REVOLUTIONS &
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MOVEMENTS

James DeFronzo

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
Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements

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Contents

Maps

Preface

An absence of public knowledge concerning the political histories and socioeconomic characteristics of other societies can permit a government to exercise an excessive influence over citizen perception of its actions in foreign lands. It is possible, for example, that U.S. involvement in Vietnam would not have occurred or at least would not have progressed as far as it did if the American people had been fully aware of the Vietnamese Revolution against French colonial rule, the loss of popular support for France's Indochina war effort, and the terms of the resulting Geneva peace settlement of 1954. Although the U.S. public was too poorly informed to prevent the American tragedy in Vietnam, the collective memory of the Vietnam experience probably helped prevent direct U.S. military intervention in several countries in the subsequent years.

But key elements of the Vietnam experience have not been passed on to post-Vietnam generations. This situation became especially clear to me through responses to a question that I have repeatedly asked to students in several large sociology classes. The question was, "How many of you have had any treatment of the Vietnam conflict in high school?" In each case, less than 5 percent raised their hands! Most also indicated on anonymous questionnaires that they knew very little about social movements and political conflicts in other parts of the world. This was particularly noteworthy and disturbing because the large majority were college juniors or seniors preparing to embark on their careers and take on their future political and social responsibilities.

There are probably several causes for Americans' general lack of political knowledge of other societies. As citizens of the richest and most technologically advanced nation, many of us have felt unaffected by other parts of the world and little need to concern ourselves with the politics of less-developed countries or to become familiar with the traditions of other cultures. Undoubtedly, many people shy away from political topics because they want to avoid controversy. The fear of conflict over how to deal with the subject of Vietnam might be especially

acute within a high-school faculty in which some may be war veterans and others former antiwar activists. The result could be a simple avoidance of this potentially explosive topic in history or social science classes.

The mass media, like the educational system, have also generally failed to provide information about foreign societies to the vast majority of the American people. Television networks, in the competition for advertising dollars, are intent on maximizing viewer ratings. Programs dealing with political topics in other lands cannot usually command a respectable percentage of the viewing public (except in times of war or other international emergencies).

Yet many people display a strong interest in learning about political events and conflicts in other parts of the world when an opportunity is provided. I have noted this phenomenon most specifically within the context of a course I teach called Revolutionary Social Movements Around the World. Through lectures and documentary films, I attempt to explain the development and significance of important twentieth-century revolutionary movements and associated political conflicts in Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Central America, Iran, South Africa, and other countries. Since the mid-1980s an average of 200+ students has taken this course every semester, with about one-third of the enrollment drawn from outside the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (that is, from the Colleges of Business, Engineering, Nursing, Education, and so forth). According to responses on surveys of class enrollees, the course has attracted so much interest because it provides students an opportunity to learn about a significant number of political conflicts (and the societies in which they occur) in a *single* course. I hope to provide a similar opportunity to a wider audience through this book.

In the first chapter, the reader is introduced to factors important for the discussion of modern revolutions, such as the development of revolutionary conditions, relevant theoretical perspectives, the roles of leaders, the functions of ideology, and the meaning of important concepts such as socialism, communism, people's war, guerrilla warfare, and counterinsurgency, which are employed in specific contexts throughout the book. The revolutions, revolutionary movements, and conflicts covered include those of greatest world significance and those of central importance to the development of revolutionary ideology, strategy, and tactics.

The chapters contain book and article references that the reader might consult to broaden his or her knowledge of a particular topic as well as a list of several relevant documentary films or videos. The sources from which the audiovisual material may be obtained are provided at the end of the book.

This volume is intended to fulfill several purposes. First, I hope that it will serve as an instrument through which students and other interested persons can significantly expand their knowledge of the countries covered and of world politics in general. Second, faculty members can utilize the book or parts of it and possibly several of the suggested films or videocassettes in existing sociology, political science, or history courses relating to social movements or political conflicts or to organize a course dealing specifically with revolutionary movements. Finally, this book could also be useful as a reference source for student or civic groups interested in stimulating greater public awareness of, interest in, and knowledge of world developments.

The list of those who played a significant role in the origin of this book must include my own instructors, fellow faculty members, and thousands of students at the University of Connecticut and Indiana University who inspired both the creation of my revolutions course and the concept of a manuscript on the subject. The reviews and advice of the experts in sociology, political science, anthropology, history, and economics who read individual chapters or the manuscript in its entirety have been of immense value. In particular, for kindly consenting to comment on various parts of this manuscript, I would like to thank Juan del Aguila, Robert Denemark, Susan Eckstein, Julie Feinsilver, Darrell Hammer, Peter Klaren, Mohsen Milani, Mark Selden, Thomas Shapiro, William Turley, Kamyar Vala, Mary Vanderlaan, John Walton, Claude Welch, and Ernest Zirakzadeh. I am also appreciative of the fine work done by Raymond Blanchette, who drew the maps used in this book. I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of Westview Press, in particular to Senior Editor Jennifer Knerr for the administrative guidance she provided. Finally, I am deeply indebted to the members of my family, in particular my mother, Mary Pavano DeFronzo, and to good friends in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Florida, Texas, California, and New Zealand for their past inspiration and their encouragement in the fulfillment of this project.

James DeFronzo

Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
ARDE	Democratic Revolutionary alliance
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
BCM	Black Consciousness movement
CDRs	Committees for Defense of the Revolution
CDSs	Sandinista Defense committees
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
COSEP	Superior Council of Private Enterprise
DR	Revolutionary Directorate
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic force
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation
GMD	Guomindang
HAPCs	higher-stage agricultural producers' cooperatives
ICP	Indochinese Communist party
IRC	Islamic Revolutionary Council
IRG	Islamic Revolutionary Guard
IRP	Islamic Republic party
ISCOR	Iron and Steel Corporation
LAPCs	lower-stage agricultural producers' cooperatives
MDN	Nicaraguan Democratic movement
MIA	missing in action
MSR	Socialist Revolutionary movement
M-26-7	26th of July movement
NLF	National Liberation front
OAS	Organization of American States
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PCD	Democratic Conservative party
PRC	People's Republic of China
SACP	South African Communist party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAIC	South African Indian Congress

SAVAK	Organization of National Security and Intelligence
SEZs	Special Economic Zones
Soweto	South Western Townships
UDF	United Democratic front
UIR	Insurrectional Revolutionary union
UN	United Nations
UNO	National Opposition union
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VNQDD	Vietnamese Nationalist party
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National union

Introduction

The twentieth century has been one of world revolution. Its first decades witnessed the beginnings of the momentous Russian and Chinese revolutions and its final decades, the largely bloodless revolutions in Eastern Europe as well as the continuation of unresolved conflicts in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This book describes and analyzes the development of several major revolutions in an effort to discover their essential features, shared or unique, their individual contributions to revolutionary strategies and practice, and their interactions with and reciprocal effects on the larger world environment.

The revolutions in Russia and China, two of the world's largest and most populous countries, not only had tremendous impacts on their own populations but also affected how other nations and peoples would react to future revolutionary movements. Both the Russian and Chinese cases constituted models of revolutionary strategy and alerted antirevolutionary ruling elites and governments throughout the world to the need to develop effective counterrevolutionary tactics. The Russian Revolution was the first that resulted in the achievement of state power by revolutionists who aimed to create a socialist society. They succeeded first in urban areas with the support of the nation's industrial working class. Their goal, ideally, was to reorganize the country into one in which the major resources and industries would be socially owned (that is, collectively owned by all the people) and that would guarantee its citizens equality of opportunity and the satisfaction of the basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, medical services, and education. What was to happen in Russia would serve for some revolutionaries as an inspiration, but for others as the prime example of how a revolution could in many ways go wrong.

1

In particular many critics of the Russian Revolution viewed the installation of a one-party political system as a perversion of revolutionary ideals. The imposition of this form of government on several politically disorganized Eastern European countries at the end of World War II frustrated cherished aspirations both for national independence and for unfettered democracy. Thus a number of Eastern European nations were in a state of readiness for revolution from the moment Communist party domination was established. The 1989 reversal of past Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) policy by Soviet leaders, who publicly proclaimed their willingness to allow political self-determination in Eastern Europe, rapidly set a half-dozen revolutionary transformations of governmental structures in motion.

The Chinese Revolution provided revolutionaries in less-developed countries with what appeared to be a model more relevant than the Russian Revolution to largely agrarian societies. Mao, who eventually emerged as the revolution's central leader, organized a movement based on rural rather than urban warfare. Through the promise of redistribution of land to poor peasants and, more generally, because Mao's revolutionaries directed effective resistance efforts against the 1937 Japanese invasion, Mao's movement attracted massive support.

The military victory of the Communist-led revolution in 1949 was followed in later years by several social movements in China, including the 1966–1968 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which aimed mainly at bringing about a greater level of equality, and the more recent Democracy Movement, whose leaders intended to increase freedom of political expression and participation. The latter movement, although it received significant mass support and was not only tolerated but even encouraged by powerful countries, such as the United States, the USSR, and Japan, was vulnerable to at least temporary suppression.

The Vietnamese Revolution, apart from being a major movement in Asia for political and economic transformation, became a central cold war test case for U.S. opposition to Communist-led revolutions. The Vietnamese, whose homeland had often been attacked and even controlled by foreign powers, waged a rural revolution and eventually adopted a strategy of placing the nationalist aim (of freeing Vietnam from foreign domination) foremost among revolutionary goals. In so doing, Vietnamese revolutionary leaders not only inspired the maximum possible number of people to work for the revolutionary struggle but also, once the foreign presence was eliminated, had an easier task in defeating domestic opponents of their goal of wealth redistribution.

The revolution in Vietnam, however, met with strong resistance from the French and later from the U.S. government, in great part because

of the intense hostility between the Western nations on the one hand and the USSR and China on the other. In the context of the cold war it became difficult for U.S. government officials to tolerate the victory of Communist-led revolutions because those officials erroneously (especially in the case of Vietnam) regarded the revolutionaries as puppets or agents of the Soviet Union or China rather than as the organizers of independent and nationalistic movements. The tendencies of both the United States and the USSR to be intolerant of defiance from smaller countries during the cold war and to interfere in their internal political affairs explain why several revolutions in less-developed countries resulted, at least temporarily, in strongly anti-U.S. governments and why revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 had, in most cases, a distinctly anti-Soviet dimension.

The Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Iranian revolutions were also, in part, reactions to foreign intervention. They illustrate how past interference by a powerful outside country can provide revolutionaries with the advantage of laying legitimate claim to protecting national interests. The Cuban Revolution had special significance as the first in the Western Hemisphere and Latin America resulting in a government committed to building a socialist society. Both the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolutions, although twenty years apart, were directed against regimes notorious for subservience to foreign interests, internal corruption, greed, and the toleration of unjust economic conditions. The Nicaraguan Revolution, which, like the Cuban, resulted in a new government committed to a redistribution of wealth and expansion of basic services toward the poor, was markedly distinct from the Cuban case in regard to the organization of its postrevolutionary political system. Nicaraguan leaders formally pledged to develop and maintain a multiparty political democracy rather than implement a Leninist style, one-party system. Although the sincerity of this commitment was often questioned by internal and external critics during the 1980s, United Nations (UN) and Organization of the American States (OAS) observers certified Nicaragua's 1989–1990 national election campaign and vote as free and democratic.

The Iranian Revolution was one of the major events in the Middle East during the cold war period. As in the Cuban and Nicaraguan situations, revolutionaries in this oil-rich and relatively populous nation rose up against a regime that they viewed as a tool of foreign exploitation and a conduit of moral corruption. The anti-imperialist and moralist aspects of the Iranian Revolution, themes present to some extent in other revolutions, contributed to an exceptional outcome, the establishment of the religiously dominated Islamic Republic. As a consequence

of this revolution, one of the largest and most powerful countries in the Middle East shifted rapidly from being a reliable ally and implementer of U.S. policies in the region to one whose new government viewed the United States, as well as the USSR, as a "Great Satan."

The final focal point of this volume is the revolutionary struggle to create a nonracial democracy in South Africa. That country's mineral wealth (gold, platinum, uranium, etc.) and industrial infrastructure are important to the world and potentially critical for the future development of much of the African continent.

Although attempts were made in the past to formulate universal theories capable of explaining the development of revolutions and predicting their success or failure, such efforts have yielded disappointing results (Goldstone 1986; Greene 1990). Studies of individual revolutions, however, have identified several key factors that apparently must be simultaneously present for a revolution to succeed. The central flaws of the so-called universal, or general, theories of revolution include their inability to recognize the importance of all the empirically demonstrated factors essential to a revolution's success, their resulting inadequacy in predicting a revolution's development or outcome, and their lack of appreciation for those critical elements that may be unique to specific revolutions. The approach that I will use here is to explore first the significance of factors that appear necessary to the success of all revolutions. I will then analyze the development of seven revolutionary conflicts, devoting special attention to the history and unique social characteristics generating the essential revolution-promoting factors. Embedded in the historical presentations at appropriate points are references to these factors; readers can anticipate the "Summary and Analysis" section of each chapter by being alert to these references and trying to relate the specific historical and social context to the general revolutionary factors at work. Finally, in the concluding chapter I will attempt to analyze the shortcomings of the general theories of revolution and to identify the reasons why they were inherently incapable of predicting the development of all the key revolution-promoting elements and, consequently, poorly equipped to predict the success of specific revolutions.

The descriptions and analyses presented here can, I hope, contribute to a deeper appreciation of the significance of major political, economic, and social conflicts and transformations around the world. Peace and the social justice on which peace depends are goals difficult to realize and sustain as long as many of us remain unaware of other people's histories and traumatizing economic, social, and political problems.

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Social Movements and Revolutions

A social movement can be defined as a persistent and organized effort on the part of a relatively large number of people either to bring about or to resist social change. Some examples of the many social movements in the history of the United States include the Antislavery movement, the Antiwar movement (the movement against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict), the Antipoverty movement, the Civil Rights movement (the movement for equal treatment of minorities), and the Women's Rights movement. These liberal social movements advocated change from existing government policies or traditional patterns of behavior. Other social movements were organized to resist social change and reassert or restore particular traditional institutions, patterns of behavior, norms, or values. These conservative movements have included the Prayer in Public Schools movement, the Pro-life (Anti-abortion) movement, and the Antipornography movement.

Although classifying movements as either primarily change oriented/ liberal or change resistant/conservative can be useful in conceptualizing the central goals of particular movements, it is important to understand that in reality few movements can fit perfectly into these categories. For example, although the Women's Rights movement can be viewed as change oriented in the sense of advocating a shift from patterns of male dominance toward greater equality of the genders in the economic and political spheres, it also has qualities that could be perceived as conservative. Among these are the movement's opposition to the sexual exploitation of women, an element of traditional religious morality. Similarly, the Antislavery movement of the nineteenth century and the Antipoverty and Civil Rights movements of the twentieth century, which

were change oriented in the sense of fighting for greater equality for minorities, attacked economic and political oppression in part because of its detrimental impacts on family life and child rearing. The goal of creating optimal economic and political conditions for the maintenance of strong family units and positive family emotional relations can be viewed as conservative: This type of family environment has been an ideal of traditional culture and morality.

Regardless of whether a movement is publicly perceived as predominantly change oriented or change resistant in terms of the direction of its goals, it can be further classified as either a reform or a revolutionary movement on the basis of the scope or magnitude of its goals. A **reform movement** attempts to change limited aspects of a society but does not aim at drastically altering or replacing major social, economic, or political institutions. For example, the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s did not call for changing the form of major U.S. institutions such as the economic system (capitalism) or the political system (representative two-party democracy). The movement instead advocated limited change: the opening up of existing institutions to full and equal participation by members of minority groups. Thus, the Civil Rights movement was a reform rather than a revolutionary movement. Similarly, the anti–Vietnam War movement and the more recent activity against Republican administration policy in Central America were reform movements because their goals involved changes in government policy rather than in the structure of government itself or in any other major institution.

A **revolutionary movement,** in comparison, is a social movement in which participants are organized to alter drastically or replace totally existing social, economic, or political institutions. For example, the Communist-led Chinese Revolution transformed China's economy by giving ownership of the country's basic industries to the state rather than private individuals. Besides differing from reform movements in which aspects of society are targeted for change, revolutionary movements often use a wider range of means to accomplish change (from legal protest demonstrations to nonviolent civil disobedience to acts of violence). Although revolutionary social change (change in the structure of basic institutions) can be brought about through nonviolent means such as peaceful labor strikes or democratic elections, most revolutionary movements that have succeeded have usually been accompanied by some level of violence on the part of both movement participants and governments and groups opposing revolution (Greene 1990; Goldstone 1986). Such violence may be branded **terrorism** by the ruling power being threatened, but terrorism—the use of force to intimidate for political purposes—is often in the eye of the beholder, and one person's

terrorist can be another person's freedom fighter. Forms of revolutionary violence include **people's war** (Giap 1962; Mao 1938; Mackerras and Knight 1985; Wolf 1969)—characterized by widespread support for the goals of the revolution, so that the established government is fighting an entire people—and **guerrilla warfare** (Guevara 1985; Mao 1938; White 1984)—a form of mobile warfare involving small units of combatants operating even behind enemy lines. Forms of antire-volutionary violence may be generally described as **counterinsurgency techniques** (Calvert 1984; White 1984) and range from arrests and temporary detention to extremes such as the death squads in El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980s (Montgomery 1982; White 1984). In several instances since the mid-twentieth century, antirevolutionary forces have, in fact, overturned electoral systems, for example, in Cuba in 1952 (Szulc 1986), Guatemala in 1954 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982), and Chile in 1973 (Valenzuela 1978), in order to prevent sweeping institutional change or even progressive reforms from being carried out through democratic means.

Sociologists and other social scientists have often attempted to classify revolutions into one of two "ideal types": leftist or rightist. A **left-wing revolution** is one in which the central goal is widely perceived to be to change major social and political institutions in order to alter the dominant economic, social, or political relationships within a society (Greene 1990). Usually involved is a redistribution of valuable resources between the rich and the poor, with more equal access to educational opportunities, medical services, higher wage levels, or, in the case of a predominantly agricultural society, land, a stated goal. A **right-wing revolution** is one in which the primary aim is the restoration of traditional institutions. Right-wing revolutionary movements also gen-erally emphasize the goals of maintaining social order and traditional authority over the goal of achieving greater social equality through institutional change.

Just as social movements in general are difficult to categorize as either totally liberal or conservative, many revolutions include both leftist and rightist characteristics. For example, the leaders of a rev-olutionary movement aimed at achieving greater social equality through radical transformations of a society's economic and political systems (leftist characteristics) might attempt to appeal for mass support by arguing that the redistribution of wealth they propose would help reinforce traditional morality (a rightist element) by eliminating extreme poverty as a cause of social evils, such as prostitution, drug abuse, and predatory crime. A number of revolutions, however, can be placed into one of the two categories on the basis of changes they brought about. Of the revolutions covered in this book, the Russian, Chinese,

Vietnamese, and Cuban have been widely interpreted as primarily leftist. On the basis of the dominant ideological orientations and policies of the revolutionary leaderships of the two nations that experienced revolutions in 1979, the Iranian Revolution can be tentatively classified as a predominantly right-wing revolution and the Nicaraguan as mainly leftist. The South African conflict continued without resolution in the early 1990s, but the effort for revolutionary change there has been oriented toward achieving greater equality by dismantling the nation's system of white racial domination and can—at least in that sense—be categorized as leftist.

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS: CRITICAL FACTORS

The factors that can influence the development of revolutionary movements include the extent of inequality and impoverishment within a society's population, degree to which the population is divided along ethnic lines, perception of corruption of governmental officials, level of armament and degree of loyalty of a government's military forces, cultural traditions of violence or nonviolence as means of protesting perceived social injustice, physical size of a country and nature of its terrain, and proximity and level of involvement of other countries that either support or oppose the development and success of a revolutionary movement. But of all possible factors, five stand out as critical and if occurring simultaneously, appear to come close to constituting necessary and sufficient conditions for the success of a revolutionary movement, according to the appraisals of leading academic scholars on the phenomenon of revolution (Goldfrank 1986; Goldstone 1986; Greene 1990). The order of development and relative importance of these elements differ from one revolution to another.

1. Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings among urban or rural populations: A large proportion of a society's population becomes extremely discontented, which leads to mass-participation protests and rebellions against state authority. In technologically backward agricultural societies, the occurrence of rural (peasant) rebellion or at least rural support for revolution has often been essential (Goldfrank 1986; Goldstone 1986, 1991; Greene 1990).
2. Dissident elite political movements: Divisions among elites (groups that have access to wealth, power of various types, or are highly educated and possess important technical or managerial skills) pit some elite members against the existing government (Goldfrank 1986; Goldstone 1986, 1991; Greene 1990).

3. Unifying motivations: The existence of powerful motivations for revolution that cut across major classes and unify the majority of a society's population behind the goal of revolution (Goldstone 1986; Greene 1990).

4. A severe political crisis paralyzing the administrative and coercive capabilities of the state: A state crisis occurs in the nation experiencing or about to experience the development of a revolutionary movement. The crisis, which may be caused by a catastrophic defeat in war, a natural disaster, an economic depression, or the withdrawal of critical economic or military support from other nations, or by any combination of these factors, may deplete the state of loyal personnel, legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and other resources. The state then becomes incapable of carrying out its normal functions and cannot cope effectively with an opposition revolutionary movement (Goldfrank 1986; Goldstone 1986, 1991; Greene 1990).

5. A permissive or tolerant world context: The governments of other nations do not intervene effectively to prevent a revolutionary movement from developing and succeeding in a given nation (Goldfrank 1986).

Mass Frustration and Popular Uprisings

Revolution has been described as involving a tremendous increase in mass participation in political activity, participation motivated by widespread opposition to existing conditions. Such popular discontent can result from the development of a gap between people's expectations (regarding the life-style they feel they should be able to achieve) and their ability to satisfy those expectations. Social scientists have referred to this phenomenon as **relative deprivation** (Gurr 1970; Greene 1990).

There are several historical processes that can lead to relative deprivation. Among them is rapid deterioration in material living conditions, which may occur for the whole population of a country during an economic depression or for only some population groups during periods of transition in the economic system. A wide breach opens between the way people expect they should be able to live and their capabilities of meeting those expectations, not because of a change in expectations, but because of a decline in capabilities of attaining them. This type of relative deprivation may also result when one country is invaded and conquered by another. The victor nation may exploit the resources and labor power of the defeated people, and a drastic decline in the standard of living ensues. People in the defeated nation may try to resist occupation forces with violence. During World War II many

of the peoples whose nations were invaded by Nazi German or Japanese forces organized resistance groups, which, in some instances, grew into revolutionary movements; the latter not only helped expel the invaders but also brought about drastic changes in social, economic, and political institutions after the war.

(2) Another process that can result in the growth of a gap between people's expectations and capabilities involves an increase in expectations rather than a change in capabilities. Expectations are essentially a function of people's beliefs about what is possible and about what is "right." Experiences that alter these conceptions can strongly influence people's expectations. One such experience is communication with people from other societies where the level of material existence is higher or where a past revolution has resulted in a redistribution of wealth. Contact with other societies or with fellow citizens who have themselves been exposed to other ways of life can lead people to believe that improvements are possible. Communication with foreigners can also influence what people consider to be morally acceptable.

A shift in a people's conception of what is morally right, however, can perhaps most easily be brought about if the message is communicated by recognizable moral authorities. The upsurge in revolutionary movements in parts of Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s came about precisely because of the role religious leaders played in changing the conceptions of millions of poor farmers and workers about the moral acceptability of existing social conditions. Many young men and women of the clergy began to embrace the idea of an expanded role for the Church in the lives of the poor. Rather than simply to cater to spiritual needs through administering the sacraments and saying mass, they came to feel it was their religious duty to work for social justice and a redistribution of wealth. This application of Christian values has been called **Liberation Theology** (White 1984; Berryman 1985, 1987). As these ideas were widely communicated, more and more of the poor came to see the poverty and misery they endured as being, not God's will, but rather the will of some men and the result of the systems these men defended. The extreme inequalities that characterized their societies were now considered wrong, even sinful. Peasants and workers began to desire, demand, and expect change. A situation of mass frustration had been created.

(3) Still a third process has evidently operated historically to generate mass discontent. Davies (1962) found that for each of several major revolutions he analyzed, the period of revolutionary upheaval was preceded by several years of economic improvement. The associated rise in material living conditions was likely to have generated an increase in people's expectations because they actually experienced improve-

ments. After the interval of prosperity there was a sudden decline in living conditions, caused by factors such as war or natural or economic catastrophes, which resulted in a wide gap between expectations and capabilities, and, consequently, a major increase in mass frustration and support for revolutionary movements.

Social scientists have tried to identify the particular conditions that have led to the development of mass discontent and the occurrence of rebellious uprisings specifically among peasants (Thaxton 1983; Walton 1984; Wolf 1969, 1971). This research generally indicated that peasants were driven to rebellion by deteriorating economic conditions; rapid population growth that exceeded increases in food supply was a factor in some situations. Both Thaxton (1983) and Walton (1984) in their respective studies on rural China and rural areas of the Philippines during the 1920s and 1930s concluded that peasants began to support revolutionary movements after a worsening of rural economic conditions; the latter was caused, in part, by a shift from paternalistic and relatively friendly relationships with landlords to cold, increasingly impersonal and exploitive landlord behavior. These studies further suggested that peasant discontent was most likely to result in full-scale rural rebellion when a majority of peasants felt that their problems were due to a common cause (some policy or policies of the current government), when peasants had a capacity to organize and act independently of landlords and government officials, and where landlords lacked their own independent means to suppress peasant rebellions and the state was unable or unwilling to carry out this activity.

Urban uprisings, according to the research, were associated mainly with two phenomena: high unemployment and major increases in the prices for basic foods (Goldstone 1986). Huntington (1968) noted that in an economically backward society (where most people lived in rural areas and were illiterate) characterized by a *weak* government (such as Russia in 1917), political and economic crises provoked revolutions in which *urban* uprisings played the leading role in overthrowing the government. The revolution then spread outward from the cities to involve peasants in the process of societal transformation. He also observed that in other underdeveloped societies with relatively *strong* governments and armed forces (including military dictatorships backed by the armed forces of a technologically advanced foreign country), revolutions succeeded first in the *countryside* when peasant armies and organizational support were mobilized. Cities fell to the revolution only after a period of prolonged struggle (the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions of the twentieth century fit this pattern). Dix (1983) claimed that the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions show that a third pattern has occurred in Latin America. Cuba and Nicaragua were partially

modernized, with about 50 percent of their populations literate and living in urban areas at the time of their respective revolutions. In these revolutions against military-based dictatorships, revolutionary movements were composed mainly of people who initially resided in urban areas and who later fought in both urban and rural settings. Although not needing to mobilize large numbers of peasants into the revolutionary armed forces in order to achieve victory, the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions did receive substantial support from peasants.

Dissident Elite Political Movements

Many who have explored the processes involved in the development of revolutionary movements (Goldfrank 1986; Goldstone 1986; Gurr 1970; Skocpol 1979; Trimberger 1978) have argued that divisions among the elites within a society can increase the probability of the success of a revolutionary movement in a number of ways. First, conflict among elite members, if nothing else, contributes to confusion and disorganization in efforts to suppress a revolutionary movement. Second, if some elite members feel threatened by the actions of other elite members who control their society's government *and* if these alienated elite members possess important resources required by the state, a decision on their part to withhold or withdraw support from the state can render it too weak and ineffective to cope with revolutionary forces. And, finally, some members of the nation's elite families may directly participate in a revolution by providing leadership or other resources to help transform popular discontent and uprisings into an organized and purposeful revolutionary movement. In this capacity, elites usually play a role in formulating an **ideology** for the revolutionary movement: an indictment and criticism of the existing power structure, a set of justifications for the necessity of resorting to a revolutionary movement to bring about social change, and a long-range plan and strategy of action (Greene 1990). Ideologies may range along a spectrum from those informed by **socialism**—the public ownership of land and capital administered for the community good—to **capitalism**—the private ownership of resources to produce commodities for profit and reinvestment. Ideologies often couple economic aims with powerful unifying goals, such as nationalist resistance to foreign domination or reaffirmation of traditional moral or religious principles, capable of facilitating alliances among a society's major social classes. The primary function of revolutionary ideology is to provide as many people as possible with the same or at least compatible viewpoints on the need to change society so that they will be motivated to cooperate in the revolutionary struggle.

Social theorists and researchers have hypothesized several ways through which elite conflict can develop. Marx and Engels (1848; Engels 1880)

argued that technological and economic changes result in one type of economic activity (for example, the manufacture and sale of industrial products) replacing another (such as farming and the sale of agricultural products) as the major source of wealth in a society. The elites involved in the newly dominant economic activity struggle for and eventually win control of the political system from elites representing the previously dominant economic activity. Goldstone (1986), Skocpol and Trimberger (1978), and others, in describing another process for the development of elite conflict, have argued that as a technologically and economically inferior state attempts to compete with more-advanced states, reforms are enacted by some members of its national elite. These reforms are perceived by other elite members to threaten their interests and privileges. Intra-elite conflict and elite opposition to government policies can result.

Huntington (1968), in addition, suggested that as technologically backward societies begin to modernize by expanding educational systems and introducing technologies and learning from the more advanced countries, they tend to create new educated and politically conscious elites that demand participation in government. When traditional elites, such as the case of the royal family and much of the nobility in czarist Russia, resist democratization of the political system, some members of the new elites come to favor revolution. Eisenstadt (1978) further observed that "economic downturns" or other disasters can cause elite conflict in societies with dictatorships based on a patronage system of personal rewards to elite members. When the benefits stop coming or are threatened by a particular dictator's continuation in power, the loyalty of elite members to the regime is greatly reduced. In other situations, some elites may simply feel threatened by the economic and political power of a dictatorship and turn against it. Both these factors applied to a degree in causing the defection of some of Nicaragua's economic elite from support for the Somoza dictatorship (Booth 1985; Walker 1985).

The direct participation of elite elements in the leadership and organizational structure of the dissident elite political movement itself is critical for the successful development of a leftist revolutionary movement (Greene 1990; Gurr 1970). Such individuals, representing in some cases only a small minority of elite members, may bring crucial organizational and intellectual skills to a movement. According to Greene (1990), many of the young people from elite families who directly participate in left-wing revolutionary movements appear to have experienced a moral alienation from their society's economic and political systems, often developed or enhanced while attending their nation's colleges and universities. They turn against the very economic and

political institutions from which their families have so greatly benefited and reach the conclusion that for some people to live in affluence while the majority of fellow citizens live in abject poverty is unconscionable.

If revolutionaries of upper- and middle-class origin live at a time when there is little or no political discontent among the majority of their society's population, many of them may perish in violent but futile attacks on the armed forces of the government they oppose. But if they live in an era when their frustrations coincide with the aroused discontent of the poor, they may not only participate but also play vital roles in revolutionary movements that have widespread support and, consequently, the potential for victory. There are many examples of revolutionary leaders from relatively privileged families who emerged to lead leftist revolutions that proceeded to dispossess the very classes from which the leaders originated. For example, the Russian revolutionary V. I. Lenin, the Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong, and the Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro all came from well-to-do backgrounds.

Unifying Motivations for Revolution

Greene (1990), in his review of various revolutionary movements throughout history, noted that it is extremely rare for a revolution to succeed without the backing of substantial numbers from most major social classes in a society. In other words, for a revolution to triumph, several classes must join forces; thus there must be a shared motivation for revolution that cuts across class lines and possibly additional differing but simultaneous and at least temporarily compatible motivations. Although the concept of redistributing wealth in favor of the poor, often manifested in some form of socialist ideology, has motivated many of the leaders of leftist revolutions, the effective mass appeal of such a goal is usually limited in great part to the members of a society's lower classes. Only a minority of the more affluent classes are likely to rally in support of a revolution intended solely to benefit the poor.

Broad cross-class participation in revolutionary movements has generally been the product of **nationalism** (Chirot 1986; Greene 1990) or of the development of widespread hatred toward a particular dictatorship (Greene 1990). Regardless of class or ideological orientation, people sharing the same language and culture who perceive that their ethnic or national group has been the victim of exploitation by another group or country can join together in an effort to end their domination (Braveboy-Wagner 1986; Breuilly 1982; Sathyamurthy 1983; Smith 1983).

Nationalism as a motivating factor that unifies diverse social classes behind the goal of revolution is most likely to emerge in reaction to direct colonial rule or indirect colonial domination through a local

regime perceived to be operating on behalf of foreign rather than national interests. The controlling alien power is called **imperialistic** because of specific political actions (gaining control over a society and its resources), economic transactions (shaping and developing the society's economy on behalf of the colonizing power), and cultural transformations (inculcating the society with outside religious, educational, linguistic, and aesthetic values based on the foreign culture).

Sometimes the effects of colonization are so thoroughgoing that the overtaken society ends up with a native ruling class not only culturally similar to the imperialist power but also politically loyal to it and economically dependent on it. **Neocolonialism** is the continuing state of political and cultural dependency and economic exploitation present in a former colony even after formal political independence has been declared (Calvert 1984; Chirot 1986).

Revolutionary movements organized with the stated goal of overthrowing either direct colonial rule or neocolonial governments have been called **national liberation movements** (Calvert 1984; Miller and Aya 1971). Five countries' revolutions covered in this book sprang in great part from such anti-imperialist impulses to national liberation: China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua, all organized mainly around socialist goals, and Iran, organized primarily around religious goals.

Beyond nationalism and national liberation, abhorrence of an especially unjust and brutal or incompetent regime can bring several classes together in a movement to oust the detested government. The czar's dictatorial rule coupled with his personal arrogance, incompetence, and disregard for human life in conducting Russia's disastrous war effort eventually brought about a near-universal demand for his abdication and an end to the autocratic monarchy system. Similarly, multiclass aversion to the Batista government in Cuba and Somoza family rule in Nicaragua developed not only because of the widespread belief that these regimes allowed foreign interests to exploit their countries' peoples and resources but also because of the perception of crimes and acts of brutality committed by these dictatorships.

Severe State Crisis

A revolutionary movement may come into being and yet have no reasonable chance for success so long as the government maintains strong administrative capabilities and armed forces to coerce the submission of the dissident elements within its population. But conditions and events, often beyond the control of either government or revolutionary forces, may act to destroy the capabilities of the state to function effectively and permit revolutionary elements to overcome its repressive

powers. Dunn (1972) argued that several successful revolutionary move-
ments of the twentieth century were in part due to state crises caused
by either war or the process of decolonization. Economic and military
mobilization for war can strain a society's resources, and if the war
effort is unsuccessful, the perceived futile loss of life and national wealth
can destroy the legitimacy and respect the government may previously
have enjoyed from its population. The shattering defeats suffered by
the czar's army during World War I helped generate the state crisis that
gave revolutionaries in Russia an opportunity to seize power.

Decolonization involves the withdrawal of one country's official ad-
ministrative personnel and military forces from another country (the
former colony). The resulting postcolonial government may include
individuals who previously served the occupying country. Thus, during
the period immediately following decolonization the government of a
former colony may be perceived by many of its citizens to be really a
mechanism through which the past occupying country continues to
control their nation's economy and resources. A postcolonial or neo-
colonial government may, consequently, lack the support of its own
people and perhaps even the loyalty of its armed forces. If this is the
case, a postcolonial state can collapse in the face of a revolutionary
movement that the population perceives to represent its true national
interests.

State collapse may also result from the efforts of economically less-
developed states to compete more effectively with more advanced states
in the world economic system or to cope with pressure on food supplies
or other resources caused by significant population increase (Goldstone
1986; Skocpol 1979). As a government attempts to achieve these goals
through various modernizing reforms (such as an expansion of the
educational system, recruitment of administrators and business and
military leaders on the basis of talent and achievement rather than on
the basis of nobility or some other traditional factor, distribution of land
from large estates to the rural poor, and the imposition of higher taxes
on the upper classes), some groups may resist, feeling the new policies
threaten their wealth, power, or other privileges, even to the point of
withdrawing support from the national government. The state may then
be so weakened as to provide revolutionary forces with an opportunity
to develop and achieve an unstoppable momentum. For example, Chinese
rulers who attempted to modernize their country in the late nineteenth
century were frustrated by wealthy landowners and other conservative
forces who prevented sufficient reforms, weakened the power of the
central government, and presented revolutionary forces with a divided,
conflict-ridden, and consequently, more vulnerable national leadership
(Skocpol 1979).

Another type of state structure that is especially fragile is the "neo-patrimonial regime" (Eisenstadt 1978). Such a government is structured around a particular individual whose rule is based on his/her control of resources that are dispensed as rewards to supporters (such as governmental administrative positions, high-profit business monopolies, high salaries and bonuses to military leaders). Important government supporters in such a society tend to be personally loyal to the particular leader and his system, which rewards them. Such a state is especially vulnerable to several types of problems: economic depression, which reduces the resources available to the chief executive to parcel out to his supporters; defeat in war, which can create economic difficulties and also tarnish the reputation of the nation's leader; and events such as illness, accidents, or assassinations, which remove a particular leader from power and thus endanger or destroy the state-supporting patronage system.

Permissive World Context

Because any society exists in a world populated by other societies, some of which may have greater or at least nearly equal military and economic power, a revolutionary movement in one nation that appears to be overcoming the national government might be suppressed, at least temporarily, by other nations opposed to the success of the revolution. The U.S. involvements in Vietnam and in El Salvador are examples of foreign intervention in domestic revolutionary situations. Similarly, the USSR intervened in the past in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan to prevent the success or retard the growth of movements it opposed. Another significant intervention was the sending of military forces by several nations, including Britain, the United States, and Japan, into the Soviet Union in an effort to help White Russian forces overturn the Bolshevik Revolution during the Russian Civil War.

In some situations, outside nations have not intervened to prevent revolutions or have not intervened to the extent necessary to defeat a revolutionary movement. In these cases one of the factors contributing to the victory of a revolutionary movement was, then, a "permissive world context." Reasons for less-than-whole-hearted or for no intervention have included: fear of disapproval, economic sanctions, or even military attack from nations that support a given revolutionary movement; concern about provoking a hostile reaction from the potential interventionist country's own citizens; displeasure with the government a revolutionary movement seeks to overthrow; or the fact that despite strong motivation to intervene, recent economic or military hardships or internal political turmoil may have so physically or psychologically exhausted a nation that it is simply unable to intervene effectively.

Several examples of unsuccessful or nonexistent intervention by outside powers against revolutionary movements illustrate the concept of permissive world context. Following World War I, the European capitalist nations and the United States probably were too battered by the years of conflict to mount a large-scale assault on revolutionary Russia, especially given the huge population and vast territory of the country and the level of popular support the revolution enjoyed. During the Cuban Revolution of 1956–1958 and the Nicaraguan and Iranian revolutions of 1978–1979, no nations sent military forces to save the internationally despised regimes of Batista, Somoza, and the shah of Iran. And despite the massive level of intervention in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia during 1963–1973, the United States might have used even greater military power were it not for the development of significant domestic opposition to the Vietnam involvement and the threat of possible direct military confrontation with the USSR or China over Vietnam. Finally, the USSR's 1989 renunciation of the right to intervene in Eastern Europe permitted the swift success of political revolutions in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

Because the five elements, mass frustration, elite dissidence, unifying motivation, state crisis, and permissive world context, appear crucial to the success of revolutionary movements, it is important to evaluate existing theories of revolution in terms of their abilities or inabilities to account for the simultaneous occurrence of these conditions. Greene (1990), in his review of theories of revolution and of studies on participants, ideologies, organizational structures, tactics, and settings for numerous revolutions, identified several major comprehensive theoretical perspectives, including the Marxist, systems, and modernization approaches.

Marxist theory is both much too complex to cover here in its entirety and much too important to gloss over. Elements of Marxism will be presented here and in several of the following chapters, but for solid overviews, see Robert Tucker's edition of *The Marx-Engels Reader* and Richard Schmitt's *Introduction to Marx and Engels.* According to Marxist theory, revolution is likely to occur at a point when existing social and political structures and leadership interfere with economic development. Such economic development is traced by Marx through various stages from feudalism to capitalism to socialism and eventually to communism. As technological and economic change takes place during the period of capitalist industrialization, a conflict develops between the new urban

industrial working class—**the proletariat**—and the ruling capitalist class. According to Marx, the importance of labor, such as the operating of manufacturing technology, would inevitably supersede that of the ownership of capital (wealth in the form of money, resources, investments, or the physical means of production) in the industrialized economic system. When the government-controlling capitalist class attempts to maintain its grip on power, the working class is driven by frustration and exploitation to revolution. What Marx posited as "the dictatorship of the proletariat" ensues, with the working class taking over governmental power. Many varieties of Marxist theory have developed over the years, but common to all has been the presumption of the need for revolution at certain critical stages in economic history.

Systems theory of revolution, unlike the Marxist theory, does not view revolution primarily in terms of progressive historical changes in technology and forms of economic organization. Systems is a more general perspective that assumes that revolution is likely to occur when prerevolutionary social structures fail to perform essential functions, no matter what the cause of such failure might be. Essential functions include not only the carrying out of necessary economic and administrative tasks but also the socialization of society's members to a culture (set of beliefs and attitudes) supportive of existing social structures.

Modernization theory is similar to Marxist theory in that it associates revolution with technological and economic change. But the modernization, unlike the Marxist, perspective does not hypothesize a set historical sequence of stages in economic development and does not specify which particular economic group would be the major proponent of revolutionary transformation. Rather, modernization theory holds that the experience of technological and economic change tends to "mobilize" new or previously apathetic groups by raising both their economic aspirations and their demands for political participation. Revolution is likely to occur when those holding state power are unable or unwilling to meet the demands of groups mobilized by modernization.

A fourth major contemporary theory of revolution is the influential and insightful **structural theory** developed by Skocpol and Trimberger (Skocpol and Trimberger 1978; Skocpol 1979). It is identified with Marx's view that a revolution is not exclusively the product of subjective characteristics of a society, such as shared cultural values or social or economic expectations, but is in great part dependent on specific objective conditions involving political, economic, and other aspects of social structure. The Skocpol and Trimberger formulation, however, departed from Marx's original perspective in several ways. First, the state was viewed not as the instrument of class domination emphasized by Marx but as a form of social organization that combines administrative

and military functions and draws resources from society to use in maintaining social order and in competing against other nations economically and militarily. Second, in contrast to the original Marxist analysis, for which a revolution was the outcome of internal technological and economic factors, the new structural approach was oriented to the larger world environment and perceived revolution as the result of conflict between nations at different levels of technological and economic development.

Structural theory specified that the key objective conditions for revolution have in the past occurred in primarily agrarian, technologically inferior states when these were confronted with overpowering military and economic pressures from more-advanced nations. Inability to resist foreign aggression reduced the perceived legitimacy of the prerevolutionary regimes, which were also undermined by divisions within elite population segments regarding how best to deal with external threats. Government policies to cope with foreign pressures, such as attempts to increase state resources by raising taxes on an already largely impoverished population, or the economic effects of foreign exploitation generated mass discontent. The resulting popular support for revolutionary movements overwhelmed the severely weakened prerevolutionary regimes. From the structural point of view, the purpose and outcome of such revolutions were primarily political: the establishment of a new governmental system in a less-developed society, a system that would be better capable of utilizing available resources to counter external threats from more-advanced nations.

The four general theories of revolution briefly described here all explicitly or implicitly hold that mass frustration has been an essential element of revolutionary movements. Marxist, modernization, systems, and structural theories all also suggest that failure of the state to meet new mass expectations or carry out important economic or other crucial social functions leads to a weakening of government legitimacy and coercive capacity, which heightens the probability of revolution. Modernization, Marxist, and structural theories specify processes by which certain elites in society may become sufficiently discontented so that they withdraw support for the existing government or even commit themselves to leading a revolutionary effort.

A major inadequacy of the Marxist, systems, and modernization theories is their relative lack of attention to two essential elements of successful revolutionary movements: a unifying motivation capable of bringing together diverse groups behind a common revolutionary goal and the existence of an international environment permissive of revolution. The structural theory, at least implicitly, confronts the issue of unifying motivation by asserting the primacy of the population-bonding

revolutionary aim of creating a new, stronger government better capable of protecting national interests but, like the other three theories, tends to ignore the world permissiveness factor. Possible reasons for such oversights will be addressed in the concluding chapter. These omissions limit the ability of the major theories of revolution to predict either the development of revolutionary movements or a revolution's chance for success. Both the unifying motivation factor and the role of a permissive international environment will be seen at work on many occasions throughout the chapters on individual revolutions. Together with mass frustration, elite dissidence, and state crisis, these factors go further than general theories toward explaining and predicting revolutionary action and success.

SUMMARY

This chapter provided an overview of concepts, theoretical perspectives, and research findings important to the discussion of revolutionary social movements. A revolutionary movement, in contrast to a reform movement, is aimed at bringing about change in the basic institutions of a society. Of all the phenomena specifically relevant to the success of a revolutionary movement, five appear to be of crucial importance: (1) the growth of frustration among the majority of a population; (2) the existence of elite elements who are alienated from the current government and, more specifically, of elite members who support the concept of revolution; (3) the development of unifying motivations that bring together the members of different social classes in support of a revolution; (4) the occurrence of a crisis that severely weakens government administrative and coercive capabilities in a society experiencing the development of a revolutionary movement; and (5) the choice on the part of other nations not to intervene or their inability to do so to prevent the success of a revolutionary movement in a particular society.

The third point does not exclude the probability that some of the reasons individuals participate in or support a revolutionary movement are of a highly personal nature, such as the belief that the success of the revolution will improve their own material well-being, or a desire for revenge, or because of ties to loved ones or friends who support revolution. But as Greene (1990) pointed out, the participants in a revolution, often drawn from different economic backgrounds, share motivations that bind them together in the common effort. In several revolutions a commitment to freeing one's country from perceived foreign control or the rule of a despised dictatorship or a commitment to a major redistribution of wealth has acted in this way.

Nationalism, often spurred by reaction to imperialist exploitation, has been a powerful unifying sentiment. And although the notion of redistribution of wealth is not necessarily synonymous with socialism, various forms of socialist ideology have figured prominently in the belief systems of many leftist revolutionary movements. The combination of the nationalist goal of liberating one's people from foreign domination and the goal of redistributing wealth to achieve a more egalitarian society has proven to be extremely effective in rallying otherwise diverse social groups to revolutions in Russia, China, Vietnam, and other societies during this century. Nationalism, as a spur to unified action, and economic redistribution, as an antidote to mass frustration, join together with the other major revolutionary factors—elite dissidence, state crisis, and world permissiveness—to explain and predict many sociopolitical upheavals of the twentieth century and, perhaps, centuries to come.

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The Russian Revolution and Changes in Eastern Europe

The Russian Revolution was the first in history won by revolutionaries who advocated the establishment of a socialist society. By early 1917 the majority of the Russian people were extremely discontented with the czar's regime. Various revolutionary groups sought to mobilize popular frustration in support of a massive effort to transform Russian society. An extraordinary opportunity for the leaders of revolutionary movements to seize control of their nation's destiny was provided by the relatively sudden collapse of the coercive power of the czarist state in early 1917. Soldiers and sailors refused orders to repress rebellious street demonstrations and instead went over to the side of the revolutionaries. As the institutions of the czarist government rapidly deteriorated, workers, military personnel, and peasants elected revolutionary administrative councils, or "soviets," from among their own numbers, to exercise power. In fall 1917, soldiers, sailors, and workers loyal to the Bolshevik-led citywide soviet of the capital, Petrograd (Leningrad), established a new national revolutionary government and soon proclaimed the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

The USSR, at 8,649,489 square miles (22,402,200 km²), is the largest country in the world and occupies over one-seventh of the earth's land area. The majority of its territory is a vast plain extending from Eastern Europe to the Pacific Ocean, interrupted occasionally by low mountain ranges. This huge plain is characterized by three distinctive sectors running east and west: The Arctic section is a frozen marshy tundra;

27

the middle band of the country is heavily forested; and the southernmost area is composed of extensive arid grassy plains that in the far south become sandy deserts.

The population of the Soviet Union, which was about 150 million at the time of the revolution in 1917 and in 1990 exceeded 287 million, is composed of many ethnic groups residing in a number of "union republics" (fifteen until 1989, but the parliaments in several of these had voted in 1990 to secede). The largest of the republics is the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, with 52 percent of the country's population and 76 percent of its land area. The second most populous is the Ukraine, with about 18 percent of the USSR's citizens. The remaining republics each contain less than 6 percent of the population.

THE SETTING FOR REVOLUTION

Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia was a vast empire ruled by a hereditary emperor called the czar. The czar governed not only the Russian people but also many of the other nationalities and lands that later were incorporated into the USSR. At the time of the revolution, only about 15 percent of the population lived in cities and the rest were peasants. Russia had begun to industrialize considerably later than other European societies, but the process was well under way by 1917.

Large factories were mainly concentrated in eight industrial regions, including Petrograd (which was the capital at the time of the revolution) and Moscow (which was the old capital and which the revolutionary government established as the capital of the USSR). Approximately half the industrial plants were owned by foreign companies from the more technologically advanced nations. In 1917, at least one-half of all Russia's industrial workers had peasant fathers or had themselves been peasants or rural laborers before migrating to urban areas. Many workers continued to return to the countryside to visit relatives. Thus there was considerable contact between large numbers of industrial workers and rural peasants.

The mass of peasants had considerable reason to be discontented with their lot in czarist Russia. Before the seventeenth century many had lived a nomadic existence, traveling about the countryside seeking optimal conditions, such as the highest possible wages or more fertile land or simply enjoying new experiences and environments. Peasant freedom of movement proved intolerable to many large landowners who desired a more reliable labor force. Thus, in 1649 serfdom, which bound individuals and their families to particular landowners or, in some cases, to the state, under penalty of law, was established. By the 1760s, about 52 percent of those living in rural Russia were serfs (Wolf 1969).

ARCTIC OCEAN

FINLAND

Kronstadt

● Leningrad
(Petrograd)

Baltic
Sea

ESTONIA

LATVIA

LITHUANIA

POLAND

● Minsk

BYELORUSSIA

● Kiev

UKRAINE

ROMANIA

BULGARIA

GREECE

Black Sea

**RUSSIAN SOVIET
FEDERATED SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC**

● Moscow

● Volgograd
(Stalingrad)

Caspian
Sea

GEORGIA

AZERBAIJAN

ARMENIA

IRAN

TURKEY

EUROPEAN U.S.S.R.

After the Russian defeat in the 1854–1856 Crimean War, Czar Alexander II decided to strengthen the nation through a modernization program, which included reforms in the countryside. In 1861 serfdom was abolished and parcels of land were distributed to former serfs. However, in many instances the emancipation from serfdom generated more economic hardship than it alleviated. Most had to pay "redemption" fees, which stretched out over decades, for their land. Furthermore, the parcels of land in high-fertility areas were often smaller than those peasants had worked before emancipation, whereas in areas where the land was less fertile, peasants were assigned much larger parcels, which they then had to pay for. Many former serfs awaited a "second emancipation" that would free them from the burden of redemption payments. Peasants also suffered from heavy taxes, which, especially during the tenure of Finance Minister Sergei Witte (1882–1903), a primary architect of the nation's industrial drive, were a major source of government investment capital (Von Laue 1971). Many fell further and further into debt because they often could not produce enough to feed their families, meet their redemption payments, and pay taxes simultaneously (Wolf 1969). Intense peasant discontent with the czar's regime constituted one of the essential elements of the revolutionary situation in the early twentieth century.

Peasant resentment was often vented through the *zemstvo*s, representative political bodies through which peasants could control their local community affairs, which had been established as part of the 1860s reforms. However, these organs of self-government by their very existence threatened the continuation of autocracy at the national level and helped prepare the countryside for a future revolutionary struggle (Katov 1967; Wolf 1969).

Many peasants did not own their land independently but rather were members of rural collectives called *mir*s. The *mir* assigned individual parcels of land to be worked by particular peasants and established taxation rates for individual households. In some areas, the parcels of land were passed down from father to son on a hereditary basis; in other areas the *mir* had the power to reassign parcels of land on a periodic basis. The existence of the *mir* in the Russian countryside helped prepare much of the rural population not only for participation in a socialist revolution but also for the collectivization of agriculture that occurred during the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Achieving the goals of industrialization and technological development required that thousands of upper- and upper-middle-class Russians receive modern educations. But since the source of advanced technological learning was Western Europe (by attending a university there or being instructed by a Western European or someone who had been

educated there), education inevitably meant exposure to political and economic concepts that were alien to the Russian autocratic system of national government.

By favoring more democratic forms of government and a redistribution of wealth, many young people came to constitute a dissident element within Russia's educated elite. During the mid-nineteenth century some proponents of social change, influenced by the Russian revolutionary activist Mikhail Bakunin, who advocated anarchism, organized the Populist movement. Anarchism included the concept that all productive wealth should be owned by the workers and peasants in collective associations. Economic inequality was to be minimized and people's basic needs satisfied. Since the participants in such an economic system would, ideally, coordinate activities and accomplish important tasks on a cooperative basis, there would be no need for society to employ force through police or military. In other words, there would be no need for a centralized formal government. This was important, according to anarchists, because government had always functioned, in part, as an instrument of oppression used by the rich to exploit the labor of the majority of the population.

Many Populist activists went into the countryside to attempt to "educate" the rural masses to the possibility and desirability of revolutionary change. Their efforts met with only very limited success, as many villagers viewed them as outsiders and meddlers. Other Populists, concluding that violent attacks on the czar's government and its supporters would help topple the dictatorship, secretly organized Narodnaia Volia (People's Will) to carry out numerous assassinations and acts of antigovernment terrorism (Dmytryshyn 1984, p. 25). People's Will, along with other branches of the Populist movement, supported the creation of national and local elected assemblies; economic and administrative freedom of action for the village communes; bestowing ownership of all land on those who worked it; workers' control of industrial plants; complete freedom of speech, press, and political activity; granting all adults, regardless of gender, wealth, or landownership, the right to vote; and the replacement of the existing professional army with a people's militia (Dmytryshyn 1984). The major victim of People's Will terrorist activity was Czar Alexander II, who was assassinated on March 13, 1881. After the assassination, the government increased police repression, effectively destroyed People's Will, and made it extremely difficult for other revolutionary groups to operate in Russia.

The Populist movement helped formulate the concept of the totally dedicated revolutionist. In a book written in 1869 by the anarchists Sergei Necheav and Bakunin, *Catechism of the Revolutionary*, the ideal revolutionary was described as a man with no inhibiting personal bonds

or emotional concerns and only one dominant passion, accomplishing
the revolution (Wolf 1969). Another important element of Populist
thought was the belief that traditional communal institutions among
Russian peasants, such as the *mir,* could serve as the basis for a direct
transition in Russia from rural collectivism to modern socialism without
having to undergo what the Populists considered to be the brutalizing
and dehumanizing experience of capitalist industrialization. The pro-
gram of the Russian revolutionaries who eventually succeeded, the
Marxist Bolsheviks led by Lenin, incorporated some of the Populist
concepts, including the need for an organization of dedicated profes-
sional revolutionaries and the possibility of industrializing under a so-
cialist system without having to go through a period of capitalist de-
velopment. Versions of the Populist movement grew and faded away
repeatedly over several decades. At the time of the 1917 revolution,
populism was manifested in the countryside through the Socialist Rev-
olutionary party, which was then the most popular political party among
the peasants.

THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Among the educated elite, some advocates of sweeping social change
in Russia rejected terrorist methods. Such actions, they argued, not only
intensified police repression but also morally alienated large numbers
of citizens and caused them to reject the message of the revolutionaries
without ever giving it serious attention. One organization that con-
demned terrorism, Osvobozhdhenie Truda (Liberation of Labor), was
founded in 1883 in Geneva, Switzerland, by Russian exiles who were
interested in the ideas of Karl Marx. This group included Georgi
Plekhanov, the man who translated Marx's works into Russian.

Marx's analysis of history had led him to conclude that *capitalism* (the
period of social development during which private ownership of re-
sources, industry, and commerce characterizes the economic system and
the owners of industrial and commercial enterprises control the gov-
ernment) would inevitably be succeeded by *socialism* (the phase of society
theoretically characterized by public ownership of resources and pro-
ductive institutions and by working-class control of government). In
Marx's view, socialism would eventually lead to the final and highest
developmental stage of history, *communism,* which was to be characterized
by material abundance, cooperative social relations, and the end of the
need for suppressive governmental institutions such as armies or police
forces.

Marx predicted that capitalist society would create both the political
means and the motivation for the exploited and toiling masses of the

world to finally, for the first time in history, seize control and redirect the resources of society toward benefiting the needs of the great majority rather than catering to the interests of a numerically small ruling element (Marx 1848, 1875). According to Marx, capitalism provided the political means for the working class to seize power by physically concentrating working people in large cities where they could interact, organize, and develop a shared consciousness concerning the cause of their economic exploitation and the desirability of replacing capitalism with socialism. The motivation for the urban industrial working class, or *proletariat*, to strive for revolutionary change would be what Marx thought was a continuous characteristic of capitalism, the impoverishment and miserable living conditions of the working class. Once capitalism had been overcome, the new socialist society, as described by Marx (1875) and, later, Lenin (1917), would be characterized by collective rather than private ownership of the economy, greater economic and social equality, an attempt to provide employment for all people able to work, and the provision of basic foods, medical services, education, and other necessities of life either free or at low cost to the entire population.

Although advocating many of the goals of the Populists, such as a democratic political system and absolute freedom of speech, press, and assembly, the Russian Marxists did not initially feel that the village commune of traditional peasant society could form the basis of a future socialist Russia. They argued, strictly adhering to Marx's concepts, that Russia first had to undergo industrialization at the hands of privately owned companies. Once capitalism had transformed much of the peasantry into an urban industrial working class, the transformation to socialism could occur.

During the 1890s the Liberation of Labor group evolved into a critically important political organization, the Russian Social Democratic party (complete title: Russian Social Democratic Labor party). At its 1903 meeting, the party publicly supported goals almost identical to those previously advocated by the Liberation of Labor movement. However, at the same meeting a split developed within the party. One divisive factor was an argument concerning control of the party itself. An important party leader, Lenin (born Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov, 1870), tried to persuade the other delegates that only the hard-core activists in the party (lifelong committed revolutionaries and certain dedicated participants in the underground revolutionary organizations) should have a voice in governing the party. Lenin claimed that a fully open and democratic party system would be hopelessly vulnerable to infiltration and manipulation by the czar's secret police and easily repressed in autocratic Russia (Wilson 1972). He was defeated 28 to 23 on this issue (Dmytryshyn 1984). But in the election for control of the party's central

committees and the editorial board of its newspaper, *Iskra* (The spark), candidates favored by Lenin won. From that point on, the supporters of Lenin called themselves "Bolsheviks" (the majority), and Lenin's opponents in the Social Democratic party were called "Mensheviks" (the minority).

The division within the Russian Social Democratic party grew and became permanent after the 1912 party conference in Prague. The Mensheviks continued to support the notion that the transition to socialism would occur gradually and in stages in Russia. First the monarchy would be destroyed and replaced by a political democracy with a capitalist economic system. As the capitalist business investors transformed the economy of Russia through industrialization, the Mensheviks would take advantage of the open democratic political system to educate the members of the industrial working class to the desirability of the fairer, more efficient economic system and society that the Mensheviks (as well as the Bolsheviks) felt socialism represented.

In contrast, the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's influence, concluded that once the monarchy had been overthrown, the postrevolutionary political system should immediately become a **dictatorship of the proletariat,** in which the government would be in the hands of leaders truly committed to the interests of the worker-peasant majority of the population and the rapid implementation of socialism (Fitzpatrick 1982; Rabinowitch 1976; Von Laue 1971).

Marx had asserted that socialist society would be characterized by the dictatorship of the proletariat, by which he meant the political domination of the working class over the government. He, however, never clearly defined how the working-class majority would control the political system and the institutions of governmental coercion, such as the army and the police. Lenin, in contrast, provided the first operational definition of the concept. He argued that the expanding Bolshevik organization should seize power in order to effect change rapidly and defend the revolution and the working class from opponents (Bottomore 1983; Fitzpatrick 1982). Thus for Lenin the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the rule of the revolutionary party in a one-party political system.

Lenin believed that although the industrial workers were to be the basis of the revolution, on their own they could develop only what was called "trade union consciousness" (that is, a concern about limited job-related objectives, such as wages, benefits, number of working hours, and working conditions). He argued that the workers required the leadership and inspiration of revolutionary intellectuals (whether they had risen from the working class to attain an education or came from middle- or upper-class backgrounds) to achieve "revolutionary con-

sciousness" (the commitment to a transformation of society to socialism). The Bolsheviks, who before the 1917 revolution officially referred to themselves as the Russian Social Democratic Labor party and in 1918 adopted the title Communist party, would, according to Lenin, lead the masses to socialism and then through the stage of socialist development to communist society (Lenin 1902, 1917). Whether Lenin would have come up with a more democratic system in a different political context or whether he would have modified his concept of government after the threat to the revolution had subsided will never be known: He died soon after the end of the Russian Revolution.

THE ATTEMPTED REVOLUTION OF 1905

At the turn of the century discontent with the czar's dictatorship was manifested not only through the growth of political parties dedicated to the overthrow of the monarchy but also through industrial strikes for better wages and working conditions, protests and riots among peasants, university demonstrations, and the assassinations of government officials, often by Socialist Revolutionaries (both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks opposed terrorist violence). But when in 1904 hostilities broke out between Russian and Japanese forces in the Far East, Russian government and military figures felt that domestic tensions could be reduced by rallying the country for a war that they were confident Russia would win. Instead, the Japanese inflicted one military disaster after another on Russian forces until the United States mediated a settlement.

Hardships caused by the war intensified worker discontent. In January 1905, a peaceful procession of thousands of workers, led by an activist priest named George Gapon, attempted to present the czar a petition listing grievances and calling upon him for assistance. But soldiers fired on the demonstrators, killing scores of people. Following the massacre, known as Bloody Sunday, strikes and peasant uprisings spread through many areas of Russia. Even some units of the army and navy rebelled. These events are known collectively as the Revolution of 1905. Industrial workers in Petrograd elected a workers' governing parliament called the Soviet (council) of Workers' Deputies (representatives).

In fear that the revolution might succeed, Czar Nicholas II promised reforms. Specifically, he pledged to allow (1) freedom of conscience, speech, and assembly; (2) the creation of a national parliament, or State Duma, which would have the power to confirm or block the implementation of any law; and (3) the right of even men who did not own property to participate in the election of the Duma (Dmytryshyn 1984; Salisbury 1981). The proclamation of these reforms caused great celebration among liberals of aristocratic background, capitalist business-

men, and many highly educated professionals. Workers and peasants who wished to continue the revolution were deprived of the support of the upper- and middle-class elements that had been opposed to the czar's dictatorial style of government. The czar then sent military units (most of the army had remained loyal) to those towns and peasant villages still in rebellion. Thousands of people were executed and many thousands more, especially Jewish socialists, were forced to leave Russia. Some of the Russian Jewish exiles migrated to Palestine, where they established collective-farming communes (kibbutzim), which embodied their socialist ideals.

In order to pacify the growing industrial working class, the czar's government legalized labor unions and introduced health and accident insurance programs for some categories of workers. Plans were developed to provide free elementary education. The government also launched an agrarian-reform program intended to encourage more individual peasants to own parcels of land rather than participate in village communes. One purpose of this policy, named the Stolypin Land Reform, after its director, Premier Peter Stolypin, was to eliminate the *mir,* which had been a source of revolutionary organization during the 1905 revolution, and to institute capitalist business relationships among farmers in place of the cooperative and collectivist relationships of the traditional village commune. This effort was intended to greatly expand the class of landowning peasants, especially the number of rich peasants (kulaks) in order to use them as a protection against further revolutionary developments in the countryside. The regime claimed that half or more of the peasants were private landowners by 1915.

The czar later refused to honor some of his promised reforms. Election laws were structured so as to prevent most of the adult population (including those most prone to revolutionary ideas, such as many of the industrial workers) from voting (Dmytryshyn 1984; Von Laue 1971). When those permitted to vote still elected a Duma that the czar could not totally control, he responded to the legislature's measures and demands by ignoring them or periodically disbanding it. Thus the czar continued to exercise dictatorial power.

The attempted revolution in 1905 had failed for a number of reasons. Most revolutionary leaders were taken by surprise by the uprisings of workers and peasants and were not in a position to coordinate the individual rebellions throughout the Russian Empire, making them easier to suppress. Furthermore, the creation of a national elected parliament persuaded upper- and middle-class liberals to desert the revolutionary cause. And the majority of army and naval units remained loyal to the czar's government. Each of these factors would be reversed in 1917.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1917

The February Revolution

During the early part of the twentieth century, tensions among European nations intensified over a number of issues, including competition for control of the resources of the less-developed parts of the world and the worsening of traditional ethnic hostilities. When Archduke Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by a Serb, Russia, declaring its readiness to aid the Serbians, a fellow Slavic people, plunged into war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its more powerful ally, Germany. Despite earlier commitments not to obey if ordered by "capitalist governments" to take up arms against working-class brothers in neighboring countries, most socialist leaders, apparently swept away on tides of nationalist fervor, pledged support for their nations' war efforts. Among Russian socialists, Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks were virtually alone in condemning the war as a "capitalist atrocity" perpetrated by the ruling classes of Europe, an atrocity that would result in the mass slaughter of millions of peasants and workers. Although he opposed the war, Lenin recognized it as a potential opportunity for a new and successful revolution. In fact, he argued that Russia's defeat in the war would be the best possible outcome because such a catastrophe would deprive the czarist state of its remaining aura of legitimacy and the loyalty of its armed forces and generate the level of mass discontent necessary to topple the regime (Fitzpatrick 1982).

Russian armies soon suffered a series of devastating defeats in battles against the better-armed German forces. Millions of Russian soldiers perished; the call-up of 15 million men into military service caused serious industrial and agricultural labor shortages, which disrupted not only army supplies but also the availability of food for the entire population. In Petrograd, extreme shortages led to accelerated inflation. Between the start of World War I and 1917, the real (inflation-adjusted) wages of Petrograd workers declined to about one-third of prewar levels, owing largely to increases in the price of necessities (Rabinowitch 1976). As conditions worsened, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors, workers, and peasants elected "soviets" to demand change and to provide organization for a building revolutionary upsurge. By early March 1917 (late February according to the Julian calendar, which Russia followed at the time), mass industrial strikes had broken out in major urban centers. The czar, who was at the front, sent troops to Petrograd to subdue the strikers. However, most of the soldiers refused to fire on the demonstrators and many joined the protests.

As the coercive power of the czarist state rapidly disintegrated, it became clear that not only the civilian workers and peasants but also the bulk of the armed forces (drawn from those classes), as well as most of the middle class and some in the upper class, were now united in opposition to the czar's continuation in power. Units of the Petrograd garrison mutinied, and soldiers, under the direction of the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, took control of the capital on March 12 (February 27 on the Julian calendar). On March 16 the czar was forced to abdicate and Russia became a republic. The czar's parliament, the Duma, then drew from its numbers individuals to serve in a new "provisional government," which was at first headed by an aristocrat, Prince Lvov, and eventually by the moderate socialist, Alexander Kerensky (Katov 1967; Rabinowitch 1976).

But the immediate postczarist national government suffered from critical weaknesses. Members of the provisional government reflected the social-class composition of the Duma: They were largely wealthy businessmen, aristocrats, or employed in the professions. Although moderate socialists served in the provisional government along with conservatives and liberals, it represented primarily upper-income interests and was viewed with some suspicion by workers and peasants, many of whom in the capital recognized only the authority of their Petrograd Soviet. Despite the fact that the Petrograd Soviet initially supported the right of the provisional government to exercise the power of state, a system of "dual power" actually existed, with the provisional government and the Petrograd Soviet as the two centers of authority. The Petrograd Soviet agreed to share power with and support the provisional government until national political power could be handed over to a Constituent Assembly that was to be elected by all male citizens.

All over the country, class hostility intensified. Soldiers no longer automatically obeyed their officers, who were typically from higher-class background. Rather, soldiers and sailors debated issues and continued to elect self-governing soviets from their own numbers. Initially, the Petrograd Soviet was dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. But from spring 1917 on, the Bolsheviks gained members— including many Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries who defected—faster than any other group (Dmytryshyn 1984; Fitzpatrick 1984; Greene 1990; Rabinowitch 1976). The Bolsheviks achieved majorities in both the Petrograd and the Moscow soviets by early fall.

The October Revolution

The provisional government made several crucial decisions that rapidly dissipated its initially limited coercive capability, which had been

based on the willingness of military personnel to accept its authority. First, it decided to continue the war against Germany. Those in favor of maintaining Russia's war effort, including the Mensheviks and the more conservative of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the Petrograd Soviet, were motivated by several factors: patriotism, hatred for Germany, and the perceived need for future economic and technical aid from England and France, Russia's allies against Germany. The Bolsheviks and the pro-Bolshevik Socialist Revolutionaries (called Left Socialist Revolutionaries) opposed the war. The provisional government's second crucial failing was its policy of delaying major economic reforms, including the redistribution of lands to the poor peasants, until after the war and postponing the election of the national Constituent Assembly. This decision outraged many peasants, who suspected the upper-class members of the provisional government were not going to go through with a land-reform program at all. But the provisional government feared mass desertions if land redistribution occurred while the war was still going on: Peasant soldiers would not want to miss out on the opportunity to obtain distributed land. So once the decision to continue the war had been made, the provisional government was forced to make the extremely unpopular declaration that land reform would be delayed.

When the czar was overthrown, two important advocates of revolution were not in Russia. Lenin was in exile in Geneva and Leon Trotsky (born Lyov Davidovich Bronstein in the Ukraine in 1879), who had led the Petrograd Soviet during its brief 1905 existence, was in New York. Lenin realized the opportunity for a sweeping socioeconomic revolution was developing in his homeland and determined that he must get to Petrograd as soon as possible. Assistance came from a remarkable source, the imperial German government. German capitalist leaders detested the ideology of socialism, especially the ideas of the Bolsheviks concerning redistribution of wealth and worldwide revolution. But Germany was at war and fighting on two fronts. If Russia were to give up the war, Germany could concentrate on the western front and perhaps deliver a knockout blow. The German leaders correctly concluded that the chances of Russia's leaving the conflict would be much greater if the charismatic Lenin, long an opponent of the war, were to return to Petrograd. The German government transported him in a railroad car through Germany to Sweden, from which Lenin made his way to Petrograd.

Trotsky arrived in Petrograd in May and declared that he was in favor of Lenin and the Bolshevik program rather than that of the Mensheviks, who continued to support Russian involvement in the war and the concept of a gradual evolution toward socialist transformation. Trotsky, Lenin, and other Bolshevik leaders argued, in contrast, that

there must be a second revolution, one in which the workers and peasants would take power away from the upper class. Throughout Russia, Bolshevik speakers proclaimed: "End the war"; "All land to the peasants"; and "All power to the soviets" (Dmytryshyn 1984; Fitzgerald 1982; Rabinowitch 1976).

The provisional government in early July launched a new offensive against the Germans, which predictably ended in disaster. Then the Germans launched a successful counterattack. Thousands of deserting Russian soldiers flocked to Petrograd. These events encouraged some Bolshevik leaders to attempt an uprising. Lenin apparently was uncertain whether the conditions were yet right for a Bolshevik seizure of power and may even have opposed an insurrection at that point. In any case, the uprising failed and Trotsky and several other Bolsheviks were jailed by soldiers still loyal to the provisional government. Lenin went into hiding. At that time, Kerensky, representing a group of moderate socialists, became head of the provisional government.

The unsuccessful Bolshevik insurrection of July was followed in September by the attempt of a conservative general, Lavr Kornilov, to seize power. Expecting the attack, the provisional government released Trotsky and other imprisoned Bolshevik leaders and called upon the growing ranks of the Bolsheviks to defend Petrograd. As it turned out, Kornilov's attempted takeover proved an utter failure since most of his forces refused to carry out their orders and many joined the Bolsheviks. Rapidly increasing numbers of workers, soldiers, and sailors concluded that any further counterrevolutionary attempts to crush the revolution and working-class power must be prevented. Therefore, the popularly elected soviets, led by those committed to establishing a socialist economic system, must be granted total power.

Bolshevik majorities, by the end of September, had been elected in both the Petrograd and Moscow soviets. Lenin concluded that the time had come for the Bolsheviks to, as he saw it, seize power on behalf of the workers and peasants and decisively commit the country to socialism. On November 7 (October 25 according to the Julian calendar) soldiers, sailors, and armed workers of the Petrograd Soviet, under Trotsky's command, occupied transportation and communication centers, government buildings, and the czar's Winter Palace (Greene 1990). There was little bloodshed since few military personnel in the capital still recognized the authority of the provisional government. Kerensky fled and the provisional government was at an end. Soviet workers and soldiers under Bolshevik leadership also took control in Moscow and other large cities. The Bolshevik-led new revolutionary government instructed local village soviets to seize large private estates and church-

owned land, abolished private ownership of industry, and announced its intention to end the war with Germany.

The election of the previously agreed-upon Constituent Assembly was held shortly after the Bolshevik overthrow of the provisional government. Bolshevik popularity had been increasing, but the party was still not well known to most people in the countryside or in the southern part of the country. Votes of the 5 million soldiers and sailors were counted separately. The Bolsheviks won absolute majorities in the armies in the north and west and among the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, but the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Ukrainian ethnic parties won among the armies of the south and the Black Sea Fleet (Fitzpatrick 1982). The Bolsheviks also won majorities in Petrograd and Moscow and probably took most of the country's urban vote. The Bolsheviks received 24 percent of the total (9,800,000 votes), placing them second to the relatively loosely organized revolutionary party of the peasants, the Socialist Revolutionaries, which received 41 percent (17,100,000 votes) (Dmytryshyn 1984). A number of other political parties and several parties representing minority ethnic interests won much lower percentages. For example, the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), who favored a parliamentary constitutional monarchy system and moderate economic reforms, received 5 percent (2,000,000), and the Mensheviks' vote was 3 percent (1,360,000).

At the time of the election, the positions of the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries on the issue of central concern to the peasants, redistribution of land, were basically identical. Consequently, in the minority of villages that were close enough to cities, towns, military bases, or rail depots for the inhabitants to know the Bolshevik program, the peasants voted in equal numbers for the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries. But in most villages where the people were not familiar with the Bolsheviks or their land policy, the rural-based Socialist Revolutionaries achieved majorities (Fitzgerald 1982). When the assembly convened in January 1918, most of the delegates began criticizing the Bolsheviks. Before the assembly had been in existence for twenty-four hours, soldiers loyal to the Bolshevik-controlled Petrograd Soviet forced it to disband.

In the following months, power shifted more and more from the elected soviets to the Bolshevik party organization (Daniels 1988; Dmytryshyn 1984; Fitzpatrick 1982; Rabinowitch 1976). Some who had supported the revolution to overthrow the provisional government objected to Bolshevik domination and demanded that major power be returned to the soviets. Most notably, in 1921 many of the sailors at the Kronstadt Naval Base rebelled and demanded a "true soviet republic of workers and peasants." The Kronstadt rebellion was quickly crushed by

Bolshevik-led military units. The soviets, although still in existence, assumed a role in influencing local community affairs. But not until the major democratization reforms in 1989 and 1990 did a soviet exercise effective power at the national level.

ASSESSING THE BOLSHEVIK SEIZURE OF POWER

According to most interpretations of Marx's theories, the Bolsheviks were wrong to seize power in 1917. Marx felt that the transformation to socialism would first occur in the most-advanced countries because they had the large urban industrial working classes that he thought would constitute the basis of support for socialism. The Russian industrial working class in 1917 was revolutionary but made up only a small fraction of the total population. Lenin realized, however, that an extraordinary political situation had provided a unique opportunity for revolutionists in Russia. In the face of rebellious armed forces and revolutionary peasants and workers desperate for relief from the miseries of war and economic exploitation, the Russian state had collapsed. Most competing political groups were handicapped by ineffectual leaders and confused or unappealing ideologies. Lenin believed that the Bolsheviks had a scientifically based understanding of human history and a realistic plan to create the first truly just human society. He and other Bolshevik leaders felt that history would not excuse a failure to take advantage of such a remarkable set of circumstances.

But Lenin and his associates also realized their "premature" seizure of power would result in several problems. For example, the revolutionary leadership was attempting to carry out a socialist revolution in a primarily agrarian society. Marxist theory assumed that socialist revolution was impossible without the support of the majority. But in Russia the majority of the population was not the industrial proletariat, but the rural peasantry. Lenin, incorporating some concepts from the tradition of the old Populist movement, argued that the majority of peasants could be convinced to support the revolution. Mobilization of the peasants would proceed, Lenin argued, in the following sequence. The Bolsheviks, originally composed mainly of revolutionary intellectuals from upper- or middle-class backgrounds, would initially awaken and recruit the Russian industrial working class to the revolution. Then the revolutionary working class, hundreds of thousands of whom would join the Bolshevik organization (Communist party after 1918), would provide leadership and inspiration to the population's discontented peasant majority, many of whom would soon also join the Party. Most of the peasants, according to Lenin, could be won over for several reasons. First, the

lands of the big private owners and the Church were to be given over to the peasants. Second, the Bolsheviks anticipated that the peasant communes (*mirs*), with their traditions of collectivism and cooperation, could provide the basis for peasant incorporation into the socialist revolution. Thus, Lenin thought that whereas the industrial working class would constitute the core of the revolution in Russia, most of the peasants would also support the revolution (Fitzpatrick 1982).

Another major concern was the question of how to industrialize without capitalism. Industry and modern technology were necessary to make the economy produce the wealth needed to provide a materially satisfying life for all of society's members. But according to Marx, industrialization was to be accomplished under the system of private ownership, investment, and profit making. If the revolution preceded complete industrialization, the latter would have to be accomplished under socialism. But this would seem to mean that the improvement of the material well-being of the population would have to be postponed while the system accumulated enough wealth (capital) to bring about industrialization.

Could a harsh transition to industrial society under socialism be avoided? Remarkably, Lenin, Trotsky, and some of their associates initially anticipated that once the Bolshevik Revolution succeeded, revolutionary Russia would provide inspiration and perhaps assistance to the working classes of the advanced industrial nations to accomplish their own socialist revolutions (Rabinowitch 1976). Then the revolutionary advanced societies could use some of the wealth produced by their industries to create an assistance fund for Russia and other less-developed countries so that they could undergo industrialization without imposing harsh austerity or repressive measures on their populations. But although industrial workers in several of the nations defeated in World War I, including Germany and Hungary, tried to organize revolutions, their efforts were unsuccessful. In these countries the armed forces, who were not won over to the side of the revolutionaries, suppressed the uprisings. Furthermore, the peasants of other European societies were more conservative than those in Russia and generally opposed revolution (Greene 1990).

When it became clear that no advanced nations of the World War I era would experience a socialist revolution, the leaders of revolutionary Russia confronted serious problems. Industrialization would have to be achieved through the Soviet Union's own resources. This meant that extreme austerity measures would be necessary for the Soviet state to accumulate the capital necessary to transform the economy. The hostility of the more-industrialized societies toward the Soviet Union intensified the motivation to industrialize as quickly as possible. In the event of

military attacks from capitalist nations, heavy industry would be crucial for producing the weapons needed for defense (Von Laue 1971).

THE CIVIL WAR

The Bolshevik Revolution of November 7, 1917, did not result in an immediate revolutionary victory throughout the czar's vast empire. On the periphery of European Russia, various forces gathered, some to overthrow the revolution and some to establish different versions of revolutionary society than that proposed by the Bolsheviks. Former czarist generals rallied anti-Bolshevik officers and soldiers and organized so-called White Armies. The more conservative elements of the Socialist Revolutionary party attempted to set up a separate revolutionary government. An anarchist group that opposed any strong central state government, czarist or Bolshevik, attempted to maintain control of much of the southern Ukraine (Palij 1976). Several capitalist countries, including Britain, the United States, and Japan, sent troops to various parts of Russia and provided military assistance to anti-Bolshevik armies.

The Bolshevik leadership responded to these attacks by organizing the Red Army, which was first made up of volunteers; later a draft was imposed. The core of the army included hundreds of thousands of industrial workers and Communist party members. Trotsky provided it with energetic and charismatic leadership. Eventually numbering more than 5 million, by 1923 the Red Army had defeated all the White Armies and other anti-Bolshevik forces.

The years of civil war and foreign capitalist military intervention instilled a siege mentality in Bolshevik supporters and helped militarize the Communist party itself (Daniels 1988; Fitzpatrick 1982). The attempted assassination of Lenin in 1921 and the actual killings of thousands of Communist party members and supporters by White and anti-Bolshevik forces were accompanied by the growth of the Bolshevik internal security forces (secret police), which executed thousands of people without trial during the Civil War (Fitzpatrick 1982).

There were several reasons why anti-Bolshevik forces failed. Probably of greatest importance was the fact that the Whites had political and economic goals that were far less appealing to the vast majority of Russia's population than were those of the Bolsheviks. For example, most of the White Army leaders proposed immediately returning the land distributed to peasants to the former big landowners and the Church. The peasants were further alienated from the Whites by the conduct of the White soldiers toward the civilian population, which was worse than the behavior of the Red Army (Dmytryshyn 1984; Fitzpatrick 1982). Moreover, the anti-Bolshevik forces were not unified nor were

their efforts, for the most part, coordinated (Von Laue 1971). Their receiving aid from foreign nations made them appear agents of imperialism to many Russians. The Red Army, in contrast, was usually perceived of as defending the country against the rich and their foreign allies. Finally, the assistance provided to White Armies and other anti-Bolshevik forces was limited both by the vast size of the country and by the fact that capitalist governments were confronted with domestic populations and economies still recovering from the devastation of World War I.

LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

The death in 1924 of Lenin, who had been ill for some time, prompted a struggle for control of the revolution. The future course of development of the Russian Communist party and the Soviet Union was at stake. Lenin had evaluated in writing some of the top Bolshevik leaders and had singled out Trotsky and Stalin as outstanding. Trotsky, the educated son of a rich peasant, was a brilliant organizer and leader; he had engineered the Bolshevik overthrow of the provisional government in 1917 and then led the Red Army to victory in the Civil War.

Stalin (born Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, in 1879) was the son of a cobbler and a washerwoman, former serfs in Georgia, a small mountainous state that had been conquered by the czar's army and then incorporated into the Russian Empire. Stalin was one of the few top Bolshevik leaders to have come from the lowest classes of prerevolutionary czarist society. Although he had trained for the priesthood, Stalin left the seminary to become a revolutionary activist among oil-industry workers. The czar's government imprisoned him and exiled him to Siberia. Although neither a charismatic speaker nor a war hero, Stalin became a top-level and very effective Party organizer. After the civil war, much of the Red Army was demobilized, but the Communist party continued to grow in membership as well as in political dominance. Controlling the Party machinery (Party leaders, bureaucracy, and newspapers) was a more significant source of power than past military glory. In his final days, Lenin wrote a letter to the Communist party in which he suggested that Party members "find a way to remove Stalin," whom he now considered "too rude" to be Party leader (*New York Times*, May 10, 1987, p. E3). But Lenin's final disapproval came too late to block Stalin's ascent to power.

Trotsky and Stalin agreed on some important issues, such as the need to industrialize the Soviet Union rapidly and the dominant political role of the Communist party. However, they disagreed on two major points (Dmytryshyn 1984; Dunn 1972; Fitzpatrick 1982; Von Laue 1971). First,

Trotsky, a former Menshevik, claimed that Stalin was imposing a type of dictatorial control over the Communist party. Trotsky argued that freedom of expression and more open and democratic methods of leader selection and policy development should exist *within* the Party. Stalin and his associates could assert that Lenin was responsible for or accepted some of the limitations on democracy within the Party, such as the 1922 Party congress resolution that permitted the Central Committee to expel by a two-thirds vote any Party members involved in an organized faction opposing the policies of the governing majority (Von Laue 1971). But Trotsky and his supporters argued that Lenin's restrictions were a reaction first to the police-state repression of the czar's regime and later to the threat posed by the Civil War and the accompanying foreign military intervention and were not meant to be permanent, let alone tightened by Stalin's measures.

The second major disagreement had to do with Russia's role in regard to revolutionary movements in other countries. Trotsky argued that Russia should provide them all possible encouragement and physical assistance. His supporters used the slogan "World revolution now!" to express this point of view. According to Trotsky, "true" socialism would be impossible to achieve, particularly in a primarily agricultural society like Russia in the 1920s, without revolutions throughout the world, including in the advanced capitalist nations. An isolated revolutionary but economically backward society without substantial industrialization assistance from the advanced countries and, in fact, militarily threatened by them, would, Trotsky predicted, tend to develop a repressive government for defensive reasons. And instead of improving the material well-being of the people, the state would be forced to limit political freedom and consumption in order to ensure a disciplined and reliable labor force and also to accumulate the capital needed for industrialization. The hardships could be avoided if worldwide revolution occurred. Fostering international revolution was an element of Trotsky's general theory of "permanent revolution." Trotsky borrowed this expression from Marx and Engels and used it to refer to what he considered to be a necessary worldwide series of revolutionary upheavals, which together would bring about the conditions necessary for the achievement of socialism throughout the world (Bottomore 1983).

Stalin, in contrast, argued that events had proven that the political circumstances in most other countries were simply not right for the occurrence of socialist revolutions, even with the meager assistance the new, economically struggling Soviet Union might be able to provide to revolutionaries. In light of these realities, Soviet aid to revolutionary movements in the more technologically advanced societies could well have the effect, not of bringing about more revolutions, but of provoking

a new and even more determined military intervention against the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviet Union should withhold assistance for the time being and devote its energies toward rapidly industrializing and increasing the efficiency of agricultural production. Then, once the Soviet Union was a mighty industrial power, not only could the country produce the weaponry necessary to defend its own revolution against capitalist intervention, but it would also be in a better position to aid foreign revolutionary movements. Stalin's supporters represented this position by the slogan "Build socialism in one country first!" That made sense to many in the Soviet Union.

Trotsky suffered from several additional handicaps in the power struggle. First, many people apparently associated the initial limitations on internal Party democracy with Lenin rather than with Stalin, even though Stalin extended them and made them permanent. Also, many Bolsheviks were students of past revolutions and feared that, as happened after the French Revolution, a successful army officer could seize power and become a "Russian Napoleon." Even though it was Stalin who eventually assumed dictatorial power, in the 1920s many Bolsheviks feared that Trotsky, charismatic leader of the Red Army, represented the real danger of a one-man dictatorship. Finally, although Stalin himself was not a Russian, but a Georgian, many Bolsheviks and other Soviet citizens were not certain about Trotsky's nationalist commitment to the Soviet Union because he had spent considerable time outside the country and because he was Jewish. Some feared that Trotsky's commitment to "world revolution" might mean sacrificing the well-being or even the existence of the Soviet Union. In the struggle for control of the Communist party, Stalin's supporters were often able to portray Trotsky as an elitist cosmopolitan intellectual with only a weak nationalist loyalty to the Soviet Union (Fitzpatrick 1982). In 1929, Trotsky, after losing several political confrontations with Stalin's supporters, was expelled from the Soviet Union. He continued to write and critically evaluate developments in the Soviet Union until he was assassinated in Mexico City in 1940 by a Stalinist.

THE SOVIET UNION UNDER STALIN

Stalin and the Communist party were confronted with the task of industrializing the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible. As revolutions had not occurred in the more-advanced industrial nations, the Soviet Union was on its own. This meant that industrialization was going to be a painful experience under socialism, as it would have been under capitalism. The only advantages, hypothetically, would be a more equal distribution of the burden under socialism, and a more-organized cen-

trally directed industrialization process. Unfortunately for the peasants, the Soviet Union would have to rely on its agricultural productivity to finance the further development of heavy industry.

During the late 1920s and the early 1930s, virtually all agriculture was collectivized. Collectivization, by increasing efficiency, would theoretically make agricultural labor available for the growing needs of industry. The introduction of more machinery, better management, and more-scientific methods of farming were also supposed to raise productivity. For many peasants, collectivization was not much more than a technicality because they were already members of village communes. But for many of those who farmed their own land independently, it was a disagreeable and often traumatic process.

According to Von Laue (1971, pp. 198–199), "The transition from private to collective farming was pushed forward with utter recklessness in 1929 and early 1930. For the countryside it meant a far more brutal upheaval than any previous agrarian measure since the imposition of serfdom." Vast rural areas were characterized by widespread "class warfare," in which many of the poorer peasants and Party activists championed the collectivization cause by attempting to force the most affluent peasants (the kulaks), often among the hardest working and most productive, to surrender their land, livestock, and costly farm equipment to the collectives. But many rich peasants killed their animals or sold them for slaughter rather than contribute them to the collective farms. The number of farm animals declined significantly (Dmytryshyn 1984). In retaliation, the government arrested and deported perhaps 1 million kulak families to Siberia (Fitzpatrick 1982). Hundreds of thousands of others who resisted collectivization were forcibly separated from their families and sent as forced labor to new industrial centers (Von Laue 1971).

The Soviet government demanded large portions of peasant production for grain export in order to earn the capital needed to purchase the industrial technology and machinery for industrialization. The loss of farm animals, the large share of agricultural production taken by the state to finance industrialization, poor weather conditions, and the social disorganization, conflict, and disruption of agriculture caused by collectivization combined to generate a famine in certain areas during the early 1930s. According to various sources, several million people starved to death (Dmytryshyn 1984; Fitzpatrick 1982; Von Laue 1971).

The push for rapid industrialization also meant hardships for the industrial workers. Trade union freedoms were reduced so that "labor discipline" could be maintained and industrial productivity raised as quickly as possible. Improvement in living standards occurred at a slow pace because the state stressed reinvestment in heavy industry rather

than development of consumer goods. The Communist party inspired a "cultural revolution," which generated literary works, cultural events, and works of art supportive of the revolution, collectivization of agriculture, and the crash industrialization program (Dmytryshyn 1984; Fitzpatrick 1982). The Soviet state's control over labor unions, peasant collectives, and the mass media and the government's marshalling of the arts and literature in support of its economic and political goals within the context of a one-party political system have been characterized as a form of **totalitarianism** (total government domination of all major social institutions) both by international critics of the Soviet regime and by later generations of Soviet leaders and citizens.

Many Communist leaders reportedly objected to the forced collectivization of agriculture, but their misgivings on that policy were more than offset by their satisfaction with the spectacularly rapid growth in industry (Fitzpatrick 1982). By the 1930s, the revolution was becoming "institutionalized." Technical and managerial personnel educated after the revolution were beginning to replace those schooled under the prerevolutionary political and cultural systems. Regime supporters anticipated that in the future the Soviet people would not have to rely on engineers, technicians, and managers who were discontented "class enemies," but on educated people who were not only technically knowledgeable but also committed to the successful development of socialist society.

Stalin continued to lead the Soviet Union until his death in 1953. His fear of counterrevolutionary or anti-Stalinist plots motivated "purges" of many government and Party officials and army officers in the mid- and late 1930s. Thousands of people were executed and many were deported to remote regions of the country. After Stalin died, Soviet leaders condemned his excesses and brutal repressive tactics. Yet Stalin's leadership did accomplish rapid industrialization. And the Soviet Union's heavy industry was a critical factor in helping the Soviet people repel the Nazi German invasion, launched in 1941.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES

When a revolution develops, often individuals and groups with somewhat differing philosophies and plans for the future join forces. Once the old order has been overthrown, disagreements among former allies are likely to resurface. During the Russian Revolutions of 1917, some of the most popular slogans were "All power to the soviets," "Soviet democracy," "All land to the peasants," and "Power to the working class." When among the contending revolutionary groups the Commu-

nist party emerged victorious, its leaders determined what these slogans were to mean in practice. "All power" or at least most power went not to the soviets but to the Communist party. "Soviet democracy" was relegated mainly to local community concerns. Elections for Party officials provided Party members with a role in exercising political power, but ordinary citizens were allowed only to vote yes or no for individuals nominated by the Party for government positions. "All land to the peasants" meant land to peasant collectives and state farms, rather than to individual peasants. And "Power to the working class" did not mean the direct exercise of political power by all industrial workers and peasants but by those workers and peasants who were Communist party members.

In fall 1917 when the Bolsheviks—theoretically on behalf of workers and peasants—assumed control of Russia, they were no longer simply an organization of middle- and upper-class intellectuals. They had by then admitted to their ranks tens of thousands of workers and peasants. In the succeeding years, the Communist party recruited millions of individuals from these groups or with parents in these groups, provided them with educations and ideological instruction, and gave them access to political and economic power both through Communist party membership and through admission to managerial and technical occupations and positions of authority in government. The victory of Marxism in Russia meant not only the alienation and even the flight of members of the former elite and privileged classes; it also meant an extraordinary increase in social and economic mobility for industrial workers and peasants (Fitzpatrick 1982).

In recent years students of Soviet society noted that the causes of economic and scientific shortcomings in the USSR included a political system that restricted freedom of expression and, therefore, inhibited creativity and an economic system that was overly constrained by bureaucracy and central planning and did not provide enough incentive for productive individuals. By the mid-1980s, Soviet leaders acknowledged such problems and launched a series of reforms (*New York Times,* Jan. 28, 1987, p. A1; June 26, 1987, p. A1).

But there were additional reasons for the technological differences between the USSR and the United States. Czarist Russia began its industrial development later; the process was disrupted by the attempted revolution in 1905, the devastation of World War I, in which several million Russians died, and the Revolutions of 1917 and the accompanying 1918–1920 Civil War, in which hundreds of thousands more perished. The economic achievements of the 1920s and 1930s were rocked by the horrible Nazi German invasion of the early 1940s. An estimated 26 million Soviet citizens were killed and hundreds of cities and towns

destroyed. Following the war, the Soviet people had to devote enormous resources to reconstruction. In response to the U.S. use of atomic bombs (against Japan), the Soviet Union diverted much of its own resources toward developing nuclear weapons. All these elements conceivably contributed to retarding the growth of the Soviet economy and non-military technology.

The relative lack of civil liberties and political freedom in the USSR in comparison to the United States probably had multiple causes. First, the Soviet people had never really experienced a stable democratic political system. The country went almost directly from the dictatorship of the czar to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, the closed, authoritarian system of government that developed in the Soviet Union, especially during the 1927–1953 Stalinist era, was in part a reaction to the threats and hostilities directed against socialist movements and against the first self-proclaimed socialist state. During the Russian Civil War, the White Armies were financed and armed by the great capitalist powers and further assisted by troops from these nations. Twenty years later, capitalist Germany under a fascist government launched a devastating invasion of the Soviet Union with the goals not only of destroying "Bolshevism" but also of exterminating the Russian Jews, colonizing the Ukraine, and enslaving the Slavic peoples, whom the Nazis considered racially inferior.

Almost immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union was confronted with a rekindled hostility from the other major capitalist powers, which proceeded to introduce one new and potentially devastating strategic weapons system after another: the hydrogen bomb, long-range jet bombers, missile-firing submarines, and so forth. The leaders and people of the Soviet Union from 1917 until relatively recent times experienced a series of events and hardships that contributed to the development of a siege mentality. That in turn provided justification for restrictions on civil liberties and political freedoms as well as for the USSR's political and military domination of Eastern Europe. Reduction of international hostilities in the late 1980s likely played a major role in promoting the creation of a more democratic political system in the Soviet Union and in other Communist party–led states.

THE SOVIET UNION
AND REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE

At the conclusion of World War II, Soviet armies occupied most of the states in Eastern Europe. The presence of Soviet forces strengthened the position of local Communist parties, many of whose members had played significant roles in wartime resistance movements against German

Nazis and other fascist elements. In some cases anti-Communists in these countries had disgraced themselves by tolerating or even supporting and assisting Nazis in the suppression, imprisonment, and mass murder of Jews and political leftists during the war.

After the war left-wing political coalitions, usually involving Communist and Socialist parties and sometimes Peasant and Liberal parties, tended to dominate the governments of Eastern Europe (Goldman 1990). With the onset of the cold war between the United States and the USSR in 1947, the Soviet Union encouraged and assisted local Communist parties in seizing exclusive control in several Eastern European countries and in the establishment of repressive regimes similar to the Stalinist system then in place in the USSR. In the process hundreds and perhaps thousands of competent administrators and technically skilled persons were denied positions of authority, which were instead filled by less-qualified individuals who were judged more loyal to local pro-Moscow Communist leaders.

Stalinist-type governments subservient to Moscow were undermined by Stalin's death in 1953 and by the condemnation of Stalin's repressive policies by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1956. As a consequence of these changes in the Soviet Union, some Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe were replaced in the late 1950s by Communist party governments that were less repressive, often relatively nationalistic, and thus somewhat more independent of the USSR.

The Soviet Union, however, invaded Hungary in 1956 when Hungarians attempted to withdraw from Moscow's influence totally and occupied Czechoslovakia in 1968 when that nation's liberal Communist leaders acted to increase freedoms of expression and assembly. Soviet leaders attempted to rationalize these military interventions by reference to the combined British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egyptian territory in 1956 and U.S. interventions in Latin America and Vietnam. The Soviet leader at the time of the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia, Leonid Brezhnev, proclaimed the right of other "socialist countries" (those whose governments were controlled by the Communist party) to intervene militarily elsewhere to protect "socialism" (in his meaning, Communist party control of the state). The Brezhnev Doctrine inhibited democratization of the Eastern European countries for the next two decades.

By the late 1980s, however, changes had occurred within the Soviet Union that contributed to a dramatic public abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1989. Possibly the most important development leading to the new permissive orientation of the USSR toward Eastern Europe was the transition in national leadership embodied in the selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist party in 1985

and as president of the nation in 1988. Members of the new cohort of Soviet leaders displayed a greater historical and psychological distance from both the early external and internal threats to the revolution and the trauma and devastation of the Nazi invasion of World War II. Gorbachev and his associates, as well as large sectors of the Soviet population, tended to view their repressive political system, excessively large and inefficient bureaucracies, and the overly centralized economy as obsolete relics of a more hostile era and of Stalinist paranoia. Many apparently felt that Soviet economic progress would require a more-decentralized, market-oriented economy, greater trade with and technological assistance from the advanced capitalist nations, a reduced drain on the economy for military expenditures, and a more democratic political system. President Gorbachev, consequently, called for *perestroika* (restructuring) of the USSR's economic and political systems and increased *glasnost* (public disclosure or openness) and freedom throughout Soviet society. The perceived advantages of more positive economic and political relations with the United States and Western Europe, the incentive to decrease military spending, and the growing view that political control over Eastern Europe was no longer necessary for the security interests of the USSR contributed to the decision to allow the nations of Eastern Europe to select their own forms of government.

For most of the Eastern European countries Communist party rule had come about as the result of primarily external factors, such as Soviet occupation and the pressures of the cold war, rather than as the outcome of an internal revolution, as had been the case in the Soviet Union. Many of the people in these countries considered Communist party rule an aspect of Russian domination and a suppression of both nationalist aspirations and democratic ideals. Although Communist party–led governments often accomplished some popular reforms such as land redistribution and improvements in access to education and medical services, frustrated nationalism, lack of democratic political systems, and, especially after 1980, stagnated economic development were significant causes of mass discontent.

Poland, which in summer 1989 became the first Eastern European nation to end Communist party domination of its government, had experienced a steady deterioration in its economy and huge increases in its foreign debt since 1975. Polish economic difficulties were widely viewed as resulting from a combination of factors, including poor planning, lack of sufficient market incentives, and the devastating impact of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which unexpectedly and drastically increased the cost of the Western technology and machinery on which Polish development had been designed to rely. It became clear that economic austerity measures would be necessary to rescue Poland from

further economic decline. But in return for sacrifices (such as higher prices for food or higher risk of unemployment), large sectors of the Polish population demanded the right to participate in governmental decision-making. In 1980 workers' protests at Gdansk and Szczecin led to the formation of the Solidarity Labor Union, an organization independent of Communist party control (Craig 1987; Ascherson 1982; Rensenbrink 1988).

The Solidarity movement, an expression of nationalist, democratic, and economic aspirations, spread rapidly to all parts of the nation and enlisted more than 9 million people, including approximately one-third of the members of the Polish Communist party (called the Polish United Workers' party). Although an implied threat of Soviet intervention kept Solidarity suppressed during most of the 1980s, the continued inability of Polish Communist leaders to solve the nation's economic crisis led to the Party's acceptance of Solidarity's demand for revoking the guarantee of Communist party control of the Polish government. Solidarity, originating and centered in the Polish working class, undermined the Communist party's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the workers and set an example whose ultimate success in transforming the Polish government undoubtedly had powerful impacts elsewhere in Eastern Europe and on the USSR itself.

In 1989 in the face of massive support for the Solidarity movement and the Polish Communist party's agreement to give up control of the government if defeated in free elections, Soviet leaders announced their decision to abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine and allow all Eastern European nations to select their own forms of government. This constituted the advent of the only remaining necessary condition for the success of political transformations in Eastern Europe, the existence of a permissive world context for revolution. When Polish national elections in summer 1989 resulted in the defeat of the Communist party, the Soviet Union proved its willingness to allow the establishment of the first non-Communist (Solidarity)–led government in Eastern Europe since the late 1940s (*New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1989, p. A8).

The populations of other Eastern European countries, including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania, were themselves encouraged by both Poland's achievement and the USSR's permissiveness and rapidly disposed of their own Communist party–dominated governmental systems (*New York Times,* Feb. 18, 1990, pp. E2, E3). In the elections that followed (which were internationally evaluated as free and democratic), Communist parties (even after being reorganized and renamed) lost to non-Communist parties in three countries that had experienced Soviet interventions in the 1950s or 1960s, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia (*New York Times,* June 17, 1990,

p. E1). But a reform coalition dominated by former Communist party members, the National Salvation Front, won by a wide margin in Romania in May 1990, and in Bulgaria during the following month the Communist party (renamed the Socialist party) achieved a majority of the vote (*New York Times,* May 21, 1990, p. A1; June 12, 1990, p. A12). In addition, a number of republics within the USSR itself also initiated multiparty political systems, and newly elected governments in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, which had been forcibly incorporated into the USSR at the beginning of World War II, resolved to secede from the Soviet Union (*New York Times,* Oct. 26, 1990, p. A6; Jan. 11, 1991, p. A1).

The Soviet Union's willingness to allow Eastern European nations to establish new forms of government was apparently in part a manifestation of Soviet leaders' reanalysis and restructuring of the USSR's own political system. In February 1990, Soviet leaders agreed to surrender the Communist party's monopoly on power and to construct a Western-style form of government in which parties would compete for popular support and in which a president would be elected directly by the people (*New York Times,* Feb. 8, 1990, p. A1). The USSR and Eastern European nations also made plans to move toward greater market orientation of their economies and even private ownership and operation of small businesses and industries (*New York Times,* Oct. 17, 1990, p. A1). However, in these societies, which were characterized by highly mobilized and unionized work forces infused with socialist ideology, most people appeared unlikely to tolerate passively economic changes that might permit the formation of new capitalist classes at the expense of the welfare of the larger population (*New York Times,* May 13, 1990, p. E3; May 20, 1990, p. E3).

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

For several decades before the Revolutions of 1917, thousands of young educated Russians had joined revolutionary movements and even engaged in terrorist violence in efforts to topple the czar's government. Elite radicalism eventually led to the formation of the Russian Social Democratic party and, more significant, of its Bolshevik faction under Lenin's leadership. The Bolsheviks steadfastly condemned Russia's participation in World War I but perceived a great opportunity for revolution in Russia's likely defeat.

Inadequate land reforms and subsequent hardships had fostered deep-seated peasant frustration. Industrial development led to the growth of a large urban working class, many of whose members were dissatisfied with their working and living conditions. Though nationalism inflamed

by the onset of World War I temporarily suppressed interclass hostilities, catastrophic military losses and war-caused social and economic disorganization resulted in widespread and intense discontent among both peasants and workers.

The monarchy was steadily undermined in the latter half of the nineteenth century in great part because of governmental efforts to spur industrialization and modernization. Many of those young Russians schooled in the technologies of the more advanced societies also learned of the relatively democratic political systems in Western Europe. As increasing numbers of educated Russians rejected autocracy in favor of the establishment of a freer and more participatory form of government, the prerevolutionary state was progressively weakened. Russia's military defeat during World War I and the accompanying social unrest finally forced the czar's abdication. Soldiers ordered to put down the protests of their fellow workers refused or openly joined the demonstrators, as did peasants. Faced with massive popular opposition and army and navy mutinies, and deserted by much of the middle- and upper-class minorities, the czarist state collapsed, providing a historic opportunity for the establishment of new political, social, and economic institutions.

A number of groups initially cooperated to accomplish the overthrow of the monarchy. But although the contending revolutionary movements and most members of the major social classes were temporarily united in the goal of ousting the czar, they were divided over other issues. Various political movements favored divergent programs ranging from constructing a constitutional monarchy and carrying out moderate social reforms to abolishing private ownership of major industries. The Bolsheviks demanded additional changes for which most people yearned, including a quick end to the war, an immediate redistribution of land to the peasants, and workers' control of industry. When other parties and factions, through the provisional government, attempted to continue the war and delayed land redistribution, popular support swung rapidly to the Bolsheviks in the large urban areas, permitting them to seize control of the national government in fall 1917.

The czar's capitalist allies were unable to effectively assist in repressing revolutionaries as long as their resources were absorbed in fighting World War I. In 1918, several nations sent troops and military supplies into the Soviet Union to aid White Armies attempting to reverse the Bolshevik Revolution. The White Armies, however, lacked unity, were notorious for engaging in more brutality toward civilians than the Red Army, and further alienated any significant popular support by offering those peasants dissatisfied with Bolshevik policies the even-less-appealing alternative of a return to czarist era landownership patterns. The fact that the capitalist nations were either unwilling or unable to launch

major invasions of the Soviet Union in support of White forces facilitated the Bolshevik defeat of counterrevolutionaries. After the Bolshevik seizure of power and the end of the Russian Civil War, Stalin and his supporters established an authoritarian governmental structure, which characterized the USSR until the democratizing reforms of the late 1980s.

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION:
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1898   Formation of the Russian Social Democratic party

1903   Split develops within the Russian Social Democratic party between the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions

1904–1905   Russia defeat by Japan; attempted revolution

1914   Russia enters World War I

1917   March Revolution: the establishment of the provisional government; November Revolution: Bolsheviks seize power

1918–1920   Civil War and foreign intervention

1924   Lenin dies

1927–1929   Trotsky expelled from the Communist party and then exiled from the Soviet Union; Stalin becomes the dominant Soviet leader

1929–1940   Forced collectivization of agriculture and rapid industrialization

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History 1917–67, Unit II, No. 5, Lenin's Revolution, 1970, 20 min., b/w film. KSU, UI, UMONT, UWASH, UWISC-L.

History 1917–67, Unit II, No. 6, Stalin's Revolution, 1970, 22 min., b/w film. Explains how Stalin shunned Lenin's goal of world revolution but built the Soviet Union into a great industrial power. KSU, UI, UMONT, UWASH, UWISC-L.

Lenin, 1980, 39 min., b/w film. Lenin's life. KSU, UI, UWASH, UWISC-L, UWISC-M.

Lenin and Trotsky, 1964, 16 min., b/w film. Traces the roles of Lenin and Trotsky in the Bolshevik Revolution. KSU, SYRU, UI, UWISC-L, UWY.

The Russian Revolution: Czar to Lenin, 1966, 33 min., b/w film. Outstanding documentary of the Russian Revolution. PSU.

Stalin and the Modernization of Russia, 1982, 20 min., color film or video. Covers Stalin's rise to power, the industrialization drive, and the collectivization of agriculture. Films Inc.

Stalin and Russian History (1879–1927), 1974, 29 min., b/w film. Stalin's early life and his role in the Bolshevik Revolution. PSU, UARIZ, UI, UWASH, UWISC-L.

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Stalin vs. Trotsky: Struggle for Power, 1964, 16 min., b/w film. The conflict between Stalin and Trotsky. KSU, UARIZ, UI.

Revolution in China

The world was shaken in 1917 when czarist Russia, the largest nation in the world, was swept by socialist revolution. In 1949 another revolution triumphed, this one in the world's most populous country. Just as the success of the Russian Revolution owed much to Lenin's ideas, the Chinese Revolution was, in part, the result of innovations introduced by a charismatic revolutionary genius, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung).

Mao realized that the sudden collapse of prerevolutionary governmental authority and coercive capability that provided a unique opportunity for Russian revolutionaries at the close of World War I was unlikely to occur in China. He correctly predicted that in his nation the major cities would remain under antirevolutionary control almost until the conclusion of the revolution. According to Mao's analysis, the accomplishment of sweeping social change in China depended on wedding the frustration of the country's huge rural majority to a genuinely revolutionary ideology. Thus during the 1927–1949 period, the peasant rebellion, the traditional mechanism for the expression of rural discontent, became a revolution that, more than simply replacing national government leaders, radically transformed the basic structure of China's economic, political, and social systems.

Chinese terms used in this chapter are written according to the "pinyin" (combination of sounds) procedure, the official system introduced by Chinese authorities in the late 1970s. In pinyin, most letters are pronounced approximately the same as in those languages using the Latin alphabet, including English. Exceptions include *c*, which is pronounced as "ts" (as in its), *x*, as "sh" (as in show), *zh*, as "j" (as in jump), *e* as "e" (as in her), and *q* as "ch" (as in cheese) (Chance 1985, p. xix). Each time a Chinese term first appears in the text, the Wade-Giles spelling follows in parentheses. The latter system was widely used in Western academic books on China before 1979 (Domes 1985).

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has a land area of 3,691,521 square miles (9,561,000 km²), slightly larger than the United States. Most of the country is mountainous and only about 15 percent of the land is arable. The population in 1990 exceeded 1.1 billion, with approximately 75 percent living in the countryside. About 95 percent were Han Chinese. The remaining 5 percent included fifty-five ethnic groups, such as Mongols, Manchus, and Tibetans. The relative ethnic homogeneity of China's population facilitated the mobilization of large numbers into periodic peasant rebellions and later into the peasant-based revolution of the twentieth century.

SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL SETTINGS
FOR REVOLUTION

When China entered the twentieth century, 90 percent or more of its people were involved in agricultural activities. The approximately 10 percent who did not work the land included servants, urban laborers, soldiers, craftsmen of various types, merchants, government administrators, and members of the economic elite. In rural China the top level of the class system was occupied by the landlord gentry. Families in this class gained wealth primarily through renting parcels of land to poor and landless peasants and through interest on loans. Several students of Chinese society have estimated that the landlord gentry families constituted 2–4 percent of the population and owned 30–50 percent of all cultivated land until 1949 (Blecher 1986; Clubb 1978; Wolf 1969). China's landlords were usually in close contact with the peasants, typically living in or near the market towns, which served surrounding villages and hamlets.

Four economic categories, rich, middle, poor, and landless, were distinguishable among peasants. In general, rich peasants owned enough land not only to provide for their families, but also to rent to others. Middle peasants owned enough land to satisfy their own families' needs but lacked any significant surplus to rent. Poor peasants did not have sufficient land to grow the food or generate the income needed to feed their families. Whereas a rich or middle peasant might choose to engage in work activity in addition to cultivating his own land, such extra labor was a necessity for subsistence for poor peasants. Supplementary labor might involve renting land from a rich peasant or a landlord, hiring out as a farm hand to do work on someone else's land, or engaging in handicrafts to make articles for sale to other peasants, merchants, or landlords. A fourth group of peasants owned no land at all and simply

worked as farm hands for others. The percentage of rural families in each of the peasant categories appears to have varied from one part of China to another. It also varied over time owing to factors such as land fertility, amounts of rainfall or irrigation, land availability relative to population size, and external economic burdens such as levels of government taxation. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anthropologists estimated that nationally about 10 percent were rich peasants, 30 percent middle peasants, 50 percent poor peasants, and 10 percent landless peasants (Bianco 1971; Thaxton 1983; Wolf 1969).

The considerable inequality in the distribution of land and other resources and forms of wealth meant that wars or natural calamities, such as floods or periods of drought that disrupted agricultural production, could have quite negative effects on the majority of peasants who lived near or at the level of subsistence. Famines occasionally killed millions. To prevent an entire family from starving, poor and landless peasants sometimes resorted to selling children, prostitution, or some form of predatory criminal activity, such as banditry. Poverty and hardships of nature in the countryside constituted a continuing source of mass frustration that would eventually combine with other critical factors to bring about a sweeping peasant-based socioeconomic revolution.

Prerevolutionary China

The official political-religious culture of China, Confucianism, functioned, in conjunction with the Chinese state and its military apparatus, to help maintain the traditional structure of society in the face of periodic surges of peasant discontent. Confucius was a philosopher (551–479 B.C.) who believed that respect for one's ancestors and obedience to one's parents constituted the foundations of society and formal authority, the state. Confucianism promoted a sense of fatalism, or accepting one's lot in life as heaven's will, and obedience to various authority figures because virtuous behavior which would merit reward in the afterlife. The Confucian stress on the individual's obligations to family and state provided a cultural and psychological receptiveness among many Chinese to the later Communist emphasis on the desirability of a collective rather than a self-centered value system.

The emperor, who exercised absolute authority over his subjects, merited the "mandate of heaven" as long as his rule embodied "justice" and "goodness." Through its recorded history, China had twenty-four imperial dynasties. Replacement of a corrupt or incompetent regime was consistent with the Confucian doctrine that unworthy rulers lose their mandate and should be overthrown.

Although the emperor was divinely selected to rule, his governmental administrators were chosen on the basis of a set of examinations that tested knowledge of the classical Confucian writings as well as administrative skills. The theory was that thorough comprehension of Confucian wisdom would result in officials who were morally good men and, consequently, government that was fair and effective in maintaining social harmony. It was estimated that during the late nineteenth century the national government comprised approximately forty thousand imperial officials, or "mandarins" (Skocpol 1979). Although entrance into the mandarinate was theoretically open to all, in the vast majority of cases only relatively wealthy families could afford the tutors and years of study required for preparation for the examinations.

Mandarins delegated authority at the local level to members of the landlord gentry class. Landlords assumed leading roles in extended family networks, or clans. Poor peasants might refuse to join in a protest against a landlord or government official from their own clan in order to avoid dishonoring the family. Furthermore, prestige rivalries among some clans often meant that peasants of different clans who had similar economic interests might not readily cooperate with one another (Wolf 1969).

Traditional Forms of Peasant Resistance

Peasant and working-class hardships and consciousness of subordinate social status fostered the development of various forms of opposition to the dominant Confucian system. Anti-Confucian secret societies, such as White Lotus, Red Spear, and Big Knives, were characterized by distinctive belief systems, oaths of allegiance, and other rituals. These organizations were generally polytheistic and often combined elements of several religious traditions, for example, the Buddhist concept of reincarnation and the Taoist emphasis on individual happiness and rejection of the value of Confucian scholarship (Chesneaux 1971, 1972b). Chinese scholars noted distinctions between the folk sects, which were older and primarily religious in purpose, and other groups, which included secret brotherhoods and the protection societies, both of which functioned mainly to provide members with mutual assistance (Eastman 1988).

Secret societies were usually more egalitarian than the dominant social order, and often members took an oath to help the poor. Most of the members of these illegal organizations were poor peasants in the countryside and "marginal and destitute elements of the towns and villages," such as porters, laborers, peddlers, boatmen, poor artisans, and smugglers (Chesneaux 1972b, p. 8). In the countryside secret so-

cieties often carried out a peasant self-defense function against marauding imperial forces, bandits, or even against attacks by rival societies (Bianco 1971). In the cities some societies, such as the Green Gang in Shanghai, capitalized on their group network and members' loyalty to develop into mafia-style organized crime associations involved in drug trafficking, smuggling, control of prostitution, and similar activities (Lust 1972; Posner 1988).

Unusually high levels of peasant unrest occasionally resulted in a peasant rebellion. These uprisings were sometimes preceded by the development of widespread banditry, with the mass of the peasantry finally driven to rebellion by the same conditions that earlier had provoked the poorest into banditry. In some instances rebellions were in part inspired by charismatic or visionary leaders. But often natural calamities played a precipitating role. When an earthquake, a flood, or a period of drought killed large numbers and endangered many more by significantly reducing agricultural productivity, many peasants interpreted the disaster as a sign that heaven had withdrawn its support for the governing regime.

Whatever the causes, peasant uprisings were only rarely successful in overthrowing a ruling dynasty. And on the few occasions when a peasant rebellion played a role in actually toppling an emperor (in these cases, elements of the national elite, military and administrative, were known to desert a crippled dynasty to assume leadership roles in a popular rebellion), postrebellion changes tended to be limited to establishing a new ruling dynasty and temporary improvements in the efficiency and fairness of government actions; meanwhile, the Confucian system was maintained. That was because although peasant rebels often fought for social justice within the Confucian framework, they almost never had the goal of transforming the traditional structure (political, economic, and social institutions) or supporting cultural system of Chinese society (Blecher 1986; Wolf 1969). Participants apparently felt that their goals could be achieved mainly by getting rid of "bad" or incompetent leaders and replacing them with virtuous men who would bring back "the good old days" of some real or mythical period of China's past. Since the basic economic and political relationships remained unchanged, the factors that caused the victorious rebellion would eventually surface again and result in still further peasant uprisings (Thaxton 1983; Wolf 1969).

The Manchu Dynasty

In 1644 the warlike Manchus, a Sinified tribal people from beyond the Great Wall in northeastern China (constituting less than 0.5 percent

of China's population), took advantage of incompetency among the Ming dynasty rulers and disunity and rivalries among provincial administrators and military leaders to sweep down and seize Beijing, China's capital. The Manchus established their own Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty, which would be China's last, 1644–1911. Since according to the Confucian belief system, a dynasty could not be overthrown and replaced by another unless heaven had removed the mandate from the defeated and bestowed it on the victorious, many Chinese accepted the rule of the Manchus, although military resistance continued for years in southern China. Many of China's secret societies took upon themselves the defense of Chinese ethnic honor by opposing Manchu authority and advocating a return to Ming dynasty rule.

Several Manchu emperors, however, proved to be effective rulers and two had exceptionally long reigns (covering 1683–1796) during which social stability returned to much of the country, Chinese military and political power achieved high levels, agricultural productivity increased, and there was peace. The latter two factors contributed to an apparent doubling of the population between 1700 and 1900 to more than 400 million (Blecher 1986; Clubb 1978).

During the nineteenth century, various pressures and momentous events heightened peasant discontent and undermined the traditional Chinese state. Among these were increased strain on China's agricultural resources because of previous decades of large population growth; military defeats by European nations and later Japan, which humiliated the Chinese, inflamed Chinese nationalism, and burdened China with huge war indemnities and unfavorable trade relationships; and massive, though unsuccessful, peasant rebellions, which resulted in millions of deaths and further depleted the resources of the central government (Bianco 1971; Blecher 1986; Eastman 1988; Skocpol 1979; Wolf 1969).

Foreign Involvement in China

The Opium Wars (1839–1842) severely weakened China's ability to resist foreign imports. During the 1830s Great Britain's leaders were appalled by the flow of their hard currency into China to purchase tea and other exports. They proposed to pay for Chinese goods by increasing sales in China of a product of their Burma and India colonies, opium. China's government reportedly feared an increase in drug dependency if the British were allowed to sell opium freely. After the Chinese destroyed an opium shipment, Britain sent military expeditions, whose advanced weaponry devastated the Chinese. As a result, the Chinese were forced to agree to (1) allow the British to sell opium and other products in China; (2) allow European missionaries to preach Christi-

anity; (3) pay large war indemnities to the British; (4) provide the British with certain cities or sections of cities as treaty-ports or concessions, within which they could establish economic enterprises, deploy military personnel, and provide exclusively European living quarters and recreational facilities. Later other European nations and Japan forced similar concessions and war-indemnity payments and eventually carved China into spheres of influence, often making specific deals for cooperation with local governmental and military leaders. The six nations that had developed significant economic interests and military presence in China by the end of the nineteenth century were Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, czarist Russia, and the United States (Harrison 1967).

Apart from the harmful effects of opium addiction, foreign victories over China had negative economic consequences. The Chinese government was forced to raise taxes in order to pay war indemnities and also to help cope with other debts that stemmed from the country's unfavorable economic relationship with Europe. The burden fell disproportionately on the relatively powerless mass of poor peasants because, in order to pay taxes, the landlords and rich peasants tended to increase the rents they charged for land use as well as interest rates on loans. The poor were further victimized by the fact that sources of supplemental income needed to make ends meet, such as handicrafts, were partially undermined by the influx of manufactured articles from the industrialized countries. These developments contributed to the discontent among the rural masses. Many Chinese blamed the Manchu dynasty (and soon the Confucian system itself) for China's inability to resist foreign domination and for conditions in the countryside.

Nineteenth-Century Rebellions

Economic deprivation and hostility toward the Manchu rulers contributed to the development of two major peasant rebellions, the Nian (Nien) Rebellion (1853–1868) in central China and the Taiping (T'aip'ing) Rebellion (1853–1864), which began in south China and spread northward, eventually establishing the Taiping capital at Nanjing (Nanking). Both rebellions advocated a redistribution of wealth in favor of the poor; at times the Taiping units advancing northward allied with Nian forces in battles against the Manchu army.

The Nian were members of a secret society devoted to overthrowing the Manchu dynasty. They were defeated in part because their decentralized military effort permitted the Manchus to concentrate large forces against isolated rebel towns (Wolf 1969). Nevertheless, the Nian Rebellion provided the peasants of central China with a tradition that

helped prepare them culturally to support and participate in the Communist-led peasant revolution of the twentieth century.

The Taiping (Great Peace) Rebellion was ideologically unique and more massive than the Nian. The Taiping Rebellion and its repression by the Manchus resulted in an estimated 20 million deaths. The Taiping movement had been begun by a man from poor peasant background, Hong (Hung) (1814–1864), who was born near the city of Guangzhou (Canton), a major site of early foreign influence. Hong's family made sacrifices to accumulate the funds to provide him with an education, but he failed in several attempts to pass state exams for teachers. In Guangzhou, however, Hong received Christian religious instruction from an American missionary.

During a serious illness Hong, possibly in a state of delirium, had a dream in which two men spoke to him. Later he interpreted this experience as a visitation from God the Father and his Son Jesus. Hong began to explain to his associates that there was only one God, not the multitude of deities to which many Chinese offered sacrifices. Hong claimed it had been revealed to him that he was God's younger son, the brother of Jesus Christ. He proclaimed that he had been instructed to gather followers and organize an army that would "destroy the demons on earth in order to create a new Kingdom of God" (Wolf 1969, p. 120). Much of the Confucian value system and power structure, including the landlord gentry class, were to be eradicated. Land parcels would be assigned to peasants to farm, but ownership would be retained by the Taiping state. Any production beyond that required to feed individual families would become a collective resource. Advancement in the political hierarchy was to be based on meritorious performance, not heredity, family wealth, or Confucian scholarship.

The Taipings granted extensive rights to women and forbade foot binding of female children and prostitution. Men were to have only one wife and marriage was to be on the basis of mutual attraction rather than arranged by parents for financial gain. Women were allowed access to the Taiping leadership grades and were given the right to serve as soldiers. The Taipings also attacked the practice of ancestor worship: They wanted to de-emphasize family lineage and clan membership, which had been one of the main causes of division among the lower classes and a major source of power and social control for the landlord class (Li 1956; Wolf 1969).

The major weaknesses of the Taipings included their sweeping attacks on all three of China's main religions (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism), which provoked opposition from many traditionalist Chinese strongly influenced by their religious training. Furthermore, the implemented Taiping land reforms were in reality limited and did little to

improve the lot of most peasants, who soon began to resent the heavy tax burden placed on them by the Taiping regime (Wolf 1969).

Moreover, foreign interests in China, having won by force of arms favorable treaties and concessions from the Manchu dynasty, saw their privileges endangered by the possible countrywide victory of the Taipings. Consequently, the industrialized nations provided the anti-Taiping Manchu ("Ever-Victorious") army with weapons, technical assistance, and mercenary officers and advisers, which contributed significantly to the defeat of the Taiping movement and execution of its leaders in 1864 (Payne 1969).

The Taiping peasant rebellion and the later Communist-led peasant revolution had important parallels. Both enjoyed mass support from intensely frustrated rural populations and both were characterized by ideologies that incorporated ideas from the West and that called for sweeping changes in major economic, social, political, and cultural institutions. (Had the Taipings won and succeeded in accomplishing transformations in the basic structures of Chinese society, their movement would have been later referred to as a revolution.) The Taiping plans for wealth equalization and collective ownership as well as the measures directed at liberating women and minimizing the factor of family prestige as a source of social status were remarkably similar to several of the basic goals proclaimed by the Communist revolutionaries sixty years later. And the twentieth-century peasant revolutionaries succeeded in establishing their first rural bases in areas of south China formerly supportive of the Taipings (Skocpol 1979; Wolf 1969).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, many Chinese realized that to regain its independence their country would have to modernize its political and social systems and industrialize. But Confucian culture constituted a powerful barrier to social change. Since a rationalized and technologically advancing society would have little use for leaders whose authority was based on antiquated and nonutilitarian scholarship, most mandarins resisted modernization.

Large landholders throughout the country were also in general not inclined to support modernization because it would likely shift China's economy toward industry and commerce (Skocpol 1976). Confucian culture assigned maximum prestige to agriculture as an economic activity, ideally coupled with training in the Confucian classics, and bestowed much less honor on merchants or others involved in nonagricultural or nonscholarly endeavors (Blecher 1986). Many Chinese

CHINA

businessmen had turned to commerce or industry as means of developing wealth because they did not possess large landholdings. But instead of using their profits to expand commercial or industrial operations, they often purchased land in order to gain entrance to the most time-honored status recognized in Confucian culture (Blecher 1986). This was an important reason why China did not develop a strong and independent national business class, which might have constituted the leadership element to bring about a rapid modernization. Consequently, much of the major industry of prerevolutionary China was foreign owned and many of the smaller industrial enterprises were owned by Westernized Chinese often shunned by their country folk as cultural apostates or lackeys of foreign interests.

Any modernization attempted by the central government had to confront not only the absence of a powerful Chinese business class but also the woeful inadequacy of imperial finances. The government had spent enormous sums in the suppression of the Taiping and Nian rebellions and in paying indemnities to victorious foreign powers. Because of their role in raising the resources and forces to crush the Taipings, the power of provincial authorities had been greatly enhanced. Few provincial leaders were willing to support any major national effort for modernization that might threaten their new political and economic prerogatives.

When war broke out between China and Japan in 1894–1895, China's navy was easily defeated, a very traumatic event for many Chinese, who had previously viewed Japan as almost a vassal state. Japan had been able to accomplish this feat largely because of its reaction to its own humiliation in 1853, when it was militarily unable to resist being opened to world trade by a U.S. naval force. The event disgraced a traditionalist, isolationist dynasty and precipitated its fall and replacement by a dynasty committed to rapid technological modernization (Gurley 1983). The new regime succeeded in freeing the Japanese in a few decades from cultural impediments to industrialization, commercial development, and military modernization. Many Chinese began to look to Japan as a model.

In 1898, the Chinese Emperor Guangxu (Kuang Hsu), then in his late twenties, and a very small group of advisers attempted to introduce a sweeping package of reforms that included the abolition of Confucian exams as a requirement for administrative posts and a plan for adopting a parliamentary form of government (a constitutional monarchy). All towns were to create free schools for the poor and all existing governmental and military officeholders were to be reevaluated. However, the "one hundred days reform" movement was abruptly halted by a palace coup in which the traditionalist majority of government ministers, along

with the conservative and exceptionally ruthless dowager empress, Ci Xi (Tz'u Hsi), placed the emperor under house arrest and ordered the execution of his reform-oriented advisers (Payne 1969; Skocpol 1979).

In 1900 the antiforeign Fists of Harmony and Justice Society (called Boxers by the Europeans because of their clenched fist symbol), encouraged by the dowager empress, murdered several missionaries and hundreds of Christian Chinese and besieged the foreign embassies in Beijing. After several months, the siege was lifted by an international relief force. Once again, victorious foreigners imposed on China new reparations payments. After this humiliation, the central government finally decided that major reforms were necessary to facilitate modernization. Among the changes was the establishment of provincial parliaments in 1908. The legislators were selected through elections in which the economic elite voted. A national parliament was to be elected in 1917. The traditional Confucian examinations for admittance to the government bureaucracy were ended in 1905. Another reform involved the establishment of technical training centers for young army officers, who were to constitute the leadership of China's "new army" (Eastman 1988; Skocpol 1979).

Sun and the Republican Revolution

Much of the ideology for the revolution to establish a Chinese republic was developed by Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), eventually honored by the title "Father of the Chinese Republic." Sun, whose father was a poor peasant, was born in a village forty miles from Guangzhou in 1866. He told friends that as a child he was deeply impressed by the stories he heard from a village teacher who was a surviving soldier of the Taiping rebel armies (Schiffrin 1989). His older brother left the family for Hawaii when Sun was six and, using savings from his wages, bought a farm and later established a store. Sun traveled to Hawaii, where he worked for his brother and attended the English-language Anglican College of Honolulu. When Sun, after converting to Christianity, returned to China, he made his way to Xianggang (Hong Kong) and spent the years 1884–1892 obtaining a medical degree at Queen's College (Payne 1969).

Sun, like many young Chinese of his era, especially those with some exposure to the benefits of Western technology, was outraged by China's backwardness and became determined to play a role in ridding China of the ineffective Manchu dynasty and in revitalizing and modernizing the nation. In 1905 Sun combined an organization he had helped found with another republican revolutionary group and formed the United Society, initially established among Chinese exiles in Japan. Thousands

secretly joined the group inside China, along with many Chinese throughout the world. Thus, within China's educated minority profoundly intense divisions developed. Depriving the state of many of its most capable and skilled citizens, these divisions also provided effective leadership for the growing revolutionary movements aimed at overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a republic form of government.

Sun and most of his associates either had professional careers or were students from upper-income families. Since they lacked a mechanism for directly incorporating the mass of China's population into the republican movement, they allied themselves with the anti-Manchu secret societies (Lust 1972). But Sun viewed these groups as backward looking and a possible impediment to social, economic, and political modernization. He asserted that he supported alliances with secret societies only as a temporary and expedient method of extending mass involvement in the republican movement (Borokh 1972).

In 1908 the dynasty was weakened by the deaths of both the villainous Empress Dowager Ci Xi, and her unfortunate nephew, the deposed former emperor, Guangxu. The monarchy fell into the hands of Prince Chun, who ruled as regent on behalf of the three-year-old Emperor Fu Yi (Pu Yi). As anti-Manchu riots broke out in south China, Prince Chun called on General Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-K'ai) to restore order.

On October 10, 1911, several thousand soldiers, fearing exposure and execution for their secret membership in republican revolutionary groups, staged a rebellion in Hubei (Hupei) Province in central China. The uprising was soon followed by similar mutinies against imperial rule in more than a dozen southern and central provinces. Local military commanders (or their successors) declared the independence of their provinces from Manchu rule. The insurrections resulted in part from the successful efforts of Sun and his associates in "forging a powerful coalition" including their revolutionary organization; "southern Chinese secret societies; regional interest groups in Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan; and some of the modern crack military units" (Domes 1985, p. 29).

Yuan Shikai seized the opportunity to advance his ambition to be China's new leader by convincing the members of the royal family that they faced the possibility of execution if they failed to compromise with the republican forces. The Manchu rulers abdicated on February 12, 1912. In the south, at Nanjing, Sun was declared provisional president of the Republic of China. But in an effort to prevent a civil war, Sun resigned after fifteen days and agreed to accept Yuan Shikai as president if Yuan would declare support for the republic. Yuan consented and became president on March 10, 1912.

Sun's United Society was transformed into the Guomindang (GMD) (Kou-min tang, KMT), National party, in fall 1912. But in the new parliament the GMD members soon fell into conflict with Yuan Shikai's supporters over issues such as Yuan's assertion that his authority was above that of the parliament. The GMD's parliamentary leader was assassinated by Yuan's agents and Sun temporarily fled. Yuan outlawed the Guomindang party and then dismissed the national parliament in 1914. The following year he installed himself as China's new "emperor," only to die in 1916. After Yuan's death, central state authority effectively ceased to exist and most of the nation disintegrated into its component provinces. Each of these was ruled by local landowning elites in combination with the general in charge of the provincial armed forces, the local "warlord."

Sun, who had been forced to leave the country, returned to south China and began to reorganize the republican movement. He appealed to the United States and several other nations for financial assistance, weapons, and military advisers to train a republican army that could subdue the warlords. But these countries, some having made trade arrangements with individual warlords and perhaps fearful of the power of a unified China and the potential radical or antiforeign tendencies of the republican revolutionaries, declined to provide aid. Only the new revolutionary government in the Soviet Union agreed to send weapons and advisers (Jordan 1976; Wolf 1969).

Sun dispatched a young republican officer, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to Moscow to report on the Soviet political and military systems. He returned impressed by the success of the Bolsheviks in carrying out and defending their revolution and in unifying the Soviet Union. But Jiang, born to a landlord family with claims to royal ancestry (Ming dynasty) and well schooled in Confucian traditions, disagreed with the social revolution occurring in the Soviet Union. Sun, however, rejected the more negative aspects of Jiang's report and proceeded to pattern the Guomindang's organizational structure after that of the Russian Communist party (Bianco 1971).

The ideological foundation of the Guomindang was the widely cited and applauded "Three Principles of the People," formulated by Sun. The first principle was that of Independence, or Nationalism, which meant freeing China from foreign domination and exploitation. Although it can be argued that this was the most clearly defined of the three principles, in reality Chinese political factions disagreed over which types and what degrees of economic and political association with other nations constituted manifestations of imperialism.

The second principle was Democracy. Sun called for a strong central government but, by the early 1920s, was disillusioned with the repre-

sentative (parliamentary) democracies of the European states. He felt that these governments were dominated by capitalist ruling classes willing to tolerate poverty in their own countries as well as exploit the peoples of less-developed societies. Sun favored the direct election of the nation's leaders by its citizens—who would also have the rights of recall of public officials and the right to propose laws and vote on proposals through referendums. However, Sun advocated a period of "tutelage," during which the Guomindang would be the only political party able to exercise state power. When China had achieved independence and political stability and had a powerful postrevolutionary central state government structure, full democracy would be established (Cheng 1989).

The third principle, People's Livelihood, was even less completely defined than the first two and its interpretation was a main point of contention among China's rightists and leftists in the years after Sun's death. In his earliest formulations of the third principle, Sun seemed to disagree with the Marxist concept that redistribution of wealth would be achieved through a process of class conflict and instead proposed that it could be accomplished peacefully and involve cooperation among the classes. People's Livelihood would include the provision of employment and the necessities of life for all. The government was to bring about an equalization of rural landownership gradually. How this could occur without the resistance of the landlords and, consequently, class conflict, was not adequately explained. Sun appeared to become more and more influenced by policies in the Soviet Union, his revolution's only source of external military assistance, and at one point confounded conservative members of the Guomindang by responding to a question about People's Livelihood with the puzzling statement, "It is communism and it is socialism" (Ch'ien 1964, p. 75). With the republican revolution still in progress, Sun died of cancer in March 1925.

China's Communist Party

Despite Sun's attempts to develop a unified movement, the republican revolutionary elite was deeply divided. Rightist figures in the GMD typically came from the upper-income families of China's coastal provinces and had little interest in redistributing the nation's wealth toward the poor. Rather, they favored the retention of capitalist property relations along with much of the Confucian cultural system. In contrast, leftists in the GMD, particularly Communist party members, viewed the revolution as both nationalistic and socioeconomic. Thus the emergent republican state was to be immediately characterized by a dissident elite movement of leftists favoring a further profound socioeconomic revolution.

China's Communist party had its origins in the New Youth movement, in which many of the nation's Western-educated students participated during 1915–1919 (Meisner 1986). The movement's leaders had become convinced that the future development and independence of China depended upon a near-total rejection of traditional culture and the rapid substitution of Western norms and values. In particular, New Youth advocates called for a radical shift in education: Schools should teach methods of rational inquiry and scientific research and convey information about modern technologies. The movement also advocated the creation of a democratically elected parliament.

The apogee of the New Youth movement occurred after the disclosure of the terms of the Versailles Treaty ending World War I that transferred German colonial holdings in China to Japan instead of returning them to the Chinese. To many it appeared that the victorious Western nations were bribing the Japanese to collaborate in the mutual exploitation of China and betraying the often-stated promise that the defeat of Germany in World War I would bring democracy and the right of national self-determination to the entire world. On May 4, 1919, 3,000 students, proclaiming "Democracy and science," the slogan inspired by the New Youth movement, demonstrated in Beijing to protest both the treaty provisions and their nation's inability to resist foreign domination.

Many participants in the New Youth movement abruptly altered their perceptions of the Western nations. "The intellectuals' views of the West underwent a rapid and dramatic transformation. The bitter nationalist resentments aroused by the fateful decision at Versailles coupled with growing nationalist political activism at home, led to a rapid erosion of faith that the 'advanced' Western nations would instruct China in the principles of democracy and science" (Meisner 1986, p. 17). Former leaders of the New Youth movement proclaimed a new movement, the May Fourth movement, whose participants continued to look to the West for inspiration, but less to the dominant ideologies that justified capitalist economic systems and the perceived imperialism of the Western nations and Japan toward China. Instead movement activists began to turn to Marxism, which some viewed

as the most advanced intellectual product of the modern West, but one that rejected the Western world in its capitalist form and its imperialist relationship with China. The latter was most forcefully demonstrated through the nationalist appeal of Leninist theory of imperialism (which offered the colonial and semi-colonial lands a crucial international revolutionary role) and the new Soviet government's renunciation of old Czarist imperialist privileges in China. (Meisner 1986, p. 18)

Lenin, in his analysis of the international function of modern imperialism, attempted to explain the failure of Marx's prediction that the industrialized capitalist societies would be the first in the world to experience transformations to socialism. Imperialism involved the efforts over several hundred years of the technologically advanced societies to establish political, economic, and cultural control over less-developed parts of the world. Lenin noted that through imperialism, several capitalist countries gained access to huge land areas with vast agricultural and mineral resources as well as the labor power of much of the world's population. The countries dominated by foreign imperialism, especially the more affluent classes among the native populations, also constituted significant new markets for products manufactured in the advanced countries. Lenin argued that the capitalist ruling classes of the advanced nations used some of the "superprofits" from their capital investments in the less-developed parts of the world to improve the living conditions of their own working classes, thus *reducing* the workers' inclination to join political movements advocating revolution and socialism (Lenin 1916). As a result, Lenin concluded, in reality revolutions would tend to occur first in less-developed, economically exploited societies and would involve not only the relatively small native industrial working class but also the participation of peasants (Bottomore 1983).

As such revolutions occurred, new leaders would demand more wealth in return for the use of their countries' mineral, agricultural, and labor resources and limit the size of the profits foreign capital could generate through business activity in their lands. Thus, the exploitive relationships between the advanced capitalist nations and underdeveloped societies would gradually come to an end. As this change in international economic relationships began to cause shortages in the advanced capitalist societies, the capitalist ruling classes would try to force their working classes to bear most of the economic hardships. Then, according to Lenin, the people of the advanced societies would want to change from capitalism to socialism. Thus revolution in China could conceivably play a major role in causing revolution eventually in the advanced countries.

In 1920 young Marxists established a number of political organizations in major cities, and in July 1921 twelve delegates from the various groups met in Shanghai to found China's Communist party. The party initially attempted to recruit members of the country's small urban working class, following Marx's theory that this class would constitute the social basis for a socialist transformation (Bianco 1971). The Russian Communist party pressured the Chinese Communists into uniting with the Guomindang and collaborating with its landlord and capitalist elements. Sun, enamored of the Bolsheviks' achievements, accepted the growing Communist movement into the GMD in January 1924 despite

the objections of Jiang and other conservatives. The purpose of the alliance was to achieve the common goals of unifying the country, freeing it from foreign control, and, at least in terms of formal proclamations, eventually establishing a Western-style parliamentary democracy.

CIVIL WAR IN CHINA

In summer 1926 Jiang, who had become a prominent GMD general, launched the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) through which the Guomindang intended to defeat the provincial warlords and unite China under its rule. The Northern Expedition involved an unstable coalition among conservative landlords and coastal merchants who helped finance the enterprise, the Communist party and allied leftist activists, and military forces led by Jiang and other mostly rightist officers. In this situation, as in the later revolutionary struggle, nationalism in the sense of the desire to construct a unified and powerful China free of foreign domination constituted the main unifying motivation, bringing different groups together on behalf of the revolutionary effort.

Young GMD activists, many of them Communists, attempted to mobilize workers and peasants in the cities and territories as the republican armies approached with the hopeful message that republican victory would result in relief from both political and economic oppression. Enlisted workers, when able to defy physical intimidation, showed support for the revolution by striking and shutting down factories and services, thereby hastening warlord surrender. But Jiang was able to "subdue" one warlord after another by bribery (offers of money and/ or senior ranking positions in the republican army) as much as through military or economic pressures (Jordan 1976; Wei 1985).

By the time Jiang's forces moved on Shanghai in 1927, he had decided to begin an all-out repression of the Communist movement. Jiang first secured promises of funding from Shanghai financiers and businessmen who were eager to see the militant workers' movement eliminated (Bianco 1971; Eastman 1988; Meisner 1986). He also negotiated with Shanghai's mafialike Green Gang secret society. Green Gang members were knowledgeable of the city's working-class sections and could help in the identification and liquidation of labor groups and Communist workers who, only days before their annihilation, had played a substantial role in helping the GMD forces capture the city (Clubb 1978). Before dawn on April 12, GMD soldiers and members of the Green Gang attacked the headquarters of Communist-oriented labor unions and proceeded to destroy the workers' militia (Jordan 1976). In addition to the workers killed in the daylong battle, hundreds more were executed after capture.

Surviving Communist activists went into hiding. Jiang's forces soon repeated these measures in other major Chinese cities. The left-leaning GMD civilian government was appalled at hearing of the murders of workers and the spreading persecution of the Communists. But Jiang, because he controlled the armed forces, was soon able to assume governmental as well as military control. Some civilians in the GMD government also supported Jiang's seizure of power because they were alarmed at reports that the Communists planned to take land from large landholders and factories from Chinese and foreign capitalists and turn these over to poor peasants and workers. Despite the reverses, most surviving Communist leaders still dogmatically held to the belief that the Communist movement must establish control of the cities and base the revolution on China's relatively minute urban working class. Some Communist leaders, however, felt that in China a revolution could be based on the rural population. The most important of these was Mao Zedong.

Mao and People's War in the Countryside

Mao (1893–1976) was born in Hunan Province, the son of a rich peasant. At seventeen, he left school to join republican revolutionary forces attempting to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. In 1912, Mao resumed his education, earning a teaching degree, and then joined the library staff at the University of Beijing. Unlike many other early members of the Chinese Communist party, Mao, influenced by his knowledge of peasant support for the Taiping Rebellion and its popularity in his home province, favored a peasant-based socialist revolution in China. But after the 1927 Shanghai massacre, Mao and others were ordered by Party leaders to assemble Communist forces (which included armed workers and peasants and a number of GMD regiments that had sided with the Communists) in the countryside and then attack and seize several cities. These efforts, as well as attempts of Communist-led workers to stage urban uprisings or resist GMD military takeovers, failed. Mao's forces retreated to heavily forested areas of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province in southeast China. There he and his associates first recruited several hundred rural bandits to their cause and soon began to make inroads with local peasants (Wei 1985).

Mao developed the theory—a modification of earlier Marxist revolutionary thought—that in China, where the vast majority of the population was rural and where relatively strong anti-Communist military forces, GMD or warlord, held the cities, the revolution would be based on the peasants (Bianco 1971; Mackerras and Knight 1985). Marx had originally concluded that most peasants would not be receptive to

revolutionary goals because of their relative ignorance of the world beyond their villages, their sense of powerlessness, and their ties to tradition. He anticipated that only after capitalist industrial economies had brought about the migration of millions of peasants to urban areas (and in the process caused tremendous adaptive changes in their cultural values and norms) would conditions be right for the transformation to socialism. The masses of urban-industrial workers would hypothetically be much more willing than their rural ancestors to participate in a revolutionary movement to improve their economic condition. This would be true not only because of their ability to interact in large numbers in urban areas and carry out unified political actions, but also because their recent alteration in livelihood and living environment would provide them with a sense of the possibility of further sweeping social changes, which the preindustrialization rural population was supposedly incapable of comprehending.

But Mao, in contrast to many Marxists, put faith in the power of ideas to transform the consciousness of the Chinese peasants. Aware of how receptive the peasants of south China had been to the very untraditional ideology of the mid-nineteenth-century Taipings, Mao was certain that the similar but more "scientific" concepts of Marxism could transform China's historically rebellious peasants into a massive revolutionary force. The key, as Mao saw it, was to fuse the tradition of peasant rebellion with the ideology of Marxism, which proposed a new plan for society in which major sources of wealth would be collectively owned and in which socioeconomic inequality would be greatly reduced. Mao's innovation, referred to as the "Sinification of Marxism," proved to be a major reason for the revolutionary victory in China.

Mao also extracted from his knowledge of past military conflicts the concept of "people's war" and adapted it to the revolutionary struggle in China. The most essential aspect of people's war was the goal of achieving widespread popular support for the revolutionary effort. Antirevolutionary forces would then confront not just the revolutionary army but also the hostility of large numbers of noncombatants rendering whatever assistance possible to the revolutionary fighters. Another central element of the people's war concept was to create politicized armed forces that would manifest the ideals of the revolution in their interaction with and treatment of noncombatants. The revolutionary soldier was to be motivated by the belief that he or she was fighting for the creation of a morally just society and against the oppression of the landlords, exploitive capitalists, and their instrument of violence, the GMD army. The intended result of politicalization of combatants was an armed revolutionary force driven by high ideals to courageous acts and to waging a determined struggle.

The people were to be educated to the goals of the revolution through both word (speeches and political instruction) and deeds, such as land reform and the exemplary conduct of revolutionary leaders and soldiers. If the people supported the revolution, the revolutionaries could overcome their disadvantages in armament and military training. This concept was expressed in the slogan, "The people are the water, the (revolutionary) army are the fish; without the water, the fish will die" (Fairbairn 1974, p. 99). The revolutionary forces were to be nourished, hidden, informed about enemy troop dispositions and in other ways aided by the people.

The GMD waged five successive military campaigns against the Communists' main base area (called the "Jiangxi Soviet"). Finally in 1934, 700,000 GMD troops under Jiang's command, following a plan conceived by a German military adviser, closed in on the Communist-controlled areas, constructing stone forts, or "blockhouses," along roadways to reduce the revolutionaries' freedom of movement. The main Communist forces in the province, thought to number about 100,000, were forced to abandon Jiangxi. They slipped out of the encirclement and began a long and tortuous retreat, first generally toward the west, then north, and then northeast to the remote north-central town of Yan'an (Yennan). The journey covered about 6,000 miles and lasted over a year. During that time Communist units were pursued by GMD forces and attacked by hostile warlord armies along the way. Fewer than 20,000 completed the entire Long March and made it to Yan'an in late 1935 (Blecher 1986; Domes 1985; Salisbury 1985).

The reform program at the new rural base differed in several respects from the Jiangxi Soviet and came to be known as the Yan'an Way. At Jiangxi Mao had advocated a landreform policy in which the rich peasants, who were generally the most productive, would retain an amount of land at least equal to the size of the farms of the poor peasants after land redistribution. In this way he hoped to minimize resistance and maximize agricultural output by continuing to have the rich peasants make major contributions to production (Wei 1985). Mao had also favored providing dispossessed landlords with land to work. But at Jiangxi more radical and vengeful thinking had prevailed. Although the rich peasants received some land of poor quality, the landlords were transformed into landless laborers. These measures not only helped decrease agricultural production, they also drove outraged landlords and rich peasants to provide important assistance to GMD forces in the successful encirclement campaign (Wei 1985). But in the Yan'an program both the rich peasants and the landlords were allowed to retain much of their land under conditions that restricted profit levels and the exploitation of poor and landless peasants (Thaxton 1983).

The mass-line approach to revolutionary leadership was also established at Yan'an. This method, while leaving ultimate decision-making to the Communist party, reflected Mao's conviction that Party policy and its mode of implementation must stem from the people and be based on popular support. According to Mao in 1943: "All correct leadership is necessarily 'from the masses, to the masses.' This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and 'concentrate' them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own" (Mao 1967, pp. 117–119). The mass-line approach became a lasting characteristic of Chinese socialism and was adopted to some extent by revolutionary movements or governments in other Third World societies, such as Vietnam, Cuba, and Mozambique. It distinguished policy-making in these nations from the more elitist procedures characteristic of most Eastern European states before 1989 (Blecher 1986).

Mao and other leaders took part in manual labor alongside peasants and were expected to submit to regular public criticism by colleagues, followed by public self-criticism. These mechanisms were intended to prevent excessive concentration of power or development of feelings of superiority.

Japanese Invasion and Revolutionary Victory

The establishment of the Yan'an base coincided with the invasion of China south of the Great Wall by the Japanese in 1937. The Communists proposed an end to the civil war and the formation of a coalition with Jiang's GMD army in order to fight Japan jointly. Jiang, having long ignored the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and other parts of China to devote his attention to crushing the Communists, was coerced by his associates into stopping the civil war and agreeing to a United Front of Communist and GMD forces against the Japanese.

The land-reform program during the United Front struggle against the Japanese (1937–1945) in Communist-controlled areas was relatively mild: Landlords who were not collaborating with the Japanese generally did not experience land expropriation but rather were subject to a rent-control program for the land they rented to poor or landless peasants and were limited in the amount of interest they could charge on loans. These wartime reforms were still significant because under Guomindang rule many landlords had increased rents and interest rates, with little concern for the welfare of the peasants. Such a trend indicated that the norms of unfettered capitalist business relations had begun to erode the collective responsibility aspects of the Confucian system, which in the

past had somewhat moderated landlord avarice (Bianco 1971; Eastman 1988; Thaxton 1983).

During the war nationalist sentiment swung increasingly in favor of the Communists (Blecher 1986; Dunn 1972). Jiang, anticipating that the United States and its allies would defeat Japan, held some of his best divisions out of the conflict so that they could be employed after the war against the Communists. This choice of action was partly dictated by other factors, such as the widespread corruption of the GMD officer corps and the low morale of many of the GMD enlisted men. The latter were subject to abuse and exploitation by their often profiteering officers (Blecher 1986). The GMD military's efforts and successes against the Japanese were far less than those of the Communist-led army, and many members of the classes most supportive of Jiang's regime (the landlords and the merchants) collaborated with the Japanese in occupied areas of China in order to preserve their assets and comfortable life-styles. Because of those factors, as the war progressed, more and more people began to recognize Mao's forces (which expanded from 80,000 in 1937 to 900,000 in 1945) as the real army of China (Bianco 1971). GMD army abuse of peasants also alienated many. Consequently, when the war ended, the legitimacy of the GMD state was severely weakened and nationalist sympathy was more on the side of the Communists than on the side of Jiang's government. All these things helped the Communist leadership to draw together diverse population segments.

Other factors reduced the appeal and the moral authority of the GMD state. It seemed clear to many that the GMD under Jiang had effectively abandoned Sun's Three Principles of the People. As for fighting for independence and against imperialism, Jiang, who obtained much of his knowledge of warfare while a cadet at a military academy in Japan, was possibly so convinced that his forces could not effectively combat the Japanese that he preferred to leave the fight to the United States and the Communists. His regime had become heavily influenced by foreign advisers and technicians. Western-educated Chinese played major roles in the GMD, and Jiang's wife, Song Meiling (Soong Meiling), the daughter of a wealthy family, grew up in the United States and often seemed to manifest more allegiance to U.S. culture than to Chinese. As a condition of marriage, Jiang became a Methodist; he soon was a great exponent of its teachings. His New Life movement, launched in 1934 supposedly to "rejuvenate" the Chinese, was a mixture of Confucian tenets and Methodist doctrine, propagated by a GMD youth movement (Payne 1969). Thus the goal that had acted to unify various groups in the republican revolution of the early twentieth century, that of ridding China of foreign domination, united increasing numbers behind the Communist-led revolution, which appeared to be capable of

and likely to establish a genuinely Chinese-controlled national government.

Jiang's conception of advancing the second of Sun's principles, Democracy, was apparently to crush the Communists. But his own government became essentially a conservative military dictatorship with Jiang in control of the single party, the Guomindang, still patterned after the old Russian Communist party organizationally but, unlike the Communists, functioning to preserve rather than reduce basic inequalities in the socioeconomic system.

The GMD regime attempted to attract and maintain the support of the traditional elites, the rural landlords, by promising to protect their landholdings. Consequently, the GMD did little to bring about the redistribution of wealth that Sun had proposed as the way to fulfill his third principle, that of People's Livelihood. Because inequalities and oppressive conditions persisted or even worsened in GMD-controlled areas, discontent among the rural population found its expression in the Communist-led, peasant revolutionary army (Bianco 1971; Blecher 1986).

After World War II and the failure of U.S.-mediated attempts to forestall the renewal of the civil war, the conflict between the immensely strengthened Communist movement and Jiang's huge but largely demoralized and incompetently led army resumed in 1947. Popular support in the countryside and massive defections from the GMD military helped the Communist forces achieve a relatively quick victory. Other nations, awed by the gigantic proportions of the conflict in China and recovering from the devastations of the war, chose not to intervene militarily to try to prevent or reverse the outcome of China's civil war. On October 1, 1949, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China in Beijing.

Jiang and remnants of the GMD armies fled from the mainland to Taiwan. There, protected by U.S. naval forces, Jiang claimed to represent the legitimate government of China. With U.S. support, the Taiwanese state, calling itself the Republic of China, held China's seat at the United Nations until 1971. At that point President Richard Nixon visited China—probably in an attempt to gain Chinese support in the U.S. international competition with the USSR and to obtain Chinese assistance in pressuring the Vietnamese into agreeing to a peace settlement acceptable to U.S. leaders. The Nixon administration decided to cease vetoing the entry of the People's Republic into the United Nations and to agree that Taiwan is a part of China and must someday be reunited with the mainland.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
1949–1990

After the civil war ended in victory for the revolutionaries, a national revolutionary government was established, dominated by the Communist party but including many non-Communists, such as Madame Song Qing Ling (Soong Ching-ling) (1891–1981), the widow of Sun. Counterrevolutionary efforts and serious nonpolitical criminal acts were harshly dealt with. This was especially true after China began to fight in Korea against the United States in 1950. More than 100,000 official executions occurred in the first half of 1951 and many more people were sent to prison or forced labor camps.

China in 1949 had a gigantic urban drug problem due in part to previous corruption among GMD police and to GMD use of "secret societies and gangster organizations which profited from the drug trade" for the political purpose of repressing revolutionaries (Meisner 1986, p. 90). Revolutionary authorities quickly launched anticrime and antivice campaigns, which over a two-year period succeeded in drastically reducing opium addiction, prostitution, gambling, and alcohol abuse. The antidrug drive "employed a combination of drastic criminal penalties (including execution) for major suppliers and dealers, amnesty for petty traffickers, rehabilitation for addicts, and a massive nationwide campaign of education and public 'ban opium' rallies appealing to patriotic sentiments by stressing the nineteenth century imperialistic origins [of the drug problem]" (Meisner 1986, pp. 90–91). Actions taken by the revolutionary leadership involving redistribution of wealth and resources toward the poor, providing jobs to the previously unemployed, asserting Chinese nationalism in defiance of former imperialist powers, and the ideology of the revolution that exalted the roles of peasant and worker in society tended to elevate the self-esteem of many Chinese and eliminate several important psychological and economic causes of drug abuse.

The new government's land-redistribution program tended to reinforce support for the revolution among most poor peasants and the successful anticrime measures appealed to much of the urban population, and the confrontation with the United States in Korea beginning in November 1950 also strengthened the revolutionary government.

For over a century China had been humiliated repeatedly by Western military forces, but now, for the first time, a Chinese army had defeated a Western army—and then fought the strongest military power in the world to a stalemate in a major conventional war. This event, perhaps

more than any other in China's modern history, served to stimulate intense feelings of national pride and confidence among the Chinese people. (Meisner 1986, p. 79)

And it helped rally nationalist sentiment throughout China in support of the revolutionary government.

Rural Change

Mao was often cited in the West for making the statement "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" (Mao 1965, p. 224). Some erroneously interpreted the expression to mean that according to Mao political power was identical with violence and that the revolutionary program would be forced on the majority of China's people. The intended meaning of the statement, however, was that in order for the poor majority of the people to pursue their aspirations, the instruments of institutionalized force (army, police) must support their right to political power rather than protect the privileges and wealth of China's landlord class, as they had in the past. Once the people no longer had to fear repression by warlord or GMD armies, they would feel secure in demanding and carrying out the redistribution of land they longed for (Blecher 1986; Meisner 1986; Skocpol 1979).

After the revolution, landownership patterns in the countryside went through a series of changes. During 1950–1953 land was taken from landlords and some rich peasants and distributed to the poor. But both landlords and rich peasants retained amounts of land to cultivate in approximate proportion to their percentage in the population. After land redistribution, 80 percent of the rural population were classified as middle peasants (average 2.3 acres), 5 percent as rich peasants (average 3 acres), and 15 percent as poor peasants (average 2.1 acres) (Domes 1985, p. 44). The continued existence of the category of poor peasant was partly due to the lack of sufficient arable land in certain areas to permit each household a parcel large enough to provide its minimum income requirements.

The process of land reform itself was at once economically, politically, socially, culturally, and psychologically transforming and, at times, violent. Throughout rural China village meetings were held in which the community participated in confiscating and redistributing land. The poor were encouraged to confront landlords directly and vent their feelings about past injustices. The reform process was intended to provide the poor, previously conditioned to a self-acceptance of inferiority and subordinate status, an experience of successful use of power against the landlords who had formerly controlled their lives (Blecher

1986). Village confrontations were typically emotionally explosive, with peasants "speaking bitterness" in recounting the deaths from starvation of children or other loved ones or the loss of friends or relatives in the struggles against the Japanese and the Guomindang.

Although Mao had called for an end of the landlord class as an economic and political entity, he had argued that landlords should not be physically eliminated, and the majority survived the land-reform process. But where emotions were particularly intense, poor peasants often vented their outrage through violence. The exact number of landlords killed is variously estimated at between 0.5 and 1 million (China's 1950 population was approximately 600 million) (Blecher 1986).

In the years following the first land reform, it became clear to many peasants that they could not significantly increase agricultural productivity on their small farms since as individuals they lacked the resources to purchase machinery or improve irrigation systems. This led to the formation of local mutual assistance organizations ("mutual aid teams") and then in the mid-1950s to the movement to combine land, livestock, and equipment to form "lower-stage agricultural producers' cooperatives" (LAPCs), which averaged about thirty households. In the LAPCs peasants received wages in proportion to their group-evaluated work contribution to farm production *and* in proportion to the amount of land, livestock, and the value of equipment they contributed to the cooperative. Membership in the LAPCs was voluntary. Finally, in the late 1950s the government, encouraged by increased agricultural productivity throughout the earlier stages of land reform, decreed the transition to the "fully socialist," or "higher-stage agricultural producers cooperatives" (HAPCs), in which all property was equally owned by participants and individuals received shares of produce and profits *only* in proportion to the their labor as evaluated by their coworkers. Membership in the HAPCs seems to have been voluntary on the part of many but involved coercion for some who had contributed the most in property to the LAPCs (Blecher 1986).

Urban Change

In 1953 after the conclusion of the Korean conflict with the United States—in which China suffered 1 million persons killed or wounded, including the death of one of Mao's sons—government leaders prepared to launch a rapid industrialization program. Because intense mutual hostility existed at the time between China and United States and most capitalist European nations, the Chinese could not turn to the West for assistance. China had no alternative but to rely on the Soviet Union.

The Chinese were encouraged by Russian advisers to adopt the model for industrialization that had worked for the USSR, the Stalinist strategy

of the late 1920s and the 1930s. This approach called for the development of powerful bureaucratic structures to control various aspects of industrialization through comprehensive central planning, for concentration of investment in heavy industry, such as steel production, rather than in the agricultural sector or in the production of consumer goods, and for obtaining financing through selling agricultural surpluses, made possible by the anticipated greater efficiency and profitability of cooperative over individual farms. The system placed economic authority primarily in the hands of technically skilled personnel rather than relying on participatory democratic styles of management, in which workers share in decision-making.

During 1953–1957 China graduated 130,000 engineers and achieved a healthy annual growth rate of 8 percent. But Mao and others were not satisfied with this pace or with the increase in urban unemployment, the de-emphasis on political education in favor of technical training, and the low priority assigned to agricultural sector development. Furthermore, many of the revolutionaries whose concepts of political authority and exercise of power had been shaped by the popular input characteristics of the mass-line approach to leadership objected to the bureaucratic elite's monopoly on decision-making. Mao and like-minded leaders decided to depart from the Stalinist model and launch a new program, the Great Leap Forward, intended to achieve more-rapid growth and more worker and peasant participation in decision-making processes.

The Great Leap: 1958–1960

The new policy involved several components. First, heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture were to be developed simultaneously. Second, the distinction between urban and rural was to be minimized by locating industrial enterprises in the countryside and recruiting urban workers for periodic agricultural work. Third, to make up for China's deficiency in industry-building capital and equipment, the Great Leap was to substitute the resource of its vast population: It would provide jobs in new projects for the unemployed and large numbers of women would be recruited into the labor force. Fourth, central planning was to give way to decentralization of authority to release the forces of creativity and to provide greater adaptability to local conditions and greater popular participation in policy-making.

The Great Leap also involved the shift in many rural areas from the fully socialist cooperative farms (HAPCs), which averaged about 160 households, to communes, which included several thousand households. Communes, unlike LAPCs and HAPCs, were much more than agricul-

tural economic institutions. Many communes constructed their own industrial plants and functioned politically as local government units within the state framework. The communes also provided their members with social services such as child care, medical treatment, education, and food services (Blecher 1986).

The Great Leap registered some positive achievements. Many previously unemployed men, as well as many women never before in the labor force, gained jobs and a new sense of purpose. Massive improvements were made to the agricultural infrastructure, including dams and irrigation systems, and many rural industrial plants were established. Those plants eventually accounted for over 20 percent of industrial output.

However, the negative consequences of the Great Leap seem to have outweighed the gains. The quality of the output of the rural factories was often too low to be useful. And in the agricultural sector, productivity fell because of the reduction of material incentives: Food and important social services were free in the new commune system, and the practice of farming private plots for individual profit-making was discontinued. Moreover, the years 1959, 1960, and 1961 were among those with the worst weather conditions in the century, and there were disastrous declines in farm output. During 1960 and 1961 food shortages contributed to a net loss in population of 20 to 25 million people, including deaths and deferred or unsuccessful pregnancies (Blecher 1986; Meisner 1986). The crisis in agriculture affected industrial productivity, which decreased by 38 percent in 1961 and 17 percent in 1962.

The deterioration of the economy also resulted from the abrupt cutoff of Soviet economic and technical assistance, ordered by Premier Khrushchev. This measure signaled the beginning of more than two decades of hostility between the USSR and China. Whereas some disagreements between Russian and Chinese Communist leaders dated from the 1920s, the more immediate antagonisms preceding the break included Soviet displeasure with Chinese abandonment of the Russian model of development and with the disruptive or impractical policies of the Great Leap, and Chinese criticisms of the elitist Soviet political system and aspects of Soviet foreign policy. The suspension of Soviet aid not only halted dozens of industrial construction projects, it also forced the shutdown of several existing power and industrial plants due to lack of replacement parts for Russian-made machinery.

Retreat from the Great Leap: 1961–1965

In an effort to bring about economic recovery the government increased reliance on centralized economic planning, canceled a number

of costly construction projects, and reduced the size of communes, limiting the economic management units to about 160 households each. Peasants were again allowed to cultivate their own private plots in addition to collectively farmed land. In both agriculture and industry, differential reward levels (material incentives) were increased. And within industrial plants, worker participation in management was curtailed and more power was restored to factory managers (Blecher 1986; Meisner 1986).

However, the shift back toward a concentration of power in the government and Party bureaucracies and the emphasis on material incentives versus revolutionary idealism provoked the animosity of Mao and various other leftists. Prior to the 1960s, Mao seemed to have argued that any resurgence of capitalist traits was due to the effects of lingering feudalistic and capitalistic cultural values, largely sustained by those still active in the remaining private businesses, and that these elements would gradually be eroded as collective ownership and other economic changes strengthened socialist culture and collectivist psychology.

But in the early 1960s Mao formulated a new theory about the reemergence of capitalist traits. He said that in any social system that allowed one population element to become specialized in the function of exercising power, "capitalist tendencies" would begin to emerge. Greater power would lead to feelings of superiority, the desire for and rationalization of having a higher standard of living than others had, and the development of mechanisms, such as elitist schools for the children of power holders, to perpetuate the concentration of power in the hands of certain groups and families, which could come to constitute a new ruling class. Unlike traditional Marxist thinking, Mao was arguing that changing the nature of the economic system did not preclude, even after some lengthy period of time, the reemergence of capitalism because such a phenomenon would be fostered whenever *power differentiation* occurred. In other words, he located the "material basis" for capitalist tendencies "not in *property* relations . . . but in *political* relations between leaders and masses" (Blecher 1986, p. 78 [emphasis in original]). He argued, therefore, that the people must be constantly ready to mount new revolutions or at least new mass movements to prevent the domination of new privileged classes and to redistribute power more democratically throughout society.

These propositions essentially constituted Mao's theory of the need for "permanent revolution" (Blecher 1986; Mackerras and Knight 1985). Such mass movements would, as in the case of China's Communist revolution, involve the combination of leftist revolutionary intellectuals and the masses. In China in the mid-1960s Mao and others attempted

to rally the masses against those whom the latter perceived to be seeking a monopoly on power and privilege. Such persons included, in Mao's view, much of the bureaucratic elite of the government *and* the Communist party. The occurrence of a mass movement led or at least inspired by the leader of a Communist revolution *against* the Party elite in the postrevolutionary period was unique. The Chinese refer to it as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION: 1966–1968

A publicly asserted objective of the Cultural Revolution was to redistribute power to the people. Concentration of power in institutional elites was viewed as being a characteristic of both U.S. capitalist society and the Soviet socialist system. The worst offenders were to be removed from their positions and assigned employment at manual labor jobs in the cities or in the countryside. In general, all persons involved in nonmanual tasks were in the future expected also to perform manual labor part of the time in order to maintain an appreciation of that form of work and to identify with the large mass of workers and peasants. Wage differentials were to be reduced and rural development projects reemphasized lest China develop parasitic urban centers relying on the economic exploitation of the surrounding countryside, as, it was argued, was the case in virtually all other primarily agrarian societies.

Mao in early 1965 began explaining the need for a cultural revolution in which leftist intellectuals would work through literature and the arts and in other areas to erode the harmful residue of "bourgeoise culture" present in Chinese society and more rapidly develop cultural elements congruent with socialism and the future "Communist" stage of society (Blecher 1986). Mao anticipated that the new culture would generate a new psychology, or "consciousness," among the people favorable to the development of Communist economic and social relations even before the advanced technology and material wealth assumed by Marx to be necessary conditions for communism were present (Meisner 1986).

The movement developed after a series of exchanges among leftist and rightist intellectuals over a play dealing with domineering officials and victimized peasants in a much earlier era in Chinese history. Many viewed this play as, in certain ways, critical of Mao's Great Leap program for rearranging the lives and livelihood of the nation's rural population. "A radical Beijing University philosophy instructor . . . denounced the university president" for attempting to suppress leftist criticism and called "upon students and intellectuals to join the battle" against rightists (Blecher 1986, p. 82). Students, faculty, and other citizens became

involved in the conflict. Mao sided with the philosophy instructor and
had his arguments broadcast throughout the nation. Inspired students
organized Red Guard committees to begin movements in their cities
against rightists in positions of authority.

Often during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards in individual
communities would lead huge crowds in a march to a particular site,
for example, the local Communist party headquarters, and demand the
presence of "guilty" officials, who would then be subjected to public
criticism. The charges might include past behavior aimed at self-
enrichment, acting in "elitist" and "antidemocratic" ways, advocating
policies emphasizing material incentives, or any other practices or stated
opinions that reflected the "capitalist road" to economic development.
In individual industrial plants, revolutionary committees of workers were
elected to act as managers; past executives were reassigned to machine
work or other manual tasks. According to Chinese government estimates
made in the 1980s, between 700,000 and 800,000 officials lost their
positions during 1966–1968. The Cultural Revolution also attacked
elements of traditional Chinese culture, which were seen as sources of
counterrevolutionary values.

In late 1966, factions began to develop among Red Guard members
over issues such as whether particular sets of local, regional, or national
officials should be attacked or defended. And in 1967, the Cultural
Revolution surged beyond the control of any particular leader or group,
including Mao. Violent conflicts broke out in a number of locales
between movement supporters and opponents, both of whom were
armed with militia weapons, and in some places, even among rival Red
Guard factions.

Mao called on the People's Liberation Army, whose commanders were
loyal to him and largely had not been the targets of Red Guard purges,
to restore order. He stated that "capitalist roaders" constituted only a
minority among the Communist party's leadership. Estimates of the
number of people who died in the turbulent 1966–1968 period as a
result of fighting among different factions, Red Guard persecution, and
especially army efforts to repress Red Guard forces in several parts of
the country range from 40,000 to 400,000 (Blecher 1986; Meisner
1986).

After 1968 the turmoil subsided, but the movement still exercised
influence over wide sectors of the population until the mid-1970s. Several
top Chinese leaders died around then; most important of course was
Mao's death on September 8, 1976. A month later, on October 6, Hua
Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng), premier and Party chairman, while professing
support for the Cultural Revolution, had four top leftist leaders (the so-
called Gang of Four), including Mao's wife, arrested on charges of

"trying to foment civil war by allegedly arming the Shanghai militia and planning an attack on the organs of state" (Blecher 1986, p. 90). In general, Hua attempted to work out a compromise between left (Maoist) and right factions in the Chinese Communist party. But these efforts failed, and the right wing won control of the Party Central Committee in December 1978. The apparent leader of the right-wing faction, Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing), assumed the vice premiership and the leadership of the Party committee that oversees the armed forces (Blecher 1986; Domes 1985).

POST-1978 REFORMS

The new rightist atmosphere in China was accompanied by the demotion of prominent Maoists and the "rehabilitation" of many who had been removed from their positions during the Cultural Revolution. Mao was subjected to posthumous criticism and accused of major errors, such as his grandiose and unsound plans during the Great Leap of the late 1950s and his role in helping to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. But he was still officially recognized as "a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary" whose "contributions to the Chinese Revolution far outweigh his mistakes" (Blecher 1986, p. 92).

The Cultural Revolution itself was interpreted by the new leadership as largely a catastrophe. Although the movement helped bring about a redistribution of resources to the rural areas, resulting in better education and health care and more industry there, the goal of increased and lasting "democratization" of national, local, and workplace authority structures was not achieved (Meisner 1986). Furthermore, economic development became stagnant because of social conflict, the interruption of the educational system and thus a reduced output of new engineers, technicians, and other skilled professionals, and the large number of incompetent administrators and other key personnel recruited during the Cultural Revolution, when emphasis was on loyalty to Mao's ideas rather than on expertise (Blecher 1986; Domes 1985).

In the 1980s changes were instituted in the economy to bring about increases in productivity. These included greater reliance on material incentives and legalizing the establishment of small-scale private businesses and industries in such areas as restaurants, clothing manufacture and sales, and transport services. A process of decollectivization of agriculture was also carried out, permitting individuals to withdraw from cooperative farming by leasing parcels of land from the cooperatives. The leasing party would then farm independently, being allowed to keep the profits (the farmer had to sell a set quantity of crops to the

state at a fixed price but could sell the surplus beyond the quota at market prices).

Reforms relevant to state-owned industries included allowing such enterprises to "produce for the market demand as long as they fulfilled the assigned state quota . . . purchase needed raw material through the market, rather than remaining dependent on central allocation . . . [and allowing that] prices for the products . . . be set by the supply and demand mechanism" (Theen and Wilson 1986, p. 448). Another important innovation involved allowing foreign corporations to build plants in specific restricted-access sites inside China (initially in coastal areas) called Special Economic Zones (SEZs). In 1989, 450 U.S. corporations were involved in joint ventures with the Chinese government, including projects such as aircraft assembly, nuclear-power plants, and coal mining (CNN, May 24, 1989). Renewed emphasis was placed on higher education and technical training and in obtaining technology and scientific knowledge from the more-advanced industrial nations. To this end, tens of thousands of Chinese students were allowed to go to the United States, Japan, and other nations for graduate school.

China's internal politics were reshaped in part by the 1982 constitution, which attempted to shift citizen political participation away from the postrevolutionary phenomena of mass mobilization and mass movements (viewed by the 1980s leadership as potentially too disruptive and chaotic) and toward reliance on political expression through representative governmental mechanisms. Although the Communist party remained dominant, under the new constitution citizens voted for representatives to local assemblies in multicandidate elections. Those elected voted in turn for the next level of officials. This process continued up to the national level.

Analysts and critics of the economic and political changes of the 1980s have speculated on potential problems and unintended consequences of the innovations. Questions such as the following have been raised: Will inequality increase in China? Will private farms lead to an increase in birthrates in attempts to enlarge the household labor force? Will the intensified reliance on material incentives and reduced experience with collective social settings erode socialist ideology and lead to an increase in undesirable self-seeking behaviors such as crime? Will mass participation in protests aimed at achieving more reforms increase, resulting in serious disruptions of the economy?

The answers lie in the future. But China's post-Mao leadership contended that capitalism could not be reestablished so long as the land— even if leased to individuals—and other forms of national wealth were ultimately owned collectively. Rather, they hoped that under the reforms "some will get rich faster so that all may get rich" (Schell 1985, p. 16)

and that individual initiative and effort would be maximized within an essentially socialist framework (Blecher 1986; Mackerras and Knight 1985; Meisner 1986; *New York Times,* Dec. 31, 1990, p. A7).

THE 1989 PRODEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATIONS

The changes in China's political system were insufficient to satisfy the demands for greater democracy put forth by millions in the late 1980s. Among the factors leading to the movement for more political freedom were the historic desire of Chinese intellectuals for a genuinely democratic political system, the decentralization and increase in freedom of initiative in the economic system, higher levels of cultural contact with societies that have relatively open political expression, and the example of democratizing political reforms in the USSR promoted by President Gorbachev. In the years prior to the democratic movement, relaxation of international tensions and economic progress had apparently also reduced public perception of the need for an authoritarian regime. The Communist party had reportedly lost considerable prestige because of the failure of a number of its pre-1980s programs and also the then-current allegations of corruption of some Party and government officials (Kristof 1989). And many young people began to anticipate a greater level of freedom of expression and political participation as necessary components of economic change and technological modernization.

A series of remarkable prodemocracy protests began in April 1989 (*New York Times,* May 20, 1989, p. 6). On April 15 Hu Yaobang, the ousted Communist party leader, who had advocated reforms to bring about greater freedom of expression, died. Beijing University students put up posters praising him and criticizing Party and government officials who had forced his resignation after blaming him for fomenting student demonstrations in 1986 and 1987. On April 17 thousands of students marched in Beijing and Shanghai, chanting the slogan "Long live Hu Yaobang! Long live democracy!" After further demonstrations, students began a boycott of classes at Beijing universities and demanded a dialogue with government officials concerning further democratization.

On May 4 tens of thousands marched in Beijing and other cities to commemorate the anniversary of China's first modern student demonstration, which had occurred seventy years earlier, in 1919. Two thousand students began a hunger strike on May 13 in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, asking for increased political and media freedom. Within a few days hundreds of thousands, including journalists, intellectuals, and

workers, joined the protests. The students appeared to enjoy widespread popular sympathy in urban areas and even some support among Party, government, and military leaders as well as encouragement from powerful countries including the United States and the USSR. One development during the sequence of demonstrations was a rapid increase in effective freedom of the press to cover the protests.

The majority of the nation's leaders, however, were unwilling to grant all the demands of the students and eventually lost patience with continued protestor occupation of Tiananmen Square. After unarmed police and soldiers were unable to clear the square, heavily armed troops, untrained and ill equipped for dealing with civilian protests, brutally repressed the demonstrators. At a minimum, hundreds were killed, and in the weeks following the June 3 crackdown thousands were arrested across the country. Several high-ranking officials accused of encouraging prodemocracy activism were demoted from public leadership roles. The government also enacted measures intended to heighten political loyalty, increase citizen commitment to the welfare of the entire nation, and intensify student identification and social bonds with the urban working class, the peasants, and the People's Liberation Army. The policies designed to accomplish these goals included more political education in the colleges and universities and the requirement that students spend at least one year working at manual labor jobs. In addition, egalitarian ideals championed by Mao were again officially emphasized.

The suppression of prodemocracy activists was in part a reaction to the dangers that many government and Communist party leaders perceived to be embodied in the movement. They feared that the conflicts and uncertainties that might result from a rapid transition to full democracy could lead to a Chinese government too weak and divided to protect national interests effectively. According to this view, a fully democratic China might be too feeble to defend itself against economic exploitation by the more technologically advanced nations, resulting in a new era of subservience to and humiliation by neoimperialist powers. Some Party and government officials complained that many student activists were overly concerned with personal gain and with attaining the relatively comfortable life-styles characteristic of the affluent classes of Western Europe and the United States at the expense of the peasant and worker majority. Finally, government and Party leaders who had been victims of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution feared the spread of a new, uncontrolled mass social movement that not only might cost them their positions but also might again plunge the nation into a state of social chaos, conflict, and economic disruption.

The weaknesses of the prodemocracy movement were to some extent the opposite of several of the strengths of the earlier Communist-led

revolution. Although over 70 percent of China's people continued to reside in the rural areas where Mao's revolution had thrived, the prodemocracy movement was almost totally urban based. Its core social constituency was highly educated young persons, an elite sector of the population, whose goals movement opponents could portray to the larger public as reforms that would mainly benefit an already advantaged minority to the detriment of the rural majority's well-being. Furthermore, the factor of nationalism, instead of operating for the movement as had been the case in the Communist-led revolution, was employed with some success to mobilize public opinion against proponents of the prodemocracy movement. Antimovement government officials depicted the most radical of the activists as foreign inspired and argued that rapid unconditional democratization of China would leave the country, while still relatively underdeveloped economically, too divided politically to resist domination by the advanced Western nations and Japan.

By late June 1990 many of those arrested during the previous summer had been released (*New York Times*, May 11, 1990, p. A1), and a number of prodemocracy movement organizers were later given relatively short sentences (*New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1991, p. A3). And the attempt of procrackdown elements in the 48-million-member Communist party to purge the organization of prodemocracy movement sympathizers apparently had very little impact (*New York Times*, June 23, 1990, p. A3). Additional reforms, including gradual steps toward greater democracy, seemed likely in the future.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A number of factors contributed to the increase in discontent among China's peasants during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including massive population growth, intense poverty in rural areas, and humiliating military defeats and exploitation by foreign powers. The impoverished millions among China's rural population, culturally inclined to the historic mechanism of rebellion as a means of expressing outrage, were attracted to the Communist-inspired program for land redistribution and formed the basis of the peasant revolution.

Within the republican movements of the early twentieth century, two types of revolutionary elites developed, the relatively conservative leadership of the GMD and the more radical leadership of the Communist party. Most individuals in these elites came from the socioeconomic upper 10 percent of China's population and had achieved a relatively high degree of education. GMD leaders were drawn largely from the merchant and other business classes of the coastal cities and often had considerable contact with Western culture and economic interests. The

leadership of the Communist party tended to emerge from among the "radicalized" children of rich peasants and landlords. Ideologically, these two sets of leaders developed strikingly different interpretations of Sun's Three Principles of the People. The main point of contention was the meaning of the third principle, People's Livelihood. For GMD leaders who relied on the urban backing of merchants and foreign business interests and the rural support of the landlord classes, People's Livelihood could not mean a substantial redistribution of wealth toward the poor.

The GMD's failure to implement meaningful economic reform after the death of Sun not only alienated large segments of the impoverished majority but also affected the GMD's ability to fulfill the first and second of Sun's principles, Independence and Democracy. Failing to carry out significant land reform and, consequently, forced to repress popular aspirations, the GMD became a conservative military dictatorship exercising power through force of arms and a one-party government. The GMD reliance on weapons and other assistance from Western nations to maintain its military apparatus compromised its claims to nationalism.

After the abdication of the Manchus in 1911 and the death of the military dictator Yuan in 1916, China dissolved into separate provinces and territories ruled independently by warlords. But though a central government no longer exercised control over most of China until after 1927, conservative province-level governments and armed forces remained essentially intact. Jiang and the GMD succeeded in unifying most of China partly through military efforts but also by offering acceptable financial, political, and military arrangements to warlords, landlords, and urban merchants and other businessmen, domestic and foreign. The primary limitations on state power were a lack of sufficient resources and of coordination among military commanders to crush insurgency in the countryside and later the inability to resist the Japanese. Because the GMD state, its armed forces, and allied provincial governments and warlord armies were relatively strong in the 1920s and 1930s, Communist revolutionaries were defeated in urban areas, unlike their Russian predecessors, and turned to organizing a peasant-based rural revolution.

Other nations of the world did not directly intervene in China to stop the revolution. Their role was largely limited to providing weapons and advisers to Jiang's GMD forces. The Japanese invaded China to conquer and possibly colonize it, but not specifically to prevent a revolution. Later, after the defeat of the Japanese, a war-weary world was loath to intervene in the internal conflict among 600 million Chinese.

By advocating the seizure and redistribution of landlord property, the Chinese Communists took advantage of the lack of GMD land reform

to attract peasants to their cause. However, although this policy received an enthusiastic response from many, an additional powerful cause for peasant support and a more general unifying motivation for participation in the revolution was the nationalism inspired by the Japanese invasion. Not only did the Japanese attack reduce Jiang's ability to combat Communist rebels, but it also provided an opportunity for Communist forces to display their nationalist commitment. Jiang's GMD armies faired poorly against the Japanese and often retreated. In contrast the Communist forces in north China organized an effective peasant-based guerrilla war against the Japanese and Chinese collaborators, often pro-GMD landlords and merchants, and largely isolated them in cities. After the withdrawal of the Japanese, the combination of the Communists' proven nationalist fervor and their program for wealth redistribution resulted in a mounting tide of popular support. This support facilitated the relatively quick defeat of the GMD and the October 1, 1949, establishment of the People's Republic of China.

CHINESE REVOLUTION: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1839–1842   Opium Wars, resulting in British victory; beginning of process of Chinese subjugation to foreign economic and political interests

1853–1864   Taiping Rebellion

1911   Republican revolution, led by Sun

1912   Sun organizes republican revolutionary groups into the Guomindang

1921   Formation of the Chinese Communist party

1925   Sun dies

1926   Guomindang armies under General Jiang launch campaign to subdue warlords and unify China

1927   Jiang attacks Communists, precipitating a new civil war

1934–1935   Communist forces retreat in the Long March; Mao, advocate of a peasant-based revolution, becomes the dominant Communist leader

1937–1945   The Guomindang and the Communists halt civil war and form an alliance to fight Japanese invaders

1947–1949   Civil war resumes; Communists win

1958–1960   Great Leap Forward

1966–1968   Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

1976   Mao dies

1989   Prodemocracy movement develops and is suppressed

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China: Century of Revolution, Part 2—Enemies Within and Without, 1927–1944, 1972, 26 min., film. Chinese Civil War and Japanese invasion. UC-B, UI, ISU, KSU, UMISSOURI, SUNY-B, PSU, PU, UT-A, WSU.

China: Century of Revolution, Part 3—Communist Triumph and Consolidation, 1945–1971, 1972, 20 min., film. Communist victory in the late 1940s. UC-B, ISU, KSU, UMISSOURI, SUNY-B, PSU, PU, WSU.

Mao: Long March to Power, 1978, 24 min., color film. Mao's political philosophy
and rise to power. BU, UI, IU, UIOWA, KSU, SYRU, UWISC-L.

Mao: Organized Chaos, 1978, 24 min., color film. Postrevolutionary China Through
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Small Happiness: Women of a Chinese Village, 1984, 58 min., video. Highly acclaimed
unrestricted investigation of changes in rural women's lives since the revo-
lution as well as the persistence of traditional views. UMINN.

The Vietnamese Revolution

While Mao and his associates were building their initial rural bases in south-central China, revolutionary ideas were taking root in another part of Asia. In 1930 several groups of Marxist-inspired Vietnamese nationalists formed the Indochinese Communist party (ICP). The Party members vowed to accomplish a social revolution in Vietnam, then under French colonial control. After years of organizational efforts, localized rebellions, and repression, the ICP made paramount the achievement of independence from foreign rule and united various sectors of Vietnamese society behind this nationalist goal. The Party established a network of mass organizations, the Viet Minh (League for Vietnamese Independence), which it led. In 1941 the Party launched a war of resistance against both the French and the Japanese armed forces, which at the time jointly occupied Vietnam. The Vietnamese were to be involved in armed conflict almost continuously for more than three decades.

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Vietnam, which has a land area of 127,246 square miles (329,566 km²), is a long, narrow country situated along the eastern side of the Indochinese peninsula in Southeast Asia. China lies to the north and Laos and Cambodia to the west. The South China Sea borders Vietnam's entire coastline. Heavily forested mountain and plateau regions constitute most of the country's territory. Two fertile river delta areas are located at opposite ends of Vietnam, the Red River Delta (about 5,800 square miles; 15,000 km²) in the north and the Mekong River Delta (about 14,000 square miles; 36,250 km²) in the south. The population, which numbered approximately 67 million in 1990, is about 85 percent

ethnic Vietnamese. The remaining 15 percent include residents of
Chinese and Cambodian (Khmer) ancestry as well as tribal peoples in
the lightly populated highland areas. Most of the ethnic Vietnamese
live in the fertile lowlands of Vietnam below the 300-foot-altitude level
and are concentrated in the two large river deltas and in smaller river
deltas and coastal plains along the length of the country. Those areas
constitute about 20 percent of the land area but contain 85 percent of
the population.

EARLY CULTURAL
AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The Vietnamese are apparently of Mongol ancestry and originated
as a distinctive ethnic group thousands of years ago. They gradually
moved south from the Red River Delta, assimilating the local residents
(or forcing them to seek refuge in the mountains). The Chinese attacked
and defeated the Vietnamese in 111 B.C. and occupied the country,
despite repeated rebellions, until A.D. 939. In that year, Viet forces
finally inflicted a devastating defeat on the Chinese, forcing their with-
drawal and an end to direct Chinese control. The Vietnamese completed
occupation of the southernmost region of the country, which had been
Cambodian territory, in 1780.

Often afflicted by internal dynastic wars and other conflicts, the
country was finally ruled as a unified political entity within its current
borders under Emperor Gia Long in 1802. Despite subsequent Chinese
invasions, the Vietnamese retained their independence until conquered
by the French during the nineteenth century. The Chinese often re-
ferred to Vietnam as Annam (the pacified south), a term most Viet-
namese detested. Later the French adopted this expression, referring
to the Vietnamese as Annamites, and outlawed use of the word *Vietnam.*

Prior to Chinese conquest the Vietnamese were a tribal people whose
king was one of the more powerful tribal chiefs to whom other chiefs
owed feudal obligations. Religious practice was a form of animism in
which ritual sacrifice and veneration were directed toward spirits thought
to control natural phenomena, such as the soil and water, and toward
the "souls" of dangerous or powerful animals, such as tigers. During
the more than thousand years of Chinese domination, the Vietnamese
adopted a Confucian political system (see Chapter 3), along with the
Chinese writing system, clothing styles, and technology. But they re-
tained their own language (related to the Mon-Khmer and Thai linguistic
families) and most steadfastly refused to relinquish their separate ethnic
identity and their desire for independence. Throughout the period of

Chinese rule, Viet leaders (such as the Trung sisters in A.D. 39–43) mounted heroic rebellions.

The peasant culture that evolved under Chinese domination combined previously ingrained rural customs and beliefs with ideologies brought by the Chinese, including Confucianism (with its emphasis on obedience and social order), Buddhism (stressing morally right behavior in order to achieve nirvana and escape the cycle of reincarnation), and Taoism (emphasizing the individual's search for the *tao,* the path or way, to happiness and enlightenment in this world and the hereafter). Although these belief systems contained elements that were conflicting (such as Taoism's rejection of the importance of Confucian scholarship in favor of seeking harmony with nature), the Vietnamese tended to select and blend compatible or complimentary aspects of the imported doctrines with indigenous folkways (Bain 1967).

FRENCH CONQUEST

In 1516 Portuguese explorers visited Vietnam. They referred to the country as Cauchichina, deriving this term from the Chinese characters for Vietnam, *giao chi,* and adding "china" to distinguish it from their "Cochin" colony located in India. Later the French came to play the dominant role in Vietnam after it became clear that Portugal was simply too weak to master the task of "Christianizing" and colonizing Asia. The French, who attempted to portray Vietnam to the world as three separate countries, modified the Portuguese misnomer and referred to the southernmost part of Vietnam, within which the Mekong Delta and Saigon were located, as "Cochinchina." They labeled the long middle section of the country, with the old imperial capital Hue, "Annam," and called the northernmost part of Vietnam, which included the Red River Delta and the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, "Tonkin."

French missionaries, originally entering Vietnam under Portuguese auspices, enthusiastically embraced the goal of converting the Vietnamese and returned to France with stories of immense wealth and excellent harbors to entice the support of French businessmen and military leaders. Eventually a mutually supportive relationship evolved among French missionaries, merchants, and the navy, which developed an interest in the potential usefulness of Vietnamese ports for extending its operational combat range. Some Vietnamese monarchs craved the modern weapons and other technologies or products the Europeans could provide and periodically tolerated missionary work in order to obtain benefits or avoid French displeasure. But inevitably Vietnamese officials became alarmed that the spread of Christianity reflected the threat of a massive expansion of French imperial presence in Vietnam.

In 1847, outraged by Vietnamese campaigns against Christian missionaries and envious of Britain's gains in its successful Opium Wars against the Chinese, the French defeated Vietnamese naval forces and obtained concessions from the emperor. Further disputes led to a French assault in 1858 and the seizure of Saigon and its surrounding provinces in 1861. In 1863 the Vietnamese gave up their control of Cambodia to the French and in 1867 the emperor surrendered the provinces west of Saigon. The French soon established Cochinchina as a colony, displacing Vietnamese administrators with French officials. Later a series of military conflicts resulted in French "protectorates" over Annam and Tonkin. In these areas many Vietnamese mandarins (those willing to collaborate) maintained their positions under the authority of French civil and military officials. By 1883, the French conquest of Vietnam was complete.

THE FRENCH IMPACT ON VIETNAM

Economic Effects

Few Frenchmen had as great an impact on Vietnam as Paul Doumer, who arrived in Vietnam as governor-general of Indochina in 1897. The measures that Doumer instituted, although harmful to the welfare of many Vietnamese, transformed Vietnam into a colony that not only paid for the cost of its own military occupation but also generated great wealth for France and many of its citizens.

In some instances Doumer merely accelerated French colonial programs begun earlier, whereas in other cases he innovated. Confronted initially with a country composed of an enormous number of basically self-sufficient agricultural communities, the French resolved to utilize Vietnamese resources in such a way as to generate products for the world market and construct a regionally complimentary economic infrastructure. Because mineral deposits were discovered in the north and labor could be readily obtained from the densely populated Red River Delta, mining and industry were developed primarily in the northern third of Vietnam. Recognizing the potential of the much larger Mekong Delta, the French government constructed hydraulic projects there to control water levels, opened huge tracts to cultivation, and sold large sections cheaply to French and Vietnamese investors in order to pay the cost of the water control program and to bring the new land under cultivation quickly. As a consequence, landownership, which was very unequal in Tonkin and Annam, was even more highly concentrated in Cochinchina. Of 6,530 landholders in all of French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) with more than 125 acres, 6,300 resided in this

THIS MAP

CHINA

Red River

TONKIN

Hanoi

Haiphong

Red River Delta

GULF OF TONKIN

LAOS

Mekong

River

THAILAND

Hue

CAMBODIA

ANNAM

GULF OF THAILAND

Saigon

Mekong Delta

COCHINCHINA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

FRENCH INDOCHINA

southernmost part of Vietnam: There 2.5 percent of the population
owned 45 percent of the cultivated land (Duong 1985; McAlister 1969).
Tenant farmers and landless agricultural laborers made up over half of
the rural population in Cochinchina (many of the landless had migrated
from the overpopulated Red River Delta area in search of employment).

The French succeeded in massively increasing the amount of rice
exported from Vietnam—from about 57,000 tons in 1860 to more than
1,500,000 tons in 1937 (Wolf 1969). They also developed large rubber
plantations (over 1,000 in Cochinchina and Cambodia), which employed
tens of thousands of Vietnamese workers under generally harsh condi-
tions. The colonial authorities also introduced heavy taxes. Since many
peasants could not make ends meet, they fell into debt and were forced
to sell their land, contributing to the growth of the landless rural segment
and greater concentration of landownership. By 1930, even before the
hardships inflicted by the international economic depression, an esti-
mated 70 percent of the country's rural population were either landless
or lacked sufficient land to meet minimal survival requirements. These
people were forced to rent additional land or to engage in other work
activity to supplement family income (Duong 1985; Karnow 1983; Pop-
kin 1979).

Moreover, in the effort to expand produce for export, the percentages
of land and harvested grain that had traditionally been held communally
to assist peasants in times of hardship were significantly reduced, de-
priving rural Vietnamese of their state-sponsored aid system (Duong
1985; Popkin 1979). Doumer's agents recruited many of the landless to
work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, or in the building of roads
and railways, sometimes making use of laws against "vagrancy" or
"vagabondism" to coerce potential laborers. In general, as the majority
of Vietnam's population could no longer maintain a self-sufficient ex-
istence because of loss of land, lack of enough land, or inability to pay
taxes, their material well-being became dependent on the international
market prices for Vietnam's exports. These prices affected the wages
of landless workers, farm income, and consumer prices for food and
other necessities. Thus the development of an export-oriented economy
under colonialism, while benefiting the French and Vietnamese large
landholders and industrial and commercial elite by providing them with
a high money income, often had negative consequences for the larger
population, particularly in times of low international prices for Vietnam's
products (McAlister 1969; Wolf 1969).

When Doumer reached Vietnam, only its Chinese residents smoked
opium. He proceeded to build an opium refinery that produced a quick-
burning mixture that proved popular. Opium addiction spread exten-
sively among the Vietnamese, and profits from the sale of the drug

eventually accounted for *one-third* of the colonial administration's income (Karnow 1983). Doumer's success in generating large profits for his country and its agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprises helped put an end to significant criticism of imperial policy in France. And the publicity given to the views of wealthy Francophile Vietnamese, who visited Paris and expressed gratitude for France's role in their nation, contributed to the self-serving illusion among the French that most Vietnamese were happy with colonial status.

For the approximately 0.3 percent of Vietnamese who had received five or more years of schooling in the French colonial educational system by 1931 (French education was a key to social mobility in colonial Vietnam), opportunities for high-paying careers or access to political power were limited. The French dominated the major positions in the colonial bureaucracy and in commerce, along with Vietnam's Chinese minority, the product of past Chinese colonial rule and repeated invasions (McAlister 1969). The lack of sufficient social and economic mobility may have motivated some in Vietnam's French-educated elite to work for independence, since access to political power and high-paying positions would presumably be greater once the French left.

By 1929 the French colonial process had also generated a Vietnamese working class, composed of about 140,000 (probably under 5 percent of the working population), which provided labor for industry, commercial operations, and mining. A 1931 analysis of the overall income structure of Vietnam showed that the top 1 percent of the population (composed of French administrators, large landholders, and well-to-do Vietnamese) enjoyed an annual money income level that was about eight times the average income of the 9 percent who were largely urban, nonpeasant employees and workers and twenty-four times the income of the 90 percent who were peasants. Although landowning peasants were usually able to raise at least part of their own basic food requirements, money income reflected their ability to pay taxes and purchase equipment and other commodities, especially imported goods (McAlister 1969).

Cultural and Social Changes

French colonialism precipitated the rapid erosion of the Confucian system, which was blamed for Vietnam's inability to resist French conquest. Many in the Vietnamese elite, schooled in the Confucian scholarship that had in the past constituted the means to governmental and economic opportunity, now sought a French education for their children. French culture soon enveloped the upper levels of Vietnamese society and, in varying ways, affected the larger population.

The colonial educational system was intended to propagate an admiration for French culture and achievements among the Vietnamese and to recruit a French-educated elite that would collaborate with colonial authorities and businessmen. But many Vietnamese took their lessons on French history and political ideologies to heart: The French Revolution and concepts of political democracy and socialism eventually would inspire an effective revolutionary movement in Vietnam. Prominent among future revolutionary figures was a brilliant history teacher, Vo Nguyen Giap, who enthralled his students with accounts of the French Revolution and the unjust society against which it was directed. In the late 1930s he left the classroom to organize and lead the revolutionary armies that would drive the French from Vietnam.

Among the social consequences of French economic policies was the movement of large numbers of landless Vietnamese away from their home villages to mining areas, industrial centers, plantations, and to the newly developed and fertile agricultural land in the Mekong Delta. Migration apparently had great emotional and moral consequences for many of the uprooted poor because their traditional culture provided few satisfactory interpretations for their new experiences and because they were isolated from their extended-family networks. Many Vietnamese succumbed to opium addiction or became involved in prostitution, both of which were promoted by the French colonial administrative and military presence. Other Vietnamese turned to new religions. In the Mekong Delta, where many migrants, separated from past social ties and lacking the status and security of landownership, had established villages, the appeal of new religions, which provided a feeling of community and a sense of prestige and personal worth through membership in the "true faith," was especially strong. An eclectic, or syncretic, cult, Cao Dai, founded by a mystic in 1926, and a Buddhist reformist sect, Hoa Hao, formally established in 1939, gained many adherents.

Cao Dai, named for a spirit who communed with its founder, was based on the concept that the ideal religion should combine the best elements of all faiths and secular philosophies and included among its "saints" Jesus, Buddha, Joan of Arc, and Sun Yixian (Karnow 1983). However, Cao Dai leaders, while attempting to incorporate what they perceived as beneficial elements from Western cultures, strongly emphasized Vietnamese nationalism. Their religion centered on an explicit integration of the three major faiths of Vietnam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, in an effort to present a sort of united religious-cultural front to French imperialism (Tai 1983; Woodside 1976; Werner 1981). Hoa Hao (named after the Mekong town where it was invented by a prophetic faith healer), was a kind of "Buddhist Protestantism"; part of its attraction for the poor was its simplicity and rejection of

expensive rituals or religious artifacts. Hoa Hao manifested strong nationalistic tendencies: It stressed traditional Vietnamese Buddhist doctrine and customs and opposed the adoption of certain Western values or even some forms of Western technology (Tai 1983).

Both Cao Dai and Hoa Hao developed into political-religious organizations with their own armed militias. The leadership of these two religions (both of which eventually fragmented into feuding subdivisions) strove for autonomous political control over certain districts in the Mekong Delta. At times they allied with Communist-led independence forces and at other times, with the French, depending on which course of action seemed to maximize their goal of localized political authority. By the mid-1950s the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao apparently each numbered over 1 million (together about 6 to 8 percent of the population), 10 percent of the Vietnamese embraced Catholicism, and 80 percent claimed varying degrees of association with one of the dozen or so other Buddhist sects.

Political Consequences

As noted earlier, the French chose to rule the southernmost part of Vietnam, Cochinchina, which the Vietnamese called Nam Bo (south territory, also called Nam Ky) as a directly administered colony. This part of Vietnam was controlled for the longest period by France and was most influenced by French rule. In contrast, the middle section of Vietnam, Annam (Trung Bo or Trung Ky), and the northernmost region, Tonkin (Bac Bo or Bac Ky), were technically protectorates of France. The Vietnamese emperor, with his court at Hue, served primarily as a figurehead, and scholarly mandarins continued to exercise political authority on the condition of serving French colonial interests. But even in these provinces the old political system was gradually phased out. As the French-educated elite gradually replaced the Confucian mandarins in Tonkin and Annam, the distinction between direct rule (in Cochinchina) and indirect rule (in Tonkin and Annam) became "virtually meaningless" by the time the revolution began in the early 1940s (McAlister 1969, p. 43).

The French also changed the system of government at the local level. Traditionally a village had been governed by a "council of notables" composed of the local Confucian scholars and the village elders. The new system provided that elections be held to select a council with a strong executive who had to be approved by the province governor and who was directly responsible for carrying out colonial policy in his village (McAlister 1969; Wolf 1969). Many Vietnamese did not accept the new system and viewed it as a mechanism of colonial control; thus

the French in reality had destroyed the popularly supported and under-
stood form of local government without replacing it with one that was
similarly accepted by the majority of the population. A political vacuum
developed; it persisted in the countryside until it was filled by the new
forms of political and social organization developed by Vietnamese
revolutionaries (McAlister 1969).

The strongest base of political support for the French presence in
Vietnam was in Cochinchina and consisted of the wealthy and powerful
French settlers and Francophile Vietnamese large landholders there.
This group organized the pro-French Constitutionalist party, which
eventually ran candidates for the Saigon city council and other local
government posts. A reflection of the degree of loyalty the French
enjoyed from affluent Vietnamese in this southernmost section of Viet-
nam was the fact that in 1937, of the 2,555 largely wealthy Vietnamese
who had received French citizenship, 1,474 resided in Cochinchina,
which then had only about 20 percent of Vietnam's population (Mc-
Alister 1969).

A major mechanism through which the French sought to control the
Vietnamese colony was the Colonial Militia, composed of Vietnamese
in service to the French. This institution became a channel of social
and economic mobility for those Vietnamese willing to improve their
lot at the probable expense of their country folk. It also served as the
nucleus of the antirevolutionary Vietnamese armies that fought first
alongside the French and later alongside U.S. forces in attempts to crush
the Vietnamese Revolution.

A final but critically important political consequence of French co-
lonial policy was the development of a Vietnamese revolutionary elite
from among the French-educated fraction of the colony's population.
This group would make use of concepts derived from their Western
educations, fuse them with Vietnamese nationalism, and organize the
successful movement to oust the French.

RESISTANCE TO FRENCH RULE

Analyses provided by McAlister (1969), Wolf (1969), and Khanh
(1982) suggest four phases of Vietnamese resistance: a period of tra-
dition-based rebellion; a transitional phase involving the integration of
traditional goals with new concepts; the creation of modern but unsuc-
cessful nationalist movements; and the development of a successful
revolutionary effort, the Viet Minh.

Tradition-Based Rebellion: 1883–1900

During the period of tradition-based rebellion, many Confucian scholars refused to serve in collaboration with the French and organized protests and even rebellions against colonial rule. But these were localized episodes that were relatively easy for the French to suppress. Furthermore, in these efforts traditional leaders were attempting to rally Vietnamese nationalism through a reliance on the Confucian system of the past, which had proven to be oppressive and ineffective.

Transition: 1900–1925

After 1900 several Vietnamese scholars, originally educated in the Confucian classics in preparation for mandarinal exams, attempted to organize Vietnamese independence movements that incorporated concepts from the more technologically advanced societies. Most important of these leaders were Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940) and Phan Chu Trinh (1872–1926), who represented a transitional generation between the tradition-oriented pre-1900 rebellions and the modern nationalist movements, which began to develop in the 1920s. Although both advocated independence and had become convinced that traditional Confucian learning had failed miserably in providing Vietnam the ability to resist Western colonialism, they advocated significantly different methods in the pursuit of nationalist goals.

Phan Boi Chau was concerned with developing a model for a modified Vietnamese state that would integrate useful modern concepts into traditional Vietnamese culture. Over time he advocated traditional monarchy, then a constitutional monarchy based on the Japanese model, then a totally republican form of government. Many of his ideas were understood only by the best-educated Vietnamese, a number of whom viewed some of his major proposals, such as blending traditional Vietnamese social forms with more efficient Japanese innovations, as ill suited to Vietnam's local conditions. In the end Phan Boi Chau was valued not for the soundness of his proposals but for being a fervent nationalist who exalted the intellectual capabilities, resourcefulness, and stubborn determination of the Vietnamese people and who supported the tradition of violent resistance to colonialism (Duiker 1976; Marr 1971; Woodside 1976).

Phan Chu Trinh, in contrast, refused to advocate armed rebellion, which, given Vietnam's technological inferiority, he viewed as a senseless waste of life. He held that modernization of Vietnam's technology, culture, and political and social systems was an absolute necessity even if this required an extended period of colonialism. He somewhat opti-

mistically called on the French to modernize Vietnam rapidly and assist
in building mechanisms of self-government leading to full Vietnamese
independence. Although in the end colonialism was thrown off not
through a reformist process but through the method of armed revolution
advocated by Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chu Trinh was credited with
encouraging many young Vietnamese to learn from Western societies
those concepts that could one day make Vietnam a strong and inde-
pendent nation.

Phan Chu Trinh, whom the French treated in a relatively lenient
manner because his protests against colonial injustices were tempered
by his nonviolent reformist approach and his advocacy of French-
Vietnamese harmony, died of natural causes in March 1926. Phan
Boi Chau was arrested by the French secret police in 1925. He spent
the rest of his life under detention and died in 1940.

Modern Nationalist Attempts: 1925–1940

By the late 1920s a significant number of Vietnam's educated young
people had traveled abroad, some hoping to discover new ideas and
methods for bringing independence to Vietnam. Several groups co-
alesced to form two nationalist organizations, the Vietnamese Nationalist
party (VNQDD) in 1927 and the ultimately much more important
Indochinese Communist party in 1930.

The VNQDD, loosely patterned after the Chinese GMD (Guomin-
dang), attempted to incorporate in its program several of the ideas of
Sun Yixian. In particular, its platform proclaimed the goals of national
liberation and social revolution. But the meaning of "social revolution"
was never clearly defined within the party, and many of its members
had differing interpretations of it (Khanh 1982). The party recruited
mainly among students and urban, middle-income, nonmanual employ-
ees, such as teachers, clerks, and journalists. The VNQDD also gained
the support of significant numbers of Vietnamese soldiers in the French-
organized and -controlled colonial militia. Among the limitations of the
VNQDD was its being primarily urban based; consequently, it had almost
no organized support among the 90 percent of Vietnam's population
who were peasants. Instead of developing an ideology and program for
redistribution of wealth that would appeal to the peasants and patiently
working to build revolutionary support and organizational structures in
the countryside, the VNQDD created special units to carry out attacks
and assassinations against French officials. The VNQDD leaders appar-
ently thought that using terrorist violence against colonial agents would
arouse Vietnamese patriotism and win mass support.

The VNQDD was largely crushed after the failure of the Yen Bay
Mutiny in February 1930. In Yen Bay, VNQDD-organized Vietnamese

colonial militia soldiers mutinied and killed their French officers. But the military rebels were overwhelmed in one day. More than 1,000 VNQDD party members were arrested. In the trials that followed, about 100 were given life sentences and 80 were sentenced to death. The VNQDD lost most of its best leaders during this repression and ceased to be a credible and genuinely Vietnamese nationalist movement. More than a decade later the French would desperately try to establish a significant non-Communist nationalist movement, only to be faced with the realization that they had destroyed in 1930 the sole organization that could have competed with the Communist-led movement's nationalist credentials. Following the destruction of the VNQDD, some of its members joined Marxist-led movements, and others escaped to China or Japan where they reorganized under foreign sponsorship and entered Vietnam during or immediately after World War II. But many Vietnamese tended to view the resurrected versions of the VNQDD as mainly extensions of foreign imperialism (Khanh 1982).

During the latter half of the 1920s several Marxist-inspired groups, including Thanh Nien (Youth) and Tan Viet (New Vietnam), were organized by university students and young, educated urban Vietnamese employed mostly in nonmanual professions, such as teaching or office work. These Marxist-oriented nationalists called for both "anti-imperialism" (independence for Vietnam) and "antifeudalism" (social revolution). When these groups, along with peasant activists, united in 1930 to form a Communist party, the membership was mostly a combination of middle-class and peasant revolutionaries with only a small representation of urban industrial workers.

At first the goal of independence assumed priority within the new party; this fact was reflected in the title *Vietnamese* Communist party. But during the same year, the international congress of Communist parties (the "Communist International," or "Comintern") decided that throughout the world Communist parties should emphasize class conflict and achievement of social revolution rather than nationalism and criticized the Communist parties in less-developed countries for cooperating in nationalist alliances with political parties that opposed social revolution. The Comintern encouraged Communist parties to break relations with other parties, including socialists, in order to communicate Party concepts more effectively to the masses and organize them for the class conflict viewed as necessary to achieve a social revolution.

This shift in the orientation of the international Communist movement influenced the Vietnamese Communist party to change its name to the Indochinese Communist party (ICP) within a few months of its founding. The name change also reflected Party members' acceptance of the Comintern's policy of matching Communist party organizations

to colonial jurisdictions (in this case French Indochina) rather than to ethnic divisions. The ICP was at least nominally given the task of bringing social revolution to Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam, although there were only a few Cambodians and Laotians in the Party during its early years. As the ICP turned energetically to the task of mobilizing peasants and workers for class conflict and social revolution, neglecting the independence struggle, the Party lost much of its appeal to educated Vietnamese in urban nonmanual occupations (who had previously been rallied by the call to fight against foreign domination, even if the movement was led by Communist revolutionaries).

In 1930 and 1931 the economic well-being of many Vietnamese abruptly worsened because of the worldwide depression, which lowered prices for Vietnam's exports. ICP agitation among peasants and workers led to strikes and protests in many parts of Vietnam. During this period there was a peasant insurrection in Nghe An, a province traditionally rebellious against foreign rule, and the neighboring province, Ha Tinh, in north-central Vietnam (northern Annam colonial region). The movement began with unarmed peasants staging demonstrations demanding the abolition or postponement of certain taxes and higher prices for their produce from the colonial government. Soon peasants began electing local revolutionary councils ("soviets") to take the place of collaborationist and French authorities and to enact reforms. The national leadership of the ICP had little role in planning the insurrection and considered it premature in the sense that, outside of Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces, most peasants in Vietnam were not yet politically committed to revolution.

Repression of the rural soviets was carried out in summer 1931. Hundreds lost their lives in the rebelling provinces and thousands of ICP members or supporters were incarcerated throughout Vietnam. But the commitment demonstrated by the ICP to social revolution in the countryside and the examples of heroism on the part of individual ICP members (important to public perception in a land inspired by myths of heroic resistance to foreign invaders and oppression) won further support from many of Vietnam's peasants and workers (Karnow 1983; Khanh 1982; McAlister 1969; Wolf 1969). The concept of communism itself, *cong san* in Vietnamese, was popularly defined as taking all property and equally dividing it among the population (Khanh 1982), a notion well received by Vietnam's impoverished classes.

Political developments in the international Communist movement and in France contributed to a considerable improvement in the ICP's situation. The leaders of the world's Communist parties had become alarmed at the growth and success of fascist movements, which espoused extreme nationalism and concepts of racial and cultural superiority.

The election victory of the Nazi party in Germany in 1933 was blamed in part on the division and hostility between the German Communist and Socialist parties. Consequently, in the mid-1930s Communist parties advocated the formation of Popular Fronts involving leftist and antifascist parties. In France a Popular Front coalition including the French Socialist and Communist parties was elected and ordered the release from Vietnamese prisons of many ICP members. The period of 1936–1939 was one of growth for the ICP throughout Vietnam. In Saigon, the major city in Cochinchina, members of the Communist party and other revolutionary-oriented leftists (followers of Trotsky) were even elected to the city council.

But in 1939 the French government, in response to shifts in policy by both the USSR and the French Communist party, made a new attempt to crush the ICP. The Soviets had been outraged when the Western democracies failed to help the elected leftist Spanish government prevent the victory of conservative forces and Fascist armies (Italian and German) in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War and when the British and the French decided to grant Nazi Germany effective control of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938. The Soviets suspected that the capitalist democracies were attempting to appease Hitler so that he would turn east and launch an invasion of the USSR; he could then seize and colonize Soviet territory as he had advocated years earlier in his book, *Mein Kampf.* To forestall an expected attack, the Soviet leader, Stalin, signed a "nonaggression pact" with Germany, which greatly increased the probability of a German attack on France. After Germany, with Soviet acquiescence, invaded Poland in September 1939 and France and Britain declared war, the new French government outlawed the pro-Moscow, temporarily antiwar, French Communist party and ordered the repression of the ICP in Vietnam. But by this point, many ICP members had already gone underground and, consequently, escaped imprisonment (Khanh 1982).

Ho Chi Minh
and the Formation of the Viet Minh

No other person contributed so much individually to the development of the revolution in Vietnam as Ho Chi Minh. According to official accounts, he was born May 19, 1890, the third child in a prominent anticolonial family in rebellious Nghe An Province in northern Annam. His scholar father had rejected a mandarin post in Hue in order to avoid serving in the colonial government. Ho's parents named him Nguyen Sinh Cung at birth and, "following a common tradition," chose a new name for him, Nguyen Tat Thanh, when he was ten (Lacouture

1968, p. 13). But both at home and abroad and in writing his hundreds of articles and political analyses, he used as many as seventy-six aliases. However, he became famous among the Vietnamese (and internationally) under two names. During 1919–1945, the world knew him as Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen who loves his country), energetic Vietnamese nationalist and most prominent organizer of the Vietnamese Communist movement. After the Viet Minh–led revolution in August 1945, when he became the first president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, he was known as Ho Chi Minh (usually translated as "Ho, who aspires to enlighten") (Turner 1975, p. 3).

True to his family's political leanings, Ho became involved in anticolonial activities at age fifteen, working as a courier and contact for proindependence scholars. He later told friends that after he learned the French slogan "Liberty, equality, and fraternity," he was confused by the lack of application of these ideals in Vietnam and he yearned to understand better the civilization behind both the concepts and the imperialism Vietnam experienced. His interest in traveling to France and other advanced nations reflected a Vietnamese saying popular with the youth of the period, "Go abroad to study to come home to help the country" (Khanh 1982, p. 59). In December 1911, he left Vietnam for France, earning his way as a laborer on the S.S. *Latouche-Treville*. He would not return to Vietnam for thirty years.

Ho traveled to a great number of ports and countries and learned that Vietnam was only one of many European colonies. Sensing that many of the French and other Europeans did not really regard the peoples of Asia and Africa as equal human beings, he began to understand imperialism and racism as worldwide phenomena. Ho also visited the United States, living and working in New York for a year. There he studied U.S. history and political documents and later patterned Vietnam's 1945 Declaration of Independence after the corresponding American Revolutionary War document. Ho subsequently lived and worked in England as a dishwasher and snow shoveler for the London school system (Lacouture 1968).

In 1917, Ho arrived in France, where 80,000 Vietnamese were serving in the French armed forces or working in defense industries as part of the war effort. He remained there until 1923. Ho was reportedly surprised to find that most of the French at home were "good people," while "the French in the colonies were cruel and inhuman" (Khanh 1982, p. 60). This observation, along with similar conclusions regarding Americans and the British, led him to the erroneous assumption that the governments of the Western democracies would honor the World War I commitment of President Wilson and other world leaders to national self-determination around the globe.

Ho attempted to present a list of moderate proposals for Vietnamese self-government, initially within the colonial system, to the world leaders attending the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. This effort made him an instant national hero among many Vietnamese (Khanh 1982; Lacouture 1968). But when the proposals were not even granted a hearing, he quickly became disillusioned with the concept of reforming colonialism peacefully from within. Ho instead concluded that independence would probably come only as the result of an autonomous effort in Vietnam, without reliance on a change of heart on the part of the colonial power, and that decolonization, like colonial enslavement, would likely be a violent process (Khanh 1982).

In December 1920, Ho, who was affiliated with France's Socialist party, as its program seemed most beneficial toward the colonized peoples, voted with the majority of its members to form the French Communist party. Ho's decision was reportedly a simple one. He discovered that the Socialists inclined to follow Lenin had the greatest concern with freeing the colonial peoples. Once Ho read Lenin's works on imperialism and colonialism, he was reportedly overcome with emotion and the feeling that Lenin had formulated conceptually the reality that he and all the colonial peoples he had encountered actually experienced. For Ho, the path to independence for Vietnam was through the international Communist movement.

In 1924 Ho went to Moscow to study revolutionary theory and organizational methods and to prepare to build a revolution in Vietnam. In December he left for China to act as a translator for the Soviet advisory mission under Mikhail Borodin. In southern China in 1925, Ho introduced the members of a previously created Vietnamese anti-colonial resistance organization to Marxist thinking and Leninist concepts concerning imperialism. Together they organized the Marxist-oriented group Thanh Nien (Youth), which would be the primary forerunner of the ICP. During 1925–1927, Ho provided lecture programs and training sessions covering world history, colonial history, Marxist theory, Lenin's analyses of imperialism, and revolutionary theory and method to about 300 Vietnamese exiles (Khanh 1982). Many of them returned to Vietnam to create local Thanh Nien organizations.

After the Chinese Civil War broke out between Jiang's wing of the GMD and the Chinese Communists in 1927, Thanh Nien members fled from Canton to Hong Kong. There Ho and others founded the Vietnamese Communist party in 1930, which, as we have seen, in a few months became the Indochinese Communist party. But on June 5, 1931, Ho was arrested by Hong Kong police and incarcerated. His health deteriorated and he was hospitalized. He evidently convinced hospital personnel to allow him to escape and report him dead from tuberculosis.

Memorial services were held for him in Paris, Moscow, and at Hong Kong's Victoria Prison. With the help of a French Communist friend, he made his way to Moscow, where he spent the years from 1932 to 1939 recuperating, studying, writing, and teaching history and political theory to Vietnamese students being educated in the Soviet Union. During these years, Ho seems to have played no direct role in the ICP in Vietnam. The Party, at the time, was pursuing the goal of social revolution through class warfare over the nationalistic, independence-first strategy Ho favored.

Ho returned to China in 1939, during the period in which the GMD and Communist party had halted the civil war in order to join forces to fight the invading Japanese; and in 1941 he reentered Vietnam. In a mountain cave in a northern province of Tonkin, Ho and several other ICP members held a meeting to establish the League for Vietnamese Independence, the Viet Minh. The formation of the Viet Minh represented the completion of the shift in ICP strategy back to an emphasis on the primacy of national liberation. It also represented the reestablishment of Ho's leadership of the ICP.

Ho had long emphasized that the "elimination of imperialism" in Vietnam, or independence, had to take precedence over the "elimination of feudalism" (breaking the hold of the landlord class and redistributing wealth, largely land, to the mass of the population). He and his supporters argued for his formula on two major grounds. First, since many peasants and workers were already inclined to support the social revolution program of the ICP, advocacy of nationalism would appeal not only to peasants but also to other patriotic Vietnamese of all classes who wanted to free their country from foreign domination. Second, Ho's analysis indicated that foreign imperialism was the main ally and source of strength for the feudalistic system in Vietnam and that a major step toward accomplishing a social revolution had to be first severing the old social and economic order from its powerful outside support. Consequently, in 1941 the Viet Minh program gave priority to achieving the goal of independence and delayed enacting a sweeping land reform until 1953.

The Viet Minh was designed to combine mass-membership organizations, whose participants were committed to an independent Vietnam and generally also to social revolution, under the leadership of the ICP, which would act, in part, as a coordinating mechanism. The ranks of the ICP were to be filled from among those members of the mass organizations willing to devote full time to working for the revolution and to developing an understanding of Marxist and Leninist concepts and theory of revolution. Actually, the linkage of the ICP with mass-membership organizations had begun long before the specifically

independence-oriented Viet Minh was formulated. Through the development of mass organizations, the ICP had succeeded in providing a meaningful opportunity for large-scale political participation and mobilization. Thus in many areas the ICP not only filled the vacuum created by the French destruction of the traditional village political mechanisms; it also brought many more people than ever before into the political process (McAlister 1969).

The revolutionary village councils and mass-membership organizations were considered by many rural residents to be truly Vietnamese rather than under the control or serving the interests of some foreign occupying power. The mass organizations established by ICP activists and supporters were based on social categories easily understood by Vietnam's peasants and workers. These included national women's, youth, peasants', and workers' associations and other groups with local chapters and national leadership; they were linked at all levels to the ICP through mechanisms such as interlocking membership. Many of the nationalists who joined the Viet Minh were not specifically interested in social revolution or in working their way into ICP membership. Some, especially recruits from the well-to-do classes, opposed "communism" or at least expressed little support for the ICP's plans for wealth redistribution. But they joined the Viet Minh and accepted ICP leadership because they recognized the ICP, especially under Ho Chi Minh, as a truly nationalist organization and because they felt that the ICP, and the movement and network it had created, represented the only viable means for establishing an independent Vietnam (Khanh 1982; McAlister 1969).

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II

Events during World War II had profound effects on the development of the Vietnamese Revolution. In June 1940, Germany defeated France and in the unoccupied sector of the country an extremely conservative government based in the town of Vichy assumed power. The Vichy regime collaborated with the Nazi Germans and their allies, the Japanese, when the latter became interested in occupying Indochina to exploit its agricultural and mineral resources and to use it as a staging area for troop deployments elsewhere. The Vichy government allowed Japan to occupy Indochina in September 1940. But the Japanese left the French colonial administration, armed forces, and French-controlled Vietnamese colonial militia intact. Thus the French were able to maintain a repressive stance toward Vietnamese rebels, smashing a Communist-organized uprising in Cochinchina in late 1940 (Khanh 1982).

The Japanese presence did, however, gradually weaken French control. And on March 9, 1945, for specific political and military reasons,

the Japanese attacked French colonial forces and most French units surrendered within twenty-four hours. The ability of the Japanese, an Asian people, to dictate to the previously all-powerful French and cast them aside at will had a significant effect on many Vietnamese. Just as the French conquest had destroyed the concept of a heavenly mandated, immutable Confucian system, the Japanese victory annihilated the myth of European racial superiority. Many more Vietnamese were thereafter encouraged to resist the French actively.

During the period of joint Japanese-French occupation, the two imperialist powers competed for Vietnamese loyalty and each actually tried to arouse and rally Vietnamese nationalism to its side. The Japanese claimed they were assisting in the liberation of a fellow Asian people from European imperialism and trained and armed several Vietnamese youth militias (soon infiltrated and won over by the Viet Minh) and also armed the political-religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. The Japanese policy appears to have been part of a plan to make use of armed Vietnamese allies in the event of an Allied invasion of Indochina (McAlister 1969). The French, for their part, expanded the Vietnamese educational system (supposedly to provide more technicians, professionals, and administrators to make Vietnam increasingly self-sufficient in these personnel categories) and organized the Sports and Youth program, which recruited and organized tens of thousands in the spirit of Vietnamese nationalism. This policy backfired: Many of the young people whose nationalism and facility with group activities were increased through the Sports and Youth program soon joined the Viet Minh, recognizing it as the only valid and competent vehicle through which to express their patriotic fervor (McAlister 1969).

While some Vietnamese supported the Japanese, and others, mostly among the 10 percent Catholic minority and the wealthy landowners, continued to support the French, the Viet Minh opposed both imperialist intruders. Under the military leadership of former history teacher Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet Minh began to educate peasants politically and organize them in the northern highlands of Vietnam. Giap and other Viet Minh leaders, who had been exposed to Chinese Communist concepts of "people's war" and who, in their own history, had repeatedly witnessed the defeat of urban or lowland insurrections against the French, realized that a key element in gaining independence would be the establishment of secure base camps in the northern mountains, where tanks and heavy weapons would be of little use to the enemy. Giap's plan for a people's war called for obtaining the support of the people in base area regions and developing intensely motivated revolutionary soldiers before fighting began. According to this approach, revolutionary combatants, highly committed to the goal of establishing

a more just moral, social, economic, and political order, would constitute the fighting arm of a mobilized supportive population. Such a combination could conceivably overcome the imperialist's advantage in weaponry (Giap 1962; Karnow 1983).

ICP activists won the support of many of the Tay and Nung tribal peoples, who lived in a mountainous region extending from northern Vietnam to southern China. Leaders of these groups were hostile toward the French, who had intervened in their affairs, and many were favorably inclined to the ICP's program because relatives in China, having already been in contact with Chinese Communist activists, had told them of the perceived benefits for most peasants of Communist-led revolution. Support from the Tay and Nung, several of whom became prominent generals in the Viet Minh army, and from other minority groups in the northern Tonkin highlands was a key factor in constructing secure base areas within which the Viet Minh could organize and train a revolutionary armed force (Khanh 1982; McAlister 1969).

As World War II continued, the Viet Minh network expanded throughout most of Vietnam. Even groups tolerated or encouraged by the Japanese or the French, such as the Advanced Guard Youth militia in Cochinchina (transformed by the Japanese from the French-sponsored Sports and Youth movement into a paramilitary group [McAlister 1969]) and the University of Hanoi Student Association in Tonkin, affiliated with the Viet Minh. The success of the Viet Minh and the wide popular support it enjoyed were soon obvious to the nations fighting against Japan. GMD military leaders in southern China recognized the Viet Minh as the only effective countrywide anti-Japanese intelligence and resistance network in Vietnam and worked with the Viet Minh despite its Communist leadership. U.S. military forces came to a similar conclusion and air-dropped weapons, along with Office of Strategic Services (OSS, predecessor of the CIA) advisers, to Giap's forces (Karnow 1983; Khanh 1982). The presence of U.S. advisers indicated to some Vietnamese that the United States actually supported the Viet Minh's goal of attaining national power, further improving the movement's appeal to Western-educated Vietnamese.

INSURRECTION

The conditions for revolutionary insurrection improved dramatically in March 1945 when Japanese forces, anticipating a possible Allied invasion, imprisoned the French colonial administration and captured or routed French military forces. The advantage for the Viet Minh was that the repressive French colonial apparatus in the countryside was destroyed without its being replaced by Japanese forces. For the next

five months, "the most important period in the history of the ICP" (Khanh 1982, p. 309), the Viet Minh were relatively unimpeded in their organizational and mobilization efforts. During this period, Viet Minh military forces expanded rapidly. In the northern provinces of Tonkin, local authorities who had previously served the colonial administration threw their support to the Viet Minh or fled to areas under Japanese control or, in some cases, were assassinated as collaborators of foreign imperialists. By August 1945, the Viet Minh had secured control of six northern provinces in Tonkin and had as many as 5,000 men and women under arms (to increase to 75,000 within a year and more than 350,000 by the early 1950s). The movement also had a countrywide network of 200,000 Viet Minh activists, led by the ICP, which had 5,000 members (it was also rapidly expanding). The Viet Minh's membership was many times greater than the 5,000 to 10,000 estimated to be associated with the largely elite urban, foreign-sponsored, alternate "nationalist" groups of the period (Khanh 1982; McAlister 1969; Wolf 1969).

Acts of terrorism, such as assassinations, were characteristic of several political groups in Vietnam, not just the Viet Minh. The previously discussed VNQDD (both the original and later versions) and a number of other organizations used terror against Viet Minh activists and sympathizers. The French, for their part, had used terror in various forms, including mass executions and aerial and artillery bombardments of civilians, to control the Vietnamese for decades.

The Viet Minh violence tended to be selective. Targets were usually individuals who were clearly identifiable as agents of the colonial regime or colonial military or police personnel. The acts were terrifying to the small category of Vietnamese who shared the collaborationist characteristics of the victims. But the violence was intended to win popular support from the majority of the population who had suffered hardships and the loss of friends and family members due to French, as well as Japanese, imperial policies and who longed to strike back and win a truly independent Vietnam (Dunn 1972).

At about the same time as the Japanese overthrow of the French administration, a terrible famine reached its height in parts of Tonkin and northern Annam. At least several hundred thousand and possibly over 1 million of Tonkin's 1945 population of 8 million perished (Karnow 1983; Khanh 1982). The food shortage was in part due to unusually heavy rainfall, which caused flooding of many cultivated areas, and to Allied bombing, which reduced the rice shipments sent from the Mekong Delta to relieve the starving north. But the famine was blamed primarily on the French and the Japanese. The Japanese had presented the French with a quota of the rice production to feed troops; the French authorities then demanded the rice from the northern peasants (who barely pro-

duced enough for their own needs). The Japanese also directed the French to require the planting of industrial use crops, such as peanuts, other oilseed crops, and cotton, in place of some food crops (Khanh 1982; McAlister 1969). The Viet Minh organized peasants and attacked landlord and Japanese grain storage buildings, rationing out what they found. The famine greatly intensified hostility in the countryside toward both the French and the Japanese and increased respect and support for the Viet Minh.

By summer 1945, the Viet Minh were immensely more powerful and had more popular support than any of the other Vietnamese groups who labeled themselves nationalists despite their foreign sponsorship. Besides the flaws listed previously, the anti–Viet Minh groups generally lacked charismatic or heroic leadership and put forth ideologies and programs that were very narrow in scope and unappealing in content. They basically offered the Vietnamese people the concept of a partially independent Vietnam run by a foreign-educated urban elite under the sponsorship of China, Japan, or France (depending on the particular clique). Furthermore, their programs contained virtually no proposals for improving the social and economic conditions of the majority of Vietnamese (largely because to do so would endanger the economic interests of the small but relatively wealthy classes they represented or the interests of the foreign countries that sponsored them or both). The Viet Minh, in contrast, offered not only genuine nationalism (an independent Vietnam controlled by Vietnamese) but also a plan for redistribution of wealth in favor of the nation's majority. Since their program embodied the aspirations of most of the rural population and much of the urban working class, the Viet Minh fostered the participation of peasants and workers in local government as well as in local chapters of the mass organizations.

Maximally favorable conditions for a revolutionary uprising developed suddenly on August 15, 1945, when Japan surrendered shortly after two of its cities were destroyed by atomic bombs. At this point, with French troops still incarcerated and the Japanese demoralized and unlikely to resist the efforts of another Asian people to seize their independence before the return of European imperialists, the insurrection was ready. By mid-August (before the Japanese surrender) many villages surrounding Hanoi were under Viet Minh control and the stage was set for the "August revolution." In the major cities, leaflets urging preparations for insurrection were circulated, movies and plays were interrupted so that announcements could be made concerning the national liberation struggle, and the flag of the Viet Minh with its gold star and red background suddenly appeared flying from prominent buildings throughout the country (McAlister 1969). On August 18 the

insurrection began. For the next ten days, uprisings swept the Viet Minh and allied groups into power in sixty-four major cities in Vietnam, including Hanoi on August 19, Hue on August 23, and Saigon on August 25 (Khanh 1982). In essence, the Japanese turned Vietnam over to the Viet Minh without violent resistance (Karnow 1983).

In the Tonkin and Annam regions, the Viet Minh met little in the way of organized opposition from other Vietnamese political groups. The situation was more complicated in Saigon and the rest of Cochinchina. The Viet Minh won over the support of the Japanese armed youth militias. But there also existed the armed political-religious sects, which had organization and popular support in certain areas of the Mekong Delta, and the Trotskyite Communists, who had no network of mass organizations but enjoyed some popular support (Khanh 1982). Consequently, the insurrection in Saigon involved an alliance of several groups, in which the Viet Minh was most prominent. But the coalition proved unstable, and participants soon began to feud among themselves. Cochinchina, which had been under French rule the longest of the three regions, also had a well-organized pro-French party, the Constitutionalists. This group desired to maintain close ties with France (McAlister 1969). In the weeks that followed the "August revolution," scores of Vietnamese were assassinated, usually by fanatical members of rival groups. Those groups with limited membership and little mass organization or popular support could not survive the loss of a few prominent figures. But the Viet Minh could endure terrorist acts directed against it precisely because it had thousands of members, a resilient organizational structure, and widespread popular support.

On August 30, after representatives of the pro–Viet Minh Students Association of the University of Hanoi petitioned the figurehead emperor, Bao Dai, to support the revolution, the latter abdicated in favor of the Viet Minh provisional government. Two days later, on September 2, Ho Chi Minh addressed several hundred thousand people at a Hanoi rally to proclaim Vietnam's Declaration of Independence and announce the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. No other nation at that point recognized Vietnam's independence.

The victorious Allied powers instead decided to occupy Vietnam. British and Indian troops (under British control) entered the southern half of Vietnam, while approximately 125,000 anti-Communist Chinese GMD troops were sent into the northern half of the country. In late September 1945, the British commander in Saigon rearmed the 1,400 French soldiers the Japanese had arrested there in March. In a surprise move the French troops quickly seized the city's government buildings and with British assistance drove the Viet Minh from Saigon. In October an additional 25,000 French troops arrived and reoccupied all the major

cities in Cochinchina. In the northern part of Vietnam, the Viet Minh resorted to bribing Chinese commanders (with gold from rings and other jewelry donated by thousands of Vietnamese) to prevent repression of their new government. And in December 1945, elections were held for a national assembly in Tonkin and Annam; the Viet Minh appeared to receive about 90 percent of the vote (Khanh 1982; McAlister 1969). French military authorities refused to allow elections in Cochinchina, where almost 25 percent of Vietnam's 1945 population of 22 million resided. The national assembly elected Ho Chi Minh president. Ho, asserting his intention to create a government of national unity, included Socialists and Catholic politicians as well as Communists among his cabinet ministers (Karnow 1983).

To Ho the Chinese presence in the north represented a greater danger than the French reoccupation in the south. China had long threatened Vietnam with its immensity and power. It appeared that Ho, lacking any significant international support for immediate independence, would have to take the risk of making a deal with the French, the more distant imperialist power, to get the Chinese out. As Ho put it, "Better to sniff a bit of French shit briefly than eat Chinese shit for the rest of our lives" (Karnow 1983, p. 100). In a move evidently intended to gain greater acceptance of their movement by the GMD Chinese and the French, the members of the ICP publicly dissolved their organization in October 1945 (although the Party continued to function covertly through its extensive and still intact social network). The party was formally reestablished in 1951 as the Vietnamese Communist party (officially labeled the Vietnam Labor party).

Early in 1946 the Chinese decided to withdraw and allow the French to reenter northern Vietnam, provided that the French relinquish their colonial claims to territory within China. The Viet Minh government agreed to allow the French to reintroduce military forces into northern Vietnam on the condition that these units be withdrawn in five years. The French were to grant Vietnam independence within the framework of the so-called French Union, which would keep Vietnam economically associated with France (Karnow 1983; Lacouture 1968; McAlister 1969). The future status of the southernmost part of Vietnam, Cochinchina, was a major point of contention. Neither the French nor the wealthy Vietnamese residents of this region wanted unification with the other parts of Vietnam, whereas the Viet Minh demanded that Cochinchina be joined to the middle section of Vietnam (Annam) and the northernmost section (Tonkin) in one independent Vietnamese state. The compromise was an agreement to hold a referendum in which the people of Cochinchina would vote either to unify with the other parts or to remain separate. The Viet Minh were certain the majority would vote

for unification. But the Cochinchina colonial administration, ignoring the pledge of French government, refused to hold the referendum.

Tensions continued to rise. The government of France, despite its leftist slant, was staunchly nationalistic and interested in restoring French pride through reclaiming imperial territory. The French, subjugated so recently by the Germans, were now attempting to reestablish their national machismo by reasserting domination over the colonies. On November 23, 1946, a dispute over who controlled customs collections in the Port of Haiphong precipitated skirmishes between Viet Minh and French units. French naval forces opened an artillery bombardment of the city, resulting in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of deaths.

THE FRENCH INDOCHINA WAR: 1946–1954

The French proceeded to seize major cities and towns and to build a colonial Vietnamese militia of more than 300,000 to help fight the Viet Minh. But the local allies of the French were largely composed of the most Europeanized Vietnamese, some anti-Vietnamese members of minority groups, the political-religious sects in the south, and the Binh Xuyen criminal "mafia," which controlled much of the Saigon-area drug business and organized prostitution. France's military leaders, however, anticipated that their professional army and much superior firepower would bring them victory in only a few weeks. But the Viet Minh chose to fight largely on terrain that reduced the effectiveness of the French advantage in weaponry. Throughout the war with the French (and later in the war with the United States) the Vietnamese revolutionary forces, in addition to the small-unit harassment tactics characteristic of guerrilla warfare, often employed the technique of attacking many widely dispersed targets simultaneously, forcing the enemy to scatter his forces. Then, when possible, revolutionary forces would use large units to attack individual positions that had been drained of manpower to meet attacks elsewhere. The Viet Minh usually enjoyed popular support in the areas of military operation and were more highly motivated than the typical Vietnamese who fought alongside the French, often as a mercenary.

At the beginning of the war the Viet Minh emphasized the goal of winning independence in an attempt to unite as many people as possible from all social classes in support of the Communist-led forces confronting the French. Rather than alienate potentially patriotic landlords and rich peasants by giving some of their land to poor peasants, the Viet Minh delayed land redistribution in the areas they controlled throughout most of the war. The Viet Minh rural economic policy until 1953 was

to leave landownership patterns relatively intact while easing the economic burdens of the poor by reducing the rent that landlords could charge for land parcels cultivated by tenant farmers.

But the Viet Minh promised the poor that the anti-imperialist struggle against the French would also be antifeudalist and eventually result in both a transfer of much of the land owned by landlords to the landless and nearly landless peasants and the destruction of landlord political dominance in the countryside. And in the later stage of the war the demands of the poor for landownership and the need for their increased involvement in the revolutionary effort as combatants and in transporting by foot large quantities of ammunition and other equipment prompted the Viet Minh in 1953 to begin significant land redistribution in much of the countryside (Moise 1983).

Realizing they were badly in need of a legitimate nationalist image for their Vietnamese supporters, the French invited back the ever-opportunistic Bao Dai to resume the role of emperor in a partially "independent" French-sponsored Vietnamese state in which Frenchmen continued to control, among other things, the country's economy and army. The men willing to serve the French in Bao Dai's cabinet were characterized by a U.S. diplomat in Hanoi in 1952 as "opportunists, nonentities, extreme reactionaries, assassins, hirelings, and, finally, men of faded mental powers" (Karnow 1983, p. 180). As Communist-led rebellions began to develop in Laos and Cambodia with Viet Minh assistance, the French allowed non-Communist governments in these countries to declare independence from France in 1953.

By the 1950s the French were experiencing extreme difficulties in Indochina. After the 1949 culmination of the Chinese Revolution, China began to provide the Viet Minh with valuable assistance, such as training services and shipments of weapons, including artillery. The French economy could not support the war effort, and consequently, the United States, determined to help the French succeed in defeating the Communist-led Viet Minh, was paying 78 percent of the cost of the war at its conclusion, including Bao Dai's $4 million per year "stipend" (Karnow 1983; Turley 1986). The French military was eventually losing more officers in combat than were being graduated from the nation's main military academy. And army morale was deteriorating, not only because of battlefield losses, but also because much of the French public turned against the war.

In 1953 both the French and the Viet Minh were considering negotiations to end the fighting. But each side sought a final battlefield triumph that would give it the stronger bargaining position. General Giap, commander of the Viet Minh forces, had sent three divisions toward Laos, taking the village of Dienbienphu on the Vietnamese-

Laotian border. French commanders, eager to protect the pro-French Laotian government from the Viet Minh, decided to recapture the town and then use it as a fortress from which to attack Viet Minh base camps. Despite its remote location, the French were confident it could be supplied by aircraft, if necessary.

The first of 12,000 French paratroopers entered Dienbienphu in November 1953. Simultaneously, 50,000 Viet Minh, including artillery, anti-aircraft, and engineering units, moved to encircle them. In March 1954, Viet Minh forces attacked and quickly destroyed French artillery bases and the airfield. The Viet Minh then closed in by digging tunnels and trenches ever closer to French positions. In desperation, the French appealed unsuccessfully to the United States for heavy bomber attacks to break the siege. On May 7, 1954, the day the Geneva negotiations to settle the fighting in Indochina convened, the Viet Minh's red and gold banner was raised over the French command center at Dienbienphu.

THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS
ON INDOCHINA

As the Geneva Conference opened, the Viet Minh were in control of most of the countryside in the northern two-thirds of Vietnam, with base camps, sizable "liberated" areas, and large forces active in the remaining southern third of the country (Karnow 1983; Turley 1986). The Viet Minh concluded they had won the war and expected essentially to negotiate terms for the French departure. But they did not anticipate the compromise stance that would be taken by the two Communist giants. The USSR leadership was attempting to establish better relations with the West after the death of Stalin in 1953 and avoided pushing for a settlement favorable to the Viet Minh. And the Chinese had taken 1 million casualties in fighting against U.S. forces in Korea and were determined not to risk another violent confrontation. Both the USSR and China pressured the Viet Minh to settle for a partial victory (Karnow 1983, 1990; Turley 1986).

The key provisions of the Geneva settlement included a *temporary* division of Vietnam at latitude 17 degrees north—the 17th parallel— (which explicitly was not to be viewed as a national boundary). French military units were to be withdrawn south of this line and Viet Minh forces to the north. No foreign military forces were to be introduced into Vietnam. And in a provision by which the post-French Saigon regime refused to be bound, the settlement stipulated that elections were to be held throughout Vietnam in 1956 *to unify* the entire country under one government (Karnow 1983; Lacouture 1968; McAlister 1969; Turley 1986; Wolf 1969).

The fulfillment of the terms of the Geneva Accords was to be supervised by a commission composed of observers from Canada, India, and Poland. During a 300-day "regroupment period," about 900,000 Vietnamese moved south of the 17th parallel (about two-thirds were Catholics fearing Communist persecution and encouraged by CIA-supplied leaflets stating, "Christ has gone to the South," while the rest were largely businessmen and employees of the French); approximately 87,000 Viet Minh combatants and 47,000 civilians headed north (Turley 1986, p. 11).

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM: 1954–1975

The U.S. decision to provide aid to the French in Indochina was based, in part, on the conception of a monolithic Communist movement expanding outward from its "origin" in European Russia. In this formulation, Communist China represented the success of "Communist aggression" against China, and Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh represented a new Communist aggression against Vietnam (supposedly directed from China). Ignoring the nationalistic character of the Viet Minh movement and the fact that Vietnam's unique history and political and economic characteristics had brought about an essentially nonexportable revolution (except, in a sense, to the two smaller countries that had also been components of French Indochina), the Eisenhower administration resolved to stop the "spread of communism."

President Diem: An Anti-Communist Leader

An important aspect of the plan to prevent the southern part of Vietnam from reuniting with the north was the selection of a leader for the south who was both an anti-Communist and recognized as a nationalist. The anti-Communist leader chosen for South Vietnam was Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was born to a wealthy Catholic family at Hue in 1901 and attended the French School of Administration in Hanoi, where he finished first in his class. He rose rapidly through governmental ranks and in 1933 was appointed minister of the interior to Emperor Bao Dai. He subsequently resigned because of French interference in his official duties. This action earned him the reputation of being a Vietnamese patriot within Vietnam's elite circle of middle- and upper-class anti-Communist nationalists. Diem, who at one time considered becoming a priest, was a religious ascetic throughout his life. His conception of holding and exercising political authority was akin to the absolute power exercised by Vietnam's ancient emperors and "concepts

CHINA

Red River

Dienbienphu

Hanoi ●   ● **Haiphong**

LAOS

NORTH VIETNAM

GULF OF TONKIN

"Demilitarized Zone"
(July 22, 1954)

Hue

THAILAND

Mekong River

CAMBODIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

Saigon

GULF OF THAILAND

SOUTH CHINA SEA

VIETNAM (1954-1975)

of compromise, power-sharing and popular participation" were alien to him (Turley 1986, p. 13).

The Viet Minh captured Diem in 1945 and sent him to a remote village for six months. In 1946 Ho Chi Minh offered him a governmental position, but he refused to work with Communists and he blamed the deaths of a brother and a nephew on the Viet Minh. In 1950, after residing for four years in seclusion at Hue, he left Vietnam and eventually settled at the Maryknoll Seminary in Lakewood, New Jersey. Diem came to the attention of the influential Catholic leader Cardinal Spellman and was later accepted by the Eisenhower administration as a possible anti-Communist leader for the southern part of Vietnam.

In July 1954 Diem was appointed prime minister of South Vietnam by emperor Bao Dai and quickly returned to Saigon. By 1955, the Eisenhower administration was pouring economic assistance and military aid into South Vietnam and reorganizing and training the men who had served in the French colonial armed forces into what was eventually called the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The weapons and military advisers the United States sent to Vietnam were in direct violation of the Geneva Accords. During the same year, Diem consolidated his power by intimidating and bribing the leaders of the political-religious sects and through military action against the French-supported Binh Xuyen organized-crime group. He also turned on Bao Dai, eliminating the position of emperor through a rigged referendum in October 1955 (Karnow 1983).

Diem decided not to hold the reunification elections scheduled for 1956 because he, like virtually everyone else, realized that Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh would almost certainly win (Karnow 1983; Turley 1986; Wolf 1969). Diem's police even helped burn the Geneva commission's office in Saigon. He proceeded to launch the fierce Denunciation of Communists Campaign, in which thousands of Viet Minh supporters, relatively unprotected since most of the revolutionary soldiers had gone north as called for by the Geneva Accords, were arrested and imprisoned. Many were tortured to obtain information about their compatriots and some were killed. Morale among Viet Minh sympathizers in the south deteriorated because the government in the north would not immediately give consent for armed resistance to Diem's repression. Without effective means of defense against persecution, membership in the southern branch of the Vietnamese Communist party declined to about 5,000 in 1959.

Ho Chi Minh and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north were hesitant to consent to a renewal of armed revolutionary conflict in the south. Among their reasons was the hope that international pressure would eventually force the Diem regime to

hold the reunification elections. The leaders in the north clung to this increasingly remote possibility because they anticipated the devastation a war with the United States would bring. They also were unsure of what assistance the USSR and China would be willing to provide in the event of large-scale U.S. intervention. This apprehension was in part prompted by the Soviet Union's startling 1957 proposal that both North and South Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations, in effect granting recognition to the south as a separate nation. Ironically, the United States helped kill this measure at the time because it objected to the implied recognition of the government of North Vietnam (Karnow 1983).

The North Vietnamese government also became preoccupied in the mid-1950s with the mishandled land-reform program, which had been designed largely by urban Party leaders and had created chaos in parts of the north. The planners selected mainly poor, semiliterate rural youth to implement the reform at the village level. These young zealots, often recruited from the revolutionary army, had thrown the countryside into an uproar by organizing other poor peasants to denounce landlords for past crimes, such as collaborating with the French and exploiting the poor. Seized lands were distributed to 75 percent of the region's peasants. But 5,000–15,000 landlords and "collaborators" were killed by peasants who blamed them for the deaths of loved ones and other past hardships (Moise 1983).

Distressed by disruptions, protests, and injustices resulting from the poorly executed land-reform program, the North Vietnamese government initiated a period of self-criticism and reassessment. Eventually many of North Vietnam's peasants were organized into lower-stage, or "semisocialist," cooperatives, in which the participants retained individual ownership of their pooled land, livestock, and equipment. The cooperative paid them "rent" in proportion to their contributed assets as well as a share of the profits in proportion to their labor (Duiker 1983; Moise 1983). During the 1960s most cooperatives became higher-stage, or "fully socialist," in that land and productive agricultural property were owned collectively by all members of the cooperative, with an individual paid only in proportion to the amount of work he or she performed.

In the south the Saigon regime's efforts to repress Viet Minh activists and suspected Communist party members by imprisonment or execution seriously damaged the revolutionary social network. Surviving Communist party members began to demand that the government to the north of the 17th parallel consent to their right to engage in all-out armed resistance against Saigon military and police forces, perhaps as

much out of a desire to fight for self-preservation as anything else
(Turley 1986; Race 1972).

The call for violent opposition to the South Vietnamese government
was well received by large numbers of peasants who since 1954 had
been outraged and alienated by many of Saigon's policies. Among the
measures provoking widespread discontent, particularly significant was
the Saigon regime's effective reversal of the land reform that the Viet
Minh had carried out in much of the countryside toward the end of
the war with the French. Saigon forced poor peasants to return own-
ership of the land to their former landlords and then pay rent for its
use. In some instances those given land by the Viet Minh were forced
to pay for it. The urban-based Saigon government, in attempting to
assert its control over the countryside, allied itself with the rural landlord
class, which had fled to the relative safety of cities during the war. The
Saigon regime returned the landlords to the villages, some in the role
of village council administrators, protected by armed guards, and there-
fore largely reinstituted the economic and political domination of the
traditional rural elite (Race 1972). Saigon authorities further antago-
nized many among the poor majority by coercing them to work on
government projects, by persecuting many non-Communists who sup-
ported the Viet Minh reforms, and by often engaging in corruption
and abusive behavior.

Formation of the National Liberation Front

On December 20, 1960, resistance forces proclaimed the formation
of the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam, an organi-
zation of southern nationalists united under the leadership of the south-
ern branch of Vietnam's Communist party for the purpose of bringing
about a reunification of Vietnam (Turley 1986). The Diem government
quickly branded the NLF the "Viet Cong" (Viet Communists). The
leaders of the Communist party evidently hoped that the actions of the
NLF, together with expected mass uprisings against Diem, would pre-
cipitate the formation of a coalition government in the south that would
include representatives of the NLF. The new government would then
hold negotiations with the north to reunify Vietnam. The decision to
mobilize the southern nationalists for armed resistance to the Diem
regime under the banner of the NLF resulted in a rapid revitalization
of both the revolutionary effort and Communist party membership in
the south, which reached 70,000 by 1963 (Turley 1986). NLF armed
forces grew at a dramatic pace and attacks on Saigon forces multiplied.

As the NLF expanded, the Diem regime, with U.S. support, launched
the so-called strategic hamlet program, which involved in some cases

the relocation of peasants from their homes to fortified sites and in others the fortification of existing hamlets (Duiker 1983; Turley 1986). According to Saigon authorities, the peasants in their new or modified living environments would be safe from Viet Cong terrorism. They would also be inhibited from supporting or joining the NLF, if they were so inclined. The policy, in effect, was a counterinsurgency technique intended to deprive the revolutionary forces of their popular support by physically removing its source—the peasants—from the open countryside (an attempt to starve the guerrilla "fish" by drying up the popular "sea" that nourished them). However, many peasants resented being displaced from their ancestral villages and compelled to build hamlets and fortifications so that they could reside under the surveillance of the Saigon regime and be subjected to its coercive measures. The strategic hamlet program was apparently so unpopular with most peasants that it influenced many to join the NLF. In fact, the ARVN army colonel in charge of implementing the program for the Saigon regime was, throughout the war, secretly a member of the National Liberation Front (Karnow 1983), and it is very likely he was willing to carry out the policy precisely because of its positive impact on NLF recruitment.

Diem favored the Catholic minority, of which he was a member. This orientation prompted opposition from some Buddhists, to which Diem responded characteristically with violent repression. After several Buddhist monks set fire to themselves in further protests in June 1963, Diem's special forces, under the command of his brother, donned regular army uniforms and raided several Buddhist pagodas. The counterproductive nature of these actions outraged many ARVN officers, most of whom were at least nominally Buddhists like 80 percent of their compatriots. Saigon's top military leaders, most inherited from the French colonial army, also resented Diem's interference in the handling of the war against the NLF. Fearing the possibility of a military plot against his government, Diem regularly rotated officers around the country so that they could not stay long enough in any one place to organize a conspiracy. But consequently, they also often lacked the time to gain the experience necessary to adapt to one command situation before they were shifted to another. Incompetency in the military ranks was also heightened by Diem's tendency to promote those he deemed most loyal to him rather than those most able (Karnow 1983; Turley 1986).

Most important, Diem's regime was clearly losing the war with the NLF. Both Washington and the Saigon general staff decided that Diem had to go. On November 1, 1963, most of Diem's generals, assured of support or at least noninterference by U.S. officials, rebelled against him (Karnow 1983). Diem and his brother were executed the next day. President John F. Kennedy, although anticipating that Diem would be

forced out, was reportedly shocked at the news of his killing. But on November 22, 1963, Kennedy was himself assassinated in Dallas.

By the end of 1963, some 15,000 U.S. military advisers were in South Vietnam. Several thousand former Viet Minh had moved south to help organize and strengthen the growing NLF ranks, but these were almost all individuals born in the south who had gone north as Viet Minh soldiers in line with the 1954 peace accords (Karnow 1983; Turley 1986). In Saigon, a council of generals replaced Diem, but this was followed by seven changes in leadership during 1964 as Saigon military figures struggled for power. According to Turley (1986, p. 52), Saigon's military leaders were "mostly products of French education and bourgeois families, holdovers of the colonial system who made up the South's anti-Communist elite" and were usually unconcerned with the economic and social hardships of the majority of the population. After Diem, corruption in the military appeared to increase. And the NLF continued to expand its areas of control. U.S. advisers concluded that only large-scale U.S. military action could save the Saigon regime (Karnow 1983; Turley 1986).

Massive U.S. Military Intervention

On August 2, 1964, an American destroyer, the *Maddox,* engaged in close surveillance in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam, was attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats. ARVN units had earlier raided several positions in the area. The patrol boat incident, which inflicted no damage on the U.S. vessel, and a second alleged but unconfirmed incident involving another destroyer two days later, were represented to Congress and the U.S. public as "unprovoked Communist aggression." On August 7, 1964, the U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (unanimously in the House of Representatives and with only two dissenting votes in the Senate), giving President Lyndon Johnson the power to take whatever military action necessary to defend U.S. forces. This vote constituted the essential congressional authorization for the war in Southeast Asia, and Congress would continue until 1973 to vote appropriations for various aspects of the conflict (Karnow 1983).

In February 1965, the United States initiated continuous bombing raids over North Vietnam and by December U.S. troop strength had reached 200,000. Regular North Vietnamese army (People's Army of Vietnam) units were also entering the south along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" (a network of mountain and jungle paths extending through Laos into Vietnam's central highlands as well as into its southern regions) to assist several hundred thousand National Liberation Front (Viet Cong)

fighters organized into village militia, regional defense units, or main combat units. U.S. force levels continued to rise, eventually approaching 500,000 by the end of 1967. The Soviet Union provided the north with weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, and China contributed weapons and rice.

In a highly constrained 1967 South Vietnamese "election" without NLF participation—but in which there were eleven slates of candidates—General Thieu, a former major in the French army who had married into a wealthy Catholic family and converted from Buddhism to Catholicism, and his running mate, General Ky, won with 34.5 percent of the vote (Karnow 1983; Kolko 1985). Toward the end of that year, U.S. military leaders assured President Johnson and the U.S. public that the war was being won and that enemy forces in the south would be hard pressed to mount any significant attacks. This assessment was highly inaccurate. Communist party leaders devised a plan for an offensive that would significantly affect the course of the war. It was set for the Vietnamese new year, Tet, January 31, 1968.

The planners of the Tet offensive had several potential goals. The basic ones were to disrupt the Saigon regime's efforts to expand control over the countryside by forcing its forces to fall back toward the cities into defensive positions; to destroy the confidence and sense of security of the Saigon government's urban supporters, who had been long removed from the violence of the war; and to disrupt any plans of the U.S. or Saigon government to launch an invasion of the north. The organizers were also hopeful that Tet would disillusion U.S. governmental and military leaders and the U.S. public and demonstrate that the conflict would last indefinitely if U.S. troops were not withdrawn. The most optimistic potential outcome of the Tet offensive, which few of its planners felt was realistic, was to provoke widespread uprisings throughout the south to bring a quick end to the war and reunify the country before the death of Ho Chi Minh (who was ill and would die in 1969) (Karnow 1990; Kolko 1985; Turley 1986).

On January 31 approximately 80,000 National Liberation Front soldiers simultaneously attacked 100 cities and towns (North Vietnamese units took part only in assaults in the northernmost sections of South Vietnam) (Karnow 1983; Turley 1986). Four thousand NLF fighters invaded Saigon itself, and one unit seized the U.S. embassy before being annihilated. Hue, the old imperial capital, was captured and held for weeks against a tremendous counterattack organized by U.S. and Saigon forces. In the end, all the major cities and towns captured by the NLF were retaken.

The NLF suffered as many as 40,000 casualties, a devastation that would take years of recovery. The offensive, however, did weaken Saigon's

control over areas of the countryside previously thought to have been secured from the NLF. But probably the most important consequence of Tet was the powerful demoralizing effect it had on the U.S. public and government. Top military leaders who had previously claimed the war was being won now appeared incompetent or deceitful. The war itself seemed destined to go on without end. While Vietnamese revolutionaries were prepared to keep fighting for decades, if necessary, the U.S. public was willing to endure the sacrifices of warfare only if a limit could be set and victory assured (Karnow 1983).

Although virtually all the observable military targets in North Vietnam had been repeatedly bombed, some U.S. political figures called for the use of even greater armed might, such as an invasion of North Vietnam by U.S. forces or even tactical nuclear weapons. However, this demand ignored important realities. The publicly asserted purpose for the U.S. presence in Vietnam was to promote democracy, the expression of the people's will. But the massive resistance to U.S. intervention by millions of Vietnamese, hundreds of thousands of whom perished, suggested that the high level of military violence used was necessary precisely because U.S. policy ran counter to the aspirations of the majority of Vietnamese. Since many of the people of other nations not directly involved in the conflict interpreted the situation in exactly this manner, the U.S. government received very little support from its major allies for its actions in Vietnam. Greater levels of military force might have further isolated the United States. Of critical importance moreover, all the presidents and Congresses of the Vietnam era feared the possibility of direct military intervention by the USSR and China. That could have forced the United States to choose between accepting an enormous military catastrophe for its forces in Vietnam or using nuclear weapons in an attempt to protect them, possibly precipitating world war.

In any case, public opinion in the United States turned decisively against the war after the Tet offensive. The reasons for antiwar sentiment varied greatly. Some who voted for peace candidates in the 1968 presidential primary campaign (Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, who was assassinated after winning the California Democratic Primary) felt the war was an immoral intervention. Others supported antiwar candidates out of a belief that U.S. armed forces were not allowed to use all their potential destructive might to win the war (Karnow 1983). But clearly, after 1968 the majority of Americans demanded an end to the conflict.

Richard Nixon, inaugurated president in January 1969, pledged to end the war "with honor." Thirty thousand Americans had died in Southeast Asia before Nixon took office and more than 26,000 would perish before the final U.S. departure in 1975. Nixon's approach to

ending the war involved greatly increasing the size and level of armament of the Saigon armed forces while at the same time gradually withdrawing U.S. units. This process was referred to as Vietnamization. Another aspect of the Nixon plan involved threats and massive bombing attacks against the North Vietnamese to pressure concessions during negotiations (Karnow 1983).

1973 Peace Agreement

The peace agreement worked out between the Nixon administration and the government of North Vietnam permitted North Vietnamese troops to remain in place in South Vietnam. The Saigon government of President Thieu (the North Vietnamese and the NLF had dropped the demand that Thieu be ousted as part of a peace agreement) was to enter into negotiations with the National Liberation Front's "Provisional Revolutionary Government" to form a coalition government in South Vietnam. The provisional government would, in turn, negotiate the possibility of reunification with the north. In essence, the peace agreement was very much in line with what the National Liberation Front had hoped to achieve when taking up arms in the early 1960s. Thieu and many in his Saigon government were outraged by the peace accords (Kolko 1985).

Nixon promised Thieu that any Communist offensive in violation of the treaty would be countered with massive U.S. air attacks. Saigon's own air force was, at the time, the fourth largest in the world (Karnow 1983). Thieu, who ignored the cease-fire in certain areas of South Vietnam, ordered the Saigon army to begin attacking NLF units and seizing territory. His plan was evidently to expand the land area (and population) under his control gradually until that held by the National Liberation Front was insignificant, thereby making the formation of a coalition government appear unnecessary (Karnow 1983).

The Communist-led forces, however, had expanded the Ho Chi Minh Trail and were pouring equipment and men into the south in preparation for the final campaign to reunify Vietnam. The offensive was launched in earnest in March 1975 with the expectation that a year's fighting might be necessary. Since Nixon had previously been forced to resign in disgrace (in August 1974) over the Watergate Affair, and the U.S. Congress had proceeded to ban any further U.S. military action in Southeast Asia, including air attacks, Saigon's forces were on their own. Initial Communist victories in Vietnam's central highlands precipitated an ARVN retreat, which turned into a rout. As ARVN generals and some other officers fled the country with whatever wealth they had accumulated, enlisted soldiers surrendered or changed into civilian

clothes and simply went home (Karnow 1983; Kolko 1985; Turley 1986). With the exception of a few South Vietnamese army and air units, the startlingly sudden collapse of Saigon's forces in the face of the determined advance of their opponents appeared to testify to the inherent weakness, artificiality, and moral shallowness of the Saigon government. Communist-led forces accepted the surrender of Saigon on April 30, 1975, and renamed it Ho Chi Minh City. The two halves of Vietnam, separated at the 17th parallel since the 1954 Geneva Accords, were then once again joined into a single nation. In retaliation for the Communist offensive, the United States canceled proposed assistance and enforced an economically damaging trade embargo on Vietnam, still in effect in 1991.

AFTERMATH AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Following the fall of Saigon and the reunification of Vietnam in April 1975, at least 200,000 former South Vietnamese government officials and army officers were sent to "reeducation camps" for periods generally ranging from a few months to several years. Upon release, many of these men and their families joined the more than 1 million people who had left Vietnam after the end of the war.

After years of destruction, Vietnam was left with staggering problems. The tasks of repairing war damage, clearing unexploded mines and bombs, and coping with the medical and ecological catastrophe caused by the spreading of thousands of tons of herbicides over the countryside (the U.S. military had attempted to defoliate large areas to reveal or inhibit the movement of enemy forces) retarded development of the economy. The country also had to care for hundreds of thousands of injured soldiers and civilians and thousands of war orphans. Inefficiency, overcentralization, and corruption created further problems in administrative and economic functions. Population growth of 3 percent per year put additional strains on resources.

Vietnam never received the several billion dollars in aid from the United States that was part of the 1973 peace settlement (the U.S. view was that the agreements had been broken, so assistance was no longer merited). And Vietnam was soon further burdened with the cost of its invasion and military operations in Cambodia after December 1978 and of defending against a punitive attack from Cambodia's ally, China, in 1979. After 1988, Vietnam's leaders attempted to improve economic performance by allowing increased private business activity geared to public (market) demand and by permitting peasants to lease substantial amounts of land on a long-term basis (fifteen to thirty years) to farm

for personal profit (*New York Times,* Apr. 9, 1989, p. E2; Apr. 24, 1989, p. A1).

By 1990, the free-market-oriented reforms had contributed to a very significant improvement in the Vietnamese economy. Inflation rates dramatically declined, as did the number of Vietnamese departing the country for economic reasons (*Time,* Apr. 30, 1990, p. 18). And Vietnam became the world's third-leading rice-exporting nation, after Thailand and the United States. A possible end to the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam, originally established in 1975, offered the prospects of further major gains in the economic situation.

U.S. treatment of Vietnam after 1975 tended to be relatively punitive. The officially stated U.S. government conditions for considering the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with Vietnam were the removal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia (where they had intervened in 1978) and the formulation of a peace settlement there, freedom for all remaining political prisoners, permission to leave Vietnam for any Amerasian offspring of U.S. citizens, and assistance in resolving questions concerning 2,303 U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action (MIA) in 1990.

The MIA issue was of considerable emotional significance in the United States, and opinion surveys indicated that a majority of U.S. citizens, especially Vietnam veterans, believed MIAs were still alive in Vietnam. But according to U.S. government officials, no reports of supposed MIA sightings were ever confirmed after investigation, at least up to 1990, and most Vietnamese had long given up hope of finding the remains of their own thousands of loved ones who were also MIA after the war (*Time,* Apr. 30, 1990, p. 21). Most U.S. authorities surmised that the persons some Vietnamese refugees reported as Americans in Vietnam were either Eastern Europeans or Amerasians. In any case, attitude surveys also showed that by 1990 many more U.S. citizens favored than opposed reestablishing relations with Vietnam.

Laos

Laos, to the west of Vietnam, a country of 4 million, had been plagued by civil war among right-wing, neutralist, and leftist factions and had experienced French and U.S. military interventions since World War II. The leftist forces, the Pathet Lao, were originally trained by the Viet Minh and adopted much of the Viet Minh organizational structure in the areas they controlled, mostly the regions bordering the northern part of Vietnam (Adams and McCoy 1970; Zasloff 1973). In 1973, a cease-fire was negotiated and a neutral coalition government assumed power. Later the Pathet Lao movement, enjoying organizational

networks and support among many of the country's peasants, inspired local seizures of power by "people's committees," followed by elections, which forced the abdication of the Laotian king and resulted in the establishment on December 2, 1975, of the Communist-led People's Democratic Republic of Laos (Turley 1986).

Cambodia

On April 17, 1975, two weeks before the end of the Vietnam conflict, the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer, or Red Cambodians) captured the capital of Cambodia, Phnom Penh. The Cambodian Communist movement had developed with Viet Minh assistance during the French Indochina War. At the Geneva Conference, however, the Cambodian Communists (as well as the Laotian Party) had been left out of the peace accords, a fact some Cambodians blamed on the Viet Minh (Chandler 1983; Etcheson 1984). Cambodian Communist displeasure with the Vietnamese increased because the Vietnamese Communist forces were reluctant to help arm the Khmer Rouge in its efforts to topple the non-Communist Cambodian government of Prince Sihanouk. Sihanouk, who had helped lead Cambodia to independence from French colonial rule in 1953 through a negotiation process, had tried to keep his nation relatively neutral regarding the conflicts in Vietnam. The prince, however, was critical of U.S. intervention and had permitted the Vietnamese National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese units to use Cambodian territory for base camps and storage of food and war matériel.

Whereas many members of the original Cambodian Communist party had taken refuge in North Vietnam after the Geneva Accords in 1954, another faction, formed mainly by Cambodian students radicalized while studying in France, returned to Cambodia with an ideology that combined ultranationalism with some extreme-Maoist concepts. The intense nationalist orientation of this group, led by individuals such as Saloth Sar (later called Pol Pot), was reflected in its hostility not only to European and U.S. influences but also to the Vietnamese, who in the late eighteenth century had deprived Cambodia of the Mekong Delta area. Inspired by their interpretation of Mao's concepts, Pol Pot Communists intended to depopulate what they viewed as the "parasitic" and "corrupt" cities and then organize the people into rural farming collectives.

The neutralist Prince Sihanouk, however, was also threatened from the Right. His establishment of diplomatic relations with the National Liberation Front's Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam disturbed conservative Cambodian generals, government officials, and businessmen. Many in these groups, along with thousands of other

urban Cambodians, advocated allying Cambodia with the United States and anticipated that such a move would result in a beneficial massive infusion of U.S. assistance. On March 18, 1970, while Prince Sihanouk was out of the country, General Lon Nol seized control of the government and proceeded to establish himself as chief executive (Etcheson 1984; Turley 1986). The Lon Nol government soon became totally dependent on U.S. economic and military aid and air power for survival.

On April 29, 1970, President Nixon ordered U.S. military forces, accompanied by South Vietnamese troops, into Cambodia for sixty days to destroy North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front supplies and bases in order both to provide the Saigon government with more time to build its forces and to shield remaining U.S. units in Vietnam from major attacks before their final departure (Etcheson 1984; Turley 1986). Vietnamese Communist forces responded by moving large amounts of equipment away from invaded territory and occupied large interior sections of Cambodia, which they soon turned over to the Khmer Rouge. The U.S. invasion and simultaneous massive bombing campaign drove tens of thousands of Cambodians into the ranks of the Khmer Rouge and strengthened the ultranationalist faction in the Cambodian Communist party, which benefited from the intensified hatred of foreigners (Etcheson 1984). Because the U.S. Congress had banned bombing in Cambodia in August 1973, U.S. air power was not available to slow the Communists' 1975 "final offensive." General Lon Nol fled to Hawaii on April 1. Phnom Penh fell on April 17.

The Khmer Rouge, dominated by Pol Pot, quickly moved hundreds of thousands of urban Cambodians to agricultural settlements, killed thousands accused of supporting Lon Nol and the Americans, and purged and executed thousands of Cambodian Communists thought to be "contaminated" by Vietnamese influence. In addition to those killed in fighting during 1970–1975, many more (estimates range from several hundred thousand to more than over 1 million, out of Cambodia's 8 million population) died between 1975 and 1979 from persecution, starvation, or disease (Etcheson 1984).

After the fall of Phnom Penh, Khmer Rouge units began attacking Vietnamese communities in border areas to the west of Saigon, possibly hoping to evict the Vietnamese from territories that 200 years earlier had belonged to Cambodia. After repeated assaults and failed negotiations, Vietnamese military forces invaded Cambodia on December 25, 1978, accompanied by thousands of Cambodian Communists opposed to the Pol Pot regime. The Vietnamese offered three major reasons for their occupation of Cambodia, including providing protection for Vietnamese civilians from Khmer Rouge border attacks, preventing the possibility of a two-front war with the Khmer Rouge attacking from

west of Saigon and the Chinese, Cambodia's ally, attacking from the north, and halting the brutality of the Pol Pot extremists (Etcheson 1984). In retaliation for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the Chinese attacked the northern section of Vietnam in February 1979 and after reportedly suffering considerable losses, withdrew.

Despite the opposition of the United States, China, and most members of the United Nations, Vietnamese forces, harassed by Khmer Rouge and some non-Communist Cambodian guerrillas, remained in Cambodia for over a decade. Finally, after negotiations involving several Cambodian factions and representatives of Vietnam and China, a tentative agreement was reached to end the war. The pact centered on the establishment of a coalition government of national unity. Vietnamese leaders announced that all their remaining troops would leave Cambodia by the end of September 1989 (*New York Times,* Apr. 6, 1989, p. A1). Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, although at least partially achieving the original aims, had cost the Vietnamese 18,000 killed and 37,000 wounded (*New York Times,* Apr. 9, 1989, p. A1).

The Cambodian peace negotiations, however, repeatedly broke down, leading to renewed civil war. The coalition of three Cambodian organizations (of which the Khmer Rouge was by far the largest and militarily most effective), supported by China and the United States, opposed the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government in Phnom Penh. But in the face of mounting successes by the Khmer Rouge, the U.S. government, apparently fearing that this movement, already held responsible for over a million deaths, could again seize power with the aid of its indirect U.S. assistance, dramatically shifted its position in July 1990. The Bush administration withdrew its previous diplomatic recognition for the anti-Vietnamese Cambodian rebel alliance and stopped referring to the Cambodian government as a puppet of Vietnam. Instead the United States agreed to negotiate with Vietnam (for the first time since 1975) in an effort to bring about an end both to the Cambodian conflict and to the threat of the establishment of a new brutal regime in that nation (*New York Times,* July 19, 1990, p. A1; p. A10; Jan. 13, 1991, p. E3).

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The prime unifying motivation for revolution in Vietnam was the goal of throwing off perceived foreign subjugation. The Vietnamese people for hundreds of years manifested a desire for independence in rebellions and wars against a multitude of enemies, taking on and often defeating Chinese armies, the forces of Kubla Khan, and numerous other foes before the twentieth century. Vietnamese nationalism, although temporarily checked by the modern weaponry of Western na-

tions, experienced a rapid resurgence in the 1920s and, heightened further by colonial repression, contributed greatly to the development of the revolution.

Frustrated nationalist aspirations, along with widespread economic hardships, were a major source of mass discontent and a basis for popular participation in revolution. Traditional inequalities present in Vietnamese society had occasionally spurred rebellions against the big landlords and the exploitation and oppression of the mandarin elite. In many ways the French colonization of Vietnam, while elevating a small percentage of the Vietnamese to great wealth and extending the benefits of Western education and technology to a larger minority, brought dislocation, a loss of self-sufficiency, and dependence on the world market to much of the peasantry. Many rural residents were transformed into propertyless tenant farmers, plantation workers, or mine or factory laborers. Downturns in the world economy meant lower prices for exports and hardships for those at the bottom of Vietnam's economic pyramid. Occupying powers so disrupted agriculture during World War II that mass starvation occurred in the northern half of Vietnam. This disaster greatly intensified hostility against the French and the Japanese and against those Vietnamese who supported the foreigners.

During the twentieth century, a small percentage of Vietnamese obtained access to the French colonial educational system and some even studied in France itself. After the 1920s, at least three major divisions could be identified among the educated. First, French colonization had generated a small but significant Francophile elite among the Vietnamese, including large landowners, some members of the Catholic minority, officers in the Vietnamese colonial army, which was organized and trained by the French, and some businessmen. These individuals supported close ties with France, if not outright colonial status, and hundreds were granted French as well as Vietnamese citizenship. Most members of this group would transfer allegiance to the United States after the French defeat in the 1946–1954 war.

A second elite element claimed the title "nationalist" (that is, they claimed to be neither front men for a foreign power nor Communists) but were anti-Communists or at least non-Communists. Ngo Dinh Diem, wealthy and French educated, was viewed as a nationalist by virtue of his resignation from Emperor Bao Dai's French puppet administration during the 1930s. But Diem represented the limited appeal of this type of nationalist to most Vietnamese. Self-centered and dictatorial, he and his supporters manifested little interest in the welfare of the majority of the population and appeared even less concerned with paying attention to popular views and national aspirations. Reflecting this approach, the Diem regime not only did little to redistribute wealth toward the

masses but even reversed land-distribution programs set in motion by the Viet Minh. The lack of a commitment to social revolution reduced the appeal of non-Communist nationalists to the peasants, and sponsorship by foreign powers undermined their claims to nationalism.

The third elite element to develop in Vietnam during the 1920s and 1930s was composed of Marxist-oriented, largely urban, middle-class, educated individuals who in 1930 unified most of their various groups into the Indochinese Communist party. Ho Chi Minh did more than anyone else to organize the ICP and develop its basic revolutionary program. The ICP fused traditionally fierce and resilient Vietnamese nationalism with Marxist-Leninist concepts. The result was an ideology that called for both the defeat of "imperialism" (meaning the attainment of true independence for Vietnam) and the defeat of "feudalism" (social revolution involving redistribution of wealth and abandonment of the remaining oppressive aspects of Confucian culture). The Party's reform program, including land redistribution to poor and landless peasants, won broad support in the countryside and provided the basis, along with nationalism, for mass membership in organizations tied to and coordinated by the ICP. Eventually the ICP, accepting Ho Chi Minh's position, put primary emphasis on achieving independence from foreign domination.

During the period of revolutionary conflict, the antirevolutionary state apparatus was always flawed in terms of its legitimacy to govern the Vietnamese people because it was either the creation of some foreign power or dependent on foreign support for its existence. From the early 1930s to 1955, the playboy emperor, Bao Dai, occupied the role of puppet for whichever outside power was paying the bills. Diem, dependent on U.S. economic and military aid, which was used to suppress revolutionaries and Buddhist religious leaders alike, also failed to gain the respect, much less the support, of most Vietnamese. The succession of generals who followed Diem, including General Thieu during 1967–1975, had previously served in the French colonial army, and some succeeded in greatly enriching themselves during their periods of military and governmental service.

The coercive and administrative capabilities of the antirevolutionary state in Vietnam fluctuated over time. On paper these were high at the time of the victorious Communist offensive in 1975. Saigon had 1 million men under arms and outnumbered its adversaries in the south by about 3 to 1. But South Vietnam's army was, especially by 1975, riddled with corruption. After the final departure of U.S. combat troops in 1973, the South Vietnamese economy went into a decline, deprived of its U.S. military customers for shop goods, bars, drugs, and prostitutes. Urban unemployment rose to 40 percent and inflation increased. Many Saigon

officers embezzled army funds and even charged "tolls" for other military units to cross through areas their garrisons controlled. By 1975, the large majority of South Vietnam's enlisted soldiers were not earning enough to support their families and morale was low (Karnow 1983; Kolko 1985; Turley 1986). Once deprived of its unconditional U.S. support, the Saigon government and military could hardly withstand the onslaught of highly motivated revolutionary forces.

The developing Vietnamese revolution experienced periodic "windows of permissiveness" regarding the larger world context and involvement of other nations in Vietnam's affairs. The 1936–1939 Popular Front government in France precipitated the release of many ICP members from Vietnamese prisons and presented an opportunity for the ICP to organize openly after earlier repression. The Japanese overthrow of French colonial authority in March 1945 provided the Viet Minh with a five-month period of relative freedom of movement in the countryside, during which base areas and the foundations of the revolutionary armed forces were securely established. The several weeks between the mid-August surrender of the Japanese and the arrival of Chinese and British (and later French) occupation forces provided the maximum favorable conditions for revolutionary insurrections. These were carried out with virtually no resistance from the demoralized Japanese in more than sixty Vietnamese cities. After that time, the huge coercive power of the French (400,000 Vietnamese killed during 1946–1954) and the even more massive military strength of the United States (over 1 million Vietnamese dead between 1956 and 1975) were inadequate to reverse a revolution that long before had succeeded in achieving widespread popular support. The steadily declining commitment of the U.S. government to supporting the Saigon regime after 1973 resulted in nonintervention during the spring 1975 Communist offensive and a relatively quick end to the military conflict.

VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1847–1883   In a series of wars, French forces defeat the Vietnamese and establish control over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; they call this area French Indochina

1919   Ho Chi Minh proposal for Vietnamese autonomy rejected at Paris Peace Conference

1930   French suppress non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists; Vietnamese Communist party (called the Indochinese Communist party) founded

1940   France defeated by Germany; Japanese forces occupy Vietnam

1941   Communist-led nationalist movement, Viet Minh, established

1945 August revolution results in Vietnamese declaration of independence

1946–1954 French Indochina War, resulting in victory for the Viet Minh

1954 Geneva Peace Conference temporarily divides Vietnam

1954–1959 Diem becomes leader of South Vietnam and uses U.S. support to suppress opponents and prevent reunification

1960 Formation of the National Liberation Front

1963 Diem assassinated; Johnson becomes U.S. president after Kennedy assassination

1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed by U.S. Congress

1965–1973 Major commitment of U.S. armed forces to conflict in Vietnam

1975 Vietnam reunified

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From the Killing Fields, 1990, 50 min., video. Peter Jennings analyzes the civil war in Cambodia and U.S. involvement. AFSC.

Hearts and Minds, 1974, 112 min., color film. Award-winning documentary of the effects of the Vietnam War on both the Vietnamese and American peoples. This film should be preceded by lecture or reading material on the factors that led to the Vietnam conflict. UMICH, UT-D.

Ho Chi Minh, 1968, 26 min., b/w film. CBS documentary on the life of Ho Chi Minh. UMINN, UWISC-M.

Vietnam: An Historical Document, 1975, 56 min., color film. CBS documentary history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. UARIZ, UC-B, USF, UIOWA, KSU, PSU.

Vietnam: A Television History, 13 parts, 1983, 60 min., color video. This highly acclaimed series includes: 1—Roots of War; 2—First Vietnam War, 1946–1954; 3—America's Mandarin, 1954–1963; 4—LBJ Goes to War, 1964–1965; 5—America Takes Charge, 1965–1967; 6—America's Enemy, 1954–

1967; 7—Tet, 1968; 8—Vietnamizing the War, 1968–1973; 9—No Neutral Ground: Laos and Cambodia; 10—Peace Is at Hand, 1968–1973; 11—Homefront USA; 12—End of the Tunnel; 13—Legacies. Parts 1–12 available from UIOWA, PSU, Films Inc; part 13 from PSU, Films Inc.

Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War, 26 parts, 1980, color film. America in Vietnam. Part 1, 55 min.; Parts 2–26, 26 min. each. 1—America in Vietnam; 2—France in Vietnam; 3—Dien Bien Phu; 4—Early Hopes; 5—Assassination; 6—Days of Decision; 7—Westy's War; 8—Uneasy Allies; 9—Guerrilla Society; 10—Ho Chi Minh Trail; 11—Firepower; 12—Village War; 13—Airwar; 14—Siege; 15—TET!; 16—Frontline America; 17—Soldiering On; 18—Changing the Guard; 19—Wanting Out; 20—Bombing of Hanoi; 21—Peace; 22—Prisoners; 23—Unsung Soldiers; 24—Final Offensive; 25—Surrender; 26—Vietnam Recalled. Part 1 available from UI, ISU; Parts 2–26 from IU.

Year Zero: The Silent Death of Cambodia, 1979, 60 min., video or color film. Describes Khmer Rouge attainment of power, policies, and resulting conflict. AFSC.

The Cuban Revolution

I n the 1950s, as the United States became increasingly involved in
Vietnam, the nearby island nation of Cuba was torn by civil war.
Many Cubans took up arms in the hope of winning a fairer distribution
of the island's wealth for the poor, while others aimed primarily at
establishing a truly democratic political system. Of critical significance
for the success of the revolution, however, was the unity of virtually all
the revolutionaries and their supporters in the goal of ridding Cuba of
the corrupt Batista dictatorship, a regime widely viewed as an antide-
mocratic protector of the economic status quo and, perhaps most im-
portant, as the mechanism through which foreign interests dominated
and exploited the Cuban people.

The Cuban Revolution had important consequences not only for the
Cuban people but also for the United States, the other countries of the
Americas, and even, in certain ways, for other parts of the world. The
success of the movement led by Fidel Castro resulted in the establishment
of the first predominantly socialist economy in the Western Hemisphere.
Radical social change and the coercive measures utilized to achieve
change polarized Cuban society. A majority of Cubans, craving social
justice, inflamed by nationalist fervor, and inspired by Castro's charis-
matic leadership, supported the revolution (Aguila 1988; Szulc 1986).
A minority, disproportionately urban upper and middle class in com-
position, objected to aspects of the revolutionary program and especially
to the dominant role of the Communist party. Since 1959 more than 1
million Cubans have left their homeland.

The revolution, however, succeeded in eliminating the desperate
poverty characteristic of most Latin American countries and in provid-
ing hundreds of thousands with educational opportunities, medical
services, and other benefits that they never would have enjoyed without

the overthrow of the Batista government. These accomplishments contributed to consolidating the support of most in the island's working and peasant classes for the postrevolutionary government and its policies and the development of a relatively strong and resilient sociopolitical system (Aguila 1988). The Cuban regular armed forces, including reservists, was estimated in the 1980s to number about 300,000, with an additional 1,300,000 men and women in militia units. More than 50,000 Cuban troops and military advisers were deployed around the world, most notably in Angola (where their presence had been supported by most African nations as a barrier to intervention by the white minority government of South Africa [PBS 1985]). Apart from military personnel, more than 1,000 Cuban doctors and thousands of nurses, teachers, and engineers, whose expenses and salaries were paid by the Cuban government, served as volunteers in at least twenty-five developing countries. The goodwill that Cuba enjoyed from many other nations was in great part responsible for Fidel Castro's election to the presidency of the Organization of Non-Aligned States ("nonaligned" in the sense of not being a member of a formal military alliance with either the United States or the USSR).

Without a doubt, Cuba has been the subject of world attention and controversy far out of proportion to its physical size or its population. This chapter will address a number of important questions: Why did the revolution succeed in Cuba? Why did the revolution lead to the domination of the Communist party? How has Cuba affected, assisted, and reacted to revolutionary movements in other societies?

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Cuba has a land area of 44,218 square miles (114,525 km²—about the same size as Pennsylvania) and a population in 1990 of about 11 million. The island, 90 miles (145 km) south of Key West Florida, is 745 miles (1,199 km) long, with an average width of 60 miles (97 km). The nation's capital is Havana, which has slightly over 2 million residents. The 1981 Cuban Census indicated that approximately 66 percent of Cubans were of European ancestry, 22 percent were of mixed racial background ("mulatto"), and 12 percent were of African ancestry (Aguila 1988). About 0.1 percent were of Asian origin. Unlike several other Latin American societies, no Indian subcultures exist in Cuba. The health and educational levels of the Cuban population improved significantly after the revolution. By the mid-1980s, 96 percent of the population was literate, the infant mortality rate was 17 per 1,000 live births, and life expectancy was over 74 years (Aguila 1988). These statistics were comparable to those of advanced European societies.

U.S.A.

Miami

GULF OF MEXICO

ATLANTIC OCEAN

THE BAHAMAS

Havana

CUBA

BAY OF PIGS

ISLE OF PINES

Santiago

Guantánamo

SIERRA MAESTRA

JAMAICA

HAITI

CARIBBEAN SEA

CUBA

PREREVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL HISTORY

Columbus discovered Cuba in 1492 on his first voyage to the New World. The Spanish settlers forcibly recruited thousands of Arawak Indians to work mining gold and clearing land for agriculture. As harsh conditions of servitude, poor nutrition, and diseases transmitted by the Spanish rapidly depleted the Indian population, African slaves were brought to Cuba. Early agriculture involved tobacco and later coffee, but after war and rebellion had disrupted the economies of French colonies in the Caribbean, wealthy migrants established large sugar plantations in Cuba and spurred a rapid increase in the importation of slaves. From 1792 to 1821, 250,000 slaves passed through Havana customs and an estimated 60,000 were brought in illegally (Wolf 1969). Unsuccessful slave rebellions occurred in 1810, 1812, and 1844. The African heritage of the slaves blended with Spanish culture, so that later the Cuban government described the nation's overall culture as Afro-Latin.

When other Spanish colonies were gaining their independence in the 1820s, many Cubans preferred to remain under Spanish military occupation. Because at the time the majority of Cuba's population was black, members of the dominant European minority might have feared that without the assistance of the Spanish army they would be overwhelmed in a slave rebellion. Cuba's independence movement did not gain support until the last third of the century when Cubans of European ancestry were clearly a majority of the island's inhabitants. But Spain's loss of its major colonies strengthened its determination to retain control of Cuba as a valuable trade and military asset.

A reformist movement, which developed in the early 1860s, was motivated in part by the desire of "Creole" planters (agriculturalists born in Cuba) to gain greater economic influence on the island. After negotiations with Spain failed, a group of planters in Cuba's easternmost province, Oriente, demanded total independence. The reasons given to justify the rebellion included Cuba's lack of effective political representation in the Spanish parliament (the Cortes), limitations on freedom of speech and other civil rights, an unfair tariff system that put Cuban planters at a disadvantage, and discrimination against native-born Cubans in business and government. The rebel group also called for an end to slavery, upon which the wealthiest planters, located in the western more often than in the eastern part of the country, depended for their prosperity. In 1868, a ten-year war of independence broke out. But due to arguments among rebel leaders, lack of support from the United States, and strong resistance by Spanish forces, the conflict—after the

loss of more than 200,000 Cuban and Spanish lives—ended in stalemate (Aguila 1988).

Martí and the Struggle for Independence

After 1878, Spain introduced some reforms and abolished slavery. But many Cubans continued to crave full independence. A second war (1895–1898) was inspired in part through the efforts of Cuban writer José Martí (1853–1895). Martí was born in Havana, the son of Spanish immigrants. He enthusiastically embraced the cause of Cuban independence and at seventeen was sentenced to six years at hard labor for writing proindependence literature. After serving a few months, he was exiled to Spain, where he earned university degrees in law, philosophy, and literature. Martí returned to Cuba in 1878 after the Pact of Zanjón had ended ten years of warfare. But since he immediately resumed proindependence activities, Spanish authorities again expelled him. Martí settled in New York and worked as an art critic for the *New York Sun* (Ruiz 1968).

During the period Martí lived in the United States (1881–1895), he wrote prolifically and inspired many others who later would lead Cuba through the struggle for independence. At first he extolled capitalism and found fault with the labor movement. But after 1883 some of Martí's views changed. Witnessing the hardships of U.S. workers and experiencing deprivation himself, he became critical of the capitalist society of his era and much more favorable toward labor unions. Martí supported some of the ideas of Karl Marx and praised Marx's concern for the welfare of workers. Martí expressed the belief that poverty, racism, and other forms of oppression could and should be eliminated. His favorite saying was "I will stake my fate on the poor of the earth" (Ruiz 1968, p. 67). And Martí expressed fear of possible U.S. economic imperialism toward Cuba. But according to most scholars, Martí never became a Marxist revolutionary. His first passion was to liberate Cuba. Whatever plans he had for social revolution would presumably have followed the achievement of independence. Because Martí's views changed in reaction to his experiences, the full range of his writings contain contradictory concepts and attitudes. Consequently, later Cubans with diverse and even conflicting political and economic philosophies could find some support for their particular ideologies in Martí's works (Ruiz 1968; Szulc 1986).

Martí's nationalism led him to land in eastern Cuba in 1895 in an effort to join rebel guerrilla groups. He was soon killed in an ambush. Despite Martí's death, a new war for Cuban independence was under way. The Spanish army erected fortified barriers to seal off one part of

the country from another and forcibly relocated much of the rural population to special camps or to the cities in an effort to separate independence fighters from civilian supporters (Wolf 1969). Rebel forces burned sugar plantations in the western part of Cuba to deprive Spain and its supporters of revenues. Tens of thousands on both sides perished in the conflict. But by 1898, the Spanish army had been driven from most of the rural areas. Many Cubans felt that through their sacrifices Spain had been defeated and would shortly be forced to withdraw.

At that point the United States, motivated by popular support for the rebels, reports of Spanish atrocities, a desire to protect U.S. interests in Cuba, and, finally, the sinking of the battleship *Maine* while it was visiting Havana harbor, entered the war. Once U.S. naval forces destroyed the Spanish fleet, Spain's armies could not be resupplied and were quickly forced to surrender. As a result of the Spanish-American War, in which fewer than 100 U.S. lives were lost, the United States assumed control of Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.

When President William McKinley requested the authority to "end the hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba," Congress approved the measure, but only after attaching the Teller amendment, which asserted that the United States would not attempt to "exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control" over Cuba once peace was restored (Aguila 1988, p. 18). The occupation forces, however, established a military government, which then restructured Cuba's economic, administrative, and political systems. Of critical significance was U.S. encouragement of the rehabilitation and expansion of Cuba's sugar industry. A number of Cuban political figures argued that Cuba would be locked into a dependent status if a "monoculture" based on sugar were revived and extended. They advocated greater diversification in agriculture and in the economy in general so that Cuba would become economically self-sufficient instead of tied to an external market for sale of a single crucially important crop. Through sugar, however, foreign investors in good times could obtain sizable returns on their capital and Cuban growers could gather foreign currency with which to purchase luxury items from other nations.

After bringing about significant improvements in health, education, sanitation, public administration, and finance, U.S. authorities turned over the reins of government. But before granting Cuba independence in 1902, the U.S. Congress forced Cuban political leaders to incorporate the so-called Platt amendment into their constitution. The amendment, drafted by Senator Orville Platt and Secretary of State Elihu Root as part of an army appropriations bill, declared that the United States could exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence and for the maintenance of a government capable of

protecting life, property, and individual liberty (Ruiz 1968; Szulc 1986). The Platt amendment also prevented Cuba from contracting any foreign debt that could not be serviced from existing revenues, barred Cuba from entering into treaties with other governments that compromised its sovereignty, and gave the United States the right to buy or lease land for naval facilities (Wolf 1969). Although some Cubans supported U.S. involvement in Cuba and even requested U.S. military interventions, many others deeply resented the Platt amendment and the growing U.S. role in Cuba's economy and political life. Under terms of the Platt amendment, the United States intervened militarily in Cuba during 1906–1909, 1912, and 1917 to protect business interests or to reestablish order (Aguila 1988). Frustrated Cuban nationalism and widespread abhorrence of corrupt and authoritarian regimes perceived as prostituting the nation for the benefit of foreigners would in the mid-twentieth century constitute the overwhelming unifying emotional sentiment welding Cubans of diverse backgrounds into a powerful revolutionary coalition.

Discontent and the Emergence of Batista

Following several unstable governments, the candidate of the Liberal party, Gerardo Machado, a popular veteran of the independence war, was elected president in 1924. Machado had promised voters that he would work for the elimination of the Platt amendment and free the government of corruption. But after his election, Machado dropped his campaign to abolish the Platt amendment, financed his corruption-plagued projects with loans from U.S. financial institutions, and, in general, was compliant toward U.S. business interests (Ruiz 1968). In 1928 Machado ignored constitutional rules and had the national congress, which was under his control, elect him to an additional six-year presidential term. Supported by the army and U.S. business interests, he instituted a repressive and bloody dictatorship (Aguila 1988).

The negative effects of the Great Depression on the Cuban economy intensified popular protest against Machado's regime. Middle-class reformers, students, and professors from Havana University and many workers, whose unions were often led by members of the growing Cuban Communist party, joined forces against the dictatorship. As disorders and violence reached extraordinary levels, the Franklin Roosevelt administration intervened and convinced Machado to resign in order to restore stability. Once Machado was out, frenzied mobs attacked and killed many of his supporters, who were accused of torture and murder. Machado's successor, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, was quickly overthrown by a coup of noncommissioned officers led by a sergeant, Ful-

gencio Batista. The soldiers supporting Batista had been outraged by pay cuts, troop reductions, and other grievances.

Batista initially supported a five-man revolutionary government led by a professor of physiology at Havana University, Ramón Grau San Martín. The revolutionary government attempted to enact reforms, such as establishing the eight-hour day, cutting utility rates, granting land to some poor peasants, limiting land purchases by foreigners, taking control of some foreign-owned properties, and mandating that a minimum of 50 percent of a factory's employees be Cuban citizens (some employers imported foreign workers willing to work for less pay). These reforms were strongly opposed by the Cuban upper class and U.S. business interests. Grau, an anti-Communist, also faced opposition from the Communist party. And the Roosevelt administration refused to recognize his government. After serving in office for four months, Grau, under pressure from Batista, who declined to continue supporting a government opposed by the United States, resigned on January 15, 1934.

Following Grau's resignation and the cancellation of certain reforms, the U.S. government, stating that political stability had returned to Cuba, abolished the Platt amendment. But many Cubans came to feel that the 1933 rebellion, like that of 1895, had failed to achieve its most important goals of eliminating corruption, significantly redistributing wealth, and freeing Cuba from foreign control. This perception was to foster both further mass discontent and elite dissidence. Some of those craving more significant reforms formed the Auténtico party, which was pledged to making an "authentic revolution," faithful to the concepts of José Martí.

With Batista holding real power through control over the army, Cuba was governed by a succession of puppet presidents until 1940. After a new constitution was enacted, Batista defeated Grau in what historians regard as a free election (Aguila 1988; Ruiz 1968; Szulc 1986). As the new constitution limited the presidency to a single four-year term, Batista could not succeed himself. He was followed by the Auténtico administrations of Ramón Grau (1944–1948) and Carlos Prío (1948–1952). These governments enacted some reforms in agriculture, education, and labor but avoided measures that could be viewed as challenging U.S. business interests; the administrations were themselves characterized by massive graft, political patronage, and theft and abuse of public funds.

In protest, a leading charismatic, though emotionally unstable, Cuban senator, Eduardo Chibás, quit the Auténtico party in 1947 in order to organize a new reform movement, the Orthodoxo party, which Chibás claimed was dedicated to the true (orthodox) principles of the Cuban

hero Martí. Chibás, who formulated the slogan "honor against money," exposed corruption through his very popular weekly radio program. Despite the fact that many viewed him as the probable victor in the 1952 presidential election, Chibás, apparently bitterly disappointed by the failure of colleagues to provide him with the evidence needed to prove, as he had promised the public, a charge of corruption, shot himself at the conclusion of a broadcast in August 1951 (Ruiz 1968). The Orthodoxo party continued to campaign for reform and still appeared likely to win the 1952 elections, including the congressional seat sought by a young activist lawyer, Fidel Castro. But before the elections could be held, the army, again under Batista's leadership, seized power. Batista installed an authoritarian regime, which lasted until he fled Cuba on New Year's Day, 1959.

ECONOMY AND SOCIAL CLASSES

Sugar came to represent over 80 percent of Cuban exports, most of which went to the United States. In the 1950s, U.S.-owned companies controlled nine of the ten largest sugar mills and twelve of the next twenty in size and accounted for almost 40 percent of the island's sugar crop (Wolf 1969). U.S. businesses also had hundreds of millions invested in utilities, manufacturing, mining, and oil refineries (Aguila 1988). Organized-crime figures based in the United States played a significant role in casinos and hotels in Havana, which was a major international gambling resort before the revolution (PBS 1985).

Approximately 160,000 Cubans were employed by U.S.-owned businesses, and 186,000 worked for the Cuban government. The regularly employed nonagricultural working class included about 400,000. Another 250,000 people worked as waiters, servants, entertainers, gift shop proprietors, and in other occupations serving tourists or well-to-do Cubans. The poorest stratum in urban Cuba included several hundred thousand underemployed or part-time workers (Wolf 1969). Official statistics indicated that during the period 1943–1957, national unemployment averaged 20–30 percent (Amaro and Mesa-Lago 1971). Due to consumer-price increases, *real* per capita income fell during much of the decade preceding the revolution (Ruiz 1968).

The Cuban economy, prone to suffer from fluctuations in the world market price for sugar, was ranked fifth among Latin American countries in per capita income. Other measures of development during the 1950s, such as life expectancy (about sixty years), infant mortality rate (32 per 1,000 live births), and literacy (between 75 and 80 percent literate), all placed Cuba among the top five Latin American societies before the revolution (Aguila 1988; Ruiz 1968; Wolf 1969). But the

island's wealth was unevenly distributed, fostering a feeling of social injustice. Although in 1956 the per capita income for Cuba's then approximately 6 million people was 336 pesos, the majority of rural families (representing about 44 percent of the population) survived on about 90 pesos. Eight percent of the farms controlled 75 percent of the farmland (and 0.5 percent, mostly large sugar concerns and cattle ranches, held one-third of the land). Eighty-five percent of the farms had only 20 percent of the land (Aguila 1988).

Medical personnel, hospitals, teachers, and schools were concentrated in urban areas, where most of the wealthy and middle class resided. The illiteracy rate in the countryside was 42 percent; it was 12 percent in the cities. In rural areas about 500,000 were employed as sugarcane cutters and 50,000 as sugar mill workers. Between sugar harvests, all the cane cutters were laid off, as were two-thirds of the mill workers. During the periods of unemployment, many rural families subsisted in part on raw sugarcane. Sugar workers who desired to end the debilitating cycle of seasonal unemployment constituted a major source of support for the revolutionary government after the 1959 victory (Wolf 1969). In general, perception of foreign dominance and exploitation of the Cuban economy, high unemployment, declining real income for many in the 1950s, and the poverty of the rural population all contributed to the growth of mass discontent preceding the revolution.

Several social scientists have argued that Cuba never developed a large, independent native capitalist class because of the dominant role played by U.S. business interests and the dependency of many Cuban capitalists on U.S. financial institutions (Wolf 1969). Furthermore, both the Cuban upper class and middle class, which together appear to have constituted perhaps 25 percent of the population, were generally enamored of U.S. life-styles and culture. Members of the Cuban middle class were often unsatisfied with their status and yearned to be rich. Highly educated Cubans, trained mainly in the legal and medical professions, often turned to government for employment and enrichment. Some without sugar holdings viewed political office, with its access to public moneys and opportunities for graft, as their only potential source of wealth (Ruiz 1968). By the 1950s, so many politicians had failed the public trust that government officials received little respect from the general population, a fact that constituted a critical flaw in the prerevolutionary state apparatus.

Upper- and middle-class Cubans were disproportionately represented among practicing Catholics. Unlike the case in other Latin American countries, the Catholic church in Cuba was relatively weak and did not provide an effective bond among the island's various classes and social groups. Although 80 percent of Cubans were nominally Catholic, only

about 10 percent practiced their religion (Ruiz 1968). Part of the reason for the Church's limited influence was the fact that the Cuban church was Spanish dominated and during the nineteenth century had opposed Cuban independence, which provoked harsh criticism by José Martí and alienated much of the Cuban people. Martí further accused the clergy of being unconcerned with the plight of Cuba's rural poor. Even in the 1950s the large majority of Cuba's 800 priests were Spaniards and very conservative (*New York Times*, May 15, 1987, p. A4). The Catholic church was especially weak in rural Cuba, particularly among Afro-Cubans.

The subordinate social and economic status of mulattoes and blacks was a major reason why many nonwhite Cubans became prominent in two rather distinct institutions, the army and the Communist party. The prerevolutionary army had originally been organized by occupation authorities early in the century and was trained and equipped by the United States. As was the case with most armies in Latin America, it functioned not to defend Cuba from foreign enemies but to preserve order and, by and large, protect traditional institutions and the interests of the privileged classes. The Cuban armed forces, which numbered about 40,000 in 1958, provided a source of steady employment, relative economic security, and an opportunity for social mobility for lower-income groups.

Following Batista's takeover of the army in 1933, 384 of its 500 officers resigned, in great part because they were unwilling to accept a mulatto commander (Batista was of Chinese, African, and European ancestry). Batista then granted commissions to 527 enlisted men, expanded the army, and increased military pay levels (Ruiz 1968). After 1933, about one-third of the officers were Afro-Cuban. Under Batista, the army was often not as directly responsive to conservative upper-class interests as in the past. Batista occasionally supported limited reforms that benefited the poor or organized labor but that did not threaten the basic interests of the upper class. Consequently, many nonwhite Cubans identified positively with Batista before the late 1950s. The army, however, because of its origin as a product of occupation, its hindering of major reforms proposed by leaders of the 1933 revolution against Machado, and its use of repressive measures, which greatly intensified during the 1950s, was generally unpopular with most Cubans (Ruiz 1968).

In the 1860s Spanish political refugees had introduced socialist concepts in Cuba. After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Leninist ideas began to spread among some Cuban intellectuals and within the working class. In 1925, several union activists joined militant students from Havana University to form the Cuban Communist party. A popular university student leader, Julio Antonio Mella, became the Party's first secretary-

general. Despite the fact that the Machado regime outlawed the Communist party and apparently paid assassins to murder Mella, the Party grew in membership and influence (Ruiz 1968). The success the Party enjoyed was due to worker frustration with corrupt business and government officials, the exploitive conditions under which many Cubans labored, and the fact that Communists generally proved to be among the most effective union leaders in their ability to win improvements from management and government.

The Communists gained thousands of members from among Cuba's especially impoverished nonwhite population. Afro-Cuban Communist leaders included Lázaro Peña, the most powerful labor leader in the island's history, Blás Roca Calderío, ideological spokesperson for the Party, and Jesús Menéndez Larrondo, who headed the Sugar Workers' Federation until he was assassinated in 1947 (Ruiz 1968). The Communists were able to obtain about 10 percent of the vote in the 1946 legislative elections. But the level of membership and public support varied over time, stemming from a combination of factors, such as periodic government repression and the occasional willingness of Party leaders to compromise principles for short-term political gains. The Communist party generally supported Batista during the 1930s and early 1940s and especially discredited itself by accepting Batista's military regime in the 1950s, with some Party members even serving in the dictator's government. Most of the Communist leadership initially refused to support Fidel Castro's movement to get rid of Batista by force of arms, claiming that it would result in useless bloodshed; those people did not endorse Castro until 1958, when the revolution was clearly gaining momentum (Aguila 1988; Ruiz 1968; Szulc 1986).

REVOLUTION

Fidel Castro and the M-26-7 Movement

Fidel Castro was born in 1926 in the town of Biran in eastern Cuba. His father, Angel Castro y Argiz, was a Spanish immigrant who became a peddler selling lemonade and other items to sugar workers and their families. With his savings he rented and later purchased land to grow sugar. Eventually the Castro holdings amounted to some 26,000 owned or permanently rented acres (Szulc 1986). Fidel's mother was his father's second wife, Lina Ruz Gonzalez, who had worked as a maid or cook in the Castro household and was at least twenty-five years younger than her husband. Lina was illiterate until well into adulthood and, though religious and devoted to her five children (Fidel was the third), did not marry Angel until several years after Fidel's birth.

Fidel, competitive and physically active, studied and played with the children of the rural poor at the little country school near his home. He later recalled realizing that his barefoot classmates would soon leave school and that their parent's impoverishment would condemn them to lives of ignorance and abject poverty. Castro claimed this early experience set him on the path toward becoming a revolutionary. After a few years, Fidel was enrolled in a Jesuit-run private school in Santiago. Later he entered Cuba's best preparatory school, Belén College, in Havana. At Belén, Jesuit instructors, who were usually conservative politically, considered Castro perhaps the most intelligent student and certainly the best all-around athlete in his class. But although prone to rebelliousness, Castro claims he knew little of political parties and their ideologies until he entered law school at Havana University (Szulc 1986).

At the university, political activity was intense. Major activist groups included the student branch of the Communist party and two supposedly revolutionary but anti-Communist armed gangs, the MSR (Socialist Revolutionary movement) and the UIR (Insurrectional Revolutionary Union). These groups and others competed for control of the student government. Physical intimidation, beatings, and even assassinations occurred. Because the university was autonomous and self-governing, neither the army nor the police could enter the campus (Szulc 1986). The fact that so many of the children of Cuba's educated classes were drawn to revolutionary groups at the university and passionately devoted to radical change reflected the acute elite discontent in the nation. That discontent was to be a critical element in the development and success of the revolution. Once Castro became involved in politics on and off campus, he, like other student activists, often carried a gun.

Although not yet twenty-one years old but already recognized as an eloquent speaker, Castro was invited (the only university student asked), along with six senators, ten congressmen, and about eighty other government and business figures, to the May 15, 1947, founding of the Orthodoxo reform party. Although Castro claimed he became interested in Marxist socialist concepts during his third year at the university, he felt that the Cuban Communist party was too politically isolated to garner the popular support necessary to bring about revolutionary change. He preferred to work with the Orthodoxos because of their greater potential mass appeal and the greater freedom of action this course allowed him. His younger brother Raúl, in contrast, decided to join the Communists.

After passing law school exams, Fidel started handling cases for lower-income people in Havana. He built a base of support that assured him election to congress on the Orthodoxo ticket in the scheduled 1952 elections. Castro claimed he intended to work within the democratic

system and campaign for high public office. He would have then used his political and oratorical skills to prepare the Cuban people gradually for the advent of a socialist economic system, which he had become convinced was necessary for the welfare of the large majority of the island's population (Szulc 1986).

Batista's seizure of power before the 1952 elections could be held changed Castro's plans. Fidel, Raúl, and a number of other militant activists decided to resort to armed insurrection. Over a number of months scores of young working-class men, many with only a primary education, met for training sessions with university-educated radicals to organize an attack on Batista's army. The target was the Moncada barracks in Santiago at the eastern end of the island, about 500 miles from Havana. The participants hoped to surprise the base's approximately 400 soldiers and seize its store of weapons. After distributing captured arms to supporters in Santiago, the rebels planned to take the city and call for a general uprising against Batista throughout the island.

On the morning of July 26, 1953, about 120 men and women crowded into sixteen automobiles and drove to the Moncada complex. Unfortunately for the attackers, they immediately encountered an army patrol. When firing broke out, soldiers in the base were alerted. Several of the rebels were killed in the fighting, more were captured, and the rest fled. During the next few days, almost all the rebels were caught and about half were executed. The Castro brothers had the good fortune to be captured by a squad under the command of Afro-Cuban Lieutenant Pedro Manuel Sarria Tartabull, who, despite the demands of some of his men and the anticipated displeasure of several of his superiors, refused on ethical grounds to kill the surrendering rebels. (Years later, Sarria would be arrested for refusing to fight against Castro's new rebel band. But after the 1959 victory, Sarria was promoted to captain and proclaimed a "Hero of the Revolution" [Szulc 1986].)

Castro was brought to trial. But as his defense, he delivered a stinging indictment of the dictatorship, governmental corruption, and social ills of Cuba, ending with the words "History will absolve me." Fidel was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. The Castro brothers were confined to the maximum-security prison on the Isle of Pines. Feeling secure in power and hoping to improve his public image, Batista declared an amnesty and freed the Moncada rebels after they had served one year and seven months (Szulc 1986). Fidel Castro and several associates, fearing assassination by Batista agents and impeded in efforts to organize a new rebel organization while they remained in Cuba, left for Mexico on July 6, 1955.

Shortly after arriving, Castro announced formation of the 26th of July movement (M-26-7), which included several Orthodoxo party mem-

bers, liberals, socialists, and some Communist party members (although Party leaders had condemned both the Moncada attack and plans for armed revolution). Castro soon contacted the Cuban-born Alberto Bayo, a guerrilla warfare expert who had served in the Spanish Civil War with the Republican forces against Spanish, Italian, and German fascist armies. Castro convinced Bayo that it was his patriotic duty to help prepare the members of M-26-7. While a training base was being established, Castro traveled to the United States and addressed anti-Batista Cuban exiles in New York and Florida. He raised thousands of dollars for the purchase of weapons, supplies, and a wooden, hurricane-damaged thirty-eight-foot yacht, the *Granma,* to transport his revolutionaries to Cuba.

"Che" Guevara and the Lesson of Guatemala

In Mexico the Castro brothers met a young Argentine physician, Ernesto (later nicknamed "Che") Guevara. Guevara, after becoming a specialist in allergies (he suffered from asthma himself), had traveled from Argentina to several other Latin American countries. Che became possibly the most radical of the revolution's central figures. Before joining M-26-7, Guevara had lived in Guatemala, where an elected government was attempting progressive reforms. Mass protests followed by an army coup in 1944 had toppled a brutal military dictatorship. Genuinely free elections resulted in the overwhelming victory of a government under the leadership of President Juan José Arevalo, a former university professor, who was dedicated to improving the lot of the poor. Arevalo's reforms offended wealthy conservative interests, which repeatedly tried to overthrow him. He left office in March 1951 worried that fascism, though militarily defeated in Europe in World War II, permeated Latin America and was even growing stronger there (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982). Arevalo was succeeded in office by the second democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, one of the officers who had overthrown the previous dictatorship.

President Arbenz enacted a sweeping land-redistribution program that involved parceling out uncultivated acreage to poor peasants. A major target for land appropriation was the United Fruit Company, based in Boston. The Arbenz government confiscated over 300,000 unused acres from United Fruit (which planted only 15 to 20 percent of its land annually), offering to pay compensation, which the company considered inadequate. The Eisenhower administration became convinced that the Arbenz government was influenced by Communists and a threat to U.S. interests. The CIA proceeded to recruit several hundred conservative opponents of Arbenz, arm them, and provide them with a

mercenary air force, flown by U.S. pilots, and a CIA-run radio station to broadcast false news reports intended to demoralize and disorganize Arbenz supporters. Some Guatemalan generals were persuaded either to support the 1954 CIA-sponsored invasion or simply not to resist it. Arbenz was forced to resign and flee the country. The right-wing military governments that followed Arbenz murdered many of his supporters, reversed some of the reforms, and engaged in repressive measures for decades to prevent the growth of leftist revolutionary or reform movements (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982).

Guevara was present in Guatemala and witnessed firsthand the overthrow of an elected progressive government. The tragedy of Guatemala undoubtedly convinced many who supported change in Latin America that future U.S. administrations would most likely again take advantage of the vulnerabilities inherent in open democratic systems in poorer, less-powerful states and, through the CIA, frustrate disagreeable policies or even destroy elected governments. Guatemala convinced Guevara of the "necessity" for armed struggle. It also taught him a lesson about Latin American armies. He felt that the Guatemalan army had deserted and betrayed Arbenz. Guevara concluded, and emphasized to Castro, that a revolution could not be secure until the armed forces were purged of conservative, corrupt, or unreliable officers and soldiers and brought firmly under revolutionary control.

Revolutionary Struggle

On November 25, 1956, eighty-two men set sail aboard the *Granma* for a landing in Oriente Province in eastern Cuba. The bad weather and mechanical problems that delayed their arrival by two days until December 2 led to failure to connect with a waiting supply party on shore and inability to coordinate with a planned uprising by the M-26-7 underground in Santiago. Within a few days, the rebel band was betrayed by a peasant guide, who helped an army unit stage a successful ambush. Most in the landing party were killed, captured, or dispersed. Sixteen survivors, including the Castro brothers and Guevara, reassembled in the Sierra Maestra mountains. With help from friendly peasants and reinforcements from Santiago and from among the local rural population, the rebel army began to grow.

In the mountains most of the peasants were small landowners who had settled there to avoid having to work as farmhands or seasonal employees for the big landholders. Though economically more independent than the sugarcane workers, they were subject to bullying and other forms of exploitation by Batista military units (Szulc 1986; Wolf 1969). Many were inclined to support the rebels but at first were reluctant because the army executed peasants who assisted Castro's guerrillas.

The rebels followed the policy of releasing captured Cuban soldiers who were only doing what they perceived to be their patriotic duty. The guerrillas, however, regularly executed captured military personnel guilty of murder, rape, or torture, as well as any civilians who informed on revolutionary forces to the army (Szulc 1986; Wolf 1969). The rebels tended to fight harder than their opponents because they were aware that they would most likely be tortured and executed if captured, whereas the army's enlisted soldiers knew their lives would be spared if they surrendered. Tactics used by the guerrillas involved high mobility, attacking vulnerable military outposts that could be looted for weapons, staging ambushes in terrain unsuitable for heavy weapons, and relying on peasant supporters for information regarding enemy troop movements. As peasants witnessed the defeats suffered by the dictator's army, more were encouraged to join or assist the rebel forces. Eventually, most Batista army units refused to venture into the hostile mountains.

Soon after the rebel landing, Batista announced that Fidel Castro had been killed. To expose this falsehood the rebels invited *New York Times* reporter Herbert Mathews to the Sierra to interview Castro in February 1957. The interview brought Castro to the attention of the U.S. media as a patriot fighting against a brutal and corrupt dictatorship. Castro appeared to be a non-Marxist, moderate nationalist with U.S.-style democratic ideas. Although he displayed hostility to the U.S. government for providing bombers, weapons, and munitions to Batista, he claimed the rebels wanted friendship with the United States. Publicity from the interview provided hope and encouragement for rebel sympathizers throughout the country.

M-26-7 organized a National Directorate with Castro at its head; it included representatives from both urban-movement units and rural guerrilla bands, united to achieve the goal of ousting the Batista regime. The urban resistance appeared genuinely more moderate in political goals and plans for social change and often was more middle and upper class in composition than the rebel guerrilla bands in the mountains. One of the several anti-Batista revolutionary groups outside of Castro's M-26-7 was the urban-based Revolutionary Directorate (DR). The members of the DR, which was anti-Communist, were drawn from university students and the middle class. On March 13, 1957, the DR launched an unsuccessful assault on the National Palace in Havana in an attempt to kill Batista. Thirty-five DR members died at the palace, and scores of others were hunted down, tortured, and killed.

Throughout 1957–1958 urban assaults against the dictatorship met with defeat and bloody suppression, which probably both promoted the success of the revolution and increased the likelihood of a radical outcome. First, urban repression eliminated some of the moderate

revolutionary leaders, making Fidel Castro an even more dominating figure. Second, defeats in the cities made the rural guerrilla strategy seem more effective and intelligent, bestowing greater prestige on this wing of the revolution. Third, torture and killing by Batista security forces provoked immense popular outrage and alienated much of the middle class from the Batista government, since the victims were often from this class. The carnage, coupled with perception of Batista's un-popularity and a lack of appreciation for Castro's plans for sweeping social change, also resulted in the Eisenhower administration's stopping arms shipments to Batista's military in March 1958. This action not only contributed to creating a severe state crisis for Batista's regime through accelerating the deterioration of army and government morale, it also essentially constituted the advent of a permissive stance of the U.S. government toward the developing revolution.

The M-26-7 urban units planned to precipitate Batista's fall by means of a general strike set for April 9, 1958. When large-scale participation in the strike failed to materialize, partly because organizers kept the strike date secret until the last moment, the urban moderates in M-26-7 lost much of their remaining political influence (Szulc 1986). Mean-while, the rebel units in the mountains were scoring repeated successes. The morale of the Cuban army was sinking because of the defeats in the Sierra and the U.S. cutoff of new weapons to the Batista government. Other demoralizing factors probably included growing popular oppo-sition to the army, the sympathy of a number of soldiers for the revo-lution, the disgust of many at the brutality of some of their fellow soldiers, and the knowledge that many officers were corrupt. Several officers refused to go into combat against the rebels and even organized mutinies against Batista. Partly as a result of the army's deteriorating confidence and spirit, Batista's 1958 summer offensive against the rebels failed miserably.

In the fall, Castro ordered two guerrilla units, with a total of 230 combatants, under the command, respectively, of Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos, to advance into the lowlands. Remarkably, the army withdrew in the face of the oncoming rebels. Castro's forces surrounded Santiago and negotiated a surrender of the city's garrison on December 31, with the troops being placed under Castro's command (Szulc 1986). Batista fled the country on January 1, 1959.

REVOLUTIONARY CUBA

When Castro assumed control of Cuba in January 1959, he enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the great majority of the Cuban people. He invited anti-Batista moderates and liberals to organize a provisional

government under his leadership as prime minister. The new government soon increased the wage levels of workers and lower-middle-class employees. In May an agricultural-reform act limited the size of farm holdings to a maximum of 966 acres, with sugar, rice, and cattle-raising enterprises allowed to be as large as 3,300 acres (Szulc 1986). This measure destroyed the very large landholdings (latifundia), including U.S.-owned sugar properties, several of which exceeded 400,000 acres. Land was distributed to tens of thousands of rural workers, and support for the revolution increased throughout the countryside. A literacy campaign sent thousands of young volunteers to rural areas. The government also began building hundreds of new schools and training thousands of additional teachers. Similarly, new clinics and hospitals were constructed, many in rural areas where such facilities had been almost nonexistent. Private and racially segregated beaches and resorts were opened to the entire public. All these changes were immensely popular with most Cubans.

Szulc claimed that Castro decided to attempt developing Cuba into a Marxist-Leninist one-party state during 1959 or even earlier. Castro's reasons apparently included the belief that a centrally controlled government was necessary to counter anticipated U.S. opposition to his planned socioeconomic changes (Szulc 1986; Ruiz 1968). Castro viewed the U.S. government as capitalist dominated and was sure that it would not easily accept the establishment of a socialist economic system in Cuba, not only because of the negative impact on U.S. investments there, but also out of fear that other Latin American countries might follow Cuba's example. Castro's experience with self-seeking and corrupt political figures in Cuba and the country's cycle of shifts between elective politics and pro-U.S. military dictatorships probably convinced him that a multiparty democratic system would be too vulnerable to economic and military pressures from the United States or to covert actions by the CIA, such as the bribery, intimidation, or assassination of key leaders (*Newsweek*, Dec. 1, 1975). A second factor influencing Castro's decision was his belief that Marxist-Leninist-style socialism could solve Cuba's socioeconomic problems, such as its high levels of inequality, unemployment, crime, and corruption (Ruiz 1968). Control of Cuba's government by a revolutionary party would enable major structural social change to be carried out quickly.

Castro and many of his associates felt that past revolutions had bitterly disappointed the economic and nationalist aspirations of most Cubans. In contrast, the new revolutionary government's rapid redistribution of wealth rallied enthusiastic support for the revolution among the majority of Cuba's rural and urban populations. Revolutionary leaders concluded that a nationally owned (rather than foreign-dominated) economic in-

frastructure would give Cuba the ability to resist economic control from
other countries more effectively. The possibility that Cuba, having
alienated the United States, might become economically dependent on
the USSR seemed less onerous because the Soviet Union was very distant
and presumably could not exercise the same level of control over Cuba
as the military and economic giant only ninety miles away.

By the end of 1959, the more radical elements from Castro's M-26-
7 movement had consolidated control over the Cuban army. This ac-
complishment involved the removal of conservative officers and soldiers
and the trials and executions of about 550 Batista military and police
personnel accused of murder and torture. The firing squads offended
some North Americans but won the strong approval of the thousands
of Cubans whose family members or friends had suffered Batista's
repression (Szulc 1986; PBS 1985). Members of M-26-7 also assumed
positions in the government bureaucracy. During 1959 Castro held
negotiations with leaders of the Communist party; his goal was to fuse
his M-26-7 movement and their organization to create a new Communist
party under his leadership.

Revolutionary Instruction Schools were established not only to train
young recruits in how to run revolutionary institutions but also to teach
Marxist-Leninist concepts and interpretations of Cuban history (Szulc
1986). Castro concealed his plans to transform Cuba into a Communist
party–dominated state in an attempt to delay the expected furious
opposition from the United States and to provide time to strengthen
the revolutionaries' control over the army and prepare the Cuban people
psychologically to accept the new system. Later Castro cited Martí's
advice to revolutionaries that to achieve desired goals, deception must
sometimes be used because to state those goals openly might provoke
powerful opposition that revolutionaries might not yet be able to over-
come. When in April 1961 Castro revealed to the Cuban people that
the revolution was going to result in socialism, he used Martí's demands
for social justice and the elimination of poverty and racism as the basis
for the proclamation.

When moderates in the provisional government, M-26-7, and the
rebel army realized that the revolution was moving toward a socialist
economy and a political system dominated by a rejuvenated Communist
party, they began to resign in protest. Castro condemned such resig-
nations as counterrevolutionary and called upon supporters to stage
mass demonstrations. Some opposed to Castro's plans launched a new
guerrilla war in the Escambray Mountains in central Cuba. The coun-
terrevolutionary guerrillas included former Batista soldiers, some land-
owners opposed to the agrarian reform, a number of individuals with
rightist political views, and even some disillusioned former rebel army

members, all loosely bound together under the banner of anticommunism (Szulc 1986). They numbered as many as 5,000 in the early 1960s, but the revolutionary government was able to mobilize many times more men and women. Castro sent tens of thousands of revolutionary militia into the mountains, positioning 1 person every few hundred yards along trails and roads. This made movement of opposition forces extremely difficult, except in small groups, and most of the weapons and supplies the CIA air-dropped to them fell into the hands of Castro's people. In a few years, the counterrevolutionary guerrilla threat was eliminated.

In the cities, hundreds of thousands joined neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) to carry on organized surveillance, which brought an end to violent attacks on the government in urban areas. In the 1980s, an estimated 66 percent of the total population and over 80 percent of adults belonged to CDRs (Aguila 1988; Szulc 1986). The efforts of the revolutionary armed forces and the CDRs were aided by Castro's intelligence service, which had agents placed in virtually every counterrevolutionary group. Several hundred thousand discontented Cubans, mostly urban upper- and middle-class individuals and families, left Cuba in the early 1960s. Castro's program of "exporting dissent" reduced security problems but also hurt the economy because many of those who departed possessed important skills.

U.S. REACTIONS TO THE REVOLUTION

In April 1959, Fidel Castro visited the United States and expressed a desire for friendship and continued trade. But by late 1959, the CIA began sending weapons to anti-Castro guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. And by mid-1960, the Eisenhower administration had decided to organize and arm an exile military force to overthrow Castro's government (Szulc 1986; Wyden 1979). In September 1960, the CIA recruited several U.S. Italian-American organized-crime figures, formerly involved in Havana casinos, to assassinate Castro. It is very possible that Eisenhower and later presidents were not specifically informed of plans to kill Castro: The CIA often neglected to inform a president about a controversial operation in order to give him "plausible deniability" if the matter ever came to light (Szulc 1986).

During 1959, the revolutionary government began buying arms for its new army, purchasing 25,000 rifles, 50 million rounds of ammunition, and 100,000 grenades from Belgium, and mortars, cannons, and heavy machine guns from Italy. The United States would not sell Cuba weapons and soon pressured Western European countries into refusing arms sales. Revolutionary Cuba could then only obtain military equipment

from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. According to Szulc (1986), the first weapons from Czechoslovakia and the USSR began reaching Cuba in late 1960, several months after President Eisenhower had severed economic relations. Deliveries of jet military aircraft began in mid-1961, after the U.S.-organized "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba had failed.

When the revolution succeeded in January 1959, the Soviet Union was at first not very enthusiastic about Castro's government because for years Cuba's Communist party had portrayed Castro as an irresponsible adventurer precipitating pointless bloodshed before objective conditions were right for revolution. But certain events during the year 1960 greatly increased Soviet interest in aiding Cuba (Szulc 1986). First, relations with the United States worsened markedly following the downing of a U.S. U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union. As tensions increased, the Soviets quickly recognized that given their significant inferiority to the U.S. in nuclear weapons and delivery systems, Cuba could be a valuable strategic asset. Furthermore, in 1960 the ideological conflict between the USSR and the People's Republic of China became public knowledge. The Soviets and the Chinese were thereafter in competition for influence among less-developed countries. Cuba provided the USSR an opportunity to demonstrate its concern with aiding a developing nation attempting to free itself from what its revolutionary leaders viewed as imperial domination.

As ties between Cuba and the USSR were developing, Cuban relations with the United States rapidly worsened. In June 1960, oil refineries owned by U.S. and British companies, under pressure from the U.S. government, refused to refine crude oil delivered to Cuba from the Soviet Union. In addition, the United States cut its purchase of Cuban sugar by 95 percent. Cuba, in turn, nationalized the refineries and all remaining U.S. properties. The United States soon imposed a virtually complete economic embargo and for years convinced all Latin American countries except Mexico to refuse trade with Cuba. Cuba responded to scarcities with a rationing system intended to ensure that basic commodities were directed toward families with the greatest need, generally those with the most children.

The Bay of Pigs invasion, a major attempt to overthrow the revolutionary government, was initiated by the Eisenhower administration. By the latter half of 1960 the CIA had recruited hundreds of anti-Castro Cuban exiles and established bases for them in Guatemala. The plan, in fact, was modeled on the CIA's successful 1954 overthrow of the elected reform government in Guatemala. Some CIA instructors evidently promised many of the exiles direct U.S. military intervention, apparently assuming that Nixon, a strongly anti-Communist conservative

and Eisenhower's vice president, would be elected president instead of Kennedy in fall 1960 (Wyden 1979).

After Kennedy was elected, the CIA informed the new president of the invasion plan and attempted to convince him to approve it (Wyden 1979). The agency suggested that if Kennedy refused to let the invasion go forward, he would be seen as a weakling unwilling to confront a Communist threat, perhaps encouraging more revolutions in Latin America. Furthermore, the CIA misinformed the president, evidently through mistaken intelligence, that Castro was no longer popular and that an invasion would spark mass uprisings against him. This erroneous view may have resulted from the agency's relying too heavily on the opinions of middle- and upper-class exiles, among whom Castro was certainly unpopular. The revolution, however, had won immense support from other sectors of the population, and Castro was apparently strongly supported by a large majority (Szulc 1986; Wyden 1979). Besides 25,000 in the regular army, 200,000 had volunteered to join militia forces all over the island and trained day and night to learn how to use newly arrived Soviet weapons. When the invasion, preceded by the detentions of several thousand Cubans suspected of counterrevolutionary activity, occurred, no uprisings materialized. Kennedy, also incorrectly informed that the Cuban air force would be destroyed before the assault, gave the go ahead, but on the condition that once the landing force was deposited on Cuban soil, there would be no direct U.S. military involvement.

The CIA signed up Cuban-American-owned ships to transport the invasion force and assembled a secret air force composed of a number of B-26 World War II–era twin-engine bombers, with Cuban-exile air crews, along with several pilots on loan from the Alabama Air National Guard (four Alabamans were shot down and killed in the assault). Cuban air force markings were put on the CIA planes so that it would appear during the invasion that the country's own pilots had mutinied and joined the counterrevolutionary attack. The function of the CIA air force was both to provide air support for the invasion and to destroy the small Cuban air force on the ground through bombing attacks. Two days before the invasion, eight CIA B-26s left Central America for a raid on Cuban airfields. After the attack, the CIA attempted to stage a false defection by having an anti-Castro Cuban impersonate a Cuban air force pilot. Wearing a Cuban uniform, he landed his B-26 in south Florida and announced that he had defected and bombed his own air base on the way out. The purpose of the charade was probably to persuade the U.S. public that Castro was so unpopular that the loyalty of his armed forces was disintegrating, and perhaps to confuse or demoralize the Cubans. But the revolutionary government quickly pointed

out that the front ends of its few B-26s were Plexiglas, whereas that on the falsely defecting plane was metal, a detail the CIA had overlooked (Szulc 1986; Wyden 1979).

After the CIA bombing raid, which destroyed five planes, the Cuban air force consisted of eight operational aircraft, including four British-made Sea Fury light attack bombers (propeller driven), one B-26, three T-33 jet trainers, and seven pilots. Unknown to the CIA, the Cubans had been able to equip the T-33 jets with two 50-caliber machine guns each and used them as fighter intercepters during the invasion to destroy or drive off the CIA's B-26s. The Sea Fury bombers were directed against the invasion transport ships, sinking two and forcing the others to flee, thereby isolating more than 1,300 counterrevolutionaries on the beach (more than 100 of these would be killed, along with several hundred defenders).

Following the raid, on April 16, 1961, Castro publicly proclaimed for the first time that Cuba's revolution was a socialist one. He had planned to make the announcement in a speech on May 1, but realizing the invasion was about to occur, he made the statement just before the April 17 landing. Later Castro said that he felt those who were preparing to give their lives in defense of the revolution had the right to know what they were fighting for (Szulc 1986).

Immediately attacked by local militia forces and then surrounded by thousands of Cuban army and militia, cut off from resupply or evacuation and with its air force neutralized, the invasion brigade surrendered after about forty-eight hours. Later, more than 1,000 members of the brigade were sent back to the United States in return for $53 million worth of medicine and food. The successful defeat of the Bay of Pigs invasion further consolidated Castro's revolution by demonstrating that it had given Cuba the strength to defeat U.S. intervention. Cuban nationalism soared and Castro's popularity was greater than ever. On December 1, 1961, Castro went beyond his April speech to announce that Cuba would proceed along a "Marxist-Leninist" course of development (Szulc 1986).

The Soviet Union, taking advantage of Cuba's fear of another invasion, perhaps directly involving U.S. armed forces, offered to station nuclear missiles in Cuba, precipitating the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Kennedy administration demanded that the missiles be removed and placed a naval blockade around the island. The USSR, at the time weaker than the United States in nuclear military capability and fearing world war, withdrew the missiles. The Kennedy administration, for its part, pledged that the United States would not invade Cuba. But the CIA recruited scores of brigade veterans and other Cuban exiles; they waged a secret war of infiltration and sabotage against Cuba

through the early 1970s and continued efforts to assassinate Castro (Brenner 1988; *Newsweek*, Dec. 1, 1975; PBS 1985; Szulc 1986).

CUBA AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

The Quest for a Continental Revolution

The success of the Cuban Revolution in resisting U.S. economic and military pressures encouraged revolutionaries throughout Latin America. Many came to Cuba to train in guerrilla tactics. The United States, which for its part had trained and armed thousands of soldiers of rightist governments in Latin America, intensified its efforts, adding specialized counterinsurgency instruction to its military aid programs. The Kennedy administration also launched a major economic assistance project, the Alliance for Progress, intended to improve the life of the poor, increase the size of the middle class in Latin American societies, and support the efforts of anti-Communist reform movements, especially the region's Christian Democratic parties, to accomplish constructive social change. The alliance contributed to significant improvements in education, health, and housing, but failed to achieve most of its objectives. It did succeed in raising the expectations of millions of the disadvantaged, thereby helping to generate frustrations when expectations were inadequately gratified, and it threatened the interests of ruling elites. These consequences, coupled with the continuing threat of violent revolution, probably brought about the overthrow of democracies by conservative military leaders in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), Peru (1968), Chile (1973), and Uruguay (1973). The fear of Cuban-style revolutions was undoubtedly a major factor motivating several U.S. administrations to provide recognition and military and economic assistance to these conservative dictatorships despite their elimination of democratic systems and their human rights violations.

Several leaders of the Cuban Revolution initially called for a "continental revolution" to liberate all of Latin America from "imperialism" and social injustice. Che Guevara became the major public proponent of this concept through his speeches and his widely read works, *Guerrilla Warfare* (1960) and *Guerrilla Warfare: A Method* (1963) (Guevara 1985). Guevara, along with the French philosopher Regis Debray (1967), formulated the so-called theory of the guerrilla *foco*. The *foco* concept contradicted the policies of the established Marxist-Leninist leadership around the world regarding the justifiability and prospects for success of revolutionary violence to accomplish structural change and redistribution of wealth. The leaders of the Soviet Union, China, and most Communist parties took the position that violent revolution was not

justifiable and could not be successful if the society in question had a democratic political system. In such a situation, in which there was at least a theoretical possibility that a revolutionary party or leaders could be elected to power, people would likely view individuals who resorted to violence as terrorists, and armed revolutionaries would be unable to achieve popular support and, therefore, unable to win. Furthermore, traditional Marxist thinking held that political work among the population had to precede any armed revolutionary effort, even if a society was governed by a rightist dictatorship rather than by an elected government. The notion was that the people had to be educated to the desirability and possibility of revolutionary change and organized into mass-support networks before revolutionary war commenced. Only in a situation in which the revolutionaries enjoyed the support of a majority of their countrymen and women could they hope to overcome the superior weaponry of the ruling element's professional army. Finally, Russia's Lenin, China's Mao, and Vietnam's Giap all stated that the revolutionary armed forces must be under the leadership of the nation's "revolutionary political party."

In contrast, Guevara argued that in a society in which the majority of the people suffered from extreme economic inequality, the injection of an armed revolutionary band of as few as thirty to fifty combatants could, through violent attacks on the state's instruments of repression, *create* the objective conditions necessary for a successful revolution. Guevara and Debray claimed that even if the majority of a nation's population was apathetic and culturally conditioned to view deprivation as unavoidable, the actions of the guerrilla *foco* would gain people's attention and begin to make them aware that their rulers were not all-powerful but were vulnerable to popular resistance. Once having "awakened the people," many of whom would tend to identify positively with the revolutionaries who were striking against the rich or hated army or police officials, the guerrillas would spread their concept of revolution. Eventually they would convert a majority of the nation's people to the desirability of the revolution's goals. Popular support would constitute the necessary condition for revolutionary victory. Because virtually all the Communist parties of Latin America criticized the guerrilla *foco* concept, revolutionaries following Guevara's strategy would have to proceed, at least in the beginning, without the support of their nation's supposedly revolutionary party.

In his 1960 work, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Guevara stated that his approach was applicable to Caribbean-style personalist dictatorships, which openly used violent repression and which no citizens really accepted as democratic governments. But in his 1963 book, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Method*, he argued that the *foco* strategy could work in almost any Latin American

country, even those that were formally (in Guevara's thinking, superficially) democracies, but that were in reality dominated by wealthy oligarchies. In 1967, Guevara entered Bolivia under a false identity and formed a guerrilla *foco* with several dozen Bolivian and other Latin American revolutionaries. Guevara thought that Bolivia provided good physical terrain for guerrilla warfare and that if he was successful, it could serve as a base of operations for similar efforts in the several countries it borders. However, the Bolivian Communist party refused to endorse his effort. And many of the Bolivian peasants his guerrillas encountered were either nonsupportive or hostile to the "outsiders." After a few months, Bolivian rangers, trained and assisted by U.S. military and CIA advisers, wounded, captured, and executed Guevara.

The Attempt at Democratic Revolution in Chile

Cuba's seemingly unqualified support for leftist guerrilla movements in Latin America in the 1960s created a host of problems for Castro's government. Many Latin American governments used Cuba's aid to revolutionaries as the reason for participating in the U.S. economic embargo. To demonstrate displeasure with some of Castro's policies, both foreign and domestic, the Soviet Union slowed oil shipments to Cuba in the late 1960s. Possibly because of this pressure and because of Guevara's failure in Bolivia, Castro declared in the early 1970s that Cuba recognized alternative paths to socialism. Local conditions could dictate methods other than armed revolution. In particular Castro expressed his willingness to support the attempt of Salvador Allende to achieve a socialist revolution in Chile through democratic means.

Allende, leader of the Socialist party, had obtained a plurality (36.3 percent) of the vote for president on September 4, 1970, in a three-way race. He had been the candidate of the Popular Unity coalition involving the Socialist, Communist, and Radical parties and was a self-avowed Marxist (though not a Marxist-Leninist in the sense that he did not advocate a one-party state). Since he had not received more than 50 percent of the popular vote, Allende was not formally elected until seven weeks later, when many Christian Democrats joined Popular Unity legislators in voting for Allende in a joint session of the Chilean Senate and Chamber of Deputies (Davis 1985; Valenzuela 1978). Allende's dream was to establish socialism in Chile not through armed revolution but through elections in a multiparty democratic political system. He was committed to preserving the multiparty system and to allowing opposition political forces to express their positions through the mass media. Allende and Popular Unity anticipated that the improvements and greater social equality they planned to bring to Chile would win the electoral support of the majority of Chileans.

But President Allende faced enormous and, in the end, insurmountable obstacles. The economy was dominated by domestic capitalists opposed to his government and by foreign corporations, which owned copper mines, 70 percent of the Chilean telephone company, and had other significant investments (Davis 1985). The Nixon administration, outraged at Allende's election, proceeded to wage economic warfare against Chile (greatly restricting aid, trade, and credit) to generate scarcities and hardships intended to increase the Chilean people's discontent with the Allende government. The CIA engaged in covert operations, such as the financing of opposition media, political parties, and even violent right-wing extremist groups that carried out acts of terrorism such as the murder of army commander, General Schneider, who supported the democratic constitution and refused to block Allende's election (Davis 1985; *Newsweek,* Dec. 1, 1975). The Chilean army, which continued to receive assistance and training from the Nixon administration, was generally under conservative leadership hostile to Allende. Those high-ranking officers who supported Allende or were firm defenders of the country's democratic constitution were gradually removed from positions of effective authority through various means, including pressure from the rightist generals.

The Allende government enacted reforms that benefited working-class and poor Chileans and nationalized the foreign-owned copper mines, which won widespread approval. But growing economic difficulties adversely affected the life-styles of middle- and upper-class Chileans, many of whom rallied against the Popular Unity government. In the 1971 municipal elections, Popular Unity received slightly more votes than the combined Christian Democrat and National (conservative) party opposition, and in 1973, despite worsened economic conditions, Popular Unity received about 44 percent of the vote in congressional elections. But a major weakness of Popular Unity was that it never achieved a clear and stable majority of support from Chilean voters.

Allende did not have the opportunity to utilize the second half of his six-year term to build more support for Popular Unity. On September 11, 1973, the armed forces overthrew the Allende government and Chile's democratic constitution, ending the longest continually functioning democratic political system in the history of South America. The presidential building was hit with bombs and rockets and then stormed by military forces; as a result, Allende and some of his guards were killed. Many other Chileans died resisting the military takeover.

Through the 1970s, international human rights monitoring groups gave Chile's conservative military dictatorship one of the worst ratings in the world. General Augusto Pinochet's regime even carried out assassinations of critics in Argentina, Italy, and the United States (Dinges

and Landau 1980; Freed and Landis 1980). Finally, General Pinochet, overestimating his popularity outside of his circle of conservative advisers and friends, permitted a plebiscite on October 5, 1988 (*New York Times*, Oct. 7, 1988, p. A1). By an official tally of 55 to 43 percent, Chilean voters rejected the general's proposal to extend his presidency for another eight years. This outcome led to a multicandidate presidential election in December 1989. The Socialist party did not field its own candidate but rather backed the nominee of the Christian Democratic party, Patricio Aylwin. Aylwin easily defeated the candidate most favored by the military and was inaugurated in 1990 as Chile's first civilian president since the 1973 armed forces takeover. But the constitution, originally drafted under the auspices of the Pinochet dictatorship, provided for a continued role of the military in overseeing the Chilean government.

The tragic and violent overthrow of Allende's Popular Unity movement provided yet another bitter lesson to those who favored peaceful and democratic means for accomplishing revolutionary change in Latin America. And just as U.S. economic pressure and CIA intervention in Guatemala had influenced Cuban revolutionaries in the early 1950s, similar actions in the early 1970s against Chile's elected government had a significant impact on revolutionaries who achieved victory in Nicaragua in 1979 (see Chapter 6).

Cuba and Revolutions in Latin America and Africa

During the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba provided training and weapons to the Sandinista revolutionaries, who achieved power in Nicaragua in summer 1979, to leftist rebels in El Salvador, and to anticolonial Marxist revolutionaries who came to power in Angola after the Portuguese withdrew in 1975. Estimates of the number of Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua during the 1980s ranged from several hundred to more than 1,000. The Angolan Marxists, some of whom had been trained in Cuba, requested Cuban advisers and troops to assist them in consolidating power, waging a civil war, and in resisting invasions by South African forces (Szulc 1986). In 1988, Cuba was estimated to have about 45,000 troops in Angola (scheduled to withdraw over a period of twenty-four to thirty months) (*New York Times*, Oct. 10, 1988, p. A1).

CUBAN ECONOMY AND POLITICAL SYSTEM

Cuba's economy suffered crippling losses during the early 1960s because of the cutoff of trade with the United States and almost all the

other Latin American countries as well as the flight of middle- and upper-class Cubans with valuable technical and managerial skills. Development of the economy was also impeded by the idealistic but impractical approach of relying heavily on moral appeals and commitment to the revolution rather than use of differentiated wage scales to provide material incentives for good work performance. Castro's personal interference in economic development through the proposal of inappropriate or inadequately planned projects, such as the drive to harvest 10 million tons of sugar in 1970, also periodically resulted in inefficiency and dislocations in the economy.

Beginning in the early 1970s, Cuban leaders, in an effort to utilize resources better, attempted to develop the economy in a more organized fashion, with greater material incentives. In 1976, Cuba temporarily introduced limited market mechanisms, more autonomy in decision-making for state enterprises, and even a system of free markets in which farmers could sell some of their produce outside the state-controlled rationing structure. During 1970–1979 the nation sustained an average annual economic growth of over 5 percent.

President Castro and others, however, feared that continued reintroduction of capitalist free market practices and private profit-making activities would progressively undermine revolutionary collectivism and idealism and promote excessively self-centered individualism. Because of this concern and in reaction to alleged cases of mismanagement and corruption, Cuban authorities again shifted economic policies. The 1984 Campaign of Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies was launched "to rectify vices and antisocialist attitudes spawned by the reforms of the 1970s. . . . Once again moral incentives are emphasized, private gain is chastised, labor discipline is sanctioned severely, and sacrifices are demanded" (Aguila 1988, pp. 108–109). But during the late 1980s Cuba still experienced problems in fulfilling its trade obligations and paying its foreign debts (Brenner 1988).

The Soviet Union provided major assistance to the Cuban economy in a number of ways (Eckstein 1986). In particular, the USSR agreed to purchase large quantities of sugar at relatively stable prices that were usually well above world market prices. Although the arrangement benefited Cuba by billions of dollars, the Cuban government portrayed this trade agreement as a positive example of the way all advanced industrial powers should economically interact with developing nations. Economic problems and political changes in the USSR and Eastern European countries, however, appeared likely to result in their providing less aid to Cuba in the future (*New York Times,* Jan. 7, 1991, p. A9).

The 1976 Cuban constitution, supported, according to the government, by an overwhelming majority of the population in secret ballot

elections, institutionalized the dominant role of the Communist party and set the structure of Cuba's political system. Voters participate in the direct election of 169 municipal assemblies, making selections from a set of candidates (all nominated by or acceptable to the local branches of the Communist party, which had 523,639 members nationally in 1986). One of the major functions of the municipal assemblies was to elect deputies to serve five-year terms in the 510-seat National Assembly. The National Assembly deputies, in turn, elected the country's top executives. For the 1986–1991 period, 40 percent of those elected to the National Assembly were workers or peasants and 35 percent were women (Aguila 1988).

By the late 1980s, relations between the Cuban government and the country's Catholic hierarchy had improved significantly (Aguila 1988). Government officials expressed the view that past hostility between the Cuban church and state had been mainly the result of the Church's opposition to the revolution. Although most Cubans were not active participants in established churches, interest in religion appeared to be reviving among many of the island's residents. And recent events suggested that in Cuba, as in several other Latin American countries, a new bond was developing between Christian social activism and Marxist socialism. In June 1990, Castro went as far as to anticipate the future official acceptance of practicing Catholics into the Cuban Communist party (CNN, June 25, 1990).

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

Repeatedly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Cubans of various social classes took up arms on behalf of the goal of national independence. In the 1950s a broad coalition developed in opposition to the Batista government, a regime widely viewed as not only authoritarian but also corrupt and subservient to foreign interests. The pervasive hatred for the Batista dictatorship and for its collaboration in the foreign domination and exploitation of the Cuban people was the key factor motivating a desperate and heroic revolutionary struggle.

Members of Cuba's educated elite historically initiated or joined revolutionary movements. José Martí led the generation that launched the 1895 fight for independence. The outcome of that costly struggle, a political and economic system dominated by the United States, alienated many intellectuals not only from the political leaders who ran the country but also from the entire corrupt political apparatus, especially after the betrayal of the major reform goals of the 1933 rebellion. During the 1950s, other rebellious children of the elite, led by Fidel Castro, launched a violent revolution against the Batista dictatorship.

Apart from those members of Cuba's privileged classes who were openly revolutionary, others withdrew support from Batista due to his regime's brutal repressive tactics.

Popular discontent grew: The dependency of the Cuban economy on a single export crop, sugar, meant both seasonal unemployment for hundreds of thousands of rural workers and cycles of prosperity and depression for much of the general population as world sugar prices rose and fell. The 1933 rebellion was sparked, in part, by a fall in sugar prices. And during the 1950s, after the prosperity of the World War II period, real income in Cuba declined. In addition to the discontent due to high unemployment and other economic problems, nationalism was often inflamed by various displays of subservience on the part of Cuban military, economic, and political figures toward foreign interests.

Batista's state apparatus was inherently weak: First, many Cubans viewed Batista's regime as strongly influenced by foreign governmental, business, and even organized-crime figures and, consequently, not truly representative of Cuban national interests. Second, as Batista had blocked an election and used military force to seize power, his government lacked legitimacy. Batista's government was weakened further by the growing hostility of the island's middle class, in great part owing to the torture and murder of hundreds of young middle-class activists and revolutionaries by Batista's security forces. Finally, the army became increasingly demoralized by guerrilla successes, the growth of popular hostility toward the army, the defection of army personnel to the rebel cause, and other factors, such as the decision of the Eisenhower administration to stop sending new weapons to the Cuban armed forces in March 1958.

Since the Spanish-American War the United States had played an active role with regard to the Cuban economy and political system. In the early part of the twentieth century, the U.S. government ordered troops into Cuba and later helped precipitate changes in the country's leadership by withholding, bestowing, or withdrawing support. Before 1958, the United States supported Batista for years with arms, military advisers, and other forms of assistance. But recognition of intense popular opposition to Batista and his regime's human rights violations, coupled with a belief that the revolutionary leadership was not dominated by Marxists, influenced President Eisenhower's decision to end arms shipments to Batista's army and not to intervene militarily to prevent the victory of the revolution.

Soon, however, the Eisenhower administration reversed its permissive stance toward the Cuban Revolution, instituted an economic boycott of the island, and engaged in a series of efforts to alter the revolution's outcome. The most dramatic of these, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion

and its defeat, generated increased nationalistic support for the revolutionary government.

Fear of future revolutions stimulated a new U.S. economic aid program for Latin America as well as more military assistance and covert CIA activities such as those directed against the Popular Unity movement in Chile. In the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. administrations recognized and aided conservative military dictatorships that had seized power in a number of Latin American countries. Measures taken by U.S. administrations after the Cuban Revolution helped prevent the victory of any further Latin American revolutionary movements until the Carter presidency. Carter's policy of making military assistance to governments contingent on their human rights behavior in effect constituted a new period of permissiveness for social change in Latin America and contributed to the success of the Nicaraguan Revolution.

CUBAN REVOLUTION: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1868–1878   First war of Cuban independence

1895–1898   Second war of Cuban independence

1902   Cuban independence, but limited by Platt amendment

1933   Revolution ousts Machado; Batista gains control of Cuban armed forces

1947   Orthodoxo party founded

1952   Batista stages military takeover

1953   Moncada attack fails

1955   Castro organizes M-26-7

1956–1958   Cuban Revolution

1959   Castro assumes power in January

1961   Bay of Pigs invasion defeated; Castro declares Cuban Revolution socialist

1962   Cuban Missile Crisis; United States pledges not to invade Cuba

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Americas in Transition, 1982, 29 min., color film. Interesting overview of political developments in Cuba, Guatemala, and other Latin American states. AFSC.

Castro's Challenge, 1985, 60 min., video. PBS account of the Cuban Revolution and its aftermath. Films Inc.

Chile: Hasta Cuando? 1987, 57 min., color film or video. Academy Award–nominated documentary of the overthrow of the Allende government in 1973 and Chilean society under the Pinochet military dictatorship. Filmaker's Library.

Controlling Interests, 1978, 40 min., color film. Modern classic on the influence of multinational corporations in less-developed societies, with specific coverage of Latin America. AFSC.

Cuba—In the Shadow of Doubt, 1987, 58 min., color film or video. Documents the Cuban Revolution, developmental successes and failures, and U.S.-Cuba relations. Filmakers Library.

Cuba: The Uncompromising Revolution, 1990, 54 min., video. Describes the Cuban Revolution and life in the island nation. Discusses policy, progress, and problems. AFSC.

The Yankee Years, 1985, 60 min., video. PBS documentary on Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador during the first half of the twentieth century. Films Inc.

Revolution in Nicaragua

I n the 1930s as Fulgencio Batista assumed leadership of the Cuban army and effective control of the island's political system, Anastasio Somoza García used command of Nicaraguan armed forces to seize the government of that Central American nation. The murder of the rebel nationalist leader Sandino in 1934 permitted the Somoza family and its primary mechanism of coercion, the National Guard, to dominate Nicaragua for decades. The Somozas amassed a huge fortune, while the gap between the nation's privileged and poor classes continued to widen. By the mid-1970s many Nicaraguans, enraged by the greed and brutality of the Somoza regime, were willing to set aside, at least temporarily, their differences and unite in a revolution to oust Somoza. During 1978 and 1979, 30,000–40,000 Nicaraguans perished in the conflict before the last of the Somozas fled the country. Following the July 19, 1979, victory, the new Sandinista government became a major concern of successive U.S. administrations. The Democratic majority in Congress repeatedly clashed with Presidents Reagan and Bush over issues such as CIA aid to counterrevolutionaries (contras) trying to overthrow Nicaragua's government and the question of how much, if any, danger the Nicaraguan Revolution posed to the United States.

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Nicaragua (50,193 square miles, or 130,033 km²) is about the size of New York State and had 3,700,000 residents in 1990 (approximately 3 million at the time of the 1979 revolution). The population was estimated to be 69 percent of mixed ancestry, 17 percent European, 9 percent African, and 5 percent Indian. About half the country's inhabitants were under sixteen. Ninety percent lived on the Pacific side of the

country and shared a Spanish culture. Those among the 10 percent of the population on the Atlantic (Caribbean) side were characterized by diverse cultural heritages. The largest Indian group there was the Miskito, with about 70,000 members. Other inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast included the descendants of former African slaves who fled to Nicaragua from other lands. Britain had controlled the Atlantic side of Nicaragua until the 1890s, so many in the region spoke English and were Protestants.

NICARAGUA BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

The early political history of Nicaragua was characterized by frequent civil strife. After Nicaragua obtained its independence from Spain in the 1820s, the country was ruled by a small number of well-to-do families. Economic and regional conflicts and ideological disagreements often resulted in civil wars in which wealthy Nicaraguans hired small armies of only a few hundred men each. One important early rivalry was that between the prominent families of the cities of León and Granada. The leading citizens of León supported social change in the direction of greater personal liberty and an economic shift toward commerce, industrialization, and other modern business activity. Calling themselves liberals, in the classical sense of favoring increased freedom from Church or state controls, they organized Nicaragua's Liberal party. In contrast, the landowning families of Granada, who founded the Conservative party, supported the values of traditional Spain and the dominance of the Church in social and political life and tended to favor an economy based on agriculture.

In the mid-nineteenth century U.S. citizens became interested in Nicaragua as a means of travel from the eastern part of the United States to California. North Americans sailed down the Atlantic to the Nicaraguan coast and then traveled up the San Juan River to Lake Nicaragua, where employees of the American industrialist Vanderbilt operated a steamship. After the fifty-mile crossing of the lake, stage-coaches carried the passengers the remaining fifteen miles to the Pacific and another sea voyage up to California.

During a civil war in 1855, the Liberal faction recruited about sixty heavily armed North American mercenaries led by an adventurer from Tennessee named William Walker. After his men and modern weapons helped the Liberals temporarily defeat the Conservatives, Walker used his control of the Liberal army to declare himself president of Nicaragua. Walker decided to promote North American colonization of Nicaragua, establish slavery, and possibly later annex Nicaragua to the United States

NICARAGUA

as a slave state to help increase the South's representation in the U.S. Senate. In 1857, once Walker's plans became clear, Nicaraguans, aided by other Central Americans, drove him out of the country. When Walker attempted to repeat his intervention in 1860, he was captured and executed in the neighboring country of Honduras.

After 1857 Nicaragua technically functioned as a republic with a president and a national legislature; many outside observers, however, did not consider Nicaragua a democracy, but rather a society governed exclusively by a group of wealthy families. As the Liberal party had disgraced itself by inviting in North American mercenaries, members of the Conservative party held the presidency during 1858–1893. A Conservative party dictatorship enacted laws in 1877 intended to end Indian ownership of communal lands and to force peasants to work as laborers harvesting coffee crops and cutting mahogany trees for European and U.S. markets. These measures helped provoke rebellions that were repressed in 1881 with the loss of several thousand lives (Cockcroft 1989). In 1893 General José Santos Zelaya of the Liberal party took over the government. Although many Nicaraguans considered Zelaya a dictator, most felt that he was also a staunch nationalist who attempted to reduce the country's dependence on foreign business interests (Cockcroft 1989; Millett 1977; Diederich 1981).

The fact that a river and a lake cut through all but about fifteen miles of the country inspired the idea that Nicaragua would be an ideal location for a canal to link the Atlantic and the Pacific. However, certain disagreements between Nicaragua and the United States, coupled with an exaggerated fear of volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, which was promoted by business interests favoring a canal through Panama, resulted in the U.S. selection of that country rather than Nicaragua as the canal site. When President Zelaya considered negotiating with the British and the Japanese about their building a Nicaraguan canal that would compete for interocean traffic with the upcoming Panama Canal, U.S. officials encouraged Conservatives to rebel against Zelaya. Military intervention by the U.S. navy and marines, along with the rebellion, forced Zelaya to resign in 1909. After fighting resumed among Liberal and Conservative factions, the United States again intervened militarily in 1912 and helped install a pro-U.S. Conservative government. A marine contingent stationed in Nicaragua during 1912–1925 helped maintain Conservatives from the Chamorro family in the presidency. In 1913 and 1914 new treaties gave the United States the right to build a canal through Nicaragua and to lease Nicaraguan land for U.S. army and naval bases.

Sandino, Somoza,
and the Nicaraguan National Guard

U.S. officials publicly supported the establishment of a real democracy in Nicaragua. One measure theoretically instituted to achieve a democratic constitution was the organization of the Nicaraguan National Guard during the 1920s. The guard, trained and equipped by the United States, was to take the place of all the small personal armies and political-party militias that had previously constituted Nicaragua's factionalized armed forces. The National Guard, it was hoped, would be loyal not to any one man or political party but to a democratic national constitution. U.S. advisers selected as leader for the new army Anastasio Somoza García (nicknamed "Tacho"). Somoza was the U.S.-educated son of a coffee plantation owner. Although he had apparently been previously involved in a counterfeiting scheme, he spoke English well (initially serving as a translator for U.S. officials), was familiar with U.S. customs and popular sports, and had an appealing personality (Macaulay 1967; Millett 1977).

In 1924 U.S. officials helped supervise a national election that appeared to be relatively free and resulted in the victory of an anti-Chamorro Conservative, Carlos Solorzano, for president and a Liberal named Juan Bautista Sacasa for vice president. In 1925 the marines withdrew. Within a few months a new civil war broke out when Chamorro Conservatives rebelled and attempted to seize power. When U.S. marines landed in 1926 to force a settlement of the conflict, one Liberal general, a farm owner whose ancestry was half Indian and half European, Augusto César Sandino, refused to lay down his arms as long as U.S. troops occupied Nicaragua. He argued that the United States was trying to impose terms that would benefit foreign, not Nicaraguan, interests and would result in the installation of another U.S. puppet as president. Rejecting attempted bribes, including the offer of regional governmental posts, Sandino and his initial band of perhaps 50 men fought on. Between 1926 and 1933, Sandino's forces, which eventually grew to more than 3,000 combatants, battled both several thousand marines and the Nicaraguan National Guard. Although newsreels shown in U.S. movie theaters at that time portrayed Sandino as a bandit leader, many Latin Americans viewed him as a nationalist fighting heroically against foreign military invasion.

Finally, facing U.S. public pressure to end a foreign intervention, whose cost during the Great Depression made it even more unpopular, as well as opposition from many Latin American countries, U.S. marines withdrew in 1933. Sandino then agreed to a settlement of the war that

involved allowing Juan Bautista Sacasa, a Liberal, to serve as president. The agreement, which would have allowed Sandino's forces to control much of Nicaragua and effectively compete for national political power, proved unacceptable to General Somoza. After having had dinner with President Sacasa one evening in 1934, Sandino and two of his aides were kidnapped and executed by officers of Somoza's National Guard. President Sacasa was outraged at the cowardly murder of his friend Sandino and demanded that those guilty be punished. They never were. Two years later in 1936 Somoza used the National Guard to install himself as president (Macauley 1967; Millett 1977). Anastasio Somoza García ("Tacho I") ruled Nicaragua until he was assassinated by a Nicaraguan poet in 1956; he was succeeded by his eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, who died apparently of natural causes in 1967. The younger, West Point–educated son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle ("Tacho II," or "Tachito"), took over until the 1979 revolution forced him to flee, first to the United States and then to Paraguay, where he was assassinated in 1980, evidently by Argentinean leftists.

Somoza Family Rule

The Somozas dominated Nicaragua through a number of methods. Most important was family control of the National Guard. Men of lower-middle-class, working-class, and peasant background joined the guard as a means of social and economic mobility in a land of limited opportunity. In return for loyal service, the guard could provide steady pay, food, medical care, and eventually a pension following retirement. The retiree could often obtain a job in a Somoza-owned business to supplement his pension or might receive assistance in opening his own small business (Millett 1977). However, the fact that the nation's military became very much the personal army of the Somoza family meant that the end of the family dynasty would likely severely weaken the coercive capacity of the Nicaraguan state.

The Somozas were also clever politicians who could keep the opposition divided and ineffectual through a combination of bribery, intimidation, or, if necessary, imprisonment and death (some dissidents were supposedly shot while trying to escape). In some "elections" vote buying or ballot box stuffing or both reportedly occurred, and the Somozas even went as far as to rewrite the country's constitution to maintain power (Booth 1985; Diederich 1981; Walker 1986).

Anastasio Somoza García often adapted to changing political conditions to protect his regime. During 1936–1938 when upper-class groups sponsored a Nazi-style "brown shirt" organization, he adopted a pro-fascist position. In contrast, during World War II Somoza allied with

the United States against Germany, and as European fascism was going down to defeat in 1944, he convinced leaders of the nation's labor unions to support continuation of his rule instead of joining the prodemocracy movement then attempting to oust him. His prolabor policies during 1944–1948 won him the temporary backing of Nicaragua's Communist party (called at that point the Nicaraguan Socialist party), some of whose members were union activists. But once Somoza had succeeded in co-opting leaders of his major upper-class opposition in the Conservative party by giving them subordinate roles in his government and once his major foreign sponsor, the United States, became increasingly hostile to the Soviet Union, he abandoned many of his previous labor reforms. Somoza then "violently purged former union leaders and forced many unionists and socialists into exile" (Booth 1985, p. 65).

Through control of the government the family was able accumulate massive wealth. One scheme involved charging foreign and domestic business interests special fees for the privilege of exploiting the nation's gold and timber resources. During World War II, the Somoza government confiscated German estates, some of which the Somoza family obtained at little expense. The Somozas also reportedly profited from illegally shipping cattle to other Central American countries and by violating a number of trade-restriction laws by which other businessmen were bound. By 1979 the family owned between 10 and 20 percent of the cultivated land, more than 150 factories, several banks, an airline, and port facilities (property in Nicaragua valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars) and was thought to have placed $500 million dollars or more in foreign bank accounts or other investments (Booth 1985; Walker 1986).

Despite the huge gap in life-style between the Somoza family, its business associates, and the mass of the Nicaraguan population, the U.S. government staunchly supported the dynasty because of its friendliness toward North American business interests and its strong and consistent anti-Communist stance. Because the Somoza family's hold on power was in great part the result of foreign intervention and sponsorship, its control was based on repression coupled with opportunistic political alliances and bribes, and its continuous goal was to increase personal and family wealth, Somoza rule generally lacked moral legitimacy. The Somoza regime, consequently, was vulnerable to the loss of U.S. support and of the ability to buy off opposition elements.

The Nicaraguan Economy

When Sandino was murdered in February 1934, Nicaragua was suffering the effects of the worldwide depression, which resulted in a

drastic decline in the prices paid internationally for the nation's major exports (coffee prices in 1933 were only one-third their 1929 level and did not recover fully until 1947). Many indebted owners of small farms lost their land to wealthy landowners, who proceeded to expand coffee planting to compensate for lower prices. As landownership became more concentrated, displaced peasants joined the ranks of landless agricultural laborers and urban workers. Many agricultural laborers were effectively bound to the plantations where they were employed through laws that prevented departure of any workers who owed money to the plantation stores. Because such stores usually sold food or tools at very high prices and provided credit only at very high interest rates, many rural workers remained mired in long-term debt and were forbidden from seeking alternate employment.

During World War II, the economy improved as the United States became somewhat more dependent on Central America's resources (such as rubber, metals, and wood). Following the war, the economy fluctuated in response to changes in the demand and prices paid for Nicaragua's exports. But in the early 1960s, fear of further Cuban-style revolutions in Latin America prompted the United States to increase economic assistance to Nicaragua greatly and led to the formation of the Central American Common Market to spur trade among nations within the region. Partly as a result, Nicaragua's gross national product rose by 250 percent between 1960 and 1975 and manufacturing's share rose from 15.6 to 23 percent. Although aggregate growth was impressive, benefits reaching the majority in the lower classes were limited by the Somoza government's restrictions on labor unions, maintenance of low wages for many workers, and failure to implement extensive agrarian-reform measures. Because of Nicaragua's high rate of population growth (the population doubled between 1950 and 1970) and the nature of the country's prerevolutionary economic system, which disproportionately benefited the upper- and middle-class minorities, inequality among social groups increased (Booth 1985).

By the start of the revolutionary decade of the 1970s, 50 percent of economically active Nicaraguans were employed in agriculture, 10 percent were industrial workers, and about 20 percent were employed in other largely urban, nonagricultural blue-collar jobs such as construction, transportation, and domestic labor. The nation's middle class included between 15 and 20 percent of working Nicaraguans involved in managerial, sales, or clerical jobs, small businesses, government functions such as administrative development planning, or the performance of other technical functions. In the 1970s the lower half of Nicaraguan income earners received a total of 15 percent of all income, whereas the top 5 percent received 30 percent of the national income. These

statistics indicate that the average income earner in the upper 5 percent had an income *twenty* times that of the average income earner in the lower 50 percent of the population (Booth 1985). With respect to agricultural wealth, the largest 0.6 percent of farms had 31 percent of the farmland, and the bottom 58 percent had only 3.4 percent. Seventy-five percent of the rural population was illiterate (compared to 25 percent in urban areas).

In the 1960s the upper class prospered and much of the middle class and some in the urban working class enjoyed economic improvements. Many wealthy and middle-class individuals flaunted their good fortune through the conspicuous consumption of luxury items. Among urban workers, industrial employees experienced an 81 percent increase in real wages (inflation adjusted) between 1961 and 1968. By the mid-1970s, however, there was an economic downturn. The devastating 1972 earthquake had caused 10,000 deaths and destroyed thousands of homes, businesses, and manufacturing jobs. Within a few years the economy was negatively affected by lowered international coffee prices, labor unrest, and intensified Somoza political repression, which discouraged new investments in business and industry. The economic decline was reflected in drops in real wages between 1968 and 1975 of 29 percent for industrial workers, 15 percent for construction workers, and 26 percent for communications and transportation workers (Booth 1985). Economically generated frustration, especially dangerous to a government lacking moral legitimacy, was increasing in the years leading up to the revolution.

THE REVOLUTION

Formation of the FSLN

Widespread poverty, coupled with Somoza corruption, greed, apparent subservience to foreign interests, and repressive measures, earned the regime many enemies. Survivors of Sandino's army repeatedly attempted to launch guerrilla wars against the Somoza dynasty. But in 1961 a small group of younger anti-Somoza militants, led by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga, created a new organization, the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN). Of the original founders only Borge survived to witness the overthrow of the Somoza regime. FSLN leaders, who viewed the Somoza dynasty as a creature of U.S. intervention, an instrument of foreign exploitation, and the embodiment of corruption and unrestrained greed, were inspired in part by the example of a number of national liberation movements around the world. Taking the name of the nationalist hero

Sandino for their revolutionary movement, FSLN organizers intended both to rid the country of the Somozas and to launch a social revolution that would redistribute much of the nation's resources toward the poor and create a society without extremes of wealth and poverty (Cockcroft 1989; Booth 1985; Walker 1986). The formation of the FSLN reflected not only the development of dissident elements within Nicaragua's educated elite but also the increasing commitment of young elite members to the view that an armed revolution was the only feasible means of social transformation.

Although most of the leaders of the FSLN from 1961 to 1979 came from middle- and upper-class families, Carlos Fonseca, widely recognized as the "prime mover" in the formation of the FSLN, was the illegitimate son of a poor cook and a laborer. Excelling as a student and a leader at Matagalpa High School, Fonseca was attracted to Marxist concepts such as the view that the flow of history involved a struggle among economic classes, that the majority of Nicaragua's people were the victims of greedy U.S. corporations and an exploiting Nicaraguan capitalist class, and that there was a need for a revolutionary redistribution of wealth and power (Booth 1985; Pastor 1987). Fonseca, who would die in combat against Somoza's National Guard in 1976, became a leftist activist at the National Autonomous University and joined the Nicaraguan Socialist party (the country's Communist party).

Fonseca, Borge, and Daniel Ortega and Lidia Saavedra de Ortega, parents of the Ortega brothers (one of whom, Camilo, was to die in the revolution, another, Daniel, to become first president of the revolutionary government, and a third, Humberto, to become commander of the Sandinista army), and thousands of others suffered imprisonment and often torture for openly opposing the Somoza regime (Pastor 1987; Booth 1985). Following the assassination of Anastasio Somoza García in 1956, Fonseca was one of more than 2,000 arrested. In 1957 Fonseca was released from prison, and the Nicaraguan Socialist party sent him to the Soviet Union. But in 1960 Fonseca quit the Party in part because of its refusal to support a violent revolution to oust Somoza. Following an initial failed attempt at launching a guerrilla war, Fonseca and others founded the FSLN and received training in jungle warfare from Santos López, a surviving veteran of Sandino's original army.

The Nicaraguan people in the 1960s, however, were not yet ready to make the sacrifices that getting rid of the Somozas and their system would require. Mass discontent had not reached the critical level. The Sandinistas had also not succeeded in communicating to most people the purpose and the desirability of the revolutionary movement before launching their guerrilla war. Therefore, another of the necessary conditions for revolutionary victory, a shared motivation for revolution

capable of uniting the largely urban born, middle-class Sandinistas with the impoverished national majority composed of workers and peasants did not exist when the Sandinistas first initiated armed struggle. Thus, the FSLN in the 1960s was little more than a small group of highly committed radicals bent on armed revolution but lacking the enthusiastic support of the people, the only possible means of victory against the well-trained and well-equipped National Guard. The result was that Somoza's army, bolstered by U.S. aid given in fear of another Cuban-style revolution, devastated the Sandinistas militarily.

Partly in reaction to initial failures, disagreements arose within the FSLN concerning which approach would be most effective in overthrowing the Somoza regime. During 1975–1977 three distinct divisions were identifiable (Booth 1985; Pastor 1987). The Guerra Popular Prolongada (Prolonged People's War) faction, led by Tomás Borge and Henry Ruíz, held that a strategy of rural warfare was the key to success. The members of this group, influenced by the examples of China's Mao and Vietnam's Giap, planned to build up peasant support gradually and to construct a large revolutionary army, which over a lengthy period would wear down, demoralize, and defeat Somoza's forces. The Proletarios (Proletarians) believed that mobilizing the urban working class would be the most effective way to achieve victory. The Proletarios, one of whose leaders was Jaime Wheelock, sought to organize labor unions and many residents of urban Nicaragua's poor neighborhoods for an anticipated campaign of workers' strikes and mass demonstrations that would bring down the Somoza system. The Terceristas (Third Force), also called the Insurrecionales (Insurgents) and the Christian Wing, included Daniel and Humberto Ortega. This group differed from the others in two major ways. First, the Terceristas de-emphasized the original FSLN Marxist point of view and rapidly expanded their ranks with members who were non-Marxist socialists, Catholic and Protestant social activists (including priests), and other diverse anti-Somoza advocates of social reform and democracy. Second, this FSLN faction advocated and carried out much bolder attacks than the other two and was eventually successful in provoking widespread insurrections against the Somoza regime.

As the tactics employed by the Terceristas proved effective and the majority of the population clearly committed itself to revolution, the primary points of disagreement among the FSLN factions disappeared. This led to provisional reunification in December 1978. Formal reunification occurred on March 3, 1979, with each faction contributing three representatives to a nine-person FSLN overall governing directorate. Partly in response to the success of the concepts employed by the Terceristas and the growth of the FSLN by 1979 into a mass movement with philosophically diverse members, the ideology of the

FSLN evolved in a moderate direction. FSLN policy after the victory was "Marxist" in the sense of promoting a "profound socioeconomic transformation to benefit the working classes but was also innovative in that it institutionalized political opposition, preserved a large private sector [in the economy], and established traditional civil liberties" (Booth 1985, p. 147).

Increased Popular Discontent

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, certain changes and events occurred in Nicaragua that drastically increased dissatisfaction with the Somoza dictatorship and set the stage for the development of a Sandinista-led mass insurrection against the dynasty. One major factor was the growth of social activism among the younger priests and religious workers. As happened in other Latin American countries, the philosophy of Liberation Theology was taking hold. The clergy, often central to the cultural and emotional life of the poor, began to tell impoverished workers, peasants, and farmhands that education, medical care, and decent wages were not unrealistic fantasies but rights to which they were morally entitled. The spread of these ideas helped generate the demand for change that would assure the victory of the revolution (Berryman 1987; Walker 1986).

The 1972 earthquake that devastated the capital, Managua, a city of more than 600,000, further increased mass discontent. In the following months, millions of dollars in international aid poured into Nicaragua. But the Somozas and their friends were ready to take advantage of what they evidently viewed as a good business opportunity and reportedly siphoned off huge amounts of relief aid through schemes involving real estate speculation, mortgage financing, and steering reconstruction projects to Somoza-owned land. Elements of Somoza's National Guard engaged in the theft and sale of donated reconstruction supplies.

In the years following the earthquake, the real wages of many Nicaraguan urban workers declined significantly, and unemployment grew to almost 30 percent by 1979. The deprivation that many felt because of the worsening economic conditions was intensified by the knowledge of the luxuriant life-styles pursued by the Somozas and other members of the country's upper class. But even some wealthy individuals began to feel that Somoza's greed simply could not be satisfied. Using his enormous economic resources and political clout to unfair advantage, Somoza was steadily absorbing more and more of the economy. The desire for self-preservation prompted an increasing number of businessmen to demand an end to the dictatorship (Walker 1986). Thus

diverse population segments, which in some cases had differing economic interests, became at least temporarily united by the motivation to end Somoza family rule.

State of Siege: 1974–1977

On December 27, 1974, a group of thirteen armed Sandinistas seized several politically prominent hostages at the home of a wealthy cotton exporter. The thirteen, who acted in part to protest Somoza's reelection to the presidency on his Liberal National party's ticket, captured the mayor of Managua, the country's foreign minister, the ambassador to the United States, and other foreign and domestic celebrities, some of whom were Somoza family members. The FSLN released the hostages in exchange for eighteen Sandinista prisoners (including Daniel Ortega, later president of Nicaragua), a payment of $5 million, publication of a message from the FSLN to the Nicaraguan people, and safe passage to Cuba. Somoza, however, declared martial law under a "state of siege," which lasted until September 1977. During this period the FSLN lost much of its personnel and top leaders, including Fonseca. And Somoza's National Guard tortured and murdered hundreds of peasants suspected of being sympathetic to the FSLN, greatly increasing hatred for the regime.

In 1977, however, several factors prompted Somoza to lift the state of siege. Most important was the U.S. election of Jimmy Carter, who made an improvement in Nicaragua's human rights situation a necessary condition for continued military assistance. While Somoza was recovering in Miami from a July 28, 1977, heart attack, Amnesty International released a report condemning the behavior of his armed forces. To counter the negative publicity and prevent a cutoff of aid from the Carter administration, Somoza ended the state of siege on September 19, 1977.

Somoza's temporary cessation of martial law allowed the FSLN to organize more freely and extend its support network around the country. Since the relaxation of repression was a reponse to President Carter's human rights ultimatum, Somoza's regime was significantly weakened by the widespread impression that his government and his National Guard no longer enjoyed the unconditional support of the United States. It now appeared that the United States might not intervene to prevent Somoza's overthrow. Thus Carter's human rights policy simultaneously meant a giant increase in the level of international permissiveness toward a revolution in Nicaragua and a substantial weakening of the prerevolutionary state.

The Revolution Intensifies

By the mid-1970s, other groups and individuals besides the FSLN called for an end to Somoza rule, including some members of the Conservative party. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the well-known Conservative party editor of the opposition newspaper, *La Prensa,* was a leader of upper-class critics and attacked the Somoza regime in several articles. Chamorro's final assault exposed the greedy activities of several Somoza supporters who ran a blood plasma–exporting business in Managua. Blood was purchased from poor Nicaraguans to sell at considerable profit to hospitals in the United States. Evidence suggested that the owners of the business hired assassins to murder Pedro Chamorro on January 10, 1978 (Booth 1985; Christian 1985). Although perhaps not directly responsible, Somoza was blamed, and anti-Somoza businessmen declared a strike in protest.

On August 22, 1978, an FSLN unit seized the National Palace and took more than 1,500 people hostage, including most of the government's officials. The raid was led by Edén Pastora, who held a deep personal animosity toward Somoza's National Guard, which he blamed for the death of his father in a land dispute. In exchange for the hostages, the Sandinistas received the release of over 50 FSLN members, $500,000, publication of revolutionary proclamations, and safe passage out of the country (Christian 1985; Diederich 1981).

After the National Palace episode, excited and inspired teenagers in several Nicaraguan towns grabbed what weapons they could and began spontaneous insurrections. Somoza reimposed martial law in early September and ordered his National Guard to attack with planes, tanks, and artillery. Perhaps 5,000 were killed in fall 1978, many shot after capture by Somoza's soldiers. But many more fled to Sandinista camps to organize and train for a coordinated revolutionary offensive.

Until 1978, the FSLN received only very limited foreign assistance. Cuba was initially reluctant to send arms, fearing that the United States would view such a move as a provocation and a reason to intervene to crush the FSLN while it was still weak. But once mass uprisings demonstrated the real possibility of ousting the Somoza regime, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Cuba provided major aid to the Sandinistas. In 1979 Cuba commenced large-scale arms shipments to the FSLN.

FSLN full-time guerrilla fighters, despite heavy losses, usually averaged about 150 in the period from the mid-1960s through 1976. During 1977 the number rose, reaching an estimated 500 to 1,000 in early 1978 and climbing to 3,000 by early 1979. In the climactic combat of summer 1979, the FSLN had approximately 5,000 regular soldiers, one-

quarter of them women (Booth 1985; Pastor 1987; Reif 1986). FSLN mainline forces at the local fronts were typically increased several times over by untrained or minimally trained volunteers wanting to join the revolutionary struggle against Somoza's National Guard.

Since Somoza refused any compromise deemed acceptable by even the most moderate of the opposition to his government, the Carter administration decided to restrict the flow of U.S. weapons to Somoza's National Guard in February 1979. Much of Somoza's ammunition and weapons were later provided by Argentina, Guatemala, and Israel (Pastor 1987).

On May 29, 1979, the Sandinistas launched the "final offensive" against Somoza's regime. After weeks of combat, several major towns and cities were under FSLN control and fighting had commenced in the capital, Managua. Somoza's air force repeatedly bombed FSLN-held cities and neighborhoods, killing thousands and destroying tens of thousands of homes and many factories and businesses. After the June 20 videotaped murder of ABC newsman Bill Stewart by Somoza's National Guard (guardsmen felt that press coverage was aiding the Sandinistas) was seen by millions of Americans on news programs, the Carter administration essentially ordered Somoza to leave Nicaragua. Support for Somoza's departure was overwhelmingly expressed by the Organization of American States (OAS) on June 23, which voted 17 to 2 (Paraguay voted with Somoza) to demand Somoza's resignation. The OAS also rejected a Carter administration plan to send an OAS military force into Nicaragua because the organization viewed such an action as unwarranted interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs. At that point, with the U.S. withdrawing support for Somoza and several regional nations assisting the Sandinistas, a maximally permissive international environment existed with regard to the revolution.

When a Carter administration plan to preserve a restructured National Guard failed because of a misunderstanding by Somoza's temporary replacement, Francisco Urcuyo, and due to National Guard panic at the flight of Somoza and a lack of ammunition, the dictator's military disintegrated on July 17 and 18. On July 19, 1979, Sandinista fighters took control of Managua. Several thousand National Guardsmen were captured and hundreds more fled north to Honduras. In the months following the revolutionary victory, the behavior of each captured guardsman was reportedly examined. Those for whom there was no evidence of personal involvement in torture or murder were let go. Hundreds thought guilty of war crimes were kept in prison, but most were released before the end of 1989. Nicaragua's criminal justice system did not have the death penalty.

POSTREVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, CHANGES, AND CONFLICTS

Although the Sandinista Front controlled the revolutionary armed forces, it did not assume exclusive responsibility for governing Nicaragua. The FSLN joined with other anti-Somoza groups to establish a revolutionary executive committee of five persons to run the country until elections were held. The governing committee included top Sandinista leaders (who favored the concept of at least a partially collectively owned economy rather than one based exclusively on private ownership) and two non-FSLN opponents of the Somoza regime, multimillionaire businessman, Alfonso Robello Callejas, a leader of an organization called the Nicaraguan Democratic movement (MDN), and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of the assassinated editor of *La Prensa*.

At the outset, the revolutionary leadership faced immense problems. The struggle to oust Somoza and the National Guard had been devastating. In addition to the tens of thousands (estimated variously at 30,000 to 40,000) killed, many more had been injured or made homeless. Many industries and businesses had been destroyed or badly damaged. Somoza and his associates not only had made off with their liquid assets and most of the state's treasury (except for about $3 million), they had also left Nicaragua a $1.6 billion debt (Booth 1985; Walker 1986). The revolution also faced the task of reducing the vast inequalities in wealth distribution, landownership, education, and health care that had characterized Nicaragua.

The revolution did, however, possess certain strengths and advantages. As Walker (1986, p. 43) noted, one great asset was the fact that the dictator's National Guard had been destroyed and replaced by a new armed force that was "explicitly Sandinist—that is, revolutionary and popularly oriented." This meant that, unlike the situation in many other Latin American countries, conservative and counterrevolutionary elements, whether internal or external, would not be able to use Nicaragua's military to block progressive change. But Sandinista domination of the postrevolution military, ostensibly to ensure the implementation of the goal of socioeconomic transformation to benefit the poor, was to be continually criticized by many outside the FSLN on the grounds that one political party's control over the armed forces interfered with the realization of the fully democratic political system also promised by the revolution.

Another major strength was that "the mass organizations created in the struggle to overthrow the dictator gave the FSLN a grass-roots base that dwarfed the organized support of all potential rivals" (Walker 1986, p. 43). The prorevolutionary mass organizations had provided

and would continue to provide hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans with their first experiences of direct political organization and participation. By 1984, almost half of all Nicaraguans aged sixteen years or older were members of pro-Sandinista voluntary membership mass organizations (Cockcroft 1989; Walker 1986). The knowledge and experience gained through involvement in these groups inspired a feeling of political competency and empowerment among many of the Nicaraguan people. No longer were politics and the exercise of political power likely to be limited to Nicaragua's wealthy minority. Neither would political power be exclusively a male prerogative. Women constituted a large proportion of members in both the mass organizations and the revolutionary armed forces.

The revolutionary government moved quickly to improve the lot of impoverished Nicaraguans. Somoza family land, along with the land of several Somoza associates who had fled, was confiscated; some large holdings were turned into state farms, and more than 6 million acres were distributed to poor peasants and landless rural workers (Cockcroft 1989). Banks and industries owned by the Somoza family were nationalized. But more than half of all farms, businesses, and industries continued to be privately owned. The revolutionary government asserted that it would attempt to (1) maintain a mixed economy and encourage investment by the private sector; (2) institutionalize political pluralism and solicit feedback from all classes; and (3) establish diplomatic and economic relations with "as many nations as possible, regardless of ideology" (Walker 1986, p. 44).

Young educated people were called upon to volunteer to combat widespread rural illiteracy. Tens of thousands, primarily urban high school and college students, spent months living with farm families and taught, with varying degrees of success, family members to read and write (Arnove 1986). With the aid of hundreds of doctors, nurses, and health care workers from many countries, including Western and Eastern European nations, Cuba, the United States, and Canada, scores of health clinics were established all over the country and several hospitals were built, primarily with international funding (Booth 1985; Donahue 1986; Walker 1986). In 1982 the World Health Organization declared revolutionary Nicaragua a model for primary health care.

Opposition to the FSLN

Despite its policies and achievements and, in some instances, because of them, internal and external opposition began to develop to the leading role played by the FSLN. The opposition included elements of the business elite as well as much of the middle class. Before the revolution,

economic class constituted the most significant social division in Nicaragua. About 20 percent of economically active persons were engaged in nonmanual businesses, professions, or other careers, whereas 80 percent worked with their hands. The division between manual and nonmanual labor was accompanied by status differences more pronounced than those existing in North America or Europe. The norms of interclass relations required individuals in the lower-class majority to address members of the middle and upper classes by family name or with specified terms of respect such as "don" or "dona" (Walker 1986).

The victorious FSLN, in contrast, encouraged Nicaraguans to treat one another as social equals and promoted other changes that irritated many members of Nicaragua's privileged minority. Beyond land redistribution, some nationalizations of properties that the Somozas owned in partnership with other businessmen prompted angry reactions from those who felt they were given inadequate compensation. Confiscations of private country clubs and their conversion to public recreational centers and other uses, the reduction of imports of luxuries, and the taxation of domestically produced luxury items as well as new taxes on income and property upset many of the well-to-do. Some economically advantaged Nicaraguans, though, agreed with these policies and supported the goal of social revolution, even to the point of granting the necessary parental permission for their children to take part in the National Literacy Crusade of 1980.

Some businessmen, however, began to liquidate their assets in order to free up capital for investment outside Nicaragua, and a number left the country. Within Nicaragua much of the opposition toward the FSLN was expressed through the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). The leadership of COSEP objected to some of the central policies of the revolutionary government such as the literacy crusade (evidently fearing prorevolutionary indoctrination of the peasants by the young volunteers), the participation and political mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans in prorevolutionary mass organizations, and the fact that the new Nicaraguan army was politicized in that it was led by FSLN members dedicated to the goal of economic and social revolution and was serving as an instrument of political indoctrination of recruits and draftees (Booth 1985; Christian 1985; Walker 1986).

The Nicaraguan Catholic church, divided before the revolution between old-line conservative and Liberation Theology proponents, manifested intense internal conflict after Somoza's ouster (O'Shaughnessy and Serra 1986). Some priests supported the FSLN, many of whose members, while espousing Marxist concepts in some respects, were also practicing Catholics. In the revolutionary leadership, priests served as

foreign minister, cultural affairs minister, and head of the Literacy Crusade (Booth 1985; Christian 1985; Walker 1986). A number of clergy formed the Popular Church movement, which explicitly advocated progressive economic and social change, proclaiming that "between Christianity and revolution there is no contradiction" (Christian 1985, p. 221). But much of the hierarchy of the Catholic church, represented by the nine-member Council of Bishops led by Archbishop (later Cardinal) Miguel Obando y Bravo, evolved into a major source of criticism of the FSLN. The archbishop objected to the efforts of some priests and Sandinista activists to combine Christian values and Marxist concepts and repeatedly voiced fear of Russian and Cuban "ideological imperialism" (Booth 1985, p. 214). He also objected to the draft on the grounds that draftees would be exposed to Sandinista ideological indoctrination. The Catholic hierarchy in general expressed outrage at what the bishops perceived to be disrespectful treatment of the pope during his 1983 Nicaragua visit. After the pope had publicly criticized priests holding high positions in the revolutionary government and refused—possibly wanting to avoid an act that could be interpreted as taking sides—to bless several Nicaraguan soldiers killed by counterrevolutionaries, though entreated to do so by the fallen soldiers' mothers, pro-Sandinista crowds at the pope's Managua mass began chanting "we want peace" (Booth 1985, p. 213).

Some observers argued, though, that a primary but unexpressed concern of the Church hierarchy was that the influence of the bishops was being undermined by the growing social and political mobilization of people in prorevolutionary mass organizations and by the developing democratization movement within the Church itself. In this sense, Walker (1986) noted, the Church hierarchy was responding to the revolution in much the same manner as other members of Nicaragua's prerevolutionary privileged classes, who sensed correctly that they had lost political power as people began to work directly to solve social problems rather than simply complaining or leaving the running of society to wealthy elites.

Opposition to the FSLN also emerged from within the nation's news media. A split developed in *La Prensa*, the newspaper owned by the Chamorro family, over the course of the revolution under Sandinista leadership. The Chamorro family, historically associated with Nicaragua's Conservative party, had long opposed the Somoza dictatorship. During 1980, however, political differences and contrasting sympathies within the Chamorro family intensified (Christian 1985). Carlos Fernando Chamorro, youngest son of the martyred Pedro Joaquín Chamorro and Violeta Chamorro, had joined with the Sandinistas during the revolutionary war and became editor of the Sandinista newspaper,

Barricada. The editor of *La Prensa* following the revolution was Xavier Chamorro Cardenal, brother of the assassinated former editor, Pedro. But by spring 1980, the majority of the Chamorro clan became convinced that Xavier was too favorable toward the FSLN. Xavier, in turn, accused several other Chamorro family members of becoming hostile toward the revolution and of slanting news coverage in attempts to slander or undermine the FSLN, promoting public discontent with the revolutionary government by printing false rumors and exaggerating real problems, and by giving disproportionate coverage to government critics like COSEP. On April 20, 1980, the family decided to replace Xavier, but most of *La Prensa*'s staff staged a protest strike in an attempt to force the Chamorros to keep Xavier as editor. The conflict eventually resulted in the departure of Xavier and much of the staff to establish a new independent newspaper, *El Nuevo Diario* (Christian 1985). Violeta Chamorro and other family members assumed total control of *La Prensa* and proceeded to use the newspaper to launch continuous attacks on the FSLN.

In April 1980 Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro resigned from the revolutionary governing committee. Both had opposed changes in the makeup of a national assembly, the Council of State, which was to assume the role of a legislature until elections could be held. At first it appeared that the assembly would have a majority of delegates representing business and union groups that had existed during the Somoza dictatorship and that were not involved in the FSLN. But the Sandinista majority on the revolutionary governing committee decided to include representatives from the newly created revolutionary neighborhood committees, called CDSs (Sandinista Defense committees), and from new labor unions (several times more workers joined labor unions after the revolution than had been unionized under the Somoza regime) and other groups that had organized or greatly expanded only after the overthrow of Somoza. The Sandinistas argued that only with the addition of delegates from new organizations would the various social classes be proportionally represented to any reasonable degree in the Council of State (Booth 1985; Walker 1986). The resulting Council of State had forty-seven delegates instead of the originally intended thirty-three, with twenty-four seats assigned to pro-Sandinista groups. The ruling executive committee after the departure of Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro was reduced in size from five to three members, with two from the FSLN and one from the Democratic Conservative party (PCD).

The hostility of anti-FSLN businessmen, bishops, and other opposition elements intensified with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, a hard-line conservative U.S. president, who some thought might help rid

them of the Sandinistas. The opposition protested that the FSLN was postponing elections to use the intervening years to rally youth to its cause and thus assure the FSLN of victory once elections were held. The Sandinista leadership, in turn, claimed that planning and implementing the literacy crusade, the land-redistribution process, the health care program, and carrying out other basic reforms all took priority over the organization and holding of elections (Booth 1985; Walker 1986).

Atlantic Coast Opposition

Perhaps the biggest error made by the revolutionary Nicaraguan government was its flawed initial policy regarding attempts to integrate the Atlantic Coast region with the much more populous Spanish side of the country. Foreign-owned companies had reaped the mineral and timber resources of the area since the nineteenth century. The various Indian groups (Miskito, Sumu, Rama, and others, who resided largely in the northern section) and the English-speaking, Protestant blacks (largely in the southern section) historically viewed Spanish-speaking Nicaraguans as "alien exploiters" (Booth 1985, p. 234). To make matters worse, Somoza had supported the efforts of the conservative, anti-FSLN Moravian Protestant sect in the region. After the revolution, scores of mostly very young Spanish-speaking, pro-FSLN Nicaraguans, many of whom had never been to the Atlantic Coast, arrived to take over nationalized mines, lumber operations, and fisheries, as well as to open new schools and health clinics.

Sandinista militants came to the region expecting to find enthusiastic support for the revolution among the impoverished inhabitants. Instead they found unfamiliar peoples and cultures that had remained relatively isolated from Hispanic Nicaragua for generations (Dishkin 1987). The Atlantic Coast residents relished the freedom to live according to their own customs, even if in poverty. Although some Indians were friendly to the Sandinistas, others viewed the new schools, clinics, and public works projects as part of a plan by the central government to destroy Indian and other local cultures. Disputes broke out in the early 1980s and in the violent skirmishes that followed more than 150 local people and dozens of Sandinistas were killed (Walker 1986). Later the revolutionary government tried and punished many soldiers guilty of human rights violations of Atlantic Coast residents. In 1987, after evaluating reports from hundreds of town and village meetings, the Nicaraguan government devised and approved limited autonomy status for the Atlantic Coast and, in effect, granted an amnesty to the Indian guerrillas who had taken up arms against the Sandinista-led army. By spring 1987,

fighting between Atlantic Coast people and Nicaraguan government forces had largely come to an end (Cockcroft 1989; *New York Times,* Apr. 14, 1987, p. A12).

U.S. AND WORLD REACTIONS TO THE REVOLUTION

Initially President Carter decided to provide over $100 million in aid to Nicaragua after Somoza's departure, although much of the sum was intended to assist private businesses rather than the revolutionary government. Carter's administration took the view that providing aid would allow the United States to influence the development of the Nicaraguan Revolution nonviolently. According to Robert Pastor (1987, p. 194), a member of Carter's National Security Council, the Carter administration objectives were:

> (1) *internal:* to assist the revolution to fulfill its stated promises of political pluralism, elections, and a vigorous private sector, and conversely, to reduce the chances that the revolution would become Communist [result in a Leninist-style one-party state]; (2) *strategic:* to deny the Sandinistas an enemy and thus a reason for relying on Cuban and Soviet military assistance; and (3) *regional:* to make clear that a good relationship with the United States was contingent on Nicaraguan noninterference in the internal affairs of its neighbors.

But when convinced that at least some Sandinistas were transporting arms to leftist rebels in nearby El Salvador, Carter suspended aid.

The Reagan administration, which took office in January 1981, assumed a much more hostile and violent stance toward the revolution. President Reagan permanently canceled the previously suspended assistance and pressured all U.S. businesses to stop buying Nicaraguan coffee, cotton, sugar, or other goods and to stop selling U.S. products to Nicaragua, eventually making all remaining trade illegal in May 1985 (Conroy 1987). As a result, from 1980 to 1986 the percentage of Nicaraguan trade (imports and exports combined) with the United States fell from 30.4 percent to 0 and with other Central American nations from 28.1 to 7.4 percent. In contrast, the percentage of Nicaragua's trade with Western European countries (almost all of which opposed the hostile measures of the Reagan administration and the later Bush administration) rose from 17.6 to 37.7 percent, while trade with Eastern Europe increased from 1.0 to 27.2 percent and with Japan from 3.0 to 9.0 percent (Kornbluh 1987).

The Contras

Beyond economic pressure, the major strategy employed by the Reagan administration to attack the revolutionary government and impede the development of Nicaragua under FSLN leadership was the sponsorship, recruitment, and arming of the contras (short for "counterrevolutionaries"), who operated primarily out of bases in Honduras supplied by the CIA (White 1984; Walker 1986). The initial counterrevolutionary units were organized by several former officers of the Somoza National Guard after their flight from Nicaragua and were funded by wealthy Nicaraguan exiles (PBS 1987). Following past strategies designed to overturn "undesirable" governments in Guatemala and Cuba, the CIA, bolstered by Reagan, provided the funds, weapons, and advisers to expand the contras dramatically.

The contras drew recruits and supporters from several groups with grievances against the Sandinista movement. First, most of the top military leadership consisted of former Somoza National Guard members. These were individuals who had staked their futures on the Somoza system. When Somoza was overthrown, their status, privileges, and careers were destroyed. Their goals were generally to eliminate the Sandinista government, take revenge, and restore their dominant position in Nicaragua (Booth 1985; PBS 1986; White 1984). Second, many affluent businessmen opposed the Sandinista government because they viewed it as undemocratic and possibly also because it prevented people like them from controlling Nicaragua politically and economically. Some initially worked against the Somoza dictatorship and cooperated in the provisional revolutionary government, but they were usually individuals who had never been members of the FSLN. Often with reputations among U.S. officials as political moderates or conservatives, they provided the contras with a civilian political wing and a public image of respectability (PBS 1987). These elements together formed in August 1981 the largest and longest-enduring contra organization, the Nicaraguan Democratic force (FDN), which in the latter half of the 1980s had between 6,000 and 12,000 soldiers. The FDN was assisted at times by mercenaries from Honduras, Chile, and Argentina paid by the CIA (Kornbluh 1987).

One prominent Sandinista figure, Edén Pastora, did desert the revolutionary government and chose to start his own contra group based to the south in Costa Rica. He felt that the Sandinistas had betrayed the goals of the revolution and had failed to establish a pluralist democracy. Pastora's background (his family had been involved in the Conservative party) and past political associations indicated that he was considerably more conservative than other Sandinistas (Christian 1985).

He had successively joined and quit several anti-Somoza movements of varying ideological characteristics and eventually committed himself to the FSLN when he perceived it to be the organization actually capable of leading and winning a revolution against the Somoza regime. His statements suggested that his motives for turning against the FSLN might have been as much personal as ideological. After the revolution he appeared to be upset because he was not being accepted as a true Sandinista (PBS 1985) and did not receive a desired government appointment.

Pastora, however, refused to enter into an alliance with the main contra army based in Honduras because it was led by former members of Somoza's National Guard and because it was under the influence of the CIA. As most of the popular support he had enjoyed as a Sandinista hero quickly evaporated once he took up arms against the revolution and as his resources were limited compared to the CIA-funded group, his movement, founded in September 1982 under the title Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), became insignificant by 1985 (*New York Times,* Sept. 4, 1985, p. A3). In summer 1986, Pastora turned himself in to Costa Rican authorities and retired from the contra war to run a fishing business. During spring 1987, he told a Cable Network News correspondent that he believed the FDN counterrevolutionaries had tried to assassinate him because he would not unite his forces with theirs and that the only reason he would again take up arms would be to help defeat the CIA-backed contras (CNN, May 22, 1987). In 1989 Pastora, benefiting from Nicaragua's amnesty program, returned to Nicaragua and announced his intention to resume peaceful political activities.

By the mid-1980s many of the contra soldiers were very young and thus could not have been members of Somoza's National Guard. And whereas 90 percent of the top fifty officers in the FDN had been in Somoza's army, 80 percent of contra field officers had not (Vanderlaan 1986). Motives for joining the contras appeared to vary. Some volunteers were the younger brothers of National Guard soldiers or relatives of former Somoza supporters. Others were recruited from among the religiously conservative peasants of northeastern Nicaragua who, largely because of contra misinformation, feared a Sandinista attack on their religious institutions and beliefs. Many independent farmers turned against the Sandinistas because of Managua's restrictions on their ability to market their produce freely or because of harsh measures that were part of the FSLN anticontra effort, such as the forcible relocation of some peasants away from homes and farms. The salaries paid to contra soldiers from the scores of millions of dollars provided by the Reagan administration and other sources constituted a significant incentive for

some farmers of northeastern Nicaragua to join the contras—the pay levels were often far above their usual incomes.

Other Nicaraguans of Indian ancestry were provoked into hostility against the revolutionary government by heavy-handed tactics used in the early 1980s by Sandinista soldiers to counter opposition in the Atlantic Coast region. Some anti-Sandinista Indian rebel groups allied for a time with the FDN and others with Pastor's ARDE. But by spring 1987, most of the Indian guerrillas had withdrawn from the contra war and several Indian leaders, who had initially organized armed resistance against the Sandinistas, supported the government's autonomy plan and accused the CIA-sponsored contra army of lacking any significant popular support (*New York Times*, Apr. 14, 1987, p. A12).

Opposition to Reagan Administration Policy on Nicaragua

The conduct of contra forces in Nicaragua provoked condemnation from international human rights monitoring organizations, which noted in 1986 and in 1987 that although the Sandinistas committed violations of human rights (such as the jailing of Miskito Indian dissidents), the Sandinista offenses were generally of a lesser magnitude and far less frequent than those of the contras (Americas Watch Committee 1985; PBS 1986; *New York Times*, Feb. 10, 1987, p. A10). Furthermore, a news story revealed that as many as 125 citizens of Honduras (the site of contra bases) who opposed the contras were assassinated by contra death squads after being identified by the CIA as subversives (CBS, March 29, 1987).

The CIA and various U.S. government officials not only knew about contra atrocities, including the murders of mayors, teachers, doctors and nurses, and captured Nicaraguan militia soldiers, but had actually prepared and distributed to contras 2,000 copies of an instructional booklet entitled "Psychological Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare." This manual, among other things, provided explicit instructions on how to carry out public executions of captured military or civilian leaders (Cockcroft 1989; *Providence Journal*–Knight-Ridder News Service, Oct. 20, 1984, p. 1).

The behavior of contra forces and leaders caused the disillusionment and resignation of several individuals recruited by the CIA to serve as the civilian political leadership for the contras. They included Edgar Chamorro, who had been FDN public relations director during 1981–1984. In a letter to the *New York Times* (Jan. 9, 1986, p. A22), Chamorro stated that the contras had a policy of terrorizing civilian noncombatants to discourage support for the FSLN-dominated government. He also

noted that the Sandinistas, despite serious shortcomings, had created a national atmosphere of social equality for the first time in the country's history and had made huge improvements in health care, education, and housing, much of which was destroyed by the contra war. He concluded that the Nicaraguan economy had been devastated primarily by the effects of the contra war and the U.S. economic embargo. According to Chamorro, the goals of the contra leaders, as revealed in their conversations with him, had been to recover their wealth and restore their previous dominant social status.

Western European allies of the United States almost unanimously refused to cooperate with the Republican administration's economic embargo and instead provided assistance to and increased trade with Nicaragua. International opposition to the contras and the CIA war against the Nicaraguan government was reflected in the overwhelming ruling of the United Nations World Court in 1984 to condemn the January–February CIA mining of Nicaragua's harbors. In 1986 the World Court, again by a large majority, found the Reagan administration's support for the contras in violation of international law and ruled that the United States must cease its assault on Nicaragua and pay reparations to Nicaragua for the loss of life, property damage, and other costs of the contra war (Cockcroft 1989; Gutman 1988; Sklar 1988).

Despite President Reagan's references to the contras as "freedom fighters," a majority of U.S. citizens consistently opposed aid to the contras. A 1986 ABC/*Washington Post* national survey of U.S. adults, who were reminded that the United States was supporting the contras, found that 62 percent opposed U.S. efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, while 28 percent supported such measures, and 10 percent had "no opinion" (Kornbluh 1987). CBS/*New York Times*, Harris Polls, and other surveys obtained similar results throughout the decade.

Contra atrocities and the mining of Nicaragua's harbors outraged many members of the House of Representatives as well as the leaders of most major religious denominations in the United States. Typical was the evaluation of Rep. Berkley Bedell (D.-Iowa), who reported, "If the American people could have talked with the common people of Nicaragua whose women and children are being indiscriminately tortured and killed by terrorists [contras] financed by the American taxpayer, they would rise up in legitimate anger and demand that support for this criminal activity be ended at once" (*New York Times*, Apr. 14, 1983, p. 1). The House of Representatives refused, in October 1984, to provide further *military* aid to the contras (Booth 1985; Gutman 1988).

But in June 1986 a few members of the House, under administration pressure and angered by reports of Sandinista army incursions into Honduras in pursuit of contras, shifted their position, resulting in a

close 221 to 209 vote victory for the Reagan administration's proposal to provide $70 million in military assistance (and $30 million in non-military aid) to the contras (Sklar 1988). The contras had received tens of millions of dollars in the two-year period during which Congress blocked U.S. government funds (Cockburn 1987; Sklar 1988). It was disclosed in 1986, 1987, and 1988 that Reagan administration personnel had sold weapons to Iran (involved then in its war with Iraq) at two to three times the cost, evidently diverting some of the huge profits to the contras (*New York Times*, Nov. 26, 1986, p. 1). The Reagan administration had also convinced other governments, such as Saudi Arabia and Brunei, to contribute millions to the contras (*New York Times*, Apr. 25, 1987, p. 1). Finally, a Senate investigative committee found evidence of a $10 million contribution to the contras from Colombian drug traffickers and other revenues derived from the transportation of drugs into the United States on planes returning from delivering weapons to contras (Cockburn 1987; PBS 1988; Sklar 1988). Public knowledge of these facts, a larger Democratic majority in Congress following legislative elections, and increased congressional sentiment in favor of nonviolent resolution of Central American conflicts led Congress to vote again in February 1988 to ban U.S. military assistance to the contras (Cockcroft 1989).

Impacts of the Contra War and the Economic Embargo

The contra war took at least 30,000 lives and strained the Nicaraguan economy in several ways. First, over half of the national budget was shifted to defense (including the purchase of weapons, largely from the only available sources willing to antagonize the United States by aiding Nicaragua militarily, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and several Eastern European nations), thus impeding further development of the economy and social programs. Second, contras and non-Nicaraguan mercenaries (paid by the CIA) inflicted significant damage on several industrial installations and repeatedly interfered with the coffee harvest in some parts of Nicaragua. Third, out of an adult (sixteen or over) population of approximately 1.5 million, Nicaragua had to mobilize a regular army of more than 60,000 and local militia units numbering more than 200,000 (PBS 1987; Walker 1986). The huge proportion of Nicaraguans under arms was one of the strongest indications that the Sandinista government enjoyed considerable popular support. But the large number of citizens committed to military operations or intermittent guard duty contributed to a labor shortage that was only partially offset by the assistance of international volunteer workers. The low-intensity warfare waged by the Reagan administration through the contras, the CIA, and the economic embargo appeared intended to motivate an overthrow of

the Sandinista-led government by a population exhausted and desperate for peace at any price (*New York Times,* March 23, 1987, p. A10; Oct. 16, 1988, p. A1; PBS 1987).

Nicaraguan Defensive Measures and International Assistance

The Nicaraguan government not only mobilized army and militia forces in its own defense. In November 1984 elections were held for a national legislature and a president. In a seven-party, secret ballot competition, the Sandinista party won about 62 percent of the vote, both for the presidency and for seats in the legislature (which were awarded in proportion to the popular vote). The Democratic Conservative party finished second, with 13 percent, Independent Liberals received about 10 percent, People's Social Christians 5 percent, and three parties to the left of the Sandinistas (the Socialist, Communist, and Marxist-Leninist parties) received 4 percent. About 6 percent of the ballots were filled out incorrectly and declared invalid. Approximately 80 percent of those eligible to vote (those at least sixteen years old) had done so, although not required to by law. The political parties that participated had been given weekly radio and TV time and were able to post signs and distribute campaign literature. International observers from several democracies, although noting that conditions were far from perfect, provided favorable evaluations of the election procedures, especially in comparison to elections in other nations in the region that the Reagan administration viewed as acceptably democratic (*Manchester Guardian,* Nov. 5, 1984, p. 6; and Nov. 6, 1984, p. 7; Walker 1986).

Some political groups had refused to appear on the ballot. Although their spokesperson, Arturo Cruz, claimed that campaign conditions were unfair, lack of participation probably stemmed from a realistic anticipation of very poor performance, coupled with, as some later admitted, inducements from U.S. agents to encourage boycotting the election in an effort to make it appear that Nicaraguans had no choices but left-wing parties (Booth 1985; Walker 1986). The election was held just before the 1984 U.S. presidential vote in order to ensure that Nicaragua would have an elected government *before* the virtually certain reelection of President Reagan. Some FSLN leaders feared that once Reagan no longer had to worry about running for a second term, he would militarily intervene if Nicaragua did not have an internationally recognized, popularly elected government.

Still another defensive action taken by the Nicaraguan government was limiting civil liberties, including imposing press censorship. Such

restrictions were suspended during the election campaign period but reinstituted shortly afterwards. *La Prensa* was shut down temporarily in 1986 (in order to prevent, according to the Nicaraguan government, publication of militarily useful information or rumors that might incite panic hoarding of essential goods). And labor strikes were banned during the contra war. As the war continued, Sandinista activists often attempted to mobilize the mass organizations, which had earlier served in part as social centers of participatory democracy, on behalf of government policies and the anticontra effort. The increasing FSLN- and government-directed character of mass organizations reduced their popularity, and participation in them declined markedly in the late 1980s (Vickers 1990).

The Sandinista government justified its limitations on civil liberties by appealing to the precedents set by other nations at war, noting, for example, that during World War I and World War II the U.S. government restricted freedom of the press and freedom of speech, imposed a ban on strikes, and, specifically during World War II, forcibly relocated tens of thousands of Japanese-American citizens, all to be more effective in a fight against enemies thousands of miles away—who never came close to invading U.S. national territory. Also, the Sandinistas were painfully aware of how the CIA and its conservative Chilean allies had made use of the wide-open democracy during Allende's presidency to prepare to overthrow not only the Allende government but also the entire democratic system in Chile (see Chapter 5). The Sandinistas and many other Nicaraguans vowed to prevent Nicaragua from becoming another Chile. The Nicaraguan government asserted that the true cause of limitations on civil liberties was the war being waged on Nicaragua by the Reagan administration and that full civil liberties would be restored once that war ended.

Outside assistance bolstered Nicaragua's ability to cope at least partially with the effects of the U.S. economic embargo and the contra war. As the Reagan administration shut down U.S. commerce with Nicaragua, Western and Eastern Europe dramatically increased their trade and sent economic and technical assistance. The Soviet Union provided weapons and Cuba sent military advisers. Assistance from the USSR was estimated to be about $400 million annually in the late 1980s (Cockcroft 1989).

1989 PEACE AGREEMENT
AND 1990 ELECTION

The revolutionary Nicaraguan government's diplomatic successes went beyond obtaining aid and increasing trade with Europe. Nicaragua in 1989 won the cooperation of the presidents of the other four Central

American states and the support of the Organization of American States and the United Nations for a comprehensive peace plan (*New York Times,* Feb. 16, 1989, p. A14; Aug. 8, 1989, p. A1; Oct. 2, 1989, p. A10). The agreement called for dismantling the contra camps in Honduras and amnesty and repatriation for all those who wished to return to Nicaragua. National and municipal elections were scheduled to be held by the end of February 1990. Voter registration, the participation of existing and new political parties, campaigning, and the election itself were to be supervised by officially designated observers from the UN and the OAS. The involvement of those organizations in the election process was meant to provide irrefutable evidence and an impartial judgment regarding the fairness of the election to a potentially hostile or skeptical Bush administration.

In the campaign for the February 25, 1990, election, fourteen political parties formed a coalition, the National Opposition union (UNO), to run against the FSLN party. UNO included (in alphabetical order) the Central American Integrationist party, the Communist Party of Nicaragua, the Conservative National Action party, the Conservative Popular alliance (one of the largest parties in the coalition), the Democratic Party of National Confidence, the Independent Liberal party (another of the largest parties in UNO), the Liberal Constitutionalist party, the Liberal party, the National Action party, the National Conservative party, the Nicaraguan Democratic movement, the Nicaraguan Socialist party, the Popular Social Christian party, and the Social Democratic party (*New York Times,* March 1, 1990, p. A20). UNO was also supported by Yatama, a Miskito Indian organization. Several leaders within the UNO coalition had at one time been associated with the contras, while other leaders and parties in UNO, although critical of the FSLN, had also opposed the contras and the violent attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The UNO coalition selected Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of the assassinated anti-Somoza newspaper editor, Pedro Chamorro, as its presidential candidate. She did not officially belong to any of the individual parties in the UNO alliance. The Social Christian party and a number of other parties ran independently.

In the election, in which an estimated 93 percent of those eligible participated, the UNO group of parties received approximately 55 percent of the vote, while the FSLN received about 41 percent and other parties about 4 percent. This outcome resulted in the election of Violeta Chamorro over the incumbent president and FSLN presidential candidate, Daniel Ortega (*New York Times,* Feb. 27, 1990, p. A1; Feb. 28, 1990, p. A1). The seats in the new parliament were awarded in approximate proportion to the votes received by the UNO coalition, the FSLN, and the other competing parties. The FSLN won thirty-nine

seats, and one each were won by two parties not in the UNO alliance, the Revolutionary Unity movement and the Social Christian party. Among the parties within the UNO coalition, the three conservative parties received a total of thirteen seats, the three liberal parties, twelve; the socialist and social democratic parties, eleven; the three social Christian parties (the Democratic Party of National Confidence, the Popular Social Christian party, and the National Action party) received ten seats; the Communist party, three seats; and the Central American Integrationist party, two seats (Vilas 1990).

Pre- and postelection voter surveys and interviews identified several major reasons for the defeat of the FSLN. The most important appeared to be concern about the Nicaraguan economy, which had 1,700 percent inflation in 1989 (following over 33,000 percent inflation in 1988) along with an estimated 30 percent unemployed or underemployed (*New York Times*, March 4, 1990, p. A1). Some observers claimed the austerity measures imposed by the FSLN-dominated government in 1988, designed to rescue the economy, hurt low-income workers and peasants more than the middle or upper classes (Vilas 1990). Since many FSLN leaders were somewhat insulated from economic hardships by virtue of their government jobs and privileges, such as cars and housing, resentment among the poor grew. As a result, electoral support for UNO came not only from the most politically conservative and wealthy sectors in the population but also from the most impoverished. The discontented among the poor typically knew little of UNO proposals or policies but desperately hoped for economic salvation under a new government and perhaps also desired to punish the Sandinistas for failing to deliver on past promises (O'Kane 1990). As many as 150,000 voters were estimated to have shifted from their 1984 vote for the FSLN and Daniel Ortega to UNO and Violeta Chamorro in 1990.

The military draft under the Sandinista government was also unpopular, along with the war against the contras, which had taken an estimated 30,000 lives by 1990 and resulted in the destruction of much of the early postrevolutionary educational and medical gains in the countryside. Some voters felt that Sandinista economic policies and hostility toward the United States government were largely responsible for both economic problems and the war. Others opposed the Sandinistas because of their periodic repressive measures toward opponents.

Many voters blamed the U.S. economic embargo and contra war for most of Nicaragua's problems but concluded that the only way to save Nicaragua would be to replace the FSLN with a government more acceptable to the United States and likely to receive immediate U.S. economic aid. Some Nicaraguans opposed the Sandinista presidential and vice-presidential candidates, Ortega and Sergio Ramírez, simply

because these men were running for reelection to new six-year terms instead of accepting lesser political roles and supporting other FSLN members for the top offices (Vilas 1990). Finally, many voters admired and positively identified with Violeta Chamorro, whose husband had been martyred in the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship and whose own family, like so many in Nicaragua, had divided over the issue of support or opposition to the governing Sandinista party (one son and one daughter on each side). Chamorro was also respected for having remained in Nicaragua to pursue her ideals and her conception of the Nicaraguan Revolution.

President Daniel Ortega and other Sandinista leaders peacefully surrendered governmental power and control of the military to President Chamorro and the new parliament on April 25, 1990 (*New York Times,* Apr. 26, 1990, p. A1). To the surprise of many, President Chamorro reappointed Humberto Ortega, the brother of the former president, as head of the armed forces (*New York Times,* Jan. 10, 1991, p. A6). Following the election President Bush quickly ended the U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua and announced plans to send $300 million in assistance to help restore Nicaragua's devastated economy (*New York Times,* March 14, 1990, p. A15). Violeta Chamorro, Daniel Ortega, and President Bush within days of the election all called for the contras to disband. In accordance with the peace agreement, most contras turned in their weapons to UN peacekeeping troops, who had been deployed in the Nicaraguan countryside to prevent further violent conflict (*New York Times,* June 11, 1990, p. A3).

Although the FSLN lost the 1990 presidential election, it remained the country's largest, best-organized, and most popular individual political party, with many supporters in the military, the police, the major labor unions, and among government employees and teachers. Daniel Ortega, an FSLN member of parliament after the 1990 elections, and other prominent Sandinista leaders vowed to "rule from below" and to fight in parliament and through the threat of labor strikes and demonstrations to defend what they viewed as the positive achievements of the revolution for the nation's disadvantaged (*New York Times,* May 30, 1990, p. A1). By mid-1990 there had been major strikes in Nicaragua for higher wages and against proposed government policies that many viewed as benefiting the economically privileged to the detriment of the less fortunate (*New York Times,* July 11, 1990, p. A3). And in general the poverty, inequality, and other economic factors that initially had led to the formation of the FSLN, the Nicaraguan Revolution, and the development of other conflicts in Central America appeared in 1990 as

bad as or worse than they were in 1970 (*New York Times,* June 24, 1990, p. E3).

WHY WERE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATIONS SO HOSTILE?

What could possibly have accounted for the intense hostility and violent responses of the Reagan and Bush administrations toward the Nicaraguan Revolution, while at the same time they took nonviolent and much more tolerant approaches to regimes internationally evaluated as undemocratic, brutally repressive, or even racist (such as the pre-1990 military dictatorship in Chile or the white minority government in South Africa)? The government first rationalized aid to the contras by stating that the contras were being used to stop arms shipments across Nicaragua to leftist rebels in El Salvador. But soon it became clear that the real goal was to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The Reagan administration's negative attitude toward Nicaragua was undoubtedly partly due to the president's tendency, which persisted until at least the latter half of his second term, to view the world largely in terms of a bipolar East-West competition. According to this rigid logic, because the Nicaraguan revolutionary government was not clearly in the U.S. camp and was receiving military and other assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba, it was an ally or even a clone of the enemy superpower, not the product of a revolution unique to its own culture and history. By 1983 President Reagan accused Nicaragua of having become a totalitarian Communist dictatorship, a charge rejected not only by most of the world's other democracies but also by the leadership of major religious denominations in the United States (*Hartford Courant–Associated Press,* May 19, 1985, p. A12).

Reagan also claimed that the Nicaraguan government was persecuting minorities and religions, and that Nicaragua was serving as a base for international terrorism. These charges were criticized as either falsehoods or exaggerations (*New York Times,* June 18, 1985, p. A27). Furthermore, the Reagan administration claimed that the large Sandinista army and militia constituted a potential invasion threat to neighboring countries. The Nicaraguan government responded by inviting members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Senate, and news media to inspect its military and armaments in order to prove that its capabilities and deployment of armed forces were for defensive purposes (CBS, Oct. 27, 1985).

A major reason for the Reagan administration's animosity toward Nicaragua may have been the fear that a successful Nicaraguan Revo-

lution could serve as an inspiration for other less-developed societies. The Cuban Revolution succeeded in redistributing wealth toward the poor majority and in creating a social and economic system more egalitarian than any other society in Latin America (Eckstein 1986). But the Cuban model was not very appealing to other American peoples because its one-party, Marxist-Leninist government ran counter to aspirations for an open and free political system. The victory of Popular Unity in Chile in 1970 suggested that a more attractive alternative might be possible. Through elections in a multiparty system, a movement advocating radical redistribution of wealth *and* the retention of an open, democratic political system had come to power. But for a variety of reasons, including the economic pressures applied by the Nixon administration, CIA intrigues, and the opposition of conservative Chilean military, business, and political leaders, the Chilean experiment ended, at least temporarily, in disaster.

In Nicaragua, after a violent revolution, another government advocating radical redistribution of wealth achieved power. But unlike Chile, the army that served the past conservative regime was destroyed and the new national army was supportive of the goal of social and economic revolution. Furthermore, the willingness of the government to distribute arms to hundreds of thousands of citizens and the results of the 1984 election reflected widespread popular support for the Nicaraguan government (in Chile, among the contending parties, Popular Unity was never able to achieve an absolute majority of the vote). All these factors indicated that Nicaragua was on the verge of achieving that dreamed of, but elusive, combination of socioeconomic revolution *and* democracy in a Third World country. Nicaraguan success might have threatened the interests of multinational corporations, for which economic stability and certainty of favorable investment conditions were viewed as prerequisites for profit-making ventures in less-developed societies.

Real political democracy in nations of impoverished workers and farmers constitutes a risk factor many multinationals have been content to do without. Truly democratic elections might result in governments that respond to popular aspirations by raising minimum wage levels (thereby increasing the cost of labor and reducing profits) or by expropriating foreign holdings (as occurred in Chile). The loss of political and economic control over Nicaragua was of little direct significance to most multinational corporations or the economies of their homelands. But if, having been encouraged by the Nicaraguan example, movements advocating socioeconomic revolution and real democracy (meaning the mobilization and political participation of the poor majority) come to power in the larger and more populous nations of Latin America or

certain other less-developed parts of the world, the impact on the multinationals could be very significant.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The major unifying motivation for and central cause of the Nicaraguan Revolution, the widespread desire to end Somoza family rule, served as the basis for joining diverse political and economic groups in the FSLN-led anti-Somoza movement. Later, conflicting class interests and differing conceptions of a post-Somoza government and society caused many Nicaraguans to desert the revolutionary alliance with the FSLN.

The FSLN was formed initially by young dissident members of Nicaragua's educated classes who intended not only to oust the dictator but also to bring social revolution to Nicaragua. Other elements of Nicaragua's elite, moderates and conservatives, had periodically mobilized against the Somoza dictatorship. The assassination of an outspoken critic of the Somozas, wealthy newspaper editor Pedro Chamorro, convinced more upper-class Nicaraguans that the family dictatorship must end. In 1978 and 1979 many business and church leaders helped weaken the Somoza government by withdrawing their support.

Popular discontent developed in response to the vast economic inequalities in Nicaragua and in reaction to the avarice, corruption, and repression of the Somozas. Discontent was considerably widened and intensified by the spread of Liberation Theology, by the misuse of earthquake relief aid, and by the increasing acts of brutality such as the torture and murder of hundreds of suspected Sandinista sympathizers and the assassination of Pedro Chamorro. Finally, mass frustration reached explosive levels that found expression in the urban insurrections of 1978 and 1979.

For decades U.S. administrations had supported Somoza family control of the Nicaraguan government and had provided weapons and training to the dictatorship's armed forces. But, in contrast, President Carter's emphasis on human rights and his policy of making military aid contingent on improvements in the recipient nation's treatment of its citizens caused Anastasio Somoza Debayle to end a state of siege. This relaxation of repression allowed opposition forces greater freedom of movement. Later, as evidence of the Somoza regime's brutality increased, the Carter administration pressured Somoza to leave, thereby precipitating the final collapse of the National Guard and the remaining prerevolutionary state structure. Neither the United States nor any other country intervened militarily to prevent the revolutionary victory. The

Reagan administration later altered the level of U.S. permissiveness and attempted to change the outcome of the revolution.

The disintegration of Somoza's regime occurred in stages: The initial withdrawal in 1977 of unconditional U.S. support for the Somoza government was a central factor. The result was that the people of Nicaragua no longer viewed the strength of the Somoza government as identical to the economic and military power of the United States. The Somoza state was probably also weakened by perception of the dictator's serious health problems following the heart attack he suffered in July 1977. Acts of repression intended to buttress Somoza rule actually weakened the regime by further alienating not only ordinary Nicaraguans but also moderate and conservative members of Nicaragua's economic elite. Eventually, support for Somoza's government narrowed to a small number of rightist Nicaraguans and the Nicaraguan National Guard, whose officers correctly anticipated its extinction in the advent of an FSLN victory. Loss of U.S. support in summer 1979, coupled with the flight of the dictator to Miami, caused the final destruction of the Somoza system. Demoralized members of the battered National Guard disbanded and were either captured or fled to neighboring countries.

Republican administration strategy appeared to be one of inflicting hardships on the Nicaraguan people and of provoking postrevolution authorities into enacting unpopular measures, such as the military draft and restrictions on civil liberties, in order to foster mass discontent, which would lead either to an overthrow of the Sandinista-led government or to a critical erosion of its popular support. The military and economic pressures brought against Nicaragua did not succeed in violently overthrowing the revolution but did have catastrophic effects on health care, education, social welfare, and general living standards, which contributed to the 1990 election defeat of the FSLN.

NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1912–1925   U.S. troops stationed in Nicaragua

1926–1933   U.S. troops return to Nicaragua during civil war, train and support the Nicaraguan National Guard in the war against forces led by nationalist rebel leader Sandino

1934   Sandino is murdered

1936   Somoza uses National Guard to seize Nicaraguan government

1956   Anastasio Somoza García assassinated

1961   Sandinista Front for National Liberation founded

1977   Carter makes U.S. aid conditional on improved human rights situation; Anastasio Somoza Debayle ends state of siege

1978   Pedro Joaquín Chamorro murdered; Sandinista unit seizes National Palace; insurrections and strikes against Somoza regime

1979   Civil war intensifies; Somoza flees July 17; Sandinistas control Managua and declare victory July 19

1980   Divisions occur in revolutionary coalition

1981   Reagan provides U.S. support for counterrevolutionaries

1981–1989   Contra war

1990   Following peace agreements, internationally supervised vote results in election of Violeta Chamorro as president of Nicaragua

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
The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Fundamentalism

As the Sandinistas and their allies battled to defeat the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, another revolutionary coalition mobilized to attempt the overthrow of the shah of Iran. In the mid-1970s Iran's economy seemed to be prospering from the high price paid by European nations, Japan, and the United States for Iranian oil. But the oil-derived wealth disproportionately benefited a minority of Iran's people and contributed to increased inequality and disruptions of traditional social and economic patterns. Much of the expanded national income was channeled into grandiose military and economic development projects conceived by Muhammad Shah Pahlavi and his advisers. The repressive aspects of the shah's regime, its ties to foreign interests, and certain of its economic and cultural policies fostered a pervasive hatred of the monarch.

Animosity toward the shah and the intensification of Iranian nationalism, aroused by the perception of the shah's regime as an instrument of foreign imperialism, united otherwise incompatible groups into a powerful and determined revolutionary alliance. In the course of one year, 1978, the shah's regime and the legacy of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy were swept away. But the revolutionary process continued beyond the January 16, 1979, flight of the shah. Among the contending revolutionary forces, religious leaders possessed a greater cultural affinity to Iran's masses and better access to extensive social networks for mobilizing large numbers of people than any other component of the original anti-shah coalition. The result was a startling innovation in the history of world governments, the creation of the Islamic Republic.

229

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Iran is a Middle Eastern nation located to the south of the Caspian Sea and to the north of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It is bordered by Iraq, the USSR, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. At 636,293 square miles (1,648,000 sq km²), it is more than twice the size of Texas. Much of the country is a plateau averaging 4,000 feet (1,219 m). A large desert stretches 800 miles (1,217 km), but there are also many oases and forests. In 1990 Iran's population was approximately 55 million. The capital, Tehran, had more than 6 million residents. Sixty-three percent of Iran's people were Persian speaking. The remainder included Turkish-speaking minorities (about 25 percent, primarily the Azeris), Kurds (6 percent), Arabs (4 percent), and others (Abrahamian 1982).

NATIONAL CULTURE

Until 1934, Iran was known to the world as Persia, the Greek word for Pars, a part of ancient Iran. In the sixth century B.C., Cyrus the Great established the Persian Empire, which reached its greatest extent around 525 B.C., spanning territory from the Indus to the Nile. The Arab conquest in A.D. 637 resulted in the conversion of most of Iran's population from the Zoroastrian religion to Islam.

Islam, an Arabic word, means the state of submission to the one and only God (Allah), and **Muslim** refers to a person who has submitted to the will of Allah. Muslims share a faith in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, who was born in 571 in Mecca. When he was about forty years old, he began preaching to the local people, who previously had worshiped several deities, saying that he had been given messages from God through the Archangel Gabriel. Muhammad's verbal expositions of God's revelations were recorded by the Prophet's followers in 114 chapters (of greatly varying length), which together constituted the Quran (Koran). By the time of Muhammad's death in 632, Islam was prevalent in much of contemporary Saudi Arabia.

Leaders of the Islamic community elected a successor to the Prophet called the *caliph.* The first caliph died after only two years, and the next two were criticized for rendering unfair judgments and favoring the interests of the rich. Both were assassinated. The fourth elected caliph was Ali, a cousin of the Prophet and husband of the Prophet's daughter, Fatima. Ali, revered by many as a champion of the poor and exploited, was opposed by several powerful Muslims and was also assassinated in 661. A belief had developed among some Muslims, however, that Ali had originally been chosen as successor by Muhammad. According to this line of reasoning, only descendants of Ali and Fatima were to rule

the community of Islam. Believers in this concept came to be known as "Shiat Ali" (Partisans of Ali) or more simply "Shia." The Shia Muslims referred to Ali and certain male descendants of Ali and Fatima whom they recognized as having the right to rule on behalf of Allah as imams.

The imams were thought by the Shia to be infallible. Other Muslims rejected this notion and instead held the view that the faithful were to consider infallible only the Quran, the Word of Allah and the most-central element of the "tradition," or "Sunna," of Islam. According to the "Sunnis," no person after Muhammad was infallible. Religious leaders could only attempt to interpret the Quran to the faithful in the particular context of each historical era. In the early 1990s, the large majority within Islam were Sunni and about one-sixth were Shia.

The Shia attached special significance to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in 680. Hussein was the grandson of the Prophet and, according to the Shia, the third imam (the first being Hussein's father, Ali, and the second, Hussein's brother Hassan). Following the death of Ali, the caliphate was assumed by Muawiya Abi Sufian, governor of Syria and antagonist of Ali. During the course of his nineteen-year reign, Muawiya attempted to alter the basis for ascendancy to the caliphate from election by the Islamic community to that of heredity (the dynastic principle). However, Muawiya's plan was for the line of descent to follow from him rather than from the Prophet. Muawiya designated his son Yazid as the successor to the caliphate. Yazid demanded that Ali's son, Hussein, pledge his allegiance to him. When Hussein refused, Yazid's army surrounded and killed him and many of his seventy-two companions in the Karbala desert in Iraq. In subsequent years, Hussein's death while resisting Yazid's tyranny came to symbolize the major example of "jihad" (a struggle conducted on behalf of the Islamic community) and martyrdom for the Shia (Hussain 1985). The concept of martyrdom thus became especially powerful among the Shia.

Despite the inflammatory issue of what constituted the right to govern the Islamic community after the death of the Prophet, the Sunnis and the Shia otherwise had very similar sets of beliefs based on the Quran and the Sharia, Islamic law derived from the Quran. However, several divisions developed among the Shia concerning how many imams had actually followed Muhammad. The Twelver Shias held that the last imam, the infant son of the eleventh Imam, vanished in 873. With the disappearance of the last imam there was no longer an infallible interpreter of the Quran and Islamic law. This situation will only change when the twelfth imam, the "hidden imam," or "Mahdi," returns to the faithful. Twelver Shia adherents believed that in the absence of the infallible imams, Islamic scholars (*mujtahid*) qualified to issue authori-

tative, *though* fallible, opinions in all matters relating to Islam were to govern the Islamic community (Hussain 1985).

Prior to the sixteenth century, the people of Iran were mostly Sunni. The spread of Twelver Shiism was occasioned by the Safavid conquest of Iran at the beginning of that century. The Safavids decided to foster a distinct religious culture in order to maintain the population's loyalty in the conflict against the powerful Sunni Ottoman Empire expanding from Turkey. Consequently, the Safavid rulers adopted Twelver Shiism as Iran's state religion. They imported Shia religious experts on Islamic law ("ulama") from southern Iraq, as well as from Syria and Lebanon, and provided them with wealth and status. In return the ulama accepted the Safavid dynasty and provided the new rulers with a Shia clerical infrastructure. By 1700, most Iranians were Shia.

THE QAJAR DYNASTY AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE

In 1779 Aga Muhammad Khan Qajar, leader of the Qajars (a Shia tribe), conquered almost all of Iran. In return for Shia religious leaders' support, the Qajars confirmed the ulama's right (originally established during the Safavid dynasty) to accept and administer religious endowments, or *waqf*s, donated by wealthy Iranians. This provided the clergy with a significant measure of economic independence. The ulama were also allowed to collect religious taxes.

The Qajar rulers often cooperated with Britain and Russia. The British began work in 1859 on a thirteen-year project to put a telegraph system through Iran to link Britain with its colonial interests in India. And in 1879 Nasser al-Din Shah accepted Russian military assistance to organize and train an elite Iranian military unit, the Iranian Cossack Brigade. Both Britain and Russia were granted economic privileges that many Iranians perceived as detrimental to their country.

Early in the twentieth century a number of Iranian intellectuals, thinking that a parliament could protect national interests from the foreign imperialists who exercised so much influence over the Qajar shahs, organized a movement for a constitutional monarchy. The first parliament, or Majlis, convened in October 1906 but was prevented from fully confronting the British and the Russians by internal strife and foreign military intervention. By World War I, Great Britain's interest in Iran intensified; the British navy had begun to switch from coal to oil fuel, much of which was obtained from the British-owned Anglo Persian Oil Company's Iranian wells at secretly lowered prices (Hussain 1985). When the Bolshevik Revolution succeeded, Russian officers left the Iranian Cossack Brigade to return to their homeland.

IRAN

The British then took control of the brigade and the Ministries of War and Finance.

In 1921 the new Soviet government and Iran signed a treaty stating that neither the USSR nor Iran would allow its territory to be used as a platform for launching aggression against the other. The British, who had been aiding counterrevolutionaries trying to overthrow the Soviets, became alarmed and worried that Bolshevism might spread not only to Iran but also to the huge British colonial possession, India. To counter the threat of socialist revolution, the British considered helping to oust the ineffective and corrupt Qajar dynasty and supporting a new leader committed to modernization and the organization of a strong Iranian government with a military capable of defeating potential revolutionary movements (Abrahamian 1982; Milani 1988).

The British-backed candidate for post-Qajar leadership of Iran was forty-two-year-old Colonel Reza Khan, commander of Iran's British-advised Cossack Brigade. On February 21, 1921, Reza Khan led 3,000 soldiers to Tehran, forced the resignation of the Qajar government's prime minister, and soon assumed the position of minister of war. For the next four years, Reza Khan, while manipulating the government and greatly expanding the standing army he commanded to 40,000 men, pretended to back Ahmad Shah Qajar. Reza Khan increased his support among the Persian-speaking majority by successfully suppressing tribal rebellions and unifying the nation. Finally on October 25, 1925, the parliament voted (80 to 5 with 30 abstentions) to depose the Qajar dynasty. Reza adopted the name of a pre-Islamic Iranian language, "Pahlavi," as the name for his dynasty and crowned himself shah-en-shah (king of kings) in 1926.

THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY

Reza Shah Pahlavi quickly enacted measures that were aimed at modernizing the economy and speeding the development of a new middle class, including engineers, doctors, lawyers, businessmen, civil servants, secular teachers, and other professional and technical workers. Because Reza Shah came to view traditional Shia influence in the social and political systems as an impediment to social change, he decided to reduce the power of the clergy. But he attempted to minimize opposition to this policy by simultaneously carrying out popular economic reforms and pronationalist actions.

During the 1930s new laws restricted the number of seminaries, placed several theological centers under state supervision, and gave the state approval power over religious endowment expenditures. The shah ordered all state institutions to accept women, and he reversed the

previous requirement that women appear in public wearing the veil. At the same time he gratified Iranian nationalism by renegotiating the British oil concession, resulting in more favorable terms for Iran. Although the shah restricted candidacy for the national legislature to individuals of whom he approved, the basis of his political strength was his growing army and police and his development of an extensive patronage system (continued and expanded by his son), through which loyal military officers, businessmen, and even some religious figures were rewarded for their allegiance. The shah's government built thousands of miles of roads, the trans-Iranian railroad, and 230 factories, providing opportunities for the shah and his associates to enrich themselves both within the law and illegally.

The concerns of vastly more powerful nations locked in the conflict of World War II and aware of Iran's strategic importance led to Reza Shah's loss of power. The shah had been favorably impressed by the German Nazi government, which came to power in 1933. Adolf Hitler had referred to Iran as an Aryan nation, inhabited by people racially related to Germans. In 1934 the shah proclaimed that the country should in the future be referred to by the rest of the world as Iran, "land of the Aryans," rather than Persia. The shah also invited hundreds of German advisers to Iran to assist in construction projects and in the organization of an Iranian Youth Corps.

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, both the Russians and the British feared the shah would side with Germany, possibly deny them Iran's oil and bestow this resource on their enemy, and forbid the use of Iranian territory as a weapons supply route to the Soviets. On August 25, 1941, the Soviets occupied northern Iran and the British seized sections in the south. Fearing that the Allied invaders would depose him and also terminate the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his twenty-year-old son, Muhammad Reza, a course of action acceptable to the British who were apparently concerned for the future stability of Iran and the possibility of expanded Russian influence if the monarchy was not preserved (Abrahamian 1982).

Reza was quickly transported to the British island colony of Mauritius and then to Johannesburg, South Africa, where he died in 1944. The first Pahlavi shah, however, left behind an Iran containing two distinct and antagonistic cultures.

> The upper and new middle classes became increasingly Westernized and scarcely understood the traditional or religious culture of most of their compatriots. On the other hand peasant and urban Bazaar classes [traditional middle-class merchants, craftsmen, and their employees] continued to follow the ulama, however politically cowed the ulama were. . . .

These classes associated "the way things should be" more with Islam than with the West. (Keddie 1981, p. 111)

Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi

The new shah in 1941 was a Western-educated playboy who lacked his father's charisma, forcefulness, and physical stature; he ascended to the "peacock throne" under British sponsorship, with his exercise of governmental power limited by Allied occupation authorities. Following the end of the war, he was in desperate need of increased internal as well as external support. Leftist political parties had attempted to establish independent republics in the Kurdistan and Azerbaijan sections of Iran while Russian forces were present in those areas. In particular, Russian troops delayed their departure from Azerbaijan. The U.S. government, fearful of either Russian imperialism or the establishment of new nations in the region controlled by leftist governments, backed the shah's demand that the Russians withdraw. When they did, the shah's army marched in and suppressed the separatist governments. The shah's actions not only rallied significant nationalist support for his leadership but also seemed to identify him as an effective anti-Communist Third World leader.

The shah attempted to appeal to the ulama by portraying himself as both a defender of Islam and a foe of communism. Eventually, pronounced divisions came to exist within the ulama regarding the monarchy. The majority of the clergy prior to the revolutionary turmoil of the 1970s, the "orthodox" ulama, were accepting or supportive of the monarchy and rejected involvement in politics unless government actions threatened Islam or violated Islamic law. A significant minority, the "fundamentalist" ulama, held the position that Islam and the clergy must be involved in politics and government and that, in fact, any concept of separating church and state was un-Islamic and a key element of foreign imperialist strategy against Muslim societies intended to subvert them culturally, politically, and economically (Hussain 1985; Milani 1988). Until the 1970s, this group sometimes supported the shah as a bulwark against the spread of Iran's Communist movement. But after 1971 the fundamentalists, by then led by Ayatollah Khomeini, openly attacked the monarchy form of government.

Following World War II, the shah feared the further growth of the Iranian Communist party, the Tudeh (Masses), which during the wartime period of Russian influence had increased its membership to more than 50,000, drawing recruits from both the modern middle class and industrial employees, particularly oil-field workers (Abrahamian 1982). The shah repeatedly predicted, especially after the 1963 protests, which

were religiously inspired for the most part, that his government would be attacked by an alliance of Islamic fundamentalists and leftists, in effect anticipating that these otherwise mutually hostile groups could be united by their hatred of his regime. The unsuccessful attempt on the shah's life on February 4, 1949, in which he was shot and wounded, appeared to justify his concern. The attacker, immediately killed by the shah's bodyguards, was carrying identification papers indicating that he was a reporter for an Islamic newspaper and that he also belonged to a journalists' union affiliated to a Communist-led union federation (Abrahamian 1982). In reaction, the government temporarily imprisoned Ayatollah Kashani, then leader of the fundamentalists, and enacted repressive measures against the Iranian Communist party.

The 1953 National Front Government

The ouster of Reza Shah during World War II had revived the vitality of the national parliament and had helped to shift the balance of power toward it and away from the monarch. Smarting from the humiliating wartime foreign occupations, parliamentary leaders soon attempted to assert Iranian national interests through a proposed expropriation of the British-controlled Anglo Iranian Oil Company. In March 1951 the parliament voted 79 to 12 in favor of nationalization and demanded that the shah name as premier Muhammad Mossadeq, leader of the National Front.

The National Front was composed primarily of secular nationalists, drawn mainly from the urban, educated, new middle class, who favored an end to foreign political influence and economic exploitation. National Front leaders proclaimed that they were also dedicated to strengthening democracy by shifting control of the military from the shah to elected government leaders and by reducing other monarchal prerogatives and ending what they viewed as the Pahlavis' repeated autocratic violations of the provisions of the 1906 constitution. But the National Front had little in the way of grass-roots organization among either the industrial working class or the peasants. Mossadeq, in fact, attempted unsuccessfully to bar illiterate men from voting (women did not have the right to vote) because he thought they could be too easily manipulated by traditional authorities such as the heads of families with large landholdings in the countryside (Abrahamian 1982). The support Mossadeq received from the masses was based primarily on the popularity of his nationalist appeals to the people and his charisma. When confronted with obstacles from the shah or opponents in parliament, Mossadeq's solution was often to speak directly to the nation and provoke marches and demonstrations in support of his policies. The temporary ally of

Mossadeq's National Front was Ayatollah Kashani's fundamentalist Islamic movement, which advocated anti-imperialism on behalf of purging un-Islamic foreign influences. The Tudeh, while not allied with the National Front, also stated its support for an end to foreign economic exploitation, but in addition wanted to achieve an extensive redistribution of wealth.

Mossadeq seized control of the military from the shah, confiscated royal lands, and reduced the palace budget, giving the savings to the country's Health Ministry. With emergency powers granted him by the parliament, Mossadeq increased the peasants' share of agricultural produce by 15 percent and shifted the burden of taxation away from the poorer classes (Abrahamian 1982).

Great Britain, however, was outraged by the Iranian seizure of its oil holdings. And although Mossadeq looked to the United States for support, the British convinced the Dwight Eisenhower administration that the Mossadeq government was a threat to Western interests and had to be eliminated. The British got major Western oil companies to cooperate in a largely successful international boycott of Iranian oil, which resulted in a deterioration of Iran's economy. The traditional middle class, whose members' businesses were harmed by both the worsening economic conditions and Mossadeq's emergency regulatory measures, became increasingly dissatisfied. In January 1953 Ayatollah Kashani, troubled by the complaints of the strongly Islamic merchants and shopkeepers, and the increasing strength of the Tudeh and other leftist elements, ended his alliance with the National Front.

When Mossadeq's ability to control the parliament was impaired by opposition from conservative, pro-shah, and some clerical legislators and the filibustering tactics (unending debates) they employed, National Front parliamentarians (thirty of the seventy-nine members of parliament) resigned their seats, which reduced the size of the legislative body below its necessary minimum and in effect disbanded it. Mossadeq then held a national referendum, a measure not in accordance with the country's constitution, in July 1953, to provide proof that the majority of Iran's people backed his actions (Abrahamian 1982; Diba 1986). The vote, which he won overwhelmingly, was interpreted by him as supporting both the dissolution of parliament and his continuation in power (although referendum procedures were criticized as unfair by Mossadeq opponents).

Several groups conspired to eliminate the Mossadeq government. Most important were the royalist officers in the military who had received special benefits that might be threatened if anti-shah civilian authorities succeeded in permanently gaining control over the armed

forces. British agents and the U.S. CIA worked with pro-shah officers during 1953 to organize and coordinate the overthrow of the National Front government. Other Mossadeq opponents included many in the upper class who had profited through their association with the shah or Western businesses and feared that future reforms might harm their interests. Finally, a number of high-ranking clerics, in addition to Kashani, began to look again to the monarchy as a mechanism for suppressing the Communist movement (Abrahamian 1982; Keddie 1981).

On August 12, 1953, the shah announced the dismissal of Mossadeq as premier and the appointment of General Fazlollah Zahedi as his successor. Troops in the Imperial Guard moved to carry out the shah's order. However, soldiers loyal to the Mossadeq government surrounded and arrested the pro-shah unit. Faced with a failed takeover attempt, the shah fled in his private plane to Rome. His departure sparked wild street celebrations and demonstrations, which deteriorated into three days of rioting, often with strong anti-British and anti-American aspects. Mossadeq's order for the army to end civil disorders provided the cover for General Zahedi to launch the coup. As troops suppressed pro-Mossadeq demonstrators, pro-shah civilians including antileft clerics and pro-shah merchants and their employees marched into central Tehran and joined with pro-shah military units, which proceeded to attack the prime minister's residence. After nine hours and 164 deaths, the shah's forces prevailed.

The shah quickly returned to Iran to assume dictatorial power. Mossadeq and other members of his government were arrested and tried for crimes against the monarchy by a military court. In the next two years, hundreds of the shah's opponents were executed, given long prison sentences, or driven into exile. Many of these were from among 600 army personnel who had secretly been members of the Tudeh (Milani 1988).

The shah lavishly rewarded businessmen and military officers who had organized or supported the coup. CIA assistance was instrumental in helping the shah create a new secret police force to gather information and harass or destroy political opposition groups. The Sazman-e Amniyat Va Ittilaat-e Keshvar (Organization of National Security and Intelligence), or SAVAK, formally organized in 1957, would be accused of the torture and deaths of thousands of Iranians. The shah decided to provide a degree of primarily elite political participation through a parliament with two controlled parties—both led by his own cronies. The new two-party system was apparently also meant to demonstrate to concerned members of the U.S. government that the shah was "democratizing" his regime.

The White Revolution

In November 1961, the shah temporarily dispensed with the formality of parliament and decided to rule by decree in order to carry out a significant reform program rapidly. The so-called White Revolution, or "Shah-People Revolution," eventually included six publicly announced goals: (1) the distribution of many of the large landholdings among former sharecroppers; (2) government ownership of forests; (3) the sale of government-owned factories to private interests in order to raise the funds to be used to compensate those who gave up land; (4) providing women the right to vote; (5) the encouragement of profit sharing between workers and management; and (6) creation of a Literacy Corps to reduce illiteracy and promote acceptance of compulsory education (Graham 1979).

The purposes of the White Revolution, apart from the six explicitly stated aims, were to promote modernization (for example by encouraging dispossessed large landholders to use compensation money to invest in industry and commerce), to extend state control in the countryside in place of the political power previously held by landlords, and to set in motion changes, such as mechanization of farming, that would motivate much of the rural population to migrate to urban centers where labor was needed for construction projects and growing industry. The shah also hoped to win support for his regime from previously disadvantaged population groups, mainly peasants and women, gratify middle-class progressives who advocated land redistribution and greater equality for women, and accommodate pressures for economic reform emanating from Iran's powerful ally, the United States, during the Kennedy administration.

Landowners were allowed to retain "mechanized" farms, as the productivity of these enterprises was considered too important to sacrifice by division into less efficiently exploitable smallholdings. Recipients of distributed land were scheduled to pay for their parcels in equal annual installments over fifteen years (these payments were usually less than the previously paid rent). The 40 percent of rural residents who lacked cultivation rights under the old system, the large majority of whom had worked as farm laborers or in various nonagricultural service occupations, were not eligible to benefit from the reform and, consequently, were to be permanently barred from acquiring land. Many from this large group abandoned the countryside to seek employment in urban areas. To blunt opposition from the ulama, land held by clergy-controlled religious organizations was not sold but instead leased to peasants on a long-term basis (up to ninety-nine years) to farm for profit, with rent paid to the clergy.

At the conclusion of the various phases of the land-reform program in the early 1970s, about half of the nation's cultivated land had been distributed to half of the rural families. However, most of the parcels owned or leased by individual peasants were actually below the minimum necessary for subsistence. Many new landowning families were required to supplement their income by additional labor. But opportunities in the countryside were limited because greater availability of manufactured goods progressively eroded the market for traditional peasant handicrafts and increased mechanization of the large farms reduced the demand for part-time agricultural laborers (Hooglund 1982; Najmabadi 1987). Thus migration to cities of the landless and even of many members of families that had received land accelerated. Social surveys indicated that approximately 85 percent claimed their main reason for leaving the countryside was the unsatisfactory employment and income opportunities there, although many were also drawn to cities by relatively high urban wage levels (Najmabadi 1987). In Tehran most of the hundreds of thousands of rural migrants lived on the south side of the capital in primitive conditions. Many of these would join the anti-shah revolutionary upsurge in 1978.

The 1963 Protest

The White Revolution provoked serious opposition from several sectors. Some secular opponents of the shah objected to the totally unconstitutional way the program was implemented. A number of religious leaders attacked the land reform as un-Islamic because it violated what they viewed as the landlord's right to maintain his private property and weakened the independent economic resources of the clergy and its staunchest contributors. Other clerics objected to the establishment of new rights for women. Ayatollah Khomeini, who in the early 1960s was emerging as the main spokesman for the fundamentalists, also found fault with the shah's program.

Ruhollah Khomeini, born September 24, 1902, the son and grandson of religious scholars, had been oriented toward a theological career from an early age. When he was only five months old, his father was murdered, possibly in revenge for enforcing a death penalty on a man who had publicly violated an Islamic fast. Khomeini's religious education was supported by members of his landowning extended family. As a member of the clergy, he became widely known for his integrity, scholarship, teaching ability, and charismatic personality (Bakhash 1984).

In his attack on the White Revolution, Khomeini criticized the shah for not calling for the election of a new parliament but rather carrying out the reforms by decree. Behind this indictment was Khomeini's belief

that a parliament would have at least partially represented the view of the Islamic clergy. By ignoring parliament and the religious leadership, the shah was conducting government in an un-Islamic manner, that is, without the consent or even the guidance of the ulama (Hussain 1985). Khomeini also accused the shah and his wealthy supporters of being corrupt and of reaping huge and undeserved profits from their access to the nation's oil income.

In a courageous speech Khomeini asked:

> And those who have filled foreign banks with the wealth produced by our poverty-stricken people, who have built towering palaces but still will not leave the people in peace, wishing to fill their pockets . . . [are they] not parasites? Let the world judge, let the nation judge who the parasites are! Let me give you some advice, Mr. Shah! . . . Don't you know that if one day some uproar occurs and the tables are turned, none of those people around you will be your friends? They are friends of the dollar; they have no religion, no loyalty. They are hanging responsibility for everything around your miserable neck! (Algar 1981, pp. 178, 180)

The shah had Khomeini arrested on June 5, 1963. The news provoked anti-shah demonstrations and rioting in Qom, Tehran, and other cities. The shah proclaimed martial law and temporarily jailed twenty-eight prominent clergymen. In crushing the protest movement, troops killed at least eighty-six.

Khomeini was released from prison to placate both the public and other major religious leaders. By January 1964, "Khomeini had emerged as the most popular religious leader in Iran" (Milani 1988, p. 93). When a new pro-shah parliament voted to grant legal privileges to U.S. citizens engaged in military projects in Iran, Khomeini proclaimed:

> If some American's servant, some American's cook, assassinates your [religious leader] in the middle of the bazaar . . . , the Iranian police do not have the right to apprehend him! Iranian courts do not have the right to judge him! The dossier must be sent to America, so that our masters there can decide what is to be done! . . . Americans . . . are to enjoy legal immunity, but the ulama of Islam, the preachers and servants of Islam, are to live banished or imprisoned. (Algar 1981, pp. 181, 182, 186)

In retaliation, Khomeini was rearrested and exiled, and in 1965 he took up residence in the Shia holy city of Najaf in Iraq.

Economic Development and Class Structure

After the White Revolution was inaugurated, the government and private investors expanded irrigation projects and the subsidized use of

farm machinery. But agricultural production increased by only 2.5 percent per year, which could not keep pace with the 3 percent annual gain in population. Iran began to purchase and import grain and other food products. Industrial productivity, however, rose dramatically from 5 percent per year in 1963, with 1,902 factories, to 20 percent in 1977, with 7,989 factories. During the same period the number of doctors tripled, and hospital capacity doubled. College enrollment increased by over 700 percent.

The financing for Iran's rapid overall growth in industry and services came primarily from rising oil income, which was $450 million in 1963 but $4.4 billion in 1973. After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Arab nations imposed an oil blockade on the United States and European nations aiding Israel. Consequently, the price of oil rose dramatically from $2.55 per barrel in September 1973 to $11.65 in December. As Iran was not cooperating in the boycott, its oil income climbed to $11.7 billion in 1974 (Hiro 1987). The shah and many of his advisers decided to expand both industrialization and the acquisition of military hardware rapidly. Much of the expertise in using advanced machinery and weapons was imported in the form of an estimated 60,000 foreign technicians and military advisers. The very high salaries paid to these individuals, as well as to Iranians with technical expertise, contributed to a dramatic rise in inflation and to a widening income gap between the technical and professional employees and the rest of the population (Graham 1979).

Economic development during the 1960s and 1970s had significant impacts on labor force and social class composition. At the top of the prerevolutionary class system was the aristocratic core, including the shah and his brothers, sister, and cousins, totaling about sixty families. Several hundred other families were ranked in the nobility in terms of closeness of relationship to the monarch. These, as well as the nonaristocratic upper-class families, derived wealth from landholdings and investments in urban projects. Many directed companies that benefited from government contracts. The entire upper class was estimated to constitute less than 0.01 percent of the population (Abrahamian 1989).

Approximately 1 million families made up the traditional middle class (about 13 percent of the population in 1976). These were headed by individuals in the types of middle-income occupations that existed before the modernization drives of the twentieth century. About 500,000 in this class were *bazaaris*, in that their occupations were associated with the bazaar system of trade and craft industries. The bazaar structure involved a network of guilds or associations for all its participants. By 1926 there were more than 100 guilds for craftsmen, about 70 for merchants, and 40 for various types of unskilled Bazaar employees. A

guild-dominated district (bazaar) in a town or city typically contained one or more mosques, traditional religious schools, businesses, craft workshops, and several teahouses. The percentage of the labor force who were *bazaaris* declined slightly from 6.8 percent in 1966 to 6.4 percent in 1976 (Milani 1988, pp. 107, 116). The other half of the traditional middle class included families that owned one or more of the nation's 420,000 village workshops that were not part of the bazaar guild system (many of these were carpet-weaving shops employing women workers) or one or more of the several hundred thousand moderate-sized farms.

Both branches of the traditional middle class contributed money and sons (as theological students and future clergy) to Islam. Major categories among the Shia clergy included mullahs (preachers), who were thoroughly versed in the Quran and Islamic traditions and laws. Those mullahs who memorized the entire Quran and the Islamic traditions merited the title *hojatolislam* (proof of Islam). Of these some were considered learned enough to qualify as *mujtahids* (interpreters) and were entitled to issue judgments and interpretations concerning both religious affairs and events occurring in other areas of life. Those *mujtahids* who achieved wide recognition and large popular followings were awarded the title "ayatollah" (sign of Allah) (Graham 1979; Hussain 1985). At the time of the modern Iranian Revolution, Iran was estimated to have more than 5,000 mosques and at least 23,000 mullahs (and probably thousands more who were not officially certified as clergy by the shah's government), of whom as many as 5,000 were *hojatolislam* and 50 were ayatollahs (estimate of mullahs from Milani 1988; estimates of *hojatolislam* and ayatollahs from Abrahamian 1982).

The modern middle class included white-collar professionals, engineers, skilled technicians, bureaucrats, managers, teachers, other intellectuals, and the large majority of students whose educations were preparing them for future careers in these occupations. Iran's process of modernization resulted in a massive expansion during 1966–1976 of the high school population, from 158,798 to 482,042, and college enrollment, from 52,943 to 437,089. The percentage of the labor force actually employed as professional workers, technicians, administrators or managers, and teachers increased from 2.8 percent (201,577) in 1966 to 6.5 percent (571,068) in 1976 (Milani 1988, pp. 107, 114).

The industrial working class (including those employed in such areas as manufacturing, mining, oil operations, and construction) climbed from 26.5 percent (1,886,988) of the labor force in 1966 to 34.2 percent (3,012,300) in 1976. The fastest-growing component of this category was the lowest stratum of urban wage earners, which included primarily construction workers, who were 7.2 percent (509,778) of the labor force

in 1966 but 13.5 percent (1,188,720) in 1976 (Milani, 1988). Most of these were relatively recent migrants to the cities, poorly educated but usually deeply imbued with religious values. They sought continuity with their traditional culture through affiliation with the urban mosques and in 1978 became disproportionately involved in the protests and riots of the revolution.

Corresponding to the increases in the percentages of the labor force in the modern middle class and the industrial working class, the percentage directly involved in agricultural labor declined from 47.5 percent in 1966 to 34.0 percent in 1976 (Milani 1988). Other workers in rural and urban areas were involved in providing various types of services (such as transportation, sanitation, social and community welfare, domestic services).

Support for the Shah's Regime

During the 1963–1977 period, despite occasional violent attacks from small groups of adversaries, the shah's regime was relatively stable. His patronage system rewarded loyal businessmen, high-ranking state administrators (who by 1977 controlled a bureaucratic network of more than 300,000 civil servants), and military leaders. In the late 1970s, the army stood at 285,000 men, the air force at 100,000, and the navy at 30,000. Many officers recognized that their careers, the level of their salaries, and the prestige of their occupations depended on the vast sums the shah invested in the military.

The secret police, SAVAK, with thousands of full-time agents, tens of thousands of part-time informants, and a fearsome reputation for torture and even murder of the regime's opponents, deterred many from publicly attacking the regime. SAVAK focused mainly on countering the perceived threat from the modern middle class through gathering data on anti-shah activists, attempting to destroy the effectiveness of nonviolent anti-shah groups, and crushing the violent guerrilla groups that emerged among some college students and professional workers during the 1970s (Abrahamian 1982; Milani 1988).

U.S. interest in preserving the Iranian monarchy was apparently motivated by several factors, including concern for keeping Iran's important oil resource under the control of a friendly government. The shah's military build-up policies reduced the overall cost of oil to Western countries by returning much of Iran's oil profits to those nations in the form of billions in payment for advanced jet airplanes and other highly expensive military hardware. The shah used his powerful armed forces to "police" the Persian Gulf area, intervening in nearby Dhofar Province in Oman in 1975 and 1976 to help suppress a leftist rebellion and

intimidating other potential foes of pro-Western governments in the region. The belief that the shah enjoyed the unconditional support of the United States, a nation most Iranians viewed as enormously powerful and potentially ready to intervene again in Iran as it had in 1953, helped discourage open opposition. And the perception in the latter half of the 1970s that U.S. support for the shah had weakened contributed significantly to the development of the Iranian Revolution.

The generally increasing national wealth during 1963–1975 and especially the accelerated growth from the early to mid-1970s contributed to regime stability by benefiting large sectors of the population, including the industrial working class (Milani 1988). The state's growing resources allowed the shah to extend medical care, education, and social services.

Opposition to the Shah

During the 1970s there were several major sources of anti-shah sentiment, reflecting distinct dissident movements among Iran's highly educated elites. The secular nationalists were drawn largely from the expanding ranks of the modern middle class and included the survivors of the old National Front. Most of the secular nationalists demanded a return to strict adherence to the 1906 constitution and genuinely free elections. Another component of secular nationalism (in the sense of opposing Western control of Iran) was Iran's Communist party. The Tudeh, however, was tainted by its strong pro-Soviet stance. Furthermore, both the National Front and the Tudeh had little support in the countryside or among most of those who had recently migrated from rural areas to the cities (Abrahamian 1982).

The fundamentalists among the religious leadership, who advocated the concept of a government under clerical influence and faithful to traditional Islamic principles, constituted a potentially powerful adversary both to the shah's policies and eventually to the monarchy itself. The advantages the religious opposition enjoyed compared to the other anti-shah groups included the fact that the thousands of clergy constituted an organizational network permeating most classes and social groups, urban and rural. Furthermore, the masses shared a common religious value system with the clergy and did not need to be converted to a new revolutionary perspective under Islamic leadership; the fundamentalist ulama merely activated the potentially revolutionary concepts already present within Islamic ideology. A key factor in the process of mobilizing the faithful was the emergence of the charismatic, uncompromising, and widely admired anti-shah member of the religious leadership, Ayatollah Khomeini, as preeminent among the ulama (Green 1982; Hussain 1985).

The religious opposition enjoyed the support of many *bazaaris*, who not only tended to be strongly religious but also experienced considerable damage from certain of the shah's policies. These included the promotion of modern Western-style shopping centers to the detriment of the bazaars, urban development projects that destroyed some bazaar districts, and government price inspection teams that, in carrying out their function of combatting inflation by suppressing excessive profiteering by bazaar merchants, precipitated many arrests. Many *bazaaris* shifted from their 1953 position of seeing the shah as a bulwark against communism to viewing him as an un-Islamic agent of corrupting foreign cultural and economic interests.

The formation of anti-shah guerrilla movements occurred after the repression of the 1963 protests. Many young activists became impatient with nonviolent techniques of resistance, such as election boycotts, strikes, and demonstrations. Some university students formed secret discussion groups and studied revolutions in countries like China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Algeria. By the early 1970s two groups developed the capacity to launch limited armed attacks against the shah's regime: the Fedayeen-e Khalq (Self-sacrificers of the People), a secular, Marxist-oriented group, and the Mujahideen-e Khalq (Combatants of the People), an Islamic leftist movement. The Fedayeen developed out of a union in 1970 of three Marxist groups initially organized by university students and writers in Tehran, Mashad, and Tabriz. Many of the Fedayeen were the children of modern middle-class parents who had been involved in either the Tudeh or the left wing of the National Front. Ideologically, the founders appeared to draw on the Debray-Guevara theory of the guerrilla *foco*. As one leader put it, "To inspire the people we must resort to a revolutionary armed struggle . . . to shatter the illusion that the people are powerless" (Abrahamian 1985, p. 156).

The Fedayeen-e Khalq initiated the guerrilla struggles of the 1970s with its February 1971 attack on security forces at the village of Seyahkal. The group carried out bank robberies, the assassination of the chief military prosecutor, and bombings of foreign corporate offices. By 1977, 106 Fedayeen had died in combat and 66 others through execution, torture, murder, or suicide while in custody (Abrahamian 1985). Seventy-three of those killed were college students and another 54 were in occupations requiring a college degree. These characteristics reflected the fact that the shah's regime succeeded, both through repression and publicly portraying them as atheistic terrorists, in limiting largely to college-educated individuals the Fedayeen-e Khalq's appeal.

The Mujahideen-e Khalq, like the Fedayeen, had its origins in the early 1960s. But many of its members were the children of parents in the highly religious traditional middle class. The Mujahideen were a

manifestation of modernist Shiism and were influenced by a number of prominent Iranian Islamic figures who themselves never directly participated in the group and may not have approved of its violent actions (Abrahamian 1982, 1989).

Modernist Shiism developed as an alternative to orthodox Shiism and fundamentalism. The central themes of modernist Shiism were that Islam, if properly interpreted, could provide Iranians with a progressive ideology capable of modernizing Iran, achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth, and protecting the nation from foreign cultural domination and economic exploitation. Proponents of this view felt that their version of Islam could unify all major population groups, from those in modern occupations to the clergy, in a shared, indigenous Shia belief system. Among its major proponents was Mehdi Bazargan, who attempted to demonstrate a compatibility between scientific knowledge and Shiism. He called for a future Islamic government run not by clergy but by highly educated lay administrators and technically trained individuals who were dedicated to Shiism. An associate of Bazargan whose ideas also influenced the Mujahideen was Ayatollah Taleqani. Taleqani, "unlike most ayatollahs, . . . came from a poor family, . . . openly criticized his colleagues for being fearful of the modern world" and had ties to leftist political groups that favored a redistribution of wealth toward the poor (Abrahamian 1985, p. 161). Taleqani and Bazargan formed the nonviolent Liberation movement of Iran in 1961, which was often critical of the shah and foreign influence.

Another inspirational modernist figure for the Mujahideen was Ali Shariati, a famous Iranian sociologist and political activist who is regarded (along with Ayatollah Khomeini) as one of the "two most important persons whose writings exercised an all-pervading influence on the Iranian people" in the years leading up to the revolution (Hussain 1985, p. 66). Shariati, unlike several past revolutionary theorists who held that religious beliefs generally inhibited social revolution, argued that Islamic doctrine, properly interpreted, promoted and required revolution. Shariati believed that the Prophet Muhammad had intended to create a classless society but that his mission had been subverted. He asserted that "true Muslims had the duty to fight against despotic rulers, foreign exploiters, greedy capitalists, and false clergymen who use Islam as an opiate to lull masses into subservience" (Abrahamian 1985, p. 163).

After the 1963 repression, nine young members of Bazargan's and Taleqani's Islamic Liberation movement split off to form the Mujahideen. As one founder put it, "It was the duty of all Muslims to continue [the struggle begun by the Shia Imams] to create a classless society and destroy all forms of despotism and imperialism" (Abrahamian 1985, p. 163). The Mujahideen launched its first military actions in August 1971.

In the next several months the organization lost almost all its original leadership through gun battles with the shah's forces and executions. But the group found many willing new recruits to replace losses and even expand membership, the large majority of which were college educated, mainly within the physical sciences—unlike the Fedayeen, who were more often drawn from the humanities and the social sciences. After 1972, the Mujahideen developed an ideology more closely aligned with Marxist concepts. Many in the Tehran branch abandoned Islam as the basis of their revolutionary thought in favor of secular Marxist thinking, but most Mujahideen outside the capital continued to adhere to Islam. This division led to a split and two separate organizations after May 1975, with the secular Marxist offshoot eventually adopting the name "Paykar."

By early 1976, both Mujahideen groups and the Fedayeen, which itself divided over the issue of the effectiveness of its previous violence, had suffered so many losses that most members decided to avoid violent combat until more favorable circumstances existed. Therefore, just prior to the mass revolutionary upsurge of 1978, there were four major guerrilla groups, two Fedayeen and two Mujahideen. "All four were well equipped to move into action and take advantage of the revolutionary situation" (Abrahamian 1985, p. 168).

THE SETTING FOR REVOLUTION

The development of the Iranian Revolution was in part precipitated by the fact that although the economy modernized rapidly during the 1960s and the 1970s, the country's political system did not modernize in the sense of providing new avenues of effective political participation. In contrast, the shah and his advisers in 1975 decided to combine the previous two parties into the new Resurgence party and establish a one-party government. The purposes of this shift were to strengthen the regime through creation of a single party whose branches and activists would permeate every aspect of Iranian society and, in bringing religion and other major institutions under state control, to transform Iran from a "somewhat old-fashioned military dictatorship into a totalitarian style one-party state" (Abrahamian 1982, p. 441). Resurgence leaders claimed their disciplined government party would "break down traditional barriers and lead the way to a fully modern society" and, combining the best aspects of capitalism and socialism, develop a "great civilization" under the leadership of the shah, "the Light of the Aryan Race" who "guides the . . . hearts of his people" (Abrahamian 1982, pp. 441, 442).

The shah's Resurgence party government characterized much of the ulama as medieval reactionaries and sent a religious corps into the

countryside to teach the rural masses the pro-shah version of Islam. The regime announced that in the future only state-controlled religious organizations could publish theological books and asserted state rather than clerical jurisdiction over family matters. These measures and the perception that moral evils (such as pornography, prostitution, and alcohol and drug abuse) were being spread by the shah's foreign advisers and other sources of what a large number of religious leaders viewed as contaminating Western culture pushed many of the previously passive orthodox ulama into openly opposing the shah.

Between the early 1950s and the 1970s, various policies of the shah's regime in effect alienated it from almost all numerically significant social groups. When the military destroyed the Mossadeq government in 1953, the shah enjoyed the backing of not only the majority of army officers but also many from groups such as the landowning upper class, the wealthy bazaar merchants, and the religious leadership. However by the mid-1970s the shah's White Revolution had severely reduced the political influence of the landlords. Other economic measures and religious and cultural policies damaged the interests of the bazaar merchants and provoked the opposition of much of the ulama. Deprived of the support of these important groups without really winning the loyalty of the intended beneficiaries of the reforms (such as the peasant recipients of land), the shah's government depended primarily on the allegiance of the military, the state bureaucracy, Iranian industrialists, foreign investors, and the United States (Milani 1988).

Whereas lack of meaningful opportunities for political participation generated discontent within the middle classes, important economic changes promoted more widespread frustration. Income from Iran's oil dramatically increased from about $1 billion in 1968–1969 to $5 billion in 1973–1974 to $20 billion in 1975–1976. The benefits went disproportionately to the upper and the modern middle classes. Inequality throughout Iran increased significantly between these classes and the mass of the population. Many of the poor did experience improvements in their life-style, but these were far outpaced by the wealth accruing to the upper class, whose "conspicuous consumption . . . gave rise to increasingly vocal discontent" (Keddie 1981, p. 174).

The shah's somewhat reckless acceleration of Iran's technical and military development after 1973 "created a host of national problems: constantly increased spending on imports; orientation of the economy toward dependence on foreigners; the huge population flow into the crowded cities; and a lack of urban low-cost housing" (Keddie 1981, p. 175). Because effective energy conservation measures in the United States and Europe caused the demand for oil to stagnate, Iran's oil revenue fell behind the cost of its imports and its foreign debt began

to climb rapidly. In mid-1977, the shah's regime attempted to cut expenditures and reduce the inflation rate (which had reached 30 percent) by canceling or postponing construction projects and in other ways slowing down economic development. As a result, unemployment rapidly increased and working-class wages fell, especially among semi-skilled and unskilled urban workers. As the shah's program of growth had raised expectations, the sudden worsening of conditions for many in the urban lower classes heightened mass discontent.

But even after the development of economic difficulties, the shah apparently felt secure. The nation had been, in general, prospering, becoming more educated, more technologically advanced, and far better armed. The regime was backed by the world's most powerful nation. And the shah perceived his opposition to be largely fragmented and easily countered by his security forces. Only the Islamic clergy had a mass base in all classes and an extensive organizational network. But the religious leadership appeared divided, with only a few ayatollahs—such as the exiled Khomeini—openly attacking the shah and, after 1971, calling for an end to the monarchy. The shah's false evaluation of the weakness of the ulama and decline in fundamentalist Islamic views prompted an enormously damaging measure. The puppet parliament passed a law in 1976 officially shifting Iran from an Islamic calendar, with year 1 beginning at the time of the Prophet's *hijra* from Mecca to Medina, to a monarchal calendar, with year 1 set at the founding of the Persian monarchy by Cyrus the Great. Many of the faithful viewed this change as an outrageous anti-Islamic act (Graham 1979; Milani 1988).

The shah also felt confident enough to accommodate pressure from the Carter administration to improve the human rights situation in Iran and restrain the brutality of the SAVAK in return for a continued flow of U.S. weapons. The relaxation of repression, which began in February 1977 with the freeing of 357 political prisoners, led to more demands for greater freedoms and reforms.

Thus by late 1977, after more than two decades of autocratic rule that had progressively narrowed the social base of support for the monarchy, a number of revolution-promoting conditions existed simultaneously. First, numerous discontented groups, several of which had major ideological differences among themselves, all shared an intense animosity toward the shah and the foreign imperialism they perceived he represented. This constituted the basis for the necessary degree of unity among developing revolutionary factions, none of which alone was capable of overthrowing the shah and establishing a revolutionary government. Second, there was an increase in mass discontent, which arose from inequality, regime attacks on Islamic traditions, religious authority, and the bazaar, and soaring inflation coupled with growth in unem-

ployment and lowered working-class wages. The intensification of mass frustration coincided with the shah's temporary relaxation of repression to gratify the Carter administration. This change, along with the perception that the shah's regime no longer enjoyed the unconditional support of the United States, precipitated the release of pent-up hostility through a series of ever-larger protest demonstrations.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

The release of political prisoners encouraged public criticism of the monarchy, mostly from discontented members of the modern middle class. In particular on June 12, members of the National Front published 20,000 copies of an open letter calling for the shah to "desist from authoritarian rule . . . abandon the single party system, permit freedom of the press and freedom of association, free all political prisoners," and establish a popularly elected government based on the 1906 constitution (Hiro 1987, p. 67). The following week the well-known Islamic leftist critic of the shah, Ali Shariati, died in England. In Iran it was widely believed, though not proven, that he had been poisoned by SAVAK.

By October 1977 the National Front, the Liberation movement, and the Tudeh were all stronger than they had been in years and were committed to winning more reforms. From his exile in Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini, through his taped sermons smuggled into Iran, called on the clergy to form *komiteh*s (derivative of the French word for "committees") at the mosques to organize and lead the Islamic faithful in the struggle against the shah. The suspicious October death of Khomeini's forty-five-year-old son, Mustapha, at Najaf, thought by many to have been caused by SAVAK agents, provoked sincere grief and anger among millions. Those arrested during subsequent demonstrations benefited from the new liberalization policies: They were dealt with by civilian, rather than military, courts, where most received light sentences. The lenient treatment facilitated further protests.

Ayatollah Khomeini as Revolutionary Leader

The shah and his advisers soon realized their limited but significant reforms were allowing the increasingly turbulent release of previously suppressed resentment. They decided to promote disunity among the anti-shah groups by attempting to discredit and isolate Khomeini, the shah's most hostile and adamant critic. This tactic, however, had a rather serious drawback: By singling out Khomeini the shah was enhancing the ayatollah's image as his most feared opposition figure. In effect, this aspect of the regime's strategy helped hand leadership of the revolution

over to religious fundamentalists instead of the somewhat more moderate middle-class opposition movements.

The politically suicidal assault on Khomeini was launched on January 7, 1978, by means of an unsigned newspaper article (later thought to have been written by the shah's information minister) titled "Iran, and the Black and Red Reactionaries." The piece characterized Khomeini as "an adventurer, without faith, tied to the centers of colonialism" who was paid by the British to oppose the shah's reforms and policies. In addition to alleging that Khomeini was the son of a "dancing girl" and was characterized by "homosexual inclinations" (Hussain 1985, p. 129), the attack on Khomeini's well-known anti-imperialism appeared outrageous to most Iranians. Hundreds of theological students in the seminary city of Qom demonstrated in protest. At least ten were shot and killed. Khomeini immediately called for new demonstrations as part of the mourning procession to be held, as tradition stipulated, forty days after the deaths of the student martyrs. Many peaceful marches in commemoration of the victims took place throughout Iran on the designated day, February 18, but in Tabriz crowds attacked police stations, Resurgence party offices, liquor stores, and large banks. Scores were killed and hundreds more wounded as troops suppressed the disorders.

Khomeini praised the uprising and a new protest was organized for March 29, forty days after the killings in Tabriz, in order to mourn these new martyrs. On this occasion demonstrations were held in fifty-five cities and turned violent in five, with crowds attacking the same types of targets as in the earlier Tabriz rioting. Dozens of people died, prompting another set of mourning processions at which still more people lost their lives. Shaken by the repetitive and massive disorders, the shah sought to placate the opposition. On June 6 he removed the widely detested General Nemattollah Nassiri, chief of the SAVAK, and promised free elections. But whereas some prominent religious leaders appeared willing to accept the word of the shah and permit him to remain with greatly restricted powers and controlled by a proposed new and supposedly freely elected parliament, Ayatollah Khomeini was adamant that the monarchy must be overthrown (Green 1982; Keddie 1981).

On September 6, Khomeini stated, "Pay no attention to the deceptive words of the shah, his government, and its supporters for their only aim is to gain another reprieve for their satanic selves," and he called on those in the armed forces to "renew your bonds with the people and refuse to go on slaughtering your children and brothers for the sake of the whims of this [Pahlavi] family of bandits" (Algar 1981, p. 236). On September 7, 500,000 people marched in Tehran to the parliament building, chanting "Death to the shah" and "Khomeini is our leader." Thousands wore the white shrouds of martyrdom, which demonstrated their willingness to die.

The shah, deciding that his concessions were encouraging the opposition, reversed himself and imposed martial law in twelve cities. On the morning of September 8, 15,000 people gathered at Jaleh Square in Tehran, near the parliament building, largely unaware that the night before the shah's regime had banned public assemblies. By 8 A.M. troops equipped with tanks surrounded the square and proceeded to open fire. According to the government, 86 were killed, but the opposition put the figure at 3,000 (Milani 1988). To many the September 8 Black Friday Massacre seemed to prove that the shah and his regime were as brutal as ever, as Khomeini had vehemently asserted. Later in the same month, staff members of Iran's Central Bank released information indicating that in the previous week 177 rich Iranians (including royal-family members and top military figures) had sent $2 billion out of the country. This news further encouraged anti-shah forces by showing that as the people rose in rebellion, the shah's regime-supporting patronage system was collapsing and his moneyed allies were "jumping ship."

In a counterproductive move, the shah pressured neighboring Iraq to expel Khomeini so as to end the ayatollah's contact with Iranians on pilgrimage to Iraq. On October 6, Khomeini flew to France, where, to the distress of the shah, he became the focus of attention of the international press. This greatly increased his ability to make his views known quickly to his followers inside Iran and function as the revolution's guiding force. Representatives of anti-shah opposition groups such as the National Front and Bazargan's and Taleqani's Liberation movement began flying to Paris to consult with Khomeini and draft coordinated policies, thereby acknowledging Khomeini as their leader (Green 1982, 1986; Keddie 1981; Milani 1988).

Disarming the Army

The ayatollah realized that the neutralization of the powerful armed forces would be a key factor in overthrowing the shah. Although Khomeini beseeched the soldiers and police not to obey orders to fire on demonstrators, he called on the faithful to confront the army fearlessly and demonstrate their willingness to sacrifice themselves. When the troops refused to fire or even joined the protestors, their actions helped accelerate the deterioration of the shah's regime by showing that it was losing control of its armed forces. If some units fired on and killed marchers, Khomeini knew that many other soldiers would be ashamed of such action and become demoralized and ready to join the revolution.

Khomeini's strategy differed radically from the armed assaults on the military by the Fedayeen-e Khalq and the Mujahideen-e Khalq. He reasoned that the approach of attacking anyone in a uniform would

increase solidarity within the military and delay the fall of the shah's regime. Khomeini chose to wage a "moral attack" on Iran's armed forces. He explained, "We must fight the soldiers from within the soldiers' hearts. Face the soldier with a flower. Fight through martyrdom because the martyr is the essence of history. Let the army kill as many as it wants until the soldiers are shaken to their hearts by the massacres they have committed. Then the army will collapse, and thus you will have disarmed the army" (Hiro 1987, p. 100).

In late October, Ayatollah Khomeini called on the oil workers to strike and cripple the regime economically. The resulting work stoppage, supported by the Tudeh, cost the shah's government $74 million a day. The shah proceeded to impose a military government on the entire nation on November 6, with the chief of staff, General Gholam Reza Azhari, as the new prime minister. During November the shah appeared to be suffering from bouts of depression over his inability to stop the uprisings. His emotional status was probably also affected by the fact that he was terminally ill from cancer; this was not to be publicly known for many months.

The shah's vacillation between repression and concessions during 1978, including his decision to make scapegoats of several of his previously faithful military and government officials to save the monarchy, reportedly dismayed and alienated many of his wealthy supporters. Their flight from Iran with millions in personal wealth speeded the deterioration of the regime.

The Soviet government, anticipating the possibility of U.S. military intervention to save the shah's regime, let it be known that such an event might result in the movement of Soviet troops into Iran in accordance with the 1921 Iran-USSR Treaty, which permitted the Soviets to send forces into Iran if another nation had already carried out such an action. The Carter administration, however, made it clear that it had no intention of sending U.S. forces to save the monarchy, further disheartening the shah (Hiro 1987).

On 10 Muharram (December 11), the anniversary of Imam Hussein's death in the seventh century, 2 million, led by Ayatollah Taleqani of the Liberation movement, religious leader of the capital's faithful, and Karim Sanjabi, a major figure in the National Front, marched in Tehran. During a successful strike on December 18, 500 army troops with tanks defected to the revolution in Tabriz and hundreds of others defected elsewhere.

Revolutionary Victory

Confronted with almost-continuous insurrectionary conditions and December oil production falling to only 40 percent of domestic require-

ments, the shah made a last desperate attempt to save the monarchy. He persuaded Shahpour Bakhtiyar, a leader of the National Front, to become premier on December 29. Bakhtiyar accepted on the condition that the shah almost immediately leave the country on a "vacation" and that when he returned he would in the future act as a "constitutional monarch." But Bakhtiyar's collaboration with the doomed monarchy was so abhorrent to most of the anti-shah forces that he was not only condemned by Khomeini but also immediately expelled from membership in the National Front (Hiro 1987; Keddie 1981).

On January 16, the shah left Iran, initially for Egypt, but apparently expecting to return once conditions were right for his generals still in Iran to seize power again and invite him back in a manner similar to the 1953 overthrow of the National Front government. Under mounting popular pressure, Bakhtiyar ordered the reopening of Tehran's airport, allowing the return of Ayatollah Khomeini on February 1. A reported 3 million people lined the streets of the capital to welcome him. The ayatollah quickly appointed a provisional government to exercise power in opposition to the Bakhtiyar regime supported by the shah's generals (Keddie 1981). On February 7, delegates from the lower-ranking personnel of the air force met with Khomeini and pledged their allegiance to him. In the following days, representatives of much of the army and navy enlisted personnel and lower-level officers did the same.

Army generals sent elements of the most pro-shah branch of the military, the Imperial Guards, to suppress air force personnel who had gone over to the revolution. The airmen resisted and thousands of civilians, including Fedayeen and Mujahideen guerrillas, joined the battle, resulting in the defeat and rout of the pro-shah forces. Guerrillas and military defectors proceeded to distribute arms from captured arsenals to tens of thousands of young people and prorevolutionary army reservists who gathered at Tehran University and volunteered to fight elements of the military still loyal to the shah or the Bakhtiyar government. On February 10 and 11, revolutionary forces attacked and defeated one of the Imperial Guard's two armored units. The rest of the military declared its neutrality. As revolutionaries seized the capital's television station, its prisons, and its police stations, Bakhtiyar fled the country.

REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Divisions Within the Revolutionary Coalition

The anti-shah groups differed on how Iran's new government should be structured and what policies it should pursue. Khomeini's fundamentalists wanted an Islamic republic led by clerics. Many lay Islamic

revolutionaries in the Liberation movement, such as Bazargan, favored an Islamic state headed by Shiite laymen. Liberals in the National Front intended to create a secular parliamentary government similar to those in Western Europe. The Mujahideen-e Khalq and other Islamic leftists hoped for a sweeping redistribution of wealth and the establishment of an egalitarian Islamic state. The Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen-e Khalq and Tudeh saw the current revolution leading to a later secular socialist revolution. All these groups took advantage of the immediate post-shah period to express their views freely, recruit new members, stage demonstrations, and propagate their goals to the larger population.

The clerically organized pro-Khomeini movement raced to build a huge volunteer armed force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG). Within two years this organization had expanded to 200,000. The IRG functioned to safeguard the emerging Islamic government from any potential royalist coup in the armed forces and from possible attacks by groups that participated in the revolution but did not share Khomeini's plans for Iran. Khomeini partisans purged the army of suspected pro-shah personnel. Hundreds of high-ranking officers in the military and SAVAK were tried by clerical revolutionary courts controlled by Khomeini supporters, found guilty of crimes including torture, murder, and "fighting against God," and quickly executed (Hiro 1987).

Significant disagreements existed *within* the ulama about the future development of the economy as well as the role of clergy in government. The economic views of the ayatollahs frequently reflected their classes of origin and continuing family ties. Those from landlord or wealthy merchant families manifested the preference of these classes for maintaining an economic system that would protect their interests, and ayatollahs from less-affluent families generally expressed more concern for redistributing wealth toward the poor. The most important of the few ayatollahs from relatively poor families was Ayatollah Taleqani, the religious leader of Tehran. Taleqani, one of whose sons was a member of a Marxist-oriented guerrilla group, had ties to both the National Front and the Mujahideen-e Khalq and played an essential role in holding the revolutionary alliance together. Ayatollah Taleqani's sudden death in September 1979, apparently from natural causes, contributed to the breakdown of the revolutionary coalition.

Taleqani had also helped prevent a split between Ayatollah Khomeini and other top members of the ulama, particularly Ayatollah Shariat-madari, who had become one of the most influential clerical figures in Iran while Khomeini was in exile. Shariatmadari, representing the orthodox clerical view, did not agree with Khomeini that the Quran mandated that the clergy be in direct control of the government. Rather

he held that the government was simply required not to pass laws or commit acts that violated Islamic law.

Groups opposed to the establishment of Khomeini's version of an Islamic Republic looked to Ayatollah Shariatmadari as their major ally within the religious leadership, especially after the death of Taleqani. Shariatmadari, however, suffered from tremendous disadvantages. First of all, his following tended to be limited ethnically because he was from an Azeri rather than a Persian-speaking family. Secondly, during the revolutionary turmoil of 1978 he had expressed a willingness to tolerate the continuation of the monarchy and to compromise with the shah and later Bakhtiyar. But Khomeini's analyses that a complete abolition of the shah's regime could be achieved through continued protest and refusal to compromise were proven correct. In fact, Khomeini's success in guiding the revolution convinced many that he must have been specially chosen and empowered by God to defeat the shah's powerful army and his evil regime. Thus, Ayatollah Khomeini's views overcame Shariatmadari's criticisms (Hussain 1985; Milani 1988).

Constitution of the Islamic Republic

After the flight of the shah and the fall of the Bakhtiyar government, a situation of dual power characterized revolutionary Iran. A provisional government approved by Khomeini and headed by Bazargan technically exercised state authority. Its officials were overwhelmingly lay members of the National Front and the Liberation movement with administrative skills. Real power, however, was held by Khomeini and his clerical associates, who enjoyed the loyalty of the large majority of poor and lower-middle-class Iranians who had served as the foot soldiers of the revolution. Khomeini's followers dominated the local revolutionary *komitehs* and militias, then coalescing into the huge Islamic Revolutionary Guard. In contrast, the National Front and the Liberation movement lacked support outside the middle classes and neither had its own militia. Whereas the Mujahideen and Fedayeen groups had thousands of members under arms, they had much less support at the grass-roots level than Khomeini's fundamentalists.

Khomeini selected a group of clergy and laymen, the Islamic Revolutionary Council (IRC), to oversee government policy until a totally new government system could be established. To hasten this event, he insisted that a referendum be held almost immediately. Voters would be given only the options of declaring Yes or No to the proposal to establish an Islamic Republic (as opposed to being allowed to select a preference from several clearly defined alternate forms of government). The referendum was held on April 1, 1979, with a reported 89 percent turnout

(more than 20 million people) and a 98 percent approval for the creation of an Islamic Republic.

In early August an election was held for an Assembly of Experts to draft the new constitution. Khomeini's followers had organized their own political party, the Islamic Republic party (IRP), to compete in the vote. All the candidates for the assembly, regardless of party, had to be approved by Khomeini. The IRP won the biggest bloc of seats. The resulting constitution called for an elected parliament including clergy and laymen who were approved as good Muslims and supporters of the constitution before being allowed to run, a separately and popularly elected president, and a supreme court, the Council of Guardians, to be composed of six clerics and six laymen selected respectively by the clergy and the parliament, to serve six-year terms. The Council of Guardians was given the authority to approve candidates for parliament and to rule on whether any act of government or law passed by parliament violated either the constitution or Islamic law (Abrahamian 1989).

The overriding theme of the constitution was the concept that ultimate sovereignty over the political system belonged to God. Any other basis for sovereignty, whether the people, a ruling dynasty, or conformity to some alternate ideology, was un-Islamic and unacceptable. In the Islamic Republic, God's will is expressed through the "rule of the just Islamic jurist," the *vilayat-e faqih*. He is to provide advice to the parliament and the president and has the power, at the rare times he may deem it necessary, to overrule the government or any part of the government. The first *faqih* of the Islamic Republic was Ayatollah Khomeini. His successors were to be selected by the Assembly of Experts. If no single individual was perceived qualified for the position, a committee of three or five could be selected to fill the role (Bakhash 1984; Hussain 1985).

The establishment of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic with the inclusion of the crucial *vilayat-e faqih* principle embodied the victory of the Shia fundamentalists over the Shia modernist and orthodox factions and the secular groups in the revolutionary alliance. The triumph of the fundamentalists, although not at this stage complete, was due to a number of factors. Of primary importance was Ayatollah Khomeini's role as the dominant personality of the revolution and the fact that he supported the fundamentalist program and the IRP. As Khomeini and, consequently, the fundamentalists enjoyed a much wider base of popular support than any of the other anti-shah groups, the fundamentalists controlled most of the revolutionary organizations (the *komiteh*s and the revolutionary courts) and possessed by far the biggest militia, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, to enforce their will.

The fundamentalists, however, were characterized by a potentially critical weakness: the internal division between much of the ulama,

whose considerable family economic interests were dependent on the existing pattern of property and income relations, and the poorer majority of Iranians, who tended to push for a further socioeconomic revolution to distribute the nation's wealth more equally. In the short run, the fundamentalists were able to delay resolution of this issue and further strengthen their dominant position relative to former revolutionary allies by rallying their country folk, making themselves the true defenders of the revolution in the face of perceived external threats during the American hostage crisis and the war with Iraq.

American Hostage Crisis

A major crisis developed when on October 22, 1979, the shah was allowed to fly to New York City. Although the officially stated reason for the shah's visit was to obtain treatment for his terminal cancer, Iranian revolutionaries were not inclined to believe the shah was really ill or why, if the affliction was real, the shah could not have gotten equivalent treatment elsewhere.

Ayatollah Khomeini and other ulama viewed New York City not only as a world center of corruption and moral degradation, but also as the home of men they identified as enthusiastic shah supporters and agents of U.S. imperialism, such as the Rockefellers and Henry Kissinger. Many Iranian revolutionaries believed that a conspiracy was being hatched to restore the shah to power, possibly involving armed U.S. intervention in conjunction with a coup by antirevolutionary military figures who remained in Iran. From the confessions of several SAVAK agents it became known that certain personnel in the U.S. embassy in Tehran were courting Iranian officers and several leaders of minority ethnic groups. Consequently, a seizure of the embassy was planned in order to protest the presence of the shah in New York and possibly also to capture documents relating to CIA activities in Iran (Bakhash 1984; Hiro 1987; Hussain 1985).

On November 4, a group of 450 young militants stormed the embassy and managed to confiscate quickly many of the sought-after documents. In addition to the bonanza of information used to purge the military further and discredit critics of Khomeini, the seizure of the embassy and the holding of fifty-three U.S. officials helped to demonstrate that Khomeini's supporters were just as "anti-imperialist" as the members of the leftist Fedayeen-e Khalq and Mujahideen-e Khalq.

Those holding the hostages refused to release them unless both the shah and his wealth (in foreign investments and bank accounts) were delivered to Iran. The U.S. government refused to return the shah to stand trial, but this issue was resolved by his death on July 27, 1980.

Eventually the United States and Iran worked out a set of financial arrangements in which some of the frozen Iranian assets in the United States were used to pay U.S. business and other foreign claims on Iran's revolutionary government, with the excess, over $2 billion, made available to Iran. Resolution of the crisis may have been delayed by fundamentalist leaders, who used the confrontation with the United States to weaken their internal opponents by portraying them as disloyal to the revolution or tools of foreign imperialists, until all the major institutions of the Islamic state were firmly established (Milani 1988). In the midst of the hostage conflict, the Iranian revolutionary state endured violent rebellion by the Mujahideen-e Khalq, a monumental conflict between the elected president and the parliament, and an invasion of its territory by neighboring Iraq.

Conflict Between the IRP and the Mujahideen-e Khalq

The conflict between Khomeini's state-dominating Islamic Republic party and the Islamic Mujahideen-e Khalq was based, in part, on differing interpretations of Islam. The Mujahideen held that the Quran supported the concept that ultimate control of the government should be in the hands of the people, not the clergy, and that Muhammad had intended to create an economically egalitarian society, a notion that ran counter to the family financial interests of many of the ulama. Since the Mujahideen disagreed with the concept of clerical domination of the state, they refused to vote to confirm the new constitution.

Khomeini used the Mujahideen referendum boycott as the reason for barring the Mujahideen leader Masoud Rajavi from running as a candidate in the February 1980 presidential election. The Mujahideen responded by throwing their support to Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, who won the election. Bani-Sadr had studied economics, sociology, and Islamic law. He was the son of an ayatollah and had been an adviser to Khomeini and a member of Khomeini's preconstitutional Islamic Revolutionary Council. The Mujahideen backed him in part because of his commitment to a redistribution of wealth and to fostering and maintaining a relatively open democratic system.

The fundamentalist clergy apparently feared the Mujahideen more than the solely Marxist groups (which, although also barred from running candidates in elections, were generally committed to supporting Khomeini for pragmatic and anti-imperialist reasons). The Mujahideen were seen as especially dangerous because they espoused Islam, which gave them a basis of appeal to Iran's masses, and because much of their membership was drawn from the younger generation of the traditional

middle class, the same class that provided most of the leadership of the IRP.

The growing hostility against the Mujahideen was paralleled by increasing IRP dissatisfaction with the republic's first president, Bani-Sadr, who had been popularly elected with a 75 percent majority on February 4, 1980, over the IRP candidate (but with considerable public perception that Khomeini actually favored Bani-Sadr). When in fall 1980 President Bani-Sadr repeatedly sought to challenge members of the IRP for their restrictive interpretation of the Quran and their harassment and repression of other political parties, he provoked the animosity of the IRP-dominated parliament and the Council of Guardians. These groups were further infuriated by the president's accusation that IRG personnel were using torture on prisoners and by his exposure of the connection of both the IRP and the IRG to bands of Islamic extremists called *hezbollahi*s (members of the Party of God). Some IRP members of parliament accused President Bani-Sadr of being a traitor and of causing disunity. Khomeini tried to reimpose calm by banning all public speeches. But when Bani-Sadr violated the restriction and was then declared incompetent by the parliament in June 1981, Khomeini removed him from office (Bakhash 1984; Milani 1988).

On June 28, 1981, after further violent attacks by fundamentalists on Mujahideen supporters, a massive explosion caused by thirty kilograms of dynamite placed in a building adjoining an IRP conference hall killed seventy-four top figures in the party. The Mujahideen were blamed. The Mujahideen carried out scores of assassinations and bombing attacks and in turn suffered the execution of many leaders and hundreds of other members. But they overestimated their own popularity and their ability to convey their message beyond the middle class to the poor, who were generally imbued with more traditional religious views. Thus the Mujahideen assassination campaign failed because popular support for the IRP and the religious dedication of IRP members provided for rapid replacement of murdered officeholders and, therefore, for regime stability. By the end of October 1981, the Islamic Republic had succeeded in containing internal rebellion, although air force sympathizers had managed to help both Bani-Sadr and Masoud Rajavi escape Iran.

The Iran-Iraq War

Undoubtedly the ability of the IRP government to crush or at least neutralize its opposition had much to do with the wave of nationalism that swept Iran after the Iraqi invasion on September 22, 1980. A number of factors had long fostered animosity between Iraq, a nation

of about 19 million, and its neighbor Iran, with three times the population and close to four times the land area. Most Iraqis speak Arabic, while the majority of Iranians are Persian speaking. The religious composition of the two nations differs significantly, with about 60 percent of Iraqis being Shia and approximately 35 percent Sunni, whereas in Iran 93 percent are Shia. A longstanding territorial controversy between Iraq and Iran concerned control over the river waterway to the Persian Gulf, the Shatt-al-Arab (the Arab River). Iran had previously forced Iraq to relinquish the east bank and had moved the international boundary between the two nations to the middle of the river. Another point of contention was rooted in the fact that Iraq was governed by the Baath Socialist party, whose members were mostly secularly oriented Sunni Muslims. Khomeini viewed the government of Iraq as un-Islamic and called upon Iraqi Muslims, both Shia and Sunni, to establish a second Islamic republic.

Apparently Iraqi President Saddam Hussein resolved to attack Iran, not only to reclaim the east bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, but also to overthrow Iran's Islamic republican form of government, the source of inspiration for fundamentalist Islamic rebels inside Iraq. Iraqi leaders estimated that Iran's military was in disarray following the revolution and would eventually run out of spare parts to maintain and repair its U.S. military equipment, as the United States had banned arms shipments to Iran (*New York Times,* March 31, 1989, p. A5).

Most Iranians, however, rallied to meet the Iraqi assault. Masses of Iranian army troops and Islamic Revolutionary Guards, supported by the air force with more than 400 combat planes, soon halted the Iraqi advance. Iran was able to obtain some replacement parts and even some new weapons from diverse sources such as Vietnam, with its stores of abandoned U.S. weaponry, the People's Republic of China, international arms dealers, U.S. companies violating the arms embargo, and the Reagan administration's covert Iran-Contra operation. The Islamic Republic, however, could not match the massive supplies of modern weapons Iraq purchased from France, the Soviet Union, and other nations with the aid of tens of billions in loans from Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, whose monarchs feared Iranian-inspired fundamentalist rebellions within their borders. Iran's larger population, however, permitted it to endure successfully a two-to-one disadvantage in war casualties.

By mid-1982, Iraqi forces had been driven from much of the Iranian territory they had originally occupied. Iran launched a counterinvasion of Iraq in July, demanding the overthrow of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein and huge war reparations payments as the price of peace. As Iranian forces slowly advanced, despite terrible losses to superior Iraqi

air power, artillery, and armor, Iraq resorted to several desperate measures. These included attacking Iranian civilian population centers with aircraft and missiles (Iran retaliated by launching missiles into the Iraqi capital, Baghdad), use of internationally banned poison gas weapons, and in the spring 1984 air attacks on Iranian oil facilities and tankers in the northern section of Persian Gulf. Iran responded by attacking the tankers of nations aiding Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait (Iraq was transporting its oil by pipeline to the Mediterranean). As the threat to Europe's oil or at least oil prices increased, the Reagan administration sent U.S. naval forces to the area to protect, first, Kuwaiti tankers (reflagged and renamed as U.S. ships) and, then, other supposedly neutral vessels. These actions were viewed by some nations as, in effect, U.S. intervention in the war on Iraq's behalf.

By mid-1988, several hundred thousand on both sides had perished in the conflict, many more had been wounded, and hundreds of billions of dollars had been lost or wasted due to destruction, weapons purchases, and lowered oil revenues. The Iranian economy was experiencing great difficulties, whereas the Iraqis regained some of their lost territory. Faced with the apparent impossibility of victory, Ayatollah Khomeini agreed to negotiate an end to the war in summer 1988 (*New York Times*, June 6, 1988, p. A1; June 20, 1988, p. A8). Although the fighting largely halted after 1988, the first face-to-face talks between the two countries' foreign ministers on a final peace agreement for the eight-year war did not take place until July 1990 (*New York Times*, July 6, 1990, p. A2). Iraq, faced with military and economic pressures from the United States and other nations because of its August invasion and occupation of Kuwait, suddenly granted Iran most of its settlement terms, possibly hoping for Iranian assistance in the confrontation with Western nations (*New York Times*, Aug. 16, 1990, p. A1; Jan. 6, 1991, p. A5).

IRAN AFTER KHOMEINI

Khomeini's apparent unwillingness to allow significant increases in freedom of political expression even after the end of the war with Iraq was illustrated in late March 1989 when he forced the resignation of Ayatollah Montazeri, whom the Assembly of Experts had previously designated as Khomeini's successor in the role of *faqih* of the Islamic Republic. Montazeri, once Khomeini's prize student, had called for greater political tolerance, charged that the revolution had failed to fulfill important promises to the people, accused the Islamic Republic's security forces of physical abuse of prisoners, and associated with critics

of Khomeini's policies such as Mehdi Bazargan (*New York Times,* May 22, 1989, p. A1). Montazeri had also declined to support publicly Khomeini's call for the death of author Salman Rushdie for writing *Satanic Verses,* a book considered blasphemous to Islam by the ulama.

After Khomeini's death in June 1989, the government of Iran continued to be largely in the hands of clerical politicians loyal to the ayatollah's basic concept of the Islamic Republic, but divided with respect to the degree of adherence to extreme fundamentalist principles in the face of the pragmatic requirements of domestic and foreign policy-making. On June 4, the day after Khomeini's death, the eighty-three-member assembly of religious experts selected Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei, who had served for eight years as president of Iran, as Khomeini's successor in the role of supreme religious-political leader (*New York Times,* June 5, 1989, p. A1).

With Khomeini no longer in control and the war with Iraq concluded, the possibility increased that conflict over the future course of the revolution would intensify. The result might be a shift in government priorities regarding economic policies. Millions of Iranians wanted the government to do more to redistribute the nation's wealth. However, the framers of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic had included a provision stating that individuals had the right to private ownership as long as the property in question was the result of the owner's honest labor. High-ranking ulama on the Council of Guardians have used their interpretation of this principle to block parliamentary proposals to transfer some privately owned wealth to the impoverished. Disagreement over this issue between top (generally antireform) and lower-level personnel in the Islamic Republic party was so great that to minimize divisive confrontation Khomeini took the extraordinary step of ordering the dissolution of the IRP in July 1987. However, with Khomeini no longer present to restrain or intimidate discontented groups, it is possible that internal popular pressures will eventually shift the ideology and policies of postrevolutionary Iran in the direction of greater redistribution of wealth and perhaps even toward economically beneficial policies of reconciliation with the United States, Europe, and the USSR. The latter possibility appeared even more likely when Iranian leaders expressed gratitude for foreign assistance following a devastating earthquake in 1990, which took more than 30,000 Iranian lives (*New York Times,* July 6, 1990, p. A2). Whether such changes are carried out exclusively by clergy or by a wider coalition of political forces, it seems very likely that the Iranian Revolution will remain firmly in the hands of those identified with Islam rather than any secular ideology.

IRAN AND ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ELSEWHERE

The central themes of Islamic fundamentalism included the concept that Islamic religious rules and moral principles must be profoundly integrated with government and must indeed permeate and influence all areas of social life. Ayatollah Khomeini and other like-minded religious leaders asserted that Islamic fundamentalism must become the dominant political ideology among *both* Shia and Sunni Muslims and that Iran was to be only the first of many Islamic republics. The unsuccessful attempt of some Shia Iraqis to organize a revolution in Iraq helped provoke the Iraqi government's attempt to crush the Iranian Islamic Republic. The eight-year conflict between Iran and Iraq not only resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties and billions in economic losses, it also temporarily led to the erroneous perception of Islamic fundamentalism as a uniquely Iranian or at least Shia phenomenon. Once the war was over, Islamic fundamentalism could no longer be easily depicted as a manifestation of Persian cultural and political imperialism. Advocates of fundamentalism could more effectively present their local religious movements as domestic developments in response to popular needs and aspirations.

By the end of the 1980s, significant Islamic fundamentalist movements existed in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and in the Arab-populated lands under Israeli control. The reasons for the growth of fundamentalism outside of Iran, apart from the easing of Arab-Iranian hostility following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, were diverse.

One powerful cause appeared to be the quest for a genuinely homegrown culture capable of instilling a sense of pride, dignity, and self-worth. The process of modernization in Muslim countries had exposed many educated persons not only to advanced technologies and managerial skills but also to foreign values and norms and relatively nonreligious life-styles. But the largely secular ideologies, whether procapitalist or prosocialist, characteristic of the ruling elites and skilled-occupation classes of a number of Islamic societies, often appeared to offer little to the middle and lower classes except a perpetual sense of cultural and technological inferiority and the threat of the progressive erosion of cherished moral values. In contrast, the fundamentalists put forward the appealing notion of a value and belief system ordained by God and, thus, immeasurably superior to all other cultures.

Financial hardships in several Arab states also motivated many members of the middle class to turn to fundamentalism. Some apparently sought a sense of renewed moral status in compensation for reduced economic benefits and opportunities, whereas others viewed fundamen-

talism as a new political force through which middle-income groups, in alliance with religiously motivated persons from the lower classes, could successfully overcome the domination of privileged governing elites. The continued expansion of popular support for Islamic fundamentalism, whether a response to moral decay, cultural subversion, or economic deterioration, was exemplified in 1990 electoral victories in which fundamentalist-oriented candidates won thirty-six of eighty parliamentary seats in Jordan and the majority of the vote in Algerian local elections (*New York Times*, June 14, 1990, p. A1; July 1, 1990, p. E5).

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The motivations temporarily unifying diverse prerevolutionary groups were the desire to oust the shah, end the monarchy's corrupt patronage system, and free Iran from perceived foreign domination. Several distinct revolutionary elites developed that were committed to these goals as well as others. The fundamentalist branch of the Shia clergy believed that God through his ulama must govern society. This variety of elite opposition constituted potentially effective leadership for the masses because the clergy espoused an ideology and value system already shared by most Iranians. Furthermore, they constituted a network of tens of thousands with control over thousands of mosques and hundreds of bazaars as possible sites for community political organization. The fundamentalists' view that their belief system was God's creation and their plan for Iran was God's intention appealed to many: It provided poor Iranians with a sense of moral superiority to the man-created cultures and ideologies of the technologically advanced societies. As the shah became progressively identified with foreign interests, the fundamentalist clergy appeared to many to be the true representatives of Iran's traditional culture and historical identity.

Whereas the fundamentalist clergy were recruited from Iran's traditional middle class, other major revolutionary elites were derived mainly from the nation's modern middle class. But when the opportunity for revolution arose, most of the relatively secularized and Westernized anti-shah groups in this category found they were unable to effectively communicate with, much less mobilize, the Iranian masses.

Most important in determining the precise ideological direction of the antimonarchal revolution was the fact that the movement's primary leader and most charismatic figure was a fundamentalist, Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini's adamant refusal to compromise with the shah despite the monarch's massive military and economic power appealed to the Iranian Shia faithful, schooled in the legendary martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Khomeini rewarded their loyalty by developing a suc-

cessful "technology of revolution" tailored to the culture and psychology of Shia Iran. The ayatollah instructed the faithful to use the forty-day-interval mourning processions for the martyrs of previous demonstrations and those religious holidays commemorating sacrifice or heroic deeds as opportunities for new and ever-larger protests. He called on his followers to offer themselves in martyrdom before the shah's soldiers, knowing the shared religious significance of any resulting deaths would gradually demoralize the armed forces and ultimately destroy the coercive capacity of the monarchal regime.

When Khomeini's tactics worked, many of his country folk concluded that to defeat the shah's worldly might, the ayatollah must indeed be endowed with divine powers. Having witnessed or even participated in this fantastic achievement, many of the faithful were thereafter much inclined to seek out Khomeini's point of view on important postrevolutionary matters and follow his advice. Consequently, when conflicts developed among former revolutionary allies, Khomeini's advocacy of a political system in which both parties and candidates had to be approved by clerical leaders and in which final authority rested in the hands of the clergy ensured the defeat of alternative revolutionary elites.

The large majority of the rural population, whose expectations had been raised by the promises of the shah's White Revolution, either received no land or parcels too small to constitute viable commercial farms. Many of the poorest, who were generally strongly religious, chose to migrate to the booming cities during the 1960s and 1970s; thus at the time of the revolution 45 percent of Iran's people lived in urban areas, which would constitute the battlegrounds for the Iranian Revolution.

The mass migration to the cities produced a housing crisis. And though the standard of living did generally improve for the poor, it rose much faster for other classes, resulting in greater inequality and a sense of injustice among the urban working and lower classes. Discontent increased markedly after the mid-1970s due to high inflation, increased unemployment, and lowered wages. Hostility toward the shah's regime intensified because many of the shah's wealthy supporters displayed conspicuously luxuriant and lavishly expensive life-styles and abandoned Islamic religious practices. The shah's attempt to control religion and reduce its traditional social and political influence was a cause of outrage for many since Islam, more than providing a sense of identity, constituted the psychocultural mechanism through which most Iranians coped with and understood life. Once the wave of protests began in early 1978, the anger of the urban poor was heightened further by the repeated slaughter of participants.

A number of inherent flaws as well as circumstantial factors contributed to the deterioration of the coercive capacity of the shah's regime. The National Front government's effort to reduce the shah's power ended in 1953, in part because of foreign intervention. This fact impaired the legitimacy of the shah's rule and merited the profound animosity of many Iranians. Certain of the shah's economic policies and attempts to modify or control religious institutions and traditions deprived his regime of the support of many landlords, bazaar merchants, and ulama who had backed his overthrow of Mossadeq's government. Without the loyalty of these groups, the existence of the shah's state depended largely on its ability to suppress opposition groups, its support from domestic and foreign businessmen, the backing of the United States, and oil revenue, which paid for the weapons of repression, fed the shah's patronage system of military and industrial elites, and bought the temporary complacency of the masses. As the shah's regime lacked genuine popular support, it was seriously weakened after 1976 when national oil income failed to keep pace with the level of expenditure and the regime lost the capacity to improve the physical well-being of its citizens.

Undoubtedly one key factor in the deterioration of the shah's regime was his relaxation of restrictions on political activities in 1977 in reaction to pressure from the United States; moreover, he was under the mistaken impression that his popular support was much greater and his opposition much weaker than they actually were. Reduction of repressive measures and the belief that the shah no longer had the unconditional support of the United States encouraged anti-shah forces to regroup, expand, and demand increasingly far-reaching concessions, which eventually could not be met without endangering the continued existence of the monarchy. The regime was shaken by the religiously oriented confrontation tactics orchestrated by Ayatollah Khomeini, which succeeded in crippling the shah's once mighty military machine.

The orientation of foreign powers toward the shah's government influenced the development and the success of the revolution. The U.S. Carter administration's demands for the shah to improve the human rights situation by relaxing restrictions on dissent contributed to mounting revolutionary pressures in 1977 and 1978. But even three weeks after the Black Friday Massacre of September 8, 1978, a CIA report asserted that the shah would stay "actively in power" for at least another ten years (Hiro 1987, p. 312). President Carter's human rights pressures on the shah, his continued support for the shah (which infuriated Khomeini and many other Iranians), and his decision not to intervene militarily to preserve the monarchy may all have been partially influenced by the incorrect assessment of the shah's ability to stay in power.

The Carter administration eventually chose to accept the shah's departure rather passively. But in September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran, with the goal of putting an end to the Islamic Republic form of government. The Iraqi assault, rather than weakening the Islamic Republic, bolstered it by inspiring Iranian nationalism and prompting Iranians to rally around their revolutionary leaders.

IRANIAN REVOLUTION: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1906 Iran's first constitution establishes a parliament

1926 Reza Khan establishes Pahlavi dynasty

1941 Britain and the Soviet Union occupy Iran, force Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Shah

1953 Mossadeq's National Front government overthrown; shah establishes dictatorship

1957 SAVAK organized

1963 Protests against the shah's White Revolution; Ayatollah Khomeini jailed (expelled from Iran in 1964)

1971 Fedayeen and Mujahideen guerrilla groups formed and launch attacks on shah's regime

1973 Arab-Israeli War and oil price rise; much of Iran's oil income used for advanced weapons

1977 Carter makes U.S. aid conditional on improved human rights situation; shah eases repression but enacts economic austerity program

1978 Shah's government slanders Ayatollah Khomeini; protesters killed by shah's forces

1979 Shah flees country on January 16; Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran on February 1; militants seize U.S. embassy and hostages; Constitution of the Islamic Republic ratified

1980 Iraq invades Iran in September

1981 U.S. hostages freed in January; open conflict between the IRP and the Mujahideen; Mujahideen and most other opponents of the IRP suppressed over the next two years

1988 Iran-Iraq War ends

1989 Ayatollah Khomeini dies and is succeeded by Hojatolislam Khamenei as Iran's religious leader

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Iran, 1979, 22 min., color film. Provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Iran from the 1950s to the revolution of 1979. UI, BU, UMINN, PSU, UWISC-M.

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi: Politics of Oil, 1980, 24 min., color film. Covers the rise and fall of the shah. BU, UIOWA, IU, UMINN, PSU, SYRU, UNEV-R.

South Africa

The Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Iranian revolutions aimed to overthrow dictatorships, perceived foreign imperialism, and unjust economic systems. Efforts for social change in southern Africa, however, confronted the further and more profound obstacle of institutionally and culturally embedded racism. In the late twentieth century only one major nation claimed the distinction of awarding political rights on the basis of race, the Republic of South Africa. The 13 percent white minority had confirmed its control of the mineral-rich country through the passage of a set of laws during 1948–1960 reenforcing race separation under the label *apartheid*. In the 1950s massive peaceful protests against white minority rule were severely repressed, as were attempts at rebellion from the 1960s on. In the 1990s the leaders and movements opposing apartheid continued to struggle to establish the unity necessary to achieve a revolutionary transformation of South African society.

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

South Africa has a land area of 437,876 square miles (1,134,100 km²) bounded by the Atlantic on the west, the Indian Ocean on the south and east, Namibia in the northwest, Botswana and Zimbabwe in the north, and Mozambique and Swaziland in the northeast. The independent kingdom of Lesotho is an enclave totally encompassed by South African territory in the southeast. Much of the interior is a high plateau or veld, half of which averages 4,000 feet (1,219 m). The Drakensberg Mountains rise to 11,000 feet (3,350 m) in the east. The longest river is the Orange, which begins in Lesotho and flows westward 1,300 miles (2,092 km) to the Atlantic. South Africa possesses large gold, diamond, platinum,

273

uranium, and other important mineral deposits. The country's population was estimated at more than 37 million in 1990, of which approximately 76 percent was black (native African), 13 percent white, 3 percent Asian (mostly persons of Indian ancestry originally brought as laborers by the British from their Asian colony), and 8 percent of mixed racial ancestry ("colored"). The nation's largest cities included Johannesburg (1,700,000), Cape Town (the national legislative capital, 1,000,000), Durban (1,000,000), Pretoria (the administrative capital, 700,000), Port Elizabeth (600,000), and Bloemfontein (the judicial capital, 200,000).

Prior to the establishment of a Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, a number of African peoples inhabited the territories that eventually were to become the Republic of South Africa. The San (whom the colonists called Bushmen) were located in the cape area. The San had a hunter-gatherer economy based on the abundant game, fish, vegetables, and fruits of the region. They roamed parts of southwestern Africa in bands as small as 25 to as large as 300. The San, like the other major group in the area, the Khoi (whom the colonists called Hottentots), spoke a "click language" (characterized by clicking sounds). The Khoi, however, made use of domesticated animals, sheep, and large herds of cattle. They lived in villages varying in size from 500 to 2,000 over a large territory that stretched from the cape as far as 500 miles (800 km) to the east and 190 miles (300 km) to the north.

Other peoples in southern Africa were technologically more advanced than the San and the Khoi in that they used iron tools and engaged in agriculture as well as cattle and sheep herding. Most of these groups have been classified by linguists as Bantu speaking. In this sense the expression *Bantu* was used to refer to an African language category that had several major subdivisions. Bantu appears to have been derived from the Zulu word *abantu*, which means "people." White colonists later applied the expression in a derogatory sense to all native Africans (Danaher 1984; North 1985).

In the area from the Drakensberg Mountains to the Indian Ocean lived the Nguni-speaking groups of the Bantu linguistic category. These included the Xhosa and the Zulu. Much of the territory of southern Africa to the north of the Orange River was inhabited by the Sotho-Tswana groups, whose Bantu dialects were mutually intelligible. In addition, a number of smaller groups whose languages were included in the Bantu family inhabited various parts of South Africa.

DUTCH AND BRITISH COLONIZATION

After the Dutch East India Company set up a naval refreshment facility at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 for their ships in transit to

and from Asia, some of the company's employees were encouraged to establish farms and cattle herds to help provision the trading vessels. Early white settlers were overwhelmingly Dutch but also included some Germans and significant numbers of French and Belgian Huguenots (Calvinist Protestants). Although the Huguenots constituted about one-sixth of the late-seventeenth-century white settler population, they adopted the Dutch language and affiliated with the Protestant Dutch Reformed church. Over time, the colonists sharing the Dutch culture added some African expressions and other modifications to their speech, which came to constitute a new Dutch dialect called Afrikaans, and referred to themselves as Afrikaners. The colony's farmers were called *boer*s. These people obtained land and cattle from the surrounding Khoi, initially through purchase and trade. But when the Khoi resisted, the settlers resorted to warfare. After several decades many of the San and the Khoi had been transformed into a destitute class whose members could only survive through accepting the role of servant or slave to the white colonists (Magubane 1979, 1988; Omer-Cooper 1987).

In 1806 Great Britain, to facilitate trade with its Asian interests, seized Holland's Cape Colony. About 5,000 English settlers arrived in 1820. Many Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants resented British domination and the increasing use of English in the colony. Furthermore, young Afrikaners sought to establish large farms—of 1,000 or more acres—less and less possible as the cape became more heavily populated. Finally, in 1834 many Afrikaners were outraged at the British abolition of slavery. Thousands decided to head for other territories as yet free from British control. A series of large settler expeditions, collectively referred to as the Great Trek, set out from the cape from 1836 to 1856. The heavily armed wagon trains generally avoided the most densely populated areas and well-organized African groups, such as the Xhosa along the coast, and turned into the interior to regions that had recently been partially depopulated by episodes of intense warfare among the Africans. English merchants provided much of the equipment, weapons, and ammunition that the trekkers used to defeat, dispossess, and subjugate the inhabitants of the territories they invaded (Magubane 1979; Wheat-croft 1986).

Eventually, those Afrikaners who trekked (most had stayed behind at the cape) succeeded in establishing two land-locked Afrikaner states independent of British rule, the Orange Free State, between the Orange and Vaal rivers; and the much larger Transvaal Republic (also called the South African Republic), to the north of the Vaal. The British, in part discouraged by the potential cost of militarily subduing and then administering the republics, were temporarily content to tolerate their existence. The discovery of diamonds at British-controlled Kimberley,

near the border between Cape Colony and the Orange Free State, in 1867 and the economically much more significant discovery of vast gold deposits in the Transvaal in 1886 prompted Britain's leaders to seek the incorporation of the Afrikaner republics into a united South Africa, along with the Cape Colony and the colony of Natal on the eastern coast, under a pro-British regime.

In the years after the gold find, thousands of Britons arrived in the Transvaal to mine the precious metal. It soon became clear that the ore, though abundant, was of generally moderate-to-poor quality, meaning that enormous quantities had to be extracted and processed. Furthermore, much of the gold was located far below the surface, necessitating the construction of expensive deep mines. The exploitation of the huge gold resource was to require major capital investments and cheap, plentiful labor to ensure large profits.

British miners and businessmen, who by the 1890s were generating most of the Transvaal's export income, were referred to as "outlanders" and were not allowed to vote. British authorities rejected a compromise for an eventual extension of the vote to British residents of the Transvaal and provoked war with the republics in 1899. Mounted Boer guerrilla fighters numbering up to 40,000 waged an effective resistance forcing the commitment of a quarter of a million British troops to the conflict. British authorities forcibly removed Afrikaner farm families to concentration camps, where 25,000 women and children perished from disease, and destroyed many farms to deprive guerrillas of sustenance. The British also detained the Boers' African servants and workers in separate concentration camps, where similar numbers died (Omer-Cooper 1987).

Many Africans denied provisions to Boer troops and even at times attacked Boer commandos, anticipating that British victory would result in the extension of political rights to nonwhites. African opposition was instrumental in forcing the Boers to accept British peace terms (Omer-Cooper 1987; Warwick 1983). But in an attempt to convince the Boers to agree to the 1902 peace proposal, the British promised not to grant political equality to nonwhites, thus betraying African loyalty and wartime sacrifices (the Boers often executed Africans who aided the British). British authorities even arrested native Africans for violating the Transvaal's laws by burning their mandatory "work passes" and obliged them to continue working at low wages in the mines, owned largely by British interests (Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987; Wheatcroft 1986).

In 1905 the Liberal party won control of the British Parliament from the Conservatives and proposed a policy of reconciliation with the Boers in which the formerly independent republics would quickly be returned to self-government within the framework of a union with the British-dominated Cape and Natal colonies. The constitution of the Union of

South Africa, approved by 1910 by the legislatures of the four states and the British Parliament, limited the vote to white males except in the Cape, where certain economically prosperous nonwhite men retained the franchise (these constituted at the time about one-seventh of all Cape voters). British Liberals apparently adopted the optimistic but incorrect view that the Cape system would serve as a model to the three other members of the union. Instead, white South African leaders eliminated nonwhite Cape voting rights by denying the vote to Cape native Africans in 1936 and Cape residents of mixed race in 1956 (Radu 1987). Thus the measures taken by the British in resolving the Boer War resulted in the establishment of a virtually all-white state structure, which both constituted a major continuous cause for nonwhite mass discontent and provided a motivation for overthrowing the white regime, a motivation that conceivably could unify nonwhite population groups in a revolutionary effort.

At the point of formation of the Union of South Africa, mining and other major developing industries, along with the professions, were dominated by whites of British ancestry. Although some Afrikaners were involved in trades or other businesses, they were predominantly farmers. But as a result of the devastation of the Boer War and later taxation, thousands of Afrikaners were forced to sell or abandon their farms, often to expanding agribusiness interests, and seek employment in the mines or in the urban industries. Thus much of the Afrikaans-speaking majority of the white population (approximately 60 percent of the whites) came to constitute an impoverished working class. These Afrikaners were especially prone to maintaining their ideology of racial superiority both as a source of psychological status and as a justification for preventing nonwhites from competing economically on an equal footing with whites or from having access to political power (Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987; Thompson 1985).

The British, in general, tended to be more liberal than the Afrikaners, as reflected by the extension of the vote to some nonwhites in the Cape Colony. British missionaries converted many Africans to Christianity and provided educational opportunities for limited numbers. But certain British colonial authorities not only held personal beliefs in white racial superiority but also took actions at various points to crush nonwhite opposition and capacities for self-sufficiency. These included the British-precipitated Zulu War in the 1870s, which (though later condemned in England, especially after initial Zulu victories resulted in the deaths of thousands of British soldiers) led to the subjugation of the Zulu and their availability as laborers for various white-owned industries. Later British authorities imposed taxation measures that coerced hundreds of thousands of Africans to seek employment in mining, industry, or

other jobs at which they could earn the money to pay taxes and otherwise survive in the increasingly white-structured economic environment (Omer-Cooper 1987).

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

After 1910 a national parliament elected exclusively by whites, except in the Cape Province, governed South Africa as a member of the British Commonwealth. Early parliaments were dominated by parties and co-alitions that generally promoted reconciliation among the nation's whites. However, during World War I thousands of Afrikaners protested against South Africa's alliance with Britain and its seizure of German-occupied Southwest Africa (Namibia). After the war, which drew many more black South Africans into the industrial labor force and, consequently, into competition with whites, many white workers, objecting to their own poor working conditions and advances by nonwhites, staged strikes and even violent protests. Government forces killed scores of white workers. Partly as a result, the white workers' Labor party formed an alliance with the National party (supported largely by Afrikaner farmers and businessmen) and during the 1920s helped pass a series of laws further restricting the rights of nonwhites. The Labor party, however, was soon weakened by internal conflict between those members who proposed cooperation with nonwhite workers and others who main-tained segregationist attitudes. The National party continued to gain support under the leadership of a former official of the Orange Free State, J. B. Hertzog.

Hertzog's government (first elected in 1924) took measures to improve employment opportunities for Afrikaner whites, such as the creation in 1928 of the state-owned Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), and assisted other Afrikaner-controlled industries by imposing special pro-tective tariffs. These and other businesses were required to reserve certain types of jobs for whites only and employ specific quotas of white workers. Many Afrikaners, believing that continued political association with Britain would gradually erode Afrikaner culture and perhaps even lead to a liberalization of race policy, favored withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Afrikaner nationalism was embodied in the growth of a covert Afrikaner organization called the Broederbond, which set up secret cells in major economic, cultural, and governmental institutions throughout the nation as well as in the armed forces (Giliomee 1980; Omer-Cooper 1987).

The worldwide Great Depression had a devastating effect on South Africa, worsened by the fact that until 1933 South Africa refused, unlike the rest of the world, to abandon the gold standard. In 1934

SOUTH AFRICA

Hertzog's National party and the party supported by many whites of British descent, the South Africa party, led by a more moderate Afrikaner, Jan Smuts, joined forces to form the United party, which then enjoyed a large majority in the parliament. Those English-speaking whites who opposed the United party organized the Dominion party, whereas those Afrikaners objecting to unifying politically with British interests formed the much more important Purified National party (which later was known simply as the National party), under D. F. Malan (Omeara 1983; Omer-Cooper 1987).

As World War II began, the United party experienced internal conflict. Hertzog and many of his Afrikaner followers favored neutrality. But Smuts, with his Afrikaner associates and the English-speaking members of the United party, supported by the smaller Dominion and Labor parties, obtained a majority in the parliament in favor of entering the war on Britain's side. As a result, thousands of South Africans of all races served in the war, although only whites were allowed to bear arms (nonwhites performed support functions). Some Afrikaners espoused pro-German views because they approved the Nazi doctrine of Aryan racial superiority. A number engaged in sabotage of military facilities, and some were incarcerated for the duration of the conflict.

The war caused a tremendous boom in and transformation of the South African economy. At the onset of the conflict, South Africa's wealth was derived primarily from mining. But at the conclusion, manufacturing was foremost. The war had stimulated South Africa to develop the capacity to build much of the machinery and equipment it had formerly imported. Furthermore, in the absence of the many whites serving in the armed forces, a massive influx of native Africans into mining and urban industry occurred.

After the conclusion of World War II, the United party, under Smuts, was confident of victory in the 1948 election for parliament. However, most Afrikaners and some English-speaking whites had become dissatisfied over certain issues. United party leaders had proposed permanent urban residency for the Africans, who by that point were extensively employed in industry. Thousands of returning whites feared not only racial integration but also increased economic competition from blacks if the United party retained power (Omeara 1983; Omer-Cooper 1987). Also Afrikaner farmers blamed the United party for a shortage of low-cost African agricultural laborers. Others were concerned with the growth during wartime of groups opposed to the racially based political system; they were especially wary of the South African Communist party, which had increased its influence in the labor movement.

All these factors combined to heighten the popularity of the concept of continued and increased apartheid ("separateness" of the races)

championed by Malan's National party. According to apartheid doctrine, each race and nation has its own distinct cultural identity and has been created to achieve a unique destiny laid down by God. Therefore each nation must be kept pure and allowed to develop freely along its own lines because "excessive contact between races, above all interbreeding, would corrupt and destroy the inner potential of both races" (Omer-Cooper 1987, p. 190). White fear of liberalization of racial policies provided the revived National party with a narrow victory in the momentous 1948 election.

THE APARTHEID STATE

Malan's new National party government immediately moved to implement a series of laws intended to increase and systematize separation not only between the four official "racial" categories of white, colored, Asian (Indian), and black, but also among the major ethnic, or tribal, groups within the huge African majority. Legislation formalizing apartheid included the Population Registration Act (mandating official racial classification of all South Africans) and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. The Suppression of Communism Act, passed in 1950, not only banned the South African Communist party but also permitted the punishment of anyone working to implement the supposedly "Communist doctrine" of racial equality (Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987). Thus the government created a powerful coercive tool to protect the white-controlled state by severely punishing opponents of apartheid as "Communists" and "traitors."

The 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act restricted native Africans' right to permanent residency in towns and urban areas largely to those who had previously resided and been employed in a particular town for a period of fifteen or more years. The select group of Africans in this category, though, could not move to any other urban area and could be removed from the town if authorities determined they were unemployed for long periods or were judged harmful to the public good. All other native Africans were permitted to reside only temporarily in urban areas (in designated locations usually remote from the white cities) as long as they were employed and had received the necessary clearance. But they officially held permanent residency only in their "tribal homelands."

The South African government had previously, through the 1913 Native Land Act and the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, allotted 13.5 percent of South Africa's territory as tribal homelands or "Bantustans," which were to serve as the only truly permanent residences for most of the country's population. The ten homelands, which on the average had close to half of their supposed populations living in the "white" 86.5

percent of South Africa, included Basotho-Qwaqwa of the Southern Sotho, Bophuthatswana of the Tswana, Ciskei of the Xhosa, Gazakulu of the Shangaana, KaNgwane of the Ngwane, KwaNdebele of the Ndebele, KwaZulu of the Zulu, Lebowa of the Northern Sotho, Transkei also of the Xhosa, and Venda of the Venda (Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987). Most Bantustans possessed little in the way of mineral wealth or industrial or transportation infrastructure. They functioned primarily as sources of cheap labor for white industry, business, and domestic service, and depositories for the elderly, the infirm, and surplus labor. Many migrant workers were not permitted to bring their families with them to white areas and were often required to live in barracks-like conditions that fostered alcohol abuse and crime. Hundreds of thousands of native African women were forced to surrender care of their own children to others as the condition of employment as domestics in white homes where, ironically, they played a major role in raising and tending to their masters' children.

The 1952 Pass Law required native Africans to carry in a single mandatory passbook a personal photograph and information on place of birth, employment history, payments of taxes, and record of police contacts. The 1956 Native Resettlement Act helped resegregate blacks after years of urban expansion had created situations in which previously black areas had become surrounded by white residential developments. Many native Africans were uprooted from these enclaves and forced to take up residency in new government-built townships, such as those southwest of Johannesburg (known by the acronym for South Western Townships, Soweto, eventually inhabited by more than 1 million people).

Other laws restricted education for nonwhites so that they would be trained only in the skills necessary to serve their tribal kin in the Bantustans and "perform the labouring roles which might be required of them by whites" (Omer-Cooper 1987, p. 201). By 1961 the National party government had succeeded in enacting into law all the measures that constituted its original white supremacist form of apartheid. This system not only perpetuated separation of the races but also guaranteed the lion's share of the nation's growing wealth to the white minority, virtually eliminating poverty among whites. The National party also renamed the nation in 1960 the Republic of South Africa and withdrew it from the British Commonwealth. These events, in a sense, reversed the outcome of the 1899–1902 Boer War.

CHANGES IN THE APARTHEID SYSTEM

After 1959 the apartheid system underwent several modifications. As most former African colonies achieved independence from European

SOUTH AFRICAN TRIBAL HOMELANDS

domination, South Africa attempted to influence the emerging states through offers of technical assistance and trade. One purpose of the new tactic was to deflect criticism and increasing antiapartheid animosity emanating from the United Nations. As newly independent Asian and African nations were admitted to its ranks, that body was becoming less dominated by the European nations (which in the past had seemed relatively tolerant of South African racism). The white regime also sensed that good relations with the other nations of the continent would provide nearby and ready markets for the exports generated by its growing manufacturing sector.

Greater reliance on manufacturing and increasing technological sophistication, along with white social mobility out of the working class and into white-collar occupations, resulted in changes in the nature of the society's demands for nonwhite labor. Previously mining and industry had utilized mainly unskilled or semiskilled nonwhites. Now the economy needed larger numbers of skilled nonwhite workers who could reliably carry out their jobs over an extended period. Finally, the increasing internal protests against apartheid since World War II, progressing from peaceful campaigns of defiance to armed resistance, and punctuated by internationally condemned episodes of violent repression, also prompted significant policy alterations (Danaher 1984, 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

The three major innovations engineered by the white regime between 1960 and 1990 included pursuing separate development toward political independence for the native homelands, promoting processes intended to result in a more highly skilled, stable, and streamlined nonwhite labor force, and in 1983 enacting a new constitution intended to co-opt Indians and South Africans of mixed racial descent (coloreds) into an alliance with whites and in opposition to the African majority (Danaher 1984; Greenberg 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

Prior to 1959, the South African government intended that the native homelands would develop local self-government along tribal lines but would still remain under the jurisdiction of the white republic. However, theoreticians within the National party eventually succeeded in winning support for the argument that South Africa could both achieve wider international acceptance and divide or blunt internal opposition by pushing a policy of full independence for the homelands. Publicly the white regime began to assert that it now recognized that native Africans had the capability to organize and govern modern nation-states. But the result of successfully establishing the homelands as independent states would be to transform the basis for economic and political discrimination against Africans from that of racism to that of citizenship. The millions of native Africans employed in South African industries, businesses, and households would in the future be classified as foreign migrant

labor; their lack of entitlement to the rights of South Africans would be based on nationality, not race (Danaher 1984; Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987).

Furthermore, National party leaders anticipated that the development of independent homeland government administrations, service bureaucracies, and economic enterprises would provide opportunities for social mobility for educated Africans blocked from participating in the republic's government or from playing major roles in other institutions, thus minimizing African elite discontent. Additional potential benefits to the white community included the probability that frustrated blacks would in the future target their own homeland governments for protest actions rather than white authorities. Granting independence along tribal lines was also thought likely to heighten competitiveness and hostility among black ethnic groups, thereby presenting whites with a divided and more easily controlled black population, whose tribal animosities might override the motivation to unite against apartheid. As most of the homelands lacked both industrial infrastructure and known significant mineral wealth and some were actually composed of several noncontiguous parcels separated by the republic's territory, they would remain economically dependent on the white-controlled state and could be easily intimidated by South Africa's overpowering military.

Business leaders reacted to the growing shortage of skilled workers by pressuring the government to open many previously restricted jobs to nonwhites. Furthermore, in seeking a stable and reliable skilled work force, the white regime by the 1980s had granted many Africans virtual permanent residency outside the homelands by successively allowing them the right to lease houses in segregated urban townships for thirty years, then ninety years, and then finally permitting them the right to purchase homes. Furthermore, to promote emotional stability among African skilled workers, the regime eventually allowed many to have their families live with them. In 1970 before the stabilization-of-workers program had begun at the Kimberley diamond mines, 86 percent of the work force was composed of migrants, whereas in 1979, after the new program had been in effect for seven years, 62 percent of the mine workers were stabilized and only 38 percent were migrants (Omer-Cooper 1987).

The need to reduce the incidence of wildcat strikes and in general provide mechanisms through which business and government could communicate with and exercise influence over the increasingly skilled and difficult-to-replace work force prompted the government to permit the legal existence of black labor unions after 1979, provided they did not engage in "political" activity (Davis 1987; Kerson 1987). To meet the demand for highly trained technicians of all races segregated non-

white colleges and universities were expanded and also white universities were opened to those needing courses not available at nonwhite institutions. In 1986 the white regime finally abolished the Pass Law and permitted the freer movement of African workers to black urban districts (*New York Times*, June 27, 1988, p. A1).

White voters in 1983 approved a new "multiracial" constitution that supposedly offered a "share of power" to coloreds and Indians, to the exclusion of the African majority. The reorganized three-part legislature included a white House of Assembly, with 166 members; a colored House of Representatives, with 85 members; and an Indian House of Delegates, with 45 members. The president of the republic, selected by an Electoral College composed of 88 members (50 elected by the white parliament, 25 by the colored, and 13 by the Indian), enjoyed greatly expanded executive powers under the new constitution. Individual parliaments were to deal with matters particular to their racial groups and jointly with matters of "common interest" (Danaher 1984, p. 23), as determined by the president of the republic. Although some viewed the constitution as a step forward, many others considered it a mechanism for preserving white domination and strengthening the coercive capacity of the regime. Large numbers of mixed race and Indian South Africans reportedly refused to register to vote in elections under the new constitution and of those who did register, only 30 percent of coloreds and 20 percent of Indians actually took part in the first parliamentary elections. The new political system particularly infuriated many members of the totally excluded black population and precipitated the most widespread series of protests since the 1976 Soweto uprising (Danaher 1984; Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID

The defeat of Chief Bambatha's 1903 rebellion against taxation and white-supported collaborationist tribal leaders has been widely cited as the last of the traditional wars of resistance against white domination in South Africa. But in 1912, following the rejection of the concept of political equality for nonwhites by the victorious British, an important African movement opposed to white domination was organized, the African National Congress (ANC), originally called the South African Natives' National Congress. This group, established largely by Western-schooled black professionals, businessmen, and prosperous farmers, whose education was often the product of Christian missionary efforts, was the "first modern, nontribal organization of blacks formed to discuss black interests under white rule" (Davis 1987, p. 3). The early ANC was resigned to the at-least-temporary reality of white minority rule but was

committed to working against laws promoting racial discrimination and to an extension of the benefits of modern education and technology to the larger population. The group proclaimed its support for a future nonracial political system in which all South Africa's peoples would enjoy equal rights in a European-style democratic state. ANC leaders originally hoped that peaceful protest and legal efforts, coupled with anticipated international pressure from Britain, other democratic nations, and the Christian church, would bring about a reorganization of South Africa along nonracial lines. But during its early years the ANC remained largely an elitist, middle-class group, somewhat isolated culturally from the traditional life-styles of the majority of Africans (Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

During World War II, as South Africa joined the side of the Allies against Nazi Germany with its doctrine of racial supremacy, ANC leaders voted to support the war effort in the expectation that victory would result in a reduction of racism and an extension of political rights at home. The results of the 1948 election, which brought the Afrikaner National party to power, as we have seen, reversed the small level of wartime liberalization, led quickly to the passage of a series of laws that reaffirmed and systematized racial segregation, and precipitated the more militant younger generation's ascendancy to leadership of the ANC. The youthful activists favored the mobilization of mass protest movements instead of the previous exclusive reliance on negotiation and moral appeals to white leaders, who in reality seemed primarily concerned with appeasing the racially biased elements within their existing electorate.

On June 26, 1952, the ANC, together with the antiapartheid South African Indian Congress (SAIC), launched the Defiance Campaign. This action involved the planned violation of segregation laws by volunteers in several cities, who passively submitted to arrest. The campaign quickly generated large-scale popular support among nonwhites, and ANC membership, which had been 4,500 in 1947, rapidly increased to 100,000. But among the many recruits were scores of paid government agents (some motivated in part by opposition to the ANC's nontribal orientation), whose information regarding the movement's leadership helped the white government's efforts at repression. In August and September, the white regime arrested ANC and SAIC leaders and accused them of violation of the Suppression of Communism Act, which banned working for racial equality. Then in mid-October in response to government actions, spontaneous riots broke out in several cities; the riots were violently crushed. As a result of the mass arrests of leaders and the smashing of riots, the Defiance Campaign collapsed (Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987). In reaction, Nelson Mandela, a young lawyer of Xhosa

ancestry, who was an architect of the Defiance Campaign, began the construction of a secretive cellular network within the ANC, the elements of which in the future would continue to provide leadership at the local level regardless of whether top leaders or any components of the overall organization were eliminated (Benson 1986; Davis 1987).

The ANC and the SACP

The ANC received instruction in organizing an internal underground network from members of the illegal South African Communist party (SACP). The SACP had been founded among exploited white workers in 1921 and, reflecting the racist attitudes of many whites, initially avoided working with blacks. But well before the 1950s, the SACP had officially committed itself to organizing black laborers and to working for racial equality. SACP activists played significant roles in some labor unions and in several protests against the regime. They perceived that the ANC had the capability to organize and guide the development of a mass movement to bring an end to white rule. In the original SACP view, such an event would lead to a second revolutionary transition to "a socialist South Africa, laying the foundations of a classless, communist society" (Davis 1987, p. 10). The SACP's estimated membership of 2,000 in 1950 included 150 whites and 250 Indians (Davis 1987; Karis 1986/1987). Outside of the small number of whites in the SACP, however, the percentage of the nation's white elite committed to overturning apartheid through a revolutionary effort remained close to zero.

The ANC's attitude toward the SACP shifted over time. From the 1920s through the 1940s, many ANC members opposed working with the SACP (Karis 1986/1987). ANC leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo in the late 1940s even proposed expelling SACP members from the ANC. But the post–World War II National party government's apartheid program and, in particular, its implementation of broad repressive policies under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which mandated that anyone working for racial equality could be punished for advocating communism, tended to promote cooperation between the ANC and the SACP.

When the ANC itself was outlawed in 1961, the organization became more dependent on assistance from the SACP. SACP members helped establish the critically important secret leadership network of ANC militants inside South Africa, obtained financial and military aid for the ANC from the Soviet Union and other Communist party–dominated states, and provided information on the South African government, military, and economic installations that was gathered either by SACP members or by the Soviet Union (Davis 1987; Karis 1986/1987; Ma-

gubane 1979). And the SACP's characterization of South Africa's system as a form of European imperialist exploitation of Africa appeared increasingly valid to many ANC members whose peaceful efforts at change were crushed within the country while capitalist nations cooperated with the white government and refused to help the ANC.

By the end of 1969, the ANC began to accept nonnative African Communists into its ranks and in 1985 the ANC National Executive Committee was opened to all races. The number of SACP members on the thirty-three-person ANC Executive Committee was estimated to be at least three to as many as twenty-three (Karis 1986/1987; Radu 1987; *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1990, p. A15). However, ANC leaders and most informed observers asserted that the ANC through 1990 represented a broad coalition of interests and ideologies within South Africa, was not controlled by Communists, and publicly called for a multiparty, nonracial political democracy.

The ANC and the Freedom Charter

The ANC and other groups participated in a Congress of the People at Kliptown in June 1955, involving a mass meeting of 3,000 people of all races. Those present voted to adopt a Freedom Charter, which asserted that the wealth of South Africa belonged to *all* its inhabitants and demanded the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a nonracial democracy. In addition to calling for a more equitable distribution of land, profits, and other forms of wealth and equal access to education and employment opportunities, further goals proclaimed in the charter included:

> The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; . . . other industries and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people. . . . The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be helpers and protectors of the people. . . . Free medical [treatment] and hospitalization shall be provided for all with special care for mothers and young children. . . . Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all. (Congress of the People—1955, 1987, pp. 209, 210, 211)

The white regime reacted harshly to the Freedom Charter and the mammoth Kliptown interracial effort to undermine apartheid. On December 5, 1956, after months of gathering information on activists, the government arrested scores of leaders of participating groups and accused them of treason. The proceedings of the so-called Treason Trial continued until November 29, 1961, with all the defendants found not

guilty. However, the government had succeeded in not only imprisoning key leaders for extended periods but also financially and occupationally injuring those apprehended so as to deter future potential activists.

The ANC and the PAC

Long-standing controversies within the ANC over the issues of multiracial cooperation to end white domination, the role of the SACP in the ANC, and reliance on funding from non-African countries that were dominated by Communist parties resulted in a major defection from the ANC and the establishment in April 1959 of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the second South African liberation group officially recognized by the United Nations (the first was the ANC). The founders of the PAC, which like the ANC supported the eventual establishment of a nonracial government, argued that South Africa must be freed from the bonds of apartheid primarily through black militancy, not through the ANC multiracial cooperation approach, which, according to the PAC, was being subverted by its Communist members and was too greatly influenced by the non-African nations from which it obtained much of its funds and weapons. The PAC advocated the "black nationalist" view that the psychology of black South Africans, theoretically crippled by decades of oppression and humiliation at the hands of whites, could only be rejuvenated by having the nation's blacks "act alone in reclaiming South Africa from white domination" (Davis 1987, p. 11). The PAC's ideology gained popularity because it enhanced feelings of pride and importance among many young Africans and engendered a special sense of mission.

Both the ANC and the PAC planned to launch a campaign against the nation's Pass Law in spring 1961. The leaders of the PAC, however, decided to begin their protest movement on March 21, ten days before the scheduled start of the ANC antipass drive. At Sharpeville on the morning of March 21 a large number of people gathered without their pass documents to await arrest. Some police, possibly fearing for their own safety, opened fire on the crowd, killing sixty-seven, most of whom were shot in the back as they tried to flee. Police shootings at other locations also resulted in deaths and scores of injuries. The killings precipitated riots by tens of thousands in the black townships outside the white cities and industrial centers they served. On April 8, the South African government outlawed both the ANC and the PAC. Because the ANC had succeeded over a number of years in building an underground network, it was less devastated than the PAC, which, partly owing to its recent creation, had virtually no clandestine organizational structure and was almost eliminated (Adam 1988; Davis 1987; Schlemmer 1988).

The ANC and Armed Resistance

Elements of the ANC, under the youthful leadership of Nelson Mandela, made one last attempt to convince the white government to accept peaceful change. They demanded a national convention of all races be called to draft a new nonracial constitution. When the white regime rejected this concept, the ANC militants reluctantly resolved to abandon their organization's long-held commitment to nonviolent protest and begin a campaign of selective sabotage. Because the shift in tactics was resisted by the older and more moderate members of the ANC, the younger activists formed a semi-independent but ANC-associated military organization called Umkhonto we Sizwe (Zulu for "Spear of the Nation"). The aim of Umkhonto was to carry out sabotage of important transportation, communication, and industrial facilities in order both to inflict injury on the nation's white-owned economy and to frighten off foreign investors, thereby pressuring the government into serious negotiations with the ANC (Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987). Members of the South African Communist party with military experience began to train young Africans in the use of bombs, grenades, and other weapons and succeeded in obtaining military assistance from the Soviet Union. Western countries, dependent on South Africa for important minerals, such as platinum and chromium, and generally favorably influenced by South Africa's strong anti-Communist stance, refused to provide military aid to the ANC, although by the 1980s several Western European nations were assisting through cash donations and in other nonmilitary ways.

The Umkhonto sabotage campaign was begun on December 16, 1961, to counter the Afrikaner celebration of an 1838 Boer victory over a Zulu army at "Blood River" during the Great Trek. Over several months scores of targets were hit by dynamite bombs or mines, but the damage inflicted was usually slight. Furthermore, the public was generally not informed regarding the political purpose of the attacks or of the link between Umkhonto and the much better known ANC. In August 1962 Mandela was captured, reportedly with the aid of information supplied to the white South African government by the CIA (New York Times, June 10, 1990, p. A15), and later tried for sabotage and given a life sentence. By the end of 1963, the Umkhonto sabotage effort had been largely crushed. A sabotage-assassination campaign begun by PAC extremists was also smashed. The ANC's leadership concluded that before another large-scale armed assault was attempted, the ANC underground "would have to be purged of counter-espionage agents and made secure" and that a military command center outside South Africa would have to be established to plan, coordinate, and order operations "without fear of capture" (Davis 1987, p. 21).

Revolutionary Changes
Among South Africa's Neighbors

In the mid-1970s, major political changes to the north of South Africa appeared to improve the chances for antiapartheid movements and certainly had the effect of both encouraging militancy among nonwhites and alarming the white minority. After more than a dozen years of unsuccessful attempts to repress nationalist guerrilla movements in its Angola and Mozambique colonies, Portugal experienced its own revolution. Leftist-oriented Portuguese soldiers, disillusioned by decades of right-wing military dictatorship and the futile and wasteful colonial wars, and in part inspired by the ideology of the African revolutionaries they had struggled against, overthrew their nation's authoritarian regime. The new left-leaning Portuguese government quickly granted independence to Angola and Mozambique. In both nations Marxist-oriented movements, extremely hostile to the apartheid state to the south, achieved dominance. For the first time, countries geographically close to South Africa appeared ready to lend support to a large-scale revolutionary effort.

Within a few more years nationalist guerrilla movements in another nearby country, Zimbabwe (formerly called Rhodesia, after the wealthy white British expansionist, Cecil Rhodes), succeeded with the aid of international pressure in forcing a negotiated end to the rule of its then 3 percent white minority. In the April 18, 1980, election for a national parliament, the ZANU (the Zimbabwe African National union), the party of the self-proclaimed Marxist and "most radical of the contenders," Robert Mugabe, won a resounding victory (Omer-Cooper 1987, p. 234). The new government, under black majority rule, encouraged whites to remain but declared its commitment to helping to overturn white minority rule in South Africa.

The Black Consciousness Movement
and the Soweto Uprisings

Prior to the changes in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, a new activist movement had been organized by young blacks at Bloemfontein in South Africa in August 1971. Steve Biko was selected as leader of the new Black Consciousness movement. The BCM, inspired in part by the Black Power movement in the United States, was mainly influenced by earlier African nationalist ideology, such as that formulated by PAC leaders. The militants of the BCM asserted the need for blacks to lead the antiapartheid movement but proposed to rely on legal means to attain their goals. This meant that the BCM was to avoid the ANC and PAC campaigns of civil disobedience and their later armed struggles.

BCM leaders began "a scrupulously law-abiding education and community action campaign designed to work at the grass-roots level toward building a psychology of self-reliance among blacks" (Davis 1987, p. 25).

According to the BCM, the pressure of a politically aroused, unified, and determined black majority, the anticipated result of the BCM program, would persuade the white government to negotiate seriously a restructuring of South African society. Wherever the BCM set up local organizations, whether community action groups, labor unions, or political education seminars, only blacks were allowed to participate. As the BCM advocated strict legality and seemed to employ its own form of apartheid rather than embrace the supposedly "Communist" method of multiracial cooperation to attain a nonracial state, the white regime temporarily tolerated the development of the movement (Omer-Cooper 1987). But the BCM failed to build a significant mass organizational network, relying instead on a relatively small elite of educated middle-class individuals for guidance. The BCM raised expectations through its leaders' public speeches eliciting black pride and self-confidence and by instilling a belief that sweeping change could be accomplished through the legal structures existing within the apartheid state. Since the group rejected the concept of an extralegal confrontational approach to dealing with the white regime, it was not prepared to coordinate the protests generated by the mass frustration that resulted when white authorities ignored peaceful demands for change (Davis 1987).

The efforts of the ANC, PAC, and BCM helped motivate a new defiance campaign by the schoolchildren of the massive black township of Soweto in 1976. The protest was directed against a law requiring that black students "not only learn Afrikaans as a language as well as English but accept it as the media of instruction through which they would have to learn other key subjects like mathematics"; many viewed this rule as constituting "an intolerable, artificial obstacle to their struggle for advancement" (Omer-Cooper 1987, p. 224). In June 1976, Soweto schoolchildren began large-scale protests. When the police used force to suppress the demonstrations, rioting broke out and spread to other towns in the Transvaal as well as to cities in Natal, the Cape, the Orange Free State, and the homelands.

The wave of riots constituted the largest black rebellion in twentieth-century South Africa. Unlike earlier outbreaks, such as that following the 1961 Sharpeville massacre, the Soweto rebellion was not quickly crushed, despite vicious police and military violence, but continued for months. At least 600 people, mostly young students, were shot to death by state forces during the conflict. The white regime arrested hundreds of suspected leaders of the protest, dozens of whom died in police custody from supposed "suicides," "hunger strikes," and "unexplained

causes" (Brewer 1986). In September 1977, the nationally known leader of the BCM, Steve Biko, was arrested and then beaten to death by police. Thousands of young people, however, fled the townships and South Africa and many joined ANC guerrilla forces organized in the newly independent antiapartheid states to the north (Brewer 1986; Davis 1987). The Soweto uprisings infused the ANC with a new generation of radicalized youth and intensified mass frustration with the white regime and support for violent revolution throughout many sectors of the African population.

Other young militants were drawn to the surviving elements of the PAC, which shared the black nationalist orientation of the shattered Black Consciousness movement, and formed the "Azania People's Liberation Army," many of whose members were quickly arrested, as the PAC had been successfully infiltrated by government agents. The post-Soweto repression crushed all major contenders for leadership of the black opposition except the longer established and more secretively organized ANC and persuaded many more nonwhite South Africans "of the futility of above-ground, peaceful opposition" (Davis 1987, p. 33).

After 1978 "the story of the black military opposition in the Republic is largely the story of the ANC and its allies" (Davis 1987, p. 33). The ANC in the early 1980s was able to commence a relatively sustained guerrilla effort, beginning with bombings of major South African oil facilities. The dominant view within the ANC was that although armed resistance could not result in a military victory in the near future, given the strength of the white regime's army and security forces, it could increase the costs of maintaining apartheid and, along with other factors, help pressure Pretoria into serious negotiations toward establishment of a nonracial democracy (Adam 1988).

Opposition to White Domination in the 1980s

The 1983 adoption of the new multiracial constitution by the white minority, which was widely interpreted as an attempt to co-opt the colored and Indian minorities while maintaining control firmly in the hands of whites, precipitated a massive intensification of protest. A major new—initially legal—antiapartheid organization was established in August 1983 when 12,000 delegates convened in Cape Town to form the United Democratic front (UDF, later renamed the "Mass Democratic movement" in an effort to circumvent government repressive measures) to oppose the approaching white referendum on the multiracial constitution. The organizational concept of the UDF involved the notion of linking the many local antiapartheid groups together through a coun-

trywide board of directors that could set national policy objectives, suggest tactics, and offer coordination. "By the end of 1986, some seven hundred community bodies had affiliated with the umbrella-like UDF," including civic organizations, "women's groups, labor unions, youth leagues, and religious councils" (Davis 1987, p. 87).

Although the UDF declared itself independent of the illegal African National Congress, the UDF's goals for the future of South Africa appeared to be almost identical to those of the ANC. Most of the UDF's member groups supported the ANC and accepted the Freedom Charter, and several national and local leaders of the UDF acknowledged at least past membership in the ANC. The UDF differed from the ANC in terms of its publicly accepted range of tactics, which excluded violence. However, in 1988 the white government declared the UDF, then claiming 3 million members in more than 600 affiliated community organizations, illegal (*New York Times*, Feb. 25, 1988, p. A1). In addition to the UDF, a major new union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), was established at Durban in December 1985. Similar in structure to the UDF, COSATU also declared its independence of the ANC, while expressing many of the same goals, and "announced socialist aims and principles" (Davis 1987, p. 102). Within several months thirty unions, representing 600,000 workers, had joined COSATU (membership would reportedly reach approximately 1 million by 1990), the largest union association in South Africa's history.

ANC leaders decided that rather than attempt the difficult task of organizing large numbers of South Africans directly into the illegal ANC, they would "federate" with like-minded legal organizations. In return for the cooperation and support of the UDF, COSATU, and associated groups, the ANC had to accept the significant degree of ideological variation characterizing the allied organizations, a decentralized authority structure, and a possibly reduced role for the ANC itself in the antiapartheid struggle. But federation presented the possibility of genuinely united, massive participation in a coordinated effort to overturn white domination through measures including labor strikes, boycotts of white businesses, and military actions involving the sabotage of key economic installations as well as violent attacks on the military instruments of white oppression.

The ANC also called on nations trading with South Africa to boycott the republic and to convince or coerce their citizens to remove their investments from South Africa or from companies doing business in South Africa to help damage the economy and force change. The ANC hoped that its supporters would make the black townships ungovernable for the white-approved, often collaborationist, township councils (whose members achieved power through elections in which generally less than

20 percent of those eligible voted) and that the townships could be turned into relatively secure bases for ANC activities. By 1986 many councils had been effectively replaced by local popular committees typically favorable to the ANC. The African National Congress and allied groups in the 1980s were estimated to enjoy the backing of about 50 percent of the black population (40 percent of the overall South African population), making it the single most widely supported political group in the nation (Davis 1987).

One rough gauge of the relative strengths of the ANC and the PAC in 1990 was size of the labor union federations affiliated with each organization. The Congress of South African Trade Unions, whose leaders tended to identify with the aims of the ANC, claimed approximately 1 million members, while the pro-PAC National Council of Trade Unions had about 150,000 (*New York Times*, March 4, 1990, p. A14). A further indication of popular allegiance to the ANC was the fact that an estimated 70 percent of native African workers participated in the nationwide strike called by the Mass Democratic movement to protest the 1989 South African elections (*U.S. News and World Report*, Sept. 18, 1989, p. 52).

Support for the ANC and other organizations working for change was motivated not only by widespread opposition to apartheid but also by economic hardships afflicting enormous numbers of nonwhites. In the 1980s white per capita income was more than four times that of Indians or individuals of mixed racial ancestry and over eight times that of native Africans (Seedat 1987a, 1987b). Unemployment among native Africans was over 20 percent. And the impact of unemployment or employment at relatively low wages included a level of undernourishment for native African children estimated at between 10 percent and 30 percent (Le Roux 1988).

Inkatha

A major rival to the ANC and its allied groups among the Zulu in Natal Province was Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSizwe (National Cultural Liberation movement). Its most prominent figure was Chief Gatsa Buthelezi, head of the most populous homeland, KwaZulu, to which more than 6 million black South Africans were assigned, whether residents there or working in white areas. Inkatha, founded in 1974 hypothetically as a Zulu cultural organization, had 100,000 members by 1977 and claimed 1,700,000 by 1990. Despite the fact that Inkatha was opened to participation by non-Zulu blacks in 1979, the organization continued to draw mostly from Zulus living in rural areas in KwaZulu or other parts of rural Natal. Inkatha's "political culture was dominated by the

personality cult surrounding Buthelezi's populist leadership, and by the traditions of Zulu power" (Davis 1987, p. 107).

While formally opposing apartheid, Buthelezi and other Inkatha leaders criticized the ANC for, in their view, advocating "socialism" as opposed to "free enterprise," for demanding a one person, one vote democratic political system for South Africa instead of being "flexible" enough to consider other forms of sharing power with whites, and for resorting to armed resistance rather than continuing to utilize nonviolent means to pressure the white regime to accept reforms. Buthelezi also rejected ANC calls for other nations to disinvest in South Africa as a way of helping to coerce the white minority economically to enact positive changes; he instead promoted foreign investment in order to, in his view, further develop the nation's economy and thereby provide more jobs and opportunities for nonwhites. In opinion surveys the KwaZulu chief's followers, much to the pleasure of the white government, reflected their leader's relative conservatism: Generally only small percentages of pro-Inkatha blacks favored the use of strikes, divestiture, or violence against the white regime in comparison to large majorities among ANC-UDF supporters (Bernstein and Godsell 1988; Davis 1987).

Buthelezi's position of leadership in KwaZulu was, in part, the result of the white regime's homeland policy, intended to separate blacks not only from whites, coloreds, and Indians, but also from other Africans by emphasizing tribal differences. In KwaZulu, where unemployment levels were high, the jobs and opportunities for economic and social mobility that Buthelezi could provide to thousands both through his control of the homeland administration and his influence over Inkatha's staff hiring constituted a major patronage-dispensing base of his power. Unlike several other homeland leaders, however, he had refused to accommodate white demands that he accept full independence for the several geographically separated territories that together constituted KwaZulu. Instead he proposed an experiment in which Zulus and Natal Indians and coloreds would have some role, along with whites, in the governing of Natal Province. Buthelezi's opposition to total independence for KwaZulu partially shielded him from being perceived as simply a puppet of white rulers. His prestige was further enhanced by the coverage his public statements received in the white media, which portrayed him as a relatively responsible and reasonable adversary and advocate of black aspirations.

Comparatively favorable white attitudes toward Buthelezi in part resulted from his rejection of ANC violence: He instructed his followers to "avoid at all costs being made cannon fodder by people who want to use our corpses to stand on in order to be seen as leaders" (Davis 1987, p. 108). But seemingly in contrast with his condemnation of armed

attacks directed at the white regime or its agents, Buthelezi's Inkatha became widely known as an organization willing to use violence in the conflict between Inkatha members and supporters of the ANC (*New York Times*, Apr. 22, 1990, p. A3; Aug. 22, 1990, p. A7). Inkatha's influence in the 1980s and early 1990s was limited primarily to Natal Province and other locations with large numbers of Zulu immigrants from rural backgrounds, whereas the ANC and its allied organizations enjoyed wide support in nonwhite urban areas throughout South Africa. Buthelezi in July 1990 announced that Inkatha was being reorganized as a political party in anticipation of participation in a reformed South African political system (*New York Times*, July 15, 1990, p. A5).

White Opposition to Aspects of Apartheid

Several significant groups within the white community expressed support for an end to major aspects of the apartheid system. The greatest movement away from apartheid through 1989 had occurred in the economic sector. Major elements of the nation's white business community, responding to the economy's need for an expanded, stable, skilled work force, convinced government officials to alter legal codes in order to achieve this goal. The changes included opening new occupational categories to nonwhites, legalization of native African labor unions, and the 1986 repealing of the Pass Laws (Bernstein and Godsell 1988). Some business leaders asked the government to negotiate with the ANC and several called for the establishment of a nonracial democracy.

Another major source of white opposition to apartheid was the Progressive Federal party, which, drawing support disproportionately from middle- and upper-middle-income whites, had for thirty years fought for greater civil and political rights for the nonwhite majority. In April 1989 this group joined with two smaller political parties to create a united left-wing opposition to the National party government. The result was the new Democratic party, which in the 1989 national election won about 20 percent of the vote and 33 positions in the 166-seat white parliament (*New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1989, p. A8). The Democratic party advocated "a true democracy which rejects race as its basis and protects the human dignity and liberty of all its citizens" (*New York Times*, Apr. 9, 1989, p. 6).

A third element of white society, the South African Dutch Reformed church, which long helped provide ideological justifications for white domination, officially moved to express opposition to apartheid. In 1986 leaders of the church, which at that time included 80 percent of white legislators among its 1.7 million members, declared racism to be a sin

"and opened its membership to Christians of all races" (Berger and Godsell 1988b, p. 298).

COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES
OF THE REGIME

In attempting to cope with movements in favor of nonracial democracy, over several decades white leaders developed a comprehensive and integrated strategy. The plans included coordination of governmental policy, the economy, mass media, the military and police in such a way as to sustain or increase divisions among the black majority, co-opt nonwhite elite elements by providing them with channels of economic and social mobility in return for their collaboration in the maintenance of white dominance, and use of selective violence against rebellious groups or individuals.

The 1983 constitution vested potentially dictatorial powers in the president, who was therefore able to act decisively in "emergencies" regardless of any divisions within the white establishment. A major split within the white elite existed between the "moderates" (mainly members of the National party, which had engineered the 1983 supposedly power-sharing multiracial constitution and won 48 percent of the vote in the 1989 election and ninety-three seats in the white parliament) and the "conservatives" (largely associated with the Conservative party, the product of a schism in the National party), who were generally opposed to any concessions to nonwhites (Brewer 1986; Davis 1987). The Conservative party obtained 31 percent of the vote in 1989 and thirty-nine parliamentary seats. Voter analyses in the 1980s indicated that the Conservative party drew support disproportionately from lower-middle-class and lower-income whites, many of whom probably felt that their economic interests and status in society would be threatened by a weakening of the apartheid system (Schlemmer 1988). The primary disagreement among most white leaders during much of the 1980s appeared to be not over the issue of *whether* to prevent the advent of black majority rule but rather of *how* to prevent it: through emphasis on the co-opting reforms advocated by the moderates or through the repression stressed by the conservatives. In general, the major component of the white elite recognized the necessity of reducing apartheid barriers in the labor market in order to ensure future economic growth but "in the social domain, and more emphatically in politics, racial division and [white] racial hegemony" were to be maintained (Berger and Godsell 1988b, p. 281).

The South African Defence Force (SADF) was capable of quickly mobilizing more than 70,000 men at any one time and more, if necessary,

from its sizable reserves (almost all white men were required to undergo military training). Through much of the 1980s about 5 percent of the regular SADF personnel were nonwhites, often organized into units separated on the basis of tribal membership, in part in order to ensure that military service reenforced rather than reduced the significance of ethnicity. Recruits for the nonwhite units, carefully screened to admit only those with antileftist views or with strong tendencies toward tribal identification or other antirevolutionary political attitudes acceptable to white officials, were apparently attracted to military service primarily by significant financial incentives within the context of relatively high nonwhite unemployment rates (Davis 1987). Since the army was over-whelmingly white, it was virtually impossible to conceive of a situation in which significant segments of the military would defect from the white-dominated state to the side of the almost entirely nonwhite rev-olutionary movement. The South African Defence Force was supple-mented by 75,000 police, approximately half of whom were white and half nonwhite (*New York Times,* Jan. 6, 1991, p. A9).

After signs of nuclear blasts were detected in the South Atlantic during South African naval exercises, followed by evidence of radioactive fallout, many authoritative observers concluded that South Africa must possess at least a small number of nuclear explosive devices. Other forms of military pressure against neighboring black revolutionary states, including military incursions by South African troops and support for rebel groups opposing leftist African governments, contributed to forc-ing several pro-ANC countries to deny the ANC bases on their territories (Davis 1987; Nolutshungu 1988). In return South Africa pledged to cease its hostile actions and reduce aid for counterrevolutionary forces.

The white regime could generally count on the six homeland armies it had trained and staffed, in part with white officers, not only to help repress ANC activities, but also to intervene to control political devel-opments within the homelands that might be viewed as detrimental to the interests of the white regime. Homeland constitutions often granted the rulers, initially selected by the white regime to head a particular supposedly "independent" homeland, the right to appoint a significant proportion of the homeland's parliament or in other ways reserve a large number of seats for tribal chauvinists or other individuals willing to collaborate with Pretoria. This resulted in elections in which the candidate favored by the white regime lost as much as 70 percent of the homeland vote *but* continued to rule because he still controlled the homeland parliament (Davis 1987).

Ratification of the 1983 constitution in September 1984 in elections that excluded the huge native African majority sparked sustained mas-sive protests, leading to the government's declaration of a nationwide

state of emergency in June 1986. The new repressive measures included prepublication censorship and other restrictions of the media and granting relatively low ranking members of the security forces permission to exercise greatly expanded discretionary power. In the first eleven months of the state of emergency, the antiapartheid Progressive Federal party estimated that 25,000 people were detained (Schlemmer 1988). More than 1,000 South Africans died as a result of actions of the security forces between the September 1984 and the September 1989 elections (*New York Times,* March 5, 1989, p. 4).

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

By the late 1980s, a number of changes had occurred that in effect began to eliminate significant but secondary aspects of the apartheid system while leaving the core features intact (*New York Times,* March 12, 1989, p. A2). The modifications included the 1983 measure allowing the residents of black townships to buy rather than rent their homes, the 1985 governmental acceptance of the right of individuals of different racial designations to marry or live together, the 1986 retraction of the Pass Laws for native Africans, and the 1990 opening of public hospitals to patients of all races (*New York Times,* May 17, 1990, p. A1). Many movie theaters, sports events, restaurants, and airline flights were made accessible to all people who could afford them. And many skilled job categories were opened to native Africans because of labor shortages. But white workers still earned considerably more than black, and the segregated educational system spent 5.5 times more on a white child than on a black child. The government granted legal status to a few integrated neighborhoods in response to a housing shortage; and in Cape Town, the traditionally most liberal of South Africa's major urban areas, the city council in 1989 requested permission from the national government to be allowed to abolish local residential segregation (*New York Times,* March 28, 1989, p. A4). The regime permitted the parents of students in all-white public schools to vote on the issue of desegregation. The requirements for integration were that 80 percent of a school's parents had to participate and that at least 72 percent vote in favor of the new admissions policy. The results were that approximately 10 percent of previously all-white public schools admitted at least some nonwhite students during January 1991 (*New York Times,* Jan. 10, 1991, p. A3). But despite these developments, most of the nonwhite population continued to demand substantially greater change.

The ANC, supported by the countries of the Organization of African Unity, called for "negotiations and elections leading to majority rule in South Africa" (*New York Times,* Aug. 22, 1989, p. A8). ANC conditions

for the opening of talks with the white government included asking Pretoria to lift the nation's state of emergency, releasing political prisoners, legalizing all antiapartheid political organizations, withdrawing government troops from the black townships, and halting trials and executions. In contrast, the white, predominantly Afrikaner, Conservative party was the only major political group that advocated the 1950s form of apartheid.

Leaders of the National party stated during the 1989 election campaign that they were committed to moving the nation further away from its original apartheid system. President F. W. de Klerk went as far as to announce that the National party intended gradually to alter the nation's political system from the present situation of white dominance to one that would involve wider power sharing among the country's designated racial groups (*African News*, Aug. 1989, p. 14). But since he also asserted that the evolutionary transformation he foresaw would not permit the possibility of native African majority rule, many viewed his proposal as mainly another set of reforms intended to modify the structure of white dominance in significant ways while retaining white control of the economy, the security forces, and, ultimately, the political system (*New York Times*, July 23, 1989, p. E2).

By 1989 most National party leaders had apparently come to the conclusion that the earlier form of apartheid in which the white government attempted to secure "a territorially defined 'nation-state' for whites [separate development]" had to be scrapped in favor of a "form of co-existence or parallelism [of racial groups] within the same geographic domain" (Schlemmer 1988, p. 44). Some observers have suggested that a new political constitution for the nation might in effect constitute a federation of races, but with constitutional mechanisms prohibiting any one group from dominating the national government.

Many residents of South Africa, however, rejected the establishment of any political structure other than one that would permit the peoples of the nation absolutely equal rights of political participation and responsibility. And critics of the National party government asserted that a valid departure from the system of apartheid must also involve a shift from exclusive white control of the security forces and the major economic institutions. Many believed that any significant attempt to increase economic equality could occur only if a postapartheid government intervened to weaken or break white minority domination of the economy. That move could open new opportunities for nonwhites in currently state-owned industries or even in other major economic concerns that could conceivably be nationalized. Such a program would be analogous to the government effort to raise the economic status of the Afrikaners

in the British-dominated South African economy in the decades immediately following the Boer War.

The South African government, however, began to sell state-owned corporations, enterprises, and facilities to private concerns and individuals, including its Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) in 1989. By fall 1990, the ANC, COSATU, and other major antiapartheid organizations had vigorously condemned the regime's privatization of state property as an attempt to deprive a future nonracial government of the resources necessary to distribute wealth and economic opportunities more equitably (*New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1990). The result of the process, if continued, would be to place in the hands of affluent whites industries and other capital that would have been owned collectively by all South Africans. In response to protests, South African officials stated that they would suspend further plans to sell publicly held assets.

The mere dismantling of even major apartheid laws might be nearly meaningless to the large majority of impoverished nonwhites unless accompanied by governmental measures to redistribute wealth. For example, if South African authorities followed through with plans to repeal the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which had assigned approximately 87 percent of the nation's land to the white minority, most of the millions of people from whose parents huge territories had been taken would not have the money to exercise their new right to buy land (*New York Times*, Jan. 4, 1991, p. A4). The majority that lacked property could only benefit significantly if additional government action provided them with land parcels either free or at very low cost.

One significant fear among some antiapartheid activists who demanded restructuring of both the economic and the political systems was that without economic reorganization the white regime might attempt to co-opt the minority of middle-class native Africans into a new governing coalition, as it had once tried to do with Asians and persons of mixed racial ancestry through adoption of the 1983 multiracial constitution. In such a hypothetical arrangement, virtually the entire white population would be joined with relatively affluent nonwhites in a ruling alliance, which would then economically and politically dominate and exploit the almost exclusively nonwhite industrial and agricultural working classes.

At the outset of the 1990s, South Africa appeared embarked on an irreversible path of change, perhaps subject to acceleration by internal and international pressures. Those advocating a full departure from the system of white domination, however, would have to confront the dilemma of how to improve the economic and social conditions of the nation's majority significantly without at the same time precipitating the departure of large numbers of whites possessing technical knowledge,

managerial skills, and investment capital important to the nation's and the continent's future development.

In February 1990 the National party administration of F. W. de Klerk took a major step toward the resolution of South Africa's civil conflict by releasing the famous ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, after more than twenty-seven years of imprisonment (*New York Times,* Feb. 12, 1990, p. A1). The government also legalized the previously banned African National Congress, the South African Communist party, and other antiapartheid organizations. In March 1990 Namibia, the country between South Africa and Angola, achieved independence after seventy-five years of South African occupation (*New York Times,* March 21, 1990, p. A1). Other changes in state policies following the freeing of Mandela included the first negotiations between the white regime and the ANC in May 1990 and the June cancellation of the repressive state of emergency decree in three of the country's four provinces, the exception being violence-plagued Natal, where it was cancelled in October (*New York Times,* May 3, 1990, p. A1; June 8, 1990, p. A1; Oct. 19, 1990, p. A3).

Once out of prison, Nelson Mandela was elected by ANC officials as deputy president of the organization (the president was the ailing Oliver Tambo). After substantial discussions with other ANC leaders, Mandela called for continued international economic sanctions against South Africa until the establishment of a new democracy with equal rights of political participation for all the nation's peoples. Although also demanding a restructuring of the economy, Mandela noted, especially during his June 1990 visit to the United States, that economic reform need not necessarily involve extensive nationalizations if other measures could assure the desired benefits of improving the welfare and protecting the interests of the nonwhite majority (*New York Times,* June 22, 1990, p. A20; June 27, 1990, p. A11).

Mandela, while diligently promoting the goals of the ANC and the antiapartheid movement, provoked some measure of controversy by reconfirming the ANC's friendly relations with Cuba, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the ANC's alliance with the South African Communist party. These governments and organizations had long provided valuable assistance to the ANC's struggle against racism in Africa. The ANC expressed particular gratitude for Cuban efforts not only in aiding the ANC but also in combating white South African intervention in Angola and in helping to achieve independence for Namibia.

President de Klerk offered to negotiate the formulation of a new constitution for South Africa that would provide national political power for native Africans (*New York Times,* Apr. 18, 1990, p. A5; June 28, 1990, p. A22). And as talks progressed, the ANC in August 1990 announced the suspension of its armed struggle against the South African regime

(*New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1990, p. E4). But de Klerk and other National party leaders consistently refused to accept the ANC's demand for a totally nonracial, one person, one vote political system. Agreement on a new South African constitution, consequently, necessitated a shift in the views of the major political organizations representing whites or nonwhites or both.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The white-dominated state in South Africa had its origin in the Dutch settlement of the Cape in the seventeenth century. The Afrikaners justified their conquests and repeated confiscations of the wealth of native peoples as a religious mission: Whites were acting to fulfill God's plan for a Christian South Africa. After gold deposits were discovered in the Transvaal, the British conquered the Boers and unified South Africa into a single white-dominated state.

Afrikaners, many impoverished by the effects of the Boer War or British economic policies, initially constituted the bulk of the white working class, which intensely feared social and economic integration with the country's nonwhite masses. Afrikaner nationalism, inflamed by the migration of tens of thousands of blacks to urban areas during World War II and into jobs previously reserved for whites, finally achieved the unity necessary to win national elections in 1948. Over the next twelve years the apartheid system was formally established. It confirmed past segregationist policies and reversed much of the limited integration that had previously occurred. Despite numerous internal and external pressures, the white regime continued to endure due to the support of the large majority of the white population, a well-trained, technologically advanced, and extremely loyal military machine, a successful policy of selectively co-opting, dividing, or repressing elements of the nonwhite majority to facilitate control, and the cooperation, even if sometimes covert, of the major Western powers in need of South Africa's important mineral resources.

South Africa's system of white domination provided the potentially key factor for the development of a successful revolutionary movement, the motivation for the huge nonwhite majority to join together in a mutual effort to establish a truly representative, nonracial government. But the achievement of the necessary degree of unity among those opposed to apartheid was impeded by divisions over issues such as whether goals should be pursued violently or through nonviolent methods, or whether the movement should demand a one person, one vote democracy or should settle for some other form of power sharing that would allow whites to retain at least temporarily a disproportionate control of government. Other divisive concerns included persisting tribal

rivalries, the issue of whether the homelands should maintain any significant level of autonomy in the postapartheid state, and the degree of socialization of the postapartheid economic system.

Mass discontent among the majority of South Africans had its obvious origin in the European conquests and seizure of the nation's wealth. Traditional forms of rebellion against white invaders, such as those marshalled by the Xhosa and the Zulu, were unsuccessful. Although European exploitation of the country's resources improved the living conditions of many nonwhite South Africans relative to the residents of other African states, the distorted levels of inequality between whites and nonwhites and the humiliation imposed by various aspects of the racially oriented political, economic, social, and cultural systems constituted powerful sources of modern discontent.

South Africa was distinguished in part by the fact that its educated elites were separated along racial and ethnic lines. Although by the time of the 1989 parliamentary elections the majority of white political leaders (those of the National and Democratic parties) at least publicly supported an end to the 1950s-style apartheid system, an even larger majority of white political leaders (those of the National and the Conservative parties) opposed the creation of a political system that would allow the possibility of native African majority rule.

Nonwhite educated elites had organized a series of movements to end white minority rule. Virtually all of these, inspired by somewhat varying ideologies, initially attempted to use legal means or at least methods of nonviolent civil disobedience to motivate whites morally to negotiate reform. When they appeared to be gaining strength, such movements were crushed by the white regime, convincing many among the nonwhite elites that South Africa would change only in response to the successful use of revolutionary violence. In the 1960s and the 1970s leaders of the the black nationalist Pan-Africanist Congress and Black Consciousness movement argued that only the efforts of the black population acting alone could result in a simultaneous dismantling of the racist system and a restoration of psychological strength (pride and positive self-esteem) among Africans.

Another movement against apartheid was made up almost completely of Zulu membership. Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha organization, founded in 1974, never provoked violent white repression, as its goals, at least in the short run, appeared consistent with the white aim of maintaining not only racial separation but also tribal disunity among blacks, and as it opposed the concept of armed revolution. Though powerful in KwaZulu and Natal and often a significant force in areas with large numbers of Zulu immigrants, Inkatha remained mainly a regional organization

following an ideology and a leader viewed as collaborationist by many Africans.

The African National Congress, along with its allied groups, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions, appeared to be the strongest, best organized, and most widely supported of the anti-apartheid groups. The original members of the group, founded in 1912, attempted to appeal to successive white governments on philosophical, religious, and moral grounds to grant concessions to the nonwhite majority. The ANC advocated the goal of a nonracial, one person, one vote democracy, to be achieved through an interracial movement. The political tactics employed by the ANC until the 1950s were generally peaceful, legal, and nonconfrontational. But following the perceived betrayal of ANC support for South Africa's role in the World War II struggle against German Nazi racism, the younger generation of ANC militants, led by individuals such as Nelson Mandela, decided to organize campaigns of mass civil disobedience in defiance of racist laws. After several such efforts were repressed in the 1950s, plans were laid for the development of an ANC underground network and the organization of a revolutionary armed force to employ selective violence against the white regime.

Foreign involvement in South Africa historically served primarily to assist the survival of the racially organized, white-dominated state. The British declined to push for a nonracial democratic system after their victory over the Boers in 1902 not only because of a desire to end self-destructive violent conflict within the white community but also to ensure a continuous supply of very cheap nonwhite labor for British enterprises. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Britain, other Western European nations, and the United States continued to trade with South Africa and overtly or covertly supply weapons or weapon technologies to the white regime in exchange for the republic's strategically important mineral resources and its hostility toward Communist party–led states or movements (Cran 1979). Until the latter part of the twentieth century when a genuine and significant commitment by much of the international community to end apartheid developed, only countries dominated by Communist parties and a few liberal Western European nations and African states provided significant aid to antiapartheid revolutionary forces.

SOUTH AFRICA:
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1652   Dutch begin settlement and conquest of South Africa
1806   Britain assumes control of the Dutch settlement

1836–1856   Great Trek of many Afrikaners inland to establish independent Boer republics

1899–1902   British wage and win Boer war

1910   Union of South Africa established

1912   African National Congress founded

1913   Native Land Act limits access to land for large majority of South Africans

1948   National party wins elections; begins process of reenforcing separation of races, which it calls apartheid

1950   Suppression of Communism and Group Areas acts, key apartheid measures

1952   ANC and South African Indian Congress launch Defiance Campaign

1955   Congress of the People proclaims Freedom Charter

1959   Pan-Africanist Congress established

1960   Sharpeville Massacre; ANC and PAC declared illegal

1961   ANC organizes Spear of the Nation and launches limited armed resistance

1962   Mandela arrested; eventually sentenced to life in prison

1976   SOWETO uprisings

1983   "Multiracial" constitution approved by white voters; United Democratic Front organized

1984   Sustained protests against constitution begin

1985   Congress of South African Trade Unions organized

1989   F. W. de Klerk becomes president of South Africa; he pledges to end apartheid

1990   Mandela released from prison; antiapartheid organizations relegalized; ANC ends violent resistance to South African regime; government leaders announce plans to develop a new constitution; repeated violent conflict between ANC and Inkatha supporters

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Biko: Breaking the Silence, 1988, 52 min., video. Describes the life of Steve Biko and the impact on South Africa of the Black Consciousness movement he led. AFSC, SAMC.

Chain of Tears, 1989, 50 min., video. Describes the impacts of war and violence on the children of South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. SAMC.

Changing This Country, 1988, 58 min., video. Describes how South African labor unions organized to combat exploitation and became the most powerful internal opposition force against apartheid. SAMC.

Children of Apartheid, 1987, 50 min., video. This documentary, narrated by Walter Cronkite, explores the contrasts between and divisions among white and nonwhite youth in South Africa. AFSC, SAMC.

Classified People, 1987, 55 min., video. Explains how racial classification in South Africa has affected many aspects of how people live and interact. AFSC.

Cry of Reason: An Afrikaner Speaks Out, 1987, 58 min., video. Describes the extraordinary transformation of a clergyman who, after living and preaching among South Africa's proapartheid wealthy elite, left his affluent congregation to join the antiapartheid movement and establish a new nonracial ministry. AFSC, SAMC.

Generations of Resistance, 1980, 52 min., 16mm color film. Describes the forms and methods of resistance to apartheid during the twentieth century. AFSC, SAMC.

Last Grave at Dimbaza, 1974, 55 min., color film. Documentary of the oppression of apartheid in South Africa. AFSC.

Maids and Madames, 1986, 52 min., video. Describes the relationships between white women and the more than 1 million native African women who work for them as domestic servants, typically forced to leave the raising of their own children to others while caring for their masters' offspring. AFSC, Filmakers Library.

Mandela: Free at Last, 1990, 79 min., video. Mandela's life and struggle in the context of apartheid and the poverty and hardships of the large majority of South Africans. AFSC.

Spear of the Nation: History of the African National Congress, 1986, 50 min., video. Documentary of the development of the ANC and its changing and varied means of opposing apartheid. SAMC.

White Laager, 1978, 58 min., 16mm color film. Documentary on the white settlement of South Africa, the development of Afrikaner nationalism, and the establishment of the apartheid system. AFSC.

Conclusions

The opening chapter presented five major factors that have played essential and interdependent roles in the success of revolutionary movements throughout history: the development of mass frustration; the existence of elite dissident movements; the presence of a unifying motivation that brings together different classes or social groups in support of revolution; a severe political crisis that erodes the administrative and coercive capacity of the state; and an international environment permissive of revolution. The revolutions and the revolutionary conflict covered in this volume illustrate the importance of the five factors in varied contexts. Internal societal characteristics and the interrelationship between the subject societies and other nations of the world helped determine which of the factors was most central to the success of individual revolutionary movements.

SOME COMPARISONS
AMONG THE CASE STUDIES

In the case of the Russian Revolution, the deterioration and collapse of the state was of primary significance. Lenin and other Bolsheviks correctly anticipated that the defeat of Russia during World War I would create a crisis of legitimacy and competency for the czarist regime much greater than that which followed Russia's loss to Japan in 1904. Taking advantage of the disintegration of czarist authority and mass military mutiny, the revolutionists bypassed the stages of historical development described in Marx's model and attempted to establish a socialist society.

In comparison to the Russian situation, Chinese revolutionaries, following the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, confronted a stronger antirevolutionary state in the form of an alliance among former imperial

313

officers, warlords, landlords, and coastal commercial elites. China's revolution would win last in the centers of state power, the cities. The Chinese Revolution, once under the leadership of Mao and like-minded associates, succeeded primarily because of the profound discontent of China's people, reflected in centuries of peasant rebellions against landlord avarice or excessive taxation and in uprisings against humiliating foreign invasions and occupations. Intensification of mass frustration in the twentieth century resulted from hardships caused both by the increasingly impersonal and exploitive relations between landlords and poor peasants under the Guomindang and by the Japanese invasion, which further inflamed nationalist passions. The course of the war displayed the incompetence, moral shallowness, and even collaboration of prerevolutionary elites with Japanese authorities and helped propel the Chinese Revolution to victory.

Vietnam's Revolution was distinguished by the dominant theme of resistance to centuries of foreign invasion and exploitation. Nationalism unified diverse social groups in the revolutionary effort. In Vietnam only one of many anticolonial movements displayed the capacity to organize a successful revolution, the Communist-led Viet Minh. This group's assets included a revolutionary policy of redistributing wealth, especially land, to the poor and the general independence of the revolutionary movement from foreign sponsorship. Non-Communist Vietnamese leaders or groups that aspired to play a nationalist role had relatively narrow bases of support and typically depended on substantial foreign assistance, thereby betraying any believable claim to genuine nationalism. Furthermore, the individuals in such groups tended to display the self-centeredness and material concerns characteristic of the upper classes of their sponsoring countries, rather than the spirit of self-sacrifice often essential to the success of a revolutionary effort.

The Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Iranian revolutions were like the Vietnamese in the sense of being viewed by many of their participants as national liberation movements. Whereas the Vietnamese Revolution began against colonial control by France and Japan, the latter three revolutions were directed against governments that many termed *neo-colonialist:* technically independent but perceived to be functioning in reality as instruments of foreign exploitation. Revolutionaries in all three countries also appealed to their fellow countrymen and -women to rally behind efforts to oust notorious personalized dictatorial regimes.

Unlike Vietnam, however, leadership for the revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran was not provided by the existing prerevolutionary Communist parties, all of which had limited appeal and initially opposed armed rebellion as a means of political transformation. The Cuban Revolution benefited from a situation in which the prerevolutionary

regime lacked legitimacy, having seized power in 1952, and was largely unprepared for the rural guerrilla tactics employed by Castro's forces. Cuba was further distinguished by the existence of a clearly identifiable and towering revolutionary leader whose concepts dictated the country's future course of development.

Nicaraguan revolutionary leaders faced a military opposition specially trained in counterinsurgency warfare and at first unconditionally backed by the United States. Experiencing more than a decade of failure in its attempts to overthrow Somoza, the FSLN temporarily fragmented over future strategy and tactics. One faction, the so-called FSLN Third Force (Christian Wing), developed the approach best suited to Nicaragua's strong religious culture and to taking advantage of the popularity of Liberation Theology. The Third Force transformed the FSLN into a broad coalition of anti-Somoza, socially progressive, and reform-minded Nicaraguans. After the victory, the revolutionary government, profiting from knowledge of the early mistakes made by Cubans after their 1959 revolution, maintained a strong private sector in the economy and contributed to the development of a pluralistic democratic political system.

Iran's nationalistic, anti-shah revolution was, like the Cuban, ultimately dominated and shaped by a charismatic and commanding revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini mobilized the single major Iranian social institution, Shia fundamentalism, that could unquestionably be perceived as free from foreign ideological taint or assistance and, consequently, be recognized by the large mass of strongly religious Iranians as a legitimate nationalist force (although Khomeini vehemently argued the revolution was religious, not nationalist). Reminiscent of the Russian czar's overthrow, the shah's military and government disintegrated in the face of repeated urban demonstrations and insurrections. The ayatollah, having guided the revolution to victory, was then in position to influence greatly the formulation of the nation's postrevolutionary political, social, and economic systems.

Of all the societies covered in this volume, South Africa was the one characterized by the deepest social divisions and the one in which the revolutionary movement was in greatest need of mass commitment to a unifying revolutionary goal, the creation of a nonracial political system. Barriers to the sufficient realization of this element of the revolutionary process included ethnic and class differences within the nonwhite population. But the most important impediment was the unwillingness of a majority of white South Africans, who constituted the basis of the prerevolutionary state and armed forces, to support transformation to a nonracial society. The achievement of such a conversion would likely require continued and even increased pressure and encouragement from

internal and external opponents of apartheid, coupled with the development of a profound sense of assurance that South Africans of European ancestry would not be persecuted or penalized in an open, democratic system by the nonwhite majority.

INADEQUACIES IN THE THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

Chapters 2 through 8 explored the five essential factors affecting the success of revolutionary movements in seven societies. Since the importance of these elements has been repeatedly demonstrated, it may be instructive to assess the capabilities as well as the limitations of general theories of revolution to account for their development. Chapter 1 described the core features of the Marxist, systems, modernization, and structural theories of revolution and noted that the first three theories neglected consideration of the necessary unifying motivation factor for revolutionary success. The structural theory, though concerned primarily with explaining the factor of state deterioration, implicitly identified a logical basis for the development of a unifying motivation for revolution, international conflict and competition, which could provoke heightened feelings of nationalism among all classes in a society threatened by more powerful countries. All four theories, however, ignored the world permissiveness aspect of successful revolutions.

The reasons for these serious oversights may include the fact that the internal logical structure of several of the general theories implies an overly rational and materialistic basis for revolution. The Marxist, systems, and modernization theories suggest that the major cause of frustration is a lack of satisfaction of material needs or expectations. This emphasis, however, tends to promote theoretical omission of the necessary unifying element because such a factor must transcend economic considerations in order to bond together social groups whose economic interests are often not only nonidentical but sometimes in conflict. Analyses of past revolutions indicate that key unifying factors have been nonrational in a strict economic sense and appealed for movement support on moral and emotional bases. For the majority of revolutions examined in this volume, a major unifying element was nationalism. This is a sentiment not necessarily identical to the gratification of economic aspirations, but rather one that involves a passionate need to rally in solidarity with one's country folk and to fulfill that part of one's self-identity and self-esteem that derives from membership in a particular national group.

The Skocpol and Trimberger structural theory, in contrast, does provide a logical framework for explaining the development of nation-

alism by focusing on the role of competition and conflict among countries at different levels of technological and economic strength. According to structural theory, just as a society's government, often the most immediate target for revolutionary transformation, is not defined as an entity reducible to the interests of an individual economic class, similarly the driving engine of revolution, mass participation, is not exclusively the expression of a single class's aspirations. Rather, popular involvement and support for revolution can be viewed in part as a manifestation of most of the population's mobilization against a foreign adversary. The effort to overthrow a domestic government that is perceived as either unable or unwilling to defend the nation against exploitation by a foreign power can be interpreted as functionally the central component of the war against the external enemy itself. Thus, unlike the more limited Marxist, systems, and modernization theories, the structural perspective provides a possible explanation for the occurrence of the necessary unifying motivation for revolution.

Lack of theoretical inclusion of the world permissiveness factor has probably resulted from the difficulty of identifying a scientific basis for predicting this element of the revolutionary situation. In modern history the willingness of major powers, such as the United States and the USSR, to stand aside and allow revolutions to occur appeared very dependent on the idiosyncrasies and personal philosophies of top government leaders, in particular Jimmy Carter (Nicaragua and Iran) and Mikhail Gorbachev (Eastern Europe). In other cases, powerful nations have chosen not to intervene effectively or to stop interventions and allow revolutions to succeed because of lack of internal popular support for such interventions, fear of provoking war with or economic sanctions by disapproving countries, military, economic, or other internal strife that made effective intervention impossible, or, in some cases, opposition to the government a revolution seeks to overthrow. Just as some students of revolution have argued that the circumstances giving rise to individual revolutions are too unique to particular societies to be validly depicted in any general theory of revolution, it might also be argued that the causes of international permissiveness toward revolution have simply been so varied as to defy incorporation into any existing theoretical framework.

REVOLUTIONS OF THE FUTURE?

The reduction of East-West hostility in the late 1980s constituted a potentially far-reaching increase in international permissiveness for revolutionary social change. Many societies were internally characterized by both mass and elite discontent, but until the 1990s proponents of

revolution were restrained by the perception of a high probability of external intervention, as well as internal repression, "justified" by the need to counter the threat of communist or capitalist "aggression." Without the constraint of the previously intense East-West conflict, many peoples may be freer to consider significant or even sweeping economic and social change as a means of coping with serious domestic social problems.

In the early 1990s, the potential sites of further revolutions were numerous. On the African continent the movement to democratize South Africa continued and movements to transform the political systems in several other African nations were under way. In the Middle East various movements aimed at political or even economic and social transformations. Some of these targeted the remaining monarchies in the area or other forms of government viewed as unsatisfactory and aspired to create European-style democracies or Islamic republics. And Palestinians continued to demand the right to establish their own homeland.

Millions on the Asian continent confronted the task of democratizing China, Vietnam, Cambodia, North and South Korea, Burma, and other nations. Many Latin American and Caribbean peoples faced the monumental tasks of dealing with enormous foreign debts, reducing domestic inequality and poverty, accomplishing the genuine democratization of political systems, and, in some cases, coping with powerful drug-trafficking organizations. Large numbers of people in Eastern European nations and the USSR pushed for further economic or political transformations and, in certain situations, even the creation of new sovereign states.

The list of nations that in the future will experience revolutionary, though, it is hoped, nonviolent, changes might even include the United States, which at the start of the decade of the 1990s was characterized by massive drug and crime problems, crises in major financial institutions, great and increasing socioeconomic inequalities, and a gigantic national debt. Previously, concern over economic problems coupled with demands for greater democracy led to the demise of Leninist-style, one-party governments in Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and the USSR. Future economic difficulties in the United States and other nonsocialist nations may lead to a restructuring (or collapse?) of capitalism as we now know it in response not only to economic issues but also to a moral crisis born of a sense of injustice and unfairness. Will the guardians of the traditional capitalist system, deprived of their once-powerful weapon for protecting the status quo, the "threat of communism," be able to continue to successfully defend economies and cultures that sustain tremendous inequalities and give rise to the abysmal violations of human

rights represented by poverty, crime, child abuse, and escapist drug abuse? In response to such concerns, future proponents of social change may well formulate themes of moral and community renewal and devise new forms of society that attempt to couple the promise of equality of opportunity and freedom from want historically emphasized by socialism with the call for individual fulfillment stressed by capitalism.

Rental Sources

AFSC: American Friends Service Committee, 2161 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02140, 617-497-5273.

BU: Boston University, Krasker Memorial Film Library, 565 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, MA 02215, 617-353-3272.

CWU: Central Washington University Media Library Services–IMC, Ellensberg, WA 89826, 509-963-2861.

Filmakers: Filmakers Library, 124 East 40th St., New York, NY 10016, 212-808-4980.

Films Inc.: Films Incorporated Education, 5547 N. Ravenswood, Chicago, IL 60640, 800-323-4222/312-878-7300.

ISU: Iowa State University Media Resource Center, 121 Pearson Hall, Ames, IA 50011, 515-294-8022.

IU: Indiana University Audio Visual Center, Bloomington, IN 47405, 812-335-2853.

KSU: Kent State University Audio Visual Services, 330 University Library, Kent, OH 44242, 216-672-3456.

PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, 1320 Bradock Pl., Alexandria, VA 22314, 800-424-7963.

PSU: Pennsylvania State University Audio Visual Services, Special Services Building, University Park, PA 16802, 614-863-3100.

PU: Purdue University Audio Visual Center, West Lafayette, IN 47907, 317-494-6742.

SAMC: Southern African Media Center, Resolution Inc./California Newsreel, 149 Ninth St./420, San Francisco, CA 94103, 415-621-6196.

SUNY-B: State University of New York at Buffalo, Educational Communications Center, Media Library, 24 Capen Hall, Buffalo, NY 14260, 716-831-2304.

SYRU: Syracuse University Film Rental Center, 1455 E. Colvin St., Syracuse, NY 13210, 315-479-6631.

UARIZ: University of Arizona Film Library, 1325 E. Speedway, Tucson, AZ 85721, 602-626-3856.

UC-B: University of California/Berkeley, Extension Media Center, 2223 Fulton St., Campus Box 379, Berkeley, CA 94720, 415-642-0618.

UI: University of Illinois/Urbana, University Film Center, 1325 S. Oak St., Champaign, IL 61820, 217-333-1362.

UIOWA: University of Iowa Audiovisual Center, C-5 East Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242, 319-353-7358.

UMINN: University of Minnesota Audio Visual Services, 3300 University Ave., S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55414, 612-373-5452.

UMISSOURI: University of Missouri/Columbia, Academic Support Center, 505 East Stewart Rd., Columbia, MO 65211, 314-882-2722.

UMONT: University of Montana Instructional Materials Services, Missoula, MT 59812, 406-243-4071.

UNEV-R: University of Nevada/Reno, Film Library, Getchell Library, Reno, NV 89557, 702-784-6037.

USF: University of South Florida, Film Library, 4202 Fowler Ave., Tampa, FL 33620, 813-974-2874.

UT-A: University of Texas/Austin, Film Library, P.O. Box W, Austin, TX 78712, 512-471-3572.

UT-D: University of Texas at Dallas, Media Services, P.O. Box 643, Richardson, TX 75083, 214-690-2949.

UWASH: University of Washington Instructional Media Services, Seattle, WA 98195, 206-543-9900.

UWISC-L: University of Wisconsin/LaCrosse, Audiovisual Center, 127 Wing Communications, LaCrosse, WI 54601, 608-785-8045.

UWISC-M: University of Wisconsin/Madison, Bureau of Audio-Visual Instruction, 1327 University Ave., Madison, WI 53701, 608-262-1644.

UWY: University of Wyoming, Audio Visual Services, Box 3273 University Station, Room 14, Knight Hall, Laramie, WY 82071, 307-766-3184.

WSU: Washington State University, 4930 Instructional Media Services, Pullman, WA 99164, 509-335-4535.

About the Book and Author

From the Russian Revolution of 1917 to the "Velvet Revolutions" launched in 1989, the twentieth century has been stirred by revolutionary impulses the world over. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* reviews a representative cross section of the most significant upheavals of the century and puts them in analytical perspective for students from every background. The result is a compact yet comprehensive handbook of revolution encompassing theory, history, cultural diversity, and connections to current—and future—events.

The author takes as his point of departure the perennial fascination students have with revolution—and their ignorance about its antecedents and aftermath. In the opening chapter, he lays out a five-factor framework that students can use to trace and analyze the historical development of seven revolutions—those in Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and South Africa—which are described in the chapters that follow. Current perspective is brought into the historical presentations through discussions of ongoing movements, such as those in Eastern Europe, among Chinese students, and in the Nicaraguan political system. Each of these chapters opens with an orienting map and concludes with a summary and analysis section, suggested readings, a chronology, and an annotated media resources list (complete with rental sources).

In the final chapter the author returns to the overall analytical framework with reflections on universal theories of revolution and their shortcomings. He points in particular to two factors of revolutionary success—a permissive world context and the unification of disparate motivations—that, though essential, are often overlooked.

Up-to-date, readable, and pedagogically sound, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* gives students the background for understanding not only the upheavals described but also those certain to rock the twenty-first century.

James DeFronzo is associate professor of sociology at the University of Connecticut–Storrs and the author of numerous articles on subjects as diverse as criminology, revolutionary movements, and demography. Since the spring of 1985, over three thousand students have completed his Revolutionary Movements course, from which this book developed.

Index