succumbed to the greed of bourgeois elites who appropriated the machinery of colonial power. An increasing contestation of the patriarchal values and social structures of the nation-state emerged, often focusing in the first instance on issues concerning the body and biological reproduction. The politics of the women's movement most tellingly articulates the differences between the anti-colonial and postcolonial periods. However much they were in sympathy with anti-colonial struggles, feminist movements, which were and are primarily a force for equal rights and equal access at all levels of society, by no means achieved their objectives simply with the political independence of the nation. Political independence was merely one stage of the much longer struggle of women for social change, often representing a founding moment for a new phase of activism (Park and Sunder Rajan 2000; also Davies 1983; Jelin 1990; Mikell 1997; Moghadam 1994; Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987). From that point of view, despite the very different political histories involved, postcolonial women of the three continents share a common political commitment and objective.

Edward Said and Colonial Discourse

How did tricontinental counter-modernity, with the radically different epistemology of the anti-colonial movements and their aftermath, succeed in infiltrating its alternative forms of knowledge into the academy as 'postcolonial theory', into the institutional site of knowledges globally dominated and validated, hitherto, by the criteria and positionality of the imperial west? Together with the material institutional factors already considered in chapter 5, the major theoretical move comprised a critical reconsideration of the whole of the project and practice of colonial modernity not merely as a particular military and economic strategy of western capitalist societies, but also as itself constituting and generated by a specific historical discourse of knowledge articulated with the operation of political power: colonization, in short, involved epistemic as well as physical violence. The introduction of the idea that colonialism operated not only as a form of military rule but also simultaneously as a *discourse* of domination was the achievement of Edward Said, whose intervention was simultaneously extraordinarily enabling and theoretically problematic.

Although the genealogy of postcolonial theory is historically complex, extensive, and itself an example of the transcultural admixture that it so often analyses, it was Edward Said's critique in *Orientalism* (1978) of the cultural politics of academic knowledge, from the basis of his own experience of growing up as an 'Oriental' in two British colonies, that effectively founded postcolonial studies as an academic discipline, invested in the political commitment and the locational identification of its practitioners (Said 1985: 25). It was Said who appeared more than anyone else to have broached the formal articulation of the political commitments and ideological critiques of the anti-colonial movements with other theoretical work, in particular that of structuralism and poststructuralism (Said 1983). This was in itself nothing unusual, since anti-colonial activists, as has been seen, were always ready to make use of any forms of theoretical or political knowledge that were available. Other political intellectuals, moreover, such as Amin, Fanon, Glissant, Hountondji, Ribeiro or Santiago, to take a few names at random, had certainly already been making use of contemporary material, some of which could be described as structuralist or poststructuralist, without any sense that there was some inherent discrepancy

between it and 'indigenous' or Marxist thought or the politics of liberation. Said did, however, make a decisive contribution with respect to the problematics of language which, by the 1970s, had become a major focus for contemporary radical intellectuals on the left. Calvet (1974), Ngugi (1981) and others had already made significant interventions with respect to the language politics of colonialism. Said, for his part, completed the theoretical articulation by moving the analysis of colonialism, imperialism and the struggles against it to the question of discourse. Even here it was never a question of articulating anti-colonialism with a completely separate body of theoretical work in linguistics. For the theoretical origins of what became known as structuralism and poststructuralism were themselves closely entangled in forms of resistance to western dominance. This argument will be substantiated here with respect to Derrida: other material will be considered elsewhere.

What is interesting about *Orientalism* is that however influential (and its influence can hardly be overestimated), it has always been seen to be theoretically and politically problematic. Few books can have sustained let alone survived the veritable barrage of critiques that have been deployed against *Orientalism* over the years. In fact you could argue that postcolonial studies has actually defined itself as an academic discipline through the range of objections, reworkings and counter-arguments that have been marshalled in such great variety against Said's work. Who among postcolonial critics, struggling to emerge from the half-life of traditional academic disciplines, from Ahmad (1992) to Bhabha (1994), from Hulme (1986) to McClintock (1995), from Lowe (1991) to Yeğenoğlu (1998) to Young (1990), has not begun their postcolonial new life with a critique of Said? The production of a critique of *Orientalism* even today functions as the act or ceremony of initiation by which newcomers to the field assert their claim to take up the position of a speaking subject within the discourse of postcoloniality. It goes without saying that, as Eagleton has remarked, the statutory requirement of this initiation rite is that the newcomer denounces one or preferably several aspects of the founding father's text, criticizes the very concept of the postcolonial and then asserts that he or she stands outside it in a position of critique (Eagleton 1998: 24). This ritual has now even developed a *mise-en-abyme* repetition effect, whereby the new critic makes his or her intervention by criticizing not only Said, but all previous commentators as well, conflating their texts with Said's, and then accusing them of either repeating or not recognizing the very problems that they originally located in the ambivalences of Said's text . . . and so on. Only by doing this do you demonstrate that you are discursively 'in the true', as Foucault put it, with the postcolonial.

It was above all the idea of *Orientalism* as a *discourse* in a general sense that allowed the creation of a general conceptual paradigm through which the cultural forms of colonial and imperial ideologies could be analysed, and enabled *Orientalism* to be so outstandingly successful, to establish a whole new field of academic inquiry. While orthodox Marxist accounts had correctly emphasized the primacy of the economic in the development of colonialism and imperialism, the diversity of economic conditions, the historical and geographical differences between colonies (how to compare, for example, the United States with India?) meant that there was no other general schema through which the particularity of the cultural effects of colonialism and

imperialism could be analysed. Said's use of the notion of a discourse to demonstrate the way in which forms of knowledge were constructed within a particular kind of language, which in turn was replete with all sorts of cultural assumptions, enabled Orientalism, and colonialism more generally, to be analysed as an ideological production across different kinds of texts produced historically from a wide range of different institutions, disciplines and geographical areas. At the same time, many of the problems that have generated such intense critical activity around Said's text result directly from the way that Said formulates the idea of a discourse in *Orientalism*. Despite becoming a fundamental concept deployed in postcolonial theory, colonial discourse has never been fully theorized, or indeed historicized, and in particular it has not been substantively theorized in relation to the work of the theorist to whom it is conventionally affiliated, via Said: Michel Foucault.

There is no reason at all why Said should not have modified Foucault for his own purposes. Given the arguments about the theoretical basis of Said's text, however, and given that Said's notion of discourse is routinely identified with Foucault's, one question that needs to be established is how close the two are. Typically, postcolonial critique begins, as noted above, with a critique of Said and then, finding Said wanting in some respect, goes on to establish its own terrain which amounts to an interpretation of a set of texts that can be centred on common issues or perspectives. An alternative, to be followed here, would be to return to Foucault, to see whether some of the problems arise from Said's use of Foucault, and whether Foucault's own account of discourse can be reworked less problematically. It could hardly be suggested that it could be reworked more productively: *Orientalism* must have been one of the most productive books of recent years, in terms of the mass of related writings that followed. It could even be that the unresolved theoretical problematic of the book was itself the basis of this.

1 DISCOURSE AND POWER IN SAID

What exactly, though, is this 'discourse'? 'Colonial discourse analysis' derived from Foucault via Said is not directly concerned with language as such, but rather with a discursive regime of knowledge. As we shall see, when Said introduces this notion at the beginning of *Orientalism*, he refers generally to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish*. He also cites *The Order of Things*. However, in practice he seems to take many of his ideas about discourse from another essay of Foucault's which he also cites, 'The Order of Discourse' of 1970, which, somewhat misleadingly translated as 'The Discourse on Language', is included at the back of the US Pantheon edition of the *Archaeology* (Foucault 1981; Said 1986: 150). In that essay, Foucault's 'discourse' describes the particular kind of language to which specialized knowledge has to conform in order to be regarded as true (for example, medical discourse, the discourse of theoretical nuclear physics, of computers, history, literary criticism, or love). Said takes from Foucault the idea that the development of a discourse is an inseparable part of the formation of a discipline and the delimitation of the object

which that discipline studies, a delimitation which, in the first instance, will be restrictive – though as Said points out, such constraints can then in their own way subsequently be productive (Said 1985: 14). According to Foucault discourse always involves a form of violence in the way it imposes its linguistic order on the world: knowledge has to conform to its paradigms in order to be recognized as legitimate. The historian's sense of unease with colonial discourse analysis is obviously an example of this in practice: to the historian's ear, the language of colonial discourse analysis is not 'in the true'. The way in which a discourse is constructed involves not only the development of a particular form of language – legal language for example – but also an agreed set of procedures, simultaneously of legitimation and exclusion.

Said sets up his argument about discourse at the beginning of *Orientalism* as follows. He outlines the interchange between the imaginative and academic meanings of 'Orientalism', and then goes on to characterize it in a third way, as something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two:

Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point, Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it, in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault's notion of a discourse, as described by him in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and in *Discipline and Punish*, to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. (Said 1985: 3)

Said thus grounds the fundamental theoretical concept utilized in the book in Foucault: that concept has become known as 'colonial discourse'. Although Said here suggests that Foucault's *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish* are the source of his own concept of discourse, the account he develops is only loosely affiliated to Foucault's theory of discourse as most fully developed in *Archaeology* (Foucault 1972). Many of the problems that have been subsequently identified in the notion of a colonial discourse derived from Said's work, in particular what is widely regarded as too determining and univocal a notion of discourse, too restrictive and homogenizing, would not be relevant to a theory of colonial discourse educed more directly from Foucault's *Archaeology*. One problem is that commentators have consistently preferred to try to modify Said rather than retheorize colonial discourse from Foucault's original substantive treatment of the concept. Said of course himself never even claimed to offer a theory of 'colonial discourse' as such in the first place – his was an analysis of Orientalism, as a discourse.

The idea of Orientalism as a corporate institution with its own discourse is quite close to Foucault. The latter's emphasis on power, discipline and domination in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1977a; cf. Foucault 1980) is invoked when Said argues that Orientalism is

above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what 'we' do and what 'they' cannot do or understand as 'we' do). (Said 1985: 12)

Here Orientalism is characterized as a discourse produced 'in an uneven exchange' with different forms of other institutional discursive power, and this comes close to what Foucault describes as a 'positivity', though Foucault emphasizes that the positivity is made up not merely of discursive interactions but of interactions between discourses and material events and circumstance, the forms through which discourse is, as it were, entangled in the material world. Said himself argues that in this sort of power, Orientalist discourse did not merely provide a *post-hoc* justification of colonial rule, but operated more instrumentally: 'To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact' (Said 1985: 39). Said therefore speaks of Orientalism as 'a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient' (ibid.: 95). Of course, no one has ever assumed that Said was making the simplistic argument that Orientalism was just an ideological supplement to European colonialism, fabricated consciously in the direct service of imperialism. White mythologies rather involve an operation of a will-to-truth in the formations of knowledge themselves. What Said shows is that the will to knowledge, and to produce its truth, is also a will to power. Academic knowledge is also a part of the apparatus of western power, and as Foucault puts it, 'it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together' (Foucault 1978: 100). It was the fundamental argument repositioning academic knowledge from its claims to objectivity and autonomy that was at the basis of the impact that *Orientalism* achieved in the academy.

Said thus conceptualizes this power/knowledge structure via Foucault, particularly *Discipline and Punish*, with some additional help from Gramsci, though his stress on hegemony, as many critics have pointed out, remains unqualified by any account of counter-hegemonic resistance. His reference to Foucault for the idea of a discourse in the example cited above also operates closely to the spirit of Foucault to the degree that he moves seamlessly between different writings and institutions: 'dealing with it [the Orient] by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it . . .'. The material that Said analyses, however, becomes increasingly focused on texts by particular writers, and not the productions of institutions or the relations between them. This textual emphasis has been central to the academic knowledge generated by the book. Said's deployment of the concept of a 'discourse' for his analysis of Orientalism enabled him to demonstrate a consistent discursive register of particular perceptions, vocabularies and modes of representation common to a wide variety of texts extending across the humanities and social sciences – from travel accounts to history, from literature to racial theory, from economics to

autobiography, from philosophy to linguistics. All these texts could be analysed as sharing a consistent colonial ideology in their language as well as their subject matter, a form of knowledge that was developed simultaneously with its deployment and utilization in a structure of power, namely colonial domination.

In *Orientalism* Said emphasizes what he called his 'hybrid perspective', the method of which was to focus on the 'material effectiveness . . . of statements made by Orientalist discourse'. This correlates to the position taken in an essay published in the same year, 'The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions', in which he compared Foucault to Derrida (Said 1978). Said characteristically chose Foucault over Derrida, but it is significant that he discussed Foucault's work, including his theory of discourse, under the rubric of 'textuality'. Although no one would ever accuse Said of employing deconstructive methods, as *Orientalism* proceeds its analyses nevertheless become more textual in focus. Said discusses specific Orientalist texts that collectively constitute what he characterizes, after Foucault, as the 'discursive formation' of Orientalism. Here he emphasizes the estrangement of Orientalist discourse from material circumstance about which it claims to provide knowledge, shifting to a primary emphasis on how Orientalist texts consist of representations 'as representations' which by no means depict the truth of the Orient. Rather, they employ 'various Western techniques of representation that make the Orient visible, clear, "there" in discourse about it. These representations rely upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-on codes of understanding for their effects, not upon a distant and amorphous Orient' (Said 1985: 23, 28). The Orient is constructed in a representation that is then transmitted from text to text, with the result that Orientalist writing always reproduces its own unchanging stereotype of an unchanging Orient. Orientalism as a discourse constitutes a linguistic repetition structure of representations that draw their reality from the authority of textual repetition rather than any truth-value in relation to what they claim to represent. At this point, Orientalism begins to be seen as operating not primarily as a discursive discipline, but rather at the level of a tradition of representation, which Said criticizes on the grounds of its misrepresentation of the real in a hegemonic power/knowledge structure. This move from a concept of discourse to one of ideological representation in Said is at the centre of the theoretical problematic of his text.

The degree to which questions of representation replace a Foucauldian concept of discourse can be discerned from Said's position with respect to the notion of 'the Orient'. At the beginning of the book he comments that although Orientalism as a practice produced its own form of knowledge of the Orient, 'it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was *essentially* an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality' (Said 1985: 5). Said took from the *Archaeology* the argument that a discourse is an epistemological device which constructs its objects of knowledge through the establishment of a practice of a certain linguistic register. Rather than simply describing the world as it is, as if language mediates reality directly, a discourse constructs the objects of reality and the ways in which they are perceived and understood: as Said put it, 'such texts can *create* not only knowledge but also the very reality that they appear to describe' (Said 1985: 94). To say that knowledge is mediated by discourse,

however, is very different to saying that there is no reality corresponding to what it is referring to, and that Orientalism thus bore little relation to the real. By the end of the book, he argues:

The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be accounted for by saying that the *real* Orient is different from Orientalist portraits of it. . . . It is not the thesis of this book to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient. . . . On the contrary, I have been arguing that 'the Orient' is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically 'different' inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally a highly debatable idea. (Ibid.: 322)

The Orient, in other words, has now become an ideological representation with no corresponding reality. There can be no 'real' Orient because 'the Orient' is itself an Orientalist construction. Orientalism was a signifier whose signified corresponded only to a western fantasy world, 'the Orient'. It was a western projection onto the Other producing only knowledge of 'the Other'. Said thus moves between an account of Orientalism in which knowledge is produced discursively, and an account of Orientalism as a representation that is only a virtual reality. It could be objected that this difference that I have emphasized is really only nit-picking: what Said means is perfectly obvious. Like the 'Third World' the 'Orient' is a name for something that at one level is real but at another level does not exist in that general form as an object of knowledge. Even so, Said still here leaves Foucault far behind. For Foucault's theory of discourse is not a theory of texts, or of textual representations, the interpretation of which makes up so much of what is called colonial discourse analysis. Rather, it is a theory of announcements, of discursive events. Its aim is to establish the rules according to which such discursive events emerge. ✓

2 THE OBJECTIONS TO 'COLONIAL DISCOURSE'

As has already been suggested, many writers have subsequently articulated objections to, or problems with, Said's argument, the sheer number of which is a testimony to its own discursive power. I shall now consider more specifically some of the objections that have been voiced generally about the 'colonial discourse analysis' derived from Said's work, particularly from the perspective of historians. Here I should stress that I am not proposing these as my own objections as such, rather voicing the kind of objections that one encounters in discussion. The question of the status of discourse itself, to which many of these objections lead, will be considered last.

The problem of the status of claims from the example of a few texts A common objection from historians is that colonial discourse analysis typically examines a restricted number of largely literary texts but then proceeds to make large historical generalizations based on them. At a theoretical level, this involves differences about questions of evidence, of 'representativeness', typicality, or the status of the example. There are

also questions about the historical status of individual texts: how significant were they, and for whom? Should it be a question of seeing the individual text as implying an historical effect, or discernible impact, or as seeing the text itself as the product, or the effect, of a history beyond it?

The problem of historicity If a problem of conventional historiography is that it does not address its own historicity, an objection to colonial discourse analysis (an objection often made against *Orientalism* itself) is that it dehistoricizes, and treats all texts as synchronic, as if they existed in an ahistorical unchanging spatialized textual continuum. The related objection made here is that analyses of colonial discourse often do not articulate discursive material with non-discursive histories, do not demonstrate that even if it participates in a discourse, an individual text is still part of a non-textual history with which it connects and interacts, influences or by which it is itself determined.

The emphasis on the textual nature of history Historians customarily tend to be wary of acknowledging that their discipline involves or participates in 'literary' questions such as narrative or interpretation, and begin to feel uneasy when historical analysis too obviously becomes a question of interpretation rather than the amassing and judging of historical evidence. Many historians prefer to affiliate their disciplinary model to the law rather than to literary studies. Colonial discourse analysis runs the risk of making these issues more visible and therefore of undermining the disciplinary identity of history as objective research. The problem is that analysis of 'colonial *discourse*' means that analysts look at texts as texts rather than as documents providing evidence about historical events. The implication in colonial discourse analysis that the representations of objective reality in the documents under scrutiny probably bear little accurate relation to what was depicted, suggesting that all knowledge is partial, and further that history itself therefore needs to be rewritten from a range of minority or subaltern perspectives, again threatens any notion of history as an objective discipline. The question that always follows is that if all history is partial, how can we ever know that a history is in any sense 'true'? Maybe we can't. Truth may, as Foucault suggests, be an effect. At the same time, critics such as Aijaz Ahmad, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, or Benita Parry, have also criticized the textualism and idealism of colonial discourse analysis which, they argue, occurs at the expense of materialist historical inquiry and politicized understanding (Ahmad 1992; Lazarus 1999; Mohanty 1984; Parry 1987, 1994a, 1998).

The question of representation Crudely put, the colonial discourse analyst analyses the representation as a representation, while the historian generally analyses the representation in terms of what it represents. Colonial discourse examines linguistic evidence, like most forms of history, but is primarily concerned to analyse the forms of representation, how they are structured, what assumptions – for example of ethno- or eurocentrism – they contain, what western ideologies they project, etc., etc. Having said that, it is not primarily concerned to compare the representation of these texts to the referents that they may or may not represent. It does not ask questions such as 'Is

it accurate?', 'Is this text telling the truth about what really went on?' etc., although it always assumes, as Said does, that more truthful forms of history could be told. Of course, given that history is a discipline whose object is in fact absent, this is always a problematic enterprise. It means, to state the point again, that colonial discourse analyses are analyses of *representations* rather than investigations that seek to deliver facts or appraise evidence as such. This means that they may come to very different conclusions than a conventional historical project, though the representations, facts or evidence may all in fact be the same. The study of representations will, moreover, be as much interested in what is not said as in what is said.

As has already been suggested, something of this ambivalence between history as representation and the real develops in Said's text. He develops his idea of an Orientalist discourse that operates at the level of representation, and criticizes it on the grounds of the misrepresentation of the real in a hegemonic power/knowledge structure. However, he then acknowledges that it may be impossible for anyone to represent other cultures accurately anyway. After spending most of *Orientalism* criticizing the representations of the Orientalists, Said asks:

The real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they *are* representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is *eo ipso* implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the 'truth', which is itself a representation. (Said 1985: 272)

The problem that follows here is that if truth is a representation, how can Said, or anyone else, know that anything has been misrepresented? If Orientalism has been a misrepresentation then, as Said asks at the end of the book, 'how does one *represent* other cultures?' (ibid.: 325). This perhaps also explains why, if the representations of Orientalism were so false, as Said continually insists, he does not offer a method that enabled a counter-representation that allowed the subaltern to speak, in Spivak's phrase (1985) – a task which he admits his study leaves 'embarrassingly incomplete'.

The complaint that discourse forms a homogeneous totality that overrides the particularity of historical and geographical difference Here the objection argues that the claim for a general 'discourse of colonialism' is totalizing and simply does not answer to the range of historical and geographical differences that exist in the real world either in the past or the present. Is the very category of 'colonialism' as such a feasible one? To what extent is 'colonial discourse' itself a legitimate general category in its claim to provide a way of dealing with the totality of discourses of and about colonialism? Is it a single discourse, or were there multiple discourses in operation during the colonial period, as Peter Hulme has argued? Does the fact that modern colonialism was effected by European or European-derived powers mean that the discourse of colonialism operated everywhere in a similar enough way for the theoretical paradigms of colonial discourse analysis to work equally well for them all?

The theory of discourse Most of these problems follow from the theoretical paradigm that Said introduced and which has since been widely followed in 'colonial discourse analysis', which is customarily taken to involve the examination of the ways in which a particular kind of discourse was developed in order to describe, represent and administer the colonial arena. Many commentators, notably Homi K. Bhabha, have criticized Said for employing too determining and univocal a notion of discourse, and this has constituted the major basis for the critique of the concept of discourse in *Orientalism*. Said insists on the uniformity of the discursive regime of Orientalism, that no westerner can ever escape; but this assertion is somewhat undermined by his own analysis of the complexity and range of positions taken up by the writers whom he discusses. He does not demonstrate the ways in which individuals become subjects by using language and assuming discursive positions. This forms the basis of the revisionary model of colonial discourse proposed by Bhabha, who has emphasized discourse's ambivalence and heterogeneity rather than its fixed homogeneity and always successfully realized intention.

While there have been substantial critiques of Said's position with respect to these questions of historicity, textuality, representation, homogeneity and determinism, there has been surprisingly little work that tries to rethink the notion of colonial discourse outside the terms of the original paradigm that Said set up. Instead of objecting to Said and qualifying him by modifying his ideas in certain ways, what needs to be done is to retheorize colonial discourse as such.

3 DISCOURSE IN LINGUISTICS

The way in which 'colonial discourse analysis' is generally understood is really often no more than that it examines the ways in which a special kind of discourse was developed in order to describe and administer the colonial arena. 'Colonial discourse analysis' can allow this vagueness of self-definition because the word 'discourse' is so ambiguous. The term is used in a wide variety of meanings even within linguistics; for example, sometimes discourse is employed to distinguish spoken from written language, but more commonly to refer to a substantial example cited for analysis of either (Fairclough 1992). Typically, the linguist will define the organizational features of dialogue or of a written sample, for example from a newspaper. Either kind of text will be regarded as an interactive social product: part of a dialogue between speakers and listeners or readers, who will be interpreting as well as producing language, always within a specific situation. Linguists also use the term 'discourse' to describe different registers of language, the different modulations of the kind of language people use or process as they move from the family meal, to reading the newspaper, to visiting the doctor, to talking to a close friend on the phone, to a business meeting, to the children's bath time. The term 'colonial discourse' is often used in a loose way to indicate the typical kind of language employed to discuss matters colonial; however, this can only operate as a general descriptive term, not as an analytic instrument.

Somewhat confusingly, colonial discourse analysis does not relate in any direct way to what sociolinguists call discourse analysis. Discourse analysis in linguistics is itself a

very varied field, with a wide variety of approaches (for some of the range, see Dijk 1985; Fairclough 1992); generally it involves either descriptive or critical textual analysis according to methodology derived from a specific linguistic theoretical framework. Although there are examples of discourse analysis that concentrate on the question of its ideological function (Fowler 1979; Pêcheux 1982), only Calvet has addressed the issue of colonialism specifically and produced a theoretical framework for analysis of language in a colonial situation. His work, however, remains virtually unknown in the postcolonial field. Calvet employs an orthodox Marxist framework, which views colonialism as an extreme version of the capitalist state: structured according to material inequality and thus social conflict. The state maintains power by direct force, together with accompanying juridical and legal structures that serve to legitimize its dominance. The discourse of the state reinforces its ideological superstructures, which in the colonial situation will include the value system that operates in favour of the language and culture of the colonizer against those of the colonized. The well-documented practice of devaluing the language of the colonized with the object of ultimately making it extinct, Calvet characterizes as 'glottophagie' – the devouring of languages (Calvet 1974). 'Glottophagie' constitutes an ideological analysis of the operation of languages in contact (very often as a direct result of colonialism) that is analysed in largely neutral terms in Pidgin and Creole linguistics.

The linguistic and thus cultural effects of colonialism have been much more highly developed in Francophone postcolonial theory than elsewhere; writers in English have rather tended to foreground linguistic interaction as a metaphor of cultural mixing, as in Brathwaite's analysis of 'creolization' (Brathwaite 1971). Anglophone postcolonial analyses of 'the language question' have concentrated on its broader ideological operation: the institutional power structures that employ a hierarchy of languages, enforcing the dominance of the language of the colonial power (past or present) over indigenous languages (Larbi Korang and Slemon 1997; Ngugi 1983). In addition to a consideration of the effects of translation between dominant and indigenous languages, the socio-political implications of the double (at least) language situation in most colonial countries as a result of the imposition of a foreign language, have been analysed most fruitfully according to the paradigms developed by Balibar with respect to the operation of language hierarchies in mainland France (Balibar and Laporte 1974; Balibar, Merlin and Tret 1974; Cheyfitz 1991; Niranjana 1992; Rafael 1988). These linguistic uses of the term 'discourse' are not incompatible with, but remain rather different from, the ways in which it is used in sociology and political science, for example by Althusser, Habermas or Giddens. Here it is not a question of detailed methodological analyses of the forms of syntax, higher-level organization or interaction from a linguistic point of view, but rather of the function of language as a part of, or barrier to, social and political life. This can be approached from the perspective of its broad ideological function (Althusser 1971; Crowley 1989, 1991; Habermas 1984–7; Gramsci 1971) or its ideological function in relation to gender (Cameron 1985; Spender 1985).

Said himself spends very little time in *Orientalism* discussing the theoretical aspects of discourse, and postcolonial critics have followed suit. Aside from Bhabha's work,

there have been relatively few substantive discussions, redefinitions and reformulations of colonial discourse at a theoretical and conceptual level, as opposed to critiques of Said (Bhabha 1994; Hulme 1986; Lowe 1991; Mills 1991; Niranjana 1992; Pratt 1992; Spivak 1987, 1993; Young 1995). Many books that use the term, even in their titles, never seem to feel the need to enquire what the 'colonial discourse' they are discussing might be (e.g., among many, Berman 1998). The general assumption has been that colonial discourse analysis has developed from the rubric of Foucault, but typically in fact involves analysis of examples of specific texts, thus returning to the traditional interpretive skills of the literary critic. As a result, the tendency, as has been suggested, has been to emphasize colonial discourse's predominantly textual nature. Sara Mills, for example, defines colonial discourse simply as 'the analysis of texts written by westerners about colonized countries' (Mills 1991: 2). Colonial discourse analysis has here been turned into just a form of literary criticism that focuses on a certain category of texts.

This returns us to the complaints of textualism often posed against colonial discourse analysis. The irony is that Foucault's own model of discourse in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* could be said to answer many of the fundamental objections that are made against colonial discourse. His most sustained and searching analysis and formulation of the nature of a discourse, however, has never been seriously considered by postcolonial theorists. One can hardly blame them, given that it is also passed over rather quickly by most of Foucault's own commentators (see McNay 1994: 66–84, for a comprehensive, exacting analysis). It is Foucault's most difficult book. It also offers a very idiosyncratic conception of discourse.

Foucault in Tunisia

1 FOUCAULT'S SILENCE: SIDI-BOU-SAÏD AND THE CONTEXT OF *THE ARCHAEOLOGY*

It is not only with respect to discourse that Foucault has been a central theoretical reference point for postcolonial analysis. Whether early or late, so much of Foucault seems to be applicable to the colonial arena – his emphasis on forms of authority and exclusion, for example; his analysis of the operations of the technologies of power, of the apparatuses of surveillance, or of governmentality (Bhabha 1994; Scott 1995). Foucault's own concepts are themselves productive, enabling forms of intellectual power. Even his images are extraordinarily suggestive: take, for example, the description of the ship of fools with which *Madness and Civilization* begins, the boat that carried from port to port its cargo of insane people who had been expelled from their native town. Later this ship of fools would become the form of the enforced migration of surplus populations to North America, to Australia, or the wandering ships of Jewish refugees that travelled the Mediterranean when the British authorities in Palestine acceded to Palestinian demands for an end to Jewish immigration. These diasporic images correspond to Foucault's own argument, made in a lecture given in 1967, that the twentieth century was dominated by concepts of space and spatial organization (Foucault 1986). As a result, many of Foucault's own concepts involve suggestive spatial and geographical metaphors: position, displacement, interstice, site, field, territory, geopolitics – spatialized concepts that have been further developed by postcolonial critics (where would they be without interstices?) as well as by postcolonial anthropologists such as Johannes Fabian or historians such as John Noyes in his *Colonial Space* (Fabian 1986: 78; 1991: 198; Noyes 1992: 52).

By contrast, Foucault's work displays a virtual absence of explicit discussions of colonialism or race (Young 1995b). Foucault remained curiously circumspect about the ways in which power operated in these arenas. Challenging this absence, Laura Ann Stoler has teased out the implications of his concept of biopower for the history of colonial racialized practices (Stoler 1995). Foucault's own silence on these issues is striking. In fact his work appears to be so scrupulously eurocentric that you begin to

wonder whether there is not a deliberate strategy involved: consider, after all, the context of the Paris of Sartre, Fanon and Althusser, the traumatic defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Algerian War of Independence, the national liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s, to say nothing of his own trips to Brazil, his contemplated move to Zaire, and, most of all, his two-year residence in Tunisia.

It was in fact the *Archaeology of Knowledge* that Foucault wrote while he was living in Tunisia, developing the ideas of the book in lectures at the University of Tunis, where he taught from 1966 to 1968. He lived in the small village of Sidi-Bou-Saïd and wrote the book during long hours of intense, isolated reflection in the early mornings. He also witnessed the violent pro-Palestinian demonstrations during the Arab–Israeli war of 1967 that by March 1968 developed into explosive student protests against the government of Habib Bourguiba and anticipated the events of May in Paris. Foucault became involved with the student activists, and by extension with their impressively fierce version of a Trotskyist–Maoist Marxism. As a result of his involvement, he began to re-read Marx, Luxemburg and Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* (Miller 1994: 171). Foucault later remarked that 'for me Tunisia in a sense represented an opportunity to reinsert myself into the political debate'; as his biographer translates, 'it was precisely his Tunisian experience that allowed a much more vocally militant Foucault to emerge' (Macey 1993: 204, 206). Events in Tunis and subsequently in Paris were to enforce Foucault's belief that 'if one is interested in doing historical work that has political meaning, utility and effectiveness, then this is possible only if one has some kind of involvement with the struggles taking place in the area in question' (Foucault 1980: 64).

At the same time, he used his distance from France while working in a postcolonial state the better to develop an ethnological perspective on French culture. Ethnology, for Foucault, was only useful as a study of one's own culture: he regarded its use for the study of other cultures, as in anthropology, as fundamentally misconceived. At the end of *The Order of Things* he had written that ethnology consists of a structural science predicated on a hypothesis of sameness, and it is this that enables it 'to link itself to other cultures in a mode of pure theory'. Ethnology, therefore, allows the exercise of a kind of comparative homology between cultures, one based on their all being made to conform to a fundamental western model:

There is a certain position of the Western *ratio* that was constituted in its history and provides a foundation for the relation it can have with all other societies. . . . Obviously, this does not mean that the colonizing situation is indispensable to ethnology . . . but . . . ethnology can assume its proper dimensions only within the historical sovereignty – always restrained, but always present – of European thought and the relation that can bring it face to face with all cultures as well as with itself. (Foucault 1970: 377)

Ethnology, Foucault here suggests, does always not have to rely on the power relation of colonialism, but it does require 'the historical sovereignty . . . of European thought'. As a disciplinary practice of knowledge, it depends for its very existence on a power relation of European hegemony. In producing a general model of how cultures organize and define themselves, ethnology for Foucault is therefore not about

the particular differences of other cultures, but about how such differences conform to an underlying theoretical pattern formulated according to the protocols of European thought. This means that

ethnology . . . avoids the representations that men in any civilization may give of themselves, of their life, of their needs, of the significations laid down in the language; . . . it sees emerging behind those representations the norms by which men perform the functions of life . . . the rules through which they experience and maintain their needs, the systems against the background of which all signification is given to them. (Ibid.: 378)

Foucault ends *The Order of Things*, his *Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, by naming ethnology and psychoanalysis as the foundations of the human sciences in general. He argues that ethnology should describe itself in his terms – not as the study of societies without history, but as the study of ‘the unconscious processes that characterize the system of a given culture’. The proper use of ethnology comes not in studying other cultures but in developing what Bhabha defines as one of the key tasks for the postcolonial critic, the development of ‘a critical ethnography of the west’ (Bhabha 1991: 54). *The Order of Things* itself represents an ethnology of what Foucault always describes very specifically as the ‘Western *episteme*’ (Foucault 1970: 378; cf. Honneth and Jonas 1988: 131). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, though entirely methodological, remains one of the greatest examples of an ethnology of European institutional practices of power.

Tunis, therefore, had the effect of sharpening Foucault’s critical gaze on French culture. In terms of his politics, it increased Foucault’s own involvement with political movements in the three continents, which continued until the very end of his life. In his academic work, by contrast, for the most part he preserved a scrupulous silence on such issues and has, as a result, been widely criticized for alleged eurocentrism (Said 1986: 149–55; Spivak 1987: 210). Clearly, Foucault’s distrust of the eurocentrism of any ethnology of other cultures was one factor prompting this contradiction. At a personal level, while he himself was more active politically than any other philosopher since Sartre, his public dispute with a Sartre who had become the major spokesperson for tricontinental issues in contemporary France, no doubt also made Foucault more reluctant to make competing public interventions in this area (Sartre 1971: 110; Caruso 1969: 109; El Kabbach 1968). He had in fact moved to Tunis partly to get away from the public interest in Paris in their quarrel. The effect of his residence in Tunisia worked in a different way: first to provide the critical distance for a more effective ethnology of the west and its mechanisms of power, and second, to make him radically reconceptualize the role of ‘the other’ and alterity in his work. The result was that Foucault, against the earlier current developed in *Madness and Civilization*, came rather to deny the possibility of the other’s separated existence and reduction to silence. In its critique of the central thesis of *Madness and Civilization*, the *Archaeology* signals a major revision in his thinking.

Foucault’s early work had provided the theoretical model for an ‘archaeology of silence’ designed to retrieve what Said’s Orientalism had excluded: the Other. In

terms of the social production of the subject, Foucault's *Madness and Civilization* (1961) functioned as a founding study of the way in which society has produced its forms of exclusion. Foucault himself described *The Order of Things* as a history of resemblance and sameness, of the incorporation of the Other into the same, whereas, he said, *Madness and Civilization* comprised a history of difference, of the expulsion of alterity.

The history of madness would be the history of the Other – of that which, for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcise the interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its otherness). (Foucault 1970: xxiv)

In a similar way, as we have seen, Said's Orientalism describes a system of apparent knowledge about the Orient but one in which 'the Other' from that Orient is never allowed, or invited to speak: the Oriental Other is rather an object of fantasy and construction. Among postcolonial critics, this account of the discursive representation of Orientalism has subsequently been balanced by attention to the reality which that representation missed or excluded and has inspired a whole movement dedicated to retrieving the history of the silenced subaltern: both in terms of the objective history of subaltern or dominated, marginalized groups, 'counter-histories', and in terms of the subjective experience of the effects of colonialism and domination. This demonstrates that they are not in any way 'Other', only that this is how Orientalist discourse presents them according to its own binaristic logic. Foucault's concept of discourse, which revises his earlier account of alterity, does not operate according to this exclusive mechanism.

2 DISCOURSE IN FOUCAULT

The theory of discourse that Foucault elaborates in the *Archaeology* is altogether different from any of its manifestations in linguistics. Foucault by contrast emphasizes the role of discourse in the structuring of the knowledge of objects as a part of the formation of scientific disciplines, or indeed in the construction of knowledge as such and the creation of the categories, such as deviance, mental illness or sexuality, through which society is organized. This is the argument for which he is best known, and indeed it is this aspect that Said invokes in *Orientalism*. Foucault's theory of discourse and discursive practices, however, goes much further than this. He does not make it easy, it has to be said. His theory of discourse, as he points out, is not properly a theory but rather a 'coherent domain of description' (Foucault 1972: 114; further references to the *Archaeology* are cited by page number only). In refusing every normative category, concept and form of analysis, inevitably it remains somewhat enigmatic, not least because he refines, qualifies and revises his argument as he proceeds. Foucault's very radical notion of discourse is primarily directed away from any form of textualism, textual idealism, texts as disembodied artefacts, or intertextuality, to-

wards a concept of the materiality of language in every dimension. Foucault wants to consider each act of language – written or spoken – as an historical event, a unique point of singularity, and to trace the ways in which it interacts and interrelates with material circumstance. His notion of discourse is therefore refined through a number of concepts that make it clear that in most respects the concept of discourse is very different from any conventional notion of text. It does not refer to sentences, propositions or representations, and is not organized or unified according to any psychological, logical or grammatical categories. Foucault's discourse does not set up a body of texts for interpretation of their common themes or ideas, language or ideology, meanings (conscious or unconscious) or representations. Its analysis, he argues, 'avoids all interpretation'.

A discourse, Foucault suggests, is primarily the way in which a knowledge is constituted as part of a specific practice whose knowledge is formed at the interface of language and the material world. Therefore, medicine or psychiatry attempts to establish knowledge that will operate at the site of interaction between language and the body. In general, knowledge is not contained discursively, but exists at the edge between language and the rest of material reality. Discourse is a border concept, a transcultural practice that crosses intellectual and physical boundaries, both because in practical terms knowledge in discourse will be part of everyday practices, and because material conditions will also operate on the conceptual formation of knowledge. Foucault, therefore, analyses forms of knowledge, but such knowledge is never considered in an abstract, disembodied mode: it never becomes part of the general 'field of discursivity' as for Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Knowledge operates in the interstices of the contact zone between concepts and materiality. The difficulty – but also the value – of his analysis is bound up with this desire to characterize discourse as a material, historical entity. Whereas language can be considered solely in the aesthetic realm of the text, and knowledge can be considered in the abstract, transcendental field of philosophy, discourse works in the realm of materiality and the body, in the domain of objects and specific historical practices.

A sequel to the *Archaeology*, conceived as an analysis of the forms of historical discourse, was unfortunately never completed. In the *Archaeology* itself, Foucault is not interested in ideas or their history in the abstract, but in how ideas of medicine, psychiatry, penalty, cash-out as a part of material practices. He looks at the discursive formation as a way of analysing a discipline and a disciplinary practice. This is rather different from *Orientalism* and from colonial discourse as generally conceived. *Orientalism* at first sight might seem closer to the kind of disciplinary and institutional analysis that Foucault goes in for. It involves a body of knowledge and has a common conceptual terrain. The point about *Orientalism*, however, in Said's account, is that it develops initially as an imaginative and academic practice, involving a form of representation that misrepresents what is really there. This implies an ideology-versus-reality distinction, or signifier–signified distinction, which Foucault's analyses explicitly reject. Indeed Said's stress on the question of representation gets away from the whole emphasis on discourse as a material force. Foucault is concerned with the way that knowledge was utilized as part of, a function in, a material practice.

The whole point of Said's argument is that Orientalism does involve a disembodied knowledge, representations that could develop prior to any material experience of the east. He suggests that the academic knowledge of Orientalism both enabled and was put into practice in the subsequent development of colonialism. He certainly emphasizes and refers widely to Orientalist discourse's institutional framework, but never analyses it as a material practice. This is problematic not only because it implies that the misrepresentation nevertheless worked effectively when it encountered the reality which it distorted, but also because it constitutes a fundamental difference from Foucault's analyses, in which a discourse is never a disembodied imaginative representation prior to any interaction with the real, but always forms at the cusp of knowledge acting in and on the material world. Discourse is language that has already made history.

3 THE DISCURSIVE FORMATION

In the *Archaeology* Foucault develops his model of discourse through a conceptual apparatus defined according to a complex succession of terms: discursive formations, statements (*énoncés*), enunciations (*énonciations*), discursive practices, the archive, and archaeology. The function of these neologisms or redefined terms is to specify the singularity of his description, to make it as clear what discourse is not as what it is. As he recognizes, discourse itself is a highly ambiguous and mobile term – Foucault himself writes the *Archaeology* to specify its meaning, but admits that he ends up using it in a variety of different ways,

treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements. (80)

While the first two conform to common usage, and the second describes the way in which colonial discourse is usually thought of, following Said, it is the last that corresponds to Foucault's analytic description. A discourse amounts to a 'regulated practice' that accounts for a group of statements. It is not an all-encompassing, amorphous category, neither homogeneous nor unified. A discourse is rather made up of what Foucault characterizes as a dispersion of statements that are diffused and scattered in locational terms, but which make up a regularity. Much of the *Archaeology* is taken up with defining how the dispersed elements articulate as a discursive formation, 'an immense density of systematicities, a tight group of multiple relations' (76).

Foucault rejects the straightforward idea that a discourse could be made up of diverse statements that describe a common object, or a common style and manner, or a system of concepts, or develop a thematic continuity (i.e. exactly what most people mean by 'colonial discourse'). Even when considering the familiar discourses of medicine, economics or grammar, their objects, the statements made about them, their concepts and thematic concerns appear far too heterogeneous, working at different

levels, and without any overall unified logical architecture. Foucault therefore seeks to characterize these discourses at a more functional level according to the strategic possibilities that allow the activation of such incompatible elements across different groups of statements. Rather than using what he considers to be overdetermined contemporary terms such as 'science', 'ideology' or 'theory' to describe these 'systems of dispersion', Foucault invents the phrase 'discursive formations'. Said uses this term in a different way to describe what he calls 'the collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism' (Said 1985: 23).

Foucault defines a discursive formation as the 'principle of dispersion and redistribution' of a group of statements 'that belong to a single system of discourse'. Discursive formations are not homogeneous, or predicated on the uniformity of historical or geographical continuities. What makes them a discursive formation is that they have certain 'regularities' which make the elements within them subject to discernible conditions of existence and modification. Foucault elaborates the functioning of what he calls 'rules of formation' at length across four chapters. They are particularly significant because these regularities make up the conditions of existence according to which the elements of a specific discourse are constituted. A discourse therefore is formed (and can be defined in retrospect), not by invoking a common object or set of concepts or representations, but by something more abstract, namely by certain rules, conditions, operating on, and therefore forming, the object or concepts that it constructs. The regularity of a discourse will operate at the level of the formation of objects, the enunciative function, the formation of concepts and strategies. Discourse analysis consists of the identification of these conditions.

4 THE STATEMENT

For Foucault, the material of discourse is made up of individual 'statements'. What does he mean by the term 'statement' (*énoncé*)? This is the most difficult concept, on which the whole theory of discourse hinges. Only Homi Bhabha (1994) has fully engaged with the Foucauldian account of enunciation, and developed it into a unique instrument of theoretical and historical insight. For the English-speaking reader, the problem begins with the distinction in French between the terms *énoncé* and *énonciation*, which has no equivalent in English. The translation in the *Archaeology* uses the terms *statement* and *enunciation*, which we could gloss as the act of making the statement, and what is stated, the saying and the said. However, it is hard to keep these entirely separate, particularly as Foucault himself at one point alternates the significance of – or perhaps himself muddles – the two terms. Together, they make up the two aspects of the discursive event, operating simultaneously as a function of the individual subject and as historical act, the study of which, in a lecture given while he was writing the *Archaeology*, Foucault described as *deixologie*, a neologism derived from the theory of deixis, of enunciation, in linguistics (Macey 1993: 507).

What Foucault is trying to make clear is that a statement, in this context, is above all not simply a text or a piece of language. The statement itself constitutes a specific

material event, a performative act or a function, an historical eruption that impinges on and makes an incision into circumstance. Its effect, therefore, in the first instance, is primarily one of discontinuity, of deictic intervention, of effecting change, but it also exists in a productive tension with regularity. It involves language, but it is not reducible to it because that language will also be part of the situated materiality of circumstance. A statement, such as a lecture title announced as 'to be announced', for example, offers a promise that an announcement will be made, which will be both an event in itself as well as giving information or commentary – exactly the properties of Foucault's 'statement'. A discourse is made up of statements that are both events and things, as well as pieces of language. Statements are of the kind made to a parliament or to the press: an announcement, itself an event that constitutes news, that will invariably relate to a set of larger circumstances and which will itself impinge on them; the statement is both conditioned by them, but may well subsequently shape them. A press statement represents an incision into a discursive field, while it is itself also an event that constitutes news.

Or consider the use of the term 'statement' as it is employed by the police: when one makes a statement to the police, it is first of all because one has been positioned as the speaker of a statement by both a set of circumstances and the subsequent invitation from the law. The statement then becomes a material piece of evidence that operates in the court as more than merely a set of words: a statement is determined by the circumstances in which it was given, for which it was given and how it is then used. It then functions as part of an institutional apparatus, the law, and cannot be separated from that function. Though the specific enunciation that gave rise to or enabled the statement remains unique and a singular event, the statement can nevertheless be cited, repeated and put in connection with other statements. The statement and other forms of evidence with which it can be linked are themselves constructed from a disparate range of possible evidence drawn from a range of sites, from a dispersion of statements, and documents of all kinds. They have no intrinsic unity, they do not have a single author, and they are not the expression of a meaning. A discourse, therefore, is made up of diverse and heterogeneous statements which, though linguistic in form, are themselves the product of an interaction between language and the world.

The analogy with the statement in court suggests that there is a core of legal documents, police statements, witnesses' evidence, etc., all of which will have been formed according to the constraints of the institutional apparatus and are appropriated within a legal discourse that forms part of the law, itself made up of acts of parliament and the precedent of earlier cases. Other documents will be brought in as evidence and will relate to the central core, but will themselves have been constructed according to other circumstances and constraints (for example, a letter, a fax, an e-mail, a phone conversation, a credit card bill, a novel). Some of them will be accepted as evidence, others not. Some of them have been constructed as a part of the legal apparatus, but others were formed in very different circumstances and have only a tangential status in relation to legal discourse. In this way a discourse will draw on elements that while not determined by the demands of that discourse, will nevertheless make up part of its material practices, brought into its domain according to its rules. The boundaries of a

discourse will therefore be permeable, but this does not undermine the consistency of its own rules of formation. Rather, it reinforces the degree to which any discourse will be in a permanent state of interaction with languages, events, circumstances, other discourses, as an intrinsic part of its own operation. Foucault employs the term *positivity* to describe the modality, the mode of being, the conditions of existence of a statement, the 'tangled mass' of language caught up with the functioning of the material world – a conception which anticipates Foucault's later conception of power as *dispositif* in *History of Sexuality*. This is the term that Said himself also invokes, but Said uses it not for such material–linguistic interaction but rather to describe what he calls 'latent Orientalism', which he characterizes as something specifically immaterial: 'an almost unconscious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity' (Said 1985: 206).

5 THE REGULARITIES, THE ENUNCIATIVE MODALITIES AND FORMATION OF OBJECTS

'Discourse is a complex, differentiated practice, governed by analysable rules and transformations', Foucault argues, and he spends much of *The Archaeology* conceptualizing the form of these rules and how they operate as a structure of discursive formation – with regard to the formation of objects (the best-known part of the argument of the book and the one which Said invokes), the means through which individuals are authorized and positioned in relation to the statement so as to invoke a discourse in a particular institutional site ('enunciative modalities, the enunciative function'), the means through which concepts emerge, and the ways in which theoretical and practical choices become available within a discursive formation ('the formation of strategies'). In the course of this elaboration, Foucault emphasizes that discourses operate in an unstable environment of change and transformation. The objects of a discourse are quite capable of being contradictory.

Of the various rules that operate for a discursive formation, those of the 'enunciative modality' and formation of concepts have been particularly influential. To take the first of these: the nature of the group of relations that constitutes a discourse can be approached from the point of view of its subject. From the point of view of discourse analysis, the question of the subject amounts to the question 'who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language (*langage*)?' Who, in other words, has the institutional, legal and professional status which allows the speaker to occupy this discursive site? Foucault uses as his example the complex status of the doctor: his qualifications, the authority of the institutions to which he is affiliated, the legal sanctions and conditions that authorize his work. This would include 'what might be called the "library" or documentary field, which includes not only the books and treatises traditionally recognized as valid, but also all the observations and case-histories published and transmitted, and the mass of statistical information . . . that can be supplied . . . by public bodies, by other doctors, by sociologists, by geographers' (51–2). In addition, the doctor will be positioned differently in relation to his various professional activities: he will be questioner,

observer, interpreter, prescriber and counsellor. So a new scientific discourse, such as clinical medicine, is not simply the establishment of a new technique of observation, but rather is the product of the establishment of new relations between a whole array of distinct, different elements, some of which are internal to the ideas of the discipline, but others of which relate to issues of professional status, institutional sites, and the subject positions of those participating. In its practice, clinical discourse makes constant use of a heterogeneous system of relations in which the modality of enunciation is constantly shifting. The types of enunciation will be disparate, enforcing a dispersion on the individual subject who will be required to adopt a series of subject positions: 'the various enunciative modalities manifest his dispersion'. What links them all together is not individual consciousness, but the specificity of a discursive practice.

Analysis of a discourse, therefore, will not be concerned to trace it back to the particular truth of individual subjective experience. Rather than seeing discourse as a field of expression for individual consciousness, Foucault declares that he will

look for a field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity. Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed. (54)

Discourse thus constitutes the unifying force of 'an anonymous field whose configuration defines the possible position of speaking subjects' (122). Foucault does not, as McNay observes, provide an account of the means whereby certain subjects are enabled to take up these positions, and certain others not (McNay 1994: 77–9). Nevertheless, his model does not preclude analysis or foregrounding of the forms and procedures of social authorization, whether determined by gender, class or political status.

6 THE HETEROGENEITY OF DISCOURSE

Among all its various activities, relations, subject positions, sites, forms of authorization, discourse alone operates as a systematic network linking them together, and in doing so constitutes the very objects that occupy its field. A discourse rarely possesses a set of concepts that form a logical totality or coherent whole; its concepts, moreover, are not static but always changing, in a state of transformation. There is nothing inherently monological or monolithic about a discursive formation. A discourse rarely possesses a set of concepts that form a logical totality or coherent whole. Discourses remain fragmented, dispersed and incomplete. Discourses are heterogeneous and uneven; concepts, moreover, are not static but always changing, in a state of transformation. Foucault argues that 'it was possible for men, within the same discursive practice, to have contrary opinions, to make contradictory choices'. Among all the

various activities, relations, subject positions, sites, forms of authorization, that make up a specific practice, discourse alone operates as a systematic though diffracted network linking them together, and in doing so constitutes the very objects that occupy its field. A discursive formation is the product of a *set of relations* between disparate entities or activities. It is not made up of the smooth surface of texts, but a product of a conjunction of institutional sites, functions, activities, subjects, etc., which in themselves are highly dispersed. The group of rules that operate within the field of a particular discourse do so at a 'preconceptual level'.

This 'preconceptual level' consists of the group of rules that operate within the field of a particular discourse – not only in the minds of individuals, but in discourse itself: 'they operate, therefore, according to a sort of uniform anonymity, on all individuals who undertake to speak in this discursive field'. These discursive regularities and constraints do not (*pace* Said) produce uniformity, but make possible 'the heterogeneous multiplicity of concepts, and, beyond these, the profusion of the themes, beliefs, and representations with which one usually deals when one is writing the history of ideas' (63). Discursive analysis thus defines regularities that specify a particular 'field of appearance', and establishes the basis of a practice in operation. Foucault emphasizes again that not only is a discourse made up of a dispersion of statements, but also that even when framed as a particular discourse it is by no means homogeneous:

One is dealing with events of different types and levels, caught up in distinct historical webs; the establishment of an enunciative homogeneity in no way implies that, for decades or centuries to come, men will say and think the same thing; nor does it imply the definition, explicit or not, of a number of principles from which everything else would flow, as inevitable consequences. (146)

Foucault's remark here indicates that his idea of discourse is almost the very opposite to Said's as elaborated in *Orientalism*. Within an 'enunciative regularity' he suggests there are 'interior hierarchies', developing in a tree-like structure, with 'governing statements' at the root, but burgeoning differential activities at the branches (147). Within a single discourse, although the general field, 'the definition of observable structures and the field of possible objects', will operate as the governing statements, all sorts of strategic options, many of them distinct from or even incompatible with each other, will be developed at the peripheries.

Nothing would be more false than to see in the analysis of discursive formations an attempt at totalitarian periodization, whereby from a certain moment and for a certain time, everyone would think in the same way, in spite of surface differences, say the same thing, through a polymorphous vocabulary, and produce a sort of great discourse that could travel over in any direction.

Moreover, discourses are themselves made up of relations with other discourses. There is no vast, smooth surface of a unitary generalized discourse; rather, there are varied, distinct systems of statements. Foucault calls these the 'archive'.

The unity of a discourse therefore lies not in its concepts, its representations, its themes, but in its underlying system of rules. A discursive practice establishes an interactive relation between otherwise heterogeneous material elements ('institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual organizations, relations between various discourses') (72). This relation, though determining, is not inflexible. In particular, Foucault emphasizes that its flexibility makes it a part of transformative historical processes:

These systems of formation must not be taken as blocks of immobility, static forms that are imposed on discourse from the outside, and that define once and for all its characteristics and possibilities. . . . A discursive formation . . . does not play the role of a figure that arrests time and freezes it for decades or centuries; it determines a regularity proper to temporal processes; it presents the principle of articulation between a series of discursive events and other series of events, transformations, mutations, and processes. It is not an atemporal form, but a schema of correspondence between several temporal series. (73–4)

Just because a discourse is determining does not mean that its determinations are themselves fixed, and that a discourse is not open to history and temporal transformation. At the same time, it does not require that everyone adopt the same position: 'my aim', writes Foucault, 'was to show what the differences consisted of, how it was possible for men, within the same discursive practice, to speak of different objects, to have contrary opinions, to make contradictory choices' (200).

7 DISCOURSE AND POWER IN *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY*

The qualities of discourse elaborated in the *Archaeology* were subsequently reaffirmed in *The History of Sexuality* (1976), where Foucault writes:

We must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. (Foucault 1978: 100)

According to this argument, the whole attempt to represent 'other voices' that have been silenced and excluded by orientalist discourse represents a conceptual error. Foucault's discourse removes all considerations relating to the subject who utters. Discourse, for Foucault, was a way of getting away from the then conventional ways of thinking in terms of books, authors, disciplinary unities, a philosophy of history based on the human subject, or anthropological categories, whether of authors or speaking subjects. Discourse effectively desubjectifies, removes the whole realm of psychology. To this degree, discourse analysis operates as the exact opposite of all attempts to recover forms of the subaltern 'voice', articulating subjective experience,

what he calls 'the living plenitude of experience'. Discourse is not about the direct representation, or misrepresentation, of experience. Foucault's discourse therefore represents a directly antithetical strain to the assumptions and endeavours of postcolonial writing that posits a subjective voice of the colonized against the objectified discourse of the colonizer.

Just as power and resistance are necessarily imbricated within each other, so discourse also enacts its own effects of destabilization.

We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. In like manner, silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions; but they also loosen its holds and provide for relatively obscure areas of tolerance. (Foucault 1978: 101)

This more flexible, heterogeneous account of discourse suggests that Foucault himself had become wary of the inclusion/exclusion dialectic in *Madness and Civilization* already challenged by Derrida (Derrida 1978: 31–63; Foucault 1979). Its result is that he denies the very existence of a dominance/subversion paradigm:

There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it. Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in a field of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy.

Power works through a 'dominance without hegemony', in Ranajit Guha's phrase, and it is this characteristic of the production of power that has been exploited so successfully by the Subaltern Studies historians (Guha 1997). For Foucault, power is neither intentional nor fully realized; it is rather 'a multiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely stable, effects of domination are produced' (Foucault 1978: 101–2). The argument in *The History of Sexuality* goes further to suggest that repression, rather than being restrictive, has the very opposite effect and breeds a proliferation of discourses. The implication of this would be that colonial domination and repression, far from silencing anyone, produced a proliferation of subaltern discourse – as indeed it did. The sites of enunciation and forms of discourse would in many cases be different from those of the colonial masters (Bolton and Hutton 1995). In other cases, such as anti-colonialism, it would operate as a counter-discourse. For Foucault, the subaltern cannot but speak. The example of *sati* shows that there can be counter-discourses, but within the terms of a particular discursive apparatus, only certain subalterns will be authorized to speak. This does not mean that subalterns cannot speak within other discourses that operate elsewhere for different constituencies and institutions.

8 A FOUCAULDIAN MODEL OF COLONIAL DISCOURSE

If we take the problems that have been articulated with respect to colonial discourse outlined earlier, it can be argued that a colonial discourse developed according to Foucault's model would not be vulnerable to most of the objections posed. The problem of historicity, the objection that colonial discourse dehistoricizes, or that it produces a textualized version of history; the labyrinthine questions of representation and its relation to the real, the complaint that the uniform homogeneity of colonial discourse overrides the particularity of historical and geographical difference, and the problem of the determining, univocal force of a monolithic discourse – none of these would apply to Foucault's original model.

At the same time, a description of a colonial discourse according to Foucault's principles would look very different from anything that could be recognized from most work that has gone under that name. Colonial discourse analysis would no longer involve the analysis of colonialism as predominantly a structure of knowledge and representations, nor the interpretation of any text that has any old tangential relation to colonialism. Indeed, from a Foucauldian point of view, what is odd about so-called 'colonial discourse analysis' is that it takes discourse itself as its primary object of analysis, rather than invoking discourse as a means of analysing a particular practice – in this case colonialism. Certainly, it would be possible to analyse colonialism according to its discursive formations, but it would have to be the discursive field of colonialism as an historical practice, a colonialism that involved a political activity and organization that developed its own forms of knowledge as part of its activities of domination and exploitation. One would have to look at discursive statements in terms of the historical emergence of colonialism as a specific practice that operated according to successive administrative regimes. Colonial discourse would necessarily be different from the kind of discourses, such as that of psychiatry or medicine, analysed by Foucault. First, it is not that of a profession, nor of a discipline, nor a self-constituted body of knowledge. However, colonialism did amount to a particular set of practices, and this makes it all the more challenging to bring its diversity under one field. What holds it together? What are its surfaces of emergence? What are the group of rules proper to its discursive practice? How does it order its objects? Do the colonial practices of the different nations work with different colonial discourses?

Such a colonial discourse would not involve analysis of texts as such; rather, it would comprise the discursive practice of colonialism as a material form of appropriation and administration. Colonialism as a practice operated at the interface of knowledge and material culture, its operations were highly dispersed, contradictory and heterogeneous in historical and geographical terms. Its discursive formations are likely to have been similarly heterogeneous and subject to successive transformations in response to specific events (for example, 1857). One would not be seeking to interpret these discourses in order to reveal their hidden psychological meaning, an 'imperial unconscious', but rather attempting to formulate the rules which governed their condition of possibility and formed and enabled specific enunciations.

In the British case this would involve a whole group of relations in a system of metropolitan institutional sites: the Colonial Office, the India Office, parliament, the press, the variety of chartered companies and firms with colonial interests, educational establishments such as Haileybury and Oxford, religious organizations, imperial conferences, etc.; and in the colonies, Government House and the whole administrative, military, legal, penal, commercial, medical, religious and educational apparatus. Vast numbers of statements were enunciated from these sites in parliamentary speeches, notices, legislation, acts, statutes, orders in council, treaties, documents, directives, despatches, instructions, resolutions, trade agreements, correspondence, papers, memoranda, minutes, memorials, resolutions, petitions, addresses, accounts, reports and official diaries from governors, district officers and magistrates, diplomatic interventions, writings on colonial governance, emigration, etc.

As a practice, British colonialism was heterogeneous and contested, but its discursive regularity has yet to be investigated. A Foucauldian account would mean focusing on these kinds of statements, considering them in the relations which they developed between dispersed 'institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual organizations', and other discourses (of government, commerce, economics, war, law, medicine, psychiatry, anthropology and linguistics). If colonial discourse therefore is to have a relation to history, it must be related to the historical practice of colonialism, but in this case such statements would themselves not need to be articulated to the historical because they would already form a part of the historical processes, events and strategic practices in which they participated. Making manifest the conditions and rules from which the statements of a colonial discursive formation emanated, would not suggest that the latter existed outside history, but rather demonstrate that, as Foucault puts it:

Discourse . . . is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself. (117)

Meanwhile, the cultural and literary texts of colonialism, the ever more carefully honed interpretations of *Passage to India*, *King Solomon's Mines* and *Kim*, the nostalgic cultivation of travel writings, autobiographies and letters, all of which have to date formed the major focus of colonial discourse analysis, would move to the margins, as elements of the general positivity. A literary text, or a travel book, though it may have had an influence on those who became administrators, would be no more part of colonial discourse proper than the private letter that is used as evidence in a law court forms part of legal discourse: it interacts with it only for the duration of a specific event. It would not have been subject to the rules of formation of a colonial discourse (its formation would rather have been the effect of the discursive conditions of literary practice), nor would it have been authorized by the institutional sites from which such a discourse would derive its legitimation – 'its legitimate source and point of application (its specific objects and instruments of verification)'. Such cultural and literary texts, in so far as they have a relation to the discursive formations of colonialism, would be affiliated to its statements but would have to be positioned and analysed as an unofficial, secondary body of texts produced as part of the material,

historical and discursive effect of colonial practice. If this seems discouraging to those whose major interests lie in the realm of the literary, its emphasis is not altogether unsurprising given that Foucault was, after all, a historian-philosopher. However, there is a positive possibility: those secondary texts could potentially carry disruptive force given that they would be constituted according to different rules and would therefore not work directly within colonial discourse proper. Such analysis, however, would have to be concerned with demonstrating the dialectical deconstructive activity operating between the two forms of discourse, not simply the interpretive richness or ambiguity of the literary text in glorious linguistic abstraction and material and historical isolation. Colonial discourse never just consisted of a set of ideological (mis)representations: its enunciations always operated as historical acts, generating specific material effects within the coercive machinery of colonial rule, its enunciative sites and formations of power simultaneously inciting material and psychological effects upon colonized subjects.

The theoretical issue that remains involves the differences between Foucault's historical materialist and institutional account of discursive events – the conceptual difficulty of which, like the work of Deleuze, results from its refusal of dialectics – and other available materialist positions, particularly Marxism. Paradoxically, the most challenging postcolonial theory, for example the work of Bhabha and Spivak, often functions productively through an unresolved tension between colonialism as an institutional performative discourse of power-knowledge and colonialism understood according to the dialectical formations elaborated in tricontinental Marxism. Indeed, as a result of their work, such a disjunctive articulation could be said to operate as the theoretical kernel of postcolonial theory itself.

Subjectivity and History:

DERRIDA IN ALGERIA

The schools were started so as to teach us how to say 'Yes' in their language.

Tayeb Salih, *Season of Migration to the North* (Salih 1969: 95)

1 WHITE MYTHOLOGIES REVISITED

'I do not believe that anyone can detect by *reading*, if I do not myself declare it, that I am a "French Algerian"' (Derrida 1998: 46). True, for when I wrote *White Mythologies* I knew that you had been born in Algeria, in the very year that had witnessed the celebrations of the centenary of the French invasion (something for Algerians to celebrate indeed). You had once guardedly spoken of your childhood memories, your 'nostalgeria', far more briefly though than Hélène Cixous had recalled her 'Algeriance' (Derrida 1985; Cixous 1998). That was, however, my only clue, apart from when I had first seen you in 1979 and understood immediately that you were no 'français de souche'. What a relief. No blockhead, at least. All the same, even before that moment I already knew that something serious was going on. It was as plain as punch even if I found it impossible then to identify where it was coming from. What was certain was that it was somewhere else, and that it was producing a strong effect of disorientation (or rather, disoccidentation). When you visited Oxford that time, the first question we put to you was about your use of the terms 'the west' and 'western metaphysics': 'The category of the "west" and the continuity of philosophical discourse from Plato to the present remains unexplicated and un-justified in your work', we complained. You answered that there was nothing 'which would be considered the essence of the west in western philosophy', that you didn't believe in the continuity of the philosophy of the west, that the unity of 'western philosophy' was an illusion, the product of the effects of a representation, a dogma, and that in your work you were always insisting on splits, fissures, discontinuities in the corpus. 'It's a contradictory, conflictual structure which has to repress forms trying to disrupt this unity from inside and out' (Derrida 1979). Twenty years later you would still have to make the same protest (Derrida 1998: 70). In Oxford that day, you didn't comment further on 'the west' as such, but the link was easy to find:

Metaphysics – the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own *logos*, that is, the *mythos* of his reason, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason. Which does not go uncontested. . . . White mythology—metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest. (Derrida 1982: 213)

Years later, when I sent you a copy of *White Mythologies* you remarked that I had indeed detected ‘a thread’ that ran through your writings. That ‘thread’ which I followed then, with such labour, has finally become the explicit subject of some of your recent, more autobiographical work. I knew it all along, for you showed it to me in your writings from the first: whereas other philosophers would write of ‘philosophy’, for you it was always ‘western philosophy’. Whiteness, otherness, margins, decentring: it was obvious to me what you were up to, what possibilities you were striving towards, what presuppositions you were seeking to dislodge. And this was why I gave my book a title alluding to your essay, which I have since often seen referred to as ‘White Mythologies’. Permit me to recall the opening of that book:

If so-called ‘so-called poststructuralism’ is the product of a single historical moment, then that moment is probably not May 1968 but rather the Algerian War of Independence – no doubt itself both a symptom and a product. In this respect, it is significant that Sartre, Althusser, Derrida and Lyotard, among others, were all either born in Algeria or personally involved with the events of the war. (Young 1990: 1)

‘Poststructuralism’, if I may reinvoké that curious term, as a form of epistemic violence always represented one echo of the violence of Algeria playing itself out in an insurrection against the calm philosophical and political certainties of the metropolis, a revolution initiated, as you argued, just ‘at the moment when the fundamental conceptual system produced by the Greco-European adventure is in the process of taking over all of humanity’ and achieving ‘worldwide dominance’. An imposition, as you now put it, of ‘a sovereignty whose essence is always colonial’ (Derrida 1978: 82, 297; 1998: 39–40, 59). From the first, then, your target was, we would say these days, western globalization, conceptual in form but material in its effects, and the eurocentrism of western culture – ‘nothing but the most original and powerful ethnocentrism in the process of imposing itself upon the world’ (Derrida 1976: 3). That book of mine sought to retranslate, working from an original that I never knew, what had been predominantly regarded up to that point as deconstruction’s philosophical or literary strategies into the more painful framework of colonial and postcolonial history. How to rewrite history when the very model of history was so much a product of the history that I wanted to rewrite? Your problematic exactly. It was your critique of the philosophy and concept of history, starting with Husserl, that indicated the first possibilities to me, offering ‘a system of critiques’ for ‘*shaking the entirety* of Occidental history’; your strategy of postcolonial retaliation, of overturning, cannot be disconnected from the you who when at school in Algeria in typical

colonial pedagogic fashion had been taught 'History' as the history of France: 'an incredible discipline, a fable and bible, yet a doctrine of indoctrination almost uneffaceable for children of my generation' (Derrida 1978: 235; 1998: 44).

Or as Aijaz Ahmad has described it:

Robert Young, who had until a decade ago devoted himself almost entirely to propagating French poststructuralism in the British Isles, with hardly a thought to spare for the erstwhile colonies, suddenly emerged as a leading theorist of what got called 'postcolonial criticism': even though he hardly uses the term in his *White Mythologies*, the book signifies his first major awakening to the fact of imperialism, but in a world already populated by poststructuralist thought. (Ahmad 1995: 8)

Ahmad's characteristic method here of reductive *ad hominem* and *ad feminam* critique subverts his accompanying claim to Marxist objectivity – for indeed he knows as little of the thoughts I had 'to spare' in the British Isles before writing *White Mythologies*, as I know of his thoughts he had to spare in the USA before writing *In Theory*, where, for all the world knew, he had 'devoted himself almost entirely to propagating' translations of Urdu poetry in North America (and why not?) (Ahmad 1992, 1969). Behind this endearing personalism, Ahmad's critique is predicated on the assumption that 'French poststructuralism' has nothing to do with 'the erstwhile colonies', and that when I 'awoke' to the fact of imperialism, Keats-like, it was, as it were, too late, for the world had already been populated by dreaming, idealist poststructuralists. Ahmad here engages in a common anti-postcolonial trope, the form of which repeats the assumption of cultural inferiority so searchingly analysed by Fanon: anything that has come to be regarded as being of intellectual or political significance in the west could have nothing to do with the (so-called) Third World, even when it is itself a critique of the west conducted from one of the many locations and positions of the three continents. Postcolonial theory, in other words, 'must' be European, if it has made such an impact on the west. It is Derrida who, as Bart Moore-Gilbert observes, 'is usually the chief bogeyman in attacks on postcolonial theory's reliance on European methodological models' (Moore-Gilbert 1997: 163, citing Ahmad 1992 and Slemon and Tiffin 1989). Those who reject contemporary postcolonial theory in the name of the 'Third World' on the grounds of it being western, however, are themselves in doing so negating the very input of the Third World, starting with Derrida, disavowing therefore the very non-European work which their critique professes to advocate. A related argument sets up an opposition between western theory and the particularity of Third World experience. This assumes either patronizingly or deferentially that theory is itself completely western, while the only thing that the Third World can be allowed is experience, never anything so conceptually or politically effective as its own theory or philosophy. Such an argument unconsciously perpetuates the relation of adult to child that lay at the heart of colonial ideology.

Structuralism came from the east, poststructuralism from the south. Many of those who developed the theoretical positions subsequently characterized as poststructuralism came from Algeria or had been involved in the war of independence. Fanon, Memmi, Bourdieu, Althusser, Lyotard, Derrida, Cixous – they were all in or from Algeria.

None of them, it is true, were Algerians proper, in the sense of coming from the indigenous Arab, Berber, Kabyle, Chaouia or Mزابite peoples that make up the population of modern independent Algeria (Bourdieu 1958). They were, so to speak, Algerians improper, those who did not belong easily to either side – a condition that the subsequent history of Algeria has shown is in its own way characteristically Algerian, for the many different kinds of Algerians ‘proper’ do not belong easily to the Algerian state either. Some, such as Althusser, Derrida’s mentor at the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, were *pieds-noirs*, as was Camus, coming from the mixed communities of poor whites who had migrated from the most impoverished areas of the Mediterranean basin; Althusser’s family had been deported to Algeria, along with thousands of others, as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian war, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871. Others such as Derrida and Cixous came from the so-called indigenous Jewish community originally expelled with the Moors from Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella in the fifteenth century, their confiscated wealth then used to finance Columbus’s expedition to the new world (Laloum and Allouche 1992; Wood 1998). Strange thought: without the Derridas and Cixous’s of this world, no ‘Latin’ America. Memmi, another Maghrebian Jew, was born in Tunis and then studied at the University of Algiers before going on to the Sorbonne. Others, such as Fanon or Lyotard, went to Algeria to work or on military service and became actively involved with the revolution (Pierre Bourdieu was also in Algeria in the 1950s doing anthropological–sociological research (Bourdieu 1958, 1979; Bourdieu and Darbel 1963; Bourdieu and Sayad 1964) and saw Derrida frequently when he had returned to Algeria to do his military service there). The poststructuralism associated with these names could better be characterized therefore as Franco-Maghrebian theory, for its theoretical interventions have been actively concerned with the task of undoing the ideological heritage of French colonialism and with rethinking the premises, assumptions and protocols of its centrist, imperial culture. In *Murder of the Other* Cixous recounts how she elaborated such thoughts out of her own experience:

I come, biographically, from a rebellion, from a violent and anguished direct refusal to accept what is happening on the stage on whose edge I find I am placed. . . . I learned to read, to write, to scream, and to vomit in Algeria. Today I know from experience that one cannot imagine what an Algerian French girl was: you have to have been it, to have gone through it. To have seen ‘Frenchmen’ at the ‘height’ of imperialist blindness, behaving in a country that was inhabited by humans as if it were peopled by nonbeings, born-slaves. I learned everything from this first spectacle: I saw how the white (French), superior, plutocratic, civilized world founded its power on the repression of populations who had suddenly become ‘invisible’, like proletarians, immigrant workers, minorities who are not the right ‘colour’. Women. Invisible as humans. But, of course, perceived as tools – dirty, stupid, lazy, underhanded, etc. Thanks to some annihilating dialectical magic. I saw that the great, noble, ‘advanced’ countries established themselves by expelling what was ‘strange’; excluding it but not dismissing it; enslaving it. (Cixous and Clément 1986: 70)

‘For all its potentially useful insights, poststructuralist philosophy remains the handmaiden of repression’ declares the Australian critic Helen Tiffin, ‘and, if I may

mix metaphors, serves as District Commissioner of the 1980s, his book title now changed from *The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger* to *Enjoying the Other: or Difference Domesticated* (cited in Moore-Gilbert 1997: 21). Things fall apart: the assumption here is that 'poststructuralist philosophy' is just another white mythology of Europe, Tiffin never apparently imagining that 'the Other' could now be writing the book him or herself. Only the white settler is allowed to use theory to write back. Woman, native, still other. As Gayatri Spivak observes of a comparable critique of her own work, 'When Benita Parry takes us [Spivak, Bhabha, Jan-Mohammed] to task for not being able to listen to the natives, or to let the natives speak, she forgets that the three of us, postcolonials, are "native" too. . . . The resistant post-colonial has become a scandal' (Spivak 1993: 60). Tiffin's comment only requires an apparently unthinkable, scandalous reversal of subject position: poststructuralism, which she characterizes as the handmaiden of repression, was in fact produced by repression, for it developed in large part out of the experience of colonialism. The structure to which it is 'post' is the colonial apparatus, the imperial machine. Its deconstruction of the idea of totality was born out of the experience of, and forms of resistance to, the totalizing regimes of the late colonial state, particularly French Algeria. That machine operated like no other, often being later redeployed, as liberals from Burke onwards always feared it would, in the metropolis. If fascism was colonial totalitarianism brought home to Europe, then totalitarianism is always colonial – externally or internally. After imperialism, after fascism, after Stalinism, after Algeria, it was time to challenge the spectacle of totality on which ideas of the state and the party had been based, and which problematically Lukács had also argued was the means by which to challenge capitalism. Sartre, the African philosopher in Mudimbe's formulation, tried hard to reformulate a Marxist theory of history which, while amounting to totality and a totalization of historical processes, would also allow for the active interventions of the agents of history. Having himself fought the Nazis as a member of the French resistance, he must have known that this theory was working against the grain, and cannot have been altogether surprised when he failed to complete its philosophical argument. His key move, which only complicated things further, and which appears at the end of the first volume of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as the opening that would never allow that work to be closed, was to produce the first Marxist philosophy of history in which colonialism, and the endemic violence of the colonial regime, was a central component: 'Violence, as bourgeois *exis* [the inert, stable condition opposed to *praxis*], exists in the exploitation of the proletariat as an inherited relation of the dominant class to the dominated class . . . and violence, as the *praxis* of this bourgeois generation, lay in colonization' (Sartre 1976a: 719; 1991; Young 1990: 28–47). Sartre's emphasis on the role of violence put him in solidarity with Frantz Fanon, Algeria's most famous adopted son, who argued simply that 'the development of violence among the colonized people will be proportionate to the violence exercised by the threatened colonial regime' (Fanon 1965: 69).

After 1962, more *colons*, *pièdes-noirs* and exiles from Algeria arrived in Paris: few 'poststructuralists' have been 'françaises de souche', 'of good stock', that is, indigenous white French men or women. Althusser made the first move, starting with his theory

of ideology. Althusser's primal scene of ideology, in which the subject is interpellated by a policeman shouting 'hey, you there!', is not the ideology theorized as an unconscious absorption of the values of the system, as European Marxists had conceptualized 'false consciousness'. Althusser's ideology starts with a brutal colonial address to a subject regarded as already degraded, a member of a debased cultural system who must be apprehended within an apparatus of power. Like Lyotard, Althusser had also experienced the 'relative autonomy' of the colonial apparatus in Algeria, its determination by Paris only in the last instance, and this suggested that the postcolonial state, far from existing in a passive position as an identical effect of capitalism, might share in the freeing up of the economism assumed to operate in the metropolis through the separate spheres of core, semiperiphery and periphery (Meynier 1981; Prochaska 1990). It was his critique of essentialism that provided the foundation of subsequent critiques of eurocentrism. Althusser's *Reading Capital* (1968), in the popular edition 'petite collection maspero' in which it was generally known, was part of a series, published by the Trotskyist FLN supporter Maspero, whose first thirty volumes also included works by Jomo Kenyatta, Mao Zedong, V. N. Giap, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon and Malcolm X – as well as Althusser's own revolutionary pupil, Régis Debray. Derrida went further, redeploying Sartre's worried observation that 'the totalization is never achieved and that the totality exists at best only in the form of a *detotalized totality*' (Sartre 1963: 78). Totalization, Derrida argued, was in fact impossible not only empirically, but also conceptually: 'that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions' (Derrida 1978: 289). The centre cannot hold, as Yeats observed on the eve of Irish independence. Colonialism and the operation of the colonial apparatus, Derrida recognized, typically produced politically and conceptually ungoverned effects. These could then be redeployed against it. So Derrida, neither French nor Algerian, always anti-nationalist and cosmopolitan, critical of western ethnocentrism from *Of Grammatology*'s very first page, preoccupied with justice and injustice, developed deconstruction as a procedure for intellectual and cultural decolonization within the metropolis to which he had sailed on the *Ville d'Alger* in 1949, and to which he had returned after doing military service in Algeria from 1957–9 in the name of a France that expected no ambivalence from him despite having itself rejected and disowned him and then readmitted him to French citizenship. The surgical operation of deconstruction was always directed at the identity of the ontological violence that sustains the western metaphysical and ideological systems with the force and actual violence that has sustained the western nations in their colonial and imperial policies, a structural relation of power that had to be teased apart if it was ever to be overturned. This preoccupation with the encounter with force and violence and their effects *on* history, politics, ethics and language, leading to their effects *in* history, politics, ethics and language, has always been fundamental to Derrida's work from the early volumes – *Of Grammatology* (1967), *Writing and Difference* (1967), and *Margins – of Philosophy* (1972) – onwards.

2 MAKE THE OLD SHELL CRACK

The phenomena which interest me are precisely those that blur the boundaries, cross them, and make their historical artifice appear, also their violence, meaning the relations of force that are concentrated there and actually capitalize themselves there interminably. Those who are sensitive to all the stakes of 'creolization' . . . assess this better than others. (Derrida 1998: 9)

Derrida himself came from the margins, from El-Biar, itself located in the margins of the city of Algiers, to Paris, the metropolitan centre. In the political geography of colonial dislocation, whereas British colonialism, like the British themselves, was nothing if not eccentric, French colonialism always operated according to what Ferdinand de Saussure's brother Léopold, who became a 'naturalized' Frenchman after serving as an officer in the French navy in Indochina, characterized as 'excessive centralization' (de Saussure 1899: 16). French culture, he argued, has

a tendency towards uniformity, simplicity, and symmetry. An antipathy for all that is disparate, complex, unsymmetrical. . . . It has engendered the extreme centralization of the administration. (Ibid.: 307)

'Try, sir, I ask you', wrote de Tocqueville in 1841, just eleven years after the first French invasion of Algeria, 'to imagine these agile and indomitable children of the desert entwined in the milieu of the thousand formalities of our bureaucracy and forced to submit to the dilatoriness, the regularity, to the documents (*écritures*) and minutiae of our centralization' (de Tocqueville 1988, 40–1). The French invaders destroyed the local administrative system and replaced it with a secular centralized administration, based on the production of *écriture*. Writing and imperialism, the violence of the letter: a topic that Angel Rama, too, has elaborated so effectively in his account of what he has called 'the lettered city' in the case of Spanish colonial America (Rama 1996). Derrida's way in, infiltration, and act of liberation would be through reconceptualizing the relation of writing to centralization, a theme that he would treat on a philosophical rather than an historical level, but without ever leaving history free from its strictures. The deconstruction of the many forms of centrism – logo-, phallo- or structural – only makes sense fully in the context of the extreme rationalization and centralization of the French administrative system. Four years after the French withdrawal from Algeria, Derrida was to propose, by means of his notion of *écriture*, the idea of a structure without a centre, or, if that was unthinkable, the problematic way in which in the human sciences, structures are always organized around centres, origins, points of presence and power, while their boundaries remain impermeable and open. Open to people like him. To those who cross borders – gypsies, nomads, tribals who dissolve the sedentary strictures enforced by the state. The history of Algeria is made up of such forms of indigenous resistance to colonial and postcolonial state power. The so-called 'Islamic threat' to French cultural identity was called into being by the French themselves, for the French themselves

(Hargreaves 1995; Hargreaves and McKinney 1997). Between the centre and the margin Derrida finds a leeway, the lateral deviant drift and meandering movement of a dislocated economy from a resistance built into the attempted uniformity of the system, and locates its breakdown at the point at which it tries to draw its own limits, to mark the edge of its faltering reach. In any system of force there will always be sites of force that are, precisely, forced, and therefore allow for pressure and intervention. Force and its traces in language from which there must be emancipation or which at the very least must be subject to resistance, madness as the excluded other of the operation of reason, inside/outside structures, the same and the other, the reign of violence in the difference between the same and the other, the ethical relationship to the Other, alterity, difference, differences in identity, identity that is different from itself, translation, displacement, the destabilizing encroachment of the marginal, the subversive subaltern, the constitutive dependency of the centre on the marginal or the excluded, dissemination and the concept of a diaspora without the end point of a final return, and above all history as violence, ontological, ethical and conceptual violence – all these formed the subjects of Derrida's early books. The very concept of 'erasure' (*rature*) echoes and denies the violent *razzias* with which General Bugeaud first attempted to subdue the Algerian interior. Derrida, who was to attend the Lycée Bugeaud, constitutes the trace of that incursion that has now come home to roost in its own system.

All these concepts offered the possibility of redefining subaltern positions both within and outside western cultural norms, but were predominantly predicated on a fifth-column politics, 'the necessity of lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it' (Derrida 1978: 111). Derrida recognized the belatedness of the postcolonial, that the postcolonial system operates according to what Partha Chatterjee has called a derivative discourse, namely that the legacy of colonialism was that the postcolonial states were left inscribed with the institutions and political concepts of the west, with colonial, postcolonial modernity (Chatterjee 1986). As Spivak puts it, the situation of the postcolonial subject is that he or she has to inhabit the conceptual, cultural and ideological legacy of colonialism inherent in the very structures and institutions that formed the condition of decolonization, a situation which Spivak describes as *catachresis* – a space that the postcolonial does not want, but has no option, to inhabit (Spivak 1993). History itself. Deconstruction was founded on the 'problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself' (Derrida 1978: 282); it represents a strategic alternative to the passivity of dependency theory or the fundamentalist nationalism of the return-to-the-authentic-tradition-untrammelled-by-the-west variety that responds to the present by seeking to deny the past while itself invoking the European Romantic trope of a return to a true, authentic, indigenous culture.

3 STRUCTURALISM, 'PRIMITIVE' RATIONALITY AND DECONSTRUCTION

In 1955, Algeria did not name a 'question' of revolutionary politics for me, it was also the name of a debt. I owed and I owe my awakening, *tout court*, to Constantine. The differend showed itself with such a sharpness that the consolations then common among my peers (vague reformism, pious Stalinism, futile leftism) were denied me. This humiliated people, once risen up, would not compromise. But at the same time, they did not have the means of achieving what is called liberty. (Lyotard 1993: 170)

When Derrida came to Paris, all the parties on the left, including the socialist and communist parties, were committed to the endurance of a French Algeria (Lyotard's Trotskyist 'Socialisme ou Barbarie' group was one of the few honourable exceptions to this rule); Sartre's commitment to the independence struggles was a major reason for his refusal to join the Communist Party (Lyotard 1993; Lamouchi 1996). This put all Algerians and Franco-Maghrebians in an ambivalent position towards French Marxism, which at that time was the dominant ideology among French intellectuals (Derrida 1980: 22). Derrida, a colonized subject bearing the effects and affects of the complex recent history of French colonial Algeria, was immediately placed in a marginal position to the still-imperial social and cultural politics of metropolitan Paris. Derrida's oblique and distanced relation to Marxism and communism has often been routinely criticized. However, it is rarely, if ever, put in the context of the fact the the French Communist Party, including its section in Algeria which was largely made up of French settlers and gallicized Algerians, had always opposed independence for Algeria and argued for its assimilation to mainland France. This was nothing new. Already by the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in 1928, there was critical discussion of a letter from the French communists in Sidi-bel-Abbès in Algeria protesting against the appeal of the Comintern to the Muslims of French North Africa on the grounds of their being yoked to a regressive 'Muslim feudalism', and exploited above all by their own nationalist religious leaders and landed proprietors – not, the communists claimed implausibly, by the French settlers (Carrère d'Encausse and Schram 1969: 196–8). Despite being categorically condemned by the Congress, the Algerian communists' proposed policy of not conceding independence to the colony on the grounds of Muslim resistance to progressive ideas, relying instead on the success of the Communist Party in France to establish communism in North Africa, was to be the *de facto* policy of the Algerian party right through the Algerian revolution. The French Communist Party's attitude to French colonial subjects in Algeria was scarcely less paternalistic and patronizing than the French government's: the position of the two more or less coincided, as they had done immediately after the Second World War when the communist ministers serving in the coalition government of newly liberated France had approved the dispatch of a military force to reconquer newly independent Vietnam from the communist government of Ho Chi Minh. In Algeria they always knew this: 'Experience and time were to prove',

commented Messali Hadj, moderate leader of the North African Star and, subsequent to its suppression, of the Algerian People's Party, 'that French leaders, whether belonging to the extreme left or extreme right of the Government, have one and the same colonial policy' (Padmore 1956: 333–4). The communists in the French Popular Front government before the war condoned the arrest of Messali Hadj and other North African Star leaders. After the war, the communists in the Ramadier coalition government supported the repression of the Algerian 'terrorists'. Upon independence, the FLN immediately banned the Algerian Communist Party.

Derrida arrived in a Paris equally dominated in intellectual terms by structuralism – itself first developed as an anti-western methodology by two Russians living in Prague. He was to recognize very quickly that the appearance of structuralism from 1945 onwards initiated at a theoretical level a post-war process of cultural decolonization, by turning the critical ethnography that had been developed for the analysis of non-western cultures onto the culture of the west itself. Claude Lévi-Strauss in particular, in the tradition of the first anti-racist anthropologist Franz Boas who had been an inspiration for the original structuralists of the Prague School, and in the post-1945 ambience of UNESCO statements on racial equality, was concerned to show that the same structure of mind was common to all humans, universal in its capacities rather than made up of a hierarchy of inequality. Despite the postmodern prohibitions on universalism, universalism as here must always be deployed in the fight against racism (Malik 1996). As its detractors always pointed out, structuralism as a method made no value distinction between different cultures (west or non-west) or even between different forms of culture ('high' and 'low') within the west: it was, therefore, essentially democratic, egalitarian, deliberately unconcerned with the bourgeois aesthetics of value, evaluation, discrimination and taste, that have always been deployed in the west to shore-up claims of cultural – and therefore class or racial – superiority. In the same way, Lévi-Strauss disputed the noxious effects of the division, central to western notions of culture, between the civilized and the primitive, the masculine and the feminine, by demonstrating that so-called primitive logic was as valid, and as controlled in its method, as that of western rationalism itself (Lévi-Strauss 1968). The direction of his work was anti-eurocentric, against the assumption of civilized superiority, of western difference.

Derrida's so-called 'critique' of structuralism – which has been said to have initiated the whole movement of poststructuralism – analysed Lévi-Strauss so as to demonstrate that these two logical possibilities were already at work within his own argument. Derrida showed that Lévi-Strauss's texts themselves operate by different forms of multiple logics: his heuristic method, that was to become central to the strategy of deconstruction, is to employ the very concepts that he wants to undo, a double intention 'to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value he criticizes'. In other words, he separates the instruments of method from the truth that that method envisages. As Sartre had described it in 1948, 'when the Negro declares in French that he rejects French culture, he takes in one hand that which he has pushed aside with the other' (Sartre 1976b: 23).

Derrida argues that Lévi-Strauss's double intention, producing texts that are simultaneously scientific and mythopoetic, forms essentially the model for how discourses work, producing meanings 'which are absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simultaneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy' (Derrida 1978: 285, 293). Taking it one stage further, he shows how such multiple, differential logics operated not only in non-western mythology, or in the method of Lévi-Strauss's argument, but even in the most exalted expressions of western thought and rationalism in its philosophical traditions. Indeed, as we have seen, western philosophy, through which the west in part defines itself, operates by exactly this kind of double logic which conflates a myth with a universal truth, the myth of reason for Reason.

Metaphysics – the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own *logos*, that is, the *mythos* of his reason, for the universal form of that [which] he must still wish to call Reason. Which does not go uncontested. (Derrida 1982: 213)

Deconstruction has itself been a form of cultural and intellectual decolonization, exposing the double intention separating rational method from its truth. Having isolated this characteristic feature of Lévi-Strauss's method, Derrida then re-utilizes it as deconstruction's fundamental procedure.

It is hardly coincidental that so many of the related concepts developed by Derrida, such as marginality, diaspora and difference, were so quickly extended to the social and political experience of minority groups. For that was where they came from. The minority has a deconstructive relation to the majority: 'all reforms owe their origin to the initiation of minorities in opposition to majorities' (Gandhi 1998: 92). The problematic was certainly a different one from that of the dialectics of the national liberation movements, the opposition of colonizer and colonized, largely because that opposition could only be constituted by bringing together all those who were structured as being different into one identity that was founded on their opposition to the same, that is, the colonizer. When the same had handed over power and left, its role was taken over by the national state: in the postcolonial era, differences have been reasserted and rearticulated against its attempted hegemony, separating its method from its truth.

4 PILLAR OF SALT

I love words too much because I have no language of my own, only false *escarres*, false foci (*eskhara*). (Bennington and Derrida 1993: 92–3)

Words: your shield, or the scabs covering your wounds? However much your work may have been 'postcolonial', and formed the basis of so much postcolonial theory, yours was no ordinary experience of colonialism, whatever that might be. Algeria, to begin with, was no ordinary colony, though it was for France the archetypal colony in the same way as India was for Britain. Algeria's history is in fact quite

extraordinary: first invaded by a military expedition in 1830 as a deliberate strategy of metropolitan imperialism, never effectively subdued in one hundred and thirty years – no need for clever critics to read against the grain, searching for subtle subaltern strategies of resistance, in the case of Algeria – a settler colony that was already more than full with settled, farming, indigenous inhabitants on its fertile plains, with the most violent history from the first day to this, the inspiration and basis for Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). After 1962, you could neither repeat his sublime injunctions for revolution, nor, as an exiled Jew after independence, simplify the situation and the peoples in the name of revolutionary action. With Memmi you were in a category all of its own, coming from 'a disintegrated "community"'. Your identity was not fixed on one side or the other, but amounted rather to a 'disorder [*trouble*] of identity', the result of a too rapid assimilation of the indigenous Jews of Algeria within two generations after the Crémieux decree of 1870 that granted French citizenship to Algerian Jews, a reclassification suddenly revoked in 1940 (Derrida 1998: 55, 14). The acculturation and embourgeoisification of the Jews after 1870 left them cut off, strangers to their own culture and even to cultural memory, strangers to Arab or Berber culture, and yet strangers also to the French culture and language which they acquired: 'Such, in any event', you comment, 'would have been the radical lack of culture [*inculture*] from which I undoubtedly never completely emerged' (ibid.: 53). Pillar of salt: to succeed in a colonial culture one must reject the identities of Jew, Arab or African. The Jews of Algeria were, as Memmi put it, 'eternally hesitant candidates refusing assimilation' while they were being refused it anyway, the very pattern of undecidability:

Their constant and very justifiable ambition is to escape from their colonized condition. . . . To that end, they endeavour to resemble the colonizer in the frank hope that he may cease to consider them different from him. Hence their efforts to forget the past, to change collective habits, and their enthusiastic adoption of Western language, culture and customs. But if the colonizer does not always openly discourage these candidates to develop that resemblance, he never permits them to attain it either. Thus, they live in constant and painful ambiguity. (Memmi 1967: 15)

The Jews live in the most acute ambivalence of hybrid states, an in-between limbo world in which on the one hand they identify with the colonizer with whom they can never be fully assimilated, but whose life they try to live in abject mimicry, while on the other hand they remain always condemned to live the life of the colonized. It was this cultural inbetweenness that enabled them during the war of independence, as Fanon put it, 'to become "the eyes and ears of the Revolution" inside the enemy apparatus' (Fanon 1980: 133). It worked both ways: as you put it, 'certain people, myself included, have experienced colonial cruelty from two sides' (Derrida 1998: 14, 39). And, of course, colonial opportunity: you, like Memmi, like Fanon, like so many of those who led the independence movements, travelled to the imperial capital for your university education.

Memmi was the first to protest against the strict dichotomy between colonizer and colonized laid down by Sartre and Fanon, arguing for an understanding of the mutual

mental relations between colonizer and colonized, producing, as he puts it, 'portraits of the two protagonists of the colonial drama and the relationship which binds them', while at the same time undoing the dialectic by emphasizing the spectral presence of all those liminal figures who slipped between these two categories (Memmi 1967; Derrida 1998: 62). That exploration of the relationship that binds colonizer with colonized ended in the necessity of deconstruction. The scenario began with the imposition of the French language by the colonial regime, so that Arabic became an alien, foreign language in its own home, the first stage of what Calvet calls *glottophagie*, the colonizer's attempt to devour indigenous languages by devaluing them (Calvet 1974; Fabian 1986). And now the Algerian and Moroccan states are, in turn, trying to suppress indigenous languages by devouring them (Hargreaves 1995: 101–2). As you have now revealed, you spoke French without it ever being your mother tongue, which remained unknown to you, French possessing you rather than being possessed by you, so that you were always existing on the shores of a French that was both yours and, to you, the language of the other: 'you see, never will this language be mine. And truth to tell, it never was' (Derrida 1998: 2). You did not have the comparative luxury of choosing to write in your native tongue, or succumbing to the necessity of the language of the international market-place. Deprived of all language, inhabiting only foreign languages – 'French, English, German, Greek, Latin, the philosophic, the metaphilosophic, the Christian, etc.' – you were thrown into 'absolute translation, a translation without a pole of reference, without an originary language, and without a source language' (Derrida 1987a: 562n; 1998: 61). Your speech was encrypted inside a stranger's language that was not your own, making you a stranger to yourself: 'it exists asymmetrically, always *for the other*, from the other, kept by the other. Coming from the other, remaining with the other, and returning to the other'. Your writings represent an exploration of the experience of French as a colonial discourse that was also your discourse: doubtless it is for this reason that Joyce, writing in an English that was also not his mother tongue, represents so significant a figure for yourself and Cixous: 'Yes, I only have one language, yet it is not mine'. You write, therefore, not in order to produce the rules of colonial discourse, as Foucault demanded, but from the experience of inhabiting it, of being its subject of enunciation put into a perpetual process of translation with no original. Small wonder, then, that you wished to free-up the monolingualism of its pellucid prose, to locate some of the heterogeneity of the alterity that remains both yours and alien to you, 'to make something happen to this language'. The language of the master, the colonist, was also yours, yours to dispossess him of, to expropriate from him inappropriately. 'Charlatan!' they called you. An incomprehensible, uninvited guest harbouring in the host language, the language of the masters, 'a new-comer without assignable origin, [who] would make the said language come to him, forcing the language then to speak itself by itself, in another way, in his language. To speak by itself. But for him, and on his terms' (Derrida 1998: 40, 51). But for you, and on your terms.

5 THE MARRANO: 'A LITTLE BLACK AND VERY ARAB JEW WHO UNDERSTOOD NOTHING ABOUT IT'

What is Franco-Maghrebian? . . . The silence of that hyphen does not pacify or appease anything, not a single torment, not a single torture. It will never silence that memory. It could even worsen the terror, the lesions, and the wounds. A hyphen is never enough to conceal protests, cries of anger or suffering, the noise of weapons, airplanes, and bombs. (Derrida 1998: 11)

So now you have said it up-front, and aligned deconstruction with your 'Judeo-Franco-Maghrebian genealogy':

Certainly, everything that has, say, interested me for a long time – on account of writing, the trace, the deconstruction of phallogocentrism and 'the' Western metaphysics . . . all of that could *not* not proceed from the strange reference to an 'elsewhere' of which the place and the language were unknown and prohibited even to myself, as if I were trying to *translate* into the only language and the only French Western culture that I have at my disposal, the culture into which I was thrown at birth, a possibility that is inaccessible to myself. (Ibid.: 70–1)

Clearly too, for you have repeated it several times to my knowledge at least, in *Le Nouvel observateur* in 1983, in *La Carte postale* in 1980, in *Psyché: Invention de l'autre* in 1987, in *L'Autre cap* in 1991, in *Le Monolingualisme de l'autre* in 1996, and in *Sur parole* in 1999, while its experience haunts your 'Circumfession' in *Jacques Derrida* (1991) and so many other texts: that moment of literal 'degradation' in 1940, when the Vichy-aligned French state in unoccupied Algeria revoked the Crémieux decree of 1870 and took away your French citizenship, producing in you 'on the one hand . . . the theme of a necessary or rather fatal degradation, as the very form of progress; on the other hand, nostalgia for what preceded this degradation, an affective impulse towards islets of resistance' (Derrida 1976: 134). The immediate effect of this deconstruction for you was that on the first day of the new school year you were told to leave the lycée and return home because the percentage of Jews allowed in the school (the *Numerus Clausus* law) had just been lowered by the Rector from 14 to 7 per cent. That moment exists like a precarious primal scene of *ressentiment* in your writing, the moment of not belonging, of being both inside and outside: 'It's an experience which leaves nothing intact, something you can never again cease to feel' (Derrida 1985: 113). Refusing to go to the school that had been set up by some Jewish teachers who had also been expelled from the school system, you then existed in a state of truant limbo for a year. You felt doubly displaced:

J.D. A paradoxical effect, perhaps, of this bludgeoning, was the desire to be integrated into the non-Jewish community, a fascinated but painful and distrustful desire, one with a nervous vigilance, a painstaking attitude to discern signs of racism in its most discreet formations or in its loudest denials. Symmetrically, oftentimes, I have felt an impatient

distance with regard to various Jewish communities, when I have the impression that they close in upon themselves. . . . From all of which comes a feeling of non-belonging that I have doubtless transposed.

Interviewer – in Philosophy?

J.D. Everywhere. (Derrida 1985: 114)

This ‘difficulty with belonging’, as Geoffrey Bennington puts it, started with this moment and has permeated all of your writing (Bennington and Derrida 1993: 326–7). You have turned that resented degradation back and deployed it upon the culture’s institutions, inveigling and ensnaring them with deconstruction’s fragile language of the degraded, the subaltern, the dispossessed, the forcibly converted, the crypto-Jew. You call yourself a Marrano, a pig, the name given to the Iberian Jews who were forced under the regime of the Inquisition to convert and eat pork, but continued to practise their faith in secret – but even then, you are not a proper Marrano: ‘If I am a sort of *marrane* of French Catholic culture . . . I am one of those *marranes* who no longer say they are Jews even in the secret of their own hearts, not so as to be authenticated *marranes* on both sides of the public frontier, but because they doubt everything’ (ibid.: 170–1).

The official degradation and regradation of your citizenship only institutionalized and formalized your status as a cultural and political Marrano. You were already that, born into Marranic colonial lack. ‘Marranos that we are, Marranos in any case, whether we want to be or not, whether we know it or not’ (Derrida 1993: 81). Your boundaries were always blurred – history had seen to that for you. You have always, as Bhabha puts it, survived ‘the after life of translation’ with an ‘act of living on borderlines’ (Bhabha 1994: 226–7). The internalized violence and historical artifice of the colonial power’s cultural and political systems were already apparent to you. You were other to them, othered by them, and hence your desire to detect or inscribe alterity within them, to show that you could find it, find yourself there already at their very heart.

When you spoke of these things, you were dismissed as a ‘charlatan’, a pretentious impostor who was telling porkies. How, indeed, could this Marranized crypto-Jew, coming from Algeria, dare to challenge the canonical traditions of the west, or the privileged traditions of the elites of the east or the south? Yours were the ideas that were said to be non-philosophical, non-political, that were dismissed because they did not conform to recognized philosophical or left-political categories or, worse, because they challenged the basis on which such categories were constructed. The very idea! What, then, came the cry, were the politics of deconstruction? Just another idealism! Yet yours were the ideas that, against all apparent odds, against all patronizing assumptions that only the simplest language and ideas could ever inspire people to self-assertion and struggle towards social and political transformation, were taken up by many refugees and minorities, migrant and immigrant groups, because they felt that it was your ideas that expressed, embodied their own disembodied devalued cultural and political situations (and let no one assume that minorities, migrants and immigrants are exclusive to the west). You talked in a language that was already their

own. Because you were one of them and thus you spoke with them from their subject positions on the margins, theirs was already the language with which and through which you reconceptualized the world from their perspective and asserted the power of the marginalized in the heartlands of western institutions. You enabled new political constituencies to articulate their identities in the processes through which they were developing their own politics. Not, indeed, a politics to cover everything for everyone in every situation to be sure (an impossible demand), but a politics that up to then had had no homeland, no language, no vocabulary, no concepts with which to assert the claims and objectives of the earth's possessed and dispossessed, its marooned and migrant Marranos, literal and metaphorical, against the ever increasing and more fully realized power of dominating white mythologies.

Epilogue

Tricontinentalism, for a Transnational Social Justice

As the previous chapter suggests in its articulation of different colonial and personal histories, this book in many ways rewrites *White Mythologies* into the wider perspective of the historical challenge of tricontinental counter-modernity. Sartre remains a fulcrum, but instead of juxtaposing the impossibility of history in its European form to the radical epistemologies of the postcolonial, the new tricontinental formations now emerge from theoretical strictures that were themselves the direct products of the praxis of historical anti-colonial struggles.

Anti-colonialism was never just an idea, a theoretical position, a philosophical view of the world; its ideas were embedded as part of a dynamic input into material political and social organizational infrastructures. Tricontinentalism, like postcolonialism, was generated from a combination of diasporic and local contexts. Unlike some postcolonials, however, anti-colonial intellectuals were not preoccupied by worries about positions of detachment or specularly (JanMohamed 1992). They were organic intellectuals, who lived and fought for the political issues around which they organized their lives and with which they were involved at a practical level on a daily basis.

While I was writing *White Mythologies* I was living in Camden, North London. It was only while researching this book that I discovered that the next house in the street where I lived had been the West Africa Students Union, founded in 1924, and run by the Nigerian, Lapido Solanke. Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, C. L. R. James, George Padmore, Paul Robeson and many others had trodden a path to the house next door, bought for the West African Students Union by Marcus Garvey himself. Despite the proliferation of blue plaques on virtually every house in London, commemorating sites associated with the achievements of well-known and obscure Europeans, there was nothing to mark the momentous revolutionary anti-colonial activities that went on at this house. Such has been the willed effacement of the history of revolutionary anti-colonial resistance, in Europe at least.

This book has presented a small number of the many histories, rebellions, political campaigns, cultural identifications and theoretical formulations that evolved during the twentieth century as part of the anti-colonial struggles that together, at great

human cost, freed the world from colonial domination in a remarkably short period of time. Today, tricontinental, or 'postcolonial', theory and its political practices seek to build on that rich inheritance, the radical legacy of its political determination, its refusal to accept the status quo, its transformation of epistemologies, its establishment of new forms of discursive and political power. Though much was achieved, injustice, inequality, landlessness, exploitation, poverty, disease and famine remain the daily experience of much of the world's population. Tricontinentalism operates out of a knowledge that was formed through the realities of such conditions: its politics of power-knowledge asserts the will to change them.

Bibliography

- Abadan-Unat, Nermin, ed. (1981), *Women in Turkish Society*. Leiden, E. J. Brill.
- Abdel-Malek, Anouar (1981), *Social Dialectics*, 2 vols, trans. Mike Gonzalez. Albany, State University of New York Press.
- Adas, Michael (1979), *Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- Adderley, Charles Bowyer (1861), *Letter to the Right Hon. Benjamin Disraeli, M.P., on the Present Relations of England with the Colonies*. London, Parker, Son, and Bourn.
- Adderley, Charles Bowyer (1869), *Review of 'The Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell's Administration', by Earl Grey, 1853, and of Subsequent Colonial History*. London, E. Stanford.
- Adderley, Charles Bowyer (1903), *Imperial Fellowship of Self-Governed British Colonies*. London, Rivingtons.
- Adelman, Jeremy, ed. (1999), *Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History*. New York, Routledge.
- Adler, John, ed. (1980), *Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International*, trans. Alex Holt and Barbara Holland. London, Pluto Press.
- Ageron, Charles Robert (1973), *L'Anticolonialisme en France, de 1871 à 1914*. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Agostinho Neto, António (1980), *Speeches*. Luanda, MPLA-Partido do Trabalho, Department of Politico-Ideological Education, Propaganda and Information.
- Aguilar, Luis E., ed. (1968), *Marxism in Latin America*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf.
- Ahamada, Mujaphphara (1959), *Communist Party of India: Years of Formation: 1921-1933*. Calcutta, National Book Agency.
- Ahamada, Mujaphphara (1962), *The Communist Party of India and its Formation Abroad*. Calcutta, National Book Agency.
- Ahmad, Aijaz (1969), *Poems by Ghalib*, trans. Aijaz Ahmad et al., with a forenote by Aijaz Ahmad. New York, Hudson Review.
- Ahmad, Aijaz (1992), *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. London, Verso.
- Ahmad, Aijaz (1995), 'The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality', *Race and Class* 36: 3, 1-20.
- Ahmad, Aijaz (1996), *Lineages of the Present: Political Essays*. New Delhi, Tulika.
- Ahmed, Akbar S. and Donnan, Hastings (1994), *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity*. London, Routledge.
- Ahmed, Leila (1992), *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

- Ajayi, J. F. Ade (1969), 'Colonialism: An Episode in African History', in *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, ed. L. H. Gann and P. Duignan. *The History and Politics of Colonialism*, Vol. 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 497–509.
- Ajayi, J. F. Ade, ed. (1989), *Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s*. General History of Africa, Vol. 6. Oxford, Heinemann.
- Alavi, Hamza and Shanin, Teodor (1982), *Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing Societies'*. London, Macmillan.
- Alavi, Hamza et al. (1982), *Capitalism and Colonial Production*. London, Croom Helm.
- Albertini, Rudolf von (1971), *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919–1960*, trans. Francisca Garvie. New York, Doubleday.
- Albright, David E., ed. (1980), *Africa and International Communism*. London, Macmillan.
- Alexander, M. Jacqui and Mohanty, Chandra Talpade (1997), *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*. New York, Routledge.
- Alexander, Robert J. (1957), *Communism in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press.
- Alexander, Robert J. (1973), *Trotskyism in Latin America*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press.
- Alexander, Robert J. (1991), *International Trotskyism 1929–1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Ali, Tariq (1985), *The Nehrus and the Gandhis: An Indian Dynasty*, foreword by Salman Rushdie. London, Putnam.
- Ali, Tariq, ed. (1984), *The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on Twentieth-century World Politics*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Allen, Chris and Williams, Gavin (1982), *Sub-Saharan Africa*. London, Macmillan.
- Allen, Kieran (1990), *The Politics of James Connolly*. London, Pluto.
- Allison, Roy (1988), *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-alignment in the Third World*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Allworth, Edward, ed. (1980), *Ethnic Russia in the USSR: The Dilemma of Dominance*. New York, Pergamon Press.
- Althusser, Louis (1966), 'Sur la révolution culturelle', *Cahiers Marxistes-Léninistes* 14, 5–16.
- Althusser, Louis (1971), *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster. London, New Left Books.
- Althusser, Louis (1977), *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster. London, Verso.
- Althusser, Louis (1993), *The Future Lasts a Long Time; and, The Facts*, ed. Olivier Corpet and Yann Moulier Boutang, trans. Richard Veasey. London, Chatto & Windus.
- Althusser, Louis and Balibar, Etienne (1970), *Reading Capital* (1968), trans. Ben Brewster. London, NLB.
- Alvarez, Sonia E., Dagnino, Evelina and Escobar, Arturo, eds (1998), *Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Amate, C. O. C. (1986), *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Amin, Samir (1973), *Neo-colonialism in West Africa*, trans. Francis McDonagh. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Amin, Samir (1974), *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Development*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Amin, Samir (1977), *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. Hassocks, Harvester Press.
- Amin, Samir (1981), *L'Avenir du maoïsme*. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
- Amin, Samir (1988), *Eurocentrism*. London, Zed Books.

- Amin, Shahid (1995), *Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922–1992*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Amrane, Djamila (1994), *Des Femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie: entretiens*. Paris, Karthala.
- Anderson, Benedict (1983), *Imaginary Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, Verso.
- Anderson, Perry (1962), 'Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism', *New Left Review* 15: 83–102; 16: 88–123; 17: 85–114.
- Anderson, Perry (1976–7), 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', *New Left Review* 100, 5–79.
- Andersson, Efraim (1958), *Messianic Popular Movements in the Lower Congo*. Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksells.
- Andrade, Mário de (1980), *Amílcar Cabral: essai de biographie politique*. Paris, Maspero.
- Andrade, Mário de (1997), *Origens do nacionalismo africano: continuidade e ruptura nos movimentos unitários emergentes da luta contra a dominação colonial portuguesa, 1911–1961*. Lisbon, Publicações Dom Quixote.
- Andrew, Christopher M. and Kanya-Forstne, A. S. (1981), *France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion*. London, Thames & Hudson.
- Apffel-Marglin, Frédérique and Marglin, Stephen A., eds (1996), *Decolonizing Knowledge: From Development to Dialogue*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Appadorai, Angadipuram (1955), *The Bandung Conference*. New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs.
- Appadurai, Arjun, ed. (1986), *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Appiah, Kwame (1992), *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. London, Methuen.
- Arendt, Hannah (1970), *On Violence*. London, Allen Lane.
- Arndt, Heinz (1987), *Economic Development: The History of an Idea*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Arnold, David (1977), *The Congress in Tamilnad: Nationalist Politics in South India, 1919–1937*. London, Curzon Press.
- Arumugam, M. (1978), *Socialist Thought in India: The Contribution of Rammanohar Lohia*. New Delhi, Sterling.
- Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth and Tiffin, Helen (1989), *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures*. London, Routledge.
- Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth and Tiffin, Helen (1998), *Key Concepts in Post-colonial Studies*. London, Routledge.
- Asian–African Conference (1955), *Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference: Texts of Selected Speeches and Final Communique of the Asian–African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24, 1955*. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations.
- Avineri, Shlomo, ed. (1968), *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*. New York, Doubleday.
- Aylmer, G. E. (1975), *The Levellers in the English Revolution*. London, Thames & Hudson.
- Azikiwe, Nnamdi (1968), *Renascent Africa*, London Cass.
- Bagchi, Amiya Kumar (1982), *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Bairathi, Shashi (1987), *Communism and Nationalism in India: A Study in Interrelationship, 1919–1947*. Noida, Anamika Prakashan.
- Bakshi, S. R. (1981), *Gandhi and Salt Satyagraha*. Malayattoor, Kerala, Vishwavidya Publishers.
- Bakshi, S. R. (1987), *Gandhi and Status of Women*. New Delhi, Criterion Publications.

- Bala, Usha and Sharma, Anshu (1986), *Indian Women Freedom Fighters, 1857–1947*. New Delhi, Manohar.
- Balibar, Etienne and Wallerstein, Immanuel (1991), *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London, Verso.
- Balibar, Renée and Laporte, Dominique (1974), *Le Français national: politique et pratiques de la langue nationale sous la Révolution française*. Paris, Hachette.
- Balibar, Renée, Merlin, Geneviève and Tret, Gilles (1974), *Les Français fictifs: le rapport des styles littéraires au français national*. Paris, Hachette.
- Bamford, P. C. (1974), *Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements*. Delhi, Deep Publications.
- Banerjee, Diptendra (1985), *Marxian Theory and the Third World*. New Delhi, Sage Publications.
- Baran, Paul (1957), *The Political Economy of Growth*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Barker, Francis, Hulme, Peter and Iverson, Margaret (1994), *Colonial Discourse / Postcolonial Theory*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Barlow, Tani E. (1997), *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Barone, Charles A. (1985), *Marxist Thought on Imperialism: Survey and Critique*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Bassnett, Susan and Trivedi, Harish (1999), *Post-colonial Translation: Theory and Practice*. London, Routledge.
- Basu, Amrita, ed. (1995), *The Challenge of Local Feminism: Women's Movement in Global Perspective*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Battistini, Lawrence H. (1955), *The United States and Asia*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger.
- Baulin, Jacques (1962), *The Arab Role in Africa*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Baumgart, Winfried (1982), *Imperialism: The Idea and Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion, 1880–1914*, revd edn, trans. by the author with Ben V. Mast. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Bayart, Jean-François (1993), *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* [1989], trans. Mary Harper, Christopher and Elizabeth Harison. London, Longman.
- Bayly, C. A. (1988), *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Bayly, C. A. (1989), *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830*. London, Longman.
- Bayly, C. A. (1996), *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Beck, Lois and Keddie, Nikki, eds (1978), *Women in the Muslim World*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Becker, David G. and Sklar, Richard L., eds (1999), *Postimperialism and World Politics*, Westport, CT, Praeger.
- Becker, David G., et al. (1987), *Postimperialism: International Capitalism and Development in the Late Twentieth Century*. London, Lynne Rienner.
- Becker, Marc (1993), *Mariátegui and Latin American Marxist Theory*. Athens, OH, Ohio University Center for International Studies.
- Behbehani, Hashim S. H. (1986), *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917–1966*. London, KPI.
- Bell, Kenneth N. and Morrell, W. P (1928), *Select Documents on British Colonial Policy 1830–1860*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

- Bennett, George, ed. (1953), *The Concept of Empire: Burke to Atlee, 1774–1947*. London, Adam and Charles Black.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre (1958), 'Sultan Galiev: The USSR and the Colonial Revolution', in Walter Laqueur, ed., *The Middle East in Transition*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 398–414.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre and Broxup, Marie (1983), *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*. London, Croom Helm.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre and Lemerrier-Quelquejaye, Chantal (1981), *Les Musulmans oubliés. L'Islam en Union soviétique*. Paris, Maspero.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre and Lemerrier-Quelquejaye, Chantal (1986), *Sultan Galiev, le père de la révolution tiers-mondiste*. Paris, Fayard.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre and Quelquejaye, Chantal (1961), *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR and their Linguistic Problems*. London, Central Asian Research Centre.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre and Wimbush, S. Enders (1979), *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Bennington, Geoffrey and Derrida, Jacques (1993), *Jacques Derrida [1991]*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Bentham, Jeremy (1843), *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. J. Bowring, 11 vols. Edinburgh, William Tait.
- Benton, Gregor (1996), *China's Urban Revolutionaries: Explorations in the History of Chinese Trotskyism, 1921–1952*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press.
- Berger, Iris (1992), *Threads of Solidarity: Women in South African Industry, 1900–1980*. London, James Currey.
- Berman, Russell A. (1998), *Empire or Enlightenment: Colonial Discourse in German Culture*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.
- Bertrand, Louis and Petrie, Sir Charles (1952), *The History of Spain*, 2nd edn. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode.
- Besant, Annie (1915), *Self-government for India*. Madras, Theosophical Publishing House.
- Betts, Raymond F. (1961), *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory 1890–1914*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Beverley, John, Oviedo, José and Aronna, Michael, eds (1995), *The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Bhabha, Homi K. (1991), 'The Postcolonial Critic', *Arena* 96: 47–63.
- Bhabha, Homi K. (1994), *The Location of Culture*. London, Routledge.
- Bhattacharya, Bhabani (1969), *Gandhi: The Writer (The Image as it Grew)*. Delhi, National Book Trust.
- Bhattacharyya, S. N. (1965), *Mahatma Gandhi, The Journalist*. Bombay, Asia Publishing House.
- Biko, Steve (1978), *I Write What I Like*. London, Bowerdean.
- Biswas, Arun Kumar (1986), *Swami Vivekananda and the Indian Quest for Socialism*. Calcutta, Firma KLM.
- Bitterli, Urs (1989), *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters Between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492–1800*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Blackburn, Robin (1988), *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848*. London, Verso.
- Bleys, Rudi C. (1996), *The Geography of Perversion: Male-to-male Sexual Behaviour Outside the West and the Ethnographic Imagination, 1750–1918*. London, Cassell.
- Bliss, Robert M. (1990), *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

- Bloch, Ernst, et al. (1977), *Aesthetics and Politics: Debates Between Bloch, Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno*. London, Verso.
- Blomström, M. and Hettne, B. (1984), *Development Theory in Transition: The Dependency Debate and Beyond. Third World Responses*. London, Zed Books.
- Boahen, A. Adu (1987), *African Perspectives on Colonialism*. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Boahen, A. Adu, ed. (1985), *Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880–1935*. General History of Africa, 7. Oxford, Heinemann.
- Bodelsen, C. A. (1960), *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism*. London, Heinemann.
- Bolton, Kingsley and Hutton, Christopher (1995), 'Bad and Banned Language: Triad Secret Societies, the Censorship of the Cantonese Vernacular, and Colonial Language Policy in Hong Kong', *Language in Society* 24: 159–86.
- Borkenau, F. (1938), *The Communist International*. London, Faber & Faber.
- Borsa, G. and Brocchieri, P. B., eds (1984), *Garibaldi, Mazzini e il Risorgimento nel risveglio dell'Asia e dell'Africa*. Milan, Angeli.
- Bose, Arun (1971), *Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, 1905–1922, in the Background of International Developments*. Patna, Bharati Bhawan.
- Bose, Subhas Chandra (1997), *The Indian Struggle, 1920–1942*, ed. Sisir K. Bose and Sugata Bose. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Bottomore, T. and Goode, P. (1978), *Austro-Marxism*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Bottomore, Tom, Harris, Laurence, Kiernan, V. G. and Miliband, Ralph, eds (1991), *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 2nd edn. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1958), *Sociologie de l'Algérie*. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1979), *Algeria 1960: Essays*, trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1998), *Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time*, trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre and Darbel, Alain (1963), *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*. Paris, Mouton.
- Bourdieu, Pierre and Sayad, Abdelmalek (1964), *Le Déracinement: la crise de l'agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie*. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
- Bozzoli, Belinda and Nkotsie, Mmantho (1991), *Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900–1983*. London, James Currey.
- Bragança, Aquino de and Wallerstein, Immanuel, eds (1982), *The African Liberation Reader*, 3 vols. London, Zed Books.
- Brailsford, H. N. (1961), *The Levellers and the English Revolution*. London, Cresset Press.
- Brandt, C., Schwartz, B. and Fairbank, J. K., eds (1952), *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*. London, Allen & Unwin.
- Brandt, W. et al. (1980), *North–South: A Programme for Survival. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues*. London, Pan.
- Brantley, Cynthia (1981), *The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya, 1800–1920*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Brantley, Cynthia (1986), 'Mekatalili and the Role of Women in Giriama Resistance', in *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa*, ed. Donald Crummey. London, James Currey, 333–50.
- Brasted, H. V. (1980), 'Indian Nationalist Development and the Influence of Irish Home Rule, 1870–1886', *Modern Asian Studies*, 14: 1, 37–63.
- Brasted, H. V. (1983), 'Nationalism and Empire, 1873–91', in O. MacDonagh, W. F. Mandle and P. Travers, eds, *Irish Culture and Nationalism, 1750–1950*. London, Macmillan, 83–103.

- Brathwaite, Edward (1971), *The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica 1770–1820*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Braun & Cie (1931), *Promenade à travers l'exposition coloniale internationale. 24 cartes détachables*. Paris.
- Braunthal, Julius (1966), *History of the International 1864–1914*, trans. Henry Collins and Kenneth Mitchell. London, Nelson.
- Breckenridge, Carol A. and van der Veer, Peter, eds (1993), *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Brennan, Timothy (1989), *Salman Rushdie and the Third World: Myths of the Nation*. London, Macmillan.
- Brennan, Timothy (1997), *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Bretton, Henry L. (1967), *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa*. London, Pall Mall Press.
- Breuilly, John (1993), *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edn. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Brewer, Anthony (1980), *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Brinkley, Douglas and Facey-Crowther, David R. (1994), *The Atlantic Charter*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Brown, Judith M. (1989), *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Buchan, John (1921–2), *A History of the Great War*, 2 vols. London, Thomas Nelson.
- Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1972), *Imperialism and World Economy* [1915], introduction by V. I. Lenin. London, Merlin Press.
- Bull, Bartle (1992), *Safari: A Chronicle of Adventure*. London, Penguin.
- Burke, Edmund (1981), *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke. Vol. 5, India: Madras and Bengal 1774–1785*, ed. P. J. Marshall and William B. Todd. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Burke, Edmund (1991), *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke. Vol. 6, India: The Launching of the Hastings Impeachment 1786–1788*, ed. P. J. Marshall and William B. Todd. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Burkholder, Mark A. and Johnson, Lyman L. (1998), *Colonial Latin America*, 3rd edn. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Burton, Antoinette M. (1994), *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- Burton, Antoinette M. (1998), *At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian Britain*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Burton, Antoinette M., ed. (1999), *Gender, Sexuality and Colonial Modernities*. London, Routledge.
- Bute, E. L. and Harmer, H. J. P. (1997), *The Black Handbook: The People, History and Politics of Africa and the African Diaspora*. London, Cassell.
- Butler, Jeffrey (1968), *The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Byres, T. J. and Mukhia, Harbans, eds (1985), *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*. London, Frank Cass.
- Caballero, Manuel (1986), *Latin America and the Comintern 1919–1943*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Cabral, Amilcar (1969), *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle*. London, Stage 1.
- Cabral, Amilcar (1973), *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches by Amilcar Cabral*. New York, Monthly Review Press with Africa Information Service.

- Cain, P. J. and Hopkins, A. G. (1993a), *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914*. London, Longman.
- Cain, P. J. and Hopkins, A. G. (1993b), *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914–1990*. London, Longman.
- Callaway, Helen (1987), *Gender, Culture, and Empire*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Calvet, Pierre (1974), *Linguistique et colonialisme: petit traité de glottophagie*. Paris, Payot.
- Cameron, Deborah (1985), *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*. London, Macmillan.
- Campa Mendoza, Víctor (1999), *Las insurrecciones de los pueblos indios en México: la rebelión zapatista en Chiapas*. Guadalajara, Jal., México, Ediciones Cuéllar.
- Camus, Albert (1983), *The Outsider*, trans. Joseph Laredo. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Canclini, Néstor García (1995), *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*, trans. Christopher L. Chiappari and Silvia L. López. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
- Cardoso, F. and Faletto, E. (1979), *Dependency and Development in Latin America* [1970]. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Carr, E. H. (1966), *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 3 vols. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène (1992), *The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State 1917–1930*, trans. Nancy Festinger. New York, Holmes & Meier.
- Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène and Schram, Stuart R. (1969), *Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings*. London, Allen Lane.
- Caruso, Paolo (1969), 'Conversazione con Michel Foucault', in *Conversazioni con Claude Lévi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan*. Milan, Mursia.
- Casely Hayford, J. E. (1911), *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation*. London, C. M. Phillips.
- Casement, Sir Roger (1997), *The Amazon Journal of Roger Casement*, ed. Angus Mitchell. London, Anaconda Editions.
- Castro, Fidel (1972), *Fidel Castro Speaks*, ed. M. Kenner and J. Petras. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Castro, Fidel (1996), *Cuba at the Crossroads*. Melbourne, Ocean Press.
- Césaire, Aimé (1972), *Discourse on Colonialism* [1955], trans. Joan Pinkham. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Chabal, Patrick (1983), *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh (1989), *Rethinking Working-class History: Bengal, 1890–1940*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh (1992), 'Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for "Indian" Pasts?', *Representations* 37: 1–26.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000), *Provincializing Europe*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Chakravarti, Uma (1998), *Rewriting History: The Life and Times of Pandita Ramabai*. New Delhi, Kali for Women.
- Chaliand, Gérard and Rageau, Jean-Pierre (1995), *The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas*, trans. A. M. Berrett. New York, Viking Penguin.
- Chambers, Iain and Curtis, Lidia, eds (1996), *The Post-colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*. London, Routledge.
- Chandhoke, Neera, ed. (1994), *Understanding the Post-colonial World: Theory and Method*. Delhi, Sterling Publishers.
- Chandra, Bipan (1979), *Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India*. New Delhi, Orient Longman.

- Chatterjee, Partha (1986), *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. London, Zed Books.
- Chatterjee, Partha (1993), *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Chatterjee, Partha, ed. (1995), *Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
- Chatterjee, Partha (1997), *The Present History of West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Chatterji, P. C. (1998), *The Adventure of Indian Broadcasting: A Philosopher's Autobiography*. Delhi, Konark Publishers.
- Chaudhuri, Rosinka (2000), 'Young India: A Bengal Eclogue; or Meat-eating, Race, and Reform in a Colonial Poem', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 2: 3: 421–38.
- Chavarría, Jesús (1979), *José Carlos Mariátegui and the Rise of Modern Peru, 1890–1930*. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
- Cheyfitz, Eric (1991), *The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and Colonization from the Tempest to Tarzan*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Chilcote, Ronald H. (1972), *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press.
- Chopra, P. N., ed. (1988), *Indian Muslims in Freedom Struggle*. New Delhi, Criterion Publications.
- Cixous, Hélène (1998), 'My Algeriance, in other words: to depart not to arrive from Algeria', in *Stigmata: Escaping Texts*. London, Routledge, 153–72.
- Cixous, Hélène and Clément, Catherine (1986), *The Newly Born Woman*, trans. Betsy Wing. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Claudin, F. (1975), *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Clayton, Anthony (1994), *The Wars of French Decolonization*. London, Longman.
- Coggiola, Osvaldo (1986), *El trotskismo en la Argentina (1960–1985)*. Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de América Latina.
- Cohen, Robin and Rai, Shirin M. (2000), *Global Social Movements*. London, Athlone Press.
- Cohen, Robin, Gutkind, Peter C. W. and Brazier, Phyllis (1979), *Peasants and Proletarians: The Struggle of Third World Workers*. London, Hutchinson.
- Colley, Linda (1992), *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Collotti Pischel, Enrica and Robertazzi, Chiara (1968), *L'Internationale communiste et les problèmes coloniaux, 1919–1935*. Paris, Editions Mouton.
- Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John L. (1991), *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John L. (1997), *Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier*, vol. 2. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Comintern (1929a), *The Programme of the Communist International. Together with the Statutes of the Communist International*. London, Modern Books.
- Comintern (1929b), *Communism and the International Situation. Theses on the International Situation and the tasks of the Communist International, adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, 1928*. London, Modern Books.
- Comintern (1929c), *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies. Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies, adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International*. London, Modern Books.

- Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims (1942), *The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint: A study by the Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims. The application of the "eight points" of the charter to the problems of Africa, and especially those related to the welfare of the African people living south of the Sahara, with related material on African conditions and needs*. New York City, Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims.
- Congress of the Toilers of the Far East (1970), *The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, held in Moscow, January 21st–February 1st 1922*. London, Hammersmith Bookshop.
- Conklin, Alice L. (1997), *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Ideal of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.
- Connolly, James (1968), *Revolutionary Warfare*. Dublin, New Books.
- Connolly, James (1973), *Selected Political Writings*, ed. Owen Dudley Edwards and Bernard Ransom. London, Jonathan Cape.
- Connolly, James (1977), *Should the Workers of Ireland Support Sinn Féin?* Cork, Cork Workers' Club.
- Connolly, James (1988a), *Collected Works*. 2 vols. Dublin, New Books Publications.
- Connolly, James (1988b), *Selected Writings*, ed. P. Berresford Ellis. London, Pluto Press.
- Connolly, James (1997), *The Lost Writings*, ed. Aindrias Ó Cathasaigh. London, Pluto Press.
- Connor, Walker (1994), *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Conrad, Joseph (1923), *Youth: A Narrative, and Two Other Stories*. London, J. M. Dent.
- Constantine, Learie (1954), *Colour Bar*. London, Stanley Paul.
- Coogan, Tim Pat (1990), *Michael Collins: A Biography*. London, Hutchinson.
- Copley, Antony (1987), *Gandhi: Against the Tide*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine (1997), *African Women: A Modern History* [1994], trans. Beth Gillian Raps. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Courrière, Yves (1968–71), *La Guerre d'Algérie*, 4 vols. Paris, Fayard.
- Crocker, W. R. (1949), *Self-government for the Colonies*. London, George Allen & Unwin.
- Crowder, Michael (1971), *West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation*. New York, Africana Publishing.
- Crowley, Tony (1989), *The Politics of Discourse: The Standard Language Question in British Cultural Debates*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Crowley, Tony (1991), *Proper English? Readings in Language, History and Cultural Identity*. London, Routledge.
- Crummey, Donald, ed. (1986), *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa*. London, James Currey.
- Cullen, Mary, ed. (1998), *1798: 200 Years of Resonance. Essays and Contributions on the History and Relevance of the United Irishmen and the 1798 Revolution*. Dublin, Irish Reporter Publications.
- Culler, Jonathan (1975), *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Curran, Jean Alonzo (1951), *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the R.S.S.* New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.
- Curtin, Philip D. (1989), *Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century*. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Curtin, Philip D., ed. (1972), *Imperialism*. London, Macmillan.
- da Campos, Haroldo (1986), 'The Rule of Anthropophagy: Europe Under the Sign of Devoration', *Latin American Literary Review* 14: 27, 42–60.
- Dallmayr, Fred R. and Devy, G. N. (1998), *Between Tradition and Modernity: India's Search for*

- Identity: A Twentieth Century Anthology*. New Delhi, Sage Publications.
- Darby, Phillip, ed. (1997), *At the Edge of International Relations. Postcolonialism, Gender and Dependency*. London, Pinter.
- Dasgupta, Biplab (1974), *The Naxalite Movement*. Bombay, Allied Publishers.
- Davenport, T. R. H. (1991), *South Africa: A Modern History*, 4th edn. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Davidson, Basil (1969), *The Liberation of Guiné: Aspects of an African Revolution*, foreword by Amílcar Cabral. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Davidson, Basil (1992), *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*. London, James Currey.
- Davies, Miranda, ed. (1983), *Third World, Second Sex: Women's Struggles and National Liberation*. London, Zed Books.
- Davin, Anna (1978), 'Imperialism and Motherhood', *History Workshop* 5, 9–65.
- Davis, Angela, Magee, Ruchell, the Soledad Brothers, and other political prisoners (1971), *If They Come in the Morning: Voices of Resistance*. London, Orbach & Chambers, in association with the Angela Davis Defence Committee.
- Davis, Lance E. and Huttenback, Robert A. (1986), *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860–1912*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Dawson, Graham (1994) *Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities*. London, Routledge.
- de Beauvoir, Simone (1968), *Force of Circumstance*, trans. Richard Howard. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- de Beauvoir, Simone and Halimi, Gisèle (1962), *Djamila Boupacha: The Story of the Torture of a Young Algerian Girl which Shocked Liberal French Opinion*, trans. Peter Green. London, André Deutsch, Weidenfeld, and Nicolson.
- De Graft Johnson, J. W. (1928), *Towards Nationhood in West Africa: Thoughts of Young Africa Addressed to Young Britain*. London, Headley Brothers.
- de Saussure, Léopold (1899), *Psychologie de la colonisation française dans ses rapports avec les sociétés indigènes*. Paris, Félix Alcan.
- de Silva, K. M. (1981), *A History of Sri Lanka*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- de Tocqueville, Alexis (1988), *De la Colonie en Algérie, présentation de Tzvetan Todorov*, Brussels, Editions Complexe.
- Debray, Régis (1967), *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*, trans. Bobbye Ortiz. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix (1977), *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Vol. 1 [1972], trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen Lane. New York, Viking.
- Dennett, Tyler (1963), *Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of United States' Policy in the Far East in the Nineteenth Century*. New York, Barnes & Noble.
- Derrida, Jacques (1976), *Of Grammatology* [1967], trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1978), *Writing and Difference* [1967], trans. Alan Bass. London, Routledge.
- Derrida, Jacques (1979), *Seminar with the Oxford Literary Review*, unpublished transcript.
- Derrida, Jacques (1980), 'An Interview with Jacques Derrida', with J. Kearns and K. Newton, *The Literary Review*, no. 14, April 18–May 1.
- Derrida, Jacques (1981), *Positions* [1972], trans. Alan Bass. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1982), *Margins – of Philosophy* [1972], trans. Alan Bass. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

- Derrida, Jacques (1985), 'An Interview with Derrida' ['Derrida l'insoumis', 1983], in *Derrida and Difference*, ed. David Wood and R. Bernasconi. Warwick, Parousia Press, 107–27.
- Derrida, Jacques (1987a), *Psyché: Invention de l'autre*. Paris, Galilée.
- Derrida, Jacques (1987b), *The Post Card* [1980], trans. Alan Bass. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1992), *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe* [1991], trans. P. A. Brault and M. Naas. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1993), *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1998), *Monolingualism of the Other, or the Prosthesis of Origin* [1996], trans. Patrick Mensah. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques (1999), *Sur parole: instantanés philosophiques*. La Tour d'Aigues, Aube.
- Desai, Narayan (1995), *The Fire and the Rose: Biography of Mahadevbhai*. Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House.
- Deutscher, I. (1970), *The Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1921–1929*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Devy, G. N. (1992), *After Amnesia: Tradition and Change in Indian Literary Criticism*. Hyderabad, Orient Longman.
- Devy, G. N. (1998), 'Of Many Heroes': *An Indian Essay in Literary Historiography*. Hyderabad, Orient Longman.
- Dewitte, Philippe (1985), *Les Mouvements nègres en France, 1919–1939*. Paris, Harmattan.
- Dia, Mamadou (1961), *The African Nations and World Solidarity*, trans. Mercer Cook. New York, Frederick A. Praeger.
- Díaz Polanco, Héctor (1997), *La rebelión zapatista y la autonomía*. México, D.F., Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
- Dijk, Teun A. van (1985), *Discourse and Communication: New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media Discourse and Communication*. Berlin, W. de Gruyter.
- Dilke, Charles Wentworth (1868), *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries*. London, Macmillan.
- Dilke, Charles Wentworth (1890), *Problems of Greater Britain*. [1890], 4th edn. London, Macmillan.
- Dillon, Dorothy (1962), *International Communism and Latin America: Perspectives and Prospects*. Gainesville, University of Florida Press.
- Dillon, Martin (1994), *The Enemy Within: The IRA's War against the British*. London, Doubleday.
- Diop, Alioune (1947), 'Niam n'goura, or *Présence Africaine's* *raison d'être*', trans. Richard Wright and Thomas Diop. *Présence Africaine* 1: 185–92.
- Diop, Cheikh Anta (1955), *Nations nègres et culture*. Paris, Éditions africaines.
- Diop, Cheikh Anta (1989), *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa: The Domains of Matriarchy and of Patriarchy in Classical Antiquity*, introduction by Ife Amadiume. London, Karnak House.
- Dirlik, Arif (1989), *The Origins of Chinese Communism*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Dirlik, Arif (1991), *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Dirlik, Arif (1997), *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Dirlik, Arif, Healy, Paul Michael and Knight, Nick (1997), *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press.
- Donaldson, Robert H. (1981), *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.

- Dreyfus, Herbert L. and Rabinow, Paul (1982), *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Brighton, Harvester Press.
- Du Bois, W. E. Burghardt (1965), *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part which Africa has Played in World History*, enlarged edn. New York, International Publishers.
- Du Bois, W. E. Burghardt (1989), *The Souls of Black Folk* [1903]. New York, Bantam Books.
- Dublish, Kaushalya Devi (1982), *Revolutionaries and their Activities in Northern India*. Delhi, B.R. Publishing.
- Duhalde, Eduardo Luis (1994), *Chiapas, la nueva insurgencia: la rebelión zapatista y la crisis del Estado Mexicano*. Buenos Aires, Ediciones del Pensamiento Nacional.
- Duse, Mohamed (1911), *In the Land of the Pharaohs: A Short History of Egypt from the Fall of Ismail to the Assassination of Boutros Pasha*. London, Cass.
- Dutt, R. Palme (1940), *India Today*. London, Victor Gollancz.
- Eagleton, Terry (1998), 'Postcolonialism and "Postcolonialism"', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 1: 1, 24–6.
- Echenberg, Myron J. (1991), *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960*. London, James Currey.
- Eddy, John J., Schreuder, Deryck and MacDonagh, Oliver (1988), *The Rise of Colonial Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa First Assert Their Nationalities, 1880–1914*. London, Allen & Unwin.
- Eickelman, Dale F. and Piscatori, James (1996), *Muslim Politics*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- El Kabbach, Jean-Pierre (1968), 'Foucault répond à Sartre', *La Quinzaine littéraire* 46: 20–2.
- El-Ayouty, Yassin (1994), *The Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years*. Westport, CN, Praeger.
- Eliot, T. S. (1948), *Selected Poems*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Elliott, Gregory (1987), *Althusser: The Detour of Theory*. London, Verso.
- Elliott, J. H. (1970), *Imperial Spain 1469–1716* [1962]. London, Penguin.
- El-Nasser, Gamal Abd (1954), *The Philosophy of Revolution. Book I*. Cairo, Dar Al-maaref.
- El-Sadaawi, Nawal (1980), *The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World*. London, Zed Books.
- Emmanuel, Arghiri (1972), *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, trans. Brian Pearce. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- English, Richard (1998), *Ernie O'Malley, IRA Intellectual*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Escobar, Arturo (1995), *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Esedebe, P. Olisanwuche (1994), *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1991*, 2nd edn. Washington, DC, Howard University Press.
- Etienne, Mona and Leacock, Eleanor, eds (1980), *Women and Colonization: Anthropological Perspectives*. New York, Praeger.
- Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (1997), *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Reader*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Fabian, Johannes (1986), *Language and Colonial Power: The Appropriation of Swahili in the Former Belgian Congo 1880–1938*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Fabian, Johannes (1991), *Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971–1991*. Chur, Switzerland, Harwood.
- Fairbank, J. K., ed. (1983), *Cambridge History of China. Vol. 12: Republican China 1912–1949*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Fairclough, Norman (1992), *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

- Faligot, R. (1978), *James Connolly et la mouvement révolutionnaire irlandaise*. Paris, Maspero.
- Fanon, Frantz (1965), *The Wretched of the Earth* [1961], trans. Constance Farrington. London, MacGibbon & Kee.
- Fanon, Frantz (1967), *Toward the African Revolution* [1964], trans. Haakon Chevalier. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Fanon, Frantz (1980), *A Dying Colonialism* [*L'An cinq de la révolution Algérienne*, 1959], trans. Haakon Chevalier. London, Writers and Readers Cooperative.
- Fanon, Frantz (1986), *Black Skin, White Masks* [1952], trans. Charles Lam Markmann. London, Pluto.
- Femia, Joseph V. (1981), *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Ferguson, Moira (1992), *Subject to Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery, 1670–1834*. London, Routledge.
- Ferrari Bravo, Giuliano (1981), *San Francisco: Le origini del sistema coloniale delle nazione unite*. Venice, Marsilio Editori.
- Ferro, Marc (1997), *Colonization: A Global History*. London, Routledge.
- Fessehazion, Tekie, ed. (1999), *Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation to Conflict*. Lawrenceville, NJ, Red Sea Press.
- Feuchtwanger, E. J. and Nailor, Peter (1981), *The Soviet Union and the Third World*. London, Macmillan.
- Fieldhouse, D. K. (1982), *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*. London, Macmillan.
- Fields, A. Belden (1988), *Trotskyism and Maoism: Theory and Practice in France and the United States*. New York, Praeger.
- Fink, Carole, Gassert, Philipp and Junker, Detlef, eds (1998), *1968: The World Transformed*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Fischer, Louis (1947), *Gandhi and Stalin: Two Signs at the World's Crossroads*. Delhi, Rajkmal Publications.
- Fisher, Frederick B. (1932), *That Strange Little Brown Man Gandhi*. New York, Ray Long and Richard R. Smith.
- Forbes, Geraldine (1996), *Women in Modern India*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Ford, James W. (1938), *The Negro and the Democratic Front*. New York, International Publishers.
- Forgacs, David (1982), 'Marxist Literary Theories', in *Modern Literary Theory: A Comparative Introduction*, ed. Ann Jefferson and David Robey. London, Batsford Academic, 166–203.
- Foster, R. F. (1988), *Modern Ireland 1600–1972*. London, Allen Lane.
- Foucault, Michel (1970), *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* [1966], trans. anonymous. London, Tavistock Publications.
- Foucault, Michel (1972), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* [1969], trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London, Tavistock.
- Foucault, Michel (1977a), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* [1975], trans. Alan Sheridan. London, Allen Lane.
- Foucault, Michel (1977b), *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1978), *The History of Sexuality. Volume One: An Introduction* [1976], trans. Robert Hurley. London, Allen Lane.
- Foucault, Michel (1979), 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire', *Oxford Literary Review* 4: 1, 9–28.

- Foucault, Michel (1980), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al. New York, Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, Michel (1981), 'The Order of Discourse', in *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert J. C. Young. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 48–78.
- Foucault, Michel (1986), 'Of Other Spaces' [1967], *Diacritics* 16: 1, 22–7.
- Fowler, Roger (1979), *Language and Control*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Fox, Ralph Winston (1974), *Marx, Engels and Lenin on the Irish Revolution*. Cork, Cork Workers.
- Franco, Jean (1989), *Plotting Women: Gender and Representation in Mexico*. London, Verso.
- Franda, Marcus F. (1971), *Radical Politics in West Bengal*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- Frank, A. G. (1969), *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* [1967], revd edn. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Franklin, Vincent P. (1992), *Black Self-determination: A Cultural History of African-American Resistance*, Brooklyn, NY, Lawrence Hill Books.
- Fredrickson, George M. (1996), *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Freire, Paulo (1972), *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Freyre, Gilberto (1946), *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf.
- Friedland, William H. and Rosberg, Carl G., eds (1964), *African Socialism*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.
- Froude, James Anthony (1886), *Oceana: or, England and her Colonies*. London, Longmans, Green.
- Froude, James Anthony (1909), *The English in the West Indies, or The Bow of Ulysses* [1887]. London, Longmans, Green.
- Fülöp-Miller, René (1927a), *Lenin and Gandhi*. London, G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Fülöp-Miller, René (1927b), *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia*, trans. F. S. Flint and D. F. Tait. London, G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Füredi, Frank (1994), *Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*. London, I. B. Tauris.
- Furtado, Celso (1964), *Development and Underdevelopment*, trans. Ricardo W. de Aguiar and Eric Charles Drysdale. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Fuss, Diana (1994), 'Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification', *Diacritics* 24: 2–3, 20–42.
- Gadant, Monique (1995), *Le Nationalisme Algérien et les femmes*. Paris, L'Harmattan.
- Gadea, Hilda (1973), *Ernesto: A Memoir of Che Guevara*. London, W. H. Allen.
- Galeano, Eduardo (1973), *The Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent*, trans. Cedric Belfrage. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Gall, Olivia (1991), *Trotsky en México: y la vida política en el periodo de Cárdenas, 1937–1940*. México, Ediciones Era.
- Gallet, Paul (1972), *Freedom to Starve*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Gálvez, William (1999), *Che in Africa: Che Guevara's Congo Diary*, trans. Mary Todd. Melbourne, Ocean Press.
- Gandhi, Leela (1998), *Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction*. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1924), *Sermon on the Sea*. Chicago, Universal Publishing.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1950), *Satyagraha in South Africa* [1928], revd edn, trans. Valji Govindji Desai. Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House.

- Gandhi, M. K. (1951), *Ruskin's Unto This Last: A Paraphrase*. Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1956), *Thoughts on National Language*. Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1958–84), *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 90 vols. Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1982), *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth* [1927]. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1993), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, ed. Raghavan Iyer. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1997), *Hind Swaraj, and Other Writings*, ed. Anthony J. Parel. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Gandhi, Rajmohan (1999), *Revenge and Reconciliation*, New Delhi, Penguin India.
- Garvin, Tom (1987), *Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland 1858–1928*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Gaur, Meena (1989), *Sati and Social Reform in India*. Jaipur, Publication Scheme.
- Geiss, I. (1974), *The Pan-African Movement*. London, Methuen.
- Gelder, Ken and Jacobs, Jane M. (1998), *Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in a Postcolonial Nation*. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest (1993), 'The Mightier Pen? Edward Said and the Double Standards of Inside-out Colonialism', *TLS* 19 February, 3–4.
- George, Susan (1988), *A Fate Worse Than Debt*. London, Penguin.
- George, Susan (1992), *The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All*. London, Pluto Press.
- Gerassi, John, ed. (1971), *Towards Revolution*, 2 vols. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Ghosh, Utpal (1996), *The Communist Party of India and India's Freedom Struggle, 1937–1947*. Calcutta, Pearl Publishers.
- Giap, General Vo Nguyen (1962), *People's War People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries* [1961]. New York, Frederick A. Praeger.
- Gibbons, Luke (forthcoming), *The Colonial Sublime: Edmund Burke, The Enlightenment, and Ireland*.
- Gilroy, Paul (1993), *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. London, Verso.
- Glassman, Jonathon (1995), *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888*. London, James Currey.
- Glissant, Édouard (1989), *Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays* [1981], trans. Michael Dash. Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press.
- Glissant, Édouard (1997), *Poetics of Relation* [1990], trans. Betsy Wing. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
- Gordon, David C. (1966), *The Passing of French Algeria*. London, Oxford University Press.
- Gordon, David C. (1968), *Women of Algeria: An Essay on Change*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo (1999), *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*, trans. Robin Kirk. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- Gott, Richard (1973), *Rural Guerrillas in Latin America*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Gouda, Frances (1995), *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in Indonesia 1900–1942*. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.
- Graham, Richard, ed. (1990), *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870–1940*. Austin, University of Texas Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio (1957), *The Modern Prince, and Other Writings*, trans. Louis Marks. New York, International Publishers.

- Gramsci, Antonio (1971), *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, trans. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
- Gramsci, Antonio (1989), *Letters from Prison*, trans. Lynne Lawner. New York, Noonday Press.
- Grewal, Inderpal (1996), *Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel*. London, Leicester University Press.
- Grey, Henry George (1853), *The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, 2 vols. London, Richard Bentley.
- Griffith, George Chetwynd (1897), *Men Who Have Made the Empire*. London, Arthur Pearson.
- Grinker, Roy Richard and Steiner, Christopher B., eds (1997), *Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Gruber, Helmut (1974), *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy*. New York, Anchor Books.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1965), *Colonialism is Doomed*. Speech delivered at the United Nations General Assembly 11 December 1964. Havana, Ministry of External Relations Information Dept.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1968a), *Bolivian Diary*, introduction by Fidel Castro. London, Jonathan Cape.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1968b), 'Song to Fidel', in *Our Word: Guerrilla Poems from Latin America*, trans. Edward Dorn and Gordon Brotherston. London, Cape Golliard Press, 2–3.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1969), *Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara*, ed. Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1971), *Oeuvres*, 4 vols. Paris, Maspero.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1987), *Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution: Writings and Speeches of Ernesto Che Guevara*, ed. David Deutschmann. Sydney, Pathfinder.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1995), *The Motorcycle Diaries: A Journey Around South America*, trans. Ann Wright. London, Verso.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1996), *Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War, 1956–58*. New York, Pathfinder.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1997), *Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Guerrilla Strategy, Politics and Revolution*, ed. David Deutschmann. Melbourne, Ocean Press.
- Guevara, Ernesto Che (1998), *Guerrilla Warfare*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.
- Guha, Ranajit (1982a), 'On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India', *Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, 1–8.
- Guha, Ranajit (1982b), 'Preface', *Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi, Oxford University Press, vii–viii.
- Guha, Ranajit (1983), *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Guha, Ranajit (1997), *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Gupta, Akhil (1998), *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Gupta, Rakesh (1982), *Bihar Peasantry and the Kisan Sabha, 1936–1947*. New Delhi, People's Publishing House.
- Gutiérrez, Gustavo (1988), *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation* [1971], revd edn. London, SCM Press.
- Gutiérrez, Gustavo (1993), *Las Casas: In Search of the Poor of Jesus Christ*. Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1984–7), *Theory of Communicative Action*, 3 vols. Cambridge, Polity Press.

- Hadjor, Kofi Buenor (1993), *The Penguin Dictionary of Third World Terms*. London, Penguin.
- Haithcox, John Patrick (1971), *Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920–1939*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Halévy, Elie (1951), *Imperialism and the Rise of Labour (1895–1905)* [1926] 2nd edn, trans. E. I. Watkin. London, Ernest Benn.
- Halliday, Fred (1978), 'Revolution in Afghanistan', *New Left Review* 112, 3–44.
- Hannerz, Ulf (1996), *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*. London, Routledge.
- Hansen, Thomas Blom and Jaffrelot, Christophe (1998), *The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Hardiman, David (1981), *Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat: Kheda District, 1917–1934*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Hardiman, David (1993), *Peasant Resistance in India, 1858–1914*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Hardiman, David (1995), *The Coming of the Devi: Adivasi Assertion in Western India*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Hargreaves, Alec G. (1995), *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*. London, Routledge.
- Hargreaves, Alec G. and McKinney, Mark, eds (1997), *Post-Colonial Cultures in France*. London, Routledge, 1997.
- Harlow, Vincent and Madden, Frederick (1953), *British Colonial Developments 1774–1834: Select Documents*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Harmand, Jules (1910), *Domination et colonisation*. Paris, Flammarion.
- Harris, Lillian and Worden, Robert L. (1986), *China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger?* London, Croom Helm.
- Harris, Nigel (1986), *The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Hasan, Mushirul (1991), *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885–1930*. New Delhi, Manohar.
- Hasan, Mushirul, ed. (1981), *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*. New Delhi, Manohar.
- Hassan, Hamdi A. (1999), *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and Otherness in the Analysis of War and Conflict*. London, Pluto Press.
- Haupt, G. (1972), *Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Havinden, Michael and Meredith, David (1993), *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850–1960*. London, Routledge.
- Hay, Margaret and Wright, Marcia, eds (1982), *African Women and the Law*. Boston, Boston University Press.
- Haynes, Douglas E. and Prakash, Gyan (1991), *Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Heehs, Peter (1993), *The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India, 1900–1910*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Hilferding, Rudolf (1981), *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development* [1910], trans. Tom Bottomore. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Hirson, Baruch (1993), 'The Trotskyist Groups in South Africa: A Retrospective View', *Revolutionary History* 4: 4, 25–56.
- Ho, Chi Minh (1962), *Prison Diary*, trans. Aileen Palmer. Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House.

- Ho, Chi Minh (1967), *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920–66*. New York, Praeger.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1977), 'Some Reflections on "The Break-Up of Britain"', *New Left Review* 105, 3–23.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1987), *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Hobson, J. A. (1938), *Imperialism: A Study* [1902] 3rd edn. London, George Allen & Unwin.
- Hodgkin, Thomas (1833), *An Inquiry into the Merits of the American Colonization Society*. London, J. & A. Arch.
- Hodgkin, Thomas (1834), *On the British African Colonization Society; to which are added some particulars respecting the American Colonization Society, and a letter from J. Hubbard on the same subject*. London, printed for Dr Hodgkin.
- Hoganson, Kristin L. (1998), *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanisli–American and Philippine–American Wars*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Holland, R. F. (1985), *European Decolonization 1918–81: An Introductory Survey*. London, Macmillan.
- Honneth, Axel and Jonas, Hans (1988), *Social Action and Human Nature*, trans. Raymond Meyer. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Hoogvelt, Ankie (1997), *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hooker, James R. (1967), *Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism*. New York, Praeger.
- Hooker, James R. (1975), *Henry Sylvester Williams: Imperial Pan-Africanist*. London, Collins.
- hooks, bell (1991), *Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics*. London, Turnaround.
- Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor W. (1982), *Dialectic of Enlightenment* [1944], trans. John Cumming. New York, Continuum.
- Horne, Alistair (1996), *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–62*, revd edn. London, Macmillan.
- Hountondji, Paulin J. (1977), *Sur la 'Philosophie africaine'*. Paris, Maspero.
- Hountondji, Paulin J. (1996), *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, 2nd edn, trans. Henri Evans and Jonathan Rée. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Howe, Stephen (1993), *Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 1918–1964*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Howe, Stephen (2000), *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Howell, David (1986), *A Lost Left: Three Studies in Socialism and Nationalism*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Howitt, William (1838), *Colonisation and Christianity: A Popular History of the Treatment of the Natives by the Europeans in All Their Colonies*. London, Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans.
- Hoy, David Couzens, ed. (1986), *Foucault: A Critical Reader*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Hudson, G. H. (1971), *Fifty Years of Communism: Theory and Practice 1917–1967*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Hudson, W. J., ed. (1971), *Australia and Papua New Guinea*. Sydney, Sydney University Press.
- Huizer, Gerrit (1973), *Peasant Rebellion in Latin America*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Hulme, Peter (1986), *Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492–1797*. London, Methuen.
- Hume, David (1932), *The Letters of David Hume*, 2 vols, ed. J. Y. T. Greig. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

- Hunt, James D. (1993), *Gandhi in London*, revd edn. New Delhi, Promilla.
- Huttenback, Robert A. (1971), *Gandhi in South Africa: British Imperialism and the India Question, 1860–1914*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Hutton, Christopher M. (1999), *Linguistics and the Third Reich: Mother-Tongue Fascism, Race and the Science of Language*. London, Routledge.
- Hyam, Ronald (1976), *Britain's Imperial Century 1815–1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion*. London, Batsford.
- Hyam, Ronald (1990), *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Hyndman, Henry Mayers (1886), *The Bankruptcy of India, an Enquiry into the Administration of India under the Crown*. London, Swan Sonnenschein.
- Hyndman, Henry Mayers (1887), *The Indian Famine and the Crisis in India*. London, Edward Stanford.
- Hyndman, Henry Mayers (1907), *The Ruin of India by British Rule. Being the Verbatim Report of the Social-Democratic Federation to the International Socialist Conference at Stuttgart*. London, Twentieth Century Press.
- Hyndman, Henry Mayers (1919), *The Awakening of Asia*. London, Cassell.
- Ikoku, S. G. (1971), *Le Ghana de Nkrumah: autopsie de la 1ère république, 1957–1966*, trans. Yves Bénot. Paris, Maspero.
- Iliffe, John (1995), *Africans: The History of a Continent*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Inglis, Brian (1973), *Roger Casement*. London, Hodder & Stoughton.
- Isaacman, Allen F. and Isaacman, Barbara (1976), *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: Anti-colonial Activity in the Zambesi Valley 1850–1921*. London, Heinemann.
- Isaacman, Allen F. and Isaacman, Barbara (1983), *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Jack, Belinda (1996), *Négritude and Literary Criticism: The History and Theory of "Negro-African" Literature in French*. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press.
- Jackson, Henry F. (1977), *The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society*. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press.
- Jacobs, Jane (1996), *Edge of Empire: Postcoloniality and the City*. London, Routledge.
- Jacobs, Jane M. (1997), 'Resisting Reconciliation: The Secret Geographies of (Post)colonial Australia', in Steve Pile and Michael Keith, eds, *Geographies of Resistance*. London, Routledge, 201–18.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe (1993), *Les nationalistes hindous: idéologie, implantation et mobilisation des années 1920 aux années 1990*. Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
- Jalal, Ayesha (1985), *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Jamal, Mahmood, ed. (1986), *The Penguin Book of Modern Urdu Poetry*, trans. Mahmood Jamal. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- James, C. L. R. (1937), *World Revolution 1917–1936: The Rise and Fall of the Communist International*. London, Martin Secker & Warburg.
- James, C. L. R. (1938), *History of Negro Revolt*. London, Fact Monographs.
- James, C. L. R. (1969), *A History of Pan-African Revolt*, 2nd edn. Washington, Drum and Spear Press.
- James, C. L. R. (1977), *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*. London, Allison & Busby.
- James, C. L. R. (1980), *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. London, Allison & Busby.

- James, C. L. R. (1987), *C. L. R. James and British Trotskyism: An Interview*. London, Socialist Platform.
- James, C. L. R. (1992), *The C. L. R. James Reader*, ed. Anne Grimshaw. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- James, Winston (1998), *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth-century America*. London, Verso.
- JanMohamed, Abdul R. (1992), 'Worldliness-without-World, Homelessness-as-Home: Toward a Definition of the Specular Border Intellectual', in *Edward Said: A Critical Reader*, ed. Michael Sprinker. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 96–120.
- Jansen, G. H. (1966), *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment*. London, Faber & Faber.
- Jayawardena, Kumari (1986), *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. London, Zed Books.
- Jayawardena, Kumari (1988), *The Origins of the Left Movement in Sri Lanka*. Colombo, Sanjiva Books.
- Jayawardena, Kumari (1995), *The White Woman's Other Burden: Western Women and South Asia during British Colonial Rule*. New York, Routledge.
- Jebb, Richard (1905), *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*. London, Arnold.
- Jeffery, Keith (1996), *An Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Jeganathan, Pradeep and Ismail, Qadri, eds (1995), *Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri Lanka*. Colombo, Social Scientists' Association.
- Jelin, Elizabeth (1990), *Women and Social Change in Latin America*. London, Zed Books.
- Jenkins, Roy (1965), *Dilke: A Victorian Tragedy*, revd edn. London, Collins.
- Jenks, Edward (1937), *The Government of the British Empire*, 5th edn. London, John Murray.
- Jinadu, Adele and Mandaza, Ibbo (1986), *African Perspectives on the Non-aligned Movement*. Harare, African Association of Political Science.
- Jones, Ernest Charles (1857), *The Revolt of Hindostan, or The New World*. London, G. Routledge.
- Jones, Jean (1996), *The League Against Imperialism*. London, Socialist History Society.
- Joshi, P. C. (1986), *Marxism and Social Revolution in India, and Other Essays*. New Delhi, Patriot Publishers.
- July, Robert W. (1968), *The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. London, Faber & Faber.
- Kahin, George McTurnan (1952), *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Kahin, George McTurnan (1956), *The Asian–African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz, ed. (1991), *Women, Islam and the State*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Kanogo, Tabitha (1987), *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau*. London, James Currey.
- Kapur, S. (1992), *Raising up a Prophet: The African-American Encounter with Gandhi*. Boston, Beacon Press.
- Karnik, V. B., ed. (1957), *Indian Communist Party Documents, 1930–1956*. Bombay, Democratic Research Service.
- Kaunda, Kenneth D. (1967), *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation*. Lusaka, Zambia Information Services.
- Kaunda, Kenneth D. (1974), *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation. Part 2*. Lusaka, Division of National Guidance.
- Kaunda, Kenneth D. (1982), *Kaunda on Violence* [1980]. London, Sphere Books.
- Kaur, Manmohan (1968), *Role of Women in the Freedom Movement, 1857–1947*. Delhi, Sterling Publishers.

- Kautsky, Karl (1975), *Socialism and Colonial Policy: An Analysis* [1907]. Belfast, Athol Books.
- Kautsky, Karl (1983), *Selected Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Patricke Goode. London, Macmillan.
- Kautsky, Karl (1988), *The Materialist Conception of History*, abridged John H. Kautsky, trans. Raymond Meyer, with John H. Kautsky. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Kay, Cristóbal (1989), *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*. London, Routledge.
- Kaye, Sir Cecil (1971), *Communism in India*. Calcutta, Editions Indian.
- Keddie, Nikki (1981), *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Kedourie, Elie (1971), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Keith, Arthur Berriedale (1916), *Imperial Unity and the Dominions*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Keith, Arthur Berriedale, ed. (1932), *Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918–1931: From Self-government to National Sovereignty*. London, Oxford University Press.
- Kelley, Robin D. G. (1994), *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class*. New York, Free Press.
- Kelly, G. A. (1965), *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947–1962*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- Kendle, John (1989), *Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870–1921*. Kingston and Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Kendle, John (1997), *Federal Britain: A History*. London, Routledge.
- Kenyatta, Jomo (1938), *Facing Mount Kenya: The Traditional Life of the Gikuyu*. London, Secker and Warburg.
- Ker, James Campbell (1973), *Political Trouble in India, 1907–1917* [1917]. Calcutta, Editions India.
- Khairi, Saad R. (1995), *Jinnah Reinterpreted: The Journey from Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood*. Karachi, Oxford University Press.
- Khaled, Leila (1973), *My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary*, ed. George Hajjar. London, Hodder and Stoughton.
- Khilnani, Sunil (1997), *The Idea of India*. London, Hamish Hamilton.
- Kiernan, V. G. (1995), *Imperialism and its Contradictions*, ed. Harvey J. Kaye. New York, Routledge.
- Kim, Elaine H. and Choi, Chungmoo, eds (1998), *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*. New York, Routledge.
- Kinsbruner, Jay (1994), *Independence in Spanish America: Civil Wars, Revolutions, and Underdevelopment*. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
- Kishwar, Madhu (1986), *Gandhi and Women*. Delhi, Manushi Prakashan.
- Knauss, Peter R. (1987), *The Persistence of Patriarchy: Class, Gender, and Ideology in Twentieth Century Algeria*. New York, Praeger.
- Knorr, Klaus E. (1944), *British Colonial Theories, 1570–1850*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Koebner, Richard and Schmidt, Helmut Dan (1964), *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840–1960*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Koehn, Nancy F. (1994), *The Power of Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First British Empire*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Kopf, David (1979), *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

- Krishnamurty, Jayasankar, ed. (1989), *Women in Colonial India: Essays on Survival, Work and the State*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Kumar, Nita, ed. (1994), *Women as Subjects: South Asian Histories*. New Delhi, Book Review Literary Trust.
- Kurian, K. Mathew, ed. (1975), *India – State and Society: A Marxian Approach*. Bombay, Orient Longman.
- Laclau, Ernesto (1971), 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America', *New Left Review* 67, 19–38.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985), *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Democratic Politics*, trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack. London, Verso.
- LaGuerre, John Gaffar (1984), *Enemies of Empire*. St Augustine, University of the West Indies Extra-Mural Studies Unit.
- Lakshmi Menon, V. (1965), *Ruskin and Gandhi*. Varanasi, Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan.
- Laloum, Jean and Allouche, Jean Luce (1992), *Les Juifs d'Algérie: Images et textes*. Paris, Éditions du Scribe.
- Lamouchi, Nouredine (1996), *Jean-Paul Sartre et le tiers monde. Rhétorique d'un discours anticolonialiste*. Paris, L'Harmattan.
- Langley, J. Ayo, ed. (1979), *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa 1856–1970: Documents on Modern African Political Thought from Colonial Times to the Present*. London, Rex Collings.
- Langley, J. Ayodele (1973), *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900–1945: A Study in Ideology and Social Classes*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Laqueur, Walter (1956), *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Laqueur, Walter (1959), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Laqueur, Walter, ed. (1958), *The Middle East in Transition*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Larbi Korang, Kwaku and Slemon, Stephen (1997), 'Postcolonialism and Language', in *Writing and Africa*, ed. Mpalive-Hangson Msiska and Paul Hyland. Harlow, Longman, 246–63.
- Las Casas, Bartolomé de (1992), *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies* [1542], trans. Nigel Griffin. London, Penguin.
- Laushey, David M. (1975), *Bengal Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Aspects of Regional Nationalism in India, 1905–1942*. Calcutta, Firma KLM.
- Lawler, Nancy Ellen (1992), *Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II*. Athens, Ohio University Press.
- Lazarus, Neil (1999), *Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Lazreg, Marnia (1994), *The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question*. New York, Routledge.
- League Against Imperialism (1931), *Report of the National Conference of the League Against Imperialism*. London, League Against Imperialism and for National Independence.
- League Against Imperialism (1935), *The British Empire*. London, League Against Imperialism and for National Independence.
- Lee, Francis (1988), *Fabianism and Colonialism: The Life and Political Thought of Lord Sydney Olivier*. London, Defiant Books.
- Lenin, V. I. (1962), *The National-Liberation Movement in the East*. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
- Lenin, V. I. (1964), *Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism*. Moscow, Progress Publishers.

- Lenin, V. I. (1965), *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline* [1917]. Peking, Foreign Languages Press.
- Lenin, V. I. (1968), *Selected Works*. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
- Lenin, V. I. (1973), *On Imperialism and Imperialists*. Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Lenin, V. I. (1988), *What is to be Done?* [1902], trans. J. Fineberg, G. Hanna and R. Service. London, Penguin.
- Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre Paul (1874), *De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques*. Paris, Guillaumin.
- Lerski, Jerzy J. (1968), *Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon: A Documentary History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 1935–1942*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1966), *The Savage Mind* [1962], trans. anon. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1968), *Structural Anthropology*, Vol. 1, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf. London, Allen Lane.
- Lewin, Moshe (1969), *Lenin's Last Struggle*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London, Faber & Faber.
- Leys, Colin (1996), *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*. London, James Currey.
- Lienhard, Martin (1991), *La Voz y su huella: escritura y conflicto étnico-social en América Latina, 1492–1988*. Hanover, NH, Ediciones del Norte.
- Likimani, Muthoni (1985), *Passbook Number F.47927: Women and Mau Mau in Kenya*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Lipsitz, George (1997), “‘Frantic to Join . . . the Japanese Army’: The Asia Pacific War in the Lives of African Soldiers and Civilians”, in Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds, *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 324–53.
- Lloyd, David (1993), *Anomalous States: Irish Writing and the Post-colonial Moment*. Dublin, Lilliput Press.
- Loew, Raimund (1979), ‘The Politics of Austro-Marxism’, *New Left Review* 118, 15–51.
- Loomba, Ania (1998), *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*. London, Routledge.
- Louis, William Roger, ed. (1976), *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy*. New York, New Viewpoints.
- Lowe, Lisa (1991), *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalism*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Lubenow, W. C. (1988), *Parliamentary Politics and the Home Rule Crisis: The British House of Commons in 1886*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Lucas, C. P., ed. (1912), *Lord Durlham's Report on the Affairs of British North America*, 3 vols. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Lugard, Frederick John D. (1922), *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*. Edinburgh, Blackwood.
- Luk, Michael Y. L. (1990), *The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism: An Ideology in the Making, 1920–1928*. Hong Kong, Oxford University Press.
- Lumumba, Patrice (1972) *Lumumba Speaks: The Speeches and Writings of Patrice Lumumba, 1958–1961* [1963], ed. Jean Van Lierde, trans. Helen R. Lane, introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre. Boston, Little Brown.
- Lustick, Ian (1993), *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank–Gaza*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Luxemburg, Rosa (1951), *The Accumulation of Capital*, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Luxemburg, Rosa and Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1972), *Imperialism and the Accumulation of*

- Capital*, ed. K. J. Tarbuck. London, Allen Lane.
- Lynch, John (1986), *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826*, 2nd edn. New York, Norton.
- Lynch, John and Humphreys, R. A. (1994), *Latin American Revolutions, 1808–1826: Old and New World Origins*. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press.
- Lyons, Eugene (1937), *We Cover The World*. London, G. Harrap.
- Lyotard, Jean-François (1993), *Political Writings*, trans. Bill Readings and Kevin Paul Geiman. London, UCL Press.
- McClintock, Anne (1994), 'The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term "Postcolonialism"', in *Colonial Discourse / Postcolonial Theory*, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iverson. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 253–66.
- McClintock, Anne (1995), *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context*. New York, Routledge.
- McClintock, Cynthia (1998), *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path*. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Maccoby, S. (1938), *English Radicalism 1853–1886*. London, George Allen & Unwin.
- Maccoby, S. (1953), *English Radicalism 1886–1914*. London, George Allen & Unwin.
- McCulloch, J. R. (1837), *Statistical Account of the British Empire*, 2 vols. London, Charles Knight.
- McCulloch, Jock (1983), *In the Twilight of Revolution: The Political Theory of Amílcar Cabral*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- McDermott, Kevin and Agnew, Jeremy (1996), *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Macdonell, Diane (1986), *Theories of Discourse: An Introduction*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Macey, David (1993), *The Lives of Michel Foucault*. London, Hutchinson.
- McIntyre, W. David (1977), *The Commonwealth of Nations: Origin and Impact 1869–1971*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
- Mack Smith, Denis (1994), *Mazzini*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- McKay, Claude (1929), *Banjo: A Story Without a Plot*. New York, Harper.
- MacKenzie, John M. (1984), *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880–1960*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- MacKenzie, John M. (1995), *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- McNay, Lois (1994), *Foucault: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- McVey, Ruth T. (1957), *The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution: A Study in the Russian Attitude towards Asian Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University.
- McVey, Ruth T. (1965), *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Maddox, Gregory, Giblin, James L. and Kinambo, Isaria N., eds (1996), *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*. London, James Currey.
- Madhok, Balraj (1996), *R.S.S. and Politics: Story of Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh with Special Reference to its Role in Indian Politics*, revd edn. Nagpur, Hindu Rajya Prakashak.
- Maina wa Kinyatti, ed. (1987), *Kenya's Freedom Struggle: The Dedan Kimathi Papers*. London, Zed Books.
- Malik, Kenan (1996), *The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Malkani, K. R. (1980), *The RSS Story*. New Delhi, Impex India.
- Malley, Robert (1996), *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

- Mamdani, Mahmood (1996), *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. London, James Currey.
- Mani, Lata (1989), 'Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India', in *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*, ed. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid. Delhi, Kali for Women, 88–126.
- Mao Zedong (1965), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, 5 vols. Peking, Foreign Languages Press.
- Mao Zedong (1970), *Mao Papers. Anthology and Bibliography*, ed. Jerome Ch'en. London, Oxford University Press.
- Mao Zedong (1989), *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao. From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek and Eugene Wu. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Marcos, Subcomandante (1995), *Shadows of Tender Fury: The Letters and Communiqués of Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Marcum, John A. (1969–78), *The Angolan Revolution*, 2 vols. Cambridge, MIT Press.
- Mariátegui, José Carlos (1971), *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, trans. Marjory Urquidí. Austin, University of Texas Press.
- Mariátegui, José Carlos (1996), *The Heroic and Creative Meaning of Socialism*, trans. Michael Pearlman. Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press.
- Marighella, Carlos (1971), *For the Liberation of Brazil*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Marighella, Carlos (1985), *Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Chapel Hill, NC, Documentary Publications.
- Markovitz, Irving Leonard (1969), *Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude*. New York, Atheneum.
- Marr, David G. (1971), *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Martí, José (1977), *Our America: Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence*, trans. Elinor Randall. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Marx, Karl (1973a), *Surveys from Exile: Political Writings* Vol. 2, trans. Ben Fowkes and Paul Jackson. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Marx, Karl (1973b), *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Marx, Karl (1974), *The First International and After: Political Writings* Vol. 3, ed. David Fernbach. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Marx, Karl (1975), *Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Marx, Karl (1976–81), *Capital*, 3 vols, trans. Ben Fowkes and David Fernbach. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Marx, Karl (1977), *Selected Writings*, ed. David McLellan. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1934), *Selected Correspondence, 1846–1895*, trans. Dona Torr. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1952), *Manifesto of the Communist Party [1848]*. Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1959), *The First Indian War of Independence, 1857–1859*. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1968), *On Colonialism*, 4th edn. Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1971), *Ireland and the Irish Question*. London, Lawrence & Wishart.

- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1982), *Collected Works*, 50 vols. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
- Masani, Minocheher Rustom (1954), *The Communist Party of India: A Short History*. London, D. Verschoyle.
- Masselos, Jim (1993), *Indian Nationalism: An History*, 3rd edn. New Delhi, Sterling Publishers.
- Maunaguru, Sitralega (1995), 'Gendering Tamil Nationalism: The Construction of "Woman" in Projects of Protest and Control', in Pradeep Jeganathan and Qadri Ismail, eds, *Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri Lanka*. Colombo, Social Scientists' Association, 158–75.
- Mayer, Tamar, ed. (1994), *Women and the Israeli Occupation: The Politics of Change*. London, Routledge.
- Mayer, Tamar, ed. (2000), *Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation*. London, Routledge.
- Mayo, Katherine (1927), *Mother India*. London, Jonathan Cape.
- Mazrui, Ali A. (1990), *Cultural Forces in World Politics*. London, James Currey.
- Mazrui, Ali A., ed. (1993), *Africa Since 1935*. General History of Africa, Vol. 8. Oxford, Heinemann.
- Mazrui, Ali A. and Tidy, Michael (1984), *Nationalism and New States in Africa: From about 1935 to the Present*. Nairobi, Heinemann Educational Books.
- Mazumdar, Haridas T. (1932), *Gandhi Versus the Empire*. New York, Universal Publishing.
- Mba, Nina (1982), *Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women's Political Activity in Southern Nigeria 1900–1965*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Mehmet, Ozay (1995), *Westernizing the Third World: The Eurocentricity of European Economic Development Theories*. London, Routledge.
- Mehrotra, Nanak Chand (1986), *Indian Socialist Thinking: From Dayananda to J. P.* New Delhi, M. N. Publishers.
- Mehta, Shirin (1990) 'The Role of Women in the Peasant Movement of Gujarat: A Study in Gandhian Phase', in *Gandhi: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Nageshwar Prasad. Delhi, Segment Book Distributors, 56–70.
- Mehta, Uday Singh (1999), *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-century British Thought*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Meli, Francis (1988), *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC*. Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House.
- Memmi, Albert (1967), *The Coloniser and the Colonised* [1957], introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre. Boston, Beacon Press.
- Mercer, Kobena (1994), *Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies*. London, Routledge.
- Merivale, Herman (1861), *Lectures on Colonization and Colonies (Oxford Lectures 1839–41)*, revd edn. London, Longmans, Green.
- Merle, Marcel (1969), *L'Anticolonialisme européen, de Las Casas à Marx*. Paris, Colin.
- Mernissi, Fatima (1985), *Beyond the Veil: Male–Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society*, revd edn. London, Al Saqi.
- Messaoudi, Khalida and Schemla, Elisabeth (1998), *Unbowed: An Algerian Woman Confronts Islamic Fundamentalism*, trans. Anne C. Vila. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Meynier, Gilbert (1981), *L'Algérie révélée. La guerre de 1914–1918 et le premier quart du XXe siècle*. Geneva, Droz.
- Midgley, Clare (1992), *Women against Slavery: The British Campaigns 1780–1870*. London, Routledge.
- Midgley, Clare, ed. (1998), *Gender and Imperialism*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

- Mikell, Gwendolyn, ed. (1997), *African Feminism*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Mill, John Stuart (1984), *Essays on Equality, Law, and Education*, ed. John M. Robson. London, Routledge.
- Miller, Christopher L. (1990), *Theories of Africans: Francophone Literature and Anthropology in Africa*. Chicago, Chicago University Press.
- Miller, Christopher L. (1998), *Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture*. Chicago, Chicago University Press.
- Miller, James (1994), *The Passion of Michel Foucault*. London, Flamingo.
- Mills, Sara (1991), *Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism*. London, Routledge.
- Milton, David, Milton, Nancy, and Schurmann, Franz, eds (1977), *People's China: Social Experimentation, Politics, Entry on to the World Scene 1966–72*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Minault, Gail (1982), *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Minh-ha, Trinh (1989), *Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Mirza, Heidi (1997), *Black British Feminism: A Reader*. London, Routledge.
- Mitchell, Timothy (1988), *Colonising Egypt*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Moghadam, Valentine, ed. (1994), *Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies*. London, Zed Books.
- Moguel, Julio (1998), *Chiapas: la guerra de los signos: del amanecer zapatista de 1994 a la masacre de Acteal*. Mexico City, Juan Pablos Editor: La Jornada Ediciones.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade (1984), 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse', *Boundary 2* spring/fall, 71–92.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, Russo, Ann and Torres, Lourdes, eds (1991), *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Mohanty, Manoranjan (1977), *Revolutionary Violence: A Study of the Maoist Movement in India*. New Delhi, Sterling Publishers.
- Mohanty, Manoranjan, Mukherji, Partha N. and Törnquist, Olle (1998), *People's Rights: Social Movements and the State in the Third World*. New Delhi, Sage.
- Mondlane, Eduardo (1969), *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Monteil, Vincent (1982), *Les Musulmans soviétiques*. Paris, Seuil.
- Montgomery, Michael (1987), *Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate*. New York, St Martin's Press.
- Moore-Gilbert, Bart (1997), *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. London, Verso.
- Moore-Gilbert, Bart (1999), 'Postcolonial Cultural Studies and Imperial Historiography: Problems of Interdisciplinarity,' *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 1: 3, 397–411.
- Moran, Seán Farrell (1994), *Patrick Pearse and the Politics of Redemption: The Mind of the Easter Rising, 1916*. Washington, DC, Catholic University of America Press.
- Morel, Edmund Dene (1903), *The Congo Slave State, A Protest Against The New African Slavery*. Liverpool, J. Richardson & Sons.
- Morel, Edmund Dene (1904a), *King Leopold's Rule in Africa*. London, Heinemann.
- Morel, Edmund Dene (1904b), *The Scandal of the Congo, Britain's Duty*. Liverpool, John Richardson & Sons.
- Morel, Edmund Dene (1906), *Red Rubber: The Story of the Rubber Slave Trade Flourishing On the Congo in 1906*. London, T. Fisher Unwin.

- Morley, John (1893), *The Life of Richard Cobden* [1879]. London, T. Fisher Unwin.
- Mortimer, Robert A. (1964), *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Mosse, George L. (1985), *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe*. New York, Fertig.
- Msiska, Mpalive-Hangson and Hyland, Paul, eds (1997), *Writing and Africa*. Harlow, Longman.
- Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988), *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge*. London, James Currey.
- Mudimbe, V. Y., ed. (1992), *The Surreptitious Speech: 'Présence Africaine' and the Politics of Otherness, 1947–1987*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Mukherjee, A. (1990), 'Whose Post-colonialism and Whose Postmodernism?' *World Literature Written in English*, 30: 2, 1–9.
- Müller, Joachim W. and Sauvart, Karl P. (1993), *Chronology, Bibliography and Index for the Group of 77 and the Non-aligned Movement*. New York, Oceana.
- Mumtaz, Khawar and Shaheed, Farida, eds (1987), *Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?* London, Zed Books.
- Munck, Ronaldo (1986), *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*. London, Zed Books.
- Munck, Ronaldo and O'Hearn, Denis, eds (1999), *Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm*. London, Zed Books.
- Muzaffar Imam, Md. (1987), *Role of Muslims in the National Movement, 1912–1930: A Study of Bihar*. Delhi, Mittal Publications.
- Myers, Ramon H. and Peattie, Mark R., eds (1984), *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895–1945*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Naldi, Gino J. (1999), *The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of its Role*, 2nd edn. New York, Mansell.
- Namboodiripad, E. M. S. (1994), *The Communist Party in Kerala: Six Decades of Struggle and Advance*. New Delhi, National Book Centre.
- Nanda, B. R., ed. (1976), *Indian Women from Purdah to Modernity*. London, Sangam.
- Nandy, Ashis (1980), *At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Nandy, Ashis (1983), *Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Nandy, Ashis (1987), *Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Nandy, Ashis (1995), *The Savage Freud, and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Napier, Colonel Charles James (1835), *Colonization; Particularly in Southern Australia: with some remarks on small farms and over population*. London, T. & W. Boone.
- Narayan, Jayaprakash (1936), *Why Socialism?* Benares, All India Congress Socialist Party.
- Narayan, Jayaprakash (1957), *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*. Rajghat, Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan.
- Nederveen Peterse, Jan P. (1990), *Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale*. London, Pluto Press.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal (1936), *An Autobiography; With Musings on Recent Events in India*. London, John Lane.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal (1941), *The Unity of India: Collected Writings 1937–1940*. London, Lindsay Drummond.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal (1946), *The Discovery of India*. London, Meridian Books.

- Neuhauser, Charles (1968), *Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957–1967*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- New York State Legislature. Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities (1920), *Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics, with an exposition and discussion of the steps being taken and required to curb it*, 4 vols. Albany, NY, J. B. Lyon.
- Ngugi, Wa Thiong'o (1981), *Decolonizing the Mind*. London, James Currey.
- Ngugi, Wa Thiong'o (1983), *Barrel of a Pen: Resistance to Repression in Neo-colonial Kenya*. London, New Beacon Books.
- Ngugi, Wa Thiong'o (1993), *Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms*. London, James Currey.
- Nimni, Ephraim (1991), *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, preface by Ernesto Laclau. London, Pluto.
- Niranjana, Tejaswini (1992), *Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Nkrumah, Kwame (1957), *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*. Edinburgh, T. Nelson.
- Nkrumah, Kwame (1961a), *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*. London, Heinemann.
- Nkrumah, Kwame (1961b), *Building a Socialist State*. Accra, Government Printer.
- Nkrumah, Kwame (1965), *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. London, Heinemann.
- Nkrumah, Kwame (1968), *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution*. London, Panaf Books.
- Nkrumah, Kwame (1970), *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization* [1964], revd edn. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Nkrumah, Kwame (1973), *Revolutionary Path*. London, Panaf Books.
- North, Robert C. and Eudin, Xenia J. (1977), *M. N. Roy's Mission to China: The Communist–Kuomintang Split of 1927*. New York, Octagon Books.
- Noyes, John (1992), *Colonial Space: Spatiality in the Discourse of German South West Africa 1884–1915*. Chur, Switzerland, Harwood.
- Nussbaum, Martha and Glover, Jonathan (1995), *Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Nyerere, Julius (1968), *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press.
- O'Balance, E. (1966), *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War 1948–60*. London, Faber.
- O'Hanlon, Rosalind, ed. (1994), *A Comparison Between Women and Men: Tarabai Shinde and the Critique of Gender Relations in Colonial India*. Madras, Oxford University Press.
- Olorunsola, Victor A., ed. (1972), *The Politics of Cultural Sub-nationalism in Africa*. New York, Anchor Books.
- Omvedt, Gail (1993), *Reinventing Revolution: New Social Movements and the Socialist Tradition in India*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe.
- Omvedt, Gail (1994), 'Reconstructing the Methodology of Exploitation: Class, Caste and Gender as Categories of Analysis in Post-Colonial Societies', in *Understanding the Post-colonial World: Theory and Method*, ed. Neera Chandhoke. Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 117–31.
- Ortiz, Fernando (1995), *Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar*, trans. Harriet de Onís. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen (1997), *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* [1995], trans. Shelley L. Frisch. Princeton, NJ, Marcus Wiener; Kingston, Ian Randle.
- Ottaway, David and Ottaway, Marina (1970), *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

- Overstreet, Gene D. and Windmiller, Marshall (1959) *Communism in India*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Padmore, George (1931), *The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers*. London, RILU Magazine.
- Padmore, George (1936), *How Britain Rules Africa*. London, Wishart Books.
- Padmore, George (1937), *Africa and World Peace*. London, M. Secker & Warburg.
- Padmore, George (1949), *Africa: Britain's Third Empire*. London, Dennis Dobson.
- Padmore, George (1956), *Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa*. London, Dennis Dobson.
- Padmore, George, ed. (1963), *Colonial and Coloured Unity: A Programme of Action: History of the Pan-African Congress*, 2nd edn. London, Hammersmith Bookshop.
- Padmore, George and Pizer, Dorothy (1946), *How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire: A Challenge to the Imperialist Powers*. London, Dennis Dobson.
- Pagden, Anthony (1990), *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Pandey, Gyanendra (1978), *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926–34: A Study in Imperfect Mobilization*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Panikkar, K. M. (1995), *Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectuals and Social Consciousness in Colonial India*. New Delhi, Tulika.
- Pankhurst, E. Sylvia (1921), *Soviet Russia As I Saw It*. London, Workers' Dreadnought Publishers.
- Pantham, Thomas (1995), *Political Theories and Social Reconstruction: A Critical Survey of the Literature on India*. New Delhi, Sage Publications.
- Paranjape, Makarand R. (1993), *Decolonization and Development: Hind Svaraj Revisioned*. New Delhi, Sage.
- Parekh, Bikhru (1989), *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse*. New Delhi, Sage Publications.
- Parekh, Bikhru (1997), *Gandhi*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Park, You-me and Sunder Rajan, Rajeswari (2000), 'Postcolonial Feminism/Postcolonialism and Feminism', in Sangeeta Ray and Henry Schwarz, eds, *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 53–71.
- Parker, Andrew, Russo, Mary, Sommer, Doris and Yaeger, Patricia, eds (1992), *Nationalisms and Sexualities*. London, Routledge.
- Parliamentary Peace Aims Group (1941), *The Atlantic Charter: A Criticism*. London, Parliamentary Peace Aims Group.
- Parry, Benita (1987), 'Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse', *Oxford Literary Review* 9: 27–58.
- Parry, Benita (1994a), 'Resistance Theory/Theorising Resistance, or Two Cheers for Nativism', in *Colonial Discourse / Postcolonial Theory*, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iverson. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 172–96.
- Parry, Benita (1994b), 'Signs of Our Times', *Third Text* 28–9, 5–24.
- Parry, Benita (1998), 'Liberation Movements: Memories of the Future', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 1:1, 45–51.
- Pasture, Patrick and Verberckmoes, Johan, eds (1998), *Working-Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity: Historical Debates and Current Perspectives*. Oxford, Berg.
- Patel, Sujata (1988), 'The Construction and Reconstruction of Women in Gandhi', *Economic and Political Weekly* 23: 8, 377–87.
- Patnaik, Ashok Kumar (1992), *The Soviets and the Indian Revolutionary Movement, 1917–1929*. Delhi, Anamika Prakashan.

- Patnaik, Prabhat (1991), 'Marxism in India', in *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 2nd edn, ed. Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 359–61.
- Patnaik, Prabhat (1995), *Whatever Happened to Imperialism and Other Essays*. New Delhi, Tulika.
- Patouillet, J. (1904), *L'Impérialisme américain*. Paris, A. Rousseau.
- Pearse, Pádraic Henry (1917–22), *Collected Works*, 3 vols. Dublin, Maunsel and Roberts.
- Peberdy, Max (1985), *Tigray: Ethiopia's Untold Story*. London, Relief Society of Tigray Support Committee.
- Pêcheux, Michel (1982), *Language, Semantics and Ideology: Stating the Obvious*, trans. Harbans Nagpal. London, Macmillan.
- Peggs, James (1830), *India's Cries to British Humanity, relative to the suttee, infanticide, British connexion with idolatry, ghaut murders, and slavery in India: to which is added humane hints for the melioration of the state of society in British India*, 2nd edn. London, Seely & Son.
- Penvenne, Jeanne Marie (1995), *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877–1962*. London, James Currey.
- Pérez, Louis A. (1986), *Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Pérez Beltrán, Carmelo (1997), *Mujeres argelinas en lucha por las libertades democráticas*. Granada, Editorial Universidad de Granada.
- Pérez Firmat, Gustavo (1989), *The Cuban Condition: Translation and Identity in Modern Cuban Literature*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Peteet, Julie Marie (1991), *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Phadke, Y. D. (1967), 'The Historical Background of Mass Violence in India', in S. P. Aiyar, ed., *The Politics of Mass Violence in India*. Bombay, Manaktalas, 44–52.
- Phillips, Anne (1989), *The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa*. London, James Currey.
- Phillips, Richard (1996), *Mapping Men and Empire: A Geography of Adventure*. London, Routledge.
- Pick, Daniel (1989), *The Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder 1848–1918*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Pieterse, Jan P. Nederveen (1990), *Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale*. London, Pluto Press.
- Pineda Gómez, Francisco (1997), *La irrupción zapatista, 1911*. Mexico, D.F., Ediciones Era.
- Pipes, Richard (1997), *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923*, revd edn. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Plaatje, Sol T. (1990), *Mafeking Diary: A Black Man's View of a White Man's War*, ed. John Comaroff, Brian Willan and Andrew Reed. Cambridge, Meridor.
- Plekhanov, G. V. (1962), *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* [1908]. Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Ponnambalan, Satchi (1983), *Sri Lanka: National Conflict and the Tamil Liberation Struggle*. London, Zed Books.
- Poppino, Rollie E. (1964), *International Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement, 1917–1963*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Porter, A. N. (1991), *Atlas of British Overseas Expansion*. London, Routledge.
- Porter, Andrew (1994), *European Imperialism, 1860–1914*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Porter, Bernard (1968), *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895–1914*. London, Macmillan; New York, St Martin's Press.
- Porter, Bernard (1975), *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850–1970*. London, Longman.

- Porter, Bernard (1983), *Britain, Europe, and the World 1850–1982: Delusions of Grandeur*. London, Allen & Unwin.
- Prago, Albert (1970), *The Revolutions in Spanish America: The Independence Movements of 1808–1825*. New York, Macmillan.
- Prakash, Gyan (1990), *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labour Servitude in Colonial India*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Prakash, Gyan (1999), *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Prakash, Gyan, ed. (1995), *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Prasad, Rai Akhilendra (1974), *Socialist Thought in Modern India*. Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan.
- Pratt, Mary Louis (1992), *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London, Routledge.
- Pratt, Mary Louise (1994), 'Transculturation and Autoethnography: Peru 1615/1980', in *Colonial Discourse / Postcolonial Theory*, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iverson. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 24–46.
- Presley, Cora Ann (1992), *Kikuyu Women, the Mau Mau Rebellion, and Social Change in Kenya*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Prochaska, David (1990), *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870–1920*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Quayson, Ato (2000), *Postcolonialism: Theory, Practice or Process?* Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Radhakrishnan, R. (1992), 'Nationalism, Gender and the Narrative of Identity', in Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer and Patricia Yaeger, eds (1992), *Nationalisms and Sexualities*. London, Routledge, 77–95.
- Rafael, Vicente L. (1988), *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule*. Ithaca, Ny, Cornell University Press.
- Rafael Vicente L., ed. (1995), *Discrepant Histories: Translocal Essays on Filipino Cultures*. Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
- Rahman, Tariq (1996), *Language and Politics in Pakistan*. Karachi, Oxford University Press.
- Rahnema, Majid and Bawtree, Victoria, eds (1997), *The Post-Development Reader*. London, Zed Books.
- Ram Chandra (1986), *Naujawan Bharat Sabha and Hindustan Socialist Republican Association/Army (H.S.R.A.)*. New Delhi, Ram Chandra.
- Ram Gopal (1959), *Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858–1947)*. Bombay, Asia Publishing House.
- Rama, Angel (1982), *Transculturation narrativa en América Latina*. Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
- Rama, Angel (1996), *The Lettered City*, trans. and ed. John Charles Chasteen. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Ramabai Sarasvati, Pandita (2000), *Pandita Ramabai Through Her Own Words: Selected Works*, ed. Meera Kosambi. New Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Randall, Margaret (1992), *Gathering Rage: The Failure of Twentieth Century Revolutions to Develop a Feminist Agenda*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Ranga, N. G. (1949), *Revolutionary Peasants: A Survey of the Various Revolutions that Peasants have Staged against Capitalism all over the World*. Delhi, Amrit Books.
- Ranger, T. O. (1956), *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896–97*. Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press.
- Ranger, Terence (1985), *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*. London, James Currey.

- Rasul, Md. Abdullah (1974), *A History of the All India Kisan Sabha*. Calcutta, National Book Agency.
- Recham, Belkacem (1996), *Les Musulmans algériens dans l'armée française, 1919–1945*. Paris, l'Harmattan.
- Renan, Ernest (1896), *The Poetry of the Celtic Races, and Other Studies*, trans. William G. Hutchinson. London, Walter Scott.
- Retamar, Roberto Fernández (1989), *Caliban and Other Essays*, trans. Edward Baker. Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press.
- Ribeiro, Darcy (1977), *Fronteras indígenas de la civilización*, 4a ed. Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno.
- Ribeiro, Darcy (1978a), *La cultura latinoamericana*. Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Ribeiro, Darcy (1978b), *O dilema da América Latina: estruturas de poder e forças insurgentes*. Petrópolis, Brasil, Editora Vozes.
- Rich, Paul B. (1986), *Race and Empire in British Politics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Riddell, John, ed. (1986a), *The Communist International in Lenin's Time. Lenin's Struggle for a Revolutionary International. Documents: 1907–1916. The Preparatory Years*, 2nd edn. New York, Pathfinder Press.
- Riddell, John, ed. (1986b), *The Communist International in Lenin's Time. The German Revolution and the Debate on Soviet Power. Documents: 1918–1919. Preparing the Founding Congress*. New York, Pathfinder Press.
- Riddell, John, ed. (1991), *The Communist International in Lenin's Time. Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress, 1920*, 2 vols. New York, Pathfinder Press.
- Riddell, John, ed. (1993), *The Communist International in Lenin's Time. To See the Dawn. Baku, 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East*. New York, Pathfinder Press.
- Rigney, Lester Irabinna (1998), 'Native Title, The Stolen Generation and Reconciliation: The Struggle Facing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in Australia', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 1: 1 125–30.
- Robbins, Bruce (1999), *Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress*. New York, New York University Press.
- Roberts, Stephen H. (1929), *The History of French Colonial Policy 1870–1925*. London, P. S. King.
- Robinson, Cedric J. (1983), *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. London, Zed Books.
- Robinson, Ronald, Gallagher, John and Denny, Alice (1981), *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, 2nd edn. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Rodinson, Maxime (1973), *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?* New York, Monad Press.
- Rodinson, Maxime (1979), *Marxism and the Muslim World* [1972]. London, Zed Books.
- Rodney, Walter (1989), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* [1972]. Nairobi, Heinemann Kenya.
- Roebuck, John Arthur (1849), *The Colonies of England: A Plan for the Government of Some Portion of our Colonial Possessions*. London, John W. Parker.
- Romulo, Carlos Pena (1956), *The Meaning of Bandung*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- Ronfeldt, David F. (1998), *The Zapatista 'Social Netwar' in Mexico*. Santa Monica, CA, Rand.
- Rosberg, Carl G. and Nottingham, John Cato (1966), *The Myth of 'Mau Mau': Nationalism in Kenya*. New York, Praeger.
- Rostow, W. W. (1960), *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto*. Cam-

- bridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Rotberg, Robert I. and Mazrui, Ali A., eds (1970), *Protest and Power in Black Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Roux, Edward (1948), *Time Longer Than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa*. London, Gollancz.
- Rowe, William (1995), 'Against Single Vision', *Bulletin Latin American Research* 14: 1, 71–5.
- Roy, Debal K. Singha (1992), *Women in Peasant Movements: Tebhaga, Naxalite and After*. New Delhi, Manohar.
- Roy, M. N. (1922), *India in Transition*, with the collaboration of Abani Mukherji. Geneva, J. B. Target.
- Roy, M. N. (1938), *My Experiences in China*. Bombay, Renaissance Publishing.
- Roy, M. N. (1954), *Memoirs*. Bombay, Allied Publishers.
- Rutherford, Jonathan (1997), *Forever England: Reflections on Masculinity and Empire*. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
- Said, Edward W. (1978), 'The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions', *Critical Inquiry* 4: 4, 673–714; revised version in *The World the Text the Critic*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 78–225.
- Said, Edward W. (1983), *The World the Text the Critic*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Said, Edward W. (1985), *Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient* [1978]. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Said, Edward W. (1986), 'Foucault and the Imagination of Power', in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Couzens Hoy. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 149–55.
- Said, Edward W. (1993), *Culture and Imperialism*. London, Chatto & Windus.
- Sainsbury, John (1987), *Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America 1769–82*. Gloucester, Alan Sutton.
- Saivetz, Carol R. (1989), *The Soviet Union in the Third World*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Salih, Tayeb (1969), *Season of Migration to the North*, trans. Denys Johnson-Davies. Oxford, Heinemann.
- Samim, Ahmet (1981), 'The Tragedy of the Turkish Left', *New Left Review* 126: 60–85.
- Sampurnanand (1961), *Indian Socialism*. London, Asia Publishing House.
- San Juan, E. (1998), *Beyond Postcolonial Theory*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Sangari, Kumkum and Vaid, Sudesh (1989), *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*. New Delhi, Kali for Women.
- Sankara, Thomas (1988), *Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983–87*, trans. Samantha Anderson. New York, Pathfinder Press.
- Sankaranh Nair, Chettur (1995), *Gandhi and Anarchy*. Reprint of 2nd edn, 1922. New Delhi, Mittal Publications.
- Santiago, Silviano (1978), *Uma literatura nos trópicos: ensaios sobre dependência cultural*. Sao Paulo, Editora Perspectiva.
- Sardar, Zia, Nandy, Ashis and Wyn Davies, Merryl (1993), *Barbaric Others: A Manifesto on Western Racism*. London, Pluto Press.
- Sareen, Tilak Raj (1979), *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad, 1905–1921*. New Delhi, Sterling.
- Sareen, Tilak Raj (1993), *Indian Revolutionaries, Japan and British Imperialism*. New Delhi, Anmol Publications.
- Sarkar, Sunit (1973), *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903–1908*. New Delhi, People's Publishing House.

- Sarkar, Sumit (1989), *Modern India, 1885–1947*, 2nd edn. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Sarkar, Tanika (1989), 'Politics and Women in Bengal – the Conditions and Meaning of Participation', in *Women in Colonial India: Essays on Survival, Work and the State*, ed. Jayasankar Krishnamurty. Delhi, Oxford University Press, 231–41.
- Sarkar, Tanika and Butalia, Urvashi, eds (1995), *Women and the Hindu Right*. New Delhi, Kali for Women.
- Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1992), *Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy*. London, Lagos and Port Harcourt, Saros International Publishers.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1948), *Existentialism and Humanism* [1946], trans. Philip Mairet. London, Methuen.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1958), *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* [1943], trans. Hazel E. Barnes. London, Methuen.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1963), *The Problem of Method* [1960], trans. Hazel E. Barnes. London, Methuen.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1964), *Situations, V. Colonialisme et néo-colonialisme*. Paris, Gallimard.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1966), 'Sartre répond', *La Quinzaine littéraire*, 15: 4–5.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1968), *The Communists and Peace, with a Reply to Claude Lefort*, trans. Martha H. Fletcher. New York, George Braziller.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1976a), *Critique of Dialectical Reason: Theory of Practical Ensembles* [1960], Vol. 1, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith. London, Verso.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1976b), *Black Orpheus*, trans. S. W. Allen. Paris, Présence africaine.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1991), *Critique of Dialectical Reason: The Intelligibility of History* [1985], Vol. 2, ed. Arlette Elkaim Sartre, trans. Quintin Hoare. London, Verso.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul and Dedijer, Vladimir (1970), *War Crimes in Vietnam*. Nottingham, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Publications.
- Sastri, Prakasa (1985), *Socialist Thought in India: With Special Reference to Lohia's Quest for Indigenous Socialism*. Jaipur, Printwell Publishers.
- Sau, Ranjit (1978), *Unequal Exchange, Imperialism and Underdevelopment: An Essay on the Political Economy of World Capitalism*. Calcutta, Oxford University Press.
- Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar (1942), *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?*, 2nd edn. Bombay, Veer Savarkar Prakashan.
- Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar (1947), *The Indian War of Independence, 1857* [1909]. Bombay, Phoenix Publications.
- Scammell, G. V. (1989), *The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c.1400–1715*. London, HarperCollins.
- Schmidt, Elizabeth (1992), *Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939*. London, James Currey.
- Schneider, William H. (1982), *An Empire for the Masses: The French Popular Image of Africa, 1870–1900*. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press.
- Schram, Stuart R. and Bastid, Marianne (1973), *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China: Essays*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Schuyler, George S. (1991), *Black Empire* [1937–8], ed. Robert A. Hill and R. Kent Rasmussen. Boston, Northeastern University Press.
- Schuyler, Robert L (1945), *The Fall of the Old Colonial System: A Study in British Free Trade 1770–1870*. London, Oxford University Press.
- Schwarz, Roberto (1992), *Misplaced Ideas: Essays on Brazilian Culture*, ed. John Gledson. London, Verso.
- Scott, David (1995), 'Colonial Governmentality', *Social Text* 43: 191–200.
- Scott, James C. (1985), *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven,

- CT, Yale University Press.
- Scott, James C. (1990), *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Seeley, John Robert (1971), *The Expansion of England* [1883], ed. John Gross. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Seers, D., ed. (1981), *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*. London, Pinter.
- Semmel, Bernard (1960), *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895–1914*. London, G. Allen & Unwin.
- Semmel, Bernard (1962), *The Governor Eyre Controversy*. London, MacGibbon & Kee.
- Semmel, Bernard (1970), *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750–1850*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Semmel, Bernard (1993), *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin*. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sen, Amartya (1982), *Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Sen, Arindam and Ghosha, Partha (1991), *Communist Movement in India: Historical Perspective and Important Documents*. Patna, Samkalin Prakashan.
- Sen, Sunil Kumar (1985), *The Working Women and Popular Movements in Bengal: From the Gandhi Era to the Present Day*. Calcutta, K. P. Bagchi.
- Sen, Sunil Kumar (1994), *Working Class Movements in India, 1885–1975*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Sen Gupta, Bhabani (1972), *Communism in Indian Politics*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Sen Gupta, Bhabani (1979), *CPI-M, Promises, Prospects, Problems*. New Delhi, Young Asia Publications.
- Senghor, Lamine (1927), *La Violation d'un pays*. Paris, Bureau d'Editions, de Diffusion, et de Publicité.
- Senghor, Léopold Sédar (1964a), *On African Socialism*, trans. Mercer Cook. London, Pall Mall.
- Senghor, Léopold Sédar (1964b), *Négritude et humanisme*. Paris, Editions du Seuil.
- Senghor, Léopold Sédar (1983), *Liberté*, 6 vols. Paris, Seuil.
- Serequeberhan, Tsenay (1994), *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse*. New York, Routledge.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh (1967), *The Russian Empire 1801–1917*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Shakir, Moin (1970), *Khilafat to Partition: A Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims during 1919–1947*. New Delhi, Kalamkar Prakashan.
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1981), *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Sharma, T. R. (1984), *Communism in India: The Politics of Fragmentation*. New Delhi, Sterling.
- Shaw, A. G. L. (1966), *Convicts and the Colonies: A Study of Penal Transportation from Great Britain and Ireland to Australia and other parts of the British Empire*. London, Faber.
- Shepherd, Verene, Brereton, Bridget and Bailey, Barbara (1995), *Engendering History: Caribbean Women in Historical Perspective*. Kingston, Ian Randle Publishers.
- Sheshadri-Crooks, Kalpana (1994), 'The Primitive as Analyst: Postcolonial Feminism's Access to Psychoanalysis', *Cultural Critique* 28: 175–218.
- Shivji, Issa G. (1989), *The Concept of Human Rights in Africa*. London, CODESRIA.
- Shohat, Ella (1992), 'Notes on the "Post-Colonial"', *Social Text* 31/32, 99–113.
- Shohat, Ella and Stam, Robert (1994), *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. London, Routledge.

- Singelmann, Peter (1980), *Structures of Domination and Peasant Movements in Latin America*. Columbia, University of Missouri Press.
- Singh, Nahar and Singh, Kirpal (1986), *Struggle for Free Hindustan: Ghadr Movement*, 3 vols. New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers & Distributors.
- Singham, A. W. and Hune, Shirley (1986), *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments*. London, Zed Books.
- Sinha, Bejoy Kumar (1994), *Indian Revolutionary Movement*. Pune, Lokamanya Tilak Smarak Trust.
- Sinha, Mrinalini (1995), *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Sinha, Mrinalini (1999), 'The Lineage of the "Indian" Modern: Rhetoric, Agency and the Sarda Act in Late Colonial India', in *Gender, Sexuality and Colonial Modernities*, ed. Antoinette M. Burton. London, Routledge, 207–21.
- Sinha, Mrinalini, Guy, Donna and Woollacott, Angela (1999), *Feminisms and Internationalisms*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Sivanandan, A. (1982), *A Different Hunger: Writings on Black Resistance*. London, Pluto Press.
- Sixth Pan African Congress (1976), *Resolutions and Selected Speeches from the Sixth Pan African Congress*. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House.
- Slemon, Stephen (1994), 'The Scramble for Post-Colonialism', in *De-Scribing Empire: Postcolonialism and Textuality*, ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson. London, Routledge, 15–32.
- Slemon, Stephen and Tiffin, Helen, eds (1989), *After Europe: Critical Theory and Post-Colonial Writing*. Sydney, Dangaroo Press.
- Smith, Adam (1910), *The Wealth of Nations* [1776], 2 vols, ed. E. R. A. Seligman. London, Dent.
- Smith, Anthony D. (1986), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Smith, Anthony D., ed. (1992), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Leiden, Brill.
- Smith, Goldwin (1863), *The Empire: A Series of Letters Published in 'The Daily News'*. Oxford, J. Henry and J. Parker.
- Smith, Linda Tuhiwai (1998), *Decolonising Methodologies*. London, Zed Books.
- Smith, Woodruff D. (1986), *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Smith Bell, Sydney (1859), *Colonial Administration of Great Britain*. London, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans & Roberts.
- Soekarno (1969), *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*, trans. Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon. Ithaca, NY, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Asian Studies, Cornell University.
- Sofri, Gianni (1999), *Gandhi and India*. Moreton-in-Marsh, Windrush Books.
- Sofri, Gianni, Rainero, Romain, Giovana, Mario, De Santis, Sergio, Collotti Pischel, Enrica and Del Boac, Angelo (1968), *Lotte di liberazione e rivoluzioni in Africa Nera, Egitto, Algeria, Cuba, Cina, Vietnam*. Turin, G. Giappichelli editore.
- Soga, Tiyo (1983), *The Journal and Selected Writings of the Reverend Tiyo Soga*, ed. Donovan Williams. Cape Town, A. A. Balkema.
- Sorel, Georges (1999), *Reflections on Violence*, ed. Jeremy Jennings. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Spector, Ivar (1958), *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917–1958*. Seattle, University of Washington Press.
- Spector, Ivar (1962), *The First Russian Revolution: Its Impact on Asia*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall.

- Spender, Dale (1985), *Man Made Language*, 2nd edn. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1985), 'Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on Widow Sacrifice', *Wedge* 7/8: 120–30.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1987), *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*. New York, Methuen.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1993), *Outside in the Teaching Machine*. London, Routledge.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1999), *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Spratt, Philip (1955), *Blowing Up India*. Calcutta, Prachi Prakashan.
- Sprinker, Michael, ed. (1992), *Edward Said: A Critical Reader*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Srivastava, Gita (1982), *Mazzini and his Impact on the Indian National Movement*. Allahabad, Chugh Publications.
- Stalin, Joseph (1936), *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*. London, Martin Lawrence.
- Stalin, Joseph (1939), *Foundations of Leninism* [1924]. New York, International Publishers.
- Staunton, Irene, ed. (1990), *Mothers of the Revolution: The War Experiences of Thirty Zimbabwean Women*. London, James Currey.
- Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, ed. (1970), *Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America*. Garden City, NY, Doubleday.
- Stern, Steve J. (1999), 'The Tricks of Time: Colonial Legacies and Historical Sensibilities in Latin America', in *Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History*, ed. Jeremy Adelman. New York, Routledge, 135–50.
- Stern, Steve J., ed. (1998), *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Stevens, Christopher (1976), *The Soviet Union and Black Africa*. London, Macmillan.
- Stoler, Laura Ann (1995), *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Strauss, Gustave Louis M. (1875), *Men Who Have Made the New German Empire: A Series of Biographical Sketches*. London, Tinsley Brothers.
- Strausz-Hupé, Robert and Hazard, Harry W., eds (1958), *The Idea of Colonialism*. London, Atlantic Books.
- Strobel, Margaret (1979), *Muslim Women in Mombasa, 1890–1975*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Sturgis, James L. (1969), *John Bright and the Empire*. London, Athlone Press.
- Suleri, Sara (1992), *The Rhetoric of English India*. Chicago, Chicago University Press.
- Sultan-Galiev, Mir Said (1984), *Stati*. Oxford, Ob-vo issledovaniia Srednei Azii.
- Sunder Rajan, Rajeswari (1993), *Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture, Postcolonialism*. London, Routledge.
- Sunder Rajan, Rajeswari (1997), 'The Third World Academic in Other Places; or the Postcolonial Intellectual Revisited', *Critical Inquiry* 23: 3, 596–616.
- Sunderland, Jabez Thomas (1932), *India in Bondage: Her Right to Freedom*. Calcutta, R. Chatterjee.
- Sundkler, Bengt (1961), *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, 2nd edn. London, Oxford University Press.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor (1998), *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Tabata, I. B. (1974), *The Awakening of a People* [1950]. Nottingham, Spokesman Books.
- Tabili, Laura (1994), 'We Ask for British Justice': *Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.

- Tarlo, Emma (1996), *Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in India*. London, Hurst.
- Taussig, Michael T. (1986), *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Taylor, Sandra C. (1999), *Vietnamese Women at War: Fighting for Ho Chi Minh and the Revolution*. Lawrence, Kansas University Press.
- Tharu, Susie J. and Lalita, Ke (1993), *Women Writing in India: 600 BC to the Present*, 2 vols. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Thomas, Alan, et al. (1994), *Third World Atlas*, 2nd edn. Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
- Thompson, V. B. (1969), *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism*. London, Longmans, Green.
- Thornton, A. P. (1985), *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power*, 2nd edn. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Tiffin, Chris and Lawson, Alan (1994), *De-Scribing Empire: Postcolonialism and Textuality*. London, Routledge.
- Tinker, Hugh (1987), *Men Who Overturned Empires: Fighters, Dreamers and Schemers*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Todorov, Tzvetan (1993), *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Törnquist, Olle (1984), *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia*. London, Zed Books.
- Törnquist, Olle (1999), *Politics and Development: A Critical Introduction*. London, Sage Publications.
- Touré, Ahmed Sékou (1959), *Expérience guinéenne et unité africaine*. Paris, Présence Africaine.
- Touré, Ahmed Sékou (1976), *Révolution, culture, panafricanisme*, 3rd edn. Conakry, Bureau de presse de la présidence de la République.
- Towa, Marcien (1971), *Essai sur la problématique philosophique dans l'Afrique actuelle*. Yaoundé, Editions CLE.
- Trivedi, Harish (1993), *Colonial Transactions: English Literature and India*. Calcutta, Papyrus.
- Trivedi, Harish and Mukherjee, Meenakshi (1996), *Interrogating Post-colonialism: Theory, Text, and Context*. Shimla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
- Trollope, Joanna (1983), *Britannia's Daughters: Women of the British Empire*. London, Hutchinson.
- Trotsky, Leon (1932), *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*. New York, Pioneer Publishers.
- Trotsky, Leon (1934), *The History of the Russian Revolution*, trans. Max Eastman. London, Victor Gollancz.
- Trotsky, Leon (1941), *Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence*. New York, Harper.
- Trotsky, Leon (1945), *The First Five Years of the Communist International [1924]*. New York, Pioneer Publishers.
- Trotsky, Leon (1970), *Where is Britain Going? [1925]*. London, Socialist Labour League.
- Trotsky, Leon (1978), *Leon Trotsky on Black Nationalism and Self-Determination*, 2nd edn. New York, Pathfinder Press.
- Tucker, Vincent (1997), *Cultural Perspectives on Development*. London, F. Cass.
- Tucker, Vincent (1999), 'The Myth of Development: A Critique of a Eurocentric Discourse', in *Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm*, ed. Ronaldo Munck and Denis O'Hearn. London, Zed Books, 1–26.
- Turner, Bryan S. (1974), 'The Concept of Social "Stationariness": Utilitarianism and Marxism', *Science and Society* 38, 3–18.
- Turner, Bryan S. (1978), *Marx and the End of Orientalism*. London, George Allen & Unwin.
- Turner, Bryan S. (1994), *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*. London, Routledge.

- Twain, Mark (1992), *Mark Twain's Weapons of Satire: Anti-Imperialist Writings on the Philippine-American War*, ed. Jim Zwick. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press.
- Ulyanovsky, Rostislav (1978), *National Liberation*. Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Urdang, Stephanie (1979), *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Uyangoda, Jayadeva and Biyanwila, Janaka (1997), *Matters of Violence: Reflections on Social and Political Violence in Sri Lanka*. Colombo, Social Scientists' Association.
- Vail, Leroy and White, Landeg (1980), *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A Study of Quelimane District*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
- Vail, Leroy and White, Landeg (1991), *Southern African Voices in History*. London, James Currey.
- Vaillant, Janet G. (1990), *Black, French and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Van, Ngo (1995), *Revolutionaries They Could Not Break: The Fight for the Fourth International in Indochina 1930–1945*. London, Index.
- Van Deburg, William L. (1997), *Modern Black Nationalism from Marcus Garvey to Louis Farrakhan*. New York, New York University Press.
- Vanden, Harry E. (1986), *National Marxism in Latin America: José Carlos Mariátegui's Thought and Politics*. Boulder, CO, L. Rienner.
- Vandevélde-Daillière, Hélène (1980), *Femmes algériennes à travers la condition féminine dans le constantinois depuis l'indépendance*. Alger, Office des publications universitaires.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. (1978), *Nasser and His Generation*. London, Croom Helm.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. (1991), *The Modern History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, 4th edn. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Vaughan, Megan (1991), *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
- Vieira, Else Ribeiro Pires (1999), 'Postcolonialisms and the Latin Americas', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 1: 2, 274–81.
- Visram, Rozina (1986), *Ayahs, Lascars, and Princes: The Story of Indians in Britain 1700–1947*. London, Pluto Press.
- Visvanathan, Nalini, Duggan, Lynn, Nisonoff, Laurie and Wiegiersma, Nancy (1997), *The Women, Gender and Development Reader*. London, Zed Books.
- Viswanathan, Gauri (1998), *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Visweswaran, Kamala (1996), 'Small Speeches, Subaltern Gender: Nationalist Ideology and its Historiography', *Subaltern Studies IX*, 83–125.
- Von Eschen, Penny M. (1997), *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
- Wade, Peter (1997), *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*. London, Pluto Press.
- Wadstrom, C. B. (1794), *An Essay on Colonization, particularly applied to the West Coast of Africa, with some free Thoughts on Cultivation and Commerce*, 2 vols. London.
- Wakefield, Edward Gibbon (1914), *A View of the Art of Colonization, in Letters Between a Statesman and a Colonist: With present reference to the British Empire [1849]*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Walker, Cherryll, ed. (1990), *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945*. London, James Currey.
- Walker, Cherryll (1991), *Women and Resistance in South Africa*, 2nd edn. Cape Town, David Philip.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1961), *Africa: The Politics of Independence*. New York, Vintage Books.

- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974–89), *The Modern World System*, 3 vols. New York, Academic Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979), *The Capitalist World Economy: Essays*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1984), *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations: Essays*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1995), 'The Insurmountable Contradictions of Liberalism: Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples in the Geoculture of the Modern World-System', *South Atlantic Quarterly* 94: 4, 1161–78.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, ed. (1975), *World Inequality: Origins and Perspectives on the World System*. Montreal, Black Rose Books.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, Guido Béjar, Rafael, Fernández Reyes, Otto and Torregrosa, María Luisa (1990), *El Juicio al sujeto: un análisis global de los movimientos sociales*. Mexico, FLACSO, M. A. Porrúa.
- Walston, Sir Charles (1920), *The English-Speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations*, 2nd edn. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Ware, Vron (1992), *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History*. London, Verso.
- Ware, Vron (1996), 'Defining Forces: "Race", Gender and Memories of Empire', in *The Post-colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*, ed. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curtis. London, Routledge, 142–56.
- Warren, Bill (1980), *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, ed. John Sender. London, Verso.
- Waterman, Peter (1998), *Globalization, Social Movements, and the New Internationalisms*. London, Mansell.
- Weber, Thomas (1997), *On the Salt March: The Historiography of Gandhi's March to Dandi*. New Delhi, HarperCollins.
- Weinberger-Thomas, Catherine (1996), *Cendres d'immortalité: la crémation des veuves en Inde*. Paris, Seuil.
- Weiner, Myron (1966), *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth*. New York, Basic Books.
- Weisbord, Robert G. (1973), *Ebony Kinship: Africa, Africans, and the Afro-American*. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press.
- Weiss, Ruth (1986), *The Women of Zimbabwe*. London, Kesho Publications.
- Wells, H. G. (1920), *Russia in the Shadows*. London, Hodder & Stoughton.
- Wells, Julia C. (1982), 'The History of Black Women's Struggles Against Pass Laws in South Africa, 1900–56', in *African Women and the Law*, ed. Margaret Hay and Marcia Wright. Boston, Boston University Press, 145–68.
- Wells, Julia C. (1986), 'The War of Degradation: Black Women's Struggle Against Orange Free State Pass Laws, 1913', in *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa*, ed. Donald Crummey. London, James Currey, 253–70.
- Wells, Julia C. (1993), *We Now Demand!: The History of Women's Resistance to Pass Laws in South Africa*. Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press.
- Werbner, Richard and Ranger, Terence (1996), *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*. London, Zed Books.
- Whelan, Frederick G. (1996), *Edmund Burke and India: Political Morality and Empire*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Wilford, Rick and Miller, Robert L. (1998), *Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism: The Politics of Transition*. London, Routledge.
- Willetts, Peter (1978), *The Non-aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance*. London, Frances Pinter.

- Williams, Raymond (1988), *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. London, Fontana.
- Williamson, Edwin (1992), *The Penguin History of Latin America*. London, Allen Lane.
- Wilson, Edward Thomas (1974), *Russia and Black Africa before World War II*. New York, Holmes & Meier.
- Wilson, Edward Thomas (1980), 'Russia's Historic Stake in Black Africa', in *Africa and International Communism*, ed. David E. Albright. London, Macmillan, 67–92.
- Wolf, Eric R. (1971), *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. London, Faber & Faber.
- Wolfenstein, Eugene Victor (1967), *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Wolfenstein, Eugene Victor (1981), *The Victims of Democracy: Malcolm X and the Black Revolution*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Wolfenstein, Eugene Victor (1993), *Psychoanalytic-Marxism: Groundwork*. London, Free Association.
- Wolpert, Stanley A. (1989), *Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India*. Delhi, Oxford University Press.
- Womack, John, Jr. (1972), *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Wood, Nancy (1998), 'Remembering the Jews of Algeria', in *Translating 'Algeria'*, *Parallax* 7, 169–84.
- World Development Movement (1999), 'In the Real World of the WTO the Sun Does Not Always Shine', *Financial Times* 22 November 1999.
- Wright, Marcia (1993), *Strategies of Slaves and Women. Life Stories from East/Central Africa*. London, James Currey.
- Wright, Richard (1956), *The Colour Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference*. London, Dobson.
- Wrong, E. M. (1926), *Charles Buller and Responsible Government*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- X, Malcolm (1992), *By Any Means Necessary*, 2nd edn. New York, Pathfinder.
- Yeğenoğlu, Meyda (1998), *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Young, Robert J. C., ed. (1981), *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Young, Robert J. C. (1990), *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. London, Routledge.
- Young, Robert J. C. (1995a), *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Culture, Theory and Race*. London, Routledge.
- Young, Robert J. C. (1995b), 'Foucault on Race and Colonialism', *New Formations* 25, 57–65.
- Young, Robert J. C. (1996), *Tom Halves: Political Conflict in Literary and Cultural Theory*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Young, Robert J. C. (1998), 'The Overwritten Unwritten: Nationalism and its Doubles in Post-Colonial Theory', in *(Un)writing Empire*, ed. Theo D'haen. Amsterdam and Atlanta, Rodopi, 15–34.
- Young, Robert J. C. (1999), '"Dangerous and Wrong": Shell, Intervention, and the Politics of Transnational Companies', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 1: 3, 439–64.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira (1997), *Gender & Nation*. London, Sage.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira and Anthias, Floya, eds (1989), *Woman – Nation – State*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Zavala, Iris M. (1992), *Colonialism and Culture: Hispanic Modernisms and the Social Imaginary*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

- Zavala, Iris M. and Rodríguez, Rafael (1980), *The Intellectual Roots of Independence: An Anthology of Puerto Rican Political Essays*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Zhang, Yongjin (1991), *China in the International System, 1918–20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.

Index

- Abd-el-Krim 153
- Abdel-Malek, Anouar 170–5, 178, 180, 181, 190, 191, 212
- Abolition Society 77
- Aboriginals Protection Society 77
- Adorno, Theodor 111, 340
- Afghanistan 49, 91, 135, 136, 143, 153, 378
- Africa 217–92
 - and African–American politics 219, 221
 - anti-colonialism 180, 217–19, 225, 226, 230
 - communist activity 226–30, 232–3
 - cultural politics 8, 291
 - diasporic activists 219, 226–7
 - legacy of colonialism 291
 - liberation movements 180
 - messianic movements 229
 - nationalism 218, 219, 230, 240
 - postcolonial states 291–2
 - religious protest movements 229–30
 - socialism 217–35, 241–2
 - women activists 363–8
 - youth movements 227, 228, 229, 230
 - see also* specific countries/regions
- African Blood Brotherhood 222
- African consciousness 221
- African National Congress (ANC) 162, 213, 230, 231, 232, 238, 249, 250, 324, 367
- African Service Bureau 227
- African socialism 50, 166, 239–42, 244–8, 251, 252, 253–73, 280, 283, 291
 - aims and objectives 242, 244
 - Francophone African socialism 253–73
 - gendered account 247
 - Nkrumah on 244–6
 - Nyerere on 246–8
 - scientific form 247
 - Senghor on 272–3
 - values 251
- African-Americans 133, 142, 220, 221–3, 225, 226
- Afrikaner nationalists 178–9
- Afro-Asian Latin American People's Solidarity Organization 213
- agency 45, 49, 354
 - subaltern agency 353, 358
- Aggrey, J. E. K. 221
- agrarian question 137, 149, 157, 182, 188, 196
- ahimsa* 248, 323–5
- Ahmad, Aijaz 62, 167, 170, 172, 339, 413
- Ahmad, Muzaffar 134, 312, 314
- Ainu 4, 59
- Al-Afghānī, Jamal el-Din 138, 175
- al-Qadhdhafi, Muammar 190, 277
- Alaska 3, 42
- Albania 58, 59
- Aleutian Islands 42
- Alexandria 29
- Algeria vii–ix, 16, 17, 20, 22, 30, 86, 88, 104, 164, 179, 191, 243, 254, 293–9, 363, 411, 419–23
 - communism 147, 156, 231, 419
 - 'defrancification' 298–9
 - disenfranchisement of Muslim population 299–300

- European minority 279
- Fanon and 277–80
- FLN 277–8, 280, 298, 362, 420
- independence 280
- indigenous resistance 167, 250, 275, 358, 417
- Islamic nationalism 147, 173, 278
- Jews 22, 414, 422, 424
- ‘pacification’ of 294–5
- pieds-noirs* 414, 415
- torture viii, 295, 298, 424
- violence 276–7, 282, 294, 295, 296, 297–9, 300, 412
- women activists 362, 363
- women’s equality 370, 381
- Algerian war of independence ix, 167, 253, 275, 276–7, 283
- Ali, Aruna Asaf 362
- alienation 270, 271
- All African Convention 232
- All India Radio 331
- All-India Non-Cooperation Movement 332
- Allende, Salvador 194, 213
- alterity 271, 418
- Althusser, Louis 185, 187, 295, 414, 416
- Alvarado, Salvador 196
- Amanullah, King 136, 153
- American Civil War 91
- American colonies 16, 78, 79, 83, 85, 92
- American Declaration of Independence 86
- American Negro Labor Congress 222, 224
- American War of Independence 35, 78, 82
- Amin, Idi 251
- Amin, Samir 48, 62, 111
- Amritsar Massacre (1919) 96, 296, 324, 332
- Anderson, Benedict 172
- Andrews, C. F. 322
- androgyny 327
- Angola 162, 166, 213, 214, 219, 240, 247, 250, 251, 283, 284, 363
- annexation 94, 117
- anthropophagy 201, 272
- Anti-colonial Conference (1927) 176
- anti-colonialism 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 19, 28–9, 35, 37, 65, 66, 73–87, 133, 161
 - and agency 45
 - common project 164–5
 - cultural nationalism and 318–23
 - cultural resistance 18–19
 - diasporic activists 177–8, 218, 219, 257, 264, 350
 - discourse of rights and justice 86–7
 - economic argument 73–4, 82–7, 88, 99, 165
 - eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revolutions 79
 - focus on white settler colonies 94
 - forms of 371
 - gendered 77, 327, 356–7, 359
 - ideology 75
 - internal activism 100
 - liberal anti-colonialism 92
 - male perspectives 178, 360, 361
 - and Marxism 111–12, 341
 - metropolitanism 61
 - moral and humanitarian argument 15, 73–4, 75–82, 88
 - and nationalism 79, 119
 - non-revolutionary forms of resistance 358
 - non-violence strategy 297
 - playing by different rules 343–4
 - political, cultural and theoretical positions 164, 165–6
 - pre-Second World War critique 130
 - psychological resistance 341–2
 - reversal into indigeneity 326
 - tradition of 74, 75, 161–3, 168
 - tricontinental anti-colonialism 218–19
 - ‘two measures’ 86
 - women’s role in 178, 356, 357, 360–82
 - see also* national liberation movements
- anti-slave trade movement 76–7
- apartheid 231
- Apithy, Sourous 219
- Appiah, Kwame 62
- Argentina 20, 156, 194, 195
- Armand, Inessa 140
- Armenia 122, 124, 135
- Arusha Declaration (1967) 247
- assimilation 30, 32, 33, 34, 75, 80, 164, 254, 259, 264, 268
 - British assimilation 300–1
 - bureaucratic centralization 34

- contradictions 260
 ethnocentric egalitarianism paradox 32
 Francophone colonies 17, 30, 32, 81,
 164, 254, 264, 284, 299, 334, 417
 political and cultural 81
 and political rights 94, 264
samas 348–9
 and violence 300
 association 32, 33, 254, 301
 Atlantic Charter (1941) 180
 Australia 17, 19, 23, 31, 39, 95, 130
 Aboriginal peoples 4, 20, 77
 decolonization 3, 163
 immigration policy 62, 79, 149
 independence 97
 nationalism 79
 participatory government 164
 Australian Natives Association 20
 Austro-Hungarian Empire 2, 115, 118
 Awooner-Renner, Bankole 227
 Azerbaijan 122, 124, 135, 136
 Azevedo, Luis de 213
 Azikiwe, Nnamdi 45, 68, 221, 227
- Babus 354
 Baghdad Pact (1955) 190
 Bahamas 179
 Bai, Rani Lakshmi 362
 Baku 135, 136
 Baku Congress (1920) 134–9, 141, 142,
 143, 144, 147, 152, 198
 Bakunin 120
 Baliño, Carlos 195
 Baltic states 118, 122
 ‘banana republics’ 50
 Banda, Kamazu 221
 Bandung Conference (1955) 51, 59, 119,
 157, 191–2, 213
 Bangladesh 4
 Baran, Paul 50, 111
 Barq, Mohammed Abdur Rabb 134, 137,
 312
 Barthes, Roland 187
 Basmachi 139
 Bastiat, Frédéric 89
 Batavia 17
 Ba’thism 190
 Bauer, Otto 115, 120
- Bavaria 129
 Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) 194
 Beckford, William 83
 Belgium 2, 3, 31, 117
 Belorussia 122
 Ben Bella, Mohammed Ahmed 156, 178,
 278
 Benin 41
 Bentham, Jeremy 85–6, 92
 Berlin conference (1884–5) 31
 Bernstein, Eduard 116
 Besant, Annie 91, 94, 319, 322, 324
 Bevin, Ernest 116
 Bhabha, Homi K. 62, 69, 339, 343, 354,
 392, 397
 challenges Indian theoretical orthodoxies
 339, 350, 351
 dialectical method 410
 hybridity in 347, 348, 349
 revisionary model of colonial discourse
 392
 use of Foucault’s concept of enunciation
 401
 Biko, Steve 220, 232, 280
 Black Atlantic 218, 219, 253
 Black Consciousness movement 220, 232,
 280
 black nationalism 220, 240
 Black Panthers 215, 223
 Black Power 219, 221, 280
 Black Zionism 218, 219–20
 Blavatsky, Madame 319
 Bloncourt, Max 176
 Blum–Violette plan 147
 Blyden, Edward W. 217, 218
 Boas, Franz 420
 Boer War (1899–1902) 41, 95, 98, 116,
 296, 318
 Boers 79
 Bolívar, Simón 76, 106, 161
 Bolivia 156, 166, 199, 207, 211, 214, 215
 Bolshevik revolution (1917) 10, 59, 100,
 119, 120, 130, 170, 185, 307
 Borkenau, F. 154, 155
 Borman, Reboti 311
 Bose, Girindrasekhar 341
 Bose, Rash Behari 312
 Bose, Subhas Chandra 179, 315, 328, 334

- Boupacha, Djamila viii
 Bourdieu, Pierre 414
 bourgeoisie 103–4, 106, 131, 147, 148
 Brathwaite, Kamu 68
 Brazil 1, 17, 193, 194, 195, 202–3, 215
 Bretton Woods agreement 49, 53
 Briggs, Cyril 220, 222, 226
 Bright, John 80, 91, 95
 Brissot de Warville, Jacques Pierre 76, 81
 Britain 135, 143, 165
 anti-colonialism 76–7, 89–95
 anti-slavery campaign 76–7
 class politics 9–10, 355
 Commonwealth 39
 Communist Party 147, 148, 232, 313
 decolonization 3
 democracy 9
 Navigation Laws 23, 36, 83
 radical populist tradition 97
 shift from anti-colonialism to imperialism 90–1
 universal suffrage 9
 British colonialism 2, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 90
 assimilation 300–1
 association doctrine 33, 301
 Burke's critique of 78–80
 colonial discourse 408–9
 domestic resistance 34, 35, 74, 82, 90
 idiosyncrasy 18, 34
 significant dates 35
 successive expansion 34–5
 British Empire 16, 18, 26, 31, 41, 180
 British Guiana 173, 179, 193, 234
 British imperialism 9–10, 29, 31, 32, 34–6, 117, 136
 Comintern activities against 145
 deconstruction 92–3
 despotism and democracy 38, 95
 dualistic system 35, 40
 'empire and commerce' imperialism 39, 41
 imperial federation 35–6
 internal anti-imperialist critique 74, 91–2
 liberalism/radicalism 37, 40
 minimal/non-interference policy 33, 41, 300, 380
 reformulation as racial not commercial entity 36–7
 Roman Empire analogy 33
 working-class attitudes towards 334
 Brockway, Fenner 177
 Brunn Congress (1899) 107, 115
 Brussels Congress (1904) 116
 Buchan, John 42
 Buganda 179
 Bugeaud, General 294
 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich 99, 109
 Bunting, S. P. 230
 Burakumin 4
 Burke, Edmund 78–80
 critique of colonialism 79–80
 Reflections on the Revolution in France 78
 Burma 102, 162, 163, 179
 Butt, Isaac 95, 96
 Byzantine empire 16

 Cabral, Amilcar 68, 105, 188, 210, 213, 246, 283–92
 and cultural reconversion 288, 290
 on identity 291
 on liberation 286
 on role of culture 288–92
 'The Weapon of Theory' 285
 theoretical formulations 284–5, 286
 California 104
 Calvet, Pierre 393, 424
 Cama, Bhikaiji 115, 312–13, 362
 Camara, Helder 297
 Cambodia 213
 Cameroons 162, 304
 Camus, Albert 294, 295, 414
 Canada 4, 19, 23, 34, 80, 91, 92, 95, 166, 301
 constitutional moves towards
 decolonization 163
 dominion status 39, 92
 immigration policy 79, 149
 independence 97
 participatory government 164
 Canary Islands 3
 Candace, Gratien 264
 Cape Verde Islands 251, 291
 capitalism 7, 9, 24, 101, 103, 136, 147, 148, 343
 free-market capitalism 59
 Gandhi on capital–labour relations 322–3

- and imperialism 27–8, 110, 290, 311
- Marx on 101, 102, 103, 105, 109
- monopoly capitalism 110, 125
- resistance to 170
- Cárdenas, Lazaro 196
- Carmichael, Stokeley 220, 223
- Carnarvon, Earl of 92–3
- Carpenter, Edward 326
- Carpentier, Alejo 193
- Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène 118–19
- Casablanca group 243
- Casely Hayford, Joseph 217
- Casement, Sir Roger 1–2, 25, 116, 312
- caste 4, 349
- Castro, Fidel 169, 196, 204, 206, 211, 212, 215, 216, 223, 288, 302, 334
- Caucasus 122, 135, 136
- centrism 417
- Césaire, Aimé 2, 30, 225, 246, 255, 265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 272, 275, 276
- Ceuta 3
- Chad 304
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh 62, 351, 354, 355
- Chamberlain, Joseph 41, 90
- Champion, George 231
- Chaplin, Charlie 330
- Charles X of France 88
- Chatterjee, Partha 203, 320, 321, 339, 344, 345, 351, 377, 418
- Chattopadhyaya, Bankimchandra 342
- Chattopadhyaya, Kamaladevi 362
- Chattopadhyaya, Virandranath 176, 312
- Chauri Chaura 324, 332
- Che–Lumumba Club 223
- Chen Duxiu 150
- Chiang Kai-shek 148, 151, 153, 177, 182
- Chile 20, 53, 156, 194, 195, 213
- China 3, 44, 47, 59, 92, 130, 135, 148, 149, 182–8, 213
- China–Soviet split 157, 188
- Comintern policy in 150–1, 181, 183
- Communist Party 134, 148, 150, 151, 155, 181, 184
- Cultural Revolution 8, 182–4, 186–8, 288
- Guomindang 150–1, 152, 183, 184, 188, 195
- independence movements 180
- legal and social equality 373
- Marx on 106
- nationalism 166
- revolutionary elements 100, 150–1, 157, 181
- rural–urban dichotomy 183
- self-modernization 374
- tricontinental communism 239
- Chittagong Armoury Raid (1930) 296–7, 314, 324, 362
- Choudhry, Suniti 362
- Christian ideology 370
- Churchill, Winston 180, 328
- CIA 194, 297
- civil rights movement 79, 223, 332
- civilization and ‘primitivism’ 33, 104, 420
- civilizing mission 22, 30, 31, 33, 73, 88, 89, 105, 116, 266
- Cixous, Hélène 294, 411, 414
- class 9, 132, 137, 142, 143, 286, 288
- Claudin, F. 154
- Cobden, Richard 80, 91, 95–6, 105
- Cold War 29, 59, 150, 154, 157, 180, 192, 223
- Collins, Michael 305
- Colón, Jesús 226
- colonial armies 165
- colonial discourse 18, 385–9
 - cultural and literary texts 409–10
 - Foucauldian model 407–10
 - linguistics 392–4
 - objections to 389–92, 408
 - retheorizing 392
 - revisionary model 392
 - Said’s analysis 385–9
 - textual analysis 394
- colonial inferiority mentality 65
- Colonial Reform movement 77
- Colonial Seamen’s Association 227
- colonialism 15–24, 57–8
 - colonizer–colonized relationship 19, 20, 325, 423–4
 - defining 15–19, 27
 - derogatory term 26–7
 - destructive and transformative analysis 6, 108, 109
 - divide and rule tendency 18
 - and domination 17, 19–24, 383

- economic motive 15–16, 21, 104
- exploitation colonies 17, 23, 24, 27, 32, 35, 164, 301
- gendered 356–7, 359
- geographical violence 20
- intellectual resistance 100
- internal colonialism 9, 20, 60, 79, 198, 279, 353
- liberal colonialism 92
- major forms 17
- male perspectives 360–1
- Marx on 101–9
- and modernity 5, 6
- ‘nervous condition’ 298, 327
- and population theory 22
- psychology of 274, 323–4, 325, 340, 341
- resistance to 28–9
- settler colonies 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 32, 35, 36, 92, 164, 166
- socialist condemnation of 116
- socialist style 77–8
- see also* specific countries
- colons* 19, 282–3, 299, 415
- Columbia 213, 215
- Columbus, Christopher 21
- Comintern 10, 29, 100, 127, 128–9, 130, 133, 137, 139, 143–4
- and African politics 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232
- and African–American politics 222
- and anti-colonial activities 154, 176, 177
- anti-fascist policy 152
- and anti-imperialist politics 154
- Central Asiatic Bureau 134
- and China 150–1, 181, 183
- and colonialism 153
- Fifth Congress (1924) 149–51
- First Congress (1919) 127, 128, 130, 139, 140
- Fourth Congress (1922) 145–9
- hostility towards Muslim nationalism 153
- International Women’s Secretariat 140
- and Latin America 195
- League for the Liberation of the East 149, 177
- mobilization of the peasantry 183–4
- and *realpolitik* 144, 145
- Second Congress (1920) 129–34, 135, 152, 153
- Sixth and Seventh Congresses (1928, 1935) 148, 152–5, 176, 222, 226
- theoretical and organizational achievements 154–5
- Third Congress (1921) 143–4
- United Front policy 145, 148, 151, 152, 153
- women’s organizations within 140, 143
- Comité Syndical International des Ouvriers Nègres 263
- Comité Universel de l’Institut Nègre de Paris 263–4
- Commonwealth 39
- communalism 247, 352
- communism 29, 59, 100, 106, 119, 120, 129, 133
- anti-racism 224, 264
- and colonialism 132
- marginalization of Asian and Latin American communists 152–3
- Muslim communist organizations 138–9, 146
- and nationalism 131, 147
- targets imperialism 29
- and women’s rights 140–3, 372
- Communist League of South Africa 231
- Communist University of Toilers of East (KUTVU) 154, 177, 227
- CONCP (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies) 250, 283
- Congo Free State 1, 25, 213, 214
- Congo Reform campaign 77
- Congress of the Toilers of the Far East (1922) 145
- Congress of Vienna (1815) 90
- Connolly, James 35, 95, 117, 127, 303–7
- Conrad, Joseph 1, 25, 33
- consciencism 244–5
- Constantine, Learie 222
- Corn Laws 91
- Council of African Affairs 223
- creolization 68, 393
- criminal transports 22
- Croce, Benedetto 197
- Crummell, Alexander 217, 218

- Cuba 17, 42, 44, 50, 161, 166, 169, 173,
 204–5, 207, 215–16, 219
 Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) 194
 communism 195
 legal and social equality 373
 ‘open door’ policy 288
 revolution 194, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215,
 235, 250, 361
 revolutionary socialism 210, 211
 transculturation 202
 cult of personality 291
 cultural activism 164
 cultural chauvinism 104
 cultural dependency 197, 200–3
 cultural identity 266, 285, 291, 379
 cultural and literary texts 36, 262, 409–10
 cultural nationalism 318, 378–80
 cultural politics 7–8
 cultural reconversion 288, 290
 cultural resistance 18–19, 199, 290
 cultural revolution 8
 culturalism 7, 8
 Cyprus 191
- da Gama, Vasco 21
 Dahomey 257, 258, 259, 304, 363
 Dalits 59
 Damas, Léon 266
 Dandi March (1930) 331–3
 Dangarembga, Tsitsi 298
 Danton, Georges Jacques 81
 Das, Bina 362
 David, Eduard 116
 Davis, Angela 220, 368
 Dayal, Har 312
 de Andrade, Mario 283
 de Beauvoir, Simone 170, 295, 298
 de Gaulle, Charles 241
 de Saussure, Léopold 417
 de Tocqueville, Alexis 417
 decolonization 3, 4, 9, 45, 57, 86, 89, 91,
 93, 162, 251, 281, 416
 British and French processes 391
 divide and rule policy 291
 federal decolonization 93
 political and cultural 65
 psychological effects 274
 violence 251, 281
- deconstruction 294, 416, 418, 421
 degeneration, ideology of 318–19
 degradation 293, 324, 425, 426
 denigration 261
 Denmark 3, 31
départements d’outre mer 32
 dependencies 17, 35
 dependency theory 44, 48, 50–1, 54–5, 194,
 200–3, 204, 205, 418
 Deraniyagala, Ezlynn 362
 derivative discourse 344
 Derrida, Jacques 187, 272, 293, 295, 387,
 407, 411–26
 on colonial violence 295
 critique of structuralism 420
 on totalization 416
dette de sang 254
 Deva, Narendra 310
 Development Studies 8, 56
 development theory 44–5, 49–56
 Devy, G. N. 320
 Dia, Maniadou 269
 Diagné, Blaise 217, 254, 256, 257, 258,
 264
 diaspora 2, 4, 36, 422
 Dickinson, John 104
 difference 255, 418, 422
 Dilke, Charles 35, 36–7, 94, 100
 Diop, Cheikh Anta 268, 273
 Dirlik, Arif 62
 discourse 385–9
 discursive formation 400–1, 403, 405,
 406
 enunciative modalities 403–4
 epistemological device 388
 formation of objects 403
 Foucauldian concept of 388
 Foucault and 398–410
 heterogeneity 404–6
 and knowledge 388, 399
 linguistics 392–4
 Orientalism as 388
 permeable boundaries 402
 and power 406–7
 preconceptual level 405
 regularities and constraints 405
 of the state 393
 ‘statement’ 401–3

- theory of 392
 - see also* colonial discourse
- disempowerment 62, 221, 354
- displacement 418
- Disraeli, Benjamin 34, 35, 90
- domination 15, 17, 19–24, 29, 32, 44, 55, 142, 221
- domination colonies *see* exploitation colonies
- Dominican Republic 42, 213
- dominions 17, 19, 34, 38, 94, 95, 100
- domino theory 170
- dress, politics of 327–8, 331, 377–8
- Du Bois, W. E. B. 179, 218, 220–1, 223, 235; 236, 237, 257, 264–5, 274
- ‘dual mandate’ argument 116
- Durham Report (1839) 92, 94, 96
- Duse, Muhammed 189, 220
- Dutch Antilles 3
- Dutch East Indies 17, 130, 146
- Dutch Guiana 193
- Dutt, Clements 176
- Dutt, Kalpana 362
- Dutt, R. Palme 176, 311, 356
- East India Association 95
- East India Company 23, 40, 78, 79, 80, 84, 104, 106
- East Timor 3
- ecopolitics 320
- Ecuador 195
- Egypt 29, 60, 91, 102, 148, 188–91, 243, 304
 - anti-colonialism in 136, 188–9
 - cultural nationalism 189
 - deindustrialization 189
 - feminism in 379, 381
 - independence 189
 - nationalism 166
 - self-modernization 189, 374
- Egyptian Revolution (1952) 175
- Einstein, Albert 176
- El Salvador 46, 215
- Elgin Marbles 3
- Eliot, T. S. 119
- ELN 215
- emerging markets 53–4
- Emmanuel, Arghiri 111
- Engels, Friedrich 9, 104, 305
 - and nationalism 106–7, 119, 120, 121
 - The Communist Manifesto* 102, 106, 119–20, 121
- Enlightenment 30, 89
- environmentalism 320
- EOKA 191
- epistemology of the postcolonial subject 212
- equality and human rights discourse 7, 76, 80–1, 86
- Eritrea 162, 363
- Ethiopia 4, 162, 233–4, 247, 296
- ethnic nationalisms 59, 118, 121
- ethnocentrism 65, 122, 390
- Étoile Nord-Africaine 256, 260, 263, 265
- eurocentrism 45, 56, 65, 168, 351, 352, 390, 395–6, 397, 416
- evangelism 47, 90
- exploitation colonies 17, 23, 24, 27, 32, 35, 164, 301
- extermination of indigenous peoples 20, 24, 75, 76, 79
- Eyre, Edward John 40
- Falklands/Malvinas 3
- Fanon, Frantz 8, 18, 30, 66, 68, 178, 185, 188, 194, 196, 221, 225, 235, 253, 274–83, 285, 351, 414
 - and Algeria 277–80
 - and anti-colonial nationalism 344
- biography 275
- class dynamics 279
- on colonial violence 295–6, 297–8, 302, 343, 415
- and colonialism’s nervous condition 327
- engagement with Marxism 278
- and Francophone African political thought 276–7
- Hegelian dialectic of native and settler 343
- and nationalism 278
- and Pan-Africanism 276
- political radicalism 255
- psychopathology of colonialism 276, 340, 341
- racial analysis 278–9
- and resistance to modernity 345

- The Wretched of the Earth* 249, 269, 270, 278, 280, 281, 283, 285, 298, 422–3
 and veiling/unveiling 378
 and violence 250, 280–3
- Farouk, King 189
- Farrakhan, Louis 220
- fascism 2, 3, 129, 152, 340, 415
- Faure, Emile 259, 260, 263
- Fawcett, Henry 80, 95
- federalism 35–6, 120, 121, 122, 123
- feminism
 and anti-colonial nationalism 357, 361
 black women 369
 bourgeois feminism 372
 eurocentrism 377
 Gandhi and 322, 326, 327, 376
 Indian feminism 327, 370, 375, 376–7
 lower-class women 375
 and modernity 375–9
 and national liberation movements 371, 372
 and nationalism 378–80
 and patriarchy 360, 369, 370, 379, 382
 post-independence politics 380–2
 postcolonial feminism 377, 381
 relation to the freedom struggles 369–72
 response to women's absence from colonial histories 360–1
 socialist feminism 372–4
 tricontinental feminism 381
- feminization of the colonial subject 326, 327
- Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain 21
- Fergusson, William 217
- Fernando Po 42
- feudal and semi-feudal societies 147, 148, 149, 279, 284
- Fiji 77
- Finland 122, 124
- First Congress of the Peoples of the East 135
- First International 107, 115–17
- First International Working Women's Congress 140–1
- First World War 10, 132, 219
 and increase in nationalist unrest 100
 product of imperialism 31, 117, 132
 recruitment of colonial soldiers 10, 219, 254, 256, 260, 262
- FLN 164, 191, 276, 277–8, 280, 298, 300, 362, 429
- Florida 3
- FMLN 215
- Ford, James W. 226
- foreign aid 47, 53
- Forgacs, David 167
- Foucault, Michel 384, 385
 Discipline and Punish 385, 386, 387
 dispute with Sartre 397
 and ethnology 396–7
 eurocentrism 395–6, 397
 History of Sexuality 403, 406, 407
 Madness and Civilization 395, 397, 398, 407
 and the Other 397–8
 positivity 386–7
 spatial and geographical metaphors 395
 The Archaeology of Knowledge 385, 386, 388, 394, 396, 397, 399, 400, 401, 403, 410
 The Order of Things 396, 397, 398
 theory of discourse 398–410
 in Tunisia 396, 397
- Fourth International 155–7
- Fourth International Organization of South Africa 231
- 'fourth world' politics 59
- Fox, Charles 78
- France 9, 135, 165
 and Algeria *see* Algeria
 anti-colonialism 76, 255–7
 Communist Party 129, 256, 419
 decolonization 3
 départements d'outre mer 32
 French Revolution 80–1
 imperialism 26, 29–30, 31, 32, 117, 136
 International Colonial Exhibition (1931) 43
 and liberation movements 180
 see also French colonialism
- Franco-Maghrebians 419, 424
- Franco-Prussian War (1870) 90, 91
- Francophone Africa 253–73
- Frankfurt School 7, 351

- free trade 23, 35, 39, 80, 82, 84, 89, 91, 92, 99, 104
 free-market economics 84
 FRELIMO 162, 164, 300, 373
 French colonialism 2, 18, 22, 23, 80–1, 86, 88–9, 241
 assimilation doctrine 17, 30, 32, 33, 34, 81, 164, 254, 264, 284, 299, 417
 between the wars 255–7
 dette de sang 254
 Francophone Africa 253–73
 metropolitan–colonial relation 255
 mission civilisatrice 30, 31, 33, 88, 89, 105, 266
 French Equatorial Africa 253
 French Guiana 3, 193
 French West Africa 240, 253, 301
 Froude, James Anthony 36, 37, 94
 Füredi, Frank 165, 172, 179, 233–4
- Gachika, Elizabeth 366
 Galeano, Eduardo 193
 Gandhi, Indira 339
 Gandhi, Mahatma 68, 95, 96, 168, 172, 174, 178, 180, 236, 255, 256, 297, 301, 302, 308, 309, 310, 317–24, 340, 341
 ahimsa 248, 321, 323–5
 anti-elitism 352, 376
 anti-modernity 320, 327, 329, 342, 345, 346
 argues for ‘voluntary poverty’ 320–1
 in Britain 319–20, 328, 333–4
 on capital–labour relations 322–3
 Comintern condemnation of 148, 149
 cultural and epistemological pluralism 346–7, 348, 349
 and cultural nationalism 318
 Dandi March (1930) 331–3, 376
 diasporic product 317
 and feminism 322, 326, 327, 376
 gender role-playing 325, 326–7
 ideology of degeneration 318–19
 invisibility in postcolonial theory 337–8
 on militancy 249–50, 324
 and nationalism 321–2
 non-violent non-cooperation 296, 323–4, 330, 343
 performative, hybrid mode 345–6
 political career 318
 political strategies 325–31, 334
 politicization of Hinduism 325
 politics of dress 327–8, 331
 and preservation of Indian languages 319–20
 and religion 347
 and *samas* 348–9
 satyagraha 238–9, 323–4, 331, 332, 334, 343, 376
 shift away from reformism 376
 socialism 310, 339
 in South Africa 95, 318, 323
 ‘spiritualization of politics’ 337, 338
 suspends non-cooperation movement 149, 313, 321, 332
 swaraj and *swadeshi* 309, 320, 328, 338, 376
 and theosophy 319, 320
 use of technology and the media 329–31, 332–3, 345
 and working-class activism 321, 322, 353
 writings 329–31, 349
 Ganguli, Kadambini 362
 Garan Kouyaté, Tiémoho 176, 227, 236, 237, 257, 259, 260, 262, 263–5, 266
 Garvey, Amy Ashwood 233
 Garvey, Marcus 219–20, 221, 222, 225, 226, 236, 237, 258
 Garveyism 225, 256, 258, 266
 Gellner, Ernst 5
 gender 360–82
 gendering of experience 274
 identities 359
 ideology of masculinity 325–6
 narrowing of gender identity 326
 politics 142, 209, 327
 genital mutilation 380
 George V 328, 333
 Georgia 122, 124, 135, 155
 Germany 94, 129, 135, 144, 165
 anti-colonialism 178–9
 colonialism 2, 118
 communism 129, 144, 152
 imperialism 30, 31, 117
 League of Non-Native Peoples 118

- Lebensraum* 2
- Nazi anti-imperialism 179
- Ghana 45, 46, 117, 162, 164, 219, 227, 228–9, 242–6, 248, 363
- Ghana–Guinea union 241
- Ghose, Samiti 362
- Giap, Vo Nguyen 297
- Gibraltar 3, 17
- Gladstone, William 84, 90–1, 93–4, 97
- Glasgow 85
- Glissant, Edouard 255
- globalization 2, 5, 54, 105–6
- ‘glottophagie’ 393, 424
- Gobetti, Piero 197
- Gobineau, Joseph Arthur, Comte de 33
- Gool, Jaïneb 232
- Gorbachev, Mikhail 121
- Gorky, Maxim 127
- Gramsci, Antonio 45, 195, 197, 199, 311, 353, 354, 355, 387
- Grant, William 217
- Greater Britain 35, 36–41, 94
- Greenland 3
- Grenada 49
- Griffith, Arthur 97, 306
- Group of 77 192
- Guadeloupe 32
- Guam 17, 42
- Guantánamo 17
- Guatemala 213, 215
- guerrilla warfare 154–5, 196–7, 214, 215, 251, 305
- Guevara, Ernesto Che 170, 175, 182, 185, 188, 196, 200, 204–15, 288, 328, 381
- Guha, Ranajit 62, 308, 322, 352, 354, 355, 356, 407
- Guinea 42, 213, 241, 243
- Guinea-Bissau 162, 214, 250, 251, 283, 284, 285, 286, 291, 363, 381
- Gumede, J. T. 176, 231
- Guomindang 150–1, 152, 183, 184, 188, 195
- Gupta, Akhil 56
- gypsies 59
- Hadj, Messali 176, 256, 277, 420
- Haggard, Rider 36
- Haiti 81, 161
- Halim, Abdul 314
- Hall, Stuart 62, 225, 281
- Hanum, Najiye 141–2
- Harbi, Mohammed 277, 278
- Hardie, James Keir 98
- Harris, Wilson 68
- Harrison, Hubert 226
- Hastings, Warren 78
- Hatta, Mohammed 176
- Hawaii 3, 17, 42
- Hayford, Caseley 218
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 108
- Hereros 116
- Hilferding, Rudolf 99
- Hindu Conspiracy Case (1917) 131
- Hindu nationalism 163, 345
- history
- colonial history 4
 - colonial negation of 288
 - counter-histories 357, 398
 - culture as product of 289
 - gendered values 358–9
 - subaltern perspectives 358, 390, 398
 - textual nature 390
- Hitler, Adolf 152
- Ho Chi Minh 30, 68, 150, 156, 166, 176, 180, 182, 255, 256, 260, 297
- Hobsbawm, E. J. 306
- Hobson, V. J. A. 80, 85, 98–100
- Hodgkin, Thomas 77
- Holy Roman empire 16
- Honduras 193
- Hong Kong 17, 301
- hooks, bell 377
- Hortus, James Africanus 217
- Houénou, Tovalou 3, 257, 258–9, 265, 266
- Huchard, Louis 217
- Hughes, Langston 222
- Hugo, Victor 88
- humanism 185, 267, 270–1, 280
- Hume, David 85
- Hungary vii, 129, 139, 161
- hunger strikes 302, 323
- Hunkanrin, Louis 259
- Hunton, Alphaeus 223
- hybridity 201, 202, 341, 345–7
- cultural hybridity 346, 349

- as form and strategy 345–7
 - linguistic hybridity 348–9
 - samas* and 348–9
- Hyndman, H. M. 96, 116
- identity 291, 418
- Ifni 42
- Il-song Kim 182
- imperialism 9, 10, 25–43, 58, 290
 - 19th and 20th century imperial powers 31
 - and capitalism 27–8
 - characteristics 17, 27
 - civilizing claims 1, 98–9, 105
 - and colonialism contrasted 16–17, 25, 27, 74
 - costs of 99
 - cult of masculinity 325–6
 - cultural and educational imperialism 22, 30, 40, 47, 89
 - defining 15–19, 26
 - desire for knowledge of other cultures 290
 - Dual Mandate 40
 - economic and ethical critique of 98–9
 - economic imperialism 26, 27, 41, 47, 59, 91, 104, 131
 - empire as brotherhood 94
 - extended nationalism 93
 - federation model 35, 84, 85, 94
 - ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ imperialism 41
 - gendering of 341
 - and global power politics 28
 - heterogeneity 74
 - ideologies 16, 17, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32
 - jingostic imperialism 37, 42, 98
 - liberal imperialism 84
 - major forms 17
 - Marxist analysis 99, 109–12
 - ‘new’ imperialism 41, 98
 - object 31
 - racialized ideology of empire 37
 - rival powers 31
 - target of anti-colonial struggle 29
 - unequal dialectic of centre and periphery 111
 - see also* specific countries
- indentured labourers 20
- India 9, 17, 19, 24, 28, 52, 54, 59, 80, 95–6, 102, 108, 128, 130, 134, 135, 161, 179, 308–51
 - All India Trade Union Congress 322
 - anti-colonialism 95–6, 164
 - British India 17, 21, 24, 38, 40, 86, 95–6, 108, 116, 380
 - caste 4, 320–1
 - Civil Disobedience campaign 362, 376
 - class struggle 9
 - colonial impact 60
 - communism in 132, 147, 148, 152, 168, 309
 - Communist Party of India (CPI) 308, 309, 311, 313, 314–15, 316
 - Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) 311
 - Congress Party 96, 131, 168, 172, 324, 350, 376–7
 - Congress Socialist Party (CSP) 309, 310, 311, 314, 315
 - denotified tribes 4
 - economic nationalism 309–10
 - Emergency (1975–7) 339, 350
 - ethnic nationalisms 59
 - feminism 327, 370, 375, 376–7
 - Home Rule demands 39, 40, 115–16
 - Home Rule League 94, 131, 301, 312, 322
 - independence 3, 96, 97, 162, 325
 - independence movements 168, 308
 - Indian Marxism 109, 309, 310–16, 317, 341, 350, 351, 355, 356
 - Indian National Congress 96, 131, 152, 301, 308, 309, 342
 - Indian–Irish nationalist links 313, 318
 - Indocentrism of intellectual life 351
 - and Kashmiri independence 3
 - Khilafat movement 134, 308, 309, 321
 - Marx on 104, 106, 108
 - Marxist–Gandhian alliance 350
 - Muslim League 308, 309, 321, 325
 - ‘Mutiny’ (1857) 35, 38, 91, 95, 161, 165
 - nationalism 38, 96, 100, 166, 172, 309, 321–2
 - non-violent non-cooperation 96, 149, 308
 - partition 297, 321, 325, 352

- politics of violence 296–7, 325
- postcolonialism 339–40, 349–51
- Quit India movement 152, 315, 324, 362
- revolutionary bases abroad 312–13
- self-modernization 375
- socialism 309–10
- strikes and civil disobedience 315
- subalternity 352–6
- supports British war effort 315
- terrorism 312, 324, 326, 362
- Trotskyist and Maoist groups 315, 356
- women activists 362
- Indian Liberation Army 179
- Indian Revolutionary Association 134–5, 312
- indigenismo* movement 199, 200
- indigenous culture 20, 24, 374
- Indochina 30, 32, 88, 128, 181, 297, 304
- Indonesia 3, 156, 179
- Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa (ICU) 230–1
- interdependency theory 215–16
- International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA) 233
- International African Service Bureau (IASB) 234, 237
- international capital, and global autonomy 45–6, 47–8
- International Conference of Socialist Women (1915) 140
- international division of labour 46, 47
- International Finance Corporation 53
- International Labour Defence 176
- International Monetary Fund 46, 47, 48
- International of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISHW) 227
- International Socialist League (ISL) 230
- International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUC–NW) 226
- International Working Men's Association 115
- internationalism 2, 61, 106, 107, 120, 166, 305
- internationalist socialism 117
- Ionian Islands 90
- IRA 179
- Iran 100, 116, 117, 129, 130, 135, 136, 153, 175, 371
- anti-colonialism in 136
- feminism in 371, 379
- Iraq 49, 59, 136, 148, 190, 293
- Ireland 16, 52, 60, 92, 96–8, 102, 108, 115, 130, 296, 299–307
- anti-colonial struggle 302
- cultural politics 7
- dominion status 34
- Easter Rising (1916) 25, 97, 118, 303–7
- Gaelic revival 7
- heroic martyrdom tradition 302
- Home Rule 39–40, 96–8, 301, 304
- Indian–Irish nationalist links 97, 313, 318
- insurrections 128, 161
- nationalism 100, 106–7, 120, 166, 302, 305–6
- partition 97
- passive resistance 302
- Penal Laws 80
- politics of violence 296, 299–301, 302, 303
- and postcolonial theory 301–2
- socialism 307
- Ulster Defence Force 301
- underdevelopment 103
- women in 305
- Irish Free State 39, 97
- Irish Socialist Republican Party 127
- Islam 129, 137, 146–7, 173
- Islamic nationalism 163, 173
- Israel 3, 190
- Italy 3, 31, 117, 129, 155, 353
- Ivory Coast 253, 304
- Jamaica 52
- James, C. L. R. 155, 156, 217, 220, 223, 224–5, 228, 232, 233, 234, 235
- on Nyerere 247
- The Black Jacobins* 224, 234
- James, Winston 225–6
- Japan 4, 6, 59, 92, 99–100, 129, 135, 162, 165
- anti-colonialism 178, 179
- colonialism 3, 52
- Communist Party 150
- imperialism 31, 117
- nationalism 179

- self-modernization 374
- Java 146, 163
- Jayawardena, Kumari 374, 375
- jingoism 37, 42, 98
- Jinnah, M. A. 168, 321, 322, 325
- Johnson, George W. 217
- Johnson, Samuel 217
- Jones, Ernest 95
- Jones, Leroi 223
- Joshi, P. C. 313
- Kabul 312
- Kadalie, Clements 231, 236
- 'Kaffir' wars 161
- Kartini, Raden Adjeng 362
- Kashmir 3, 59
- Kaunda, Kenneth 247, 271, 297
 - abandons non-violent resistance 250, 251, 297
 - on Gandhi 297
 - on using the media 330–1
- Kautsky, Karl Johann 109, 110–11, 115, 116, 120
- Kemal, Mustafa 142, 144, 153
- Kennedy, Robert 62
- Kenya 20, 49, 162, 164, 166, 173, 179, 191, 280, 304, 363, 365–6
- Kenyatta, Jomo 68, 176, 178, 220, 221, 227, 230, 233, 234, 380
- Khaile, E. H. 231
- Khaled, Leila 362
- Khan, Abdur Rezzak 314
- Khartoum Conference (1968) 250
- Khilafat movement 134, 166, 308, 309, 321
- Khiva 135, 136
- Khrishnvarma, Shyamaji 312
- Khumalo, Rhoda 364
- Kies, Ben 232
- King, Martin Luther 332
- Kipling, Rudyard 36, 345
- knowledge 63–6
 - academic knowledge 8, 387
 - counter-knowledge 339
 - culturalization of 8
 - displacement of western knowledge 65
 - experiential forms 271
 - knowledge-formation 19, 384
 - mediated by discourse 388, 399
 - power/knowledge structure 387, 388
- Kollontai, Aleksandra 140
- Korea 52, 130, 135, 149
- Korean War (1950–3) 180, 183
- Kosovo 78
- Kriplani, Sucheta 362
- Kristeva, Julia 187
- Kún, Bela 129, 152
- Kurds 4, 59
- Kuwait 190
- La Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre (CDRN) 259, 260–1
- La Guma, J. A. 176, 231
- La Race nègre* 264, 266, 267, 269
- Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis de 88
- language 67–9, 424
 - Creole 393
 - double language situation 48, 393, 424
 - nationalism as a 172, 173
 - Pidgin 393
 - politics of 320
 - of postcolonial theory 67–9
 - preservation of 319–20
 - privileged language 138, 393
 - problematics of 383
 - see also* discourse, translation
- Laos 213
- Las Casas, Bartolomé de 75–6
- Latin America 24, 188, 193–216
 - alliance of intellectuals and peasantry 197
 - anarchist doctrines 195
 - Balkanization 199
 - bourgeois revolutions 194
 - communism in 152, 155, 156, 195
 - criollos* 194, 198
 - dependency theory 48, 194, 200–3, 204
 - feudalism and modernity 194, 196, 201
 - history of resistance 193
 - hybridity 202
 - independence movements 193
 - 'Indian problem' 198, 207
 - indigenismo* movement 199, 200
 - liberation theology 76, 215
 - Marxism in 195–6, 199, 203

- neocolonialism 194
- peasant revolutions 194, 196–7
- radicalism and revolutionary movements 197, 201
- socialism 198–9, 215
- US imperialism 194, 212
- see also* specific countries
- Laurenço Marques 284
- Le Bon, Gustave 33
- League Against Imperialism and for Colonial Independence 96, 100, 116, 176–7, 233, 260
- League for the Liberation of the East 149, 177
- League of Nations 118, 221
- League of Struggle for Negro Rights 222
- Lebanon 30
- Lenin, V. I. 2, 7, 22, 61, 90, 100, 106, 109, 118, 119, 121, 129–30, 139
 - and black American communist activity 222
 - and colonialism 116–17, 127, 132
 - doctrinal flexibility 139
 - eastern orientation 7, 129, 131, 149, 241
 - and federation 123
 - and imperialism 110, 111, 124–5
 - and the Indian Revolutionary Association 134–5
 - on the Irish Easter Rebellion 306
 - on Islamic nationalism 138, 146
 - and liberation movements 132, 133
 - on Marxism 167
 - on nationalism 121, 122, 125, 127
 - on *Ordine Nuovo* 197
 - on the peasantry 183–4
 - and the Second Comintern Congress 129–30, 131, 132, 133, 134, 139, 146
 - on self-determination 121, 123, 125, 127
 - United Front policy 145
 - and world revolution 150
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude 420, 421
- liberalism 88–100
- liberation theology 76, 215
- Liberia 218, 219
- Libya 49, 162, 179, 190, 304
- Lienhard, Martin 202
- Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre (LDRN) 263–5
- Ligue Universelle de Défense de la Race Noire (LDRN) 258, 261
- liminality 345, 346
- literature, colonial 36, 262, 409
- Little Red Book 187
- Lloyd George, David 319, 334
- Locke, Alain 227
- Lohia, Ram Manohar 310
- Long March (1934–5) 161, 181, 183
- Louisiana Purchase 3
- Lucas, C. P. 35, 94, 96–7
- Luxemburg, Rosa 10, 109, 115, 117, 120, 125
- Lyotard, Jean-François 299, 414, 419
- Macaulay, Herbert 217, 227, 228
- Macaulay, Thomas 38, 80
- MacBride, Major John 95, 318
- McCulloch, John Ramsay 91
- MacDonald, Ramsay 98
- McKay, Claude 226
- McKinley, William 42
- Madagascar 128, 162
- Maghreb 30, 68, 189, 229, 294, 425
- Mahdi* movements 163
- Makonnen, T. R. 234
- Malacca 17
- Malaka, Tan 146, 147, 149, 156, 174
- Malaysia 47, 179, 180
- Malcolm X 220, 280
- Mali 241, 243, 253, 257
- Malta 17
- Malthus, Thomas 22
- Manchester School 74, 84, 91
- Manchuria 179
- Mandela, Nelson 232, 246, 249, 250, 251–2
- Mannoni, Octave 340
- Mao Zedong 7, 134, 137, 151, 157, 173, 175, 181, 182–8, 242, 279
 - on power and worth of the peasantry 184, 185, 186
 - revision of orthodox Marxism 184–6, 187
- Maoism 156, 187, 200, 311, 350, 354, 356, 396
- Maori wars (1860–72) 161
- Maoris 20, 60, 91
- Maran, René 258

- march, strategy of the 332
- March on Washington Movement 222, 332
- marginality 361, 422
- marginalization 321, 352, 354
- Mariátegui, José Carlos 136, 168, 195–6, 197–201, 207, 293, 372
- maritime enclaves 17
- Marranos 425
- Martí, José 207, 209, 210
- Martinique 3, 32, 254, 255, 275
- Marx, Karl 9, 24, 89, 92, 278
 - and alienation 271
 - Capital* 278
 - on colonialism and imperialism 29, 73, 74, 77, 82, 101–12
 - on the Indian ‘Mutiny’ 165
 - on Ireland 92, 106–7, 120, 306
 - and nationalism 106–7, 119, 120, 121
 - The Communist Manifesto* 102, 106, 119–20, 121, 212
- Marxism 6–7, 64, 67
 - Abdel-Malek on 170–4
 - African Marxism 271
 - anti-colonial Marxism 167–8, 169, 174
 - Che Geuvara on 208
 - and dependency theory 51
 - eurocentrism 168, 352
 - existential Marxism 67, 68
 - hybridization 167–8
 - identification with modernity 341–2
 - Indian Marxism 109, 309, 311–16, 317, 341, 350, 351, 355, 356
 - in Latin America 195–6, 199, 203
 - Lenin on 167
 - Mao’s revision of 184–6, 187
 - and the national liberation movements 167–81
 - and nationalism 119, 120, 169, 171
 - postcolonial Marxism 7, 10, 58–9, 60, 168
 - tricontinental Marxism 150, 169, 170, 171, 176, 188, 278, 279, 302, 305, 311, 341, 353–4
- Marxism–Leninism 243–4, 272, 280
- masculinity, ideology of 28, 325–6, 328
- Mau Mau 161, 162, 173, 191, 230, 248, 300, 366
- Mauritania 162
- Mauritius 17
- Mazrui, Ali A. 62
- Mazzini, Giuseppe 119, 229
- M’Balía, Camara 369
- media revolution 330
- Mehta, Sharda 376
- Mehta, Usha 362
- Mekatalili 365
- Melanesia 94
- Melilla 3
- Mella, Julio Antonio 195, 196
- Memmi, Albert 295, 340, 414, 423
- messianic movements 163, 229
- Mexico 116, 130, 131, 156, 196–7, 215
 - communism 131, 195
 - indigenismo* movement 199
 - land reform 196
 - peasant rebellion 196–7
 - Zapatistas 196, 215
- Micronesia 94
- Midway Islands 42
- migration/migrants 2, 4, 9, 61
- Mill, James 85
- Mill, John Stuart 39, 41, 80, 86–7, 92
- mimicry 68
- Miquelon 3
- mission civilisatrice* 30, 31, 33, 88, 89, 105, 266
- missionaries 24, 77
- modernity 75, 105, 109, 374–8
 - anti-modernity 320, 378
 - colonial modernity 194, 345, 350, 371–2, 374, 383
 - counter-modernity 345, 383
 - feminism and 374–8
 - Marxist identification with 341–2
 - nationalism and 344
 - postcolonial modernity 418
 - resistance to 345
 - ‘second form of colonization’ 342
 - self-modernization 374–5
- Mondlane, Eduardo 373
- monetarism 53
- Monroe Doctrine 39, 50, 194
- Montoneros 215
- Moore, R. B. 176
- Morant Bay uprising (1865) 40, 91, 161

- Morel, E. D. 1, 25, 77, 116
- Morocco 42, 149, 153, 243
- Morris, William 98, 310
- Mouvement pour la Triomphe des Libertés
Démocratiques (MTLD) 277
- Movement of Non-Aligned Countries 157,
191–2, 239
- Movimento Anti-Colonista 283
- Mozambique 162, 166, 188, 240, 247, 251,
284, 304, 363
- MPLA (Popular Movement for the National
Liberation of Angola) 162, 213, 251,
283, 300
- Mtwana, Ida 367
- Mudimbe, V. Y. 62, 217, 246, 268, 281–2
- Muhammed, Elijah 220
- Mundondo, Tainie 373
- Münzenberg, Willi 176
- Musburo 138
- Muslim Brotherhood 190
- Mussolini, Benito 233
- Muthoni, Mboni 366
- Muzaffar, Hanafi 175
- NAACP 221, 223, 260
- Nagy, Imre vii
- Naidu, Sarojini 328, 362, 376
- Nair, Sir Chettur Sankaran 324
- Namibia 162, 214, 250, 251, 363
- Nandy, Ashis 320, 325, 339–43, 349
on countering colonialism 343–4
cultural hybridity 347
on derivative discourse 344
on Gandhi's strategies 339, 342, 346
and ideology of masculinity 326
on Indian postcolonialism 339–40
Intimate Enemy 339, 340, 341
on liminality 345, 346
on psychology of colonialism 340–1
- Naoroji, Dadabhai 115
- Napoleon Bonaparte III 30, 41, 88, 89
- Narayan, Jayaprakash 309, 310
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel 59, 188, 189–91
- Natal 161–2
- nation-states 28, 46, 59
- National Congress of British West Africa
100
- national liberation 285, 286, 291
cultural–historical dimension 289
and independence distinguished 287
internal and external dimensions 286
object of 289
relation of socialism to 286
two stages 287
- national liberation armies 164
- national liberation movements 9, 28, 48, 60,
61, 62, 65, 81, 98, 128, 130, 156,
161–81, 163
- Abdel-Malek on 170–4
- aftermath 371
- bourgeois 131, 133, 149, 286, 287
- constitutional moves towards
decolonization 163
- first stage towards socialism 145, 153
- guerrilla warfare 163
- heterogeneity 174
- identification with nationalism 157
- identification with the peasantry 183
- male perspectives 360
- Marxism and 167–81
- non-communist movements 133
- pluralist approach 134
- religious revivalism 163
- resistance to conquest 163
- women activists 357, 369
- National Negro Congress 222
- nationalism 2, 61, 93, 94, 287
anti-colonial nationalism 79, 93, 171–2,
343–4, 378, 379
anti-imperial nationalism 93
black nationalism 220, 240
bourgeois nationalism 61, 121, 122, 129,
166, 179, 287
Chatterjee on 344–5
and class conflict 137
and communism 131, 147
cultural nationalism 121, 122, 378–80
economic nationalism 309–10
elite forms 172
emancipatory nationalism 380
ethnic nationalisms 118, 121
Islamic nationalism 137–8, 153
as a language 172, 173
Lenin on 121, 122, 125
Marxist 106–7, 139
Nandy on 343–4

- nationalist internationalism 106, 107, 115
 - socialism and 117–20
 - 'third-world nationalism' 61, 172
 - women's role 360
- native Americans 3, 4, 79
- Naxalbari peasant revolt (1967) 350
- négritude* movement 166, 218, 237, 258, 261–2, 265–9
 - criticisms of 265, 267
 - political agenda 266
 - Sartre on 265–6
- Negro Welfare Association of British West Africa 227
- Nehanda, Mbuya 363
- Nehru, Jawaharlal 59, 168, 176, 177, 188, 191, 309–10, 339–40, 348
 - on Gandhi 309, 349
 - socialist secularism 168, 309–10, 339, 376
 - and women's issues 376
- neocolonialism 7, 11, 42, 44–56, 58, 194, 246, 288
 - continuation of colonial rule 47
 - cultural neocolonialism 48
 - dependency theory 48, 50–1
 - economic neocolonialism 45, 48
 - last stage of imperialism 46–9
 - military neocolonialism 48
 - neocolonial elite 45, 48
 - resistance and cultural assertion 48, 49
 - socialist solution 287
- neoliberalism 53
- Netherlands 2, 3, 31, 76, 117, 135, 180
- Neto, António Agostinho 283, 284
- New Caledonia 17
- New Guinea 39
- New International Economic Order 192
- New Social Movements 55
- New Zealand 3, 4, 17, 19, 20, 23, 31, 39, 60, 79, 91, 95, 97, 163
- newspaper and print culture 162, 229, 329–30
- Newton, Huey P. 220, 223
- Ngugi, wa Thiong'o 48, 65
- Nicaragua 42, 46
- Nigeria 17, 45, 59, 63, 162, 179, 218, 227–8, 304
- Nivedita, Sister 97, 376
- Nkrumah, Kwame 44, 45, 46–7, 48, 50, 52, 68, 178, 190, 191, 218, 219, 221, 225, 228, 235, 242–6, 280
 - abandons non-violent resistance 250, 297
 - on African socialism 244–6
 - Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization* 244–5, 246, 270
 - cult of personality 291
 - on decolonization 291
 - Ghana–Guinea union 241
 - Manchester Pan-African Congress (1945) 238–9
 - Marxism–Leninism 243–4
 - on nationalism 240
 - and neocolonialism 50, 52
 - Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* 46–7
 - on non-violent resistance 248, 249, 297, 308
 - and Pan-Africanism 242–6
 - political success 228–9
 - theoretical legacy 246
 - Towards Colonial Freedom* 228, 246
 - on women activists 363
- noble savage theme 76
- Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) 232
- non-violence 250, 251–2, 343
 - anti-colonial strategy 297
 - Gandhi's ideology of 296, 323–4, 330, 343
 - western colonial concept 343
- North America 16, 17, 19, 78, 79, 82
 - see also* United States
- Northern Ireland 4
- north–south divisions 9, 51, 54
- Nurse, Malcolm *see* Padmore, George
- Nyanjiru, Mary Muthoni 365–6
- Nyasaland 304
- Nyerere, Julius 68, 246–8, 251, 269, 271, 372
- O'Brien, William 313
- O'Casey, Sean 306
- Oceania 32
- O'Connell, Daniel 296
- O'Malley, Ernie 302
- opium trade 106

- Opium Wars (1839–42) 92
Ordine Nuovo 197
 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 8, 243
 Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America 5, 213
 Orientalism 319, 378, 383–4, 385–6, 387–9, 391, 392, 398, 399–400, 401, 403
 Ortiz, Fernando 169, 201–2, 267
 Other 271, 272, 397–8, 415, 418
 marginalized otherness 202
 Ottoman empire 16
 Oussedik, Omar 277
- Padmore, George 7, 39, 156, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226–7, 232–3, 235, 236–7, 243, 244
 on African socialism 239, 241–2, 269
 expelled from Comintern 264
 and Garan Kouyaté 263, 265
 Manchester Pan-African Congress (1945) 238–9
 Pan-Africanism or Communism? 246
 Pan-Africanism defined by 236
- PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) 162, 283, 300, 381
- Paine, Thomas, *Rights of Man* 86
- Pakistan 3, 164, 166, 322
- Palestine 3, 136, 153, 251, 362
- Palmerston, Lord 90
- Pan-African Association 218
- Pan-African Congress 218, 220, 221, 225, 235, 237, 238–9, 248, 251, 368
- Pan-African Federation 234
- Pan-Africanism 166, 190, 217, 218, 221, 225, 233, 235, 236–52, 253
 absence of female narrative 368–9
 association with *négritude* 237
 economic policy 236
 Fanon and 276
 first articulated 236
 ideology 237, 238
 international independency of states 270
 new policy of reciprocal violence 249, 250
 Nkrumah and 242–6
 non-violent positive action 238–9, 248–9
 political tactics 238–9
 renamed Revolutionary Pan-Africanism 251
 socialism 236, 239–43
 pan-Arabism 166, 190–1
 pan-Islamism 138, 146, 166, 175, 190, 308
 Pan-Russian Muslim Congress (1917) 138
 Panama 42
 Panama Canal 42
 Pankhurst, Sylvia 140, 378
 Papua New Guinea 94
 Paranjape, Makarand 320
 Parekh, Bikhu 346–7
 Parnell, Charles 96, 296
 paternalism 37, 40
 patriarchy 360, 369, 370, 378, 379, 382
 Payne Jackson, John 217
 Peace Corps 47
 peasant insurgency 166, 194, 196–7, 352–3, 354, 357–8
 peasantry 157, 182, 183–4, 185, 186, 194, 277, 279, 285, 321, 322, 352, 353
 Pereira, Carmen 369
 Pereira, Francisca 381
 Persia 102
 Peru 20, 194, 197–9, 213, 215
 communism 195
 domestic colonialism 199
 Indian ‘problem’ 198
 indigenismo movement 199
 internal colonialism 198
 Peruvian society 197–8
 revolutionary tradition 198
- Petit, Mithiben 376
- petty bourgeoisie 287–8
- Philippines 17, 42, 180, 357
- Pidgiguiti massacre (1959) 249
- Pitt, William (Pitt the Younger) 90
- Pizer, Dorothy 233
- Plaatje, Sol T. 95, 220–1
- plantation economies 20, 24, 81, 83
- Platt Amendment 215
- Plekhanov, G. V. 306
- PLO 362
- Poland 115, 120, 122, 129, 143, 166
- political suffrage 141
- politics of theory 11
- Polynesia 30

- Polynesian Islands 94
 Ponce, Aníbal 195
 population theory, and colonialism 22
 Porter, Bernard 74
 Portugal
 colonialism 3, 283–4
 communism 155
 imperialism 16, 31, 117
 and liberation movements 180
 Portuguese East Africa 218
 Portuguese Guinea 249
 positivity 386–7, 403
 Post-Development Studies 320
 Post-Development Theory 55
 post-independence 60, 291–2
 postcolonial critique 4, 6–8, 19, 27, 166, 270, 355
 concerns 66, 69, 81
 critique of Said 384–5
 diasporic production 318, 350
 focus, object and assumptions 11
 heterogeneity and fluidity 68, 69
 historical retrieval 66
 hostility towards 65
 institutional origins 62, 63, 64
 language and terminology 67–9
 linguistics 393
 and Marxism 6–7, 10, 67, 168
 naming 63
 nationalist criticism of 62
 political and moral consensus 5
 postcolonial Marxism 58–9, 60, 67
 shared methodologies and theories 64, 65
 tensions in 166
 theoretical base 18
 in the western academy 63, 65
 postcolonial feminism 377, 381
 postcolonial studies 63
 double focus 341
 material–spiritual divide 338
 secularism 338
 postcolonialism 2, 5, 15, 27, 57–69, 271
 object of 287
 postcolonial states 58–9
 situating 57–8, 60
 postcoloniality 57
 postmodernism 347
 poststructuralism 67, 68, 187, 271, 347, 351, 383, 412, 413, 415
 power 354, 386
 and discourse 406–7
 dominance/subversion paradigm 173, 407
 power/knowledge structure 387, 388
 and resistance 407
 Prakash, Gyan 354, 355
 Pratap, Mahendra 312
 Price-Mars, Jean 266
 ‘primitive logic’ 420, 421
 prophetism 163
 protectorates 42, 94
 protest songs 358
 protest–migration 166
 psychoanalysis 341, 343, 351
 Puerto Rico 3, 17, 42
 Putumayo Indians 1

 Quebec Act, 1774 78

 race
 and class 261, 278–9
 and colonialism/imperialism 37, 90, 243, 251
 cultural ideology of 33
 French discourse of 261
 paternalistic racial hierarchy 37
 racial difference 33
 racial theories 326
 racism 4, 62, 149, 261
 Radek, Karl 129, 144, 145, 148, 150, 152
 Rai, Lala Lajpat 131, 312
 Raleigh, Sir Walter 21
 Rama, Angel 202, 417
 Ramabai, Pandita 362, 370, 375
 Rana, S. R. 312
 Rassemblement Coloniale 263, 265
 Red Army 129, 130, 136, 144, 157
 Reed, John 142, 222
 Reindorf, C. C. 217
 religious communalism 168
 religious revivalism 163–4
 representation 19, 388, 390–1, 399, 406, 408
 repression 407, 415
 resistance 355

- cultural resistance 18–19, 90, 199
 objectives 356
 psychology of 340–1, 342, 343, 344, 355
 Retamar, Roberto 210
 Réunion 3
 revolution
 commodification of 169, 302
 social and cultural aspects 286
 revolutionary consciousness 288, 357
 Reybaud, Louis 89
 Rhodes, Cecil 22, 35, 38, 39, 90, 94
 Rhodesia 20, 34, 164, 250, 280, 297
 see also Zimbabwe
 Rif Revolt 147, 162
 Rio de Oro 42
 Robeson, Paul 222, 223, 225
 Robespierre, Maximilien 81
 Robinson, Cedric 225
 Rodney, Walter 51
 Roman empire 15–16, 33
 Romanticism 81, 89
 Roosevelt, F. D. 180
 Roosevelt, Theodore 42
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 76
 Roy, M. N. 106, 109, 125, 134, 144, 145, 147–8, 149, 151, 153, 174, 195, 262, 312, 313
 at the Second Congress 131–2, 134
 on bourgeois liberation movements 131, 133
 in China 151, 313
 on class 286
 and the Communist Party of India 313
 and the Indian Revolutionary Association 134–5
 on revolution in the East 132
 Roy, Rammohun 86, 342, 375, 380
 RSFSR 123
 Rushdie, Salman 349
 Ruskin, John 310, 320, 329
 Russia 59, 99–100, 165
 chauvinism and ethnocentrism 122
 colonialism 118, 122
 imperialism 31, 37, 120
 Islamic Russia 138
 Russian revolution (1905) 116
 Russification programme 121
 see also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 Russo-Japanese war (1905) 99–100, 116
 Rwanda 218
 Said, Edward W. 18, 20, 62, 74, 319, 383–94
 colonial discourse 383–94
 discourse and power 385–9
 Orientalism 63, 74, 383–4, 385–6, 387–9, 391, 392, 398, 399–400, 401, 403
 St Pierre 3
 Sajous, Leo 263, 265
 Saklatvala, Shapurji 96, 312
samas 348–9
 Samoa 3, 42
 Sánchez, Celia 361
 Sankara, Thomas 286
 Sarbah, John Mensah 217
 Sarhaoui Democratic Arab Republic 3
 Saro-Wiwa, Ken 46
 Sartre, Jean-Paul 8, 18, 210, 270, 273, 278, 298, 351, 415, 416, 419
 on Algeria 282, 294
 on colonial violence 282, 294, 295, 296, 415
 dispute with Foucault 397
 engagement with colonialism 281–3
 existential Marxism 270, 282, 415
 on Fanon 281
 on *négritude* 265–6
 ‘Third World’ issues 282
 on the use of French by Francophone activists 268, 420
sati-daha 380
 Satthianadhan, Krupabai 370
satyagraha 180, 238–9, 248, 250, 323–4, 327, 331, 332, 334, 343, 376
 Savage, Akiwande 218
 Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar 312, 324, 326, 338
 Schuyler, George S. 222
 Schwarz, Roberto 202–3
 Scotland 80, 85, 166, 300, 301
 Seale, Bobby 220
 Second Declaration of Havana 169, 215, 285

- Second International 77–8, 105, 107, 109, 115–17, 127
 Second International Conference of Communist Women 142
 Second World War 44, 117, 162, 181, 296, 315
 Seeley, John Robert 23, 34, 36, 37, 38, 94, 326
 self-determination 45, 81, 115, 117, 120, 121, 123, 125, 128, 221, 374
 self-empowerment 62, 221, 275
 self-government 39–40, 60, 92, 94, 100
 Sen, Bhowani 311
 Sen, Surjya 296–7, 324
 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 200, 215
 Senegal 162, 218, 241, 253, 254, 257, 259, 304
 Senghor, Lamine 66, 176, 218, 237, 257, 259–62
 La Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre (CDRN) 259, 260–1
 La Violation d'un pays 262
 and the *négritude* movement 261–2
 radicalism 261
 Senghor, Léopold 217, 218, 219, 225, 235, 237, 253, 255, 257, 261, 265, 266, 267, 269–73
 and African socialism 269, 272–3, 280
 and being and alterity 271–2
 concept of *négritude* 269
 on culture 272
 on difference 255
 ‘elitist cultural politics’ 269
 and Pan-Africanism 269–70
 proposes new ‘open’ humanism 270–1
 Serbia 49, 78
 settler colonies 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 32, 35, 36, 92, 164, 166
 Seven Years War 30, 78, 83
 sexual politics 326
shakti 321, 327, 341
 Sharpeville massacre (1960) 249, 297
 Sherard, R. H. 326
 Siberia 122
 Sierre Leone 52, 92, 162, 228
 Sikhs 59
 Silà, Ernestina 381
 Singapore 17, 52, 296, 304
 Singh, Bhagat 324
 Sinn Féin 96, 97, 306, 320
 slavery 1, 2, 20, 24, 26, 76
 abolition 81, 194
 economic objection to 83
 slave revolts 75, 81, 161, 163
 Slovakia 129
 Small, E. F. 227
 Smith, Adam 73, 78, 82–5, 89, 105
 critique of colonialism 82–5
 Wealth of Nations 82, 85
 Smith Bell, Sydney 93
 Smith, Goldwin 9, 91, 95, 96
 social exclusion 321
 socialism 6, 100, 115–26, 145, 153
 black socialism 223
 and colonialism 116
 Muslim socialism 146
 and nationalism 117–20, 188, 230, 305
 relation to national liberation 286
 revolutionary socialism 210
 tricontinental socialism 170, 185
 utopian socialism 320
 socialist feminism 372–4
 Socialist League 98
 socialist reformism 100
 socialist secularism 168
Société des amis des Noirs 76
 Soga, Tiyo 236
 Solomon Islands 179
 Somalia 78, 162, 251
 Sorel, Georges 197, 295, 296, 303
 South Africa 19, 20, 42, 91, 95, 170, 188, 213, 214, 218, 230–2, 250, 251, 280, 284
 apartheid 3, 231
 Black Consciousness movement 220
 Boers 79
 Hertzog Native Bills 232
 immigration policy 79
 insurrections 161–2
 nationalist movements 94
 Pass Laws 366–7
 peasant movements 230
 revolutionary intelligentsia 231
 socialism 251, 252
 South African Communist Party (SACP) 230, 231, 232

- violence versus non-violence 251–2
- women activists 363, 366–8
- South African National Congress 100
- Southey, Robert 76
- space and spatial organization 395
- Spain 21, 59
 - colonialism 3, 199
 - communism 155
 - imperialism 16, 25–6, 31, 75–6, 117
- Spanish Sahara 251
- Spanish–American War (1898) 42, 116
- Spartacist uprising (1919) 128
- ‘spiritualization of politics’ 337, 338
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 62, 69, 355, 415
 - catachresis* 418
 - challenges Indian theoretical orthodoxies 339, 350, 351
 - dialectical method 410
 - extends category of subaltern to women 354, 357
- Sri Lanka 17, 59, 251, 362
- Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 9, 156, 164, 362
- SS *Windrush* 62
- Stalin, Joseph 121, 125, 126, 129, 139, 147, 148, 149–50, 154
 - ‘autonomization’ 123, 124
 - demarcation of Soviet Central Asia 138
 - intervention in Comintern affairs 149–50, 151, 176
 - and Muslim Communist organizations 138
 - on nationalism 121, 122
 - purges 152
 - ‘revolution from above’ 169
 - and secession 122
 - and world revolution 150
- Stalin–Hitler pact 152, 315
- strikes and civil disobedience 163, 166, 173, 315, 323
 - see also satyagraha*
- structuralism 67–8, 187, 383, 413, 420
- Stuttgart Congress (1907) 116
- sub-Saharan Africa 30, 50, 157, 161–2, 229
- Subaltern Studies 311, 339, 350, 352–6, 358–9, 410
 - feminist critiques 356–7
 - interaction with cultural criticism 354
 - ‘Naxalite historiography’ 353
 - project 352, 353, 354, 355
 - subalternity 9, 66, 293, 320–1, 352–6, 407, 418
 - autonomous agency of subaltern resistance 353
 - defining 354
 - dialectic of dominance and subordination 356
 - and marginalization 354
- Sudan 49, 162
- Suez Crisis vii, 189–90
- suffragette resistance strategies 323, 326, 330
- Sukarno, Achmad 59, 179, 191
- Sultan-Galiev, Mir Said 129, 137, 138–9, 146–7, 152, 174–5, 212, 279
- Sumatra 146
- Sun Yat-sen 150, 151
- Survival 1
- Swaminathan, Lakshmi 362
- SWAPO 162, 164, 250
- swaraj* 309, 320, 338, 376
- Switzerland 118
- Sylvester-Williams, Henry 218
- Syria 30, 59, 136, 147, 190
- Tabata, Isaac Bongani 232
- Tagore, Sir Rabindranath 319
- Taiwan 3, 17, 52, 177, 183
- Tamil Tigers (LTTE) 362
- Tamils 4, 59
- Tanaka Memorandum (1927) 179
- Tanzania 52, 247
- Tashkent 134, 312
- Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre 271
- Tel Quel* group 187
- texts 387–8, 394, 398
 - cultural and literary texts 36, 262, 409–10
 - historicity 389–90
 - representation 389, 390–1
- Thierry, Amédée 278
- Third International 105, 109, 118, 127–39, 130, 154, 155
- ‘Third World’ 4, 5, 46, 54, 55
- Third World Feminism 58
- Thomas, J. J. 68

- Thoreau, Henry David 323
 Thornton, A. P. 10
 Thuku, Harry 365, 366
 Tibet 3
 Tiffin, Helen 415
 Tilak, B. G. 309, 380
 Tito (Josip Broz) 59, 191
 Togliatti, Palmiro 197
 Togo 17
 Torres Strait Islands 20
 totalitarianism 415
 totalization 415, 416
 Touré, Sékou 218, 241, 269
 Toussaint L'Ouverture 81, 161, 225
 trade
 colonial trade 19, 21, 22–3
 Marx on 102
 monopoly trading rights 83, 84, 91
 protective trade tariffs 84, 91
 trade agreements 47
 trade unions 177, 226, 227, 228
 trade-union militancy 368
 transculturation 169, 201–2, 259, 267
 translation 320, 393, 418
 absolute 424, 425, 426
 of Marxism 6, 8, 168, 169, 174, 199, 311, 314, 351, 355
 nationalism as 173
 postcolonial politics of 66, 68
 as transculturation 202, 267, 347
 Transvaal/Orange Free State 166
 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) 122
 Treaty of Versailles (1919) 117, 118, 132, 220
 Tricontinental (Havana) 5, 192, 194, 212–14, 285
 tricontinentalism 4–5, 57, 58, 61, 212, 427–8
 see also anti-colonialism, feminism, Marxism, Socialism
 Tripoli 116
 Trotsky, Leon 109, 121, 124, 128, 129, 139, 144, 150, 151, 224, 225
 and the colonies 155, 156
 and the Fourth International 155–7
 indifference towards nationalism 155
 and the Irish Easter Rebellion 306
 ‘revolution from below’ 157
 United Front policy 145
 Trotskyism 129, 156
 Tucker, Dean 83
 Tunisia 102, 162, 179, 218, 304, 396, 397
 Tupamaros 215
 Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques 79
 Turkestan 122, 134
 Turkey 2, 59, 100, 116, 130, 135, 147, 153, 287
 anti-colonialism in 136
 communism in 144
 feminism in 142, 379
 nationalism 166
 Turner, Bryan 167
 Turner, Nat 161
 Twain, Mark 116
 Uganda 304
 Ukraine 118, 119, 122, 123
 Umkhonto we Sizwe 249, 251
 underclass 353
 underdevelopment theory 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 110–11
 UNIA 220, 258
 Union Africaine et Malgache 270
 Union des Travailleurs Nègres (UTN) 264
 Union Inter-coloniale 256, 259
 Union of Nationalities 118
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 3, 44, 59, 120–57, 170, 213
 dual foreign policy 143, 144
 federal structure 123
 foreign policy interests 152
 and independence movements 180
 Muslim states 123–4
 racial tolerance 222–3
 Soviet policy towards the east 129, 130
 and women's rights 140–1
 Union of West African Socialist Republics 219
 United Arab Republic 190
 United Nations (UN) 180, 192
 United States 3, 4, 20, 29, 44, 130, 135, 166
 anti-imperialism 179
 Black Belt state proposal 222, 231
 Black Liberation Movement 220
 colonialist expansion 3, 9

- Communist Party 220, 222, 223, 224
 focus for anti-imperialist campaigns 181
 immigration laws 62, 149
 imperialism 26, 32, 37, 41–3, 117, 212
 and independence movements 180
 McCarthyite purges 223
 settler colony and imperial power 32
 Universal Declaration of Rights (1948) 87
 universal human rights discourse 81, 82, 87
 Universal Negro Improvement Association 219, 221
 Universal Races Congress (1911) 218
 universal suffrage 9
 universalism 420
 Uruguay 195, 213
 Utilitarianism 82, 104
 Uyghur 4

 veiling/unveiling 124, 141, 328, 378
 Venezuela 213, 215
 Vespucci, Amerigo 21
 Victoria, Queen 90
 Vidyasagar, Isvarachandra 375
 Vietcong 164
 Vietnam 58, 59, 156, 162, 166, 173, 180, 181, 183, 213, 250, 275, 297, 362, 419
 Vietnam War (1960–74) 161, 170, 181, 212
 Villa, Pancho 196
 violence 250, 293–307, 327
 colonial violence 76, 276–7, 282, 294, 295, 296, 297–9, 300, 412
 ‘degradation’ 293
 Fanon and 250, 280–3
 ‘pacification’ 293
 psychotherapy of the oppressed 295
 Virgin Islands 3, 42
 Vivekenanda, Swami 310
 Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de 76
 Von Eschen, Penny 223

 Waddedar, Pritilata 362
 wage labour 101
 Wake Islands 42
 Wakefield, E. G. 23, 92, 101
 Wales 300, 319
 Wallace-Johnson, I. T. A. 227, 228, 232, 234
 Wallerstein, Immanuel 51, 111
 Wang Jingwei 148, 151
 Warren, Bill 55
 Washington, Booker T. 218, 220
 wealth disparities 54
 Wedderburn, Sir William 96
 West Africa
 anti-colonialism 217
 Balkanization 48, 240
 French imperialism 88
 Home Rule demands 39
 independence movements 92, 162
 nationalist movements 94, 229
 slave trade 77
 women activists 363
 West African Congress 217, 238
 West African National Secretariat 228
 West African Students Union 228, 237, 260, 427
 West African Youth League (WAYL) 227
 West Bank 3
 West Indies 16, 162
 white man’s burden 38, 89
 White, Walter 223
 widow burning 380
 Wilde, Oscar 326
 women 140–3, 360–82
 anti-colonial activists 178, 360–82
 anti-imperial activism 374
 benefits of colonial rule 375
 communist women’s movement 140–3
 double colonization 305, 370, 379
 freedom fighters 364, 366, 373
 gender role transformation 364, 366, 373
 ‘home and colonial’ ideology 325–6, 368, 371, 377, 379
 in Ireland 305
 liberating effect of anti-colonial struggle 373
 marginality 361
 oppressive practices 379–80
 political organizations 362, 367, 368
 post-independence disempowerment 371, 381
 role in anti-colonial movements 362–9
 suffrage 141
 and terrorism 362
 see also feminism

- Woolf, Virginia 378
Wordsworth, William 76
Workers International League 231
Workers Party of South Africa (WPSA)
231, 232
World Bank 46, 47, 48, 53
world systems theories 44, 51, 171, 205
World Trade Organization 46
Wounded Knee (1890) 161

Yacef, Saadi 378
Yeats, W. B. 319, 416
Yergan, Max 223
Young Ireland 96
Young Italy movement 229

Yousseff, Ibrahim 176

Zaire 179, 213
Zambia 188, 250
ZANU 162, 164
Zapatista Manifesto 193
Zapatistas 196, 215
ZAPU 162, 213, 250
Zetkin, Clara 140
Zimbabwe 162, 165, 188, 213, 214, 240,
250, 251, 363, 364, 381
Zinoviev, Grigori 100, 125, 129, 130, 136,
141, 144, 151, 152
Zutshi, Lado Rani 362

'In pursuing the historical past of postcolonial discourse, Robert Young makes a truly insightful and inventive contribution to the development of the field. His intricate and exhaustive study finds its inspiration in the exhilarating events and ideals of anti-colonialist struggle. Inspired by the imaginative spirit of emancipation, Young argues that the great anti-colonial movements were also transformative and hybrid moments that reshaped both power and knowledge. The fine achievement of this provocative account lies in reviving and revising the remarkable dawning of the Third World as we emerge into the global conceits of the third millennium.'

Homi K. Bhabha, Harvard University

'A major work, marking a turning-point in thinking and research in the field.'

Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi

'the foremost postcolonial theorist in Britain'

Times Higher Education Supplement

This innovative book by one of the leading exponents in the field introduces 'postcolonialism' in both theoretical and historical terms.

Robert Young provides a wide-ranging analysis of postcolonial theory's emergence from anticolonial movements in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America, tracing the development of a transnational third-world 'counter-modernity' through the work of major figures of the freedom struggles, including Cabral, Connolly, Fanon, Gandhi, Guevara, Nkrumah, Mao, Mariátegui, and Senghor, and through the roles played by women activists.

Young suggests that the anti-colonial movements were revolutionary mixtures of the indigenous and the cosmopolitan, diasporic formations of intellectual and cultural resistance that produced new kinds of knowledge that flourished alongside anti-colonial political practice. Postcolonial theory marks the intrusion of these radically different perspectives into the academy, hitherto dominated by the criteria of the west.

Young argues that while postcolonial critique challenges established, eurocentric knowledge in the cultural sphere, it must continue to work in the spirit of the anticolonial movements by further developing its radical political edge to enforce social justice on a global basis.

This is a stimulating introduction for those new to postcolonial theory, while offering more advanced readers a fresh perspective on the dynamics and history of the field.

Robert Young is Professor of English and Critical Theory at Oxford University. His previous publications include *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (1990), and *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race* (1995). Robert Young is also the General Editor of *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*.

Cover illustration: A French soldier on patrol in Algiers, during the war of Algerian independence, 1962. Photo: Stuart Heydinger,

The Observer / Hulton Getty

Cover designed by Em Quad

Printed in Great Britain

Visit our website at <http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk>

 **BLACKWELL**
Publishers

ISBN 0-631-20071-1



9 780631 200710

90000 >

