




EDITED BY

MICHAEL
FREEDEN

LYMAN TOWER
SARGENT

MARC
STEARNS

≡ The Oxford Handbook *of*
POLITICAL
IDEOLOGIES

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

.....

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Edited by
MICHAEL FREEDEN, LYMAN TOWER SARGENT
and
MARC STEARS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS



Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

© Oxford University Press 2013

The moral rights of the authors have been asserted

First Edition published in 2013

Impression: 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior
permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by
law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights
organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above
should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address
above

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013938773

ISBN 978-0-19-958597-7

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

PREFACE

Over the past twenty years or so, the study of ideology as a political phenomenon has thickened and broadened, and the integration of ideology studies into the domains of political science and political theory in particular has made immense strides. The investigation of ideology has come out of the shadows of the Marxist tradition—though of course that tradition still exerts considerable influence. Ideology studies have begun to shed the pejorative connotations of the totalitarian legacies with which they have been burdened. They have also had to overcome being maligned—almost since the term was coined—as abstract, dogmatic, doctrinaire and apolitical, remote from the concrete world of praxis. Within the discipline of political studies or political science, ideology still leads a somewhat fragmented life, mirroring the regrettable distance that obtains between comparative politics and the more ethical and philosophical confines of political theory. Thus, the empirical exploration of attitudes and the inquiry into psychological explanations of ideational variations have developed in isolation from cultural and anthropological findings that are relevant to ideologies. Those in turn have flourished in separation from the critical basis of discourse analysis or from post-Marxist examination of ideology as articulating and fixing social and individual identities.

The publication of a handbook on political ideologies represents a milestone in the evolution of this branch of knowledge. All recent trends in its study would agree that ideologies are, have been and will be very much with us—indeed as long as human beings remain political creatures, which they always will. Those trends complement each other in important ways that attest to the centrality of ideologies as a product of social activity and an indispensable feature of the political (and for the purposes of this volume ‘ideologies’ and ‘political ideologies’ are used interchangeably). No longer can the disparaging remarks of some philosophers or some politicians, to the effect that ideologies are inferior kinds of thinking or distractions from the real world, be taken seriously. Rather, they are at the heart of concrete political thinking as practised across the globe in myriad forms. As such ideologies require close consideration irrespective of their substantive merits—which can be rich and positive as well as destructive or indifferent. No general understanding of the political can be fashioned without factoring in the role of ideologies. No academic course of political studies and no political activist can expect to attain professional and practical competence in

their endeavours, unless the role of ideologies—as action oriented ideas concerning human communities seeking to achieve public influence and control—is appreciated.

The diversity of ideology studies is attested to by a mixture of the range of theories that illuminate the field, combined with the mutating complexity of concrete ideologies and their segmentation. In the thirty-five chapters that follow we cannot do justice to all, but we believe that an adequate cross-sample both of theories of ideology and of particular instances of ideological thinking has been assembled, and one that we hope will encourage further thought, research, and informed practice.

The Handbook has been divided into three parts. The first part reflects some of the latest thinking about the development of ideology on an historical dimension, from the standpoints of conceptual history, Marx studies, social science theory and history, and leading schools of continental philosophy. The second part includes some of the latest approaches to, and theories of, ideology, all of which are sympathetic in their own ways to its exploration and close investigation, even when judiciously critical of its social impact. This part contains many of the more salient contemporary accounts of ideology as a set of political-thought practices. The third part focuses on the leading ideological families and traditions, as well as on some of its cultural and geographical manifestations, incorporating both historical and contemporary perspectives. Ideologies obviously mutate, gently or radically, smoothly or through ruptures, and their study evolves as well. Even their very existence is questioned from time to time, though were that a view held by the authors of the chapters that follow, this volume could not have been written. If this Handbook throws down the gauntlet to those who have yet to treat the study of ideologies with respect, it is first and foremost intended to provide a firm basis for all those who want to learn about ideologies, who find them to be exciting as well as occasionally disturbing products of the human mind, and who desire to take our understanding of ideologies in yet newer directions.

We would like to express our profound thanks to the contributors who entered into the spirit of the enterprise and produced essays that reflect the coming of age of a scholarly discipline. And special thanks are due to Dominic Byatt as the guiding spirit and wise counsel who accompanied this project.

Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears.
August 2012

CONTENTS

List of Contributors

I. THE HISTORY OF IDEOLOGY AND OF IDEOLOGY STUDIES

1. Ideology and Conceptual History

BO STRÅTH

2. Marxism and Ideology: From Marx to Althusser

DAVID LEOPOLD

3. Karl Mannheim and Political Ideology

PETER BREINER

4. Total and Totalitarian Ideologies

EMILIO GENTILE

5. Social Science and Ideology: The Case of Behaviouralism in American Political Science

JOHN G. GUNNELL

6. The End of Ideology Thesis

HOWARD BRICK

II. CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY

7. The Morphological Analysis of Ideology

MICHAEL FREEDEN

8. Contemporary Critical Theory

LOIS MCNAY

9. Poststructuralist Conceptions of Ideology

ALETTA NORVAL

10. Ideology and Discourse

TEUN A. VAN DIJK

11. Ideology and Political Rhetoric

ALAN FINLAYSON

12. Political Ideologies in the Age of Globalization

MANFRED B. STEGER

13. Political Ideologies and their Social Psychological Functions

JOHN T. JOST, CHRISTOPHER M. FEDERICO, AND JAIME L. NAPIER

14. Ideology and the Intellectuals

CRAIG BERRY AND MICHAEL KENNY

15. Postcolonialism

RAHUL RAO

III. IDEOLOGICAL FAMILIES AND TRADITIONS

16. Conservatism

NOEL O'SULLIVAN

17. Christian Democracy

PAOLO POMBENI

18. Liberalism

MICHAEL FREEDEN AND MARC STEARS

19. Social Democracy

BEN JACKSON

20. Communism

ARCHIE BROWN

21. Anarchism

BENJAMIN FRANKS

22. Economic Libertarianism

ANDREW GAMBLE

23. Green Ideology

MATHEW HUMPHREY

24. Ideology and Utopia

LYMAN TOWER SARGENT

25. Nationalism

ANDREW VINCENT

26. Fascism

ROGER EATWELL

27. Populism

CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER

28. Republicanism

CÉCILE LABORDE

29. Ideologies of Empire

DUNCAN BELL

30. Feminism

CLARE CHAMBERS

31. Latin American Political Ideologies

JOSÉ ANTONIO AGUILAR RIVERA

32. Modern African Ideologies

JOY HENDRICKSON AND HODA ZAKI

33. Islamic Political Ideologies

MICHAELLE BROWERS

34. Chinese Political Ideologies

LEIGH JENCO

35. South Asian and Southeast Asian Ideologies

ROCHANA BAJPAI AND CARLO BONURA

Name Index

Subject Index

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Professor José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, CIDE, México

Dr Rochana Bajpai, Department of Politics and International Relations, SOAS, University of London, UK

Dr Duncan Bell, Department of Politics and International Studies and Christ's College, University of Cambridge, UK

Dr Craig Berry, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK

Dr Carlo Bonura, Department of Politics and International Relations, SOAS, University of London, UK

Professor Howard Brick, Department of History, University of Michigan, USA

Professor Peter Breiner, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, USA

Professor Michaelle Browsers, Department of Political Science, Wake Forest University, USA

Professor Archie Brown, St Antony's College, University of Oxford, UK

Dr Clare Chambers, Faculty of Philosophy and Jesus College, University of Cambridge, UK

Professor Roger Eatwell, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath, UK

Professor Alan Finlayson, Political, Social and International Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

Professor Christopher M. Federico, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, USA

Dr Benjamin Franks, Department of Philosophy, Crichton University Campus,

University of Glasgow, Scotland, UK

Professor Michael Freedon, School of Politics and International Relations,
University of Nottingham and Department of Politics and International
Relations, University of Oxford, UK

Professor Andrew Gamble, Department of Politics and International Studies,
University of Cambridge, UK

Professor Emilio Gentile, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science,
University of Rome La Sapienza, Rome, Italy

Professor John G. Gunnell, Distinguished Professor, Emeritus, Rockefeller
College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, USA

Professor Joy Hendrickson, Department of Political Science and History,
Hampton University, USA

Dr Mathew Humphrey, School of Politics and International Relations,
University of Nottingham, UK

Dr Ben Jackson, University College, University of Oxford, UK

Dr Leigh Jenco, Department of Government, London School of Economics,
London, UK

Professor John. T. Jost, Department of Psychology, New York University, USA

Professor Michael Kenny, School of Politics and International Relations,
Queen Mary, University of London, UK

Professor Cécile Laborde, Department of Political Science, University College
London, University of London, UK

Dr David Leopold, Mansfield College, University of Oxford, UK

Professor Lois McNay, Somerville College, University of Oxford, UK

Professor Cas Mudde, Department of International Affairs, University of
Georgia, USA

Professor Jaime L. Napier, Department of Psychology, Yale University, USA

Professor Aletta Norval, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK

Professor Noel O’Sullivan, Department of Politics and International Studies,
University of Hull, UK

Professor Paolo Pombeni, Department of Politics, Institutions, History,
University of Bologna, Italy

Dr Rahul Rao, Department of Politics and International Relations, SOAS,
University of London, UK

Professor Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, School of Political Science,
University Diego Portales, Chile

Professor Lyman Tower Sargent, University of Missouri-St Louis, USA

Professor Marc Stears, University College, University of Oxford, UK

Professor Manfred B. Steger, Professor of Political Science at the University of
Hawai-i-Manoa, USA, and Research Leader, Global Cities Research Institute,
RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia

Professor Bo Stråth, University of Helsinki, Finland

Professor Teun A. van Dijk, Pompeu Fabra University, Department of
Translation and Language Sciences, Spain

Professor Andrew Vincent, Honorary Professor, Cardiff University, Cardiff
School of European Languages, Translation and Politics, Wales, UK

Professor Hoda Zaki, Hood College, USA

I
THE HISTORY OF IDEOLOGY AND OF IDEOLOGY STUDIES

CHAPTER 1 IDEOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL HISTORY

BO STRÅTH

POLITICAL ideology studied through the lenses of conceptual history begins with the assumption that ideology escapes definition. Friedrich Nietzsche provided the argument for this assumption with his statement that what is definable has no history. Taking Nietzsche seriously on this point consequently means that what has a history cannot be defined. Ideology as a concept does indeed have a history.

Conceptual history departs from yet another assumption. Politics—in democratic societies—is based on general agreement on certain key concepts like democracy, freedom, solidarity, welfare, progress, etc., but on deep disagreement when it comes to giving substance and content to these concepts. Politics is thus based on both agreement and disagreement. Without agreement there is no political cohesion and framing of the political process but only fragmentation. Without disagreement there is no politics (Koselleck 1979, 1988 [1959]). Without disagreement there is only administration of consensus. Politics in democratic societies is not about consensus but about conflict and the search for compromises, for positions of compatibility of the incompatible.

The target of the analysis of the term ideology from the viewpoint of conceptual historical methodology is the contentious process of giving meaning to the term from its first use in French Enlightenment philosophy. Conceptual history is about discursive struggles aimed at appropriating positions of interpretative power. It asks the following questions: Who uses key concepts and what meanings do they invest in them? Which counter positions and counter concepts do they provoke? How do the struggles about the occupation of semantic fields change the meaning of key concepts over time? How does the vocabulary that constitutes a semantic field shift?

The term ideology was launched in the turbulent period before and after the French Revolution. The inventors of the term, the French ‘ideologues’, coined the term in their attempt to label a new science outlined in the framework of the Enlightenment programme, the teaching of ideas. Their assumption was that ideas could be studied as universal and nomothetic categories. Auguste Comte would later use this approach to the study of the society with a similar ambition, himself coining the term ‘sociology’ (from the Latin *socius*: society and the

Greek *logos*: law, principle). The assumption of the Enlightenment philosophers was that ideas and societies were of the same category as nature and that they therefore followed regular and general patterns that conformed to laws. The target of the two new sciences of ideology and sociology was to explore these laws. Developed as parallel approaches in line with an optimistic Enlightenment belief in the possibility of discovering the universality of the world, they soon became opposed to one another. One pretended to explore the reality as it really was, the other was accused of ascribing power to evasive and illusionary ideas. Nonetheless, they were at the same time kept together as the two sides of one coin.

In a contribution to the extensive standard German work *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (Historical Key Concepts), edited in seven volumes by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, Ulrich Dierse has analysed the political contention about shaping the concept of ideology after its creation by the French Enlightenment philosophers. The focus of his analysis, after an account of this French origin, is on German debate but there are brief references to American and British developments (Dierse 1982. Cf Oertel 1970; Rauh 1970; Schmidt 1970).

Napoleon transformed the term ideology from an expression of an academic imagining of a new science exploring how ideas conformed to laws into a political concept of conflict. The term lost its philosophical-apolitical connotation and became a polemic catch word in the public debate. The term ideology became, so to speak, ideologized and politicized. Napoleon confronted the ideologues arguing that they were ‘airy-fairy’ and whimsical dreamers divorced from reality. In particular he attacked the leading ideologue Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, who, in a lecture in the Paris *Institut National* in 1796, had introduced the term ideology into philosophical language (Destutt de Tracy 1804–15. Cf Kennedy 1978).

Napoleon’s critique forged a gap between ideas and reality, theory, and practice. The argument of the ideologues about the primacy of the human spirit and intellect in the mapping of reality was turned upside down. Ideas became synonymous with illusion and self-deception. Critique of the term ideology became critique of opaque obstacles in the fact-finding process that would establish the truth. More precisely the term ideology began to take on the meaning of what was argued to be a particular form of illusion, a belief in the power of ideas in politics and world history (Dierse 1982: 131–2).

Napoleon was initially an adherent of the ideologues. He was a member of the section for mechanics at the *Institut National* and, like several of the

ideologues, visited the salon of Madame Helvétius in Auteuil. The brainchild of the revolution, the Institut National fostered the belief in progress through science. When the royal academies were suppressed, the *comité d'instruction publique de la Convention* was rapidly charged with the task of preparing an organizational plan for a *société destinée à l'avancement des science et des arts*.

In 1795 the Convention adopted a report on the formation of such an organization, no longer referred to as a *société* but as an *institut national*. The intention was that the latter would cast the splendour of the former royal academies into the shade. This new body was named the *Institut National des Sciences et Arts* and encouraged a belief in the possibility of discovering the means by which ideas conformed to universal laws, just as in the case of the natural sciences.

During the Egyptian campaign, Napoleon founded an Institute in Cairo. At the coup d'état on 18 brumaire 1799 some of the ideologues supported him. However, as Napoleon cemented his power and granted increasing concessions to the Catholic church (the Concordate in 1801), he established a growing opposition to the a-religious and anti-theological theories of the ideologues and their liberal political opinions. Napoleon began to call his former friends metaphysicians and fanatics, creating a new semantic field around the term ideology. The term ideology, which had originally indicated a new science, became a condescending catch-word that served to demarcate political enemies. Ideology and ideologue began to connote the unwarranted interference of philosophical theory in political practices. Theory in turn, was presented as nothing other than ridiculous intellectual experimentation and scheming. Napoleon confronted the old ideal based on Plato's claim that philosophers should be kings and kings should be philosophers. He separated the philosophers from political power. Ideology thus came to connote day-dreaming and the ideologues were brushed aside as *pauvres savants-là* and *bavards* who believed that they could interfere in government matters.

In the wake of Napoleon's campaign against the ideologues, there followed a rejection of politics on the part of the intellectuals whose programmes and claims challenged politicians. The condescending political view marked the whole nineteenth century as a kind of sub-current. Ideology became a label for unrealistic theories that tried to intervene in the spheres of government and political action. However, during the nineteenth century and parallel to the belief in progress through positivism and sociological exploration of societies conforming to law, the term also retained its original meaning of a scientific discipline, and this constituted another kind of discursive sub-current (Dierse

1982: 139).

In the USA, there was great interest in the French debate. There was widespread familiarity with Napoleon's curse of the ideologues and it was commented upon in American public debate. Thomas Jefferson was influenced by the ideologues and corresponded with Destutt de Tracy and others. He distributed their works. However, he was more interested in their outlines and designs of economics and politics than their theory of ideas. John Adams, in turn, was influenced by Napoleon's view. The dreams of the ideologues to establish a free, republican constitution for a people, of whom the majority was illiterate, was unnatural, irrational, and impractical in the eyes of Adams: 'Napoleon has lately invented a word, which perfectly expresses my Opinion at that time and ever since. He calls the Project Ideology', Adams wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1813. Indeed, Adams referred to all those who dreamt of a future better constitution—Franklin, Turgot, Rochefoucauld, Condorcet, and others—as 'Idiologians'. He was not acquainted with the theories of Destutt de Tracy, which Jefferson had to convey to him, and took his argument directly from Napoleon. Jefferson did not share Adam's scepticism versus the philosophers: 'Bonaparte, with his repeated derisions of ideologists ... has by this time felt that true wisdom does not lie in mere practice without principles', he wrote to Adams in 1816 as Napoleon contemplated his destiny on Saint Helena.

In the USA as well as in Germany, the main question to arise in the wake of the French debate was whether politics was decoupled from theory or whether true politics only can be based on principles, that is, ideologies. In the British debate, however, the term ideology received little attention during the first half of the nineteenth century (Dierse 1982: 141).

The reinterpretation of the concept of ideology initiated by Napoleon was noticed in the debate in Germany even earlier than in the USA. In 1804 a reference was made to the fact that across the French debate the terms protestant, philosopher, encyclopedist, economist, principalist, ideologue, illuminist, democrat, jacobine, terrorist, and homme de sang were used synonymously. A few years later *Ideologe* was used incisively and polemically: 'Cossacks and ideologues, scoundrels and friars are unblest extremes wrongful against the youth'.¹ However, only from around 1830 was ideology used more regularly as a political invective. Conservatives deemed as ideologues those who wanted to realize the principles of the French Revolution and argued for liberalization, people's sovereignty, press freedom, emancipation of the Jews, and a constitution. Political theoreticians were referred to as visionaries, sticklers for

principles, doctrinaire professors, and ideologues. In March, 1848 King Wilhelm I of Württemberg referred to certain members of his government as ‘ideologues and advocates of principles’² and the assembly in Paul’s Church in Frankfurt was suspected of doctrinaire professorial vanity. The Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Manteuffel characterized the various attempts to bring about German unification, basic citizen rights, and a constitution at this time as helpless efforts of German ideologues, who failed to take the actual political preconditions into consideration. ‘They will never achieve anything because they make up their ideas beforehand, stick to them and run their heads against the wall’.³

However, it was not only conservatives who criticized the ideologues. Critique also came from socialists. Ferdinand Lassalle called all those who had lived their lives ‘in books and are used to exist in and sacrifice everything for ideas and thoughts’ ideologues (Lassalle 1919: 281–4). Lassalle’s view was that if behind the claims for freedom there was no material interest, no class interest, then ideas were just the dreams of a handful of ideologues and emotionalists. Lassalle defined ideology as unrealistic thinking. In dictionaries at the end of the 1830s, ideology was defined both in the original sense of a theory of ideas and in the sense of Napoleon as uncoupled from political realities. Prussian historian Heinrich Leo contributed the term *Idiokratie* in the German debate to describe a state form based on fanaticism and abstract principles (Dierse 1982: 141–4). Like many other intellectuals, Leo had started out as a nationalist inspired by Hegel. After the revolutionary year of 1830 he broke with the philosophers and became a reactionary. He became a friend of the Prussian camarilla and of King Frederick William IV. He also contributed to the highly conservative *Politisches Wochenblatt*, which first appeared in 1831.

Heinrich Heine was among the contributors to the German debate who developed a critical distance from Napoleon’s critique of the ideologues. Heine referred to Napoleon by means of Hegel’s term ‘the cunning of Reason’ (Heine 1876: 312–13). In his view, Napoleon failed to realize that the ‘German metaphysic’, which he derided as ideology, would not remain abstract metaphysics, but would become the pivot of national power. Ideology as a weapon in the hands of liberal nationalists drove Napoleon out of Germany and destroyed his own ideology, the abstraction of a universal monarchy which, however, he did not understand as ideology. Napoleon certainly suppressed French ideology, but when he carried the revolution to Germany and did away with the old regimes, he unconsciously became the saviour of German ideology. ‘Without him our philosophers would have been exterminated together with their ideas through the gallows or the wheel’. Instead they became the triggers of

national emancipation. Napoleon did not pay attention to the dangerous ideology emerging from the 'blond youth at the German universities'. The German friends of freedom realised what a service Napoleon had unintentionally afforded them when he wrote them off as ideologues, Heine noted (Heine 1876: 127).

Despite Heine's attempt to charge ideology with positive meaning, the power of Napoleon's pejorative rejection had such a negative connotation that it proved difficult to transform the term from a label accorded to enemies into a description that groups and individuals would willingly apply to themselves. In the German debate the term remained a description of the opposition between political action and the thoughts of a stratum of intellectuals, whose science and scholarship was devoted to developing an action programme, for which they ultimately took no political responsibility (Brunner 1980).

However, in the long term, Napoleon's insistence on separating ideology and politics allowed for the emergence of an intelligentsia, which confronted political practices with a series of programmes and claims. This intelligentsia did not restrict itself to combating or defending particular rights and privileges. Instead they wrote abstract principles like freedom, equality, progress, and so on their banners. By the mid-nineteenth century these principles had become a characteristic of modern political parties. They presented general principles and goals departing from a general idea. The ideology concept was transformed into a concept that epitomized a set of principles. Ideology became an action-oriented concept for shaping the future. The concept moved away from its original meaning of studying ideas conforming to law, although this meaning still played a certain role in the debate. It also distanced itself from the Napoleonic pejorative meaning, which, equally, retained a presence in the debate.

Against this context of conceptual contention in the 1840s Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels made their first contribution to the debate on ideology. In the *German Ideology* of 1845/46 they developed a fundamental critique of the young Hegelians, in particular Ludwig Feuerbach. For a long time the content of this critique remained fragmented and somewhat unclear since the text was published in substantial excerpts only in 1903/04 and did not appear in full until 1932. From around 1890 onwards, more than half a century after the writing of the original text, Engels made attempts to clarify what he regarded as misunderstandings. Marx and Engels rooted their analysis in the tensions pertaining to ideology as they had appeared in the German debate since the 1830s, as discussed above. Thus, on the one side there was the Napoleonic view of ideology as unrealistic escapism and philosophical reverie and, on the other side, the argument of Heine and others that Napoleon's contempt for the

ideologues was wrongful and ironic, given the fact that he had stumbled on ideology during the German wars of liberation. In 1841 Engels wrote, for instance, that those who rejected the term did not want to know that what they called theory and ideology had been transformed into the blood of the people and had been infused with life, which meant that 'not we but they [those who rejected the concept] err in the utopias of the theory' (Dierse 1982: 147).

However, despite early attempts to vindicate it, ideology gradually became to be regarded negatively as a misunderstanding of the reality and hypostatization of ideas. It was argued that one should take the world as it (really) is and suspect the ideologues. According to Marx and Engels, romanticism and idealism posed a major problem for German understandings of ideology as it emerged in the nineteenth century, and had led to erroneous assumptions about the independent existence of ideas. Philosophers disguised reality in their fight against phrases instead of trying to come to terms with the real world. Marx and Engels labelled this philosophical activity ideology. In a well-known metaphor, they maintained that ideology and reality are like the upside-down depiction in a camera obscura or on the retina of the eye (Marx and Engels 1845/46). They argued that the young Hegelians were subject to the illusion that imaginations, thoughts, and concepts determined the life and history of humanity. They turned the concept of ideology upside down themselves and argued that they based this step on scientific analysis, which was contrary to ideology.

In retrospect it is clear that Marx and Engels were no less ideological than those they accused of being ideological. They claimed to explain the factual relationships between *Sein* and *Bewusstsein*, between being and consciousness, and they argued that they based their analysis on the real preconditions of the human condition. They saw the entire intellectual production of human beings as predetermined by material production relationships. Marx and Engels imposed a gap between reality and the material on the one side and ideas and ideologies on the other. According to their interpretation, ideology implied that concepts, thoughts, and imaginations were disconnected from their empirical basis. This decoupling led to abstract speculation, fancy, and figments of the imagination. The matter at stake was not, as the philosophers believed, to understand the world but to change it. The urgent task was to deplore rather than explore the world and the existing production relationships.

For Marx and Engels the class concept offered the correct means for changing the world. They believed that ideology was the instrument of the ruling classes, who asserted that their ideas were the ruling ideas and that they legitimized the existing power relationships. Those who controlled social

relationships managed to convince members of the subservient class that the bourgeois ideology was also theirs. Class was not guided by ideology but by a true consciousness which emerged as a pre-given out of the existing production relationships. 'Reality' predetermined class consciousness. Ideology tried to distort it. The distinction between true consciousness and false beliefs (fostered by ideology) was crucial in the emerging Marxian interpretative framework. Once the distortion was removed—that is, when true social relationships had been reintroduced—truth would emerge and ideology disappear.

From their first young Hegelian target of attack Marx and Engels then turned this critique against political economy, the social democrats, and abstract natural scientific materialism as developed, for instance, by Darwin. Religion and the bourgeois state were seen as expressions of ideology. Ideology was identified as superstructure which both reflected and disguised the real material interests of the basis.

From the 1870s onwards the separation of reality and ideology, basis and superstructure, made by Marx and Engels, which also drew on Napoleon's distinction, had a great impact on public debate across Europe. The imagined separation became a lodestar in the emerging class language levelled against the bourgeois society.

As the 1890s began, however, there was a re-interpretation of the ideology concept, in particular among social democrats. The negative connotation remained in formulations like 'bourgeois ideologies' or 'ideological' as opposed to 'material' interests. However, at the same time more positive understandings emerged. Eduard Bernstein, for instance, made efforts to demonstrate the connection between theory and practice, ideas and politics. Marxism was opposed to what it maintained was not free from ideology. Yet the social and economic theory developed by Karl Marx was not science but itself an ideology. In contrast to other ideologies, it was built on a realistic historical outline. However, history was more complex than explanations based on a simplistic basis–superstructure relationship suggested, and to argue that morals and law were nothing but secondary phenomenon was to fall victim to unrealistic abstractions. Any project or plan for the future necessarily implied ideological assumptions and considerations.

For Bernstein it was important to build future reform activities on prevailing opinions about morality and law, that is, on ideas and ideologies. Karl Kautsky argued against him that ideologies could only be an instrument of social progress as long as they reflected society and remained connected to it. The Austromarxist Karl Renner argued that in order to confront other ideologies it

was necessary for the economic material to become ideology itself by means of its ideological superstructure. At the same time he warned against rigid and petrified ideologies that demarcated themselves from historical facts. The French socialist Jean Jaurès stated that materialistic and idealistic approaches to history were not exclusive but entangled categories (Dierse 1982: 159–161).

From the 1890s, the new interpretative trend, developed in particular by social democratic thinkers, maintained the distinction between matter and idea, basis and superstructure in principle, but far more than Marxism, saw these as intertwined dimensions. Indeed, social democratic debaters blurred the distinction. Considerable differences concerning the meaning of ideology emerged. However, in general and in opposition to Marxist understanding, the term also began to connote positive understandings. The perjorative inflection of terms like ‘socialist’ or ‘bourgeois’ helped to make a distinction between positive and false ideology. This distinction meant that ideology could be used as a critical instrument in discursive confrontations with liberals and conservatives about the shaping of future society. Ideology became a compass rather than a false consciousness.

Around 1900 the ideology concept transcended its Marxist associations to become a general and rather value-neutral term in philosophy and sociology. Value was infused through amendments like socialist, liberal, conservative, nationalistic, false, and right. The dilution of Marxism by social democrats, austromarxists, and others from the 1890s onwards, which did not prevent the coexistence of orthodox versions of Marxism and class language, gradually resulted in new understandings. The view that people are products of their environment became more widespread. As Marx put it, ‘men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’ (Marx 1990). The political implication of this human condition was subject to lengthy and heated debate on the theme of revolution or reform. Ideas and ideologies were increasingly understood as the products of groups, part of cultural milieus that shaped and were shaped by human activities. Ideas were not merely rhetorical figures and they had to be taken seriously, in particular if they performed in guises as powerful as an ideology (Freeden 2003: 10–11).

From this point on ideologies were analysed in the discipline of history of ideas as long, coherent chains of thought. The debate dealt with the degree of coherence and the degree of deviation from the imagined argumentative chain. The twentieth century saw ongoing debate on the question of the nature of the

connection between ideological outlines and political practices. At the same time, as a kind of sub-current, the older pejorative connotation of ideology remained and was politically mobilized through frequent references to terms like reality, *Realpolitik*, interest politics, result politics, pragmatism, compromise. The general trend was nevertheless clear. The emerging sociology focusing on knowledge production did much to promote this development, with the generalized conceptualization of the social democratic ideology also introduced into political reflection beyond social democratic circles.

In the 1920s and within this broader interpretative framework, the German-British cultural philosopher and sociologist Karl Mannheim developed Marx's theory focusing on the role of ideology in capitalism, and the social democratic relativization of that theory, towards a more general view which dropped the condescending attitude that prevailed in Marxism. Mannheim's approach can be seen as a precursor to functionalism which came later and is discussed below. His most important work was *Ideologie und Utopie* in 1929, which became the foundation of the so-called sociology of knowledge ('*Soziologie des Wissens*'). Mannheim tried to demonstrate that different forms of knowledge and the diversity of opinions were related to different social groups and their position within social structures. His approach entailed a relativization of knowledge as a cooperative and coordinating process of group life within which ideologies played a crucial role. Ideology was not a passing monster, but the point of departure for more pluralistic views from which multiple ways of thinking and acting produced a variety of ideologies.

According to Mannheim's approach, ideology had both a social and a psychological dimension and was more than just an instrument of manipulation. The psychological dimension referred to the integration of unconscious assumptions that guided human thinking and action. Knowledge had an irrational and mythical dimension expressed in the performance of social groups on the basis of shared rites and rituals, prejudices and myths. Myth was thereby not seen as a pejorative category (Mannheim 1936 [1929]; Loader 1985). According to this view, myths assumed a dimension of reality in the sense, and to the extent, that people believe in them. From this perspective, they cannot be separated or distinguished from reality and truth, rather they constitute this reality and truth through language. This means that reality and truth are contested and contextual entities. Foundation myths, the myths upon which societies ultimately rest, draw their power to legitimate from some specific connection to God, history, or the truths of the social and economic sciences. It is within this context of the legitimation or *doxa* of everyday life that right and

wrong are defined and laws are promulgated which separate the proclaimed communities of destiny from the arbitrary and capricious (cf Stråth 2000).

Karl Mannheim aimed at a science of politics surveying and assessing the various truths of a society. By identifying the inherent limitations of existing relativist views, Mannheim sought to take an important step towards a value-free knowledge, which he distinguished from absolute truth. Ideologies and knowledge were in his view always changing and dynamic depending on context and social power relationships (Freeden 2003: 17). Yet, he believed that they could be studied objectively by scientists taking a bird's eye view of the processes they analysed.

The radical Italian Marxist theorist and activist Antonio Gramsci modified the Marxist understanding of the ideology concept in different directions. According to Gramsci, ideological hegemony could be exercised by a dominating class with the ideology not an immediate reflection of production relationships but rather constituting the result of a cultural construction of community by intellectuals who understand how to manage consent through the coordination of different and conflicting interests and ideologies. Hegemony produced compromise, which to some extent considered the inferior group. Ideology provided a mask that repressed the social practices of the subordinate class.

Gramsci was one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party in 1921 and was its leader between 1924 and 1926. In 1926 he was captured by Mussolini's regime and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was released when gravely ill and died of a cerebral haemorrhage in 1937. In prison he wrote the famous *Quaderni del carcere* (Prison Notebooks), which were published after the Second World War. The thoughts on hegemony, civil society, the role of the intellectuals and the modern prince that he developed there influenced the so-called eurocommunism of the 1970s and 1980s. Gramsci's achievements as a theorist and activist have been judged very differently; more totalitarian than his jailers according to some, others still saw him as a trailblazer for democratic socialism (Gramsci 1979 [1929–1935]; Germino 1990; Laqueur and Mosse 1966). It is in any case clear that his cultural approach was an innovative contribution to the understanding of the ideology concept.

After the Second World War, the expansion of the meaning of ideology in various directions from the 1890s onwards, together with the point of departure provided by Marx and Engels, was confronted by an approach known as critical theory. In contrast to Marx's understanding of ideology as a spirit disconnected from social processes, Theodor Adorno, for instance, saw it as the force that

shapes society and reality. For Adorno, ideology and reality merge in an extremely powerful appearance. In the capacity of a socially necessary appearance, ideology itself becomes the real society. There is no ideology in the sense of a false consciousness opposed to the really existing society (Adorno and Horkheimer 1962; Adorno 1953/54 and 1955; Lenk 1961).

Jürgen Habermas developed this critical vein in his argument about the functional transformation of late-modern ideologies. Technique and science emerge and justify themselves through a critique of traditional legitimizations of power. The argument is that they are less ideological than earlier ideologies, but at the same time more overwhelming and irresistible and also more far-reaching, because they eliminate practical-political questions from the agenda and focus on emancipating forces (Habermas 1968: 72–89).

Another sociological and socio-psychological trend which affected the ideology concept after the Second World War focused on the function of ideologies for political and social action. The question of function circumvented the earlier problem of the opposition between ideas and reality. Ideologies were seen as instruments for managing societies and social processes. According to this view, they function as the media for the socialization of individuals. They provide the framework in which reality, and the huge amounts of information on which it is based, is negotiated in processes of social work. Ideologies, in the plural, legitimize action and separate the strange from the self in terms of true or false. They justify social conditions as they are or provide tools to change them. They are thus endowed with crucial political functions. They order the social world and provide action orientation. They legitimate and delegitimize political practices. Ideologies rationalize value preferences (Parsons 1951. Cf Luhmann 1962, 1970 and Freeden 2003: 11).

From the 1950s the pluralist and functional view of ideologies emerged in the framework of the Cold War, which tended towards an ideological polarization, rather than relativization, between a Western democratic and an Eastern socialist supra ideology. Reinhart Koselleck analysed the emergence of this ideological polarization in his 1959 PhD *Kritik und Krise (Critique and Crisis)*, (1988). There he investigated and described in detail, and in a long historical view, how the two ideological concepts of freedom and equality which were kept together in one cohesive connection in the French revolution, split in the nineteenth century into the two ideologies of liberalism and socialism, which after the Second World War engaged in an existential conflict that brought the world to the edge of nuclear extinction. Koselleck described this process as the pathogenesis of bourgeois society (Koselleck 1988 [1959]).

Against Koselleck's pessimistic interpretation of the straight-jacket of the Cold War more optimistic views emerged which talked about the end of ideology and a convergence between liberalism and socialism under terms like mixed economy. The end of ideology school based its predictions on the interpretation of historical trends and on the belief that totalitarian regimes had ultimately been defeated in 1945. It saw this defeat as marking the end of attempts for world ideological domination. Both Americans and Russians wanted consumer-oriented societies. The desire for welfare and good living standards would result in a convergence of previously hostile world-views. Implicit in the end of ideology approach was a kind of apocalyptic understanding of the term ideology against which a counter narrative about scientific progress, social engineering, and secular religion was outlined. The adherents, with Daniel Bell a prominent voice, described ideology as the creation of an intellectual cast devoted to 'pure' thoughts demarcated from society and pragmatic politics (Bell 1962). Ordinary people were tired of such shrill ideological overtones. There was a close connection between the end-of-ideology assumption and the belief in a future society whose affluence would be ensured by the political management of economies.

The complex and more finely-tuned understanding of ideas and ideologies after the Second World War—from functionalism to the end of ideology scenarios to Koselleck's imagination of ideological polarization—provided instruments with which to analyse the function—or disfunction—of democratic societies against the backdrop of the totalitarian era before the war. The three predominant totalitarian regimes that held the world in an iron grip from the 1920s—fascism, nazism, and stalinism—were fundamentally built on ideologies. It became an important task for the social and historical sciences to identify the differences as well as the similarities between totalitarian and democratic ideologies. Koselleck saw connections under the overall umbrella of modernity, whereas functionalism and proponents of end of ideology scenarios emphasized the differences. Where Koselleck saw historical continuity between the pre- and post-1945 periods, others emphasized that year as creating a rupture. Koselleck worked from the assumption that human beings do not learn from history, proponents of the opposite assumption held that they do.

'Totalitarian' was a term used by the enemies of totalitarianism as well as its adherents. In 1923 Giovanni Amendola used the term to describe Italian fascism as a new system fundamentally different from earlier historical examples of dictatorship (Amendola 1924). Amendola, a journalist, liberal politician, and activist, as well as a professor of philosophy, was one of the most prominent

critics of Mussolini in the early 1920s. He died in agony in 1926 from violence inflicted by the Blackshirts.

The leading fascist ideologue Giovanni Gentile (1946) referred to *totalitario* as the aim and the structure of the new state, which would provide the total representation of the nation and total guidance for national goals. The state ideology was an instrument to subjugate the citizens. According to Benito Mussolini (1935) *totalitarismo* was the cornerstone of an ideology that penetrated all areas of human activity; it was a system that politicized every aspect of life: everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state.

In 1938 and 1940 Austrian writer Franz Borkenau used the term totalitarianism in English in books he wrote in exile about communism and nazism (Borkenau 1939, 1940). He argued that totalitarianism united rather than separated the Soviet and German dictatorships. In *The God in the Machine*, first published in 1943, Isabel Paterson (1972 [1943]) followed the same line of argument. Immediately after the war, the pro-Soviet British historian E. H. Carr gave totalitarianism a positive connotation when, in a book of 1946, he described Marxism-Leninism as a successful type of totalitarianism, which had recently been demonstrated by the Red Army in the fight against Hitler and by the industrial growth of the Soviet Union. According to Carr, this system represented the future and the trend away from individualism towards totalitarianism was unmistakable everywhere (Carr 1973 [1946]).

Against such arguments, Karl Popper published his influential critique of totalitarianism in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* in 1945, in which he contrasted the open society and liberal democracy with totalitarianism. Popper rejected the legitimizing argument by totalitarian adherents that history conforms to laws (Popper 2003 [1945], 1994 [1961]). The German-Jewish philosopher and student of Martin Heidegger Hannah Arendt described how totalitarianism broke down the distinction between legality and illegality, so that ordinary citizens never knew which side of the law they were on, a law that changed at the whim of the regime so that it perpetuated a state of terror and disorientation. Nazism and state communism were new forms of totalitarian government with little connection to old forms of tyranny. The source of the power of totalitarian regimes was their ideology, which provided single answers to the mysteries of the past, present, and future. For nazism, history was the history of race struggle and for communism it was the history of class struggle. According to Arendt, totalitarian regimes seek to mobilize the entire population in support of the official state ideology (Arendt 1967). The converging view on totalitarian

ideology about a totalitarian society combined a fierce and aggressive nationalism, a cult of the leader, terror and physical violence, and a myth of juvenile regeneration that resurrected past glories (Freedman 2003: 90–1). This mix gave rise to fascism, nazism, and stalinism.

An extended academic debate during the Cold War and since has dealt with the question of the extent to which these regimes really were totalitarian. Their capacity to control populations in every aspect has been questioned. Evidence has been brought forward of the emergence of strategies of resistance, albeit not necessarily active. However, as an ideology and a language of power of the three totalitarian regimes, the label of totalitarian is no doubt justified.

The fall of the Soviet Empire in 1989–91 was seen in ideological terms as a new divide, similar to that of 1945. Here too, however, a more sophisticated view about continuities and discontinuities was eventually to emerge. The fall of the totalitarian regimes in 1945 resulted in a growing interest in the preconditions and functions of ideologies in democratic societies among political and social scientists. For a short time after 1989, ideologies were seen as a disappearing category but in a different way than convergence theorists had argued in the 1960s. Here it was argued that their disappearance was due to the fact that there was only one ideology left and no remaining ideological competition. Now the debate dealt with the end of history and the final liberal victory, as in the ideology of Marx but one step earlier in the teleological process (Fukuyama 1992). Far from the end of history and ideologies, a new strong master narrative emerged around a semantic field of concepts such as globalization, neoliberalism, market economics, freedom, and citizenship. The globalization narrative can be seen as a third strong ideology with an American origin to emerge in the twentieth century following the modernization language of the 1960s and the 1970s and the rationalization rhetoric of the 1920s and 1930s. All three had a clear teleological message concerning a goal-bound process.

This narrative of a unified world without borders has more recently been challenged by and adjusted in relation to another narrative: one that concerns a clash of civilizations and wars of religion (Huntington 1993, 1996). Between these two ideological narratives, which, somewhat inconsistently, merged into a story about a defence of universal liberal Western values against Islamic attacks under the development of sharp religious borders, was the European ideology based on imaginings of a European identity and European unity in diversity.

At the time of writing, in 2010, both the globalization and the European narratives have lost their legitimacy and mobilizing power. The war of religions

ideology remains strong and has undergone further evolution in the direction of nationalism, populism, and racism. The ideological landscape has changed dramatically in a few years. Ideology is about exclusion as much as inclusion, enemy as much as friend, the Other as much as Self. The Cold War provided strong boundaries between West and East in this respect. The belief in an ideology without borders was ultimately a short-lived illusion. The crash of the financial markets in September 2008 revealed power relationships legitimized by ideology and eroded the neoliberal priority, not to say monopoly of, interpretation which had existed until then. From the perspective of conceptual history there is no reason to believe in the end of ideologies or the end of history. Ideological attempts to master the world form a story with permanent challenges and no end, where ideology must be seen in plural.

During the 1980s the practice of German conceptual history—as developed in particular by Reinhart Koselleck in the 1970s with the publication of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* as its pioneering work—connected to a new methodological and epistemological approach under the label of the linguistic turn. The gradual breakthrough of this perspective made it possible to view ideologies as an interpretative framework constituted by semantic fields and key concepts. The approach called for an analysis of the struggles for discursive power based on the appropriation of the priority of interpretation of key political concepts and the occupation of semantic fields. The analysis focused on how, for instance, categories of class were formulated through representation in discursive contests where the goal was the right to define and identify problems and their solutions. This was different to the conventional approach where ideology was derived from social structures and material interests. In such contexts patterns of affirmations, negations, and repressions were apparent in processes by which one definition emerged as more or less dominant. Analyses of the discursive context looked for both explicitly stated and implicitly structured political relationships. The result was not a unitary concept of class or other key political categories, not history as teleology, but a conceptualization of a field that always contains multiple and contested meanings. The outcomes of conceptual struggles are always open and uncertain. The outcome is contingent and emergent; it is not—as in numerous earlier understandings of ideology—causative. Through conceptual history, the ability to launch new concepts convincingly and the ability to appropriate positions of priority or monopolies of interpretation of key concepts became of critical importance in the analysis of ideologies. Koselleck's methodological approach was more than a history of ideas. The linguistic transformation of semantic fields which shape ideologies

was analysed through questions about which new concepts were introduced by whom and which old concepts were given new meaning and to what purpose.

In many respects Lynn Hunt came close Koselleck's view in her analysis of the French revolution (Hunt 1984). There words 'came in torrents' and had a unique magical quality. Revolutionary language during the French revolution was charismatic. Wherever names were identified with Old Regime values, they were supplanted by new revolutionary appellations. Language did not simply reflect the reality of revolutionary changes, rather it was itself transformed in the process of making a revolution. Language participated in the very transition of power. Revolutionary rhetoric opened up the field of politics to its broadest possible limits. One of the initial accomplishments of the new revolutionary rhetoric was its invention of the Old Regime. Once French society was divided into a new nation and an old regime, the revolution was in motion. Concepts and ideologies are developed by social actors to establish interpretative frameworks and to orient action. These concepts and ideologies produce interests and meanings. Meanings are multidimensional and relationally formed in existing and emerging discursive fields. If key ideological concepts like freedom, citizen, solidarity, class, etc. are treated as a discursive category without essence rather than as an ontological reality, the implication is that ideological languages are explained through the nature of politics instead of social structures.

Conceptual history, and the linguistic turn more generally, drove the trend for a relativization and historicization of the ideology concept since Mannheim one step further. Ideology was not seen as an objective category that could be studied from an external position, nor was it a function of pre-given interests. Instead it was viewed as contingent on interpretative power and mastery of language. Conceptual history dissolved the old dichotomy between reality and ideas. The new approach also undermined the study of ideologies as the history of ideas, where the ideologies were seen as long consistent chains of arguments and where the analytical task was to determine the degree of conformity or deviation. The history of ideas became a more contextual intellectual history. Arguments did not follow from a repertoire of logic but, as Michael Freeden has convincingly demonstrated, were rather to be seen as ad hoc selections from argumentative depositories depending on the historical context (Freeden 1996). There was not simply one depository—one single arsenal of conceptual weapons—for each ideology, but rather a large, shared repertoire based on a wide range of arguments with diverse origins. Key concepts such as progress, reform, modernity, security, freedom, welfare, etc. met with broad general support but their meanings were divided and the ways in which they combined varied.

Not only does the view on time and history in conceptual history emphasize contingency, openness, and outcome rather than cause, it also rejects imaginings of the past in terms of sharp ruptures and magic years representing historical divides. On the other hand, the argument is not that everything is continuity. The past is described as a combination of continuities and discontinuities. There are repetitive structures which last for long periods, but at the same time each historical moment is unique by virtue of new elements added to the repeated ones. Reinhart Koselleck (2000) described this time philosophy in terms of *Zeitschichten*, time strata. Older ideologies were not simply succeeded by newer ones and sent off to the storeroom. They were present together with the newcomers in ever-new combinations. They did not remain the same when seen in a new light and as attempts were made to adjust them to new situations. Koselleck's time strata are similar to Michael Freeden's term ideological morphology, according to which key concepts build up semantic fields of argumentation which overlap and divorce depending on their context. Continuities are challenged by and adjust to new problem formulations (Freeden 1996). Ideological coalitions as well as competition are justified and legitimized in these changing fields of argumentation. Strata and morphology are both geological metaphors emancipated from their physical essence.

Seen in such a historical perspective of continuities and discontinuities, ideology is a concept that is still very much alive, although the negative connotations it was subject to as a result of the efforts of Napoleon and Marx, and the liberal and conservative opponents of communism, still give it a somewhat dubious undertone. The term is seen simultaneously as an instrument that provides orientation and initiates political action and as an instrument to control the world manipulated by the powers that be or want to be. However, as Freeden has put it, not every ideology is dropped from a great height on an unwilling society. Ideologies are also everyday phenomena which we produce, disseminate, and consume throughout our lives (Freeden 2003: 1).

Ideologies make sense of the world and in this respect we cannot do without them, although they do not represent an objective external reality. The forecasts of the end of ideologies in the 1960s and of the end of history a generation later were based on a past that was called the age of ideologies. This was the age of extremes between 1914 and 1989. Ideology in this understanding connoted force and terror which provided efficient obstacles to rational reasoning, empiricism, and pragmatism. Ideology as a closed order was contrasted to the non-ideological conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. The conceptual historical approach demonstrates how problematic this dichotomy is. In the ongoing global

discourse on Islam and the war on terror, a highly ideological ‘Other’ contaminated by religious fanaticism is contrasted to a liberal post-ideological, rational, tolerant, and open Western society seeking only to defend itself against intolerance and superstition. This contrast is no less problematic than the earlier one. Caricatures of what other people call holy figures used to be criminalized as blasphemy and are no less ideological than the subject of the caricatures. Intolerance in the name of tolerance is a highly ideological mix.

The weakness of the conceptual historical approach is its focus on the producers of strong and mobilizing concepts, intellectuals and politicians, and its difficulty in responding to the question of everyday reception. The strength of the approach is its historicization and dynamitization of Foucault’s epistemes, which hang like heavy commandment tables over the minds of individuals and often prove resistant to our attempts to liberate ourselves from them. Ideologies are contested categories in a flux.

NOTES

1. In a letter from Philipp Albert Stapfer, Swiss envoy to Paris 1801–03, to Paul Usteri, Swiss liberal politician and publicist in 1813. Philipp Albert Stapfer, Brief an Usteri v. 11.1.1813, Briefwechsel, hg v. Rudolf Luginbühl, Bd 1 Basel 1891: XI. Quoted from Dierse (1982: 141).
2. Wolfgang Menzel, *Denkwürdigkeiten*. Bielefeld, Leipzig 1877: 432. Quoted from Dierse (1982: 142).
3. Otto Frh. V. Manteuffel, 1851. *Reden seit dem ersten vereinigten Landtage*. Berlin, p. 98. Cf Theodor Rohmer, 1841. *Deutschlands Beruf in Gegenwart und Zukunft*. Zürich: Winterthur, p. 47. Quoted from Dierse (1982: 142–3).

REFERENCES

- Adorno, Theodor W. 1953/54. ‘Beitrag zu Ideologienlehre’, in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 6.
- Adorno, Theodor W. 1955. *Prismen. Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Adorno, Theodor W. and Max Horkheimer. 1962. *Sociologica II. Reden und Vorträge*. Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Frankfurter Beiträge zu Soziologie, Bd 10.
- Amendola, Giovanni. 1924. *Una battaglia liberali. Discorsi politici 1919–1923*. Torino: Piero Gobetti.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1967. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: A & U.
- Bell, Daniel. 1962. *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. New York: Collier Books.
- Borkenau, Franz. 1939. *World Communism. A History of the Communist International*. New York: W W Norton.
- Borkenau, Franz. 1940. *The Totalitarian Enemy*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Brunner, Otto. 1980, 3rd edn [1956]. ‘Das Zeitalter der Ideologien: Anfang und Ende’ in Otto Brunner, *Neue Wege der Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte*. Göttingen: V & R.
- Carr, Edward H. 1973 [1946]. *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Destutt de Tracy, Antoine. 1804–15. *Éléments d’Idéologie*. Paris: Didot.
- Dierse, Ulrich. 1982. ‘Ideology’. Pp. 131–69 in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur*

- politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*. eds. Werner Conze, Otto Brunner, and Reinhart Koselleck. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Freeden, Michael. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Freeden, Michael. 2003. *Ideology. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Germino, Dante L. 1990. *Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press
- Gentile, Giovanni. 1946 (posthumous). *Genesi e struttura della società*. Firenze: Sansoni.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1979 [1929–35]. *Selections from Prison Notebooks*. eds. Graham T. Q. Hoare and G. Newell-Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1968. *Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
- Heine, Heinrich. 1876. *Heinrich Heine's sämtliche Werke*. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe. Vol. 6 *Lutetia* (1854) and Vol. 7 *Ludwig Börne* (1840).
- Hunt, Lynn. 1984. *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1993. 'The Clash of Civilisations?' in: *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (3): 22–49.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Kennedy, E. 1978. *Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of 'Ideology'*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 1979. 'Einleitung', Pp. xiii–xxiii in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Vol. I, eds. Werner Conze, Otto Brunner, and Reinhart Koselleck. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 1988 [1959]. *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*. Oxford: Berg.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 2000. *Zeitschichten. Studien zur Historik mit einem Beitrag von Hans-Georg Gadamer*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
- Laqueur, Walter and George L Mosse. 1966. *The Left Wing Intellectuals between the Wars, 1919–1939*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lassalle, Ferdinand. 1919 [1883]. *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften: Herausg. und eingeleitet von Eduard Bernstein*. Vol. 3, *Die Agitation für den Allgemeinen deutschen Arbeiterverein; Das Jahr 1863, Polemik*. Berlin: Cassirer.
- Lenk, Kurt (ed.) 1961. *Ideologie. Ideologiekritik und Wissenssoziologie*. Neuwied: Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand.
- Loader, Colin. 1985. *The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim: Culture, Politics and Planning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luhmann, Niklas. 1962. 'Wahrheit und Ideologie', *Der Staat*, Bd 1.
- Luhmann, Niklas. 1970. *Soziologische Aufklärung. Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme*. Köln, Opladen: Westdt Verlag.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1936 [1929]. *Ideology and Utopia*. London: Kegan Paul & Co.
- Marx, Karl. 1990 [1852]. *Eighteenth brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: International.
- Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1971 [1845/46]. *The German Ideology*, ed. C. J. Arthur. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Mussolini, Benito. 1935. *The Doctrine of Fascism*. Firenze: Vallecchi.
- Oertel, Horst 1970. 'Zur Genesis des Ideologiebegriffes', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 18 (6): 206–11.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1951. *The Social System*. Glencoe. Ill: Free Press.

- Paterson, Isabel. 1972 [1943]. *The God in the Machine*. New York: Arno Press.
- Popper, Karl. 1994 [1961]. *The Poverty of Historicism*. London: Routledge.
- Popper, Karl. 2003 [1945]. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. London: Routledge.
- Rauh, Hans-Christoph. 1970. 'Zur Herkunft, Vorgeschichte und ersten Verwendungsweise des Ideologiebegriffes bei Marx und Engels bis 1844', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 18 (6): 689–715
- Schmidt, Ernst Günther. 1970. 'Kannte Epikur den Ideologiebegriff?' *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 18 (6): 728–31.
- Stråth, Bo. 2000. 'Introduction: Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of Community', Pp. 19–46 in: *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community, Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond*, ed. Bo Stråth. Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang.

CHAPTER 2 MARXISM AND IDEOLOGY: FROM MARX TO ALTHUSSER

DAVID LEOPOLD

1

THE account of ideology contained in the writings of Karl Marx (1818–83) is regularly portrayed as a crucial element of his intellectual legacy. It has been identified as among his ‘most influential’ ideas (Elster 1986: 168), and acclaimed as ‘the most fertile’ part of his social and political theory (Leiter 2004: 84). Not least, these views on ideology are said to constitute Marx’s claim to a place—alongside Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939)—as one of the ‘masters of suspicion’; that is, as an author whose work casts doubt on the transparency of our everyday understandings of both our own identity and the social world we inhabit (Ricouer 1970: 32–3).

Given this enthusiastic reception, it can come as something of a surprise to turn to Marx’s own writings—including his collaborative work with Friedrich Engels (1820–95)—and discover how little they contain about ideology, and how inchoate and opaque those infrequent and passing observations on that topic are. There are, of course, some famous quotations, not least from the group of texts written in the mid-1840s and now usually known as *The German Ideology*. The references there to ideology as involving an ‘inversion’ of the relation between individuals and their circumstances, perhaps analogous to the workings of a ‘*camera obscura*’—an optical device which projected an image of its surroundings, upside down but preserving perspective, onto a screen inside—have often mesmerized commentators but not always generated much genuine illumination (Marx 2000: 180). The point should not be exaggerated, but these striking images notwithstanding, there is no clear and sustained discussion of ideology in the Marxian corpus.¹

Attempts to reconstruct Marx’s account can make a certain amount of progress by careful contextual work—for instance, by paying attention to different stages of his intellectual evolution, and to the precise ambition of particular discussions—and by recognizing that he discusses the concept of ideology without always using that particular term, or any of its cognates. However, such techniques only get us so far in trying to understand and systematize Marx’s remarks, and it is unsurprising to discover that many

commentators maintain that the search for a *single* model of ideology in his work has to be given up. Indeed, there is something of an ‘arms race’ in the literature, as commentators discover two, three, even five, competing models of ideology in Marx’s writings (Mepham 1979; Rosen 1996; Wood 2004).

Most surprisingly, it seems that some licence can be found in Marx’s corpus for three very different ways of thinking about what ideology is. There is textual evidence of his variously utilizing: a ‘descriptive’ account of ideology involving a broadly anthropological study of the beliefs and rituals characteristic of certain groups; a ‘positive’ account of ideology as a ‘world-view’ providing the members of a group with a sense of meaning and identity; and a ‘critical’ account seeking to liberate individuals from certain false and misleading forms of understanding (Geuss 1981: 4–26). That said, the textual basis for the first two of these three approaches in Marx’s writings is slight, and it seems certain that it is the last of them—the critical account rather than either of the two ‘non-critical’ accounts—which is central to his wider social and political theory.

The discussion here focuses, at least initially, on this critical approach to the subject. Marx’s identification of certain sets of false or misleading ideas constitutes his most characteristic model of ideology, but this account is itself subject to some considerable interpretative disagreement. In what follows, I sketch its basic contours, starting with the role that this account of ideology plays in Marx’s thought, before turning to say a little more about its substantive content. Finally, I offer a brief outline of the reception and development of the theory of ideology, within the wider Marxist tradition, in the period from Marx’s death until the 1970s. That outline is illustrated by a discussion of two of its landmark figures: Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) and Louis Althusser (1918–90).

2

It might be doubted whether Marx’s account of ideology is sufficiently clear and consistent to be considered a *theory* (Rosen 1996: 220). The extent to which his relevant remarks get beyond what could be called low level social description to offer genuinely explanatory generalizations about human understanding and behaviour, is certainly a moot point (and readers may have noticed that, thus far, I have referred to it simply as an account). However, such qualms are not widely shared, and are not pursued further here.

One advantage of accepting the received view, that Marx does provide a theory of ideology, is that we can reasonably ask what a theory is seeking to

explain. His theory of ideology is usually portrayed as an element in what might be called Marx's sociology, as distinct from his philosophical anthropology say, or his theory of history. (I do not, of course, mean to deny the existence of many important connections between these, and other, areas of his thought.) Marx seems to think of ideology as consisting of certain false and misleading ideas found within particular kinds of society. Note that I intend 'ideas' broadly here, to cover a wide variety of assumptions, values, beliefs, doctrines, theories, and so on.² The restriction to particular kinds of society is significant. Marx does not view ideology as a feature of all societies, and, in particular, maintains that it will not be a feature of a future communist society. However, ideology is portrayed as a feature of all class-divided societies, and not only of capitalist society—although many of Marx's comments on ideology are concerned with the latter.

The theory of ideology appears to play a role in explaining a feature of class-divided societies which might otherwise appear puzzling, namely what might be called their 'stability'; that is, the absence of overt and serious conflict between social classes. This stability may not be permanent, but it can last for extended historical periods. (On Marx's account, all class-divided societies are eventually overthrown, initially to be replaced by other class-divided societies, but finally to be replaced by a society which is not class-divided and which provides the conditions for human flourishing.) This stability appears puzzling to Marx because class-divided societies are flawed in ways which not only frustrate human flourishing, but also work to the material advantage of the ruling minority. (By 'flawed' I have in mind such failings as being illegitimate or involving oppression, or—if those failings sound insufficiently Marxian—as containing exploitation and alienation.) Why, we might wonder, do the subordinate classes, who form a majority, tolerate these flaws, failing to resist and rebel even when resistance and rebellion of various kinds might be in their objective interests? Marx sees no corresponding puzzle, either about why the ruling class in class-divided societies tolerate such flaws (which, after all, work to their material advantage), or, indeed, about why a society without any such flaws might be stable.

Marx's account of the sources of social stability in class-divided societies appeals to both repressive and non-repressive mechanisms. Such societies might often involve the direct repression (or the threat of it) of one group by another, but Marx does not think that direct repression (or the threat of it) is the whole story. There are also non-repressive sources of social stability, and ideology is usually, and plausibly, considered one of these. Very roughly, Marx's account of

ideology claims that the dominant social ideas in such societies are typically false or misleading in a fashion that redounds to the advantage of the economically dominant class; for example, by variously concealing or misrepresenting or justifying those flaws in the societies which also redound to the advantage of that class. As a result, ideology is one of the non-repressive factors that plays a role in sustaining flawed social arrangements.

Three points about this account might be emphasized here. First, Marx appeals to both repressive and non-repressive sources of social stability in class-divided societies. Moreover, he appears to think that the relative importance of these two factors varies in particular cases. Direct repression (or the threat of it), for example, might be much less important in modern capitalism, by comparison with ancient slave-owning societies. Second, ideology would seem to be a part and not the whole of Marx's account of the non-repressive sources of stability in class-divided societies. Other factors which might be thought to play some explanatory role here include: dull economic pressure, including the daily grind of having to earn a living; doubts—justified or otherwise—about the feasibility of alternatives; sensitivity to the possible costs of radical social change; and collective action problems of various kinds which face those who do want to rebel and resist. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, merely to reinforce the suggestion that ideology constitutes a part and not the entirety of Marx's account of the non-repressive sources of stability in class-divided societies. And third, the grip exercised by these false and misleading ideas is limited. Marx does not think individuals are permanently trapped within ideological modes of thinking. Ideology may have an initial hold, but it is not portrayed as impervious to reason and evidence, especially in circumstances in which the objective conditions for social change obtain. In short, these false and misleading ideas can eventually be thrown off.

On this reading, Marx's theory of ideology has a constrained but significant role. Not least, insofar as ideology is given some role in the explanation of the widespread stability of class-divided societies—and assuming that ideology concerns certain, as yet otherwise unelaborated, sets of false and misleading ideas—then the theory of ideology looks to be a clear counterexample to the once familiar claim that Marx was inclined to deny the sociological importance of consciousness in its various forms. For example, the interpretative suggestion that Marx views ideas as somehow epiphenomenal, or lacking in causal efficacy, would appear implausible in the light of this appeal to ideology as one of the key factors helping to sustain certain kinds of flawed social arrangements.

3

I have associated Marx with a critical view of ideology as involving certain false or misleading ideas which help to sustain class-divided societies, typically by concealing or misrepresenting or justifying certain flaws in those societies, flaws which redound to the advantage of the economically dominant class. That basic picture clearly requires some elaboration.

Marx is not to be understood, in his theory of ideology, as propounding a general theory of consciousness, but should rather be seen as concerned with a specific subset of ideas which we might think of as ‘social’ in two senses. They are social in that they are widely shared, indeed so widely-shared that for long periods they constitute the ‘ruling’ or ‘dominant’ ideas in a given class-divided society (Marx 2000: 192). And they are social in that they directly concern, or indirectly impact upon, the action-guiding understandings of self and society that individuals have. These action-guiding understandings include the dominant political, religious, and legal views within particular class-divided societies in periods of stability (Marx 2000: 426).

Note that being both widely-shared and impacting on our understandings of self and society does not make ideas ideological. The ideas in question are said to be ideological only when they possess certain additional, and much contested, characteristics. Here I consider three likely additional characteristics: epistemological standing; social origin; and class function.

By the ‘epistemological standing’ of ideology I mean what I have previously referred to as the ‘false’ or ‘misleading’ character of the ideas in question. Being widely shared or having implications for social understanding and behaviour does not make ideas ideological. Some parts of science, for example, might have those characteristics, yet Marx frequently contrasts ideology and science, portraying ideology as paradigmatically unscientific (characterized by falsity and misleadingness). In addition, and as I have already tried to suggest, the falsity here needs to be understood expansively. The subject of the ‘falsity’ or ‘misleadingness’ is obviously not always a proposition, and neither of these terms is intended to denote a single kind of error. (I have tried to suggest this latter thought by describing ideology as variously concealing or misrepresenting or justifying flaws in class-divided societies.) Understood in this expansive manner, ideology can mislead even when nothing that it claims is strictly speaking false; it might, for instance, misdirect critical attention by concentrating on a part rather than the whole of the truth. Ideological views might, for example, portray what Marx calls the ‘wage form’, with its exchange of

equivalents, as the whole (rather than a part) of the story about the relation between capital and labour, thereby ignoring the exploitation which occurs in the sphere of production (Marx 1976: 680). Indeed, it may be that our notion of the ‘falsity’ of ideology needs to be expanded beyond the content of the ‘ideas’ in question, to include cases where their origins are in some way contaminated (Geuss 1981: 19–22). Consider, for instance, cases where one subscribes to the relevant ‘ideas’ for reasons which are ‘noncognitive’; that is, which have nothing to do with reason and evidence. Perhaps the only reason I believe something to be the case is that the belief in question has a consoling effect on me, or that holding it makes me look good to others. Having such origins does not show that the content of the belief is false (given some version of the ‘genetic fallacy’), but it might provide a reason, not only to be deeply suspicious of the relevant belief, but even to reject it since this kind of motive is one that the individual cannot acknowledge (and remain so motivated).³ The notion of falsity here is expansive but not without limits, and Marx is certainly interested in identifying certain recurring and characteristic types of ideological error (Pines 1993: 21–7). To give two paradigmatic examples: ideology often portrays institutions, policies, and decisions which are in the interests of the economically dominant class, as being in the interests of the society as a whole (Marx 1986: 303); and ideology often portrays social and political arrangements which are contingent, or historical, or artificial, as being necessary, or universal, or natural (Marx 2000: 227).

By the ‘social origin’ of ideology, I mean to draw attention to certain aspects of the relation between these ideas and the structure of the class-divided societies in which they are produced, distributed, and consumed. In particular, Marx thinks of these ideas as often originating with, and being reinforced by, the complex structure of class-divided societies—a complex structure in which a deceptive surface appearance is governed by underlying essential relations (Geras 1986: 63–84). Capitalism is seen as especially deceptive in appearance; for example, Marx often contrasts the relative transparency of ‘exploitation’ under feudalism, with the way in which the ‘wage form’ obscures the ratio of necessary and surplus labour in capitalist societies. The surface appearance of such societies, we might say, is real but deceptive, and that deceptive appearance helps to explain both the emergence and resilience of false and misleading social ideas (Marx 1976: 680). Ideology stems, in part, from this deceptive surface appearance which makes it difficult to grasp the underlying social flaws that benefit the economically dominant class. And ideology sticks (is widely accepted), in part, because of its comfortable fit with the deceptive surface

appearance of class-divided society. In short, Marx does not consider the pervasiveness of these false and misleading ideas to be the sole or conjoint result of, either, what might be called failures of rationality (our not being clever enough to see what is really going on), or the various propagandistic skills of the economically dominant class and their agents. More generally, Marx portrays the striving to uncover essences concealed by misleading appearances as characteristic of scientific endeavour (Marx 1981: 956). And, in this context, he distinguishes between classical political economy, which strove—albeit not always successfully—to uncover the essential relations often concealed behind misleading appearances, and what he calls vulgar economy, which happily restricts itself to the misleading appearances themselves (Marx 1981: 969).

By the ‘class function’ of ideology, two rather different claims—one more modest than the other—might be attributed to Marx. The weaker claim refers to the effects of these false or misleading ideas being widely held. The stronger claim refers to the explanation of those false and misleading ideas being widely held. It seems likely that, for better or worse, Marx is committed to the stronger claim here (Marx 2000: 192). That is, he does not think that one of the effects of ideology just happens to be that it secures the rule of the economically dominant class in class-divided societies, since it is that class which benefits from certain flaws in those societies (exploitation, injustice, and so on), flaws which ideology helps to conceal, or misrepresent, or justify. Rather, Marx holds that the pervasiveness of ideology is explained by those effects on the economic structure of class-divided societies. That is, he holds that these prevailing false and misleading ideas prevail *because* they help stabilize the economic structures of such societies. This further claim might be elaborated in a number of ways. One suggestion is that we might think of the functional role of ideology as playing a role in explaining the persistence, but not necessarily the emergence, of false and misleading ideas (Rosen and Wolff 1996: 235–6). All sorts of ideas might get generated for all sorts of reasons, but the ones that tend to ‘stick’ (become widely accepted) in class-divided societies are the false and misleading ones, and these false and misleading ideas ‘stick’ precisely because they conceal or misrepresent or justify flaws in that society which redound to the benefit of the economically dominant class.

One might have a number of critical concerns about these three additional characteristics of ideology. Those worries could involve, either the relation between them, or any of three characteristics individually.

As an example of the former kind of criticism, some have emphasized the distinctiveness of these (or related) characteristics. After all, being false or

misleading, reflecting the deceptive appearance of certain societies, and promoting ruling class interests, are all different things. It is but a small step to suggest that these differences reflect a fundamental confusion or inconsistency in Marx's understanding of ideology. However, such a reading is not only unsympathetic, but also risks neglecting evidence that Marx may have thought of these threads as connected in various ways. For example, I have already suggested that, for Marx, the pervasiveness of false ideas results, in part, from the deceptive appearance of social arrangements. And I have suggested that Marx thinks that these false ideas stick because of their class function. Of course, this is not to unravel all the possible connections, still less to substantiate the claim that they delineate a single coherent explanatory model. However, such connections might caution against too hasty an embrace of the claim that Marx is simply confused or inconsistent here.

As an example of the latter kind of criticism, consider the third of these characteristics; the claim that these false and misleading ideas prevail because they promote the interests of the ruling class. Critics often see this as just another example of sloppy functional reasoning—purportedly widespread in the Marxist tradition—whereby a general pattern is asserted without the identification of any of the mechanisms which might generate that pattern. In the present case, it is said that Marx never properly explains *why* the ruling ideas should be those of the ruling class (Elster 1985: 473). In response, Marxists might appeal to a variety of mechanisms which (either individually, or in combination) could help explain how it is that ideas benefiting the ruling class are the ones that get to become dominant (Shaw 1989). One possible mechanism involves the control of the ruling class over the means of mental production; it is readily apparent, for example, that print and broadcast media in capitalist societies are typically owned and controlled by the very wealthy (Marx 2000: 192). Another possible mechanism appeals to the psychological need of individuals for invented narratives that legitimize or justify their social position; for example, Marx identifies a widespread need, in flawed societies, for the consolatory effects of religion (Marx 2000: 71 ff.). A final possible mechanism refers to the ways in which ruling ideas connect with, and are reinforced by, aspects of social reality; for example, the 'fetishism' (of both commodities and capital) that Marx sees as widespread in capitalism—very roughly, the phenomena whereby material objects which have certain characteristics conferred on them by the prevailing social relations, appear to have those characteristics by nature—is portrayed not as an intellectual invention but as part of the deceptive appearance of an opaque social reality (Marx 2000: 472 ff.). I mention these possible mechanisms not in

order to demonstrate that Marx has a complete or satisfactory account of why the ruling ideas should be those of the ruling class, but to suggest that his writings are not wholly bereft of ideas about where to look for appropriate elaborations of that basic functional claim.

4

I turn now to the reception and development of the theory of ideology within the Marxist tradition between Marx's death and the 1970s. That history is a complex and contested one—even if that tradition is narrowly construed—and only the briefest of sketches is possible here.

I begin with a contrast evident from a survey of historical accounts of Marxism and the theory of ideology. On the one hand, there is something approaching a consensus in that literature about those figures who have contributed most to the development of Marxist theories of ideology. Few accounts, for example, omit some discussion of V.I. Lenin (1870–1923), Georg Lukács (1885–1971), Gramsci, a representative member—perhaps Theodor Adorno (1903–69)—of the Frankfurt School, and Althusser. On the other hand, there is much less of a consensus in that literature about the overall narrative into which those figures are to be placed. I make no claim to provide a complete account here, but it does seem possible to pick out two overarching threads which contribute to, albeit not exhaust, that overall historical pattern.

The first of these overarching threads is that ideology became a more important element within the social theory of these subsequent Marxists. From being an infrequent and underdeveloped topic of discussion in Marx's own work, ideology moved centre stage in the subsequent Marxist tradition. For example, it formed one of the characteristic preoccupations of the intellectual current now known as Western Marxism. The reassessment by Western Marxism of the role and significance of broadly 'superstructural' phenomena (over the primarily economic concerns of an earlier generation) has been portrayed as part of a wider intellectual reaction to the background of socialist defeat that characterizes much of our chosen historical period (Anderson 1976). That background includes both the failure of socialist revolution to spread beyond the particular circumstances of Tsarist Russia, and the subsequent deformation of socialism inside what would become the Soviet Union.

The second of these overarching threads is that Marx's critical account of ideology was eclipsed by various non-critical, especially descriptive, models in which ideology, as such, is no longer seen as problematic (although, of course,

particular ideologies may remain so). That process had begun well before, although it was certainly exacerbated by, the advent of Western Marxism (Larrain 1983). For example, in *What Is to Be Done?* (written in 1902), Lenin treats ideology descriptively to refer to something like sets of political ideas which further the interests of particular classes. The battle of ideas in contemporary society is described as an increasingly polarized struggle between ‘bourgeois or socialist ideology’, a struggle in which to disparage the latter is to strengthen the former (Lenin 2008: 710). On this account, particular classes might or might not adopt the ideology which furthers their interests. In particular, Lenin suggests that bourgeois ideology often dominates amongst the proletariat because it is more established, more fully elaborated, and more widely disseminated, than its socialist alternative (Lenin 2008: 712). (In this particular text, Lenin’s account of ideology is connected, in ways that need not detain us here, with the issues of party organization, and the relation between party and class.)

Confirming these two threads—let alone capturing the wider pattern of which they form a part—would require a more detailed study than can be attempted here. However, by saying a little more about two of the landmark figures in the history of ideology—namely Gramsci and Althusser—I hope, at least, to illustrate these two trends in the Marxist tradition.

5

Gramsci’s relatively short life combined political activism, philosophical reflection, and great hardship (compounded by ill-health) in varying combinations (Fiore 1970). His most influential reflections on ideology appear in the *Prison Notebooks* which he produced during his lengthy incarceration in fascist jails. Started in February 1929, the *Prison Notebooks* consist of some thirty-three handwritten notebooks, twenty-nine of which contain his fragmentary, often opaque, non-sequential, and complexly recursive, reflections on a wide range of historical, political, philosophical, and literary topics.

The *Prison Notebooks* can be seen as an intellectual response to the historical background of socialist defeat (identified above). Gramsci saw a need to reassess the various sources of the unexpected resilience of established capitalist societies in the face of socialist challenges. It is in this context that he develops his concept of the ‘integral state’ as combining ‘political society’ (or ‘political state’) and ‘civil society’ (Gramsci 2011c: 75). The state, in this expanded sense, includes the various practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling

class justifies and maintains its ascendancy. Gramsci emphasizes that this ascendancy involves 'consent' as well as 'coercion' (or 'dominance'), and locates civil society as the predominant location of the former and the political state as the predominant location of the latter. His much-heralded use of the concept of 'hegemony' denotes, roughly speaking, the intellectual and moral leadership exercised predominantly, but not solely, in civil society. It includes the various ways in which leading social groups integrate subaltern classes into their political projects, generating and reinforcing a kind of consensus around the basic structure of the existing society.

Gramsci's reassessment of the importance of 'consent' in explaining the resilience of capitalist society includes reflections on both the strategic consequences for socialism, and the importance of 'intellectuals'.

That strategic thread is apparent in Gramsci's much-quoted military analogy contrasting the 'East' (Russia) and the 'West'. What had made the seizure of power in the 'East' easier was that these consensual aspects of the integral state were relatively underdeveloped (civil society was 'primordial and gelatinous') by comparison with the 'West' (where civil society consisted of a 'succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements' standing behind the state) (Gramsci 2011c: 169). In the West, a 'war of position' involving protracted 'trench' warfare would have to be central to the struggle for socialism, and the 'war of manoeuvre', the direct assault on state power, should be demoted to something like a tactical rather than strategic role (Gramsci 2000: 227). In contemporary politics, Gramsci suggests, it is the 'war of position' which will be decisive, and which will require building a counter-hegemony in advance of any assault on state power (Gramsci 2011c: 109).

Gramsci defines 'intellectuals' expansively to include all those whose social function is to organize, administer, educate, or lead others. Intellectuals are the intermediaries who generate the habits and attitudes which either help sustain an existing social and political order, or foreshadow the emergence of a new one. (Political parties also play an important role here, since they have an intellectual, that is 'educative' and 'organizational', function.) A social group that aspires to ascendancy must not only attract 'traditional' intellectuals, who imagine themselves independent of the dominant class, but also evolve 'organic' intellectuals from within—intellectuals of a 'new type' who 'arise directly out of the masses, but remain in contact with them' (Gramsci 2000: 340).

The place of ideology in Gramsci's wider reassessment of the importance of 'superstructures' is not easily summarized. He uses the term 'ideology', and its various cognates, in a confusing variety of ways, and my account here involves a

certain simplification.

A first ‘expansive’ use of ideology refers to the ‘superstructure’ in its entirety. It would be easy to miss the radical character of this conceptual move. A familiar Marxist interpretation extends the superstructure beyond political and legal institutions to include ‘ideology’ (understood as some subset of ‘ideas’), but Gramsci now identifies ‘the necessary superstructure’—that is, all these (institutional and ideational) entities—as ‘ideology’ (Gramsci 2011c: 170). Thus, the couplet ‘structure’ and ‘superstructure’ is equated with ‘economy’ and ‘ideology’ respectively (Gramsci 2011c: 173). Ideology, so understood, would seem to function as the (institutional and ideational) ‘terrain’ on which individuals ‘become conscious of their social position, and therefore of their tasks’ (Gramsci 2000: 196). So understood, ideology typically works to secure or stabilize the economic structure—the set of relations of production—that obtains.

The intellectual motivation for this expansive definition is not obvious. It seems intended to bolster claims about the reality and efficacy of ideology, but we might wonder whether those claims require this conceptual move which appears to conflate very different kinds of entities. Gramsci’s own elucidatory remarks are focused less on justifying his expansive definition of ideology, than on defending a particular account of the relation between the economic structure and the superstructure so understood, one which preserves both some priority for the former and some autonomy for the latter. Economic developments, Gramsci maintains, may limit the political possibilities, but they do not generate particular outcomes. These latter are a result of the specific constellation of broadly ‘ideological’ forces that obtain, and which his account of superstructures sought to illuminate.

A second ‘narrow’ use of ‘ideology’ refers to certain ‘conceptions of the world’ which are manifested in individual and collective life (Gramsci 2000: 330). Ideological conceptions of the world, on this account, seem to be associated with social groups, and embodied in practical activity of various kinds. Again, Gramsci seems less concerned with defending this definition, than with elaborating the ways in which particular conceptions of the world can help either to secure, or to challenge, existing social and political arrangements. For example, he draws attention to the tension that might obtain between the conceptions that are ‘implicit’ in an individual’s ‘activity’ (which might, for example, challenge the existing social order), and the conceptions that are apparent in their ‘theoretical consciousness’ (which might, for example, support that order) (Gramsci 2000; 333).

Gramsci's expansive and narrow uses of ideology would both seem to be broadly descriptive in character. These 'superstructures' and 'conceptions of the world' appear to be features of the social landscape which, although they might take better and worse forms, are not in themselves problematic.

In addition, ideology in both of these Gramscian senses would appear to identify features of the social world which—no doubt radically transformed—would exist under socialism. This claim may surprise some readers, but it is implied by certain remarks in the *Prison Notebooks*.

Regarding ideology in the expansive sense, consider an image that Gramsci uses in discussing the 'necessary and vital connection' between superstructures and structures (Gramsci 2011b: 157). In a discussion of the notion of an 'historical bloc', he describes the distinction between 'ideologies' and 'material forces' as corresponding to the distinction between 'form and content', in that the two entities are 'conceptually' distinct but 'historically' always bound together (Gramsci 2011c: 172). Both the analogy and the language suggest that ideology in the expansive sense is a permanent feature of the social world, since historically 'content' will always have a 'form'.

Regarding ideology in the narrow sense, consider Gramsci's reference to differences between the 'philosophy of praxis' (roughly his specific conception of Marxism as a unity of theory and practice) and 'other ideologies' (Gramsci 2000: 196). The reference to *other* ideologies would suggest that the 'philosophy of praxis' is also an ideology in this sense. Of course, the 'ideology' characteristic of socialist society would presumably look very different to its class-divided counterparts. Risking a speculative reconstruction, we might appeal to a series of contrasts that Gramsci makes between 'coherent' and 'incoherent' sets of ideas. Coherent ideologies, we might say, would be active, honest, self-critical, historically informed, consistent, and reflect the interests of all. In contrast, their incoherent counterparts would remain passive, deceitful, uncritical, historically ill-informed, contradictory, and partial.

Gramsci does occasionally refer to critical accounts of ideology in the *Prison Writings*, but typically only in order to reject them. For example, he dismisses these approaches as an embodiment of 'primitive infantilism' which underestimates the reality and efficacy of ideology (Gramsci 2011c: 173). In particular, Gramsci identifies critical uses of ideology with the view—allegedly prevalent in the Marxist tradition—that 'every ideology is "pure" appearance, useless, stupid, etc.' (Gramsci 2011c: 171). That is, critical uses of ideology are conflated with the view that political and ideological fluctuations are epiphenomenal, a mere reflection of the economic structure. So understood, we

might wonder about both the intended target, and the persuasiveness, of his remarks.

The intended target of Gramsci's criticism is not, as sometimes suggested, Marx himself. Gramsci was not familiar with all of Marx's writings on this topic—most obviously, he had not read *The German Ideology*—but he often associates his own emphasis on the reality and effectiveness of ideology with Marx. For example, he defends Marx's concrete political writings (such as the *Eighteenth Brumaire*) against the claim of the idealist philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) that they portray ideologies as merely 'an appearance or an illusion' (Gramsci 2011b: 157).⁴ It seems likely that the real target of Gramsci's animus was the overly schematic and reductive handbook accounts of Marx that were popular in the Communist movement of the day. In particular, the 'Popular Manual'—*Historical Materialism. A System of Sociology* (1921)—written by Nikolai I. Bukharin (1888–1938) is a recurring object of criticism in the *Prison Notebooks*.

Gramsci's hostility towards critical accounts of ideology looks to be misplaced. Simply put, he assumes that critical accounts necessarily underestimate the reality, or independence, or efficacy, of ideology. Yet, whatever the connections here, they do not look to be necessary ones. It seems possible to associate ideology with false and misleading ideas without denying the reality, or independence, or efficacy, of those ideas. Indeed, we might think that Marx's own account, discussed above, exemplifies such a possibility.

6

Althusser was a highly productive, philosophically controversial, and—for a brief historical moment—intensely modish French academic (Elliott 1987). His distinguished career at the École Normale Supérieure was not without difficulties, albeit of a somewhat different stripe to those of Gramsci. (Althusser's working life was punctuated by bouts of depression, and—after he killed his wife in 1980—lengthy periods in a mental hospital.) Althusser's reflections on ideology are often closely bound up with other aspects of his thought which itself underwent a complex and contested evolution. Disentangling those reflections is not straightforward, but it may help to start with certain continuities and discontinuities with Marx's own account.

At first glance, it might seem that their views on ideology are rather similar. In particular, Althusser and Marx both emphasize the opposition between ideology and science. Althusser, for example, allows that 'historically' speaking

science may emerge from ideology—as in his controversial reading of Marx’s own intellectual development as characterized by an epistemological break in which a Hegelian and ‘humanist’ ideology is displaced by a new science of historical materialism—but insists that ideology remains a ‘system of representations’ (‘images, myths, ideas, or concepts’) which is conceptually distinct from science (Althusser 1969: 231). However, once Althusser begins to elaborate the basis of this distinction in his own work, certain significant disparities with Marx begin to emerge.

Althusser insists that ideology is not to be defined in terms of false or misleading ideas, and that to proceed on such an assumption would be to misunderstand its essential character. (Asking about the truthfulness of ideology seems to be viewed as a kind of category mistake, like inquiring into the colour of an algorithm.) Science and ideology are properly distinguished by their different ‘functions’; whereas science has a ‘theoretical’ function, ideology has a ‘practico-social’ function (Althusser 1969: 231). As a result, ideology should not be thought of as a ‘cognitive’ relation between individuals and the world (to be discussed in terms of truth or falsity), but rather as an ‘experiential’ relation (to be discussed, perhaps, in terms of efficacy). In particular, ideology is said to involve ‘representations’ of society, of nature, and of our relation to both, which guide and shape individuals in accordance with their ‘assigned tasks’ (Althusser 1990: 24–5). In short, the efficacy of ideology is portrayed in terms of its success in *cementing* individuals to the social role that they are allocated by the particular social structures that obtain, thereby ensuring the reproduction of those social structures (Althusser 1990: 25). Ideology functions to ensure that society’s members are ‘formed, transformed, and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence’ (Althusser 1969: 235).

In addition, Althusser suggests—we might think implausibly—that to consider ideology in terms of its false or misleading character is to underestimate both its coherence and ‘materiality’. The coherence sometimes exhibited by ideology—consider the high degree of logic and rigour evident in medieval scholastic theology—scuppers any Althusserian attempt to distinguish it from science on grounds of ‘falsity’, because Althusser himself identifies ‘truth’ with ‘internal’ criteria, such as coherence, and not with any notion of empirical falsification. Ideology is also said to be characterized by ‘materiality’. The ‘representations’ of ideology can be practical, as well as theoretical, and—at least, in some of his writings—Althusser associates himself with Gramsci’s insistence on the institutional dimensions of ideology (Althusser 1971).⁵ Reproducing the conditions of social order is said to require ideology as well as

violence, and the predominance of either of these two ‘techniques’ is associated with different ‘state’ institutions. Violence is the province of ‘Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs)’ such as the army, police force, courts, and prisons. In contrast, ideology is generated and sustained by ‘ideological state apparatuses (ISAs)’ such as churches, schools, universities, families, trade unions, and political parties. (The importance of particular ISAs is said to vary historically; thus, in feudal society the family and church were dominant, whereas in capitalist society it is the family and school.) Althusser’s account of ISAs is perhaps intended to lend credence to his claims about ‘materiality’—ideology is created and sustained by institutions (and their associated practices)—but not all commentators have been persuaded by his characterization of this disparate group as ‘state’ institutions.

Althusser portrays the ideological moulding of individuals as taking a distinct (and obscure) form; namely, that of ‘interpellating’ individuals as ‘subjects’. This process always remains a little opaque, but it helps to realize that, for Althusser, human beings are not ‘subjects’—that is, independent and autonomous agents—but rather the ‘effects’ and ‘supports’ of social structures. Despite not being ‘subjects’, it seems that human beings need to experience the world as if they were. Althusser’s reasoning here is scarcely transparent, and not all readers will be helped by knowing that he draws selectively on the ‘mirror stage’ of infant development controversially identified by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901–81). Indeed, Althusser’s efforts to establish the crucial claim that only ‘subjects’ can be ‘subjected’ can seem to rely heavily on word association. As human beings we need to think that we have ‘subjected’ ourselves to our social roles—thereby establishing an imagined unity between ourselves and the social order—and that, in turn, requires that we think and behave as if we were ‘subjects’. Ideology is the ‘imaginary relation’ in which this ‘interpellation’ as ‘subjects’ takes place, in which human beings become ‘subjected’ beings, reliably obedient to our own individual conscience, God, employer, and so on (Althusser 1971: 169).

Althusser’s account of ideology looks to be predominantly descriptive. Ideology is defined by its practico-social function of moulding and cementing individuals to their social roles, and that practico-social function would seem to be required in all societies. However, his account of our ‘interpellation’ as ‘subjects’ would appear to introduce an important nuance which complicates the proper characterization of his account. Whatever the precise reasoning, Althusser portrays the imagined relationship—between individuals and their conditions of existence—as distorting the real relationship here. Ideology may

not be defined by its false or misleading character, but it does seem to involve a particular kind of distortion: simply put, we are required to think of ourselves as we are not. Human beings are simply the ‘effects’ and ‘supports’ of the social structure, but securing and reproducing the social order requires that we think of ourselves as subjects, as autonomous and independent agents (see Althusser 1990: 29).

The observation (above) that the practico-social function of moulding individuals would seem to be required in all societies was not a slip. Althusser insists that ideology is not limited to class-divided societies. All societies need a social division of labour, and that requires moulding the beliefs and dispositions of individuals in order that they can carry out their allotted social roles. Althusser reinforces this insistence on the universality of ideology with references to Freud and allusions to Aristotle (384–322 BCE). Like the Freudian unconscious, ideology is said to be ‘eternal’; not exactly transcendent, but certainly ‘omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of history’ (Althusser 1971: 152). And, in Aristotelian mode, we are told that human beings ‘are born “ideological animals”’, needing a certain ‘representation’ of their world in order ‘to exist as conscious, active social beings in the society that conditions all their existence’ (Althusser 1990: 24–5).

Althusser may not shy away from asserting that the cohesive function of ideology will be needed even in a classless (communist) society, but he does shy away from admitting the heretical character (in Marxian terms) of that claim. ‘In a classless society, as in a class society’, Althusser maintains that, ‘ideology has the function of assuring the *bond* among people in the totality of their forms of existence, the *relation* of individuals to their tasks assigned by the social structure’ (Althusser 1990: 28). However, he not only portrays his own view about the universality of ideology as a conventional Marxian nostrum, but also dismisses the idea of a society without ideology as ‘a utopian idea’ with which historical materialism has no truck (Althusser 1969: 232). The reader unfamiliar with Marx’s own writings would have no idea that they provide the best-known endorsement of that ‘utopian’ idea which historical materialism purportedly rejects.

On Althusser’s account, ideology is no longer an eliminable phenomena. It is a universal condition for social order, since all societies require that individuals are moulded to fit the demands of the social structure. Of course, ideology might well take very different forms in class-divided and classless societies, respectively. At one point, for example, he appeals to the different beneficiaries

of the successful ideological cementing of individuals to their social roles: in a class-divided society, those social relations are ‘settled to the profit of the ruling class’, whereas in a classless society they are arranged ‘to the profit of all’ (Althusser 1969: 236). In short, communist citizens might be eternally trapped within the distortion required for the reproduction of social order, but happily it seems that they—and not, for instance, the capitalist minority—are now the beneficiaries of that compliance.

7

I have suggested that the predominant, and most characteristic, account of ideology in Marx’s own work is a critical one, but that in the subsequent Marxist tradition this critical model is often eclipsed by non-critical, predominately descriptive, accounts. I sketched certain reflections on ideology found in the work of Gramsci and Althusser in order to illustrate that pattern. By way of some concluding remarks, I want to suggest that this historical development is to be regretted.

There is a significant loss involved in the eclipse of critical accounts of ideology by non-critical ones. It results from the very different character of these two types of account. Simply put, the latter—the ‘non-critical accounts’—do not include the concerns and ambitions of the former. This loss has explanatory and emancipatory dimensions.

The explanatory loss is that, neither the original puzzle identified by the critical model, nor the solution to that puzzle, appear amongst the concerns of non-critical accounts. Marx’s puzzle was to explain the considerable stability of class-divided societies which are flawed in ways which frustrate human flourishing and promote the material interests of a ruling minority. Part of his solution is to claim that the dominant ideas in class-divided societies are often false or misleading in a fashion that redounds to the advantage of the economically dominant class, typically by concealing or misrepresenting or justifying the flaws in those societies. (One might, of course, allow the Marxian problem without endorsing their solution, but the latter does not look obviously implausible.)⁶

The emancipatory loss is that the ‘constructive’ ambitions of the critical account do not appear amongst the concerns of non-critical accounts. Marx not only diagnoses a social ill, he seeks to cure it; that is, he envisages, and strives to bring about, a society which does not rely on false and misleading ideas in order to be stable. That emancipatory ambition raises many interesting and difficult

questions about the precise character of, and conditions for, a world without ideology in the pertinent sense. These questions largely fall beyond the scope of the present essay, but it is worth noting that this emancipatory ambition is not a uniquely Marxian one. Consider, for example, the insistence of the liberal political philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002) that a ‘publicity condition’—very roughly, the requirement that the evidence for, and justification of, the principles of justice regulating a society should be understood and accepted by its members—must be fulfilled for a ‘well-ordered’ (that is, just) society to exist. As Rawls himself recognizes, another way of putting this desideratum is that a just society ‘does not require an ideology in order to achieve stability’, where ideology is understood in the original Marxian sense as ‘some form of false consciousness or delusory scheme of public beliefs’ (Rawls 1999: 326 n.4).

One might be tempted to see these (explanatory and emancipatory) losses as unwelcome but necessary. In particular, they might be considered justified by virtue of some trade-off against the purported benefits (not examined here) of ‘non-critical’ accounts of ideology. However, I think we should be sceptical of the widespread tendency to see critical and non-critical accounts of ideology as competing accounts of the same thing—perhaps different ‘conceptions’ of the same ‘concept’—in which the victory of the one seems to require the defeat of the other. Instead, these models might fruitfully be seen as involving different concepts which capture different phenomena, and do not compete for the same territory (Humphrey 2005). (One could, of course, think that using the same term for different phenomena is unhelpful, but language is often messy in precisely this way.) That is, I doubt not only that non-critical accounts incorporate all of the concerns of critical accounts, but also that there exists any fatal inconsistency in subscribing to both accounts of what ideology is.

In short, non-critical accounts of ideology do not capture the explanatory and emancipatory ambitions of critical accounts. Consequently, the displacement of the latter by the former involves a loss. Moreover, there seems to be no conflict between critical and non-critical accounts of ideology which might justify that loss as part of an unwelcome but necessary trade-off. As a result, the eclipse of critical accounts of ideology—whether inside the Marxist tradition or elsewhere—is to be regretted.

NOTES

1. I use the term ‘Marxian’ here to refer to views which, broadly speaking, are held by Marx and Engels (and not to refer to the subsequent Marxist tradition).
2. There is, however, some evidence (largely neglected here) that Marx thought of ideologies as relatively

abstract and theorized sets of ideas (see Torrance 1995: 192–4).

3. The *locus classicus* is the letter to Franz Mehring (dated 14 July 1893) in which Engels describes ideology as requiring that the ‘actual motives’ from which an individual acts are ‘hidden from him’ (Marx and Engels 2004: 164).
4. This emphasis on the materiality of ideology in Marx’s work is also evident in Gramsci’s own translation of the ‘1859 Preface’, where a reference to the ideological forms ‘in which’ people become conscious (of the conflict between forces and relations of production) is rendered as ‘on which terrain’ they become conscious (see Rehmann 2007: 218).
5. Althusser’s relation to Gramsci is more complex than suggested here (see Althusser and Balibar 1970). For critical discussion of Althusser’s critique of Gramsci’s ‘absolute historicism’ see Coassin-Spiegel (1983) and Thomas (2010).
6. As one sympathetic commentator rhetorically asks: can it really just be an accident that so many Americans have factually inaccurate beliefs about issues such as the ‘estate tax’, beliefs which are so clearly in the interests of those with money and power? (Leiter 2004:, 86–7.)

REFERENCE LIST

- Althusser, L. 1969. *For Marx*. London: Penguin.
- Althusser, L. 1971. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. London: New Left Books.
- Althusser, L. 1990. *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays*. London: Verso Books.
- Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. 1970. *Reading Capital*. London: New Left Books.
- Anderson, P. 1976. *Considerations on Western Marxism*. London: New Left Books.
- Coassin-Spiegel, H. 1983. *Gramsci und Althusser: Eine Kritik der Althusserischen Rezeption von Gramsci’s Philosophie*. Berlin: Argument Verlag.
- Elliott, G. 1987. *Althusser. The Detour of Theory*. London: Verso Books.
- Elster, J. 1985. *Making Sense of Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster, J. 1986. *An Introduction to Karl Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fiore, G. 1970. *Antonio Gramsci. Life of a Revolutionary*. London: New Left Books.
- Geras, N. 1986. *Literature of Revolution. Essays on Marxism*. London: Verso Books.
- Geuss, R. 1981. *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gramsci, A. 2000. *The Antonio Gramsci Reader. Selected Writings 1916–1935*, ed. D. Forgacs. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Gramsci, A. 2011a. *Prison Notebooks*. Vol. 1, ed. J.A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gramsci, A. 2011b. *Prison Notebooks*. Vol. 2, ed. J.A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gramsci, A. 2011c. *Prison Notebooks*. Vol. 3, ed. J.A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Humphrey, M. 2005. ‘(De)contesting ideology: The struggle over the meaning of the struggle over meaning’, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 8 (2): 225–46.
- Larrain, J. 1983. *Marxism and Ideology*. London: Macmillan.
- Leiter, B. 2004. ‘The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud’. Pp. 74–105 in *The Future of Philosophy*, ed. B. Leiter. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lenin, V. I. 2008. ‘What Is to Be Done?’ Pp. 673–840 in *Lenin Rediscovered. ‘What Is to Be Done?’ in Context*, ed. L. T. Lih. Chicago, Ill: Haymarket.
- Marx, K. 1976. *Capital*. Vol. 1. London: Penguin.
- Marx, K. 1981. *Capital*. Vol. 3. London: Penguin.
- Marx, K. 1986. *Karl Marx: A Reader*, ed. J. Elster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Marx, K. 2000. *Selected Writings*, ed. D. McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marx, K. and Engels, F. 2004. *Collected Works*. Vol. 50: *Engels: 1892–1895*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Mepham, J. 1979. 'The theory of ideology'. Pp. 141–74 in *Capital. Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, vol. 3: *Epistemology Science Ideology*, ed. J. Mepham and D.-H. Ruben. Brighton: Harvester Press.
- Pines, C.L. 1993. *Ideology and False Consciousness, Marx and his Historical Progenitors*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Rawls, J. 1999. *Collected Papers*, ed. S. Freeman. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rehmann, J. 2007. 'Ideology theory', *Historical Materialism*, 15: 211–39.
- Ricouer, P. 1970. *Freud and Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rosen, M. 1996. *On Voluntary Servitude. False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Rosen, M. and J. Wolff. 1996. 'The problem of ideology', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol. 70: 229–41.
- Shaw, W. 1989. 'Ruling Ideas', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supp. Vol. 15: 425–48.
- Thomas, P.D. 2010. *The Gramscian Moment. Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Torrance, J. 1995. *Karl Marx's Theory of Ideas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, A.W. 2004. *Karl Marx*. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 3

KARL MANNHEIM AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

PETER BREINER

WHEN commentators address Karl Mannheim's contribution to the theory of ideology, they typically associate him with the Mannheim paradox. The core of this paradox is Mannheim's well-known criticism of Marx's theory of ideology: 'The analysis of thought and ideas in terms of ideologies is much too wide in its application and too broad a weapon to become the permanent monopoly of any one party. Nothing is to prevent the opponents of Marxism availing themselves of the weapon of applying it to Marxism itself' (Mannheim 1936: 75 [henceforth IU]; Mannheim 1985: 69) [henceforth IuU].¹ For the commentators who focus on this argument, Mannheim's central contribution is to make explicit the paradox that every time we uncover an opponent's political ideas and world-view as ideology, we achieve this only from the vantage point of another ideology, and so there is no vantage point outside of ideology to understand and criticize ideology (IU: 77; IuU: 70). Most commentators have treated this paradox as the central theoretical problem informing Mannheim's application of his sociology of knowledge to the understanding of ideology, in particular political ideology. And in different ways, they have claimed it to be destructive of both the study of social and political ideas and the practice of social science. Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt saw this move as undermining the autonomy of philosophical thought and the possibility of transcendence (Jaspers 1957: 174–8; Arendt 1990: 196–208). Similarly, Raymond Aron criticized Mannheim for 'an inability to understand any ideas which cannot be justified by their utility in social thought and action' (1964: 60). On the other hand, Clifford Geertz, who coined the phrase, 'Mannheim's Paradox', claimed that Mannheim's preoccupation with the self-referential nature of the concept of 'ideology' may very well have 'destroyed its scientific utility altogether', and he queries 'whether having become an accusation it can remain an analytic concept' (Geertz 1973: 194). Mannheim, on this account, has left us with an infinite regress. So for one set of critics, Mannheim's approach to ideology stands accused of undermining philosophy or the autonomy of ideas as such; for another set of critics he stands accused of undermining social science.

In this article I would like to argue that critics like Arendt, Jaspers, and Aron and in a different idiom Geertz misunderstand the role that ideology and the

sociology of knowledge is playing in Mannheim's argument. Specifically, they mistakenly treat the ideological understanding of ideological unmasking as if it were the core of Mannheim's famous inquiry in *Ideology and Utopia* when it is in fact merely a step along the way. That is, this famous argument from *Ideology and Utopia* is merely a preparation for a far more complex and persistent paradox, one that poses a recurrent problem for any political science that seeks to understand how political ideas can function as political ideology—or more generally understand what it means to translate political ideas into political practice. Roughly put, the paradox functions like this: when we try to understand contending ideologies that constitute a political field at any one historical moment both as they inform and criticize one another, and when we seek to test the possibilities for their realization in light of the historical developmental tendencies and political tensions in their sociological context, our constructions of this context is itself informed by these ideologies. We construct the context of political ideological conflict either from the viewpoint of our own partisan commitments or our sense of the way these ideologies interact with one another. So there is no way to understand how the grand political ideologies—say, conservatism, liberalism, and socialism—politically relate or fail to relate to one another and how they assess the tendencies on which they place their bets for success from some standpoint outside of the field of political conflict. A synoptic understanding of the political field must come from a point within it. This leads to the question, how can we test political ideas as ideologies for their 'congruence or lack of congruence' with a dynamic social and historical reality when our access to that reality is understood through the variety of partisan ideologies defining politics at any one point in time?

It is this paradox, I will want to argue, that is at the core of his famous set of arguments in *Ideology and Utopia*. I will also maintain that the often criticized tentativeness of Mannheim's solution is not a conceptual problem of Mannheim's but a problem built into understanding political ideologies as such. I will further argue that when we read *Ideology and Utopia* with its original three chapters as the centre of this work, we will see that Mannheim's account of the sociology of knowledge is subservient to his project of developing a new political science—one that is at once sensitive to the contingent historical development and the durable elements of politics and to the specific constellation of political ideologies whose adherents use political means in the struggle for preeminence.⁴ Thus the paradox that this political science both intensifies and seeks to resolve turns out to be the much neglected political one: that we can only understand and evaluate political ideologies (and their

interrelationships with each other) against a dynamically developing context whose features we are only able to discern through the lens of those self-same ideologies—and this is the case even if we embrace a political ideology we think to be missing from the field. At the end I will argue that this paradox is still operative in present debates between proponents of analytic political philosophy and those who treat political ideas as ideologies.

REDEFINING HISTORICISM AS SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Mannheim's account of political ideology in *Ideology and Utopia* is rooted in his relentless attack on what we might want to call the analytic philosophy of his own moment (Turner 1995: 722). More accurately, in his earlier writings he launches a full scale attack on the claims of both epistemology and a priori ethics to have a unique authority over cultural and political knowledge. From his early writing on 'Worldviews' (1952b) to his subsequent accounts of 'Historicism' (1952a) and 'The Sociology of Knowledge' (1952c) Mannheim viewed his project as justifying a dynamic theory of the relation of knowledge to reality as against static theories of philosophy that treat the historical, developmental, and sociological as contingent to that which is durable and unchanging (1952a: 112–13). While, according to Mannheim, epistemology and the positive sciences seek truth in the durability of a priori concepts or brute facts over and against the stream of history or the constantly changing phenomenal world, truth, Mannheim argues, is to be found in that which is dynamically changing. That is, truth is to be found in the constantly changing relations of irrational and rational, of theory and practice, of sociologically constituted structures and history, and of ideas and collective experience: 'What the individual holds, with a feeling of phenomenological self-evidence, as eternal certainties ... represents, in actual fact, merely correlates of a specific configuration of vital and cultural factors of a cultural *Gestalt* which is perennially in flux' (Mannheim 1952a: 113). To this Mannheim adds the claim that all attempts to understand historical changes and structures are determined by the perspective or standpoint we occupy within 'the historical stream'. But there is no impartial standpoint from which to order historical reality or, for that matter, a series of ideological viewpoints on a fixed historical reality, because both the (ideological) position we occupy and the object we seek to understand are in constant movement (Mannheim 1952a: 120). Or as he radically puts it: 'history is only visible from within history and cannot be interpreted through a "jump" beyond history in occupying a static standpoint

arbitrarily occupied outside of history' (1952c: 172).

Mannheim's concept of the sociology of knowledge flows out of this account of historicism and his criticism of epistemology (Mannheim 1952c: 137–46). The crucial moment that launches the sociology of knowledge occurs when sociology dispenses with inquiry into the truth value of ideas and instead is used to unmask them by revealing their social function when the purveyors of ideas claim these ideas transcend reality and thus rise above their social function (Mannheim 1952c: 141). However, sociology of knowledge truly comes into own when it changes from unmasking sets of ideas by revealing their social function and the deceptive justifications used by the ruling classes in claiming to represent universal interests to demonstrating that 'all thinking of a social group is determined by its existence' (Mannheim 1952c: 144). However, this notion now becomes self-reflexive in that unmasking now focuses on ideas that are part of an obsolete theory or of a whole world-view that historical development has left behind. It also becomes self-reflexive in a second sense, that society itself accepts the claim that ideas are socially determined (Mannheim 1952c: 144–5). Sociology of knowledge reaches its final development when the background against which all ideas are reduced to a function becomes 'dynamic'. So now both ideas and the account of existence which provides the functional backdrop are evolving in relation to one another—a kind of double evolution.

In sum, for Mannheim, all ideas are intelligible only if we understand the background concept of being in which the ideas are a function or of which they are meant to be an expression—Mannheim is rather loose in his usage here. But combining his notion of history as movement with phenomenology, Mannheim claims that this background is in fact always a horizon of becoming, though one constituted by socially structured meanings under historical pressure. Sociology of knowledge does not discover this but incorporates it by drawing all standpoints and patterns of thought back to 'an underlying historico-social reality' (Mannheim 1952c: 182).

Viewed against this background Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*—at least in its original German version—appears not merely as a justification of sociology of knowledge as a method for studying the relation of ideas to society, but as a way of revealing the relation of ideology to politics and thereby launching a new kind of political science—a political science that can map and remap the field of political struggle as one of competing ideologies under the pressure of a dynamic reality. And in doing this, Mannheim will claim to provide political clarification for all partisans of a political field.

THE WEBERIAN BACKGROUND

This new sociologically informed political science is forged initially out of a critical dialogue with Max Weber—leavened through a political reading of Marx (see Loader 1985: 121–2). Specifically, Mannheim seeks to vindicate Weber’s aim of providing a kind of political sociological clarification of political choices that is not identical with the standpoint of the political partisan (Weber 1989: 25–6). But he forges a new approach—in keeping with his dynamic approach to reality—by intensifying the circular relation of partisan standpoints and the construction of the political field against which the partisan standpoints will be judged. This involves replacing Weber’s emphasis on individually chosen political ‘convictions’ (Weber 1994: 359, 367–8) with an emphasis on ideologies and utopias as ideas that are held by collectivities, most often in conflict with one another (see Ashcraft 1981: 40). More importantly for Mannheim, this move requires us to acknowledge that political ideologies and utopian strivings do not merely constitute the political commitments of political actors to be tested by political sociology but provide perspectives on the very political-sociological constructs through which we understand political reality. And he will make this circularity between ‘partisanship’ and ‘science’ the centre of his application of the sociology of knowledge to political science. This in turn will require a redefinition of one of the central terms that Weber thought he had overcome by emphasizing ‘convictions’ and subjective meanings, namely ‘false consciousness’.

THE DIALOGUE WITH IDEOLOGY AS ‘FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS’: UNMASKING VERSUS EVALUATING IDEOLOGIES

Mannheim seeks to overcome the notion of ideology as a form of false consciousness susceptible to being unmasked by its opponents. But the problem, as Mannheim points out, is that the sociology of knowledge has its origins in the Marxian definition of ideology as unmasking an opponent in order to discredit his/her set of ideas or world-view by demonstrating the social function it performs from a secure non-ideological standpoint of one’s own. And this in turn implies the party doing the unmasking must claim that its opponents suffer from false consciousness while the critic possesses a standpoint that bespeaks true consciousness. This unleashes a logic internal to the concept of ideology itself but also informing its practical employment when all parties make use of it

against their opponents: thus, Mannheim's all too famous claim that 'The problem of ideology is much too general and much too fundamental for it to remain the privilege of any one party and for anyone to prohibit the opponents of Marxism to analyze it for its ideological entwinement' (IU: 75; IuU: 69, my translation). But Mannheim does not make this insight the aim of his inquiry as so many commentators and critics claim. Rather, this move for Mannheim has the ironic effect of reducing all the ideas of all parties in a particular period to ideology in a neutral or 'non-evaluative' sense. This allows the sociology of knowledge to analyse the relations between structures of consciousness and particular kinds of existence—or more specifically, the way socially structured conditions of existence shape particular styles of interpreting existence (IU: 80; IuU: 72)—without having to make any judgements about the truth value of ideas. But this in turn requires that we try to put together the different particular standpoints and their interactions in the context of the total social context and social processes (IU: 81; IuU: 73). However, as we have seen, for Mannheim the relation between styles of thought and the social structures which shape them and which these self-same ideas try to make intelligible is not static but is always developing historically. Given that styles of thought are partial in relation to the whole they claim to make sense of and given that they are in tension with the development of social structures, Mannheim proposes a new approach to the understanding of ideologies, his controversial notion of 'relationalism'.

Relational thinking enables the sociology of knowledge to avoid both the reduction of ideas to a static social function or to a judgement on the validity of ideas by a static notion of truth value—including true consciousness. Rather it requires we understand ideology as a kind of knowledge arising from 'our experience in actual life situations' (IU: 86; IuU: 77). Moreover, it also requires we understand each ideology as a particular perspective on social reality. It furthermore requires we construct an account of the ways each of these points of view interact with each other in conflictual or complementary ways as we move from one perspective to the other. And lastly it requires we understand that the way ideologies in a particular period interact with each other horizontally is at the same time a vertical response to a historical sociological reality, at once 'temporal, spatial, and situational' (IU: 93; IuU: 82). However, Mannheim adds one additional move that renders such inquiry hermeneutic and dialectical—what he will label dynamic relationism—namely, we must treat the combined ideological perspectives on the life situation of a period as the vehicle through which we gain insight into that period's sociological forms and historical development; and in turn insight into these forms and their development will

demonstrate the partiality of insight that the ideologies of a period provide. So when we engage in relational analysis, we move back and forth between the sociological developments of a historical period and the ideological responses to these developments, but the latter serve to give us insight into what is durable and what is changing in the former.

The consequence of this last move for Mannheim is to force us to reinstate the connection between the concept of ideology and false consciousness precisely within this non-evaluative concept of ideology itself.³ For the very understanding of an ideology as a perspective on the form and development of a historical social structure involves us in describing the degree of its adaptation or lack of adaptation to that structure and its development—that is, understanding and evaluation are now inseparable. Or to put the matter more politically, we cannot separate a sociology that reveals the partiality of ideological world-views without some way of evaluating those ideologies in relation to the developmental political reality of which they provide only a partial understanding. This requires Mannheim to come up with what I would argue is his most significant contribution to the understanding of ideology: ‘the concept of evaluative ideology’. Under this notion we can evaluate the degree to which ideas correspond to ‘the criteria of reality in practice, particularly political practice’ (IU: 94; IuU: 83). However, the practical reality against which we evaluate ideas for their ideological features is not a fixed or static reality but a ‘historical’ and dynamic one so that ideas may adequately guide practice at one moment but later prove to be either outmoded or too demanding. Either way, under this new conception of ideology for Mannheim, ideas are not false in relation to a brute reality but rather when they guide one’s orientation to life through categories that reflect ‘superseded and antiquated norms and ways of thought, but also ways of interpreting the world that conceal rather than clarify the relation between a completed action and the given reality’ (IU:, 95; IuU: 84).

This false consciousness can occur in three ways. A set of ethical norms may no longer correspond to the imperatives of a new social structure. The human agent may be deceived or deceive him/herself regarding both self and others either through reifying or idealizing certain human characteristics at the expense of others. Or lastly, an agent’s everyday orientation to the world fails to comprehend changes in social structure such as the patriarchal employer overseeing a capitalist firm (IU: 95–6; IuU: 85). Mannheim’s point here is that false consciousness in all these three senses now rotates less around a failure of knowing than a failure of practical understanding, especially of the ideas about the social and historical world from which that practical understanding is

derived. This means then that the tension within false consciousness that leads to mal-adaptation of ethical principles, self, and world-view to historical and social reality can only be overcome within a concept of ideology 'which is evaluative and dynamic': 'It is evaluative because it makes certain judgments concerning the reality of ideas and structures of consciousness, and it is dynamic because these judgments are always measured by a reality which is in constant flux' (IU: 97; IuU: 85).

But here the question arises, without knowing what counts as 'real' and what counts as 'possible', how do we know which norms, concepts of agency, and world-views are 'ideological' and which ones are adapted to a particular set of social and historical developments? Mannheim's answer is twofold, though in each case this answer is more a specification of dynamic relational thinking—of the dialectic between ideology as a perspective on practical reality and dynamic reality itself—than a precise conceptual account of the real and the possible. The first answer is to draw his famous distinction between the new evaluative concepts of ideology and utopia. World-views will turn out to be ideologies if they use categories that inhibit our understanding of the social and political possibilities within the dynamic trends that constitute historical 'reality' (IU: 94–6; IuU: 84–5). They turn out to be utopias if they seek to radically break with historical and social realities to achieve forms of society that historical and social tendencies have not yet made possible (IU: 96–8; IuU: 85–6). Ideologies prevent us from taking advantage of an altered social and political situation either by treating social reality as static and unvarying, or by emphasizing one dynamic of social reality at the expense of others that have superseded it. Utopias either exaggerate the dynamics available to achieve new models of society or claim we can reorganize state and society without having to take the dynamic forces constituting historical reality into account. Thus ideologies and utopias can both be shown to suffer from a kind of political 'false consciousness'. Because they are rooted in the particular interests and aspirations of groups, classes, and generations, they fail to grasp fully the various dynamics of historical development and political conflict and thus come to wrong judgements of what we can politically achieve.

Against both forms of thought aiming to shape dynamic political and social reality, Mannheim proposes a kind of political thinking that, analytically at least, avoids these difficulties: 'Thought should contain neither less nor more than the reality in whose medium it operates' (IU: 98; IuU: 86). Thus the standard for judging a world-view or set of social and political principles for whether they are ideologies or utopias is their 'congruence with reality'. But the problem is that

these distinctions are largely analytic and heuristic, since every idea claiming to guide practical action also claims to be congruent both with some aspects of reality that are durable and recurrent, and some aspects of historical reality that are in a state of development. Thus ideologies and utopias contain perspectives on the relations of their own aspirations to dynamic reality and so provide partial knowledge about social and political reality even though they seek to transcend that reality. And so the best we can do is try to understand these ideas as different ways ‘of experiencing the same reality’ (IU: 99; IuU: 87) while at the same time assuming this ‘reality’ is in constant flux.

However, this tripartite scheme contains a number of difficulties. It conflicts with Mannheim’s claim that ‘dynamic relationism’ assumes that the relation between ideologies (and utopias) and historically developing reality is itself interpretively constructed from within not from outside. Furthermore, the typical relation between ideas and politics rotates around political ideologies. Utopias for Mannheim are distinctive only because they seek to transcend a given way of life through a radical rupture rather than seeking forces within that given reality in order to get beyond it (IU: 173–4; IuU: 169–71). Nonetheless, most ideologies as Mannheim describes them seek a form of political and social arrangements beyond what is given but derive them from some given political or social dynamics; so utopias most often appear as corollary parts of ideology. Thus whether acting under ideology in conjunction with utopian thought or out of utopian strivings alone, political and social actors typically seek to shape social and historical reality in light of their aspirations for organizing society as they understand it, even if they are ignoring difficulties arising from developments beyond their comprehension. But in either case, ideologies containing affirmative utopias—‘conceptions that transcend existence’—Mannheim argues, are typical of every way of life while ‘adequate conceptions congruent with existence’ are relatively rare (IU: 194; IuU: 170–1) even if we could determine what they are. Lastly, Mannheim admits that at the end of the day, we can only test the validity of the concepts, ideas, and world views for their congruence with reality—that is whether they are parts of ideologies (or utopias) or sociologically adequate conceptions—by linking them to an active political will in the situation they are describing (IU: 97; IuU: 85). So it would seem that we need a different way of making sense of ideologies and utopias than relying on dynamic relationism alone as an interpretive approach—one that allows us to test them in the practical contexts in which groups try to realize them in conflict with one another. We thus arrive at Mannheim’s second answer.

The second answer is to redefine these new evaluative concepts of ideology

and utopia politically and treat them as the objects of study for a new political science: political ideologies (and the utopian strivings contained within them) will now be evaluated for their adaptation to a dynamic historical sociology through the sociology of knowledge. In turn the older unmasking process of showing the false claim to universality of a set of ideas will now become part of what ideologies do to their opponents within a field of political conflict, and the strategies that different political ideologies employ when they engage in this unmasking become one of the central objects for political science to understand.

THE NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE I: RESTYLIZING MARX AS AN ANSWER TO WEBER

Mannheim seeks to accomplish this through a deliberately political reading of Marx. This Marx, 'corrected' by Mannheim, offers a new political science of ideology whose aim is not merely to unmask other ideologies but also to provide a mode of assessing the feasibility of the contending political ideologies of conservatism and liberalism while having the benefit of being able to assess its own political possibility using its own method—a sociology of knowledge *avant le lettre*. It is this latter feature that sets it apart, for Mannheim, from all opposing political ideologies.

Specifically, in its struggle with opposing ideologies of liberalism and conservatism, Marxism reveals that there is no pure political theory but only political thought that is historically located in collective groups in conflict with other collective groups (IU: 124; IuU: 108)—in short, political thought takes the form of political ideologies. But to make good on this insight, Mannheim insists, Marxism needs to be corrected by the insights of dynamic relationism—or more accurately, by bringing out the operation of dynamic relationism within the theory itself. To this end, Mannheim first proposes to apply Marxism's dynamic account of the political ideologies of its opponents as collective ideas embedded in political conflict and history to Marxism itself—a move similar to his claim that partisanship and social scientific clarification of political ideas in Weber inform one another, leading to a hermeneutic relation between the two notions. The upshot of this move is to render Marxism a historical and socially located form of political understanding that can explain both the source of its own emergence and that of its opponents. At the same time, this distance based on viewing all political thought as bound or connected to social existence (IuU: 109) clarifies Marxism's own political position within the field of political action in a way that would be obscured were Marxism to claim an impartial standpoint

above the political-ideological conflict.

Mannheim's second correction redefines the Marxian notion that theory validates itself in the 'real movement of social forces' by rendering this very idea as a new 'realist dialectic' [Realdialektik] of political theory and practice in history. This new dialectic involves an oscillation between a rational understanding of historical movement and a sudden opening up of an irrational moment of political will, that is a moment of political choice and initiative, whose outcomes are reabsorbed once again under a redefined understanding of rational historical change (IU: 128; IuU: 111). This dialectic reveals the space for political action in two senses: first by examining the constantly changing relation among productive relations, class relations, social relations and ideology as they together shape the space for political manoeuvre (IU: 129–130)—note that Mannheim's relational approach does not give priority to the economic structure; second, by tracing the moment when convergent rational developments suddenly reach their limit in determining the scope of action and turn into the irrational moment of pure unpredictability in which pure political will determines outcomes. Mannheim's Marxian dialectic captures that situation in which the relation of reason to will is overturned and active intervention suddenly becomes possible—in Marxism the moment of the revolutionary act of the proletariat, but for Mannheim the moment in every political ideology when its account of historical and sociological development reaches its limit and it finds an opening for wilful political action as such: a 'breach in the rationalized structure of society'. This dialectic containing both a long-term and short-term view of politics becomes a model of how a political science may both provide a relational understanding between rational forces in history and society and advice for the collective actors defined by the various political ideologies (and corollary utopias) of where they are in the historical processes and what occasions for political action are available: 'One acts here never out of mere impulse, but rather on the basis of sociologically understood history; but on the other hand, one does not ever through mere calculation eliminate the room for action and the [unpredictable] moment within sociological tendencies' (IU:133; IuU: 116).

Thus on Mannheim's reading, Marx's account of history as providing the opportunities for political intervention by the working class parties provides us with a frame for understanding the whole field of contending political ideologies. That is, the Marxian relational concept of history as an alternation between rational understanding of developments and non-rational moments of political will describes—with Mannheim's essayistic corrections—what all

political ideologies seek to do. What is missing in this politicized reading of Marxism as political science for Mannheim is that it too resides as one of the central political ideologies within this field of contending political ideologies from which it needs to take distance. That is, while applying a dynamic relational understanding to its opponents in order to discover the conditions for a political will that produces a society beyond conservatism and liberalism, it fails in its *potential*, as it were, to apply a dynamic relational understanding to the whole field of political ideologies of which it is a part. Hence Mannheim suggests a post-Weberian, post-Marxian political science of political ideology with dynamic relationism, as its operative principle, but one that can move between the perspectives of engaged partisans and the political field as a whole. This political science will construct the whole field of conflicting political ideologies. However, it will not just be a way of studying political ideology employing a sociology of knowledge that brings all political ideas back to their ‘Seinsverbundenheit’, their locatedness in a dynamic account of social existence, but also a form of political education to all political actors in the political field. In this way it may potentially serve as a kind of political intervention within that field.

THE NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE II

It is in the background of this political-sociological re-stylization of Marx as a way of solving the Weberian dilemma that we can understand the German title of his central chapter in *Ideology and Utopia*, ‘Ist Politik als Wissenschaft Möglich?’ (‘Is Politics as Science Possible?’). On the surface Mannheim is asking a conventional question: whether our ordinary understanding of politics can be understood scientifically as well, whether we can find durable generalizations about the relation between the dynamics of sociology and political ideology. However, the German title conveys a far more ambitious and a far more radical project than the English one—‘The Prospect for Scientific Politics’. Mannheim’s German title explicitly references Weber’s two lectures, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ and ‘Science as a Vocation’. But he reduces the science versus politics question to one: namely, is it possible to forge a ‘political science’ that can inform *all* political actors, active and potential, so that the purveyors of the former can remain engaged with the world of the latter and the latter remain connected to the former?

To this end Mannheim wants to inquire whether understanding political ideas with their different maps of political reality and their different recipes for

political practice might become the precondition for drawing generalizations about the dynamic relation between political ideologies in combat with one another and their constant tension with a dynamically changing political reality without the inquirer imposing a model of political science from outside. Political science has to find its own internal relation to its object of inquiry. This reflexive relation of political science to its own subject matter generates a series of problems that at least have to be faced if not resolved given that the object of this new political science is at once a relational understanding of political ideologies to one another and to their 'Seinsverbundenheit', their mutual boundedness, to an existential reality of social groups, social structures, and generations from some standpoint within that reality.

The most profound of these problems for Mannheim is the difficulty of gaining a synoptic view of political ideology from within the field of politics itself. Specifically, the different points of view of political theorists will lead to differences in political concepts and styles of political thinking that are not just incompatible but also incommensurable because their accounts of the fields of political conflict are encased in different ideologies and partisan commitments (IU: 116–17; IuU: 101). In a direct challenge to Weber's distinction between scientific impartiality and partisanship (and more in keeping with his radicalization of Weber through Marx), Mannheim claims that there is no political style or vocabulary or, for that matter, logic of social inquiry that transcends our locatedness in a particular partisan political conflict of world-views. Every world-view has its own mode of interpreting history and society and makes its own claim to have discovered a logic that renders intelligible the dynamic movement of history and society toward desired political forms of society (IU: 148; IuU: 129). And in addition, every world-view locates the 'irrational element' of political will in a different place. If the world-views of different political standpoints each find a different economy of the irrational to the routine, they also conceptualize this economy under differing theories, some resting on convention, others on rational progress, and others on productive relations and class conflict, and yet others on the pure exercise of political will against all routine or alternatively on the insistence upon rational routine against all political will. In sum, all partisan positions at any historical moment have their own style of thought that 'penetrates into the very "logic" of their political thought' (IU: 117; IuU: 101).

To be sure, what all political ideas have in common is their participation in politics as irrational willing over and against 'rationalized structures', but this is precisely what also draws these ideas into conflict with another at the highest

level of intensity. And so the attempt to transform our ordinary understanding of politics into a science of politics that is sensitive to political-ideological conflict meets resistance at every turn by the very fact that the study of politics is implicated in politics as an activity that resists rational control—that is an activity characterized by will, passion, partisanship, conflict over collectively held ideas, and chance in constant tension with routine. Nonetheless, Mannheim insists that a political science that is more than simply the world-view of a party is possible, but only if it can gain a certain—though never perfect—independence from the ‘fundamental structure of the power struggle’ in which ideologies and their political adherents are engaged (IU: 117; IuU: 101–2).

A NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: POLITICAL SCIENCE AS DYNAMIC SYNTHESIS

To achieve this distance without capitulating to a self-defeating detachment, Mannheim proposes his famous notion of political sociology as dynamic synthesis (IuU: 130, 149). Employing ‘dynamic relationism’ this approach embraces rather than seeks to overcome the perspectival and partisan nature of our accounts of social and political ‘reality’ (IuU: 136; IU: 156). Thus to produce a dynamic synthesis, the political sociology of each of the contending ideologies must be constructed into a series of conflicting but overlapping types within a common field—for Mannheim the central ideologies of modernity were traditionalist conservatism, liberalism, and socialism (or variations within them). If this is done right, Mannheim claims, each of these ideological types will contribute a perspective on the dynamic and durable political and social reality within which they all seek to prevail, but they will also prove to be blind to other features both of that reality and of the insights of their opponents. For example, a conservative may emphasize the slow development of traditions while the socialist will emphasize how social and productive relations may be undermining them, generating openings for political initiative, and the liberal may emphasize the ways political struggle produced by economic and social structures may be contained by parliamentary conflict and political procedures. And yet each of these political ideologies may be blind to the force of the other’s account of political reality (see IU: 147–50; IuU: 128–34). Likewise, each political ideology may be blind to the other’s account of the occasion for the exercise of (irrational) political will and so overestimate or underestimate the moments for political intervention. The effect of this synthetic construction of political ideologies based on combining their historical-political sociologies and

their accounts of wilful political intervention is that the blindness of each party to the insight of the opposing party regarding the conditions of and limits to political possibility becomes obvious.

By integrating the various ideological points of view into a whole made of many perspectives on political reality against a construct of political reality derived from these very perspectives and yet in tension with them, we can attain, however temporarily, a view of the whole political field. However, for Mannheim, this is not the static testing of a series of interlocking political ideologies against a static notion of congruence with political reality, but a relational account in which the political ideologies of the moment give an insight into the existing political reality as it is structured, but the account of this self-same reality is more comprehensive than that provided by any one of the ideologies. With the construction of such syntheses, Mannheim claims, we gain a synoptic overview of the variety of political ideologies in tension with a political reality consisting of the recurrent conflict between political will and routine and the unique developmental tendencies and social structures of which particular ideologies understand only a part.

But this said, there is no straightforward method of constructing these dynamic syntheses through a political science informed by sociology of knowledge. Mannheim ultimately maintains that even in the backdrop of a synthesis that gives us a horizon of potential areas for (irrational) political action and its (rational) limits, judgements as to whether a particular partisan position happens to be an ideology out of touch with historical possibility, or is attached to a utopia demanding too much of reality, is ultimately a matter of sensibility and judgement—‘a distinctive alertness to the historical present’ and a case by case sense for ‘what is no longer necessary and what is not yet possible’ (IU: 154; IuU: 135). At the core of such judgements regarding the dynamics spawned by conflicting political ideologies is the capacity to empathize with the views of each side (IU: 157; IuU: 136) and project oneself into the struggle from different ideological points of view. There is no brute reality to appeal to, nor one master method of understanding the dynamics at work in each political conjuncture. There is only the dynamic synthetic construct itself.

MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

The emblematic example of such a synthesis for Mannheim is the modern conjuncture of political conflict among fundamental political world-views consisting of historical conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. Bureaucratic

conservatism and fascism as well as anarchism represent the limiting cases at opposite ends of the continuum—pure formal rules on one side combined with distrust of all politics, pure irrational will on the other. These two ideological positions set the parameters of modern politics in that the bureaucratic conservative sees all expressions of political will as a threat to reason and order while the anarchist or fascist sees all attempts to impose rational routine as a threat to political initiative. But the conflict between the two is also part of the political field—indeed the rebellion of political will against pure bureaucratic rationality is always in the backdrop of the more differentiated political ideologies.

Without at this point going into Mannheim's revealing discussion of each of these ideologies, I would like to briefly discuss the way Mannheim demonstrates the ways they intertwine with one another in their assessments of the relation of political will to routine on one side and to history on the other—that is the relation of the existentially durable features of politics to that stream of reality that is in constant flux. Historical conservatism emphasizes the irrational moment of political will through its emphasis on historical prudence while finding the routine in the durability of custom and the organic development of society. Liberalism seeks a rational framework to reconcile all competing interests while extirpating all irrationality from politics. Marxism, by contrast, incorporates from the conservatives the organic notion of society as historically evolving but sees a rationality of conflict behind it, which it employs against liberalism to show the irrationality behind its claims to use reason to solve all conflicting claims when political will outside of procedural institutions is necessary (IU: 117–46; IuU: 102–32). Each of these positions finds politics somewhere else. But when we put their accounts of politics together, we get a comprehensive sense of the different possible loci of political action—in traditional prudence, in parliamentary discussion, in class conflict and revolution—and the different limitations on political action—in custom, in legal-constitutional procedure and partial interest, and in the development of class structure and productive means (IU: 150; IuU: 130). All of these loci of political action and accounts of history are influential in different ways in different situations.

SOCIOLOGICALLY INFORMED POLITICAL EDUCATION FOR IDEOLOGICALLY DEFINED ACTORS

Mannheim hoped that such dynamic syntheses of political fields might educate

ideologically located partisans—in particular traditional conservatives, socialists, and liberals—to the meaning and social boundedness of their political commitments and thereby provide them with an enlarged horizon which might make their political choices more realistic (IU: 189; IuU: 165. See Kettler 2002: 38). And in this way political science might actually alter the political field from which it derived its subject matter. Alternatively, one might want to argue that it is precisely in seeking to affect political debate by relating political ideas to ideologies and ideologies to political fields of conflict in which ideologically committed partisans seek to realize their goals within a developmental political reality that Mannheim's 'politics as science' becomes possible. It becomes at once distant from and part of the dynamic political reality it seeks to understand.

Perhaps viewed this way, Mannheim's famous but much ridiculed answer that it is the role of the 'social free floating intellectuals' (IU: 155; IuU: 135) to transmit this education as well as pursue this new political science might seem less presumptuous or naive. He never claims they are non-partisan, or that they constitute a vanguard with superior knowledge, but only that they are *capable* of viewing the ideological-political field as a whole and testing it against the developmental reality from which their own approach derives. In short, given that all ideas must be brought back to their boundedness in social reality, he is merely claiming that they have the *potential* for political intervention based on their capacity to understand his sociology of knowledge-informed political science. He is not saying they will.

HOW SATISFACTORY IS MANNHEIM'S POLITICAL SCIENCE OF IDEOLOGY?

But even critics who do not find Mannheim's reliance on intellectuals as the transmitters of his new political science problematic may still object to its dependence on synthesis based on dynamic relationism. For such critics Mannheim's political science leaves us with no firm ground to test the normative claims of political ideas and concepts or clarify what counts as political reality. Political knowledge needs a firmer grounding than Mannheim's political sociology can provide, based as it is on providing a dynamic synthesis (Frisby 1992: 168–9).

This is a common criticism of Mannheim and one that should not to be ignored. However what this criticism may overlook is that the attempt to break out of Mannheim's relational political science may be achieved only by positing a stability in the meaning of political principles and empirical reality that is not

available to us. For if we argue that knowledge must be appropriate to its subject matter, Mannheim's inconclusiveness about both the ground for testing political standpoints in empirical reality and for the stability of political ideas may appear as a strength. For Mannheim's political science registers the fact that political ideas are located within a conflict of rough world-views that function as political ideologies and always make claims about the reality they are meant to clarify and in which they are meant to be efficacious. Mannheim is simply describing what it means to take these facts into account if we want a political science that can understand these political ideas with both distance and engagement at the same time. Indeed, Mannheim's political science of political ideology may simply register a problem and a paradox of treating political thought as political ideology that cannot be overcome, and Mannheim's synthesis is the best we can do once we recognize the self-reflexive nature of setting political ideas in political contexts.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY

Though presented in a different idiom from ours, Mannheim addresses contemporary accounts of political ideology in at least three ways. First, his sociology of knowledge and subsequent reconstruction of political ideological fields is sensitive to the fact that political concepts and categories that respond to a particular set of recondite political facts on one side of the political spectrum, say the incorporation of class conflict and the attack on the destructive consequences of the market into a dynamic of conflict over capitalism, will frequently travel to the other side of the spectrum and be incorporated, but given a different meaning and priority, in the ideology of the opposing position (Mannheim 1952c:154). Mannheim is explicitly clear that we miss such movements—that is such reconstitutions of concepts within ideologies—if we insist upon consistency and analytical clarity, and in turn view such tendentious movements and incorporations as signs of bad thinking. This comes close to the programmatic of Michael Freeden in his attempt to understand the political ideologies as often sharing concepts but giving them different priorities within a set of political ideas, contesting one another for the priority they give to their central concepts while decontesting the concepts that take pride of place within their ideological economy (Freeden 1996: 60–91). But Mannheim would add that this shifting around of concepts within conflicting political frameworks also has to be understood as representing collective standpoints of political groups,

classes, and generations and responding to a constantly shifting equilibrium between political sociological 'reality' and political ideological perspectives on that reality.

Second, Mannheim raises the possibility that in studying the formation of political ideas as they become dynamic in the form of political ideologies competing with one another to define the political field, we cannot very easily separate the production and consumption of ideologies. To be sure Mannheim tries to forge a way to study ideologies in which the engaged individual can also gain distance by trying to construct the political field of ideologies apart from her own partisan attachments and measure the incongruity between these ideologies (and corresponding utopias) and the developmental ground of politics. But he also implies that we can come to understand this relationship only in understanding our political ideologies from within politics itself. As he implies in the title to the central chapter of *Ideology and Utopia*, politics is itself a discovery process that enables a science of politics to be pursued. One must be somewhere in the political field as a partisan to be able to construct it as a distanced intellectual. And that construction must itself be scrutinized for its effect on political education of partisans, which in turn may require a new construction of the political field. There is no outside to politics as a science. In effect, viewed as a political science of political ideologies, the former is a part of the thing it is studying.

Finally and most importantly, Mannheim represents a major contributor to the present debate in political theory between ideal theory and the new realism. It should, after all, be clear from the previous discussion that Mannheim's account of political ideologies raises difficulties for ideal theory—especially the argument of G. A. Cohen (2003) that all moral-political principles that are based on empirical evidence presuppose a fact-insensitive principle that would be true whether the relevant facts changed or not. For Mannheim would attack a notion of political philosophy based on such an argument for reifying the meaning of certain privileged political concepts instead of understanding them as components of political ideologies and discovering their meaning by testing them against a dynamic reality which is not made up of brute facts but is constructed from within the variety of world-views, all of which are sensitive to developing and durable features of political action. Cohen's claim that behind any set of fact-dependent ethical principles is a non-fact-dependent principle—say equality of equal treatment—is to present a notion that is part of a fierce political-ideological debate as if it were above that debate, despite the fact that these principles only make sense as part of an ideological standpoint. But less

obviously, Mannheim's paradox of political ideology raises even greater problems for the recent realist response (Stears 2005; Geuss 2008). For he demonstrates that it is precisely the reality we construct to test political principles as political ideologies that is itself not neatly separable from these principles, and so finding the distance between these principles and the dynamic developments and durable existential political features that shape them—to say nothing of testing them for their blindness and insight—depends on creating contingent political fields. These fields are stable only for the moment and in time will dissolve requiring new constructions. Thus if Mannheim is right, the realist must engage in a dialectical back and forth movement between the construction of a political field of political ideas and their context, attaining a momentary equilibrium but always aware that even that construction will become part of—indeed potentially effect—a dynamic reality that may render this picture obsolete. Thus Mannheim's realism in the study of political ideology is not so much antiquated as a recurrent problem for both ideal and realist theorists of politics. The challenge he poses for the study of political theories as political ideology is still waiting to be addressed.

NOTES

1. As Kettler and Meja (1995: 214–16) have pointed out, Mannheim's German version of *Ideology and Utopia* differs markedly from the English edition. The German version, which consisted only of the three middle chapters, operates in a hermeneutic vocabulary tying ideology to everyday experience. Kettler and Meja demonstrate convincingly that the English translation of *Ideology and Utopia*, directed largely by Mannheim himself, washed out much of the provocative political and experimental language of the German original. Thus I have often made my own translations of this work. The English translation will be cited as IU; the German edition will be cited as IuU.
2. My reading of *Ideology and Utopia* follows Kettler and Meja (1995; also see Mannheim 2001) and Loader (1985) in emphasizing the significance of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as part of a project of political education. However I would want to argue that the project of political education informs his sociology of knowledge driven political science as well
3. In the German edition, the title of the subsection in which the evaluative concept of ideology first appears reads 'Das wiederholte Auftauchens des Problems des "falschen Bewußtseins"' ['The repeated emergence of the problem of "false consciousness"'] (IuU: 83). This would indicate that the concept of false consciousness as the failure of ideology to provide an adequate sociologically informed political and social prudence has always already been part of his argument. This intimation is washed out of the English edition whose subtitle unrevealingly reads, 'The problem of false consciousness' (IU: 94).

REFERENCES

- Arendt, H. 1990. 'Philosophy and sociology'. Pp. 196–208 in *Knowledge and Politics, The Sociology of Knowledge Dispute*, ed. V. Mejaand and N. Stehr. London: Routledge.
- Aron, R. 1964. *German Sociology*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Ashcraft, R. 1981. 'Political theory and political action in Karl Mannheim's thought: Reflections upon

- Ideology and Utopia and its critics', *Comparative Studies in History and Society*, 23: 23–50.
- Cohen, G. A. 2003. 'Facts and principles', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 31 (3): 211–45.
- Freeden, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frisby, D. 1992. *The Alienated Mind: The Sociology of Knowledge in Germany 1918–33*. London: Routledge.
- Geertz, C. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Geuss, R. 2008. *Philosophy and Real Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kettler, D. 2002. 'Political education for dissensus', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 1 (1): 31–51.
- Kettler, D. and Meja. V. 1995. *Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Jaspers, K. 1957. *Man in the Modern Age*. Garden City: Doubleday and Company.
- Loader, C. 1985. *The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mannheim, K. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia*. New York: Harcourt Brace and World.
- Mannheim, K. 1985. *Ideologie und Utopie*. Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klosterman.
- Mannheim, K. 1952a. 'Historicism'. Pp. 84–133 in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. P. Kecskemeti. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Mannheim, K. 1952b. 'On the interpretation of *Weltanschauung*'. Pp. 33–83 in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. P. Kecskemeti. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Mannheim, K. 1952c. 'The problem of a sociology of knowledge'. Pp. 134–229 in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. P. Kecskemeti. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Mannheim, K. 2001. *Sociology and Political Education*, ed. D. Kettler and C. Loader. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Stears, M. 2005. 'The vocation of political theory: Facts, principles, and the politics of opportunity', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 4: 325–50.
- Turner, B. 1995. 'Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*', *Political Studies*, 43: 718–27.
- Weber, M. 1989. 'Science as a vocation'. Pp. 3–32 in *Max Weber's Science as a Vocation*, ed. P. Lassman and I. Velody, London: Unwin Hyman.
- Weber, M. 1994. 'The profession and vocation of politics'. Pp. 309–69 in *Weber: Political Writings*, ed. P. Lassman and R. Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 4 TOTAL AND TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGIES

EMILIO GENTILE

POLITICAL ideology, in the general meaning of the term acquired in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, incorporates an action-oriented conception of man, of history and of society directed at conserving or reforming the existing order, or at toppling it with the aim of constructing a new order.

The origin of ideologies resides in the political, social, and cultural transformations and conflicts of modernity. The age of ideologies commenced in the course of the eighteenth century, when the hegemony of Christianity over state and society began its decline, and the church was no longer recognized in the role of leading guarantor of the order of things based on the primacy of throne and altar. Consequently, the church ceased to be the supreme spiritual institution—one that had interpreted the sense and end of history—that defined the meaning and purpose of human life, and that claimed for itself the authority to legitimate political power, recognizing that power as legitimate only when it conformed to the doctrine of the church, and imposing it on rulers as an exclusive source of moral directives for the conduct of individual and collective life.

The crisis of the spiritual domain of ecclesiastical authority was accompanied at the end of the eighteenth century by the decline of a monarchy based on divine right, challenged by the new principle of popular sovereignty as the sole foundation of legitimate state power. The main impulse for the birth of modern ideologies emerged from the French Revolution, which undermined—both in principle and in reality—the thousand-year old system of society and state, conceived as the realization of a providential design immutable in its rigidly organized hierarchy and based on the sovereignty of divine right. Moreover, the French Revolution was accompanied by the bestowal of political primacy on the nation as a total collective entity, to which individual citizens owed devotion and loyalty to the point of sacrificing their life.

The rights of man and of the citizen, the popular sovereignty of nations, and the separation of state and church were the new fundamental principles in which the nascent democratic nationalist ideologies were rooted. Concurrently, the economic and social upheavals effected by the industrial revolution involved radical changes in production systems, in the organization of labour, in class

divisions, and in work conditions. In those lay the origins of socialist ideologies that desired to abolish the exploitation of human beings by their fellow humans and to create a new society based on equality and social justice. Democratic and socialist ideologies shared a faith in progress as a continuous improvement of the human condition, founded on the assumption that human beings were masters of their own destiny and were capable of continually bettering their lives and improving the conditions of the world in which they lived.

At the same time, opposition to the French Revolution saw the origins of traditionalist political ideologies, be they conservative or reactionary, which defended a hierarchical order based on the primacy of throne and altar and extolled tradition as sanctifying the goodness and effectiveness of political and social institutions. Conservatives and reactionaries legitimated social inequality as a condition of life that corresponded to the natural inequality of human beings and to the diverse functions assigned to each social group within the ambit of a hierarchical social order. Counter-revolutionary ideologies denied individuals the right to set themselves up as makers of their own destiny against God's will—expressed through the church and the monarch—while acclaiming the political and social institutions that were consolidated by history and consecrated by tradition.

From opposite points of view, both progressive and traditionalist ideologies shared the conviction that the disintegration of the traditional order was the outcome of a momentous historical crisis rooted in the advance of modernity. It was understood as a process of profound transformation accompanied by social, economic, political, and cultural conflicts, central to which was the interchange between individual and society, citizen and state, liberty and equality, order and change. The modern political ideologies emerged out of the intention of overcoming those contrasts and causes of the transformation of modern society, depending on whether the divergent solutions proposed were on behalf of those who welcomed modernity as a period of transition towards the establishment of a new order, or on behalf of those who objected to the changes that modernity brought in its wake, desiring instead to preserve and restore the traditional order.

HOLISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

In line with the general orientation of their proposed solutions, political ideologies can be divided into two categories, individualist and holistic. To each category ideologies appertain that differ in their theoretical content, in the political objective they pursue, and in the means of action they propose for the

purpose of attaining it. Individualist ideologies such as liberalism or anarchism affirm the primacy of the individual in relation to society, while holistic ideologies such as socialism and nationalism affirm the primacy of the collective with regards to the individual.

The term ‘holism’ (from the Greek ‘*hólos*’, meaning ‘all’, ‘entire’) was employed by the human sciences in order to specify the historical and sociological theories that maintained that ‘a social group is *more* than the mere sum total of its members, and it is also *more* than the mere sum total of the merely personal relationship existing at any moment between any of its members’. (Popper 2002: 15). In this sense, the term ‘holism’ could be related to all ideologies that placed a collective entity—society, state, nation, class, race, or humanity—at the centre of their conception of man and society. Those were conceived as an organic whole perpetuating itself through time, through the successive generations of the single individuals comprising it. The assumption held in common by the holistic ideologies is the postulate of the social nature of human beings, from which was derived their cardinal principle, to put the individual at the service of society, rather than society being at the service of the individual. Hence they saw society not as an aggregate of individuals, each of which was endowed with their own autonomy and independent personality, but as an organic unity that throughout the course of its continuous historical existence was superior to the individuals that constituted its parts.

Holistic and individualist ideologies exhibit diverging political orientations. On the one hand there is the will to realize a unified and homogeneous society, a negation of individualism as a form of egoism contrary to the common good, and a wariness of, or hostility towards, a clash with ideas and groups considered to contribute to the disaggregation of society. ‘A society whose members are in opposition to each other tend towards their own dissolution’, stated Claude Henri de Saint Simon (quoted in Girardet 1986: 142). On the other hand, it is the affirmation of individual autonomy and an individual’s right to determine freely his or her destiny, accepting modern society with its divisions and competition among individuals and groups and respecting the diversity and the contrasts among groups and ideas: ‘Diversity is life; uniformity is death’, proclaimed Benjamin Constant (Girardet 1986: 143). Holistic ideologies hold that in political action individual personality is realized only through its integration in an organic totality, while individualist ideologies aim at guaranteeing each individual the possibility of the free development of their own personality.

The distinction between holistic and individualist ideologies is not as sharp in historical reality as it is in analytical formulations. Historically, in fact, some

ideologies such as conservatism have from time to time—depending on different circumstances, countries and situations—acquired either an individualist or a holistic orientation. In addition, there have been ideologies that, although setting out from individualist presuppositions—such as Jacobinism—have subsequently taken on a holistic orientation. In fact, even while being advocates of individual liberty, the Jacobins affirmed the primacy of organized society over its single members, extolling political unity as an expression of the common good, and sacralising the one and indivisible republican nation. For them it was the highest collective entity to which citizens, revitalized from the egoism and the evil hereditary customs of despotism, should dedicate their lives, thus forming a politically and morally unified community that embraced the civic religion of one's native land. The Jacobin passion for unity, and their aversion to diversity and to the multiplicity of opinions and groups, led to the adoption of terror as a necessary instrument for saving the republic and realizing a national community, eliminating all those who dissented from the Jacobin conceptions of society, the nation, and politics (Bènoit 1980: 108–12).

‘Unity’, ‘community’, ‘harmony’, ‘totality’, ‘organism’ are the typical concepts of holistic ideologies. This essay will deal with the holistic ideologies born after the French Revolution, and within this category will distinguish total from totalitarian ideologies, for reasons to be elaborated below. We will not examine the contents of single ideologies, which are the subject-matter of specific essays, but will consider only their morphology, as it were, namely, their general nature, with respect to what they have in common and in what ways they differ.

TOTAL IDEOLOGIES

A total ideology is a global and unitary conception of life and of history, which postulates the social essence of man and subordinates the individual to the collective, according to an organic notion of human existence that is realized only in the total unity of a harmonious community.

Karl Mannheim defined total ideology as ‘the ideology of an age or of a concrete historic-social group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group’ (Mannheim 1936: 50). As Michael Freeden has observed, that definition underlines ‘the holistic nature of the total conception of ideology’, ‘a *Weltanschauung*, an all-encompassing view of the world adopted by a given group always reflecting the general ideas and thought-system of an historical

epoch' (Freedman 2003: 14).

However, the general ideas of a specific epoch may be manifold, and each of them is reflected in very different, even contrasting, total ideologies. For example, the principle of the social essence of human beings, the subordination of the individual to society, or anti-individualism, are ideas we may find in the conservatism of the English Protestant Edmund Burke, in the reactionary traditionalism of the Catholic Savoyard Joseph De Maistre, as well as in Hegel's statism, in the socialism of Saint-Simon, Robert Owen, and Charles Fourier, in August Comte's positivism, in Karl Marx's communism, and in nationalism and racism.

Furthermore, total ideologies have in common a vision of history as a unified global process that unfolds in successive phases or stages of development until it reaches a final destination. In that sense, the philosophy of history is the framework for all total ideologies, because each of them has proposed a teleological vision of past, present, and future, as a homogeneous process oriented towards the attainment of an ultimate end. That end is prefigured in the overcoming of conflicts produced by modernity, and in the realization of a harmonious condition of human life, consisting of the integration of the individual in the organic totality of a collective entity, be that society, the state, the nation, race, or humanity itself.

That teleological representation of history, be it even with radically diverse assumptions, contents, and aims, is present both in progressive total ideologies that propose the creation of a new order for a free and sovereign humanity wholly emancipated from any religious belief, such as in Marxism, and in reactionary total ideologies that wish to preserve the integrity of the traditional order, founded on the supremacy of the Church and the monarch by divine right. A different conception, that seeks to reconcile tradition and progress, was proposed by Hegel, who sacralized history as a progressive manifestation of Spirit in the world and sanctified the ethical state as the incarnation of divine will, in which an integral totality was realized through the fusion of the individual in the organized collectivity.

The progressive total ideologies held in common the Enlightenment belief in progress as the inevitable march of human emancipation. Saint-Simon, Comte, and Marx shared the conviction of having discovered, each in his own manner, the laws and rhythms of historical change and hence the ability to predict inevitable future developments. For Saint-Simon and for Comte, as for Marx, albeit for diverse reasons, the new epoch of crises identified as modernity was none other than the decisive moment of the ascent of humanity to a superior state

of progressive existence. That ascent would continue until attaining its final stage, with the decisive removal of all the historical, social, economic, political, and cultural conditions that generated inequality, division, and conflict, leading ultimately to the advent of a humanity definitely emancipated by means of reason and knowledge.

The traditionalist total ideologies that wished to preserve or restore the order shattered by the French Revolution—such as English conservatism, French reactionary thought, or German political romanticism—were united by their rejection of the idea of progress, understood as the freeing of man from the spiritual supremacy of the Church and from the absolute authority of the monarch, consecrated by God. Burke, de Maistre, and Adam Müller negated individualism, which had engendered the arrogance of revolutionary man in rebellion against the institutions sanctified by history, in which a harmonious, perfect and intangible totality that corresponded to the wishes of divine providence had already been realized. Their historical model and ideal of traditionalist holism was the organic society of the Christian middle ages, with its primacy of altar and throne, its hierarchical system of orders and its corporatist organization of the economy and of labour. The organic totality of the Christian middle ages, exalted by a romantic culture, was considered a model also by those, like Saint Simon and Comte, who envisioned the future foundation of a new total social organization, with its own new religion.

Ecclesiastical Christianity, be it Protestant or Catholic, considered a pillar of the old order, was opposed to the total ideologies that wished to install a new order without, however, altogether excluding religion from the future of humanity. Their vision of a total harmonious future was clothed with religious significance. Indeed some of them, such as utopian socialism, Saint-Simonism, or positivism, explicitly proposed new religions. They held that it was impossible to realize a new order without a new religion, without a unifying and sole spiritual principle that would serve as the moral foundation of a new collective harmony. Not all the progressive total ideologies rejected Christianity. The socialism of Owen or of Wilhelm Weitling claimed that their own religious character was the implementation of an authentic Christianity. Saint-Simon proposed a ‘new Christianity’ in order to realize the original authentic spirit of Christ in a new society, distorted and betrayed by the Churches. Comte wanted to substitute a new religion of humanity for Christianity.

In reality, all the progressive total ideologies, presenting themselves as global conceptions of life that defined the significance and ends of individual and collective existence, were considered as new secular religions, even when, as in

the case of Marxism, they professed a fully fledged atheism (Charlton 1963: 155 ff.; Sironneau 1982: 248 ff.). As secular religions, they contributed to the sacralization of politics (Gentile 2006). That phenomenon, consisting of the conferring of an absolute and inviolable, and hence sacred, status on a secular collective entity, was initiated in Europe with the French Revolution and became more pronounced during the course of the nineteenth century. This occurred in parallel to the birth of modern mass politics through the adoption of collective rituals that, by means of rites and symbols, sacralized the secular collective entity of the total ideologies: society, state, nation, proletariat, or humanity (Mosse 1974).

The character of the secular religions of the total ideologies was accorded emphasis through the idea of regeneration and the myth of the new man, both of which were likewise introduced into contemporary politics by the French Revolution (Reszler 1981: 141ff.). Furthermore, the idea of regeneration constituted a fundamental factor in elaborating the myth of revolution as a total experiment in the transformation of society, of the state and of human beings themselves. The integration of the individual in a new harmonious community depended on the implementation of internal renewal, intended to eradicate egoism from the human heart and thus create a new man animated by a collective sense of community (Ozouf 1989: 116ff.).

Revolutionary faith was the propelling factor of the total ideologies that desired the wholesale regeneration of humanity. It was to involve the destruction of everything that supported a social order based on inequality and the exploitation of human beings (Billington 1980: 3–14). A further element common to progressive total ideologies, and which contributed to their appearance as new secular religions, was political messianism. Political messianism attributed the role of creator of a new order to a particular group, such as the producers and scientists in Saint-Simon and Comte's accounts, or a particular class as with the proletariat in Marx and Engels' account, or a people or chosen collectivity, a nation or race (Talmon 1960: 505ff.).

The essential elements of total ideologies constitute the typical morphology both of nationalism and of racism. By their very nature as ideologies postulating the existence of a homogeneous spiritual collectivity, nationalism and racism were among the leading and most popular total ideologies of the nineteenth century, often blending with other total ideologies, whether traditionalist or progressive. The Romantic movement, with its search for a new organic synthesis between the individual and the whole and its conception of life as an organic totality, notably contributed both to their working out and to their

diffusion. That totality would be realized in the integration or fusion of the individual with nature and with one's community of birth or affiliation. The Romantic vision of collective life as an organic whole had a decisive influence on the development of nationalism and racism in their various versions, democratic and anti-democratic.

The elements intrinsic to total ideologies, aimed at the creation of a new order, were also to be found in the principal anti-nationalist and internationalist ideology, namely Marxism. Marx and Engels entertained a negative conception of ideology, defined as a mystifying representation of reality, a 'false consciousness' that disguised the economic and social structure of class domination by those who possessed the ownership of the means of production, while growing rich through exploiting the labour power of the proletariat. Ideology was a superstructure of religious, political, juridical, philosophical, and cultural ideas employed to legitimate the domination of the property-owning class, organized through the institutions of the state. However, the notion of totality was central to the Marxist conceptions of history and society. Marx and Engels created a total ideology that became among the most influential in contemporary history, be it due to its persuasive power of rational argument involving an interpretation of history as purportedly scientific, or due to its prophetic vision emanating from the peremptory certainty in the advent of Communism as an inevitable consequence of modern history. For Marxism, the conflicts of modern capitalist society dominated by a triumphant bourgeoisie constituted the labour pains of the delivery that preceded the revolution of the new universal class, the proletariat. It was the crafting of a new total harmony of a classless society and of a humanity fully emancipated and liberated from all alienation.

A final consideration remains, relating to the common character of total ideologies. They were all born of a palingenetic fervour that had accompanied the upheavals provoked by the French and Industrial Revolutions. In a more or less marked manner, the total ideologies that came to fruition in the first half of the century possessed something of an apocalyptic tone, in the sense of sharing the belief that humanity was on the threshold of a momentous collision, imminent and inevitable, between the old and the new order. Instead, the exhaustion of the European revolutions after 1848 also signalled a weakening—but not the definite disappearance—of apocalyptic messianism in the face of a prevailing political realism, of pragmatic positivism and of parliamentary reform.

FROM TOTAL TO TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGIES

Among the total ideologies of the nineteenth century, Marxism alone poses concretely the problem of political action whose aim is to create an instrument of proletarian struggle for seizing power. The attempts by Marx and Engels to found a revolutionary proletarian party were unsuccessful, but Marxism became in the main the ideology of the socialist parties that emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century. They adapted themselves to parliamentary political struggle, albeit in theory without renouncing the pursuit of the revolutionary objectives of their total ideology.

The political orientation of the total ideologies of the nineteenth century, also when prefigured in the future advent of a society liberated from all constraints, was decisively anti-liberal because it was anti-individualist, even if not always anti-democratic. For traditionalist and reactionary total ideologies, the absolute negation of liberty was taken for granted. However, even those total ideologies that conceived of history as a march towards the liberation of human beings, affirming the primacy of society over the individual, involved authoritarian implications. For example, we already find this characteristic in the democratic ideology of Rousseau, even if it cannot be considered to be a precursor of twentieth-century totalitarian ideologies, as Jacob Talmon (1952) has argued. For Rousseau, individual liberty was a prerequisite of the social contract, but elements emerged in his democratic ideology that bestowed on it a strong anti-liberal tendency. Among those was the primacy of the 'general will' over the will of the majority or the will of all; the idea of democracy as a political body morally united in belief in the dogmas of a civil religion; and compulsory education in the cult of the fatherland and in the surrender of individual interests to the common good. An analogous ambiguity regarding the relationship between individual liberty and the primacy of organized society brought forth the Jacobin dictatorship and the politics of terror, legitimated as an expression of the general will of a revolutionary republic, one and indivisible.

The anti-liberal and anti-democratic orientation was more explicit in the total ideologies of Hegel, Saint-Simon, Comte, and Marx, even if their visions of the new order diverged. Comte, for instance, held that the new organic society had to reject the dogma of freedom of conscience and that of popular sovereignty and to entrust power to sociologists who possessed knowledge of the laws of social evolution. They could inculcate the masses with a uniform social consciousness, through the imposition of a sole system of general ideas and of the cult of the religion of Humanity. For Marx, individual liberty was an abstract principle of

bourgeois ideology that disguised the subjugation of the proletariat, while in the future communist society the total emancipation of humanity from all restrictions would have been realized. However, in order to arrive at that goal, following the destruction of the bourgeois state, Marx foresaw a period of the dictatorship of the proletariat—namely of the working class that constituted the majority of the population—that would eliminate all the social and ideological conditions that bred the exploitation of man by man. In the end a future classless society of man in his totality would be realized; that is to say, human beings would reclaim their own essence.

None of the total ideologies born in the first half of the nineteenth century succeeded in realizing their own conception of an organic and harmonious communal order, and none became the official ideology of a political regime. Some, though, were able to exert indirect influence as in the case of the positivism contained in the ideology of Napoleon III and later in the Third French Republic, or in the case of a few Latin American republics. ‘Order and progress’, the synthetic formula of Comte’s philosophy, still is the motto of the Brazilian state. Undoubtedly more extensive and important was the influence of nationalism on movements that fought for the independence and unification of their own nation, though with diverse and at times contrary orientations. For Fichte, as for Mazzini, the nation was an organic unity that included every aspect of life. Nonetheless, while Fichte subsumed the individual in the totality of the nation, for Mazzini the nation had to guarantee individual liberty: During the Italian Risorgimento a liberal ideology prevailed. As for racism, it was the ideological ingredient of all colonial and imperialist governments, even when they proclaimed themselves liberal or democratic, but for none of them did it become a total ideology, dominating all actions of domestic and foreign politics.

In effect, the main influence during the second half of the nineteenth century on the birth of the new political regimes or on the transformation of existing ones was exercised by liberalism, through the acceptance of the parliamentary system and with it a recognition of the rights of organization and competition among parties possessing different ideologies. Up until the First World War, no total ideology succeeded in producing a new political regime, nor did any new political regime demand the obligatory imposition of its own ideology on the collectivity as a whole.

What the total ideologies of the nineteenth century had failed to achieve was however accomplished by the totalitarian ideologies that arose in the twentieth. A holistic conception of man, of history, and of politics was associated with the new experiences of one-party regimes.

TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGIES

A totalitarian ideology may be defined as a holistic ideology of a revolutionary party that considers itself to be the unique and exclusive vanguard of its own reference group—the proletariat, the nation, the racial entity—and as such demands for itself a monopoly of power in order to establish a new order, modelled on its own conception of man and politics.

The words ‘totalitarian’ and ‘totalitarianism’ were coined during the 1920s by Italian anti-fascists to refer to the new system of rule imposed by the Fascist party after its accession to power in October 1922 and its transformation into a one-party regime after 1925 (Gleason 1995: 13). During the 1930s the concept of totalitarianism was extended to include the Soviet and Nazi regimes and subsequently the Communist regimes that emerged during the second half of the twentieth century. A considerable number of one-party regimes in Africa and Asia following the end of colonial rule may also be deemed to be variants of totalitarianism (Rubin 1987: 36–56).

Like almost all concepts employed in the social sciences, the definition of totalitarianism is controversial, but the proposal of some scholars to ban it from scientific discourse is unacceptable (Spiro 1968: 112). Without the concept of totalitarianism it would not even be possible to comprehend the genesis, nature and functions of the new holistic ideologies that came into being in the twentieth century and that have had an enormous, devastating, and often deadly impact on the life of millions of people, so as to prompt Karl D. Bracher into defining the twentieth century as ‘the age of ideologies’ (Bracher 1985). According to Bracher, the process of the ‘ideologization of politics’ reached its extreme in the past century with the common affirmation by the totalitarian ideologies of ‘their claim to political and intellectual exclusiveness’ and ‘the claim to definitive validity’ (Bracher 1985: 114). The ideologization of politics, according to Bracher, ‘requires not only a unification that is at odds with the reality of the situation, but also a quasi-religious total obligation of political values and goals, and indeed the population’s active and devout participation in the government’s actions: total approval as coercion towards permanent participation’ (Bracher 1985: 113–14). Bracher maintains that totalitarianism was a phenomenon belonging to the history of the twentieth century, and that an elaborate concept of totalitarianism is an indispensable analytical tool for studying the new experiment of rule put into practice by the one-party regimes.

Totalitarianism is here intended to define a system of governance based on a monopoly of power and politics by a party with a holistic ideology that is

rendered compulsory for the entire collective. The fundamental characteristic elements of a totalitarian regime are: The affirmation of the supremacy of politics, understood as the submission of the individual and the masses to a single party; the militarization of the party through a rigidly hierarchical organization, implementing the principle of appointment from on high that culminates in the figure of the leader; the permanent organization and mobilization of the masses through a network of associations controlled by a single party that encompasses every aspect of public and private life; and the institutionalization of the ideology of the single party through a system of dogmas, symbols, rites, and commandments that assault the sum total of collective existence.

The most important functions of totalitarian ideologies are the legitimization of one-party rule, its politics and the methods it adopts in order to arrive at the final aim of an organic and harmonious totality; the defining of the significance and ultimate ends of individual and collective life; mass indoctrination; and the identification of internal and external enemies.

The morphological resemblance of totalitarian regimes such as Bolshevism, Fascism, and National Socialism does not imply an identity among them, as if they were almost diverse faces of the same phenomenon. Nor is it even intended to hypothesize a genetic connection between the original totalitarianism (Bolshevism) and the successive totalitarianisms (Fascism and National Socialism) as imitations of the prior instance, or as one of its reactive derivatives. The extreme antagonism between the Soviet Communist regime and its Fascist and National Socialist counterparts pre-empted historically any such identification. The three totalitarian ideologies constituted autochthonous totalitarian matrices in their respective 'dictatorial parties' (Neumann 1942: 118ff.) and in their various experiences of struggle, conquest, and exercise of power. The contents of their ideologies were at variance as well, the greatest difference being between Bolshevism on the one hand and fascism and National Socialism on the other. But not even the affinities between the two totalitarianisms of the right were of such a nature to consider them possessing identical ideologies.

Totalitarian ideologies should be differentiated from total ones, although they possessed some similar fundamental elements: a global and unitary vision of the historical process, a perception of modernity as an apocalyptic crisis, the messianic role of the chosen collectivity, the dawn of an organic and harmonious society, the regeneration and formation of a new man as the final result of overcoming the conflicts of modern society. For that reason, some scholars

indiscriminately refer to a single type of ideologies 'called "total" or "totalitarian" ideologies' (Epstein 1995: 154). According to Hannah Arendt, 'all ideologies contain totalitarian elements, but these are fully developed only by totalitarian movements, and this creates the deceptive impression that only racism and communism are totalitarian in nature' (Arendt 1976: 420). Certainly, what unites the total and totalitarian ideologies derives from the fact that totalitarianism, too, as Bernard Wolfe has observed, 'is rooted in the word *total*. All cultures have had their ideologies, but the ideology in a totalitarian society is deliberately total—that is, it embraces and prescribes for every aspect of human life. Similarly, every modern society has involved 'a state' but the totalitarian state is designedly total, in that it becomes coextensive with the society itself. This totality is unique to our age' (Wolfe in Friedrich 1954: 74).

The concept of totality is not, however, sufficient to regard totalitarian ideologies merely as a variant of total ideologies or as one of their derivatives, not even in cases in which there exists between them a concurrence in contents or an explicit connection. For instance, Fascist and National Socialist ideologies have a lot in common with the total ideologies of nationalism and of racism, but nationalism and racism are not in themselves totalitarian ideologies, from the moment in which they are also conjoined with liberal and democratic ideologies. An analogous observation could be made with respect to Bolshevik totalitarianism that refers directly to Marxism. Yet that is not a reason to consider it an inevitable consequence of Marxism, making Marxism tantamount to a totalitarian ideology, because other non-totalitarian ideologies, such as social democracy, reform socialism, and revolutionary syndicalism, have stemmed from Marxism.

The differentiation between totalitarian and total ideologies hinges on historical and analytical reasons. From an historical point of view, it needs to be emphasized that the total ideologies, as we have seen, locate their origins and development in the nineteenth century, while all totalitarian ideologies emerged during the first half of the twentieth. Consequently, they reflected profoundly different situations, circumstances, problems, and conflicts of modernity. From an analytical viewpoint, the chief difference between total and totalitarian ideologies concerns not their contents, which in some cases could be similar, as their relationship with political action. In fact, while total ideologies were born of intellectual reflections that were not immediately involved in the conquest and exercise of power, totalitarian ideologies were devised as being closely linked to the organization of political action, the conquest of power, and the construction of a new political regime.

Totalitarian ideologies are essentially ‘organizational ideologies’ as defined by Franz Schurmann, namely, ‘a systematic set of ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creating and using organization’ (Schurmann 1968: 18), where by organization is meant both party and regime. In that sense one can claim that ideology ‘is a very important element of contemporary totalitarianism’, making clear that as concerns totalitarianism ‘ideology is secondary, and primary is organization. Any ideology was always formed—and is formed—on the basis of some teaching (Marxism, racism, pan-Arabism, pan-Slavism, for example), but it is a concrete political organization that transforms the teaching into ideology’ (Korchak 1994: 9). That does not imply, though, that an organization, be it party or regime, can come into existence without an ideological presupposition, that is to say, without a definition of the goals for which it was constituted. Rather, it means bringing out the role that the concrete experiences of totalitarian parties and regimes have in the formation of totalitarian ideologies, ideologies that never present themselves as an accomplished and definitive theoretical complex. In fact, the dogmatism of some fundamental conceptions held by totalitarian ideologies and considered to be absolute, indisputable and immutable truths, codified as dogmas, coexists with a flexibility of interpretation of the same conceptions in order to adapt them to new orientations and to the choices dictated by political action.

Bolshevism harked back explicitly to Marxism, if anything considering itself the most orthodox of the movements emanating from the thought of Marx and Engels. But the originality of its ideology stemmed above all from the experience of a revolutionary party, conceived by Lenin as a strongly centralized organization, disciplined by professional revolutionaries who saw themselves as the conscious vanguard of the proletarian masses. Subsequently, after the takeover of power in 1917, the development of Bolshevik ideology continued in the light of the experience of party dictatorship, identified by Lenin as the dictatorship of the proletariat, which laid the foundations of the one-party Soviet regime. After Lenin’s death and the confirmation of Stalin as supreme leader of the party and the Soviet regime, the codification of Bolshevik ideology in the light of Stalin’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism became above all a reflection and rationalization of the organization of the regime and of the various policies adopted in the course of constructing ‘socialism in one country’ and consolidating Stalin’s personal power (Lane 1982: 1–15).

As for Fascism, the theses of Fascist ideology existed as a complete and definitive system of ideas even prior to the birth of the Fascist movement, constituting a theoretical hypothesis without an equivalent in historical reality.

Mussolini himself declared that Fascism ‘was not given out to the wet-nurse of a previously elaborated armchair doctrine; it was born of a need for action and it was action’. In effect, Fascist ideology had its origins in the experience of the Fascist party as the armed militia of the nation, in its methods of struggle and in its transformation into a one-party regime (Gentile 2003). During the years the regime was in power, the development of Fascist ideology continued as the rationalization of political action in the construction of a totalitarian state and in decisive choices pertaining to domestic and foreign policy. As far as National Socialism is concerned, its ideology derived almost entirely from the ideas expressed in Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, which held that a political movement bereft of a *Weltanschauung* was destined to fail, but in the same manner a *Weltanschauung* was destined to remain an impotent theory unless embodied in a political organization. After taking over power, National Socialist ideology, too, continued to be articulated in relation to the political conduct of the regime and to Hitler’s domestic and foreign policy choices, welding together the fundamental ideas of the Hitlerite *Weltanschauung*.

The close dependence of ideological elaboration on concrete experience was asserted by totalitarian regimes as proof of their truth and adherence to reality, while rival ideologies were deemed to be mystifying representations of reality or insubstantial utopias. Bolshevik ideology claimed to be the most scientific of the historical, economic, and social theories. National Socialism asserted that Aryan racism was based on the biological and anthropological sciences. As for Fascism, it did not profess to be a science, claiming rather to be a realistic conception of politics. However, in contradistinction to Bolshevism, Fascist and Nazi ideologies explicitly attributed an important political function to political myth and openly declared that they were availing themselves of a rational use of irrationalism in order to attain their ends. During the Stalinist years, Bolshevik ideology too followed that route, albeit without publically declaring it. As a consequence, all totalitarian regimes attained a dogmatic codification of their ideologies as an expression of absolute and indisputable truth, and spread them through rites, symbols, and myths that conferred the character of secular religions on totalitarian ideologies—as was noted by the early interpreters of totalitarianism. That provided the greatest boost to the process of sacralization of politics that had commenced in the nineteenth century (Gentile 2006).

The sacralization of politics was concordant with Fascist and National Socialist ideologies as they did not deny the importance of religious and mystical experiences in collective life. This was in sharp contrast to the scientistic assumptions of Communist ideology; but even that ideology, above all during

the Stalinist era, had acquired a sacralizing function since the celebration of the cult of Lenin. That cult evinced a collective devotion towards his embalmed body, displayed in the Red Square mausoleum, and a dogmatic veneration of his thought in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine codified by Stalin as an absolute truth, of which he elected himself as sole interpreter (Thrower 1992). The consecration of the leader as the supreme and unquestioned guide of the regime—officially sanctioned in the institutional shape and role of the Duce and the Führer—was also in accord with Fascist and National Socialist ideologies, though not their Bolshevik counterpart. But an analogous phenomenon also occurred in the ideology of the Soviet regime following Lenin's death in 1924, and above all after 1929, with the commencement of the cult of Stalin, despite the fact that a personality cult was in stark contrast with the materialist conception of history that celebrated the masses and condemned the myth of the great man. The establishment of the cult of Lenin—the infallible deceased leader—was the pedestal on which Stalin erected the cult of his own personality as the infallible living leader (Tumarkin 1997).

The co-existence of dogmatism and pragmatism, of scientific claims and sacralizing myths, has been the source of contrasting interpretations of the role of ideology in totalitarian regimes. Morstein Max observed in 1939 that totalitarianism's 'official elaboration must be distinguished from its pragmatic base'. Totalitarian ideology was 'the secular religion of the Ecclesia of Leviathan'; that is to say, a new despotism for the era of the masses. 'It provides anchorage for the 'mass mind'. It may even move mountains' (Morstein Marx 1940: 2). The interpretation espoused in the same year by Raymond Aron was different, however. He defined totalitarianism as a modern political Machiavellism that employed ideology solely as a propaganda instrument among the masses in order to legitimate the seizing, conservation, and expansion of power by the new elites, propelled exclusively by their ambition to dominate. Totalitarian ideology, Aron concluded, combined cynicism and fanaticism: the cynicism of the elite of a single party and the fanaticism inspired by the leader in the masses (Aron 1993, 139ff.).

Studies of Fascism and National Socialism published in the decades following the Second World War denied that they had possessed a proper ideology, and maintained that it was little more than a demagogic and propagandist falsehood, designed to obscure a politics of mere domination or one placed at the service of capitalism. The totalitarian leaders (including Stalin after 'destalinization') were described as opportunists driven only by a naked desire for power, bereft of an ideology but skilled in employing ideas in order to

deceive the masses and subjugate them to their ambitions.

In her study of the origins of totalitarianism, published in 1951 and expanded in a new version in 1966, Arendt identified the essence of totalitarianism in terror. She attributed to totalitarian ideology solely the instrumental function of realizing mass terror and achieving world dominion—an aim on which both Stalin and Hitler had set their sights. That which distinguished totalitarian ideologies from their ideological precursors, according to Arendt, ‘is no longer primarily the “idea” of the ideology—the struggle of classes and the exploitation of the workers or the struggle of races and the care for Germanic peoples—which appealed to them, but the logical process which could be developed from it’ (Arendt 1976: 472). The logic of totalitarian ideology was no other than an institutional fabrication, imposed on the masses through propaganda for the purpose of creating a fictional reality that provided a presumed scientific representation of immutable laws of historical development. Only the totalitarian leader was capable of knowing and interpreting them, aiming at a sole goal: the effecting of mass terror in the cause of regenerating human beings and achieving total domination over their consciousness (Arendt 1976: 468–72). In Arendt’s interpretation of totalitarianism, what nevertheless remained less clear was the link between ideology, totalitarian movement, and single party. She did not in fact consider Bolshevism and Lenin’s one-party dictatorship to be totalitarian. Instead, she attributed the transformation of Lenin’s dictatorship into a totalitarian regime solely to Stalin’s personality (Arendt 1976: xxxi–xxxiii). In the case of National Socialism, Arendt deemed it to be an exclusively totalitarian movement from its origins, but she held to the belief that the single-party regime created by Hitler never became ‘a fully developed totalitarian rulership’ (Arendt 1976: 310). As for Fascism it was, according to Arendt, ‘up to 1938 ... not totalitarian but just an ordinary nationalist dictatorship developed logically from a multiparty democracy’ (Arendt 1976: 257).

Arendt’s opinions concerning her interpretation of totalitarianism and the relationship between its ideology and a single-party state frequently do not correspond to historical reality, and leave us somewhat confused. Rightly, other scholars of totalitarianism maintain that to reduce totalitarian ideology to a mere institutional fabrication committed by cynical despots impedes an understanding of the complexity of the totalitarian phenomenon. Recognizing the instrumental nature of ideas in totalitarian regimes does not necessarily entail an interpretation of their ideologies as mere falsehoods, noting the blatant contradictions between ideological propositions and the reality of totalitarian regimes. With that in mind, one may however observe that in the cases of

Fascism and National Socialism the incongruity between ideology and reality is less jarring. The reality of their regimes and the conduct of their domestic and foreign policy reflected the tenets of their ideologies with great consistency. Those tenets clearly did not promise liberty, equality, justice, or peace to all mankind. On the other hand, the contradiction between ideology and reality was certainly starker in the Soviet regime, yet that is no reason to deny that throughout its entire trajectory, from Lenin to Stalin, until the declining stages of the Soviet Union, ideology had always had a central role and function in the Communist system, be it internally or externally. Even though Fascism and National Socialism advanced an ideology that aimed at overcoming the confines of the nation state, the fundamental nationalism and racism of their *Weltanschauung*, their exalting of hierarchy and of discrimination, and their contempt for humanitarianism, genetically precluded, so to speak, any international spread of their ideology. And yet, they elicited the consent of millions of men and women who felt themselves to be part of a privileged collectivity destined to rule the world, as their ideology had promised. As for bolshevism, it is undeniable that much of the fascination in which it had been held throughout the world, from the October revolution until the second half of the last century, was due to its universalist and internationalist ideology that held out the promise of emancipation and equality for all human beings. Nationalist and racist, universalist and internationalist, in each case the ideology was one of the factors contributing to the success of totalitarian regimes. That success cannot be studied or understood when starting from the assumption that it all depended on an institutional lie on the part of cynical manipulators driven by a naked thirst for power. In totalitarianism, cynicism and fanaticism were always and everywhere combined, but privileging the one over the other would hinder any understanding of the phenomenon.

The instrumental use of ideology did not rule out that those who adopted it did not in the least believe in its truth. Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski observed, in relation to this, that for the cynic ideas were weapons 'because truth has no meaning for him. Totalitarians tend to be such cynics. Yet they are fanatics when it comes to maintaining their own ideas. They seem to believe passionately in *their* truth' (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956: 71). For that reason, when listing the fundamental factors of totalitarian dictatorship, the two political scientists emphasize 'an elaborate ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere, at least passively; this ideology is characteristically focused and projected toward a perfect final state of mankind

—that is to say, it contains a chiliastic claim, based upon a radical rejection of the existing society with conquest of the world for the new one’ (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956: 9). Stimulated most likely in 1965 by new studies and new reflections on totalitarianism, Aron assigned an important role to ideology in totalitarianism’s birth, one beyond any ambition for mass manipulation, holding rather that at the genesis of totalitarian regimes are revolutionary parties ‘propelled by an original intention, namely the desire to transform fundamentally the existing order in the mould of an ideology’ (Aron 1965: 290).

The importance of ideology in totalitarian regimes, due also to numerous and exhaustive studies conducted since the 1990s on the political culture, myths, and rites of the totalitarian experiments, is by now a given fact in the more recent interpretations of totalitarianism. It is beyond doubt, commented Juan J. Linz, ‘that the totalitarian leaders, individuals or groups, in contrast to other non democratic rulers, derive much of their sense of mission, their legitimation, and often very specific policies from their commitment to some holistic conception of man and society’ (Linz 2000: 76). According to Linz, ideologies ‘vary much in the richness and complexity of their content and in the degree to which they are closed, fixed, and can be action-related’, but they have, however, played an essential part in the genesis and life of a totalitarian system, so much that it prompted Linz to advance the hypothesis that ‘a fully autonomous totalitarian system cannot exist without almost full control over the formulation or interpretation of the ideological heritage or content’ (Linz 2000: 75–6). In totalitarian systems ideology certainly has a fundamental role because it is ‘a source of legitimacy, a source of a sense of mission of a leader or a ruling group, and it is not surprising that one should speak of charisma of the leader or the party’ (Linz 2000: 76).

In conclusion, Linz maintains—and we concur—that the study of totalitarian ideologies understood as ‘systems of ideas, of meanings, and of the internal logical or emotional connections between those ideas is obviously essential to understanding different totalitarian systems’ (Linz 2000: 76).

REFERENCES

- Arendt, H. 1976. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. San Diego; New York: Harcourt (first published 1966).
Aron, R. 1965. *Démocratie et totalitarisme*. Paris: Gallimard.
Aron, R. 1993. *Machiavel et les tyrannies modernes*. Paris: Editions De Fallois.
Bènoit, F.-P. 1980. *Le idéologie politiques moderne. Le temps d’Hegel*. Paris: PUF.
Billington, J. H. 1980. *Fires in the Minds of Men, Origins of the Revolutionary Faith*. New York: Basic Books.

- Bracher, K. D. 1985. *The Age of Ideologies. A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*. London: Methuen.
- Charlton, D. G. 1963. *Secular Religions in France 1815–1870*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Epstein, M. 1995. *After the Future: The Paradoxes of Postmodernism and Contemporary Russian Culture*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Freedden, M. 2003. *Ideology. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Friedrich, C. J. (ed.) 1954. *Totalitarianism. Proceeding of a conference held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences March 1953*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Friedrich, C. J. and Z. K. Brzezinski. 1956. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gentile, E. 2003. *The Struggle for Modernity: Nationalism, Futurism, and Fascism*. Westport-London: Praeger.
- Gentile, E. 2006. *Politics as Religion*. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Girardet, R. 1986. *Mythes et mythologies politiques*. Paris: Seuil.
- Gleason, A. 1995. *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Korchak, A. 1994. *Contemporary Totalitarianism. A Systems Approach*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lane, D. 1982. *Politics and Society in the USSR*. New York: New York University Press.
- Linz, J. J. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. London: Boulder.
- Mannheim, K. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Morstein Marx, F. 1940. 'Totalitarian politics', *Symposium on the totalitarian state from the standpoints of history, political science, economics and sociology*. 17 November 1939. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society.
- Mosse, G. L. 1974. *The Culture of Western Europe. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Neumann, S. 1942. *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Ozouf, M. 1989. *L'homme régénéré*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Popper, K. R. 2002. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. New York: Routledge.
- Reszler, A. 1981. *Mythes politiques modernes*. Paris: PUF.
- Rubin, B. 1987. *Modern Dictators. Third World Coup Makers, Strongmen, and Populist Tyrants*. New York: New American Library.
- Schurmann, F. 1968. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2nd edn. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Sironneau, J.-P. 1982. *Sécularisation et religions politiques*, Le Haye; Paris; New York: Mouton.
- Spiro, H. J. 1968. 'Totalitarianism'. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol.16, ed. D. L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
- Talmon, J. L. 1952. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. London: Secker & Warburg.
- Talmon, J. L. 1960. *Political Messianism. The Romantic Phase*. London: Secker & Warburg.
- Thrower, J. 1992. *Marxism-Leninism as the Civil Religion of Soviet Society. God's Commissar*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Tucker, R. C. 1972. *The Soviet Political Mind. Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change*. New York; London: W.W. Norton and Co.
- Tumarkin, N. 1997. *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

CHAPTER 5
**SOCIAL SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY: THE CASE OF
BEHAVIOURALISM IN AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

JOHN G. GUNNELL

THE modern social sciences were principally the outgrowth of nineteenth-century moral philosophy and social reform movements (see e.g. Ross 1991). Consequently, it should not be surprising that social scientific inquiry, and particularly political science, has, in various respects and degrees, been informed by ideological motives and motifs. It is contentious to attempt to situate historically the exact point of the invention of the idea of a science of society—whether it is to be attributed to the ancient Greek philosophers, the work of Francis Bacon, the positivism of Auguste Comte, or the liberalism of John Stuart Mill. But when the social sciences emerged as differentiated, professional, and institutionalized practices, they were forced to confront, in a more systematic and direct manner, specific issues regarding their internal identity, their status with regard to rival authorities, and their cognitive and practical relationship to their subject matter. They found it necessary to come to grips with the fact that despite the practical concerns that attended their origins, the only basis on which they could sustain a claim to social relevance was by vouchsafing their scientific status and invoking their epistemic authority. In the contemporary era, the relationship between ideology and social science has been attenuated by professional and methodological commitments, but it has also been obscured as a result of a strategy that was, from the beginning, widely embraced among these disciplines as an attempt to resolve the endemic tension between the practical purposes of social science and the claim of these fields to the authority of scientific impartiality and objective value-free research.

These issues were paradigmatically represented in Max Weber's famous 1904 essay on objectivity in the social sciences, which was written at a point of crisis regarding the relationship between what he later referred to as the vocations of science and politics. Weber's basic, but paradoxical, argument was quite simply that it was necessary to separate science and politics in order to get them back together. He claimed that the principal commitment of modern social science should be to an objective account of 'the *facts* of social life', but he stressed that these fields had not only originated from a concern with 'social policy' and 'the training of *judgement* in respect of *practical problems* arising from these social

circumstances' but necessarily approached inquiry from a variety of value perspectives. This raised an issue about how the empirical claims of social science were related to, and could be reconciled with, 'value-judgments' and a 'critique of socio-political work' which had become, at least *de facto*, primarily the province of political actors and legislators (Weber 1904, 2004 edn: 359–60). Although Weber tended to subsume a number of quite different things under the category of value (interests, perspectives, and ethical positions—as opposed to specifications and descriptions of events), he was talking less about forms of speech and judgement than about the existential problem of the relationship between the practices of social science and politics as well as the basic commitments that should, in his view, define and distinguish them. He was attempting to carve out the domain of the empirical social sciences as a territory distinct from the ideologies embedded in various forms of nineteenth-century philosophy, ranging from conservative idealism to Marxism, but it was also clear that Weber understood that behind claims to objectivity there was the value perspective of the social scientist. The dilemma of the relationship between ideology and the claims of science would remain an underlying dimension of the history of social science, and it is an essential part of any attempt to understand the behavioural movement in American political science.

What was most overtly involved in the self-ascribed, but generally acknowledged, behavioural revolution of the mid-twentieth century was a commitment to scientism, that is, to a belief in the unity of science and the need to appropriate what was believed to be the methods of the natural sciences, but this claim to the title of science masked its foundation in the propagation of a particular theory and ideology of democracy. Although both the scientific image and the political ideology often associated with behaviouralism have often been persuasively linked to the context of the Cold War, they were rooted in a transformation in the discipline that took place half a century earlier. There is no doubt that the political atmosphere of the Cold War had an impact on the social sciences, including the behavioural movement. Behaviouralism was significantly supported by government funding for what was deemed to be truly scientific research and by involvement with institutions such as Social Science Research Council, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, which, while encouraging the application of scientific methodologies, had a definite ideological agenda. Few disciplines escaped accumulating dirty laundry with respect to being implicated in certain government policies, and dissenting political views were often repressed in a context in which there was a tendency to affirm the values of the status quo (see, e.g., Ball 1993; Farr 1995; Adcock

2007; Isaac 2007). These influences, however, were not constitutive of the basic character of the behavioural movement. There is often a tendency among historians to think latitudinally rather than longitudinally and to assume that similarities between modes of thought imply a causal relationship. Although both the political ideology and the image of science most prominently associated with behaviouralism provided a set of ideas that were often entwined with elements composing the circumstances and events conventionally designated as the Cold War, the ideology and the scientific perspective were already deeply embedded in the history of what Bernard Crick (1959) famously referred to as the 'American science of politics'.

Whether the story of political science has, as in the case of Crick, been told critically or viewed as one of scientific progress (e.g. Somit and Tanenhaus 1967), subsequent historians have stressed the fact that political science has been a distinctly and uniquely *American* social science. Notwithstanding the waves of foreign influence that have contributed significantly to shaping the field and despite its aspirations to scientific universality, political science has borne a unique relationship to the values of American political life, and its concerns have characteristically been political as well as scientific. While political science has sought to give a descriptive and explanatory account of the nature of the American polity, the discipline has both reflected and informed the evolution of American democratic thought (Gunnell 2004). Despite changing images of both democracy and science, there has, from the beginning, been a consistent search for a science that would contribute to realizing and enhancing what was conceived as democratic values and institutions. There have, nevertheless, been changes in the conception of democracy as well as a persistent ambivalence about the discipline's relationship to politics, and it has often been suggested that the simultaneous commitments to science and democracy have not been in harmony with one another.

Although this tension has in part involved the problem of reconciling scientific and political criteria of judgement, it has also been the consequence of a longstanding assumption, much like the position articulated by Weber, that only by remaining aloof from politics and by claiming ideological neutrality could the discipline gain the scientific authority that would, in the end, provide it with practical purchase. Consequently, although the American science of politics emerged from, and has remained tied to, American political culture, it has also, in various ways, sought to distance itself, both conceptually and institutionally. This was still evident during the mid-twentieth century when the behavioural movement came to dominate American political science. Although one of the

principal criticisms of behaviouralism, during the 1960s and beyond, was that it lacked political relevance and had renounced normative concerns, it was also chastised by critics for its underlying ideological biases (e.g. McCoy and Playford 1967; Connolly 1969). The explanation for this irony is that the claim to objective science remained tied to a particular theory and ideology of democracy. What was presented as the principal and revolutionary attributes of behaviouralism actually constituted a reaffirmation of basic methodological and ideological commitments that, for at least a generation, had characterized the field. The behavioural revolution certainly came closer to fulfilling the longstanding dream of creating a theoretically grounded empirical study of politics but, in many respects, it was more a reformation than a revolution in that it sought to counter foreign and domestic ideological challenges and to defend what had become, in both politics and political science, the dominant account of American liberal democracy.

From the point of the founding period and the publication of the *Federalist Papers*, as well as in Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, there has remained a fundamental ambivalence about whether popular government in the United States, and the concept of democracy itself, was rooted in social unity or plurality. In both politics and commentary on politics, the ideal of unity initially won out and kept alive the traditional republican image of an organic American people. In the nineteenth century, academic publicists produced their own version of this image, which was represented in the concept of the State. The introduction of this concept was largely through the work of the German émigré, Francis Lieber, who can reasonably be designated the founder of American political science. For nearly a century, his theory of the State, which was set forth in his *Manual of Political Ethics* (1838) and *On Civil Liberty and Self-government* (1853), fundamentally determined the direction of political inquiry. It may seem today that this concept, based on German idealist and historicist philosophy, which was perpetuated and refined by second-generation theorists such as Theodore Woolsey at Yale, Herbert Baxter Adams at Johns Hopkins University, and, above all, by Lieber's successor at Columbia, John W. Burgess (1890) is little more than an antiquarian curiosity, but what it represented was a rather elaborate theory of democratic government. What Lieber, and the later American State theorists who were educated abroad and imbibed the German paradigm, conceived was the existence of an organic democratic people and a story of the evolution of democratic institutions as springing from ancient Teutonic origins, passing through English government, and culminating in the American polity. This vision of the State was essentially that of an

associationally and institutionally diverse but nevertheless fundamentally unified people which gave theoretical substance to the idea of popular sovereignty.

An essential feature of the concept of the State during this long and formative period was that it did *not* refer either to the form or institution of government but rather to a community whose majoritarian voice expressed a will and opinion that stood not only behind government but preceded, in time and importance, the Constitution. Even though the concept of the State was embraced across the ideological spectrum, it principally reflected and abetted a conservative ideology, and it was in some respects both inspired by, and functioned to legitimate, the cause of the Union before and after the Civil War. It also provided both a scientific identity for the discipline and sublimity for its subject matter. Although the third generation of political theorists, which included Woodrow Wilson (1889) and W. W. Willoughby (1896), continued to remain bound by the language of State theory, the term 'state' increasingly became indistinguishable from the concept of government. The problem, in a country of great complexity and multiplicity, became one of specifying the locus of a national community, and eventually this precipitated a crisis in democratic theory which was paralleled by an ideological shift within the discipline of political science.

When political scientists broke away from the profession of history in 1903 and formed the American Political Science Association, the purpose was in part to establish a distinct academic identity with truly scientific credentials, but this move also represented, and justified, a sharp ideological break both from conservative methodological and political propensities in the fields of history and economics as well as from the dominant elements of nineteenth-century political science (Gunnell 2006). The founders of twentieth-century American political science were primarily Progressives who advocated a more active role for government and administration, but they also embraced a new image of science which, they believed, would at last secure the kind of cognitive privilege that, during the past quarter of a century, had been the continuing but elusive goal of the social sciences. The work of Charles Merriam at Chicago during the 1920s was dedicated to the propagation of an empirical science of politics (Merriam 1925), but this was still closely tied to a dream of creating a more democratic society. The programme of Merriam and others, such as his student Harold Lasswell and the English visitor G. E. G. Catlin (1927), advanced a naturalistic image of science that would continue to permeate the theory and practice of the discipline. Although the founding of the American Political Science Association constituted a distinct methodological and ideological break with the past, it at first retained the core of the nineteenth-century image of

democracy as predicated on an American people. And as the existence of that unity became less credible, individuals such as Merriam and John Dewey (1927) advocated the application of social scientific knowledge to matters of civic education and social control. During the 1920s, however, the new view of science became increasingly attached to an emerging alternative account of democracy.

Despite the publication of William James's *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), the term 'pluralism' had not, in any substantial manner, entered the discourse of either politics or political science. Although Arthur Bentley's book, the *Process of Government* (1908), with its attack on the theory of the State and its description of the processes of pressure-group politics, would become a central reference for later pluralist theory, it had very little immediate impact, and Bentley never employed the term 'pluralism'. But Bentley's work was only one example of an increasing recognition of cultural and social diversity and of the manner in which group life was at the core of both institutional and informal aspects of politics. It was during Harold Laski's brief sojourn in the United States, subsequent to World War I, that the term, and the concept, of pluralism was introduced into the conversation of political science as part of his critique of the idea of state sovereignty and centralized authority (Laski 1917, 1919). There were some strong reactions against both the new methodological commitments and a pluralistic image of society (e.g. W. Y. Elliott 1928). Merriam, like most members of his generation, recognized certain democratic values inherent in social and cultural diversity, but he was equally impressed with the divisiveness inherent in such difference and with the anti-democratic sentiments and practices of certain groups. An image of democratic unity was, however, increasingly difficult to reconcile with the realities of American politics, and the emerging descriptive account of American politics as the pursuit of group interest was eventually transformed into an argument about how this process constituted a form of both democratic interaction and representation.

In 1907, the Harvard historian Albert Bushnell Hart had expressed a growing sentiment when he concluded that Americans had, in the end, furnished no clear philosophical basis for their government. He noted that even though the idea of the State as the core of a theory of democracy and American politics seemed to still hold sway, it really did not fit the present circumstances and character of American society. Although he expressed faith that America was a democracy, he could no longer, any more than most of his contemporaries, account for it theoretically. There was an increased sense that there was no homogeneous American public but rather only complex congeries of interests that exceeded

even James Madison's account, in *Federalist #10*, of factitious political reality. Individuals such as A. Lawrence Lowell (1913) and Walter Lippmann (1921, 1925) questioned the existence of a natural and identifiable public or even the reality of a public opinion that commentators such as James Bryce (1890) had emphasized as constituting the heart of American democratic society. By the end of the 1920s, what Henry Adams had labelled, and critics had begun to refer to as, the 'democratic dogma' and what Brooks Adams (1916) had spoken of as the 'American democratic ideal', had been thoroughly rejected. It was eventually out of the ruins of both traditional State theory and the Progressive dream of unity that a new theory and ideology of democratic government in America emerged.

The new theory was adumbrated in the work of individuals such as Pendelton Herring (1929) and Peter Odegard (1930), and, by the late 1920s and early 1930s, a number of scholars, among whom George Sabine (1923; 1930), John Dickinson (1927; 1930), and Walter Shepard (1935) were prominent, had elaborated a theory that challenged the 'democratic dogma' in both politics and political science, and it contained all the essential theoretical elements that would be re-articulated a generation later during the behavioural era. At the core of this theory was the claim that all societies consist of groups seeking their self-interest and that this, at any stage of social evolution, required mechanisms for compromise and adjustment. In the context of modern society, such adjustment was achieved through the medium of government, which functioned as an umpire acting pragmatically in response to the needs of the situation and with respect to matters of intervention and control. It was through participation in groups that individuals realized their goals and achieved identity, and it was through groups gaining access to influence, rather than through formal institutions, that democratic representation was most essentially effected. Stability in society was achieved through a balance of conflicting social pressures constrained by appropriate enabling institutions and a consensus on the rules of the game. Majoritarian democracy was viewed as a myth which belied the fact that majorities were little more than indefinable aggregations of individual preference which were democratic only in the sense that they had the capacity, through elections, to effect a circulation of elites.

During the 1930s, there was little in the way of a further explicit statement or elaboration of this theory, but it became the basic ideology of democracy in both political science and public policy. Americans were seeking an account of democracy that would overcome some of the difficulties of earlier constructions but also one that would clearly identify the United States as democratic and distinguish it from the growing number of totalitarian regimes and foreign

doctrines such as communism and fascism. The name for this new democratic identity became 'liberalism', and the manner in which pluralism was transfigured as liberalism is a crucial chapter in the story of the evolution of American democratic ideas (Gunnell 2004: ch. 5). Although today it is common to write the history of American political thought as a history of liberalism, the concept of liberalism as an American identity was largely invented within a period of about five years during the 1930s. The term 'liberalism' had seldom been used in either American politics or political science before that point, but there was a very distinct path of internal evolution. While politicians such as Woodrow Wilson, and later Franklin Roosevelt, had begun tentatively to court this term as a label for a variety of policy initiatives, everyone eventually seemed anxious to adopt this synonym for pluralistic democracy. A variety of individuals, including Herbert Hoover, claimed to be the 'true' Liberal but, in politics, Roosevelt finally won the title and his opponents eventually accepted the name he had originally pejoratively bestowed upon them—Conservatives. Although Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism was predicated to a large extent on the ideology of Progressivism, the theory of democracy that informed it was based on the idea that the United States was a pluralist nation both culturally and in terms of what had come to be understood as the nature of interest-group politics. What, by the late 1930s, came to be designated as liberalism and conservatism in the discourse of American politics were little more than different perspectives on the role of government in a pluralist society.

The term 'liberalism' gravitated into the language of political science, often via those sympathetic to the New Deal, but eventually political theorists, such as C. H. McIlwain (1932) and Sabine (1937), emptied the concept of its concrete political meaning and began writing the history of Western political thought and institutions as a story of the progress of liberalism culminating in the American democratic polity. Although in the work of individuals such as Dewey, as well as a number of political scientists, there continued to be a certain correspondence between the academic and political visions of liberalism, two quite distinct traditions of discourse began to evolve as liberalism, in the language of political science, was reified, provided with a philosophy and history, and re-imposed as a description of American politics and its development. Many political theorists and philosophers took the position that what characterized democracy was less any absolutist doctrine than a commitment to toleration and diversity within a procedural institutional framework for settling conflicts. And in politics, pluralism had become the American public philosophy and the basis of a consensus that transcended the debate over the role of government.

By the early 1940s, on the eve of World War II, the basic elements of this vision were further systematized by Herring (1940) and presented as the ‘politics of democracy’. Herring saw his task as taking all that was often considered bad about politics—from pressure groups to bosses and the power of money—and demonstrating that they were all, if understood scientifically, part of a democratic process. One reason for the re-articulation of pluralism qua liberalism was still to provide a concrete image with which to confront foreign ideologies, but it was also a response to a somewhat subterranean critique of liberal democracy that had begun to infiltrate the discipline and particularly the subfield of political theory. During the late 1930s, this critique, largely originally conceived by émigré scholars but joined by political scientists such as John Hallowell (1943), was gaining a place in the literature and manifest in journals such as the *Review of Politics* and its theological anti-liberal perspective as well as in the work of those involved in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago under President Robert Hutchins, who had begun to challenge the methods and ideology associated with what many considered to be the Chicago school of political and social science at the university. This critique gave rise to a new mode of political theory that would eventually lead a number of political scientists such as David Easton, who became one of the leading representatives of the behavioural approach, to make an identity choice with which they had never previously been confronted, that is, a choice between political science and political theory. The behavioural ‘revolution’ was in many respects a defense of past scientific and ideological commitments, and in large measure it was evoked by an unprecedented attack on the basic values of the discipline by scholars who, by the 1950s, had begun to define the agenda of political theory. These individuals were ideologically and philosophically diverse and ranged from conservative philosophers such as Eric Voegelin (1952) and Leo Strauss (1953) to members of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School (e.g. Adorno and Horkheimer 1972), but, along with a number of indigenous theorists such as Sheldon Wolin (1960), they mounted a critique both of the idea of a science of politics and of the theory and ideology of liberal democracy that attended that idea. Although behaviouralists often presented themselves as rebelling against the discipline’s past, what was really at issue was in many respects more the contemporary denigration of long-standing democratic and scientific values. The real enemy, however, was often neither well-defined nor directly acknowledged. The actual locus of the anti-scientific sentiment against which behaviouralists were putatively rebelling was more evident in Easton’s defence (1953) of the scientific spirit where he also made his initial statement of what should constitute the kind of comprehensive empirical theory which would go beyond

simply an emphasis on quantification and the accumulation of factual data and which was later more fully elaborated (Easton 1965a; Easton 1965b). Although Easton, who came to Chicago in 1947 after finishing graduate work at Harvard, did not defend the core of what had become the dominant pluralist account of politics, he strongly embraced Merriam's orientation and the idea of political science as a science of democracy. The confrontation between emerging critical arguments in political theory and the scientism of behaviouralism, with its reconstituted group theory of liberal democracy, increasingly became the axis of the discourse of political science. What really separated behaviouralists and dissenting political theorists during this period was less the overt conflict between what came to be called normative and empirical theory than two quite different ethical and ideological positions revolving around the issue of democracy.

By the 1950s, the academic image of liberalism had become increasingly dominant as historians and political theorists such as Daniel Boorstin (1953) and Louis Hartz (1955) set out to demonstrate that although there might not be an American public, there was, for better or worse, in addition to the institutions that, like the structure of a kaleidoscope held the fragments of society together, a historically rooted liberal value consensus and tradition that was so pervasive and successful that it pointed toward what the sociologist Daniel Bell termed *The End of Ideology: the Exhaustion of Ideas in the Fifties* (1960). The positive version of the notion of a liberal consensus became an essential element of the revived group theory of politics. By the 1950s, liberalism, both because of doubts about interventionist government and events such as the McCarthy hearings, had become a highly contested concept in American politics, and, along with pluralism, it was also losing its positive valence in academic discourse. Most of the individuals, such as Easton and Dahl, who were the principal actors in the behavioural movement, were defenders of a left-liberal ideology, but by the point of the Cold War, this had become a relatively conservative political stance in the American context. Although behaviouralists were far from totally united in their assumptions about democracy, the core of the behavioural movement increasingly involved a reaffirmation and defence of the theory of interest-group liberalism.

In his 1952 Presidential address to the seventh annual convention of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Bernard Berelson (1968), who had done so much to propagate the behavioural sciences, famously posed the question of how the empirical study of public opinion could contribute to bringing democratic practice and democratic theory into closer harmony. He

claimed that the old, but often still popular, image of democracy assumed a coherent citizenry knowledgeable about public affairs and acting in a rational and principled manner on the basis of accurate perceptions of political reality and a dedication to the public interest. Berelson argued that although social scientific research indicated that the model did not conform to the reality of American politics, this was 'not necessarily a matter for disillusionment or even disappointment'. As Berelson and his collaborators (1954) in later studies of voting concluded, the lack of active participation, for example, might very well represent contentment. What mattered was less the individual citizens than the 'system' and its 'collective properties' and the manner in which there was a symbiotic relationship between a complex of diverse 'cleavages', which moved the system, and 'a basic consensus', which served to 'hold it together'. While there were intellectual resources within the discipline for shoring up the idea of liberal democracy, a defence of the image of science was less secure. The content of what Merriam and others had described as science involved little more than a general commitment to empirical studies and the application of quantitative techniques.

By mid-century, however, another group of European scholars, such as Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel, who were among the founders of the philosophy of logical positivism, had immigrated to the United States and offered a highly structured account of the logic of scientific explanation, which gained hegemony in the literature of the philosophy of science. In Europe, this philosophy had spearheaded a liberal, and sometimes radical, ideological programme that challenged traditional authorities, but this dimension was sublimated in the American context where it had less relevance (Gunnell 2009). Although often somewhat remotely accessed, it served, however, as a model for social scientists seeking the title of science and a more robust account of the nature of scientific explanation. Beginning at least with Lasswell's collaboration with the philosopher Abraham Kaplan (Kaplan and Lasswell 1950), it was apparent that, as in the work of Lasswell's student Herbert Simon (e.g. 1957), who became one of the most steadfast proponents of the scientization of political science, what was meant by 'science' pivoted on the positivist model of scientific inquiry. For both Lasswell and Simon, positivism was most clearly exemplified in economic modelling which they, like Catlin before them, believed should be extended to the study of politics, and which by the end of the century would surpass the popularity of approaches such as systems theory and lead to rational choice analysis as a basis of hope for scientific unity in the discipline. For Lasswell and Kaplan, however, the explicit purpose for pursuing a scientific

study of politics was still, as for others of his generation as well as in Easton's early work, to achieve the kind of scientific credibility that would enable social science to influence public policy and, in the words of Lasswell and Kaplan, bring 'political theory and practical politics into closer harmony' (Kaplan and Lasswell 1950). Their research was originally funded during the war by the Rockefeller Foundation as part of a programme for training people in the application of propaganda techniques, a project that had interested both Lasswell and Merriam since World War I. The increased emphasis on science, however, and the bipolar politics of the Cold War would, within the next decade, lead to a gradual displacement among behaviouralists of overt concerns about the relationship between political science and politics.

It would be difficult to determine when the first shot was fired in what came to be called, by all parties, the 'behavioural revolution', but, despite some early post-war signs of restlessness, the basic battle-lines had taken shape by the end of the 1940s. In 1948, Herring, who, since the 1920s, had been one of the champions of the belief that it was necessary to develop a more empirically grounded study of politics, became president of the Social Science Research Council and urged the scientific study of political 'behaviour'. A group of social scientists at the University of Chicago, who were devoted to developing a general interdisciplinary theory of human behaviour, chose, in 1949, the label 'behavioural sciences', and by the mid-1950s, the term 'behaviouralism' had begun to appear in the discourse of political science (e.g. Waldo 1956). This label seemed both to suggest an attitude of scientific objectivity and, unlike 'social science', to avoid a persistent, but once again accentuated worry, about the public and government confusing social science with the ideology of socialism. The first significant statement of the principal position may reasonably be attributed to Easton's (1951) article on the 'Decline of Modern Political Theory' in which he ascribed what he claimed to be the 'poverty' of theory in the discipline to its absorption with the study of the history of past ideas and the failure to take on the 'task of building systematic theory about political behavior'. In the article, however, he put equal emphasis on the need for creative 'value theory', as he did once again in *The Political System* (1953), but behaviouralism increasingly became identified, by both proponents and opponents, with a commitment to a scientific approach to the study of politics and a depreciation of normative, historical, and institutional forms of research. But a distinct democratic ideology remained embedded in this scientific commitment.

When David Truman (1951) resurrected and adapted Bentley's ideas, he

suggested that earlier pluralism had been promising but that it had failed to develop a 'real theory'. Truman's basic account of American politics, however, was largely the same as that articulated in the earlier period. Much like Herring, one of Truman's goals was to provide a more positive image of interest groups. He argued that politics could not be understood apart from the activity of such 'organized' groups which were as much a part of the political system as formal governmental institutions and which operated within an unorganized 'ideological consensus' that provided the 'rules of the game'. Although Truman admitted that there might be 'pathogenic' aspects of group politics, he stressed that even though there was no such thing as an inclusive public interest, something functionally comparable was achieved by government acting as a centre of 'interest based' power to which various groups sought 'access'. Individuals participating in multiple potential groups representing various broad interests produced an equilibrium of inputs and outputs in public policy.

Earl Latham (1952) offered an early account of *The Group Basis of Politics*, but it was Robert Dahl who more than anyone else provided a full re-articulation of pluralist democratic theory. In 1953, Dahl and Charles Lindblom argued that 'polyarchy, not democracy' (as it was often understood) was the fact of politics and the answer to modern problems and that it was necessary, finally, to put the 'democratic dogma' to rest. Dahl reached back to the work of Barker and Laski for the term 'polyarchy', but he indicated only the vaguest knowledge of this work and of what the English theorists had meant by the term. After the Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions at the University of Chicago had sponsored several series of lectures by individuals such as Strauss and Voegelin, who were some of the leading critics of scientism and pluralism, and who the Foundation characterized as expressing 'the point of view of the philosopher and moralist', they invited Dahl as a representative of those 'political theorists' who were involved in 'testing democratic ideas empirically'. Dahl's (1956) *A Preface to Democratic Theory* presented an account that he offered as a challenge to 'traditional democratic theory'. The latter, however, remained a vague image. He claimed to disagree with Madison, even though his argument often seemed to be a gloss on Madison's account of how unity would be achieved through the alchemy of factional conflict and constraining institutions, and he invented an abstract image of 'populist democracy' as a contrast model and as another name for various defenses of majoritarian and participatory democracy. His real concerns were to counter the growing criticisms of science and liberal democracy which were being advanced by political theorists, confront the criticisms of individuals such as C. Wright Mills

(1956) and others who claimed that power in American communities was not widely dispersed but hierarchical, and provide a basis for defending American democracy from the challenge of Marxist ideology.

In seeking to codify the features of a group theory of politics, Dahl employed what he referred to as a 'descriptive method' for constructing a democratic theory. This involved isolating the essential attributes of 'all those nation states and social organizations that are commonly called democratic by political scientists'. What most distinguished democracy from totalitarian regimes, he concluded, were basically 'competitive politics' and the 'bribery of the electorate by politicians'. Such 'polyarchies' were not only identified by the presence of elections, which were a means of aggregating diverse individuals' preferences and of holding officials responsible, but by the 'social prerequisites' of multiple associations which, despite conflicts with one another, were bound together by an 'underlying consensus' on values and procedures. For Dahl, the 'American hybrid' was the paradigm in which all the 'social variables' were manifest. Beneath the 'chaff' of formal dimensions of politics and government were 'groups of various types and sizes, all seeking in various ways to advance their goals, usually at the expense, in part, of others'. In this context, substantive majorities would not be a problem, and in effect 'minorities' would rule within a process of 'endless bargaining' with respect to particular issues and with the acquiescence of an 'apathetic' numerical majority that was never mobilized at any one time. In this situation, the 'manifold specialized groups become vested interests' and 'part of the fundamental warp and woof of the society', but there would be a 'steady appeasement of relatively small groups' and 'a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision' (Dahl 1956: 63, 68, 131, 136, 144–5).

Dahl's basic formulation, despite his claim to surpassing past and current democratic theory, was actually far from new, but it consolidated the empirical and normative dimensions of political science and provided a clear image, which would be widely accepted in the literature and research programmes of the discipline. Dahl's later account, in *Who Governs?* (1961), attempted to demonstrate further the processes involved in what he now identified as 'pluralism', which included his claim that any general 'concern of citizens with the life of the democratic polis' was a 'myth' and that the realities of politics revolved around diverse interests brought to bear on a variety of changing issues. In works such as Seymour Martin Lipset's *Political Man* (1960), Harry Eckstein's *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (1961), and Gabriel Almond and

Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963), the same model was projected. Lindblom did acknowledge that the contemporary theory of how 'people can coordinate with each other without anyone's coordinating them, without a dominant purpose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relations to each other' was an attempt to complete the 'unfinished business in pluralist thought' which reached back to Bentley and the English pluralists (Lindblom 1965: 3, 12), but he did not elaborate on this connection. Most theorists of the period were, at best, only vaguely cognizant of the intellectual legacy that they had inherited, and what is equally remarkable is that the wide range of criticisms of pluralism and the behavioural movement in general, which characterized the 1960s, accepted arguments such as that of Dahl as novel and failed to recognize the extent to which the debate about science and democracy was an echo of the 1920s.

Wolin's (1960) *Politics and Vision* was in many respects a story of the degradation of political theory and of 'the political' itself as, in his view, the theory and practice of democracy succumbed to modern liberalism and pluralism and the claims of behaviouralists such as Glendon Schubert (1960) that the idea of a substantive public interest was a myth. The critique of liberalism qua pluralism would be the principal theme of much of the literature of political theory during the 1960s. By 1961, however, Dahl (1961) had proclaimed the 'behavioral approach' a 'successful protest' against 'conventional political science' and the work of speculative theorists, historians, legalists, and moralists. He defined it as a 'mood' or 'outlook' which emphasized empirical modes of investigation and a focus on what 'is' as opposed to what 'ought' to be. This sentiment was again apparent in Easton's (1962: 17) statement of 'The Current Meaning of Behavioralism' in which he famously defined it as a 'science of politics modeled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences'. Among the other 'tenets' were a distinction between ethical claims and 'empirical explanation' and the assumption that achievements of 'pure science' should precede the practical application of the knowledge that was gained about politics. Easton noted that by the beginning of the decade 'the methods of modern science had made deep inroads into political research, under the rubric of the study of political behavior' (1968: 295) and represented a sharp break with the past, the accumulation of large amounts of empirical data, the introduction of theoretical coherence, and a clear distinction between factual and normative claims.

By the early 1960s, however, the reaction against behaviouralism had permeated the field, and critics pointed to what they believed were the

democratic pathologies associated with this form of politics as well as to the flaws in the theories that defended and embodied it. Two volumes, published in 1962, *Essays on the Behavioral Science of Politics* (edited by Austin Ranney) and *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (edited by Herbert Storing), represented one dimension of the polarity. While the first volume celebrated what Heinz Eulau (1963) referred to as the *Behavioral Persuasion in Politics*, the second volume gathered Straussian attacks on the American tradition of political science and its vision of what Lasswell had defended as the liberal science of politics. New versions of a more participatory vision of democracy that was reminiscent of the 'democratic dogma' would be advanced by critics such as Wolin and Carole Pateman (1970).

The criticisms emanating from the subfield of political theory were complemented by, and overlapped with, arguments of a more mainstream but diverse group of political scientists who focused on what they believed to be inherent flaws in the theory of pluralist politics as well as its implications for public policy. A major ideological challenge to what many political scientists considered to be the underlying conservative implications of pluralism was mounted by the Caucus for a New Political Science (Greene and Levinson 1970), which was formed in 1967. In addition, some, like Mills (1956) earlier, called into question the reality of the pluralist image of political power (e.g. Domhoff 1967), and others contested its normative claims about democracy and charged that pluralism itself amounted to an elitist theory of democracy (e.g. Bachrach 1967). Echoes of the Progressive image of unity and its distaste for interest-group pluralism would be visible in works such as Schattschneider's (1960) *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* and Grant McConnell's (1966) *Private Power and American Democracy*. By the end of the 1960s, what some argued to be the anti-democratic aspects of pluralism had been widely voiced. Robert Paul Wolff (1968) attacked what he claimed to be the *Poverty of Liberalism* and Theodore Lowi (1969), who announced *The End of Liberalism*, provided the most expansive historical and empirical account of how 'interest-group liberalism', as an amalgam of 'capitalism, statism, and pluralism' (Lowi 1969: 29), had displaced government as a representative of the public interest.

Many viewed the defence of the pluralist account of democracy as abetting the quietism of the field in the face of the crises that characterized contemporary domestic and international politics during the 1960s, and there were visible signs of, and protests against, complicity between government agencies and elements of the American Political Science Association. At the very point at which Eulau

(1969) edited a volume celebrating *Behavioralism in Political Science*, Wolin (1969) argued that behavioural political science, in its commitment to 'methodism', had retreated from the moral and political concerns that had characterized the vocation represented in the great tradition of political theory and had failed to address the political crises of the period. And in the same issue of the *American Political Science Review* Easton (1969), in his 1969 Presidential address to the APSA, announced a 'new revolution' in political science, a 'post-behavioral revolution', designed to reconcile the conflict between what was increasingly defined as 'scientific' and 'traditional' theory and to establish a credo of relevance whereby political science would defer its pursuit of pure science in favour of addressing current political issues. Although the debate about behaviouralism was often centred on claims about the scientific study of politics, the work of philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn had, by this point, raised significant questions about the positivist reconstruction of science which defined how both proponents and critics of behaviouralism had perceived science. More significant, however, was the underlying debate about the concept of democracy. One of the reasons for the growing emphasis on science during the behavioural era was that there was already a 'value theory' that informed the theory and practice of American political science. In some respects, the controversy about science was a red-herring which concealed the depth of the disagreement about democratic theory and ideology.

By the mid-1970s, The controversy about behaviouralism began significantly to wind down as the subfield of political theory, from which much of the criticism of behaviouralism emanated, while still professionally attached to political science, increasingly identified itself as an intellectually autonomous interdisciplinary form of scholarship. In what came to be called the 'post-behavioural era', mainstream political science began to profess an ecumenical attitude and a concern to pursue the kind of policy focus for which Easton had pleaded. The discipline, however, incorporated in its research programmes the basic values and practices associated with behaviouralism as it continued, through the 1980s, with the increasing popularity of approaches such as rational choice analysis, to pursue an authoritative scientific identity and achieve the dream of scientific unity. Given the split between 'empirical' and 'normative' theory, new directions in democratic theory were largely manifest in the subfield of political theory and had little significant effect on how the concept of democracy was understood and studied by political scientists. By the end of the century, new versions of democratic pluralism had arisen and begun to dominate the discourse of political theory (Gunnell 2004), but this was challenged by more

communitarian images of democracy as the traditional dialectic between unity and diversity as the foundation of democratic politics continued into the first decade of the twenty-first century. But, within mainstream political science, it was increasingly difficult to isolate any dominant theory of democracy. After the behavioural era, political science and political ideology continued to intersect in various ways, but both had become internally fragmented.

REFERENCES

- Adcock, R. 2007. 'Interpreting behavioralism'. Pp. 180–208 in *Modern Political Science: Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880*, ed. R. Adcock, M. Bevir, and S.C. Stimson. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. 1972. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York: Herder and Herder.
- Almond, G. and S. Verba, 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bachrach, P. 1967. *The Theory of Democratic Elitism*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Ball, T. 1993. 'American political science in its postwar context'. Pp. 207–21 in *Discipline and History: Political Science in the United States*, ed. J. Farr and R. Seidelman. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Bell, D. 1960. *The End of Ideology: the Exhaustion of Ideas in the Fifties*. Glencoe, IL.: Free Press.
- Bentley, A. 1908. *The Process of Government*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berelson, B. 1968. 'Behavioral sciences'. Pp. 41–5 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. D. Sills. New York: Macmillan.
- Berelson, B, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W.N. McPhee (eds.) 1954. *Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Boorstin, D. 1953. *The Genius of American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brooks Adams, P. C. 1916. 'The American democratic ideal', *Yale Review*, 5.
- Bryce, J. 1890. *The American Commonwealth*. New York and London: Macmillan and Co.
- Burgess, J. W. 1890. *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*. Boston and London: Ginn & Co.
- Catlin, G. E. C. 1927. *The Science and Method of Politics*. New York: Knopf.
- Connolly, W.E. (ed.) 1969. *The Biases of Pluralism*. New York: Atherton.
- Crick, B. 1959. *The American Science of Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dahl, R. and C. Lindblom. 1953. *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*. New York: Harper & Bros.
- Dahl, R. 1961. 'The behavioral approach in political science: Epitaph for a monument to a successful protest', *American Political Science Review*, 55: 763–72.
- Dahl, R. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dewey, J. 1927. *The Public and its Problems*. New York: Holt.
- Dickinson, J. 1927. 'A working theory of sovereignty', *Political Science Quarterly*, 42: 524–548.
- Dickinson, J. 1930. 'Democratic realities and democratic dogma', *American Political Review*, 24: 283–309.
- Domhoff, G. W. 1967. *Who Rules America?* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Easton, D. 1951. 'The decline of modern political theory', *Journal of Politics*, 13: 36–58.
- Easton, D. 1953. *The Political System*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Easton, D. 1962. 'Introduction: The current meaning of "behavioralism" in political science'. Pp. 1–25 in *The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science*, ed. J.C. Charlesworth. Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science.
- Easton, D. 1965a. *A Framework for Political Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

- Easton, D. 1965b. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Easton, D. 1968. 'Political science, method and theory'. Pp. 295–7 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, ed. D. Sills. New York: Macmillan.
- Easton, D. 1969. 'The new revolution in political science', *American Political Science Review*, 62: 1051–61.
- Eckstein H. 1961. *A Theory of Stable Democracy*. Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.
- Elliott, W. Y. 1928. *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics*. New York and London: Macmillan.
- Eulau, H. 1963. *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics*. New York: Random House.
- Eulau, H. (ed.) 1969. *Behavioralism in Political Science*. New York: Atherton.
- Farr, J. 1995. 'Remembering the revolution: behavioralism in American political science'. Pp. 198–224 in *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions*, ed. J. Farr, J.S. Dryzek, and S. Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, P. and S. Levinson (eds.) 1970. *Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science*. New York: Pantheon.
- Gunnell, J. 2004. *Imagining the American Polity: Political Science and the Discourse of Political Science*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Gunnell, J. 2006. 'The founding of the American Political Science Association: Discipline, profession, political theory, and politics', *American Political Science Review*, 100: 79–86.
- Gunnell, J. 2009. 'Ideology and the philosophy of science: An American misunderstanding', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 14: 317–37.
- Hallowell, J. H. 1943. *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hart, Albert Bushnell 1907. 'Growth of American theories of popular government', *American Political Science Review*, 2: 531–57.
- Hartz, L. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
- Herring, P. 1929. *Group Representation before Congress*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Herring, P. 1940. *The Politics of Democracy*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Isaac, J. 2007. 'The human sciences in cold war America', *Historical Journal*, 50: 725–46.
- James, W. 1909. *A Pluralistic Universe*. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co.
- Kaplan, A. and Lasswell, H. D. 1950. *Power and Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Laski, H. 1917. *Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty*. New Haven; Yale University Press.
- Laski, H. 1919. *Authority in the Modern State*. New Haven; Yale University Press.
- Latham, E. 1952. *The Group Basis of Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lawrence Lowell, A. 1913. *Public Opinion and Popular Government*. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co.
- Lieber, Francis 1838 [1875]. *Manual of Political Ethics*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.
- Lieber, Francis 1853.[1877]. *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.
- Lindblom, C. 1965. *The Intelligence of Democracy*. New York: Free Press.
- Lippmann, W. 1921. *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Lippmann, W. 1925. *The Phantom Public*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Lipset, S.M. 1960. *Political Man*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Lowi, T. 1969. *The End of Liberalism*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
- McConnell, G. 1966. *Private Power and American Democracy*. New York: Alfred. A. Knopf.
- McCoy, C. A. and J. Playford (eds.) 1967. *Apolitical politics: A Critique of Behaviorism*. New York: Thomas A. Crowell.

- McIlwain, C. H. 1932. *The Growth of Political Thought in the West*. New York: Macmillan.
- Merriam, C. 1925. *New Aspects of Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mills, C. W. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Odegard, P. H. 1930. *The American Public Mind*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pateman, C. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ranney, A. (ed.) 1962. *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Ross, D. 1991. *The Origins of American Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sabine, G. H. 1923. 'Pluralism: A point of view', *American Political Science Review*, 17: 34–50.
- Sabine, G. H. 1930. 'The pragmatic approach to politics', *American Political Science Review*, 24: 865–85.
- Sabine, G. H. 1937. *A History of Political Theory*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Shepard, W. 1935. 'Democracy in transition', *American Political Science Review*, 29: 1–20.
- Shubert, G. 1960. *The Public Interest: A Critique of a Political Concept*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Simon, H. 1957. *Models of Man: Social and Rational*. New York: Wiley.
- Somit, Albert and Joseph Tanenhaus. 1967. *The Development of American Political Science: from Burgess to Behaviorism*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Storing, H. J. (ed.) 1962. *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Strauss, L. 1953. *Natural Right and History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Truman, D. 1951. *The Governmental Process*. New York: Knopf.
- Voegelin, E. 1952. *The New Science of Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Waldo, D. 1956. *Political Science in the United States of America*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Weber, M. 1904. 'The "objectivity" of knowledge in social science and social policy'. In *The Essential Weber*, ed. S. Whimster. 2004. London: Routledge.
- Willoughby W. W. 1896. *An Examination of the Nature of the State*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wilson, W. 1889. *The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics*. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co.
- Wolff, P. 1968. *The Poverty of Liberalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Wolin, S. 1960. *Politics and Vision*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Wolin, S. 1969. 'Political theory as a vocation', *American Political Science Review*, 62: 1062–82.

CHAPTER 6 THE END OF IDEOLOGY THESIS

HOWARD BRICK

‘The End of Ideology’ served as the title of a well-known 1960 book by the US sociologist Daniel Bell (see Bell 1962) as well as a common phrase in numerous articles that had appeared in transatlantic liberal intellectual circles for at least five years beforehand. The very idea excited controversy among intellectuals and social scientists for a decade or more beyond Bell’s publication. Indeed, the ‘end of ideology’ has remained emblematic of a certain placid temperament alleged to characterize the 1950s, connoting either the welcome end, in Western countries, of the political furies and extreme politics that shook the modern world from the 1910s through the 1940s—or, viewed very differently, reflecting the suppression of vigorous, critical debate in public affairs by the orthodoxies of Cold War liberal anticommunism. Both these perspectives—each the evaluative flip-side of the other—bear some validity, though neither adequately grasps the complex social and political posture that found a voice in this highly ambiguous phrase.

The difficulty that attends attempts to define ‘the end of ideology’ begins with the uncertain meaning of that which was supposed to have ended: ‘ideology’ itself. In a large compendium published in New York in 1948, *European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas* (see Gross 1948), one of Daniel Bell’s teachers at Columbia University, Robert M. MacIver, defined ideologies as ‘idea-systems’ that in the twentieth century had come to work as real forces in society and politics—that is, as ‘springs of collective behavior’ and ‘instruments of power’ (MacIver 1948: xiii). More than a political philosophy, an ideology was for MacIver a ‘doctrine’ that welded people together into a social group (perhaps as large as a nation) or into one among other contending political forces; it might be identified with an ‘ism’ that could become, in the hands of leaders at the helm of parties or nations, a ‘manipulative art’ and a ‘technique of control’. MacIver’s allusions were quite clear: he was speaking of the intellectualized programmes of movements, parties, and states that came to be recognized in his time as ‘totalitarian’, namely Stalinist Communism as well as the family of right-wing causes known as Fascist or Nazi. Yet this was not all, for *European Ideologies* offered a range of scholarly essays on other forms, including Falangism, Anarchism, Liberalism,

Nationalism, Humanism, Trade Unionism, Pacifism, and Consumer Cooperation, among others. Considering this broad range, then, 'ideology' seemed to apply to any more or less conscious formulation of aims and principles in social and political action, including but not exclusively the grand visions that took on the totalitarian form.

An alternative definition, however, had long suggested that 'ideology' alluded to aspects of thought that were less than fully conscious, indeed so intricately woven into perception and cognition as to seem 'second nature' and as such, working as a sort of filter or, very often, a distorting lens through which people understood their social circumstances in the world. MacIver was surely aware of this connotation too, since he added that a world 'activated by ideologies' was also 'ridden by myths'. In any case, MacIver had to recognize that a number of doctrines surveyed in the book were far less fearsome than totalitarian worldviews. Moreover, behind ideologies, he wrote, there lay 'surging human needs, human values, and human aspirations' concerned among other things with 'liberation of the body' and 'liberation of the spirit' (MacIver 1948). These purposes and principles, MacIver hoped, would not dwindle or die, even if critical reason was successful, as he hoped, in piercing the illusions and checking the overweening power of 'isms' in his day.

From the various meanings of 'ideology', then, its 'end' could refer to the dismissal of totalitarian doctrines, or their waning appeal; to a realistic or pragmatic suspicion of all rigid formulas of ideas, that is, to fixed doctrines or 'isms', be they socially and politically destructive or seemingly benign, such as 'vegetarianism'; or to the elimination of all mental illusions clouding human cognition. Precisely because of this multivalence, an 'end of ideology' might be celebrated for quieting political furies, mourned for closing the door on noble aspirations for human freedom and social change, or scorned as a presumptuous claim that rational enlightenment had finally been reached in human affairs—in this last respect, then, serving as a grand ideology of 'progress' in its own right. The history of the idea of an 'end of ideology' in the years closely following the end of the Second World War incorporated all these propositions and the variety of ways they were received.

Ironically, the phrase, 'the end of ideology', came to public notice as a direct outgrowth of what was, in fact, a fierce ideological battle between competing alliances of intellectuals in the late 1940s. First came the mobilization of intellectuals in a Communist Party-led Popular Front campaign for peace and international friendship, as Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union heated up. Left-wing rallies and conferences dotted the West

European scene; in the United States, the emblematic event was the Waldorf Peace Conference of March 1949 in New York City, where prominent left-liberal writers such as the Harvard literary critic and historian F. O. Matthiessen shared the podium with visiting representatives of the Soviet cultural establishment. Anti-Stalinist intellectuals led by New York University philosophy professor Sidney Hook—most of them former Marxist radicals who had drifted to more of a moderate socialist, or social-democratic perspective—attended the Waldorf meeting as well, assailing political repression in the Soviet Union and thus, they hoped, blunting Communist portraits of the Soviet Union as the defender of world peace and comity. The next year, Sidney Hook joined forces with a transatlantic group to found the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin, dedicated to building a broad anti-Communist intellectual front. At the Berlin meeting, ex-Communist novelist Arthur Koestler sounded the keynote in a speech reprinted later under the title, ‘The Outgrown Dilemma’ (1955). In it, he argued that ‘the words “socialism” and “capitalism”, “Left” and “Right” have today become virtually empty of meaning’ (Koestler 1955: 186–95). Here was the crux of the ‘end of ideology’: old political and ideological antitheses had broken down, and formerly antagonistic intellectuals in ‘the West’—as they joined forces to rebut the totalitarian threat—should dismiss those terms as misleading shibboleths. It was a call, ironically, to take sides in an ideological battle for hearts and minds. Yet it was not Koestler’s invention. Nor was it a very definite ‘theory’ but rather something of a rough current of sentiment among politically minded intellectuals, having some roots in and affinities for a variety of arguments in social and political thought that had been brewing already for decades.

Inquiring into the antecedents of the end of ideology thesis ventured by thinkers like Koestler around 1950 reveals a complex and changing field of ideas. Charting that field helps to situate the end of ideology thesis in intellectual history, but it also makes it more difficult to endow ‘the end of ideology’ with a very clear, decided meaning. The history of the ideas involved can illuminate the burden of meanings (in the plural) that the phrase came to bear as it emerged into public discourse by the mid-twentieth century. The end of ideology thesis was intellectually overdetermined, and the multiple streams contributing to it would result in considerable variation in the connotations it carried. This essay will identify a ‘main stem’ in the discourse surrounding the end of ideology thesis. At the same time, however, it will illuminate the range of variation within which ‘the end of ideology’ became salient in the 1950s and 1960s and thus seek to explain how and why that thesis became a matter of often passionate debate. The

very overdetermined character of the idea helped make it the hot-button issue it became for a time in the 1960s; that overdetermination also helped render the debate confused and often misguided, generating more heat than light. To be sure, the terms of that intellectual debate became the means for fighting out some significant political conflicts. Yet in exploring the complex emergence of the thesis and the fog of debate surrounding it, we will also see why it rather suddenly lost salience when it did in the 1970s. Its terms have not entirely lost relevance to more recent theoretical discussions, though it is often difficult still to pinpoint where the legacy of the end of the ideology thesis lies today.

ANTECEDENTS AND VARIATIONS

To be sure, genealogies of ideas can easily be stretched so far back in time that they become more misleading than informative. The American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, who, in the 1960s, became the figure most devoted to defending and elaborating the end of ideology thesis, asserted that Frederick Engels himself coined ‘the famous phrase’ (Lipset 1972). Yet Engels’s usage involved a matter of definition (where his and Marx’s understanding of ‘ideology’ was only partially related to the meanings the word carried in the mid-twentieth-century debate) rather than a historical claim. Since ‘ideology’, Engels wrote in a critique of philosophical idealism, referred to ideas conceived as independent of (or abstracted from) the material conditions that fostered them, the carriers of such ideas remained unaware of the *particular* ‘material life conditions’ that gave rise to their ideas and typically granted those ideas a false universality. And if thinkers *were* cognizant of the generative, material conditions of their thought, then ‘there would be an end to all ideology’ (Engels 1941: 50–6). For Engels, this was tautology. Whether a future classless society that overcame the division of mental and manual labor would so unite thought and deed as to wipe out the gap Engels cited—thus rendering ideas nothing more than transparent plans of action in material circumstances—was quite another matter, widely debated by Marxists ever since but bearing at most a tangential relation to the twentieth-century ‘end of ideology’ thesis.

Much more germane were a series of discussions in German social theory from Max Weber onward regarding the politics of ‘absolute ends’, or strict adherence to ideal principles in affairs of state (see Weber 1946). In Weber’s view, parties of principle tended to become ‘nonideological’, opportunist parties of compromise (where ‘ideology’ implied a definite programme of ideal aims and commitments). The younger sociologist (and former radical activist) Robert

Michels wrote in 1911 (see Michels 1962) that modern political parties in an electoral system cultivated bureaucratic apparatuses that pursued self-interested organizational aims (election victories, maintenance in power, etc.) that overrode professed political ideals. Hence the revolutionary fervour of the socialist party *necessarily* lapsed, as the party bargained with other elite powers to reach an accommodation that would guarantee the socialist organization institutional security, or organizational survival for its own sake. This built-in tendency toward the erosion of principle in quotidian bureaucratic and political affairs (or the ‘law of oligarchy’ in Michels’s phrase) was framed more dramatically in the work of Karl Mannheim in the late 1920s. Building in part on Marx and Engels’s notion of ‘ideology’ as ideas whose material roots were concealed, combined with a view of bureaucratic ‘rationalization’ drawn from Weber, Mannheim imagined a possible future with considerable regret: as rational control by state authority extended its sway over all parts of modern society, he surmised, all ideas ‘incongruous’ with given reality might wither away, yielding a ‘tensionless’ existence in which neither the idealization of the present (which Mannheim called ‘ideology’ as such) nor the imagination of a different, better future (which he dubbed ‘utopia’) compelled belief.

That theme of ‘tensionless’ social and political life found another formulation in the work of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research by the 1940s, when Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (despite their distaste for Mannheim) foresaw an emerging ‘administered society’ in which instrumental processes of production and organization proceeded as if part of a perpetual-motion machine, requiring no intellectual justification. This fate was a far cry from old anticipations of progress that promised humankind in an advanced condition of civilization the free use of critical reason. Rather, in the ‘administered’ world, no room was left for ideals of either a conservative or liberating sort. ‘The rulers themselves disavow thought as mere ideology’, Horkheimer and Adorno wrote in 1944 (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 27). Seven years later, Adorno added, ‘in the authentic sense of false consciousness there are no more ideologies’ (Adorno, *Prisms*, quoted in Lipset 1977: 21–2).

Horkheimer and Adorno wrote amid, and in the aftermath of, the ‘discovery of totalitarianism’ in the late 1930s, which must be acknowledged as the real seed-bed of the end of ideology thesis. ‘Totalitarianism’ entered circulation—broadcast throughout public discourse—over a period of a few years, from around 1936 on, as Nazi Germany embarked on a ‘five year plan’ focused on military expansion, to the Stalin–Hitler pact of August 1939, in which ostensible political extremes of Left and Right converged. That event encouraged a range

of liberal, left-leaning, and self-consciously democratic intellectuals to rush away, disenchanted, from prior involvement with the Communist-inspired Popular Front anti-fascist crusade. In doing so, they heralded a new political era recommitted to mainstream standards of deliberative democracy and resistant to doctrinaire loyalty to grand causes. For many left-wing and liberal American intellectuals ‘in retreat’ from former revolutionary aspirations of the Depression crisis years or from Popular Front allegiances, John Dewey’s pragmatism—and other Dewey-derived attitudes of skepticism toward doctrinaire ‘systems’ of thought—provided a usable heritage. The years 1939–41 witnessed a first installment of ‘end of ideology’ sentiment, as scepticism toward doctrinaire thought systems encouraged a critique of reified models of social orders defined antithetically as ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’. A search began for a ‘democratic’ politics of reform disentangled from such allegedly rigid ‘old’ alternatives.

At the same time, however, the discovery of totalitarianism yielded some very different responses, expressing a more or less radical disenchantment with a whole world out of joint. To be sure, Horkheimer and Adorno, in contrast to the liberal refugees from the Popular Front, were disinclined to embrace a ‘Western liberal’ status quo as the default position of opposition to new kinds of oppressive, over-organized states. Other voices framed an inchoate or explicit ‘end of ideology’ disposition in still other, existentialist or moralist forms. Right after the end of the Second World War, for instance, the transatlantic voice of Resistance writer Albert Camus appeared in the pages of the iconoclastic leftist magazine of Dwight Macdonald, *politics*, to call on radical intellectuals to ‘demonstrate that this era marks the end of ideologies, that is of absolute utopias which destroy themselves in history by the price [in mass atrocities] that they end up costing’—not to embrace a conservative Burkean rejection of all reforming visions but rather to turn ‘revolutionaries’ into ‘radicals’ in Camus’s (1947: 143) terms, into determined critics of all forms of tyranny and degradation no matter what political labels they wore.

THE END OF IDEOLOGY THESIS COMING INTO FOCUS

The main stem of the end of ideology thesis, however, grew from the kinds of sentiments Koestler voiced at the 1950 Berlin meeting, namely, that all hitherto standard ideological divisions paled before the necessity of Western liberals to unite in the anti-Communist cause. That declaration had its roots in the first ‘end of ideology’ moment, 1939–41, the time when Koestler himself had broken decisively from his long career as a Communist operative and published his

blockbuster anti-totalitarian novel, *Darkness at Noon* (Koestler 1941, 1955). By 1950, in Berlin, however, the end of ideology became clearly identified with the Cold War ‘West’. At this point, there was hardly ever any doubt that ‘the end of ideology’ was itself ideological in the sense of mobilizing ideas for the sake of a political battle. The Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), and its US affiliate the American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF), have been studied from several points of view (e.g. Coleman 1989). Most of the participants in those organizations, and some of their historians, see this Cold War campaign as an honorable defence of democratic principles setting norms for free, open, and scientifically legitimate uses of intellect—in the face of a Soviet Union that, at the very moment of the CCF’s birth, trumpeted politically motivated fantasies such as Lysenko’s anti-Darwinist biology. Other historians, however, most notably Frances Stonor Saunders (1999) in her book, *The Cultural Cold War*, have sought to demonstrate that the cause of ‘cultural freedom’ was, with the substantial financial support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other US government organs, inextricably bound up in a widespread concerted programme of psychological warfare waged by the American state (e.g. Wilford 2008; Osgood 2010).

If Koestler himself did not actually use the phrase, ‘the end of ideology’, for the political consensus he desired, an early critic of the Congress of Cultural Freedom did, anticipating its much wider use later in the 1950s. In 1951, the left-leaning observer H. Stuart Hughes (later to be a distinguished intellectual historian), wrote about the Berlin CCF meeting under the title, ‘The End of Political Ideology’, intending to describe not the *salutary* but the *conservative* and dampening character of the new political consensus trumpeted there. Hughes noted that the ‘old political divisions were forgotten’ at the CCF, but he went beyond the self-justifying claims of the conferees to judge the end of ideology theme as a mark of the current right-ward drift of the European intelligentsia, who seemed to be awaiting, in taut suspense, a new war on the continent. Fearing a Soviet occupation even more than the fascist occupation they had lately escaped, the intellectuals came to recognize, Hughes said, not only the ties that bound them and their fate to the capitalist elites they had always scorned but also, at the same time, the need for a strong state with a ‘social policy’. ‘In such a situation’, Hughes observed, ‘the ideological differences—the issues dividing capitalist and partly socialist states [such as Labour-governed Britain]—that now characterize the Western coalition may cease to be of much practical importance’ (Hughes 1951: 153). Still, all of this represented a victory for those Hughes called the ‘anti-ideologists’ of the early twentieth century: he named the

conservative ‘elite theorists’, Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, who had influenced Robert Michels’s view of bureaucratic erosion of principled programmes. Intellectually, Hughes wrote, the new conservative trend ‘means the triumph of the political concepts associated with force and irrational sentiment, the necessarily elite organization of society, and the basically illusory character of social reform—and with it the discrediting of politics as reason in action, the virtue of majorities, and progress as a social faith’ (Hughes 1951: 155). In this sense, an end of ideology suggested the end of confidence in political ideas for their own sake, a recognition of their futility and the acceptance of the imperatives of bare power. In that case, though, the ‘end of political ideologies’ for Hughes made the ‘normal’ world of the West more like its totalitarian enemy.

In this way, Hughes approached the view of the Frankfurt School critics by finding everywhere a drift toward authoritarian consolidation and a suppression of vibrant dissent. It was, he wrote, ‘the governmental current in Western European socialism’ (Hughes 1951: 151)—the surrender of principled opposition and participation in coalition governments—that wedded even the older Left to the conservative defence of existing power structures. Hughes had served during the war in the US Office of Strategic Services with members of the Frankfurt group, most notably Herbert Marcuse and political scientist Otto Kirchheimer, and together the Hughes-Marcuse circle shared a left-wing pessimism about shrinking space for real political critique and conflict (Müller 2010). Like Hughes, Kirchheimer’s 1957 essay, ‘The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes’, saw the apparent stability of Western European politics (following the initial years of Liberation enthusiasm for great change) as a disheartening echo of the administered society debuted under Nazism. Kirchheimer noted ‘the shrinking of the ideologically oriented nineteenth-century party’ (1957: 153) and ‘the tendency for the party to exercise a brokerage function for specific interest groups’ (1957: 153). The old ‘opposition of principle’, in which rebel left-wing parties stood outside government and the parliamentary system, dedicated to a wholly new order of society yet to come, had for all intents and purposes disappeared. Now, all that remained was ‘government under various forms of cartel arrangements among political organizations’ (1957: 127) that—like the price-fixing of business pools and trusts—colluded in high-level policy making while setting the limits of political debate and criticism in ways that blocked entry to new actors.

This was an end of ideology that had none of the promise that the 1950 CCF saw in a broad liberal consensus defending freedom from totalitarianism. When

Kirchheimer analysed the new parliamentary order, he saw a new type of party that worked as a 'harmonizing agency' (1957: 149), and politics as a realm of action became merely a 'technique of neutralizing and playing down divisive elements or transferring elements of conflict from the domestic to the international scene' (1957: 150). In this sense, the political order 'prematurely' pretended to consolidate a nonantagonistic society: 'one [German] author has recently gone so far as to approximate present-day conditions with the classless society, alluding in this context to the well-known slogan of the transformation of the state into an organ for day-to-day administrative concerns' (1957: 150).

Despite the variation in evaluating this course of events, from a CCF-minded embrace of anti-Communist consensus to the Frankfurt-based distaste for a 'harmonistic' and 'administered' society, a common diagnosis of 'ideologies' ending defined what many observers saw as new in the political tenor of the postwar Western world (that is, anti-Communist Western Europe as well as the United States) compared to an 'old' world of social fracture, disruptive conflict, and high-stakes political contest between sharply opposed alternative visions of order or change. For those who welcomed this denouement, the end of ideology gave form to a mood bred of the discovery of totalitarianism in the late 1930s, nurtured in horror at mind-boggling atrocities of the war, and settling into a deep assumption as the heady Liberation days gave way to the Cold War reconstruction of Western Europe under the aegis of American power. In contrast to Hughes's and Kirchheimer's view, it was the latter, more satisfied contemplation of the postwar settlement that determined the main stem of the end of ideology thesis by the time the phrase began to reach a wide audience around 1955. That year, the Congress for Cultural Freedom convened as a grand intellectual seminar in Milan, devoted to the theme of 'The Future of Freedom'. The English-language organ of the Congress, the London-based *Encounter* magazine, published several of the scheduled papers in the months prior to the event. The philosopher of science and conference organizer, Michael Polanyi, forecast key Milan themes in his essay, 'On Liberalism and Liberty' (Polanyi 1955). He quickly dispensed with the idea that totalitarianism stemmed from economic planning (as free-market liberal Friedrich von Hayek had argued in his 1944 polemic, *The Road to Serfdom*, widely regarded by CCF thinkers as a misguided and outmoded tract). Rather, Polanyi wrote, totalitarianism arose as a purely political phenomenon when 'civility' (a sense of public responsibility and affective identity nurtured by common traditions) was lacking and when speculative hopes of social reconstruction on a grand scale outran a community's inherited cultural resources. Polanyi was gratified by 'examples of civic

reconciliation' in Western Europe since the late 1940s. He noted the signs that 'the intensity with which violent political illusions are held had undoubtedly decreased' (Polanyi 1955: 33), though he complained that overly excited 'anti-capitalists' and 'anti-socialists' 'are still glaring at each other through the angry masks of obsolete ideologies' (1953: 34).

At the Milan conference, the 'end of ideology' became the phrase of the day, decisively opening the period in which it served as a focus for major debates on the state of contemporary society and politics. Thus in his essay, 'The End of Ideology?' the Anglophile American sociologist Edward Shils reported from Milan that the last of the doctrinaire formulae had indeed fallen: 'The full awareness that nationalization is no universal solution to economic problems and that British socialism has not resulted in tyranny have materially weakened the ideologies of thorough-going socialism and thorough-going neo-liberalism' (Shils 1955: 53).

Milan even signalled a desire among some participants to assuage the ideological passions of the Cold War itself, seeking to make the most of the 'thaw' that appeared possible a few years after Stalin's death. In 'Some Fundamental Similarities between the Soviet and Capitalist Economic Systems', Bertrand de Jouvenel (quoted in Shils 1955) likened the hardships imposed on workers and consumers by the industrial revolution of the West 150 years before to the forced development in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Similarly, Polanyi (1955) had argued that the Soviet 'planned economy' in fact functioned 'through a system of more or less regulated, and more or less legal, markets'. The problems of both world camps were essentially those of a common 'industrial society'. This was precisely the theme of the conclusion to Raymond Aron's *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (1955), 'The End of the Ideological Age?' Aron argued that market and plan, in themselves were pure types existing nowhere in reality: 'Mixed systems ... are the normal thing'. He wondered why intellectuals still yearned for some abstract, universal truth to realize in action, and he hoped, as Camus had, for 'the advent of the skeptics' who would doubt all the models and utopias.

Still, it was clear that Aron's notion of political realism entailed welcoming the modern Left into the political mainstream. Elsewhere, Aron pointed out, with reference to the postwar order encompassing regulation, state enterprises, and limited planning, that 'socialism has ceased in the West to be a myth because it has become a part of reality' (Aron 1954, quoted in Crosland 1964: 63). The eclipse of socialism as ideological 'model' corresponded, for Aron, to the parallel eclipse of capitalism as 'abstract universal myth': the postwar

intellectuals of his world, Aron noted, embraced ‘anticapitalism’ as an ‘article of faith’ in their refusal to believe that markets, private property, profit and entrepreneurship could, by themselves, assure abundance and democratic equality—the key desiderata of the modern liberal politics that emerged in the wake of the Depression and the conclusion of the Second World War (Aron, quoted in Coleman 1989: 11–12).

The American sociologist Daniel Bell had also been intimately involved in the Milan conference, and he followed that up with a year spent in Paris during 1956 and 1957, as a member of the CCF seminar planning committee along with Polanyi, Shils, Aron, and the leading theorist of ‘revisionism’ in the British Labor Party, C. A. R. Crosland. In Bell’s judgement, it was the Labour Party’s ‘New Right’—the current borne by Crosland, Hugh Gaitskell, and Roy Jenkins—that gave to the CCF at that time its distinct ‘political coloration’. Crosland’s major work, *The Future of Socialism* (1956), argued that in the wake of the Second World War, ‘capitalism had been transformed almost out of recognition’ in the West. The accomplishment of Britain’s postwar Labour government, even though it was out of power at this point in the late 1950s, had been to usher in a kind of ‘statism’ that was ‘postcapitalist’ in the sense that partial nationalizations, a substantial measure of social provision, and other reforms had ended ‘the absolute autonomy of economic life’ and ‘the dominant emphasis [in public policy] ceases to be on the rights of property, private initiative, competition, and the profit motive; and is transferred to the duties of the state, social and economic security, and the virtues of cooperative action’.¹ Of course, as part of the same ‘end of ideology’ disposition, Crosland asserted not only the demotion of these capitalist standards but also the obsolescence of old, archetypal principles of ‘socialism’. Neither thorough-going nationalization nor complete economic planning at the ‘commanding heights’ held much conviction among Crosland’s like-minded reformers, since high-output mass industry, corresponding mass consumption, Keynesian fiscal management, and fairer norms of meritocracy promised the steady reduction of poverty and a gradual approach to genuine equality of opportunity—a large part of older socialist aims that could be won by nonsocialist, indeed market-based means.

It was this moderate, social-democratic liberalism that informed Daniel Bell’s work as it achieved greatest renown in 1960 and afterward, following publication of *The End of Ideology*. Also in 1960, Seymour Martin Lipset’s book, *Political Man*, ended with his own venture in this field, ‘The End of Ideology?’ Lipset had already reported on the 1955 Milan conference, hailing the absence of rancorous disputes within the boundaries of anti-totalitarian

‘democratic politics’. As Lipset put it, ‘The ideological issues dividing left and right had been reduced to a little more or a little less government ownership and economic planning’ (Lipset 1955: 170–1). Revealing his own political bias, Lipset tellingly emphasized the social-democratic elements of the ‘mixed order’—rather than the market elements of the mix—as the policy matters to be debated, or to be extended ‘a little more or a little less’.

THE END OF IDEOLOGY DEBATE

Hence the stage was set for ‘the end of ideology debate’. If the end of ideology theme already had a long, tangled history—hinted at by early twentieth-century social theorists of elites and modern rationalization, sharpened by the discovery of totalitarianism in the late 1930s, bruited about in moods of mingled exhaustion, fear, and hope after the end of war in the mid and late 1940s, and declared as a watchword of Cold War liberals starting around 1950 but especially from 1955 onward—it became best known as a 1960s idea that galvanized dispute both within the social sciences and in the broader world where intellectuals argued politics. Fortuitously appearing in print right at the turn of the decade, Bell’s (1962) *End of Ideology* and Lipset’s (1960) *Political Man* assumed special significance at a moment that was believed to open a new era, one step beyond the period of postwar restabilization culminating in the 1950s when the end of ideology thesis first took shape.

Decades, of course, are entirely arbitrary markers in a continued flux of change in human practices and institutions, but in self-consciously modern societies, decade changes often take on enormous symbolic weight, both in the moment and in the retrospective views of memory and history. In US political history, the coincidence once every twenty years of a presidential election with a decade shift often lends the turn of a year special meaning as well. Even as popular culture and the writings of intellectuals had stamped ‘the Fifties’ with a specific tenor (for intellectuals of many political hues, it represented stolidity, conformity, passivity, and apathy), particular events late in the 1950s, such as the Little Rock, Arkansas, school-desegregation crisis, the midterm Democratic election victory of 1958, and even the revolutionary take-over of Havana at the start of 1959, had already stirred anticipations that the somnolence of the fifties was about to give way to something daringly new. John Kennedy’s political campaign cleverly seized on precisely that sense, buoyantly promising ‘Greatness for the Sixties’. Before long, the surge of civil rights activism and an increasingly vocal ‘ban the bomb’ sentiment in the early 1960s signalled the rise

of dissent. In the eyes of some observers, that turn seemed to mark Bell and Lipset's 'end of ideology'—insofar as the phrase connoted an historically unique cessation of sharp political conflict between interest groups or between duelling visions of a new future—as an idea that came 'too late', obsolete as soon as it appeared in print (Steinfels 1979: 162).

The decade shift also became assimilated with the boom in higher education, the numbers and proportion of young people in college or university, and the consolidation of the disciplinary structure of modern scholarship. College enrolments would double over the years from 1960 to 1970, as states rapidly added new branch campuses to their public university systems. American social science gained in prestige and resources, with government funders adding grant support to the private foundations that had begun promoting the disciplines in the 1920s, and large-scale survey research centres blossoming at Columbia, Chicago, and Michigan. By the early 1970s, the American Sociological Association had ten times as many members as it had before the Second World War. And this heyday in advanced social science research spawned the conviction that a new Enlightenment had arrived, promising to deliver sound knowledge of social affairs in value-neutral terms. At the same time, 1960 marked a dramatic leap in the trend of decolonization, with seventeen 'new states' emerging in sub-Saharan Africa that year, and revolutionary movements gaining power or mounting anti-colonial struggles from Cuba to Vietnam. The promise of 'development' or 'modernization' for the 'hungry nations' of the world, and the engagement of the United States in the Cold War struggle for influence in the third world, would enlist the knowledge-producing services of the social science disciplines at the same time as it would stir vast political controversy on campuses as the 1960s continued. Conditions were set for a flourishing debate over consensus and dissent in social and political life, the epistemological status of the social sciences as they became embroiled in contentious political affairs, and the degree to which academic affairs could or should be shielded from controversy. The end of ideology debate provided one medium for confrontation over all these issues.

The end of ideology debate focused to a great extent on the person and writing of Daniel Bell, whose book did most to popularize the phrase, and to a secondary degree on the work of Seymour Martin Lipset—who took a far more active role than Bell in rebutting critics and striving to make the 'end of ideology' a very definite thesis about the fundamental change that had taken place since the Second World War in the social structure of modern politics, an argument not only warranted, he wished to say, by empirical evidence but also

based in a long pedigree of social theorists, most of whom, Lipset was at pains to point out, hailed from left-wing standpoints. Like Bell, Lipset had begun his intellectual life as a young socialist and in the early 1960s, sure that the end of ideology assured a prominent place for social-democratic reform in the modern world, persisted in viewing himself as a man of the (moderate) Left, serving as the faculty sponsor of the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) at the University of California at Berkeley. To Lipset, then, an emerging critique of 'the end of ideology *as* ideology'—and a conservative ideology at that, according to the founder of the upstart 'new left' Students for a Democratic Society, Robert (Al) Haber—was bound to rankle.

Writing in 1962, Haber challenged the end of ideology writers by claiming that ideology need not be doctrinaire, millenarian, or violent—as it appeared in Bell and Lipset's pejorative view. Rather, ideology, generally speaking, should be understood as a set of moral values that sustained political criticism, a definition of the 'good society', and a strategic plan of action dedicated to realize it (Haber 1968). Nothing less could have been expected from a young radical engaged, as Haber was at that moment, in efforts to draft a left-wing student manifesto—mainly the work of Haber's acolyte and collaborator Tom Hayden—to appear that summer as 'The Port Huron Statement'. Likewise, the young Yale political scientist Joseph LaPalombara defined ideology as 'a philosophy of history, a view of man's present place in it, some estimate of probable lines of future development, and a set of prescriptions regarding how to hasten, retard, and/or modify that developmental direction' (LaPalombara 1968: 320). Struck in these terms, large parts of the 'debate' had as much to do with the meaning of 'ideology' as they did with ideology's 'end'—but if 'ideology' was defined in Haber's or LaPalombara's terms rather than as totalitarian doctrine, its 'end' appeared not at all to be a benign outcome. Thus the iconoclastic sociologist C. Wright Mills argued that the end of ideology doctrine 'stands for the refusal to work out an explicit political philosophy' (Mills 1963: 251). Bell and Lipset's theme then equalled an 'intellectual celebration of apathy' (1963: 247) based upon 'a disbelief in the shaping by men of their own futures' (1963: 249). Moreover—and here Mills wedded his political distaste for the Cold War allegiances of the liberal sociologists he scorned with his wider critique of the positivist disposition of so much American social science, its pretension to utterly separate fact and value in promoting a disinterested picture of empirical reality—he suggested that 'end of ideology' notions forgot that every social theory presupposed an 'ideological' or evaluative stance toward the given realities of society and the uses of power within it (1963: 251–2). By pretending,

allegedly, that intellectual work could be free of political commitment, the end of ideology thesis simply masked its proponents' embrace of 'society as it is, a going concern'—and bowed to the abstracted empiricism that prevented American social science from broaching big questions about the nature of order in those times and pressing demands for social change.

Almost none of Bell's critics directly challenged his central argument that socialism—as the concerted programme of a dedicated political party advocating revolutionary social transformation—had lost relevance to the problems of Western industrial society. In fact, in this respect, there was a great deal of agreement on central 'end of ideology' arguments between its main exponents and their most vigorous critics. In his 1959 assault on academic social science, *The Sociological Imagination*, Mills concurred with Bell that inherited political doctrines were exhausted—that both liberalism and socialism were 'detached from any tenable theory of modern society'. In his polemical 'Letter to the New Left', (1963) which greeted the early, transatlantic signs of renewed radical dissent *circa* 1960, Mills seconded an 'end of ideology' view that faith in the socially-transformative and liberating potential of the working class was an outmoded legacy of Victorian Marxism.

Similarly, LaPalombara did not doubt that 'romantic notions of socialist revolution' had proven impotent; he simply asked for a 'new rhetoric' and 'new ideological formulations' appropriate to 'large-scale interventions of the public sector' in a rising welfare state (LaPalombara 1968: 338). The sociologists Stephen Rousseas and James Farganis, who like Mills reproached Bell for his alleged 'apotheosis of a non-committed scientism', claimed only to advocate 'long-range planning on a governmental level' that would 'make the capitalist system viable in a power world [i.e. a world marked by systems of highly organized, centralized power that made the old market ideology of decentralized competition obsolete]' (Rousseas and Farganis 1968: 206–7). In these terms, the end of ideology debate was not much of a debate at all, but a combination of misunderstandings, claims to marginal differentiation, or a contest between distinct *styles* of responding to conditions of welfare-state capitalism that looked very much the same to most of the contenders. Much of the debate actually steered away from substantive argument over the structural character of the contemporary social organization of political economy and led to chest-thumping and self-regarding recriminations over the status of what a later generation would call 'public intellectuals'. Rousseas and Farganis worried most of all that the end of ideology thesis suggested that 'the traditional role of the intellectual as social critic is no longer logically possible' (Rousseas and

Farganis 1968: 221–2). Likewise, Dennis Wrong, writing in the social-democratic journal *Dissent* (Wrong 1960) did not challenge the end of ideology claims that the push and pull of totalitarianism and the welfare state necessarily subdued the primacy or salience of independent socialist movements in contemporary politics. Assuming that, however, Wrong nonetheless argued that the end of ideology made a cult of moderation and accepted a consensus providing little room for debate. In an age marked by the end of ideology, he warned, intellectuals ‘are failing to perform their roles as unattached critics and visionaries’ (Wrong: 1968).

Thus ‘the end of ideology’ became associated with a flight from the intellectual vocation. Scorning the ‘NATO intellectuals’ associated with the Cold War Congress for Cultural Freedom, Mills charged that

intellectuals accept without scrutiny official definitions of world reality. Some of the best of them allow themselves to be trapped by the politics of anti-Stalinism, which has been a main passageway from the political thirties to the intellectual default of our apolitical time. They live and work in a benumbing society without living and working in protest and in tension with its moral and cultural insensibilities. They use the liberal rhetoric to cover the conservative default (Mills 1958: 143).

Mills’s accusation became the basis of a New Left jeremiad against the intellectuals’ embrace of liberal anticommunism in the apathetic Fifties.

In this sense, the end of ideology debate in the 1960s signalled one more iteration of a standard trope in twentieth-century intellectual life: recriminations over the status, role, and moral integrity of ‘the intellectual’. The very identity of ‘intellectuals’ was framed as new social type starting around the occasion of Emile Zola’s *J’Accuse*, his protest against the persecution of Col. Alfred Dreyfus and a rallying cry for writers standing to defend France’s Third Republic from its reactionary enemies. Thereafter, the gesture of moral accusation became a means for one generation of self-conscious ‘intellectuals’ to distance itself from the preceding one. In the United States, the initial formation of American ‘intellectuals’ took place in the early twentieth century around cultural criticism of American heritage, a rebellion against ‘the genteel tradition’ or ‘Puritanism’. Further differentiations followed in generational and political sequence: Radical intellectuals of the 1930s dismissed the self-indulgence of 1920s bohemians; the end of ideology writers scored the credulity of Popular Front writers in the face of Stalinism; opponents of the end of ideology writers charged them with another betrayal. In a more subdued way, the critics of ‘end of ideology’ met their come-uppance in Russell Jacoby’s (1987) polemic against the academicizing drift of Sixties radicals.

Besides manifesting the pattern of rehearsing new versions of a similar complaint, the course of the end of ideology debate revealed that the proponents and critics of the thesis, for the most part, failed to escape the circle of discourse they shared. Not only did many of the critics more or less share the view that revolutionary politics had lost their purchase on the Western imagination; to the extent that the critics harped on the end-of-ideologists' betrayal of the critical vocation, they were also echoing the argument about the advent of an 'administered' or 'one-dimensional' society that had, since the 1940s, represented simply another variant of the end of ideology thesis, the evaluative flipside of the social-democrats' celebration of modern democratic stability.

The adversarial view of the end of ideology—finding its keynote in the claim that its advocates utterly deserted the field of social and political criticism—had always been somewhat misguided. If the adversaries were prepared to challenge the main-stem, social-democratic inclinations of the end of ideology proponents from a point of view calling for the need for and relevance of persistent revolutionary critique, they might have had a point. Suggesting, however, that the end-of-ideologists were utterly satisfied with the status quo, that they were absolutely incapable of political dissent, raised a straw person evidently lacking substance. To take one example of the chastened radicals of the 1950s who was deeply suspicious of mass 'ideologies', the historian Richard Hofstadter typically labelled a 'consensus historian', it is easy to see the biased, loaded nature of the adversaries' assault. By the late 1940s, even as he penned an influential critique of the American political heritage for its undeviating support of bourgeois private property, Hofstadter admitted he found some appeal in the conservative principles of Edmund Burke. 'The conception of some kind of good society above and beyond ruling groups is very likely a utopian fiction' (Hofstadter, quoted in Brick 1986: 157), he said, and in the face of Joseph McCarthy's red-scare hysteria, he had come to appreciate the restraint of popular passions promised by continuity in political order and wise leadership. Nonetheless, Hofstadter's writing in the early 1960s included a clear recognition that the persistence of social inequality and the political power of great corporations *should* remain the targets of political dissent. He joined other historians at Martin Luther King, Jr.'s August 1963 march on Washington and at the 1965 Selma, Alabama, march for voting rights, opposed the Vietnam war, and, in the course of the war, endorsed the idea of freeing the university from compromising affiliations with military research. While he disdained the young radicals—whose building occupations and student strikes shut down the Columbia University campus in the spring of 1968—he came to regard them,

quite in the spirit of the end of ideology, as simple-minded, moralistic, ruthless, and destructive. He also was known to make a contribution to the defence fund of Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver, deeming it likely that Cleaver had suffered police harassment.

Daniel Bell was no less repelled than Hofstadter by the New Left student radicals of the late 1960s, though he had, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, been involved in promoting disarmament and had voiced a strong interest in the radical critique of bureaucratic order. In one of the classic essays of his book, *The End of Ideology*, Bell marked the ‘cult of efficiency’ in a mass-consumption economy, embraced not only by corporate management but by the workers who suffered the hierarchical regimentation of mass production, as a proper target for criticism. Combating this ‘cult’ in his essay, ‘Work and Its Discontents’, Bell (1962: 391) mocked the ‘scientific’ approach of industrial engineers to conflict resolution and called instead for ‘new, humanistic’ approaches to work that would break down centralized controls and attack the alienation or estrangement induced by the gulf between labor and meaningful activity. ‘For the unions to challenge the work process would require a radical challenge to society as a whole’, Bell (1962: 386–7) wrote, and for once he scattered any doubt of his own inclinations: ‘The exploration of such a road is necessary’ (1962: 249). So much for charges that Bell’s end of ideology endorsed technocracy or positivism. Indeed, Bell needed no lessons about the evaluative foundation of social analysis. ‘The idea that a scientist simply studies “what is”, as John Dewey has argued, is a parochial conception of science.... As Dewey said forcefully on another occasion: “Anything that obscures the fundamentally moral nature of the social problem is harmful”’ (Bell 1962: 237).

In fact, Bell’s analysis and evaluation of American or ‘Western’ society during the period of postwar reconstruction and the ‘end of ideology’ had always been ambivalent, signalled by the subtitle of his book, ‘The Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties’, which not only lacked any celebratory ring but came close to sharing his critics’ disheartened view of the status of acute political thinking. Although Bell welcomed the decline in the mass or elite (intellectual) appeal of absolutist and messianic political ‘ideologies’, he too feared the demise of effective social analysis and critique and vibrant political philosophy. Indeed, he believed the postwar period had ushered in a new species of social order—later he called it ‘postindustrial society’—and he regarded most inherited doctrines of social science and political theory irrelevant to addressing the real problems posed by the new shape of things. As his later writing made clear, just as the ‘welfare state’ marked an achievement, it was profoundly

unfinished if society was incapable of fashioning what he called a ‘public household’, a political consensus to extend a just share of resources, rights, and responsibilities to all members of the civic community. His pursuit of that goal was driven, Bell insisted, by a ‘socialist ethic’ that seemed doomed by the antinomian ethos of late capitalist consumerism. Even at the very moment the end of ideology debate first flared, Bell remarked, with some regret,

The pacifist and Socialist elements have been unable to make the peace issue salient. The radicals have been unable to develop a comprehensive critique of the social disparities in American life—the urban mess, the patchwork educational system, the lack of amenities in our culture. Among the liberals, only the exhaustion of the ‘received ideas’, such as they were, of the New Deal remains. It is a token of the emptiness of contemporary intellectual debate that from the viewpoint of the radical right, the Americans for Democratic Action constitutes the ‘extreme left’ of the American political spectrum. (Bell 1963: 30–1)

He *bemoaned* the fact that ‘a viable left [does not] exist in the United States today’ (Bell 1963: 31).

THE OTHER DISCUSSION OF IDEOLOGY IN THE 1960s

Another dimension of debate, however, appeared in the work of scholars whose attentions focused on the ‘new states’ of the decolonizing world. In 1964, the political scientist David Apter edited a volume entitled *Ideology and Discontent* that cast a distinctive light on the main line of the end of ideology debate. Apter—who like Bell, Lipset, Hofstadter, and others had personal roots in radical politics during the 1940s—had begun his academic career in the 1950s studying the independence movement that turned the Gold Coast into Ghana (and he continued to offer political support to the regime of independence leader Kwame Nkrumah long after Western governments turned against him). Interestingly, *Ideology and Discontent* made very few allusions to the mainstream ‘end of ideology debate’, while it attended to political developments in Africa, the Middle East, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Attempting a definition of ‘ideology’, Apter placed it at a point somewhere between abstract philosophy and political party platforms. It was ‘a generic term applied to general ideas potent in specific situations of conduct’, a formulation of belief that ‘helps to make more explicit the moral basis of action’, the ‘application of particular moral prescriptions to collectivities’ understood as political communities. Apter also asserted that ‘ideology’—especially in the emerging third world—in some way ‘embodies hope and a positive notion of the future’ (Apter 1964: 16–17). In that sense, ideology was a crucial element of ‘development’ or ‘modernization’ in the decolonizing world, which Apter and his colleagues viewed not primarily as an

imposition by the West but as a desire for ‘progress’ voiced by the newly independent peoples and their political leaders. Apter shared the worldly, sceptical view of ideology that marked the end of ideology writers: he knew that ‘ideology has changed considerably’ in the West with the lapse of movements offering ‘total solutions’, and he acknowledged that one of the most current ‘ideologies’ of the developing world—‘socialism’ (along with ‘nationalism’)—did not always mean what it professed, focusing on ‘sacrifice’ for the sake of national advance rather than saying much that was definite about property relations. It served primarily as a motivator or mobilizer of allegiance and action in new states.

Yet Apter and his colleagues were loath to declare the ‘end’ of ideology in this sense, and there was no index entry for ‘end of ideology’ in the book. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz, a student of Indonesia, made a classic statement contrary to ‘the end of ideology’ in his contribution to this volume, ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’: ‘It is through the construction of ideologies, schematic images of social order, that man makes himself for better or worse a political animal.... Whatever else ideologies may be ... they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience’ (Geertz 1964: 16–17). Geertz was eager to overcome a positivist streak in contemporary social science that deemed ‘ideology’ as something always pathological or defective compared to ‘scientific’ ventures. To rebut this dichotomy, Geertz cited Kenneth Burke’s theory of ‘symbolic action’ and Burke’s notion of ‘stylistic strategies’ by which actors respond to definite but complex social and historical situations. Science and ideology, Geertz suggested, might be distinguished as ‘stylistic strategies’ but not absolutely counterposed in terms of their relative truth value. Science, he wrote ‘names the structure of situations’ in a mood of ‘disinterestedness’, with a style that is ‘restrained, spare, resolutely analytic’. Ideology ‘names the structure of situations in such a way that the attitude contained toward them is commitment’ rather than disinterestedness—and its style is ‘ornate, vivid, deliberately suggestive’ (Geertz 1964: 71). Geertz was not interested in granting either style absolute primacy.

In focusing on ‘strategic styles’, Geertz’s analysis suggests a way of reading the end of ideology in terms of the structure of feeling it embodied. To begin with, the end of ideology writers were, by and large, preoccupied by the ‘advanced West’, and when they did, through the Congress of Cultural Freedom, try to address postcolonial third-world intellectuals as potential Cold War allies, they were more or less uncomprehending of the ‘socialist’ and ‘nationalist’ commitments that Apter, Geertz, and others saw all around them in the new

states. It is most telling, however, that as Apter stressed the element of ideology that expresses 'hope and a positive notion of the future' (and indeed visions of 'progress'), it was clear that the Western end of ideology writers remained gunshy of overarching philosophies of history that focused motivation on a future yet to be won. Daniel Bell, for one, somewhat condescendingly acknowledged that 'ideology' (in the sense of the term that roused his suspicion) might understandably survive in the new states, while he strove to convince his critics that he was by no means opposed to social change. He only wished that political ends be framed in terms of realizable goals and responsible acceptance of their costs, not in terms of the 'faith ladder', as he called it, of apocalyptic visions of transformation (Bell 1962).

There was inherent in this disposition a kind of scepticism, caution, a preference for balance and measure in all things, and an appreciation for kinds of tradition and authority that granted societies a precious degree of continuity and stability (understood as bulwarks against the politics of extremity that produced modern atrocities). In this structure of feeling, there was in fact an appeal, like Richard Hofstadter's self-surprising pull towards Edmund Burke, to distinctly conservative elements in philosophy, culture, and ethics. Since most of the end of ideology writers were not at all political conservatives (nor really cultural conservatives in the sense that later New Right exponents like William Bennett have made familiar), this element gave the main-stem end of ideology its distinctive flavour, as it wedded a conservative structure of feeling with social-democratic aspirations. It was that conservative sensibility (as opposed to 'conservative' politics in any decided sense) that drew the sharp line between the end of ideology social democrats, who viewed themselves as people 'of the Left', and the adversaries of the end of ideology who tended toward the 'strategic styles' of the New Left.

THE AFTERGLOW OF THE END OF IDEOLOGY DEBATE

The end of ideology debate exhausted itself by the early 1970s, and before long the material circumstances that had sustained the end of ideology thesis in its heyday were undermined by the main forces making up the Great Shift of the 1970s: the commencement of an economic crisis issuing in a 'long downturn' of capitalist economies that undermined the promises of public welfare accompanying economic growth in 'mature' Western societies; the Right Turn in politics that reinvigorated precisely the laissez-faire dogmatism the end of ideology authors thought to be historically buried; and, in the consequent of both

of those two developments, the catastrophic decline in the political clout of the social-democratic consensus that the main stem of the end of ideology thesis had hailed after the Second World War. Nonetheless, the phrase had become so well-known that recurrent echoes have sounded in later intellectual contexts. At least, it might be said, new turns of debate have emerged after the end of ideology debate that *seem* to evoke a sensibility like that of the end of ideology.

By the 1980s, the receding influence of theoretical Marxism—which, notwithstanding the end of ideology writers of the 1950s, had enjoyed a revival and considerable academic influence from the late 1960s to the late 1970s—lent Daniel Bell's *End of Ideology* a bit of renewed prestige, as some readers concluded that his somewhat premature view of Marxism's obsolescence had been borne out after all. In fact, the advent of 'postmodernism' in academic thought paradoxically recalled some elements of the end of ideology. Particularly the formulation of the 'postmodern condition' by Jean-François Lyotard in his book of that title—its distinctive trait of 'incredulity towards metanarratives'—seconded significant elements of the end of ideology (Lyotard 1984). The end of ideology writers, not only in the main stem but in the corollaries such as Horkheimer and Adorno's (1972) critique of 'Enlightenment', had expressed deep suspicion of transhistorical trajectories, the philosophies of 'History' that subordinated human individuals in the present to a goal (telos) fixed in the Future.

Big-P 'Progress', whether defined in the ascent of Enlightenment liberalism or the final conquest of Socialism, surely counted as metanarratives that, the postmodernists claimed, had lost their cogency for mass publics as well as most members of the academic elite. In that sense, one might say, the postmodernists echoed the end of ideology, but they also differed from it in crucial ways. After all, the end of ideology dispensed with notions of social-evolutionary progress in some respects but not in others: to be sure, the sacrificial demands of Progress or History had to be repudiated, but the end of ideology nonetheless rested on confidence in the achievements of modernity registered in the welfare-state supersession of market fundamentalism. More importantly, the end of ideology writers, even if they were not accurately considered crude positivists, were surely not prepared to cast out the ideal of progress in knowledge and science. In part due to the totalitarian-state manipulation of science and truth claims, the end of ideology generally found reason to keep scientific knowledge as a special preserve, to be protected at all costs from political intrusion and reduction to the demands of 'social utility'.² The kind of scepticism toward science that many postmodernists expressed, or Lyotard's emphasis on the multiplicity of 'truth-

games' in the advanced, digital world, would have been suspect claims to most exponents of the end of ideology. The postmodern wish to destabilize assumptions of settled norms in social life likewise would have scandalized end of ideology writers, who wished on the contrary to preserve 'normal' frames of political and moral judgement against the totalitarian threat that lay in conditions of social and political extremity or emergency.

A decade beyond Lyotard's *Postmodern Condition*, Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) also evoked end of ideology dispositions. According to Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War marked the 'end' of fundamental conflict between opposed visions of the good society, and it signalled the establishment of a broad consensus that only liberal democracy could truly fulfil the aspirations implicit in human reason and desire for prosperity and the recognition of personhood and fundamental rights. Ostensibly like the end of ideology writers in the 1950s, who saw Western society passing a threshold in which old 'ideological' illusions 'are dissolving and collapsing like a dream picture' (as Fukuyama quoted Hegel), Fukuyama celebrated a now world-ranging consensus on liberal values. Seemingly like end of ideology writers, he stated that 'in most advanced democracies the big issues concerning governance of the community have been settled, reflected in the steady narrowing of the already narrow policy differences between political parties in the United States and elsewhere' (Fukuyama 1992: 317). Yet in fact, Fukuyama's perspective was light-years apart from the end of ideology thesis, not only because Fukuyama's supposed final resolution of fundamental social and political disputes entailed an unambiguous settlement on the virtue and efficacy of free-market capitalism (never avowed by the end of ideology social democrats), but more importantly because Fukuyama built his argument by resurrecting Hegel's Universal History, whereby the 'cunning of reason' finally led to the end of all basic questions and struggles of social and political existence. In other words, Fukuyama's 'History', having ended, evoked precisely the overarching schemes and systematic philosophy that the end of ideology had considered the curse and cause of the worst modern nightmares.

The end of ideology thesis entailed a range of propositions and a structure of feeling more or less characteristic of certain political and theoretical circles active in the mid-twentieth century, and as such is unlikely ever to recur as a dominant world-view of an age—as the 'now-term' (in historian Allan Megill's (2005) phrase) that it once was. That is not to say, however, that the complex of ideas and attitudes comprised in the end of ideology thesis has entirely lost its purchase on creative thinking. Under changed circumstances, a perspective

informed by the main stem of the end of ideology thesis might be hard to recognize for what it is. The clearest recent exposition of an end of ideology perspective has been the British historian Tony Judt's (2010) valedictory essay, *Ill Fares the Land*. A historian of twentieth-century France (and in his most monumental work, *Postwar* (2005), the rest of Europe as well), Judt had grown up with a disposition identified with the moderate Left. In assessing French politics, he spurned the long-term political influence of the Communist Party (not only its hard Stalinism but the general Marxist scenario of radical change that transfixed French intellectuals beyond the bounds of the Communist Party as well), and embraced the example set by the towering liberal political intellectual of mid-century France, Raymond Aron, a central figure in the end of ideology milieu of the 1950s. Yet the mood of *Ill Fares the Land* was by no means a contented view of the virtues of social and political civility. Instead, it was a passionate call to dissent. For in the statistics describing—particularly for the United States—the increasing polarization of wealth, the weakening of social services, and the resulting decline of crucial indices of health, education, and welfare, Judt saw ‘the unraveling of decades of social legislation and economic oversight’ (2010: 13). There had been an age of ‘great societies’, 1945–75, in which the ‘regulated market’ not only sustained the common welfare but stood as a kind of consensus on social democracy shared by American parties, moderate British Labourites, and all the other European forces, ‘French Gaullists, Christian Democrats and Socialists [who] shared a faith in the activist state, economic planning and large-scale public investment’ (2010: 49).

That age of great societies had begun to erode in the late 1960s, and like the end of ideology writers, Judt freely vented his disdain for the radical young Left whose antinomian energies did little more than wreck societal harmony at the heart of social democracy. Strains of a conservative ethical and philosophical disposition, carefully intertwined with deeper liberal allegiances, filter through Judt's polemic as he scored the New Left's ‘resort to aesthetic and moral relativism’ and recognized the virtues of a common cultural inheritance and respect for authority in ordinary social institutions (such as schools and universities). Yet the keynote of Judt's book was the dread state of the present, after thirty years of right-wing political dominance. The decline of voter turnout and other signs of a ‘democratic deficit’ in Western countries, he remarked, are indeed worrisome, for ‘political demobilization, beyond the healthy retreat from ideological polarization which characterized the growth of political stability in postwar western Europe, is a dangerous and slippery slope’ (2010: 132). For, however healthy that prior moderation had been, Judt argued that it was now

urgent to reverse the trend toward inequality and reset the agenda on facing ‘the social question’ of poverty and its attendant features of infant mortality, crime, violence, and mental illness, all again on the rise (2010: 174–7).

Ill Fares the Land was a potent cry of dissent, and it lambasted the consensus—or rather the ideological exhaustion—of our time. To be sure, Judt repeated the end of ideology standards: ‘The vision of total social organization—the fantasy which animated utopians from Sidney Webb to Lenin, from Robespierre to Le Corbusier—lies in ruins’ (2010: 146). Even ‘the Enlightenment vision—with or without God as its first mover and moral arbiter—no longer convinces’ (2010: 183). But we labour now under a genuine emergency, as ‘social democracy’ too lay ‘exhausted’, leaving an ‘empty space’ in contemporary politics. Whatever the faults of grand ideologies, Judt argued (in terms quite consistent with those affirmed by a 1950s end of ideology writer like Daniel Bell) that we cannot do without some notion of a ‘just society’ (2010: 181), which must galvanize forces that can turn the tide—to reverse the reign of free-market ‘locusts’ that descended on Western societies since 1989, and to rescue the good society from ‘the rubble’ (2010: 146) of market fundamentalism. For while moderation and stability are virtues to protect, the very lessons of the end of ideology—‘that the 20th century morality tale of “socialism vs. freedom” or “communism vs. capitalism” is misleading’ (2010: 145)—weigh more against the contemporary Right and its laissez-faire dogmas than against the Left. Judt demanded a return to appreciating the provision of ‘public goods’, insisted on the value of ‘community’ and other essentials to rebuilding a society that had, he believed, been ‘eviscerated’, Political conversation, ideals of mutuality, a ‘language of ends ... to express [our] moral instincts’ all needed resuscitation (2010: 180). ‘What is to be done?’ Judt asked in a curious echo of Lenin, just as he concluded his text by quoting Marx, that while philosophers ‘have hitherto only interpreted the world[,] the point is to change it’ (2010: 179, 237). And yet this must be done without ‘the old-style master narrative: the all-embracing theory of everything’ (2010: 179). To go without that, while sustaining or reviving ‘a sense of common purpose and mutual dependence’: this stood, in Judt’s voice, as the legacy of the end of ideology thesis. Judt’s recovery of it, now in a time of pessimism rather than the liberal optimism of the 1950s, was bravely honest, in its call for moral community, norms of social justice, a restoration of hope, and ever-present moderation of vaulting aspirations. As a political vision, however, is that moralist perspective enough to build a movement that must now undertake a radical turn of direction and change a way of life?

NOTES

1. Quotations from Crosland are taken from his earlier essay, 'The Transition from Capitalism', *New Fabian Essays* (Crossman 1952), which ventured key themes elaborated in *The Future of Socialism* four years later. On Crosland and the Labour Party 'New Right', see Foote (1997: 201–28).
2. The polemics of Michael Polanyi (1941, 1955b), originally aimed against the British Marxist biologist J. D. Bernal regarding the relation of science and social purpose, played a key role in shoring up 'end of ideology' dispositions.

REFERENCES

- Apter, Daniel (ed.) 1964. *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: Free Press.
- Aron, Raymond 1955. 'The end of the ideological age?'. Pp. 305–24 in *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, trans. Terence Kilmartin. New York: Norton (2nd edn 1962).
- Aron, Raymond 1984. *The Century of Total War*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Bell, Daniel 1962. *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. New York: Free Press.
- Bell, Daniel 1963. 'The dispossessed—1962'. Pp. 1–38 in *The Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Updated*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Brick, Howard 1986. *Daniel Bell and the Decline of Intellectual Radicalism: Social Theory and Political Reconciliation in the 1940s*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Camus, Albert 1947. 'Neither victims nor executioners', *Politics*, July–August: 143.
- Coleman, Peter 1989. *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*. New York: Free Press.
- Crosland, C. A. R. 1964. *The Future of Socialism*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Crossman, R. H. S. 1952. 'The transition from capitalism', *New Fabian Essays*, ed. R. H. S. Crossman. New York: Turnstile Press.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf 1959. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Dewey, John 1929. *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*. New York: International Publishers.
- Engels, Frederick 1941. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. New York: International Publishers.
- Foote, Geoffrey 1997. *The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fukuyama, Francis 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Avon.
- Geertz, Clifford 1964. 'Ideology as a cultural system'. Pp. 47–76 in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. D. Apter. New York: Free Press.
- Gross, Feliks (ed.) 1948. *European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas*, with an introduction by Robert M. MacIver. New York: Philosophical Library.
- Haber, Robert A. 1968. 'The end of ideology as ideology'. Pp. 182–205 in *The End of Ideology Debate*, ed. Chaim Waxman. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.
- Hofstadter, Richard 1967. 'What happened to the antitrust movement'. Pp. 236–7 in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays*. New York: Vintage.
- Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor 1972. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Hughes, H. Stuart 1951. 'The end of political ideology', *Measure*, 2 (Spring): 146–58.
- Jacoby, Russell 1987. *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe*. New York: Basic Books.
- Judt, Tony 2005. *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Vintage.

- Judt, Tony 2010. *Ill Fares the Land*. New York: Penguin.
- Kirchheimer, Otto 1957. 'The waning of opposition in parliamentary regimes', *Social Research* 24 (Summer).
- Koestler, Arthur 1941. *Darkness at Noon*, trans. Daphne Hardy. New York: Macmillan.
- Koestler, Arthur 1955. 'The outgrown dilemma'. Pp. 186–195 in *The Trail of the Dinosaur and Other Essays*. New York: Macmillan.
- LaPalombara, Joseph 1968. 'Decline of ideology: A dissent and an interpretation'. Pp. 315–41 in *End of Ideology Debate*, ed. Chaim I. Waxman. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin 1955. 'The state of democratic politics', *Canadian Forum*, 35 (November): 170–1.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin 1960. 'The end of ideology?' Pp. 403–17 in Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. New York: Doubleday.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin 1972. 'Ideology and no end: The controversy till now', *Encounter*, 39 (December): 17–22.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin 1977. 'The end of ideology and the ideology of the intellectuals'. Pp. 15–42 in *Culture and its Creators: Essay in Honor of Edward Shils*, ed. Joseph Ben-David and Terry Nichols Clark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lyotard, Jean-François 1984. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mannheim, Karl 1936. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Megill, Allan 2005. 'Globalization and the history of ideas', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 66: 179–87.
- Michels, Robert 1962. *Political Parties*. New York: Free Press.
- Mills, C. Wright 1958. *The Causes of World War Three*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Mills, C. Wright 1959. *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford.
- Mills, C. Wright 1963. 'Letter to the New Left'. Pp. 247–59 in *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Müller, Tim B. 2010. *Krieger und Gelehrte: Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg*. Hamburg;.
- Osgood, Kenneth 2010. "'We are not very good at propaganda": The American way of (psychological) war', Conference on the Intellectual History of the Cold War, Institute of Social Research, Hamburg, Germany, 31 August–3 September.
- Polanyi, Michael 1941. 'The Growth of Thought in Society', *Economica*, 8 (November): 428–56.
- Polanyi, Michael 1955. 'On liberalism and liberty', *Encounter*, 4 (March): 29–34.
- Rousseas, Stephen W. and James Farganis, 1968. 'American politics and the end of ideology'. Pp. 206–28 in *End of Ideology Debate*, ed. Chaim I. Waxman. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.
- Saunders, Frances Stonor 1999. *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. New York: New Press.
- Shils, Edward 1955. 'The end of ideology?' *Encounter*, 5 (November): 52–8.
- Steinfels, Peter 1979. *The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics* New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Weber, Max 1946. 'Politics as a vocation'. Pp. 77–128 in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wilford, Hugh 2008. *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wrong, Dennis 1960. 'Reflection on the end of ideology', *Dissent*, 8: 286–91.
- Wrong, Dennis 1968. 'Reflections on the end of ideology'. Pp. 116–25 in *End of Ideology Debate*, ed. Chaim I. Waxman. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.

II

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY

CHAPTER 7

THE MORPHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY

MICHAEL FREEDEN

RECENT research into ideology is characterized, among others, by an attempt to counter its forceful and enduring image as a mystifying and obfuscating set of ideas in which social and political power are used, often unscrupulously as well as unintentionally, to serve certain collective interests at the devastating expense of others. Although endeavours to bestow a ‘neutral’, or at least non-pejorative, connotation on ideology are far from new, surfacing mainly through social science approaches to the investigation of systems of opinions and beliefs in the mid-twentieth century (Brown 1973; Hamilton 1987), the newly emerged trend captured by the morphological approach to ideology has been inspired by developments that took place in a range of disciplines in the later twentieth century. The linguistic turn, cultural anthropology, and the revival of hermeneutics are some of the fields in which scholarly interest was drawn to the direct and significant impact of the semantic and symbolic nature of political thinking. Acknowledgement of the growing gap between the two conventional ways of exploring political thought—as a normative and ethical enterprise or as an historical set of narratives predominantly involving outstanding individual thinkers—highlighted a missing ingredient. That ingredient was a social-studies perspective focusing on noteworthy phenomena that regularly occur in societies, and from which the study of political thought had become detached. The morphological approach identifies a ubiquitous practice, under-researched by political theorists, namely, that people in all walks of society think about politics in discernible patterns and that understanding those patterns and the options they open, challenge, or close is vital to appreciating the nature of the political. It is not intended to proffer a total or exclusive theory of ideology or to identify all of its characteristics. Rather, is it a general method of investigating and decoding the internal structure of ideologies, highlighting the central role of that structure in fashioning the semantic fields of all ideologies, and offering a revealing insight into the ways ideologies consequently construct the political and navigate through it.

SEVEN FEATURES OF MORPHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The morphological approach incorporates and develops a number of specific features. First, it approaches ideology as a ubiquitous and permanent form of political thinking, irrespective of whether it is for good or evil, or for neither. Ideologies are therefore unquestionably ‘typical’ manifestations of political thinking, though not all of them are ‘normal’.

Second, it cuts across the distinction between elite, professional, and vernacular political thinking, contending—as already suggested by Antonio Gramsci (1971)—that ideologies emerge at all levels of social articulation, and are of scholarly interest at all such levels. In that search for inclusiveness, both in subject-matter and in sources, this represents a departure from the narrower focus of the traditional study of political thought.

Third, it remains faithful to the professional concerns of political theorists in identifying the political concept as a fundamental building block of political thought, and consequently analysing ideologies as particular combinations of political concepts, whose meanings are not always immediately transparent but decipherable through a systematic appreciation of the nature of political language. It amounts to an explicit reaction to the derogatory meanings, often propagated by Marxists, ethicists, conservatives, and in popular discourse, accumulated by the concept of ideology for over two hundred years (Marx and Engels 1974; Oakeshott 1962: 21–2). It deliberately seeks to retrieve ideology as pivotal to the discipline of political theory, while recommending alternative methods for conducting, evaluating, and appreciating the latter’s analytical practices. That entails acknowledging the need for detailed conceptual and contextual analysis of the sets of political ideas circulating in a society, inasmuch as respect for the study of ideology can come, *inter alia*, through applying to it the tools and perspectives that political theorists can legitimate. Among the aims of morphological analysis is therefore to demonstrate that ideology both as *explanans* and as *explanandum* passes the three tests of ideational complexity, methodological sophistication, and political relevance that can entitle it to command a recognized and serious place in the academic investigation of political thought, on a par with the disciplinary practices of political philosophers and of historians of political ideas; and as a necessary complement to the empirical study of politics engaged in by political scientists.

Fourth, while endeavouring to arrive at some generalizations about what ideologies are and do, in terms of family resemblances, it focuses on the micro-structures of different ideologies in order to reveal how patterns of conceptual combinations are capable of multiple and nuanced variations (See also Balkin 1998: 114). The morphology of ideological and conceptual architecture tenders a

vital interpretative perspective from which to understand how meaningful, and potentially influential, configurations of political thinking for and about collectivities are created. In parallel, it explores the contextual opportunities and constraints (temporal, spatial, and cultural) as well as logical imperatives and limits operating on such configurations. That micro-perspective departs notably from the conventional macro-approach to ideologies that all too often seeks to regard them solely as grand narratives, that attempts to contain their importance and downgrade their intricacy by describing them as a series of simplified generalizations, often characterized by a single organizing concept, or that neglects the multitude of variants nesting under general headings such as liberalism or socialism. It also departs from the modelling instruments used in attitude and voting studies in which ideologies are loaded on to simple matrices and unidimensional conceptual continua (e.g. Kim and Fording 2001). And it is intended to provide a response to those who insist that there are modes of thinking about social values that are pragmatic and non-ideological (Graham 1989), or those who employ ideology as a catch-all for broad intellectual or cultural movements (Riff 1987). It presents conceptual combinations as complex significance-distributing devices that allocate and reallocate variable weightings to the concepts comprising an ideology. Those continuously modulated and readjusted arrangements are at the heart of the morphological approach, for which that structural fluidity is crucial. In particular, it provides the basis for imaginative inventiveness in political thinking. In that way morphological analysis can illuminate the diachronic mutation of an ideology. It also reinforces a more refined comparative study of ideologies (Sargent 2009: 13).

Fifth and consequently, the morphological approach regards ideologies as discursive competitions over the control of public political language—a control that facilitates the crafting of significant political decisions and subsequent actions by and for collectivities—and investigates the aspects of ideological argumentation and presentation that contribute specifically to such an end (Freedman 2003: 55). The durability of such contests attests to the inherent ideological and conceptual pluralism revealed by morphological microstructure, and with it the flow and movement typical of political processes that negate the rigidity of ideological boundaries—although ideological positions are limited from ranging across their full potential through inevitable decontestation practices. The morphological approach invariably addresses *ideologies* as differentiated phenomena that cannot be subsumed (usually negatively) under the single label *ideology*. From this perspective ideologies are strategies, deliberate or not, for managing the underlying pluralism of political ideas in all

societies, permitting it in culturally acceptable doses or trying to suppress it publicly and artificially. Ideologies are in the main counter-pluralist discourses. Even societies whose policies profess to promote pluralism or multiculturalism exhibit a preferential ranking of the kinds of pluralism that are permissible. In the course of such ideational competitions the fragmented or conjoined nature of ideologies is revealed, directing and fashioning their components in registers of dissent or consensus.

Sixth, through engagement with political language, textual, oral, and symbolic, and with the visual forms of human expression, the study of ideologies requires an eye and an ear for the breadth of existing political discourse in all its forms and varieties, past and present (van Dijk 1998). Reconstruction, deconstruction, and interpretation, elucidation and exploration, and the accumulation of knowledge, rather than the substantive prescription of ethical positions and solutions, are what drive the morphological approach to the study—not to the production!—of ideologies. The production of ideologies displays, of course, as salient a normative dimension as do their philosophicoethical counterparts. In morphological analysis, however, mapping the feasibility and ideational consequences of political solutions is held to be a necessary preliminary to recommending them or putting them into effect. Only then should the role of plotting future conceptual and discursive permutations be judiciously assumed by political philosophers, politicians, and ideologists. It is not that the past or present constrain the future in a conservative manner, but that the attributes of concepts and the plausible—if occasionally disputable—limitations on their combinations need to be known before an attempt is made to challenge existing morphologies or to construct purportedly improved conceptual arrangements. Some limitations pertain to the properties of language itself and to the formalities of logic (often breached in ideological discourse); other limitations come and go contingently (e.g. the cultural acceptability of combining nationalism and socialism in one phrase). The morphological approach thus reattaches theorizing about political thought to its everyday manifestations, alongside its abiding interest in the exceptional and the outstanding.

Seventh and finally, on the morphological understanding of ideology we have no access to political ideas and thinking except as ideologies. The operative phrase here is ‘as ideologies’, not ‘through ideologies’, because ideologies are not perceived as masking something true, or undistorted, that transcends or is obscured by them. They are the actual modes of political thinking, whether expressed in the vernacular, the discourses of political élites, or the academic

languages of engagé political theorists and philosophers. That is not to contend that the extraordinary range of political thought is reduced to its ideological aspect. Far from it! Rather, the conceptual structure that is endemic to all political thought, and that its analysts have to uncover, always incorporates the basic features of ideologies. They display verbal and ideational practices of decontestation—a notion central to morphological analysis—through which specific meanings, selected from among the spectrum of inevitably contested and contestable conceptions that a concept can and does hold, are conferred on a political discourse. Decontestation has explanatory value in exploring how meaning is fought over, how choices among contested meanings are fixed yet simultaneously fail to be fixed, and how semantic patterns are formed that direct social action through particular routes among possible ones (Freeden 1996).

Every form of political thinking hence contains an ideological *dimension*, an attempt at a semantic ‘solution’ to the messiness and indeterminacy of perceptions and comprehensions of the political world. The decontestations proffered by ideologies are temporary stabilities carved out of fundamental semantic instability in the social and political worlds. The solutions they provide appear as apparently firm and ‘final’ pronouncements on issues such as social justice, liberty, sovereignty, and the like, supplying charts for navigating through what would otherwise be a bewildering social environment. Ideologies provide resources that nourish the crucial capacity of political agents and agencies to offer policy options, without which society, debarred of the routes to making decisions for collectivities, would collapse. That role is vital to the political process. Whatever other noteworthy dimensions political thought also possesses—philosophical, rhetorical, historical—its ideological attributes are striking, salient, and ineluctable.

The actual and invariable nature of political thought is thus potentially competitive, containing within itself two opposite, yet asymmetric, attributes: an inevitable variability and a drive to finality. The former is ever-present yet always constrained; the latter is ephemeral and ultimately unsustainable. Finality (and its dissolution), typicality, ubiquity, fluidity, and complexity are some of the lodestones guiding the morphological analysis of ideologies. Here lies a second level of stability: stability not only in the simplification processes of the ideological practitioner but in the very assertion of the analyst of ideologies that they have a discernible morphology. In fact, ideological morphology is anything but simple, being dynamic, mutating, or shifting from rupture to rupture. Yet the scholarly challenge is to regard the thought practices it reflects as decodable, and decoding implies an internal rhythm or pattern.

THE ROUTES TO MORPHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The paths that have led to the morphological approach to ideologies are diverse. One of the most important is the notion of essentially contested concepts introduced by W. B. Gallie (1955–6). The idea driving Gallie's argument was that disputes over the meanings of political words will, in some cases, be irresolvable rather than contingent. The main reason for that was that political concepts were appraisive, signifying something of value, yet conclusive adjudication among competing evaluations was unattainable. What Gallie did not explore, though, was the structural explanation for such ineliminable contestability. It ensued from the fact that a political concept embraces more conceptions than can be expressed in any single account or definition of that concept. From this pool of components, many combinations are logically possible, though acceptable cultural combinations are fewer, and any combination will still find itself with a pile of unused spare parts, located outside the specific conception that is being employed. Equality cannot simultaneously contain the conceptions of identity and of similarity nor—in the real world—the conceptions of equal desert and equal outcomes. The concept of liberty cannot at the same time mean non-intervention in the domain of an agent and intervention in that domain in order for that agent to make adequate choices. In its conceptual history, liberty has meant unfettered action, but it has also meant the unfettered working out of individual potential. The nature of the constraint that the idea of liberty is meant to remove is quite different in each case (interference with action as against interference with development). But so is the fundamental view of human nature underpinning those differences: human beings as separate and autonomous actors or as mutually interdependent developers (see Freedman and Stears' chapter on 'Liberalism' in this volume).

Deep-seated contestations over the multiple conceptions of equality or liberty exist regardless of the appraisive character of political concepts, emanating from the plurality of the very nature and contents of the concept as a unit of meaning. And ideologies are devices designed to bring about a fleeting—yet temporarily necessary—halt to those competitions by opting for one conceptual structure rather than another. They do that not only with regard to a single concept, but with clusters of concepts, whose mutual ordering creates further morphological variations, conferring specific meaning on each concept in an ideology's domain. Definitions—by definition!—aim to make things finite, paralleling the finality drive of the political. They are excluders as well as includers of meaning, legitimating some meanings while delegitimizing others, negotiating unavoidable absence as well as inevitable presence. No concept comes with a

rulebook stipulating its components.

Since Gallie's original idea, the extensive penetration of the notion of polysemy has reinforced that view of concepts (Collier et al. 2006); and the study of (political) language has moved away from the normative aspiration for precision to emphasizing ambiguity and indeterminacy as its inherent attributes (Freeden 2005), as well as its forms of rhetorical delivery and argumentation (Finlayson 2012, and his chapter on 'Ideology and Political Rhetoric' in this volume). Recognition of problems in transmitting, let alone translating, and in receiving or consuming the meaning of words further underscores the difficulty of holding the meanings of concepts constant, even by fiat. The emergence of the comparative study of political thought has begun to sensitize students of ideology to the pliability and particularity of political language (Freeden and Vincent 2013). Any assumed potential universality of its content is giving way to an awareness of different political vocabularies, diverse meanings assigned to the same political terms, and cultural frameworks that prioritize and 'naturalize' very different assumptions and perceptions.

Underlying the morphological approach is a view of coherence and cohesion that detaches itself from theories of harmony and complementarity, and from assumptions that identify harmony as the default position of good understandings of the world. Instead, limited coherence is attained through the temporary and manufactured assembly of a field of meaning within an untidy world. Although ideology as a macro-phenomenon is ineluctable, no particular ideology is 'natural', given the sphere of shifting and socially contrived conceptual meaning. Yet, where inconsistencies might apply in that sphere, decontestation serves provisionally to eliminate its contradictions and to minimize its tensions. Decontestation never attains perfection because of the ambiguity and indeterminacy of language, but ideologies display stronger and weaker decontestations—sometimes insisting on a highly specific meaning, say, to fundamental human rights; at other times permitting a limited plurality of meanings to attach to their components, as with liberal views on religion. Nonetheless, decontestation underscores the direct link between the study of ideology and of the political because it endeavours to exert semantic power over a resistant linguistic pliability. That is not the optional power of oppression so frequently attached to critical theories of ideology but the necessary affixing of a connotation without which political utterance becomes unmanageable. Decontestation is bolstered both by rational and irrational preferences, each assisted by emotions—pride, loyalty, anger, or fear—and strong passions of commitment that lock them further into place. Accordingly, morphological

analysis reveals the attempts at balancing the centrifugal tendencies of disruption immanent in an ideology's micro-structure and the centripetal grammar and anatomy of ideological patterning that weaves the interdependence characteristic of a semantic field. Ideologies are then seen to consist of affinities of meaning that are interpreted by their devotees as either 'true' or 'plausible'. If 'true', that involves a considerable suspension of belief in the viability of other ideological viewpoints and a suspension of disbelief in one's own grasp of political values and ends (Freeden 2004); if 'plausible', the ideology is considered to be more tentative, requiring a struggle over minds and hearts and open to some modification. Not many people in their capacity of thinking ideologically regard themselves as entertaining even such tentativeness, but the student of ideologies may deduce it from the degree of flexibility or rigidity that applies to the relationship between the core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts of an ideology (see the section 'Cores, Adjacencies and Peripheries'), whether or not that is appreciated by its adherents. Essential contestability and polysemy are neither normal nor comfortable features in the awareness of the methodologically unreflective carriers and articulators of an ideology, but they are indispensable to its analysis.

A second path was trodden through a gradual, often hesitant, broadening of the canon of political thought and political philosophy. The traditional focus on a small number of 'great thinkers' encouraged the development of abstracted comparisons among them, ignoring temporal and spatial differences. That saw a convergence upon 'perennial' political ideas that created a unified body to which students of such ideas could refer. By contrast, in part inspired by intellectual historians and cultural anthropologists, a more extensive purview of what constituted political thought emerged, drawing in sources and sites such as parliaments, the press, public debate, literary works, and myriad vernacular expressions of such thinking (Skinner 2002: 158–187; Müller 2011). The variety of the production, location, and articulation of political thinking necessitated a search for methodologies that could account for, and analyse, its empirical plural forms intelligibly as well as persuasively (Birnbaum 1960). That interest in the minute, the diverse, and the concrete was accompanied by the impact of democratization on the exploration of mass political thinking. Initially that process was presented as a negative and irrational manifestation of human herd behaviour (Le Bon 1896; Hobson 1901). But fascination with undifferentiated and suggestible crowds gave way within democratic cultures to investigating ordinary people (Walsby 1947), whether through the mass observation techniques of interwar Britain (Madge and Harisson 1939), the attentiveness to

the ‘common man’ in American attitude studies (Lane 1962), or various approaches to political psychology (Jost et al. 2009; see also chapter by Jost et al. on ‘Political Ideologies and their Social Psychological Functions’ in this volume).

A third path witnessed a resistance to the facile dichotomy between prescription and description that seemed to separate normative political philosophy from the empirical social sciences. Not only were those boundaries incessantly interpenetrable, but the often dismissive allusion to description ignored the interpretative selectivity that so-called description entailed. In what became a seminal argument, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz raised the practice of social and symbolic mapping to that of a complex intellectual exercise (Geertz 1964). The immediate influence his approach had on the study of ideology was to highlight the configurational role in which the student of ideology had to engage: the delineation and micro-investigation of the patterns that could be teased out of the diverse conceptual concatenations of which ideologies consisted, as well as identifying nodes of important symbolism within an ideology’s internal architecture. The consequent distancing of that scholarly role from ‘mere’ description was another way in which the morphological investigation of ideologies laid claim to be taken seriously by political theorists.

Geertz’s chapter appeared in a volume edited by the political scientist David Apter, who contributed to the resurrection of the reputation of ‘ideology’ by contending that it ‘lends a more honourable and dignified complexion to social conduct’ and that it ‘helps to make more explicit the moral basis of action’ (Apter 1964: 16–17). Apter expressed confidence in ideology as a transmitter of morality, but Geertz too—in a lower key—referred to ideology as ‘objectifying moral sentiment’. Yet such confidence in the morality of ideology also obscured the subjective and relativist forms of morality that ideologies promoted. While it is proper to acknowledge that aspect of ideological discourse, the propagation of morality in a philosophically and ethically recognizable manner, rather than as commonly held codes of conduct, is by no means a necessary feature of ideologies.

Apter’s emphasis on the cognitive role of the social sciences also attributed too much rationality to ideology, instead of allowing for ideologies always to be suspended between rational and emotional, even passionate, support for certain ends and understandings—even the seemingly most cerebral among them, such as liberalism (Freedman 2006). In addition ideologies evince both intentionality and unintentionality in their views of the political, exhibiting what Ricoeur termed the surplus of meaning (Ricoeur 1976), and Gadamer termed

prejudgement (Gadamer 1979). Morphology is not always consciously designed. Even when design enters the picture, it is partial, fragmented, and undergirded by layers of cultural and political meaning that are pre-assimilated into rational thinking.

A fourth element is not really a path but a fresh development. Morphological analysis has anticipated the current attention bestowed by some political theorists on non-idealized ‘real’ politics and political thinking (Swift 2008). Its reputation has been retrospectively enhanced through the recent rediscovery, by a new school of realism in political theory, that the actual study of political thought has intrinsic and heuristic value, no less and possibly greater than ideal-type political theory. That message had already been made clear by the morphological school without claiming for itself the term ‘realist’ (Humphrey 2012). However, there still are significant differences between the concerns of some realist theorists, such as Raymond Geuss, and the morphological approach. One of them hinges on the telling distinction between prescriptive and interpretative realism (Freedman 2012). The former seeks to advance from examining the properties of existing institutions and contexts to recommendations for a good polity, retaining an acute normative edge. It deems political power as something to be constrained rather than harnessed, and frequently rejects ideology as a distorting view of the world (Geuss 2008). The latter, as already noted, regards the study of ideologies as making sense of the actual manifestations of political thinking in a society, with a view to understanding and to knowing—however limited and provisional those may be—prior to prescribing.

UNENDING IDEOLOGY

One consequence of the morphological approach to ideologies is yet another rejection of the ‘end of ideology’ thesis (Bell 1962; Shils 1968), and with it the ‘beginning of ideology’ thesis that locates it in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, post-Destutt de Tracy and the French Revolution. That rejection is supplementary to the historical and ideological reasons discussed by Bo Stråth in **Ideology and Conceptual History*[oxfordhb-9780199585977-e-013]*. Because the discursive use of political ideas always and inevitably involves conceptual and linguistic selectivity, patterning, and decontestation, it is inconceivable in the senses sanctioned by the morphological approach that any significant expression of political thinking can be non-ideological. If one retort to that is that the concept of ideology is itself essentially contestable, it is not

effectively contestable. There is scant evidence to suggest that whenever human beings think, talk, or write about politics they refrain from making selective value-judgements—consciously or unintentionally—about the nature, ends, and desirability of the political arrangements that concern them or that they encounter. The ‘end of ideology’ school is often associated with the type of conservative thinking that voices great scepticism about the role of ideas, contrasting them with a ‘pragmatic’, matter-of-fact, concrete interpretation of social conduct as spontaneously unstructured, instrumental, and contingent. Its adherents refuse to recognize that such a perspective has its own ideological features, rejecting planning, political introspection, and future-oriented social visions (Scruton 2012).

To call a political utterance, text or act non-ideological is to refuse to extract ideological import from what it means, be that meaning disguised, muted, or, conversely, extreme. It is to ignore that even given an hypothetical end to all ideological contestation—itsself logically possible in a make-believe world but effectively impossible in the non-cloned and linguistically and ideationally rich world we inhabit—individuals would still subscribe to the one remaining ideology. Even on the micro-level complete agreement on the meaning of a concept does not eliminate its principled and potential contestability; it merely points to the intellectual and emotional force of the decontestation: some decontestations are always more durable than others but nonetheless culturally and logically contingent. On the most general level it endorses one of those frequent ‘endisms’ to which the human imagination falls prey, only for new variants of the ‘ended’ form to emerge (see Brick’s chapter on ‘The End of Ideology Thesis’ in this volume). Even toning down the intractable conflict associated with totalitarian or absolutist ideologies—itsself a utopian aspiration as new forms of holistic dogma re-emerge unabated—cannot eliminate the kind of contestation that still occurs beneath the level of ostensible macro-consensus. Contestation is always there, or lurking around the corner. The malleability and invariable contingency of conceptual arrangements underlie the constant regeneration of ideological positions, for reasons found in conceptual morphology, in linguistic indeterminacy, and in cultural diversity. The latter two are necessarily subsumed within the morphological approach.

CORES, ADJACENCIES, AND PERIPHERIES

Because morphology relates to patterns and structure, it invokes a consideration of the rigidity or flexibility of such structures as loci of linguistic and semantic

power. Hence another important corollary of the morphological approach is to encourage a move away from the notion that ideologies are always and only totalizing, doctrinaire, and dogmatic, locked into an unyielding configuration. That move occurs in tandem with a challenge to the containing of ideologies within crisp boundaries. The clash of the totalitarian ideologies in the first half of the twentieth century imposed on the study of ideology a view that amplified the ongoing perception of its subject-matter as uncompromising and closed on the one hand, and pervasive and oppressive on the other (Halle 1971; Bracher 1984). Some of those views originated in Marx and Engels' powerful critique of ideology as dissimulative, manipulative, and distorted, and had already been nourished by earlier and parallel evaluations of ideology as impractical, metaphysical, and highly abstract (Freeden 2011). The notion of ideology as an alien set of ideas with little relevance to the real world (Minogue 1985), except as a disruptive force, emphasized the relative immunity of its frameworks to change or adaptation—indeed, their absence was thought to be its overriding characteristic. The image of such an unbending structure had some purchase with respect to ideologies such as fascism, in particular its Nazi variant, and communism, in particular its Stalinist phase. But it deflected attention from the far more subtle internal architecture of ideologies, blinding scholarship to the existence of ideologies that did not conform to that model, and making them almost invisible. Moreover, the morphological rigidity of totalitarian ideologies generates brittleness, paradoxically rendering them more susceptible to fracturing.

Ideologies possess an elaborate structure, analysable on two main axes. First is a three-tier distinction between concepts (the middle tier), their micro-components, and their macro-conceptual concatenations. As discussed above, the arrangements among the components generate diverse conceptions of any concept; while the clusters of concepts form the specific anatomy of an ideology. Within those relatively flexible clusters lies the second axis, the distinction between core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts. The relationships among concepts are decisive here: the relative positioning of concepts is not set in stone and will fluctuate—though at variable speeds—over time and across space. The notion of a core concept signals its long-term durability—though not its inevitability—and suggests that the concept is present in all known cases of the ideology in question. But it also suggests a second characteristic: core concepts are indispensable to holding the ideology together, and are consequently accorded preponderance in shaping that ideology's ideational content. Thus, liberalism always appears to contain the concept of liberty, among other core

concepts. It is both ubiquitous and indispensable; its absence from a professed instance of liberalism would raise profound doubts about whether that case is indeed a member of the liberal family. Revealing the conceptual morphology of an ideology assists in assessing its staying power—its longevity or ephemerality—and its claim to social validation.

In addition, the morphological approach distances itself from more simple accounts of ideological distinctiveness and diversity by dismissing identifications of the major ideologies with one central concept (e.g. tradition for conservatism, liberty for liberalism, or equality for socialism). It maintains that even ideological cores contain a number of key concepts that, although omnipresent, may be accorded different proportional weight in each particular manifestation of the investigated ideology. If among the core concepts of liberalism we find not only liberty but individuality and (self-)development, these may nonetheless occupy varying amounts of space vis-à-vis each other within that core, representing different variants of liberalism. What ideologies signify is therefore indicated by a dual spatial positioning, involving both distance and volume. Thus, for some liberals, liberty as unimpeded personal agency may restrict—though not eradicate—the possibility of development; for others individuality will be closely linked to progress, while the conception of liberty as licence will be ruled out. The interplay among the multiplicity of core concepts in any ideology accounts for a constant mutation within the ideational boundaries of a core that will—loosely or more tightly—anchor the ideology and secure its components. These form the basis for the rhetorical rhythms that reverberate through ideological structure.

Here the adjacent and peripheral concepts come into play, for their own positioning impacts profoundly on the internal mutations of the core itself. Adjacent concepts are second-ranking in the pervasiveness and breadth of the meanings they impart to the ideology in which they are located. They do not appear in all its instances, but are crucial in finessing the core and anchoring it—at least temporarily—into a more determinate and decontested semantic field. Thus, some of the adjacent concepts surrounding the liberal core would be well-being, democracy, and property. Combinations of those have pulled liberal ideology in different directions, generating versions that emphasize social solidarity and mutual responsibility—leading to welfare state policies; or versions that emphasize entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency—leading to market-oriented policies (see Freeden and Stears' chapter on 'Liberalism' in this volume). Even in such a division the morphological arrangements may produce hybrids of the two sets.

Finally, ideologies contain peripheries in a dual sense. The first pertains to more marginal and generally more ephemeral concepts that change at a faster pace diachronically and culturally. Empire or elitism have come and gone, or have been much reduced, in liberal ideologies, while localism and ethnicity have joined the outer circle of liberal concepts. Whether they are there to stay—that is, whether they will move from the periphery towards a more central position—is a matter for future observation and judgement. The second sense pertains to the perimeter interface between the conceptual arrangement of an ideology and the social practices, events, and contingencies that occur in its environment. Financial crises, terrorism, mass migration, climate change, or the discovery of oil will impact on an ideology and be decoded and absorbed by it—in acceptance, rejection, or obfuscating mode—inducing partial readjustments of the adjacent and core architecture in order to react to or pre-empt such ‘externalities’. We might liken those to a continuous bombardment of Earth by meteorites and asteroids, all of which have a variable impact on the body they enter.

Ideologies are thus sites of multiple navigational routes—and hence of manifold meanings—through the pool of concepts associated with the political. Within any specific ideological family the re-ranking of a concept’s significance will cause it to migrate across an ideological space on the centrality–periphery axis, while the multiplicity of concepts transforms a linear configuration of ideology into a spatial one. The category of ideology in general contains within itself the potential for infinite variety and alteration, but in every society some routes are regarded as impermissible or illegitimate. Any chosen—or contingently alighted on—path is subject to logical constraints (e.g. it is difficult to be an extreme individualist and simultaneously to accord the state primacy over the individual) and cultural constraints (e.g. diverse readings of gender differences in and across societies filter understandings of the political significance of being a woman). Within those constraints any particular ideology offers an even more specific semantic path, out of the many available ones, from periphery to core and from core back to periphery, in its attempt to render political meaning determinate. Two provisos accompany those journeys. First, their highways and byways may change abruptly or gradually. In a two-way trip from periphery to centre and back we may find over time that entities on the perimeter have been replaced by others. Second, unlike the scalar correspondence between a topographical map and a physical reality, the identifying of core and adjacent concepts, and their relative positioning, will always remain a matter for interpretation alongside empirical observation.

Three further attributes of ideology follow from the morphological approach: First, in holding an ideology we possess the imaginative and discursive power to deflect and ignore those meteorites and asteroids, or to contest their impact, and to make judgements on the desirability of a route. Second, the conceptual fluidity of ideologies always contains the potential for renewal as well as dissolution. Third, against the assertions and assumptions about the comprehensiveness of total ideologies by their adherents as well as their investigators (see Gentile's chapter on 'Total and Totalitarian Ideologies' in this volume), no ideology can contain a complete map of political reality, let alone a total vision of politics.

Finally, visual displays of ideology—posters, the architecture of public buildings, or a military parade—may also, in slightly different ways, be subjected to morphological as well as symbolic decoding. They too are distributors of significance and allocators of differently weighted stories about their societies.

IDEOLOGICAL FAMILIES

But how do we know which components help to mould the contours of a specific ideological family? The Gadamerian notion of prejudgement in our expectations of what an ideology contains is helpful here: we approach existing ideologies already on the basis of the content their name conventionally connotes. What constitutes socialism reflects to a considerable degree the naming of a particular constellation of political concepts, born out of discursive diachronic traditions and continuously reassessed in the light of earlier or dominant meanings. Thus, the primacy of human interdependence, equality, welfare, the active nature of human beings, and the future as delivering beneficial change are core socialist concepts, to which we relate every new bid to join the socialist ideological family. State socialism, Marxism, guild socialism, syndicalism, anarcho-syndicalism, communism, and many other variants may claim such membership and their acceptance will subtly or drastically alter family characteristics. On the other hand, National Socialism—nominally a self-defined type of socialism—has failed to make the cut in terms of its conceptual profile. Self-definition and other-definition, through recourse to accumulated evidence, bounce off each other in establishing the reach of an ideological family. And when it comes to new ideologies or ideological segments, we will have to engage our own analytical creativity in identifying their components.

We are familiar with Wittgenstein's conception of a family resemblance, in

which a loose connection between members links them together. But ideological morphology differs in one important respect. Wittgenstein allowed for some members of a family to have no common features at all with some others. For him those families are ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ (Wittgenstein 1958: 32), provided every member shared common features with a goodly number of relatives. Synchronically, however, all members of an ideological family will share at least most, if not all, of the core features across the board, even if the influence of adjacent concepts on that core will present the core in very different colours. Otherwise it becomes difficult to justify applying the same name to all the variants of an ideological grouping. Yes, they overlap and criss-cross but they do form roughly identifiable patterns—with less familiar hybrids at their margins. Vagueness and inexactitude prevail, but that does not impede us from searching for a ‘Gestalt’. Ideological structure is akin to furnishing a room with modular units from which many sensible—and not a few absurd—arrangements are fashioned, resulting in each case in a broadly recognizable ‘profile’.

All that is subject to the level of magnification we choose to apply to our studies. Identifying the shared features harbouring under one name enables us to engage in the macro-practice of classifying political thinking, as well as ensuring the removal of some ideological pretenders. For other heuristic purposes we may prefer to zoom in, microstyle, on differences that challenge the unity of the family, as for example when neoliberalism moves too far into domains we might call either libertarianism or conservatism. Or we may zoom in on a particular area with which the ideology is associated or seeks to promote—say welfare policy—voiced by a powerful or articulate group within the family. Magnification and contraction are important by-products of the morphological approach, revealing the segmented nature of ideological discourse, its oscillation between the general and the specific, the alterations in messages caused by minute changes in conceptual relationships that an ideology imparts, and the advantages in presentation and debate that different magnifications can provide to disseminators of an ideology.

The commonality of the thought-practices in an ideological family does not imply an essentialism, nor the universality of their semantic content—that content is at the most, though rarely, nigh-universal. Rather, it is to maintain that there are some core concepts that can be identified empirically—through historical as well as current evidence—as running through all known cases of a given ideological pattern. It is not amiss to identify patterns and categories that are common to human thinking, despite the different content with which they are

filled. That search for patterns is a valid aim of the social sciences. It attempts to create heuristic order without which meaning cannot be bestowed on, or extracted from, the raw material of thinking and acting. It also parallels the need for participants to extract a semblance of order from the social world itself, as part of the legitimating or delegitimizing functions of ideology. Devoid of any pattern, both participant and analyst become disoriented. The commonality of ideological patterns—granted the modicum of fluidity such patterns embody—can only outline their contents, but cannot even begin to fix their meaning without stipulating adjacent and peripheral concepts, at which point all members of the genus begin to display their species and differentiae. Hence it remains a contingent universalism, dependent on what political and historical experience conjures up. More accurately, it is a form of quasicontingency: the categories apply to every instance while their diverse occupants do not (Freeden 1996: 65–6, 68).

SEEING THROUGH BOUNDARIES

The focus consequently shifts to the boundaries between ideologies (as distinct from the boundaries between the various branches of political theory). At the beginning of this essay the conventional notion of boundaries between producers and non-producers of ideology was challenged, human societies being rich depositories of ideology both at vernacular and specialist levels. But the morphological approach also profoundly challenges the notion of clear or fixed boundaries among ideologies, because the conceptual permutations and consequent fluidity of ideological positions suggest a relationship of continua among neighbouring ideologies rather than sharp differentiation, and in some cases even a seemingly haphazard distribution of concepts, as in a scatter-diagram, over a range of ideologies. Ideologies do not necessarily contain mutually exclusive components; what differentiates one ideology from another is the relative location and significance assigned to common components. In some of their notable variants, liberalism and socialism have shared components historically (progress and well-being), as have liberalism and conservatism (private property and constitutionalism) or, for that matter, as have conservatism, socialism, and nationalism (the relative primacy of group over individual wills).

The assertion of boundaries by an ideology's adherents is thus itself an ideological-rhetorical move that assists the process of decontestation and competition over the control of public political language. When employed by carriers of ideologies, boundary formation is a morphological instrument of

collective self-identification, while when addressed by scholars who subscribe to morphological analysis, it is an object to be decoded, queried, probed, and challenged. Contrary to recent tendencies in political theory that either reinforce binaries or transcend them by holding them in a constructive and mutually informing agonistic balance, the vagueness and indeterminacy posited by the morphological approach suggest a third, compelling, route of conceptualizing the political, one that bypasses the boundary problem and its implied 'otherness' and 'difference', replacing it with mutating patterns, profiles, footprints, overlaps, and—ultimately—reconfiguration as typical spatial forms of political thinking.

The fluidity of ideological morphology relates to a sea-change in the semantic evaluation of knowledge. Various Marxist interpretations regarded ideology as a form of misproducing knowledge, when knowledge was equated with truth and ideology with its distortion; hence the eradication of ideology was both justified and expected once proper, unalienated, social relationships were re-established. But a decisive move occurred, away from defining knowledge as truth, and ideology as contra knowledge. The morphological approach aligns itself to a methodology that obviates truth not by denying but by ignoring much of it, just as early Marxist critical ideology standpoints ignored the real features of ideology and remained content with unmasking it. That methodology implies that ideologies may or may not contain truth, but that issue—however central to ethicists—is irrelevant to identifying the semantic fields that ideologies shape. For those who would sooner see knowledge as tentative, fragmentary, and accordingly indeterminate, it is ideology that constitutes a major source of knowledge. Knowledge then pertains more to the organizing of understanding and information than to their conclusive verification. That insight is reinforced by appreciating an ideology's internal relationships. The double bind of ideological morphology is that its decontestation devices can present it as substantively and semantically fixed as far as the individual and groups that employ it are concerned—that is, proponents of an ideology often believe that they are making truth statements; while revealing to the penetrating eyes of scholars its permanent contingency as an ideational construct. Whether the truth can be permanently contingent is a philosophical issue that critical ideology theory might reject, yet morphological analysis can set aside.

Here also is a link to the polysemy that most varieties of liberal thinking find attractive. Openness, diversity, and the spontaneity of liberal agency are receptive to the morphological method of analysis, as is the notion of competition for influence and impact. The possibility of multiple semantic

decodings reinforces the tentativeness that is one aspect of the liberal spirit of inquiry, but that tentativeness has to cohabit with the parallel and equally prevailing liberal assertion of purposiveness. The resulting tension is evident in the case of unintended morphological combinations, which cannot be contained within the liberal notion of autonomous choice: for example protecting individuality versus respecting the inherited cultural life-style preferences of groups. As for the practitioners of liberal ideology, operating within the logic of contestation, they will try to hold non-negotiable liberal values such as human rights, constitutionalism, or individual development within as narrow a range of meanings as is feasible in culturally concrete instances.

PARTY, CONSTITUTION, AND IDEOLOGY

The predominance of party political ideologies has exaggerated differences among ideologies for propagandist and power-gaining purposes, just as the teaching of ideologies in basic university courses has occasionally done the same for pedagogical purposes. There is no doubt that party and ideology can frequently be reinforcing companions. But ideologists in campaigning mode generally distort or grossly simplify their opponents' positions, and strong decontestation is the tool through which such artificial ruptures are made, serving—as we have seen—the political quest for finality. They are also prone to dichotomizations intended to offer easy choices to the consumers and targets of ideology, especially apparent in the language of ideologues—the dogmatic ideologists who thrive on excessive rigidity of structure and conceptual fixity. That dichotomization is often mirrored in theories of ideologies and of political thinking in general, where contrary pairings such as friend/enemy, harmony/agonism, or East/West persist. Undoubtedly, dichotomies provide powerful rhetorical mapping for views of the world among ideological practitioners and their reinstatement of sharp conceptual boundaries constitutes a prime ideological device. Colonial and postcolonial ideologies offer a good instance of the retention of dichotomies, while Marxism exaggerates them in order to transcend them emphatically. The micro-analysis of ideologies, however, draws very different conclusions about the content of ideologies, accepting the strategy of mutually exclusionary decontestation as both politically necessary and epistemologically chimerical. For to present ideologies and politics as the site of dichotomous divisions—both by actors and by analysts—undermines the subtlety of ideological architecture that the morphological approach promotes.

Ideologies are nevertheless strongly associated in popular and governmental discourse with political parties, and are frequently thought to be reflected in the official programmes of parties. Parties indeed offer an illuminating sub-set of ideological discourse, production, and implementation, but no more than that. The regular crafting of party manifestos is considered to be an indication of the ideology the party wishes to preserve or introduce when in power (Budge 1994), although scepticism towards ideologies in general is fostered by the frequent reluctance or inability of parties in power to deliver on what they promised. Much empirical research into ideologies is based on the collation and processing of attitudes that appear to correlate with the convenient dichotomies that parties promote, such as left–right, or liberal versus conservative in the USA (Knight 2006)—though the evocation of such spatial positioning possesses rhetorical as well as substantive import (White 2011). Multi-party systems invariably generate a greater awareness of ideological differences in a society, as does coalition-building. Significantly, political parties are not only the receptors and distributors of ideologies, but their internal organization as well as their competition over power through elections and lobbying has an immediate effect on the morphology of ‘official’ ideologies, enhancing or contracting the allocation of emphasis within the programmatic menus they offer (Hinich and Munger 1994). After all, parties—particularly but not only in democratic environments—act as channels that appeal to and reflect public opinion as well as attempting to shape the ideological dispositions of the citizenry, fusing rational and emotional performativity. The link between voting patterns and ideology thus becomes salient (Jackson and Kingdon 1992). Hence the perimeter of party ideology is a site of intensive mutability as everyday events and contingencies operate at the ideology’s margins and may penetrate, or be invited, to travel inward and back out again, drawing out faster or slower reactive patterns. From there parties transmit concretizations of core and adjacent concepts into the realm of governance and react to the more pressing demands and occurrences from wider social spheres.

Party organization contributes towards the increase or decrease of ideological polarization through what has been termed ‘value cleavages’; it can change the salience of interest and pressure groups and the sub-ideologies they carry within a broad ideological family; and it can encourage ideological elasticity by refocusing on different electoral demands or presumed preferences in the process of negotiating policy (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 520–1). Depending on how wide the net of targeted voters is perceived to be, parties and politicians may deliberately introduce an element of ambiguity into their statements, thus

reducing decontestation in the pursuit of electoral support. Not least, parties undertake to ‘control’ the future, by translating general visions into concrete policies and plans, and in so doing they offer reassurances about overcoming uncertainty and indeterminacy. The left–right scalar rhetoric of democratic party systems is also misleading on a morphological account of ideologies, because the diverse components of any ideological grouping are never all unequivocally to the ‘left’ or ‘right’ of a neighbouring ideology (Dyrberg 2009). Rather, multiple spatial relationships—in terms of radicalism or conservatism—are created between any two ideologies. In sum, much work in streamlining and honing ‘consumable’ ideologies emanates from the party system, which introduces its own constraints on the default complexity of ideologies.

Constitutions, too, are sites of ideological framing, prescribing what appears to be a strong set of decontested interpretations of social and political life. They may be discursive window-dressing, as was the Soviet constitution of 1936, or foundational documents that are referred to in all major cases of political and ideological dispute, as with the constitution of the United States. On closer inspection, the ideological fixity that is a requirement of authoritative decision-making, but a myth obscured in the language of constitutional quasi-legality and affirmation, evaporates, and the role of interpretation, whether by Supreme Court Justices themselves or by other socio-political circles, asserts itself. The chequered history of the 14th Amendment phrase ‘the equal protection of the laws’, giving rise both to racially discriminatory ‘separate but equal’ legislation and to the civil rights movement tellingly illustrates the semantic flexibility embedded in a constitution (Cox 1976). The language of political and legal texts cannot produce fixed meanings, and frantic decontestation upon decontestation is heaped in particular on documents with pivotal ideological import in the struggle over the control of the political and of public policy.

PARALLEL SCHOOLS

The morphological approach to ideology intersects with other recent developments in the study of political ideas. Three of those are conceptual history, poststructuralism and post-Marxism, and discourse analysis. Conceptual history began as a series of interventions in the interpretation of the history of political thought, mainly on three dimensions. It too identified the concept as the unit of meaning, but saw it moving on a diachronic trajectory as its synchronic contexts—external events and group practices—changed. That trajectory was future-oriented, expressing the increasing complexity and capacity for

abstraction incorporated into concepts as they became modern. Second, it regarded concepts as subject to continuous contestation with respect to their meanings. Conceptual historians thus moved away from essentialism to endorse polysemy. Third, it too sanctioned the investigation of vernacular as well as 'élite' languages (Koselleck 1985: 73–91; Koselleck 2002: 20–37).

One contribution of the morphological analysis of ideologies to conceptual history has been to encourage the latter to depart from pursuing the changes occurring in single concepts and to plot instead encounters among concepts as they collide into each other—leaving debris and fragments of one concept attached to another—or as they interact within ideological families (Steinmetz 2011). As argued above, any given concept is surrounded by other concepts, located at a node through which many intersecting and complementary concepts travel. Morphological analysis also deals more effectively with moving away from the linearity postulated in the field of conceptual history towards an appreciation of the parallel lives that a concept can lead synchronically, being located simultaneously in different semantic fields that, at most, overlap. There is also the methodological issue of the relative narrowness of the sources employed by some conceptual historians, preferring a lexicographical approach over the utilization of broader pools of evidence, textual, oral, and visual.

Poststructuralists and post-Marxists have emphasized the contingency of political discourse and the articulatory role of ideology (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996). For Laclau and Mouffe, ideology holds disparate elements together, forming a (transitory) social identity and bestowing on society a discursive and symbolic unity to counterbalance its internal dislocations and antagonisms (see also Norval 2000, and Norval's chapter on 'Poststructuralist Conceptions of Ideology' in this volume; Glynos and Howarth 2007). That may underestimate the disruptive components of an ideology (a feature not notably in the sights of Marxist theory) when its internal arrangements are directed at challenging existing social orders through offering innovative conceptual combinations. In another post-Marxist version advocated by Slavoj Žižek, elaborating the psychoanalytical theories of Jacques Lacan, ideologies are fantasmic substitutes for an unfathomable void: the lack of the real world that needs to be papered over because of the impossibility of its representation. Ideologies are nonetheless discussed in great detail, but only in order to unveil the illusory nature of those 'spectres', not to explore their diverse properties (Žižek 1994).

There is also a key difference between the evaluative perspectives that post-Marxists project onto ideologies and those with which morphological analysis

aligns itself. Although post-Marxists have a far more sophisticated understanding of ideology than the early Marxists, they too engage in Marxist ideology critique. However, for them ideology critique involves sensitization to an ongoing problematic, not—as for the Marxists—the elimination of a problem. That process was already initiated by Althusser (1971). Post-Marxists are chiefly concerned to cut through ideology in order to establish what human identity is, how a subject is constructed, and what reality might be. Subscribers to ideology critique of various kinds are sceptical about analyses of ideology that refrain from exposing its manipulative and oppressive aspects. They frequently join hands with moral philosophers in accusing such analyses of merely proffering a narrative while failing to introduce an ethical cutting edge.

The morphological approach, however, possesses its own evaluation and critique potential, but it is of a different kind. Morphological analysis is appraisive rather than descriptive in its investigation of its subject-matter, imposing a selective map instead of reproducing existing contours. Refraining from substantive prescription, or from developing a largely hostile exposure of the biases and distortions of ideology, does not render the study of ideologies uncritical. Nor does morphological analysis ally itself with extreme relativist positions; it can still maintain that ideologies exhibit better and worse conceptual arrangements, and evaluate them on the work that its practitioners are charged with accomplishing. Communicability, persuasiveness, electoral success, popular support, intellectual soundness (to include minimal logical coherence and affinity with an empirically-observable world), affective identification, imaginative creativity, the durability of problem-managing, adaptability, are some of the criteria for assessing the quality and the efficacy of an ideology, quite apart from the ethical values it endeavours to promote.

Discourse analysis is closely focused on language, as is the morphological approach. Moreover, it assigns significance to some forms of linguistic structure—syntax or word frequency would be such instances. But that also constitutes a clear difference: discourse analysis stresses the direct investigation of grammar and language in terms of word order, frequency, and emphasis (coalescing with some features of rhetoric that relate to the persuasive performativity of ideologies) (de Beaugrande 1997), whereas conceptual morphology examines the construction and distribution of meaning through units of ideas rather than units of language. Of course, discursive emphasis plays a notable role in changing the internal weight of conceptual units and sub-units. One of its most salient variants is critical discourse analysis (CDA), which pursues a strong normativity in offering resources to combat the social domination practices that

are replicated in language. Language is regarded as a repository of oppressive power that needs to be transformed (Fairclough, 2001; Wodak 2009). Morphological analysis does not deny that as a possible, though far from omnipresent, feature of language, but its perspective on power relates mainly to the spatial architecture of concepts and the efficacy of decontestation.

To conclude, morphological analysis extracts four salient features of ideologies. *Proximity* draws attention to the interrelationship of the conceptual meanings that ideologies contain: each concept within an ideology is crucially informed by the conceptual environment in which it is located. *Permeability* identifies the intersecting of ideological positions, indicating that ideologies are by no means mutually exclusive in their substantive stances, nor are they separated by clear ideational boundaries. *Proportionality* refers to the relative weight that the conceptual components of an ideology possess. Mostly, ideologies are to be distinguished not by the presence or absence of a concept, but by the impact and centrality attributed to it within one ideology in contrast to its downplaying in another. And the *priority* accorded to core over adjacent and adjacent over peripheral concepts emphasizes the major political role of ideologies as ranking devices for socially valued or urgent goods. Holding all of these strands together is an intellectual commitment to unearthing and elucidating an influential and pervasive thought-practice in its concrete abundance, variety, and intricacy. Above all, by understanding the morphology of ideologies we alight on an obviously endemic feature of the political in general, one that assists us in working out the diverse patterns, potential and limitations of political thought, and through it of political life.

REFERENCES

- Althusser, L. 1971. *Essays on Ideology*. London: Verso.
- Apter, D. E. (ed.) 1964. *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: The Free Press.
- Balkin, J. M. 1998. *Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- de Beaugrande, R. 1997. 'The story of discourse analysis'. Pp. 35–62 in *Discourse as Structure and Process*, ed. T. A. van Dijk. London: Sage Publications.
- Bell, D. 1962. *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. New York: Collier Books.
- Birnbaum, N. 1960. 'The sociological study of ideology (1940–1960). A trend report and bibliography', *Current Sociology*, 9: 91–172.
- Bracher, K. D. 1984. *The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*. London: Methuen.
- Brown, L. B. 1973. *Ideology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Budge, I. 1994. 'A new spatial theory of party competition: Uncertainty, ideology and policy equilibria viewed comparatively and temporally', *British Journal of Political Science*, 24: 443–67.

- Collier, D., F. D. Hidalgo, and A. O. Maciuceanu 2006. 'Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11: 211–46.
- Cox, A. 1976. *The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- van Dijk, T. A. 1998. *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*. London: Sage Publications.
- Dyrberg, T. B. 2009. 'What is beyond right/left? The case of New Labour', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 14: 133–53.
- Fairclough, N. 2001. *Language and Power*. 2nd edn. Harlow: Longman.
- Finlayson, A. 2012. 'Rhetoric and the political theory of ideologies', *Political Studies*, 60: 751–67.
- Freeden, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeden, M. 2003. *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeden, M. 2004. 'Editorial: Essential contestability and effective contestability', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9: 3–11, 225.
- Freeden, M. 2005. 'What should the "political" in political theory explore?' *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 13: 113–34.
- Freeden, M. 2006. 'Liberal passions: Reason and emotion in late and post-Victorian liberal thought'. Pp. 136–49 in *Politics and Culture in Victorian Britain: Essays in Memory of Colin Matthew*, eds. P. Ghosh and L. Goldman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeden, M. 2011. 'Ideology and conceptual history: The interrelationship between method and meaning'. Pp. 73–101 in *Political Concepts and Time: New Approaches to Conceptual History*, ed. J. Fernández Sebastián. Santander: McGraw Hill/Cantabria University Press.
- Freeden, M. 2012. 'Editorial: Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 17: 1–11.
- Freeden, M. and A. Vincent eds. 2013. *Comparative Political Thought: Theorizing Practices*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
- Gadamer, H.-G. 1979. *Truth and Method*. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Gallie, W. B. 1955–6. 'Essentially contested concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56: 167–98.
- Geertz, C. 1964. 'Ideology as a cultural system'. Pp. 47–76 in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. D. E. Apter. New York: The Free Press.
- Geuss, R. 2008. *Philosophy and Real Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Glynos, J. and D. Howarth 2007. *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
- Graham, G. 1989. 'Beyond ideology: Politics and pragmatism'. Pp. 175–87 in *The Structure of Modern Ideology*, ed. N. O'Sullivan. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Gramsci, A. 1971. *Selections from Prison Notebooks*. Eds. Q. Hoare and G. Newell-Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Halle, L. J. 1971. *The Ideological Imagination*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Hamilton, M. B. 1987. 'The elements of the concept of ideology', *Political Studies*, 35: 18–38.
- Hinich, M. J. and Munger, M. C. 1994. *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hobson, J. A. 1901. *The Psychology of Jingoism*. London: Grant Richards.
- Humphrey, M. 2012. 'Getting "real" about political ideas: Conceptual morphology and the realist critique of Anglo-American political philosophy'. Pp. 241–58 in *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden*, eds. B. Jackson and M. Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, J. E. and Kingdon, J. W. 1992. 'Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes', *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 805–23.
- Jost, John T., Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorrisdottir (eds.) 2009. *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Kim, H. and R. C. Fording 2001. 'Voter ideology, the economy, and the international environment in western democracies, 1952–1989', *Political Behavior*, 23: 53–73.
- Knight, K. 2006. 'Transformation of the concept of ideology in the twentieth century', *American Political Science Review*, 100: 619–26.
- Knutsen, O. and E. Scarbrough 1995. 'Cleavage politics'. Pp. 492–523 in *The Impact of Values*, eds. J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Koselleck, R. 1985. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Koselleck, R. 2002. *The Practice of Conceptual History*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Laclau, E. 1996. 'The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1: 201–20.
- Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.
- Lane, R. E. 1962. *Political Ideology*. New York: The Free Press.
- Le Bon, G. 1896. *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. London: T.F. Unwin.
- Madge, C. and T. Harisson 1939. *Britain by Mass-Observation*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Marx, K. and F. Engels 1974. *The German Ideology*. Ed. C. J. Arthur. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Minogue, K. 1985. *Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Müller, J.-W. 2011. *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Norval, A. 2000. 'The things we do with words—contemporary approaches to the analysis of ideology', *British Journal of Political Science*, 30: 313–46.
- Oakeshott, M. 1962. *Rationalism in Politics*. London: Methuen & Co.
- Ricoeur, P. 1976. *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Riff, M. A. 1987. *Dictionary of Modern Political Ideologies*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sargent, L. T. 2009. *Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis*, 14th edn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Scruton, R. 2012. 'Ideology and the environment'. Pp. 289–99 in *Politics and Ideology*, eds. K. Almqvist and A. Linklater. Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Axson Johnson Foundation.
- Shils, E. 1968. 'The concept and function of ideology'. Pp. 66–76 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7, ed. D. L. Sills. USA: The Macmillan Company & the Free Press.
- Skinner, Q. 2002. *Visions of Politics*, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Steinmetz, W. 2011. 'New perspectives on the study of language and power in the short twentieth century'. Pp. 3–51 in *Political Language in the Age of Extremes*, ed. W. Steinmetz. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Swift, A. 2008. 'The value of philosophy in nonideal circumstances', *Social Theory and Practice*, 34: 363–87.
- Walsby, H. 1947. *The Domain of Ideologies*. Glasgow: William MacLellan.
- White, J. 2011. 'Left and Right as political resources', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 16: 123–44.
- Wittgenstein, L. 1958. *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wodak, R. 2009. *The Discourse of Politics in Action*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Žižek, S. 1994. 'The spectre of ideology'. Pp. 1–33 in *Mapping Ideology*, ed. S. Žižek. London: Verso.

CHAPTER 8 CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY

LOIS MCNAY

IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE: DISCLOSURE AND REFLEXIVITY

THROUGHOUT its seventy years and more as an established school of social research, there have been repeated attempts on the part of Critical Theorists to define exactly what distinguishes their ‘critical’ grasp of the world from other, more ‘conventional’ intellectual approaches. Some would argue that, nowadays, in an intellectually diverse milieu, Critical Theory no longer has (if it ever did) a monopoly of the epithet that its first generation of thinkers originally claimed in the era of the Second World War. In a post-positivist, post-metaphysical world, the grounds for the assertion of the superior analytical insight of critical over so-called ‘traditional’ theory no longer remain. Nonetheless, whilst Critical Theorists today would undoubtedly accept that there is a greater diversity of thought about the world that overlaps with their own approach, they would still maintain that there is something distinctive about their particular intellectual endeavour. At base, this distinctiveness flows from the guiding principle of Critical Theory, namely, to produce an account of society that has the practical aim of unmasking domination and, in doing so, revealing possible paths to emancipation: ‘to conceptualize society in a way that [makes] visible its historical fault lines, revealing the contradictions and emancipatory potentials that mark a given time and place’ (Fraser 2004: 1107). Continuing its Marxist inheritance, the founding premise of Critical Theory is that capitalism is an exploitative and deeply irrational system and it consequently has profoundly alienating, even pathological effects, upon the bodies and minds of its subjects. The job of the Critical Theorist is to try to expose these insidious distortions in order to overcome them and, within this general project, the notion of ideology critique plays a particularly central role. Ideology critique has two principal dimensions of disclosure and reflexivity. Disclosing critique tries to penetrate forms of ideological domination, the ways in which symbolic forms (words, images, ideas) are used to naturalize and legitimate exploitative and unequal social relations and, above all, to manufacture political quiescence. The central problem for ideology critique is how a social system that produces such unjustifiable inequalities and such a degraded, heteronomous mode of living

ensures the apparent passive consent of its subjects. It is only by exposing these deep mechanisms of subjection that a way to emancipation can be revealed. Crucially, then, the negative moment of sociological critique is always inextricably intertwined with the positive moment of normative thought; the kernel of freedom lies within existing unfreedoms. In contrast to the outward direction of sociological disclosure, the second moment of reflexivity is inwardly directed towards scrutiny of ideology critique's own presuppositions. This reflexive moment is necessary to ensure that ideology critique itself does not become yet another ideological mode of thinking, that is, that it reproduces prejudicial beliefs that themselves reinforce or mystify unjust social hierarchies. Liberalism is, for Critical Theorists, the paradigm of traditional thinking that perpetuates an ideologically blinkered view of the world; its placing of the individual as the origin of social relations leaves it unable to grasp the systemic nature of class exploitation and the intrinsic structural inequity of capitalism. The orthodox Marxist way of dealing with this issue of ideological blinkeredness was famously to assert its 'scientific' status over the delusions of bourgeois thought but the first generation of Critical Theorists led the way in rejecting such claims as naive and epistemologically meretricious. Instead they responded to the issue of reflexivity by emphasizing the necessarily interdisciplinary nature of Critical Theory. The intertwining of social critique with normative thought, of fact with norm, necessitates a dialogue with other, often very different modes of enquiry which, in the effort to reach understanding, can force critical reflection upon one's own theoretical and methodological presuppositions. The claim is that when intellectual enquiry, especially normative thought, is contained within a single discipline unified by received assumptions about how to proceed, there is no imperative for such critical self-reflection and it runs the risk of becoming reified. The lineaments of an ideal society cannot be arrived at through abstract, logical reflection but only through negative sociological scrutiny of current practices and political struggles. Normative thinking cannot be freestanding but must be self-consciously interdisciplinary in nature, remaining 'theoretically responsive not only to the political struggles of the age but also to contemporary developments in historical, social and cultural studies' (McCarthy 2009: 41).

It may be a relatively simple matter to set out the basic elements of ideology critique but its practical realization in the work of the Critical Theorists has not been so straightforward. As well as generating controversy, the project of unmasking domination has also at points run into various theoretical and political dead-ends, notably the pessimism of the Frankfurt school but also, arguably, the quietism of post-Habermasian thought. Adorno and Horkheimer's

famous analysis of the manufacture of consent in consumer capitalism is undoubtedly a tour de force, deploying ideas of reification and commodity fetishism to explain how individuals are passified and rendered complicit with their own subjection. The extension of the commodity form into social life diminishes autonomy through the construction of a standardized, illusory freedom of 'pseudo individuality': 'now any person signifies only those attributes by which he can replace everyone else: he is interchangeable, a copy' (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944: 145). Works such as *Dialectic of Enlightenment* were ground breaking in that, along with Gramsci's idea of hegemony, they moved Marxism away from crude theories of illusion and false consciousness to more complex understanding of how ideology shapes material existence, is constitutive of subjectivity itself, and is deeply embedded in social practices and common sense beliefs. In particular, their innovative combination of the logic of the commodity with psychoanalysis laid the way for contemporary thought on ideology such as the work of Althusser, Laclau, and Žižek. Yet, despite the intrinsic sophistication of these notions of ideology as subject formation, their extrapolation into a general social theory resulted in such a monolithic and bleak account of domination that the ultimate goal of ideology critique, emancipation, appeared to be abandoned altogether. It is now commonplace to observe that Adorno and Horkheimer forsook the central political tenet of Marxism, that individuals can be agents of revolutionary change, in favour of an oblique and fragmentary form of high cultural critique (e.g. Chambers 2004; Habermas 1985). In this respect, they can be seen to have defaulted on the second reflexive moment of ideology critique in that they failed to sufficiently scrutinize some of the problematic assumptions—many would say elitist—informing the aesthetic nihilism that they finished by espousing.

Habermas's major contribution has been to free ideology critique from the theoretical and political impasse of the Frankfurt school's account of domination and to have provided renewed critical prominence for the Critical Theory perspective in debates on central social and political problems of our time. In Habermas's view, the reason why Adorno and Horkheimer and, for that matter, many other thinkers of modernity including Weber, Foucault, and Heidegger, finish by espousing mass cultural pessimism is that they have a one-sided account of the rational logic that governs modern social development. For these thinkers, rationality primarily denotes humankind's instrumental relationship to the world, the way in which it manipulates and shapes objective reality for its own ends. On Adorno and Horkheimer's account, the 'myth' inherited from the Enlightenment is the belief that man can shape the world according to these

rational ends through technological and industrial means, whereas, in fact the pervasive spread of instrumental rationality renders human existence fundamentally irrational in that it is emptied of higher meaning and purpose. What is forgotten in this view of ‘mass culture as mass deception’ is that social existence is characterized not just by humanity’s attempt to conquer and control its objective environment but also by interaction with each other. Rationality has an inter-subjective as well as an instrumental dimension; society must reproduce itself as a meaningful, symbolic entity as much as a materially productive one. Individuals are bound together in society through shared norms, values, and collective enterprises, the content and legitimacy of which are constantly being contested and transformed by their struggles. In existing capitalist societies, these processes of deliberation and contestation are distorted by the uneven distribution of money and power (‘colonization of the lifeworld’) so that they are often unrepresentative and skewed towards the interests of dominant groups. Habermas believes, however, that the process of deliberation can be rescued from these distortions and rendered both more representative, in terms of equality of participation, and also more rational, in terms of style and content of debate. In this purified, egalitarian form, rational deliberation, he claims, can deliver unanimous and binding agreement about the norms and values that should guide a genuinely progressive democratic order. In this way, then, Habermas counters the extreme pessimism of Adorno and Horkheimer and restores a practical emancipatory content to Critical Theory—the unfinished legacy of Enlightenment reason—where communicative rationality provides a regulative ideal against which we can measure the failings of existing democratic debate and towards which we must ceaselessly aspire.

DELIBERATION AND DOMINATION

It is difficult to overestimate the influence of Habermas’s idea of communicative reason on contemporary thought. It has been instrumental in defining the terms of some of the major social and political controversies from the late 1960s onwards, notably debates over legitimation crisis in 1970s and, more recently those over the nature of deliberative and cosmopolitan democracy. As one commentator puts it: ‘thinkers of Habermas’s stature leave behind more good undeveloped ideas than less extraordinary thinkers develop in a lifetime’ (Kompridis 2006: xii). Yet, despite this rich legacy, many thinkers would claim that Critical Theory has reached another impasse from which it must somehow emerge in order to renew the project of ideology critique. On this view, there has been a significant cost to Habermas’s normative reorientation of Critical Theory

and it has produced ‘a split between new and old critical theory so deep that the identity and future of critical theory are at risk’ (Kompridis 2006: 17; see also Anderson 2000; Chambers 2004). Following what is widely regarded as the procedural turn of his later work (exemplified in his exchange with Rawls), Habermas, and many of his followers, have become increasingly preoccupied with elaborating the deliberative procedures that will supposedly deliver the universally binding norms for a just society but have, arguably, neglected the primary task of ideology critique, the unmasking of domination. It would be misleading to say that issues of inequality and subjection are not a serious concern for Habermas, but the burden that he places on the rational nature of communication and the abstract terms in which it is elaborated—for instance, in its latest incarnation as a ‘subjectless’ cosmopolitan discourse—tends to underplay or displace from view some reasons why individuals are unable to deliberate in the orderly fashion that is required of them (Scheuerman 2006). Many of the gaps in Habermas’s analysis of domination stem from the way the norms of deliberation are derived by being separated from the context of unequal social relations in which they are always situated. Abstraction from the context of power enables him to construe embodied subjects as linguistic beings who have a roughly equal linguistic capacity to participate in debate and, indeed, all of whom have accepted a priori the necessity of participation in the political realm. Participation in debate is conceived of as an abstract linguistic competence: that as speaking beings ‘everyone participates in language as they enjoy the sun, the air, or water’ (Bourdieu 1992: 146). The difficulty with such a separation of linguistic competence from embodied social existence is that it is a theoretical artifice, a form of ‘symbolic denegation’ which brackets off relations of power and forgets that ‘linguistic relations are always relations of symbolic power’ and that ‘the theoretically universal competence liberally granted to all by linguists is in reality monopolized by some’ (Bourdieu 1992: 146). Some of the deepest barriers to equal participation in debate cannot be discerned from the perspective of an abstractly endowed capacity to deliberate because they only ever emerge in an embodied context. There are types of symbolic power inescapably associated with embodied being, one’s sex, one’s race, one’s class which means that some speakers will always be taken more seriously than others and indeed, some speakers will not be heard at all (e.g. Sanders 1995). Prejudice, for instance, the failure to take seriously some types of speakers, is triggered not by force of argument but by the colour of someone’s skin, the timbre of their voice, the ‘authority’ of their demeanour and so forth and, more significantly, it operates below the radar of formal prescriptions that Habermas claims guarantee in advance an equal right to participation. The capacity to speak is not a formal

competence available to all but directly related to one's social situation and, consequently, what is presented as an abstract capacity is in fact an expression of a invidious 'linguistic universalism' that tacitly generalizes a dominant way of being as a universal norm (Bourdieu 2000). Habermas has of course responded to such criticisms but for many concerned with issues of domination and inequality, his responses are either equivocal or simply re-inscribe, in an even more entrenched way, the conceptual dualisms between the just and the good, the conventional and the post-conventional, the rational and the non-rational that make his theory so problematic when it comes to a critique of power (e.g. McNay 2008b).

The task of rendering discourse ethics more sensitive to these issues of embodied domination or so called 'deep' difference has been, of course, central to the work of a number of the third and fourth generation of Critical Theorists, amongst them Seyla Benhabib, John Dryzek, and James Bohman. These thinkers have made important revisions to the nature and scope of communicative debate in order to ensure its receptivity to the voices of individuals and groups who, for a variety of reasons, would have had difficulty in making themselves heard within the stringent rationalism of Habermas's original idea of deliberation. Indeed Habermas himself has acknowledged the force of many of these revisions and incorporated them into his work. There remains, however, a more intractable difficulty with the communicative paradigm itself, namely, whether the claim that deliberation is a universally inclusive form of democracy—a 'quasi-transcendent' ideal—in fact reifies political practice and excludes other modes of action that are arguably fundamental to a genuinely radical politics. This imperialism of the universal flows, once again, from the separation of fact from norm, from the unhitching of ideas of democratic debate from the underlying context of power struggles between unequal groups in which it is always ineluctably situated. For instance, coercion, violence, the mobilization of extreme emotions are ruled out a priori by deliberative thinkers, as illegitimate political strategies because of their potentially destabilizing effects on democratic debate. Yet, in the context of hierarchical social relationships, these strategies can be important even necessary political tools for rendering visible oppressions and injustices that remain below the threshold of public perception or that, even when they have been given voice, have not been taken seriously by dominant GROUPS. Historically, as various thinkers have shown, marginalized and excluded groups have more often than not had to resort to coercive techniques—civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts, and so forth—to gain entry into democratic debate and be taken seriously (Medearis 2005; see also Stears

2010: 1–14). The resort to coercive, even violent actions is testament to how, even when oppressed groups adhere to the rules of the deliberative game, that is, put their demands in a rational form, they are just not heard ‘the social problems that they wish to address are effectively invisible to others’ (Medearis 2005: 53). In short, there are aspects to the political process of challenging domination, things that need to be done to overcome it, that cannot be captured by simply putting them into words, by limiting them to ‘the regulated confrontations of a rational dialogue that knows and recognizes no other force than that of arguments’ (Bourdieu 2000: 73). In presenting deliberation as beyond power, as grounded in abstract and supposedly neutral competences rather than inseparable from contingent political struggles, post Habermasian thinkers are unwilling to consider deeply enough the limits of the universal validity of their paradigm. The resort to coercive strategies on the part of subordinated groups to gain entry into democratic debate reveals ways in which deliberation may foreclose radical political challenge through the imposition of a priori sanctions on unacceptable modes of action. In this light, the resort to coercion represents not just a bid to be included in an established democratic order but rather a challenge to the very parameters of the reasonable order itself. As Cavell reminds us, ‘Deprivation of a voice in the conversation of justice is not the work ... of the scoundrel ...; deprivation here is the work of the moral consensus itself’ (Cavell 1990: xxxvii). From the perspective of emancipatory power struggles then, there is a ‘serious incompleteness’ in the deliberative model of politics because it cannot really incorporate radical democratic challenge and transformative action within the limits of its linguistic universalism: as Medearis puts it ‘what is at stake is *the structure of major institutions and social relations* (not just deliberative forums), their distribution of *power* (not just deliberative chances and capacities), and broad inclusion on equal terms in *political contention* (not just in deliberation)’ (Medearis 2005: 69).

If anything, these limitations are more pronounced in deliberation’s most recent incarnation as cosmopolitan democracy. Many critics have noted that too often ideas of cosmopolitanism are based in a troubling idealization of Western values and notions of progress and pay insufficient attention to their own implication within global structures of economic exploitation (e.g. Cheah 2006; Honig 2006; Taylor 2002). Cosmopolitan thinkers are selective in their focus on emancipatory struggles, lionizing those that conform to their ideas of multicultural diversity whilst dismissing as regressive other popular struggles that do not apparently possess the hybrid, progressive characteristics that are a constitutive of cosmopolitan virtues. What this attenuated cultural vision

conveniently occludes is that although certain ‘regressive’ (e.g. nationalist) struggles in peripheral regions may not display the requisite features, they often represent bids for emancipation from the economic domination of the West, as Cheah puts it: ‘a cosmopolitan consciousness formed in North Atlantic space that is attentive to struggles for multicultural recognition is not necessarily concerned with the problems of uneven development and the superexploitation of labour in the peripheries’ (Cheah 2006: 69).

It is too easy to dismiss these criticisms from the perspective of power as non-ideal objections to ideal theory although that is the claim that Habermasians often make (e.g. Benhabib 2002; McNay 2008b). What is forgotten in retreating behind the claim that deliberation is a regulative ideal is that, following the intertwinement of fact and norm, this ideal is supposedly derived from existing social practices, indeed, this is why Habermas originally called it a universal *pragmatics*. Habermasians seem to want to have it both ways; on the one hand, their ideal of deliberation is supposedly more grounded in social practice and therefore more feasible than other competing models (e.g. Rawls), and yet, on the other hand, when challenged, they reassert its status as a transcendental norm. This vacillation perhaps indicates instead the failure of deliberative thinkers to sustain the reflexive moment of ideology critique with regard to their own idealizing presuppositions with the consequence that deliberation can only be maintained as a universal norm by repressing thought about its own social and economic conditions of possibility. Any theory cannot hope to set up a priori a universal model of democracy whose inclusiveness vis-à-vis radical political challenge is perpetually guaranteed. This does not inevitably entail a slide into a realist pragmatism as is claimed, rather it might imply a renewed effort to think in the dialectical manner originally suggested by Critical Theory. Universal norms cannot be asserted once and for all, they must be constantly rethought in the light of changing inequalities and struggles, ‘to include, what, in their limited historical forms, they unjustly exclude’ (McCarthy 2004: 163). By defaulting on this basic element of ideology critique, contemporary Habermasian thought has, in the view of many of its critics, abandoned its radical inheritance, accommodated itself to liberalism and finished in a politics of resignation rather than one of radical transformation (e.g. Scheuerman 1999).

RECOGNITION AND SUFFERING

Given the direction of post-Habermasian thought, other third- and fourth-generation Critical Theorists have tried to re-orient ideology critique back to its

original task of uncovering socially invisible forms of subjection, domination, and exclusion. This thought on the 'other of justice' is inspired, in a large part, by the work on recognition of one of Habermas's most well-known students, Axel Honneth (Anderson 2000). Although Honneth's seminal work *Struggles for Recognition* was published in English over fifteen years ago and is well-known, it is only in recent years that his oeuvre as a whole has started to garner sustained critical attention. This relatively slow response is partly because Honneth's work was originally received into the Anglophone world via liberal debates about multiculturalism where it was largely, and misleadingly, conflated with Charles Taylor's work on recognition. Partly, however, as a result of his high profile debate with Nancy Fraser on redistribution and recognition and partly because of a growing interest in his early work on 'social suffering' and the philosophy of labour, Honneth's thought has recently begun to generate renewed critical interest (e.g. Fraser and Honneth 2003; Deranty and Renault 2007; Van Den Brink and Owen 2007; Renault 2008; Deranty 2009; Bankovsky and Le Goff 2011;).

Honneth appreciates the normative potential unleashed by Habermas's reformulation of reason in inter-subjective, dialogic terms but like others, he believes that the communicative model seriously underplays the deleterious effects of sustained social inequality upon the capacity of individuals to act as autonomous agents. Indeed, in his view, Habermas's formal theory of justice has become so removed from underlying issues of domination that, an 'extreme discrepancy' has opened up between it and the experience of the democratic subjects whom it is supposed to represent. For Honneth, many types of inequality are not revealed as violations of moral norms that can be formally expressed as justice claims but are instead experienced in a more immediate manner as types of psychological injury and suffering. Suffering is, then, an expression of the way in which domination is maintained through embodied power relations. In order to better grasp the significance of this substrate of suffering, Honneth argues that social bonds should be conceptualized not as communication but as relations of recognition. For individuals to acquire a secure sense of self and to develop their capabilities for self-realization, they require meaningful acknowledgement from others in the three basic spheres of social action: affective recognition or love (family), cultural recognition or esteem, and formal legal recognition (rights). When these forms of recognition are successfully instantiated in a society the individual understands herself as 'both an equal and unique member of society' (Honneth 2007: 74). If recognition is denied to individuals in any or all of these spheres, then their sense of self-

worth can be profoundly damaged and these injuries of misrecognition are often lived, at a deep psychological level, as feelings of shame, anger, hopelessness, and so forth. At a societal level, when patterns of misrecognition become systematically entrenched, they may engender widespread social suffering and this speaks to something morally amiss with the logic of social relations. This strong and undoubtedly contentious claim about the intrinsic normative core of suffering underscores a major difference with Habermas. In the latter's deontological approach, moral norms are the outcome of rational debate, whereas in Honneth's realist approach, morality is found in embodied experience, where it often takes an inchoate, pre-rational form.

Habermas obliquely acknowledges some types of misrecognition in the thesis of the 'colonisation of the lifeworld' when instrumental considerations (money and power) intrude upon and distort the communicative processes whereby societies debate the norms and values which should guide it. The difficulty, however, with this account of colonization is that distorting power is regarded as extrinsic to social practices, as an external force that comes from the 'systems' and overlays and deforms the communicative processes of the lifeworld. What is not entertained by Habermas is that the lifeworld itself may have its own intrinsic pathological tendencies that cannot be reduced to the exogenous distortions of money and power. Prejudicial and ideological beliefs, such as homophobia and racism, that construe certain individuals as less worthy of respect and esteem than others, can't really be said to originate from an external realm but are deeply, if unevenly, embedded and reproduced in patterns of socialization and communication. Habermas's definition of justice as reaching understanding free from domination is only tangentially related, at best, to such experiences of disrespect because it does not adequately penetrate the prior social conditions that effect entry into communicative relations meaning that, for reasons of, say, prejudice, some speakers are never as equal as others. As Honneth puts it, the claim that norms of equality underpin communicative ethics becomes meaningless if these norms do not permit 'subjects to present themselves in intersubjective structures of public life without shame' (Honneth 2011: 8). Habermas in fact sidesteps such underlying existential issues with the repeated assertion that, by the time they have reached the point of debate, issues of misrecognition should have been solved, that recognition of the individual as a unique and autonomous being is a 'universal and unavoidable' pre-supposition of communicative debate (Habermas 1992: 191). In making such an assertion, he implicitly ignores fundamental and widespread forms of misrecognition and social suffering which persist in an often unthematized form as diffuse feelings

of dissatisfaction, anger, and despair but which may, in certain conditions, erupt into forms of collective protest and struggles for recognition.

In focusing on issues of misrecognition and ‘ordinary’ suffering, Honneth has arguably restored the unmasking of domination as the central concern for Critical Theorists. In this respect, his work can be seen as a development of ideas of suffering gestured towards, but never fully realized, in the work of Adorno: ‘the corporeal moment registers the cognition, that suffering ought not to be, that things should be different’ (Adorno 1990: 202–4; see also Bernstein 2005). Moreover, in highlighting the profound corporeal and psychological effects of domination qua misrecognition, Honneth has opened up grounds for a potentially fruitful encounter between Critical Theory and the work of poststructural thinkers, most especially Foucault. The similarities between Foucault’s ideas of disciplinary control and the early work of some of the Frankfurt school have been noted many times. Habermas, however, closed off any sustained exchange between the two traditions because of his well documented ‘anxiety of regression’ which led him, famously, to dismiss French poststructuralism as the ‘new obscurity’ (Habermas 1985; also Anderson 2000). Honneth reopens this potential dialogue by drawing constructively, although not uncritically, on the work of Foucault and others and, in doing so, he takes ideology critique in interesting new directions. There are striking similarities, for instance, between his and Foucault’s (2008) analysis of the restructuring of the self in neoliberal capitalism that revolves around the promotion of notions of citizenship as responsible self-management. Foucault calls this neoliberal strategy of governance ‘self as enterprise’ where, in accordance with its marketized view of social relations, the individual is construed as an ‘entrepreneur’ of his own life, who relates to other individuals as competitors and to his own being as a form of human capital. A distinctive feature of self as enterprise is that it operates according to a principle of active self-regulation rather than, on the Frankfurt School’s account, one of passive submission that eliminates the capacity for autonomous thought and critique. In this self-relation, individual autonomy is not an obstacle or limit to social control but one of its central technologies. Discipline and freedom are not opposites but intrinsically connected in that biopower indirectly organizes individuals in such a way that their apparent autonomy is not violated but is used as a vehicle of governance at a distance. Honneth identifies a similar manipulation of individual autonomy in his idea of organized self-realization (Honneth 2004a). In ‘flexible’ or disorganized capitalism, individuals are no longer treated as workers who are compelled to participate in capitalist production but are treated more like

entrepreneurs or ‘entreplooyees’ which requires from them a ‘readiness to self-responsibly bring one’s own abilities and emotional resources to bear in the service of the individualized projects’ (Hartmann and Honneth 2006: 45). Any apparent increase in individual autonomy in fact represents an intensification of a certain disciplinary power an effect of which is a blurring of the boundaries between the public and private realms. The overall effect of these transformations is to instil in the individual a seemingly paradoxical ‘compulsion to responsibility’. The normative and emancipatory force that originally inhered in the idea of personal responsibility is eroded as individuals are forced to assume responsibility for states of affairs for which they are not responsible. The wider consequences of organized self-realization are a fragmentation of social values and a process of ‘social desolidarization’ expressed in elevated levels of depression and mental illness and the emptying out of any meaning to the achievement principle other than the maximization of profit (Hartmann and Honneth 2006: 52). In sum, what Foucault and Honneth both find objectionable about this organized self-realization is that it depoliticizes social and political relations: it atomizes ideas of society, attenuates the obligations of states to their citizens, and erodes collective values and inter-subjective bonds of duty and care. One of the most interesting challenges of Honneth and Foucault’s idea of organized self-realization is for normative political thought, which often starts from the premise of individual autonomy. If, under neoliberalism, individual autonomy is not a limit to social control but one of its central supports, what form can effective political opposition take? Normative thought on freedom, not just classical liberalism, assumes that the political subject inherently wills her own emancipation and represents, therefore, an absolute limit to power. But if autonomy and discipline are not extrinsic forms but intrinsically connected, then the possibilities for radical challenge to neoliberal governance of the self seem inevitably to become more complicated than the claim for individual freedom.

A second area opened up for ideology critique by Honneth’s engagement with French thought on domination is around the changing nature of labour under globalized capitalism and the new types of social suffering that this engenders. Clearly labour has always been central to Marxist thought but what is distinctive about Honneth’s approach is that he focuses on the negative psychological effects of work in an era of ‘precarisation’ (Deranty 2008). Following Bourdieu, Honneth argues that although material compensation for labour is important, so too is its social recognition as fulfilling and worthwhile. Work is not simply instrumental activity but has an experiential significance for self-esteem and for the process of healthy identity formation in general. Too many forms of labour

continue, under the 'flexible' conditions of globalized capital, to be alienated in that they do not contribute to an individual's sense of being a valued member of society. The increasing precariousness of work deepens existing inequalities of class, gender, and race, and intensifies feelings of vulnerability and despair. Thus, Honneth argues that class deprivation persists in a symbolic form, in the 'lasting inequality in the distribution of classes for social recognition' but, on the whole, this type of deprivation remains largely unarticulated, lying beneath more publically visible forms of normative conflict and taking the form of 'uncoordinated attempts to gain, or regain, social honor' (Honneth 2007: 94). By connecting the idea of recognition to issues of work and identity, the difference between Honneth's work and that of Charles Taylor, to which it is frequently but misleadingly compared, becomes apparent. Unlike Taylor's expressivist model where identity is connected to free-floating notions of cultural authenticity, his labour-inflected approach situates recognition claims more firmly within the context of systematic inequality and class struggle. In doing so, Honneth suggests fruitful new theoretical paths for the general debate on the politics of recognition which has been filtered mainly through liberal notions of cultural and ethnic identity that too often displace from view underlying structures of race, class, and gender inequality. Perhaps more importantly, Honneth's emphasis on the existential significance of labour to self-identity opens up new grounds on which leftist thinkers can re-engage with the debate on recognition which they have tended to dismiss as a politics of 'suffermongering' (Brown 1995; Brown and Halley 2002). One of the effects of the consequent turn by post-identity thinkers to thinking about politics in more universal terms like justice or modes of democracy is that class issues have tended to drop out of normative thought. By turning away from class and therefore from one of the major causes of continued social suffering, political theory has lost sight of social pathologies and the means with which to criticize them: 'social criticism has essentially limited itself to evaluating the normative order of societies according to whether they fulfill certain principles of justice ... this approach has lost sight of the fact that a society can demonstrate a moral deficit without violating generally valid principles of justice' (Honneth 2008: 84). Honneth's work, in short, gives new significance to a host of ethical and existential issues arising from the fact of embodied domination that have been marginalized by the justice turn in political theory but nonetheless lie at the heart of creating a just society.

Although Honneth's work brings the idea of recognition out of the restricted liberal frame of dialogue and, by situating it more firmly in the context of power inequalities, suggests new directions for ideology critique, it is not without its

limitations. Many of the issues of domination and inequality which accompanied his early work on social suffering have been put aside in his more recent work where he turns instead to establishing the moral and psychological foundations of recognition as a primal social relation (Honneth 2008). Unsurprisingly, this ontogenetic turn is much more problematic and eminent critics including Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser have forcefully exposed the questionable psychological assumptions and politically reductive effects of this move (Fraser and Honneth 2003; Butler 2008). Ultimately, just as Habermasian ideas of deliberation are weakened by their claims to transcendence, so too Honneth's idea of recognition is thrown into question by being generalized as the single explanatory framework for all social and political conflict. This over-stretching of the concept of recognition empties it of analytical complexity, finishing in a psychologically reductive account of the multifarious dynamics of inequality and struggle. More damagingly, given Honneth's claim that recognition provides a universal model of ethical life, it empties it of much content as a meaningful normative ideal. As critics such as Foucault and Bourdieu would argue, acts of recognition can be as normalizing as they are liberating depending on who is doing the recognizing, what is being recognized and the particular form that the act itself assumes. Honneth's unwavering investment in the idea of recognition as a universal norm leaves him unable to address these political dynamics in anything but the most simplistic terms and he finishes by espousing precisely the type of idealized abstraction that ideology critique is supposed to obviate (McNay 2008a).

IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE TODAY

Although Honneth's thought continues to function as a 'gravitational centre' for many third- and fourth-generation thinkers, it is much more difficult to identify a unified intellectual approach in the heterogeneous body of work that nowadays makes up Critical Theory. Leading figures in Germany who can be said to continue the tradition include the sociologists Ulrich Beck and Hans Joas and the political thinker Rainer Forst. In the USA, its leading lights are the Habermasian thinkers Selya Benhabib and Thomas McCarthy and Nancy Fraser who, whilst explicitly identifying her approach with Critical Theory, draws from many other intellectual sources, notably poststructuralism. The task of unmasking domination is no longer the central concern of much of this work. Many thinkers now focus on formulating positive theories of justice rather than pursuing in detail the negative social critique of existing injustice. Perhaps the abandonment of the project of 'social theoretical negativism' ceases to matter that much

because the concern with domination can no longer be said to be the exclusive intellectual property of Critical Theory; poststructuralists, feminists, critical race and postcolonial thinkers, amongst others, have taken this project in many interesting directions (Honneth 2004b: 338). It seems, then, that if it has not been abandoned entirely, the task of ideology critique no longer has the intellectual distinctiveness or catalysing force that it once had for the thinkers of the Frankfurt school.

Despite the apparent dissipation of a coherent Critical Theory approach—if indeed there ever was one—there remains something valuable about the idea of ideology critique that stands as an important corrective to a prevailing tendency to abstraction in current political thinking. In the wake of debates about identity politics, there has been a pronounced ontological turn in contemporary political theory, of all stripes, towards thinking about the quintessence of the ‘political’ in the kind of transcendental mode famously exemplified by Schmitt. The concept of the political came to the rescue of political philosophy, it saved it, as Agnes Heller observes ‘after it had fallen victim to too much science, too much compromise, too much realism’ (Heller 1991: 336). Ontologies of the political currently abound in contemporary thought: as well as Analytical and Habermasian accounts of deliberation, there are Arendtian and Foucauldian versions of agonist democracy (Zerilli, Tully, Honig), Derridean accounts of radical democracy as undecidability (Mouffe and Laclau, Žižek), left Hegelian theories of political difference (Badiou, Nancy, Lefort), and so on (e.g. White and Moon 2004; Marchart 2007). This ontological turn might have breathed new life into political theory but it has a troubling feature, namely the tendency to think about the political realm in isolation from social and economic realms. A conceptual priority is accorded to this political domain over the others without fully justifying it or attending sufficiently to its underlying material conditions of possibility. In an exchange with Rainer Forst, Nancy Fraser has commented on an analogous tendency to ‘politicism’ that ‘fails to do justice to the complexity of structural causation in capitalist society’ and cannot therefore conceptualize ‘dialectically entwined sources of power asymmetry in contemporary society’ (Fraser 2008: 343). A common feature of this ‘obsession with the exclusively political’ is the move to conceptualize the essential dynamics of the political through models of language (Heller 1991: 336). It is easy to see the attraction of language for thinking through progressive models of democracy: it provides an inclusive and universal framework for political participation whilst being sufficiently ‘thin’ to accommodate problems of deep-difference. The difficulty however is that the formal model of language upon

which these models of democracy are based results in a reduction upwards where social relations of power are misleadingly conflated with linguistic dynamics. As a result of this false elision, these ‘socially weightless’ accounts of the political often occlude profound dynamics of domination and inequality that do not conform to a model of language. We have already seen how the deliberative idea of participation as an abstract linguistic competence forecloses issues pertaining to embodied mechanisms of domination. Another variant of this linguistic universalism can be discerned in certain theories of agonist democracy that propose models of radical action that owe more to the abstract properties of language than to practical action. For instance, when Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2005) extrapolates from her linguistically derived notion of antagonism, to claim that the democratic political sphere should enshrine disagreement and conflict, one might ask what kind of capacities she is attributing to her citizens to be able to endure perpetual agonism. At the very least, the toleration and celebration of conflict as a necessary democratic ethos assumes a certain level of political virtuosity and commitment that, arguably, in an era of democratic deficit, is not especially evident amongst citizens. When she claims that the job of the democratic political sphere is to convert potentially violent social antagonisms into a safer form of political agonism, she gives no indication of what is to be done about those subjects who, for whatever reasons cannot or do not wish to participate in the political sphere. Or, to return to Honneth’s question of silent suffering, she has little to say about social antagonisms, which do not take the form of explicit or zero-sum tensions between groups, but instead are latent structural strains that are incorporated into the body and lived as seemingly natural and inevitable physical and psychological dispositions. How are such embodied antagonisms to be converted into a productive form of political agonism when they are largely silent, pre-rational, or unarticulated? Furthermore, why should the ability to tolerate conflict be a self-evident political good? At some level, does the capacity to do so not speak to being in a position of relative power and privilege vis-à-vis political norms and practices and not in a position of relative powerlessness where permanent contestation may be experienced as profoundly alienating?

Mouffe’s theory of agonism is a particularly stark expression of a more general prioritization of political over other social and cultural identifications and practices. It is unaccompanied by a compelling justification of why this primacy of the political should be the case for many individuals (e.g. McNay 2010). Political theorists might claim, in response, that it is precisely the failure to understand the political in its ontological dimension that remains at the root of

our ‘current incapacity’ to think about politics in a genuinely radical way (Mouffe 2005: 8). It is possible, however, to claim the opposite; it is the tendency of many types of current political theory to get stuck in certain received ontological givens that lies at the root of the inability to think about progressive politics as interventions in the world not just as abstract dynamics (e.g. McNay 2010). Indeed, one might suggest instead that the distinction between the ontological and the ontic conceals a troubling failure to think about the realm of instituted practices in a sufficiently complex and differentiated way and to retreat into normatively appealing but phenomenally empty notions of the political. Ultimately this tendency to privilege the ontological over the ontic results in a discounting of concrete practices in favour of abstract notions of radical change. Existing attempts to change the world lack intrinsic interest and have significance only in that they are incomplete empirical instantiations of foundational dynamics of indeterminacy. In the light of what Bruno Bosteels has described as this ‘eschatological even catastrophic desire for radicalization’, a focus on the actual dynamics of domination and emancipation often becomes tantamount to a reductive metaphysics of presence. Existing social and political processes are endowed with the ‘negative aura of “being merely positivist, sociologist, empiricist, or ontic”’ (Bosteels 2009: 246). The risk of this turning away from the actual is that ‘the gesture of radicalization may very well have disabled in advance the pursuit of truly emancipatory actions in so far as the latter will necessarily appear far less radical’ (2009: 247). The animating impulse of Critical Theory reminds us that if it is not to drift into the realm of empty and infeasible abstractions, normative thought should develop in tandem with a sociological attentiveness to the ordinary dynamics of oppression and struggles for change. Indeed, what Critical Theory would remind us of is that the essence of the political cannot be found on a purely abstract terrain but lies precisely in the tension and movement between the Ought and the Is. This is not, as it may seem, an argument against abstract or idealizing modes of thought per se. Critical Theorists would, in fact, unambiguously reject this as falling into the counterveiling error of an unreflective acceptance of the given. Abstraction is essential to normative thought but it must form part of a more fallibilist, contrapuntal, and interdisciplinary approach than perhaps prevails in current political thinking which, as Shapiro has it, is often characterized by a ‘flight from reality’ (Shapiro 2007). Critical Theory’s idea of ideology critique is undoubtedly frustrating because, even as it proposes such a dialectical, cross-disciplinary approach to normative thought, it does not seem to lead to any specific method or precise intellectual focus. But, despite this open-endedness, it is the insistence on the intertwinement of fact and norm that, in an era of

disciplinary boundedness and intellectual abstraction, constitutes the enduring relevance of the notion of ideology critique for political thought today.

REFERENCES

- Adorno, Theodor. 1990. *Negative Dialectics*. London: Routledge.
- Adorno, Theodor and Max Horkheimer. 1944. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Joel. 2000. 'The "Third Generation" of the Frankfurt School', *Intellectual History Newsletter*, 22.
- Bankovsky, Miriam and Alice Le Goff (eds.) 2011. *Theories of Recognition and Contemporary French Philosophy: Reopening the Dialogue*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bernstein, J. M. 2005. 'Suffering injustice: Misrecognition as moral injury in critical theory', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 13 (3): 303–24.
- Bosteels, Bruno. 2009. 'Thinking, being, acting; or, on the uses and disadvantages of ontology for politics'. Pp. 235–51 in *A Leftist Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity Politics*, ed. Carsten Strathausen. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000. *Pascalian Meditations*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brown, Wendy. 1995. *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Wendy and Janet Halley (eds.) 2002. *Left Legalism/Left Critique*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Butler, Judith. 2008. 'Taking another's view: Ambivalent implications'. Pp. 97–119 in *Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea*, ed. A. Honneth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cavell, Stanley. 1990. *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism*. Chicago: University Chicago Press.
- Chambers, Simone. 2004. 'The politics of critical theory'. Pp. 219–47 in *The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory*, ed. F. Rush. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cheah, Pheng. 2006. *Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Deranty, Jean-Philippe. 2008. 'Work and the precarisation of existence', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11 (4): 443–63.
- Deranty, Jean-Philippe. 2009. *Beyond Communication: A Critical Study of Axel Honneth's Social Philosophy*. Leiden: Brill.
- Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault 2007. 'Politicizing Honneth's ethics of recognition', *Thesis Eleven*, 88: 92–111.
- Foucault, Michel. 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978–1979*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fraser, Nancy and Nancy A. Naples. 2004. 'To interpret the world and to change it: An interview with Nancy Fraser', *Signs*, 29 (4): 1103–24.
- Fraser, Nancy. 2008. 'Prioritizing justice as participatory parity: A Reply to Kompridis and Forst'. Pp. 327–46 in *Adding Insult to Injury: Nancy Fraser debates her Critics*, ed. K. Olson. London: Verso.
- Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth 2003. *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*. London: Verso.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1985. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Habermas, Jürgen. 1992. *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hartmann, Martin and Axel Honneth 2006. 'Paradoxes of capitalism', *Constellations*, 13 (1): 41–58.
- Heller, Agnes. 1991. 'The concept of the political revisited'. Pp. 330–44 in *Political Theory Today*, ed. D. Held. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Honig, Bonnie. 2006. 'Another cosmopolitanism? Law and politics in the new Europe'. Pp. 102–27 in *Another Cosmopolitanism*, ed. S. Benhabib. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Honneth, Axel. 2004a. 'Organized self-realization: Some paradoxes of individualization'. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7, 4: 463–478.
- Honneth, Axel. 2004b. 'A social pathology of reason: On the intellectual legacy of critical theory'. Pp. 336–60 in *The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory*, ed. F. Rush. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Honneth, Axel. 2007. *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Honneth, Axel. 2008. *Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Honneth, Axel. 2011. 'Interview on "The relevance of contemporary French philosophy for a theory of recognition"'. Pp. 23–38 in *Theories of Recognition and Contemporary French Philosophy: Reopening the Dialogue*, eds. M. Bankovsky and A. Le Goff. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kompridis, N. 2006. *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- McCarthy, Thomas. 2004. 'Political philosophy and racial injustice: From normative to critical theory'. Pp. 149–70 in *Pragmatism, Critique, Judgement: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein*, eds. Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser. London: MIT Press.
- McCarthy, Thomas. 2009. *Race, Empire and the Idea of Human Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McNay, Lois. 2008a. *Against Recognition*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- McNay, Lois. 2008b. 'Recognition as fact and norm: The method of critique'. Pp. 85–105 in *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches*, eds. David Leopold and Marc Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McNay, Lois. 2010. 'Feminism and post-identity politics: The problem of agency', *Constellations*, 17 (4): 512–25.
- Marchart, Oliver. 2007. *Post-foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Medearis, John. 2005. 'Social movements and deliberative democratic theory', *British Journal of Political Science*, 35: 53–75.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. *On the Political*. London: Routledge.
- Renault, Emmanuel. 2008. 'The political philosophy of social suffering'. Pp. 158–76 in *New Waves in Political Philosophy*, eds. Boudewijn de Bruin and Christopher Zurn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sanders, Lynn. 1995. 'Against deliberation', *Political Theory*, 25 (3): 347–76.
- Scheuerman, William E. 1999. 'Between radicalism and resignation: Democratic theory in Habermas's *Between Facts and Norms*'. Pp. 153–77 in *Habermas: A Critical Reader*, ed. P. Dews. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Scheuerman, William E. 2006. 'Critical theory beyond Habermas [oxfordhb-9780199548439-e-4]*'. Pp. 85–105 in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, eds. John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shapiro, Ian. 2007. *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stears, Marc. 2010. *Demanding Democracy: American Radicals in Search of a New Politics*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

- Taylor, Charles. 2002. 'Modern social imaginaries', *Public Culture*, 14 (1): 91–124.
- Van Den Brink, Bert and David Owen. (eds.) 2007. *Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White, Stephen K and Donald J. Moon (eds.) 2004. *What is Political Theory?* London: Sage.

CHAPTER 9 POSTSTRUCTURALIST CONCEPTIONS OF IDEOLOGY

ALETTA NORVAL

INTRODUCTION: VARIETIES OF POSTSTRUCTURALISM

‘WHAT creates and sustains the identity of a given ideological field beyond all possible variations of its positive content?’ With this question, Žižek opens a discussion of ideology and its characterization that could be argued to capture a key distinction within poststructuralist approaches to ideology. Yet, the answer he provides to this question also portrays the extent to which poststructuralists share many core starting-points of analysis. Ideological space, he suggests, ‘is made of non-bound, non-tied elements, “floating signifiers”, whose very identity is overdetermined by their articulation in a chain with other elements—that is, their “literal” signification depends upon their metaphorical surplus-signification’ (Žižek 1989: 87). This answer, moreover, encapsulates the importance of the linguistic turn in the poststructuralist reformulation of what goes under the heading of ideology analysis and critique. The full implications of the ‘linguistic turn’,¹ a turn not only indicative of a renewed interest in the nature and functions of language but also of the realization ‘that our language does not merely mirror the world, but is instead partially constitutive of it’ (Ball 1985:740), have been elaborated over the last five decades (Dallmayr 1984: 1–27). In political theory, it is associated with writings emanating from the late 1960s and it took a good decade or so longer for the consequences of a focus on the constitution and reconstitution of reality to become the object of reflection in political and social theory in general,² and for the study of ideology in particular. If the theory of ideology has traditionally been intimately bound up with metaphysical assumptions—ranging from systemic conceptions of society and the laws governing it, to sovereign conceptions of subjectivity—the linguistic turn could not but further put into question these deeply held assumptions.³

In the light of that questioning, and since ideology had always been conceived of in contrast to some order of truth or knowledge from which it would be possible to discern its misleading and false character, it has to be asked whether it is appropriate to continue to deploy the term in a context in which the dualism between absolute truth and absolute falsity is questioned?⁴ Would it not be more appropriate to banish the term ‘ideology’ from our analytical vocabulary

altogether, rather than invest it with new and different post-metaphysical meanings? Contemporary poststructuralist theoretical writings on the question of ideology offer a resounding negative response to these questions. Rather than rejecting the term, thus running the risk of forgetting the problems associated with it, poststructuralist political theorists have opted to reinscribe it on a different terrain.⁵ In so doing, they distance themselves from the end of ideology thesis, popularized in the 1960s by Lipset and Bell, and argue that our world is deeply and inescapably ideological in character. This process of reinscription entails both a repetition of earlier themes and a certain alteration of them.⁶ The resulting move beyond traditional Marxist theories of ideology has not taken the form of an argument that we live in a non-ideological world. Rather, it suggests that we find ourselves in a world where ideology is a constantly present feature of social and political life. It is this emphasis on the *ubiquity* of ideology that is at the heart of poststructuralist approaches to the question of ideology.

By poststructuralism I understand here an approach that works from a set of assumptions, including a decentred conception of structure and of subjectivity, developed within the context of a systematic engagement with language and the symbolic dimensions of political practices. In this sense, poststructuralism is understood in a broad rather than a narrow sense, so as to include writings that engage with the works of Austin, the later Wittgenstein and Cavell, as well as Althusser, Freud, and Lacan, to name but a few. There are both advantages and disadvantages to this starting point. On the positive side, it allows one to engage a range of thinkers who share the central concerns listed above, without negating the differences—sometimes serious and pronounced—between these thinkers. For purists, the fact that this approach allows me to include writers who at times explicitly situate themselves against poststructuralism, would be an anathema. Nevertheless, it is my view that the writers discussed here share enough with one another, particularly in the domain of ideology analysis, to make this not only plausible, but necessary. Moreover, it also allows one to become aware of the ways in which the concerns expressed within poststructuralist writings drawing on the Continental tradition, as well as on post-Marxist insights, resonate strongly with views expressed by writers writing within an English tradition of ordinary language analysis. A too narrowly confined conception of poststructuralism would preclude these conversations from emerging and becoming established.

The consequences of this interest in language in the wake of the linguistic turn for the study of ideologies have to be spelled out. From this point of view, the task of the analyst of ideologies is to investigate those forms of

representation, convention, political discourses, and so on, which contribute to shaping our worlds. To be amenable to systematic investigation, it has to be assumed that these matters are sufficiently ‘sedimented’ or conventionalized to display characteristics which, while not unchangeable have, nevertheless, reached a certain degree of stability; in short, that they have become decontested.⁷ The focus here is on the poststructuralist study of ideology as an analysis of such naturalized, conceptual formations, practices, and images for identification, as well as on the concomitant processes of subject formation and contestation of such provisionally decontested practices. I concentrate on two main contemporary approaches to the study of ideology—post-Marxist and psychoanalytical accounts—both of which share a poststructuralist concern with the constitutivity of language to political practices and subjectivity, and take the ubiquity of ideology as a starting-point. However, before turning to an in-depth discussion of these approaches, it is necessary to place them and this interest in language and its consequences for the study of ideology in the context of the wider intellectual traditions that facilitated their emergence and shaped the form the arguments have taken.

RECLAIMING IDEOLOGY

What seemed to many, about 1956, the subversion of political philosophy by linguistic analysis helped to liberate the history of political thought by converting it from a history of systematization (‘philosophy’ in an old sense) into one of linguistic use and sophistication (‘philosophy’ in a new)

(Pocock 1971: 12).

If the ubiquity of ideology is taken as a starting-point of analysis, several conceptual questions arise concerning its status and specificity. McLellan, for instance, argues that the ‘pale view of the omnipresence of ideology’ has the dangerous implication of ‘reducing all social phenomena to the status of mere propaganda’ (McLellan 1995: 72). Others, like Morrice in his study *Philosophy, Science and Ideology in Political Thought*, have echoed this thought, arguing that if all thought is irreducibly ideological we cannot but fall prey to its non-rationality, its partiality, and its distorting character (Morrice 1996). The antidote to these problems, for Morrice, is to reintroduce a distinction between political science and political philosophy, on the one hand, and political ideology, on the other. This, he argues, would allow one to engage in proper political analysis, conceived as ‘rational political philosophy’. However, the consequence of the solution proffered, clearly is to render ideology illegitimate as a proper object of

study.

This approach stands in sharp contrast to attempts to re-establish the legitimacy of ideology as a phenomenon amenable to serious political analysis by demarcating it from the concerns of normative political theory, on the one hand, and empirical political analysis, on the other. The most important articulation of this view is found in Freedén's *Ideologies and Political Theory*. Freedén argues that, in opposition to traditional studies of political thought which focus on 'truth and epistemology, ethical richness, logical clarity, origins and causes' and aim to direct or recommend political action, we need to develop a form of conceptual analysis of ideologies that is sensitive to concrete political language and debate (Freedén 1996: 7). This enterprise stands in sharp contrast to a teleological perfectionist approach to political philosophy which, Freedén points out, runs the risk of becoming increasingly 'remote from the sphere of politics' (Freedén 1996: 7).⁸ To counter these tendencies, he proposes that the study of ideology should concern itself with establishing a 'plausible, generally applicable, and reasonably comprehensive framework of analysis that is both intellectually and culturally satisfying, but that acknowledges the multiplicity of available perspectives on ideological thought as well as the inevitable gaps in recreating so intricate a phenomenon' (Freedén 1996: 6). On this account, analysis of political ideologies will take the form of explaining, interpreting, decoding, and categorizing, while taking cognizance of the range of socially supported and culturally delimited formations, of which an examined concept constitutes an integral part. In this manner, the study of ideologies can fruitfully be approached as a specific genre of political thought that involves a close scrutiny of fundamental political concepts, understood as those units of political thinking which shape political argument (Freedén 1996: 13–14).

The emphasis in contemporary writings on ideology upon culturally sensitive historical and conceptual analysis of political languages continues an intellectual tradition of analysis which first emerged in the late 1960s in Cambridge.⁹ This tradition, fostered by scholars such as John Dunn, Quentin Skinner, and James Tully, all working with John Pocock, recast the study of the 'history of ideas', in a manner similar to that developed by Michel Foucault, by emphasizing the importance of language and context in the analysis of political ideas. (Indeed, in Skinner's later writings, this resonance has become explicit.¹⁰) In 1971 Pocock had written 'that the paradigms which order "reality" are part of the reality they order, that language is part of the social structure and not epiphenomenal to it' (Pocock 1971: 38).¹¹ Dissatisfied with dominant liberal and Marxist forms of analysis, as well as with historical interpretations of political thought that

attempted to reduce texts to systematizations bearing little resemblance to the actual arguments developed in the texts, they refashioned the study of the history of ideas through the development of a more historically sensitive, methodologically aware and philosophically informed series of studies (Skinner 1998: 101–8; Tully 1988: 7–25). As Skinner argues, his generation began to see the history of political thought as a ‘more wide-ranging investigation of the changing political languages in which societies talk to themselves’ (Skinner 1998: 105).

In this regard, they were particularly influenced by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin. The later Wittgenstein’s understanding of language as a social activity and Austin’s work on the ‘illocutionary force’ of language served to open up new areas of analysis, and new methodological approaches to the study of political thought and its relation to action in specific historical contexts.¹² (It is also around the works of these thinkers, that a significant convergence in approaches between writers in the English tradition and explicit poststructuralist thinkers such as Butler, can be discerned.) Of great importance is the emphasis on exploring the languages of politics in terms of prevailing conventions, including shared vocabularies, principles, assumptions, criteria for testing knowledge-claims, problems, conceptual distinctions, and so on (Tully 1988: 9). This approach thus facilitated a study of language as used in a particular society to discuss political problems, as well as the systematic analysis of the rise and use of organized political language in the political activity of society in general. As Tully points out, implicit in this approach and expressly argued for in Skinner’s work is an understanding of ideology as nothing other than a language of politics deployed to legitimate political action, and to establish and/or alter a society’s moral identity (Tully 1988: 13). From this perspective, the analysis of ideologies must proceed through a careful, historically informed conceptual analysis.

These works resonate in important respects with the concerns of contemporary poststructuralist writers on ideology, who draw on Gramscian post-Marxist and post-structuralist traditions of thinking, as well as on the writings of the later Wittgenstein, Cavell and others in the post-analytical tradition. While approached from a different vantage-point, poststructuralist political theory shares a set of significant concerns with writers in the post-analytical tradition. Like the works discussed above, post-structuralist approaches in political theory also developed in response to dissatisfaction with ahistorical structuralist and overly metaphysical accounts of language and its relation to the world. Drawing on Foucault’s genealogical method and

deconstruction amongst others, these approaches start out from the centrality of the analysis of language, while questioning accounts that posit language as a closed and unified totality.¹³ Combined with Gramscian insights, these approaches brought discussions of language and symbolic systems in conversation with approaches that focus on power, culture, and the establishment of hegemony. It is this emphasis that is distinctive to poststructuralist political analyses and theorization of ideology. As Gramsci argues in the *Prison Notebooks*, an ‘historical act can only be performed by “collective man”, and this presupposes the attainment of a “cultural-social” unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills ... are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world ... Since this is the way things happen, great importance is assumed by the general question of language, that is, the question of collectively attaining a single cultural “climate”’ (Gramsci 1971: 349). This emphasis on the importance of studying the formation of a ‘common conception of the world’ comes close to a Wittgensteinian inspired interest in the study of conventions, and the ways in which they have been deployed or shaped by political discourses. However, in the Gramscian tradition—and this is something that is continued in the works of Foucault and differently in that of Lacan—there is an added dimension of analysis which is crucial to the study of ideologies: the question of subject formation.¹⁴ In true Wittgensteinian fashion, Foucault seeks to analyse the things people say and do ‘in order to identify themselves and so to play their parts in “forms of life”’ (Rajchman 1991: 100) or discursive formations. Similarly, central to psychoanalytic thought is the question of identity formation, and the role of language in that process. According to Lacan, for instance, accounting for the formation of subjects is at the same time a theory of culture, since both arise through processes of symbolization, which are always primarily linguistic (Chaitin 1996: 4). It is these concerns that stand at the heart of poststructuralist approaches to ideology, to which I now turn.

A DISCURSIVE ACCOUNT OF IDEOLOGY

The social world presents itself to us, primarily, as a sedimented ensemble of social practices accepted at face value, without questioning the founding acts of their institution.

(Laclau 1994: 3)

The development of a poststructuralist conception of ideology that is post-Marxist in character can be traced primarily to the work of theorists such as Claude

Lefort, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe. These theorists argue from the general proposition that ideology entails an attempt to decontest central political concepts and relations of domination even though such attempts must, of necessity, fail. In these accounts, ideology is not to be conceived of as ‘false consciousness’, an illusory representation of reality. Rather, it is this reality itself which is already to be conceived of as ‘ideological’ (Žižek 1989: 21). Lefort in his *The Political Forms of Modern Society* argues that the operation of ideology is a feature of a specific type of society, a society in which social reality is intelligible in itself and not through some transcendent principle of ordering (Lefort 1986: 181–236). Although religion and ideology may share certain general features in the sense that both provide structures of intelligibility, the latter does so in the precise conditions of the modern state, where political power is circumscribed within society, and where there is a need to provide an image or representation of the unity of society which that society lacks. Thus, Lefort recuperates one of the central insights of Marx’s work, namely, that modern society can relate to itself only on condition that it forges a representation of its unity. The function of ideology is to provide a projection of imaginary unity, and to make that projection appear natural. These images of unity are, however, always subject to failures of concealment. The necessary failure of such concealment arises from the fact that ideologies are secondary discourses which seek to cover over the fact of the institution of modern society, and to negate it through processes of naturalization. The impossibility of achieving complete concealment and naturalization thus depends on the gap between the discourse and that about which it speaks: the very institution of social division. The task facing the analyst of ideology is to conceptualize the mechanisms which secure the imaginary essence of the community, without falling back on naturalistic fictions. A set of analytical issues arises here that is distinctive to poststructuralist accounts of ideology. In particular, there is a concern with the manner in which political identities are constituted in and through ideological practices. Highlighted in the Gramscian and Foucaultian, as well as in the Lacanian traditions, the theorization of subjectivity and its relation to the functioning of ideology become central to accounts of ideology. It is to an account of these issues that I now turn in discussing Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) work.

Laclau and Mouffe share a broad agreement on the ubiquitous nature of ideology, and on the fact that ideologies function through processes of decontestation or sedimentation. This agreement rests on a background proposition concerning the contestability of all political terms, shared by post-

Marxist theories of ideology specifically and poststructuralist theories more generally. However, post-Marxist theories of ideology do not limit their critique of essentialism to the domain of the meanings of political concepts. In addition, the very character of 'society' and 'identity' are also put into question.¹⁵ This is evident particularly in the early work of Laclau and Mouffe, which took the form of a critical engagement with Marxist theory so as to arrive at a discursive understanding of hegemony and ideology. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* they develop a critique of essentialism aimed at cleansing the Marxist conception of ideology from essentialism generally and, more specifically, from the last vestiges of class determinism. To achieve this, they distance themselves from the topographical, base/superstructure conception of ideology informing Marxism. As a result, they come to reject the idea of 'society' as a naturalized and given object of analysis. Laclau and Mouffe argue that society is traversed by antagonism¹⁶ and that it lacks an essence since it is an overdetermined and precarious unity resulting from articulatory practices.¹⁷ Laclau and Mouffe develop these insights in order to account for the manner in which particular discursive representations succeed in becoming hegemonic. In so doing, they introduce a series of distinctive analytical concepts aimed at grasping the process through which the precarious unity of the social is established. Of these, the concepts of 'myth' and 'imaginary' are amongst the most important.

Myths and Imaginaries

Where a social order is dislocated, one may expect attempts to overcome dislocation.¹⁸ Such processes, Laclau argues, take the form of the articulation of new principles for (re)interpreting, and thus reconstructing, the political order.¹⁹ Structurally, these new ordering principles may take two forms: myth and imaginary (Laclau 1990: 61–8). As Laclau formulates it, the work of myth is to re-establish closure where a social order has been dislocated. This is done through the construction of a new space of representation. A myth, as a novel principle of reading, thus attempts to reconstruct the social as objectively given; its operation is nothing other than an endeavour to reconstitute the absent unity of society via the naturalization of its divisions and a universalization of the demands of a particular group. In so far as it succeeds and manages to become institutionalized, it can be said to have become hegemonic. Under such circumstances, the myth will have been transformed into an imaginary: a horizon on which a multiplicity of demands may be inscribed. In so far as every attempt to introduce closure and to institute a structure is ideological, both the categories

of myth and imaginary can be utilized in the analysis of the discursive (ideological) structuring of the social.

Subjectivity

This account also elaborates a series of adjacent concepts. Of these, subjectivity is the most central to ideological analysis. In contrast to Althusserian structuralism, and to class reductionist approaches to ideology more generally, this theory of ideology aims to 'bring subjectivity back in'. Laclau proposes, in the place of structural determinism, that the place of the subject can be located where the structure fails to institute closure and to provide unified images of selfhood (Laclau 1996b). Thus, the subject is not given prior to entering into social relations as in liberal accounts of subjectivity, where 'individuality' is already a subject position with which there is identification. Neither is it the simple result of structurally determining processes. The subject emerges where there is dislocation; at the point at which things are still at stake, where meanings and identities are loosened from their structural subject positions.²⁰

In this respect, there are two theoretically distinct processes that have to be analysed. First, one needs to inquire into the subject positions created for the subject in ideology; that is, into those processes that make contingent and historically specific images appear natural, unmediated, and direct, and with which subjects come to identify. Second, one needs to investigate the failure of existing images and the resulting possibility of constructing new identities. An example may serve to clarify the issue. The breakdown of an extant order often results in the identities of all involved being destabilized. For instance, in the 2011 Arab spring in Egypt, members of the regime and the armed forces were forced to question their positions at the same time as new positions of identification were opened up for those who struggled against the authoritarian regime. This, as we know, does not occur without difficulty. The new subject positions are not simply available, but have to be constituted in and through political struggle. Thus, analysis of both the mechanisms through which contingent political identities become naturalized and decontested, and the processes through which recontestation occur are of crucial importance in the understanding of the operation of ideologies. The former allows one to engage with the manner in which ideologies create and sustain images for identification, while the latter facilitates analysis of interpellative failures. If one concentrates solely on the former, one runs the risk of reintroducing an account of the subject and of society which, in principle, may allow complete suture. One may be

tempted to say, 'if only there were no competing discourses, the subject might be one with him or herself'. By contrast, if one concentrates solely on the latter, one runs the risk of negating the importance of the role that images for identification play in political life, a topic to which we return below (Bottici and Challand 2001; Norval 2010). This account of the discursive constitution of political identities adds crucial insights into the way ideologies operate.

Empty Signifiers

Laclau has extended his and Mouffe's earlier analysis of ideology to the operation of what he calls 'empty signifiers' (Laclau 1996c). Empty signifiers are those signifiers which attempt to represent the absent fullness of a community. That is, they are those signifiers which embody the unity of a community which, nevertheless, cannot ever be fully achieved. In this, he argues, the operation of ideology *par excellence* is located (Laclau 1996a). In other words, the study of ideology is the study of the mechanisms which makes this illusion possible. Imagine a situation of radical dislocation of the social fabric in which a need for order arises. Laclau argues that if people need 'an order', its actual contents become a secondary consideration: "'Order" as such has no content, because it exists only in the various forms in which it is actually realised'. However, in a situation of radical disorder 'order' is 'present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, the signifier of that absence' (Laclau 1996c: 44). As a result, political forces may compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which may carry out the task of filling the lack. Ideological struggles are, therefore, struggles over the filling out of such empty signifiers. This filling process operates through a double inscription. It is a process that simultaneously signifies the need and impossibility of closure; the need to constitute a unified representation of society, and the impossibility of ever doing so entirely. This results in the ever-present possibility of recontestation and struggle over the particular objects that may take on this task, a task which is, in principle and in practice, impossible to fulfil.

This is best characterized through an example. Drawing on Walzer's account in *Thick and Thin* of how particular demands such as the end of arbitrary arrests, equal and impartial law enforcement, and so on, give content to 'justice' for the Prague demonstrators, Laclau argues that 'justice' as an empty signifier is not necessarily associated with any of these demands: 'as it has no representation of its own, once incarnated in certain demands it becomes in some way imprisoned by them, and is not able to circulate freely' (Laclau 1996a: 219). Once a demand

such as ‘the end of arbitrary arrests’ has become one of the names of ‘justice’, some other demands, such as ‘the prevalence of the will of the people over all legal restrictions’, cannot enter the fray, except with difficulty. Thus, the filling out of empty signifiers by particularistic demands will *limit* the operation of that empty signifier, in this case, ‘justice’. However, this is only one side of the argument. Laclau also emphasizes the extent to which empty signifiers, such as ‘justice’, are *empty* rather than ‘floating’. Floating signifiers are simply terms that are subject to a great deal of contestation and which, as a result, have no clearly delimited meaning, while empty signifiers ultimately have no signifieds. They signify a structural impossibility in signification as such, an impossibility that is shown only in the interruption or subversion of the sign. What does this mean for a signifier such as ‘justice’, if it is to be not just a floating, contested signifier? It suggests that in some instances ‘justice’ may come to represent the ‘pure being of the system’ (Laclau 1996c: 39), a being which is constitutively unrealizable. We are thus dealing with an impossibility that can only ever be instantiated or ‘positivized’ approximately. Which signifiers will play this role of approximation and of filling out depends, Laclau argues, on the relevant social context.²¹

This theoretical elaboration of the manner in which key signifiers not only represent particular ideological contents, but signal the impossibility of the closure of the system as such facilitates a distinctive engagement with the idea of the ubiquity of ideology. Given the dual character of the empty signifier—signifying both the need and the impossibility of full closure—it would only be possible to postulate the end of ideology if one of the two operations succeeded in eliminating the other. Should the particularistic demand, attempting to occupy the place of the empty signifier, become dominant, the split between empty and floating signifier would be dissolved; but should there be a completely empty signifier with no remaining traces of particularity, that split would also be obliterated, and one would have a social order in complete coincidence with itself. Both these options are, however, impossible to obtain fully, since the operation of the one depends upon the other. The difficult and necessary negotiation of the movement between the floating and empty signifier, or to put it in different terms, between the particular and the universal, ensures that we will continue to live in an ideological universe.²²

Images, Imaginaries, and Identification

The focus in poststructuralist discursive accounts of ideology on myths and

imaginaries structuring subjects' mode of identification, opens up further novel areas of investigation. Laclau, for instance, focuses on the role of identification in subject formation and in the constitution of social bonds. Crucial to this process is the availability of images for identification. Lefort, we have already noted, argues that imagination is crucial to the constitution of a social order in the absence of transcendent principles of ordering. In each of these cases, the images under discussion are not unreal or fictional.²³ Rather, they are what allow senses of commonality and social bonds to be constituted. Such images are not simply given. They are constituted politically, and the processes through which they are constituted are the stuff of politics.²⁴ Examples abound in contemporary politics. One only needs to think here of the role played by key political figures, such as Nelson Mandela and Aung Sang Suu Kyi, as well as signifiers of political events, such as Seattle and the Arab Spring, to capture the centrality of such images to the constitution of our political imagination. Several aspects of such images with which subjects identify, and that are constitutive of the horizons of political imagination need further analysis when thinking about the operation of political ideologies. As noted above, they include, first, the processes through which the images come to occupy a central place in the political imagination. In this respect, attention needs to be given to the selection of specific images for identification, the reasons these images and not others occupy a central place in the political imagination of a collectivity, and the role they play in the very constitution of that collectivity. Here the example of the Milan's women's collective as analysed by Zerilli is instructive, for it highlights the precise functioning of the role of a 'symbolic mother' in the formation and constitution of the activities and ethos of the collective (Zerilli 2005: ch. 3). The second aspect concerns that of the mechanisms through which such images may be made more generally available. Laclau and Mouffe's account of the articulatory logics of equivalence and difference is of particular relevance here, providing the analytical tools with which to capture the processes through which images for identification become universalized, and if successful, hegemonic.²⁵ Finally, it is also crucial to focus on the specific political ethos captured by and disseminated through a particular image. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, for instance, instituted a particular ethos of engagement, cultivating a democratic ideal constituted around the idea of *ubuntu* (Norval 2007: 197–207). Hence, the focus on exemplary images and the constitution of political imaginaries is central to accounting for the institution, deepening, and maintenance of political orders. The question of such images for identification—the sublime objects of ideology—also play a central role in the

account offered by theorists such as Slavoj Žižek, who develop a Lacanian-inspired theory of ideology.

IDEOLOGICAL FANTASY: INTRODUCING THE REAL

Slavoj Žižek argues that we cannot undertake to delimit ideology with reference to a reality whose features would be derived from positive knowledge, without thereby losing a sense of the operation of the constitution of reality, and of the distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘the real’.²⁶ It is this very distinction, and its consequences for misrecognition, which is at the heart of attempts to bring together Lacanian psychoanalysis and the theory of ideology. According to Žižek the ideological is a social reality the very existence of which implies the non-knowledge of its adherents as to its essence (Žižek 1989: 21). This insight is best illustrated by contrast to Sloterdijk’s thesis that the dominant mode of functioning of ideology in contemporary societies is a cynical one. The cynical subject is aware of the distance between the ideological mask and social reality, but he or she nonetheless still insists upon the mask: ‘one knows the falsehood very well, one is aware of the particular interest behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it’ (Žižek 1989: 29). Žižek suggests that cynical reason conceived in these terms proceeds too quickly, for it leaves untouched the fundamental level of *ideological fantasy*, the level on which ideology structures social reality itself.

The standard conception of the way fantasy works within ideology ‘is that of a fantasy-scenario that obfuscates the true horror of a situation’ (Žižek 1996: 78). The example of safety instructions on an aeroplane prior to take-off is instructive: ‘after a gentle landing on water ... each of the passengers puts on the life-jacket and, as on a beach toboggan, slides into the water and takes a swim, like a nice collective lagoon holiday’ (Žižek 1996: 79). This ‘gentrifying’ of a catastrophe is not what is at stake in the psychoanalytic conception of fantasy. Rather, the psychoanalytic conception of fantasy does not direct attention to an illusion masking the real state of things, but to an unconscious fantasy structuring our social reality itself (Žižek 1989: 33). Ideology, on this reading, is not a ‘dreamlike illusion that we build to escape reality’; it is an illusion which structures our social relations by masking a traumatic social division—the real in Lacanian terms—which cannot be symbolized (Žižek 1989: 45).

It is important to stress that the Lacanian ‘real’ should not be confused with ‘reality’ as reality is that which is always already symbolized, constructed by symbolic mechanisms. The real, however, is that part of reality which remains

unsymbolized, but which always returns to haunt ideological attempts to cover it over. The Marxian notion of class struggle is a case in point. Žižek argues that the ultimate paradox of ‘class struggle’ is that society is held together:

by the very antagonism, splitting, that forever prevents its closure in a harmonious, transparent, rational Whole—by the very impediment that undermines every rational totalization. Although ‘class struggle’ is nowhere directly given as a positive entity, it none the less functions, *in its very absence*, as the point of reference enabling us to locate every social phenomenon—not by relating it to class struggle as its ultimate meaning ... but by conceiving it as (an) other attempt to conceal and ‘patch up’ the rift of class antagonism, to efface its traces. What we have here is the structural-dialectical paradox of *an effect that exists only in order to efface the causes of its existence* (Žižek 1994: 21–2).

For Žižek, class struggle is the real in the Lacanian sense.²⁷ The real gives rise to ever-new symbolizations by means of which one endeavours to integrate and domesticate it, but such attempts are simultaneously condemned to failure. This emphasis on the unsymbolizable real has important consequences for the operation and analysis of ideological processes through which the subject is constituted. It is also in this respect that the Lacanian approach differentiates itself most strongly from a post-Marxist account of ideology. To make clear both the full implications of this approach and its difference from the approaches discussed so far, it is useful to give further attention to the manner in which Žižek seeks to distinguish his approach from post-Marxism along two axes: the analysis of ideology, and the account of the subject. Žižek argues that post-Marxist discourse analysis leads to a position where discourse as such is inherently ideological. On the one hand, he argues, analysis of ideology consists of symptomal readings that attempt to discern the unavowed bias of the ‘official text’ from its fissures, omissions, and slips. On the other hand, it focuses on an investigation of the nodal points, empty signifiers, and subject positions created for identification within such ideologies, around which antagonisms (friend–enemy distinctions) may arise. He contrasts such an understanding of ideology and subjectivity with one that aims to take account of the ‘real’. In the post-Marxist case, he states, what is important is an understanding of how antagonistic subject positions are structured discursively *in opposition to one another*. If, however, the dimension of the real is taken into account, what is important is precisely *not* to focus on an ‘external enemy’. Žižek argues that it is not this enemy who is preventing me from achieving my identity since every identity is already in itself blocked: ‘the external enemy is simply the small piece upon which we ‘project’ or ‘externalize’ this intrinsic immanent impossibility’ (Žižek 1990: 251–2).²⁸

With this, the terrain of relevant questions has shifted significantly. Once the

emphasis is on the idea that the identity of the self is always already blocked, the one who occupies the position of ‘the enemy’ becomes for all intents and purposes irrelevant. The important point is to recognize that the subject itself is an impossible entity and the purpose of ideological analysis is to make this clear. Taking the example of the Fascist construction of ‘the Jew’, Žižek argues that ‘the Jew’ is:

just the embodiment of a certain blockage—of the impossibility which prevents society from achieving its full identity as a closed, homogeneous totality.... Society is not prevented from achieving its full identity because of the Jews: it is prevented by its own antagonistic nature, by its own immanent blockage, and it ‘projects’ this internal negativity into the figure of the ‘Jew’ (Žižek 1989: 127).

Accordingly, the criticism pertinent to ideology is not to account for the ‘positive’ constructions of the enemy, but to focus on the fact that such positivizations are instantiations of the impossibility of the ideological edifice. Thus, this theorization puts the theory of ideology, understood as an analysis of decontestations (of political concepts, identities, and imaginaries), radically into question. Ideological analysis here is solely concerned with the *formal* misrecognition at the heart of the ideological fantasy, and not with the manner in which sedimented, decontested images operate in the workings of ideological discourse. Psychoanalysis informs us that identity, society, and ideology are all impossible. Ideological analysis consists in revealing that impossibility, and nothing more.²⁹

Fantasmatic Logics and Sublime Objects

Central to this account of ideology is a focus on the sublime objects of ideology, that is, those objects through which collectivities secure a sense of their own identity by relating it to what exceeds or challenges that identity (Sharpe 2010). For Žižek, all successful political ideologies refer to and posit such sublime objects (God, the Nation, etc.). The function of these objects is to ‘resignify individuals’ very inability to explain the content of their political beliefs’ (Sharpe 2010). This is the work of fantasmatic narratives. The idea of fantasy is systematized in the work of Glynos and Howarth (2007), who place it in the context of a discussion of a logics approach,³⁰ seeking to bridge what is sometimes cast as a rather sharp division between post-Marxist and Lacanian approaches to ideology. Drawing on both Laclau and on Žižek, and focusing on social, political, and fantasmatic logics, they argue that *social logics* characterize

practices or regimes by setting out the rules informing the practice as well as the kinds of entities populating it. *Political logics* furnish the tools with which to account for the historical emergence and formation of such practices by focusing on the conflicts and contestations surrounding their constitution (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 15). Finally, *fantasmatic logics* ‘shows how subjects are rendered complicit’ in ‘covering over the radical contingency of social relations’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 15). Hence, they argue that fantasmatic logics add an explanatory and critical layer to the analysis of ideology: if political logics enable a theorist to show *how* social practices come into being or are transformed, then fantasmatic logics provide the means to understand *how* and *why* subjects are gripped by practices and regimes (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 15). They concern the *force* of our identifications (Laclau 2005: 101). The role of *fantasy* is thus important in explaining the way in which different subjects are attached to certain values and practices by identifying with key signifiers. It focuses attention on particular objects and discourses that turn us into the subjects we are and hold us fast, providing the ‘grip’ of ideology (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 107). The fantasmatic dimension of such discourses draws attention to the contradictions in these identifications and the way these discourses cover-over the radical contingency of social relations in the name of the normal, the natural, and so on. The logic of fantasy thus conceals the radical contingency of social relations. As Žižek suggests, it does this through a dual process of promising a ‘fullness-to-come’ once an obstacle is overcome—the ‘beatific dimension’ of fantasy—or foretelling of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable—the ‘horrific dimension’ of fantasy (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 147). It should be noted that in any particular instance the two work hand-in-hand.³¹ The beatific side, Žižek argues, has ‘a *stabilizing* dimension’ found in images of omnipotence or of total control, while the horrific aspect has ‘a *destabilizing* dimension’, where the Other is presented as a threat and images of victimhood predominate (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 147). On the whole, then, fantasmatic logics capture the ways subjects organize their enjoyment (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 107).

CONCLUSION: THE TASK OF ANALYSING IDEOLOGY

By way of conclusion, I would like to reflect somewhat further on the question with which I opened this discussion, and relate it specifically to the fecundity of each approach for analysing ideological phenomena. As is clear from the foregoing discussion, the theoretical tools developed from within the post-

Marxist horizon focus on how different discursive elements may be articulated together to form an ideological unity. The analytical tools developed to flesh out this account, make a major contribution to the analysis of ideologies. Nevertheless, the bulk of theoretical effort is not directed at the analysis of the internal structuring and ‘identity’ of ideological configurations, but at the question of their limits. From this point of view, what is important about myths and imaginaries is how their identity is given in their *differentiation* from what falls outside them. This results from the specific manner in which an anti-essentialist critique has been developed in the post-Marxist tradition.³² The general tenor of this critique suggests that it is not possible to combine a ‘positive’ characterization of the elements of an ideological configuration with a non-essentialist grasp of those elements. For Laclau, for instance, if one were to characterize the ‘nature’ of any system or identity, the crucial point is not to look for positive or differential features since the very possibility of the system depends upon a moment of radical exclusion or negativity which can only be approximately incarnated in empty signifiers. As I have argued above, what is crucial in the analysis of ideological formations is to investigate the manner in which such empty signifiers function. Take the example of a Tsarist regime. Laclau argues that ‘we can represent the Tzarist regime as a repressive order by enumerating the differential kinds of oppression that it imposed on various sections of the population as much as we want’, but, he continues, ‘such enumeration will not give us the specificity of the repressive moment’, because ‘each instance of the repressive power counts as a pure bearer of the negation of the identity of the repressed sector’ (Laclau 1996c: 41). This focus has clear implications for ideology analysis. The emphasis on frontiers or limits, it is argued, reveals the ‘true’, that is, ‘negative’ character of identity. The decontestation that is characteristic of the way ideologies operate, thus, depends upon the limit, which is simultaneously a condition for closure and the mark of the impossibility of such decontestation. The post-Marxist account therefore introduces an added dimension into the treatment of ‘identity’.

It is this dimension which is driven to its logical conclusion in psychoanalytic accounts of the functioning of ideologies. This becomes abundantly clear with reference to the example of ‘the Jew’ discussed above. In the post-Marxist account, the analysis of the functioning of the empty signifier and of the construction of political frontiers retains a degree of specificity, of reference to *this* empty signifier. In the case of the psychoanalytic account of ‘the Jew’, what is crucial is *not* the fact that ‘the Jew’ occupies this place, but that it is a signifier for the impossibility of identity *tout court*.³³ Here the emphasis has shifted

almost completely away from the actual embodiments of political identities, towards the dimension of impossibility. What gets occluded here is the very real antagonisms and shifting alliances in favour of a hypostatization of ‘radical impossibility’ (Bellamy 1993: 33–4). In this respect, the question arises as to what extent this characterization can be useful in the analysis of the specificities characteristic of different political ideologies. Does not this emphasis on impossibility lead us away from an engagement with the world of politics, from a concern with the implications of how *this* or *that* embodiment is significant, if not crucial, to an understanding of the operation of ideologies as they function today, and have functioned in the past?

If Žižek’s account of ideology drives us towards an emptying out of the specificity of ideological forms, it does, nevertheless, provide us with an important way of addressing the question of the relation between ideology and critique. This account retains a dichotomy, at the root of the Marxist tradition, between ‘description’ and ‘critique’, but reformulates it in terms of the constitutive dimension of ‘impossibility’ and the role of the psychoanalytic account of fantasy outlined above. We are, therefore, no longer in a position to offer critique from a position of substantive knowledge (such as the movement of history and the laws of capitalism). Rather, the possibility of critique now arises from a *negative* account of identity and the impossibility of achieving knowledge of the real. Žižek argues that the inherent limit that traverses society and prevents it from constituting itself as a positive, complete, self-enclosed entity, is also what allows for the retention of a critical distance:

although no clear line of demarcation separates ideology from reality. Although ideology is always already at work in everything we experience as ‘reality’, we must none the less maintain the tension that keeps the critique of ideology alive ... it is possible to assume a place that enables us to keep a distance from it, *but this place from which one can denounce ideology must remain empty, it cannot be occupied by any positively determined reality*—the moment we yield to this temptation, we are back in ideology (Žižek 1994: 17).

On this reading, any attempt to develop intra-ideological criticism could not but reinforce the ideological attitude as such. Even though the emphasis on impossibility reveals the ultimately ideological character of all positivizations, it remains questionable whether this conception of critique is adequate for political analysis. In this respect, post-Marxist and morphological approaches to the study and critique of ideology are far more attuned to the continued need to give attention to the role and operation of the mechanisms that make the illusion of closure, or to put it differently, the ideological decontestations, possible. Here critique may be understood to encompass what Freeden calls ‘appraisive

handling' (Freedden 1996: 135), which does not deflect attention from the product itself, and which does not deflate its status and value, 'both as an intellectual phenomenon and as a means through which social understanding may be attained' (Freedden 1996: 1). In political analysis one needs to go beyond the assertion of the ultimate impossibility of reaching complete knowledge of the real towards an analysis of the mechanisms which make the illusion of reality possible. This involves serious engagement with the dimension of that which is decontested, with the 'positive' characterizations of identities and concepts, as well as with the specificity of the exclusions necessary to establish those decontestations. Otherwise, we forever run the risk of remaining detached and of pretending that we can occupy a position entirely outside ideological discourse.

NOTES

1. Whilst the first use of the term 'linguistic turn' can be attributed to Gustav Bergmann, a member of the 'Vienna Circle', it is Richard Rorty's 1967 volume, *The Linguistic Turn* that popularized its usage.
2. The earliest works in this respect were published in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. It was only during the 1980s that these ideas penetrated the field more generally. Some of the main writings associated with the linguistic turn in political theory include Pitkin 1967, 1972; Pocock 1971; Shapiro 1981; Connolly 1983; Dallmayr 1984; Tully 1988, 1995.
3. These assumptions were most evident in traditional Marxist accounts of ideology (see Barrett 1991: Part 1).
4. This is not to say that the writings under discussion endorse relativist positions. Rather, they analyse how truth claims come to be established, and how frameworks of truth organize what is sayable and visible.
5. Methodologically this could be characterized as a deconstructive strategy. Abandoning the term 'ideology' and the problems associated with it would leave the terrain on which it was originally conceived intact. In contrast, a deconstructive strategy urges the political theorist to effect an intervention by investigating the questions and assumptions that gave rise to certain answers in the first place.
6. This process of reinscription is one of 'iteration'. See Derrida (1988).
7. The term 'decontestation' is drawn from Freedden's morphological approach to the analysis of ideologies. Freedden argues that ideologies aim to 'decontest' the meanings of political concepts. That is, they aim to limit the range of possible contestation around central political concepts (Freedden 1996: 82.) My use of the term 'decontestation' is somewhat wider. I will argue that political ideologies do more than decontest clusters of political concepts. They also try to limit contestation of our political identifications.
8. Freedden does not draw this distinction, but it is necessary to distinguish between teleological and non-teleological perfectionist approaches, since the latter is compatible with poststructuralist approaches to ideology analysis while the former is not.
9. In this respect, Wittgenstein (1953) and Austin (1971) have been particularly influential.
10. In contrast to his earlier dismissal of poststructuralism, Skinner's later writings explore the resonances, in particular, with Foucault's genealogical method. See Skinner (1998: 112).
11. Pocock was particularly influenced by Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The idea of a Kuhnian paradigm allowed him to draw out similarities and differences between scientific and political languages and communities. See Pocock (1971: 13–41).

12. Skinner first utilized the idea of an 'illocutionary force' in his seminal article published in 1971.
13. For a brief discussion of similarities in approach between Skinner and Foucault, see: Tully (1988: 16–25). Several other texts have also been published over the past decade that attempt to trace out connections between the British tradition of 'ordinary language analysis' and continental poststructuralist approaches to language. In this respect, see Staten (1984) and Cavell (1995).
14. The Marxist, psychoanalytic, and poststructuralist traditions all take a central interest in the formation of subjectivity. In the Marxist tradition, this interest takes the form of a concern with the formation of social classes. The psychoanalytic and poststructuralist traditions avoid this a priori determination of subjectivity by focusing on the structured processes through which subjects are brought into being. For an introduction to different conceptions of subjectivity and their relation to politics, see Finlayson and Valentine (1988: Part 1).
15. The theorization of the 'impossibility of society' relies upon a more general account of the impossibility of the full constitution of any identity, drawn from deconstruction. Derrida's reading of the concept of 'structure' has been particularly influential in the development of Laclau and Mouffe's arguments. See Derrida (1978).
16. Laclau and Mouffe's theorization of 'antagonism' is closely related to their understanding of the nature of identity. Drawing on Saussurean linguistics, they argue that all identity is relational in character. That is, identity is achieved by differentiation from other identities rather than by reference to any positive characteristics.
17. The term 'articulation' can to be understood by contrasting it to the Hegelian conception of 'mediation' and to the Marxist emphasis on a necessary relation between class and ideological position. Thus, articulation does not refer to an internal movement of the concept, and neither does it refer to a relation of necessity. Articulation is a political practice of linking together elements of an ideological formation (be they subject positions or political concepts) which have no necessary connection (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105–14).
18. The category of dislocation is discussed extensively in Laclau (1990:,39–41).
19. The reverse may also occur. A discourse may fail in its function of the universalization of particular social demands. In this case, the imaginary horizon will be less and less successful in inscribing those demands within its orbit. The imaginary will enter into a crisis, and revert to being a myth revealing, once again, the particularity of the very attempt to create an image of representation for the society as a whole.
20. Primarily as a response to a critical reading by Slavoj Žižek, Laclau introduced a distinction between the idea of the subject in a radical sense, and the Foucaultian idea of subject positions in his later works. See Žižek, 'Beyond Discourse-Analysis' (1990: 249–60).
21. The main limitation of this formulation is that it throws the analysis back on an undifferentiated idea of 'context'. In order to facilitate the analysis of ideologies, this needs to be supplemented, at the very least, by a Foucaultian conception of genealogy, and by the development of meso-level concepts.
22. For a good discussion of the relation universal/particular see (Zerilli 1998).
23. Bottici suggests the term 'imaginal' to emphasize that these images are both the result of action on the side of individuals, and what shapes the imagination of such individuals, and one would have to add, social collectivities (Bottici and Challand 2001: 29).
24. Norval (2007: 191–7). Exemplarity is not given but is constituted through political practices of articulation.
25. For a discussion of the logics of equivalence and difference, see Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 127–34).
26. The real is one of the three orders according to which all psychoanalytic phenomena may be described. For a discussion of the different nuances of the term 'real' in Lacanian psychoanalysis, see Evans (1996: 159–61).
27. The nature of 'class struggle' is debated extensively between Laclau and Žižek. See, for instance, Butler, Laclau, and Žižek (2000).
28. Note that this reading by Žižek ignores the role of dislocation in post-Marxist accounts of ideology. It

also posits an exaggerated distance between post-Marxist and Lacanian approaches on the question of the subject. These approaches share very similar starting-points for their theorization of subjectivity. The influence of Lacan, for instance, is present already in Laclau and Mouffe (1985).

29. Bennington berates Žižek for this dimension of the analysis. He argues that ‘in Žižek’s readings ... the dimension of ... “politics” is radically foreclosed, because nothing can *happen* that is not already recognisable ... as the truth already given in [Žižek’s presentation of] Hegel and Lacan’ (Bennington 1994: 6).
30. Glynos and Howarth argue that logics are *in* yet not subsumable *by* the practices examined (2007: 159). Instead, they provide a bridge between a subject’s own self-interpretation and the investigator’s interpretations of those self-interpretations, and these sets of interpretations may or may not match-up.
31. Stavrakakis quoted in Glynos and Howarth (2007: 147).
32. This is a result of the particular intellectual trajectory of post-Marxist approaches, and the manner in which it has tended to develop its anti-essentialist critique. For a full discussion of this issue, see Norval (1997: 53–61).
33. It is important to note that post-Marxist and psychoanalytic approaches are in agreement on the idea that the figure occupying this position—in this case ‘the Jew’—is a contingent embodiment of this impossibility. ‘The Jew’ is not a positive cause of social negativity but, as Žižek (1989: 127), makes abundantly clear, ‘*a point at which social negativity as such assumes positive existence*’. The difference between the two approaches is to be found in what is prioritized in the analysis.

REFERENCES

- Austin, J. 1971. *How To Do Things With Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ball, T. 1985. “‘Hobbes’ linguistic turn’, *Polity*, 17: 739–60.
- Barrett, M. 1991. *The Politics of Truth*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bellamy, E. J. 1993. ‘Discourses of impossibility: Can psychoanalysis be political?’ *Diacritics*, 23: 24–38.
- Bennington, G. 1994. *Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction*. London: Verso.
- Bottici, C. and Challand, B. 2001. *The Politics of Imagination*. Abingdon: Birkbeck Law Press.
- Butler, J., E. Laclau. and S. Žižek 2000. *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. London: Verso.
- Cavell, S. 1995. *Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chaitin, G. D. 1996. *Rhetoric and Culture in Lacan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Connolly, W. E. 1983. *The Terms of Political Discourse*. 2nd edn. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- Dallmayr, F. 1984. *Language and Politics*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Derrida, J. 1978. ‘structure, sign and play in the discourse of the human sciences’. Pp. 278–93 in *Writing and Difference*, J. Derrida. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Derrida, J. 1988. *Limited Inc. abc*, ed. Gerald Graff. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Evans, D. 1996. *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis*. London: Routledge.
- Finlayson A. and J. Valentine (eds.) 1988. *Politics and Post-Structuralism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Freedon, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Glynos, J. and D. Howarth 2007. *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Gramsci, A. 1971. *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Laclau, E. 1994. ‘Introduction’, in E. Laclau (ed.), *The Making of Political Identities*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E. 1996a. ‘The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1: 201–20.

- Laclau, E. 1996b. 'Deconstruction, pragmatism, hegemony'. Pp. 47–68 in *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, eds S. Critchley, J. Derrida, E. Laclau, and R. Rorty, ed. C. Mouffe. London: Routledge.
- Laclau, E. 1996c. 'Why do empty signifiers matter to politics?' Pp. 36–46 in *Emancipation(s)*. E Laclau. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E. 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E. 1990. *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. London: Verso.
- Lefort, C. 1986. *The Political Forms of Modern Society*, edited and introduced by John B. Thompson. Cambridge; Polity Press.
- McLellan, D. 1995. *Ideology*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Morrice, D. 1996. *Philosophy, Science, and Ideology in Political Thought*. London: St. Martin's Press.
- Norval, A. J. 1997. 'Frontiers in question', *Acta Philosophica*, 18: 51–75.
- Norval, A. J. 2007. *Aversive Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norval, A. J. 2010. 'A democratic politics of acknowledgement: Political judgment, imagination and exemplarity', *Diacritics*, 38 (4): 59–76.
- Pitkin, H. F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pitkin, H. F. 1972. *Wittgenstein and Justice*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pocock, J. G. A. 1971. *Politics, Language and Time*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rajchman, J. 1991. *Truth and Eros*. New York: Routledge.
- Rorty, R. (ed.) 1967. *The Linguistic Turn. Essays in Philosophical Method*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rorty, R. 1991. *Consequences of Pragmatism*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Shapiro, M. J. 1981. *Language and Political Understanding*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sharpe, M. 2010. Slavoj Žižek (1949–). Pp. 248–9 in *From Agamben to Žižek*, ed. Jon Simons. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Skinner, Q. 1971. 'On performing and explaining linguistic actions', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 21: 1–21.
- Skinner, Q. 1998. *Liberty before Liberalism*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Staten, H. 1984. *Wittgenstein and Derrida*. London: University of Nebraska Press.
- Tully, J. (ed.) 1988. *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Tully, J. 1995. *Strange Multiplicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walzer, M. 1994. *Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Zerilli, L. M. G. 1998. "'This universalism which is not one": A review of Ernesto Laclau's *Emancipation(s)*'. *Diacritics*, 28 (2): 3–20.
- Zerilli, L. M. G. 2005. *Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Žižek, S. 1989. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.
- Žižek, S. 1990. 'Beyond discourse-analysis'. Pp. 249–60 in *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, E. Laclau. London: Verso.
- Žižek, S. 1994. 'The spectre of ideology'. Pp. 1–33 in *Mapping Ideology*, ed. S. Žižek. London: Verso.
- Žižek, S. 1996. 'Fantasy as political category: A Lacanian approach', *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society*, 1: 77–85.

CHAPTER 10 IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE

TEUN A. VAN DIJK

INTRODUCTION

IDEOLOGIES are largely acquired, spread, and reproduced by text and talk. It is therefore strange, to say the least, that both in the history of the notion as well as in the contemporary social sciences so little systematic attention has been paid to the fundamental role of discourse in the reproduction of ideology. The same is true for the important sociocognitive basis of ideologies as belief systems. This chapter therefore offers a socio-cognitive and discourse analytical account of ideology and the ways ideologies are discursively used and reproduced in communicative situations and in society.

Ideologies have traditionally been studied especially in philosophy and the social sciences—despite the early proposal by Destutt de Tracy, more than 200 years ago, for a new discipline that would study ‘ideas’. Napoleon hardly liked such a philosophical-psychological discipline and Marx-Engels later further contributed to the negative image ideologies have had since then as systems of misconceived ideas. Until today, ideologies in everyday and academic discourse are typically attributed to Others, such as our ideological opponents or enemies: *We* have the truth, *They* have ideologies.

For the same reason, despite very similar functions, such as the cognitive representation of ingroup interests, ideologies are typically associated with systems of domination, and seldom with systems of dissent or resistance, called *utopias* by Mannheim (1936). Contrary to this biased conception of ideology as an instrument of domination, we propose a *general theory of ideology and its reproduction by discourse*—of which ideologies of domination, as is the case for racism, sexism, classism, or neoliberalism, are special examples. Indeed, anti-racism, feminism, socialism, pacifism, or environmentalism, among many others, are no less ideologies by our definition, but not with the function to found and legitimate domination, but precisely to provide the sociocognitive basis for the struggle against it (Van Dijk 1998).

Critical Discourse Studies

The approach to ideology presented here may be seen as part of *Critical Discourse Studies* (CDS, often also called *Critical Discourse Analysis*, CDA), a movement of scholars in the field of *Discourse Studies* (usually also called *Discourse Analysis*) interested in the study of the ways social power abuse, such as racism and sexism, is (re)produced—and resisted—by text and talk (for introductions and other studies in CDS, see, e.g., Fowler et al. 1979; Fairclough 1995; Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996; Toolan 2002; Weiss and Wodak 2003; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Van Dijk 2008b; Van Leeuwen 2008; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Machin and Mayr 2012;).

It should be emphasized though that *CDS/CDA is not a method of analysis*, as is often believed, but a social movement of scholars using a wide variety of (usually, but not exclusively, qualitative) methods of discourse analysis. These methods may include analysis of the lexicon, syntax, local and global meaning (semantics), speech acts, and other relations with the context (pragmatics), style, rhetoric, argumentation, narrative structures, or other conventional organization of discourse, on the one hand, and quantitative corpus analysis, ethnography, participant observation, or psychological experiments, among other methods, on the other hand. Unlike some other approaches to ideology in CDS, we combine a sociocognitive definition of ideology as a form of social cognition with a systematic analysis of a variety of structures of discourse that typically express underlying ideological representations (Van Dijk 1998).

One of our claims is that ideologies are largely acquired, expressed, and reproduced by discourse, and that hence a discourse analytical approach is crucial to understand the ways ideologies emerge, spread, and are used by social groups.

It should also be emphasized that this approach to ideology does not reduce the theory to a mere cognitive approach. First of all, discourses are social practices, and it is through such practices that ideologies are acquired, used, and spread. Secondly, as forms of social cognition, ideologies are inherently social, unlike personal beliefs, and shared by members of specific social groups. Hence, our approach to ideology is triangular: it relates discourse with society via a sociocognitive interface.

IDEOLOGY AS SOCIAL COGNITION

As suggested above, the history of the notion and the study of ideology generally ignored the cognitive nature of ideologies (but see, e.g., Malrieu 1999; Dirven et al. 2001). Rather vaguely, ideologies in philosophy and the social sciences were

conceived of as ‘false consciousness’ and later as belief systems, but without an explicit psychological theory of the nature of these ideas or beliefs (Harris 1968; Thompson 1986). In fact, until recently, both cognitive and social psychology themselves rarely paid attention to ideologies, for instance in the form of complete monographs (see Jost et al.’s chapter on *Political Ideologies and their Social Psychological Functions[oxfordhb-9780199585977-e-024]*). While cognitive psychology focused on knowledge, social psychology limited itself to such notions as stereotypes, prejudice, and other attitudes, often without examining their obvious ideological basis (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Leyens et al. 1994; Nelson 2009). In other words, there is as yet no general *cognitive science* of ideology.

Yet, knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies are all forms of *social cognition*, that is, mental representations shared by, and distributed over, the members of social collectivities (Fraser and Gaskell 1990; Hamilton 2005; Augoustinos et al. 2006; Fiske and Taylor 2007;). In the same way as there are no private or personal languages, there are no personal ideologies. And like natural languages, ideologies are forms of social cognition that are *used* by individuals. In other words, ideologies are first of all *socially shared belief systems*. They should be theoretically distinguished from the many ways these systems can be expressed, used, or implemented by individual people, as members, in discourse and other social practices.

Early on in the history of the notion and the theory of ideology a distinction was usually made between (true) *knowledge* and (false) *ideology*. Since both are a form of social cognition, we also need to distinguish between these notions, but not along the dimension of their truth value. We conceive of knowledge as socially shared beliefs that are justified within *epistemic communities*, and on the basis of special *knowledge criteria*, such as reliable observation, sources, or inference. Within such communities, knowledge consists of shared beliefs that are taken for granted, and hence typically presupposed in public discourse. Such knowledge is the basis of all other beliefs in society (Van Dijk 2012).

Ideologies, on the other hand, are belief systems that are only *shared by specific (ideological) groups of people*, and are typically *not* shared and taken for granted by the whole sociocultural community. In other words, they embody beliefs about which there are differences of opinion, and that hence are typically persuasively attacked and defended among members of different ideological groups. Thus, whereas ideologies may be beliefs that are taken for granted and presupposed within the own group, they are not so across groups and in society as a whole. This implies, as it should, that as soon as ideological beliefs are

accepted and taken for granted by all members of a community, by definition they are no longer ideologies but will count as knowledge *in that community*. Conversely, and for the same reason, what once counted as generally accepted belief, and hence as knowledge, may later be challenged by special groups of people and thus come to be seen and used as an ideology, as is typically the case of religion.

Besides these social differences between the functions of knowledge and ideologies, there are also more sociocognitive ones. Whereas knowledge as socially shared belief systems is usually seen as ‘true’ belief, that is, as belief about ‘facts’, most ideologies feature beliefs that are based on norms and values. These general (community based) norms and values may be applied in different ways by members of different groups, depending on their goals and interests. Hence ideological beliefs do not have the same consensus nature as knowledge. For instance, the very general value of freedom may variously be interpreted as freedom of the market, freedom of expression, or freedom from oppression, depending on the ideology and the interests of ideological groups. Hence the general consequence that ideological differences become manifest in ideological struggle.

The Structure of Ideologies

Another topic neglected in traditional ideology studies is their very structure. Thus, we may discuss ideologies of liberalism, socialism, or pacifism, among many others, but it is obviously crucial that their analysis requires an explicit description of their ‘contents’ and their internal organization. As yet, we have no general theory of this cognitive organization of ideologies. However, their social functions as representations of the goals and interests of social groups, as well as the analysis of ideological discourse, offers some suggestions for what may be called an *ideology schema* that organizes the beliefs of an ideology. Such a schema may be seen as composed of the following fundamental categories (Van Dijk 1998):

- **Identity:** Who are we? Who belongs to us? Who is a member and who can join?
- **Activities:** What do we (have to) do? What is our role in society?
- **Goals:** What is the goal of our activities?
- **Norms and values:** What are the norms of our activities? What is good

or bad for us?

- **Group relations:** Who are our friends and our enemies?
- **Resources:** What material or symbolic resources form the basis of our (lack of) power and our position in society?

This very general schema organizes the fundamental beliefs of an ideological group and hence may also be seen as the structure of the overall self-image of the group as well as its relations to other groups. Generally—though not always—such a self-image of the ideological ingroup is positive, whereas that of outgroups is negative. Hence the typical polarized structure of ideologies as organized representations as *Us* versus *Them*. This polarized nature of ideologies is obviously more prominent for ideologies where the goals and interests of social groups are at stake, as is the case for neoliberal versus socialist, or between sexist and feminist ideologies, and possibly less so for ideologies that are less polarized, as is the case for ideologies shared by groups of professionals (such as professors or journalists).

Ideologies and Attitudes

The social and political functions of ideologies require these to be rather general and abstract. Thus, a feminist ideology needs to be applicable to any issue related to the position of women in society, such as their role as citizens, workers, mothers, and so on. Hence, a feminist ideology must consist of fundamental, value-based beliefs about gender equality and human rights. It therefore makes sense to further distinguish between general ideologies, on the one hand, and socially shared *ideological attitudes*, on the other hand. The latter feature more specific beliefs about socially relevant issues in specific domains, as is the case for attitudes about abortion, divorce, or glass ceilings in hiring. In everyday life, ideologies tend to be experienced and applied at this more specific level of ideologically based attitudes. It may be a matter of theoretical dispute to include ideological attitudes as part of an ideology, or rather as separate attitudes influenced and organized by an underlying ideology. In the first case, the ideology is constantly changing, depending on social, political, or technological developments, whereas in the latter case the ideology is more stable, but with flexible application in variable social issues. It may be assumed that specific social attitudes (e.g. about abortion or capital punishment) are acquired by members before they are related to other attitudes and abstracted from in terms of a more general and abstract ideology.

Ideologies and Mental Models

We have seen that ideologies are assumed to be shared by members of groups. This also enables ideologies to be used and applied in the social practices in the everyday lives of these members. This means that the general beliefs of ideologies and the social attitudes based on them need to be made specific for the individual circumstances, characteristics, and experiences of individual members. That is, social cognition should be related to personal cognition, including personally variable opinions about social issues and social practices (such as, for instance, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, or immigration). Such personal cognitions are specified in *mental models* that represent personal experiences in episodic memory (Tulving 1983; Baddeley et al. 2002), influenced not only by general ideologies and attitudes but also by earlier personal experiences (old models) of each group member (for the theory of mental models, see e.g. Gentner and Stevens 1983; Johnson-Laird 1983; Van Dijk and Kintsch 1983; Oakhill and Garnham 1996).

Thus, each member of an ideological group may be a socialist, feminist, or pacifist in her or his own way—as we also see in the variable ideologically based discourses and social practices in empirical research. Since, moreover, individual people may be members of various ideological groups, their experiences (mental models) may feature—sometimes contradictory—personal opinions and other beliefs as influenced by different ideologies: One may be a feminist, socialist ecologist—even when in specific social situations one or more of these ideologies will be more relevant, and hence more influential, than the others.

Ideologically based mental models are absolutely crucial to link ideologies with the social practices of group members. They are the interface between the social and the personal, between the group and its members, and between the system and its manifestations. In other words, all ideological practices of group members are based on specific mental models that feature a subjective representation of events or actions observed or participated in.

For the same reason, all ideological discourse—engaged in by people *as group members*—is based on unique mental models. This accounts for the fundamental fact that on the one hand everyday practices can be planned and recognized as practices of a member of a group, and hence as ideological, whereas on the other hand they may still have the unique personal properties as influenced by people's personal history and social circumstances. It is this personal nature of the *use* of ideologies that has also been the object of research of ideology in contemporary psychology (Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2009). As it is

theoretically important to distinguish between language as a socially shared system on the one hand, and the personal, contextually situated uses of language on the other hand, one should not confuse group ideologies with their personal acquisition and uses, as the latter are also influenced by personal biography, personality, and current context.

In sum, an adequate theory of ideology should account not only for overall, group-based social practices or systems of interpretation of social events, but also for the ways individual members may participate in, and hence reproduce ideologies in their everyday lives.

This distinction between ideology as system and its personal uses offers a very crucial condition for (usually slow) *changes of ideologies* when (initially small) subgroups of people develop new ideological ideas as variants or deviations from a prevalent ideology.

Concluding, we see that the underlying, sociocognitive system of ideologies consists of at least three layers: the general ideology itself, a set of variable ideological attitudes, also shared by social groups, and finally personally variable mental models representing individual experiences at the basis of personal discourse and other practices.

DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY

The sociocognitive system explained above not only provides a partial theory of ideology but also an explicit basis for the theory of the production and comprehension of discourse as well as other social practices. That is, talk and text are produced and understood, first of all, in terms of mental models that account for the subjective, personal nature of discourse and action. To plan or to understand a discourse or any other act is to construe a mental model. To do so as a member of a community or a social group, these mental models feature specific instantiations of socially shared beliefs such as knowledge and ideologies, respectively.

Ideological discourse usually exhibits the polarized structures of underlying attitudes and ideologies, that is, a structure that typically emphasizes positive properties of Us, the ingroup, and negative properties of Them, the outgroup. Such polarization may affect all levels of discourse, from the surface levels of sounds and visual structures, syntax, and the lexicon, on the one hand, to the underlying semantic and pragmatic levels of meaning and action, as well as the dimensions that cut through different levels, as is the case for the rhetoric of sound (e.g. alliterations) and meaning (as in hyperboles, euphemisms, or

metaphors), on the other hand. We shall illustrate and further develop this theory of ideological discourse in the rest of this chapter.

Context Models

In order to account for ideological discourse, however, we first need another crucial level of cognition, namely the subjective representation of the communicative situation. Language users, and in general social actors, not only construe a subjective mental model of events they think or talk about, but also of the very actions and environment in which they are currently engaged. That is, they also need to construe subjective *context models*. The context models also consist of a spatiotemporal setting, a representation of the current identity and role of the participants as well as the relations between them, the current social action and its goals, as well as the knowledge and ideology of the participants (Van Dijk 2008a, 2009).

These context models are crucial to account for the socially *appropriate* production of discourse and interaction. Thus, an editorial in the newspaper may not only exhibit the ideology of the newspaper, but also needs to be appropriate as an editorial, as different from a news story, a letter to the editor or an advertisement, or a political speech.

For the account of ideological discourse, context models are especially relevant to explain how ideological discourse is adapted to the communicative situation. For instance, a feminist typically adapts her (or his) discourse to the current communicative situation, featuring her current identity or role, those of the recipients, the goal of current text and talk and especially the ideology of the recipient. Not quite trivially, this explains that a feminist does not always talk or write as feminist, and if so such discourse will be adapted to the audience.

This context dependence also explains, quite fundamentally, that the same discourse or discourse property may be intended or understood as racist (or sexist) in one communicative situation and not in another, as we know from jokes about blacks and the use of the N-word by black youth themselves and when used by white speakers. In other words, very few discourse properties are racist by themselves. They are always more or less racist as used in concrete communicative situations, featuring, for instance, the racist beliefs of the speaker (Van Dijk 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993).

This account of racist discourse also suggests that in general it makes sense not to speak of racist people but rather of racist (or anti-racist) practices. Racism

as a system of domination is defined for groups who share racist beliefs. However, such beliefs are not continuously expressed in all discourse and other social practices of group members, but only in specific contexts. Hence, it is contextualized text, talk, and action that is at the basis of the daily reproduction of racism, as well as other ideologies.

As is the case for all mental models, context models as well may themselves be ideological. For instance, journalists may write a sexist or racist story *about* women or black people, but also directly interact with women or black people in a sexist or racist way. In that case, they have a representation of their recipients that is based on a sexist or racist ideology, for instance feeling themselves somehow superior to their interlocutors. That may show not only in explicit derogatory terms, but also in quite subtle variations of tone of voice, intonation, volume, gestures, gaze, and other aspects of body language on the one hand, or subtle semantic implications on the other hand.

We now have the outline of a general theory of ideological discourse consisting of a sociocognitive basis of ideologies as socially shared belief systems, more specific ideological attitudes and personal mental models, on the one hand, and of socially situated ideological discourse and other social practices on the other hand. In other treatments of ideology, the social, political, and institutional aspects of the contexts of ideological discourse are made explicit, such as the acquisition and use of ideologies in parliament and by political parties, by journalists, and the mass media or by teachers and professors in textbooks and schools, among many other ideological practices and their social sites. Such broader, macro-sociological and political accounts of ideology can now be related to the details of discourse and other social practices at the micro-level, as well as to the sociocognitive nature of ideology of belief systems of groups and their individual applications in the mental models of individual group members. We thus account for the general, aggregate nature of ideological systems and the role of ideological groups in society, as well as of the way such systems are actually expressed, used, and reproduced by their members in concrete situated practices.

Ideological Discourse Semantics

Within the theoretical framework outlined above, we are now able to provide a more explicit and detailed account of ideological discourse. We shall do so first with an analysis of underlying ideological meanings, and then proceed to the way such ideological meanings may be further expressed or signalled by the

various kinds of surface structures of multimodal discourse. Our examples will be taken from a debate on asylum seekers in the UK House of Commons of 5 March 1997. Very similar debates have taken place since. The debate is initiated by Member of Parliament (MP) for the Conservative Party, Mrs Teresa Gorman, representative of Billericay, who argues against the abolition of the current immigration law, as proposed by Labour Party MPs.

Topics. As is the case for many phenomena, discourse may be analysed at a more global and a more local level. The same is true for discourse meaning. Thus we distinguish between (local) meanings of words, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs, on the one hand, and overall, global meanings of whole discourses, on the other hand. The latter are described in terms of *macro-propositions*, which may be seen as overall conceptual summaries of (larger parts) of a discourse, and are commonly described as (discourse) *topics* (van Dijk 1980). These topics are typically expressed in headlines, abstracts, and summaries. A text may have several, hierarchical levels of such macro-propositions. This overall macro-structure also defines the *global coherence* of discourse. In other words, for a discourse to be globally coherent, local propositions always need to be related to a higher level topic.

The choice of topics of discourse may be biased by underlying attitudes and ideologies. Thus, in the usual polarized structure of ideological discourse, we may expect largely negative topics about Them, and neutral or positive topics about Us. To wit, the coverage of immigration and minorities in the mass media focuses on such topics as ‘Immigration is a threat’, ‘Integration of ethnic others is a huge problem’, ‘They are criminals’, etc. Meanwhile, ingroup members and institutions are globally represented as tolerant and as helping immigrants (or third world countries, etc.). Conversely, negative topics about Us (such as our racism and prejudice) are typically mitigated or ignored, and hence seldom reach (important) topic status. The same is true for positive information about Them, such as the contributions of immigrants or minorities to the national economy or culture. Thus, in her speech Mrs Gorman develops at length the topic that asylum seekers are abusing the British welfare system. Complementary to this topics, British taxpayers are represented as victims of such asylum seekers.

Propositions. Traditionally, meanings are represented as propositions, consisting of a predicate, some arguments, and modalities such as ‘It is necessary that ...’. First of all, in ideological discourse, as we also have seen for topics (macro-propositions), negative meanings about outgroups may be emphasized, and such will also be obvious in the predicates of local propositions, for instance as follows in Mrs Gorman’s speech:

- (1) The Daily Mail today reports the case of a woman from Russia who has managed to stay in Britain for five years. According to the magistrates' court yesterday, she has cost the British taxpayer £40 000. She was arrested, of course, for stealing. I do not know how people who are not bona fide asylum seekers and whose applications have been rejected time and again manage to remain in this country for so long at the expense of the British public, but the system clearly needs tightening up.¹

We see in this example an accumulation of negative predicates and their negative implications and implicatures, such as 'managed to stay in Britain for five years', 'she has cost ...', 'stealing', 'not bonafide', and 'at the expense of'. These local predicates overall construe the predicates of 'abuse' and 'criminal' at the global level of topics—which is usually best remembered by the recipients.

Modalities. Propositions may be modalized in many ways. Facts may be presented as possible, probable, or necessary; as obligatory or permitted; as desired or hoped for; and so on. Obviously such epistemic, deontic, or other modalities may also be controlled by underlying attitudes and ideologies. Indeed, what Mrs Gorman does in her speech is extensively telling the MPs what in her view the government should (not) do, asylum seekers should (not) do, etc. In example (1) we see this in the last sentence: *The system clearly needs cleaning up*. See also the evaluative modalities 'It is wrong that' and 'should bear' in the following example, which also presuppose underlying ideological attitudes, not only about refugees, but also about paying taxes.

- (2) It is wrong that ratepayers in the London area should bear an undue proportion of the burden of expenditure that those people are causing.

Local coherence. At the semantic level of meaning, text and talk consist of sequences of propositions that also need to be locally coherent, from one to the next. Such coherence may be *referential* (when the facts referred to are related, for instance by a relation of cause and consequence) or *functional* (when one proposition has a special function with respect to another one, as is the case for a Generalization, Specification, Explanation, or Example). Referential coherence depends on the (subjective) mental model language users have of an event, and we have seen that these models may have an ideological basis. Thus, people of one group may see some event as a cause when others do not see a cause at all, or maybe even see just a consequence. In her speech, Mrs Gorman argues at length that the immigration of refugees causes taxpayers to pay more taxes—

whereas her opponents may well argue that because many refugees do have work and do pay taxes, British taxpayers might well be paying less taxes as a result of immigration, or may have all kinds of menial jobs done by ‘cheap’ immigrant workers. This is how Mrs Gorman starts her speech, namely with a ‘thematic’ local proposition that may also function as a macro-proposition summarizing her speech:

- (3) I want to bring to the attention of the House the particular difficulties faced by the London boroughs because of the problems of asylum seekers.

See also her argument in the following passages:

- (4) I understand that many people want to come to Britain to work, but there is a procedure whereby people can legitimately become part of our community. People who come as economic migrants are sidestepping that.

The Government, with cross-party backing, decided to do something about the matter. The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 stated that people whose application to remain in Britain had been turned down could no longer receive the social security and housing benefit that they had previously enjoyed. That is estimated to have cut the number of bogus asylum seekers by about a half.

It is a great worry to me and many others that the Opposition spokesman for home affairs seems to want to scrap the legislation and return to the previous situation. I would consider that extremely irresponsible. It would open the floodgates again, and presumably the £200 million a year cost that was estimated when the legislation was introduced would again become part of the charge on the British taxpayer.

This passage is locally coherent because of the following relationships between the propositions expressed in its respective sentences. First of all, it is asserted as a fact that ‘economic migrants’ are sidestepping the procedure and that *as a consequence* the (Conservative) Government enacted the Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996. Then, Mrs Gorman states that the number of ‘bogus refugees’ has been cut by about half *as a consequence* of that law. And finally she claims that the abolition of this law will have the opposed *consequence* of ‘opening the floodgates’ again, with dire *consequences* for British taxpayers. This causal sequence of events and actions is obviously only coherent with

respect to Mrs Gorman's current ideological mental model of the immigration situation in the UK, in which refugees are only represented as 'bogus refugees' who are abusing the system, as a burden for taxpayers, and so on. Alternative policies, as proposed by Labour (in that case), are not being considered. In other words, the coherence of discourse is closely related to the ideologically based view speakers have of political issues.

Implications and presuppositions. Discourses are essentially incomplete. Because of the presupposed shared sociocultural knowledge (Common Ground) of the participants, speakers may imply or presuppose—and hence leave implicit—propositions that can be supplied by the recipients—namely by inference from their socially shared sociocultural knowledge. The same is true for implicit information based on, and hence derived from underlying attitudes and ideologies. Indeed, much ideological discourse is largely implicit. Mrs Gorman is sometimes quite explicit about 'bogus' refugees and their alleged crimes. But in many other fragments her negative propositions about immigrants are only implicit—and hence her racism or xenophobia deniable. See for instance the following:

- (5) There are, of course, asylum seekers and asylum seekers. I entirely support the policy of the Government to help genuine asylum seekers, but to discourage the growing number of people from abroad who come to Britain on holiday, as students or in some other capacity and, when the time comes for them to leave, declare themselves to be in need of asylum.

Besides the obvious negative implications of this and many other passages, there is also a presupposition—that is, a proposition assumed to be true by the speaker and possibly to be shared by the audience. Such presuppositions are often handy ideological moves to indirectly state something that may not be true at all. Thus, in this example, Mrs Gorman presupposes that the Conservative Government actually helps genuine asylum seekers, a statement that others may well doubt.

Actor descriptions. People can be described or identified in many ways, for instance by their first or last name, as individual persons or as members of groups or categories, as well as with many possibly explicit or implicit attributes. In ideological discourse in which ingroup and outgroups are quite explicit, outgroups are typically identified and described in negative ways, as we already have seen in Mrs Gorman's characterization of asylum seekers. Here is a selection of her negative, ideologically based characterizations of this group of immigrants:

- Asylum seekers (genuine versus bogus)
- People from abroad who come to Britain on holiday
- Economic migrants
- Benefit seekers on holiday
- Those people
- Not bone fide asylum seekers

Note that the negative meaning in some expressions may only be implicit, as is the use of the demonstrative in the distancing expression *those people*. Note that on the other hand, British taxpayers, especially in Westminster, London, which she here represents, are described as victims of bogus asylum seekers, as follows:

- (6) The truth is that, out of 100 000 households in Westminster, only 1500 are in Mayfair and only 3000 are in Belgravia. Many of those people live in old-style housing association Peabody flats. They are on modest incomes. Many of them are elderly, managing on their state pension and perhaps also a little pension from their work. They pay their full rent and for all their own expenses. Now they are going to be asked to pay £35 to able-bodied males who have come over here on a prolonged holiday and now claim that the British taxpayer should support them.

Level and granularity of event and action descriptions. As we have seen for the distinction between macro-structures and micro-structures of discourse, events and actions can be described at various levels of generality and specificity. Thus, Mrs Gorman may initially speak in very general terms of ‘the particular difficulties faced by the London boroughs because of the problems of asylum seekers’, but later in her speech she goes into many specific financial details. Similarly, at each level of description, a speaker may give many or few component descriptions or actions or events. Again, in ideological discourse, such variation may well be biased against the Others. Thus, what we typically find is that the negative actions or attributes of the Others are described not only in general, global terms (as topics) but also at very specific levels of description, and often in more detail, that is, with greater granularity—as a semantic-rhetorical means of emphasis. Our own negative actions, if described at all, will only be described at very general or abstract levels, and not in great detail. Here is another example of a relatively detailed description of an individual within a parliamentary speech that is normally expected to refer to groups or categories of

people:

- (7) In one case, a man from Romania, who came over here on a coach tour for a football match—if the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross (Ms. Cunningham) would listen she would hear practical examples—decided that he did not want to go back, declared himself an asylum seeker and is still here four years later. He has never done a stroke of work in his life. Why should someone who is elderly and who is scraping along on their basic income have to support people in those circumstances?

Notice again that in addition to the detail of negative action and personal description of an outgroup member, such a description is rhetorically enhanced by opposition to an emotional ‘scraping along on their basic income’ of the elderly of our ingroup. Besides level and amount of detail, the same effect may be obtained by using more or less vague or precise concepts to describe people. Thus, one may concretely describe someone as a ‘bogus asylum seeker’, but also as an ‘asylum seeker’ or as ‘people from abroad’, etc.

Disclaimers. Ideological talk in general, and racist discourse in particular, is replete with various types of disclaimers. Derogation of outgroups today is often seen as a violation of a norm or even a law, and hence may need to be hedged or otherwise mitigated. Classic examples are such disclaimers such as ‘I have nothing against blacks (immigrants, etc.), but ...’ Such disclaimers have a first part emphasizing a positive characteristic of the speaker or the ingroup, and a second, contrasted part, typically introduced by *but*, in which the speaker says something negative about the outgroup. One of the functions of the first part is not only a form of positive self-description, but also to make sure that the second part is not interpreted as being racist or sexist, that is in order to *avoid* a bad impression. This specific form of ideological impression management in discourse is interesting because it shows that discourse is also organized by underlying norms, as well as by the possibly ambiguous attitudes and ideologies of dominant group members. On the one hand, they know and show they should not say negative things about Others, but at the same time they feel that the Others also have some negative attributes. In our view, such ambiguity is real when a discourse more or less evenly says positive and negative things about the Others. If the positive thing is limited to the initial denial of racism or the affirmation of tolerance, and the rest of the discourse is negative, then I interpret such a disclaimer only as a form of positive self-presentation and as an introduction of racist (or sexist) talk. Mrs Gorman uses such a disclaimer at the beginning of her speech, thus presenting herself (and her party and government)

as humane and not against genuine asylum seekers.

- (8) I entirely support the policy of the Government to help genuine asylum seekers, but to discourage the growing number of people from abroad who come to Britain on holiday, as students or in some other capacity and, when the time comes for them to leave, declare themselves to be in need of asylum.

Metaphor. Conceptual metaphors are also powerful semantic means to bias text and talk ideologically (Lakoff 1987, 1996, 2002). Although deeply embedded in culture and the basis of multimodally based cognition, metaphors relate abstract notions to concrete experiences of people. In such cases, negative or positive feelings and opinions may be emphasized. For instance, the classic example of media discourse on immigration is in terms of *waves* of people, that is, as threatening amounts of water, in which one may drown—a sensation that has important emotional consequences and hence may seriously influence understanding, recall and general ideological learning from discourse. Not surprisingly, Mrs Gorman uses the same threatening metaphor to describe the immigration of asylum seekers:

- (9) It would open the floodgates again...

Concluding this section on the semantics of discourse, we see that both globally and locally meaning may be organized in many ways that are favourable for Us, and unfavourable for Them.

We have seen that text and talk are controlled by the context models of the participants, and hence the meanings being expressed (and how they are being expressed) are found to be appropriate in the current communicative situation, as is the case of the debate in the UK House of Commons. For the same reason, we may not simply assume a direct relationship between discourse structures and underlying attitudes and ideologies—especially not when these are obfuscated, for example by apparent ‘tolerance talk’, disclaimers, denials, and so on.

However, when we notice that a discourse at all levels matches the polarized structure of underlying ideological attitudes or mental models, as is the case in Mrs Gorman’s speech, we may safely assume that such discourse indeed expresses such underlying ideological representations. Probably, in a less public and controlled communicative situation, the same speaker would be even more explicitly negative, where some of her expressions are still toning down her opinions.

We have particularly focused on the ideological semantics of discourse because these ‘contents’ have most direct impact on the mental models and the attitudes of the recipients. Propositions and especially macro-propositions are best recalled and directly used to build interpretations in terms of mental models. Other (e.g. formal) properties of discourse in that sense always only have an indirect influence via discourse meaning, for example by emphasizing or mitigating such meanings—as is typically the case for rhetoric.

FORMAL STRUCTURES OF DISCOURSE

The meanings analysed above are expressed in many ways, such as sentences, clauses, phrases, words, sounds, visuals, gestures, and so on, as they are traditionally studied in grammar and today increasingly also in the social semiotics of multimodal discourse (Van Leeuwen 2005, 2008). Interestingly, the same or similar meanings may be expressed in many different ways, and this *variation* may have many interactional, communicative, and other social functions, as we know from stylistics, rhetoric, and sociolinguistics. Generally speaking, such variation depends on the *context*, or rather on the way the participants interpret or construe relevant parameters of the communication situation in what we called *context models*, that is, definitions of the communicative situation.

Since ideologies may be relevant properties of participants, these may be among the contextual conditions that influence the variation of discourse—not only its meanings or contents but also its variable expressions. In other words: Someone on the Left will often speak or write in a different way on social issues than someone on the Right, as might a feminist talk in a different way about women than an anti-feminist. Let us examine some of the ideologically based variants of discourse expressions, again using the parliamentary debate as example. Unfortunately, these data do not allow an analysis of the sound structures (such as intonation, volume, stress, etc.) of the MPs, nor an analysis of their gestures and other aspects of body language, but a complete ideological discourse analysis would most certainly also need to take these into account.

The analysis of variation expression in discourse usually presupposes, as we have just done, that something, such as meaning, remains the same. This is not quite correct, of course, precisely because a different expression usually also expresses, conveys, or implies at least a slightly different meaning or contextual function. This is, for instance, the case for such classical ideological lexical variants as *terrorist* versus *freedom fighter*. Obviously, these are not synonyms,

and hence convey different meanings, also outside of context, but these expressions may be used to refer to the same people, and hence are at least *referentially equivalent*. The difference in that case, apart from a semantic one, is also contextual, namely the ideology or attitude of the speaker or writer. As we shall see, the same may be true for syntactic variation.

Lexicon

The first and most obvious level of the expression of underlying discourse meaning is of course that of the lexicon: What words are being used to formulate this ‘same’ meaning or—as we just saw—to refer to the same things? Much traditional ideological discourse analysis barely went beyond such an analysis of words, even of words without their immediate co-texts, as is still the case in many quantitative approaches, such as content analysis or corpus studies. Apart from the semantics of discourse examined above, no doubt lexical variation is a very obvious and explicit way of expressing ideologically based opinions, and hence group-based attitudes and ideologies.

In Mrs Gorman’s speech, we find, as expected, many lexical variants to refer to the same people, as we have already seen: *refugees*, *asylum seekers*, *bogus asylum seekers*, *those people*, etc. As may be expected in such debate, a frequency count of all words of the whole debate has the pronoun *I* as the most frequent content word (appearing 144 times), followed by *asylum* (132), *people* (116), *seekers* (65), *government* (57), *country* (49), *London* and *Westminster* (both 42). Ideologically interesting are the uses of *genuine* (21), presupposing an ideologically based difference between genuine and non-genuine asylum seekers, and the frequent uses of *burden* (10), *benefits* (15), *million* and *cost(s)* (31), implicating that asylum-seekers are primarily being discussed in terms of what they ‘cost’ the country. Quite typical, as suggested before, is the use of *bogus* (9), *fraud* (6), *illegal* (6), *exploit* (6), *abuse* (5), and even *parasites* (1).

Asylum seekers (65) is the term obviously preferred over *refugee(s)* (15), not only because of their different status, but also because the word *refugee* is more closely associated with political refugees, whereas the use of the expression *asylum seeker* in the UK has become associated with economic refugees and false applications. Interestingly, it is the Labour opposition MP (Jeremy Corbyn) who particularly uses the notion of *refugee* in this case, which also suggests an ideologically based difference in the uses of this term. The term is often preceded by the word *genuine*, and refers to refugees in the world, and not only those applying for refugee status in the UK, for example in the following by Mr

Corbyn: ‘The real burden of the world’s refugee crisis falls not on Western Europe ...’. The strongly ideologically based term *bogus* is only used in combination with words such as *applicants*, *application*, *claim*, and *asylum seeker*.

It should be emphasized that although a quantitative lexical analysis may yield suggestions for a more detailed, qualitative analysis, such an analysis might overlook passages such as the following which have no or few significant ideological words, but which as a whole are very strongly negative, while attributing very negative properties to asylum seekers:

- (10) The National Assistance Act says that the assistance given to these people must be provided in kind, which means that Westminster city council has to use its meals on wheels service to take food to them, wherever they are placed, whether in the centre of London or in outer boroughs. In addition to the breakfast that comes with the bed-and-breakfast accommodation, they have to be given a packed lunch, presumably in case they decide to go shopping in the middle of the day or to do a bit of work on the black economy—who knows? They also have to be provided with an evening meal and snacks to keep them through the day because the assumption is that they have no money—they have declared themselves destitute.

In other words, ideological discourse analysis should not be limited to the lexicon, and examine words in their co-text, and whole clauses, sentences, and paragraphs and the local and global propositions they express. Examples such as (10) are the prototypical expression of stereotypical mental models prejudiced people have about asylum seekers. When formulated in parliament by MPs, such passages and their underlying models and attitudes are even more influential than when used by ordinary citizens in everyday conversations.

Syntax

Although seemingly only a formal structure without any direct meaning, sentence syntax might seem a strange place to look for the expression of underlying ideological meanings or reference. Yet in the last decades many studies have shown that the syntactic form of sentences may well contribute to interesting aspects of the management of ideology in text and talk (Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1993). Syntax is about the order and other structures of constituents (such as words, phrases, etc.). Thus, word order may reflect such

meaningful aspects of what is known and unknown, now in focus or not, and so on. In English, for instance, the canonical word order places words referring to known entities in beginning (topical) positions, and new information in later (focus) positions of the clause. Words expressing information that is now being focused on may come first, but in that case need to have extra stress. We have seen that ideological discourse structures in general are about emphasizing Our good things and Their bad things, and this emphasis may also be implemented at the sentence level with such syntactic structures as word order or topic–focus articulation.

Most studied is the ideological use of passive sentences and nominalizations, which allow that agents are left implicit or placed in last position, for instance in order to mitigate their role in negative actions. The classic example is the difference between such headlines as *Police killed demonstrator*, *Demonstrator killed by police*, and *Demonstrator killed*, where the agent of the action of killing, the police, progressively receives less emphasis. Obviously, passive sentences may be used to express many functions, for instance when agents are unknown, have been mentioned already, or are less relevant. Yet, earlier studies have shown that ideological uses are quite common in discourse that mitigates the negative actions of ingroup members or its institutions, whereas such is not the case for outgroup members (such as black youths), whose active role is usually not mitigated but emphasized. Here are some examples from the speech of Mrs Gorman:

- (11) She was arrested, of course, for stealing.
- (12) people whose application to remain in Britain had been turned down
- (13) presumably the £200 million a year cost that was estimated
- (14) whose applications have been rejected time and again
- (15) the assistance given to these people must be provided in kind
- (16) in case they decide to go shopping in the middle of the day or to do a bit of work on the black economy
- (17) when the time comes for them to leave, declare themselves to be in need of asylum
- (18) People who come as economic migrants are sidestepping that.
- (19) I am sure that many of them are working illegally
- (20) Goodness knows how much it costs for the legal aid that those people invoke to keep challenging the decision that they are not bona fide asylum seekers.
- (21) a woman from Russia who has managed to stay in Britain for five years

- (22) In one case, a man from Romania, who came over here on a coach tour for a football match—if the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross (Ms Cunningham) would listen she would hear practical examples—decided that he did not want to go back, declared himself an asylum seeker and is still here four years later. He has never done a stroke of work in his life.
- (23) Such people should not be exploited by people who are exploiting the system.

These and many other examples first show that when asylum seekers are being mentioned, this typically happens as agents of negative actions, and that the syntax does not mitigate that role: they are referred to by expressions that are grammatical subjects in first positions of clauses and sentences. Sometimes, as in example (11), they are semantically ‘patients’ of the actions of others, but even then they are subjects and in first position—in which case the police remain implicit. Example (22) tells a mini story entirely framed in this active way, emphasizing the negative attributes of the asylum seeker.

These examples also show that many of the actions of the government or the state agencies that might be criticized are expressed in passive sentences: *have been turned down*, *have been rejected*, etc.

Example (23) is especially interesting because it has the two forms in one sentence: the passive form is used to refer to old people, thus emphasizing their role as victims, and the active form to asylum seekers.

The ideological management of syntax is not limited to active and passive sentences, but may also show in the use of nominalizations, which typically leave implicit or hide the agents of actions (see the debate on the assumed ideological aspects of nominalization initiated by Billig 2008). Classic examples are, for instance, nominalized verbs such as *discrimination*, without being explicit about who discriminates against whom. One of the typical effects of such nominalizations is that instead of specific actions, the expression seems to refer to a natural phenomenon, as something that simply *occurs*. Instead of referring to an action, there seems to be reference to a ‘thing’ (hence the use of the notion of ‘grammatical metaphor’ to refer to nominalizations that change the domain of reference). In this way, many social problems are being obfuscated by nominalized expressions, leaving responsible agents outside of explicit focus. Of course, as is the case for active–passive sentences, nominalizations may have a further ‘normal’ syntactic-semantic function when referring to actions of processes of which agents are unknown, irrelevant, or already mentioned. See the following examples:

- (24) people whose *application* to remain in Britain had been turned down
- (25) Goodness knows how much it costs for the legal aid that those people invoke to keep challenging the *decision* that they are not bona fide asylum seekers.
- (26) They also have to be provided with an evening meal and snacks to keep them through the day because the *assumption* is that they have no money—they have declared themselves destitute.

As is the case for passive sentences, the nominalizations also appear to be used to denote actions of the government or the authorities, and when repeating an action already mentioned before, as in example (24). Interestingly, the spokesman for the Labour Opposition, Mr Corbyn, also uses nominalizations to denote the actions of the government or its agencies, but in this case the actions of foreign governments, for instance when referring to oppression and persecution.

Other Formal Structures

Whereas syntax has often been studied as the grammatical core of language and ideological language use, there are many other formal ways or formats that may be used to express, mitigate, or emphasize underlying meanings or convey other communicative functions. We already have seen that word order plays a special role in the management of information and focus in sentences. More generally in discourse, order also applies to the whole text or talk, by mentioning information or topic first or last, high or low in the discourse.

Thus, many discourse genres have an *importance or relevance order*, in which more important or relevant information typically appears first, for instance in headlines, titles, leads, abstracts, and summaries that express macro-propositions (main topics). The same is true for the *foregrounding* and *backgrounding* of information, which again may be done by discourse order, but also by special letter type (as in headlines), pictures, gestures, and so on. Again, the ideological function of order and salience would typically be the emphasis on Our good things and Their bad things, and the mitigation of Our bad things and Their good things. It is also for this reason that Mrs Gorman begins her speech with a thematic sentence that not only expresses the main topic of her speech, but at the same time serves to foreground and emphasize the problems of (read: caused by) asylum seekers:

(27) I want to bring to the attention of the House the particular difficulties faced by the London boroughs because of the problems of asylum seekers.

Formal discourse structures may organize the *conventional formats* of genres or types of text and talk, such as those of *argumentation* and *narration*. Note though that in the same way as sentence syntax such conventional structures apply to *all* discourses of the genre, and hence are *not subject to ideological variation*: a story has a story structure whether told by someone on the left or the right, and the same is true for an argument.

However, again as for sentence syntax, conventional schemas such as those of argumentation or narration may be transformed in many ways. For instance, in normal stories a Complication category follows the Summary and the Orientation categories, but storytellers may want to emphasize the relevance of the Complication by mentioning it first. Similarly, the canonical order of argumentation is that of one or more Premises followed by a Conclusion, but sometimes important Conclusions are mentioned first and then are backed up by arguments. In Mrs Gorman's speech, therefore, she begins with the Conclusion of the arguments that are later mentioned, namely that London boroughs financially suffer from the presence of asylum seekers.

Finally, at the boundary of formats and meanings, argumentations may feature *fallacies* that violate the rules of acceptable argumentation. Again, fallacies as such appear in any kind of argument, independently of underlying ideologies. The Left does not engage in fewer fallacies than the Right, for instance.

Yet, the *kinds* of arguments and fallacies may well be ideologically different. Thus, Mrs Gorman and the Conservatives use as their main argument that unrestricted immigration of asylum seekers would cost the British taxpayers a lot of money, with the further supporting argument that such asylum seekers abuse the welfare system and do not work. The presupposed normative statement (warrant) is that we are not obliged to help people who abuse the system and do not work. On the other hand, Labour argues that the UK is bound by international laws about refugees, with the further argument that many refugees are persecuted in their own countries—an argument that presupposes the normative statement as a warrant, namely that we should help people who are persecuted. On the Conservative side, one of the fallacies of this and related arguments is that it is presupposed as a fact that asylum seekers cost more money to the state, and hence to the taxpayer, than their tax contributions. The

fallacy on the Left is that it is presupposed that most asylum seekers come to the UK because of political persecution. Similarly, Mrs Gorman has recourse to authority arguments by citing British laws and evidence from agencies, whereas Mr Corbyn cites international agreements and authorities, such as Amnesty International.

CONCLUSIONS

Ideologies form the shared sociocognitive foundations of social groups and their social practices. They are organized by schemas consisting of fundamental categories for the existence and reproduction of social groups, such as their identity, activities, goals, norms and values, reference groups, and resources. Their contents are often polarized by positive properties attributed to the ingroup and negative ones to the outgroup. Ideologies control and are formed by more specific socially shared attitudes about social issues that are relevant for the group and its reproduction. These attitudes in turn control the personal mental models group members form about specific events and actions, whereas these mental models again control actual social practices, such as the production and comprehension of discourse.

Conversely, therefore, ideologies are generally acquired by text, talk, and other forms of communication. Special ideological structures of discourse facilitate this formation of ideological models, attitudes, and ideologies. Given the polarized nature of underlying ideologies, attitudes, and mental models, ideological discourse too tends to be organized by such polarization. Thus, in text and talk negative properties of outgroups and positive ones of ingroups tend to be emphasized and, conversely, Our negative properties and Their positive ones tend to be ignored, suppressed, or mitigated.

This general ideological strategy takes place at all levels of discourse, such as the selection of main topics, local coherence, implications, descriptions, lexical choice, as well as syntactic structures (active versus passive, nominalizations) and overall ordering, backgrounding, and foregrounding of information. In addition, conventional discourse formats, such as those of narration and argumentation may thus be transformed so as to emphasize or de-emphasize information or arguments.

In conclusion, we need to repeat and emphasize again that a general, multidisciplinary theory of ideology needs to feature a detailed theory of ideology of social cognition, on the one hand, and a theory of discursive ideological expression, acquisition, and reproduction, on the other hand. We are

able to understand the many social and political functions of ideologies only when these fundamental sociocognitive and discursive dimensions of ideologies are made explicit.

NOTE

1. All quotes from Parliamentary debates taken from *Hansard*, 5 March 1997.

REFERENCES

- Augoustinos, N., I. Walker, and N. Donaghue 2006. *Social Cognition. An Integrated Introduction*. 2nd edn. London: Sage.
- Baddeley, A., M. Conway, and J. Aggleton (eds.) 2002. *Episodic Memory. New Directions in Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Billig, M. 2008. 'The language of critical discourse analysis: the case of nominalization', *Discourse & Society*, 19 (6): 783–800.
- Caldas-Coulthard, C. R. and M. Coulthard (eds.) 1996. *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Routledge.
- Dirven, R., R. Frank, and C. Ilie 2001. *Language and Ideology, vol. II: Descriptive and Cognitive Approaches*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Eagly, A. H. and S. Chaiken 1993. *The Psychology of Attitudes*. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Fairclough, N. 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. London New York: Longman.
- Fiske, S. T. and S.E. Taylor 2007. *Social Cognition. From Brain to Culture*. 3rd edn. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Fowler, R., B. Hodge, G. Kress, and T. Trew 1979. *Language and Control*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Fraser, C. and G. Gaskell (eds.) 1990. *The Social Psychological Study of Widespread Beliefs*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gentner, D. and A. L. Stevens (eds.) 1983. *Mental Models*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Hamilton, D. L. (ed.) 2005. *Social Cognition*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Harris, N. 1968. *Beliefs in Society: The Problem of Ideology*. London: Watts.
- Hodge, R. and G. R. Kress 1993. *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge.
- Johnson-Laird, P. N. 1983. *Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jost, J. T. 2006. 'The end of the end of ideology', *American Psychologist*, 61 (7): 651–70.
- Jost, J. T., A. C. Kay and H. Thorisdottir (eds.) 2009. *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lakoff, G. 1987. *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal About The Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. 1996. *Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don't*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. 2002. *Moral Politics. How Liberals and Conservatives Think*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Leyens, J. P., V. Yzerbyt and G. Schadron 1994. *Stereotypes and Social Cognition*. London Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- Machin, D. and A. Mayr 2012. *How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Malrieu, J. P. 1999. *Evaluative Semantics: Cognition, Language, and Ideology*. London New York: Routledge.
- Mannheim, K. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Nelson, T. D. (ed.) 2009. *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Oakhill, J. and A. Garnham (eds.) 1996. *Mental Models in Cognitive Science. Essays in Honour of Phil Johnson-Laird*. Hove (Sussex): Psychology Press.
- Thompson, K. 1986. *Beliefs and Ideology*. Chichester, West Sussex, London & New York: Ellis Horwood Tavistock Publications.
- Toolan, M. J. (ed.) 2002. *Critical Discourse Analysis. Critical Concepts in Linguistics*. New York: Routledge.
- Tulving, E. 1983. *Elements of Episodic Memory*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1980. *Macrostructures: An Interdisciplinary Study of Global Structures in Discourse, Interaction, and Cognition*. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1984. *Prejudice in Discourse. An Analysis of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Conversation*. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1987. *Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1991. *Racism and the Press*. London: Routledge.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1993. *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1998. *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*. London: Sage Publications.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 2008a. *Discourse and Context. A Socio-Cognitive Approach*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 2008b. *Discourse and Power*. Houndmills, Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 2009. *Society and Discourse. How Social Contexts Influence Text and Talk*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 2012. 'Discourse and knowledge'. Pp. 587–603 in *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, eds. James Paul Gee and Michael Handford London: Routledge.
- Van Dijk, T. and W. Kintsch 1983. *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*. New York: Academic Press.
- Van Leeuwen, T. J. 2005. *Introducing Social Semiotics*. London: Routledge.
- Van Leeuwen, T. J. 2008. *Discourse and Practice. New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weiss, G. and R. Wodak (eds.) 2003. *Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinarity*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wodak, R. and P. A. Chilton (eds.) 2005. *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis. Theory, Methodology, and Interdisciplinarity*. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
- Wodak, R. and M. Meyer (eds.) 2009. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London & Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

CHAPTER 11 IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL RHETORIC

ALAN FINLAYSON

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I explore (and promote) the combination of studies of political ideology with research rooted in the theory and analysis of political rhetoric. I do so because the political theory of ideologies is concerned not only with the internal organization of political thinking but also with its external face—with the ways in which political ideas are presented in public, communicated to varied constituencies and made ‘persuasive’. That external face is not secondary or subordinate to the core propositions of an ideology but is an intrinsic part of the whole. That is to say, an ideology is not only the substantive propositions that make up its content. It is also a form, a way in which propositions are presented and justified. Appreciating this aspect of ideological formation, manifestation, and development can enrich understanding of political thinking and bring the political theory of ideologies into fruitful conversation with a number of other schools of political study.

The chapter begins by making a case for bringing the analysis and interpretation of arguments to the fore of the political theory of ideologies, followed by a presentation of reasons for reawakening the rhetorical tradition of political thought and analysis. I then look at a variety of approaches from political theory, political science, and political analysis which, I show, have recently taken an increased interest in rhetoric. Examining these I draw out key themes on which the political theory of ideologies might focus, and about which it has important and valuable things to say. I then turn to a consideration of how one might ‘operationalize’ the study of rhetoric in relation to ideologies. This involves investigation of the general ‘situation’ within which rhetorical acts take place, including the history and organization of persuasion, as well as, fundamentally, explication of the rhetorical ‘appeals’ employed by ideologies (to character, emotion, and reason or to *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*) and their presentation through potentially powerful schemes and figures. In the conclusion I turn to a consideration of what the combined analysis of political rhetoric and political ideology might, in general, add to the conduct of political theory, political science, and political analysis.

OBJECTS OF ANALYSIS: FROM CONCEPTS AND SIGNIFIERS TO ARGUMENTS

Different approaches to the study of political ideologies can be characterized by the different ‘objects’ they make their focus of inquiry. For Michael Freeden, the student of political ideologies should, in emulation of the anthropologist, become a ‘conceptologist’ seeking to ‘map and interpret the strange, wonderful and occasionally repulsive world of political ideas’ (Freeden 2005: 133). Here the object of study is concepts—their arrangement, internal architecture, the weighting of components (2005: 117–24). Locating these arrangements in historical context, morphological analysis explores their trajectory, development, and change.

In contrast, Discourse Theory and Analysis takes as its primary object of study, the signifier (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1990; Norval 1996; Howarth et al. 2000). Here, ideological formations are understood as arrangements of signifying elements. Analysis of these emphasizes the construction of relations of equivalence between such elements and, concomitantly, antagonistic frontiers of difference or divisions between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. It also examines ‘empty signifiers’, capacious keywords such as ‘freedom’ or ‘nation’ around which, it is argued, a range of potentially contradictory positions may cohere into a broader alliance and with which individuals may strongly identify.

Both the concept and the signifier are important objects of analysis within the political theory of ideologies, studies of which have enriched our stock of historical examples, and strengthened our theories of the relationship between political thinking and political acting. These have had the additional benefit of making more distinct a third object, the analysis of which is vital to the political theory and analysis of ideologies: the argument.

Freeden’s analysis of ideologies concentrates on the arrangement of core, logically and culturally adjacent concepts. But it also directs attention to those peripheral concepts found at the edge of an ideology in its historical, geographical, and cultural context (Freeden 1996: 79). These, Freeden writes, ‘add a vital gloss’ (1996: 178) and include ideas at the ‘perimeter’ which ‘straddle the interface between the conceptualization of social realities and the external contexts and concrete manifestations in and through which those conceptualisations occur’ (1996: 79). He concludes that ideologies are a combination of ‘meaning and form’, a ‘sampling’ of the ‘variety of human thinking on politics, contained within and presented through *a communicative*

and action-inspiring pattern' (1996: 54, my emphasis). Thus, Freedden's approach, while starting with the internal conceptual organization of ideologies, opens onto the study of their external presentation, their adaptation to the ever-changing conditions of public life. To understand these, as he puts it, we must 'readmit the role of the emotional as well as the intellectual attraction of arguments, and ... examine cultural as well as logical validation of political thinking' (1996: 37).

Laclau's research similarly opens onto the ways in which ideological discourse enters into and shapes public life. He particularly emphasizes the trope of *catachresis* and the processes of 'naming' which organize the myths at the base of all political movements (Laclau 2007: 109). It is with these 'names' that people are invited to identify. Indeed, Laclau concludes that the rhetorical organization of social space (the ordering of equivalence and difference through topological displacements of meaning) is 'the very logic of the constitution of political identities' (Laclau 2006: 78). To examine ideologies, then, is also to consider how people respond to claims and come to see themselves or their interests as expressed by them—that is, how they develop sometimes passionate emotional identifications with ideological propositions or promises (Laclau 2000; Glynnos 2001; Stavrakakis 2007).

As we turn from the 'internal' organization and logic of ideological arrangements to their 'external' manifestations, so we turn from the study of concepts and signifiers to that of arguments. Importantly, the examination of arguments is not a substitute for the study of concepts or signifiers and other aspects of ideologies. It is a *part* of the overall field of study. But it is not an optional part. The argumentative form of ideologies is not a surface element, nor simply a secondary or subsequent (merely strategic or instrumental) addition. There are three reasons for thinking this.

First, ideologies subsist in a challenging environment and, if they are to survive, cannot be entirely static bodies of unalterable doctrine. The world about them throws up not only challenges from rival ideologies but also new phenomena and unforeseen problems. When actors are faced by these—and the ambiguity or contestation that is usually a component of such situations—ideologies provide them with not only a set of answers but also a way of formulating questions, apprehending phenomena, and explaining them (to one's self and fellow adherents as well as to opponents). In this respect an ideology is not only a set of propositions but also a kind of argumentational resource; it is a 'playbook' as it were, providing ready-made 'cognitive shortcuts' to assist in grasping a situation but also ways of making political claims about it. Another

way of putting this is to say that an ideology is a resource of rhetorical ‘commonplaces’ or *topoi*—general arguments that can be adapted to particular cases.

Secondly, just as—to invoke Freeden—a contestable concept can carry a range of meanings but cannot carry them all simultaneously (not least because some definitions exclude others) so an ideology cannot be argued for in just any way. An ideology is a set of propositions but also a set of reasons for accepting them *and* a conception of what counts as a good reason. It cannot embrace every single reason or mode of argument. Those it does embrace are part of what it is. Furthermore, leaving aside instances of confusion, adherents of a particular political ideology cannot justify their claims in just any way; they cannot promote the wholesale contradiction of their own principles (although over time there certainly can be change in these); the socialist cannot justify a measure by pointing to its capacity to increase inequality; the nationalist cannot agitate for the reduction of national sovereignty.

Of course, it is quite possible to think of instances in which adherents to an ideology have made propositions directly at odds with the principles of that ideology, and have done so deliberately and consciously. Perhaps they think that lying will secure some advantage. This brings us to our third reason for thinking that argumentational form is inseparable from ideological content; instances of ideologically motivated cynicism are precisely indicative of the way in which *how* an ideology makes arguments is part of what it is. Ideologies include within them a general theory of politics—of what it is, how it should be conducted, and of what is and is not legitimate or appropriate political conduct. An ideology may indeed legitimate cynical activity such as the cultivation, in Lenin’s well-worn phrase, of ‘useful idiots’—the manipulation of those who cannot otherwise be brought to agreement. But that it can do so tells us something about an ideology because it is a part of it and related to its other propositions and argumentative strategies. Conversely, a form of liberal ideology which prioritizes the belief that individuals are capable of rational reflection and objective deliberation, and which builds normative claims about politics upon this, is unlikely to use forms of propaganda that appeal to fear and hatred (and if it does then this would seem a good reason to think it a distinct variant of Liberal ideology).

An ideology is not only ‘contained within’ a communicative and inspiring pattern. Part of what it is, is precisely this pattern. A challenge for political theory and the analysis of ideologies is the development of terms and tools with and through which we can examine it, exploring the argumentative form of

ideologies, identifying the distinctive patterns of argument that characterize them, the kinds of claim or appeal they make, the figures with and through which they are represented. We have already had recourse to terms taken from rhetoric ('tropes', 'commonplaces') and, as we shall now see, in rising to the challenge the political theory of ideologies can benefit greatly from attending carefully to that rhetorical tradition.

THE VIRTUES OF RHETORIC

The word 'rhetoric' has quite a lot of rhetorical force. To label something 'rhetoric' is generally considered pejorative. Rhetoric is associated either with excessively stylized, perhaps flowery language (of the sort which probably masks vacuity) or with language that is simply misleading or seeks to influence in an unfair or improper way. Contemporary analysts of political speech and argument tend to confirm this by looking for the strategies by which the powerful evade challenges (Bull 1994), obscure their real interests (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2000) or simply win applause (Atkinson 1984).

This is unfortunate. Rhetoric may be empty and it may be misleading. But it is not necessary that it be so. In attending to rhetoric, scholars of political ideologies may bear in mind Aristotle's simple definition: 'the power to observe the persuasiveness of which any particular matter admits' (*Rhetoric* 2, 1.2). In examining rhetoric we are examining the varied ways and means by which something may be made persuasive. Aristotle states that this art is a 'counterpart' to dialectic, complementing rather than necessarily undermining it. Furthermore, rhetoric is needed because there are arguments that must be made in conditions of uncertainty and difficulty quite different to those attendant on dialectic. It is sometimes needed to make people see and understand a truth which they might find difficult, and in that sense rhetorical adaptation is a secondary activity (Sprute 1994). But rhetoric is also necessary because in civic life, as the sophist Protagoras pointed out, some matters do not yield to a single, indisputable truth and there are good arguments on both sides (see Billig 1987; Farrar 1988; de Romilly 1992; Gagarin and Woodruff 1995). For the rhetorical theorist and analyst the political actor 'has to analyse situations in which the alternatives of action are either normatively ambiguous or cannot be placed in a definitive ranking order' (Palonen 2005: 363). She has to invent arguments, and to arrange and present them in ways adapted to the audiences with which she is engaged. The rhetorical tradition thus draws to our attention forms of argument and reasoning that exceed the strictures of the syllogism yet manifestly and

necessarily operate and function in real-world contexts of argument (for surveys of the many works in this field see Perlman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Lucaites et al. 1998; Bizzell and Herzberg 2001; Booth 2004).

The argumentative resources particular actors possess, and the moves that they come to think are best or most appropriate, are fundamental components of political ideologies. The concerns of rhetoric thus bear directly on the concerns of scholars of political ideology and the rhetorical tradition is a rich resource of terms, tools, and examples. In addition to this coincidence of interest, there are two further arguments for incorporating rhetoric more clearly into the study of politics.

The first is that rhetoric is itself a constitutive part of the tradition of Western politics. It is not only there in the Athens of Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides as well as the Rome of Cicero and Quintilian. The foundational texts of modern political thought were deeply influenced by rhetorical practices (Skinner 1978, 23-48; 1997) and one cannot appreciate all that Machiavelli, Hobbes, or Burke are doing without knowing something of the rhetorical tradition in which (and against which) they thought and wrote. But it is not only political theory that has been shaped by rhetoric. Western politicians, into the nineteenth century (in Parliament, on the platform, at the Inauguration) demonstrated and delighted in an oratory decisively shaped by classical and renaissance models (see Campbell and Jamieson 1990; Meisel 2001). Parliament itself—literally a ‘talking-place’—embodies a rhetorical principle; that of *in utramque partem* (see Palonen 2008a; 2008b) or arguing both sides of a question. The United States system of government, Karlyn Campbell and Kathleen Jamieson argue, is designed to induce negotiation between the branches ‘through processes infused with rhetoric’. It is, they say, ‘an experiment in rhetorical adaption’ (Campbell and Jamieson 1990: 1). The designers, framers, and founders of these institutions took their lead from the Roman and Greek rhetoric in which they had been very well schooled. In short, contemporary political organizations are born from a long history of rhetorical theory and practice. If we fail to understand the rhetorical tradition we fail to understand our own politics.

Secondly, and importantly, rhetoric—as we shall now see—is returning to prominence in contemporary political theory and analysis. Over the last decade (sometimes explicitly, often only implicitly) it has become increasingly important for a wide range of approaches to the theoretical, normative, and analytical study of politics. The political theory of ideologies can learn from these developments and, as we shall see, also contribute to them.

RHETORIC AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS

The achievement of the historian of political thought, Quentin Skinner, is his demonstration of the ways in which political theories are ‘doing’ something as well as saying something. He has thus enabled us to see political thoughts as ‘moves’ employed in concrete political situations (see Palonen 2003: 29–60). In particular he has shown how, in politics, normative statements are never merely statements about the world but the ‘tools and weapons of ideological debate’ (Skinner 2002a: 176; also 2002b: ch. 4). He is particularly interested in the use of terms to both ‘describe and appraise’ politics and morality, and in the ‘capacity of a normative vocabulary to perform and encourage particular acts of appraisal’ (2002a: 175). Here Skinner emphasizes the rhetorical trope of *paradiastole* or re-description: the placing of an action in an alternative moral light, making use of the ‘neighbourliness’ between seemingly opposed evaluations so that one slides into another (as when courage is converted into recklessness or vice versa; generosity into profligacy; prudence into meanness; firmness of conviction into stubbornness). So defined, an act or phenomenon is located within one dimension of moral behaviour rather than another (Skinner 1997) in a way that contributes to powerful arguments about how to assess it.

Something similar, perhaps surprisingly, has been identified as of political significance by practitioners of social and rational choice analysis. This school has tended to downplay the influence of seemingly vaporous ‘ideas’ on the grounds that ‘What can be counted and measured is more amenable to precise formulation and presentation than other forms of human action’ (Barker 2000: 223–4). A problematic consequence of this exclusion has been that rational choice analyses may appear oddly determinist, treating political outcomes as expressions of interests that possess definition without any significant intervening process of intellectual or communicative deliberation (see Hindess 1988; Hay 2002: 103–4). However, the more sophisticated variants of social choice theory are aware of this problem and have sought to take account of the ways in which the presentation, organization, and conduct of arguments can shape the expression of preferences and interests. Most important, for our present purposes, is William Riker’s concept of ‘heresthetic’. Riker coined this neologism to refer to an art of ‘influencing social decisions’ through the transformation of the ‘dimensions’ of political space within which decisions are deliberated and decided upon.

For instance, with regard to a proposal to relax immigration restrictions some people may take up a position at one end, very strongly in favour, whereas others

will take the polar opposite view. Most will be scattered along this ‘for’ and ‘against’ dimension, and political activity (assuming there is some kind of voting or other choice-mechanism in play) involves modifying proposals until it is possible to create a majority. Riker’s insight was that few issues sit simply and unambiguously within a single dimension. For instance, that proposal regarding immigration will look different if presented as a way of helping employers recruit more skilled labour than if presented as a matter of human rights. People who might oppose a proposal when it is presented within the dimension of human rights might support it when they find it in the economic dimension (and, probably, vice versa). Riker suggested that a lot of political activity involves trying to arrange issues in such a way as to put them in dimensions where one stands the best chance of winning. That might involve technical mechanisms such as the management of agenda and voting mechanisms, but primarily it involves producing definitions of the issues put before people (Riker 1986: 147–51; also Shepsle 2003: 309–10). The heresthetician, Riker says, ‘uses language to manipulate people. He talks to them, asking them questions and telling them facts; he utters arguments, giving reasons for believing his arguments are true; and he describes social nature, importing to his description the exact twist that leads others to respond to nature as he wishes’ (Riker 1986: x).

In both Skinner and Riker, two very different sorts of political theorist, we find a convergence on the ways in which political action involves, to a significant degree, the creative description of issues, actions, and phenomena in ways that locate them within one frame rather than another. This particularly involves the naming of things, which as we have seen, Laclau has conceptualized with reference to the trope of *catagoresis*. One possible task for the political theory of ideologies is the investigation of the extent to which particular forms of *paradiastole*, heresthetic, or *catagoresis* characterize particular ideologies, and how the use of these changes develops over time and in relation to broader contexts.

In contemporary normative political thought, interest in the study of political rhetoric and argument is also intensifying, especially among theorists of deliberation and communicative action. A principal reason for this has been the need to respond to the critical charge that deliberative theories presuppose too specific a mode of argumentation, one that privileges some groups over others (Young 1996; Sanders 1997). This has spurred advocates of deliberative theories of democracy to look more carefully at the different forms and styles of public reasoning. Thus Dryzek, for example, acknowledges the place of rhetorical modes of argument because through them deliberation may reach across

communal frames of reference (2004: 168), enabling ‘bridging’ or ‘bonding’ (2010). He observes that individuals may subscribe to a variety of ‘discourses’ reflecting their complex and possibly even ‘fractured’ subjectivity. Consequently one goal or function of political argument is to emphasize one discourse over another, or to enable their combination and, ‘One important criterion for an effective representative is therefore his or her capacity to identify the configuration of discourses in the intended audience, and to appeal successfully to and so raise the standing of one (or more) of the discourses in question ...’ (2010: 325). Dryzek concludes that in deliberative democracy ‘rhetoric can play an essential part in communicating across and so linking differently situated and differently disposed actors, forums, and institutions’ (2010: 327).

From a different position, one greatly shaped by an Arendtian conception of public speech and action, Linda Zerilli finds something analogous to Dryzek’s ‘fractured’ subjectivity. Emphasizing the way in which public arguments are, in the Kantian tradition, validated by their emergence from and reference back to a ‘common sense’ she stresses the extent to which the latter is constitutively divided and open-ended yet susceptible to transformation through its apprehension. She writes, ‘when we appeal to the *sensus communis*, we are not appealing to a fixed set of opinions but to what is communicable. Far from guaranteeing agreement in advance, *sensus communis* allows differences of perspective to emerge and become visible’ (Zerilli 2005). On these grounds Zerilli substitutes for the rule of communicative reason, the imaginative power of rhetoric—acts of discursive disclosure grounded in a common rhetorical and poetic capacity to call the world into being (see also Grassi 2001; Finlayson 2007).

In these different conceptions of deliberation and publicity we find a recognition of the importance of attending to the interaction of political argument with audiences. For the theorist and analyst of political ideologies a question might be, to what extent can a particular form of political thinking adapt to audiences and find ways to represent itself to them. But rhetorical activity does not involve merely adapting to a unified audience with transparent and consistent preferences and interests. In a sense, audiences are always an invention of an ideology in that part of what a rhetorical act seeks to ‘bring off’ is an acceptance of certain roles, the adoption of a particular relationship between participants. Further questions thus follow for the student of ideologies: how does a particular form of thought conceive of audiences, which audiences does it think can and should be communicated with? How an ideology does this is an absolutely definitive part of its overall conception of what politics is, and of

what it can achieve and how.

A third subfield of political studies for which rhetoric has become an important concern is that of political and policy analysis. Here there has been a renewed focus on the interaction between political ideas, traditions, and narratives and on the formulation of dilemmas and the decisions they demand (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2007; Bevir et al. 2004). There is also a growing school of 'critical policy analysis' which explores the narrativization or dramatization of political ideas that takes place in policy argument and formation (Fischer 2003; Hajer 2005). In a connected research field, analysts of political leadership have explored the ways in which political 'actors' may 'perform' various roles, embodying communal values or needs in a way that reinforces the political or policy positions they advocate (Edelman 1985, 1988). Such research suggests that the political theory of ideologies might investigate the ways in which ideologies make possible or close off such performances, the kinds of narratives of past and present on which they rely when communicating their conception of the traditions on which they draw, as well as the ways in which leaders might embody ideological claims and values.

In these varied instances, from across the study of politics, we find growing interest in the political phenomena of naming and framing, the interaction of political claims with the audiences at whom they are directed and in the narration and embodiment of political ideas. All of these are also important concerns of the political theory of ideologies. The rise in such interest surely indicates the utility and relevance of a renewed acquaintance with our own rhetorical tradition and further research into the ways in which political movements, discourses, and ideologies take on rhetorical form.

CONTEXT AND IDEOLOGICAL RHETORIC

The analysis of ideological argument starts with general questions concerning the organization of deliberation and the institutional and cultural context within which advocates and audiences are found (see Finlayson 2007; Finlayson and Martin 2008). That is to say, acts of ideological rhetoric must first be located within their 'rhetorical situation' (Bitzer 1998 [1968]). Debate follows different rules in Parliament from those found in a public meeting, set-piece speech, or polemical pamphlet. Those rules are both formal (enshrined in standing orders or in a constitution) and informal (the accretion of traditions and cultural expectation). Tradition and expectation also form the distinct genres of communication that we identify as stump speeches, committee debates, briefing

documents, street protests, and so on. This context matters, of course, in itself. The formal and informal rules of rhetorical engagement are definitive of a polity (and exactly what theories of deliberative democracy are concerned with). But these contexts of communication matter also for the analyst or theorist of ideologies for we want to know how different kinds of political thought relate to them. Do they accept it, ignore it, explicitly oppose it or make much of how they adhere to it?

One way in which different ideological orientations to the context of political disputes show themselves is in the way they try to set the rules and limits of argumentation. No matter how intense or bitter a political dispute or contest, what an argument is really about can itself be arguable; the point of a dispute, the ‘bone of contention’, is established by the act of arguing itself and the side that succeeds in fixing it secures great advantage (as we have seen hinted at in Riker’s conception of heresthetic). Roman rhetorical theory understood this through ‘stasis theory’ identifying four points of argument: if a thing is (conjecture), what a thing is (definition), what kind of thing it is (quality), and whether or not it is a thing we should be arguing about at all (place). We can hypothesize that some ideological arrangements ‘prefer’ one kind of *stasis* than others. For instance, arguments of ‘place’ are often associated with ‘reactionary’ politics. That is to say, one thing Conservatism does is challenge the utility, appropriateness or legitimacy of the politicization of an issue. This is the kind of strategy identified by Hirschman (1991) as the ‘argument from jeopardy’. Cornford (1933) amusingly names one of its manifestations the ‘argument from unripe time’, while for Bentham (1952 [1824]) these are ‘fallacies from delay’. All of these are ways of ruling an issue off the political agenda, and of implementing a political strategy of depoliticization. The contrasting position is exemplified by Stuart Hampshire who remarked that ‘the sphere of political action may be gradually extended as more of the great evils, such as starvation and poverty, are moved from the column headed ‘natural misfortunes’ into the column headed ‘political failures’ examples of which include slavery and the subordination of women’ (Hampshire 1999: 47–8). Here a stasis of place is challenged by one of quality, the argument turning on the extent to which something can be conceived of as political. There is not space to discuss in detail examples of the other points of *stasis*. Our point here is only that the way in which an argument is set, and the interaction between participants to a dispute and the rules (formal and informal) governing it, tell us something about how an ideology acts in the world and thus something about what it is made of.

THE APPEALS OF IDEOLOGY

As we have seen, rhetoric is not necessarily unreasonable argument. In fact, the concern of rhetoricians has always been with the many different kinds of reason that might be given to people in order to persuade them of something, and that includes reasons which exceed the strictures of the laboratory or seminar room but which are undoubtedly common, and sometimes effective, in everyday and public life. These cannot be ignored by any serious student of political ideologies.

For instance, what in classical rhetoric was called the appeal to ethos is an appeal that relies for justification on the character of the speaker, on their honesty, for instance, or their authority. This is what is invoked when someone claims expertise, formal qualifications, or direct experience of a matter under discussion (and is thus something with which academic researchers are intimately familiar). It is also a matter of great concern to professional politicians and the reason they employ professional ‘image consultants’. But the appeal to ethos is a bit more complicated, subtle, and interesting than the hairstyle, life story, or family life of the average politician.

One important form of the appeal to ethos is the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, or the argument that relies on our respect for what an authority has said. In making use of the words, thoughts, or findings of another (in quoting them or referring to them) an actor hopes to gain from the other’s glow of authority and respect. Locke saw this appeal to authority as a kind of illegitimate use of force—the attempt to cow an interlocutor by daring them to risk the appearance of immodesty in challenging that which is commonly thought to be unchallengeable (but he did admit that it might ‘dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth’, thus recognizing its potential rhetorical validity (Locke 1838 [1690]: 524)).

The interest of the political theory of ideologies lies in the way in which different ideologies employ different kinds of ‘authority’. The validity of recognized scientific authorities is a central element of much Liberal thinking (while attacking the argument from authority in his *Handbook of Political Fallacies*, Jeremy Bentham was careful to reserve room for this). An ideology justified by reference to such authorities is quite different to one that makes a virtue of not believing official or expert evidence or one that demonstrates its commitment to the good sense of the common person or ‘the people’ (a hallmark of populist ideologies of both the left and the right). One thing an ideology is, then, is a specification of legitimate authorities.

The argument from ethos has a further dimension sometimes overlooked by rhetorical theorists but brought to our attention by analyses of political ‘performance’ (such as those we have already considered). In constituting themselves as ‘authoritative’ an ideologue is trying to appear not only as an ‘expert’ but as ‘the sort of person’ that possible adherents to the ideology might admire, respect, and trust. In this respect ethos is fundamentally about what the American rhetorician Kenneth Burke (1969) thought the main function of rhetoric: the creation of community through forms of identification. At the perimeter—to use Freedman’s term—political actors and movements attempt to embody their causes and perform their politics; political style takes on the form of a proof that can in turn be identified as a definitive aspect of a form of political thinking. Characterizations as varied as the ‘powerful and reliable leader’ or ‘the lone seeker of truth and justice’, ‘the humble and representative everyman-outsider’ or ‘the exciting polemicist’, may function as demonstrative exemplars—as personifications or embodiments of the ideology, of who or what it holds to be most authorized to speak on some matter. The ‘characters’ of, say, Sarah Palin (Ferguson 2008) or Anne Coulter (Chambers and Finlayson 2008) are embodied arguments for an historically specific strand of North American Conservatism, as was that of Reagan before them. Margaret Thatcher embodied a new mode of Conservatism in the United Kingdom (Hall and Jacques 1983; Nunn 2003) and Tony Blair a series of claims about ‘modernized’ social democracy (Finlayson 2003).

The second classical ‘appeal’ was to pathos or emotion. Appeals to the emotions are perhaps some of the most frowned upon normatively. They are considered to be, at one extreme, simplistic (easy sentimentality substituting for clear thought) and at the other, sinister (exploiting our fears and prejudices). From the perspective of the political theory of ideologies the emotional or affective register is a vital dimension of motivation and thus a necessary and inextinguishable aspect of practical political thought and action. But not all ideologies can appeal to emotions of the same sort or in the same way. That is, what distinguishes one from another is not only that they promote the love or hatred of one sort of policy, principle, or person rather than another but the extent to which hate or love are part of their overall tone. Emotional tenor is part of what an ideology is and traditions of political thinking can be characterized by their particular emotional tones and their combination in specific contexts. This raises an interesting question concerning the characterization and categorization of ideologies. For instance, is a socialism for which resentment is a major mood the same or a different ideology to a socialism of collective fraternal feeling?

More broadly, in relation to which issues and in which ways is an ideology most emotionally intense?

As well as invocations of character and emotion, rhetorical political argument also (and primarily) employs a range of ‘quasi-logical’ forms of argument: attempts to produce in audiences conclusions taken to follow naturally from certain premises. Perlman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in the landmark *The New Rhetoric*, identified a range of such arguments: definitions, relations of various kinds such as division, appeals to probability, reciprocity, and classical rhetorical *topoi* such as cause and effect, means and end. They also identified the extent to which public arguments rest on appeals to ‘the structure of reality’—attempts to derive something from a claim about the given nature of the world. These claims in turn rely on rhetorical figures and techniques such as analogy, examples and various other forms of metaphor (1969: 350–410). In classical rhetoric this is the realm of the enthymeme (which Aristotle called the ‘body of persuasion’). It is the attempt to bring together ‘reality’ and commonly accepted premises—what ‘everyone’ knows to be the case. It involves ‘showing’ how things are, inviting people to consider things and to see them as ‘like this’ rather than ‘like that’ (see also Burnyeat 1994) and thus to infer or deduce particular conclusions.

Thus, in politics, the emphasis of argument often falls on quite a different place to that usually attended to by political philosophy. For instance, an issue such as euthanasia produces a range of philosophical arguments about how to judge cases, the appropriate way to derive conclusions, the procedures for doing so. But in political argument the burden often falls not on the derivation but on the premise. That is, the weight is carried by definition—by names such as ‘euthanasia’ or ‘assisted suicide’ as opposed to ‘murder’ or ‘state killing’—or by a picture of the situation (as one of suffering relieved or of the selfish rejection of what has wrongly been thought a ‘burden’). In the contestation around such an issue nobody actually tries to show how we might justify ‘murder’ or why we should prolong suffering. What is at issue is the nature of the event or phenomena, its description and the narrative context in which it is placed and the ways in which this can be connected to different aspects of ‘common sense’. This is the importance (noted by Skinner, Riker, and Laclau) of naming and framing as well as of narratives and political ‘story-telling’ in general. The establishment of such pictures of a situation relies on a range of metaphorical forms—*catachresis*, *paradiastole*, analogy, and so on (see Aronovitch 1997; Panagia 2001; Charteris-Black 2004; Beer and Landtsheer 2004; Norval 2007)—and their integration into particular narratives. The political theory of ideologies must, therefore, examine the metaphors that underpin ideological arguments and

in so doing it can draw on a wider range of research in philosophy, literature, and linguistics as well as in political theory and political analysis.

The elements of ideological argumentation—a variety of appeals and commonplaces, the establishment of a relationship to context, tropes, narratives, and a performance that carries and embodies them—work as part of a whole. Although they can be analysed in isolation (and often are) it is important to see them as part of an overall ideology which, from this angle, looks like a kind of assemblage of arguments, a machine of rhetorical possibility out of which there emerge particular forms of political action. These actions and the way they relate to the whole are one of the most important objects of study for the political theory of ideologies.

CONCLUSION

As I. A. Richards observed, in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, ‘an idea or a notion, like the physicists’ ultimate particles and rays, is only known by what it does. Apart from its dress or other signs it is not identifiable’ (Richards 1936: 5). Often, political theory and analysis has been concerned with the internal coherence or causal effects of ideas and has neglected to attend to such ‘dress’, to the ways in which ideas are formulated in communicable terms. In this chapter I have drawn on the rhetorical tradition and identified some ways of identifying, describing, and understanding that ‘dress’. I have also shown how this connects directly with the study of ideologies since one of the things an ideology is, is a way of, as it were, dressing for politics. Appreciating this can enrich our understanding of ideologies, enhance our capacity to classify them and deepen our appreciation of their development and trajectory. In developing this aspect of its overall research programme, the political theory of ideologies can contribute to a range of extant areas of political research that includes: the history and development of political concepts; how rational and social choices are shaped by ideological and rhetorical actions; policy formation and implementation.

The contribution of the political theory of ideologies is not, however, confined to the analytical and so-called ‘non-normative’ aspects of political study. As we have seen, rhetoric is increasingly a concern of theories of deliberation and thus also of democratic theory more generally. This should not be surprising. Although it is often associated with an aristocratic tradition of formalized eloquence, since its ‘invention’ in ancient Greece, rhetoric has primarily been associated with democratic impulses because it is an intrinsic

component of any process of open and public debate where people seek to persuade others of something. In the Platonic dialogue that bears his name, Protagoras, a teacher of rhetoric, is perceived by some to be a simplistic relativist; he makes the claim that, since attitudes vary in different cities, ‘man is the measure of all things’. However, what Protagoras is saying here is that cities, political organizations, determine the criteria for evaluating courses of action. This is a sentiment not so far removed from Aristotle’s declaration in *The Politics*, that what makes us the political animal is that through speech we may come to a common view on the expedient and inexpedient, the just and the unjust and so form a polis. Protagoras, on this reading, is simply describing the situation in a world of democratic cities. What most enrages Plato about Protagoras is the latter’s conviction that the art of public and political argument is not a gift possessed by only a few, but one which can be taught to anyone.

Given its close relationship to democracy, an important topic of investigation for the political theory of ideologies is how different political (or political-philosophical) ideologies relate to their own rhetoric—what they claim about the special legitimacy of their own argumentation, and how they position the rhetorical and argumentative acts of others. Indeed, one of the most definitive aspects of any system of political thought is the relationship it has to itself and its own claims. There certainly are ideological formations and acts which proceed on the basis that others who argue against them must be, for reasons of foolishness or venality, blind to the truth and who must therefore be defeated by any means necessary. There are other ideologies which, because of propositions and argumentative forms internal to them, can recognize that, although they want to win the argument, the argument itself is also important and that, therefore, ever greater numbers should be enabled to participate.

There would seem to be good reasons for thinking that this latter formation is part of a broader set of ‘democratic’ ideologies. We may here draw a conclusion of importance for theories of both democracy and deliberation, one most clearly expressed in *Antidosis* by the Athenian teacher of rhetoric, Isocrates: ‘I consider that the kind of art which can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed and does not exist, and that people who profess that power will grow weary and cease from their vain pretensions before such an education is ever found. But I do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well, if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers’.

REFERENCES

- Aronovitch, H. 1997. 'The political importance of analogical argument', *Political Studies*, 45: 78–92.
- Atkinson, Max. 1984. *Our Master's Voices*. London: Methuen.
- Barker, Rodney. 2000. 'Hooks and hands, interests and enemies: Political thinking as political action', *Political Studies*, 48: 223–38.
- Beer, Francis A. and Christ'l Landtsheer. 2004. *Metaphorical World Politics*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press.
- Bentham, Jeremy. 1952 [1824]. *The Handbook of Political Fallacies*. New York, Harper and Brothers.
- Bevir, Mark and R. A. W. Rhodes 2003. *Interpreting British Governance*. London, Routledge.
- Bevir, Mark and R. A. W. Rhodes 2007. *Governance Stories*. London, Routledge.
- Bevir, Mark, Keith Dowding, Alan Finlayson, Colin Hay, and Rod Rhodes. 2004. 'Interpretive methodology and political science: A roundtable', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 6 (2): 129–64.
- Billig, Michael. 1987. *Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bitzer, Lloyd. 1998 [1968]. 'The rhetorical situation'. Pp. 217–26 in John Lucaites, C. M. Condit, and S. Caudill (eds.), *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory*. London: Guilford Press.
- Bizzell, Patricia and Bruce Herzberg (eds.) 2001. *The Rhetorical Tradition: readings from classical times to the present*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's.
- Booth, Wayne. 2004. *The Rhetoric of Rhetoric*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bull, Peter. 1994. 'On identifying questions, replies and non-replies in political interviews', *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 13 (2): 115–31.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Burnyeat, Myles. 1994. 'Enthymeme: The logic of persuasion'. Pp. 3–55 in David J. Furley and Alexander Nehemas (eds.), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Campbell, K. K. and K. H. Jamieson 1990. *Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Chambers, Samuel and Alan Finlayson. 2008. 'Ann Coulter and the problem of pluralism: From values to politics', *Borderlands*, 7, 1.
- Charteris-Black, Jonathan. 2004. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie and Norman Fairclough 1999. *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking critical discourse analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Cornford, F. M. 1933. *Microcosmographia Academica: Being a Guide for the Young Academic Politician*. Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes.
- de Romilly, Jacqueline. 1992. *The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dryzek, John S. 2004. *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dryzek, John. 2010. 'Rhetoric in democracy: A systemic appreciation', *Political Theory*, 38 (3): 319–39.
- Edelman, M. J. 1985. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Edelman, M. J. 1988. *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fairclough Norman. 2000. *New Labour, New Language?* London: Routledge.
- Farrar, Cynthia. 1988. *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferguson, Kathy. 2008. 'Bush in drag: Sarah Palin and endless war', *Borderlands*, 8, 3.
- Finlayson, Alan. 2003. *Making Sense of New Labour*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Finlayson, Alan. 2007. 'From beliefs to arguments: Interpretive methodology and rhetorical political analysis', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 9 (4): 545–63.

- Finlayson, Alan and James Martin. 2008. “‘It ain’t what you say ...’: British political studies and the analysis of speech and rhetoric”, *British Politics*, 3: 445–64.
- Fischer, Frank. (2003). *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeden, Michael. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Freeden, Michael. 2005. ‘What should the “political” in political theory explore?’ *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 13 (2): 113–34.
- Gagarin, Michael and Paul Woodruff. 1995. *Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Glynos, J. 2001. ‘The grip of ideology: a Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 6: 191–214.
- Grassi, Ernesto. 2001. *Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Hajer, M. 2005. ‘Setting the stage: a dramaturgy of policy deliberation’, *Administration and Society*, 36 (6): 624–47.
- Hall, Stuart and Martin Jacques. 1983. *The Politics of Thatcherism*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Hampshire, Stuart. 1999. *Justice is Conflict*. London: Duckworth.
- Hay, Colin. 2002. *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Hindess, Barry. 1988. *Choice, Rationality and Social Theory*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1991. *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy*. Harvard: Belknap Press.
- Howarth, David, Aletta Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds.) 2000. *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 1990. *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 2000. ‘Identity and hegemony: The role of universality in the construction of political logics’. Pp. 44–89 in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality; Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 2006. ‘Ideology and post-Marxism’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11: 103–14.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 2007. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.
- Locke, John. 1838 [1690]. *Essay Concerning Understanding*. London: William Baynes and Son.
- Lucaites, J., C. M. Condit, and S. Caudill (eds.) 1998. *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory*. London: Guilford Press.
- Meisel, J. 2001. *Public Speech and the Culture of Public Life in the Age of Gladstone*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Norval, Aletta. 1996. *Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse*. London: Verso.
- Norval, Aletta. 2007. *Aversive Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nunn, Heather. 2003. *Thatcher, Politics and Fantasy: The Political Culture of Gender and Nation*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Palonen, Kari. 2003. *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Palonen, Kari. 2005. ‘Political theorizing as a dimension of political life’, *European Journal of Political Theory*, 4 (4): 351–66.
- Palonen, Kari. 2008a. *The Politics of Limited Times: The Rhetoric of Temporal Judgement in Parliamentary Democracies*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Palonen, Kari. 2008b. ‘Speaking pro et contra’. Pp. 82–105 in Suvi Soininen and Tapani Turkka (eds.), *The Parliamentary Style of Politics*. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Panagia, Davide. 2001. ‘The predicative function in ideology: on the political uses of analogical argument

- in contemporary political thought', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 6: 55–74.
- Perlman, Chaim and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. London: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Richards, I. A. 1936. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Riker, William H. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sanders, Lynn. 1997. 'Against deliberation', *Political Theory*, 25: 347–77.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2003. 'Losers in politics (and how they sometimes become winners): William Riker's heresthetic', *Perspectives on Politics*, 1 (2): 307–15.
- Skinner, Quentin. 1978. *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1: The Renaissance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skinner, Quentin. 1997. *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skinner, Quentin. 2002a. *Visions of Politics: Regarding Method*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skinner, Quentin. 2002b. *Visions of Politics: Volume 3, Hobbes and Civil Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sprute, Jürgen. 1994. 'Aristotle and the legitimacy of rhetoric'. Pp. 117–28 in David J. Furley and Alexander Nehemas (eds.), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2007. *The Lacanian Left*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Young, Iris. 1996. 'Communication and the Other: Beyond deliberative democracy'. Pp. 120–36 in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zerilli, Linda. 2005. "'We feel our freedom": Imagination and judgment in the thought of Hannah Arendt', *Political Theory*, 33: 158–88.

CHAPTER 12
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

MANFRED B. STEGER

INTRODUCTION

FOR some time now, political and social theorists have been struggling to make sense of the transformation of what used to be a relatively durable ideological landscape dominated by the familiar mainstays of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. Starting with the collapse of Soviet-style communism more than two decades ago, this period of conceptual destabilization accelerated further with the rise of ‘globalization’—the latest and most intense phase in the age-old human story of expanding and intensifying connections across world-time and world-space.¹ Most debates on the subject have revolved around its objective dynamics, especially the worldwide integration of markets aided by the information and communication revolution of the last quarter century.

While its material dimension is certainly important, it would be a serious mistake to neglect globalization’s subjective aspects related to the creation of new cosmopolitan and hybrid identities linked to the thickening of a global imaginary. However, as Roland Robertson (2009: 121) has recently noted, the evolution of global consciousness has often been neglected in the social sciences and humanities. And yet, the study of the rising global imaginary constitutes an important area of theoretical inquiry where students of political ideologies can make crucial contributions to our understanding of subjective globalization. After all, the thickening of public awareness of the world as an interconnected whole has had a dramatic impact on political belief systems—those shared mental maps people utilize for the navigation of their complex political environments.

But what sort of evidence is there to bolster my claim that the conventional ‘isms’ of the last two centuries have come under full-scale attack by the forces of globalization? For starters, one might consider what I have referred to elsewhere as the ‘proliferation of prefixes’. ‘Neo’ and ‘post’, in particular, have managed to attach themselves to most conventional ‘isms’ (Steger 2008: viii)². As a result, one encounters with remarkable frequency in both academic writings and public discourse such curious compounds as ‘neoliberalism’, ‘neoconservatism’, ‘neofascism’, ‘neonanarchism’, ‘post-Marxism’, ‘post-communism’,

‘postmodernism’, ‘postcolonialism’, and so on. Granted, some of these isms may not constitute full-blown *political* ideologies, but this should not detract from the fact that all major political belief systems have been afflicted by the invasion of the prefixes. This prefix phenomenon points not only to a growing sense that something ‘neo’ has descended upon the ideological landscape of the twenty-first century, but also casts a long shadow on the contemporary relevance of conventional political idea-systems and their corresponding typologies.

What then, precisely, is new about political ideologies? Have we really moved ‘post’ our conventional ideological landscape? Responding to these questions, this essay reflects on why and how the forces of globalization have altered the grand political ideologies codified by social power elites since the French Revolution. In order to explain these transformations, I discuss at some length the crucial relationship between two social imaginaries—the national and the global—and political ideologies. The essay ends with a brief survey of my own attempt to arrive at a new classification system for contemporary ‘globalisms’. This typology is based on the disaggregation of these new ideational clusters (formed around the global) not merely into core concepts, but—perhaps more dynamically—into various sets of central ideological claims that play crucial semantic and political roles. As I have argued elsewhere in some detail, these three major globalisms—market globalism, justice globalism, and religious globalisms—represent a set of political ideas and beliefs coherent and conceptually ‘thick’ enough to warrant the status of mature ideologies (Steger 2005).

Unfortunately, the fundamental changes affecting political belief systems triggered by the forces of globalization have not been adequately described or analysed in the pertinent literature. Well-intentioned attempts to ‘update’ modern political belief systems by adorning them with prefixes resemble futile efforts to make sense of digital word processing by drawing on the mechanics of movable print. The failure to redraw our ideological maps appears most glaringly in leading academic textbooks where the grand ideologies of the national age—complemented by various neo-isms—continue to be presented as the dominant political belief systems of our time.³ To grasp the novelty of today’s globalisms, we must realize that large chunks of the grand ideologies of modernity—liberalism, conservatism, socialism, fascism, and communism—have been discarded, absorbed, reconfigured, synthesized, and hybridized with new core concepts such as ‘globalization’ and ‘sustainability’ into ideologies of genuine novelty. But before we survey the morphologies (ideational structures) of these new globalisms, let us consider the crucial relationship between political

ideologies and various deep-seated ‘social imaginaries’.

IDEOLOGIES AND SOCIAL IMAGINARIES

Modern political ideologies emerged during the American and French Revolutions as malleable political belief systems that competed with religious doctrines over what sorts of ideas and values should guide human communities. Supposedly constituting ‘secular’ perspectives on these fundamental questions, ideologies nonetheless resembled religions in their attempts to link the various ethical, cultural, and political dimensions of society into a fairly comprehensive thought-system. Imitating their rivals’ penchant to trade in truth and certainty, ideologies also relied on narratives, metaphor, and myths that persuaded, praised, condemned, cajoled, convinced, and separated the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’. Like religion, they thrived on human emotions, generating rage, fear, enthusiasm, love, sacrifice, and altruism. Ideologies inspired mass murder, torture, and rape in much the same way as religious doctrines have run through the gamut of human vices (Hazareesingh 1994: 13). Its pejorative connotations notwithstanding, however, ideology deserves a more balanced hearing—one that acknowledges its integrative role of providing social stability as much as its propensity to contribute to fragmentation and alienation; its ability to supply standards of normative evaluation as much as its tendency to oversimplify social complexity; its role as guide and compass for political action as much as its potential to legitimize tyranny and terror in the name of noble ideals.

Drawing on this appreciative conception of ideology that takes seriously the indispensable functions of political belief systems irrespective of their particular contents or political orientations, I define ideology as comprehensive belief systems comprised of patterned ideas and claims to truth. Codified by social elites, these shared mental maps that help people navigate their complex political environments are embraced by significant groups in society (Steger 2009b; Sargent 2008). All political belief systems are historically contingent and, therefore, must be analysed with reference to particular contexts that connect their origins and developments to specific times and spaces. Linking belief and practice, ideologies encourage people to act while simultaneously constraining their actions.

To this end, ideological codifiers—typically social elites residing in large cities—construct ‘truth claims’ that seek to fix authoritative definitions and meanings of their core concepts. Michael Freeden refers to this crucial process as ‘decontestation’. As he puts it, ‘An ideology attempts to end the inevitable

contention over concepts by *decontesting* them, by removing their meanings from contest. “This is what justice means”, announces one ideology, and “that is what democracy entails” (Freeden 2003: 54–5).⁴ By trying to convince us that their claims are ‘true’, ideologies produce conceptual stability, thus serving as key devices for coping with the indeterminacy of meaning. Although even successfully decontested ideas always require further explanations and justifications, their meanings are accepted by significant segments of the population with such confidence that they no longer appear to be ‘opinions’ at all. Ultimately, these decontested core concepts (such as freedom, equality, justice, tradition, class, race, and so on) are linked to related ‘adjacent’ concepts to form coherent ideational claims which give each ideology its unique configuration. Such ideological ‘morphologies’ should thus be pictured as decontested truth-claims that serve as devices for decontesting meanings as well as instruments for facilitating collective decision-making. It would be a mistake to reduce ideologies to mere justifications of economic class interests or impractical metaphysical speculations. Although they frequently distort and provide legitimation for dominant power interests, ideologies also contribute to the necessary construction of identities and bonds of political belonging. Thus, they are fairly comprehensive shared mental maps that guide people through the complexity of their social environments. In short, ideologies are indispensable ideational systems that shape and direct human communities in concrete political ways.⁵

To understand the fundamental changes affecting the ideological landscape of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to grasp the connection between competing political ideologies and their overarching ‘social imaginary’. Constituting the macro-mappings of social and political space through which we perceive, judge, and act in the world, social imaginaries are deep-seated modes of understanding that provide the most general parameters within which people imagine their communal existence. Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s (1991) account of the imagined community of the nation, Charles Taylor (2004: 2, 23–6) argues that social imaginaries are neither theories nor ideologies, but implicit ‘background understandings’ that make possible communal practices and a widely shared sense of their legitimacy. Social imaginaries offer explanations of how ‘we’—the members of a particular community—fit together, how things go on between us, the expectations we have of each other, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie those expectations. These background understandings are both normative and factual in the sense of providing us with the standards of what passes as common-sense. Much in the

same vein, Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 54–5) notes that the social imaginary sets the pre-reflexive framework for our daily routines and social repertoires. Structured by social dynamics that produce them while at the same time also structuring those forces, social imaginaries are products of history that ‘generate individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with the schemes generated by history’.

Human thought is mostly unconscious and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Indeed, most of human reasoning is based on mental images that are seldom explicit; usually they are merely presupposed in everyday reasoning and debates. Thus, all social imaginaries express themselves in a series of interrelated and mutually dependent narratives, visual prototypes, metaphors, and conceptual framings. Despite their apparent intangibility, however, social imaginaries are quite ‘real’ in the sense of enabling common practices and deep-seated communal attachments. Though capable of facilitating collective fantasies and speculative reflections, they should not be dismissed as phantasms or mental fabrications. As shared visions of self and community, social imaginaries often find expression as nameable collectivities such as ‘Americans’ or ‘Hutus’. Endowed with specific properties, social imaginaries acquire additional solidity through the social construction of space and the repetitive performance of their assigned qualities and characteristics. Thus feigning permanence, social imaginaries are nonetheless temporary constellations subject to constant change. Social imaginaries acquire additional solidity through the (re)construction of social space and the repetitive performance of certain communal qualities and characteristics. And yet, they are temporary constellations subject to change. At certain tipping points in history, such change can occur with lightning speed and tremendous ferocity.

The late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century social revolutions in the Americas and Europe, for example, made visible the transformation of the ‘traditional social imaginary’ in a dramatic way. For many generations, the conventional modes of understanding had reproduced divinely-sanctioned power hierarchies in the form of tribes, clanships, trading city-states, and dynastic empires. Between 1776 and 1848, however, there arose on both sides of the Atlantic the familiar template of the ‘nation’ now no longer referring to the king at the pinnacle of the state hierarchy, but to an abstract ‘general will’ operating in free citizens fighting for their homeland. The political message was as clear as it was audacious: henceforth it would be ‘the people’—not kings, aristocrats, or clerical elites—that exercised legitimate authority in political affairs. Over time, the will of the people would replace monarchical forms of communal authority

based on transcendental powers emanating from a divine realm beyond the nation. Thus, modern nationhood found its expression in the transformation of subjects into citizens who laid claim to equal membership in the nation and institutionalized their sovereignty in the modern nation-state. But who really counted as part of the people and what constituted the essence of the nation became the subject of fierce intellectual debates and material struggles. Seeking to remake the world according to the rising national imaginary, citizens exhibited a restlessness that became the hallmark of modernity. As William Connolly (1988: 2–3) observes, ‘Modern agencies form and reform, produce and reproduce, incorporate and reincorporate, industrialize and reindustrialize. In modernity, modernization is always under way’.

Countless meanings and definitions of modernity have been put forward in the last two centuries. They extend far beyond familiar designations referring to a historical era in the West characterized by its radical rupture with the past and its ensuing temporal reorientation toward notions of infinite progress, economic growth, and enduring material prosperity. As the philosopher Juergen Habermas (1987: 7) reminds us, modernity is inextricably intertwined with an expanding ‘public sphere’—the incubator of modernity’s tendency to ‘create its own normativity out of itself’. Various thinkers have elaborated on the main dynamics of modernity: the separation of state and civil society; conceptions of linear time; progressive secularization; individualism; intensifying geopolitical rivalries that facilitated the formation and multiplication of nation-states; new orders of rationality and their corresponding domains of knowledge; the uneven expansion of industrial capitalism; the rapid diffusion of discursive literacy; the slow trend toward democratization; and so on. The detailed genealogy of these features need not concern us here. What we ought to consider straightaway, however, is the position of the national in the modern social imaginary.

IDEOLOGIES AND THE NATIONAL IMAGINARY

New treatments of nationality and nationalism appearing on the academic scene since the early 1980s have advanced convincing arguments in favour of a tight connection between the forces of modernity, the spread of industrial capitalism, and the elite-engineered construction of the ‘national community’ as a cultural artifact. As Eric Hobsbawm (1992: 14) notes, ‘The basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything associated with it is its modernity’. Even scholars like Anthony Smith (1998: 1) who reject the modernist view that nations were simply ‘invented’ without the significant incorporation of pre-modern ethnic ties

and histories, concede that nationalism represents ‘a modern movement and ideology, which emerged in the latter half of the eighteenth century in Western Europe and America’. Smith’s definition of nationalism as an ‘ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of a nation’ usefully highlights the idiosyncratic ways of processing and disseminating secular ideas that emerged in the nineteenth century as a distinctive feature of modernity. As Tom Nairn (2005: 13) explains, ‘An ism ceased to denote just a system of general ideas (like Platonism or Thomism) and evolved into a proclaimed cause or movement—no longer a mere school but a party or societal trend’. In other words, ideas acquired alluring banner headlines and truth claims that resonated with people’s interests and aspirations and thus bound them to a specific political program. Having to choose sides in these proliferating battles of political ideas, like-minded individuals organized themselves into clubs, associations, movements, and political parties with the primary objective of enlisting more people to their preferred normative vision of the national.

There is, however, a downside to Smith’s definition: it turns nationalism into an ideology of the same ilk as liberalism or conservatism. This begs the question of how nationalism can be both a distinct political ideology and a common source of inspiration for a variety of political belief systems. Sensing the overarching stature of the national, Benedict Anderson and other social thinkers with an anthropological bent have resisted the idea that nationalism should be seen as a distinct ideology. Instead, they refer to it as a ‘cultural artifact of a particular kind’ that is, a relatively broad cultural system more closely related to ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’ than to ‘liberalism’ or ‘conservatism’ (Geertz 1973; Anderson 1991; Dumont 1994). Following their intuition, then, I suggest that we treat the national not as an ideology in its own right but as a crucial component of the modern social imaginary. As such, the ‘national imaginary’ corresponds to what Benedict Anderson (1991: 6–7) has called ‘modern imaginings of the nation’ as a limited and sovereign community of individuals whose knowledge of each other is, in most cases, not direct, but mediated in linear time through the diffusion of discursive literacy. This was made possible, in part, by the invention of printing technology embedded in nascent capitalism.

Since the national decisively coloured the modern social imaginary, we ought to treat the national not as a separate ideology but as the background to our communal existence that emerged in the Northern Hemisphere with the American and French Revolutions. The national gave the modern social imaginary its distinct flavour in the form of various factual and normative assumptions that political communities, in order to count as ‘legitimate’, had to

be nation-states (Greenfeld 2004: 40). The ‘national imaginary’, then, refers to the taken-for-granted understanding in which the nation—plus its affiliated or to-be-affiliated state—serves the central framework of the political community.

What, then, is the precise relationship between the national and ideology? Or, to reverse the question, what is the connection between political belief systems and the national imaginary? I suggest that ideologies translate and articulate the largely prereflexive social imaginary in compressed form as explicit political doctrine. This means that the grand ideologies of modernity gave explicit political expression to the implicit national imaginary. To be sure, each ideology deployed and assembled its core concepts in specific and unique ways. But the elite codifiers of these ideational systems pursued their specific political goals under the common background umbrella of the national imaginary. Liberalism, conservatism, socialism, communism, and Nazism/fascism were all ‘nationalist’ in the sense of performing the same fundamental task of translating the overarching national imaginary into concrete political doctrines, agendas, and spatial arrangements. In so doing, ideologies normalized national territories; spoke in recognized national languages; appealed to national histories; told national legends and myths, or glorified a national ‘race’. They articulated the national imaginary according to certain criteria that were said to constitute the defining essence of the community.⁶

But whatever ideologies purported the essence of the nation to be, they always developed their truth-claims by decontesting their core concepts within the national imaginary. Liberals, for example, spoke of ‘freedom’ as applying to autonomous individuals belonging to the same national community, that is, the liberties of *French*, *Colombian*, or *Australian* citizens. The conservative fondness for traditional ‘law and order’ received its highest expression in the notion of *national* security. Even the apparent ‘internationalism’ of socialists and communists was not tantamount to what I call ‘globalism’. First, the term ‘*international*’ betrays its reliance on the ‘nation’ as its central conceptual category. The whole point of an ideational framework centred on the ‘global’ is to go beyond the nation-state as the basic unity of analysis. Second, socialist internationalism achieved its concrete political formulation and manifestation only as *German* social democracy or Soviet *Russia*’s ‘socialism in one country’ or ‘socialism with *Chinese* characteristics’. Third, even the supposed *theoretical* ‘global’ characteristics of communism/socialism reflect their unmistakable national rootedness in the basic documents of these two political belief systems.⁷

For two centuries, then, the partisans of the major political ideologies clashed with each other over such important issues as participation, the extent of civil

rights, the purposes and forms of government, the role of the state, the significance of race and ethnicity, and the scope of political obligations. Clinging to their different political visions, they hardly noticed their common embeddedness in the national imaginary. Insisting on their obvious differences, they hardly questioned their common allegiance to the overarching national imaginary. After all, the business of modern political belief systems was the formidable task of realizing their core values under the banner of the nation-state—the ceaseless task of translating the national imaginary into competing political projects.

IDEOLOGIES AND THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY

In the aftermath of the Second World War, new ideas, theories, and material practices produced in the public consciousness a similar sense of rupture with the past that had occurred at the time of the French Revolution. For example, novel technologies facilitated the speed and intensity with which these ideas and practices infiltrated the national imaginary. Images, people, and materials circulated more freely across national boundaries. This new sense of ‘the global’ that erupted within and onto the national began to undermine the sense of normalcy and self-contained coziness associated with the modern nation-state—especially deeply engrained notions of community tied to a sovereign and clearly demarcated territory containing relatively homogenous populations (Appadurai 2006; Albrow 1997). Identities based on national membership became destabilized. During the early decades of the Cold War, the changing social imaginary led prominent thinkers in the ‘First World’ to proclaim the ‘end of ideology’. As evidence for their assertion, they pointed to the political-cultural consensus underpinning a common Western ‘community of values’ and the socioeconomic welfare state compromise struck between liberalism and democratic socialism. Conversely, detractors of the end of ideology thesis seized upon the decolonization dynamics in the ‘Third World’ as well as the rise of the counter-cultural ‘new social movements’ in the 1960s and 1970s as evidence for their view that the familiar political belief systems were being complemented by ‘new ideologies’ such as feminism, environmentalism, and postcolonialism.

But, as indicated by the new designations *First*, *Second*, and *Third World*, the most fundamental novelty of these ‘new ideologies’ lay in their sensitivity toward the rising global imaginary, regardless of whether they were formulated by the forces of the ‘New Left’ or the cohorts of the ‘New Right’. Starting in the late 1970s, and especially after the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union, the

neoclassical economic ideas of the New Right gained the upper hand across the globe. By the mid-1990s, a growing chorus of global social elites was fastening onto the new buzzword ‘globalization’ as the central metaphor for their political agenda—the creation of a single global free market and the spread of consumerist values around the world. Most importantly, they translated the rising social imaginary into largely economistic claims laced with references to globality: global trade and financial markets, worldwide flows of goods, services, and labour, transnational corporations, offshore financial centres, and so on.

But globalization was never merely a matter of increasing flows of capital and goods across national borders. Rather, it constitutes a multidimensional set of processes in which images, sound bites, metaphors, myths, symbols, and spatial arrangements of globality were just as important as economic and technological dynamics. Such heightened awareness of the compression of time and space influences the direction and material instantiations of global flows. As Roland Robertson (1992, 2009) has emphasized time and again, the compression of the world into a single place increasingly makes ‘the global’ the frame of reference for human thought and action. Thus, globalization involves both the macro-structures of community and the micro-structures of personhood. It extends deep into the core of the self and its dispositions, facilitating the creation of new identities nurtured by the intensifying relations between the individual and the globe (Elliott and Lemert 2006: 90).

Like the conceptual earthquake that shook Europe and the Americas more than two hundred years ago, today’s destabilization of the national affects the entire planet. The ideologies dominating the world today are no longer exclusively articulations of the national imaginary but reconfigured ideational systems that constitute early-stage translations of the dawning global imaginary. Although my account of this transformation emphasizes rupture, it would be foolish to deny obvious continuities. As Saskia Sassen (2008: 402) notes, the incipient process of denationalization and the ascendance of novel social formations depend in good part on capabilities shaped and developed in the national age.

THREE GLOBALISMS: TOWARD A NEW TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As capitalist liberalism expanded across the globe after the fall of Soviet

communism, it drew on the basic neoclassical ideas of politically engaged economists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who had seized upon the crisis of Keynesianism in the 1970s to pitch their ideas to rising conservative politicians in the United States and United Kingdom. Still, it represented a remarkable ideological achievement for market-globalist codifiers in the 1990s to reconfigure these ideas around the buzzword ‘globalization’, thereby articulating the rising global imaginary in concrete political agendas and programmes. The Anglo-American framers of market globalism spoke softly and persuasively as they sought to attract people worldwide to their vision of globalization as a leaderless, inevitable juggernaut that would ultimately engulf the entire world and produce liberal democracy and material benefits for everyone.

Even after the two severe crises of the 2000s—global terrorism and the Great Recession—market globalism (‘neoliberalism’) has remained the dominant ideology of our global age. Although market globalists across the planet share a common belief in the power of free markets to create a better world, their doctrine comes in different hues and multiple variations. ‘Reaganomics’, for example, is not exactly the same as ‘Thatcherism’. Bill Clinton’s brand of market globalism diverges in some respects from Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’. And political elites in the global South (often educated at the elite universities of the North) have learned to fit the dictates of the market-globalist ‘Washington Consensus’ to their own local contexts and political objectives. Thus, market globalism has adapted to specific environments, problems, and opportunities across the world.

The discursive preeminence of the ‘market’, of course, harkens back to the heyday of liberalism in mid-Victorian England. And yet, market globalists tie this concept no longer exclusively to the old paradigm of self-contained national economies but refer primarily to a model of global exchanges among national actors, subnational agencies, supranational bodies, networks of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational corporations. Our globalizing world contains a multiplicity of orders networked together on multiple levels. Disaggregating nation-states struggle to come to grips with relational concepts of sovereignty while facing unprecedented challenges to their authority from both subnational and supranational collectivities.

As I have argued elsewhere in much detail, market globalism emerged in the 1990s as a comprehensive ideology extolling, among other things, the virtues of globally integrating markets (Steger 2009, 2009b). Ideationally much richer than the more familiar term ‘neoliberalism’ suggests, market globalism discarded,

absorbed, and rearranged large chunks of the grand ideologies while at the same time incorporating genuinely new ideas. The outcome was a new political belief system centred on six central ideological claims that translated the global imaginary into concrete political programmes and agendas: (1) globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets; (2) globalization is inevitable and irreversible; (3) nobody is in charge of globalization; (4) globalization benefits everyone; (5) globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world; and (6) globalization requires a global war on terror.⁸

The ideological codification and public dissemination of these claims fell disproportionately to global power elites enamoured with neoliberal economics and consisting mostly of corporate managers, executives of large transnational corporations, corporate lobbyists, prominent journalists and public-relations specialists, media tycoons, cultural elites and entertainment celebrities, academics writing for large audiences, high-level state bureaucrats, and political leaders. They marshalled their considerable material and ideal resources to sell to the public the alleged benefits of the liberalization of trade and the global integration of markets: rising living standards, reduction of global poverty, economic efficiency, individual freedom and democracy, and unprecedented technological progress. Ideally, the state should only provide the legal framework for contracts, defence, and law and order. Public policy initiatives should be confined to those measures that liberate the economy from social constraints: privatization of public enterprises, deregulation instead of state control, liberalization of trade and industry, massive tax cuts, strict control of organized labor, and the reduction of public expenditures. Other models of economic organization were discredited as being ‘protectionist’ or ‘socialist’. Seeking to enshrine their neoliberal paradigm as the self-evident and universal order of our global era, these transnational power elites articulated the rising global imaginary along the lines of their six ideological claims.

But no single ideational system ever enjoys absolute dominance. Battered by persistent gales of political dissent, the small fissures and ever-present inconsistencies in political ideologies threaten to turn into major cracks and serious contradictions. As the 1990s drew to a close, market globalism found itself challenged on the political Left by what I call ‘justice globalism’—an alternative translation of the rising global imaginary propagated by the members of the ‘global justice movement’ (GJM) who argued against ‘corporate globalization’ (Steger et al. 2013). At the core of global justice lies the ideological claim that the liberalization and global integration of markets leads, in fact, to greater social inequalities, environmental destruction, the escalation of

global conflicts and violence, the weakening of participatory forms of democracy, the proliferation of self-interest and consumerism, and the further marginalization of the powerless around the world.

Hence, the chief ideological codifiers of justice globalism—often the leading voices of progressive networks and alliances connected to the World Social Forum (WSF)—seek to accomplish two fundamental tasks. The first is ideological, reflected in concerted efforts to undermine the premises and ideological framework of the reigning market-globalist world-view by constructing and disseminating alternative articulations of the global imaginary based on the core principles of the WSF: equality, global social justice, diversity, democracy, nonviolence, solidarity, ecological sustainability, and planetary citizenship (Steger and Wilson 2012). The second is political, manifested in the attempt to realize these principles by means of mass mobilizations and non-violent direct action targeting the core structures of market globalism: international economic institutions like the WTO (World Trade Organisation) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund), transnational corporations and affiliated NGOs, large industry federations and lobbies, and the ‘American Empire’.

The justice-globalist vision is neither about reviving a moribund Marxism nor a return to the ‘good old days’ of 1968. Although justice globalism contains elements of Gandhian Third World liberationism and traditional European social democracy, it goes beyond these Cold War ideational clusters in several respects—most importantly in its ability to bring together a large number of New Left concerns around a more pronounced orientation toward the globe as a single, interconnected arena for political action. One example of the GJM’s strong global focus is its publicity campaign to highlight the negative consequences of deregulated global capitalism on the planet’s environmental health. Indeed, in the first decade of the new century, the issue of global climate change has advanced to the forefront of public discourse around the world, second only to the spectre of global terrorism and warfare.

Finally, the policy vision of justice globalism lays out in some detail by now rather familiar proposals. The programmatic core of these demands is a ‘global Marshall Plan’—now a fashionable buzzword that has entered the mainstream discourse as a result of the lingering 2008–9 Great Recession—that would create more political space for people around the world to determine what kind of social arrangements they want. As Susan George (2004: chs 6–10), a seasoned GJM activist widely considered one of the movement’s premier ‘idea persons’ notes, ‘another world’ has to begin with a new, worldwide Keynesian-type

programme of taxation and redistribution, exactly as it took off at the national level in the now-rich countries a century or so ago. Justice globalists like George envision the necessary funds for this global regulatory framework to come from the profits of transnational corporations and financial markets—hence their worldwide campaign for the introduction of the global Tobin Tax. Other proposals include the cancellation of poor countries' debts; the closing of offshore financial centres offering tax havens for wealthy individuals and corporations; the ratification and implementation of stringent global environmental agreements; the implementation of a more equitable global development agenda; the establishment of a new world development institution financed largely by the global North and administered largely by the global South; establishment of international labour protection standards, perhaps as clauses of a profoundly reformed WTO; greater transparency and accountability provided to citizens by national governments and global economic institutions; making all governance of globalization explicitly gender sensitive; the transformation of 'free trade' into 'fair trade', and a binding commitment to non-violent direct action as the sole vehicle of social and political change.

Market globalism has also been challenged from the political Right by various 'religious globalisms'. Indeed, today we are witnessing a weakening if not a reversal of the powerful secularization dynamic of the last centuries as a result of the decline of the national. Moreover, the rising global imaginary has been creating more favourable conditions for the convergence of political and religious belief systems. It is unlikely that secularism in the West will disappear any time soon, but the religious will give it a run for its money, forcing previously unimagined forms of accommodation and compromise. In short, the rising global imaginary will continue to create fertile conditions for 'religious ideologies' or 'ideological religions'. Consequently, we ought to treat religious ideas and beliefs as an increasingly integral part of certain global ideologies. While religious globalisms are not tied to one specific religion, Al Qaeda's form of 'Islamist globalism' represents one of the most potent religious ideologies of our time.

As can be gleaned from the vast literature on 'Islamism', this term has been used in many different ways by both Muslims and non-Muslims to refer to various 'movements' and 'ideologies' dedicated to the revival of Islam and its political realization. Related terms currently in circulation include 'political Islam', 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamist purism', and the pejorative 'Islamofascism'.⁹ Although different in causes, responses, strategies, and collective identities, various forms of Islamism share the common proclivity to synthesize

certain religious elements of their traditional political discourses with certain elements of modern ideologies. Indeed, Islamisms are about the politicization of religion just as much as they represent the sacralization of modern politics.

This chapter's focus on al Qaeda's Islamist globalism is neither meant to downplay the diversity of ideational currents within Islamism nor to present one particular strain as its most representative or authentic manifestation. Rather, the doctrine articulated by the likes of the late Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahri, or the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been the most prominent example of Islamist globalism. Second, its tremendous influence around the world points to the rise of new political ideologies resulting from the ongoing deterritorialization of Islam. Third, Islamist globalism constitutes the most successful ideological attempt yet to articulate the rising global imaginary around its core concepts of *umma* (Islamic community of believers in the one and only God), *jihad* (armed or unarmed 'struggle' against unbelief purely for the sake of God and his *umma*), and *tawhid* (the absolute unity of God). As Bruce Lawrence notes, the bulk of Osama bin Laden's writings and public addresses emerged in the context of a 'virtual world' moving from print to the Internet and from wired to wireless communication. Largely scriptural in mode, the al Qaeda leader's 'messages to the world' were deliberately designed for the new global media. They appeared on video and audio tapes, websites, and hand-written letters scanned onto computer disks and delivered to Arabic-language news outlets, including the influential Qatari satellite television network al-Jazeera.¹⁰

Decontesting their core concepts of *umma*, *jihad*, and *tahwid* in potent ideological claims, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri developed a narrative predicated upon globalization's destabilization of the national imaginary. Seeing themselves as members of a global *umma*, they consciously addressed a global audience of believers and non-believers. Al Qaeda's desired Islamization of modernity has taken place in global space emancipated from the confining national or regional territoriality of 'Egypt' or the 'Middle East' that used to constitute the political framework of religious nationalists fighting modern secular regimes in the twentieth century. As Olivier Roy (2004: 19) observes, 'The Muslim *umma* no longer has anything to do with a territorial entity. It has to be thought of in abstract and imaginary terms'.

Although al Qaeda embraces the Manichean dualism of a 'clash of civilizations' between its imagined global *umma* and global *kufr* ('unbelief'), its globalism transcends clear-cut civilizational fault lines. Its desire for the restoration of a transnational *umma* attests to the globalization and Westernization of the Muslim world just as much as it reflects the Islamization

of the West. Constructed in the ideational interregnum between the national and the global, jihadist-globalist claims still retain potent metaphors that resonate with people's national or even tribal solidarities.¹¹ In its contemporary phase following the killing of bin Laden on 2 May 2011 by US Special Forces, al Qaeda's focus has remained on the global as its new leaders target both the 'Near Enemy' (the new secular or moderate Islamist regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries in the region) and the 'Far Enemy' (the globalizing West). This remarkable discursive and strategic shift reflects the destabilization of the national imaginary. By the early 1990s, nationally-based Islamist groups were losing steam, partly as a result of their inability to mobilize their respective communities around national concerns, and partly because they were subjected to more effective counterstrategies devised by secular-nationalist regimes.¹²

Hence, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri urged their followers to take the war against Islam's enemies globally. Al Qaeda's simple ideological imperative—rebuild a unified global *umma* through global *jihad* against global *kufur*—resonated with the dynamics of a globalizing world.¹³

For example, in a videotaped address to the American people aired around the world only a few days before the 2004 election, bin Laden managed to inject himself into a national electoral contest as the self-appointed leader of the global *umma*. Articulating the rising global imaginary as the familiar set of political claims, the al Qaeda leader appeared on the TV screens of a global audience as the world's chief critic of American democracy. As Faisal Devji notes, al Qaeda's Islamist globalism projected no national ambitions, for it was as global as the West itself, both being intertwined and even internal to each other: 'This is why Bin Laden's calls for the United States to leave the Muslim world do not entail the return to a cold-war geopolitics of détente, but are conceived rather in terms of a global reciprocity on equal terms'.¹⁴

Another videotaped message delivered by the al Qaeda leader in September 2007 unleashed further verbal broadsides against the 'corrupt American political system'. He linked the Bush administration's involvement in Iraq to transnational corporate interests that held 'the American people' hostage to their all-out scramble for war-related profits. Moreover, Bin Laden charged 'the capitalist system' with seeking 'to turn the entire world into a fiefdom of the major corporations under the label of "globalization"'¹⁵ Unsurprisingly, bin Laden's first audio-taped message to President Barack Obama in June 2009 followed the same ideological pattern. Osama bin Laden's death has done little to change the form and substance of the religious globalist message now delivered by a new generation of al Qaeda leaders.

Although some political commentators have suggested that virulent forms of national-populism embodied by the likes of Jean-Marie Le Pen or Patrick Buchanan constitute the most powerful right-wing challenge to market globalism, I contend that this designation belongs to ‘religious globalisms’. Far from being a regionally contained ‘last gasp’ of a backward-looking, militant offshoot of political Islam, jihadism of the al Qaeda variety still represents a potent globalism of worldwide appeal. But we must not forget that ‘religious globalism’ comes in the plural and goes beyond this article’s narrow focus on one particular Islamist variant. Other religiously-inspired visions of global political community include fundamentalist Christian groups such as the Army of God and Christian Identity, Sikh movements, Falun Gong, and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan. Despite their deep conservatism, and in contrast to the liberal and socialist links of market and justice globalisms, religious globalisms still also promote an alternative global vision. This is not to suggest that *all* religiously-inspired visions of global community are conservative and reactionary. Indeed, most religions incorporate a sense of a global community united along religious lines, although in general this is largely informal. A key point about the religious globalist visions highlighted here, however, is that these groups desire their version of a global religious community to be all-encompassing, to be given primacy and superiority over state- and secular-based political structures and are prepared to use violent means to achieve this end goal. The vast majority of religious believers do not seek to institute their global religious community over the authority of the state, rather recognizing that it should only relate to those who share the same beliefs and should remain largely informal. Thus again, religious globalisms may be considered one variant within a family of contesting ideologies.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Potent as they are, the dynamics of denationalization at the heart of globalization neither propel the world to an inevitable endpoint nor have these forces dispensed entirely with vast ideational and material arsenals of the nation-state. The geographical concreteness of global dynamics stares us in the face as the Cuban-Chinese restaurant around the corner or the Eurasian fusion café next door. These hybrid culinary establishments are serving us up a daily taste of a global stew that is slowly thickening but still needs plenty of stirring. The national is slowly losing its grip on people’s minds, but the global has not yet ascended to the commanding heights once occupied by its predecessor. It erupts in fits and false starts, offering observers confusing spectacles of social

fragmentation and integration that cut across old geographical hierarchies of scale in unpredictable patterns.¹⁶

As the national and the global rub up against each other in myriad settings and on multiple levels, they produce new tensions and compromises. Putting the analytic spotlight on the changing ideational structures not only yields a better understanding of current globalization dynamics, but also helps us make sense of the shifting conceptual and geographical boundaries that (re)shape individual and collective identities. Although globalization unfolds toward an uncertain future, the first attempts to translate the rising global imaginary into concrete political agendas have yielded textual evidence to point to a profoundly altered ideological landscape.

NOTES

1. For my definitions of basic concepts related to globalization, see Steger (2009a, 2009b).
2. This essay draws on parts of my book-length study on the subject. See Steger (2008).
3. See, for example, Festenstein and Kenny (2005); Ball and Dagger (2004); Barat (2003); and Heywood (2003). The laudable exception to this rule is Sargent (2008).
4. The ideological function of 'fixing' the process of signification around certain meanings was discussed as early as the 1970s by the French linguist Michel Pecheux and intellectuals associated with the French semiotic journal *Tel Quel*.
5. For a useful summary of the main functions of ideology, see Ricoeur (1986).
6. Craig Calhoun (1997: 18–20) argues that such nationalist 'essentialism' represents one of the guiding assumptions in modern thinking on matters of personal and collective identity.
7. See Kautsky (1922) and Lenin (1902).
8. For a substantial discussion of these claims, see Steger (2009a).
9. See, for example, Mozaffari (2007); Roy, (2004); Karam (2004); Kepel (2004); and Ruthven (2002).
10. Lawrence (2005). See also Lewis (1998). For the most recent collection of writings by al-Qaeda leaders, see Kepel and Milelli (2008).
11. For an insightful analysis of the tribal, national, and global dimensions in Bin Laden's discourse, see McAuley (2005). For a brilliant discussion of globalizing dynamics involving tribal identities, see James (2006).
12. For a more detailed exposition of the reasons behind al-Qaeda's shift from the near to the far enemy, see Gerges (2009); and Kepel (2004).
13. Bin Laden (2005: 91).
14. Devji (2005a: 2). See also Devji (2005b: 144).
15. Osama Bin Laden, untitled transcript of a video-taped message to the American people (6 September 2007).
16. For a discussion of such 'fraggementation', see Rosenau (2003).

REFERENCES

Albrow, M. 1997. *The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn. London: Verso.
- Appadurai, A. 2006. *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Ball, T and R. Dagger. 2004. *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*. 5th edn. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Barat, L. P. 2003. *Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact*, 8th edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Bin Laden, O. 2005. 'A Muslim bomb'. In *Messages to the World*, ed. B. Lawrence, trans. J. Howarth. London: Verso.
- Bourdieu, P. 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Calhoun, C. 1997. *Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Connolly, W. E. 1988. *Political Theory and Modernity*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
- Dumont, L. 1994. *German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Devji, F. 2005a. 'Osama Bin Laden's message to the world', *OpenDemocracy*, 21 December: 2.
- Devji, F. 2005b. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Elliott A. and C. Lemert. 2006. *The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Festenstein, M. and M. Kenny (eds.) 2005. *Political Ideologies: A Reader and Guide* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freedman, M. 2003. *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geertz, C. 1973. 'Ideology as cultural system'. Pp. 193–233 in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, ed. C. Geertz. New York: Basic Books.
- George, S. 2004. *Another World is Possible, If* London: Verso.
- Gerges, F. A. 2009. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greenfield, L. 2004. 'Is modernity possible without nationalism?' Pp. 38–50 in *The Fate of the Nation-State*, ed. Michel Seymour. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Habermas, J. 1987. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hazareesingh, S. 1994. *Political Traditions in Modern France*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Heywood, A. 2003. *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 3rd edn. Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hobsbawm, E. 1992. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- James, P. 2006. *Globalism Nationalism Tribalism: Bringing the State Back In*. London: Sage.
- Karam, A. (ed.) 2004. *Transnational Political Islam: Religion, Ideology and Power*. London: Pluto Press.
- Kautsky, K. 1922. *Das Erfurter Program: In seinem grundsatzlichen Teil erlaeutert*. Berlin: Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachfolger.
- Kepel, K. 2004. *The War for Muslim Minds*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Kepel, G. and J.-P. Milelli (eds.) 2008. *Al Qaeda in Its Own Words*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Lawrence, B. 2005. 'Introduction'. In Osama Bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, ed. B. Lawrence, trans. J. Howarth. London: Verso.
- Lenin, V. I. 1902. 'What is to be done?' In Robert Tucker, ed., 1975. *The Lenin Anthology*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Lewis, B. 1998. 'License to kill', *Foreign Affairs*, 77 (6): n.p.

- McAuley, D. 2005. 'The ideology of Osama Bin Laden: Nation, tribe and world economy', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 10 (3): 269–87.
- Mozaffari, M. 2007. 'What is Islamism? History and definition of a concept', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8 (1): 17–33.
- Nairn, T. 2005. 'Make for the Boondocks', *London Review of Books* (5 May): 12–14.
- Ricoeur, P. 1986. *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Robertson, R. 1992. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Robertson, R. 2009. 'How useful is the concept of global society?' *International Political Sociology*, 3 (1): 119–22.
- Rosenau, J. N. 2003. *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roy, O. 2004. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ruthven, M. 2002. *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America*. London: Granta Books.
- Sargent, L. T. 2008. *Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis*, 14th edn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Sassen, S. 2008. *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Smith, A. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Steger, M. B. 2005. 'Ideologies of Globalization', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 10: 11–30.
- Steger, M. B. 2008. *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Steger, M. B. 2009a. *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, 2nd edn. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Steger, M. B. 2009b. *Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-First Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Steger, M. B. and E. K. Wilson. 2012. 'Anti-globalization or alter-globalization? Mapping the political ideology of the global justice movement', *International Studies Quarterly*, 56 (4): 1–16.
- Steger, M. B., J. Goodman, and E. K. Wilson. 2013. *Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policy*. London: Sage Publications.
- Taylor, C. 2004. *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

CHAPTER 13

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND THEIR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS

JOHN T. JOST, CHRISTOPHER M. FEDERICO, AND JAIME L. NAPIER

It is difficult to distinguish sharply between rational and non-rational inferences in the stream of mental experience, but it is clear that many of the half-conscious processes by which men form their political opinions are non-rational.

Graham Wallas (1908, *Human Nature in Politics*)

THE history of social psychology as a science began in the late nineteenth century in the Leipzig laboratory of Wilhelm Wundt, who sought to develop a *Völkerpsychologie* ('folk psychology') that would complement physiological approaches to the study of mind and behaviour.¹ However, it was not until 1908 that two books were published, more or less simultaneously, bearing the landmark title *Social Psychology*. One was written by a British psychologist, William McDougall, who proposed a theory of instinct and habit to explain human emotion, intellect, and volition. The other was written by an American sociologist, Edward A. Ross, who was concerned with tradition, imitation, and social suggestibility and their implications for public opinion, mass behaviour, and progressive social reform.

Only one year later, Graham Wallas, a Fabian socialist and co-founder of the London School of Economics, published *Human Nature in Politics*, which was probably the first work in a fledgling field that would come to be known as *political psychology* (Jost and Sidanius 2004). In this work, Wallas (1908) railed against the 'intellectualist' assumption that political judgement is driven largely by 'calculations of means and ends', anticipating criticisms of 'rational choice theories' in political science that would come much later (e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994). More specifically, he warned that democracies were especially vulnerable to elite manipulation through 'the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inference'. In this respect, Wallas may have foreseen the horrors that would result from the effective use of fascistic propaganda in the first half of the twentieth century.

Indeed, the study of social and political psychology acquired genuine urgency in the period that included the Second World War, prompting Cartwright (1979) to note that 'the one person who has had the greatest impact upon the field ...

would have to be Adolph Hitler' (1979: 84). The psychological investigation of political ideologies begins, in many ways, with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) classic postmortem of fascistic tendencies, *The Authoritarian Personality*. Although the book has been much maligned on ideological and methodological grounds, the fact remains that it constituted a profound, multi-method synthesis of social, personality, and political psychology that has largely withstood the test of time (Jost 2006). Adorno et al. (1950) were correct that cognitive rigidity, prejudice, intolerance, status quo conservatism, and right-wing ideology frequently co-occur, seemingly for *psychological* as well as historical and sociological reasons (e.g. Jost et al. in press).[Q] The authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* also formulated what has turned out to be an indispensable theoretical assumption in psychology, namely that specific 'ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual's needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated' (Adorno et al. 1950: 2). Political ideologies, in other words, often serve social psychological *functions* (or motives) that may or may not be entirely rational but, in any case, help to explain why people are drawn to them in the first place.

More specifically, we propose that ideologies possess both a discursive (socially constructed) superstructure and a functional (or motivational) base or substructure (see Jost et al. 2009a). The former describes a set of socially constructed 'attitudes, values, and beliefs' that are bound up with a specific ideological position in a given time and place (Jost et al. 2003b). Defined in this way, the discursive superstructure can be thought of as a 'social representation' (Moscovici 1988) that guides political judgement and is usually transmitted from political elites to mass publics (Zaller 1992). The functional substructure refers to the constellation of social and psychological needs, goals, and motives that drive the political preferences of ordinary citizens (and are therefore served by the discursive contents of ideology).

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE DISCURSIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE

We follow most political scientists in assuming that elected officials, party leaders, and media representatives impose structure on the political environment by developing and 'bundling' specific ideological content, which we refer to as the discursive superstructure (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992; Converse 2000; Layman and Carsey 2002). Examples include prominent Northern

Democratic leadership in promoting civil rights legislation to benefit racial minorities in the United States (Sears et al. 2000) and the social influence that politicians, journalists, and public intellectuals exert over public perceptions of their nation's participation in war (Berinsky 2007). Consistent with McGuire's (1985) theory of persuasion, major factors governing the mass acquisition of ideological content include *attention* to and *comprehension* of information flowing from political elites (Lupia et al. 2000; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Bennett 2006).

Presumably, the specific bundling of attitudes, values, and beliefs that comprise the discursive superstructure arises through both communicative and strategic forms of interaction between partisan elites and their followers (Zaller 1992; Hinich and Munger 1994). This raises the worrisome but hardly outlandish possibility that a relatively small and unrepresentative group of political operatives wield a disproportionate amount of influence. Or, as Marx and Engels (1846/1970) put it, the 'ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas'.

Ideological bundles that are socially constructed and disseminated through elite discourse 'anchor' both poles of the left-right (or, in the USA and elsewhere, liberal-conservative) spectrum, arraying the options on an ideological 'menu' from which ordinary citizens select preferences (Sniderman and Bullock 2004). More specifically, the content associated with different ideological positions is absorbed by members of the mass public who 'take cues' from those elites, especially those who share their basic partisan or ideological inclinations (Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992; Converse 2000).

At the same time an abundance of evidence indicates that some voters (especially those who are relatively knowledgeable or sophisticated about politics) are more able and/or willing than others to 'learn' the contents of the discursive superstructure as defined by political elites (e.g. Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Erikson and Tedin 2003; Bennett 2006; Federico and Schneider 2007). It is well known that most citizens in the USA and elsewhere lack detailed knowledge about the specific discursive contents of liberal and conservative ideologies; are hesitant or unable to interpret political events in left-right terms, and possess fairly low levels of attitudinal consistency, stability, and constraint (e.g. Converse 2000; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Stimson 2004). Although facts such as these do suggest that the majority fails to learn the contents of various ideologies in vivid detail, they do not warrant the common conclusion that people are utterly devoid of ideological commitment or understanding (see Jost 2006, for a sustained discussion). Even those who are

relatively indifferent to electoral politics exhibit some psychological understanding of core differences between ideologies of the left and right (see also Jost et al. 2009a).

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOTIVATIONAL SUBSTRUCTURE

It is important to point out that, in addition to the capacity to understand and absorb messages conveyed by political elites, a number of personality and individual difference variables affect an individual's ideological proclivities. Or, as Adorno et al. (1950) noted, an individual's belief system 'reflects his personality and is not merely an aggregate of opinions picked up helter-skelter from the ideological environment' (1950: 176). Research on personality and ideological orientation fell out of favor for many years (e.g. Zaller 1992: 23), but there are clear indications that interest has revived in psychological processes contributing to ideological outcomes (e.g. Jost et al. 2003a, 2007, 2008a, 2009a; Caprara and Zimbardo 2004; Block and Block 2006; Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Smith et al. 2011b). Ultimately, a psychological perspective is needed to address the vexing question raised by Sniderman and Bullock (2004: 353): 'Why are some disposed to a liberal or broadly left political outlook while others are disposed to a conservative or broadly right orientation?'

To address this fundamental issue, Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) offered a theory of political ideology as motivated social cognition, hypothesizing that relative preferences for liberal versus conservative ideologies are linked to basic psychological orientations toward uncertainty and threat. This idea was inspired by earlier work by Adorno et al. (1950), Allport (1954), Rokeach (1960), Tomkins (1963), Wilson (1973), Tetlock (1983), Sidanius (1985), and Altemeyer (1996), among others. A cornerstone of the theory is that ideological outcomes are the joint products of the discursive superstructure and the motivational substructure, so that—as Adorno et al. (1950) observed—individuals gravitate toward those ideologies that are present in the informational environment and that appeal to them, given their own psychological needs, motives, and desires.

Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) argued that since at least the time of the French Revolution, two major axiological dimensions have distinguished left-wing (or liberal, progressive) ideology from right-wing (or conservative, reactionary) ideology, namely: (a) advocacy (vs. resistance) to social change, and (b) rejection (vs. justification) of inequality. This formulation was consistent with

numerous denotative definitions of the left–right dimension, including one favoured by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz (1962): ‘By left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall mean supporting a traditional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change toward equality’ (Lipset et al. 1962: 1135). Presumably, the two core aspects of the left–right dimension are intertwined for historical reasons having to do with the fact that Western civilization has been drifting, over a period of many centuries, in the direction of increasing social, political, and economic equality. In some cases equality increased gradually, and in others it was implemented through radical or revolutionary means, which were initially opposed by conservatives (Burke 1790/2003; Lipset and Raab 1978). In both sets of circumstances, traditionalism has typically necessitated a defence of existing authorities and hierarchical institutions.

More than two centuries later, liberals and leftists still exhibit stronger preferences for social change and equality, in comparison with conservatives and rightists (e.g. Feldman 2003; Goren 2004; Rathbun 2007). In the realm of public policy, liberals are invariably more supportive than conservatives of initiatives that are designed to increase social and economic equality, such as welfare, social security, affirmative action, universal health care, progressive forms of taxation, and same-sex marriage (e.g. Jacoby 1991; Evans et al. 1996; Federico and Sidanius 2002; Bartels 2008). Ideological differences in the valuation of social change and equality are observable even at the level of automatic or implicit attitudes. For example, reaction time studies reveal that self-identified liberals exhibit implicit (as well as explicit) preferences for words such as ‘flexible’, ‘progress’, and ‘feminism’, whereas conservatives prefer their opposites, namely terms such as ‘stable’, ‘tradition’, and ‘traditional values’ (Jost et al. 2008b). Liberals are also significantly less likely than conservatives to hold prejudicial attitudes—at both implicit and explicit levels of awareness—toward racial and ethnic minorities, women, gays, lesbians, and members of other groups that are disadvantaged by the hierarchical status quo (e.g. Sidanius et al. 1996; Cunningham et al. 2004; Jost et al. 2004a; Nosek et al. 2009).

Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) hypothesized that conservative (or right-wing) ideologies, which are characterized by resistance to change and acceptance of inequality, should be more appealing to individuals who are either temporarily or chronically higher in psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and threat, whereas liberal (or left-wing) ideologies should be more appealing to individuals who are lower in these needs. To understand why this would be so, it is useful to

draw on the social psychological concept of *system justification*, which is defined as the (conscious or unconscious) motivation to defend, bolster, and justify existing social, economic, or political institutions and arrangements (Jost et al. 2004a). Although virtually everyone is motivated, at least to some degree, to engage in system justification (e.g. Kay et al. 2009), the evidence is clear that conservatives score consistently higher than liberals on measures of economic and general or ‘diffuse’ system justification (e.g. Jost et al. 2008b). In some sense, system justification is the motivational ‘glue’ that holds the two dimensions of left–right ideology together. To vindicate and uphold traditional institutions and arrangements, conservatives are bound to defend extant inequalities as just and necessary. Conversely, to bring about a more equal state of affairs, progressives are obliged to criticize existing institutions and practices.

But, why, from a psychological perspective, would some individuals be more motivated than others by system justification goals? According to Jost et al. (2008a), the tendency to defend, bolster, and justify the status quo is motivationally compelling because it satisfies *epistemic* needs to attain certainty, order, and structure; *existential* needs to maintain safety and security and to minimize danger and threat; and *relational* needs to affiliate with others and to acquire a sense of belongingness and shared reality. Putting all of this together, it follows that if endorsement of conservative ideology is motivated, at least in part, by the desire to vindicate the social system (and, conversely, endorsement of progressive ideology is motivated, at least in part, by the desire to challenge the social system), it follows that heightened epistemic, existential, and relational needs should increase the psychological attractiveness of conservative ideology, whereas lowered epistemic, existential, and relational needs should increase the psychological attractiveness of liberal or progressive ideology. We turn now to a consideration of the empirical evidence bearing on these hypotheses.

EPISTEMIC MOTIVATION: SYSTEM-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES OFFER CERTAINTY

To flesh out the empirical implications of this integrated model of ideology as motivated social cognition, Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) conducted a quantitative, meta-analytic review of 88 studies involving over 22 000 research participants (or individual cases) that had been conducted in 12 different countries between 1958 and 2002. They found, among other things, that dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and personal needs for order, structure, and closure were all

positively associated with endorsement of conservative (vs. liberal) ideology. Conversely, openness to new experiences, cognitive complexity, and tolerance of uncertainty were positively associated with endorsement of liberal (vs. conservative) ideology.




FIGURE 13.1 Epistemic, Existential, and Relational Motivation Favors the Adoption of System-Justifying (vs. System-Challenging) Ideologies

Subsequent research has further demonstrated that heightened psychological needs to manage uncertainty predict both reliance on ideology in general and endorsement of conservative policy positions, such as support for the Iraq War (e.g. Federico et al. 2005; Jost et al. 2003a, 2003b, 2007; Hennes et al. 2012). For example, studies conducted in several countries demonstrate consistently that individuals who score higher on the Need for Cognitive Closure scale, which measures the motivation to ‘seize and freeze’ on beliefs that offer simplicity, certainty, and clarity, are significantly more likely to hold conservative or right-wing attitudes (Jost et al. 2003a: 358–9; see also Chirumbolo et al. 2004; Sargent 2004; Leone and Chirumbolo 2008; Federico and Goren 2009; Thorisdottir and Jost 2011; van Hiel et al. 2010). These effects are especially robust for well-informed individuals who are familiar with the discursive contents of various ideologies (e.g. Kimmelmeier 2007; Federico and Goren 2009). Research by Shook and Fazio (2009) found that individuals who are reluctant to engage in novel exploration in the context of learning tasks that involve some degree of short-term risk are more likely to embrace conservative (vs. liberal) ideology. In addition to these motivational variables, cognitive

abilities to manage informational complexity are positively associated with social liberalism (Deary et al. 2008; van Hiel et al. 2010; Hodson and Busseri 2012).

Studies of political neuroscience provide further evidence of a connection between epistemic processes and ideology. For instance, liberalism is associated with better performance on tasks requiring the suppression of habitual responses in favour of novel ones, along with greater activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain region involved in the monitoring of conflicts between one's immediate response tendencies and higher-level goals (Amodio et al. 2007). Consistent with these findings, studies of brain structure reveal that liberalism is also associated with greater ACC volume (Kanai et al. 2011).

Taken in conjunction, these findings indicate that epistemic needs and tendencies to reduce uncertainty are associated with an affinity for political conservatism. Given that nearly everyone wants to achieve at least some degree of certainty, is it possible that conservatism possesses a natural psychological advantage over liberalism? Although this is a complex question, several lines of research suggest that this might be the case. First, a series of experiments by Skitka et al. (2002) demonstrated that 'the default attributional position is a conservative response', insofar as both liberals and conservatives are quick to draw dispositional (rather than situational) conclusions about the causes of poverty, unemployment, disease, and other negative outcomes, but only liberals 'correct' their initial response, taking into account extenuating circumstances. When a distraction is introduced, making it difficult for liberals to engage in secondary correction processes, they tend to blame individuals for their fate to the same degree that conservatives do. Skitka et al. therefore concluded that, 'It is much easier to get a liberal to behave like a conservative than it is to get a conservative to behave like a liberal' (2002: 484). Research by Eidelman et al. (2012) takes this general line of reasoning even further, showing that several variables associated with increased cognitive load or need for closure, such as drinking alcohol, lead people to become more conservative. Both of these lines of research are consistent with the notion that conservative styles and opinions are generally simpler, more internally consistent, and less subject to ambiguity, in comparison with liberal styles and opinions (e.g. Rokeach 1960; Jost et al. 2003a, 2003b; Tetlock 2007). A third reason to suggest that conservatism enjoys a psychological advantage over liberalism comes from research on system justification, which suggests that most people (including many who do not identify themselves as conservative) are motivated to develop and maintain relatively favourable opinions about existing institutions and authorities and to

resist sweeping social changes (Kay et al. 2009; Jost et al. 2010).

Nevertheless, some people are motivated by sensation-seeking, novelty, curiosity, and openness to new experiences, and they are significantly more likely than the average person to embrace liberal and leftist opinions and causes (for a review, see Jost et al. 2003a: 356–7). Of the ‘Big Five’ personality dimensions, Openness to New Experiences is most strongly predictive of political orientation, with liberals scoring consistently higher than conservatives (Jost 2006; Carney et al. 2008; Rentfrow et al. 2009; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010). The other ‘Big Five’ dimension that consistently correlates with political orientation (in US and other samples) seems to be Conscientiousness (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010). Here, conservatives generally score higher than others on needs for order, structure, and discipline—even in non-political contexts. For instance, one study found that the bedrooms and offices of conservatives contain more items relating to Conscientiousness, such as postage stamps and cleaning supplies, whereas liberals’ rooms contain more items relating to Openness, such as travel books, music, and art supplies (Carney et al. 2008).

EXISTENTIAL MOTIVATION: SYSTEM-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES OFFER SECURITY

According to terror management theory (TMT), ideologies serve the existential function of allowing people to transcend symbolically the threat induced by the uniquely human awareness of one’s own mortality (e.g. Solomon et al. 2004). That is, political and other belief systems are seen as assisting people in the motivated belief that they are persons of value in a meaningful universe that transcends the finite self, thereby providing a sense of existential security. Consistent with this claim, a vast experimental literature demonstrates that making research participants aware of their own mortality leads them to hew more closely to established belief systems and identities. For example, mortality salience appears to produce greater patriotism and hostility toward critics of one’s nation, a stronger endorsement of the unique validity of one’s own religion, stronger support for traditional gender norms, increased stereotyping, and greater hostility toward individuals and groups who are perceived as threatening to a cultural worldview (e.g. Pyszczynski et al. 1999; Schimel et al. 1999; Arndt et al. 2002).

Drawing on the theory of ideology as motivated cognition, Jost et al. (2004b) proposed that a special affinity exists between psychological needs to minimize threat—including threat arising from death anxiety—and conservative ideology.

Accordingly, they found that priming liberals, moderates, and conservatives with thoughts of death produced an across-the-board increase in issue-based conservatism. Such a result is consistent with the meta-analysis of Jost et al. (2003a), which revealed that fear of death, system threat, and perceptions of a dangerous world were all positively associated with the endorsement of conservative ideology (see also Jost et al. 2007). Similarly, experiments conducted before the 2004 Presidential election revealed that although college students favoured Democratic challenger John Kerry in a control condition, they showed a preference reversal following exposure to mortality salience primes, supporting Republican President George W. Bush instead (Cohen et al. 2005; Landau et al. 2004). In a similar vein, Ullrich and Cohrs (2007) demonstrated in several experiments that increasing the salience of terrorism led participants to score higher on a measure of system justification. Lastly, a study of high-exposure survivors of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks found that Democrats as well as Republicans reported 'conservative shifts' in the 18 months following the attacks (Bonanno and Jost 2006; see also Nail and McGregor 2009).

Research on right-wing authoritarianism also indicates that highly threatening situations are frequently (but not always) associated with ideological shifts to the right. For example, archival research suggests that the appeal of conservative and right-wing leaders and policies is enhanced during periods of high social, economic, or political threat (Doty et al. 1991; Davis and Silver 2004; Willer 2004; McCann 2008). Presumably, this is because threat encourages individuals to embrace social and political attitudes that offer 'relatively simple yet cognitively rigid solutions' to questions of security (Bonanno and Jost 2006: 311). Along these lines, Thorisdottir and Jost (2011) demonstrated in several experiments that exposure to threatening stimuli (such as frightening movie clips) elicited a temporary increase in motivated closed-mindedness and that increased closed-mindedness was associated with an attraction to conservative policies and opinions (see also Nail et al. 2009).

Several other studies reinforce the notion that fairly deep links exist between threat sensitivity and conservatism. Oxley et al. (2008) found that individuals exhibiting strong physiological (i.e. startle-eyeblick) responses to threatening stimuli were more likely to endorse socially conservative positions aimed at protecting the social order. Vigil (2010) reported that conservatives are more likely than liberals to perceive emotionally neutral faces as threatening. Similarly, research using negatively valenced words as threatening stimuli reveals that conservatism is positively associated with automatic vigilance (e.g.

Carraro et al. 2011; Shook and Clay 2011). Neuroscientific evidence is consistent with these behavioural observations (see Jost and Amodio 2012, for a review).

A growing body of research suggests that sensitivity to disgust—a basic emotion that presumably evolved to guard against biological contamination—is greater among conservatives than liberals (Hodson and Costello 2007; Inbar et al. 2009a; Inbar et al. 2009b; Terrizzi et al. 2010; Helzer and Pizarro 2011; Smith et al. 2011a). Given the apparent link between disgust and moral judgement (Haidt 2001), these differences help to explain why conservatives are more motivated than liberals to enforce purity standards in sexual and other domains (Skitka et al. 2002; Jarudi et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2009). If this reasoning is correct, political and other messages that elicit disgust reactions should benefit conservatives disproportionately, much as threat-related messages seem to help conservatives and hurt liberals.

RELATIONAL MOTIVATION: SYSTEM-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES OFFER SOLIDARITY

A vast research literature on political socialization, reviewed by Sears and Levy (2003), indicates that ideological beliefs are likely to be transmitted from parents to children, especially if both parents have similar beliefs and discuss politics frequently (Jennings and Niemi 1981) and if bonds within the family are close (Davies 1965). Similarly, peers and parents exert a reasonably strong influence on ideological self-placement (Alwin et al. 1991; Jost et al. 2008a). These relational influences on ideological outcomes are strongest in late adolescence and early adulthood (Sears and Levy, 2003) and persist as long as one's relational context does not change markedly (e.g. Alwin et al. 1991).

It seems likely that passive forms of learning are involved in the transmission of social and political attitudes from parents to offspring and from peer to peer. At the same time, more active forms of influence, which implicate relational motives for affiliation, social identification, and/or the attainment of a shared view of reality, also shape ideological preferences (e.g. Hardin and Higgins 1996; Cohen 2003). For instance, Jost et al. (2008a) found that students whose parents were ideologically divergent scored higher on a measure of system justification after writing about an interaction with their more conservative (vs. liberal) parent, suggesting that priming a close bond with others produces ideological consequences.

The study of relational motives could also shed light on the question of when

the discursive superstructure developed by partisan elites is likely to become a shared social representation that penetrates public consciousness (e.g. Marx and Engels 1846/1970; Parsons 1951; Moscovici 1988; Hardin and Higgins 1996; Billig 2003). Research indicates that important reference groups—including those based on race, ethnicity, gender, social class, political party, and religious affiliation—can be used as cues for political judgement and behaviour by citizens at nearly every level of political sophistication (e.g. Conover and Feldman 1981; Hamill et al. 1985; Sniderman et al. 1991; Bartels 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Eagly et al. 2004). Supporting this idea, several studies suggest that party leaders are capable of instigating political polarization and bringing about ‘conflict extension’ in the electorate (Hetherington 2001; Layman and Carsey 2002). Cohen (2003) demonstrated that people are more likely to endorse a given policy position when they believe that it was proposed by their own party than when the same policy was seen as part of the opposing party’s agenda (see also Goren et al. 2009).

Although it is abundantly clear that processes associated with social identification, partisanship, and group interest can exert political influence in both liberal and conservative directions (e.g., Bartels 2000; Green et al. 2002; Cohen 2003), Jost et al. (2008a) speculated that—as with epistemic and existential motives—some relational motives could favour conservative outcomes in general. This is broadly consistent with evidence that conservatives are especially likely to value tradition, conformity, social order, and adherence to rules, norms, and conventions (Conover and Feldman 1981; Altemeyer 1998; Feldman 2003; Jost 2006; Graham et al. 2009). It is also consistent with the notion that it may be easier to establish ‘common ground’ with respect to the status quo than with respect to its many possible alternatives (Jost et al. 2008a). In addition, it is probably easier to communicate effectively by transmitting messages that are relatively simple and unambiguous rather than reflecting the kind of complex, nuanced, and perhaps ambivalent cognitive and rhetorical styles that seem to be more common on the political left than the right (Jost et al. 2003b).

Individual differences in relational motivation—such as the Agreeableness factor of the ‘Big Five’ personality dimensions—may also be linked to ideological preferences, albeit in a somewhat complex manner. Caprara and Zimbardo (2004) observed that Italian leftists were more concerned about friendliness and agreeableness than were rightists, but other studies have yielded mixed results. For instance, Gerber et al. (2010) found that Agreeableness was positively associated with economic liberalism and social *conservatism* (see also

Mondak 2010). Hirsh et al. (2010) determined that the *compassion* facet of Agreeableness is associated with greater liberalism (and egalitarianism), whereas the facet of *politeness* is associated with greater conservatism (and traditionalism).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

From a social psychological perspective, ideology is not merely an ‘organizing device’ or a shortcut for making heuristic judgements about politics; it is also a motivational device for justifying or rationalizing the way things are or, alternatively, how things should be different than they are. Thus, ideologies typically make at least tacit reference to some social system—either as an affirmation or a rejection of it (Marx & Engels 1846/1970; Parsons 1951; Lipset and Raab 1978; Freeden 2003, 2010; Jost 2006; Knight 2006). Research on system justification theory suggests that most people—to varying degrees, as a function of dispositional and situational factors—engage in both conscious and non-conscious rationalization of the status quo through the use of stereotypes, social judgements, and ideologies such as conservatism (Jost et al. 2004a; Lane 1962). These and other system-justifying mechanisms imbue social, economic, and political arrangements with perceived legitimacy (Jost et al. 2003; Jost et al. 2003c; Sidanius & Pratto 1999; Kay et al. 2009; Jost et al. 2010). From the point of view of political elites, system justification is beneficial insofar as it contributes to the stability of the social system and increases voluntary deference on the part of ordinary citizens (Tyler 2006).

The power of ideology to explain and justify discrepancies between the current social order and some alternative not only maintains support for the status quo, but also serves for its adherents the palliative function of alleviating dissonance or discomfort associated with the awareness of systemic injustice or inequality (e.g., Jost and Hunyady 2002; Wakslak et al. 2007; Napier and Jost 2008). The endorsement of system-justifying beliefs is associated with increased positive affect, decreased negative affect, and self-reported satisfaction or contentment (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Jost et al. 2003c; Rankin et al. 2009). In attempting to understand why conservatives report being happier than liberals, Napier and Jost (2008) found that the association between political ideology and subjective well-being was explained to a significant degree by respondents’ differential tendencies to rationalize economic inequality in society. Furthermore, the happiness gap between conservatives and liberals in the United States was tied to the nation’s level of income inequality, such that as inequality

has increased steadily over the last 30 years, the subjective well-being of liberals dropped more precipitously than that of conservatives. Thus, system-justifying ideologies such as conservatism can ‘provide a kind of ideological buffer against the negative hedonic consequences of social and economic inequality’ (Napier and Jost 2008: 565).

In sum, ideology can play an important role as a system-serving bundle of attitudes, values, beliefs, and opinions. However, as with respect to the organizing role of ideology, it is best to conclude with a few caveats about the reach of ideology as a system justification device. Although system-justifying attitudes, values, and beliefs are widespread, they rarely diffuse or ‘work’ completely, especially in large, highly complex societies and among those who are suspicious of and/or geographically distant from centers of power (e.g., Abercrombie et al 1980; Freeden 2010). This opens the door to at least some degree of change and flux in social relations (see also Kay and Friesen 2011). Nevertheless, there is a lot of evidence indicating that when the status quo is perceived as inevitable (or nearly so), people are far more likely to rationalize than to challenge it (e.g. Kay et al. 2002; Laurin et al. 2012).

Given the apparent resurgence of ideological polarization in the current era (e.g. Layman and Carsey 2002; Stimson 2004 Jost, 2006; Abramowitz 2010), it is our hope that this summary of existing psychological research will not only help us to better understand the present but also point the way to a more constructive future. To succeed, we will need the continued engagement of the social scientific research community as a whole. For our own part, we have taken seriously the possibility first suggested by Adorno et al. (1950) that a ‘structural unity’ exists between underlying psychological needs and ideological manifestations of those needs. Although contemporary researchers are much closer to understanding the connections between the discursive superstructure of ideology and its motivational substructure, it is plain to see that we still do not know as much about these connections as one would like. We can only hope that over the next half-century researchers will continue to identify sound scientific principles that help to explain why certain individuals and groups ‘choose’ particular constellations of ideas or, to put it another way, why some ideologies find deep resonance in the minds of some social actors but not others.

NOTE

1. We wish to thank Michael Freeden, Erin P. Hennes, David Kalkstein, Hannah Nam, and Chadly Stern for extremely helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this essay.

REFERENCES

- Abercrombie, N., S. Hill, and B. Turner. 1980. *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Abramowitz, A. I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center*. New Haven, CT: Yale.
- Adorno, T. W., E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Allport, G. W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.
- Altemeyer, B. 1996. *The Authoritarian Specter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Altemeyer, B. 1998. 'The other "authoritarian personality"', *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 30: 47–92.
- Alwin, D. F., R. L. Cohen, and T. M. Newcomb. 1991. *Political Attitudes over the Life Span*. Madison: University of Wisconsin.
- Amodio, D. M., J. T. Jost, S. L. Master, and C. M. Yee. 2007. 'Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism', *Nature Neuroscience*, 10: 1246–7.
- Arndt, J., J. Greenberg, and A. Cook. 2002. 'Mortality salience and the spreading activation of worldview-relevant constructs: Exploring the cognitive architecture of terror management', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 131: 307–24.
- Bartels, L. M. 2000. 'Partisanship and voting behavior, 1952–1996', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44: 35–50.
- Bartels, L. M. 2008 *Unequal Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton.
- Bennett, S. 2006. 'Democratic competence, before Converse and after', *Critical Review*, 18: 105–42.
- Berinsky, A. J. 2007. 'Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict', *Journal of Politics*, 69: 975–97.
- Billig, M. 2003. 'Political rhetoric'. Pp. 222–51 in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Block, J. and J. H. Block. 2006. 'Nursery school personality and political orientation two decades later', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 40: 734–49.
- Bonanno, G. A. and J. T. Jost. 2006. 'Conservative shift among high-exposure survivors of the September 11th terrorist attacks', *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 28: 311–23.
- Burke, E. 1790/2003. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Caprara, G. V. and P. Zimbardo. 2004. 'Personalizing politics: A congruency model of political preference', *American Psychologist*, 59: 581–94, 710.
- Carney, D., J. T. Jost, S. D. Gosling, and J. Potter. 2008. 'The secret lives of liberals and conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind', *Political Psychology*, 29: 807–40.
- Carraro, L., L. Castelli and C. Macchielli. 2011. 'The automatic conservative: Ideology-based attentional asymmetries in the processing of valenced information', *PLoS ONE*, 6: e26456. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026456.
- Cartwright, D. 1979. 'Contemporary social psychology in historical perspective', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 42: 82–93.
- Chirumbolo, A., A. Areni, and G. Sensales. 2004. 'Need for cognitive closure and politics: Voting, political attitudes and attributional style', *International Journal of Psychology*, 39: 245–53.
- Cohen, F., D. M. Ogilvie, S. Solomon, J. Greenberg, and T. Pyszczynski. 2005. 'American roulette: The effect of reminders of death on support for George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election', *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 5: 177–87.
- Cohen, G. L. 2003. 'Party over policy: The dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85: 808–22.
- Conover, P. J. and S. Feldman. 1981. 'The origins and meaning of liberal-conservative self-identifications',

- American Journal of Political Science*, 25: 617–45.
- Converse, P. E. 2000. 'Assessing the capacity of mass electorates', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 331–53.
- Cunningham, W. A., J. B. Nezlek, and M. R. Banaji. 2004. 'Implicit and explicit ethnocentrism: Revisiting the ideologies of prejudice', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30: 1332–46.
- Davies, J. C. 1965. 'The family's role in political socialization', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 361: 10–19.
- Davis, D. W. and B. D. Silver. 2004. 'Civil liberties vs. security: Public opinion in the context of the terrorist attacks on America', *American Journal of Political Science*, 48: 28–46.
- Deary, I. J., G. D. Batty, and C. R. Gale. 2008. 'Bright children become enlightened adults', *Psychological Science*, 19, 1–6.
- Delli Carpini, M. X. and S. Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Doty, R. M., B. E. Peterson, and D. G. Winter. 1991. 'Threat and authoritarianism in the United States, 1978–1987', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61: 629–40.
- Eagly, A. H., A. B. Diekmann, M. C. Johannesen-Schmidt, and A. Koenig. 2004. 'Gender gaps in sociopolitical attitudes: A social psychological analysis', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87: 796–816.
- Eidelman, S. and C. S. Crandall, J. A. Goodman, and J. C. Blanchard. 2012. 'Low-effort thought promotes political conservatism', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 38: 808–20.
- Erikson, R. S. and K. L. Tedin. 2003. *American Public Opinion*, 6th edn. New York: Longman.
- Evans, G., A. Heath, and M. Lalljee. 1996. 'Measuring left–right and libertarian–conservative attitudes in the British electorate', *British Journal of Sociology*, 47: 93–112.
- Federico, C. M. and P. Goren. 2009. 'Motivated social cognition and ideology: Is attention to elite discourse a prerequisite for epistemically motivated political affinities?' Pp. 267–91 in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, eds. J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, and H. Thorisdottir. New York: Oxford.
- Federico, C. M. and M. Schneider. 2007. 'Political expertise and the use of ideology: Moderating effects of evaluative motivation', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 71: 221–52.
- Federico, C. M. and J. Sidanius. 2002. 'Sophistication and the antecedents of whites' racial policy attitudes: Racism, ideology, and affirmative action in America', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 66: 145–76.
- Federico, C. M., A. Golec, and J. Dial. 2005. 'The relationship between need for closure and support for military action against Iraq: Moderating effects of national attachment', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31: 621–32.
- Feldman, S. 2003. 'Values, ideology, and structure of political attitudes'. Pp. 477–508 in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis. New York: Oxford.
- Freedman, M. 2003. *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford.
- Freedman, M. 2010. 'Book review of Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification', *Political Psychology*, 31: 479–82.
- Gerber, A. S., G. A. Huber, D. Doherty, C. M. Dowling, and S. E. Ha. 2010. 'Personality and political attitudes: Relationships across issue domains and political contexts', *American Political Science Review*, 104: 111–33.
- Goren, P. 2004. 'Political sophistication and policy reasoning: A reconsideration', *American Journal of Political Science*, 48: 462–78.
- Goren, P., C. M. Federico, and M. C. Kittilson. 2009. 'Source cues, partisan identities, and value positions', *American Journal of Political Science*, 53: 806–20.
- Graham, J., J. Haidt, and B. A. Nosek. 2009. 'Liberals and conservatives use different sets of moral foundations', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96: 1029–46.

- Green, D. P., B. Palmquist, and E. Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Green, D. P. and I. Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Haidt, J. 2001. 'The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment', *Psychological Review*, 108: 814–34.
- Hamill, R., M. Lodge, and F. Blake. 1985. 'The breadth, depth, and utility of partisan, class, and ideological schemas', *American Journal of Political Science*, 29: 850–70.
- Hardin, C. D. and E. T. Higgins. 1996. 'Shared reality: How social verification makes the subjective objective'. Pp. 28–84 in *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition*, Vol. 3, eds. R.M. Sorrentino and E.T. Higgins. New York: Guilford.
- Helzer, E. G. and D. A. Pizarro. 2011. 'Dirty liberals! Reminders of physical cleanliness influence moral and political attitudes', *Psychological Science*, 22: 517–22.
- Hennes, E. P. and H. H. Nam, C. Stern, and J. T. Jost. 2012. 'Not all ideologies are created equal: Epistemic, existential, and relational needs predict system-justifying attitudes', *Social Cognition*, 30: 669–88.
- Hetherington, M. J. 2001. 'Resurgent mass partisanship: The role of elite polarization', *American Political Science Review*, 95: 619–31.
- Hinich, M. J. and M. C. Munger. 1994. *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hirsh, J. B., C. G. DeYoung, X. Xu and J. B. Peterson. 2010. 'Compassionate liberals and polite conservatives: Associations of agreeableness with political ideology and moral values', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36: 655–64.
- Hodson, G. and M. A. Busseri. 2012. 'Bright minds and dark attitudes: Lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice through right-wing ideology and low intergroup contact', *Psychological Science*, 23: 187–95.
- Hodson, G. and K. Costello. 2007. 'Interpersonal disgust, ideological orientation, and dehumanization as predictors of intergroup attitudes', *Psychological Science*, 18: 691–8.
- Inbar, Y., D. A. Pizarro, and P. Bloom. 2009a. 'Conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals', *Cognition & Emotion*, 23: 714–25.
- Inbar, Y., D. A. Pizarro, J. Knobe, and P. Bloom. 2009b. 'Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays', *Emotion*, 9: 435–9.
- Jacoby, W. G. 1991. 'Ideological identification and issue attitudes', *American Journal of Political Science*, 35: 178–205.
- Jarudi, I., T. Kreps, and P. Bloom. 2008. 'Is a refrigerator good or evil? The moral evaluation of everyday objects', *Social Justice Research*, 21: 457–69.
- Jennings, M. K. and R. G. Niemi. 1981. *Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jost, J. T. 2006. 'The end of the end of ideology', *American Psychologist*, 61: 651–70.
- Jost, J. T. and D. Amodio. 2012. 'Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence', *Motivation and Emotion*, 36: 55–64.
- Jost, J. T., S. Blount, J. Pfeffer, and G. Hunyady. 2003. 'Fair market ideology: Its cognitive-motivational underpinnings', *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 25: 53–91.
- Jost, J. T. and O. Hunyady. 2002. 'The psychology of system justification and the palliative function of ideology', *European Review of Social Psychology*, 13: 111–53.
- Jost, J. T. and J. Sidanius. 2004. 'Political psychology: An introduction'. Pp. 1–17 in *Political Psychology: Key readings*, eds. J. T. Jost and J. Sidanius New York: Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.
- Jost, J. T., J. Glaser, A. W. Kruglanski, and F. Sulloway. 2003a. 'Political conservatism as motivated social cognition', *Psychological Bulletin*, 129: 339–75.

- Jost, J. T., J. Glaser, A. W. Kruglanski, and F. J. Sulloway. 2003b. 'Exceptions that prove the rule—using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological incongruities and political anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003)', *Psychological Bulletin*, 129: 383–93.
- Jost, J. T., B. W. Pelham, O. Sheldon, and B. N. Sullivan. 2003c. 'Social inequality and the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 33: 13–36.
- Jost, J. T., M. R. Banaji, and B. A. Nosek. 2004a. 'A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo', *Political Psychology*, 25: 881–920.
- Jost, J. T., G. Fitzsimons, and A. C. Kay. 2004b. 'The ideological animal: A system justification view'. Pp. 263–84 in *Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology*, eds. J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, and T. Pyszczynski. New York: Guilford Press.
- Jost, J. T., J. L. Napier, H. Thorisdottir, S. D. Gosling, T. P. Palfai, and B. Ostafin. 2007. 'Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity?' *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33: 989–1007.
- Jost, J. T., A. Ledgerwood, and C. D. Hardin. 2008a. 'Shared reality, system justification, and the relational basis of ideological beliefs', *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2: 171–86.
- Jost, J. T., B. A. Nosek, and S. D. Gosling. 2008b. 'Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality, and political psychology', *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 3: 126–36.
- Jost, J. T., C. M. Federico, and J. L. Napier. 2009a. 'Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 60: 307–37.
- Jost, J. T., A. C. Kay, and H. Thorisdottir (eds.). 2009b. *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jost, J. T., I. Liviatan, J. Van der Toorn, A. Ledgerwood, A. Mandisodza, and B. A. Nosek. 2010. 'System justification: How do we know it's motivated?' Pp. 173–203 in *The Psychology of Justice and Legitimacy: The Ontario symposium*, 11, eds. R. C. Bobocel, A. C. Kay, M. Zanna, and J. Olson. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Jost, J. T., A. Nilsson, and A. Shipley. In press. 'A few words about authoritarianism, conservatism and related constructs'. In *Perspectives on Authoritarianism*, eds. F. Funke, T. Petzel, J. C. Cohrs, and J. Duckitt. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS-Verlag.
- Kanai, R., T. Feilden, C. Firth, and G. Rees. 2011. 'Political orientations are correlated with brain structure in young adults', *Current Biology*, 21: 677–80.
- Kay, A. C. and J. Friesen. 2011. 'On social stability and social change: Understanding when system justification does and does not occur', *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 20: 360–4.
- Kay, A. C., D. Gaucher, J. M. Peach, J. Friesen, K. Laurin, M. Zanna, and S. J. Spencer. 2009. 'Inequality, discrimination, and the power of the status quo: Direct evidence for a motivation to view what is as what should be', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97: 421–34.
- Kay, A. C., M. C. Jimenez, and J. T. Jost. 2002. 'Sour grapes, sweet lemons, and the anticipatory rationalization of the status quo', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28 (9): 1300–12.
- Kemmelmeier, M. 2007. 'Political conservatism, rigidity, and dogmatism in American foreign policy officials: The 1966 Mennis data', *Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied*, 141: 77–90.
- Kluegel, J. R. and E. R. Smith. 1986. *Beliefs about Inequality*. New York: De Gruyter.
- Knight, K. 2006. 'Transformations of the concept of ideology in the twentieth century', *American Political Science Review*, 100: 619–26.
- Kuklinski, J. H., P. Quirk, J. Jerit, and R. Rich. 2001. 'The political environment and decision-making: Information, motivation, and policy tradeoffs', *American Journal of Political Science*, 45: 410–25.
- Landau, M. J., S. Solomon, J. Greenberg, F. Cohen, T. Pyszczynski, and J. Arndt. 2004. 'Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on support for President George W. Bush', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30: 1136–50.
- Lane, R. E. (1962). *Political Ideology*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

- Lau, R. R. and D. Redlawsk. 2001. 'Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision-making', *American Journal of Political Science*, 45: 951–71.
- Laurin, K., A. C. Kay, and G. J. Fitzsimmons. 2012. 'Reactance versus rationalization: Divergent responses to policies that constrain freedom', *Psychological Science*, 23: 1–5.
- Layman, G. C. and T. M. Carsey. 2002. 'Party polarization and "conflict extension" in the American electorate', *American Journal of Political Science*, 46: 786–802.
- Leone, L. and A. Chirumbolo. 2008. 'Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 42: 755–62.
- Lipset, S. M. and E. Raab. 1978. *The Politics of Unreason*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Lipset, S. M., P. Lazarsfeld, A. Barton, and J. Linz. 1962. 'The psychology of voting: An analysis of political behavior', Pp. 1124–75 in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. G. Lindzey. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. (Original work published 1954)
- Lupia, A., M. D. McCubbins, and S. L. Popkin. 2000. 'Incorporating reason into the study of politics'. Pp. 1–20 in *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality*, eds. A. Lupia, M. D. McCubbins, and S. L. Popkin. New York: Cambridge.
- McCann, S. J. H. 2008. 'Societal threat, authoritarianism, conservatism, and U.S. state death penalty sentencing (1977–2004)', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 94: 913–23.
- McDougall, W. 1908. *Introduction to Social Psychology*. London: Methuen & Co.
- McGuire, W. J. 1985. 'Attitudes and attitude change'. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3rd edn. New York: Random House, II, 233–46.
- Marx, K. and F. Engels. 1846/1970. *The German Ideology*, trans C. J. Arthur. New York: International.
- Mondak, J. J. 2010. *Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Moscovici, S. 1988. 'Some notes on social representations', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18: 211–50.
- Nail, P. R. and I. McGregor. 2009. 'Conservative shift among liberals and conservatives following 9/11/01', *Social Justice Research*, 22: 231–40.
- Nail, P. R., I. McGregor, A. Drinkwater, G. Steele, and A. Thompson. 2009. 'Threat causes liberals to think like conservatives', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45: 901–07.
- Napier, J. L. and J. T. Jost. 2008. 'Why are conservatives happier than liberals?' *Psychological Science*, 19: 565–72.
- Nosek, B. A., M. R. Banaji, and J. T. Jost. 2009. 'The politics of intergroup attitudes'. Pp. 480–506 in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, eds. J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, and H. Thorisdottir. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oxley, D. R., K. B. Smith, J. R. Alford, M. V. Hibbing, M. S. Miller, P. K. Hatemi, and J. R. Hibbing. 2008. 'Political attitudes vary with physiological traits', *Science*, 321: 1667–70.
- Parsons, T. 1951. *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
- Pyszczynski, T., J. Greenberg and S. Solomon. 1999. 'A dual process model of defense against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts: An extension of terror management theory', *Psychological Review*, 106: 835–45.
- Rankin, L., J. T. Jost, and C. J. Wakslak. 2009. 'System justification and the meaning of life: Are the existential benefits of ideology distributed unevenly across racial groups?' *Social Justice Research*, 22: 312–33.
- Rathbun, B. C. 2007. 'Hierarchy and community at home and abroad: Evidence of a common structure of domestic and foreign policy beliefs in American elites', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51: 379–407.
- Rentfrow, P. J., J. T. Jost, S. D. Gosling, and J. Potter. 2009. 'Statewide differences in personality predict voting patterns in 1996–2004 U.S. Presidential Elections'. Pp. 314–47 in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, eds. J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, and H. Thorisdottir. New York: Oxford.

- Rokeach, M. 1960. *The Open and Closed Mind*. Oxford, England: Basic Books.
- Ross, E. A. 1908. *Social Psychology*. New York: Macmillan.
- Sargent, M. 2004. 'Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts support for punitive responses to crime', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30: 1485–93.
- Schimmel, J., L. Simon, J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski, S. Solomon, J. Waxmonski, and J. Arndt. 1999. 'Support for a functional perspective on stereotypes: Evidence that mortality salience enhances stereotypic thinking and preferences', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77: 905–26.
- Sears, D.O. and S. Levy. 2003. 'Childhood and adult political development'. Pp. 60–109 in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis. New York: Oxford.
- Sears, D. O., J. J. Hetts, J. Sidanius, and L. Bobo. 2000. 'Race in American politics: Framing the debates', Pp. 1–43 in *Racialized Politics: The debate about racism in America*, eds. D. O. Sears, J. Sidanius, and L. Bobo. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Shook, N. J. and R. Clay. 2011. 'Valence asymmetry in attitude formation: A correlate of political ideology', *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 2: 650–5.
- Shook, N. J. and R. H. Fazio. 2009. 'Political ideology, exploration of novel stimuli, and attitude formation', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*: 45, 995–8.
- Sidanius, J. 1985. 'Cognitive functioning and socio-political ideology revisited', *Political Psychology*, 6: 637–61.
- Sidanius, J. and F. Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sidanius, J., F. Pratto, and L. Bobo. 1996. 'Racism, conservatism, affirmative action, and intellectual sophistication: A matter of principled conservatism or group dominance?' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70 (3): 476–90.
- Skitka, L. J., E. Mullen, T. Griffin, S. Hutchinson, and B. Chamberlin. 2002. 'Dispositions, ideological scripts, or motivated correction? Understanding ideological differences in attributions for social problems', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83: 470–87.
- Smith, K. B., D. Oxley, M. V. Hibbing, J. R. Alford, and J. R. Hibbing. 2011a. 'Disgust sensitivity and the neurophysiology of left-right political orientations', *PLoS ONE*, 6, e25552. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025552.
- Smith, K. B., D. Oxley, M. V. Hibbing, J. R. Alford, and J. R. Hibbing. 2011b. 'Linking genetics and political attitudes: Reconceptualizing political ideology', *Political Psychology*, 32: 369–97.
- Sniderman, P. M. and J. Bullock. 2004. 'A consistency theory of public opinion and political choice: The hypothesis of menu dependence'. Pp. 337–57 in *Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change*, eds. W. E. Saris and P. M. Sniderman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sniderman, P. M., R. A. Brody, and P. E. Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Solomon, S., J. Greenberg, and T. Pyszczynski. 2004. 'The cultural animal: Twenty years of terror management theory and research'. Pp. 13–34 in *Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology*, eds. J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, and T. Pyszczynski. New York: Guilford.
- Stimson, J. A. 2004. *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Terrizzi, J. A., Jr., N. J. Shook, and W. L. Ventis. 2010. 'Disgust: A predictor of social conservatism and prejudicial attitudes toward homosexuals', *Personality and Individual Differences*, 49: 587–92.
- Tetlock, P. E. 1983. 'Cognitive style and political ideology', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45: 118–26.
- Tetlock, P. E. 2007. 'Psychology and politics: The challenges of integrating levels of analysis in social science'. Pp. 888–912 in *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles*, 2nd edn, eds. A. W. Kruglanski and E. T. Higgins. New York: Guilford Press.
- Thorisdottir, H. and J. T. Jost. 2011. 'Motivated closed-mindedness mediates the effect of threat on political

- conservatism', *Political Psychology*, 32: 785–811.
- Tomkins, S. S. 1963. 'Left and right: A basic dimension of ideology and personality'. Pp. 388–411 in *The Study of Lives*, ed. R. W. White. Chicago: Atherton.
- Tyler, T. R. 2006. 'Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 57: 375–400.
- Ullrich, J. and J. C. Cohrs. 2007. 'Terrorism salience increases system justification: Experimental evidence', *Social Justice Research*, 20: 117–39.
- Van Hiel, A., E. Onraet, and S. De Pauw. 2010. 'The relationship between social-cultural attitudes and behavioral measures of cognitive style: A meta-analytic integration of studies', *Journal of Personality*, 78: 1765–99.
- Vigil, J. M. 2010. 'Political leanings vary with facial expression processing and psychosocial functioning', *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 13: 547–58.
- Wakslak, C. J., J. T. Jost, T. R. Tyler, and E. S. Chen. 2007. 'Moral outrage mediates the dampening effect of system justification on support for redistributive social policies', *Psychological Science*, 18: 267–74.
- Wallas, G. G. 1908. *Human Nature in Politics*. Oxford: Constable.
- Willer, R. 2004. 'The effects of government-issued terror warnings on presidential approval ratings', *Current Research in Social Psychology*, 10: 1–12.
- Wilson, G. D. (ed.) 1973. *The Psychology of Conservatism*. New York: Academic.
- Zaller, J. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge.

CHAPTER 14 IDEOLOGY AND THE INTELLECTUALS

CRAIG BERRY AND MICHAEL KENNY

THE preponderant focus of contemporary Anglophone political theory on the logical integrity and conceptual adequacy of a familiar set of normative arguments means that little attention has been paid from this quarter to the producers, consumers, abridgers, and circulators of political thinking. Intellectuals, who have played all of these different roles, and more, tend therefore to be of only peripheral interest to scholarship in the political theory field (see Kenny 2008).

Yet, questions about the roles that intellectuals should play in relation to extant ideological traditions—whether they are duty-bound to pursue and promote the truth (irrespective of political passions and communal loyalties), what societal functions they fulfil, and in which political systems they flourish and falter—have been central to leading bodies of social and political thought over the last two centuries. In this chapter we consider some of the still resonant accounts of intellectuals that were proffered by some of the major theoreticians of modernity, and focus especially on how the authors of these ideas conceptualized the relationship of intellectuals to extant traditions and patterns of political thinking.

The assumption that these figures gain credence and authority in relation to traditions of thought that have historically developed with reference to bounded political communities was ubiquitous in these ‘classic’ accounts. And yet, despite their lingering influence and the homage that is routinely paid to them, the notion that good intellectual practice required the achievement of epistemological detachment from extant ideological traditions, and national political cultures, began to take hold in public life towards the end of the twentieth century. This complex shift, which was most apparent in the United Kingdom in debates among progressive thinkers about globalization, Europeanization, and technological change, has had a number of baleful and significant consequences. These include a tendency to overlook the lingering impact of national-ideological influences and traditions, and the abandonment of the terrain of the ‘national-popular’ to intellectual rivals from the political right. In some key respects, we maintain, this turn towards the post-national has in fact served to obscure the ideological character of the re-organization of political life

associated with globalization, rather than illuminate it (Berry 2011).

An examination of this recent chapter in British intellectual life is therefore highly revealing about a shifting pattern of expectations about and among intellectuals. It is our contention that if the idea that these figures can only operate as critical thinkers at the level of the ‘post-national’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ passes without critique, we are in danger of recycling some of the most debilitating pathologies afflicting modern intellectual practice, not least the fallacy that it is possible and desirable for thinkers to achieve a vantage point that transcends ideological influence altogether.

INTELLECTUALS AND IDEOLOGY

We begin with some brief reflections upon three of the most influential accounts of the role and nature of intellectuals to have emerged in modern European thought. The disparate ideas of Karl Mannheim, Julien Benda, and Antonio Gramsci have played a key role in framing various competing notions about the relationship between intellectuals, political communities, and ideological traditions. They have each continued to figure as key reference points for subsequent reflections on these topics, even though, we will suggest, recent conceptualizations of intellectual practice have in crucial respects broken the bounds of their thinking.

In *Ideologie und Utopie*—published in 1929 but first translated into English as *Ideology and Utopia* in 1936—Hungarian-born sociologist Karl Mannheim (Mannheim 1991) laid down the tracks for much subsequent thinking about the role of intellectuals in relation to modern societies and democratizing political communities. He developed a series of contrasting, and complementary, images of intellectual practice and self-understanding, exploring in particular the role that these figures played in reproducing and critiquing established ideas. Other nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers made complementary and distinctive contributions in relation to these subjects. French philosopher Julien Benda (1955), in his iconic essay *La Trahison des Clercs*, published in French in 1927 and in English as *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals* in 1928, provided a powerful version of the argument that intellectuals need to remain independent from the constraints and compromises he associated with nationalism and politics.

Antonio Gramsci, Italian Communist theoretician, also developed a rich and influential set of ideas about intellectuals, popular culture, and politics in his *Prison Notebooks* (written during the 1930s). Each has become a key reference point for characterizations of the intellectual. Here, we identify their principal

contributions to theoretical understandings of this figure, and highlight their contrasting ideas about the nature of intellectuals' relationship with ideological traditions in particular, and politics more generally.

One of the central themes of Mannheim's work was his attempt to codify a 'sociology of knowledge', and, as such, to uncover the social character of intellectual practice. Social and political thinking should be understood in relation to the historically-constituted interests of social groups, and the lived experiences of their members. While social class was, for Mannheim, the vital arbiter of the individual's relationship with their cultural environment, he also pointed towards the importance of a wider set of influences upon social thinking, including institutions and political culture.

Mannheim combined this sociological focus with the proposition that intellectuals were coming to occupy a 'relatively classless stratum', with their status enhanced and restricted by institutional location. How he held to both of these seemingly contradictory positions has long puzzled his interpreters. One clue about his thinking in this area lies in his reflections on ideologies, and specifically their relationship with 'utopias'. Once the logic informing these ideas is grasped, we suggest, Mannheim's apparently ambivalent stance towards intellectuals becomes more comprehensible.

Ideas emerged out of various kinds of prior 'collective activity':

The sociology of knowledge seeks to comprehend thought in the concrete setting of an historical-social situation out of which individually differentiated thought only very gradually emerges.... It may be that, in certain spheres of knowledge, it is the impulse to act which first makes the objects of the world accessible to the acting subject, and it is this factor which determines the selection of those elements of reality which enter into thought. (Mannheim 1991: 2-4)

This proposition underpinned his understanding of how patterned traditions of thought interact with, and emerge from, an established social order. The latter, he suggests, 'produces the guiding thread for the emergence of their problems, their concepts, and their forms of thought' (1991: 3). But he was also keen to defend his position from the charge that it constituted a form of 'relativism', in which the meaning of ideas was to be evaluated solely in relation to the contexts in which they arose. He did this by claiming that a different epistemological value underpinned his theoretical project. This he labelled 'relationism'.

This perspective led Mannheim to present individual thinkers as inevitably shaped by extant ideological paradigms. It also underpinned his contention that they were able to reflect upon, interrogate, and refine particular arguments within these, by dint of their unique critical capacities. These skills provided the source of independent and critical reflection, as thinkers develop a unique

disposition to consider 'the dynamic nature of society and its wholeness'. The intelligentsia is thus presented as arising out of the matrix of collective life, acquiring the potential and capacity to become 'free floating' (Mannheim 1991: 136–7) in relation to the pattern of existing social interests and their accompanying world-views. It is, thus, on the basis of their ability to synthesize different bodies of knowledge and reflect critically upon ideas and traditions, that intellectuals can assume this mantle. Mannheim expressed this aspiration through rather ambiguous linguistic imagery which conveyed both a sense of relative independence and a more fundamental kind of detachment. This ambiguity has been at the heart of much subsequent dispute about *Ideology and Utopia*.

The capacity to stand some degree apart from extant patterns of thinking, and hold them at a critical distance, was in his thinking closely connected to the notion of 'utopias'. It was inevitable, and desirable, that intellectuals would associate themselves with new kinds of 'utopia', a term which also had a rather elusive set of connotations in his work (Tamgidi 2002). Utopian perspectives provided sources of critique of the social order, but are also generated, like other ideologies, from within the lived experience of social groups whose interests are systematically marginalized. The values and ideas they embody, therefore, necessarily point towards a different social order to the one that is currently prevalent. Utopianism exhibited many of the same features that Mannheim attributed to ideology in general, tending to turn 'its back on everything which would shake its belief or paralyse its desire to change things' (Mannheim 1991: 36). Yet utopias are also possessed of unique attributes which, like the intellectuals who shape them, give them a particular place within modern culture and politics. Because the intelligentsia is 'recruited from constantly varying social strata and life-situations, and ... its mode of thought is no longer subject to regulation by a caste-like organisation' (Mannheim 1991: 9), intellectuals are able to offer new synthetic accounts of group identities. In so doing they generate new kinds of utopias, which may in the long term inspire changes to the fabric and organization of society. In this respect at least, utopia has the immanent potential to escape the limits of ideology.

Commentators on his work remain largely unconvinced by the coherence and status of the distinction that Mannheim proposed between ideology and utopia (Mendel 2006). But while it may be true that the conceptual basis for this separation was not rigorously bolted down, the projection of intellectuals as defined both by their closeness to, and potential separation from, existing patterns of ideas, has proved fertile and significant for many subsequent

characterizations of intellectual practice.

Quite often, Mannheim's thinking is presented as of a piece with other classic modernist arguments for the deracinated thinker, unbound by ties of ideology and national culture, and devoted to the pursuit of universal truths. Such an impression represents a significant distortion of his thinking. This image of the intellectual is more properly associated with Julien Benda, yet in his case too, closer inspection suggests that a more nuanced position was actually on offer.

Benda was far more stipulative than Mannheim about the propensity of intellectuals to form a class-in-themselves. This common identity arose not so much from their skills or cognitive attributes, but from a moral disposition to set aside their own personal interests in the service of the greater good:

Here is an entire phalanx of people who not only conceive of general ideas, but for whom ideas determine the corresponding emotions, which in turn determine their acts, which are, much of the time, directly opposed to the immediate interest of the individual. (cited in Kurzman and Owens 2002: 65)

Benda famously castigated the moral failure of particular figures to live up to this ideal. Intellectuals were guilty of reneging on their vocation by succumbing to 'political passions' or material interests, rather than taking 'joy in the practice of an art or science or metaphysical speculation'. Within this framework, traditions of political thought amounted to binds upon perception that would need to be cast aside in the service of higher truths. Those who deploy their intellectual skills in the pursuit of political goals or institutional ends have 'betrayed their duty, which is precisely to set up a corporation whose sole cult is that of justice and of truth' (Benda 1955: 57). The justification and promotion of nationalism constituted perhaps the most heinous betrayal of this unique vocation. Too many intellectuals 'declare that their thought cannot be good, that it cannot bear good fruit, unless they remain rooted on their native soil, unless they are not "uprooted"' (Benda 1955: 64). Benda's position has, like Mannheim's, become one of the major reference points underpinning subsequent normative contentions about the nature and role of intellectuals.

A third, early twentieth-century account of intellectuals—that developed by Antonio Gramsci—has often been deployed in support of the opposite view. Every social group in a capitalist society, Gramsci believed, emerges in relation to a particular function in the world of economic production, and also creates within itself one or more strata of intellectuals who provide for that broad grouping a sense of its own shared identity and an awareness of its own place and function in society and politics (Gramsci 1971: 5).

This contention forms a crucial element of his theoretical account of the struggle for ideological hegemony, which takes place across the institutional terrain and social landscape of civil society. Gramsci placed particular emphasis on the unique role of organic intellectuals—for him always an expansive empirical category—in deploying their skills as interpreters of traditions and national storytellers, who could play a major role in shaping an alternative set of ideas, ranging across the fields of politics, culture, and morality. These needed ultimately to serve the purpose of constructing an alternative ‘national-popular’. This suggestive concept pointed towards the imperative of developing a wide-ranging rival to conventional ideas, but one that was rooted in popular morality, mythologies, and everyday thought, as much as in the citadels of economic analysis and political theory. Only with the forging and dissemination of this alternative outlook could the left hope to gain the allegiance of a broad range of social groups and interests (Femia 1987; Thomas 2010).

This vision of the role and potential of organic intellectuals, and his proposed contrast with their traditional counterparts who speak from within the cultural and historical assumptions of the established order, has continued to resonate throughout the radical imagination. We contend that Gramsci’s insistence upon ‘the national’ as the imaginative and cultural terrain upon which intellectuals act is an important, if little noticed, element of this theoretical perspective (Germain and Kenny 1998).

A number of important and influential ideas about the mission and identity of intellectuals, and their optimal relationship with bodies of thought that loosely comprised discernible national traditions, stemmed from these various ideas, and have continued to shape notions of the normative and epistemological characteristics of intellectual practice. Here, we discuss three particularly important and enduring ideas that have been derived from these sources.

1 On the National and Social Constitution of the Intellectual

One of the most important contributions of Mannheim’s account was his stress upon intellectuals as figures who possess a particular capacity to express and represent the shared identity and consciousness of distinct groups. While such a notion was far from unique, his own analysis of this theme has proved especially influential, in part because of his insistence that modernity involves a transformation in the nature and role of the intelligentsia. Mannheim invoked the ideal of the free floating, independent intellectual, but subsequent theorists have been too hasty in depicting such figures as normatively inclined to break from

the traditions and thought-patterns of a given community. His account of the social forces that underpinned intellectual production assumed the existence of bounded political communities and the national-cultural traditions which they contained. As such, Mannheim's work cannot be accurately deployed in support of the more recent theoretical proposition that both detachment and objectivity imply the adoption of a post-national or cosmopolitan viewpoint.

Much the same is true of Benda, despite the reputation his writing has acquired. Though he was an opponent of nationalism, and proponent of universalism as the appropriate framework for intellectual enquiry, Benda conceived of intellectuals as dissident figures within political communities and as a counter-weight to the machinations of political elites and leaders. The detached stance he urged upon thinkers was advanced in part so that they might play their role as consciences and critics of their polity to greater effect, not so that they might leave such communities behind altogether.

And for Gramsci, and others working in relation to the Marxist tradition, social class remained the most important source of social conflict and political struggle around which intellectual practice took shape. But Gramsci broke from other classical Marxist thinkers in positing the 'national-popular', rather than the consciousness of the international proletariat, as the terrain upon which intellectual engagement would be conducted.

While all three of these thinkers have been deployed in different respects as sources for recent post-national representations of intellectuals, there are good reasons to doubt whether such appropriations do justice to the integrity of their thought. Thus, in the Reith Lectures that he delivered in 1993, leading political thinker and campaigner Edward Said developed a stipulative narrative of the intellectual as a heroic, detached and inherently critical figure. The metaphors of distance and removal are central to this account (Said 1996: 21). While, for Said, there can be 'no escape into the realms of pure thought or, for that matter, into the realm of disinterested objectivity or transcendental theory', intellectuals can and must remain steadfastly independent, enabling them to 'speak truth to power' (Said 1996: 21, 85). This stance is grounded in an understanding of, and commitment to, universal values. The intellectual therefore is:

an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, the public. And this role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of being someone whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose *raison d'être* is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug. The intellectual does so on the basis of universal principles: that all human beings are entitled to expect

decent standards of behaviour concerning freedom and justice from worldly powers or nations, and that deliberate or inadvertent violations of these standards need to be testified and fought against courageously. (Said 1996: 11–12)

Said famously took Mannheim's elusive image of the free-floating intellectual and gave it an avowedly political twist. Proper intellectuals must be metaphorical 'exiles', inhabiting a different imaginative space to the traditions and cultures of nation-states. It is the willingness to be an incessant, unbowed critic that supplies the modern intellectual's role 'precisely because the dominant norms are so intimately connected to ... the nation, which is always triumphalist, always in a position of authority, always exacting loyalty and subservience rather than intellectual investigation' (Said 1996: 36). Exile is therefore achieved by setting aside the ties and obligations associated with any given national identity. The connections he traced in this account between a heroic ideal of independence and a willingness to stand outside the national forms of thinking of a given political community have proved inspirational for later practitioners. But this stance has significant costs: it has encouraged a notable turn against 'the national' in favour of 'the cosmopolitan' in ethical terms (see Miller 1997). And it has, analytically, inhibited a serious assessment of the possibility that the development of ostensibly post-national ideas actually reflect certain longstanding features and traditions within national life.

2 On the Expertise of the Intellectual

A second, paradigmatic idea to emerge from these writers is the contention that intellectuals derive at least part of their authority from the technical nature of the expertise that they acquire, and that their distinctive skills yield a unique vantage point in relation to extant ideological traditions. This relationship is conceptualized variously by these, and other, leading thinkers. In Mannheim's elusive metaphorical construct, intellectuals achieve a position of detachment afforded by the opportunity and capacity to provide a critical reflection upon, and overview of, the terrain of ideas. This sets up a marked ambivalence within his account about whether these figures are inhibited, or enabled, by professional obligations and institutional commitments, a stance that is replicated in much subsequent theorizing. According to Mendel, Mannheim recognized the importance of the kind of financial independence and security afforded by an academic career, yet was also wary of the dangers of the imperatives shaping professionalization, and indeed identified the latter as one of the trends most likely to obstruct the utopian ideal (Mendel 2006: 45). These thoughts have been

recycled by subsequent pessimists, many of whom have identified the professionalization of academic life, or the rise of professionalism in general, as the source of the decline, or even death, of the public intellectual (see Furedi 2004).

Other thinkers, however, have found inspiration in Mannheim's vision of modern intellectuals as figures able to achieve influence through the establishment of a new kind of clerisy, based upon their distinctive skills. This way of conceiving intellectuals gathered force, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, in the form of a number of prominent accounts of the rise of a broad new social stratum based upon a wide array of intellectual skills. This technocratic class was presented by a number of social theorists as constituting the basis for an emerging elite which would oversee the shift to a knowledge-based economy (see Brym 1987: 203–4; Kurzman and Owens 2002:70–2).

Such a vision was central to the thinking of American theorist Daniel Bell. He championed 'the rise of the new elites based on skill' who 'are not bound by a sufficient common interest to make them a political class' but share 'norms of professionalism' that 'could become the foundation of the new ethos for such a class' (Bell 1976: 362). Bell's 1960 account of intellectuals was premised upon his analysis of the exhaustion of grand ideologies derived from the social relations of the industrial order which, he maintained, were increasingly inadequate to the contemporary age. Intellectuals were likely to become increasingly important, both because their skill-sets matched the emerging economic paradigm, but also because they possessed the forms of knowledge and critical understanding which a post-industrial order was likely to value.

3 On the Democratic Contribution of Intellectuals

A third distinct position arising from the battery of ideas associated with these figures, which has also been fleshed out by later thinkers, concerns the notion that intellectuals have a special status and role in democratic society. Due both to their commitment to, and facility with, deliberation and its attendant values, they have repeatedly been invoked in modern social and political thought as custodians and sources of the democratic spirit (Kenny 2004). In emphasizing the particular authority which arises, for intellectuals, from their ability to distance themselves from dominant ideological positions, both Mannheim and Benda held to particular versions of this argument.

This position has been developed most fully in more recent years in the work

of the influential German legal and political theorist Jürgen Habermas. His emphasis upon the regulative idea of communicative rationality has been accompanied by an insistence upon the integrity of deliberation to the democratic process (Habermas 1984). Habermasian thinking betrays clear echoes of Mannheim's 'relationist' notion of rationality as emerging from the exchange of a diversity of independent viewpoints that are advanced within the already established rules of rational debate. Importantly, towards the end of the twentieth century Habermas began to advance arguments for the merits of post-national forms of national consciousness, a position that was reflective of wider debates among the German centre-left. This position combined with his philosophically grounded emphasis on the need for a rationally determined set of procedures to ensure that a freely chosen rational consensus is achieved in public debate, and has encouraged many normative political theorists to regard political thought as fundamentally divorced from everyday forms of political reasoning and sentiment.

Jeffrey Goldfarb employed the logic of Habermasian thinking in his characterization of intellectuals in *Civility and Subversion* (Goldfarb 1998). These figures are integral to democratic culture, he claimed, in that they exemplify the values of civilized public debate. This means that they might need to play an oppositional role, especially in circumstances involving the contraventions of basic democratic principles and rights, although Goldfarb also warned against what he regarded as a somewhat narcissistic drift in intellectual circles towards positions that implied a kind of 'permanent marginality'.

He deployed this normative position, like many other democratic theorists, in support of the contention that the rationality which provides the regulative norm for intellectual practice involves the transcendence of established forms of ideology (see also Furedi 2004). This conviction imparted to intellectuals an anti-ideological mission, which overlooked the fact that the internalization of the ideals of liberal democracy does not take place outside the parameters of political traditions and discourse. And while Goldfarb drew heavily upon the 'classic' accounts of intellectual practice supplied by Mannheim and Benda, he also moved beyond the spirit of their thinking in proposing such a clear-cut opposition between intellectuals and ideologies (see Jacoby 1999: 17).

INTELLECTUALS AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONHOOD IN THE UK

As Said himself pointed out, it is rare that modern intellectuals are actually

exiled from their own political communities. And yet, towards the end of the last century and the start of its successor, the notion that such a stance might represent an integral aspect of the normative identity of the intellectual became prominent among a growing number of liberal and leftist thinkers. This stance was associated with a vigorous questioning of the validity and status of both the nation and the nation-state in the context of a growing focus upon globalization, and an ethical turn towards ‘the cosmopolitan’.

Here, we consider this broad trend against the backdrop of our assessment of the various conceptions of intellectuals supplied by Mannheim, Benda, and Gramsci. In one key respect—the celebration of the ‘post-national’ as the site and source of contemporary critical thinking—these more recent thinkers have moved onto terrain that was not staked out by these earlier thinkers. We conclude that the proposition that critical intellectual practice requires a rupture with the ties of national culture and ideology is a dangerous, and possibly self-defeating, illusion. And in analytical terms, we propose a weakening of the widely employed dichotomy between national and post-national forms of thinking in relation to the study of intellectual practice. We argue, finally, that the shift towards a more avowedly anti-national stance among an influential cluster of moral and political theorists has had some important, unforeseen political ramifications. Thinkers and commentators from the political right have found it much easier to shape the terms upon which the ‘national-popular’ is framed, and position themselves as vehicles for populist aspiration at a vital juncture in the history of the UK, partly because of the evacuation of this terrain by parts of the intellectual left.

This complex pattern of thinking emerged out of a confluence of related, and often contradictory, processes. In combination, these were widely held to signal the weakening, and perhaps even demise, of the powers of the nation-state (cf. Giddens 1990, 2002; Cerny 1995; Dicken 1998; Callinicos 2001). Globalization was often characterized, not least in the UK, as consisting of a set of unalterable, exogenous developments which encompassed financial, technological, and cultural trends. It was widely presented as engendering a growing trend towards supranational regionalism, and as the engine of shifts towards trans-national, even global, forms of governance (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996; Held et al. 1999; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Berry 2011). The nation-state, and the traditions of thinking and culture associated with distinct political communities, were increasingly refracted within these literatures as entities that were being surpassed and undermined by a range of cultural, social and economic transformations. At the same time, the decision of the mainstream political

parties to engage more wholeheartedly with the project of European integration generated an upsurge of concern about the apparent erosion of British sovereignty (cf. Bradbury and Mawson 1997). And, within the UK, the shift towards the pooling of sovereignty with other European states was mirrored by moves towards the significant devolution of governing powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland after 1997.

Despite the absence of any matching programme of devolution within England, with the notable exception of the re-establishment of a London-wide government, these important reforms contributed to a burgeoning sense that the days of the unitary state, and perhaps also a sense of a coherent British nation, were over. The combined effects of these changes to established patterns of political authority were reflected in the rapid growth of interest in the academic community in a cluster of closely related descriptions of a purported shift from the era of government to one characterized in turns as ‘multi-level’, ‘post-national’, ‘supranational’, and ‘regional’ governance (cf. Gamble and Payne 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Elcock and Keating 1998; Wilkinson and Hughes 2002).

More generally, beyond these specialist academic communities, there broke out a much wider debate about how society and economy were now changing in paradigmatic ways. One strand of this emerging body of thinking proclaimed globalization to be the handmaiden of a new, cosmopolitan order, and pointed towards a very different idea of the terrain and ambition of progressive politics (Held and McGrew 2002). A widely influential reading of globalization as the ‘stretching’ of social and economic relations gave rise to the notion that a polity established on the basis of a nation-state was no longer a viable context for developing solutions to the policy challenges of the current era. Citing Bell’s ubiquitous maxim, Anthony Giddens argued that:

in circumstances of accelerating globalisation, the nation-state has become ‘too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life’. At the same time as social relations become laterally stretched, and as part of the same process, we see the strengthening of pressures for local autonomy and regional cultural identity. (Giddens 1990: 65)

For Giddens, and other advocates of a progressive global future, the stretching of our horizons beyond the nation-state was irreversible, and also presaged a flourishing commitment to other geographic identities which nationalism had tended to obscure or marginalize. He went further still, arguing that in a world characterized by ‘reflexivity’ and altered spatial-temporal relations, the modes of thinking and culture associated with industrialized modernity were increasingly redundant:

A world of intensified reflexivity is a world of *clever people*. I don't mean by this that people are more intelligent than they used to be. In a post-traditional order, individuals more or less have to engage with the wider world if they are to survive in it. Information produced by specialists (including scientific knowledge) can no longer wholly be confined to specific groups, but becomes routinely interpreted and acted on by lay individuals in the course of their everyday actions. (Giddens 1994: 7; emphasis original)

In his book, *The World We're In*, commentator Will Hutton argued that:

The idea of the public realm is in eclipse, and with it a conception of civilisation. We British are no longer citizens who make common cause and share common destinies. The scope for public initiative and endeavour through which our common values are expressed is contracting with giddy speed. (Hutton 2002: 5)

This was, he proclaimed:

a book for the idea of Europe. In my view, the quest for European Union is one of the great rousing and crucial projects of our time ... offering genuine multilateral leadership in the search for global public goods. It is a means of advancing core European values. It is also the way to reanimate our politics and the public realm—and, indirectly, to put our economy on an upward trajectory.... We should, of course, join the euro. (Hutton 2002: 3–4; see also Hutton 1996)

This kind of endorsement of the progressive possibilities associated with European integration rested upon an almost invariably negative assessment of the prospects for governance at the level of the nation-state. Rather than seeing Europe as an additional, or supplementary, domain of governing authority and political engagement, it was often represented as a new kind of demos which heralded the progressive transcendence of some of the limitations associated with governing processes and politics in nation-states. In their jointly authored work, *On the Edge*, Giddens and Hutton argued that although '[t]he open global economy is a precious acquisition offering opportunity, creativity and wealth', it was nevertheless 'precarious', requiring the visible hand of post-ideological governance to steer the process (Hutton and Giddens 2000: 217).

Other progressive intellectuals agreed, including Charles Leadbeater, a cultural analyst whose work achieved some influence within government circles during the years of New Labour rule. He hailed the demise of a modernist era of political thinking which had given rise to forms of 'utopian optimism' that had proved to be dangerous and illusory (Leadbeater 2002: 329). Those who stand against this new world, which in Leadbeater's view was underpinned by the dynamics of globalization, were labelled 'degenerationists'. For Leadbeater, the global age demands a politics that champions 'our shared capability for innovation'; similarly, innovation itself demands of the national polity diversity, openness, and a commitment to interdependence (Leadbeater 2002: 332, 341–7).

Other related thinkers, such as political theorist David Held, placed these arguments within a cosmopolitan framework that ostensibly harked back to the thinking of Immanuel Kant. Drawing heavily on Giddens' understanding of globalization, Held maintained that 'regional and global interconnectedness contests the traditional national resolutions of the key questions of democratic theory and practice' (Held 1995: 16). Autonomy, he declared was the sovereign progressive value, and its realization signalled the integral importance of democratization. But democratic rights and obligations needed to be reconfigured to protect individual freedom and choice from the power of entrenched social and economic forces:

people's equal interest in autonomy can only be adequately protected by a commitment from all those communities whose actions, policies and laws are inter-related and intertwined. For democratic law to be effective it must be internationalised. Thus, the implementation of a cosmopolitan democratic law and the establishment of a cosmopolitan community ... must become an obligation for democrats, an obligation to build a transnational, common structure of political action which alone, ultimately, can support the politics of self-determination (Held 1995: 231–2).

The achievement of central values, such as democracy and autonomy, was significantly enabled, cosmopolitans suggested, by the arrival of a global order and the real possibility of a viable form of international citizenship. The nation-state was, by implication, framed as a constraint upon both the democratic imagination and the achievement of cosmopolitan law. Whether these kinds of normative arguments can justifiably be anchored in Kantian thinking remains the subject of intense scholarly debate (Berry 2008; Brown 2009). A related phenomenon was the appearance in philosophical and legal circles of the new category 'global civil society', which was promoted in conjunction with the heady idea of global citizenship, as a major step beyond the constraints and contingencies associated with membership of the nation-state (see Germain and Kenny 1998; Shaw 1999; Kaldor 2002; Gamble and Kenny 2005).

But the body of thinking which positioned 'progressive' intellectuals as sceptics about the nation-state drew from other sources of inspiration as well. One emergent strand of thought emphasized the importance of an open-ended democratic dialogue among cultural groups as the best method of constituting the rules, law, and norms of the public realm in an increasingly multicultural state. Political theorist Bikhu Parekh argued that in a:

dialogically constituted multicultural society ... the common good and the collective will that are vital to any political society are generated not by transcending cultural and other particularities, but through their interplay in the cut and thrust of a dialogue (Parekh 2000: 341).

‘Contemporary multicultural societies’, he suggested, ‘are integrally bound up with the immensely complex process of economic and cultural globalisation’, which intensifies cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and indeed the internal plurality of cultures (Parekh 2000: 8). Parekh spoke for many other pluralist-inclined liberals in positing the inherited cultures associated with national identities as constituting significant obstacles to the achievement of a just and equal social order (Kymlicka 1996; Taylor 1994).

This strand of thinking was apparent within the report produced by the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, which was commissioned by the British government and chaired by Parekh. The Commission’s controversial final report (published in 2000) insisted that Britishness carried significant historical baggage because of its lingering ethnic and imperial connotations (see also Gilroy 2004). The Commission also proposed that Britain should be re-imagined as ‘a community of communities as well as a community of citizens’ (see Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000). As such, the ideal of deliberative multiculturalism was presented as a direct competitor to the notion of a common citizenship sustained by an inclusive sense of nationality (Barry 2001). British identity was recast within the Report as a thinner, civic form of community, devoid of substantive cultural content, within which there would be room for many other communal cultures to flourish.

Throughout these years, a strengthening tide of opinion framed such processes as globalization and Europeanization as both historically unalterable and inherently progressive, with those forces, ideas, and institutions associated with the nation-state implicitly deemed to be backward or regressive. While a number of these figures continued to place hopes in the idea of a civic and inclusive Britishness, it became increasingly apparent that this form of ‘post-national’ patriotism hinged upon an often unstated distaste for the prospect of any kind of substantive sense of nationhood emerging among the English, whose constitutional fate was assumed to be best expressed by the institutional architecture of the UK (Kenny and Lodge 2009). Social democratic thinker David Marquand’s reaction to David Cameron’s decision to exclude the UK from closer European fiscal integration at the Brussels summit in December 2011 provides a clear illustration of the enduring quality of this sentiment. Marquand stipulated that; ‘[t]here is a raw virulence about today’s anti-European rhetoric. It is visceral, not intellectual. It comes from the gut, not the head’ (Marquand 2011). Having established the non-rational nature of a body of sentiments which ‘has nothing to do with policy’ and everything to do with

‘identity and recognition’, he spoke for many other liberal commentators in readily conflating appeals to English nationhood with forms of grievance and identity politics. English identity, he suggested, was an immature national identity unable to imagine itself—in contrast to Scottish and Welsh national sentiments—as merely one layer within a multi-layered governance framework.

Just as strikingly, during these years, other intellectual figures, often associated with conservative positions, settled upon this increasingly salient, but often uncontested, terrain. Right-wing pundit Peter Hitchens (2000), for example, sought to document and address moral decline in Britain—a process he associated with a generalized sense of social decay and the weakening of British identity. His splenetic and declinist assessment of its society ran counter to almost every empirical indicator, yet provided the template through which much of the political right came to view questions of crime, morality, and social trust (see also English et al. 2009: 348–51).

Tory columnist and writer Simon Heffer was more sanguine about the break-up of Britain, seeing this as an opportunity to re-establish a distinct and independent English identity, on which basis liberal orthodoxies such as multiculturalism could be more easily refuted. And, like Heffer, conservative intellectual Roger Scruton advocated Englishness as a hidebound, cultural identity, proclaiming the need for its revival at the same time as he invoked its near extinction (English et al. 2009: 345–8, 351–4).

One of the common themes in the writings of these defenders of the beleaguered nation was an attack upon the legitimacy and impact of ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectuals, who were typically deemed to be united in their contempt for the traditions and merits of Anglo-Britain. Scruton remarked that:

As an Englishman, I am bothered by the term ‘intellectual’, which came late to our language.... Intellectuals have an inveterate tendency to be on the Left and to turn on dissenters with a venom that no educated person could comfortably endorse.... Moreover, intellectuals value their oppositional and transgressive stance far more than they value truth, and have a vested interest in undermining the practices—such as rational argument, genuine scholarship and open-minded discussion—which have truth as their goal (Scruton 2004; see also Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997: 4).

This ‘anti-intellectual’ bias within current conservative national thought represents, as Julia Stapleton shows, a marked shift from the self-consciously intellectual idiom within which ‘national’ sentiments were expressed by thinkers and politicians operating within the dominant liberal and conservative traditions of a century ago. As she puts it:

British intellectuals complicate the idea—deriving from Benda—that national particularities only serve to warp the intellectual imagination and distract it from its mission of attaining pure truth and understanding. Indeed, the stimulus of national culture and traditions has been central to that imagination in Britain for much of the twentieth century, enriching rather than impoverishing the process.... This applies not only to ‘establishment’ intellectuals of an earlier period ... but those, like E.P. Thompson, who have been central to a radical, dissenting tradition in the postwar period (Stapleton 2001: 2).

Different political inflections of nationalist ideas were, Stapleton shows, central to the ideological terrain associated with high British politics for much of the last century. The parameters observed by these seams of thinking were, she contends, breached towards the end of the twentieth century, when significant numbers of liberal intellectuals began to counter-pose ideas of rights and citizenship to an affiliation to ‘the nation’. Stapleton sees an ever-sharper bifurcation between those streams of (largely conservative) argument that continued to imagine citizenship in relation to ideas of Anglo-British nationhood, and the popularization of ‘rights’ among liberal intellectuals.

Yet it is also worth recalling that post-national ideas about governance and citizenship in recent years have also often been anchored within indigenous patterns of thought. Stapleton herself notes that Parekh’s critique of the British liberal establishment is reminiscent of the arguments of earlier generations of British liberals (Stapleton 2001: 191–2). Even as they reject ‘the nation’, cosmopolitans should be seen as reappropriating fragments of older, nationally rooted cultures.

And, in analytical terms, it is important to distinguish between the contention that nations matter from the view that *only* nations matter, in terms of normative intellectual practice. We suggest that attention instead be paid to the merits of the national-ideological roots of the forms of intellectual subjectivity that have made cosmopolitan ideas imaginable and repeatedly alluring. The appeal to cultural and economic openness made by many post-national intellectuals, for instance, can be seen as rekindling a political orientation long present in British political culture and indeed British national identity (see Trentmann 2008; Berry 2011).

A significant counter-view to the dream that intellectuals may achieve a kind of dis-embedding from parochial and partisan currents of thought, suggests that they derive the resources, rhetorics, and sense of moral and political purpose animating their ideas from traditions emanating primarily, though certainly not exclusively, from their own political communities. It is through the critical engagement and re-interpretation of these materials, not via their transcendence, that critical intellectual practice has often been enabled.

American political theorist Michael Walzer provided an important normative

version of this idea in his critique of the universalist propensity of much professional American liberal theorizing towards the end of the last century. His reflections suggested an image of the intellectual:

... not as the inhabitant of a separate world, the knower of esoteric truths, but as a fellow member of this world who devotes himself, but with a passion, to truths we all know (Walzer 1994: 42–3; see also Walzer 1984).

Walzer proceeded to reject the ideal of detachment as a fantasy which often carried conservative and conformist, rather than radical, implications: ‘the same motives that make for criticism at one moment in time make for silence and acquiescence at another’ (Walzer 1988: 23). Cosmopolitans were wrong, he insisted, to cite feelings of nationality as sources of inhibition upon intellectual reflection. Rather strikingly, he turned to Benda to buttress this argument:

Benda believed that the major source of treason was ‘the national passion’ and all the related passions of identification and belonging.... I would suggest that surrender is a yielding more often to power than to passion. Or better, it is a yielding to the passion for power, not to the passion for membership and solidarity. This is the only asceticism that the intellectual must practice: he cannot rule over others, not because rulers are never just, but because they are never perfectly just, and the task of the intellectual is to point his finger at the inevitable gap between their pretensions and their achievements (Walzer 1988: 43–4).

Walzer’s critical distinction is especially interesting in the context of our assessment of recent trends in British intellectual life. A number of the figures who were most committed to depicting ‘the national’ as a deadening inhibition upon the ethical imagination, and as a manifestation of a disappearing world, achieved varying degrees of influence within the political and policy worlds in these years. Figures such as Giddens, Hutton, Leadbeater, Parekh, and Held were variously influential over aspects of the thinking of the New Labour governments. The latter have been criticized on a range of fronts, notably for the uncritical and socially insensitive approach they took to economic globalization, with the latter often framed as an inexorable process in the context of which both economy and society needed to be reconfigured (Finlayson 2003). There was also a strong whiff of unreflective cosmopolitanism and pro-Europeanism about the upper echelons of New Labour, which was bolstered and perhaps legitimated by the wider intellectual currents emphasized here. Despite their desire to distance themselves from aspects of British national culture, these thinkers were generally quite keen to engage and insert their thinking into debates at the apex of their political communities. This latter ambition implied a degree of engagement and familiarity with ideological positions and traditions that belied the simplistic and illusory sense of detachment associated with some forms of

cosmopolitan argument.

CONCLUSIONS

The idea that intellectuals can in some sense escape the clutches of ideology is a longstanding and recurrent delusion. Intellectuals refract, refine, and contribute to ideologically-shaped patterns of thinking, as do other political actors (Freedman 2010). They are also their consumers, along with their fellow citizens.

This is not to suggest that intellectuals do not enjoy distinctive relationships with such traditions, or indeed with the audiences they address. Nor is it to downgrade their importance as producers, abridgers, and disseminators of political thinking. But there is a recurrent temptation among members of this species to announce the dawn of a post-ideological age, in which intellectual skills and the producers and interpreters of ideas will come to assume a long dreamed of position of social influence and cultural centrality.

What has been less remarked upon, but our case study tends to highlight, is that a new, supplementary delusion has emerged within the ambit of contemporary intellectual practice. This arises from the notion that the kind of critical independence vaunted by figures such as Mannheim and Benda is, due to a battery of recent technological, economic and cultural transformations, associated with the achievement of a post-national vantage-point.

Three features of our assessment of this particular body of thinking have a wider bearing upon the priorities and challenges facing political theorists more generally. We propose, first, the insight that the shifting self-representations of intellectuals are themselves implicated in the content and character of political and ideological thought. In this sense, we suggest, political theorists would do well to pay much greater attention to traditions and debates about the nature and role of intellectuals in particular, and to the ‘problematic’ of the normative self-image of those engaged in forms of intellectual production more generally.

We highlight, second, the tendency among a significant band of ‘progressive’ intellectuals to frame critical intellectual practice in post-national terms, and, in so doing, to move away from some of the normative co-ordinates that have underpinned leading ideas about critical intellectual practice in modern European thought. Importantly, this shift may well be better understood as a re-appropriation of aspects of the national imaginary—often invoking Britain as the source of open-minded, cosmopolitan, and ‘civic’ ideas, untainted by the danger of popular nationalism—rather than, as was sometimes proposed, a whole new stage of theoretical evolution.

A third critical insight can, we believe, be derived from these first two lessons. This concerns the epistemological, ethical, and, crucially, analytical distance from popular kinds of political and national reasoning which the turn towards 'the cosmopolitan' implies. The tendency for many progressive thinkers to evacuate, and critique, forms of popular reasoning and political discourse, has left the rich, complex, and contradictory terrain of the 'national-popular' more amenable to influence by other rival intellectuals, many of whom have been marching to a very different ideological drum.

REFERENCES

- Barry, Brian. 2001. 'The muddles of multiculturalism', *New Left Review*, 8: 49–71.
- Bell, Daniel. 1976. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.
- Benda, Julien. 1955. *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals*. Boston: The Beacon Press.
- Berry, Craig. 2008. 'Liberal political theorists, the cosmopolitan tradition and globalisation discourse', *In-Spire: Journal of Law, Politics and Societies*, 3 (2): 15–32.
- Berry, Craig. 2011. *Globalisation and Ideology in Britain: Neoliberalism, Free Trade and the Global Economy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Bradbury, Jonathan and John Mawson. 1997. *British Regionalism and Devolution: the Challenges of State Reform and European Integration*. London: Jessica Kingsley.
- Brown, Garrett. 2009. *Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Brym, Robert. 1987. 'The political sociology of intellectuals: a critique and a proposal'. Pp. 199–209 in *Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies*, ed. Alain G. Gagnon. London: Palgrave.
- Callinicos, Alex. 2001. *Against the Third Way*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Cerny, Philip. 1995. 'Globalization and the changing logic of collective action', *International Organization*, 49 (4): 595–625.
- Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. 2000. *The Parekh Report*. London: The Runnymede Trust.
- Dicken, Peter. 1998. *Global Shift: Industrial Change in a Turbulent World*. London: Sage.
- Elcock, Howard and Michael Keating. 1998. *Remaking the Union: Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s*. London: Frank Cass.
- English, Richard, Richard Hayton, and Michael Kenny. 2009. 'Englishness and the Union in contemporary conservative thought', *Government and Opposition*, 44 (4): 343–65.
- Femia, Joseph. 1987. *Gramsci's Political Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Finlayson, Alan. 2003. 'The meaning of modernisation', *Soundings*, 23: 62–83.
- Freedon, Michael. 2010. 'On European and other intellectuals'. Pp. 77–84 in *European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts*, eds. Justine Lacroix and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Furedi, Frank. 2004. *Where Have All the Intellectuals Gone? Confronting Twenty-First Century Philistinism*. London: Continuum.
- Gamble, Andrew and Michael Kenny. 2005. 'Ideological contestation, transnational civil society and global politics'. Pp. 19–34 in *The Idea of Global Civil Society: Politics and Ethics in a Globalizing Era*, eds. Randall D. Germain, and Michael Kenny. London: Routledge/RIPE.

- Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Payne. 1996. *Regionalism and World Order*. Cambridge: Palgrave.
- Germain, Randall and Michael Kenny. 1998. 'Engaging Gramsci: International relations theory and the New Gramscians', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1): 3–21.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1994. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Giddens, Anthony. 2002. *The Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives*. London: Profile.
- Gilroy, Paul. 2004. *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* London: Routledge.
- Goldfarb, Jeffrey. 1998. *Civility and Subversion: The Intellectual in Democratic Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. London: Heinemann Education.
- Hay, Colin and Ben Rosamond. 2002. 'Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9 (2): 147–67.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Held, David and Anthony McGrew. 2002. *Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Culture*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hirst, Paul and Grahame Thompson. 1996. *Globalization in Question: the International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hitchens, Peter. 2000. *The Abolition of Britain*. London: Quartet.
- Hutton, Will. 1996. *The State We're In*. London: Vintage.
- Hutton, Will. 2002. *The World We're In*. London: Little Brown.
- Hutton, Will and Anthony Giddens, eds. 2000. *On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Jacoby, Russell. 1999. *The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy*. New York: Basic Books.
- Jennings, Jeremy and Anthony Kemp-Welch. 1997. 'The century of the intellectual: from the Dreyfus affair to Salman Rushdie', Pp. 1–21 in *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie*, eds. Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch. London: Routledge.
- Kaldor, Mary. 2002. *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Kenny, Michael. 2004. 'Reckless minds or democracy's helpers?' *Contemporary Political Theory*, 3: 89–103.
- Kenny, Michael. 2008. 'Britain's anti-intellectual intellectuals: thoughts on Stefan Collini's absent minds', *Political Studies Review*, 6 (1): 1–13.
- Kenny, Michael and Guy Lodge. 2009. 'More than one English question'. Pp. 222–39 in *Breaking up Britain: four nations after a union*, ed. Mark Perryman. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Kurzman, Charles and Lyn. Owens. 2002. 'The sociology of intellectuals', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28: 63–90.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1996. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Leadbeater, Charles. 2002. *Up the Down Escalator: Why the Global Pessimists are Wrong*. London: Viking.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1991. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.
- Marquand, David. 2011. England's visceral Europhobia may break up the UK. *The Guardian*, accessed at

<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/18/english-europhobia-identity-crisis1>> on 31 December 2011.

- Mendel, Iris. 2006. 'Mannheim's free-floating intelligentsia: the role of closeness and distance in the analysis of society', *Studies in Social and Political Thought*, 12: 30–52.
- Miller, David. 1997. *On Nationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parekh, Bikhu. 2000. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Rhodes, Rod. 1997. *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Said, Edward W. 1996. *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Scruton, Roger. 2004. 'Review of Frank Furedi's *Where Have All the Intellectuals Gone*', *The Times*, 4 September 2004, accessed at <www.frankfuredi.com/intellectualreviews.shtml>. on 14 December 2011.
- Shaw, Martin (ed.) 1999. *Politics and Globalisation: Knowledge, Ethics and Agency*. London: Routledge.
- Stapleton, Julia. 2001. *Political Intellectuals and Public Identities in Britain since 1850*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Tamgidi, M. H. 2002. 'Ideology and utopia in Mannheim: towards the sociology of self-knowledge', *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, 1 (1): 120–139.
- Taylor, Charles. 1994. 'The politics of recognition'. Pp. 25–73 in Charles Taylor et al., *Multiculturalism and 'The politics of Recognition'*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Thomas, Peter. 2010. *The Gramscian Moment: Hegemony, Philosophy, Marxism*. London: Haymarket.
- Trentmann, Frank. 2008. *Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Walzer, Michael. 1984. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Walzer, Michael. 1988. *The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century*. London: Peter Halban.
- Walzer, Michael. 1994. *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Wilkinson, Rorden and Stephen Hughes. 2002. *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 15 POSTCOLONIALISM

RAHUL RAO

Writing in 1992 about the ‘pitfalls of the term “post-colonialism”’, Anne McClintock places it in the cacophonous company of other ‘post’ words in the culture of the time—‘post-colonialism, post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-Cold War, post-Marxism, post-apartheid, post-Soviet, post-Ford, post-feminism, post-national, post-historic, even post-contemporary’—the enthusiasm for which she reads as a symptom of ‘a global crisis in ideologies of the future, particularly in the ideology of “progress”’ (McClintock 1992: 93). The collapse of both capitalist and communist teleologies of development in the debt-wracked Third World seemed to conspire with postmodernist critiques of metanarrative to discredit not only particular articulations of ‘progress’ but also the very enterprise of charting a ‘progressive’ politics. Setting themselves resolutely against a past that they are determined to transcend, ‘post’ words drift in a present that seems allergic to thinking about the future.

Writing in 2004 and looking back on nearly three decades of ‘postcolonial studies’ in the academy, Neil Lazarus traces a significant shift in the meaning of the term ‘postcolonial’. Originally used in a strictly temporal sense to refer to the period immediately after decolonization (‘post’ as ‘after’), Lazarus cites a markedly different usage in the work of Homi Bhabha for whom “‘postcolonial’ is a fighting term’, invoked in polemics against colonialism but also against anti-colonial discourses such as Marxism and nationalism that are disavowed on account of their essentialism and deconstructed in the vocabulary of poststructuralism (Lazarus 2004: 4). In Lazarus’s retrospective view, what McClintock saw at the time as ideology *in flux* begins to look more like an ideology *of flux*. The ‘post’ in ‘postcolonial’ begins to signify not merely (or even necessarily) ‘after’, but ‘anti’: a periodizing or historical term has become an ideological concept.

This chapter attempts to illuminate what is at stake in the ‘fight’ between postcolonialism and its ideological antagonists. It proceeds to do this in three parts. First, it outlines some of the defining features of postcolonialism as an ideological discourse. There is some irony here in that while postcolonialism, as it emerged in the work of its leading practitioners under the sign of colonial discourse analysis, began as a tool for the analysis of ideology, its professed

normative commitments have made it available as an object for ideological analysis. While postcolonialism has been attacked from both right and left, it is its engagements with Marxist and poststructuralist criticism that have been most productive of its further development. Accordingly, the second part of the chapter will focus on this engagement. Responding to this critique, the third part of the chapter locates postcolonial theory within a longer tradition of anti-colonial thought, whose ambivalent relationship with the universalistic categories of colonial discourse accounts for much of the contemporary ideological debate between postcolonialism and its critics.

THE MAKING OF AN IDEOLOGY

Orient/Occident

‘Postcolonial studies’ as an academic field is conventionally dated to the publication of Edward Said’s *Orientalism* in 1978. The signal achievement of this work is its conceptualization of the colonial encounter as entailing not only the physical violence of military conquest and economic exploitation, but also an epistemic violence enacted by particular forms of knowledge tethered to imperial power. Said named this cognitive dimension of Western imperialism ‘Orientalism’—a term that he defines in three ways at the outset of the eponymously named book. In its most obvious sense, Orientalism names a field of academic enquiry encompassing anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the ‘Orient’. Second, Orientalism is a ‘style of thought’ based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’. In this sense, Orientalism names a Western tendency to dichotomize the world into a series of us/them contrasts and to essentialize the resultant ‘other’, so that the backward, savage, benighted Orient is seen to confront the developed, rational, enlightened Occident in a Manichean opposition of civilizational proportions. Third, from the late eighteenth century onwards, ‘Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said 1985: 2–3). As such, Orientalism articulates a relationship of knowledge to power that is both instrumental (to rule them you have to know them) and constitutive, producing the putative reality (the ‘Orient’) that it describes. Enabled by the brute material superiority of European imperial

power, the production of Orientalist knowledge also comes to function as an enabler of such power by legitimating imperial rule in the guise of a civilizing mission.

Borrowing Michel Foucault's notion of discourse as a pattern of statements to which specialized knowledge must conform if it is to be regarded as true (Foucault 2002: 131), Said argues that the Western discourse of Orientalism has been remarkably consistent across time. As a 'style of thought', Said's account of Orientalism accommodates figures of European classical antiquity such as Homer, Aeschylus, and Euripides, through Dante and Marx, to the nineteenth-century British and French orientalists, their twentieth-century US counterparts and indeed contemporary popular culture. It ranges across an array of texts including literature, poetry, drama, travel writing, anthropology, economics, and administration. Perhaps most crucially, it operates across ideologies taking within its sweep not only those committed to imperialism but also those like Marxism that are self-consciously anti-imperialist. Thus, while noting Marx's sympathy for the misery inflicted by Britain on its Indian subjects, Said indicts Marx as an Orientalist—the term now bearing only a pejorative sense, thanks in no small part to Said's text. Citing Marx's observation that while England might be driven by the 'vilest interests', it 'has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia', Said remarks that 'the idea of regenerating a fundamentally lifeless Asia is a piece of pure Romantic Orientalism', conforming to the persistent logic of the colonial civilizing mission (Said 1985: 153–6). While this repudiation of Marx in a foundational text of postcolonialism warrants further scrutiny, suffice it to say that the staggering range of Said's account of Orientalism as a discourse operative across time, texts, and ideologies—indeed as *the* constitutive discourse of Western civilization—made the argument a provocative intervention in the social sciences and humanities.

Unsurprisingly, *Orientalism* attracted a large number of critical responses. Some objected that Said's account of Orientalism was too monolithic in its focus on negative stereotypes and its neglect of affirmative tropes that were also a feature of the colonial archive. The Syrian philosopher Sadik Jalal al-'Azm argued that Said was guilty of reverse essentialism, opening himself up to the charge of Occidentalism and in the process reifying the very East/West dichotomy that he had set out to deconstruct (Lockman 2004: 195–8). In a wide-ranging polemic against Said's oeuvre as a whole, the Marxist literary critic Aijaz Ahmad took Said to task for failing to identify capitalism as the structure

that gives European prejudices against the extra-European world such devastating consequences. In particular, Ahmad defended Marx against the charge of Orientalism, noting that Marx's view of British colonialism in India as playing a progressive role in sweeping away the remnants of 'Oriental despotism' is analogous to his view of capitalism as dismantling the vestiges of feudalism in Europe (Ahmad 1994: 225). Moreover, Marx emphatically endorsed the right of Indians to resist colonialism, observing that while the British bourgeoisie were simply laying the 'material premises' for the development of India's productive powers, the full realization of those powers would require a proletarian revolution in Britain or an anti-colonial one in India (Marx 2000: 365).

But it is perhaps Said's engagement with poststructuralism that has attracted the greatest attention from both sympathetic and critical commentators alike (see for example Clifford 1988). *Orientalism* disavows any interest in, or capacity for, demonstrating what more accurate representations of the 'Orient' might look like. Indeed, there are deeply poststructuralist moments in the text when Said doubts whether there can be 'true' representations of anything, noting that all representations are embedded in the language, culture, institutions, and 'political ambience' of the speaker (Said 1985: 272). Yet there are other moments when he insists on the possibility of 'scholarship that is not as corrupt, or at least as blind to human reality' as Western orientalism is (Said 1985: 326). In making these apparently contradictory claims, Said borrows the Foucauldian notion of discourse as constraining what can be said within a discipline, without pushing it to the logical extremes that Foucault does. Paraphrasing Marx's view of men and the making of history in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, we might understand Said as attempting to articulate an understanding of scholarly production that takes into account the cognitive structures within which scholars seek to exercise agency: scholars produce their own scholarship, but not within discursive formations of their choosing. Indeed Said holds out the possibility that individual scholars can elude the constraints of discourse to exercise a transformational impact on the discursive formations within which they function. His 1993 Reith Lectures define the vocation of the public intellectual in terms of a duty to search for relative independence from institutional and other pressures to function 'as exile and marginal, as amateur, and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to power' (Said 1994b: xiii). The tensions between these views of truth and representation place Said in an ambivalent relation to humanism which, I will suggest, is emblematic of the archive of anti-colonial and postcolonial thought more generally.

Blurring Binaries

Perhaps most productive of further developments in postcolonialism were the criticisms of Homi Bhabha, for whom Said's notion of colonial discourse was too determining and univalent in its implication that power was possessed only by the colonizer. If Said presents colonial discourse as a totality that must be resisted from outside (without quite explaining how such agency-outside-of-discourse is possible), Bhabha sees discourse as itself riven with ambivalence. Deploying a Freudian understanding of ambivalence as the expression of antithetical emotions of equal intensity towards a common object, Bhabha proposes a view of colonial discourse as 'negotiation rather than negation', reading the antagonistic or contradictory elements within it as 'a dialectic without the emergence of a teleological or transcendent History' (Bhabha 1994: 37).

In contrast to Said's account of Orientalism as replete with stark binaries, Bhabha reads colonial stereotypes as ambivalent modes of representation. While the purpose of the stereotype is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate racial types with a view to justifying conquest, exploitation, and 'civilization', colonial stereotypes oscillated between viewing the native as fixed, unchanging, and timeless on the one hand, and as disorderly, anarchic, and licentious on the other. The colonial fantasy both proposes a teleology of improvement in which under certain conditions of colonial domination the native is progressively reformable, while insisting on the separation of colonizer and native on the basis of the latter's irredeemable inferiority (Bhabha 1994: 118). In Bhabha's reading, the stereotype is as anxious as it is assertive, declaring what is 'known' about the native but nonetheless anxiously restating this knowledge as if it can never be confirmed but only reinforced through constant repetition, making it a sign of a deeper crisis of authority in the wielding of colonial power (Childs and Williams 1997: 128–9).

This crisis becomes more evident in Bhabha's discussion of mimicry, which also inaugurates a tendency in postcolonialism towards the blurring of imperial binaries. Mimicry, in Bhabha's view, begins as a colonial strategy of power/knowledge that seeks the inclusion of an authorized 'good' native, with a view to excluding 'bad' natives (for a contemporary illustration in the context of US imperial policy see Mamdani 2005). Exemplified by Lord Macaulay's desire, articulated in his infamous 1835 Minute on Indian Education, 'to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in

morals, and in intellect’, the strategy of mimicry is ambivalent in its desire to remake the colonized in the image of the colonizer without producing so close a resemblance as to threaten the racial and other hierarchies on which imperialism was premised. The difficulty of maintaining this balance means that ‘the ambivalence of colonial authority repeatedly turns from mimicry—a difference that is almost nothing but not quite—to menace—a difference that is almost total but not quite’ (Bhabha 1994: 131). Crucially, Bhabha makes visible the subversion inherent in mimicry, not by delineating the subjectivity of the colonized but through an account of ambivalence and equivocation in colonial strategies of power, so that mimicry becomes—in the interpretation of Robert Young (2004: 188)—‘a kind of agency without a subject, a form of representation which produces effects, a sameness which slips into otherness, but which still has nothing to do with any “other”’. The menace in mimicry is not a deliberate strategy employed by the colonized, but an effect of the colonizer’s own discourse: we might say, with David Huddart (2008: 60–1), that the colonizer ‘spooks himself’.

It is in his writings on the messy, compromised process of religious conversion in colonial India that Bhabha makes some of his most acute observations. Analysing British missionary Charles Grant’s 1792 proposal for mission education in English in India, Bhabha describes how the tension between Grant’s desire for religious reform and anxiety that this could make Indians restive for liberty resulted in a policy whereby Christian doctrine would collude with indigenous caste practices to keep the subject population divided, thereby illustrating how in the very practice of domination the language of the master becomes hybrid and perverts its professed moral project (1994: 124). In a move that begins to acknowledge the agency of the colonized, Bhabha finds in the archives of nineteenth-century Christian missionaries in India, an obstinate native insistence on engaging with the missionaries on their own terms. Bringing their denied knowledges of indigenous religion, magic, and superstition to this encounter, native converts accept the Bible as the word of God, but also decouple it from the authority of the English as religious, cultural, and linguistic mediators. As such, the ‘native’ Bible must be located in a separate hybrid space of colonial discourse which, in Bhabha’s view, ‘has been systematically denied by both colonialists and nationalists who have sought authority in the authenticity of “origins”’ (Bhabha 1994: 171). The effect of colonial power, for Bhabha, then, is ‘the production of hybridization rather than the noisy command of colonialist authority or the silent repression of native traditions’. The realization that colonial power never quite gets what it wants ‘enables a form of

subversion, founded on the undecidability that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention' (Bhabha 1994: 160).

Importantly, in Bhabha's view, ambivalence is a feature not only of colonial but also postcolonial discourses of authority. His writings on the nation explore the numerous dissonances in discourses of national culture. While these are often clearly apparent in a spatial sense in the discourses of minorities that challenge hegemonic narratives of national homogeneity, Bhabha is particularly interested in the dissonances that haunt the nation as a temporal process. Drawing attention to what he calls the 'double and split time' of the nation, he observes that 'the people' in discursive strategies of the nation are doubled as both its past and present—they are both 'the historical "objects" of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin *in the past*' and 'the "subjects" of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity: as that sign of the *present* through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process'. As such, the narration of the nation is split between 'the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative' (Bhabha 1994: 208–9). Indeed, the history of the postcolonial nation can be read as the incessant interruption of the pedagogical by the performative, so that 'national culture' can only ever be articulated as the dialectic of these temporalities and never as a knowledge that is stabilized in its enunciation because it is always contemporaneous with the act of recitation (Bhabha 1994: 218–19).

There is now a formidable body of postcolonial scholarship that independently, or under the influence, of Bhabha, builds on the impulse against imperial binarism and towards an exploration of the hybrid cultural formations resulting from the colonial encounter. Pioneering a technique that he calls 'contrapuntal reading' in which cultural identities are conceived, not as essentializations, but as contrapuntal ensembles in which identities cannot exist without an array of opposites, Said's *Culture and Imperialism* (1994a) reads a number of ostensibly metropolitan texts in ways that demonstrate the multiple ways in which they are deeply implicated in the colonial periphery, thereby reconceiving the imperial encounter as a process of 'overlapping territories, intertwined histories'. We are reminded, for example, that it is Australian wealth that enables the *Great Expectations* that Pip entertains, that the order and civility of Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park* are enabled by the profits from slave plantations in Antigua, and that Giuseppe Verdi's *Aida* began life as a

commission by the Khedive of Egypt to inaugurate the new opera house that he had built in Cairo as a way of signalling a modernizing Egypt's entry into international society. Partha Chatterjee (1986) has provided the definitive account of the hybrid imaginaries of anti-colonial nationalist elites in India, arguing that they sought to mimic the West in the sphere of the 'material' (statecraft, economy, science) where it was thought to possess decisive advantages, but rejected it insofar as 'spiritual' matters were concerned (language, literature, art, education, family), insisting on the superiority of the East in these domains of human endeavour. More recently, Leela Gandhi (2006) has written about the late nineteenth-century 'affective communities' that brought together figures associated with marginalized lifestyles and subcultures, from both sides of the imperial divide, in struggles against imperialism.

Subaltern Speech

The postcolonial impulse towards a critique of both imperialist and nationalist narratives also finds expression in the work of the Subaltern Studies collective of historians of South Asia. Its leading figure, Ranajit Guha, criticized both colonialist and bourgeois nationalist historiography for their assumption that the development of political and national consciousness in India was a predominantly elite achievement, and for their failure to adequately theorize the mass character of nationalism. The collective has been animated by an interest in the history and politics of those social groups that Gramsci (1971: 52–5) described as 'subaltern'—non-hegemonic groups such as the peasants of southern Italy, who were thought to lack a social and political consciousness of themselves as a class. In the work of Subaltern Studies historians, the term has been interpreted more broadly to describe a 'general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other way' (Guha 1994: vii).

The most profound challenge confronting subaltern studies has been the question of how to 'read' subaltern consciousness from archives that largely record the perspectives of elites. While acknowledging in his study of peasant insurgency in colonial India that he has had to rely on the archives of counter-insurgency in which policemen, soldiers, bureaucrats, landlords, and other authorities register their hostility to insurgency, Guha nonetheless insists that counter-insurgency 'derives directly from insurgency and is determined by the latter in all that is essential to its form and articulation [and] can hardly afford a discourse that is not fully and compulsively involved with the rebel and his

activities' (1992: 15). This means that although the archives overwhelmingly represent the will of colonial counter-insurgents, they do not derive their content from that will alone, for it is predicated on another will—that of the insurgents—leading Guha to conclude that it should be possible to read the presence of a rebel consciousness as a necessary and pervasive element within the archive of counter-insurgency.

While the collective has gone on to publish a number of volumes, it is the critique of the very enterprise of subaltern studies that has generated some of the most influential statements in postcolonial studies, particularly on questions of subaltern agency, representation, and the role of the intellectual. From a position of poststructuralist scepticism of coherent identities as effects of dominant discourses, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak—herself a member of the collective—has questioned whether in attempting to reinscribe a subaltern consciousness in the archive, subaltern historians might unwittingly “‘insidiously objectify” the subaltern, control him through knowledge even as they restore versions of causality and self-determination to him’ (1988b: 201). Yet despite expressing discomfort with the self-presentation of the subaltern studies project as a positivist and essentializing endeavour, she argues that the actual practice of the collective—driven as it is to articulating subaltern consciousness in terms of its difference from elite interests—is deeply Derridean in its implicit recognition that signs have meaning only in terms of their difference from other signs. It is this, coupled with her approval of the political agenda of the project as an ‘attempt to undo a massive historiographic metalepsis’ that leads her to offer a qualified endorsement of subaltern studies as ‘a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest’ (Spivak 1988b: 205). This phrase has taken on a life of its own in postcolonial studies, coming to be read as a slogan for the field’s broader attempt to draw from the seemingly incompatible heritages of Marxism and poststructuralism. I shall return to the implications of this in the final section of the chapter.

Spivak’s critique of the pretensions of intellectuals to represent the disenfranchised is most powerfully articulated in an oft-misunderstood article entitled ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (Spivak 1988a; for a good discussion see Morton 2003: 56–68). Central to this work is a scepticism of claims of representation, whether they emanate from radical intellectuals in the academy (here Spivak takes aim at Foucault and Deleuze) or governments professing to use power in the defence of the powerless (her example here is that of British imperialists purporting to rescue Indian women from the native custom of sati—widow burning on the funeral pyres of their husbands). Spivak suggests that the

apparent benevolence of these varied manifestations of the representation/rescue impulse can mask an appropriation and silencing of subaltern voice when the powerful claim to represent subalterns. Importantly, she contrasts two meanings of representation—representation as ‘speaking for’, as in politics, and representation as ‘representation’, as in art and philosophy. Drawing on Marx’s *Eighteenth Brumaire*—a text in which he distinguishes these connotations through the use of distinct German words (*vertreten* for political and *darstellen* for aesthetic representation respectively)—Spivak warns of the dangers of conflation of these distinct notions of representation in intellectual and political endeavours that profess an emancipatory agenda: the aesthetic representation of subaltern groups as coherent political subjects can often be taken as a straightforward expression of their political interests.

Spivak concludes the article with a story that is intended to drive home the impossibility of subaltern speech. She describes the suicide of a woman named Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri in Calcutta in 1926. Nearly a decade after her death, it was discovered that she had been part of the armed struggle for Indian independence and had killed herself because of her inability to carry out an assassination that had been entrusted to her. In an effort to subvert the typical attribution of such deaths to illegitimate passion, Bhaduri had waited for the onset of menstruation before she killed herself. Despite this and notwithstanding the evidence that later became available, her family clung to the narrative of illicit love by way of explanation. For Spivak, the incident suggests that even when the subaltern makes an effort to the death to represent herself, it does not fulfil itself in an intersubjective speech act. Defending herself against critics who misread her as suggesting that subalterns are mute and unable to represent themselves, Spivak has insisted that the issue has never been whether subalterns can talk (they can), but whether their utterances are intelligible in relationships of power (1996: 287–90). Perhaps the challenge for subaltern studies has always been ‘can the bourgeois theorist hear?’

Spivak’s critique of the gender-blindness of early work in subaltern studies coupled with her incisive interventions in discourses that purport to emancipate women have worked to make space for postcolonial feminism. A full account of the insights of postcolonial feminism is impossible in an essay of this length. Nonetheless, Spivak’s description of nineteenth-century British colonial officials professing to save Indian women from the custom of sati—‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (1988a: 297)—usefully draws attention to the differently situated actors implicated in transnational colonial and postcolonial discourses of feminism, and signals the trajectories of subsequent scholarship.

From the perspective of white men, gestures such as sati prohibition enabled imperialism to represent itself as the establisher of the good society by espousing women as objects of protection from their own racial and national kind (for a contemporary illustration of this dynamic in the realm of queer theory see Puar 2007). Elsewhere, Spivak offers a literary account of the implication of white women in imperialism through a reading of Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*. Noting that Bertha Mason, the mad Creole first wife of Mr Rochester 'has to set fire to the house and kill herself, so that Jane Eyre can become the feminist individualist heroine of British fiction', Spivak reads this 'as an allegory of the general epistemic violence of imperialism, the construction of a self-immolating colonial subject for the glorification of the social mission of the colonizer' (1999: 127). A great deal of postcolonial feminism is devoted to elaborating the historical and contemporary processes by which Third World women were constructed as abject, oppressed, and in need of saving, as a means of consolidating white Western women as fully formed subjects epitomizing modernity and progress (Grewal 1996; Mohanty 2003).

The brown man's interests become visible in Chatterjee's (1993) gendered account of the split consciousness of anti-colonial nationalism, whereby men became agents of mimicry of the West's material modernity, while women were required to function as repositories of the East's spiritual superiority. This gendered division of labour would bequeath a legacy in which any attempted transformations of gender relations via discourses of feminism or, more recently, queer activism have come to be seen as encroachments on the sovereign terrain of the nation (Rao 2010: 101). Finally, the silence of the brown woman in the context of Spivak's example of sati prohibition, receives its fullest elaboration in the work of Lata Mani (1998) who argues that women were neither subjects nor objects but the grounds or sites on which tradition was contested and reformulated in debates between male colonial officials and indigenous elites. Thus, in common with subaltern studies, postcolonial feminism has worked to fracture monolithic images of the colonized and to elaborate more complex hierarchies of domination and subordination.

While subaltern studies originated as an argument within Indian Marxism, it has also questioned central assumptions of Marxist historiography. In particular, it has registered difficulties with Marxist modes of production narratives that chart transitions from feudalism to capitalism and so on in ways that reflect the history of Western Europe, but cannot adequately theorize situations in which capitalism fails to effect these transitions completely. When Marxists encounter locations such as these, featuring social groups that do not mobilize along class

lines, or whose collective life features gods, spirits, and supernatural agents in worlds that have yet to become disenchanted, they have tended to relegate such phenomena to the realm of false consciousness and to the time of the pre-political, viewing them as anachronistic relics of another time. Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) suggests that the very notion of anachronism—by no means unique to Marxism but intelligible to all forms of historicist thinking—assumes an underlying unity of historical time: one that is singular, homogeneous, and secular, in which (most of) the world (barring its non-modern holdouts) is located by the historian, regardless of the understanding of time held by the societies s/he is studying. Arguing that such historicist thinking is imperialist in its imposition of a single notion of time on the world, Chakrabarty proposes that rather than viewing the world outside Europe as having made an incomplete transition to modernity, we begin to think in terms of the heterotemporality of modernity. Acknowledging that subaltern histories cannot avoid being constructed within the master code of history, he nonetheless insists that they cannot afford to grant this master code its claim of being a natural and universal mode of thought. The task for subaltern histories, as he sees it, is ‘to ask how this seemingly imperious, all-pervasive code might be deployed or thought about so that we have at least a glimpse of its own finitude, a glimpse of what might constitute an outside to it’, and further, ‘to hold history, the discipline, and other forms of memory together so that they can help in the interrogation of each other, to work out the ways these immiscible forms of recalling the past are juxtaposed in our negotiations of modern institutions, to question the narrative strategies in academic history that allow its secular temporality the appearance of successfully assimilating to itself memories that are, strictly speaking, unassimilable’ (2000: 93–4). It is evident from a manifesto of this kind that the agenda of subaltern studies and postcolonialism more generally—sometimes simplistically construed as that of including the excluded subaltern—has far more profound epistemological consequences that is often recognized.

AGAINST POSTCOLONIALISM

By the early 1990s, the contours of postcolonialism had become clear enough for Bhabha to offer the following confident assessment:

The postcolonial perspective ... departs from the traditions of the sociology of underdevelopment or ‘dependency’ theory. As a mode of analysis, it attempts to revise those nationalist or ‘nativist’ pedagogies that set up the relation of Third World and First World in a binary structure of opposition. The postcolonial perspective resists the attempt at holistic forms of social explanation. It forces a recognition of the more complex cultural and political boundaries that exist on the cusp

of these often opposed political spheres. It is from this hybrid location of cultural value—the transnational as the translational—that the postcolonial intellectual attempts to elaborate a historical and literary project ... the encounters and negotiations of differential meanings and values within ‘colonial textuality’, its governmental discourses and cultural practices, have anticipated, *avant la lettre*, many of the problematics of contemporary theory—aporia, ambivalence, indeterminacy, the question of discursive closure, the threat to agency, the status of intentionality, the challenge to ‘totalizing’ concepts, to name but a few. (Bhabha 1994: 248)

While this should not be taken as a definition of postcolonialism with which all those identified with it might agree, the crystallization of postcolonial thought in these terms does much to explain the onslaught to which it was subject. Indeed, Bhabha’s major work *The Location of Culture* (1994) neatly divides early critiques of postcolonialism that accused it of being too nativist (Appiah 1991: 354) from later ones that berate it for almost exactly the opposite reason. Thus, Benita Parry (2004) has strenuously objected to what she sees as postcolonialism’s insistent critique of the nativism of anticolonial liberation movements and its concomitant valorization of hybridity and synthesis, arguing that this relies on a highly selective reading of the anti-colonial archive. In a close reading of Bhabha’s oeuvre, she questions whether the putative ‘ambivalence’ of colonial discourse matters very much, given that it did not seem to inhibit the drive to mastery and domination, not to mention the longevity, of colonial authority virtually everywhere it prevailed (see also JanMohamed 1985). She disputes Bhabha’s reconceptualization of the colonial relationship as agonistic rather than antagonistic, arguing that this seems to imply a competition amongst peers rather than the brutal, often existential, material struggle between unequally placed adversaries that the documentary record suggests (Parry 2004:62–3).

For all its Marxist critics (Ahmad 1994; Dirlik 1994; Lazarus 2002, 2004; Parry 2004), the fundamental problem with postcolonialism lies in its repudiation of the foundational role of capitalism in history. This repudiation—although far from total, as I will go on to suggest in the following section—is a function of postcolonialism’s critique of the Eurocentrism of all forms of historicism, manifest in the temporal teleologies of narratives of progress, whether in the guise of the ‘modernization’ or ‘modes of production’ stories central to bourgeois nationalism and Marxism respectively. Lazarus (2002: 54) sees the postcolonial focus on the cultural dimensions of the colonial encounter as a ‘bracketing, displacement, or euphemization of the specific agency of capitalist social relations in imperialist development’ that leaves postcolonial theorists unable to explain what distinguished Eurocentrism from other forms of ethnocentrism with such devastating consequences for the world. Postcolonial theorists stand accused of ignoring the conceptual resources within Marxism that

have long sought to engage with the very problems they have diagnosed—work on ‘combined and uneven development’ that seeks to theorize the differential insertion of global peripheries into a world capitalist system, a long tradition of thinking about the relationship between the material ‘base’ and cultural ‘superstructure’ of social formations, and the efforts of Third World Marxists to ‘translate’ Western Marxism to the conditions of their locations (for an exceptional postcolonial engagement with these questions see Young 2001; 2004). As Arif Dirlik (1994: 342) has complained, rather than seeking to engage with Marxism, postcolonial theorists have deconstructed and decentred it in the vocabularies of post-structuralism. Claiming to repudiate the universalistic pretences of one Eurocentric narrative, they have replaced it with another First World language claiming universal epistemological relevance. Yet in their disavowal of ‘totalizing’ theory, they have jettisoned, and sabotaged, the conceptual resources with which they might have contested the totalizing structures of capital.

Indeed, these critics detect a more insidious logic in the proliferation of postcolonial critique, seeing it as expressive of the needs of late capitalism. Thus, the transition from Fordist to flexible accumulation under conditions of neoliberalism has necessitated a capitalism that is fluid and able to articulate itself in multiple cultural contexts outside its original European home (one has only to glance comparatively at the menus of McDonald’s outlets the world over to confirm that multinational capital understands that it cannot afford cultural parochialism). To its critics, postcolonialism seems to affirm precisely those modes of belonging—fluidity, hybridity, cosmopolitanism—that are most conducive to the working of global capitalism. Not coincidentally, postcolonialism in the academy is articulated by the beneficiaries of this form of capitalism—upwardly mobile immigrants from the high bourgeoisies of former colonies migrating to the metropolis and seeking employment in its professional (including university) sectors. The allegation here is two-fold. By producing an ideology that downplays class in favour of other markers of ‘subalternity’ the purveyors of postcolonialism accord themselves privileged status in the academy as representatives of the disenfranchised (Ahmad 1994: 195–7). Beyond crude instrumentality, postcolonial critics also stand accused of a sort of epistemological solipsism in projecting their subjectivities onto their reading of the global condition, so that their own experiences of migration, exile, liminality, and multiple belonging come to be treated as exemplary (Dirlik 1994: 339). Expressing incredulity towards metanarratives they have, in effect, elevated autobiography to the status of metanarrative.

THE DIALECTICS OF ANTI-COLONIAL THOUGHT

At stake in the dispute between postcolonialism and its antagonists are questions of historical interpretation (how should the colonial encounter and its aftermath be understood?) but also political progress (how should oppression and liberation in the contemporary conjuncture be theorized and responded to?). A central feature of these debates is the extent to which all parties refer to the archives of anti-colonial liberation in legitimation of their arguments. This makes it imperative to consider how postcolonialism is related to that archive: is postcolonialism a restatement, or a revision, of the protocols of anti-colonial liberation?

The vast majority of anti-colonial activists—irrespective of ideological affiliation—viewed imperialism as a totality comprising economic, political, military, cultural, and psychological dimensions and necessitating struggle on all of these fronts. Many saw the cognitive dimensions of imperialism as even more fundamental—because more insidious—than its more obvious physical manifestations. Gandhi famously excoriated his countrymen for wanting ‘English rule without the Englishman’ (1938: 26), arguing that they had been subjugated by British imperialism not only because of political disunity but also because of their *moha* (infatuation) for British civilization, and warning that such a mentality would perpetuate the ‘rule’ of British civilization even after the cessation of political and economic control (Parekh 1995: 16–18). If Marx welcomed modernity but questioned the appropriation of its fruits by the bourgeoisie, Gandhi’s *Hind Swaraj* is an indictment of modernity itself—but one whose message would ironically be disseminated via the quintessentially modernist technologies of the railways and mass media.

Running through the anti-colonial archive is an enduring tension between two tendencies: on the one hand an acceptance of the terms of colonial discourse even as the valuations encoded within these are reversed; on the other hand, a refusal of those terms altogether. Ashis Nandy (1988) provides a number of examples of this tension in the context of Indian anti-colonial thought. Thus he contrasts the resistance efforts of nineteenth-century writers such as Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay whose reinterpretations of Hindu texts projected on to the Hindu past the qualities of Christianity that seemed to give it strength—a process that has been described as the ‘semitization’ of Hinduism—with Gandhi’s less defensive willingness to grant Hinduism its open-ended, anarchic, and unorganized character. In an analogous illustration, he notes that colonialism was structured around a homology between sexual and political dominance in

which a virile, masculinized West was seen to penetrate a subservient, feminized Orient. Once again, he contrasts earlier forms of anticolonial thinking and praxis that accept the colonial ordering of masculine as superior to feminine and respond with idioms of protest that valorize indigenous forms of masculinity such as ‘Kshatriyahood’ (the cult of the warrior), with Gandhi’s more gender-ambiguous cultivation of self (the eccentric experiments with celibacy, the self-description as ‘God’s eunuch’, etc.) and androgynous techniques of ‘passive resistance’.

This tension between negation within terms derived from colonial discourse, and the deconstruction of those terms, is also visible in the great debates central to Pan-Africanist thought in the Americas, Caribbean, and Africa, between proponents of various forms of indigenism, and advocates of more hybrid modes of belonging such as Creolité, Métissage, etc. (Munro and Shilliam 2011). Here, the tension between derivative negation and deconstructive negotiation is understood by some of the leading figures in these debates as equally necessary stages in a historical dialectic. In his preface to a 1948 anthology of African and West Indian poetry edited by Léopold Senghor (the leading figure in the black nationalist ferment of the 1930s that came to be called Négritude, later to become President of Senegal), Jean-Paul Sartre describes the poetry of Aimé Césaire in the stark dichotomies of negation:

It is not a question of the poem becoming part of the calm unity of opposites; but rather of making *one* of the opposites in the ‘black-white’ couple expand like a phallus in its opposition to the other. The density of these words thrown into the air like stones from a volcano, is found in negritude, which is defined as being *against* Europe and colonization. What Césaire destroys is not *all* culture but rather *white* culture; what he brings to light is not desire for *everything* but rather the revolutionary aspirations of the oppressed negro; what he touches in his very depths is not the spirit but a certain specific, concrete form of humanity. (Sartre 1964–65: 33)

Sartre affirms the indispensability of this poetic negation in his insistence that ‘this anti-racist racism is the only road that will lead to the abolition of racial differences’ (Sartre 1964–65: 18). Yet even as he does so, he announces the necessary end of Négritude and, by implication, all movements of negation:

Negritude appears like the up-beat ... of a dialectical progression: the theoretical and practical affirmation of white supremacy is the thesis; the position of Negritude as an antithetical value is the moment of negativity. But this negative moment is not sufficient in itself, and these black men who use it know this perfectly well; they know that it aims at preparing the synthesis or realization of the human being in a raceless society. Thus Negritude is *for* destroying itself, it is a ‘crossing to’ and not an ‘arrival at,’ a means and not an end. (Sartre 1964–65: 49)

Irritated at the teleological condescension of the European Marxist who has

effectively relegated Négritude to the status of a passing phase, Frantz Fanon responds with incredulity in his 1952 work *Black Skin, White Masks*:

What? I have barely opened eyes that have been blindfolded, and someone already wants to drown me in the universal? ... I need to lose myself in my negritude, to see the fires, the segregations, the repressions, the rapes, the discriminations, the boycotts. We need to put our fingers on every sore that mottles the black uniform. (Fanon 1986: 186–7)

Yet this book ends with a denial of the very notion of racial essences, expressing the author's hope that 'it may be possible for me to discover and to love man, wherever he may be. The Negro is not. Any more than the white man' (Fanon 1986: 231). Moreover, in a move that recalls the Sartrean dialectic, even as he affirms Négritude as an indispensable insurrectionary mode, Fanon warns presciently of the 'pitfalls of national consciousness' in his 1961 work *The Wretched of the Earth*. In a vision of freedom that encompasses not only independence from colonial oppression but also liberation from the native bourgeoisie, Fanon insists that the people must pass 'from total, indiscriminating nationalism to social and economic awareness' if they are to attain the forms of consciousness with which to challenge the ossification of the revolutionary leader and party into instruments for the entrenchment of native capital (Fanon 1967: 115). In effect, this statement represents a logical working through of the Leninist strategy of temporary alliance between the forces of communism and anti-colonial bourgeois nationalism in the worldwide struggle against imperialism, as first articulated at the 1920 Second Congress of the Comintern (Young 2001: 130). By implication, once the colonizer had been expelled, the tactical alliance between communists and bourgeois nationalists and the ideological consciousness of nationalism through which it had been forged, could no longer serve a progressive purpose. As such, Fanon's early disagreement with Sartre is best interpreted as one about not the direction in which History marches, so much as the speed with which Marxism expects it to do so in its hurry to subsume all forms of oppression under the rubric of class.

Far from transforming it into a 'reconciliatory rather than a critical, anti-colonialist category' as argued by its critics (During 1998: 31), we can see postcolonialism's critique of nativism and its affirmation of hybridity and synthesis as evocative of the most subversive voices in the anticolonial archive. From a materialist perspective, the critique of nativist and nationalist consciousness, while cognizant of its necessity as the vehicle for postcoloniality, is nonetheless entirely consistent with a Leninist project that accords it a vital but temporary place as a mode of consciousness conducive to a particular stage of the historical dialectic. From this perspective, the debate between Marxism

and postcolonialism can be understood as one about temporality within the terms of Lenin's dialectic, so that it becomes possible to conceive of postcolonialism as a form of Marxism: the debate, then, is one about whether the time of transcendence of nationalist consciousness has arrived. From a cultural perspective, postcolonialism views nativism as problematic because of its tendency to fight the colonizer within the terms set by the latter: it is a reverse ethnocentrism that upends the hierarchies inherent within colonial discourse without undermining the notion of hierarchy per se. As Nandy eloquently puts it, in terms that resonate with the Sartre–Fanon debate:

in every situation of organized oppression the true antonyms are always the exclusive part versus the inclusive whole—not masculinity versus femininity but either of them versus androgyny, not the past versus the present but either of them versus the timelessness in which the past is the present and the present is the past, not the oppressor versus the oppressed but both of them versus the rationality which turns them into co-victims ... the opposite of thesis is not the antithesis because they exclude each other. The true 'enemy' of the thesis is seen to be in the synthesis because it includes the thesis and ends the latter's reason for being. (Nandy 1988: 99)

Yet even as we recall the subversive, rather than reconciliatory, potentials of voices of synthesis, it is salutary to bear in mind that the anti-colonial archive is a space of debate rather than the locus of a singular view on questions of liberation. Confronted with the universalistic categories of colonial discourse—'reason', 'History', 'human'—anti-colonial thought responds in at least three registers. First, there is the register of reverse ethnocentrism, which accepts the orientalist notion of a native essence, but posits this as superior to that of the colonizer and therefore as having a stronger claim to the mantle of universality. Second, there is the register of synthesis which looks to the creation of a more perfect universality encompassing colonizer and colonized on equal terms, audible in Césaire's stirring insistence that 'no race has a monopoly of beauty, intelligence, strength / and there is room for all at the rendez-vous of conquest' (1968: 125). In its refusal of the constitutive terms of colonial discourse, this second register begins to anticipate the mode of reading that we would now call deconstruction, whilst nonetheless holding out the possibility of the reconstruction of a better universal. But third, albeit more infrequently, we can also hear—in a much clearer anticipation of poststructuralism—a scepticism of universality per se. When James Joyce has a character in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*—a novel that appeared in book form in 1916, the year of the Irish Easter Uprising—describe the protagonist Stephen Dedalus as a 'born sneerer' (1965: 219) in bewilderment at the latter's disparagement of quite distinct campaigns for world peace and Irish freedom, we might read this as a literary anticipation of Jean-François Lyotard's definition of the postmodern

condition as ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ (1984: xxiv).

As such, although postcolonialism is conventionally described as bringing the tools of poststructuralism to the terrain of the ‘non-West’—the colonization of which had hitherto been understood primarily in terms of categories derived from Marxism—it is more accurate to think of it as bearing the inheritance of the anticolonial archive, which itself *anticipates* debates between Marxism and poststructuralism as a result of its diverse and contradictory responses to the universalistic platitudes of Western humanism encoded within colonial discourse. Moreover, notwithstanding the tendency of its critics to portray it as a unified discourse, postcolonialism continues to speak in the dissonant registers of that archive. Nowhere is this more visible than in the contrasting appropriations by postcolonial theorists of the work of Fanon, who can himself be read as speaking in multiple registers. Thus, there is the widest of chasms between Said’s embrace of the universalist humanism of Fanon audible in *The Wretched of the Earth* (Said 1994a: 278) and Bhabha’s disavowal of this later Fanon in favour of a dialectics without transcendence, a ‘politics without the dream of perfectibility’ visible in an earlier Fanon (Bhabha 1994: 86–91).

It is here that Spivak’s endorsement of ‘a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest’ has come to be seen as a way of making sense of postcolonialism’s simultaneous pursuit of both humanist and anti-humanist critique. If Marxists worry that postcolonialism’s (poststructuralist-influenced) critique of essentialism renders impossible a politics of solidarity, postcolonialism might respond that it does not criticize essentialism per se but the persistence of particular essentialisms beyond the time of their strategic usefulness. Indeed Spivak has acknowledged that essentialisms—categories such as ‘worker’, ‘woman’, or even ‘human’—are unavoidable and that the critique of essentialism should be understood not as an exposure of error but as ‘an acknowledgement of the dangerousness of something one cannot not use’ (2009: 5). Sitting precariously between the humanist essentialisms of emancipatory discourses such as Marxism and nationalism, and the anti-humanist interruptions of poststructuralist deconstruction, postcolonialism can legitimately claim to have inherited the archive of anti-colonial liberation in its dissonant entirety.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, Aijaz. 1994 [1992]. *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. London: Verso.
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 1991. ‘Is the post- in postmodernism the post- in postcolonial?’ *Critical Inquiry*, 17 (2): 336–57.

- Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Césaire, Aimé. 1968 [1956]. *Return to My Native Land*, trans. Emile Snyders. Paris: Présence Africaine.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1986. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* London: Zed Books.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Childs, Peter and Patrick Williams. 1997. *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory*. London: Prentice Hall.
- Clifford, James. 1988. *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dirlik, Arif. 1994. 'The postcolonial aura: Third world criticism in the age of global capitalism', *Critical Inquiry*, 20 (2): 328–56.
- During, Simon. 1998. 'Postcolonialism and globalisation: A dialectical relation after all?' *Postcolonial Studies* 1(1): 31–47.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1967 [1961]. *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington. London: Penguin.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1986 [1952]. *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann. London: Pluto Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 2002 [1969]. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.
- Gandhi, Leela. 2006. *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Gandhi, Mohandas K. 1938 [1909]. *Indian Home Rule or Hind Swaraj*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Grewal, Inderpal. 1996. *Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel*. London: Leicester University Press.
- Guha, Ranajit. 1992 [1983]. *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Guha, Ranajit (ed.) 1994 [1982]. *Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Huddart, David. 2008. *Homi K. Bhabha*. London: Routledge.
- JanMohamed, Abdul R. 1985. 'The economy of Manichean allegory: The function of racial difference in colonialist literature', *Critical Inquiry*, 12 (1): 59–87.
- Joyce, James. 1965 [1916]. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. London: Penguin.
- Lazarus, Neil. 2002. 'The fetish of "the West" in postcolonial theory'. Pp. 43–64 in *Marxism, Modernity and Postcolonial Studies*, eds. Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lazarus, Neil. 2004. 'Introducing postcolonial studies'. Pp. 1–16 in *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies*, ed. Neil Lazarus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lockman, Zachary. 2004. *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. 1984 [1979]. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 2005. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: Islam, the USA, and the Global War Against Terror*. Delhi: Permanent Black.
- Mani, Lata. 1998. *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Marx, Karl. 2000 [1852–3]. 'The future results of British rule in India', in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, ed.

- David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McClintock, Anne. 1992. 'The angel of progress: Pitfalls of the term "post-colonialism"', *Social Text*, 31/32: 84–98.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2003. *Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Morton, Stephen. 2003. *Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*. London: Routledge.
- Munro, Martin and Robbie Shilliam. 2011. 'Alternative sources of cosmopolitanism: nationalism, universalism and Créolité in Francophone Caribbean thought'. Pp. 159–77 in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity*, ed. Robbie Shilliam. London: Routledge.
- Nandy, Ashis. 1988 [1983]. *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 1995 [1989]. *Gandhi's Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination*. Delhi: Ajanta.
- Parry, Benita. 2004. *Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique*. London: Routledge.
- Puar, Jasbir K. 2007. *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Rao, Rahul. 2010. *Third World Protest: Between Home and the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Said, Edward W. 1985 [1978]. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Penguin Books.
- Said, Edward W. 1994a [1993]. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage.
- Said, Edward W. 1994b. *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures*. London: Vintage.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1964–65 [1948]. 'Black Orpheus', trans. John MacCombie. *The Massachusetts Review*, 6 (1): 13–52.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988a. 'Can the subaltern speak?' Pp. 271–313 in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988b. *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1996. *The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*, eds. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean. New York: Routledge.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1999. *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 2009 [1993]. *Outside in the Teaching Machine*. New York: Routledge.
- Young, Robert J. C. 2001. *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Young, Robert J. C. 2004 [1990]. *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. London: Routledge.

III

IDEOLOGICAL FAMILIES AND TRADITIONS

CHAPTER 16 CONSERVATISM

NOEL O'SULLIVAN

MODERN conservative ideology is sometimes dismissed as an anti-ideology inspired by self-interest and fear of change, with no coherent alternative of its own to offer. What will be suggested is that conservative ideology in its moderate form does in fact offer a positive alternative, which is a defence of limited politics against a belief in the desirability of radical political and social change that appeared in Europe during the Enlightenment and has gradually come to constitute, in more or less qualified form, the progressive orthodoxy of our age. For conservatives, the principal characteristic of this new way of thinking, which first found political expression in the French Revolution of 1789, is an excessively optimistic belief in the ability of political action to transform society into a rationally grounded order in which power will survive only as a benign instrument for facilitating desirable ends.

Faith in this exalted conception of what politics can achieve is fostered, conservatives maintain, by several mistaken assumptions, of which the most important are that human nature is highly malleable; that human will can refashion history in whatever ways human ideals may require; that society is the artificial product of a contract between autonomous individuals to implement their vision of the good society; and that evil is a contingent and eliminable feature of human existence caused mainly by social oppression and deprivation. Edmund Burke, who is generally credited with founding the modern conservative ideological tradition, prophesied that far from transforming society for the better, attempts to implement these assumptions would destroy spontaneous traditional ties and replace them by ever-increasing centralized state regulation of an atomized social order.¹ The ultimate danger, Burke maintained, was that the old monarchical system would be replaced by new forms of popular despotism far more hostile to liberty than the *ancien régime* had been. Since Burke made this prophesy before Napoleon acquired power, his insight into the danger of dictatorship created by the new style of politics has continued to impress critics of radical politics ever since that time.

In order to avoid the prospect of arbitrary power created by modern political radicalism, conservative thinkers have followed Burke in attempting to set limits to the scope of political action by identifying ineliminable sources of tension at

the heart of the human condition. Although this concern is the unifying theme of all conservative ideology, different thinkers have theorized the ideas of limit and tension in extremely different ways—so different, indeed, that they have given rise to ultimately incompatible versions of conservative ideology. In order to examine the principal versions more carefully, it will be useful to divide them into four schools. The first three, which are the oldest, may be termed the reactionary, the radical, and the moderate schools respectively. More recently, attempts have been made to establish a fourth school, the New Right. What then are the different conceptions of limit and tension in each school, and what political implications have been drawn from them?

Consider first the reactionary school, which represents the most uncompromising conservative rejection of modern radical and progressive thought. It is tempting to dismiss the school as merely a futile call to put the clock back to a pre-revolutionary golden age, but to do that ignores the principal reactionary contention, which deserves serious consideration. This is that no society can survive unless its political institutions are underpinned by a consensus on fundamental religious and moral values. As the Spanish reactionary thinker Juan Donoso Cortes proclaimed, there are

only two possible forms of control: one internal and the other external; religious control and political control. They are of such a nature that when the religious barometer rises, the barometer of control falls and likewise, when the religious barometer fall, the political barometer, that is political control and tyranny, rises. That is a law of humanity, a law of history (Menczer 1952: 170).

Since modern democracies tend to have secular cultures which encourage diversity of self-expression, they inevitably destroy the kind of spiritual control Donoso Cortes advocates. In this situation, ‘The way is prepared for some gigantic and colossal tyrant’, a prospect which cannot be averted by optimistic liberal tactics such as ‘granting more liberty, more guarantees [for rights, etc.] and new constitutions’. The only hope is ‘a salutary reaction—a religious reaction’, about the possibility of which, however, Donoso Cortes confessed that he was sceptical (Menczer 1952: 173).

The core of reactionary ideology, then, is the claim that at the heart of modern democracy is a spiritual void created by false optimism about the ability of man to abandon religion and pursue happiness through creative political action. What this optimism ignores, the French reactionary thinker Joseph de Maistre maintained, is that without God, men are impotent beings, as the Christian doctrine of original sin acknowledged. If an event like the French Revolution seems at first sight to suggest the contrary, this is simply due to a failure to

realize that the Revolution must have been the work of God, since God alone possesses the power to influence history on such a massive scale. Confronted by the response that, if God caused the French Revolution, then it must be good, and the reactionaries therefore wrong to regard it as evil, de Maistre's rejoinder was that the French Revolution was indeed good insofar as it was a divinely inspired means of purging the French of their revolutionary ideals, thereby preparing them to welcome a restoration of the old monarchical and ecclesiastical order. As de Maistre's response to the voluntarist aspect of radical ideology indicates, his main achievement was to display the intrinsic instability of reactionary ideology by revealing its readiness to embrace political nihilism rather than to compromise with the existing social order (Lively 1965).

Other reactionary thinkers have extended the critique of modern democracy in various ways, of which two merit special consideration. One is by arguing that the conjunction of modern democracy with capitalism legitimates a ruthless ethic of self-seeking that makes a consensus on fundamental values even more difficult to achieve. In practice, Charles Maurras (who founded the Action Française movement in 1899) maintained, this ethic means that far from benefiting the common man by promoting equality, modern democracy merely replaces the old form of oppression by an aristocracy with oppression by a new business plutocracy (McClelland 1970: 267). The other extension of the reactionary critique was by Maurice Barrès, who claimed that the democratic egalitarian ideal dumbs down educational standards to such an extent that it becomes impossible to transmit a common cultural heritage to each new generation. The result is the end of civilization itself, since the integrating power of culture is replaced by spiritual rootlessness. (McClelland 1970: 267, 183–195). The fact that the end of culture may be accompanied by mass prosperity, the Spanish reactionary thinker Ortega y Gasset added, should not conceal the fact that it nevertheless inaugurates a new era of barbarism (Ortega y Gasset 1951). Similar sentiments were expressed by T. S. Eliot, who characterized modern mass democracy as a 'waste land' in which men are mainly interested in 'balls propelled by hand, by foot, and by engines or tools of various kinds; in playing cards; or in watching dogs, horses, or other men engage in feats of speed or skill' (Hayward 1953: 222).

Reactionary cultural criticism of this kind obviously owes as much to intellectual snobbery as to detached political analysis. The main problem with the reactionary critique of democracy, however, is that it is inspired by an essentially utopian vision of a perfectly harmonious hierarchical society. When this vision proves to be unattainable, as it inevitably does, the immediate

response of reactionary ideologists is to attribute its failure to conspirators, amongst whom the Jews have been a favourite target. Even if anti-semitism is rejected, the need to demonize some group or other is still necessitated by the black and white picture which the reactionary school substitutes for the complexities of social reality. In this respect, the structure of reactionary ideology converges with the structure of extremist ideologies at large, all of which favour a single-factor conspiracy theory of social and political conflict.

The result of the wholesale rejection of democratic modernity is that reactionary movements are condemned to the fringe of politics, where they claim to stand above the sectional claims of political parties. Faced by marginalization, reactionary politicians have adopted several strategies. One is the use of extra-constitutional methods for overthrowing the established social order. An early pioneer of this strategy at the end of the nineteenth century was the Marquis de Morès who was so inspired by cowboys during a period he spent ranching in North Dakota that he founded (in 1891) a group modelled on them called the 'Friends of Morès', who aimed to overcome the decadence of mass democracy by engaging in punch-ups while dressed in the sombreros and purple shirts which he considered appropriate to their manly and self-sacrificial alternative vision of life (Tannenbaum 1962: 18–19). A less exotic extra-constitutional strategy was advocated by Charles Maurras, who followed up his creation of the Action Française movement in 1908 by founding a student support group called the *Camelots du roi* the members of which showed their royalist zeal by activities such as beating up a university professor who criticized Joan of Arc (Tannenbaum 1962: 99). The long-term result of Maurras's acceptance of violent methods was to bring his movement into such disrepute that it was eventually disowned by both the Church and the French Pretender whom it was created to support.

A second reactionary strategy for escaping political impotence is by abandoning the claim to be a supra-political movement and joining a revolutionary political party which seems better placed to overthrow the existing order. It was this second strategy which sometimes led reactionary thinkers like Oswald Spengler, for example, to give qualified support to the Nazi movement, even though Spengler despised Hitler as vulgar and had no sympathy for racism (Spengler 1939).

It is necessary to add in this connection that reactionary conservatism is not a form of fascism, to which it is in principle opposed. Whereas the aim of fascism is to transform the social order by a dynamic cult of mass participation under the guidance of a charismatic leader, reactionary ideology, by contrast, is

fundamentally static, rejecting mass dynamism in any form. As just indicated, however, reactionary movements may nevertheless act as a bridge over which their supporters may be tempted to cross into movements like fascism when they become impatient with their own impotence.

A third reactionary strategy is the most politically effective: it consists of compromising with modern democracy by adopting a charismatic concept of leadership that aims to unify the people in the face of the divisive impact of representative institutions. It was a strategy of this kind which enabled Barrès, for example, to overcome the reactionary obsession with a past golden age by relocating the centre of gravity of reactionary thought in a future political order to be created by a popular leader. At the level of practical politics, it was this form of reactionary thought upon which the French Gaullist Party relied after the Second World War, although the charismatic ideal was qualified in this case by a commitment to constitutional politics (Curtis 1959).

The final strategy by which the reactionary may come to terms with his political marginality is only adopted when despair in the face of modern democracy is so profound that no political option appears to be available. In that event, the reactionary may simply abandon politics altogether in favour of purely private activities which display complete contempt for the mediocrity and boredom of ordinary democratic life. Three kinds of activity are favoured. One is spiritual activity. Julius Evola, for example, has argued in favour of a revision of contemporary Western values inspired in part by sympathy for Buddhism (Evola 1951). A second is aesthetic activity, which was favoured by Ortega y Gasset and T. S. Eliot. A third is strenuous activities which pose a high risk of death. Henri de Montherlant's love of bull-fighting, for example, provides an excellent example: his partially autobiographical novel *The Bullfighters* (*Les Bestiaires*, 1926), written after he was badly gored, tells the story of Alban, who finally overcomes his sense of extreme alienation through mortal combat with bulls. The interest of this last strategy—the pursuit of meaning, that is, in life-threatening activities—is that it illustrates how easily the lofty conception of spirituality which the reactionary opposes to democratic decadence shades over into moral posturing sometimes so extreme that it is difficult to distinguish from nihilism.

As has already been indicated, the principal defect of the reactionary school of conservatism is not so much that it desires to put the clock back as that it pursues a utopian vision of a social order so perfectly unified and unchanging that it precludes any compromise with the realities of the social world. The lesson to be learned is that a viable form of conservative ideology must abandon

this utopian tendency and instead seek balance and amelioration within the existing order.

At the opposite extreme to reactionary conservatism is the radical conservative school, whose members insist that a relevant conservatism must embrace democratic modernity positively instead of viewing mass society with the hostility characteristic of reactionary ideology. This can most effectively be done, radical conservatives maintain, by rallying the masses behind leaders who reject both the liberal commitment to parliamentary institutions and the socialist emphasis on class conflict in favour of an ideology which fuses nationalism and socialism in a synthesis intended to integrate the whole population. If reactionary conservative ideology is constructed 'from above', so to say, radical conservative ideology is constructed 'from below'.

Radical conservatism found its earliest proponents in inter-war Germany amongst critics of the Weimar republic who rejected the idea of solving the social and political divisions of the time by returning to the pre-democratic age of the Kaiser and Bismarck, insisting instead on the need to construct a new, mass-based conservative movement (Woods 1989). Foremost amongst them was Muller van den Bruck, who maintained that since 'Conservatism and revolution co-exist in the world today', the task now must be to develop 'a conservative revolutionary [system of] thought as the only one which in time of upheaval guarantees the continuity of history and preserves it alike from reaction and from chaos'. Conservatives who grasp this, van den Bruck asserted, will realize that today, 'conservative goals may be attained even with revolutionary postulates and by revolutionary means'. More generally, they will be prepared to seize 'directly on the revolution and by it, through it and beyond it save[s] the life of Europe and Germany' (van den Bruck 1971: 193).

As van den Bruck indicates, radical conservatism rejects parliamentary democracy in favour of direct mass involvement in politics. The same activist commitment was also evident in, for example, Ernst Jünger's ideal of 'total mobilization' as the goal of the modern state—an ideal, Jünger hoped, which would win the proletariat away from the Marxist dream of social revolution to nationalism, conceived in tragic and heroic terms. In a more qualified form the ideal of a populist leader who could unite the masses behind the national cause inspired Carl Schmitt's insistence that the most important task of the leader is to identify the political foe. The principal defect of modern liberal democratic theory, he maintained, is that it refuses to acknowledge that this task is the essence of the political relationship, concentrating instead on subordinating the leader's will to legal rules. Liberalism, Schmitt argued, has thereby paralysed the

modern state by perpetuating the divisive pluralism of modern democratic institutions.

Although the inter-war radical conservative thinkers referred to above were associated with Nazism, both van den Bruck and Jünger despised the Nazi movement and had no sympathy for racism. Schmitt, who was more sympathetic to Hitler and became known as the crown jurist of the Third Reich, nevertheless rejected racialism of the genetic kind favoured by Nazism. Inter-war proponents of radical conservatism were sufficiently tainted by association with Nazism and fascism, however, for post-Second World War defenders of it to try to make the school more respectable by adopting three intellectual strategies. The first was a rejection of the leader principle in its individualized form. The second was a rejection of nationalist doctrine in favour of a supranational ideal of European unity as the main safeguard against domination by the USA. In France, for example, the *nouvelle droite* associated with Alain de Benoist attached particular importance to this ploy.² The third strategy for distancing radical conservatism from fascism was a rejection of extra-constitutional political methods in favour of the gradualist programme of mass political education originally adopted on the left by Gramsci as an alternative to the Leninist attempt to impose revolution by violence from above, regardless of the wishes of the populace. The last strategy was favoured in particular by the *nuovo destra* in Italy.³

As a thoughtful commentator has noted, the influence of radical conservative thought, as well as electoral support for it,

grew considerably ... throughout much of Europe, especially in Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, France, Switzerland and Italy in the last decades of the [twentieth] century. Driven more by political propaganda than intellectual reflection, this branch of the right became an integral part of late twentieth-century politics in those countries and has achieved governmental office in several. (Lukes 2003: 623)

As this brief account indicates, radical conservatism presents several major problems. One is faith in a politically unaccountable national leader, which is completely at odds with Hume's insistence that political prudence consists in treating all politicians as knaves. A second problem is the reluctance of radical conservatism to confront the disinclination of modern populations to become politically involved. The result is that, instead of creating national unity, radical conservatism merely accentuates national division by concentrating power in the hands of activist elites who despise the politically indifferent majority. Yet another problem is the inevitable demonizing of groups which reject the leader's claim to be the exclusive representative of national unity. The result is that although radical conservatism claims to be a movement of national unification,

in practice it is a slippery slope which offers no protection against a slide into totalitarian dictatorship of the kind pioneered by fascism and communism.

Whereas reactionary conservatism is committed to a static social ideal and radical conservatism to active mobilization of the populace, the moderate school is committed to the ideal of a limited state ruled by law, with representative institutions and a constitution that provides for checks on executive power. Although this ideal overlaps with liberal ideology, its conservative defenders reject the abstract rationalist concepts used by liberal thinkers to theorize. Despite the anti-rationalism common to conservative ideologists, however, they interpret the conservative concept of limits in very different ways. Edward Burke, for example, conceived of them in theological terms; Benjamin Constant in tragic ones; and David Hume in terms of a sceptical view of the requirements of political prudence.

In Burke's case, the source of moderation was the divinely ordained structure of the universe itself, which he believed was best reflected in the political sphere by a balanced constitution of the kind which the British have miraculously developed. The secret of the British achievement is the fact that, unlike the French revolutionaries, they have rejected abstract political ideals in favour of 'a constitutional policy working after the pattern of Nature', the result of which is that 'Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts ...' (Burke 1963: 439). From this theological point of view, the pursuit of radical ideals by the revolutionaries was not just folly: in Burke's eyes it was impious, involving as it did an assault on the divine plan of creation

Burke's ambitious attempt to provide a theological ground for moderate conservatism entails not only a dogmatic claim to knowledge about God's plan for mankind but an equally dogmatic assumption that social and political hierarchy is a divinely ordained part of it. It is possible, however, to defend moderate conservative ideology in less problematic ways. One, developed by Benjamin Constant, involves the tragic vision. According to Constant, human nature in its modern form is inevitably divided by complex interests which make total commitment to any single value or passion impossible. In this respect, he maintained, modern man is fundamentally different from the man of the ancient world, who could hope to achieve a unified self. In this interpretation of the modern situation Constant sympathized with the radical position of Rousseau, who emphasized that alienation, or inner self-division, is now inescapable. Despite sharing Rousseau's critique of modernity, however, Constant followed

Burke in completely rejecting Rousseau's belief that political action can remedy this situation. In his partly autobiographical novel *Adolphe*, Constant sought to demonstrate that this is especially true in matters of love, presenting Adolphe's love for his mistress as inevitably doomed by the enfeebling impact on emotion of the social order under which they live.⁴

How successful is Constant's attempt to underpin moderate conservative ideology with the tragic vision? The main criticism is that invoking tragedy casts modern man as a victim of society. In other words, it masks a somewhat pretentious form of self-pity which destroys individual responsibility. That difficulty can be avoided, however, by an ideological strategy not yet considered. This strategy, which is most clearly formulated by David Hume, involves neither theology nor tragedy but consists, rather, of a pretence which Hume regards as the basis of all political wisdom. The pretence consists in making the assumption that all men are 'knaves', regardless of whether in reality they are or are not. If we conduct politics on this assumption, deeming that every man has 'no other end, in all his actions, than private interest', Hume wrote, then 'in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution', men will not be taken by surprise by the abuse of power in politics, nor will they be caught off balance when they discover from time to time the fragility of political order and the severe limits to government action (Hume 1963: 40–2). When they encounter these inescapable aspects of human life, they will not seek to evade their political responsibilities by off-loading them onto rulers whom they discover, too late, cannot be relied upon to discharge them without abusing their powers. It should be added that Hume thought that we should only pretend that all men are knaves when dealing with them in their *political* capacity as fellow citizens and potential rulers: to make that pretence in private life (about one's friends, for example) would of course be shameful.

Despite the fact that defenders of moderate conservative ideology have adopted very different theoretical standpoints, they share a commitment to the limited state. That ideal, however, has proved difficult to defend insofar as it was been linked to an organic vision of society which treats the social order as tending naturally towards harmony provided it remains under the guidance of what Burke termed a 'natural' aristocracy, whose authority he assumed commanded universal acceptance. Greater realism was displayed, however, by his younger contemporary, Coleridge, who insisted that the organic vision would only be plausible if it took account of the demand for political reform arising from democratic sentiment, as well as the disruptive impact of the industrial revolution on spontaneous tendencies towards social harmony. In this situation,

Coleridge maintained, an organic social order could only be achieved if the state adopted a far more interventionist role than Burke had envisaged (Coleridge 1972). In addition, the state would have to be restructured in a way that permitted a shift of political power away from the aristocratic leadership upon which Burke had relied towards the newly influential middle class.

During the course of the nineteenth century, Coleridge's insistence on the need for a relevant form of conservative ideology to make fundamental modifications in Burke's version of the organic vision was echoed, albeit in very different forms, by a series of thinkers and politicians. Carlyle, for example, proposed abolishing parliamentary government altogether in favour of a charismatic style of leadership which could heal the split he believed had occurred between the nation's institutions and its spiritual values by articulating what he described as the 'dumb wants' of the people (Carlyle 1897: 208). Although Coleridge himself would not have approved of Carlyle's rejection of the established constitutional system, Carlyle's proposals nevertheless anticipated the massive growth in executive power which characterized government responses to the problems of the twentieth century. The extreme form of charismatic leadership proposed by Carlyle, however, created the danger that political accountability would be destroyed in favour of a dictatorship, not least because the leader was free to interpret the dumb wants of the populace in whatever way he might choose.⁵ In practice, the far less radical revision of the organic vision advocated by Disraeli proved much more influential. Although he shared Burke's belief that 'no society is safe unless there is a public recognition of the providential government of the world', Disraeli also shared Carlyle's fear that industrialism would divide Britain unless 'some reduction of [the multitude's] hours of labour' and some 'humanis[ing] of their toil' occurred.⁶ He responded by accepting the need for a more interventionist state, on the one hand, whilst simultaneously democratizing, rather than abolishing, the existing constitution by extending the suffrage beyond the middle class, on the other.

Although Disraeli's 'one nation' ideal was to provide a successful means of winning mass support for the Conservative party during the next century, deep misgivings about the likely long-term consequences of his accommodation with mass democracy were expressed by some conservatives. Lord Salisbury, for example, maintained that it would not only undermine Burke's commitment to a system of constitutional checks and balances but would also ultimately destroy whatever organic social tendencies still existed. In a dramatic essay entitled 'Disintegration', Salisbury argued that the extension of the suffrage would shift power away from the House of Commons to the prime minister, who would be

able to claim a popular mandate enjoyed by no other component of the constitution. Since this mandate would be based on the votes of a majority who were poor, however, the destruction of the balanced constitution would be accompanied by an attack on property that would eventually strangle the goose that laid the golden eggs. The final result would be that, far from welding the two nations into an harmonious organic society, Disraeli's reforms would divide the populace into haves and have-nots. Although Salisbury's pessimism proved to be exaggerated, his fears about the dangers for limited politics created by mass democracy acquired renewed relevance in the decades after the Second World War, when variations of the so-called 'middle way' strategy outlined in Britain by Harold Macmillan in a book of that name were adopted by European governments at large (Macmillan 1938).

In Germany, for example, it took the form of a 'social market economy' defended by such thinkers as Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm. Other influential continental proponents included the Swiss thinker, Wilhelm Röpke (1971). Perhaps the best indication of the difference between the British and the continental conception of the middle way, however, was the Christian democratic ideal of the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, which made religion central in a way alien to British social democratic thought but widespread amongst continental thinkers (Maritain 1938). The combination of socialist sympathies with a rejection of secular humanist culture and a conservative stress on authority and traditional institutions like the family and the church found in Maritain's work was characteristic of the Christian democratic parties which dominated political life in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in much of the postwar era.

It was in response to this development that the New Right acquired influence during the 1970s due to several concerns. One of the most important, eloquently aired in the UK by the conservative publicist Samuel Brittan, was the fear that the parliamentary constitution was being replaced by a corporatist system of rule consisting of private bargains made between the government, leading industrialists, and trade unions for which none of the participants was responsible to the nation (Brittan 1989). Other major concerns were about the relentless increase in the state's share of the gross national product; about rising inflation; about growing welfare dependency, family breakdown and the emergence of an 'underclass' unlikely ever to be integrated into the dominant social order; and, last but not least, about the loss of a distinct conservative identity. Although the middle way compromise had brought conservatism electoral success, opinion polls in Britain indicated that it had left many electors

unable to distinguish moderate conservatism from moderate forms of socialism.

Far from being an intellectually homogeneous movement, the New Right contained at least three conflicting responses to the breakdown of the social democratic consensus. One consists of a reformulation of the organic position, represented for example by the British philosopher Roger Scruton. This reformulation involves, in particular, restoring to national sentiment a political centrality which it has lost since the Second World War partly because it was discredited by fascism, and partly because it was still further discredited by the postwar tendency to favour supranational institutions. For Scruton, however, a shared sense of national identity is the only possible bond for modern European states, all of which are 'societies of strangers' that need to create a sense of a genuine 'we' in order for their citizens to trust and tolerate each other, as well as adopt laws about which they may deeply disagree. The sense of national loyalty, Scruton emphasizes, must be clearly distinguished from nationalism. Whereas national loyalty 'involves a love of home and a preparedness to defend it', nationalism 'is a belligerent ideology, which uses national symbols in order to conscript the people to war'. Far from being a militant nationalism, the aim of national loyalty is to unite religion and culture in a way that gives concrete reality to 'the Burkean contract between the living, the dead and the unborn'. This can only be done, however, if the rulers 'listen to the dead' and serve as 'fit guardians of the unborn' (Scruton 2006: 7–9, 15, 207).

The main problem presented by Scruton's organic version of New Right ideology is that it implicitly identifies conservatism with the Hegelian enterprise of enabling men to feel at home in the world. Not only is a consensus about what such a feeling involves unlikely in a multicultural society, however, but to pursue it politically also endangers the rule of law, since the only identity which this can provide is a purely formal or impersonal one based on legal status. In short, the Tory version of the New Right creates an unresolved tension between the ideal of civil association, on the one hand, and the desire, on the other, for an organic national identity not only sensitive to the dead and the unborn, but ultimately giving meaning to life.

A second version of New Right ideology was based on defending the free market, rather than on commitment to a national cultural identity. The most influential exponent of this version was F. A. Hayek, despite the fact that he himself insisted that he was not a conservative at all but an 'unrepentant Old Whig' defender of liberalism who rejects conservatism because it is hostile (in his view) to the growth of the new knowledge upon which the progress of civilization depends (Hayek 2009: 353, 349). Why was it, one must ask, that

despite his liberal commitment, Hayek's work was nevertheless hailed as an inspiration by notable New Right politicians?⁷

The answer lies in Hayek's powerful critique of the postwar social democratic consensus as grounded on the mistaken assumption that there can be a stable middle way compromise between fully-fledged collectivism and the free market. In reality, there can be no such middle way, only an irresistible movement towards more and more planning inspired by the belief that the inevitable failure of each plan can be remedied by still more planning. This mistaken faith in planning, Hayek maintained, is rooted in a misunderstanding about the nature of practical knowledge which goes back as far as Descartes. It consists in the belief that it is possible for knowledge of the entire economic resources of the social order to be collected and made available for central planning. In reality, practical knowledge is necessarily dispersed throughout society and can only be coordinated by the market, which is best understood as a computer network system (or invisible hand, to use Adam Smith's image) for developing and allocating resources efficiently. What especially appealed to conservative thinkers was the anti-rationalist emphasis which this led Hayek to place on custom and tradition, rather than planning, as the principal forces integrating the social order.

In addition to misunderstanding the nature of practical knowledge, Hayek maintained, the social democratic belief in planning ignores the fact that there is no objective way of determining the 'social justice' at which it aims. This term merely conceals arbitrary policy preferences which gradually, Hayek argued in *The Road to Serfdom*, bring about the self-destruction of the liberal democracies through the constant erosion of liberty, as well as stifling the conditions for material and intellectual progress (Hayek 1944). The real enemy today, in other words, is the destruction of freedom by well-intended social democratic planners, rather than by malign dictators of the inter-war kind.

Hayek's misgivings about the good intentions of politicians, it may be noted, were not new. Over a century earlier, a conservative thinker with deep liberal sympathies, Alexis de Tocqueville, had argued that modern mass democracies might well prove to be self-destructive if their citizens preferred equality and comfort to liberty (Stone and Mennell 1980: 348–80). In that event, he observed, modern citizens would be quite willing to accept arbitrary government and state dependency, provided they took a paternalistic form. The result, de Tocqueville prophesied, would be a novel form of benign despotism which would still remain despotism, no matter how good the intentions of the rulers might be. Hayek, however, responded to this danger in a very different way from De

Tocqueville. Whereas de Tocqueville regarded the only remedy as civic education through active participation in local government, Hayek maintained that liberty will only survive if it is realized that 'Law, liberty and property are an inseparable trinity' (Hayek 1982: vol. 1, 107). In different words, liberty is indivisible, and freedom is therefore impossible without capitalism.

Although Hayek was committed to the free market, he rejected the ideal of *laissez-faire*. Welfare provision, he maintained, was desirable, provided that it was a safety net for those faced by occasional crises, rather than a universal cradle to grave system. In addition, it should be funded on the insurance principle, rather than as a supposedly free good provided out of general taxation. The state, furthermore, should never be a monopoly provider of welfare services. Finally, the state should not be given unrestricted control of the money supply, since no democratic government will be able to resist sacrificing national to party interest by using offers of welfare provision to buy votes at general elections. An important implication of Hayek's concern to restore a regard for national interest by de-politicizing money was the key to one of the most influential New Right doctrines, which was that inflation is a moral disease of democratic politics, rather than a purely economic phenomenon.

Conservatives who attempted to make Hayek's thought the foundation of New Right ideology faced several difficulties. Hayek has been accused, for example, of caricaturing social democracy by presenting it as a system of directive planning, whereas in reality social democratic regimes have relied on regulative techniques which do not restrict freedom by substantive constraints. It has also been argued that his concept of liberty lacks an ethical basis, since he appears to value it primarily as a means for promoting progress (Forsyth 1988: 235–50). He has been accused, in addition, of failing to realize that the market economy fosters an acquisitive character that erodes the moral values upon which its own existence depends. In practice, however, the main limitation of the free market version of New Right ideology was its unattractiveness to modern electorates in conditions of economic crisis, when dependence on unemployment benefit left little sympathy for 'rolling back the state', which one of Hayek's best known admirers, Mrs Thatcher, proclaimed to be her mission. Thatcher's failure, however, should not obscure Hayek's more lasting importance, which was in redirecting the postwar political debate from distribution, which had been the central concern of social democracy, to production, without which there can be nothing to distribute. The ability of socialists, as well as conservatives, to learn that lesson was to be a vital part of the electoral success of New Labour in 1997.

A third version of New Right ideology attempted to deal with the breakdown

of the social democratic consensus by reviving the ideal of civil association originally developed by Hobbes in the early modern period. The essence of that ideal, as John Gray succinctly expressed it, was to construct 'a form of political solidarity that does not depend on a shared moral community, but only on the mutual recognition of civilized men and women'. A state of this kind 'is strong but small', being one in which 'the little that is not privatized is centralized'; in which diverse religious and cultural traditions are left at liberty so long as their practitioners do not disturb the common peace; and in which the concern of government is not with truth, or abstract rights, or with progress or general welfare, but with the essentially limited task of 'securing a non-instrumental peace [that] creates the possibility of civil association' (Gray 1988: 44). As Gray himself subsequently acknowledged, however, three major problems confront any attempt to restate conservative ideology in terms of the classical Hobbesian ideal of civil association.

One problem is that the non-instrumental perspective which civil association presupposes is almost completely lacking in modern western cultures, which are mainly devoted to self-realization and prosperity (Gray 1995: 181–2). The second is that the ideal is too formal or 'thin' to cope with such contemporary difficulties as the destruction of community ties to which Gray himself has drawn attention (Gray 1995: 8). The third is that, in increasingly multicultural societies, the legal concept of citizenship upon which the civil ideal rests is too impersonal to appeal to many non-western members. Consequent pessimism about the practical relevance of civil association is reinforced by the disillusion displayed by Michael Oakeshott, its most impressive philosophical proponent, towards the end of his life.⁸ There is, however, one vital aspect of civil association which some contemporary conservative thinkers believe remains relevant even in an overwhelmingly instrumental culture. This is a concern for constitutionalism, especially in so far as it entails the maintenance of a separation of powers.

The traditional conservative commitment to constitutional government, Ferdinand Mount has argued, has suffered in particular from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which has dominated British constitutional theory since it was formulated by Dicey during the second half of the nineteenth century. This doctrine, he maintains, has resulted in a 'shrivelled and corrupted understanding of the British Constitution' which leaves no place for the separation of (overlapping) powers and has resulted, in particular, in the erosion of an independent judiciary and the destruction of local government (Mount 1993). Mount's constitutional conservatism has been criticized, however, on

several grounds. In the first place, Mount has been accused of neglecting the underlying cultural problem which accounts for the erosion of a balanced constitution, which is 'the prevailing belief that government knows best' (Moore 1992). Secondly, he has been accused of ignoring the great merit of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which is that it has made the British state sufficiently flexible to respond rapidly and effectively to whatever challenges confront it. As Ronald Butt remarks, 'Mount wants, above all, to have our liberties in writing, yet our flexible, unwritten constitution, combining concrete amendable laws with clear general principles of political behaviour, has served us well' (Butt 1992). Although mistakes have sometimes been made, such as the forcing through of the poll tax by Mrs Thatcher against many misgivings in her party, these have usually been correctable. Finally, conservatism rooted in the old constitutional tradition has provoked the objection that the inherited ideal of a balanced constitution no longer fits the modern democratic state, which requires a conception of balance based on popular participation in politics. Recent decades, it has been argued, have in fact seen the beginnings of a new constitutionalism of this kind (Bogdanor 2009).

It is instructive to consider at this point the parallel search for a conservative alternative to the collectivist consensus which has been pursued in the United States. There, the search was initially inspired by dissatisfaction with the heritage of Roosevelt's New Deal, and subsequently by concern about Lyndon Johnson's Great Society project during the 1960s. The search took several forms, one of which echoed the constitutional concern of some British conservatives. Harvey Mansfield Jr., for example, agreed with Michael Oakeshott when he maintained that the American constitution has been widely reduced to a machine for pursuing happiness, instead of being regarded as a vital constituent of happiness (Mansfield 1991). For the most part, however, American conservatism has been characterized by two extremes. At one lay Robert Nozick's libertarian defence of the minimal state (Nozick 1984) and Ayn Rand's rejection of modern mass society in favour of a Nietzschean ideal of the superman (Rand 1961: 77). The problem with the libertarian extreme, however, was that it provided no way of distinguishing conservatism from radical liberalism. At the opposite extreme stood the New Conservatism of thinkers like Russell Kirk, who attempted to apply European conservative thought to American experience (Kirk 1953). Critics like Louis Hartz, however, were not slow to point out that old world conservatism was totally at odds with the American democratic commitment to equality, individualism, and the common man (Hartz 1955). Despite their influence in academic circles, to be at odds with modern American democracy

was also the fate of two influential (amongst intellectuals, at least) émigré German scholars, Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss, whose conservatism was rooted in an ancient ideal of virtue which inevitably conflicted with American consumerism and commitment to personal freedom.⁹

More practically relevant kinds of conservatism required a much greater compromise with the realities of American life. One was the Chicago school of economics, represented in particular by Milton Friedman, which shared Hayek's commitment to the free market. Another was rational choice theory, used by James Buchanan, for example, to attack state planning on the ground that no government can avoid self-serving considerations which render it incapable of using power with the detached rationality upon which defenders of welfare intervention rely. Yet another was neoconservatism, which was distinguished from both the previous kinds by a cultural and moral concern evident, for example, in Irving Kristol's belief that contemporary American civilization is prone to spiritual nihilism (Kristol 1970).

The moralism evident in Kristol's thought was reflected more generally in the neoconservative belief that American foreign policy during the Cold War had been too reluctant to promote the universal triumph of democracy¹⁰ and, in the domestic context, in the belief that the Great Society welfare project had destroyed personal responsibility. The result, Charles Murray argued in *Losing Ground* (1984), was an underclass composed of single parent families who lived outside the boundaries of civil society (Murray 1984). State action to alleviate poverty or improve educational opportunities will never solve this problem: the only remedy is a return to the traditional concept of individual responsibility. Since Murray does not believe that everyone is willing to embrace this responsibility, however, the outcome is a bleak vision of the future as a 'custodial democracy—literally custodial for criminals, figuratively custodial for the neighbourhoods [sealed] away ...' (Murray 2005). Put still more brutally, this vision involves 'writing-off a portion of the population as unfit for civil society' (Murray 2005; see also Murray 1990). Other neoconservative thinkers like Thomas Sowell extended Murray's critique of dependency culture by focusing on the counterproductive effects of positive discrimination measures intended to improve the situation of ethnic minorities (Sowell 1981).

The harsh neoconservative critique of state welfare measures meant that it had little appeal beyond an élite circle of intellectuals. Greater popularity was achieved, however, by Paleoconservatism, for which Father Richard Neuhaus achieved wide publicity by uniting Christian opposition to abortion and homosexuality with a defence of the market, a critique of the permissive society

and a call for protectionist policies in the face of cheap imports (Neuhaus 1996). Critics, however, found comfort in the fact that increased popularity brought even less intellectual coherence, and only a precarious political unity, precisely because Paleoconservatism tried to fuse so many disparate strands in American life. The same may be said of the rise during 2010 of the Tea Party, whose more activist members derive their inspiration from Ayn Rand's portrait of a dystopian United States in her novel *Atlas Shrugged*, in which the government has illegitimately seized control of the life of the country in order to impose a collectivist vision.¹¹ More generally, the Tea Party has been described as a 'disorganised, devolved, amorphous' protest movement that nevertheless captured, by 'plain orneriness, irrationality and anti-establishment fervour', the contempt with which the fiscal laxity of both Democratic and Republican parties is widely viewed (Sullivan 2010). Although it may succeed in splitting the Republican vote, it offers no coherent alternative policy for government.

Perhaps the main lesson to be learned from the American quest for a coherent conservative ideology is that mass appeal can only be achieved by a pragmatic, issue-oriented movement which is unprotected against the danger of sliding into unprincipled opportunism. In this respect, however, contemporary American conservatism is not unique, as is evident from recent attempts to formulate a coherent conservative ideology in Britain.

The background to these attempts, as Steven Lukes has remarked, is the fact that the end of the twentieth century saw the decline of the left throughout the western world as a coherent political force (Lukes 2003). In Britain, the partial adoption of New Right free market doctrine by New Labour was an implicit recognition by the left of this decline. Rather than resolving the crisis of conservative identity, however, the decline intensified it, since some formerly distinctive conservative clothes were stolen by the left in the course of its compromise with the market. The consequent conservative plight was illustrated by the British Conservative party's failure to establish a clear identity during the general election campaign of May 2010, when it relied on talk about a 'broken society'¹² and the vague promise of replacing it by a 'Big Society' (Cowley and Kavanagh 2010). So far as a broken society is concerned, a thoughtful commentator remarked that 'Few would deny that there are *parts* of British society that are broken, but the sum of these parts does not make a broken society' (Driver 2009, italics in original). More troubling, however, was the fact that the precise nature of the Conservative alternative—the Big Society—was difficult to discern.

One of the most ambitious theorists of the Big Society gave it the graphic

name of ‘Red Toryism’, the aim of which he described as the creation of a ‘new model of public-sector delivery’ in which services

could be provided by social enterprises ... led by front-line workers, owned by them and the communities they serve. These new social businesses would exchange (often illusory) economies of scale for the real economies that derive from empowered workers and an engaged public. (Blond 2010: 241)

In addition, ‘new employee- and community-owned ‘civil companies’ ... would deliver the services previously monopolised by the state’ (Blond 2010: 241).

To sceptics, this was merely empty rhetoric permitting conservative governments to dump social services onto voluntary organizations that could not possibly deal with the problems of a modern industrial society (Raban 2010: 23). To sympathizers, however, it was an indication that conservatives intended to promote the restoration of civil society in an era when the state could no longer afford the welfare commitments it had funded in earlier decades. What the Big Society project made especially clear, however, was the paradox of seeking to cut back the state and recreate civil society ‘from above’—that is, by a ‘libertarian paternalism’ which may mean yet more centralization and government expenditure.¹³

Perhaps the most powerful criticism of conservatism in the new century was that the need for massive welfare reform and extensive overhaul of the regulation of financial institutions risked transforming it into a ‘modernizing’ project that marked the final disintegration, rather than the implementation, of a distinctively conservative identity. Attempts to extend conservative concerns to such issues as the environment and aid to poorer nations did nothing to remedy this situation, since these were concerns shared by the opposition. The main consideration in the British case, Peter Osborne remarked, was that despite David Cameron’s Establishment credentials, he was a core member of the cross-party ‘modernizing’ movement which unites the contemporary British Conservative Party with the Blairite wing of New Labour. The members of this movement, Osborne observed, are notable primarily for their lack of political principle and skill in ‘political technology’—that is, in using focus groups, psephological methods, voter targeting, and consumer advertising to manipulate voters rather than present them directly with mainstream political concerns (Lee and Beech 2009: viii). Although conservatism of this kind treats constitutional concerns in a purely instrumental way, it may nevertheless be the case that only a Conservative party of this kind can hope to win elections.

Which, finally, of the various schools of conservative thought considered

above is most relevant to the continuing search for a coherent conservative identity? If the reactionary yearning for a lost utopia is discounted, then the answer lies in a combination of elements from the three remaining schools, although the nature of the best balance between them must inevitably remain a matter for debate in the light of different conditions. In the case of the organic school, what remains relevant is the commitment to the 'one nation' ideal, pursued in the contemporary world through a welfare ideal now defended by conservative supporters as 'compassionate' or 'fair' rather than by the patrician assumptions frequently taken for granted before the Second World War. In the case of the liberal strand in conservative thought, what remains relevant is the ideal of civil association, combined with a constitutional commitment to institutional checks on power. So far as the New Right is concerned, what remains relevant is an acceptance of the need to encourage economic productivity, rather than to concentrate primarily on distributive issues (such as 'social justice') which take production for granted. Linking these different elements in conservative ideology, as was mentioned at the beginning, is a critique of rationalism; of a voluntarist standpoint which exaggerates human plasticity and the power of will to reshape the social order; of the tendency to treat the power of the state as a phenomenon which can be transformed into a benign and effective instrument for promoting human well-being.

NOTES

1. See Stanlis (1963), especially the extracts from Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.
2. On the *nouvelle droite*, see Eatwell (1996: ch. 13).
3. On the *nuovo destra*, see Eatwell (1996: ch. 11).
4. For Constant's contention that earlier tragedy treated society as merely the background to individual self-division, whereas contemporary tragedy acknowledges that social obstacles are the principal source of it, see his essay 'Reflections on Tragedy', in Constant (1957, esp p. 947).
5. It is not altogether clear whether Carlyle thought of dictatorship as a permanent institution or an essentially temporary one, appropriate only until society is restored to an organic condition.
6. Address to a mass audience at the Crystal Palace, London, on 3 April 1872.
7. A useful collection of essays on Hayek by members of the Mont Pelerin Society he founded in 1947 with the aim of debating threats to free society is Machlup (1977).
8. For Oakeshott's exposition of the civil ideal, see Oakeshott (1975). For his pessimism, see Oakeshott (1983).
9. For the influence of Voegelin, see for example Meyer (1996: 210, fn. 1). For that of Strauss, see for example Bloom (1989).
10. For a comprehensive collection of essays by neoconservatives which is especially valuable on neoconservative foreign policy, see Stelzer (2004). See also Fukuyama (2006).
11. *The Daily Telegraph*: 26 October 2010. The report refers specifically to the admiration for Rand of Texas congressman Ron Paul, the 'so-called grandfather of the Tea Party'.
12. 'The central task I have set myself and this party is to be as radical in social reform as Margaret

Thatcher was in economic reform. That is how I mean to repair our broken society.’ David Cameron addressing the Conservative conference in Birmingham in 2008, quoted in *The Guardian*, Thursday 2 October 2008.

13. For Cameron’s ‘libertarian paternalism’ see Lee and Beech (2009: 25–6).

REFERENCES

- Blond, P. 2010. *Red Tory*. London: Faber.
- Bloom, A. 1989. *The Closing of the American Mind*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Bogdanor, V. 2009. *The New British Constitution*. Oregon: Hart.
- Brittan, S. 1989. ‘Dangers of the corporate state’, *Financial Times*: 26 November, colour supplement.
- van den Bruck, A. M. 1971. *Germany’s Third Empire*. Eng. trans. E. Lorimer [first published 1923]. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Burke, E. 1963. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. In E. Burke, *Selected Writings and Speeches*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Butt, R. 1992. *The Times*, Books section: 7 May.
- Carlyle, T. 1897. ‘Parliaments’. In *Latter Day Pamphlets*. New York: Peter Fenelon Collier.
- Coleridge, S. T. 1972. *On the Constitution of Church and State*. London: Dent.
- Constant, B. 1957. *Oeuvres de Benjamin Constant*. Paris: Librairie Gallimard.
- Cowley, P. and D. Kavanagh, (eds.) *The British General Election of 2010*. London: Palgrave.
- Curtis, M. R. 1959. *Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès and Maurras*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Driver, S. 2009. “‘Fixing our broken society”: David Cameron’s post-Thatcherite social policy’. Pp. 80–96 in *The Conservatives under David Cameron*, eds. S. Lee and M Beech. London: Palgrave.
- Eatwell, R. 1996. *Fascism: a History*. London: Vintage.
- Evola, J. 1951. *Doctrine of Awakening*. London: Luzac.
- Forsyth, M. 1988. ‘Hayek’s bizarre liberalism’, *Political Studies*, 36: 235–50.
- Fukuyama, F. 2006. *After the Neocons*. London: Profile Books.
- Gray, J. 1988. ‘The politics of cultural diversity’, *Salisbury Review*, 7 (1): 38–45.
- Gray, J. 1995. *Enlightenment’s Wake*. London: Routledge.
- Hartz, L. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America*. New York: Harcourt.
- Hayek, F. A. 1944. *The Road to Serfdom*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, F. A. 1982. *Law, Legislation and Liberty*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, F. A. 2009. *The Constitution of Liberty*. London: Routledge.
- Hayward, J. (ed.) 1953. *Selected Prose*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hume, D. 1963. *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Kirk, R. 1953. *The Conservative Mind*. Chicago: Regnery.
- Kristol, I. 1970. ‘When virtue loses all her loveliness: reflections on capitalism, socialism and nihilism’, *The Public Interest*, 21: 3–15.
- Lee S. and M. Beech (eds.) 2009 *The Conservatives under David Cameron*. London: Palgrave.
- Lively, J. (ed.) 1965. *The Works of Joseph de Maistre*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Lukes, S. 2003. ‘The grand dichotomy of the twentieth century’. Pp. 602–26 in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought*, eds. T. Ball and R. Bellamy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McClelland, J. S. (ed.) 1970. *The French Right*. London: Cape.
- Machlup, F. (ed.) 1977. *Essays on Hayek*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

- Macmillan, H. 1938. *The Middle Way*. London: Macmillan.
- Mansfield, Jr., H. 1991. *America's Constitutional Soul*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Maritain, J. 1938. *True Humanism*. London: The Centenary Press.
- Menczer, B. (ed.) 1952. *Catholic Political Thought 1789–1848*. London: Burns Oats.
- Meyer, F. S. 1996. *In Defense of Freedom*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Moore, C. 1992. *The Daily Telegraph*: 1 May.
- Mount, F. 1993. *The British Constitution Now*. London: Mandarin.
- Murray, C. 1984. *Losing Ground*. New York: Basic Books.
- Murray, C. 1990. *The Emerging British Underclass*. London: I.E.A.
- Murray, C. 2005. 'The advantages of social apartheid', *The Sunday Times*: 5 April.
- Neuhaus, R. 1996. 'Symposium on "The end of democracy"', *First Things*, 57 (November).
- Nozick, R. 1984. *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Oakeshott, M. 1975. *On Human Conduct*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Oakeshott, M. 1983. 'The Tower of Babel'. Pp. 165–194 in *On History and Other Essays*, M. Oakeshott. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ortega y Gasset, J. 1951. *The Revolt of the Masses*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Raban, J. 2010. *London Review of Books*: 22 April: 23.
- Rand, A. 1961. *For the New Intellectual*. New York: Random House.
- Röpke, W. 1971. *A Humane Economy*. Chicago: Regnery.
- Scruton, R. 2006. *A Political Philosophy: Arguments for Conservatism*. London: Continuum.
- Sowell, T. 1981. *Markets and Minorities*. New York: Basic Books.
- Spengler, O. 1939. *The Decline of the West*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Stanlis, P. J. (ed.) 1963. *Selected Writings and Speeches*. New York: Doubleday.
- Stelzer, I. (ed.) 2004. *Neoconservatism*. London: Atlantic Books.
- Stone, J. and S. Mennell (eds.) 1980. *Alexis de Tocqueville on Democracy, Revolution and Society*. London: University of Chicago Press.
- Sullivan, A. 2010. *Sunday Times*: 19 September.
- Tannenbaum, E. R. 1962. *The Action Française*. New York: Wiley.
- Woods, R. 1989. 'The Radical Right: The "Conservative Revolutionaries" in Germany'. Pp. 124–45 in *The Nature of the Right*, eds. R. Eatwell and N. O'Sullivan. Pinter: London.

CHAPTER 17 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

PAOLO POMBENI

ATTENTION toward the phenomenon of parties that included a reference to ‘Christian Democracy’ in their name or which, though not mentioning it formally, derived *de facto* from the tradition of political mobilization of mainly Catholic social forces (as was the case of *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* in France between 1945 and 1958), was quite strong among political scholars during the first phase of the post-Second World War period (1945–63). At that time, it seemed considerably important—and almost singular—that forces that were until to then considered mainly conservative if not reactionary (especially with regard to the Catholic front) in many countries (Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Austria) had taken on a driving role in reestablishing ‘modern’ democratic regimes, following authoritarian and fascist deviations, whether long- or short-lived.

Evidence of this can be found in a conference held by the English historian A. J. P. Taylor at the BBC in November 1945¹ in which he offered an interesting, and at the time entirely original, analysis of the ideological panorama of postwar Europe. One novelty of Taylor’s analysis lay in its understanding of the importance assumed by the ‘Christian Democracy’ parties in a context where, he believed, the ideology of capitalism had now been marginalized, reduced to nothing more than a hangover from the war.

For Taylor, the novelty was Christian Democracy, although he placed it in the category of ‘conservative’ and ‘peasant’ parties (a judgement which, as we shall see, was largely shared at the time). Although the Catholic parties had garnered votes from the old right, Taylor regarded them as anti-capitalist and not opposed to nationalization. They comprised a section of the popular classes marked out by a boundary that was ‘not social, but religious’.

Some years later, in 1948, American political scientist Gabriel Almond (1911–2002), who had resumed academic activity after serving in the Intelligence Service of his government first at home and then in Germany, dedicated two important essays to the phenomenon of Christian parties (Almond 1948a, 1948b). There was no doubt in Almond’s mind when, in the first of the two articles, he defined Christian parties as being ‘a new political phenomenon’ stating that ‘what has occurred has been a shift in “elites”’, but also that ‘the

support given to democratic regimes by the Vatican and the hierarchies is *expediential*' (Almond 1948a: 34). In fact, Almond felt that the electoral success of the Christian parties also depended on the merging of consensus coming from the (Catholic) masses who had supported the authoritarian regimes and who were now adapting to the new times. He did not, however, ignore, but actually examined in detail the fact that within those parties there was a group that 'consists of the democratic and social reformist Catholic intellectuals, the left-oriented middle class elements, and a large part of Catholic trade unionists' (Almond 1948a: 42).

What struck him, nonetheless, was the variety of Christian parties: 'Catholicism cannot compare with the communist movement in regard to discipline and centralized control'; 'it would be an unfortunate mistake to view the Catholic Church as a monolithic political force', if nothing else because the Vatican's directives were intentionally general and generic (Almond 1948a: 50).

In fact, when in his second article Almond (1948b) had to deal with searching for the 'ideology' of the Christian democratic movements, he found himself faced with a number of difficulties: on the one hand he had no problem saying that he was in the presence of those that Max Weber called *Weltanschauungsparteien*; on the other, in order to describe this ideology, he had no other tool than to unite most, if not all, under the slogan 'third force' (between Marxism and capitalism), an expression widely used at that time by those parties, with the description of a certain historic route that had led the Catholics to reconcile themselves with democracy.

Though this analysis grasped many significant elements, it was not truly able to penetrate the heart of the ideological issue that was behind the postwar success of the Christian-democratic parties. Almond identified the following pillars of Christian-democratic ideology: personalism instead of liberal individualism; solidarity as an alternative to both socialist and fascist totalitarianism; and, finally, 'pluralism' both as the request for acknowledgement of the different ways of belonging of each 'person' (the family, professional, territorial, religious groups)—belongingness which should be given juridical importance. In terms of constitutional theory it was founded on the reduction and control of state power in favour of regional and local communities. This picture also included the good will that these ideologies showed towards doctrines of economic planning, as it was the state's duty to provide for the establishment of social balance based on redistributive justice.

Where the American political scientist seemed to slip was in the substantial mistrust of the solidity of these ideological assumptions. As seen also in his

preceding essay (Almond 1948a), Almond considered the Church's attitude *expediential* because 'the principle of Catholic Church organization is authoritarian' and went so far as to write: 'A De Gasperi must be prepared to become a Dolfuss or a Salazar if Church interests are threatened, or if they are considered to be threatened' (Almond 1948b: 751). In this case, this suspicion would prove to be deeply unfounded: when in 1952 Pope Pius XII asked De Gasperi to join forces in the elections for the municipality of Rome with the revived neo-fascist party (MSI), the Christian-democratic leader resolutely refused, sparking the anger of the pontiff and almost all the Vatican authorities (Pombeni 2009: 32).

The question regarding the ideology of 'Christian democracy' cannot however be posed today in the terms in which it was considered at the end of the Second World War. If we look at ideology not as a *doctrinal corpus* or banally as a specific 'philosophy of action', but as 'human and social products that bind together views of the world—in the most general sense, à la Mannheim, a political Weltanschauung—and enable collective action in furthering or impeding the goals of a society' (Freeden 2007: 12); and if we interpret it as 'imaginative maps drawing together facts that themselves may be disputed. They are collectively produced and collectively consumed, though the latter happens in unpredictable ways, and that collective nature makes them public property' (Freeden 2007: 18), we would better understand the specific nature of that which can be reduced neither to traditional 'Christian social doctrine', nor to a forced synthesis of the stances taken in different moments in history by the political movements that defined themselves 'Christian'. Both these factors have undoubtedly entered the ideology of Christian democracy, but only as parts of a more complex puzzle held together by two components: (1) the need to allow the subcultures that were at the basis of community belonging and referred to Christianity to find a place within the 'modern' political system (which in turn is a constantly evolving and transforming element); (2) the need to safeguard along this path a 'community identity' that would protect the content of 'power' implicit in the associative-political nature of subcultural aggregation, by imposing a reorganization of the rival ideologies in such a way as to be able to establish a relationship, be it competitive or collaborative.

Though these elements were at least potentially present from the beginning of the journey, they became explicit only over time. It seems, in fact, that the term 'Christian democracy' began to be used at the time of the French Revolution to distinguish those Christians (especially Catholics) who did not share the preconceptual resistance to new times in the name of the traditional alliance

between the throne and the altar. Actually, here too the matter is rather complex: participants in the debate on the crisis of the *ancien régime* also included various Catholic intellectuals and theologians, and the term 'Christian democracy' had often been used to outline the political system that preceded absolutism, especially the Medieval kind. This determined an ambiguity that will persist at length in the shaping of this ideology: on one hand, the sacralization of the old regime was being denied; on the other, however, there was also in most cases a denial of the legitimization of the new which, especially after the anti-religious shift made by the French revolutionary regime, implied being that it was possible to do without religion.²

From here there seems to have come the ideological assumption that will remain at the base of any 'Christian democracy' ideology: the political world, in order to find a form of balance and a bond for social integration, needed religion. From this moment on the debate would have focused on the terms and specificity of this bond. Simplifying, we could place them under two guiding principles. The first accords priority to the cultural level, which can be more or less 'nostalgic': a society will find cohesion only if it shares a system of values and explanations of the meaning of the world and history, and this is the Christian religion. The Middle Ages (i.e. in their entirely idealized version) were a moment in which Christianity, still undivided by the revolution of the Protestant Reformation, achieved this cohering society. Hence, it is to there that we should aim to return. The most famous work expressing this ideology is *Christenheit oder Europa*, by the Romantic poet Novalis (pseudonym of G. F. Ph. Von Hardenberg: 1772–1801), a work written in 1799, but published posthumously only in 1826. Novalis, who was a Protestant educated in Pietism, proposed a return to an ideological vision of the 'Christian' past from which the most diverse varieties could descend.

Completely opposed to this was the other guiding principle, which shares with the first the premise of a 'religious' bond for social cohesion, but which sees it guaranteed and embodied in a historic church, the Catholic church, and entrusts the power to manage it in particular to its hierarchies, which become its points of reference and the source of judgement over the actions of political institutions. The work that can be considered emblematic for this line of thought is *Du Pape*, published in 1819, by Joseph Marie de Maistre (1753–1821). Here importance is given not only to the counter-revolutionary position of this author, champion of the divine origin of the absolute power of sovereigns, but also to his dream of returning to a 'Christian res publica', with the role of a 'great demiurge of universal civilization' being bestowed on the pope (de Maistre 1966: 231.)

One of the main issues that emerged regarded, as can be imagined, the notion of 'people', which regained favour with the events of the Revolution, but was interpreted differently by the various lines of thought. In fact, there was also a conservative interpretation that saw the people as an 'organism' to be taken as one in its different components, each however integral with the others. Romantic thought had for the most part extolled this idea, also arbitrarily made to date back to the Middle Ages, proposing to counter the representative system of the rising liberal parliamentarianism with a return to the parliamentarianism of the classes.

The question of the participation of 'Christians' or, better, of Catholics in the evolution of political progress was posed to a greater extent in France, where the rift between political modernity and Catholicism had been greater. On 15 October 1830, the first issue of the newspaper *L'Avenir* was published: its soul was the priest Félicité Robert de Lammenais (1782–1854) with his friends Charles de Montalambert and Henri Lacordaire. The paper's motto was 'Dieu et liberté' and spoke not of 'Christian democracy', but rather of the promotion, albeit within the framework of a liberal system, of social Catholicism against a bourgeois (anti-clerical) revolution, considered unjust.

This approach was soon to face the firm opposition of Pope Gregory XVI who, with the encyclical 'Mirari Vos' (15 August 1832), not only condemned Lammenais' undertaking, but also established some lines of opposition to the modernization of the Catholic approach to politics; lines which, with hesitations and transformations, were destined to have a long history. According to the Pope, everything derived from the corruption of the times in which 'depravity exults; science is impudent; liberty, dissolute'.³ The consequence was that 'the obedience due bishops is denied and their rights are trampled underfoot. Furthermore, academies and schools resound with new, monstrous opinions'. For Gregory XVI the underlying danger was liberalism, which saw in 'that absurd and erroneous proposition which claims that *liberty of conscience* must be maintained for everyone' a 'pestilence more deadly ... than any other', that paves the way for the full and 'immoderate *freedom of opinion*' that continues to grow to the detriment of the Church and State.

In this climate, the Pope saw the attempt to 'attack the *trust and submission due to princes*', in the light of what was due to the Catholic hierarchical authorities. Although here there is no explicit stance as to what 'Christian policy' means, there is the premise of the conflict between papal authority and the individual conscience of a Catholic that would have later been called into play (Mirari Vos: 14–15).

The problem of Catholics participating in the historic evolution in progress presented itself again with the events of 1848. In France, Frédéric Ozanam (1813–53) reintroduced the idea of a Catholicism attentive of the needs of social outcasts and upheld two theories that were established and became bearers of development during the period of the 1848 revolution.

Although still not referred to explicitly as ‘Christian democracy’, it is clear that these approaches had meaning only within the framework of liberal constitutionalism and which nevertheless, by contesting its inability to solve the problem of the proletariat, underlined the need to hypothesize at least a more evolved form of its system. ‘Democracy’ was a difficult word to use, both because it was a prerogative of the more radical (and anti-clerical) forces and because it was hated by the Pope. Pius IX (Giovanni M. Mastai Ferretti, 1792–1878) had in fact been crushed by the Italian revolution of 1848, which forced him for a brief time to escape from Rome which had remained in the hands of the ‘republican’ forces. The revolution had promulgated a democratic constitution and passed an attempt at an electoral system (actions against which the Pope had immediately imposed excommunication).

Increasingly more appalled by the changes being brought about in the wake of the revolution, on 8 December 1864, Pope Pius IX promulgated the most controversial (and bluntest) document of his papacy, the encyclical ‘Quanta Cura’ to which he had appended a ‘list’ (*Syllabus*) of what he considered the most serious errors of the century. In the encyclical he immediately condemned those who

utterly neglecting and disregarding the surest principles of sound reason, dare to proclaim that ‘*the people’s will, manifested by what is called public opinion or in some other way, constitutes a supreme law, free from all divine and human control; and that in the political order accomplished facts, from the very circumstance that they are accomplished, have the force of right*’. (Quanta Cura)⁴

It would seem that after this statement there would be no more room for the development of a ‘Christian democracy’ movement.

The turning point had come from solid and specific circumstances, which, however, could not fail to require some adjustments to be made to the official doctrine of the Church. In Belgium, the Catholics, together with the liberals, had been the key players in the 1830–31 revolution that had led the country to independence from (Protestant) Holland. The nuncio in Brussels from 1843 to 1846 had been Bishop Vincenzo Pecci (1810–1903), destined to become pope in 1878 with the name Leo XIII: this circumstance proved to be very important, as

the young prelate greatly welcomed the results that could be obtained with the public presence of Catholics.

On the other hand, Christian democracy had also asserted itself in Germany, where a declaredly Catholic party—though not explicitly in name—the *Zentrum*, had shown how much weight it could have and how much could be obtained with an ability to lead solid parliamentary action, made possible thanks to the universal suffrage system.

In France, too, following the failure of the instrumentally pro-Catholic policy not only of Napoleon III, but also of the first republican governments between 1872 and 1875, it was clear that political weight depended on the extent to which one was able to control the dynamics of public opinion.

Something similar had also come to pass in Italy, where the need for the Vatican to remain a thorn in the side of the new state saw the parallel presence of a policy prohibiting Catholics from voting and the widespread social initiative to maintain the compact and incisive character of the Catholic masses.

Here of course it is neither possible, nor essential to our purposes, to cover the complex vicissitudes of political Catholicism in various European countries (the United States remained in effect detached from these dynamics, because from the very start religious affiliation remained confined to the ‘private’ sphere, while on the level of public life reference to a ‘Christian’ culture purged of confessional references was never challenged). What must be underlined is that, from the perspective of the formation of Christian-democratic ‘ideology’, it was between 1885 and 1903 that the term made its true public debut in various countries as an instrument of education, support, and upheaval in the public life of Catholicism.

On 1 November 1885, Leo XIII promulgated the encyclical ‘*Immortale Dei*’, which marks a veritable turning point.⁵ The text is long and complex, but it is a true masterpiece at restructuring the preceding theoretical edifice, while pretending to observe traditional doctrine to the utmost. On one hand, it reasserted that power came from God and that the Church was entitled to give its opinion in the political sphere, adding condemnation to the ‘deplorable passion for innovation which was aroused in the sixteenth century’ that had upset the Christian religion and which was the ‘source’ from which ‘burst forth all those later tenets of unbridled license’, while, on the other, the passage ‘sovereignty of the people ... lacks all reasonable proof, and all power of insuring public safety and preserving order’, and the conclusions that followed were entirely inconsistent with the traditional premises. The pope then wrote that ‘if judged dispassionately, no one of the several forms of government is in itself

condemned, inasmuch as none of them contains anything contrary to Catholic doctrine, and all of them are capable, if wisely and justly managed, to insure the welfare of the State. Neither is it blameworthy in itself, in any manner, for the people to have a share greater or less, in the government: for at certain times, and under certain laws, such participation may not only be of benefit to the citizens, but may even be of obligation’.

Nor did the pope stop here. Not only did he underline that the Church looked ‘willingly and even joyfully’ upon the progresses of science, but stated that the Church had always cooperated throughout the ages to ‘avail for the common welfare’, and actually ‘to curb the license of rulers who are opposed to the true interests of the people, or to keep in check the leading authorities from unwarrantably interfering in municipal or family affairs’. Then followed a call for the Catholics to go beyond action in the purely social ambit: ‘it is in general fitting and salutary that Catholics should extend their efforts beyond this restricted sphere, and give their attention to national politics’ (with the addition: ‘It follows clearly, therefore, that Catholics have just reasons for taking part in the conduct of public affairs’). (*Immortale Dei*).

The *Immortale Dei* encyclical reached the point of admitting diversity of opinion in the political field: ‘in matters merely political, as, for instance, the best form of government, and this or that system of administration, a difference of opinion is lawful’. It was a clear disavowal of the conservative and reactionary component that wanted to ban the liberal and democratic Catholic currents.

This stance paved the way to fully legitimizing the political presence of a Catholic force no longer organized simply in ‘support’ of a legitimate or traditional power, but as a dialectic element within the construction of a new political system that was rising from the tension among diverse presences. From the ideological point of view, the most striking novelty lies in this passage.

One of the most ‘orthodox’ theoreticians of Vatican thought at the time, the Italian Giuseppe Toniolo (1845–1918), defined ‘democracy’ as: ‘that condition of society in which the legal and economic factors, in the complete hierarchical development, are so harmonized that each in due proportion contributes its share towards the well-being of the entire community and in such a manner that the greatest benefit of all is reaped by those classes situated at the bottom of the social structure’.⁶

In the space of the years mentioned, the term ‘Christian democracy’ became widely circulated especially in countries where a specific Catholic party did not exist, such as Italy and France. It also turned into an important weapon used to

counter the new ideological challenge rising from socialism. Since it proposed itself as the only true form of democracy in favour of the working-classes, and in order not to confuse it with the reaction of continental liberalism, which was either conservative or Masonic in character, the ideal-type 'Christian democracy' was created (whether or not it referred to the tradition of the primitive church or the Medieval one) as a distinctive and aggregating trait of the contribution that the persistence of organized Catholicism could offer the evolution of the times.

It should be made clear that up to that time it was mainly the Christian-Catholic confession that was involved. In the various Protestant confessions there were undoubtedly many currents that fought for the social action of their churches as well as the phenomenon of so-called 'Christian socialism', but none of them had the Catholic problem of *opposition* to the public order that sprung from modernity, nor did they look for an alternative 'Christian' definition to establish a different regime (Conze 1992).

Of course the inclusion of the Catholic movements in the melting pot of the political and social struggles between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was not devoid of tension: the so-called 'end of the century crisis', present in various forms across Europe, had led to the radicalization of many positions and especially to a pervasive fear of the possibility of a wide-scale social revolution. One of the victims of this climate was also 'Christian democracy', because Leo XIII, by then an elderly man, had been convinced by his entourage that 'the young' had exceeded in interpreting his directives (in 1891 the encyclical 'Rerum Novarum' had been published, further inviting social action in defence of the working-classes, by proclaiming the legitimacy of many of their demands). Hence on 18 January 1901, he published another encyclical, 'Graves de Communi Re',⁷ which—albeit acknowledging that the term 'Christian democracy' had been introduced to distinguish it from the 'social democracy' advocated by the socialists—specified that

not much exception is taken to the first of these two names, i.e., *Social Christians*, but many excellent men find the term *Christian Democracy* objectionable. They hold it to be very ambiguous and for this reason open to two objections. It seems by implication covertly to favor popular government and to disparage other methods of political administration. Secondly, it appears to belittle religion by restricting its scope to the care of the poor, as if the other sections of society were not of its concern. More than that, under the shadow of its name there might easily lurk a design to attack all legitimate power, either civil or sacred. (Graves de Communi Re)

For all these worries, the root of which in the context of the time is plain to see, Leo XIII pronounced it to 'be a crime to distort this name of Christian Democracy through politics', to remove from the concept any semblance of

neglecting the upper classes, and above all to banish the suspicion that there was any 'intention of diminishing the spirit of obedience, or of withdrawing people from their lawful rulers'. A resolute passage was added imposing strict obedience to the ecclesiastic authorities, especially the bishops. (Graves de Communi Re).

The passage is important because it marks another characteristic of the political ideology of 'Christian democracy': the dispute as to who should have the last word in its interpretation and management, the Catholics who led the political battles, or the episcopacy which often felt part of the ruling classes against which the battles were being fought.

The matter became even more complicated following the ascent to the papal throne in 1903 of Cardinal Giuseppe Sarto (1835–1914). The new pope, Pius X, even more obsessed than his predecessor with the possible cultural consequences of the 'Christian democracy' movement, actually began to demolish its specific ideology, aiming (and this should not be underestimated) to maintain the strength of an organized Catholic public presence. We should add that Pius X, not well-learned and with limited horizons, viewed politics through the filter of the contemporary Italian situation, and saw doctrinal matters from the prejudiced position that believed that any form of 'democracy' would weaken the authority of the pope and the bishops.

So starting from the *motu proprio* of 18 December 1903 ('Fin Dalla Prima Nostra')⁸ he posed the problem 'that the Christian movement among the people be rightly governed and conducted', that is to say, that the traditional doctrine on social inequalities 'according to the ordinance of God' be reasserted and that private property be declared inviolable. To this end, 'Christian Democracy must be taken in the sense already authoritatively defined. Totally different from the movement known as "Social Democracy"...' (Fin Dalla Prima Nostra: XII). 'Moreover, Christian Democracy must have nothing to do with politics, and never be able to serve political ends or parties; this is not its field' (Fin Dalla Prima Nostra: XIII).

In short, Pius X, as was to be expected by his choice of name, returned to the approach of Pius IX, believing, possibly irrationally, in a looming nightmare of 'modern errors'. This belief led to the violent encyclical of 1907, 'Pascendi Dominicus Gregis', in which the vague concept of modernism proved useful for the short-sighted and generalized repression of the progress of Catholic intellectualism. Within this framework, even the Christian democratic movements were suspect: in 1910 Pius X condemned the movement 'le Sillon' (the furrow) founded by the Frenchman Marc Sangnier (1873–1950), which had

declared itself a political movement for democracy, but which did not officially aspire to be a Catholic movement, but instead involved lay forces.

Although the Catholic social movements continued their activities in various countries, they had to abandon the ideology of the defence of a peculiar Christian contribution in determining a democratic political regime. There were no further important debates on the need for a 'Christian order', which would have found its most natural place in a democratic context, until the 1960s.

Following the papacy of Pius X, who had made an organized Catholic presence in politics extremely difficult, subsequent events were not enough to relaunch that possibility.. Although personally favourable to independent action by laymen in politics (he was educated by Cardinal Rampolla, secretary of state to Leo XIII), the pontificate of Benedict XV (1914–22) was relatively short. His incumbency had favoured the rise of the 'Italian Popular Party' of Father Luigi Sturzo (1871–1959), a party which proclaimed to be 'not a Catholic party, but a party of Catholics' and prudently kept itself out of the theological debate on the nature of a 'Christian democracy', although a good number of its most active members had been marshalled during the years of enthusiasm for that ideology, which had found a discreet sponsor in Leo XIII (Aubert 1997).

This was not enough, however, to rekindle the cause, because in 1922 Achille Ratti (1857–1939) rose to the papal throne, taking on the name Pius XI, drawing from the theories of Pius X, and in some ways making them more aggressive. With the latter he shared the thesis, seen as traditional, of the disaster promoted by the French Revolution and the need to restore a society founded on religion, which was to preside over every sphere, including the political. That, however, meant bringing everything back under the direct dependence of the Catholic hierarchy. Pius XI also applied this reform to 'Catholic Action', which was de-politicized (also to avoid problems with totalitarianism, first Fascist and later Nazi) and placed under the bishops, effectively ruining the men who had managed the Catholic presence during the difficult political situation in the postwar years (specifically, in Italy it took place with the marginalization of Father Sturzo and De Gasperi, and then in Germany with the decapitation of the *Zentrum*).

Despite this period of a return to the past authority of the papacy, the 1920s and 1930s saw the relaunching of a theme for the possible establishment of a 'Christian society'. Overall this concerned the debate on the participation of Christians in the work of reconstruction following the tragedy of World War I, this time with the involvement of almost all the confessions. From this point of view, various experiences came together in different national contexts. In

Germany there was obviously the problem of recovering from the trauma of defeat and the debate regarding the building of the new democracy of the Weimar Republic, which involved not only the Catholics of the *Zentrum* (which became one of the key parties of that experience), but was also extended to Protestant circles that, at least in part, had joined the new experience. Such was the case with the famous theologian and historian Ernst Troeltsch (1866–1923) who was already well-known for having published, in 1912, an important study on the social doctrines of Christian churches and groups. On the other hand, the German Protestant world was hardly sensitive to the idea of mobilizing as a specific social group in support of democracy: on the contrary, it became divided between radical groups that included the theologian Paul Tillich (1886–1965)—who had embraced socialism and published, in 1931, a book on State theory—and more conservative groups that instead ended up espousing Nazism.

It was in France, however, that the most important movement advocating the rebirth of a ‘Christian democracy’ ideology developed. Without doubt the most important figure was that of Jacques Maritain, who in the 1930s abandoned his initial traditionalistic position inspired by Medievalism to turn to constructing an interpretation of the historic events of his time that became increasingly more ‘political’.

Maritain’s contribution constitutes a key passage for the development of what would later become the ideology of ‘Christian democracy’ in the period after the Second World War. From a certain perspective, even during the second phase of his thought, he drew on critical positions against contemporary culture which had been typical of the anti-modernist debate, but gave them a ‘progressive’ meaning: that is to say, he joined Catholic critique not with nostalgia for the old regime, but with a critique of the dysfunctions of modernity that had come from Marxism, which he defined, in a formula that later became famous, as ‘a Christian heresy’. He presented the abandonment of religion by the masses, especially the workers, as a fruit of the disenchantment towards the churches due to their not having been able to protect and promote social justice.

Hence arose the need for Christians to cooperate with all those who had the development of social justice at heart, accepting, at least to some extent, their induction into the new political and cultural movement that required the reestablishment of liberal constitutionalism.

This occurred with the rediscovery of ‘humanism’ as a new interpretational code of political culture. It was not by chance that Maritain’s most popular work, published in 1936, but originating in a series of conferences held in Spain during the climate of rebirth of republicanism in that country, was entitled *Humanisme*

Intégral. Here we need not follow the subsequent evolution of this French philosopher's thought, because as far as its influence on the evolution of Christian-democratic ideology is concerned, it does not compare with the work published in 1936. It gave Christians in politics the certainty that they were not fighting to reestablish a declining political system, but rather cooperating in the creation of a 'new world' exactly as the new, more open cultural movements in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s had hoped for (Gehler and Kaiser 2004b).

Of course this momentarily set aside a problem that would reemerge later: when the time came, who would undertake the leadership of this new change? What role could Christians expect to have in this new world? And would that new world be a world fully in keeping with the values of the Gospel?

Nonetheless, this climate for change left open one essential matter: to achieve the 'new order' was it necessary to pass through a revolution, and if so, what type? The reaction against Nazism and Fascism had been growing even with respect to the cultural polarization that had been induced by the opposing passions aroused by the Spanish civil war. If the official Catholic hierarchies had essentially looked with favour upon the 'crusade' launched by Francisco Franco, most French Catholic intellectuals had distanced themselves, as did all the Catholic political currents forced into exile after having lost to the fascist regimes. Even the Protestant churches in their World Conference in 1937 expressed themselves in favour of an ethical concept of democracy against all forms of totalitarianism.

This entailed a radicalization of the Christian positions, which occurred on both the Catholic and Protestant sides. In the case of the Catholics, the most typical representative (as well as the most followed) was the Frenchman Emmanuel Mounier (1905–1950), who introduced two notions destined to become very popular. The first was the overturning of the traditional idea of 'established order', in favour of 'established disorder', which backed the theory that it made no sense to continue a traditional Christian doctrine supporting a natural order of society which included inequalities, a duty of submission to established authorities, etc. The second was 'personalism', that is, the theory according to which the basis of political order was not the 'individual' as claimed by traditional liberalism, but the 'person'. Although the distinction between the two terms was more argumentative than substantial (Pombeni 1996, 2008), Mounier employed it to argue that the new order had to be based on the consideration of persons no longer considered for their individuality, but for their being part of relational networks (be they community, union, religious, etc.) in which they assumed a concrete form.

The participation of various Christian movements in resistance to fascism and Nazism, as well as in a broader sense the presence of representatives of different Christian cultures in the anti-fascist intellectual movement, meant that in the final stages of the Second World War it was possible to witness the rebirth of the public presence of Christian thought in what was later called ‘reconstruction’. In this case, the only thing that could be at its basis was the rediscovery of the essential value of ‘democracy’ within Western constitutionalism, both because this was the explicit ideology of the two powers that had vanquished Nazism (the United States and Great Britain) and because the USSR, which had participated in that victory, also strove to present itself (and was acknowledged under the emotional thrust of the circumstances) as a peculiar form of democracy.

The first sign of this change came from the Vatican. The new pope, Eugenio Pacelli (1876–1958), elected in 1939 as Pius XII, did not seem to favour progressivism, yet took a stand for ‘democracy’ as the best political model even from the viewpoint of Christian social doctrine. This became explicit during his radio broadcast address of Christmas 1944.

In that message the Pope stated that all people ‘awakened from a long torpor’ had assumed ‘in relation to the state and those who govern, a new attitude—one that questions, criticizes, distrusts. Taught by bitter experience, they are more aggressive in opposing the concentration of dictatorial power that cannot be censured or touched, and call for a system of government more in keeping with the dignity and liberty of the citizens’. The pope acknowledged that this system was democracy, therefore ‘We direct our attention to the problem of democracy, examining the forms by which it should be directed if it is to be a *true, healthy democracy*’.⁹

Pius XII therefore began a long theoretical description of what democracy should be, though never using the adjective ‘Christian’, since it was claimed that the version presented was the only perfect form of democracy. It had to incorporate a ‘people’, not a ‘mass’ (hence the ‘true spirit of union and brotherhood’); and the form could be either monarchic or republican. However ‘that absolute order, in the light of right reason, and in particular of the Christian Faith, cannot have any other origin than in a personal God, our Creator’. But above all ‘a sound democracy, based on the immutable principles of natural law and revealed truth, will resolutely turn its back on such corruption as confers on the state legislature unchecked and unlimited power, and moreover, makes the democratic regime, notwithstanding an outward show to the contrary, purely and simply a form of absolutism’.¹⁰

As to the relation between Christianity and democracy, the Pope left no doubt:

If the future is to belong to democracy, an essential part in its achievement will have to belong to the religion of Christ and to the Church, the messenger of our Redeemer's word which is to continue His mission of saving men.¹¹

These words were part of a context in which the activities supporting the need for Christians to be dynamic elements of reconstruction increased, taking upon themselves the battle against social injustice. They also promoted democracy as the best political form that would allow the active participation of all believers, motivated by a sincere comprehension of the duties imposed by the changes the historical progress was undergoing. This trend featured the involvement of reformed theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), who in 1944 published a popular book on the need for democracy from the religious viewpoint (Niebuhr 1944), or Karl Barth (1886–1968) who, already active on the anti-Nazi front, was now relaunching the duties of temporal commitment as an analogy and consequence of religious duties (Barth 1946). In parallel, there are also notable works from the Catholic side, such as the publications of the theologian Charles Journet (1891–1975) (Journet 1945) or the further writings of Maritain. In a series of lectures held in Chicago before the end of the war, Maritain had upheld not only social pluralism, but also maintained that democracy was the political form most suitable for protecting human dignity, and for promoting the common good that included religious pluralism as well as freedom of thought, expression, and assembly—which corresponded to the freedom that God gave man.¹² However, we are not always in the presence of such structured works. Though the title of the small volume by British politician Stafford Cripps (1889–1952)—who at the time had returned to the Labour party and would later fight as an Anglican for a kind of Christian socialism—referred to the idea of ‘Christian democracy’, it was actually a generic appeal for a greater commitment of the churches in the struggle for social justice (Cripps 1945).

The fact is that in the circumstances we have described and with the endorsement of these intellectual premises, the presence in postwar reconstruction of parties that implicitly or explicitly referred to ‘Christian democracy’ was very strong, so much so that in countries such as Italy, Germany, and Austria they became key forces of the system. The question we should ask ourselves is, of course, how much did these parties actually meet, from the ideological point of view, the above cultural premises (and this applies in

particular to those parties that referred to the Catholic church) and how much were they really part of a single universe.

The answer is far from simple, especially because that ideology of ‘reconstruction’ from which they originated would soon be subject to considerable changes. In general terms, the problem of the marginalization of the social components tied to Christianity had essentially disappeared after 1945, because pluralism was easily accepted in that part of Europe outside Soviet influence. Second, the ‘Christian’ parties found that they had become the electoral focus for considerable portions of those sections of society that were previously oriented towards sustaining the ‘parties of order’, in addition to other elements of traditional social Catholicism. In a world that looked as though it could be assailed by some form of ‘revolution’, it was precisely a certain reference to the Christian tradition that could guarantee the maintenance of order.

The Christian-democratic parties were therefore inclined to present themselves, almost everywhere, as the point of mediation between the need for a profound renewal of political systems that the crisis of the war had demonstrated could not live up to the new times, and the maintenance of a system of values and coordinates that excluded all possibility of revolutionary renewal. A phrase by the French MRP leader Georges Bidault (1899–1983) is often quoted to explain the policy of his party, which was to ‘govern in the center with the aid of the right to reach the goals of the left’ (quoted in Marchi 2011: 267). Others quote an equally famous definition by the leader of the Italian DC, Alcide De Gasperi, who spoke of ‘a party of the center that *looks to the left*’ (Pombeni 2009: 46).

These words revealed the ideological evolution that these large parties underwent at the political level. Having abandoned the demand for a space for Catholics as a ‘minority’, they were increasingly oriented towards proposing themselves as promoters of controlled modernization, guaranteed against radical shifts, aiming to mythologize, in contrast with the leftist ideologies, the ‘middle class’ as the pivot of the political system. In fact, with time and due to the success of economic reconstruction policies, they argued that society would have organized itself more and more on the basis of a larger middle class (to include also those who would later be defined *affluent workers*), which at its two extremes had two very narrow segments of the super rich and the extremely poor. In this context, although using different formulas, there was an increasingly progressive acceptance of the ideology of compromise between promoting a free market and securing the space for a state rebalancing action,

later labelled in Germany a 'market social economy' (promoted by Ludwig Erhard, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politician who belonged to the Protestant faith component of the party).

It comes as no surprise that with respect to this transformation, the political scientist Otto Kirchheimer (1905–65) came to elaborate, starting precisely from the success and ideology of Adenauer's *Christliche Demokratische Union*, the concept of a 'catch-all-party'.

Nonetheless, this ideological evolution would not be comprehensible were we not to take into consideration the effects the start of the Cold War would have on it, with the birth of the notion of a 'Western world' as a body of values opposed to the Soviet model. In this context, even democracy became 'Western', and its model was consequently American democracy. In addition, it was not only the stronger Christian democrat parties such as the Italian DC and the German CDU that made a clear stand, but the Catholic Church itself led by Pius XII joined that side in the battle against communism.

That kind of choice caused a breach among those Christians who had promoted participation in the 'reconstruction'. Karl Barth had already refused, in 1949, to take sides in the battle between the Western and the Soviet models: 'As Christians, it is not our concern at all. It is not a genuine, not a necessary, not an interesting conflict. It is a mere power-conflict' (Barth 1954, 131). Mounier, in his 1950 essay 'Agonie du Christianisme?' had again taken a stance against any idea of Catholic parties which, in his opinion, resurrected 'bourgeoisie Christianity' (Mounier 1962: 531–2). In a certain sense the original issue returned within these currents. Their leaders at times chose the integral passage to religious life, as in the case of the Italian Giuseppe Dossetti, or direct militancy within the socialist parties, as happened to the German Walter Dirks: giving evidence of and promoting the radical diversity of a 'Christian policy' as opposed to the dominating principles of a Europe that was becoming increasingly more secularized and 'Westernized' (Pombeni 2007).

Of course, compared to the beginning, this 'diversity' was not the one promoted or advocated by the ecclesiastic leaders who had demanded a role in the direction and even final judgement in political matters. In general, the leadership of the churches at this point had opted for the undisputed recognition of democracy as the system of government closest to the Christian social doctrine. Within the Catholic Church the sun was setting on the will to assert a particular form of democracy that emerged from the teaching of its magisterium. In the 1963 encyclical 'Pacem in Terris', promulgated by Pope John XXIII (Angelo Roncalli, 1881–1963), democracy without adjectives was considered

the best political model to guarantee good government for a country, a statement that sparked the irritated reaction of the diplomatic corps of Franco's Spain (Melloni 2010: 84).

The Second Vatican Council (1962–65) would later reject an attempt to include in the decree on the Church a chapter that identified the establishment of a Christian state as the best political system (a proposal tabled by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, 1890–1979, leader of the conservative wing).

Similar approaches also came from the authorities of the Protestant churches: an example is the document of the seventh synod of the German Evangelical Church (August 1985), which recognized the bonds that tied that church to the democracy of the country (Kalinna 1987).

After the early 1960s there were no more significant ideological formulations on what the wording 'Christian democracy' could mean: the parties that referred to it were by this time 'historic' yet widely secularized, while the exportation of this ideology to other contexts, as for example in Latin America, had initially produced a success that had attracted attention between the middle of the 1950s and the middle of the 1960s, but then did not have sufficient impetus to keep going. Secularization had brought its results and it is fair to say that the ideologies of Christian democracy (the plural is mandatory because, as we have seen, there was more than one) had in fact, beyond all intentions, contributed substantially to the inclusion of segments of the population that found their identity in Christianity within a political system forged by modern constitutionalism.

NOTES

1. The text of the broadcast was subsequently published in Taylor (1945: 575–6).
2. On this, see the extensive analysis by D. Menozzi, 'La risposta cattolica alla secolarizzazione rivoluzionaria: l'ideologia di cristianità', in Menozzi (1993: 15–71).
3. Mirari Vos; accessed at <www.papalencyclicals.net/Greg16/g16/mirar.htm> on 12 March 2013.
4. Quanta Cura accessed at <www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9quanta.htm> on 12 March 2013.
5. Immortale Dei; accessed at <www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/ecncyclicas/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei_en.htm> on 12 March 2013.
6. Quoted in Giordani (1945: 60).
7. Graves de Communi Re; accessed at <www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/ecncyclicas/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei_en.htm> on 12 March 2013.
8. Motu Proprio: *Fin Dalla Prima Nostra* on popular Catholic action by Pope St Pius X; accessed at <http://www.sspaxasia.com/Documents/Catholic_Doctrine/Fin_Dalla_Prima_Nostra.htm> on 25 February 2013.
9. Radio Message of His Holiness Pope Pius XII to the People of the World, Christmas 24 December 1944: opening paragraphs, italics added; accessed at

www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/speeches/1944/documents/hf_p-xii_spe_19441224_natale_it.html> on 25 February 2013.

10. Pius XII to the People of the World, Christmas 24 December 1944, section II.
11. Pius XII to the People of the World, Christmas 24 December 1944, section IV.
12. The Chicago lectures were later collected in Maritain (1965).

REFERENCES

- Almond, G. 1948a. 'The Christian parties of Western Europe', *World Politics*, 1: 30–58.
- Almond, G. 1948b. 'The political ideas of Christian Democracy', *The Journal of Politics*, 10: 734–63.
- Aubert, R. 1997. 'Democrazia cristiana'. Pp. 70–88 in *Enciclopedia del Novecento*, Roma: Treccani.
- Barth, K. 1946. *Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Barth, K. 1954. 'The Church between East and West'. Pp. 127–40 in *Against the Stream*, K. Barth. London, SMC Press.
- Conze W. 1992. 'Christliche Demokratie'. Pp. 894–95 in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. I, eds. O. Brunner, W. Conze, and R. Koselleck. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta.
- Cripps, S. 1945. *Towards Christian Democracy*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Freeden, M. 2007. 'Ideology and political theory'. Pp. 1–20 in *The Meaning of Ideology*, ed. M. Freedden. London and New York: Routledge.
- Gehler M. and W. Kaiser (eds.) 2004a. *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Gehler M. and W. Kaiser (eds.) 2004b. *Political Catholicism in Europe 1919–1945*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Giordani, I. 1945. *I Pionieri della Democrazia Cristiana*. Roma, SELI.
- Journet, C. 1945. *Exigences Chrétiennes en Politique*. Paris: Egloff.
- Kalinna, H. E. J. 1987. 'Demokratie'. Pp. 470–6 in *Evangelisches Staatslexikon*. Stuttgart: Kreuz.
- de Maistre, J. 1966. *Du Pape*. Gèneve: Droz.
- Marchi, M. 2011. 'La democrazia Cristiana postbellica: un'ideologia europea?', in, M. Cau (ed.), *L'Europa di De Gasperi e Adenauer. La sfida della ricostruzione (1945–1951)*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Maritain, J. 1936. *Humanisme Integral*. Paris; English translation: *Integral Humanism*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996.
- Maritain, J. 1965. *L'homme et l'état*. Paris: PUF.
- Mayeur, J. M. 1972. 'Catholicisme intransigent, catholicisme social, démocratie chrétienne', *Annales E.S.C.*, 27: 483–99.
- Melloni, A. 2010. *Pacem in Terris*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Menozzi, D. 1993. *La Chiesa Cattolica e la Secolarizzazione*. Torino: Einaudi.
- de Montherlant, H. 1926. *Les Bestiaires, (The Bullfighters)*, trans. Edwin Gile Rich, New York: The Dial Press (1927).
- Mounier, E. 1962. *Oeuvres*, III, Paris: Seuil.
- Niebuhr, R. 1944. *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defence*. New York: C. Scribner's Son.
- Pombeni, P. 1996. 'Individuo/persona nella costituzione italiana. Il contributo del dossettismo', *Parole Chiave*, 10/11: 197–218.
- Pombeni, P. 2007. 'Un riformatore cristiano nella ricostruzione della democrazia italiana. L'avventura politica di Giuseppe Dossetti 1943–1956'. Pp. 7–73 in *Le 'Cronache Sociali' di Giuseppe Dossetti. La Giovane Sinistra Cattolica e la Rifondazione della Democrazia Italiana*, ed. L. Giorgi. Reggio Emilia:

Diabasis.

Pombeni, P. 2008. 'Antiliberalism and the liberal legacy in postwar European constitutionalism: considerations on some case studies', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 7: 31–44.

Pombeni, P. 2009. 'Il "cattolicesimo democratico" nella ricostruzione dell'Italia postbellica'. Pp. 29–56 in *Quando i Cattolici Non Erano Moderati. Figure e Percorsi del Cattolicesimo Democratico in Italia*, ed. L. Guerzoni. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Taylor, A. J. P. Taylor. 1945. 'The European Revolution', *The Listener*, 34: 22 November.

CHAPTER 18

LIBERALISM

MICHAEL FREEDEN AND MARC STEARS

INTRODUCTION

THE vigour and intricacy of liberalism are situated at many levels that overlap while maintaining their distinctiveness: as a political theory, as an ideology and as a set of moral injunctions for human interaction. Like conservatism, liberalism possesses unusual capacities of durability and adaptability, although it has also been particularly successful in penetrating other political ideologies, as well as having been falsely appropriated by others still. Significantly, it has contributed to some of the most important terms of political public discourse and has immensely enriched political vocabulary by placing concepts such as rights, political obligation, justice, equality, democracy, and of course liberty itself at centre stage. More than any other ideology, it has paved the way to the implementation of modern political practices in its methods of governing as well as in its slow but steady drive towards a social inclusiveness that embraces individual recognition and participation, as well as in its resolute commitment to safeguarding fundamental human well-being.

Liberalism is both the dominant ideology of the developed world and one of the most misunderstood. While ideologists, philosophers, and historians of political thought often proceed as if their accounts of liberalism are uncontentious, they produce manifold contrasting accounts, disagreeing on multiple axes of interpretation. It is thus crucial to recognize that liberalism is not a single phenomenon, but an assembly of family resemblances, with a rich and complex historical story and with numerous contrasting contemporary formations. Any student coming to liberalism afresh today will need to be able both to trace the similarities and the contrasts, as well as to realize that efforts to control the language of liberalism mark one of the most frequently employed devices in contemporary political life across the developed world and beyond.

All efforts to understand the nature of liberal ideology demand, therefore, that we make some sense of this multiplicity and contestation. It is helpful to begin by noting that there are elements of liberalism that are widely accepted. Despite its multiple varieties, liberalism is often described as an individualist creed, celebrating a particular form of freedom and autonomy, involving the

development and protection of systems of individual rights, social equality, and constraints on the interventions of social and political power. It would be an error, however, to think that this common rendering of its content was uncontroversial. Even within single countries, such as the United States, the programmatic recommendations and principled commitments of movements that describe themselves and are described by others as liberal have shifted dramatically across times. Indeed, multiple liberalisms often seem to jostle for position at the very same moment in political debate. Liberalism can often be found celebrating notions of communality, progress and welfare that seem initially at odds with the orthodox definition. The differences across countries are more stark still, with liberal traditions in continental Europe and beyond often standing in contrast to those in the Anglophone world and with diverse forms of liberalism being associated with different types of institutional arrangements.

Providing some sense of order to such a complex discussion always risks doing damage to the richness that accompanies liberal ideology. Nonetheless, an overview of the ways in which liberalism can be understood is needed, if only to encourage the student of particular liberal moments not to be misled by more standardized accounts. What follows, therefore, is an account, first, of the broad historical story of liberalism, second, of the most prominent critics of this ideological form and, third, of its dominant contemporary formulations. Combining this history, criticism, and contemporary perspective permits us to provide a sketch of liberal ideology that is sensitive to its complexity while also enabling the reader to grapple effectively with its common core, its programmatic commitments and its most persistent faults.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

As an ideology, a fully-fledged liberalism began to be discernible in the early nineteenth century—notably in the post-Napoleonic world of Spain, where the term ‘liberal’ first became avowedly political, moving from adjective to noun around 1810, and initially indicating independence from absolutism and despotism (Merquior 1991: 2). In France, too, the ‘generosity’ earlier denoted by the adjective ‘liberal’ was transformed into a broader association with enlightenment ideals and ‘*idées libérales*’ (Leonhard 2001: 131). However, a distaste for revolutionary radicalism and its collectivism resulted in the incorporation, through thinkers such as Benjamin Constant, of concrete forms of moderation, an appeal to variety, representative constitutional government and

the exercise of choice, legal limits on arbitrary rulers, a respect for the private sphere and for private property and security, and a plea for the enjoyment of individual liberty—all along balancing individual rights and conjoined political power (Constant 1988: 77, 171–2, 104, 115, 177, 261–3, 97, 326).

Liberalism came decisively into its own in the course of the nineteenth century, both as a humanist creed and in institutional form as a political party capable of capturing state power. But its origins as a way of thinking about individuals in society emanate from preceding and diverse ideational sources that gradually merged to form a strong and influential current. We might then speak of proto-liberalisms, each of which supplied their particular themes, such as the early-modern resistance to tyranny and absolutism and to specific doctrines such as the divine right of kings, which opened up a path to constitutional and restricted government. These were followed by seventeenth-century natural rights theories that emphasized voluntarism, contract, and the inviolability of agency and its prerequisites as the bases for organized society (Flathman 1996). In its most celebrated form in the American revolution, this early liberalism was also clearly accompanied by a significant commitment to social equality, the strong notion that all individuals (or, more specifically, all individuals of particular races and genders) were equal in standing to one another and were deserving of no higher or lower respect as a result of their class or heritage. Liberalism hence became a doctrine that focused on the emancipation of individuals, and that also percolated into many other manifestations of radicalism—utilitarian, anarchist, and Marxist—in addition to the specific theories of the individual with which it was directly associated. Its emancipatory messages were related to communities and peoples as older republican traditions intertwined with those proto-liberalisms. They were also notably picked up later in certain genres of nationalist and even imperialist discourse—the former preaching national independence and sovereignty as the rousing hallmarks of a free people; the latter expecting the exporting of reason, knowledge, and skill to enlighten its recipients, as well as benefit its bestowers. The emancipatory theme concurrently built on forms of religious dissent that introduced a fledgling pluralism into the distribution of social and cultural power. Liberalism was initially the ideology of the new order (de Ruggiero 1959).

Even in this formulation, though, liberal ideology was far from an anarchistic creed. Alongside notions of individual liberation, that is, were a set of strong commitments to the rule of law, to institutional stability and to at least some moderated form of sociability and social harmony. It was for this reason that the

idea of 'social contract' became so widespread among early liberals, combining as it did an individualist philosophical anthropology that allowed for choice and personal expression with a desire to preserve a constitutional order that protected the weak, avoided the possibilities of domination by social elites and allowed for continuity across time. In theory, it subordinated the state and other political institutions to individual wills, by identifying the former firmly as human artefacts (Boucher and Kelly 1994). Such a tendency also enabled liberalism to begin to assert its claim to universal status as the inevitable outcome of the reason with which individuals were endowed in the state of nature. The contingency of individual or group behaviour was thus always accompanied by a trans-personal claim to constitutional and legal transcendence. Even as the metaphor of social contract dropped away in the nineteenth century, this essential attempt to combine individuality and social order continued.

The nineteenth century witnessed the blossoming of liberalism on many fronts, and it reinforces an approach to that ideology that uncovers its protean nature, so that an inelegant reference to 'liberalisms' seems more apt than the unitary 'liberalism', although that linguistic preference is not normally shared by liberal philosophers, for reasons that will become obvious in what follows. One such front was philosophic radicalism, which married a utilitarian pleasure-maximizing and calculating individual, aggregated together with other like-minded men and women, to an urge for reform and social reconstruction. The subservience of society to rational individuals evident in social contract theory was replaced by a rejection of contract that nonetheless retained the idea of the intelligent design of social institutions that were charged with the delivery of individual well-being and expressed faith in a politics devoid of sinister interests (Harrison 1983; Hamburger 1965).

A second liberal front was opened up through attaching the active human agent to the cause of invention and entrepreneurship. One of its manifestations was free trade, a practice that combined a vigorous, initiative-taking individual whose capacities were enhanced by the institution of private property, with the breaking-down of barriers to human interaction across the globe, and with a sense of a civilizing mission that had become increasingly close to the hearts of liberals, bent on shaping the world in their own mould (Hall 1988; Wolin 2004: 257–314). Weber's protestant ethic was epitomized in a form of liberalism that created its own universalism laboriously and persistently, rather than through the immediate logic of rational inevitability, as it spread over the field of material, scientific, and technological human endeavour. The social and cultural costs of free trade were, however, manifold. At first they were incorporated into a liberal

mindset unable to abandon the paternalism of a pre-democratic age. Free trade frequently mutated into imperialism as universalism was reinvented as colonialism with regard to what were then termed ‘backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage’ (Mill 1977: 224). As for the economic exploitation for which imperialism is now largely remembered, that may well be thought of as a departure from liberal codes of practice rather than as one of liberalism’s features.

Not so, however, with liberalism’s general endorsement of markets, whether created by state action or naturally emergent through individual transactions. Thrift and dedication to the expansion of profit and of economic growth through individual effort were part and parcel of the liberal defence of the market. The ideological rendering of such market freedoms also often depended on the quest for a scientific foundation, embodying the sense that any objective observer analysing the sources of prosperity in a modernizing world would be drawn to the need for a stable and energetic market economy. Here was a new way in which liberalism sought to combine the spirit of contingent individuality—which in this instance came with the insistence on market behaviours—with the necessity of order and predictability, which came here from the apparently impartial and ever-reliable science of political economy (de Ruggiero 1959: 123–35).

Underlying those attributes of a resurgent liberalism as the nineteenth century unfolded was a growing and sturdy middle, or bourgeois, class. If proto-liberalism was the product of the socially dispossessed or the politically invisible and their champions, the very success of liberal ideas and programmes relocated it in the bosom of the rising and increasingly affluent ‘haves’. The bourgeoisie imparted a solidity and respectability to liberalism that impacted on a parting of the ways among diverse liberalisms. Locke’s radical appeal to distribute the right to property was channelled into a powerful linkage of liberty and property (Tully 1980). German liberalism in particular off set an enlightenment-inspired appeal to education, spirituality, and culture epitomized in the term *Bildung*, with a sociological respect for the solid urban citizen, the *Bürger* (Langewiesche 1988). Overarching those was the German idea of the *Rechtsstaat*, one in which the constitutional rule of law was buttressed by a meticulous observation of rules, underpinned by an apparently rational bureaucracy that, as Max Weber noted, could also have a stifling effect on some of the very values of independence and spontaneity associated with liberalism (Beetham 1989). At the same time the *Rechtsstaat* imparted stability and predictability, indicating some of the more conservative attributes of continental liberalism. It was a state-based nationalism

later to be partly reflected in Jürgen Habermas's 'constitutional patriotism' (Müller 2000: 90–119), but one that also located the emancipated and rationally constrained *Volk* at its heart, while reluctant to proceed towards a thorough democratization of German society. Unsurprisingly, current political manifestations of liberalism in the German political arena are centrist rather than radical, as in the case of the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei 2012).

A third, and crucial, turning-point was the move from individualism to individuality, central to John Stuart Mill's exploration of liberty throughout an opus that, while paradigmatically liberal, only occasionally referred to the term liberalism. Mill abandoned the atomistic implication of utilitarianism and intriguingly combined the spatiality of liberalism with an eloquent temporality. On the one hand was to be found the liberal concern with boundaries, with the delimitation, separation, and regulation of human activity that eventually consolidated into constitutionality and the rule of law in order to allow unfettered liberty and autonomy, constructing a personal domain around individuals. On the other hand, that focus on 'horizontal' space was joined by a 'vertical', developmental, conception of human nature that became proportionally more important in the cluster of liberal ideas, exemplified in Mill's crucial phrase 'the free development of individuality' (Mill 1977: 261). It focused on human growth and thriving, and on exercising mental and moral faculties that emanated from the individual but could be actively encouraged by the right intellectual and moral atmosphere. That move introduced a dynamic in which maturation and a sense of historical time began to play a major role, and illustrated the complex interdependence of the concepts forming liberal vocabularies (Freedman 2008).

Mill's paradigmatic association with the development of liberal ideology combined a commitment to human individuality with a faith in the universal possibilities of liberal social science in a manner that surpassed previous thinking. For with Mill, liberalism developed a distinctively ethical character. Liberal ideology, seen this way, was not only a coldly reliable science nor was it a celebration of the necessity of limiting the potential of the state to overstep its bounds. It was now a means for enabling full scale individual flourishing, celebrating the interior life of individuals in a form that owed much to Romanticism, with individuals ceasing to be simple maximizers of their own interests and becoming choosing agents, seeking always to improve their lives by shaping their own response to the external environment (Donner 1991). Such a celebration of the inner life of the individual, of course, only exaggerated

further liberalism's potentially peculiar combination of the specific and the general, the particular and the universal. For in this version, liberalism was an ideology that societies were all likely to turn to as they progressed (although that progress was believed to be shaky in some places) but it was also an ideology that applauded the absolute distinctiveness of each and every individual in an increasingly dramatic form and emphasized the necessity of deep personal reflection, a pursuit of interior authenticity. It was at once social and individual, scientific and romantic, universal and particular.

Mill's own programmatic struggles to reconcile the universal aspirations of liberalism with its commitment to individual particularity are well-known. His attempt to distinguish between a realm of action that was justifiably constrained by others and that where individuals should be allowed free rein has haunted liberal ideologists ever since. That effort has, of course, been continually reinterpreted by distinctive liberal variants. Some of those insist that Mill's delineation of a sphere of 'self-' and 'other-' regarding activities should continually reinforce liberalism's dedication to a strict limitation on the power of government. In this way, Mill gave inspiration to a generation of liberals, especially prominent in the United States, who associated the creed almost always with the restriction of social action (Gerstle 1994; Foner 1998; Morone 1999). Directly to the contrary, however, others have taken Mill's dedication to ensuring that each and every individual enjoys a life of rich texture and interior beauty to imply a far more active policy of personal development, even at the expense of more traditional notions of protection from outside influence. In its exaggerated form, this has even led to a worrying kind of cultural elitism, which denies that those individuals who appear incapable of 'exercising the mental muscles' in the way that Mill encouraged are worthy of the same kind of respect and protection as those who are (Hamburger 1999). Examples of that abound even in early twentieth-century liberalism, with some advanced radicals believing that the absence of education among the masses entitled educated reformers to reasonable patronage, for in the words of one of them, 'the only test of progress which is to be anything but a mere animal rejoicing over mere animal pleasure is the development and spread of some spiritual ideal which will raise into an atmosphere of effort and distinction the life of the ordinary man' (Masterman 1901: 30). Consequently, 'Whenever a good thing is accomplished it is not in the first instance because the people wish it to be done, but because a few men will do it' (Trevelyan 1901: 412-13).

That said, the active and developmental strand of liberalism was directly encouraged toward the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth

centuries. At this time, as Western states developed ever more extensive bureaucracies and as awareness of social pathologies intensified with the expansion of modern methods of social science, liberalism adapted by returning explicitly to its understanding of the social and its conception of the political, even if, as in France, it emerged under a different name such as *Solidarisme* (Logue 1983). The most striking form of alterations occurred in the Anglophone world. In the UK, the new liberalism of L. T. Hobhouse and J. A. Hobson crafted a radical organic view of society in which the health of the whole was dependent on the health of each and every part, requiring reciprocal assistance. The incipient ideas of sociability detectable in Lockean contract theory thus became a powerful notion of liberal community, and were buttressed by an attempt to ground that community in a theory of social evolution as a process of increasing human rationality and harmony, rather than the alternative social Darwinism of conflict and competition for survival (Hobson 1909; Hobhouse 1911; Freedman 1978). Alongside that, Hobson argued for an expansive interpretation of equality of opportunity, including ‘free land, free travel, free [electric] power, free credit, security, justice and education’ (Hobson 1909: 113).

The impact of those ideas on the emergence of the welfare state was one of liberalism’s chief domestic achievements in the twentieth century. Coordinated governmental action and agency were held to be the rational and democratically accountable implementation of a common good. Liberal governments before World War I were inspired by the message of mutual interdependence and responsibility that now entered liberal discourse—partly in response to the human costs of the industrial revolution that increasingly perturbed a progressive conscience. They adopted significant legislation in the form of health and unemployment insurance and graduated income tax. Those forms of redistributive justice, intended to equalize as far as possible the life chances of individuals, were to serve as the foundation of welfarism, developed further by the Liberal policy-maker William Beveridge in his famous Report envisaging postwar reconstruction (Beveridge 1942). That left-wing of liberalism incorporated a vision of social justice as an extension of its emphasis on individual flourishing—a set of ideas mirrored and paralleled in the liberal social democracy of Swedish social policy (Tilton 1990), and preceding the rather less radical quest for social justice in recent American political philosophy (Starr 2007), but one left largely unrealized in American political practice.

A similar transformation of liberalism occurred in perhaps a more emphatic fashion still in the United States where the progressive movement led intellectually by Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and Walter Weyl insisted that

the 'do nothing' governmental philosophy they claimed to have been inspired by early forms of liberalism was consciously dismantled in favour of a much more activist account of the necessity of Federal government action. Liberalism in this variant deployed recent scientific evidence as proof of the necessity of 'plan over clash', with individual flourishing of the kind celebrated by Mill now said to be dependent on the ability of government to create order out of the chaos of a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing society (see Weyl 1912; Lippmann 1913).

Ideologies always incorporate specific conceptions of time, and liberalism was no exception. In the broadest sense its view of human progress was open-ended rather than teleological or deterministic, but its future-orientation was conjoined with an emphasis on the good life in the present rather than as a utopian ideal necessitating far-reaching social upheaval. In contradistinction to the statics of a liberalism of spaces and boundaries, the Victorian vigour of individual agency was transposed onto a reconceptualization of human nature. To begin with, liberalism as a movement was geared to progress in a foreseeable future across the globe, as its message of human rights, constitutionalism, and individualism would take hold. But the new liberals now employed an additional sense of natural and spontaneous biological and spiritual energy that demanded release through appropriate social arrangements of forbearance as well as assistance, with liberalism being held to be 'coextensive with life' (Hobhouse 1911: 46, 124).

All of these tendencies pushed liberalism away from a fascination with the protection of the individual from the evils of excessive intervention towards an account of the welfare of the individual that stressed the importance of a stable social context and a functioning economic order. They were underpinned still further by a cautious optimism that led liberals to believe that the undoubted evils of industrial society—class segregation, poverty, urban aggression—could at least be significantly ameliorated by co-ordinated governmental activity. Liberals were still theorists of progress, therefore, even as they were dismantling the faith in an unconstrained market economy, as was evident in some liberal intellectual powerhouses such as the British Rainbow Circle (Freedman 1989).

That faith in progress was, however, shaken profoundly first by World War I and then even more seriously by the Second World War. Liberalism's response to the First World War came partly in the form of a little more caution with regard to the benefits of state intervention and partly in the form of a critique of its underlying philosophical certainties (Freedman 1986). The inter-war years were, then, a period of doubt, especially in Europe, where the challenges of Fascism and Communism made it particularly difficult to insist that liberalism and

progressive modernity were necessary companions of each other. But the impact of the Second World War was far more extensive. As the horror of totalitarianism became ever more apparent, a series of liberal ideologists, especially but by no means only in the United States, began to interpret liberalism as the desperate last protective force against the evils of pathological forms of ideology and state power. That search for steadfastness was further provoked by critics of liberalism who accused it of a pusillanimous toleration that allowed the unrelenting rise of the totalitarianisms of right and left in the 1930s (Hallowell 1943; Katznelson 2003).

Liberalism in the early 1950s was widely seen both to be under threat politically from the forces of the far left and the far right and philosophically more important to protect than ever. As Mark Mazower and others have emphasized, it was at this point that the universal aspirations of liberalism began to surface most prominently once again. Liberalism, it was argued, offered the only account of why it was necessary to restrain the enthusiasms and pretensions of other political creeds (Mazower 2004). On both ideological and philosophical dimensions, liberals were in hot pursuit of a new certainty to reinvigorate the confidence and aura of unassailability that had once been invested in an immutable natural law, the dictates of utility, or the inevitability of economic science. The one dimension led primarily to a reformulation of the pre-eminence of rights; the other—noted below—conjoined that regard for rights with an insistence on the primacy of social justice. Liberalism thus often reverted to an ideology essentially of protection from evil. Its primary contributions to public debate became the insistence on rights, both in domestic and now in international contexts too. This rights-based liberalism took the ideology in two important new directions.

First, and in direct opposition to the early twentieth-century variants, liberalism became a political defence of the priority of courts and legal mechanisms over democratic assemblies or popular will. When seen as an ideology of protection, liberalism also became directly associated with the political *institutions* of protection. The liberal emphasis thus became that of preventing states from trampling over individuals and groups rather than on encouraging them to create social harmony out of chaos. The practical implications of this shift were not straightforward, though. For as liberalism encouraged courts to take a more direct role in political life, they often ended up challenging political outcomes and social norms in far more extensive ways than the initial liberal aspiration had encouraged. Courts in the United States, for example, became critical of a whole host of existing governmental practices,

contributing to an effective revolution in a wide range of areas of social life, including most prominently in race, gender, and sexuality. Liberalism's encouragement of the institutions of protection thus transformed the ideology once again from one of anxiety to one of activity, just now with a new part of the institutional fabric leading the way and with the emphasis almost always being once again on liberation (see Shafer 1991).

Second, the traditional tension between the universal and the particular became even more exaggerated. On the one hand, the contrasting national histories of the inter-war years made it plausible to talk of liberalism as a particular cultural form. In the United States, for example, John Dewey (in his later work), Gunnar Myrdal, and Louis Hartz insisted that liberalism and American political culture were almost synonymous, echoing the moral and intellectual high ground claimed by nineteenth-century European liberals (Myrdal 1944; Hartz 1955). The reason that the United States had not fallen to totalitarianism while other societies had was thus said to be because its political culture was inherently liberal. To protect liberalism, therefore, was to enhance an already existing, particular cultural form rather than to progress towards a new political order that could plausibly be shared with others. On the other hand, the more general protective urge in postwar liberalism often pushed in a more universalistic direction. If liberalism was to be able to overcome the threats posed by totalitarian ideologies it had to be able to hold those ideologies in check by making a claim of some kind of special status, a status that placed liberalism 'above politics'. That argument required liberals to assert that their ideology, unlike others, was rooted in some universal assumptions about human flourishing. These assumptions, it was maintained, should always trump the more controversial and particularistic claims of other ideological systems (Dworkin 1985: 181–204; Dworkin 2009). Liberalism was at once, then, a distinctive political culture, with roots and history in particular places, and a universal claim about the protections that each and every human being required wherever they lived and however they conceived of the world around them. The possibility that universalism was itself a parochial conception, rooted in some genres of Western philosophy, did not figure in the liberal *Weltanschauung*. Liberals employed the rhetoric of universalism as a way of competing over the control of public political discourse, while sincerely believing in the truth of universalism.

This tension was not only of intellectual interest, it noticeably became politically important too. Within individual societies, liberals were often accused in the mid- to late-twentieth century of not living up to their promises. Their

status quo commitments to the national culture stood apparently at odds with their more wide-ranging critique of the dangers of power. As the New Left theorist Carl Oglesby put it, critics believed that mainstream liberal ideologists ‘mouthed’ liberal values but did so in order actually to defend the prevailing order rather than to challenge otherwise unaccountable political power (Oglesby 1966: 2). Across societies, more tellingly still, liberalism was renewedly accused of being an imperialistic ideology, a national particularity masquerading as a universal form of life in order to legitimate the grab for power that an ever-more powerful United States was engaged upon especially towards the end of the Cold War.

In recent years, liberalism has had to evolve once again, as befits an ideology sensitive to context and to accommodating change. The growing importance of multiple cultural identities in Western societies towards the end of the twentieth century, especially among religious and ethnic groups, has elicited among liberals a finer sensitivity to difference and an appreciation of the pluralism of social life (Baumeister 2000). That constitutes a shift away from their previous reliance on universal solutions to social problems that typified the unitary perception of society assumed by reformers such as the new liberals. As a consequence, major difficulties both for liberal ideology and for its manifestations in liberal policy have arisen. Like all ideologies, liberalism has non-negotiable principles and red lines it will not cross: it has its own ‘dogmas’. Yet, particularly at the domestic level, the desire of liberals to supplement their existing respect for the singularity of individuals with the uniqueness and integrity of cultural groups has led to zero-sum clashes between liberal values. If the protection of the cultural practices of diverse groups—by extending to them the notions of individuality and autonomy—is not met by those groups with a corresponding regard for all their individual members and for those members’ freedom of choice, the conceptual heart of liberalism is torn among irreconcilable decontestations of its core principles. That has disabled liberals, for instance, from offering workable political practices that can satisfy both pro-abortion and pro-life groups, as in the USA, or from reconciling groups who distinguish women from men in culturally significant ways with those who attempt to elide such differences, as recently in Belgium or France.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, a cautious liberalism emerged in Eastern Europe. Reinforced by the revulsion from authoritarian and totalitarian state control, its proponents emphasized a liberal civil society that offered refuge against state intervention and extolled individual rights (Michnik 1999). Unsurprisingly, the social liberalism associated with the welfare state was hardly

in evidence, while features of neoliberalism became evident as capitalist enticements replaced the appeal of civil society with that of market society. In particular, liberals found it difficult to draw upon indigenous cultural traditions to promote their ideology, importing instead simplified versions of liberalism (Szacki 1994; Suda and Musil, 1999).

THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERALISM

The various tensions that had been at the heart of liberal ideologies since the start began to shape the critical response. Like any ideology, liberalism has always had its critics. Some of those are predictable, of course. The initial drive to liberation was rejected by the defenders of tradition and authority, by those who felt that liberalism's emphasis on the individual and her or his creative talents unsettled established orders. The later turn to welfare and to social harmony found its opponents in more radical forms of socialism who believed that the challenge to the prevailing order was not thorough enough or that liberalism was too blind to sources of power other than those found in the state. Postwar challenges came from essentially similar sources but now mingled much more frequently with charges that liberalism was too close to Cold War imperialism or to similar efforts at international domination.

In addition to these general critiques, however, a pattern of arguments about liberalism has also continually surfaced throughout the ideology's history. These arguments focus not so much on liberalism's alternatives as on the hidden dangers of liberalism itself. Seen this way liberalism is a peculiarly dangerous ideology because it in fact delivers the precise opposite of what it claims to seek. Liberalism presents itself as an ideology of freedom but is in fact one of coercion, of inclusion when it in fact excludes, and of equality when in fact it entrenches established patterns of inequality.

This kind of anti-liberal argument is associated in particular with various forms of Marxism, having emerged first in Marx's own early writings and especially in 'On the Jewish Question'. But its emphasis is found in many other forms too. The argument itself has two variants.

The first of these targets the actual content of liberal ideology. Along the lines laid down by Marx, this view initially argued that the anthropological assumptions and conceptual commitments at the heart of the vast majority of liberalisms are essentially exclusionary because they are well suited to the interests of the powerful but ill-serve the requirements of weaker groups in society. Liberalism, in other words, is condemned for working as an ideological

justification for a competitive, property-owning, free-market capitalism and overlooking the interests of those incapable of flourishing in such an environment. This argument took a new turn in the mid-twentieth-century, however, when the economic dimension was replaced by the suggestion that the liberal emphases served the interests of a particular cultural experience rather than an economic class: the experience of the white, male, and middle-class. Along such lines, Joyce Appleby claimed that liberalism's underpinning assumptions always essentially 'devalued the cohesion of ethnicity, class, and commitment' in place of those of individual flourishing or overall social harmony (Appleby 1992: 11). As such, the argument continued, liberalism was incapable of valuing the experiences of others who placed significant emphasis on these more particular solidaristic bonds and the ideology would thus always work against their interests.

The second variant denies that liberalism is *necessarily* exclusive in this way, but argues instead that liberal ideology had been widely used for distinctly non-liberal ends in the actual histories of developed democracies. It concerns the ways in which identifiably liberal languages have been employed—or perhaps better, misemployed—intentionally to justify exclusionary politics, including campaigns of disenfranchisement, inequalities in public service provision and racial segregation. In the appropriately titled *In the Name of Liberalism*, Desmond King explains this claim particularly clearly. King argues that the political forces of exclusion in the twentieth century often employed a variety of liberal tropes—including appeals to the value of human flourishing and to the idea of the social contract—to justify public policy measures that clearly contradicted liberal values as traditionally understood (King 1999).

Along these lines, it was identifiably 'liberal' claims and not the contentions of other ideologies that were employed by political agents wishing to justify exclusionary policies such as immigration restrictions in the early twentieth century and the racially-biased welfare regime of the century's close. Examinations of the rhetoric used in campaigns to disenfranchise African Americans in the early to mid-nineteenth century United States provide the perfect example. Such campaigns often did not depend on some explicitly racist ideology but rather on ideas borrowed explicitly from mainstream American liberalism. Those arguing for disenfranchisement were able to do so not by ascribing particular characteristics to specific categories of citizens as racist ideologies do but by invoking putatively universalistic liberal notions. Liberals were thus found to be arguing that only citizens whose social and economic position would lead them to conduct themselves in the public interest should be

allowed to vote: a criterion which might seem noble and impartial but which had the actual political effect of excluding most African Americans, women and the poor from political power (see Iton 2005).

Liberalism's apparently peculiar vulnerability to these kinds of arguments probably owes much to its position of dominance in many developed democracies. It is easier, after all, to criticize in this way an ideology that is so widely employed that it is rarely present in public political debate. Liberalism's alleged dominance in the late twentieth century has made it easy to lay—however misleadingly—all of the evils of late twentieth century political societies at its door. These are, of course, relatively lazy reasons for ideology critique and are unlikely genuinely to reveal anything of particular importance. Liberalism's success, moreover, means that it has permeated into a whole host of other ideological forms and it is plausible at the very least to suggest that some of its putative failings are, in fact, the failings of hybrid ideologies rather than of liberalism itself. Just because liberal languages have been deployed to defend strategies of political disenfranchisement on racial grounds might not mean that liberalism is racist as much as racial ideologies have been able to draw on some of the stronger rhetorical elements of liberalism and have then deployed them as their own.

Thus, a cohort of liberal pretenders and amenders has emerged, ranging from neo-liberals to some right wing ideologies. In its popular sense, neo-liberalism (see Gamble's chapter on 'Economic Libertarianism' in this volume) has become an umbrella term for a host of policies loosely revolving around the supremacy of markets, the deregulation of economic activity, competition, and property accumulation, while concealing its cultural and ideological roots under the label of globalism. Like its libertarian predecessor, it has pursued liberty as an overriding concept at the expense of other core liberal concepts, concurrently reducing the salience that welfare liberals accord to the state and to individual development. Even some American neoconservatives regard themselves as salvaging the liberal tradition by exporting an aggressive and interventionist pursuit of liberty in foreign relations (Drolet 2010). Those are direct attempts to colonize the space claimed by a much richer liberal tradition. Right-wing populists, particularly in Europe (Austria and the Netherlands have provided typical examples), have a far more marginal relationship with liberalism, often dressing up their policies in the liberal garb of freedom and individual rights, while attacking ethnic and religious differences in their societies (see Mudde and Kaltwasser's chapter on 'Populism' in this volume). The presence of the odd liberal principle in other ideologies is not sufficient to designate them as such,

even though many are keen to appropriate liberal language for their own purposes.

That said, there is, nonetheless, a widespread assumption among many observers that liberalism's inherent internal tensions, and especially the relationship between the universal and the particular, draws it into circumstances where it falls foul of the kind of critique levelled at it. An ideology that claims to be at once a celebration of the free expression of the individual and a creed that can shape governing authorities and their limits wherever they are to be found, is bound at times to find itself with the potential for contradiction. For some, then, liberalism's vulnerability to critique emerges from its own internal confusion rather than from its position of prominence in our contemporary political world.

It is for this reason that it is always crucial to recognize that, contrary to some people's expectations, liberal ideology could never, in fact, be a straightforward conceptual ordering. Like any ideology, instead, liberalism is always comprised of a cluster of concepts that sit in relationship to each other and to a range of claims about the world. There is no such thing as an ideology where all of the component parts are structured in clear hierarchical ordering internally and thus invite no potential confusion. All liberalisms appear to share seven core concepts: liberty, individuality, progress, rationality, the general interest, sociability, and constrained power (Freeden 1996: 141–77). But as with every other ideology, different variants of liberalism understand those individual components in different ways, situate them in different relationships among each other and draw different concrete recommendations for social and political life from them as well. There are, of course, limits to this flexibility. Not every ideology that claims to be is, in fact, liberal. But such variation should demonstrate at the very least that not all liberalisms are susceptible to the kind of critiques described above. Any particular variant of liberalism *may* be exclusive and its political languages *may* be deployed for exclusive effects, but that is not the case for all liberalisms, many of which will be specifically constructed so as to deny the very possibilities of which the critics are so wary.

CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL IDEOLOGIES

If the history and internal morphology of liberalism reveal its essential variability, we are left with the question of how liberalism looks today. Such a question attracts a still further set of distinctions, between liberalism as a popular political philosophy, liberalism as a political movement and liberalism as a phenomenon in international politics that necessarily invites comparative

analysis. It also demands that we respond to an undeniable paradox: at the very moment when liberalism seems to be triumphant in many areas of our intellectual and cultural life, it seems so potentially weak in our actual politics. Liberalism is now somehow both the victorious ideology—marking even the ‘end of history’ in some formulations (Fukuyama 1992)—and an ideology that appears incapable of garnering enough support to maintain a serious political movement.

If there is one area of our contemporary life where liberalism appears to enjoy a position of almost unrivalled dominance it is in formal political philosophy, where it has shaped the terms of debate for at least the last four decades, spurred by the work of the American philosopher John Rawls and his many admirers and followers. Liberalism in this vein is generally conceived as a particular form of *ethical* theory, one that is widely seen to prioritize the interests of individuals as autonomous, rational, purposive agents, and a supporting form of *political* theory, one that places faith in constrained government where courts protect fundamental human essentials while citizens always seek to pursue the common good collectively rather than their own personal or sectional interests. This dominant form of philosophical liberalism appears to be a device to create once again universal ground rules for society, rules that permit a fair and equal pursuit of the chosen life plan of every individual person in the context of a political order focused on impartiality, relative inclusiveness and a distribution of goods and services that works to the benefit of all and especially the least well off (Rawls 1996). For Rawls, this is a ‘realistic utopia’ (Rawls 1999: 5–6). It is a philosophy, in other words, that places strict demands on individuals and societies but does so in a way that they could at least imaginably be able to satisfy.

Confusion emerges, however, when this very abstract and demanding philosophical code comes into contact with liberalism as an actual political ideology, one that functions in the context of real political contestation. For within the realm of politics, liberal political philosophy of the sort which is so prominent in the academy seems unable to cope. No major democratic society appears to have moved further towards the ideals as laid out in Rawlsian liberal political philosophy in recent years and no major political parties have successfully adopted a Rawlsian liberal political philosophy as an electoral device. Although aspects of liberal political philosophy do remain popular in some societies, then, the distinction between philosophy as an intellectual exercise and political ideology appears as stark in this regard as in any other comparative case.

This is no accident. Its admitted utopianism means that Rawlsian political philosophy intentionally eschews the constraints of the actual political world, constraints that cannot in fact be removed through the kind of intellectual ratiocination and searching for optimality that underpin its philosophical method. In order to work more practically in the political world, liberalism would have to acknowledge that ideological acceptance is won not through abstract thinking alone but through the offering of substantive benefits to actual citizens, benefits that, it must be argued, would accrue from the liberal way of life and from no other, and that this often happens as a arduous process over time. But contemporary liberal political philosophy is unwilling or unable to argue on this register and this has had a serious impact on liberal ideologies in those countries where the philosophy has been most influential. Liberalism, at its politically strongest, has always been a creed that is willing to fight against its rivals, to invoke emotional support through claims of history, tradition, or mythology and to insist on the practicalities of its political claims. But liberal political philosophy in its recent guise does none of those. Indeed, it is often designed in precise opposition to them and as a result a liberalism that is inflected by it is unlikely to turn to those features even when political success so clearly depends upon them.

As a result, many contemporary liberalisms lack the political components required to do well in actual political contestation. This is, no doubt, not the only reason why precise liberal political movements have struggled of late. There is a broader range of forces that have clustered together to make life difficult for movements that explicitly associate themselves with liberalism. These forces include the rise of identity politics, the demands of globalization, environmental and security threats and the restoration of religion to a major place in the public sphere. None of these factors is particularly well-suited to a liberal response. Indeed, efforts to provide a liberal politics in each of these areas has often spectacularly failed of late, with difficulties including widespread public dissatisfaction with liberal multiculturalism, the unwillingness to protect national economies, scepticism about climate science, anxiety about the protections offered to terrorists by 'human rights' law. In almost all of these regards a distinctly non-liberal account appears to have prevailed across much of the developed world, with conspicuously non-liberal, even illiberal, responses to these challenges finding homes in the ideologies of both the left and the right even when they occasionally assume liberal posturing.

The difficulty that avowedly liberal politics currently finds itself in is demonstrated most spectacularly in the United States. For much of the twentieth

century, liberalism in the USA was associated with mainstream politics, if generally the mainstream politics of the left. There was little difficulty associated with describing political movements as liberal during the New Deal years or again during the Kennedy and early Johnson Presidencies (Starr 2007). Later in the century, however, the term liberal became almost entirely pejorative. It was used, initially by Republicans but eventually by the remainder of mainstream political opinion, to indicate both an extreme position of tolerance on issues of so-called 'cultural' concern, including family life, sexual mores, racial politics, and minority concerns more generally and a deep commitment to the redistributive welfare state in its most exaggeratedly bureaucratic forms. Liberalism, in this new US context, was thus associated with 'far left' positions at the very moment when these positions became increasingly unpopular with the broader public.

Scholars of the historical development of liberalism, including Eric Foner, Gary Gerstle, and Ira Katznelson have struggled to make sense of this late twentieth-century transformation in liberalism's fortunes in the United States. It appears undeniably paradoxical that liberalism has laboured most as a self-identified political movement at the very same moment that it has both become so dominant in academic political philosophy and has been widely associated with a form of institutional politics and cultural life that now stretches across the globe. But those alternative successes might, in fact, have contributed to the ideology's fall in popular appeal. For it may be that liberalism's status outside mainstream politics is a result of its appeal to the universal and the transcendent while it is precisely that appeal that disrupts its popularity in a more standard setting. Putting that another way, as contemporary liberalism has related the ideology's longstanding universal aspirations to new institutions of global governance, of universal culture and absolute rights and freedoms it has found it harder to remember that there is also an appeal in particularistic dimensions, the dimensions which allow an ideology to relate specifically to the peoples and places that are the substance of actual lived politics. If this is right, then the historic tension within liberalism between the universal and the particular has now been resolved too far in favour of the former over the latter for liberalism to flourish as an ideology within mainstream politics. It has become an ideology of abstraction, distance, detachment as it has become an ideology of the universal. And that is no good for politics.

CONCLUSION

Although liberalism has an identifiable core and a recognizable set of values, its variants allow for an astonishing variety, and it has consequently provided both inspiration and opposition to a multitude of political programmes and movements. At the very least it has permeated the discourses of a large range of ideologies in smaller or larger measures. At its best, it has propagated a secular, anthropocentric vision built around some of the most persistent challenges of social and political life: how to balance the uniqueness of individuals with the solidarity of groups, how to encourage optimal choice within a framework of civilized restraint, how to enable the decencies of a fulfilled life alongside an acceptance of productive human rivalry, and how to remain silent where other ideologies may be raucously vocal. That agenda and legacy are enduring, irrespective of the political fortunes that beset those more narrowly identified with liberalism's contingent institutional and cultural forms, but it is in the sphere of the everyday political world that liberal ideology is continuously confronting those challenges.

REFERENCES

- Appleby, J. 1992. *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Baumeister, A. T. 2000. *Liberalism and the 'Politics of Difference'*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Beetham, D. 1989. 'Max Weber and the liberal political tradition', *European Journal of Sociology*, 30: 311–23.
- Beveridge, W. 1942. *Social Insurance and Allied Services*. London: HMSO.
- Boucher, D. and P. Kelly (eds.) 1994. *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls*. London: Routledge.
- Constant, B. 1988. *Political Writings*, ed. B. Fontana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Ruggiero, G. 1959. *The History of European Liberalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Donner, W. 1991. *The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Drolet, J.-F. 2010. 'A liberalism betrayed? American neoconservatism and the theory of international relations', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 15: 89–118.
- Dworkin, R. 1985. *A Matter of Principle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dworkin, R. 2009. 'Concluding debate'. Pp. 145–58 in *Liberalisms in East and West*, eds. T. Garton Ash et al. Oxford: Medical Informatics Unit.
- Flathman, R. 1996. 'Strains in and around liberal theory: An overview from a strong voluntarist perspective'. Pp. 40–55 in *The Liberal Political Tradition: Contemporary Reappraisals*, ed. J. Meadowcroft. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Foner, E. 1998. *The Story of American Freedom*. New York: Norton.
- Freeden, M. 1978. *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Freeden, M. 1986. *Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought 1914–1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Freeden, M. (ed.) 1989. *Minutes of the Rainbow Circle 1894–1924*. London: Royal Historical Society.
- Freeden, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Freeden, M. 2005. *Liberal Languages: Ideological Imaginations and Twentieth Century Progressive Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Freeden, M. 2008. 'European liberalisms: An essay in comparative political thought', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 7: 9–30.

Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschland. 2012. Verantwortung für die Freiheit. Karlsruher Freiheitsthesen der FDP für eine offene Bürgergesellschaft. Accessed at http://www.fdp.de/files/408/Karlsruher_Freiheitsthesen.pdf on 24 March 2013.

Fukuyama, F. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Avon.

Gerstle, G. 1994. 'The protean character of American liberalism', *American Historical Review*, 99: 1043–73.

Hall, J. A. 1988. *Liberalism*. London: Paladin.

Hallowell, J. H. 1943. *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hamburger, J. 1965. *Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Radicals*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Hamburger, J. 1999. *John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Harrison, R. 1983. *Bentham*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hartz, L. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Hobhouse, L. T. 1911. *Liberalism*. London: Williams and Norgate.

Hobson, J. A. 1909. *The Crisis of Liberalism*. London: P.S. King & Son.

Iton, R. 2005. 'The sound of silence', *Perspectives on Politics*, 3: 111–15.

Katznelson, I. 2003. *Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledge After Total War, Totalitarianism and the Holocaust*. New York: Columbia University Press.

King, D. 1999. *In the Name of Liberalism: Illiberal Social Policy in the USA and Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Langewiesche, D. 1988. *Liberalismus in Deutschland*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Leonhard, J. 2001. *Liberalismus: Zur Historischen Semantik eines Europäischen Deutungsmusters*. München: Oldenbourg.

Lippmann, W. 1913. *A Preface to Politics*. New York: Michael Kennerley.

Logue, W. 1983. *From Philosophy to Sociology: The Evolution of French Liberalism 1870–1914*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.

Masterman, C. F. G. 1901. 'Realities at home'. Pp. 1–52 in *The Heart of the Empire*, ed. C. F. G. Masterman. London: T. Fisher Unwin.

Mazower, M. 2004. 'The strange triumph of human rights', *Historical Journal*, 47: 379–97.

Merquior, J. G. 1991. *Liberalism Old and New*. Boston: Twayne Publishers.

Michnik, A. 1999. *Rethinking Civil Society*. London: London School of Economics.

Mill, J. S. 1977. 'On liberty'. Pp. 213–310 in *John Stuart Mill: Essays on Politics and Society* 18, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press/Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Morone, J. 1999. *The Democratic Wish*. New York: Basic Books.

Müller, J.-W. 2000. *Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Myrdal, G, with the assistance of R. Sterner and A. Rose. 1944. *An American Dilemma*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Oglesby, C. 1966. 'Liberalism and the corporate state', *New Left Notes*, 1: 2.

Rawls, J. 1996. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Rawls, J. 1999. *The Law of Peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sandel, M. 1996. *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Shafer, B. E. 1991. 'What is the American way?' Pp. 222–61 in *Is America Different?*, ed. B. Shafer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Starr, P. 2007. *Freedom's Power: The True Force of Liberalism*. New York: Basic Books.
- Suda, Z. and J. Musil (eds.) 1999. *The Meaning of Liberalism: East and West*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Szacki, J. 1994. *Liberalism after Communism*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Tilton, T. 1990. *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Trevelyan, G. 1901. 'The past and the future'. Pp. 398–415 in *The Heart of the Empire*, ed. C. F. G. Masterman. London: T. Fisher Unwin.
- Tully, J. 1980. *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weyl, W. 1912. *The New Democracy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wolin, S. 2004. *Politics and Vision*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 19

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

BEN JACKSON

INTRODUCTION

BORN in an era of sharp ideological polarities and intense social conflicts, social democracy has often been seen as a pragmatic compromise between capitalism and socialism.¹ As Leszek Kołakowski has put it: ‘The trouble with the social-democratic idea is that it does not stock or sell any of the exciting ideological commodities which totalitarian movements—communist, fascist, or leftist—offer dream-hungry youth’. Instead of an ‘ultimate solution for all human misfortune’ or a ‘prescription for the total salvation of mankind’, said Kołakowski, social democracy offers merely ‘an obstinate will to erode by inches the conditions which produce avoidable suffering, oppression, hunger, wars, racial and national hatred, insatiable greed and vindictive envy’ (Kołakowski 1982: 11). These evocative words give us some initial orientation in understanding social democratic ideology, but they leave indeterminate the source of the suffering and oppression that social democrats have sought to erode. Historically, they have given a relatively precise account of this: social democrats have opposed the power of unregulated market forces to sweep away community bonds, create inequality, and entrench economic tyranny. Social democracy has been above all an effort to constrain, and assert democratic control over, the commodifying power of markets. As Karl Polanyi put it: ‘Socialism is, essentially, the tendency inherent in an industrial civilisation to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 242). Provisionally, therefore, social democracy can be defined as an ideology which prescribes the use of democratic collective action to extend the principles of freedom and equality valued by democrats in the political sphere to the organization of the economy and society, chiefly by opposing the inequality and oppression created by laissez-faire capitalism.

EMERGENCE

What would later be called ‘social democracy’ first emerged in the late

nineteenth century in the labour movements of north-west Europe. Early non-European outposts were also established in Australia and New Zealand around the same time. In nations such as Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden, advocates of the interests of the working class inhabited polities that were characterized by rapid industrialization and the slow, inconsistent emergence of liberal constitutionalism and democratic citizenship. These circumstances created a complex structure of constraints and opportunities for labour movements that differed from those in southern or eastern Europe. In this relatively liberal environment, the politicized elements of the working class could build powerful political parties and trade unions to represent and protect their interests. Ultimately, it was hoped that such democratic collective action would lead to the abolition of the profound poverty and social oppression that working-class leaders saw as the ineluctable consequences of industrialization. The leaders and theorists of these movements, figures such as Keir Hardie, Jean Jaurès, Eduard Bernstein, and Hjalmar Branting, were influenced by a variety of ideological traditions, most obviously Marxism, but also progressive liberalism, republicanism, and ‘utopian’ socialism. They drew on all of these intellectual currents as they began to sketch the outlines of a social democratic political theory.

While important first approximations of this ‘revisionist’ socialism were articulated in the late nineteenth century by the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in Britain, and by the republican socialists led by Jaurès in France (Tanner 1997; Berman 2006: 28–35), the frankest and most influential theoretical case for social democracy in this period was made by Bernstein, who explicitly confronted the forces of Marxist orthodoxy led by Karl Kautsky within the German *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD). Bernstein’s ideas, most fully expressed in his 1899 book, *The Preconditions of Socialism*, laid the foundations for subsequent social democratic thinking by directly contesting the core doctrines of second international-era Marxism. The revisionist departure from this Marxism was in part epistemological. Bernstein was influenced by Kantian socialism, particularly the positivistic reading of Kant offered by the philosopher F. A. Lange, which limited scientific knowledge to empirically observable regularities rather than the sweeping predictive claims made by Marxists indebted to Hegel. Kantian socialism also prescribed a clearer distinction between fact and value than such Marxists were prepared to acknowledge, opening space for socialism as an ethical rather than a purely scientific project (Kloppenbergh 1986: 224–38; Steger 1997: 75–6, 98–119). Styling his revisionism an empiricist, anti-dogmatic stance, Bernstein invoked

‘Kant against cant’:

Social Democracy needs a Kant to judge the received judgment and subject it to the most trenchant criticism, to show where its apparent materialism is the highest and therefore most easily misleading ideology, and to show that contempt for the ideal and the magnifying of material factors until they become omnipotent forces of evolution is a self-deception which has been, and will be, exposed as such by the very actions of those who proclaim it (Bernstein 1993 [1899]: 209).

After undertaking an analysis of the most recent empirical data, Bernstein argued that capitalism was not doomed to collapse of its own accord, as a result of inevitable internal crises and the immiseration of the mass of the population. On the contrary, he thought that capitalism had shown itself to be a flexible and adaptable economic system, capable of sustaining itself for the foreseeable future. While there was therefore no inevitability to the collapse of capitalism, continued Bernstein, it was certainly possible for significant modifications to be made to its structure through political action. Socialism, which Bernstein understood as ‘a movement towards, or the state of, a cooperative order of society’, could be advanced democratically, through the evolutionary enactment of legislative reforms (Bernstein 1993 [1899]: 99). In this sense, Bernstein provocatively argued, ‘what is usually termed “the final goal of socialism” ... is nothing to me, the movement is everything’ (Bernstein 1898: 168–9).

Bernstein was also sceptical of the doctrine of class struggle. In contrast to the traditional Marxist assumption that socialism required the working class to monopolize political power, he stressed that cross-class alliances would be necessary for socialists to enter government, and that socialism was in any case best seen as addressed to the people as a whole rather than as an ideology tethered to only one social group. In these senses, Bernstein presented social democracy as the ‘legitimate heir’ of liberalism, with its aim being ‘the development and protection of the free personality’. Whereas liberalism had historically fought against the legal constraints on individual freedom, social democracy sought to complete the struggle for liberty by releasing the individual ‘from any economic compulsion in his actions and choice of vocation’ (Bernstein 1993 [1899]: 147, 150). Bernstein argued that in an advanced constitutional system, this could only be accomplished democratically, rather than through revolutionary violence. He defined democracy as ‘the absence of class government’: majority rule constrained by the need to protect the equal rights of each member of the community. Once the political rights of a propertied minority had given way to a broader franchise, Bernstein argued, it was the mass of the people themselves who had to be won over to socialism

through positive political achievements. 'You can overthrow a government, a privileged minority, but not a people'. It followed that 'democracy is both means and end. It is a weapon in the struggle for socialism, and it is the form in which socialism will be realized' (Bernstein 1993 [1899]: 140–1, 204–5, 142). While it had been necessary to sweep away with force the rigid political institutions of feudalism, a flexible liberal constitutionalism could be deepened and expanded by the socialist movement without resorting to a revolutionary dictatorship (Bernstein 1993 [1899]: 158).

Bernstein was not very precise about the policies and institutions that could advance a more cooperative society. But the ideas he did offer were characteristic of the emergent social democracy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He was enthusiastic about the possibilities latent in co-operatives, municipal socialism, industrial organization by trade unions, and state regulation of the labour market (particularly the shortening of the working day). Although Bernstein was scathing about the claims of Marxists to predict the future demise of capitalism, he did in fact indulge in some future-gazing of his own. Like many revisionist socialists of this period, Bernstein believed that capitalism was slowly evolving towards a more social model of ownership as a result of the growing separation between ownership and control at the heart of the capitalist firm: companies, he noted, were increasingly run by salaried managers while the owners were dispersed shareholders. This would facilitate a gradual expansion of social ownership of the economy, as passive shareholders could be bought out by the state, though Bernstein was ambiguous about how extensive the socialized sector of the economy should eventually be (Kloppenbergh 1986: 255–6). Bernstein was also cautious about the use of social spending to ameliorate capitalism; he ranked what would later be called the 'welfare state' as a helpful intervention, but ultimately secondary to more decisive policies intended to attack the source of poverty and inequality. He expressed scepticism about state aid to the unemployed, for example, which he feared might merely sanction a new form of pauperism (Bernstein 1993 [1899]: 161).

Although Bernstein was very influential, his revisionism was initially unpopular and controversial among socialist intellectuals. But he gave theoretical expression to the practical orientation of many social democratic politicians and activists, who were less interested in theoretical debate about the character of socialism and more focused on the achievement of practical gains for their working class followers. Bernstein-style revisionism had greater currency within the labour movement after the First World War, as socialist

parties began to mobilize considerable political support and found themselves on the cusp of power in many nations. The Russian revolution had established a clear distinction between two different forms of socialist struggle, the reformist and the revolutionary. In response, the socialist parties of north-west Europe (and of Australia and New Zealand) were increasingly drawn towards reformism in practice, if not always in theory. Before the Second World War, however, the experience of such parties in government was for the most part short-lived and ineffective. In Britain, France, and Germany, notionally socialist parties endured traumatic periods in government. Faced by economic crisis and ultimately depression, these parties had few intellectual resources to draw upon as they found themselves fighting capitalist crises armed only with socialist rhetoric. But more encouraging news came from Sweden, as has often been the case in the history of social democracy. The Swedish *Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet* (SAP) was in office more or less continuously from 1932. Under their leader Per Albin Hansson and innovative finance minister Ernst Wigforss, the SAP built a durable cross-class political coalition that pioneered counter-cyclical economic policies and introduced a range of social welfare measures (Tilton 1990: 39–69; Sassoon 1996: 42–6; Berman 2006: 152–76). Sweden was a harbinger of the form that a successful social democratic politics might take given the right social conditions and sufficient political imagination.

By the outbreak of the Second World War, then, the parameters of social democratic ideology had been established. First, social democrats were committed to parliamentary democracy rather than violent insurrection or direct democracy. This not only meant that social democrats saw peaceful, constitutional methods as the best means of reforming capitalism, but also that they saw a system of parliamentary representation as the most plausible form of democratic government and the mass party as the best vehicle for aggregating and advancing their political objectives. These democratic commitments meant that in the early twentieth century social democrats often led the struggle to expand the franchise to all men and women. Second, social democrats tailored their electoral appeals to the ‘people’ as a whole and not simply to one social class. From its inception, social democracy has been understood by its advocates as aiming at the construction of cross-class coalitions. A form of ‘social patriotism’ has dominated social democratic political discourse, which presented economic redistribution as synonymous with the national interest. As Per Albin Hansson famously argued in 1928, the Swedish social democrats sought to establish Sweden as a ‘people’s home’ (*folkhemmet*) where ‘no one looks down upon anyone else ... and the stronger do not suppress and plunder the weaker’

(quoted in Tilton 1990: 127). Third, social democrats believed that it was primarily through legislation and government policy that this vision of an egalitarian society would be realized (for further discussion of these three points, see Esping-Andersen 1985: 4–11; Przeworski 1985).

Animating all three of these basic social democratic assumptions was a political theory that affirmed core liberal ideals of liberty, equality, and community, but emphasized that these goals remained purely formal without radical reform to a capitalist system that concentrated ownership and economic power in the hands of a few; created massive disparities in the distribution of resources and opportunities; and permitted the interests of employers to dominate the sphere of production (Kloppenbergh 1986: 277–97; Jackson 2007: 17–90). Ideologically, social democracy married the classical democratic ideals of liberals and republicans to new insights into the social interdependence of individuals and the capacity of collective action to protect individuals from the consequences of unhindered market forces (Freeden 2003: 10–20). As a result, social democratic thinking was close to, or even overlapped with, the most advanced liberal political theory of the early twentieth century (Clarke 1978; Freeden 1986: 177–328; Kloppenbergh 1986). Strategically, social democracy drew on the mobilizing energies of new social movements such as trade unions and co-operatives, but harnessed them to an emphasis on electoral politics as the arena in which democratic principles and the market could be reconciled.

The most effective policies to advance social democratic ideals remained an open question in 1939. Many social democrats remained convinced that some form of social ownership of capital, and ultimately a fully socialized economy, was the only sure way of taming the market. The policy instruments that would later become synonymous with social democracy, and had been pioneered in Sweden in the 1930s, had yet to be firmly established in the minds and hearts of many social democratic politicians, intellectuals, and activists.

GOLDEN AGE

The three decades following the Second World War are often seen as a ‘golden age’ for social democracy. This label is contestable—for one thing it overestimates how electorally successful social democratic parties were in this period—but it nonetheless captures an important change in the terms of political trade in the industrialized democracies as they recovered from the trauma of six years of unprecedented violence and destruction. The radical social patriotism engendered by total war against fascism proved extremely influential on

decisions about the character of postwar reconstruction. Anxious memories of the unregulated capitalism of the 1930s—and the hardship and political extremism that it fostered—cemented a widespread desire to build a more stable and just social settlement. The importance of the state in coordinating the war effort demonstrated that the capacity existed to exercise greater control over the market. And new economic thinking provided policy-makers with the technical tools needed to guide state power.

The sources of this new thinking were not uniformly social democratic: liberal and Christian Democratic ideas were also important in shaping the new ideological context. William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes, probably the most famous architects of postwar reconstruction, saw themselves as progressive liberals. But while social democracy was only one important ideological current among others after the War, the terrain over which political battles were now fought was much more congenial for the democratic left. Basic social democratic aspirations, such as full employment, fair shares, and labour market regulation, had been installed as the lexicon of high political debate. With the ascent of Keynesian economics, redistribution, public spending, and progressive taxation all acquired greater economic credibility. As Przeworski has pointed out, Keynesianism was ‘a theory that suddenly granted a universalistic status to the interests of workers’: measures that benefited the working class could now be portrayed as beneficial to society as a whole, because they would lead to greater consumption and hence higher economic growth (Przeworski 1985: 37). And the issue agenda that unfurled from the writings of Beveridge and Keynes modified and sharpened those strands of social democratic thought that had been reliant on imprecise socialist rhetoric before the War.

The first item on this agenda evident after 1945 was the creation of ‘social citizenship’ through what would become known as the ‘welfare state’. As the British sociologist T. H. Marshall observed, the postwar welfare state gave citizens new rights to material resources and social services that complemented and reinforced the civil and political rights acquired in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Marshall argued that in Britain and other industrialized democracies, universal access to health care, housing, education, and social insurance had now become regarded as an integral part of a citizen’s package of rights. Marshall concluded that the key break-through achieved by the welfare state was that citizens now possessed rights to material resources irrespective of their success or otherwise in the labour market (Marshall 1950). The status of equal citizenship—and the needs of the citizen—trumped the class inequalities thrown up by the market. This notion of allocation on the basis of need, or

decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21–3), was a familiar one in social democratic thinking, and it shaped how the welfare state was assimilated into postwar social democratic ideology. While the welfare state was also nurtured by Christian Democrats, conservatives, and liberals, the distinctive social democratic vision of welfare was universal in scope and egalitarian in its distributive objectives. Rather than providing a residual safety net only for the poorest, social democrats sought to provide services and income that encompassed all sections of society. As later became apparent, this aspect of the social democratic welfare state, when considered in isolation, could be in tension with the egalitarian distributive objectives the welfare state was said to advance. Greater progressivity in the tax system was therefore critical to ensuring that public spending on a universal welfare state could be maintained and that the overall distributive impact of taxation and spending was to narrow market-generated inequalities.

As Gøsta Esping-Andersen has observed, social democrats had in practice turned from the socialization of capital to the socialization of income flows as the primary focus of social democratic policy-making (Esping-Andersen forthcoming). The most advanced welfare states of the immediate postwar years—Britain and Sweden—were indeed built by social democratic governments: Labour from 1945 to 1951 and the SAP in the 1950s introduced institutions such as the British National Health Service or the Swedish earnings-related pension scheme, the ATP, which bound together a cross-class alliance in favour of collective social spending.

The shift of focus from socializing capital to socializing income flows was grounded on a second important change in social democratic thought after 1945: the reduced salience of the social ownership of capital to the attainment of social democratic objectives. While the public ownership of ‘natural’ monopolies or basic industrial infrastructure was supported by most social democrats in this period, party leaders and their allies now doubted that more expansive measures of nationalization were sufficient or even necessary ingredients of a social democracy. The success of the welfare state and progressive taxation appeared to show that egalitarian distributive goals could be advanced without recourse to such measures. Meanwhile the post-war economic boom, apparently nurtured by Keynesian economics, was taken as evidence that full (male) employment and economic stability could be maintained under a broadly market-based system, provided that the private sector was embedded within a framework of government regulation, and where necessary subject to state intervention. Expansionary fiscal policy, some social democrats now believed, could sustain

economic demand during a downturn and prevent a return to the mass unemployment of the 1930s. It is doubtful whether the discretionary government policies conventionally labelled as 'Keynesian' in fact played an important role in stoking the postwar boom, but the rise of the welfare state and the associated growth of public spending probably did make a significant contribution to boosting aggregate demand and stabilizing the business cycle (Glyn 1995: 42).

Earlier generations of socialists had supported public ownership for one further reason: as a means of placing the democratic control of industry in the hands of the workers rather than the owners. Social democrats had always been uneasy about the most radical versions of this argument advanced by syndicalists or guild socialists. But they nonetheless agreed that the workplace should not be the privileged fiefdom of managers and owners, and hoped that the culture of the workplace might be reformed so that it was based on bargaining and negotiation rather than autocracy. The new capitalism that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s was believed by some social democrats to demonstrate that such reforms would be possible without resorting to outright public ownership. Indeed, it was argued by certain social democrats that ownership had actually become irrelevant to who controlled the workplace, on the grounds that there was a growing split in capitalist enterprises between ownership and control: firms were now run by a salaried management class while the owners were passive shareholders. This was not a new empirical insight—we have seen that Bernstein had already made a similar observation. But the conclusion that mid-twentieth-century revisionists drew from this sociological finding was quite different from their predecessors. Earlier revisionists had believed that the rise of the passive shareholder and the large corporation would make it relatively painless to buy out shareholders and substitute public for private ownership. But for later revisionists, the split between ownership and control signified that the real issue was not who owned a company—since this in fact seemed to be irrelevant to who controlled it—but rather how to secure greater democratic accountability within both private and public industrial organizations (Brooke 1991; Sassoon 1996: 246–7). Enhanced collective bargaining rights for trade unions, and the representation of workers in both industrial and political decision-making, could therefore be presented as an advance towards economic democracy, regardless of who actually owned the means of production.

In the wake of the Second World War, this corporatist style of economic management became embedded within the policy-making apparatus of the industrialized democracies, and it became a commonplace of social democratic rhetoric that organized labour helped to promote a stable democratic political

culture. The introduction of constitutional government in industry through collective bargaining and other forms of workplace representation was said to act as a check on the accretion of totalitarian concentrations of power (Clegg 1960; Jackson 2012).

But since this formula of ‘the welfare state plus Keynes plus corporatism’ had apparently made such remarkable progress in reducing economic hardship, narrowing class inequality, promoting full employment, and amplifying the democratic voice of workers, then the need to promote the public ownership of industry seemed correspondingly less urgent. Thinking through the implications of these developments led to a new bout of revisionism in social democratic circles in the 1950s and 1960s. The catalyst for this rethinking was often electoral—successive defeats for the SPD and the Labour Party in the 1950s meant that doctrinal iconoclasm was particularly feverish in West Germany and Britain—but the underlying issues were of real ideological substance. Confronted by the threat of the communist bloc, social democrats ostentatiously settled their accounts with Marxism, distancing themselves from a classical socialist outlook that prioritized collective ownership as the definitive socialist end goal. We have seen that Bernstein famously distinguished between socialist ends and means, suggesting that the means—by which he meant gradual reforms to capitalism—were of greater significance to him than the traditional socialist end goal, the ultimate attainment of a qualitatively different form of society. But in another sense Bernstein had also seen socialist means and ends as intertwined: the gradual reforms enacted through democratic procedures advanced the ethical objectives of socialism. This style of thinking about the relationship between means and ends became an important feature of the new social democratic revisionism of the 1950s. Socialist ends were portrayed as ethical ideals—such as ‘freedom, justice and solidarity’ in the SPD’s famous 1959 Bad Godesberg programme—which could then be advanced through a variety of different means, with the precise selection of policies that could best advance these ends left as a pragmatic matter, dependent on political conditions (SPD 1959: 7). What were once seen as short-term objectives on the road to a qualitatively different form of society—a more equal distribution of wealth, stable economic growth, full employment—were now said to be exhaustive of the ambitions of social democracy.

The most famous—and intellectually sophisticated—statement of this case was set out by the British Labour politician Anthony Crosland in his 1956 book, *The Future of Socialism*. Like Bernstein, Crosland aroused considerable opposition within his own party, but in the longer run his vision of social

democracy proved to be highly influential in Britain, and accurate in its assessment of the future path of social democratic ideology in all of the industrialized democracies. Crosland set out to define a viable modern democratic socialism by distilling the aspirations that he thought had underpinned the most important intellectual currents on the British left over the previous 150 years or so. In Crosland's view, British socialism was the legatee of an eclectic group of doctrines: the philosophy of natural law; Owenism; the labour theory of value (or Ricardian socialism); Christian socialism; Marxism; the theory of rent as unearned increment (J. S. Mill and Henry George); William Morris and anti-commercialism; Fabianism; the ethical socialism of the ILP; the welfare state or paternalist tradition; syndicalism and guild socialism; and the doctrine of planning (which included Keynes-style criticisms of free market capitalism). Reflecting on this legacy, Crosland concluded that the quintessential socialist aspirations should be seen as: first, a passion for liberty and democracy; second, a protest against the material poverty produced by capitalism; third, a concern for the interests of those in need or oppressed or just unlucky; fourth, a belief in equality and the classless society; fifth, a rejection of competition and an endorsement of 'fraternal' (his word) cooperation; and sixth, a protest against the inefficiencies caused by capitalism, particularly mass unemployment. From the sanguine perspective of the mid-1950s, Crosland concluded that the first of these objectives was shared across all parties in Britain, while the second and sixth had been rendered less relevant by the achievements of the 1945–51 Labour government. He was therefore left to claim the third (the promotion of the welfare of those in need); the fourth (equality), and the fifth ('the cooperative ideal') as the distinctive objectives of a modern democratic socialism. But Crosland was uncertain about the plausibility of cooperation as an ideal, for a mixture of practical and libertarian reasons, and focused instead on the promotion of equality and welfare as the core objectives of a revisionist socialism that could meet the challenges of the 1960s and 1970s (Crosland 1964 [1956]: 43–80; Jackson 2007: 169–76, 184–96).

Given these 'ends', Crosland argued that revisionists should be open to using a variety of different 'means' to advance them. Although sometimes portrayed as the archproponent of a 'Keynesian welfare state' route to social democracy, Crosland in fact supported a diverse and radical set of policies. He certainly favoured a strengthened welfare state and Keynesian demand management, but also emphasized the need for greater progressive taxation of wealth and further social ownership of capital, in the form of state investment funds holding shares in private industry rather than the wholesale public ownership of companies or

industrial sectors (Crosland 1964 [1956]: 224–46, 335–40; Jackson 2005). As Crosland argued:

State ownership of all industrial capital is not now a condition of creating a socialist society, establishing social equality, increasing social welfare, or eliminating class distinctions. What is unjust in our present arrangements is the distribution of private wealth; and that can as well be cured in a pluralist as in a wholly state-owned economy, with much better results for social contentment and the fragmentation of power (Crosland 1964 [1956]: 340).

Although the twenty years or so after 1945 saw social democrats retreat yet further from classical socialist orthodoxy, they remained sharply critical of unfettered markets. They aimed to push forward from the institutional beachhead of the postwar welfare state to enhance redistributive spending on social welfare; reform schooling to reduce class inequalities in educational attainment; narrow wealth inequality through taxation; and strengthen the voice of workers in industry to dilute the control exercised by capitalists over economic life. Above all, social democracy offered a confidence that its gradual path towards helping the needy, advancing equality, and fostering solidarity was reaping irreversible social dividends that could only grow larger in the future. This confidence was not to last.

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS

In the 1970s, social democracy was engulfed by an ideological crisis, from which it has yet to recover fully. Social democratic ideas were placed on the defensive, and in some countries forced into an undignified retreat. The source of this crisis was in part sociological—shifts in economic and social structures undermined formerly fixed social democratic assumptions—but it was also political and intellectual: the post-1945 social democratic synthesis began to fray when subjected to testing scrutiny by a new and ingenious body of market liberal thinkers.

The sociological context for the late twentieth-century ordeal of social democracy was the maturation of the economies of the advanced industrialized nations, which brought with it a decline in the proportion of workers employed in manufacturing industries; an increase in employment in the service sector; a rise in female employment, particularly in service industries; and an increase in levels of material affluence and education. Alongside these quantifiable changes in social life came a more intangible cultural shift towards a widespread desire for greater individual freedom and self-expression, whether articulated via growing consumer purchasing power in the market, or in rebellion against social

norms and institutions felt to constrain the individual (Eley 2002: 341–428; Kitschelt 1994). In such a context, the traditional outlook of social democracy appeared to be a doctrine oriented around manufacturing industry, a male breadwinner model of family life, hostility to the acquisition of consumer goods, and the defence of the impersonal bureaucratic institutions of the welfare state and trade unions.

The initial response to these challenges among many prominent social democrats was an enthusiasm for deepening the institutions of postwar social democracy. Influenced by the rise of a ‘New Left’ focused on economic democracy, gender equality, and ecological politics, social democracy was radicalized in the 1970s and early 1980s, adopting a renewed emphasis on the democratization of industry and the social ownership of capital (Sassoon 1996: 647–729). The global economic downturn of the early 1970s, and the accompanying distributive conflict and industrial unrest, persuaded some social democrats that this period of capitalist crisis could only be resolved by the application of more decisively socialist measures. The most striking example of this development came in Sweden, where the SAP sought to counteract industrial conflict by introducing greater workplace democracy and by socializing the ownership of capital (Tilton 1990: 223–35). This latter objective was rendered more concrete by the influential trade union economist Rudolf Meidner, who proposed that companies should set aside a proportion of their profits to be issued in new shares to collective social funds administered by the trade unions, on behalf of employees (Meidner 1978). The Meidner plan (as it became known) was intended to compensate employees for the wage restraint imposed on workers by the Swedish model of full employment (and to redistribute the high corporate profits that resulted from this), but it also had broader implications: it sought to shift social democracy beyond the socialization of income flows towards the socialization of capital and democratic scrutiny of investment decisions. Meidner was in essence challenging the mid-century revisionist assumption that social ownership was less important for social democrats than social control exercised through the state. As Meidner put it:

We want to deprive the capitalists of the power that they exercise by virtue of ownership. All experience shows that it is not enough to have influence and control. Ownership plays a decisive role. I refer to Marx and Wigforss: we cannot fundamentally change society without changing its ownership structure (Meidner (1975), quoted in Pontusson 1987: 14).

The Meidner plan proved too radical to put into practice. Although it was championed by the Swedish trade unions, it was defeated by a concerted counter-offensive by employers and a palpable lack of enthusiasm on the part of

some of the SAP's leadership. In this respect the Swedish case was emblematic of wider trends in social democratic thinking and policy-making. Across a number of nations, the New Left-inspired move towards industrial democracy and socialism ran out of steam in the early 1980s in the face of a capitalist backlash (Glyn 2006: 15–23). It became clear that the political blame for the sluggish growth, rising inflation, and obstreperous industrial relations of the 1970s would in fact be pinned on social democracy rather than capitalism. A 'new right' emerged, which deftly portrayed the crisis of the 1970s as the product of clumsy Keynesian intervention in the economy, over-mighty trade unions, and wasteful and efficiency-inhibiting levels of public expenditure. Although chiefly based in the English-speaking nations, this neoliberalism set the political agenda for the three decades after the 1980s across the globe: retrenchment, deregulation, and privatization became the hegemonic language of policy-making. This style of policy-making was advanced and rendered more powerful by its association with a set of deeper theories about the economy and the state. Neoliberal thinkers such as F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman offered a critique of social democracy that sought to reinstate the market rather than politics as the primary arbiter of human fate: on their view, it was the free exchange between individuals promoted by markets that best realized liberty and self-expression, whereas the progressive expansion of the domain of democratic collective action had achieved only uniformity and coercion. Economic dynamism and growth, neoliberals argued, could only be restored by pushing back the intrusions of the state into the workings of the price mechanism and lessening the 'burden' of taxation that held back individuals from creating wealth. The persuasive power of neoliberalism was greatly strengthened by the growth in capital mobility during the 1980s and 1990s, which set new constraints on the policy-making autonomy of national governments, and enabled the financial markets to discipline governments thought to be pursuing policies disadvantageous to the owners of capital.

Although social democrats opposed much of this agenda, it nonetheless reshaped the terms of political debate and demanded a serious response. Neoliberalism had in effect triumphed as the most socially compelling set of ideas to respond to the social change and individualism of the late twentieth century. A new form of social democracy emerged, which sought to find an accommodation with neoliberalism and to harness the resurgent capitalism of the 1980s and 1990s to social democratic objectives. Although it seemed heretical at first, this new revisionism was not as novel as it initially appeared. Shaped as it was by the specialized intellectual culture of the late twentieth century, it lacked

an authoritative theoretical statement of the sort provided in earlier generations by Bernstein or Crosland (there was a gulf between the closest analogue, Giddens 1998, and the intellectual innovation, political influence, and durability of the books written by Bernstein and Crosland). Articulated largely amid the exigencies of day-to-day political warfare by politicians, journalists, and policy advisors, the new social democracy was viewed by many keepers of the social democratic faith as nothing more than an unprincipled abandonment of the social democratic tradition. But matters were more complex than this first impression suggested.

At the heart of the new revisionism lay an old social democratic theme: the relationship between economic efficiency and equality. As we have seen, in the ‘golden age’ an important part of the social democratic prospectus was that an economy organized around full employment, a strong welfare state, and a more egalitarian distribution of income would significantly improve on the productive efficiency of unregulated capitalism. Such a social democratic economy, it was argued, would increase economic growth by bringing idle productive resources into play, stabilizing the business cycle, and providing a skilled, healthy, and dynamic workforce for employers (Andersson 2007: 15–44; Pontusson 2011: 91–8). The SAP famously crystallized this confluence between social democratic welfarism and capitalist entrepreneurship with the slogan ‘secure people dare’ (Kielos 2009: 63). A fresh attempt to find complementarities between social democratic and capitalist objectives underpinned the revisionism of the 1980s and 1990s, albeit in the face of a more self-confident and uncompromising capitalist elite. Two strands of social democratic statecraft were particularly prominent in this quest.

First, an acceptance of new constraints on what politics could achieve. The ruling neoliberal mentality—which stipulated that certain economic ‘laws’ ruled out intervention in the market—was absorbed in a diluted form into the social democratic bloodstream. Social democrats came to believe that economic credibility—in the eyes of both the electorate and the global financial markets—ruled out significant increases in progressive taxation, or the use of deficit financing, to pay for social benefits, while the pursuit of a rigorous anti-inflationary policy would have to be prioritized ahead of full employment. This was alternately presented as an immutable result of global economic integration, or a matter of political strategy to win the support of sceptical centrist voters and powerful economic elites. Either way, it represented a concession to the primacy of the market over democratic politics: the space for political action was believed to have narrowed when compared with the halcyon days of the ‘golden

age’.

But the corollary of this was that the political space for social democracy had not been completely effaced: the scope of social democratic politics had been squeezed, but not destroyed, by the victories of neoliberalism. A second strand of social democratic thought offered a more familiar treatment of the ways in which greater equality might advance economic prosperity. Since Keynesian demand management in one country had apparently been ruled out, social democrats appropriated the neoliberal emphasis on reforming the supply-side of the economy. But social democrats sought to harness this discourse to traditional social democratic objectives: their aim was to increase employment and productivity through the investment of public resources in education, training, active labour market programmes, infrastructure, and research and development. This would create what Giddens termed ‘the social investment state’: a state that used public resources to foster a dynamic economy (Giddens 1998: 99–100). As we have seen, this was not a new idea—in Sweden at any rate something like this philosophy had informed the policy architecture of Swedish social democracy during the ‘golden age’—but it served a useful political purpose by challenging the stark antagonism between public spending and economic growth diagnosed by neoliberals.

In addition to this form of supply-side social democracy, the reduction of economic inequality and poverty through the welfare state and labour market regulation remained a social democratic priority. But these objectives were also recast in response to the late twentieth-century social landscape: the emphasis shifted to the provision of in-work benefits to help reduce unemployment and provide incentives for low-paid workers to stay in the labour market, while supporting female participation in the workforce became a much higher priority for social democratic policy-makers (Vandenbroucke 2001: 161–3). Significant progress on this latter objective had been made in Scandinavia from the 1970s onwards. Other social democratic movements were slower to absorb the fundamental feminist insight that each individual should be free to combine both paid and care work. But it slowly percolated into the mainstream of social democratic political thought over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Social democracy shifted away from the classical ‘golden age’ model of full male employment towards an ideal of gender equality that would be advanced through new welfare institutions that socialized the provision of childcare and created career structures for men and women that were more hospitable to participation in family life.

This neo-revisionism carved out some space for a recognizably social

democratic accommodation with neoliberalism: an acceptance of the deregulated markets that constituted late twentieth-century capitalism coupled with the use of the state to equalize access to those markets and to ameliorate their inequalities. But the traditional language of social democracy was undoubtedly attenuated in the process. A narrower understanding of economic efficiency as synonymous with private economic gain supplanted an earlier social democratic vocabulary of the public good (Judt 2009). Meanwhile, social democratic egalitarianism drew to a greater extent than earlier on ideas about personal responsibility and equality of opportunity, although the social democratic deployment of these ideas was intended to subvert the market-based understandings of liability and merit articulated by neoliberals (Franklin 1997; Vandenbroucke 2001: 170–2). And as with earlier social democratic accommodations to capitalism, this neo-revisionist programme was premised on capitalism itself delivering economic growth and tax revenues which could be directed towards social democratic (but also efficiency-enhancing) ends. The financial crisis of 2008 was therefore as much a blow to this vision of social democracy as it was to the neoliberal architects of resurgent late twentieth-century capitalism. As a market crisis mutated into a crisis of the state, the discourse of fiscal retrenchment once more gained the political ascendancy. The slow, testing work of building a fresh social democratic revisionism suitable for new times had to commence once again.

CONCLUSION

‘I have often compared socialism to the heart’, wrote Jean Jaurès in 1907. ‘It has, like the heart, pulsations, rhythm, alternate movements of expansion and contraction’ (quoted in Kloppenberg 1986: 296). As we have seen, Jaurès’s powerful image resonates with the subsequent history of social democratic ideology—its heroic moments of political creativity, its grubby compromises in the face of implacable circumstances, its outright defeats. Social democratic political thought has offered what Ernst Wigforss described as a ‘provisional utopia’: ‘visions of social conditions different from those that surround us’ but ‘developed with sufficient concreteness that they can stand out as conceivable alternatives to the given reality or to other models of the future’ (quoted in Tilton 1990: 44). Such provisional utopianism connects the more mundane day-to-day political battles to a larger vision and set of ideals, yet remains open to revising that vision in the light of future experience. As Kołakowski has observed, this mix of idealism and empiricism ‘has invented no miraculous devices to bring about the perfect unity of men or universal brotherhood’ (Kołakowski 1982: 11). But it has influenced the political trajectory of many nations, and in doing so

transformed the life chances of many millions of people. By inserting and protecting egalitarian and communitarian domains within broadly capitalist economies, and representing the interests of the disadvantaged in political systems formerly monopolized by the rich, social democracy has gone some way towards making the rhetoric of democratic liberty and equality a lived, and attractive, reality.

NOTE

1. I am grateful to Zofia Stemplowska for helpful comments on this essay. Parts of the introduction and the first section of this essay were previously published in Ben Jackson 2008. 'Social Democracy'. Pp. 606–13 in *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 2nd edn, eds. S. Durlauf and L. Blume. Basingstoke: Palgrave. This text is reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

REFERENCES

- Andersson, J. 2007. *Between Growth and Security: Swedish Social Democracy From a Strong Society to a Third Way*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Berman, S. 2006. *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bernstein, E. 1898. 'The theory of collapse and colonial policy'. Pp. 159–173 in *Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate 1896–1998*, ed. H. Tudor and J. M. Tudor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Bernstein, E. 1993 [1899]. *The Preconditions of Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brooke, S. 1991. 'Atlantic crossing? American views of capitalism and British socialist thought 1932–1962', *Twentieth Century British History*, 2 (2): 107–36.
- Clarke, P. 1978. *Liberals and Social Democrats*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clegg, H. 1960. *A New Approach to Industrial Democracy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Crosland, C. A. R. 1964 [1956]. *The Future of Socialism*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Eley, G. 2002. *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. 1985. *Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. forthcoming. 'Equality with a happy bourgeoisie: the social democratic road to equality'. Available at <<http://www.esping-andersen.com/>> last accessed 27 May 2013.
- Franklin, J. (ed.) 1997. *Equality*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Freeden, M. 1986. *Liberalism Divided*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeden, M. 2003. 'The coming of the welfare state'. Pp. 7–44 in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought*, ed. T. Ball and R. Bellamy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, A. 1998. *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Glyn, A. 1995. 'Social democracy and full employment', *New Left Review*, 211: 33–55.
- Glyn, A. 2006. *Capitalism Unleashed*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, B. 2005. 'Revisionism reconsidered: "property-owning democracy" and egalitarian strategy in

- post-war Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, 16 (4): 416–40.
- Jackson, B. 2007. *Equality and the British Left*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Jackson, B. 2008. 'Social Democracy'. Pp. 606–13 in *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 2nd edn, eds. S. Durlauf and L. Blume. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Jackson, B. 2012. 'Corporatism and its discontents: Pluralism, anti-pluralism and Anglo-American industrial relations, c. 1930–80'. Pp. 105–28 in *Modern Pluralism: Anglo-American Debates Since 1880*, ed. M. Bevir. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Judt, T. 2009. 'What is living and what is dead in social democracy?' *New York Review of Books*, 56 (20), 17 December.
- Kielos, K. 2009. 'Flight of the Swedish bumblebee', *Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy*, 17 (2): 61–6.
- Kitschelt, H. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kloppenber, J. 1986. *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kołakowski, L. 1982. 'What is living (and what is dead) in the social-democratic idea?' *Encounter*, 58: 11–17.
- Marshall, T. H. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meidner, R. 1978. *Employee Investment Funds*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Polanyi, K. 2001 [1944]. *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Pontusson, J. 1987. 'Radicalization and retreat in Swedish Social Democracy', *New Left Review*, 165: 5–33.
- Pontusson, J. 2011. 'Once again a model: Nordic social democracy in a globalized world'. Pp. 89–115 in *What's Left of the Left? Democrats and Social Democrats in Changing Times*, eds. J. Cronin, G. Ross, and J. Schoch. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Przeworski, A. 1985. *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sassoon, D. 1996. *One Hundred Years of Socialism*. London: Fontana.
- SPD 1959. *Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*. Bonn: SPD.
- Steger, M. 1997. *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tanner, D. 1997. 'The development of British socialism 1900–18'. Pp. 48–66 in *An Age of Transition: British Politics 1880–1914*, ed. E. H. H. Green. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Tilton, T. 1990. *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vandenbroucke, F. 2001. 'European social democracy and the third way: Convergence, divisions, and shared questions'. Pp. 161–75 in *New Labour: The Progressive Future?*, ed. S. White. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

CHAPTER 20 COMMUNISM

ARCHIE BROWN

PRE-MARXIAN COMMUNIST IDEAS

THE idea of a communist society, one in which property would be commonly owned and divisions based on rank and privilege abolished, long preceded the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. It was around the year 1380, Norman Cohn has argued, that people moved beyond thinking of a society with no distinctions based on status or wealth as ‘a Golden Age irrecoverably lost in the distant past’ and started to believe in it as something which it would be possible to create, or recreate, in the immediate future (Cohn 2004: 198). Much of the inspiration for this rejection of hierarchical authority and of extreme inequality stemmed from the belief that a primitive communism had been practised by Christ and his closest followers. According to the Acts of the Apostles, the disciples of Jesus ‘were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that ought of the things he possessed was his own; but they had all things common’ (Acts 4:32).

This was the underpinning of the beliefs of fourteenth-century English churchmen John Wycliffe and John Ball. An admirer of Wycliffe’s writings, Jan Hus in early fifteenth-century Bohemia, was burned as a heretic in 1415 for challenging Papal authority. A century before Luther and the Reformation, he said that when papal decrees contradicted the teaching of Christ as expressed in the Bible, the faithful should not obey them (Cohn 2004: 206–7). Outrage at Hus’s execution saw the rise of a Hussite movement which in one of its more extreme offshoots, known as the Taborites, practised a form of communism in expectation of the imminent Second Coming of Christ. Thousands of peasants gave up their belongings to be held in common, but since they had given no thought to the need to produce as well as to share, their ideals soon collided with economic reality. A sixteenth-century German advocate of a new social order, Thomas Müntzer, believed both in the Second Coming and in the need for ruthless violence to oust ‘the godless scoundrels’ who represented church and state (Cohn 2004: 247–8).

A more humane vision of a communist society than that of Müntzer was presented by Sir Thomas More in his *Utopia*, published (in Latin) in 1516. His

book gave a name to the entire genre of utopian literature, of which thousands of examples were published over the next five or six centuries. More's *Utopia* takes the form of a dialogue in which arguments both for and against common ownership are made. The 'traveller' who has been to Utopia where 'recognition of merit is combined with equal prosperity for all' argues that 'you'll never get a fair distribution of goods, or a satisfactory organization of human life, until you abolish private property altogether'. Otherwise, laws will only treat the symptoms of injustice, while 'wealth will tend to vary in inverse proportion to merit'. However, 'there's no hope of a cure so long as private property continues. If you try to treat an outbreak in one part of the body politic, you merely exacerbate the symptoms elsewhere' (More 2003 [1516]: 44–5). More poses his own objections to this: there would be shortages and nobody would work hard enough, for people would rely on everyone else to do the work for them. He clearly had his doubts about the viability of the society whose virtues he was expounding, yet he tilted the balance of the argument in favour of the society of his imagination and against that in which he lived. More concludes his reflections on what the 'traveller' has told him by remarking that 'there are many features of the Utopian Republic which I should like—though I hardly expect—to see adopted in Europe' (More 2003 [1516]: 113). Another notable utopia was that elaborated by the Italian Dominican monk, Tommaso Campanella, at the beginning of the seventeenth century. His *La Città del sole* [*The City of the Sun*] (Campanella 1992 [1602]) saw the family as the main obstacle to the creation of a state based on communist principles. Therefore, he argued, the state must assume responsibility for children's education. Working hours, however, would be reduced to four a day, and much of the rest of the time would be devoted to joyful learning.

The French Revolution of 1789 was to be an inspiration to the principal founders of Communism (as a movement and ideology), Marx and Engels, as well as to the far greater number who wished to see power pass from monarchs to citizens. The offshoot of the French Revolution which most presaged later Communist ideology was that known as Babouvism, after its leader, Gracchus Babeuf. The Babouvists advocated 'a period of dictatorship for as long as might be necessary to destroy or disarm the enemies of equality' (Kołakowski 1978: vol. 1, 186). The nineteenth century saw a vast growth of socialist thought, much of which was neither 'communist' in the sense of believing in the possibility of a creation of a society in which all property was held in common nor 'Communist' in the sense of belonging to the tradition whose progenitors were Marx and Engels. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was the first theorist to use the expression

‘scientific socialism’, but he was not an advocate of revolutionary violence, believing in the eventual universal appeal of socialist ideals. His work, *The Philosophy of Poverty*, became the subject of a book-length attack by Marx in a riposte entitled *The Poverty of Philosophy*. (Marx, as usual, pulled no punches, writing even in his Foreword to the first edition: ‘In France [Proudhon] has the right to be a bad economist, because he is reputed to be a good German philosopher. In Germany, he has the right to be a bad philosopher, because he is reputed to be one of the ablest of French economists. Being both German and economist at the same time, we desire to protest against this double error’ (Marx 1955: 31).) Another, more utopian, French socialist, Étienne Cabet, is credited by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as being the first person to use the term ‘communism’ (*communisme*) in 1840. But Cabet rejected violent revolution and his communism was inspired by Christianity.

The first socialist to whose thinking the young Karl Marx was introduced was Saint-Simon (Stedman Jones 2002: 173). He was opposed to violence, but he believed that economic competition produced poverty and crises. An historical process would, he believed, lead to the development of more rational, scientifically-based administration. The educated segments of society would appreciate the need for this, and other social groups would follow. Marx was later to pour scorn on Saint-Simonian socialism’s commitment to peaceful change and its belief in the possibility of class cooperation rather than class struggle. He was also to regard as utopian the efforts of Robert Owen to set up co-operative communes. Owen began as a paternalist employer, but developed the idea of cooperation as a universal panacea. He was an influential advocate of factory reform, and his best-known publication, *A New View of Society* (Owen 1927), proclaimed his faith in environment as the determinant of character and his belief in the value of education. Like Saint-Simon, he believed in class cooperation and in the development of a growing rationality. In his *Address to the Working Classes* of 1819, Owen concluded that ‘the past ages of the world present the history of human irrationality only’ but now the world was ‘advancing towards the dawn of reason, and to the period when the mind of man shall be born again’ (Owen 1927: 155). The older he became, the more utopian were Owen’s enterprises. He made more than one attempt to set up a co-operative commune. The best-known was New Harmony in the American state of Indiana. It aspired to complete equality of income, with all the residents having also similar food and clothing as well as education. Its self-government, though, did not work and the project which had begun in 1825 was abandoned by Owen two years later. His communistic experiments notwithstanding, Owen

was a world away, both temperamentally and in his values, from the Communism which developed in the twentieth century. He was described by Leslie Stephen as ‘one of those bores who are the salt of the earth’ (Cole 1927: xvii).

FROM MARX TO LENIN

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels are universally regarded as the main founders of Communism as an ideology and movement, although many of the ways in which the doctrine was developed in the twentieth century, not to mention the deeds done in its name, would surely have horrified them. Marx himself was less influenced by socialist writers who preceded him than by British political economy and German Hegelianism. The social science of the Enlightenment was a more important stimulus to his thinking than utopian visions, although Marx was later to introduce a utopian element of his own in the guise of the final stage of social development. Montesquieu and especially Turgot in France (Montesquieu 1949 [1748]; Turgot 1973), and Adam Smith, John Millar, and Adam Ferguson in Scotland were the most important thinkers to elaborate in the eighteenth century a theory of stages of development of society linked to the means of subsistence—or what Marxists would later call the economic base (Smith 1978; Meek 1977). For these theorists—Smith and Millar, in particular—the first stage of human development was that in which men were hunters and fishermen and lived off the spontaneous fruits of the earth; the second stage was one of pasturage when, becoming shepherds, people began to acquire property in the form of animals; the third stage was that of agriculture, when they cultivated the soil and started to acquire property as land; and this was followed by the commercial (fourth) stage during which people began to engage in mercantile activity (Brown 1975: 270–2). For Marx, the earliest form of economy and society was a primitive communism. The subsequent stages were ancient society, which depended on slave labour; feudal society, which relied on serf labour; bourgeois, or capitalist, society, in which wage labourers were the exploited class; which was to be followed by communism, although initially that would be ‘a communist society, not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it *emerges* from capitalist society’ and it would accordingly still be ‘stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it comes’ (Marx 1966 [1875]: 15; Avineri 1968: 220–39). The preceding capitalist stage, however, would be the ‘last antagonistic form of the social process of production’ (Marx 2000b: 426). Marx identified, in addition, what he called the Asiatic mode of production, in which private property was absent and where

water shortage and the need to organize irrigation led to a centralized state and ‘oriental despotism’.

From Hegel, Marx adopted the idea of the dialectic. In Hegel’s case this meant ‘the development of the spirit’ which came about through ‘the conflict and reconciliation of opposites’ (Plamenatz 1954: 9). Instead of the development of the spirit, Marx—like those Enlightenment thinkers noted above—embraced a materialist interpretation of history. But he took over Hegel’s term ‘contradictions’, applying it to what he saw as the growing incompatibilities in each historical epoch between institutional relationships and the changing forces of production. Marx’s theory of stages was both encouraging and worrying for nineteenth-century revolutionaries in Russia, a country which had barely begun to develop capitalism, and where radical opponents of the regime did not wish to contemplate a long period of bourgeois rule before their society was ripe for socialist revolution. To be assured of the eventual victory of socialism was one thing; it was quite another to see it apparently consigned to the distant future, so far as Russia was concerned. Disturbed by the implications of Marx’s views, Vera Zasulich inquired whether the traditional Russian peasant commune might not provide a short cut to socialism and communism. Marx, a revolutionary by temperament, did not wish to discourage Russian radicals, but found it hard to square their desires with his theories. After composing three lengthy drafts of a reply to Zasulich, which he did not send, he dispatched a brief response in which he said that when he spoke of the ‘historical inevitability’ of the capitalist stage of development, he was limiting the generalization ‘to the countries of Western Europe’ (Marx 2000a: 623).

The most memorable and influential statement of Marx’s political ideology was the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 (see Marx and Engels 2002). Although the work was one of joint authorship, Engels readily conceded that the major ideas came from Marx. Its most central postulate, as Engels put it in 1888, was that ‘the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes’ and that the process had now reached a stage at which the oppressed class, the proletariat, could attain their ‘emancipation from the sway of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie’ and at the same time emancipate ‘society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles’ (see Marx and Engels 2002: 203). The *Manifesto* forcefully set out a way of understanding history, while simultaneously exhorting the working class to fulfil its preordained revolutionary task of overthrowing the capitalist system.

Although it was their claim to have found the key to historical change, combined with a vision of a future which was destined to happen, that gave wings to their ideology, Marx and Engels produced analyses of nineteenth-century capitalism which have had a longer life than their attempts to foretell the future. (In the twentieth century, however, the strength of their conviction and the persuasiveness of their predictions had a powerful influence on people who, initially in the name of Marx and Engels, attempted to create that future.) Engels's grim account of working-class life in Britain in the 1840s (Engels 1999) was based not only on wide reading of official reports and other written evidence on conditions from London to Glasgow, but on his own close observation of factory life in Manchester. His revolutionary Communist convictions already shone through, as in his complaint that the English 'Socialists are thoroughly tame and peaceable, accept our existing order, bad as it is, so far as to reject all other methods but that of winning public opinion' (Engels 1999: 244). Nevertheless, Engels was later to observe that Marx had come to the conclusion that 'England is the only country where the inevitable social revolution might be effected entirely by peaceful means' (Engels 1965: 6), a view which Engels had come to share. That remark appeared in Engels' Preface to Volume 1 of Marx's *Capital* (Marx 1965). The three volumes of this work were the most important for Marxist analyses of nineteenth-century capitalism. Only the first of them was completed to his own satisfaction by Marx himself. The second and third were compiled by Engels, drawing upon Marx's extensive notes.

Marxism was to develop a variety of strands, some differing radically from others, but it is not Marxism as such that concerns us in this essay. It is, rather, that part of Marxism which inspired the Communist movement, together with what was made of Marxism by twentieth-century Communist leaders and ideologists. Marxist theory suggested that the places ripest for revolution and the transition from capitalism to socialism were the most advanced industrial countries in the nineteenth century—Britain and Germany. Yet attempts at socialist revolution led by Communists had no more than fleeting success in advanced industrial societies. Communism's first and most momentous victory was in Russia. For both Marx and Engels, the success of revolution in that country had to be dependent on it triggering proletarian revolution in the West. This was also the view of the major figures in the Marxist strand of the Russian revolutionary movement—until after they had seized power.

The leading Russian Marxist theorist in the last decades of the nineteenth century, Georgy Plekhanov, took the logic of the analysis sufficiently seriously to maintain that a quite lengthy period of bourgeois government, following a

bourgeois revolution, would be necessary before a socialist revolution could take place. Although Vladimir Lenin, who became far and away the most important of Russian revolutionaries, was influenced by Plekhanov in a number of respects, he had much more revolutionary impatience. One of his most notable contributions to what was later to become known as Marxism-Leninism was his stress on the vital role that could be played by even a small circle of professional revolutionaries. Unlike Plekhanov, he was also fully prepared to embrace terrorism to the extent that it advanced the cause of socialist revolution. For Lenin, as for Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin, the ends justified the means. Lenin held that workers, left to themselves, would develop only 'trade union consciousness' and that the task for Russian revolutionaries 'consists in a *struggle against spontaneity*, in order to *drag* the labour movement *away* from this spontaneous tendency of trade unionism to go under the wing of the bourgeoisie' (Lenin 1963: 71–2; italics Lenin's). It was necessary for professional revolutionaries to provide workers with the theoretical understanding that they could satisfy their true interests only by destroying capitalism. Lenin took the view, by no means universally shared, that by the end of the nineteenth century there was a recognizable form of capitalism in Russia and the presence of an urban proletariat, especially in Moscow and St Petersburg (Harding 1996: 18–23).

The working-class movement was far weaker in Russia than it was in Britain, Germany, or France. Thus, Lenin's emphasis on the role which could be played by professional revolutionaries made tactical sense. These revolutionaries themselves were regularly arrested by the Tsarist authorities—although their treatment was much milder than that meted out later to supposed enemies of the state, even in the years when the Soviet government was led by Lenin, not to speak of Stalin. Lenin was in Siberian exile from 1895 until the end of the century, but it was during that time that he wrote his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, published under the pseudonym, Vladimir Ilyin, in 1899. On his release, Lenin became the principal organizer of a newspaper which would be a platform for his views. Called *Iskra* (The Spark), it became an organizational base as well as a propaganda instrument for Lenin as he sought control over the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), the unwieldy name of the organization which was the forerunner of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Being in exile at the time, Lenin missed its inauguration.

In his important 1902 political tract, *What is to be Done?* (Lenin 1963), Lenin made the case for a party which would be centrally controlled, strictly

disciplined, and which would imbue workers with a socialist consciousness and acceptance of the idea that to seek material gains by trade-unionist methods played into the hands of the bourgeoisie. At the second congress of the RSDLP in 1903, Lenin provoked the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Mensheviks were the more orthodox Marxists, inasmuch as they were prepared to accept that a period of 'bourgeois democracy', following a revolution, was likely to be necessary before a transition could be made to socialism. They were more committed to democratic advance for its own sake than was Lenin. The victory of the Bolsheviks meant that Lenin became the dominant figure within the revolutionary movement. For Leon Trotsky, who joined neither the Bolsheviks nor the Mensheviks, the latter were too ready to accommodate themselves to a merely bourgeois revolution, and even the Bolsheviks spoke of a 'democratic dictatorship' rather than 'socialist dictatorship' in the immediate aftermath of successful revolution. In a work penned after the Russian revolution of 1905, first published in Germany in 1909 and in Russia in 1922, Trotsky wrote:

The workers' government will from the start be faced with the task of uniting its forces with those of the socialist proletariat of Western Europe. Only in this way will its temporary revolutionary hegemony become the prologue to a socialist dictatorship. Thus permanent revolution will become, for the Russian proletariat, a matter of class self-preservation. (Trotsky 1973: 333)

By the summer of 1917, Trotsky believed that Lenin had come round to his view, and so he threw in his lot with the Bolsheviks (Trotsky 1973: 332). Following the revolution which overthrew the Russian autocracy in March 1917, the Bolsheviks did not delay long before seizing full power. They were nothing like as disciplined in that year of revolutions as Lenin's precepts had ordained. There was disagreement within the leadership even on the crucial question of whether the Bolsheviks should seize power by force. They were, however, better organized than other parts of the revolutionary movement, including the more numerous Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs). The SRs were the most popular party among the peasantry, and peasants were by far the largest social class in the Russia of 1917. As a pathway to power, the soviets were to be more important in 1917 than they ever were thereafter. Soviets, a form of local organization which had sprung up in St Petersburg during the revolution of 1905, re-emerged in 1917 and were an alternative source of authority to that of the provisional government. Aiming to end this 'dual power', the Bolsheviks called for 'All power to the Soviets', although Lenin allowed sufficient time to facilitate Bolshevik control of the soviets. The Bolsheviks also promised 'freedom, bread, and peace', popular slogans at a time of war-weariness and turmoil following the

overthrow of the autocracy. They seized power on 7 November 1917, and in the Civil War that followed had secured victory by 1922. Trotsky, as war commissar, combined efficiency with ruthlessness. The secret police created by the Bolsheviks, the Cheka, made mass arrests and shot tens of thousands of opponents. Lenin led the government with some skill, and Stalin began to play an increasingly important role in the party organization, becoming General Secretary in 1922. If the Bolshevik victory owed much to capable leadership, it was also important that the Reds had a more coherent ideology than the Whites during the Civil War.

This was, nevertheless, an ideology which was to change in important ways over time and, as Communist states became more numerous, over space. Lenin himself changed his mind on a number of important issues in 1917 and during the first years of Bolshevik power. Writing a few months before the Bolshevik revolution (or, as many historians would insist, coup), Lenin sharpened a distinction which Marx had made between the lower and higher phases of communism. Lenin called that first stage 'socialism', reserving only for the later stage the name of 'communism' (Lenin 1962 [1917]). This work of Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, is often contrasted with his earlier *What is to be Done?* Unlike the earlier tract, the emphasis was not on discipline and hierarchy within the revolutionary party. Yet to portray it as 'democratic' would be very misleading. It optimistically 'swept aside or simply ignored' the problem of power, including 'the danger of the bureaucratization of the revolution and the reproduction of a strongly hierarchical order, not to mention the question of civic freedoms' (Miliband 1977: 12). Indeed, Lenin believed that freedom would be found only in the communist phase after the state had 'withered away' which would be a gradual and spontaneous process (Lenin 1962; 143, 152). He observed that Engels had been right to ridicule 'the absurdity of combining the words "freedom" and "state"'. Lenin declared: 'So long as the state exists there is no freedom. When there will be freedom, there will be no state' (Lenin 1962: 152). In reality, in the absence of authoritative political institutions (in other words, a state) to defend freedom, civil liberty will not exist. However, the absence of a state was not what threatened or crushed civil and political liberties when states ruled by Communist parties came into existence. It was, on the contrary, the overweening and unconstrained power of the party-state.

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY IN POWER

Within a matter of months, following their seizure of power in November 1917,

the Bolsheviks, who had developed as a faction within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, took the name 'Communist'. Karl Kautsky, a respected Marxist theorist who had in his youth known Marx and Engels personally, wrote in 1918 that it was entirely appropriate that the Bolsheviks had stopped calling themselves 'Social Democrats' and now 'described themselves as Communists', for their practice since seizing power had nothing in common with democracy (Kautsky 1964; 74). They had, he argued, completely distorted what Marx meant by 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'. Moreover, 'a secret organization cannot be a democratic one', for it would lead to 'the dictatorship of a single man, or of a small knot of leaders'. Lenin's methods might have been 'rendered necessary for an oppressed class in the absence of democracy', but now that the Bolsheviks were in power their methods would not promote self-government, but instead 'further the Messiah-consciousness of leaders, and their dictatorial habits' (Kautsky 1964: 19–20). Kautsky's critique, coming from within the Marxist tradition, could not have been more apposite, but it enraged Lenin who, although already heading the revolutionary government, set aside time to write a polemical reply entitled *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. For generations of Soviet students the words 'renegade' and 'Kautsky' went together. They were allowed to read Lenin on Kautsky but not Kautsky on Lenin.

Over time the names given by the rulers of these countries to what most external analysts called *Communist* states varied. Among the designations, apart from 'dictatorship of the proletariat', were 'people's republic', 'people's democracy', and, most commonly, 'socialist'. Until the end of the Second World War, there were only two such states—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, so named in 1922—the successor state to Imperial Russia) and Mongolia, essentially a Soviet satellite and known as the Mongolian People's Republic from 1924. Communist states increased greatly in number from the 1940s until the 1970s, many of them being foreign, especially Soviet, impositions. Almost half, however, came into being as a result of essentially indigenous revolutions, with China and Yugoslavia especially notable examples. That is not only because China was the most populous country in the world, but because both China and Yugoslavia developed ideologically distinctive positions (discussed later), although these changed radically over time.

In spite of some ideological variation among Communist states, the differences emerging especially from the 1950s onwards, there was every justification for outside analysts applying the term 'Communist' to them, although this was not what the regimes called themselves. Even some

Communist reformers objected to the appellation on the grounds that they had never claimed to have reached the stage of communism, only that of socialism (Shakhnazarov 2003: 179–80). It is, though, far more ambiguous and misleading to use the socialist label for dictatorial party-states in which the secret police enjoyed arbitrary powers of arrest. Calling the systems ‘Communist’ preserves an obvious and necessary distinction between states ruled by Communist parties and those in which socialist parties of a social democratic type have at various times formed a government. Some shared origins do not make it appropriate to apply the same ‘socialist’ label to social democrats and Communists (Freeden 1996: 480). Such was the oppressive character of the Communist party-states that there was, moreover, hardly a serious danger of conflating ‘Communism’ with a capital ‘c’—actually existing Communism—and the communist, classless, and stateless society of the future envisaged by Marx.

Communist ideology developed a number of distinctive characteristics which set it clearly apart from democratic socialism. Six, in particular, may be regarded as the most essential defining features of Communist ideology. The first of these was a firm belief in *the necessity of the monopoly of power of the Communist party*. In some Communist states, at different times, other parties were allowed to exist, but only as a constitutional decoration. They were denied both power and autonomy. The Communist party itself appeared in various guises. The lower-case ‘p’ has been used, because this is a generic term; some of the ruling Communist parties had other names, such as, for example, the Polish United Workers’ Party. The party rested its right to rule on its claim to possess the theoretical knowledge and practical experience needed to build a socialist and ultimately communist society. In its own perception, the party constituted the vanguard of the working class, and thus became the institutional embodiment of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’. In reality, what ensued was not dictatorship *of* the proletariat—the idea of an entire social class exercising dictatorship is fanciful—but party dictatorship *over* the proletariat as well as over everyone else.

From very early in the Soviet era, intolerance of alternative parties and political movements extended not only to supporters of the tsarist regime but also to fellow revolutionaries who had not belonged to the Bolshevik faction. Thus, when Lenin instituted a series of economic and cultural concessions in 1921—inaugurating the New Economic Policy (NEP)—this was seen as a temporary retreat, although one which might have to last for several decades. Nevertheless, it was accompanied by a tightening of discipline within the ruling party and increasing intolerance of other parties and movements, including those

broadly of the left. The way Lenin put it to the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922 was:

When a Menshevik says, 'You are now retreating; I have been advocating retreat all the time; I agree with you, I am your man, let us retreat together', we say in reply, 'For public manifestations of Menshevism our revolutionary courts must pass the death sentence; otherwise they are not our courts, but God knows what'. (Fitzpatrick 2008: 97)

The second ideological tenet serving as a major defining characteristic of Communism was *democratic centralism*. The doctrine developed in the years when the Bolshevik party was still an underground organization in Tsarist Russia, but it continued to be accorded great weight in post-revolutionary Russia and throughout the international Communist movement. In theory, democratic centralism meant the election of party bodies at all levels, the subordination of the minority to the majority, the right of discussion up until the point a decision has been made, and obligatory, strictly disciplined acceptance and implementation of the decision once it had been taken. In practice, both in the underground Bolshevik party, and in the worldwide experience of Communist parties subsequently, intra-party 'elections' were generally co-options or appointments. The highest party body—the Politburo (Political Bureau) of the Central Committee—in its more oligarchical phases collectively co-opted new members. At other times—for example, during the years of high Stalinism in the Soviet Union, a period of some twenty years which ended only with Stalin's death in 1953—Politburo members were appointed essentially by the top leader. The Central Committee, which officially elected its Secretariat and the Politburo, was in practice selected by those higher organs of executive power. Similarly, first secretaries of party committees at lower levels of the hierarchy were 'elected' by their committees, but the members normally had the privilege of voting only for the one candidate who had been selected by party organs a rung higher up.

Democratic centralism was contrasted in party writings with bureaucratic centralism. While the former supposedly meant taking into account the views of members and allowing discussion up to the point at which a binding decision was made, bureaucratic centralism was the name given to high-handed behaviour by officials who did not listen to opinion within the relevant party committee or the broader membership. In reality, what the party literature described as bureaucratic centralism was much closer to the reality of democratic centralism than it was to the myth that the latter embodied real accountability and meaningful intra-party elections. For both leadership and members, what democratic centralism actually boiled down to was a strictly

centralized, hierarchical, and disciplined party which brooked no dissent on major issues. When attempts were made to democratize Communist parties, it was the opponents, not the proponents, of democratization who attempted to legitimize their position by appeal to democratic centralism. The centralistic component was wholly dominant, the 'democratic' adjective but a nod to the rhetorical appeal of democracy which in party practice was devoid of substance.

The *third* defining feature of Communist ideology was the fundamental belief that public ownership was necessary to extirpate capitalists as a class, and this took the form of a *commitment to state ownership of the means of production*. That came to be linked to a *fourth* characteristic which, although also a defining feature of the economic system and linked with the previous one, is conceptually distinct: namely, the idea that a *centrally planned economy* was, in principle, *more just and more efficient than a market economy*, the latter being seen by most Communist rulers at most times as a quintessential component of capitalism. It was well into the post-second World War period that a small minority of Communist states embraced the idea of a 'socialist market economy'. Yugoslavia led the way, vehemently condemned at the time by Mao Zedong's China. Much later, China, during and after Deng Xiaoping's leadership, went a lot further not only in marketization but also in privatization.

One of the most outstanding analysts of the Soviet economic system, Alec Nove, had a nuanced view of ideology, but was closer to the end of the spectrum of commentators who downplayed its autonomous significance than to those who emphasized ideological imperatives. He argues that the kind of economic system constructed in the earliest years of Soviet Communism was a result of an 'interaction of Bolshevik ideas with the desperate situation in which they found themselves' (Nove). In their efforts to cope with confusion and anarchy, the Bolsheviks introduced rationing and banned private trade in foodstuffs. They then, in Nove's view, made a virtue out of necessity. Minimizing the role of ideology in Bolshevik decision-making, Nove suggests that 'actions taken in abnormal circumstances for practical reasons are often clothed in ideological garb and are justified by reference to high principles'. Later it becomes easy 'to conclude, with documentary evidence to prove it, that the action was due to a principle' (Nove 1972: 47).

Nevertheless, part of the motivation for the establishment of Communist systems, and an imperative for its leaders, was to replace private ownership by some form of public ownership and the vicissitudes of the market by a form of cooperation. Thus, in addition to the exigencies of the situation in which the Bolsheviks found themselves in 1917, their ideology pointed in the direction of

nationalization and of hostility to the market. When some of these policies were reversed during the NEP period from 1921 to 1928, with substantial private enterprise and market relations reintroduced, the measures were seen as a temporary retreat—concessions to economic hardship and growing unrest—and they were unpopular with most Bolshevik activists. They had ‘wanted their revolution to transform the world, but it was very clear during NEP how much of the old world had survived’ (Fitzpatrick 2008: 118).

Every subsequent Communist take-over was speedily followed by the nationalization of industry—collectivization of agriculture proceeded at varying speeds and in Poland was avoided—and an attempt to replace market relations by planned development. In its economic dimensions, ideology was especially important as a guide to policy in the earliest years of Communist rule. Once the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture had long been completed, and after a series of Five Year Plans had accelerated the industrialization of these (hitherto mainly agricultural) countries, Marxism-Leninism offered fewer clues on how to proceed. Decisions on how much to invest in one sector of industry rather than another, how to move from extensive to intensive development, how to raise the level of technological innovation, and how to enhance the quality and not just the quantity of production (and of consumer goods most specifically)—all these were issues on which the ideology which had inspired the Communist seizure of power had few, if any, useful nostrums to offer.

What the ideology continued to do, however, was to rule out various options. Even when it had ceased to provide a guide to action, it offered strong support for inaction. It presented orthodox Communists with a compelling list of taboos. Thus, in the great majority of Communist states between the 1940s and the 1980s, Communist ideology remained important for economic decision-makers by eliminating from serious political consideration such policy options as mixed ownership of industry, private agriculture, and market prices. Some economists, especially in Poland, Hungary, and (more briefly) in Czechoslovakia, tried to find a compromise between plan and market (Brus 1972; Šik 1967, 1976; Kornai 1992, 2006). But though there were significant concessions to the market in Yugoslavia and, from 1968, in Hungary, in most Communist countries those who dared advocate major concessions to the market or, more audaciously, partial privatization were condemned as ‘revisionists’, at best, or, as in China during the ‘Cultural Revolution’, ‘capitalist roaders’. The arguments used against such economic reformers were not pragmatic ones grounded in efficiency criteria but essentially ideological, in that the objection was to departures from sanctified

doctrine. During late Communism the previous optimism that centralized, planned economies would be much more efficient than market economies had largely disappeared. Accordingly, marketizing reform was resisted mainly on the grounds that it was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism, although it should be noted that there was congruence between the appeal to doctrine and the concerns of powerful vested interests, such as the industrial ministries, the economic departments of the Communist Party, and the ‘red directors’ (factory managers). When privatization did come—for the most part after Communist systems had been dismantled—a significant number of people in those categories were able to turn their previous control over state property into ownership, but it was far from clear to them in advance that this would be possible.

The four crucial components of Communist ideology already discussed were, then, closely interlinked with Communist power. The political monopoly exercised by the Communist Party and the controlling mechanisms embodied in the doctrine of ‘democratic centralism’ underpinned the power of the Communist leadership in all Communist states. State ownership of the means of production, together with regulation of the economy through central planning rather than through market relations, put additional levers of power in the hands of the party-state authorities. Every individual’s employment prospects ultimately depended on his or her relationship with the state. Countervailing forces of economic power were no more accorded a place in the system than were alternative sources of political power. This puts into perspective the question which was often posed: did the leaders of Communist states actually believe in Communist ideology? They could hardly fail to believe sincerely in such central features of the doctrine as those already elaborated, since they bolstered their exercise and retention of power.

The two remaining defining characteristics of Communist ideology were not of the same immediate significance for the power structure within a given state and, in that respect, somewhat more purely ideological. Thus the fifth such distinguishing feature was the sense of belonging to an International Communist Movement, while the sixth was the aspiration to build communism in the sense of the classless, stateless society of the future, envisaged by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. There is no doubt that the internationalism of the doctrine inspired many of the recruits to Communist parties in both democratic countries and in non-Communist authoritarian states. The analogy with religious belief has been used by many of those who joined in these countries as well as by critics of Marxism-Leninism (Hyde 1951; Fast 1958; Crossman 2001; and Morgan et al. 2007). In the words of the former Communist Raphael Samuel:

Communism, like medieval Christendom, was one and indivisible, an international fellowship of faith, 'all working together, all over the world ... with one common end' ... 'one great vision' uniting us, in the words of a communist song. Internationalism was not an option but a necessity of our political being, a touch-stone of honour and worth.... Communism was a world outlook or it was nothing (Samuel 2006: 47–8).

Eric Hobsbawm lays no less emphasis on the salience of internationalism. However, in contrast with Samuel, his imagery is military rather than religious:

... it is hard to recapture the immense strength which its members drew from the consciousness of being soldiers in a single international army, operating with whatever tactical multiformity and flexibility, a single grand strategy of world revolution. Hence the impossibility of any fundamental or long-term conflict between the interest of a national movement and the International, which was the *real* party, of which the national units were no more than disciplined sections (Hobsbawm 1999: 5–6).

In reality, Soviet leaders from Stalin onwards subordinated the ideals of early Communist internationalism to the interests of the USSR. 'Proletarian internationalism' and 'socialist internationalism' became code-words for fidelity to the Soviet line at any given time. Many Communists in countries with weak or underground parties looked to the Soviet Union as 'the homeland of socialism' and readily accepted Moscow leadership of the International Communist Movement. Soviet leaders themselves took for granted such a leadership role and were outraged when it was challenged, first, by Yugoslavia and, later, by China. In spite of such rifts, the sense of belonging to a worldwide movement was an important part of the Communist belief system. Indeed, until the 1980s an international movement—even though one which had in the post-Second World War era rested increasingly on coercion, in the case of Eastern Europe, and financial subventions from Moscow in the case of many non-ruling parties—was an organizational reality.

The aspiration to build a communist society—stateless, self-administering, and classless—bulked less large in the propagation of Communist doctrine than the defining features of the ideology already discussed. Its importance is of a different order. The issue of whether Communist leaders believed in their own ideology becomes relevant in this instance. It is hard to accept the notion that Stalin really believed in the withering away of the state. Nikita Khrushchev may have done so in an ill-thought-out way (CPSU Programme 1961). He envisioned the Communist Party eventually taking over the functions of the state, although this seemed to suggest a renaming of state organs as party institutions rather than an abolition of the state. After Khrushchev, it seems safe to say that no top Soviet leader truly believed in the eventual goal of communism. In their non-belief or agnosticism, they were joined by most Communist leaders elsewhere.

Yet, until the moment when leaders of Communist states actually renounced Communist ideology—as Mikhail Gorbachev effectively did while he still headed the Soviet party and state—the goal of communism could not be publicly foresworn. It was for the realization of this goal that sacrifices had been demanded over the years. It was the Communist Party's understanding of the progress of history, of which this was the ultimate stage of development, which lay at the foundation of their claim to exercise their 'leading role' in society. The pursuit of the goal of communism also further distinguished at a theoretical level Communist parties from socialist parties of a social democratic type.

SCOPE AND LIMITS OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

While it is important to set out the central tenets of Communist doctrine, elements which to a large extent united Communists in different countries and over time, it is no less essential to note that this movement was neither as monolithic nor as unchanging as it was often portrayed—both by its own propagandists and by much anti-Communist propaganda. There were many Communist intellectuals who developed views which deviated in significant respects from those of Lenin, although such was the esteem in which Lenin was held that they would rarely admit this even to themselves. Antonio Gramsci, who fell into this category, led the Italian Communist Party from 1924 until his arrest in 1926, after which he spent all but the last days of the remaining eleven years of his life in prison. His *Prison Notebooks* (Gramsci 1971) were to have an influence on Communist reformers many years later. In his writings, Gramsci placed greater emphasis on cultural hegemony than on crude power and, as distinct from Lenin's idea that a party elite knew what was good for the workers, stressed the need to identify with workers' 'real aspirations' and to organize these and incorporate them in the party's ideology (Kołakowski 1978: vol. III, 220–52; Sassoon 1997: 77–81). In his analysis of the capitalist state, Gramsci contended that 'the hegemony of the bourgeoisie lay in its dominance of civil society rather than its control of the repressive force of state power' (McLellan 2003: 288).

Between the mid-1920s and the early 1950s, however, the predominant arbiter of Communist ideology, as well as the dominant figure not only in the Soviet Union but also within the International Communist Movement, was Joseph Stalin. Much ink has been spilled in the controversy over whether Stalin faithfully followed and logically developed Lenin's doctrine or whether he fundamentally distorted it. It is fair to say that Lenin provided much of the

foundation on which Stalin built, although Stalin's justification of 'socialism in one country' in the 1920s, or the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Hitler of 1939, or, still more certainly, his espousal of a form of Russian chauvinism (although Stalin himself was a Georgian), accompanied by anti-semitism in his later years, would all have been anathema to Lenin. Communist doctrine under Stalin had many zig-zags, generally corresponding to what he perceived to be the interests of the Soviet state.

Yet Stalin himself was steeped in Marxism-Leninism and his interpretation of the ideology was far from always consistent with Soviet 'national interest'. His hostility to socialism of a social democratic type and to all forms of liberal democracy meant that his doctrine at times was, regardless of his intentions, in conflict with the interests of the state over which he presided. This applied to Soviet international policy from the late 1920s to the mid-1930s when Stalin's support for what became known as the 'Third Period' within the International Communist Movement encompassed a refusal to cooperate with non-Communist socialists during the period of the rise of fascism. At the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928 Stalin identified 'right deviationists' (within international socialism) as the principal threat to the Communist movement. By the time he abandoned this policy in 1935 in favour of a Popular Front, Hitler and Nazism had consolidated their power in Germany. The fate of many German political refugees in Moscow was especially shocking. Of the Communists who managed to escape to Russia from Hitler's Germany, approximately 60 per cent perished during the Soviet Great Terror of 1936–38 (Weitz 1997: 280).

By setting up himself and his acolytes as the arbiters of ideologically correct science and scholarship, Stalin also pursued policies which were not in the long-term interests of Soviet citizens and the Soviet state. That applied, for example, to his support for quack scientists such as Trofim Lysenko whose endorsement of an extreme environmentalism appealed to Stalin's ideological predispositions and led to the retardation of genetics as a scientific discipline until well into the post-Stalin era. (Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor as party leader from 1953 to 1964, was also duped by Lysenko, but by the Khrushchev era it was possible for genuine scientists to begin to campaign against pseudo-science.)

Stalin had begun as an orthodox follower of Lenin, and he was skilful in expounding the doctrine in a schematic way which sounded convincing to the poorly educated rising Soviet elite between the two world wars. The cult of his own personality which he sedulously encouraged not only appealed to his vanity. It also, he believed, appealed to the Russian people, since as he said in private conversation in 1926: 'For many centuries the Russian people, and especially the

Russian peasants have been used to being led by just one person. And *now* there must be *one*' (Brown 2009: 196). The anti-cosmopolitanism of Stalin's later period also resonated with popular beliefs, but only a Stalin could find a way of making it compatible with the thought of Marx and Lenin. As Eric van Ree has observed:

Stalin's upgrading of love of fatherland and national character to supreme values had little to do with Marxism, but anti-capitalism remained incorporated, when it was insisted that cosmopolitanism was produced by capitalism, which put money and profit over fatherland. Late Stalinism was an ideology that bluntly put two points of departure: nation and class, and two main goals: national development and world communism, next to each other and left the impossible job of reintegrating them into one whole to its baffled interpreters. (van Ree 2005: 178)

The most serious challenge to Soviet domination of the International Communist Movement in Stalin's lifetime came from Yugoslavia under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. The initial basis of the quarrel in 1948 was straightforward. The issue was 'whether Tito and his Politburo or Stalin would be the dictator of Yugoslavia' (Rusinow 1977: 25). Tito and his comrades-in-arms had made their own revolution and this gave them the confidence to object to Soviet agents being planted within Yugoslavia and to defy Stalin's insatiable desire to be in complete control of what was up to that point a unified Communist bloc. At the time of the break in 1948, the Yugoslav Communists did not have an ideological position distinctive from the rest of the International Communist Movement. It was the shock of being expelled from the Cominform (the successor organization to the pre-war Comintern) which led them to seek alternative Communist ideas. They developed the idea of 'workers' control' and, although this turned out to be a less resounding deviation from Soviet orthodoxy in practice than it appeared in theory, work councils gradually acquired greater power within the factories. 'Workers' self-management', accordingly, became a centrepiece of the Yugoslav variant of Communist ideology. The Yugoslav party also came to accept a reduced role in economic management and moved gradually to an acceptance of market prices. Thus, from the mid-1960s 'market socialism' became another important feature of the 'Yugoslav model'. Over time as well, a highly centralized Yugoslav state with federal forms gave way to a federalism of substance, so that by the late 1960s much power had flowed from the centre to the republics.

The Cuban revolution, in contrast, did not produce any real innovation in Communist doctrine. At the time Fidel Castro, together with his brother Raúl and Ernesto (Che) Guevara and their group of revolutionaries, overthrew the corrupt authoritarian regime of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959, Fidel himself

was not a Communist, although Raúl and Guevara were ideologically closer to Communism. However, the only model of long-term survival of a non-capitalist state was that offered by the Soviet Union, and the practical exigencies of government brought Cuba closer to that model and to the International Communist Movement. In 1963 Cuba was fully embraced by that movement and recognized as a 'socialist' (that is to say, Communist) state. Castro and Guevara maintained, however, a revolutionary élan and genuine commitment to internationalism which was in short supply in Eastern Europe. When Cuban troops were sent to help African revolutionaries, they were not, as was widely believed at the time, acting as proxies for the Soviet Union. The initiatives were taken by the Cubans themselves and they went beyond what the cautious Soviet leadership, headed between 1964 and 1982 by Leonid Brezhnev, deemed prudent. Yet, even if the first-generation Communists who led the Cuban revolution were more genuinely committed to revolutionary ideals than were their ageing Soviet counterparts, they did not make any significantly new contribution to Communist ideology.

China, in contrast, has produced distinctive versions of Communist ideology at different times. Having constructed a political and economic system essentially on orthodox Soviet lines by the mid-1950s, Mao seemed for a brief moment to be welcoming what Mikhail Gorbachev would much later call a 'pluralism of opinion'. When Mao said, 'Let a hundred flowers bloom in culture' and 'let a hundred schools of thought contend', he appeared to be looking for constructive criticism of the Chinese Communist Party's record thus far (Mitter 2004: 189). Before long, however, and still favouring horticultural metaphors, Mao was concerned to 'dig out the poisonous weed' (Lüthi 2008: 71). The 'Hundred Flowers Movement' of 1956–57 had seen voices raised criticizing Mao himself as well as the party's unchecked power. The campaign damaged Mao's authority and his response was to re-emphasize the importance of class struggle. His most disastrous ideological and political innovation was to launch the 'Great Leap Forward' in 1958. The aim was to advance the communization of Chinese society, with every locality encouraged to create small-scale technology (the 'backyard furnaces' which were economically useless) to complement the large-scale industry already built. Agricultural co-operatives were turned into much larger 'people's communes'. The 'leap', which many found initially inspiring, turned into the greatest disaster in the history of Communist China. The economic turmoil it induced, exacerbated by floods and droughts in 1959 and 1960, was responsible, latest research suggests, for the deaths of some forty-five million people (Dikötter 2011: 325).

Following the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward, the first half of the 1960s saw a return to more orderly Communist government in China. The system became increasingly institutionalized and, as Mao viewed it, bureaucratized. Mao was concerned both to enhance his personal position—Mao Zedong Thought was now appended to Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology of China—and to renew the revolution by waging war on existing institutions. He launched the Cultural Revolution which, in its intolerance and ferocious language, bore some resemblance to Stalin's 'Great Terror', although it killed far fewer people than perished in the Soviet Union between 1936 and 1938 (or in the Great Leap Forward). It was, however, an anti-intellectual movement which did great damage to education. Millions of teachers were denounced and universities shut down, so that students could participate as Red Guards in the revolutionary process. At its most extreme the Cultural Revolution was a phenomenon of the second half of the 1960s, although it continued, with less intensity, until the mid-1970s (and Mao's death in 1976). For many foreign admirers, this period constituted the essence of 'Maoism', a variant of Communist ideology which encouraged revolutionary youth to lay waste to established institutions, including the bureaucratic structures of Communist states.

Although an almost unremitting disaster, the Cultural Revolution had a solitary beneficial consequence, and one wholly unintended by Mao. Its onslaught on existing institutions, such as economic ministries, meant that there was very much weakened bureaucratic resistance to far-reaching economic reform—including substantial marketization and privatization—when this was initiated, and subsequently radicalized, by Deng Xiaoping from the late 1970s onwards. Deng himself had suffered during the Cultural Revolution, and his pragmatism led to much greater political stability and economic progress than had been achieved by Mao's egocentric and ruthless attempts to accelerate Chinese progress from 'socialism' into 'communism'. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping declared that many generations would be required to build the first stage of socialism. That implied hundreds of years and, therefore, put the final stage of communism into a future so distant that it was not even worth thinking about.

The reforms introduced under Deng and his successors preserved, indeed, only two of the six defining features of Communist ideology already elaborated. The monopoly of power of the Communist Party is still rigorously defended, as is democratic centralism. Yet, over the past generation the understanding of the latter has not excluded serious intra-party discussion of many issues, so long as

they do not question the party's hegemony. Orthodox Communist economic ideology is still defended by some within the party, but the party leadership has endorsed both a large private sector (producing two-thirds of China's industrial output) and market prices. Thus, China has become a mixed economy. It has alternatively been described as a system of 'party-state capitalism', in which much authority is left to local party bosses and private individuals. The central authorities 'can intervene, but they ration their energies' (Rowan 2007: 42). As for the two remaining fundamental features of Communist ideology, there is no longer an International Communist Movement for China to belong to, and, as already noted, the aspiration to build communism scarcely figures even as a theoretical desideratum (Brown 2009: 604–6).

The limits of Communist ideology were breached more comprehensively in the final great attempt to bring about change within a major Communist state. The Soviet perestroika, launched after Mikhail Gorbachev became the last leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, began as an attempt to reform the existing system. Gorbachev in 1987 introduced the concept of 'socialist pluralism' and by 1988 was on record as espousing a separation of executive, legislature, and judicial powers and a system of checks and balances. While he continued to speak highly of Lenin, he broke ever more definitively with Leninism (Brown 2007: 284–94). While the period between 1985 and 1987 might be regarded as one of serious reform within the limits of Communist ideology, from 1988 onwards these boundaries were transcended. Universal values and interests were deemed superior to class values, and the notion of class struggle was rejected. By February 1990 Gorbachev was speaking not of 'socialist pluralism' but of 'political pluralism'. This fundamental ideological change was fully reflected in political practice, with contested elections on a national scale taking place in 1989, 1990, and 1991.

Every one of the six defining characteristics of Communist ideology was abandoned by Gorbachev and his allies in the Soviet leadership, resistance from conservative Communists notwithstanding. As Andzej Walicki has observed, the ideas Gorbachev attempted to implement 'were not communist in any meaningful sense of the term'. Especially clearly from 1988 onwards, he aimed 'to *replace* the existing system with one consonant with freedom'. Perestroika was *not* 'six wasted years of reform communism' but 'an incredibly quick and peaceful dismantling of the entire edifice of communist tyranny' (Walicki 1995: 554–5). This was hardly the end of socialism, still less the end of history. Gorbachev himself had evolved from Communist reformer to socialist of a social democratic type. But the abandonment of Communist ideology and

practice in its economic dimension in China and its repudiation both politically and economically in the Soviet Union (with the Soviet state itself ceasing to exist) meant that in the last decades of the twentieth century Communism died as a serious ideological and political force.

REFERENCES

- Acts of the Apostles, *Bible* (King James Authorised Version).
- Avineri, Shlomo. 1968. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, A. H. (Archie). 1975. 'Adam Smith's first Russian followers'. Pp. 247–73 in *Essays on Adam Smith*, eds. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Brown, Archie. 2007. *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, Archie. 2009. *The Rise and Fall of Communism*. London: Bodley Head; New York, Ecco.
- Brus, Włodzimierz. 1972. *The Market in a Socialist Economy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Campanella, Tomasso. 1992. *The City of the Sun*. Berkeley: University of California Press. First published in Italian as *La Città del Sole* in 1602.
- Cohn, Norman. 2004. *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*. London: Pimlico; first published 1957.
- Cole, G. D. H. 1927. 'Introduction to Robert Owen'. Pp. vii–xix in *A New View of Society*. London: J.M. Dent.
- CPSU Programme. 1961. *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU 31 October 1961*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Crossman, Richard, ed. 2001. *The God that Failed*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dikötter, Frank. 2011. *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Engels, Friedrich. 1965. 'Preface to the English Edition of Karl Marx', *Capital*, Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers; first English edition 1887.
- Engels, Friedrich. 1999. *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, edited and with an introduction by David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1999; first published 1845.
- Fast, Howard. 1958. *The Naked God: The Writer and the Communist Party*. London: Bodley Head.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. 2008. *The Russian Revolution*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freedman, Michael. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Mowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Harding, Neil. 1996. *Leninism*. London: Macmillan.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1999. *Revolutionaries*. London: Abacus.
- Hyde, Douglas. 1951. *I Believed: The Autobiography of a former British Communist*. London: Heinemann.
- Kautsky, Karl. 1964. *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; first published 1919.
- Kołakowski, Leszek. 1978. *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution*, 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kornai, János. 1992. *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Kornai, János. 2006. *By Force of Thought: Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lenin, V. I. 1962. *The State and Revolution*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House; first published 1917.
- Lenin, V. I., 1963. *What is to be Done?*, edited with an introduction by S. V. Utechin. Oxford: Clarendon Press; first published in Geneva in 1902.
- Lüthi, Lorenz M. 2008. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Marx, Karl. 1955. *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Moscow: Progress; first published 1847.
- Marx, Karl. 1965–67. *Capital*, 3 vols. Moscow: Progress Publishers (Vol. I first published in English, 1867).
- Marx, Karl. 1966. *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. Moscow: Progress; first published 1875.
- Marx, Karl. 2000a. 'Letter to Vera Sassoulitch'. Pp. 623–8 in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, 2nd edn, ed. D. McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marx, Karl. 2000b. Preface to *Critique of Political Economy*. Pp. 424–8 in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* 2nd edn, ed. D. McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. 2002. *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Gareth Stedman Jones. London: Penguin; first published 1848.
- McLellan, David. 2003. 'Western Marxism'. Pp. 282–98 in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought*, eds. Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meek, Ronald L. 1977. *Smith, Marx, and After: Ten Essays in the Development of Economic Thought*. London: Chapman & Hall.
- Miliband, Ralph. 1977. *Marxism and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mitter, Rana. 2004. *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Montesquieu, Baron de. 1949. *The Spirit of the Laws*. New York: Hafner; *De l'Esprit des Lois* first published 1748.
- More, Thomas. 2003. *Utopia*, trans. and ed. Paul Turner, rev. edn. Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics; first published in Latin, 1516.
- Morgan, Kevin, Gidon Cohen, and Andrew Flinn. 2007. *Communists and British Society 1920–1991*. London: Rivers Oram Press.
- Nove, Alec. 1972. *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Owen, Robert. 1927. *A New View of Society and Other Writings*. London: J.M. Dent; first published in 1813.
- Owen, Robert. 1927. 'An address to the working classes'. Pp. 148–55 in *A New View of Society and Other Writings*. London: J.M. Dent.
- Plamenatz, John. 1954. *German Marxism and Russian Communism*. London: Longmans.
- Rowan, Henry S. 2007. 'When will the chinese people be free?' *Journal of Democracy*, 18, 3: 38–52.
- Rusinow, Dennison. 1977. *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Samuel, Raphael. 2006. *The Lost World of British Communism*. London: Verso.
- Sassoon, Donald. 1997. *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*. London: Fontana.
- Shakhnazarov, Georgiy. 2003. *Sovremennaya tsivilizatsiya i Rossiya* [Contemporary Civilization and Russia]. Moscow: Voskresen'e.
- Šik, Ota, 1967. *Plan and Market Under Socialism*. Prague: Academia.
- Šik, Ota. 1976. *The Third Way: Marxist-Leninist Theory and Modern Industrial Society*. London: Wildwood.
- Smith, Adam. 1978. *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Stedman Jones, Gareth. 2002. 'Introduction to Marx and Engels', *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Penguin.

Trotsky, Leon. 1973. 1905. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Turgot, A. R. J. 1973. *Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics*, trans. and ed. Ronald L. Meek. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Ree, Erik. 2005. 'Stalin as Marxist: the Western roots of Stalin's russification of Marxism'. Pp. 159–180 in *Stalin: A New History* eds. Sarah Davies and James Harris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walicki, Andrzej. 1995. *Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Weitz, Eric D. 1997. *Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 21 ANARCHISM

BENJAMIN FRANKS

There is a considerable amount of confusion, even among Socialists, as to the real meaning of words that run off the end of our tongues every time we speak of the revolutionary movement. Take, for instance, the words Socialist, Communist, Collectivist, Social Democrat, Anarchist, and collect the opinions of the first half dozen men you meet as to what they understand by them, and you will hear as many interpretations as replies. Yet amidst this seeming confusion it is quite possible to gather the general lines of tendency expressed in these disputed terms (*Freedom*, Vol. 2, No. 17 (December 1888), 1).

INTRODUCTION

ANARCHISM is amongst the most difficult of the ideologies to identify and explain precisely. Emma Goldman began her noted introductory essay on anarchism with John Henry McKay's poetic observation that anarchism is: 'Ever reviled, accursed, ne'er understood' (McKay quoted in Goldman 1969: 47). More recently, the analytical political philosopher Paul McLaughlin (2007: 25), following John P. Clark, has questioned whether it is possible to provide a satisfactory definition of anarchism. David Miller (1984: 3), after considering the range of differing accounts of anarchism, argues that there are no common features ascribed to anarchism, and as a result it can barely be recognized as a political ideology. This perception is further enhanced by anarchism's rejection of the main interest of orthodox political scientists, namely the gaining control of the state, and shaping policy decisions. As a result, anarchism's rejection of statist politics is misconceived as a rejection of politics in the widest sense (the influencing of one's own and others' realities) and therefore as irrelevant.

'Anarchism' can be something of an empty signifier, at best used simply to indicate disapproval or self-consciousness abrasiveness (e.g. Moran 2008). This widening of the application of the term 'anarchist' to obscure its more precise theoretical underpinnings is sometimes the result of a deliberate strategy by opponents. By associating their ideological competitor with any number of social ills, the aim is to discredit it. Ruth Kinna lists various groups and thinkers, from Goldman's close comrade Alexander Berkman to more contemporary advocates like Donald Rooum and the Cardiff-based Anarchist Media Group, who lament these pernicious misrepresentations of anarchism. These distortions include presenting anarchism as being concerned with 'bombs, disorder or

chaos', advocating the 'beating up [of] old ladies' or 'government by marauding gangs' (Kinna 2005: 9).

Despite the confusion as described in this essay's initial quotation from *Freedom*, an early British anarchist newspaper, activists as well as theorists have identified some relatively stable constellations of anarchist principles. However, there is division between these commentators as to which principles are the core ones, so that it is more suitable to discuss 'anarchisms' rather than 'anarchism'. In addition, there are a number of different formations of anarchism, many of which share the same principles, although in different contexts different principles take priority. For instance: anarchist communisms and anarcho-feminisms reject gender discrimination, but anti-sexism is more central to most anarcho-feminist practice than figuring in the selection of anarchist communist tactics. The most significant, but contested, division is that between social anarchisms on the one side—which are broadly within the socialist political tradition—and that of individualist anarchism on the other. However, this demarcation is itself contested, and there are constellations often identified as the latter that are in most contexts largely socialistic. Nonetheless there is a significant division between the main social and individualist libertarian traditions. There are also other distinctions within anarchism, these are best explored using a form of Michael Freeden's (1996, 2003) conceptual approach to analysing ideologies.

IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND ANARCHISM

Freeden's 'conceptual approach' to investigating ideologies identifies them as relatively settled structures of mutually defining principles (Freeden 2003: 32), which alter over time or in different contexts (Freeden 1996: 78–81) and intersect with other ideological structures (Freeden 2003: 63–4). Such assemblages of principles legitimize and encourage particular forms of political behaviour and ways of thinking about social problems, and simultaneously discourage and delegitimize others (Freeden 1996: 77; 2003: 55). The main ideologies have certain ineliminable core concepts, principles without which they cease to be recognizable as that particular ideology (Freeden 1996: 87–8; 2003: 61–2). Such identifications are not metaphysically ordained but the result of 'sustained empirical, historical usage' (Freeden 2003: 62). Freeden's approach is thus sympathetic to the anti-foundationalism common to post-anarchism (May 1994; Newman 2001), and found also in older anarchist epistemologies and meta-ethics (Bakunin 1970: 54–5; Cohn and Wilbur 2010). However, many,

questionably, regard anti-statism as the irremovable, universal principle at the core of anarchism (McLaughlin 2010: 25; See also Kinna 2005: 14).

A slight alteration of Freeden's model employs a greater emphasis on the role of resources and institutions. Institutions are the collection of linked individual practices. Practices, to borrow from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, are constituted out of material resources that operate according to particular structures of evolving norms, and engage specific types of agent and produce particular types of internal and external good (MacIntyre 2006: 152, 187–8, 222–3). The analysis offered here places greater stress on the ways different resources will influence the structure of ideologies and their impact on audiences, though this approach is consistent with Freeden's method. Although Freeden concentrates on written texts, he too identifies that different ideologies operate through distinctive media. Radical forms of socialism, plus certain constellations of feminism and environmentalism, operate through the apparatus of public protest, whilst others, like conservatism, are largely antipathetic towards public demonstration (Freeden 2003: 2). Moreover, many contemporary ideologies operate through the institution of the democratic-political party (2003: 78–9), whilst other ideologies, like anarchism, oppose them.

MacIntyre makes clear in his practice-based account of virtue ethics that different principles require particular types of materials in order to operate: justice needs some form of arbitrational structure, as well as linguistic resources in order to articulate and defend legal judgments (MacIntyre 2006: 67–8; 152–3). Repeating Giambattista Vico, MacIntyre concludes that all principles and concepts can only be expressed and recognized through institutional activity, that is to say, through the way that they shape the inter-personal and the material world (2006: 265). So, as alluded to by Murray Bookchin, and anarchists like Colin Ward and Paul Goodman, anarchisms, like other ideologies, are best understood through the everyday practices they embody and shape (Kinna 2005: 24, 142–3). The concepts that construct ideologies have greater impact if they involve more resources, and the ones that have greatest influence are those that have the largest effect on shaping the social world. The media through which concepts are expressed therefore help form the ideological structure.

Arguments carried through the medium of popular newspapers will have a different impact from similar arguments that are shouted on street corners; and they will differ again from those expressed on television or on an internet blog. The media is not the whole message, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan (2001), but the choice of medium nevertheless impacts on the type of sign produced and its reception. Even in the simplest form of ideological utterance, greater material

resources can allow for greater amplification and impact. The type of medium can twist a message, such that certain peripheral features become pushed to the fore at the cost of some core principles. It is the institutional arrangements which embody the different structures of concepts that distinguish, in particular, social anarchisms from individualist anarchisms, and also help to identify the differences between, and links amongst, the other constellations of anarchism.

SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUALIST ANARCHISMS

Whilst Freeden's (1996) major text on ideology, *Ideologies and Political Theory* does not subject anarchism to sustained analysis, it does however note that anarchism 'straddles more than one ideological family' (1996: 311), namely liberalism and socialism. Indeed, some activists and theorists like Rudolf Rocker (1988) and George Woodcock (1975: 40) regard anarchism as a conjoining of liberal individualism with socialist egalitarianism. Others like Murray Bookchin (1995) argue that there is a substantive distinction between social and individualist wings of anarchism, with the first being genuine anarchism and the other being a form of oppression. Anarcho-capitalists Chris Cooper (n.d.) and Brian Micklethwait (n.d.) argue the opposite. Bob Black (1997), amongst others, disputes Bookchin's division and regards social anarchism to be old-fashioned and 'played out' and other forms of individualism, though not anarcho-capitalism per se, as being more appropriately anarchist (141 and 147). Laurence Davis (2010, 70–73) is similarly critical of Bookchin's division, rightly pointing to the idiosyncratically diverse collection of theorists that Bookchin collapses into the lifestyle, individualist camp. This is a category which includes not just anarcho-capitalists like Benjamin Tucker, and Stirnerites who place their egos and other enlightened egoists in a privileged section above the mere masses, but also those influenced by the revolutionary Marxian artists and provocateurs, the Situationist International (Bookchin 1995: 7–11).

This division does, however, predate Bookchin's flawed but influential polemic. Kropotkin (2005: 77), for instance, contrasts the morally limited concept of the self found in egoistic anarchism with the more sophisticated contextual notion of the human agent found in social anarchism. Kropotkin left *The Anarchist* newspaper to set up a rival anarchist communist publication, *Freedom* (quoted above), when the former moved into an individualist direction that made cooperation impossible (Woodcock 1975: 419). Berkman (1987: 31–2), too, demarcates individualist and mutualist anarchisms from communist anarchism.

Whilst there are some differences between Kropotkin's and Berkman's taxonomy, they identify largely similar movements as being on either side of the individualist–socialist divide. There are variants of anarchism that clearly have a socialist morphology, and others that adopt conceptual arrangements more in keeping with the intersection of liberalism and conservatism (right-libertarianism). The fact that both versions share a core concept of 'anti-statism', which is often advanced as the ground for assuming a commonality between them (see for instance Heywood 1998: 188–91), is insufficient to produce a shared identity. This apparently critical core feature is not sufficient because the surrounding principles, theoretical canons, and institutional forms are distinct, such that the concept of state-rejection is interpreted differently despite the initial similarity in nomenclature.

Individualist Anarchisms

There are many different types of individualist anarchism. Philosophical anarchism, following Robert P. Wolff (1976), captures many of the core features of individualism: an absolute prohibition on coercion in order to protect the negative rights of the rational individual, with only consensual agreements providing legitimate bases for human interaction. As the state *de facto* acts without individual consent, it is illegitimate, though legitimate government is possible, albeit highly unlikely for Wolff (1976: 24–7). In addition, there are the more existential versions of individualist anarchism posited by L. Susan Brown (2003: 107–8, 115) who has similar concerns about coercion, but views the individual as more socially-connected, requiring a rejection of property rights as these restrain self-development. In contexts where those concepts are prioritized these apparently individualist anarchisms have more in common with the social forms. Where the existential anarchisms prioritize a form of self-development predicated on the domination or exclusion of others, they tend away from social forms of anarchism. Nonetheless, the main individualist anarchisms have been largely anarcho-capitalist in content, and in some areas, such as more privileged academic circles in the United States and Britain, especially in the 1980s, this constellation became synonymous with 'anarchism'.

Anarcho-capitalism is contemporarily associated with figures such as Murray Rothbard and David Friedman and can be traced back to the American individualism of Lysander Spooner, Josiah Warren, and Tucker (Long and Machan 2008: vii; Machan 2008: 60), though with a more consistent approach to property rights (Rothbard 2008). In anarcho-capitalism individual freedom is

predicated on absolute negative rights over the body and these negative rights are extended to private property. Anarcho-capitalism is in conflict with the right-libertarianism of Robert Nozick and Ayn Rand's Objectivism primarily over the issue of the minimal state (Nozick 1974: 24–5; Johnson 2008: 157; Machan 2008: 59 and 67). Many canonical anarcho-capitalists and their disciples are found in right-wing think tanks and professionally tiered lobby groups in the USA such as the Cato Institute, Mises Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Libertarian Party and, in the UK, the Libertarian Alliance, Adam Smith Institute and Institute of Economic Affairs.

The 'state' for individualist anarchists of this form is a coercive state of institutions that illegitimately disrupt private contractual arrangements and impinge on individual rights over one's own body and private property. Thus the main targets of anarcho-capitalist ire are state legislation that restricts self-ownership such as the imposition of minimum health and safety regulations, paternalistic prohibitions on drugs, alcohol, and tobacco and the compulsory wearing of seatbelts, or that impinges on rights over private property by 'destructive', redistributive welfare policies (e.g. Micklethwait 1992, 1994; Lester 2007; Myddleton 2008). By contrast, the main social anarchists reject this primacy of property rights, especially those over productive resources. Social anarchists argue that institutions based on absolute property rights are a product of, and generate, hierarchies of power. Such inequalities produce and maintain structures of domination to protect the power of the wealthy from the impoverished and dispossessed (Bakunin 2005: 48; McKay 2008: 159–69; Proudhon 2011:, 155–6; Kropotkin 2013 [1910]).

For individualist anarchists anti-statism is conjoined with the rejection of coercion, which is linked to the concept of the individual as a self-reliant and self-serving entity. Principles such as equality or contestations of hierarchy and solidarity are, as Charles Johnson (2008: 169–74) notes, rarely associated with anarcho-capitalism, and indeed are subject to much hostility. By contrast, social anarchism's critique of the state is predicated on the concepts rejected, or pushed to the very margins, by anarcho-capitalism. Consequently, what is meant by the 'state' and 'liberty' differs significantly between the two groups.

Social Anarchisms

Social anarchists are identified by four key concepts that have remained consistently core and stable since the late nineteenth century, as they can be found in the founding statements of the earliest left libertarian newspapers such

as *The Anarchist* (1885), prior to its drift into individualism. These principles can also be found more contemporaneously in the aims and principles of contemporary movements, such as the Anarchist Federation (2009). These four principles are: (i) the aforementioned rejection of the state and state-like bodies, which distinguishes anarchism from social democracy; (ii) a rejection of capitalism as a hierarchical and coercive set of norms and practices, which distinguishes it from anarcho-capitalism; (iii) a fluid concept of the self in which one's identity is inherently linked to socio-historical context and relationships with others, which distinguishes it from forms of egoism; and finally (iv) a recognition that the means used have to prefigure anarchist goals, which demarcates anarchism from the consequentialism of orthodox Marxism (see for instance Seymour 1885: 2; Anarchist Federation 2009: 28; see also Franks 2006: 12–13, 17–18).

These principles are expressed in the concept of 'direct action' (Franks 2003; Kinna 2005: 149–52; AFAQ 2008b) and can be re-articulated as a continual process of contesting hierarchy by the oppressed themselves in the pursuit of internal (or immanent) social goods rather than external goods (such as exchange values). Priority is given to the direct or unmediated role of the oppressed in controlling their forms of contestation rather than relying on representatives, such as a vanguard who will guide the masses to liberation. Thus, part of the anarchist critique of the hierarchical nature of Leninism is based on this suspicion of mediation (see Weller 1992; Graeber 2007). In contrast to individualism and other forms of socialism, social anarchisms have different sets of principal thinkers (though, in keeping with anarchism's scepticism towards authority, none is taken as wholly authoritative) including Michael Bakunin, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, and Rudolf Rocker. Social anarchisms also have distinctive sets of organizations, often with methods designed to flatten hierarchies and prevent fixed leadership using tactics that would be largely antipathetic to individualist anarchisms.

In social anarchism anti-statism is understood in relation to core principles of contesting, reducing, or evading hierarchy and in developing mutually beneficial rather than purely self-serving relationships. As a result, 'anti-statism' takes a different form and has a different meaning from that ascribed to it by individualist anarchism. Individualists locate anti-statism next to a possessive, abstract view of the self, and a foundational belief in the absolute autonomy of the individual, but with no critique of inequality. Thus, for individualists the state refers to any agency unjustly interfering with property rights (including the property of the body), whilst for social anarchists the state is a particular form of

hierarchical institution, which is self-serving but also acts to police property boundaries and thus limits self-development by the oppressed. On occasion, state action is preferable to other, grosser forms of economic hierarchy, such as those of unregulated capitalism. Thus social anarchists like Chomsky (2007) or the Solidarity Federation (2007) are not inconsistent in preferring state-provided welfare, health provision, and statutory health and safety regulation over simple market arrangements that would leave the already socio-economically weak worse off.

Social anarchists consequently reserve their criticism of the state for when it primarily functions to support the property relations that support economic inequality, maintained by a coercive apparatus of oppressive practices, such as the judiciary, policing, and prisons. It is these functions that min-archists (minimal or ultra minimal statists) accept from the state, whilst anarcho-capitalists support these functions and practices so long as they are carried out by private enterprise (Friedman n.d.; Lester 2009: 4). Even the apparently shared characteristic of ‘anti-statism’, which is supposed to unify the two types of anarchism, actually divides them.

SYNTHESIS

The concept of ideological synthesis is not unusual in analyses of conceptual structures, having been used as a conceptual tool for analysing the development of fascism (Marsella 2004), movements within the inter-war Labour Party and latterly New Labour (Nuttall 2008). As Iain McKay (2008) documents in his and the Anarchist Frequently Asked Questions editorial team’s (AFAQ) monumental hard copy and online resource *An Anarchist FAQ*, there have been not only various attempts to synthesize distinctive forms of anarchism, but also different interpretations of what a ‘synthesis’ would mean for anarchism. For Sébastien Faure, the strength of a synthesis lies in maintaining the different perspectives whilst finding areas of commonality between rival anarchisms. However, for Voline (the pseudonym for Vsevolod Eichenbaum), whilst the ‘emergence of these various tendencies was historically needed to discover the in-depth implications of anarchism in various settings’ it was important to find, and concentrate on the united features (Voline 2005, 487; AFAQ 2008c). The desire for unity was strengthened by the particularly precarious position of anarchists at that time, caught between Bolshevik suppression and the White Army’s counter-revolution. The difficulty for the synthesizers was in finding sufficiently significant commonality and methods of agreed decontestation for a synthesis to

take place.

Synthesis takes many forms. The combination of the different elements can produce hybrids that in most contexts are a minor variant of one or other of the original ideological parents. The main forms of contemporary social democratic or left-Zionism might be such an example. Here, the privileging of the nation-state, aligned to the security of specific ethno-religious groups, has pushed more mainstream egalitarian and cosmopolitan socialist ideas to the margins. A synthesis might be the construction of a whole new ideology that has a coherent set of principles distinct from its constituent parts. Jeremy Nuttall (2008: 13) points to the claims of New Labour as providing an original singular coherent ideology that can identify cogent policy solutions to social problems. The existence of conflicting principles need not undermine an ideology if the competing principles can assist in mutual clarification, are structured in such a way that they indicate a way to prioritize goals and actions (2008: 14–15). However, it is possible that the synthesis is so wholly unstable because the combined elements are so contradictory that it provides, at best, an alignment that is only very localized and temporary.

Ideologies can be a product of intentional hybridization. Here ideological players recognize limitations or absences within an existing political structure and attempt to overcome them with the addition of key principles and methods from alternative ideologies. Alternatively, engineered hybrids might be a more disingenuous effort to co-opt support from an ideological rival, rather than engaging in any significant transformation, thereby remaining a minor variant on an existing conceptual morphology. An example of the latter might be found in Rothbard's attempt to synthesize anarcho-capitalism and social anarchism through the magazine *Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought*.

This magazine initially seems to embrace more than one type of synthesis, allowing for the continued separation of distinctive theoretical positions but also finding 'new dimensions' through their interaction (Editor 1965: 3). However as Rothbard's and the anonymous editor's arguments are framed solely in accordance with free market solutions, it looks more as though the synthesis was merely an attempt to bring in some of the discourse and membership of the New Left over to the free market right (see for instance Rothbard 1965a, 1965b; Editor 1966). So whilst finding common areas of action, such as anti-Vietnam war protests, free speech movements, and criticism of Soviet Marxism, the problems are primarily identified because they contest market relationships and the solutions are advanced based on private, enforceable contracts. The New Left contribution is admired only when it conforms to anarcho-capitalist's

ideological structure.

The New Left are moving, largely unwittingly but more consciously in the work of some of its advanced thinkers, toward a vision of the future that is the fullest possible extension of the ideals of freedom, independence and participatory democracy: a free market in a free society (Rothbard 1965b: 67).

Given the differences between the two, a stable rapprochement with an organization sharing similar tactics was unlikely. Fusions of libertarian left with right usually end up just being a subset of the dominant one, which in terms of resources and institutional power is invariably the libertarian right version.

Increasingly, academic analysis has followed activist currents in rejecting the view that anarcho-capitalism has anything to do with social anarchism (see for instance, Jennings 2000: 147; Kinna 2005: 26; McKay 2008: 478, 481). More usually the combinations of social anarchism with individualism occur when the latter are either ambivalent or reject private property. A rare exception is provided by Johnson (2008: 179), who sees right-libertarian principles of individual autonomy as providing the basis for '*voluntary mutual aid between workers*, in the form of community organisations, charitable projects and labour unions'. Johnson (2008: 179–80) rightly points to the mutual aid societies that provided welfare outside of the state and independent unions, like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), that operate consensually.

However, there are problems with Johnson's account. First, some of the praised institutions, such as benevolent societies, are antipathetic to the social solidarity he admires, as they excluded the most desperate who were financially unable to join or maintain membership. Second, in the case of institutions based on social solidarity they have governance principles that differ significantly from those of anarcho-capitalism. The IWW includes in its operations the social principles excluded by individualism, such as the commitments to contestations of hierarchy and to the freedoms of others as being intimately connected to their own self-conceptions, hence their popular slogan 'An injury to one is an injury to all'. Consensual agreements, especially those that are the result of economic inequality, are not inviolable for the IWW. The IWW acts aggressively towards those union members who kept their contract of employment and broke strikes because the strike-breaker was assisting managerial hierarchies and leaving their colleagues in a far worse economic state. In addition, the goals of anarcho-capitalism are to retain and extend private property relationships, while for anarcho-syndicalists the objective is to transcend them.

Others, too, have suggested that the division can be transcended. Davis

(2010: 75) indicates that many of the activities derided as ‘individualist’ by social anarchists, such as Bookchin, share a commitment to contesting capitalist social relations and developing anti-hierarchical forms. Davis’ point is a good one. Too frequently innovative forms of anarchic activity are dismissed by longer-standing groups, often more overtly working class in form, as ‘liberal’, ‘individualist’, or ‘lifestylist’, such as squatting, climate, and anti-roads activism (Davis 2010: 78–9). However notwithstanding the particular weaknesses in Bookchin’s account of the distinction between ‘lifestyle’ and social anarchism, there are still distinctive morphological structures that make most forms of individualism incompatible with social anarchism. Individualisms that defend or reinforce hierarchy such as economic-power relations of anarcho-capitalism, or the implied elitism within Stirnerite egoism where the non-egoists are available for exploitation (see Brooks 1996: 85; Stirner 1993: 189–90) are incompatible with the practices of social anarchism that are based on developing immanent goods that contest such inequalities.

Kinna (2005: 15) and McKay (2008: 76–7) describe the efforts of Voltairine de Cleyre and Ricardo Mella to construct an ‘anarchism without adjectives’, that is to say an account of anarchism that can unify the distinctive divisions that are part of the histories of this movement (see too Williams 2009: 192), but note that these efforts inevitably fail. The broad range of conceptual structures that have had the epithet ‘anarchism’ applied to them is too wide to find a commonality. Even apparently shared concepts have radically different meanings when placed into contrasting conceptual frameworks. Instead, anarchism here is best understood as a range of different sub-groups which frequently come together into alliances of differing degrees of stability and fecundity.

ANARCHISM WITH ADJECTIVES

Numerous variants of anarchism can be identified by concentrating on analyses of the main social forms of anarchism, which historically have had the largest numbers of organized adherents. These share a largely similar morphological structure, but differ with respect to often peripheral, but identifiable, characteristics. Consistent with Freeden’s (2003: 62–3) approach, these differences in apparently marginal concepts, in particular contexts, can redefine core principles and lead to radical shifts between apparently similar ideological forms. For over a century, the main forms of social anarchism have been anarchist communism and anarcho-syndicalism, and whilst groups that identify with these traditions tend to work together, differences have occurred, which

have highlighted divisions over sites of struggle, revolutionary agency, and modes of organization.

Anarchist Communism and Anarcho-Syndicalism

Anarchist communism is historically associated with figures like Errico Malatesta, Kropotkin, and, in the UK, with Kropotkin's *Freedom* group and the closely aligned Yiddish anarchist group *Der Arbeiter Freund* (The Workers Friend) (see Fishman 1975). Today, anarchist communist groups are found across the world including the Anarchist Federation, formerly the Anarchist Communist Federation (UK), the Northeastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (North America), the main sections of *Alternative Libertaire* (France), and Zabalaza Anarchist Communist Front (South Africa). Anarcho-syndicalism is most often associated with Émile Pouget (2005), Rocker (1988) and Lucy Parsons through her work in the revolutionary syndicalist IWW, which included socialists and non-aligned members although its principles are largely consistent with anarchism. In the recent era Noam Chomsky (2005) is perhaps the most famous advocate of anarcho-syndicalism and is reputedly a member of the IWW. Anarcho-syndicalist groups are found on four continents; many of the most active are united into, or associated with, the Industrial Workers Association (IWA), which includes the UK's Solidarity Federation, Russia's *Konfederatsiya Revolyutsionnikh Anarkho-Sindikalistov*, and most famously Spain's *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT) which was active in the civil war against Franco. The IWA groups are explicitly anarchist but identify closely with the IWW (SolFed Collective 2001: 10).

These groups largely share the same principles of privileging the oppressed themselves in shaping forms of opposition to hierarchical social relations, through methods that attempt to avoid replicating oppressive social forms. The similarities between these anarchist-communist and anarcho-syndicalist groups are so great that many theorists associated with one have also been staunch advocates of the other, such as the aforementioned Kropotkin (1997), Parsons (2004a: 103), and Rocker (Fishman 1975: 230–312). Like Fernand Pelloutier (2005: 413), they saw industrial organization as a basis for building an anarchist communist revolution. Individuals are often members of both types of group, or drift between them, depending on which is more active in their area.

However, there are occasions when distinctions arise, although these differences might not lead to hostility. On other occasions, once-peripheral concepts can shift towards the core redefining key principles, and thus generate

considerable morphological differences within social anarchism. For instance, anarcho-syndicalists, especially in Spain, are associated with the economic system referred to as collectivism. Each worker or collective is rewarded in terms of their labour time. By contrast, anarchist communism promotes free and equal access to goods and productive mechanisms. As Augustin Souchy Bauer notes, some of the peasant collectives in Aragon pushed in the direction of anarchist communism in contrast to the collectivism of the industrial syndicates:

Everyone, whether able to work or not, received the necessities of life as far as the collective could provide them. The underlying idea was no longer 'a good day's pay for a good day's work' but 'from each according to his (sic) needs'.

Herein lay a difference between the peasant collectives in Aragon and the industrial and commercial collectives in Catalonia [a CNT stronghold] and other parts of Spain (Souchy Bauer 1982: 21–2).

In practice disputes rarely arise on this issue as, unlike in revolutionary Spain, the central concern is with contesting the dominance of capitalism rather than implementing its immediate replacement. Another strategy for limiting areas of difference is to de-emphasize the importance of deciding upon future, post-anarchist economic arrangements (AFAQ 2008a). Others decontest the difference by viewing collectivism as a transitional stage towards anarchist communism (McKay 2008: 64; AFAQ 2008a). Donald Rooum (2001: 18) considers that the issue of rival economic alternatives is no longer of contemporary relevance as few adhere to collectivism or mutualism. Rooum's view is challenged by advocates of Participatory Economics, such as Michael Albert, who promote distribution on the basis of an individual's contribution of essential labour hours and thus borrow from economic collectivism (Albert 2000).

Other differences arise between anarchist communists and syndicalists, which are in most contexts marginal, but can shift to more prominent positions. For instance, the concentration in anarcho-syndicalism is on exploitation at the point of production (Woodcock 1975: 304). Anarcho-syndicalism as a result concentrates on the industrial syndicate as the most suitable form of counter-organization, and the industrial worker as the potentially revolutionary agent of change (McKay 2008: 64–6; see too the Confederation Generale du Travail 1906). By contrast, anarchist communists regard exploitation as taking place throughout social locations and not just at the point of production. Thus, anarchist communists place greater emphasis on community groups and consequently reject the centrality of the labour organization. These differences become particularly acute at times of especially low or especially high industrial

militancy. A degree of accommodation is often found, according to McKay (2008: 65), as both share a commitment to anti-hierarchical organization based on a discourse of overcoming class oppression. However, this area of similarity leads to a further problem for anarchist communists and syndicalists alike: namely, that the concentration on class can lead to the marginalization or exclusion of other oppressions—and subjugated identities—such as those based on gender, ethnicity, or sexuality.

Anarcha-Feminism, Black Anarchism, and Queer Anarchism

The intention in including feminist, black, and queer anarchisms in a single heading is not to assume a common identity amongst them; although many (but not all) black, queer, and feminist critics share a partial critique of those socialist movements that regard all oppressions as being centrally and wholly economic in origin. It is inaccurate to regard feminist, racial, and sexual issues as new or marginal issues for anarchism. Goldman (1969: 177–239) and Parsons (2004b: 92, 2004c: 101–3, 2004a: 103), for instance, address issues of women's oppression in domestic, social, economic, and sexual arenas. The libertarian socialist Edward Carpenter (1930) saw the democratic impulse in loving relationships within as well as between the genders. Anarchism also has long traditions, sometimes brutally curtailed, throughout the non-occidental sections of the planet (see for instance Anderson 2006; Adams n.d.; Drilik 1991).

The application of anarchist principles to the differing contexts of oppression based on gender, ethnicity, or sexuality, produces distinctive primary agents of change, and sometimes results in distinctive forms of organization and contestation. Anarcha-feminist movements developed strategies to limit often overlooked forms of organizational domination (Freeman 1984; Levine 1984), to seek new ways to identify, examine, and confront or evade subjugation that male activists overlook (Leeder 1996: 143–4; Kornegger 1996: 159) and to develop mutually fulfilling social practices (Kornegger 1996: 163–6). Similarly, anarchists of colour seek structures that allow them to develop their own forms 'where we can meet as people from oppressed backgrounds and not only share our experiences and how they are relevant to each other', without feeling patronized or dominated by those from dominant ethnic groups with their own forms of knowledge (Ribeiro 2005) who act like a vanguard. Gavin Brown (2011) describes recent experiments in generating autonomous queer spaces that operate on, and encourage, anarchist ethical principles of mutual-aid, anti-hierarchy, and self-organization as opposed to those based on commercialism or

fixed and privileged sexual identities (see too Heckert, 2004).

Such movements that prioritize agents based on gender or ethnicity rather than class have drawn some hostility from some social anarchists, such as Martin Wright (1980: 2) and indeed the Black female activist Parsons (2004d: 54). They were critical of those who view patriarchy or white-skin privilege as the main source of oppression and thereby marginalize or ignore, and thereby sustain, class oppression. However, an anarchy-feminist reply to Wright argues that patriarchy is not the sole form of oppression and that different and diverse organizations are required to deal with different forms of subjugation (Anonymous 1980: 9). Where patriarchy is a major force then feminist modes of organization are the most consistent with anarchist principles. Pedro Ribeiro (2005) from the Furious Five Revolutionary Collective and former Black Panther, turned anarchist, Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin (n.d.) defend autonomous Black organizations on similar grounds, arguing that such structures do not preclude the development of other structures and the creation of different alliances to deal with particular types of oppression.

Environmental Anarchisms

As many commentators have noted, environmental themes have been significant features of anarchism from the late nineteenth century given the impact of the geographical interests of leading figures like Elisée Reclus and Kropotkin (Ward 2004: 90; Kinna 2005: 90; McKay 2008: 65). The privileging of environmental principles within anarchist practices has altered depending on historical and social context. Dana Williams (2009: 201–7) notes that regional factors, such as the presence of threatened ecologically-desirable landscapes and distinctive organizational histories, might impact on the degree to which anarchist movements consciously adopt ecological principles. Problematically, Williams sets up a binary opposition in which social anarchism is defined against green anarchism, though he recognizes that presenting them as ‘discrete ideologies excludes social green anarchisms such as green syndicalism’ (2009: 207).

There are a number of significant features that anarchism shares with ecologism: one is a united recognition of the artificiality of the borders of nation-states and the identification of the human subject as part of, rather than separate from, the biosphere. Links, too, can be made with anarchism's rejection of the capitalist *telos* of ever greater productivity to generate increasing profit, with environmentalism's post-materialism. In addition, environmentalism's organic view of society as a complex web of interlinked systems is inconsistent with

anarchism's commitment to fluid non-centralized social organization. However, as Elissa Aalota (2010) identifies, the selection of principles from anarchism and environmentalism and the ways in which they are structured generate a range of green anarchisms and sub-currents, some of which come into conflict not just with other forms of anarchism but also with rival forms of green anarchism.

The three main green anarchisms are (i) variants of deep ecology, which influenced groups like the US sections of Earth First!; (ii) primitivism associated with John Zerzan (1994, 2002); and (iii) Bookchin's social ecology. All of these green anarchisms share certain common characteristics: namely a rejection of capitalism, and the principle that other species and eco-systems have a value which is irreducible to their exchange value. Given this substantive similarity, the different variants co-existed in radical ecological movements around *Fifth Estate* and *Green Anarchist*. Green-tinged anarcho-capitalism is an exception, as it takes a wholly anthropocentric view of the environment, views ecological problems as one of improperly defined and enforced property rights, and considers that a flourishing capitalist economy provides the resources for dealing with any ecological threat (Morris 2005).

However, deep ecology's and primitivism's ideological structures place concern for the biosphere at their core, and locate human interests in a more peripheral position. Deep ecology and primitivism, though distinct, also share a substantive critique of enlightenment scientism, but replace it with an ungrounded mysticism and irrationality (Aalota 2010: 173–4; Bookchin 1997: 55–6). Social ecologists regard environmental problems as a product of oppressive human interactions that stands in contrast to primitivism, which blames a 'Dead Zone' of undifferentiated human civilization as a whole (Zerzan 1994: 144; Bookchin 1997: 77–86). As a result, different types of institutions and tactics are identified within the different forms of green anarchism. Bookchin (2005: 83) prioritizes holistic social institutions to undo ecological damage. Primitivists look at the inherent self-destructiveness of existing social institutions and prefer individualized responses to recreating what is for them the inherently alienating problems of collective civil action (*Green Anarchist* 2002: 12 and 18).

Aalota (2010: 173–4) recognizes that some critics identify environmentally centred direct action organizations with deep ecology and more individualist, albeit destructive, forms of contestation with primitivism. Social ecology, by contrast, promotes more sophisticated and complex structures to generate social change (2010: 172–3). As these institutions tend to identify the vast, diverse but economically oppressed masses as those most capable of generating the values

and practices capable of contesting the social relations that devalue nature, so too do these ideologies tend closer to social anarchist forms. The syndicalist Graham Purchase (1995), for instance, argues that as a sustainable environment is necessary for human flourishing, this requires coordination and planning, especially to reverse the destruction that has already occurred. The only way to achieve that in a humane and fulfilling manner is by democratic participation in all productive and distributive areas of social life, which consequently requires anarcho-syndicalist types of organization.

Post-Anarchism

Post-anarchism (or postanarchism) is one of the most recent variations within anarchism. It, too, is subject to numerous competing interpretations, depending on geography and social context. Post-anarchism is viewed as extending the range of anarchist concerns to the contemporary postmodern cultural arena, or as supplementing the absences within standard anarchist theory with conceptual tools developed from post-structuralism, or as transcending the limitations of standard or classical anarchism, representing a significant reordering of anarchist theoretical principles and their inter-relation.

The key theorists of post-anarchism are Todd May (1994), Newman (2001, 2010) and Lewis Call (2002), Richard Day (2005), and Süreyya Evren (2011) (see too Call 2009: 123). There are significant links, theoretical and historical, between anarchism and politically engaged poststructuralism. For instance, they are both theoretically diverse and have a shared interest in identifying power that pervades not just the economy but all social institutions. Such similarities are not surprising given that the major poststructuralist figures, such as Jean Baudrillard and Jean-François Lyotard, were initially engaged with left-libertarian groups (Plant 1992: 5).

Post-anarchists identify certain epistemological, ontological, and meta-ethical weaknesses within the traditional anarchist canon—including a commitment to benign essentialism—with a reductive, methodological analysis of political problems. However, critics like Jesse Cohn and Shaun Wilbur (2010) argue that this account of the difference between post-anarchism and its earlier precursors is inaccurate, with significant earlier anarchists rejecting essentialism and scientific reductivism. Even where these are present, they are more peripheral than significant structural features of anarchist practice.

Other criticisms of post-anarchism come from activists who fear that post-

anarchism, with its unfamiliar discourse, is impregnated with concepts derived from those with social, especially educational, capital (see the exchanges at Libcom 2010). Post-anarchism is regarded as representative of the interests and needs of a particular (and often materially advantaged) section of the workforce—academics. The danger is that post-anarchism, whilst providing useful insights into anarchist practice, might dominate public understandings of anarchism, associating it with particular educationally privileged locations at the cost of less favoured groupings. However, the strength of post-anarchism may lie in its ability to express types of anti-hierarchical critique and promote forms of action that are appropriate to this limited domain.

CONCLUSION

In analysing anarchism as an ideology, it is more appropriate to consider it as separate, multiple arrangements. One of the main divisions is between individualist and socialist constellations, though some that have been identified by Bookchin as individualist are actually closer to a socialist structure. Attempts at finding a singular account, through a synthesis of the main currents of individualism and socialist anarchisms, are invariably unsuccessful because the structure of their conceptual arrangements is so distinct that even apparently shared concepts, like anti-statism, have radically different meanings.

Because social anarchism prioritizes a necessarily malleable and variable conception of the political agent, it is particularly prone to hybridization. It also influences and is influenced by other ideologies based on contesting forms of oppression. Some hybrids, however, are particularly unstable, especially those that attempt to synthesize individualisms such as anarcho-capitalism with anti-market social anarchisms. Social anarchism prioritizes an unmediated and prefigurative contestation of hierarchies; as oppression takes different forms in different contexts, it generates specific agent identities, distinctive forms of organization and tactics. This produces diverse forms of (adjectival) anarchism, which provide links to other radical social movements.

REFERENCES

- Aalota, E. 2010. 'Green anarchy: Deep ecology and primitivism'. Pp. 161–85 in *Anarchism and Moral Philosophy*. eds. B. Franks and M. Wilson. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Adams, J. n.d. *Non-Western Anarchisms: Rethinking the Global Context*. Johannesburg: Zabalaza.
- AFAQ. 2008a. 'Is this a blueprint for an anarchist society? An anarchist FAQ. Section I—What would an anarchist society look like?' 11 November 2008; accessed at <http://anarchism.pageabode.com/afaq/secI2.html> on 18 August 2010.

- AFAQ. 2008b. 'What is direct action? An anarchist FAQ. Section J—What do anarchists do?' 11 November 2008; accessed at <<http://anarchism.pageabode.com/afaq/secJ2.html>>, on 6 August 2010.
- AFAQ. 2008c. 'What kinds of organisation do anarchists build? An Anarchist FAQ. Section J—What do anarchists do?' 11 November 2008; accessed at <<http://anarchism.pageabode.com/afaq/secJ3.html>>, on 6 August 2011.
- Albert, M. 2000. *Moving Forward: Program for a participatory economy*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Anarchist Federation. 2009. 'Aims and principles', *Organise!* 73 (Winter): 28.
- Anderson, B. 2006. *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the anti-colonial imagination*. London: Verso.
- Anonymous. 1980. 'No masters, no gods', *Xtra*, 5: 9.
- Bakunin, M. 1970. *God and the State*. New York: Dover.
- Bakunin, M. 2005. *Statism and Anarchy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; originally published 1973.
- Berkman, B. 1987. *ABC of Anarchism*. London: Freedom.
- Black, B. 1997. *Anarchy After Leftism*. Columbia: Columbia Alternative Library.
- Bookchin, M. 1995. *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Bookchin, M. 1997. *The Bookchin Reader*, ed. J. Biegl. London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. 2005. *The Ecology of Freedom*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Brooks, F. 1996. 'American individualist anarchism: What is was and why it failed', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1: 75–95.
- Brown, G. 2011. 'Amateurism and anarchism in the creation of autonomous queer spaces'. Pp. 200–33 in *Anarchism and Sexuality: Ethics, Relationships and Power*, eds. J. Heckert and R. Cleminson. London: Routledge.
- Brown, L. S. 2003. *The Politics of Individualism*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Call, L. 2002. *Postmodern Anarchism*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Call, L. 2009. 'Review of S. Newman, *Unstable Universals*', *Anarchist Studies*, 17 (1): 122–5.
- Carpenter, E. 1930, *The Intermediate Sex*. London: George Allen and Unwin, accessed at <<http://www.edwardcarpenter.net/#books>>, on 20 August 2010.
- Chomsky, N. 2005. 'The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism'. Pp. 133–48 in *Chomsky on Anarchism*. Edinburgh: AK Press; originally published 1976.
- Chomsky, N. 2007. 'Chomsky on Ron Paul'. Originally published on ZNet, now accessible at <<http://uspolitics.tribe.net/thread/623b39d1-2481-48f5-b93a-5e595551beda>>, last accessed 22nd July 2010.
- Cohn, J. and S. Wilbur. 2010. 'What is Wrong with Postanarchism?' *The Anarchist Library* originally published 2007; accessed at <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Jesse_Cohn_and_Shawn_Wilbur_What_s_Wrong_With_Postanarchism> on 24 March 2013.
- Confederation Generale du Travail 1906. *Charter of Amiens* available online at Industrial Workers of the World, accessed at <<http://www.iww.org.au/node/214>>, on 30 September 2010.
- Cooper, C. n.d. *Mere Anarchy*. Personal Perspective No. 1. London: Libertarian Alliance.
- Davis, L. 2010. 'Social anarchism or lifestyle anarchism: An unhelpful distinction', *Anarchist Studies*, 18 (1): 62–82.
- Day, R. 2005. *Gramsci is Dead*. London: Pluto.
- Drilik, A. 1991. *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California.
- Editor. 1965. 'The general line'. *Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought*, 1 (1), accessed at <http://mises.org/journals/lar/pdfs/1_1/1_1_1.pdf>, on 6 August 2010.
- Editor. 1966. 'Why be libertarian?' *Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought*, 2 (3), accessed at

- <http://mises.org/journals/lar/pdfs/2_3/2_3_1.pdf>, on 6 August 2010.
- Evren, S. 2011. 'Introduction: How new anarchism changed the world (of opposition) after Seattle and gave birth to post-anarchism'. Pp. 1–19 in *Post-Anarchism: A Reader*. eds. D. Rousselle and S. Evren. London: Pluto
- Fishman, W. 1975. *East End Jewish Radicals 1874–1914*. London: Duckworth.
- Franks, B. 2003. 'The direct action ethic', *Anarchist Studies*, 11 (1): 13–41.
- Franks, B. 2006. *Rebel Alliances: The Means and Ends of Contemporary British Anarchisms*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Freeden, M. 1996 *Ideologies and Political Theory: A conceptual approach*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Freeden, M. 2003. *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeman, J. 1984. 'The tyranny of structurelessness', Pp. 5–16 in *Untying the Knot: Feminism, Anarchism and Organisation*. London: Dark Star and Rebel Press.
- Friedman, D. n.d. *Rational Anarchism*. Libertarian reprints No. 2. London: Libertarian Alliance; originally published 1970.
- Goldman, E. 1969. *Anarchism and Other Essays*. New York: Dover; originally published 1917.
- Graeber, D. 2007. 'Twilight of vanguardism'. Pp. 250–3 in *Realizing the Impossible: Art against Authority*, eds. J. Macphee and E. Reuland. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Green Anarchist. 2002. 'Green anarchism now', *Green Anarchist*, 67.
- Heckert, J. 2004. 'Sexuality/identity/politics'. Pp. 101–16 in *Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global Age*, eds. J. Purkis and J. Bowen. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Heywood, A. 1998. *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Jennings, J. 2000. 'Anarchism', *Contemporary Political Ideologies*. 2nd edn. eds. R. Eatwell and A. Wright. London: Continuum.
- Johnson, C. 2008. 'Liberty equality solidarity: Toward a dialectical anarchism'. Pp. 155–88 in *Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country?*, eds. R. Long and T. Machan. Aldershot: Ashgate
- Kinna, R. 2005. *Anarchism: A Beginners Guide*. Oxford: Oneworld.
- Kom'boa Ervin, L. n.d. *Anarchism and the Black Revolution*. 2nd edn. npl: np (first edition produced by North American Black Cross). Accessed at <<http://libcom.org/library/anarchism-black-revolution-lorenzo-ervin>>, on 9 March 2013.
- Kornegger, P. 1996. 'Anarchism: The feminist connection.' Pp. 156–69 in *Reinventing Anarchy, Again*. ed. H. Ehrlich. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Kropotkin, P. 1997. 'Syndicalism and anarchism', *Black Flag*, 210: 24–7; originally published 1908.
- Kropotkin, P. 2005. *Anarchist Morality*. Edmonton: Black Cat; originally published in 1897.
- Kropotkin, P. 2012. 'Anarchism', from *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Anarchy Archives; originally published in 1910.
- Leeder, E. 1996. 'Let our mothers show the way'. Pp. 142–8 in *Reinventing Anarchy, Again*. ed. H. Ehrlich. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Lester, J. 2007. 'Smoking & libertarianism: Amartya Sen's article and J. C. Lester's reply', originally appeared in *Financial Times* 14 February 2007; accessed at <http://www.la-articles.org.uk/smoking_and_libertarianism.htm> on 24 March 2013.
- Lester, J. 2009. *Libertarianism: An Extremely Short Introduction*. London: Libertarian Alliance, accessed at <http://www.la-articles.org.uk/libertarianism_intro.pdf> on 5 August 2010.
- Levine, C. 1984. 'The tyranny of tyranny'. Pp. 17–23 in *Untying the Knot: Feminism, anarchism and organisation*. London: Dark Star and Rebel Press.
- Libcom. 2010. 'Post-anarchism', 6–21 April 2010; accessed at <<http://libcom.org/forums/theory/post-anarchism-06042010>> on 27 August 2010.
- Long, R. and T. Machan. 2008. 'Preface'. Pp. vii–viii in *Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a*

- Free Country?*, eds. R. Long and T. Machan. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Machan, T. 2008. 'Reconciling anarchism and minarchism'. Pp. 59–86 in *Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country?*, eds. R. Long and T. Machan. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- MacIntyre, A. 2006, *After Virtue*. 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Duckworth.
- McKay, I. 2008. *An Anarchist FAQ*. Vol. 1. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- McLaughlin, P. 2007. *Anarchism and Authority: A philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- McLaughlin, P. 2010. 'In defence of philosophical anarchism'. Pp. 13–32 in *Anarchism and Moral Philosophy*, eds. B. Franks and M. Wilson. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McLuhan, M. 2001. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. London: Routledge.
- Marsella, M. 2004. 'Enrico Corradini's Italian nationalism: The "right wing" of the fascist synthesis', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9: 203–24.
- May, T. 1994. *The Political Philosophy of Poststructural Anarchism*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Micklethwait, B. n.d. *Anarchy versus Anarcho-Capitalism*, Political Notes No. 4. London: Libertarian Alliance.
- Micklethwait, B. 1992. *Against Charity: Charity, Favours, Trade and the Welfare State*. Economic Notes 40. London: Libertarian Alliance, accessed at <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/econn/econn040.htm> on 4 August 2010.
- Micklethwait, B. 1994. *The Rule of Law in Britain*. Legal Notes 21. London: Libertarian Alliance accessed at <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/legan/legan021.pdf> on 3 August 2010.
- Miller, D. 1984. *Anarchism*. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.
- Moran, J. 2008. 'The myth of Top Gear'. *The Guardian*. Tuesday 10 June 2008, accessed at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/10/automotive.bbc> on 17 March 2010.
- Morris, J. 2005. 'Environmental problems: Myths and reality. Lecture at Liberty', available to listen to at <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/conferences/conf05record.htm>, last accessed 20 August 2010.
- Myddleton, D. 2008. *Slimming Down Government: Personal Perspectives*, No. 23, London: Libertarian alliance, accessed at <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/persp/persp023.htm> on 4 August 2010.
- Newman, S. 2001. *From Bakunin to Lacan*. Oxford: Lexington.
- Newman, S. 2010. *The Politics of Postanarchism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Nozick, R. 1974. *Anarchy State and Utopia*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Nuttall, J. 2008. 'Equality and freedom: The single, the multiple and the synthesis in Labour Party thought since the 1930s', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13: 11–36.
- Parsons, L. 2004a. 'What Freedom means'. Pp. 103–4 in *Freedom, Equality and Solidarity: Writings and speeches*, ed. G. Aghrens. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Parsons, L. 2004b. 'Woman'. Pp. 92–3 in *Freedom, Equality and Solidarity: Writings and speeches*, ed. G. Aghrens. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Parsons, L. 2004c. 'The woman question again?' Pp. 101–3 in *Freedom, Equality and Solidarity: Writings and speeches*, ed. G. Aghrens. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Parsons, L. 2004d. 'The negro'. Pp. 54–6 in *Freedom, Equality and Solidarity: Writings and speeches*, ed. G. Aghrens. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr; originally published 1886.
- Pelloutier, F. 2005. 'Anarchism and the Workers' Union'. Pp. 409–416 in *No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*, ed. D Guérin. Edinburgh: AK Press; originally published 1895.
- Plant, S. 1992, *The Most Radical Gesture: The Situationist International in a postmodern age*. London: Routledge.
- Pouget, É. 2005. 'What is the Trade Union?' Pp. 427–36 in *No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*, ed. D Guérin. Edinburgh: AK Press; originally published 1895.
- Proudhon, P.-J. 2011. 'Letter to M. Blanqui'. *Property is Theft!: A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon anthology*;

- originally published 1841.
- Purchase, G. 1995. 'Anarcho-syndicalism, technology and ecology', *Kick It Over* No. 35, accessed at: <<http://flag.blackened.net/daver/anarchism/aste.html>> on 9 March 2013.
- Ribeiro, P. 2005. 'Senzala or Quilombo: Reflections on APOC and the fate of Black Anarchism'. *Anarkismo.net*. 11 May 2005; accessed at <http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=460> on 20 August 2010.
- Rocker, R. 1988. *Anarcho-Syndicalism*. London: Phoenix; originally published 1938.
- Room, D. 2001. *What is Anarchism? An Introduction*. London: Freedom; originally published 1992.
- Rothbard, M. 1965a. 'Left and Right: The prospects for liberty. Liberty and the New Left'. *Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought*, 1 (1), accessed at <http://mises.org/journals/lar/pdfs/1_1/1_1_2.pdf> on 6 August 2010.
- Rothbard, M. 1965b. Liberty and the New Left. *Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought*, 1 (2), accessed at <http://mises.org/journals/lar/pdfs/1_2/1_2_4.pdf> on 6 August 2010.
- Rothbard, M. 2008. 'Are libertarians "Anarchists"?' *Murray Rothbard Archives*, accessed at <<http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard167.html>> on 3 August 2010.
- Seymour, H. 1885. Editorial. *The Anarchist*, 1 (1): 2.
- Solfed Collective. 2001. 'A history of anarcho-syndicalism: USA 1886–1930—The wobblies'. Unit 8. Solidarity federation; accessed at <<http://www.solfed.org.uk/docs/units/2001pdfs/08.pdf>> on 15 September 2010.
- Solidarity Federation. 2007. 'NHS Notional Health Service—The great health and social care swindle'. *Direct Action* No. 38 (Spring 2007); accessed at Libcom.org <<http://libcom.org/library/nhs-notional-health-service-the-great-health-social-care-swindle>>, on 23 July 2010.
- Souchy Bauer, A. 1982. *With the Peasant of Aragon*. Sandoz: Cienfuegos.
- Stirner, M. 1993. *The Ego and Its Own*. London: Rebel Press; originally published 1845.
- Voline. 2005. Proceedings of Nabat. Pp. 487–9 in *No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*, ed. D Guérin. Edinburgh: AK Press; originally published 1895.
- Ward, C. 2004. *Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weller, K. 1992. 'The Ken Weller interview', *Flux*, 5 (Autumn): 7–11.
- Williams, D. 2009. 'Red vs. Green: Regional variation of anarchist ideology in the United States', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 14: 189–210.
- Wolff, R. 1976. *In Defence of Anarchism*. London: Harper Torchbooks.
- Woodcock, G. 1975. *Anarchism*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Wright, M. 1980. "'Oi" you', *Xtra*, 3: 2.
- Zerzan, J. 1994. *Future Primitive and Other Essays*. Brooklyn and Columbia: Autonomedia and Anarchy.
- Zerzan, J. 2002. *Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilisation*. Los Angeles: Feral House.

CHAPTER 22 ECONOMIC LIBERTARIANISM

ANDREW GAMBLE

ONE of the significant ideological developments in the second half of the twentieth century was the revival of free market doctrines, which went under many names, including libertarianism, classical liberalism, free market liberalism, public choice economics, economic liberalism, and neoliberalism. This ideological current has included at various times paleo-liberals, ordo-liberals, anarcho-capitalists, the Austrian School, and the Chicago School, and has also attracted many kinds of Conservatives, including liberal Conservatives, neoconservatives and Paleoconservatives. Many think tanks and institutes have been associated with it, including the Liberty Foundation, the Institute for Humane Studies, the Cato Institute, the Institute for Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute, and many more. The ideas it has generated have become common currency in public discourse through their promotion by journalists, radio hosts, and columnists, and they have been influential in parts of the academy as well. There have been some notable intellectual champions, including Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, James Buchanan and Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard. Many significant politicians in many countries, including Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Augusto Pinochet, Junichiro Koizumi, Vaclav Klaus, and Roger Douglas have declared support at times for some of the principles associated with this discourse. But with such variety has come considerable conflict and confusion about what exactly this rather diffuse movement represents and what are its core principles. One sign of this is the difficulty of finding a common name. Neoliberal has been widely used, but mostly by those who are hostile to it. Libertarian is preferred by many of the adherents of the movement, particularly in the United States, but it is a label also used to identify particular currents of the New Left since the 1960s. Many Conservative libertarians reject it for that reason, as it tends to be associated by them with libertinism and licence, the living of life with no restraints. Other libertarians, however, have always wanted to combine economic liberty and social liberty, and believe that it is inconsistent to confine libertarian principles to the economic sphere alone. They are what would once have been called 'liberal', but the term liberal, once supreme in American political discourse (Hartz 1955), has become contaminated for many libertarians by

becoming associated with big government, state welfare, and high taxation, and this has fuelled the recent enthusiasm for Conservatism. Many libertarians are, however, unhappy with it, including Friedrich Hayek who always maintained that he was not a Conservative, preferring the designation of 'Old Whig' (Hayek 1960: 410), a label which had only a narrow appeal outside a limited circle. Libertarian is therefore in many ways the most appropriate and least offensive term for this movement. To distinguish it from other forms of libertarianism, particularly those associated with the New Left, it will be referred to in this essay as economic libertarianism, since what marks it out as an ideological current is the priority which it gives to the economy and to economic reasoning about politics and public affairs.

The revival of economic doctrines celebrating the free market and disparaging the role of government which characterized economic libertarianism from the outset proved puzzling to many observers. It was often at first regarded as a forlorn and rather misguided attempt to revive earlier formulations of liberalism which had been superseded and were no longer relevant to the political and economic conditions of the twentieth century. But this estimate of economic libertarianism proved inaccurate. In the last three decades of the twentieth century it furnished a powerful set of doctrines which became influential in many countries, in particular the United States and Britain, but also in many others including Chile and several other Latin American states, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as many countries in Eastern Europe following the opening of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many international as well as domestic policies were shaped by these doctrines, in particular over finance and trade and the idea of what constituted good economic practice. In this way most economics in the international economy were influenced by these doctrines of the new economic libertarianism, whether their governments subscribed to its tenets or not.

The significance and visibility of these doctrines was greatly enhanced by the fierce opposition they encountered. Critics of this new economic libertarianism and its forceful advocacy of market solutions to problems of public policy and a major reduction in the role of the state, dubbed it 'neoliberalism', which started to be used as a negative term in ideological discourse. Neoliberalism had actually a much longer history. It originated in Germany with the *Ordo Liberals* in the 1930s and 1940s, and was intended by them to signify a political order which combined a free economy with a strong state. The economy should be as free and decentralized as possible, but the state had to be strong and legitimate in order to break interest groups and cartels which formed to prevent the markets

from working. The Ordo Liberals were therefore not opposed to the state, but they wanted it to be confined to its proper sphere, which was protecting the key institutions which made a decentralized market economy possible (Peacock and Willgerodt 1989; Nicholls 1994; Turner 2008).

Neoliberal ideas underpinned the moderate and pragmatic policies of the social market economy which came to characterize the economic miracle of the West German Bundesrepublik in the 1950s and 1960s. Neoliberalism acquired a very different twist in the 1960s and 1970s when it came to be associated in Britain with the turn towards market solutions to the problems of the British economy and welfare state launched by the Conservative Leader, Edward Heath. It gradually by extension came to be used as a rallying cry for all those who sought to defend the welfare states and mixed economies which had come to characterize the political economy of so many European states since 1945, and had also influenced the United States through the New Deal and Great Society programmes. Centre-right and Conservative parties appeared to be increasingly attracted to the new free market doctrines both as a source of solutions to intractable public policy dilemmas, and also as a way of differentiating themselves from centre-left programmes and perspectives (Hoover and Plant 1988). There was a new aggression about the growing fiscal burden of the state, and the intractable dependency culture fostered by welfare programmes. The political consensus that had lasted since the 1940s in many countries about the proper role of government in a market economy now appeared to be increasingly under attack, and the attack came to be associated with the rise of an aggressive New Right, which wished to roll back the gains that had been made by parties of the left, re-opening questions which had been thought settled. The events in Chile in 1973 became very important for this interpretation, because the military coup which overthrew the socialist government of Salvador Allende and installed Augusto Pinochet at the head of a military junta was widely believed to have had American involvement and received support from many economic libertarians, including Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. The economic policy which the Chilean junta pursued was heavily influenced by economists trained at Chicago, one of the main sources for the doctrines and theories of the new economic libertarianism. The subsequent endorsement of these economic libertarian ideas by both Margaret Thatcher (who became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1979) and by Ronald Reagan (who became President of the United States in 1980) fuelled the idea that there was a coherent neoliberal doctrine which was being applied in many different countries. From the 1980s neoliberalism was used indiscriminately to refer to a broad range of ideological

and policy positions which were associated with the 'New Right' which had come to dominate the politics of so many states (Cockett 1994; Harvey 2005).

The use of the term neoliberal served to distinguish this current of ideas from other forms of liberalism, particular the New Liberalism of the first half of the twentieth century, and also to mark the policies associated with the label as harmful and regressive. The policies that were identified in this way related both to the management of domestic economies and to the governance of the international economy through the capturing of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, whose original inspiration was Keynesian, for the neoliberal agenda. In this formulation neoliberalism came to be seen as a new dominant orthodoxy, making theoretical and commonsense claims about how the economy worked which issued in a powerful discourse deployed at many levels, which came to dominate debate, and whose influence was all-pervasive, although dented for a time by the 2008 financial crash. While this characterization is an important one, it seriously exaggerates the unity and coherence of neo-liberalism, and lumps together a diverse set of ideas and policies, which have many internal tensions. This essay rejects monolithic accounts of neo-liberalism as an all-embracing and all-conquering ideological force, in favour of exploring the diversity of economic libertarianism as a set of ideas and policies, and some of the arguments which have been deployed by its proponents.

POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXTS

The revival of interest in economic libertarianism and its gradual emergence as a new and powerful critique of all collectivist ideologies as well as of other forms of liberalism reflected a reaction to the general trend towards an expanding state and the ever greater involvement of the state in the economy and society. The sense that liberalism of the old classical kind was on the retreat in the first half of the twentieth century brought together thinkers from a variety of ideological traditions, and was one of the powerful influences on the formation of a conservative movement in that most liberal of all political cultures, the United States.

The ideological revulsion against collectivism was the seedbed for all the currents which converged to make these new doctrines of economic libertarianism so formidable. The immediate source was the experience of Nazism and Stalinism. The attempts by states to take over the direction of the economy and to institute forms of central planning had been criticized in the 1920s and 1930s, particular by economists from the Austrian School (Hayek

1935; von Mises 1936), but the political criticism had often appeared rather weak and defensive, because from different ideological positions the successes of Russia and Germany were feted, and both of them seemed much more likely to be the models of the future social and industrial organization than anything the liberal economies could produce. The demonstration in the 1930s of the transformation of the German economy by Hjalmar Schacht after unemployment had risen to six million in 1932, and the successes of the Stalinist five year plans in Russia, appeared to dwarf the more modest achievements of the liberal democracies, and convinced many that Britain in particular could not be the model for the twentieth century as it had been for the nineteenth. Max Weber earlier in the century had predicted that the United States would have to shed its voluntarism and its decentralization if it wished to compete with the states that gave priority to organization and centralization and develop a form of planning that was both rational and strategic (Offe 2005).

This context was transformed first by the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and then by the outbreak of the Cold War. Revelations about the nature of the Nazi economy and in particular the genocides for which the Nazi state was responsible, revived the moral authority and confidence of liberal political economy (von Mises 1944). The Ordo Liberals were one sign of that intellectual resurgence of liberalism. Their liberal political economy was founded on a repudiation of the methods and values of the Nazi period, and on reclaiming a German liberal inheritance which had been submerged first under Bismarck and then under the Nazis. Similarly Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* was written during the Second World War in Cambridge when the LSE was temporarily moved there, and was intended as a reflection on the ideas which had led to Nazism in Germany and a warning to other countries, in particular Britain, of the need to safeguard their liberal heritage (Hayek 1944). Hayek was surprised by the popularity of the book, which was particularly marked in Britain and in the United States, where an abridged version was published by the Readers Digest. It was issued to all Conservative Members of Parliament and was used by Churchill in the election campaign to warn of the dangers of voting for the Labour party. It gave Hayek his first taste of intellectual celebrity and was one of the reasons which persuaded him to abandon economics and pursue his studies in social and political theory (Ebenstein 2003). It also emboldened him to think that a more general liberal intellectual offensive to support his kind of liberalism should be organized. One of the fruits of this was the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society, named after the hotel in Switzerland where the group first met in 1947. Prominent liberals attended from many countries, including Walter

Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke, Lionel Robbins, Karl Popper, Walter Lippman, Ludwig von Mises, Frank Knight, and Milton Friedman (Turner 2008; Jackson 2010).

The idea behind the Mont Pelerin Society was simple; to rally liberals behind a programme to revive liberal ideas across a broad front and to show that there were many liberals who did not believe liberals should compromise with collectivism or that there was any need to do so. This was conceived as a liberal international, although at this stage composed of individual intellectuals rather than political parties. It was also intentionally divisive, because it drew a line between those liberals who were prepared to compromise with collectivism and those who were not. This was later to be elaborated by Hayek in his distinction between true and false individualism, which he argued ran through the history of liberalism. The true liberals were those who had never wavered in their scepticism towards the state and in their appreciation of the limits of knowledge and therefore of central planning. The false liberals were those who had given credence to ideas of knowledge and politics that had legitimated increasing state intervention in the market economy and had removed the institutional and constitutional restraints which had been a central part of the liberal tradition (Hayek 1949).

The Mont Pelerin Society was not a political party and did not take formal positions on political issues. But, in the hands of gifted ideologists like Hayek and Friedman, it began to develop a distinctive perspective on the postwar world. Hayek came to see the years immediately after the Second World War as a key dividing point. Socialism, he decided, reached its high point in 1948. There had been a century of socialism, inaugurated by the revolutions of 1848, which had seen the rise of socialist and social democratic movements and political parties, and the installation of the first workers' state, and the arrival of mass democracy, and with it a major extension of political, civil, and social rights, and the extension of state powers and the fiscal base of the state. For the economic libertarians of the Mont Pelerin Society contemporary societies had moved much too far and too fast towards collectivist principles, and had been far too ready to abandon the principles of liberal political economy established in the course of the nineteenth century. The defeat of Nazism (or national socialism as these liberals always emphasized) and the mobilization of all free peoples under American leadership against the threat of Soviet Communism meant that the era of socialism and collectivism was now over, and that the forces of liberalism could revive and revitalize the Great Society which liberalism had helped bring into existence, and for which it provided the only possible political philosophy.

One of the features of this ideology as it emerged was the emphasis which it placed upon the power of ideas, both the power of socialist and collectivist ideas between 1848 and 1948 to displace liberal ideas and corrupt the institutions of a free society, and the power of liberal ideas to enable liberals to regain the initiative and reverse the gains which socialism and collectivism had made. For many of those associated with Mont Pelerin and the think tanks they inspired there was a major struggle of ideas taking place. They saw the great ideological battle of the twentieth century as between socialism and capitalism and between collectivist servitude and market freedom.

For the new economic libertarians after 1945 there were two main targets—the communist economies centred on the Soviet Union and China, and the social democracies and mixed economies of the western world. The first was the most immediate danger, particularly because of fears that it might expand, and that western efforts to contain it would not be successful. The collectivism of the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union was not discredited during the Second World War, rather enhanced, but this began to change after 1945, especially with the outbreak of the Cold War, and the establishment of spheres of influence in Europe between a communist East and a liberal West. The prestige of the Soviet model persisted in some quarters through the 1950s and 1960s, but the ideological division between East and West which was fundamental to the Cold War greatly encouraged the revival of older liberal ideological perspectives, particularly those emphasizing the dangers of unlimited state power and the need to preserve a decentralized economy. The Austrian case for the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism found confirmation in a new generation of studies of how the economies within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union actually worked, and how wasteful and inefficient they often proved to be except for tasks where there was a single goal which allowed all available resources to be applied to achieve it. The fears still expressed in the 1950s that the command economies of the East might outperform the market economies of the West proved to be unfounded. The command economies could not generate the diversity of economic activity which makes possible the wealth and productivity underpinning the levels of consumption in western economies and they gradually lost political legitimacy as a result. The frequent resort to direct measures of coercion to control the peoples of the East—the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Prague Spring in 1968—increasingly discredited Soviet communism and lost it any moral claim it may once have had.

The other target of the new economic liberals was social democracy. This was

obviously different from Soviet Communism, not least because the social liberals and social democrats who were the principal supporters of an extended role for the state were also strong anti-Communists and part of the ideological alliance of the West against Communism. It was a major part of Western policy after 1945 to form alliances between all those who believed in democracy and opposed totalitarianism. But the new economic libertarians were also from the start very strong ideological opponents of all forms of collectivist political economy, including social democracy as well as corporatist inclined Christian democracy. Many argued like Hayek that there was a continuum between moderate and extreme forms of collectivism. Hayek caused great offence by insisting that countries which experimented with mild forms of collectivism in political economy would end up embracing ever stronger forms, until freedom had been completely extinguished. His intention was an ideological one, intended to drive a wedge within the Western camp. The identification of even mild forms of collectivism as an insidious and growing threat to free institutions gave the new economic libertarians a powerful commitment to campaign for what they believed to be a basic truth about modern society.

The two campaigns against democratic collectivism and totalitarian collectivism increasingly became a single campaign. All forms of socialism and collectivism had to be purged from Western society if it was to survive and eventually triumph in the battle against the communist empire, and that meant there could be no tolerance for those who supported collectivist policies within Western democracies. They risked undermining the integrity and effectiveness of the fight against socialism. This moral certainty became a defining characteristic of the new economic libertarians, and became a part of their polemics, and was characteristic not only of their journalists and think tanks but also of their leading thinkers. They thought of themselves as a movement and to some extent modelled themselves on the socialist movement. The Institute of Economic Affairs saw itself as performing the same kind of role for the new economic libertarianism as the Fabians had performed for socialism. The economic libertarians were crusaders for liberty, and very conscious of being bound together in a common fight against an ideological foe (Seldon 1981). They constantly used images of battle and struggle.

They also forged alliances with other anti-collectivist forces. In the United States in particular the economic libertarians became important allies of the conservative movement. So toxic did the term liberal become after the 1960s that many economic libertarians preferred to identify themselves with the Conservatives. The economic libertarians shared much in common with

conservatives, and also a clear sense of what they were against. Their ideological opponents were the supporters of strong federal powers, high taxation, government intervention and regulation, federal programmes on welfare—all the tendencies and attitudes summed up by the New Deal and the Great Society programmes. In this way their ideas tapped into the American tradition of dislike for a strong federal centre, suspicion of the power of the state, resentment against taxation and government interference, and opposition to redistribution through the state to help the poor, the unsuccessful, and the disabled. If the poor were to be helped it should be through private giving. Private charity was always to be preferred to state charity (Friedman 1962, 1980).

The success of the Western economy in the two decades following the Second World War did dim the criticism of the social liberal and social democratic character of economic policy in many western states. The reconstruction of Germany and Japan, the extension of Marshall Aid, and the creation of strong growth, employment, and export performance throughout all the developed economies in the American orbit, coupled with the security alliances against the Soviet Union brought all the states together, and allowed a domestic consensus to emerge in many of them which united left and right on the broad parameters of public policy. There was compromise involved on all sides, and there always were dissidents, but what existed for a time was a broad agreement on how western economies should be managed and western polities governed which seemed to transcend the fierce ideological arguments in the first half of the century. Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology*, S. M. Lipset's *Political Man*, and Andrew Shonfield's *Modern Capitalism* all represented this mood (Lipset 1960; Shonfield 1966; Bell 1988). Shonfield's book is particularly interesting in relation to the new economic libertarians, because he argued that capitalism had been so transformed by the political and economic changes of the postwar period that it had become unrecognizable, and the political conflicts over how it should be organized had largely been settled. The key bargain according to Lipset was that the Right now accepted the welfare state and the greatly enlarged public sector and the fiscal base required to support it, while in return the Left had abandoned its plans to take all productive assets into public ownership, recognizing the dangers it posed to political and economic liberty.

This grand compromise had many national inflections, but in ideological terms it was recognizable as essentially the same process. The new economic libertarians were not part of this consensus and objected vociferously to it, but they were a minority voice and had little impact on public debates. Hayek published *The Constitution of Liberty* in 1960 but it did not have the same

impact as *The Road to Serfdom* fifteen years earlier, and was criticized as a book out of time, harking back to a much earlier age, and no longer relevant to the political problems of the second half of the twentieth century. All this was to change rapidly in the next twenty years. The economic libertarians were to find new allies and a new audience for their policies and for their analysis. The critique of central planning was already accepted; it was no longer a live issue in debate. What was new was the willingness to accept that the social democratic Keynesian welfare states of the postwar period had become inefficient, overmanned, and over-taxed. As Keith Joseph, a recent convert to the new economic libertarianism, put it in a speech in 1975:

The visible signs of Britain's unique course—as it slides from the affluent Western World towards the threadbare economies of the communist bloc—are obvious enough. We have a demotivating tax system, increasing nationalisation, compressed differentials, low and stagnant productivity, high unemployment, many failing public services and inexorably growing central government expenditure; an obsession with equality, and with pay, price and dividend controls; a unique set of legal privileges and immunities for trade unions; and finally, since 1974, top of the Western league for inflation, bottom of the league for growth. (Joseph 1979: 5)

This analysis was opposed not just by social democrats and social liberals but by many British Conservatives who had come to see the postwar settlement as the best framework for managing the economy and governing the society. These Conservatives were regarded as traitors or appeasers, and on the wrong side of the ideological war. The new economic libertarians argued that Western societies were facing a grave internal crisis, that many of the policies adopted after 1945 were leading to disaster and must be reversed, and that governments had to rediscover and protect the essential institutions of a free society and a market economy. This new context arose because of a marked deterioration in the economic performance of the Western economy, the collapse of the arrangements agreed at Bretton Woods for managing currencies, the first generalized recession since the war, the oil price shocks, the rise in industrial militancy, and the acceleration of inflation. These events led to a widespread questioning of Keynesian economic management, whether the political compromises on which the postwar settlement had been based were still viable, and in particular whether the welfare state as it had originally been conceived was affordable. The new economic libertarians were quick to put forward their ideas as to why collectivism had failed, why Keynesianism had inevitably led to an acceleration of inflation and the destruction of prosperity, and why government needed to tackle the problems of trade union power and welfare dependency. These ideas were taken up by political leaders in many different countries, and experiments with liberalization, deregulation, tax cuts,

privatization, and welfare reform began to proliferate. The ideas that had previously dominated were pushed on to the defensive. The crisis of the 1970s can be seen as the moment at which the ideological discourse of the economic libertarians became the leading discourse in many countries, and shaped the policies and attitudes of the leading institutions.

THE STATE

Attitudes to the state were at the heart of the new ideology of economic libertarianism, and were also the source of many of the divisions that surfaced in their ranks. What the different strands of this ideology have in common is a deep suspicion of the state, which at times is expressed as extreme hostility. The state is conceived almost entirely in negative terms, as a source of restriction on the freedom of individuals to live as they choose, and therefore to be independent and self-reliant. The tendency of the state to encroach on individual liberty has continually to be resisted. In its extreme form this leads to proposals to abolish the state altogether. This is a position adopted by the anarcho-capitalists and by some key libertarian thinkers, such as Murray Rothbard. They argue that there is no logical resting place between a minimal state and a maximal state. The functions of a minimal state cannot be stated with any precision and will always tend to expand. The only safe course is to abolish the state altogether and rely on voluntary and private arrangements to discharge all the functions which the state currently performs (Rothbard 1977).

Many of the ideas of this wing of the movement reflect a simple populist commonsense, such as the argument, advanced by Rothbard, that any form of taxation is coercive. As a delegate at a Conservative Party Conference in the 1960s put it, if citizens pay 40 per cent of their income in taxes, they are only 60 per cent free (CPCR 1968: 62). By defining all state regulation as inherently coercive and asserting that liberty is the highest prized good, it follows that the state must be dismantled if individuals are to regain their freedom. Individuals may conceivably suffer from other forms of unfreedom, but economic unfreedom is regarded by economic libertarians as the worst of all, and must be tackled first. Hayek argued that to be controlled in our economic pursuits is to be controlled in everything. For economic libertarians an essential condition for freedom of any kind is economic freedom. It is the loss of that economic freedom which they seek to restore.

It does not follow, however, that all economic libertarians or even a majority believe that there is no role for the state, and that it has to be dismantled. The

anarcho-capitalists and similar groups have remained on the fringe. The dominant strands in the movement endorse a role for the state, but there is considerable disagreement as there is in other ideologies over where the line should be drawn, and what functions the state should perform. Those who favour deontological and rights-based arguments tend to advocate a tightly drawn minimal state. The functions of the state are very clearly defined, and nothing beyond that minimum is legitimate. The functions over which there is most agreement tend to be those associated with the nineteenth-century liberal state—internal security, external defence, the rule of law, protection of property and enforcement of contract, and sound money.

One of the most elegant defences of a minimal state conceived in these terms has been provided by Robert Nozick. He argues that the general presumption must be to legitimate only voluntary exchanges, including any transfers concerning welfare (Nozick 1974). If the state intervenes it infringes individual rights and its actions are therefore illegitimate. The state has to keep out of free exchanges between individuals. The outcomes of free exchanges have to be accepted as just. But Nozick does permit the state to infringe individual liberty in other areas, because there are some goods such as internal security whose character as public goods is so marked that they cannot be provided efficiently except by a central organization. Such an organization must be funded by taxes which is coercive on Nozick's definition but acceptable when it is applied for these limited purposes and them alone.

Nozick was criticized by other economic libertarians for providing a pragmatic criterion for justifying the minimal state, which potentially opened the floodgates and left economic libertarians defenceless. Arguments in terms of public goods are notoriously hard to pin down. Welfare economics which developed such notions gave legitimacy to many different kinds of state intervention. Once public good arguments are allowed in one area it is hard to deny their use in others. The criteria devised by economists for deciding when a good is a public good are clear theoretically but often ambiguous in their practical application, and this allows arguments to be made that can greatly extend the scope of public goods.

For many economic libertarians whose libertarianism is based on rights, Nozick is accused of not taking his argument far enough and making exceptions to the principle of free voluntary exchange. Such ideas depend on moral authority being located exclusively in the individual, and the individual being regarded as the owner of his or her self, and by extension everything which that self produces. Such notions of self-ownership have undoubted ideological force,

such as when Nozick deploys them to ridicule the idea that there can be any objection to huge inequalities in income. He uses the example of the enormous earnings of sports stars like the American basketball player, Wilt Chamberlain, to argue that there can be no objection to them if the contracts on which they are based have been entered into freely. Individuals are not coerced into buying tickets and merchandise which allow the clubs to offer ever higher salaries to attract the best players. This is the natural outcome of what the fans want through the exercise of their preferences. The state has no business to intervene and regulate players' wages, or to tax them heavily. But it does have a duty to interfere and to impose taxes where external defence or internal security are concerned.

Other libertarians advance a different justification for the state, one which does not suffer from the difficulties of Nozick's rights-based argument. In the Austrian School, for example, there is a similar suspicion of the state, and a desire to see its powers limited, but there is also an appreciation that state power is necessary to protect the market order. The state plays an enabling role and a protective role. It seeks to remove obstacles to the widest possible development of free exchanges between individuals, and it has to prevent new ones emerging. This requires constant vigilance and constant effort to secure legitimacy. On this view the market order, although rooted in spontaneous orders such as law, language, and morality that have been evolving for thousands of years, is nevertheless remarkably fragile and can be destroyed by heedless experimentation and intervention (Barry 1986; Plant 2010).

This approach encourages a pragmatic politics, in which alliances can be formed with other anti-collectivists, to resist the tide of collectivism and reform the state to make its primary purpose the safeguarding of the market order. This policy is libertarian because it seeks to free individuals from excessive taxation, excessive regulation, and excessive patronage by the state. The state that results is clearly a minimal state rather than an extended state of the kind proposed by social democrats and social liberals, yet there is no simple minimum that can be defined. It is to be decided pragmatically, but the presumption is that the smaller the better. A good practical example of this principle in operation was the rules of thumb applied by Margaret Thatcher's Policy Unit to all new policy proposals. They asked, can this be done more cheaply and efficiently, and secondly does government need to be doing this at all? It is a principle similar to that of John Maynard Keynes' distinction between the agenda and non-agenda of government (Keynes 1931), which was first used by Bentham. This distinction, however, only states the problem. It does not say how big the state should be or

what should be included in the agenda and what in the non-agenda. Such an approach will never satisfy those economic libertarians like Murray Rothbard who regard it as justifying all manner of state intervention. But for most economic libertarians the distinction was a useful one, and allowed them to mount strong criticism of the existing size and role of the state.

One of the most influential theories of the state developed as part of economic libertarianism has been the Virginia public choice school, associated with James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. One of the main aims of the School was to debunk the ideas which they associated with mainstream currents in public administration that public servants aimed at achieving the public good and acted in the public interest (Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Tullock 1987). They rejected the contrast between the moral superiority of the public sector and the moral turpitude of the private sector, arguing instead that state failure was a more serious problem than market failure, and that therefore state solutions to problems of market failure, the hallmark of interventionist social and economic policy, were likely to be worse than the original problem. Instead of talking about the state or the government, libertarian public choice theory preferred to talk about politicians and bureaucrats and to examine how like all other actors they were governed by self-interest and sought to maximize benefits and minimize costs. They, however, were operating in an environment where there was no effective competition and no prices, so the effect was perverse outcomes, such as the expansion of bureaucratic empires, huge cost overruns on projects, and pervasive waste and inefficiency. The analysis was radical and hard-hitting and was applied not just to social welfare but also to defence spending and law and order. It became one of the inspirations for the new public management, which sought to develop quasi markets in the public sector to introduce greater efficiency, and to subject public servants to much greater accountability and control through the dethronement of professional judgement, and the development of an audit culture with its ubiquitous targets and performance indicators.

The new public management, however, was not welcomed by many economic libertarians, dismayed that it often seemed to centralize power still further and created many perverse effects, such as box-ticking and the concentration on process rather than substance, instead of bringing real market discipline to bear. Another approach associated with the public choice school was the attempt to depoliticize economic policy, partly by creating agencies which were not under the direct control of politicians, such as independent central banks, and partly by proposing constitutional changes which would

establish a framework which would rule out certain kinds of laws and administrative actions. One of the most popular in the United States has been the desire to write into the United States Constitution an amendment requiring the Federal Government and the states legislatures to balance the budget, and forbidding them to engage in any discretionary policy, whether pump priming, fiscal stimulus, bailout, or borrowing which might result in the budget being unbalanced, and a deficit created (Buchanan and Wagner 1977).

These ideas developed a long tradition of thinking about ways to constrain federal power, and to prevent the federal government growing in both its scale and its scope. The proponents of a strong federal government, ever since Alexander Hamilton, have argued that the state must have discretion to develop appropriate policies to enhance the development of the economy. Economic libertarians are for the most part strongly opposed to the use of discretionary powers and prefer power to be always rule-based, and policy to involve the taking of decisions within a framework of general rules. This is a dispute over the best way to protect and promote a liberal market order, and the powers that are appropriate for this. It opens a clear ideological divide between those who wish to use state power pragmatically and libertarians who are instinctively suspicious of what the state will do if it is not carefully monitored and limited.

DEMOCRACY

The problem with constitutionalizing the economy is how those rules can be embedded in a political system, and not overthrown by a coup, or a revolution, or a general election. The American Constitution is founded on the principle that executive power is not to be trusted, and attempting to make matters such as the level of taxation or the ability to run a deficit part of the constitution hands the power to decide such questions to the judiciary. If such amendments were successful it would reverse the steady accretion of power by the federal state in Washington and reduce the ability of the federal government to act in many of the ways the electorate has come to expect (Buchanan et al. 2004).

From the standpoint of economic libertarians such a redressing of the balance is long overdue. This would not be a move towards greater democracy, but a restriction on democracy, or at least on the power of elected governments to claim to enact a mandate given them by the voters. It would encourage a more indirect form of representation, in which citizens would still vote for parties, but what the parties could do in government would be much more confined. Certain kinds of policies, such as inheritance tax, could not be proposed because it

would be ruled unconstitutional. For this to happen a state has to have a codified constitution which is difficult to amend, typically requiring more than simple majorities to do so. This is possible in the United States although not in Britain, which still has the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which means that no Parliament can bind its successors, and until recently Parliament could not be overruled. Economic libertarians tend to prefer constitutional systems of the American rather than the British type, although they face the problem that if a two-thirds or three-quarters majority is required to effect a constitutional change, changing the constitution to embed economic libertarian principles is not easy.

Economic libertarians support democracy, and generally regard it as the best available political system, but they treat it strictly as a means for choosing representatives and governments, in a context of reasonable transparency and competition. However, they are very suspicious of democracy and wish to see it confined as much as possible (Tullock and Perlman 1976; Seldon 1998). This is because democracy constantly generates ideas and expectations which if acted upon by politicians in government can lead to serious erosion of the principles of a market order. Doctrines such as popular sovereignty and the mandate suggest that the will of the people should override everything else, but for economic libertarians much more important than the will of the people is the reality of the market, which is the expression of the will and preference of millions of individuals on a daily, even hourly basis. Democratic elections take place infrequently, voters are faced with bundles of policies and often bundles of candidates in ways which make it hard to discriminate and register their exact preferences. Much of the time voters do not know what they are voting for. Politicians have an incentive to raise expectations ahead of an election, and then lower them immediately afterwards, leading to widespread disillusion and cynicism about politics.

Since so little can be expected from democracy, economic libertarians propose reducing its scope as much as possible. There have been some grand utopian blueprints, such as that of Hayek in *Law, Legislation and Liberty* which would involve a drastic restriction of political rights, effectively disenfranchising everyone under 40 for elections to an Upper House which would determine the general rules compatible with the principles of the market order within which the Lower House and the Government would be obliged to operate (Hayek 1982). Hayek's plan is the latest in a long line of attempts to create an institutional structure for democracy which limits the power of the mob and the ill-educated, and seeks to entrust power to the informed and the judicious. The weakness of such proposals is that they lack a simple principle with the same normative

power as the principle of one person one vote to make such a departure from democratic norms legitimate.

It exposes a more general dilemma in economic libertarian thought. The powerful analysis of the libertarian public choice school is cynical or at best sceptical about the political process. But that makes it hard to imagine how principles of economic libertarianism can be safely installed and carried out, since the individuals entrusted with that charge will be corrupted by the processes in which they are involved. Many libertarians have acknowledged this dilemma. Sometimes the solution is to invoke the power of ideas. Individuals convinced of the moral superiority of the case for economic libertarianism will stay pure and focused on their task, a new set of Guardians, this time for the market order. Another solution is to follow the Virginia School in thinking of institutional and constitutional means by which the temptations and the opportunities for self-seeking behaviour can be curtailed.

The distrust of democracy among economic libertarians is such that if a democracy elects a government which appears to threaten the very foundations of economic freedom, as they believed had happened in Chile with the election of the Unidad Popular Government in 1970, the main task of economic libertarians is to protect the market order rather than the constitution. Both Hayek and Friedman endorsed the Pinochet regime because they drew a distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian government. Pinochet was authoritarian but not totalitarian. Under his rule the sphere of private property and market exchange was protected, and in time greatly enhanced, through his adoption of advice from libertarian economists trained in Chicago. He re-established the key institutions of a libertarian capitalist economy, which made possible eventually the restoration of democracy, but within new limits the reforms had established.

KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE

One of the prominent characteristics of economic libertarianism as an ideology is its attitude to knowledge. Although some of the economic libertarians adopt very rationalist modes of political argument, the majority have been influenced by Hayek and also by in connecting with the English traditions of critical rationalism and scepticism. The critique of central planning turned on the impossibility of gathering together all the knowledge that is dispersed throughout a market economy. The incomplete and fragmentary nature of knowledge sets limits both to human understanding and to what can be achieved

by rational action. The market is regarded as the main institutional locus of diversity, and therefore the crucial bulwark against state power.

This attitude of economic libertarians can be contrasted with the rationalist and positivist attitudes to knowledge and in particular to prediction found in mainstream economics. Market failures tend to be treated as deviations from an ideal equilibrium, whereas for many economic libertarians market failure is endemic to the way that markets work, as discovery processes, and the product of millions of individual calculations which are coordinated but always imperfectly through the price mechanism. One of the differences between Hayek and Friedman was that Friedman believed that rational techniques like monetarism could be devised to help governments create financial stability. Hayek never believed that monetarism or any other such technique could work because it was based on a false understanding of how the economy worked.

If the nature of knowledge gives a bias in policy towards always decentralizing economic functions wherever possible, and preventing the tendency of the state to centralize everything in its hands, it suggests that the state should shrink radically, and that many of its functions, including most of those concerned with welfare, would be better discharged through market relationships. Economic libertarians are generally radical cutters, although many of them concede that there must be a social minimum, but provided as a targeted social minimum rather than as a universal entitlement. Economic libertarians have been a major influence on governments in the last thirty years, but often they have been as disillusioned with the governments that purport to act on economic libertarian principles as socialists have been with socialist governments. Public sectors have been contained but not shrunk, and the role of the state in many areas has continued to expand.

Another area of contention for economic libertarians has been over culture, arising from the unease that many economic libertarians feel over combining economic and social liberty. It has led to the formation of the paleo-libertarians, who argue that support for free market principles does not mean abandoning traditional moralities. Social conservatism is the foundation of a successful market economy because it inculcates a respect for private property, the family, and religion, all of which are necessary foundations for the market. In the early 1990s the paleo-libertarians broke with the Libertarian party which had been contesting presidential elections in the United States because of the party's attitude to issues such as drugs, abortion, and pornography. Radical libertarians wanted the freedoms extolled for economic life to be extended to all human activities. Free to choose should mean just that. But the paleo-libertarians

wanted freedom to be confined largely to the economic sphere, and the social sphere to be governed by traditional morality (Durham 2000). This stance emphasized the closeness of this ideological strand to forms of conservatism, and it also showed the priority given in this discourse to the protection of the economic sphere. Nothing else matters nearly as much.

REFERENCES

- Barry, N. 1986. *On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Bell, D. 1988. *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Buchanan, J. and R. Wagner. 1977. *Democracy in Deficit*. New York: Academic Press.
- Buchanan, J., G. Tullock, and C. Kershaw. 2004. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Cockett, R. 1994. *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-tanks and the Economic Counter-revolution, 1931–1983*. London: Harper Collins.
- Conservative Party Conference Report (CPCR). 1968. London: Conservative Central Office.
- Durham, M. 2000. *The Christian Right, the Far Right and the Boundaries of American Conservatism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Ebenstein, A. 2003. *Hayek's Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Friedman, M. 1962. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Friedman, M. 1980. *Free to Choose*. London: Secker and Warburg.
- Hartz, L. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America: an Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Harvey, D. 2005. *A Brief History of Neo-liberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hayek, F. A. (ed.) 1935. *Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibility of Socialism*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, F. A. 1944. *The Road to Serfdom*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, F. A. 1949. *Individualism and Economic Order*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Hayek, F. A. 1960. *The Constitution of Liberty*. London: Routledge.
- Hayek, F. A. 1982. *Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Hoover, K. and R. Plant. 1988. *Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the United States: A Critical Appraisal*. London: Routledge.
- Jackson, B. 2010. 'At the origins of neo-Liberalism: The free economy and the strong state 1930–1947', *Historical Journal*, 53 (1): 129–51.
- Joseph, K. 1979. *Solving the Union Problem is the Key to Britain's Recovery*. London: Centre for Policy Studies.
- Keynes, J. M. 1931. *Essays in Persuasion*. London: Macmillan.
- Lipset, S. M. 1960. *Political Man*. London: Heinemann.
- von Mises, L. 1936. *Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis*. London: Cape.
- von Mises, L. 1944. *Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War*. Yale University Press.
- Nicholls, A. 1994. *Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918–1963*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Nozick, R. 1974. *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Offe, C. 2005. *Reflections on America: Tocqueville, Weber and Adorno in the United States*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Peacock, A. and H. Willgerodt (eds.) 1989. *Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Plant, R. 2010. *The Neo-liberal State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rothbard, M. 1977. *Power and Market: Government and the Economy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Seldon, A. 1981. *The Emerging Consensus ...?: Essays on the Interplay between Ideas, Interests and Circumstances in the First 25 Years of the IEA*. London: IEA.
- Seldon, A. 1998. *The Dilemma of Democracy: The Political Economics of Over-government*. London: IEA.
- Shonfield, A. 1966. *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Tullock, G. 1987. *The Politics of Bureaucracy*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Tullock, G. and M. Perlman. 1976. *The Vote Motive*. London: IEA.
- Turner, R. 2008. *Neo-liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

CHAPTER 23 GREEN IDEOLOGY

MATHEW HUMPHREY

INTRODUCTION

The development of that sort of planetary consciousness depends upon our being able to rediscover our links with the Earth, and to work in sympathy with rather than against the organic harmonies that make life possible. This is the most important feature of what ecologists refer to as 'holism' (Porritt 1984: 199).

[W]e rely on an extraordinarily eclectic political and philosophical ancestry. To try to weld this into some easily articulated ideology really would be a waste of time—and would completely miss the point. Ideologies are by definition both reductionist *and* divisive. (Porritt 1984: 199–200).

BOTH of the above quotes come from the same page of Jonathon Porritt's *Seeing Green*, a book that has been hugely influential for Greens in the UK (Stavrakakis 1997: 277, n. 51). They encapsulate a long-standing tension in green political thought between a desire to, on the one hand, put forward a clear set of political ideas based upon an 'ecophilosophy', and on the other to deny that ecological politics¹ is an 'ideology' in the same sense that conservatism, liberalism, or socialism are seen as ideologies, which for Porritt implies a set of fixed and dogmatic political ideas that reduce political thought to a simple set of axioms. I will suggest here that green ideology is an ideology much like any other. Ideologies do not have to be rigid and inflexible in the way that Porritt suggests (or, at least, why would we *assume* this a priori?) and the idea that we need to develop a 'planetary consciousness' that will allow us to 'rediscover our links' with the Earth and work in sympathy with 'organic harmonies' is as classically ideological as any prospect of 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism' (Griffin 1993).² If we view ideologies as structured arrangements of political concepts and propositions (Freedman 1996), then the ideological status of any pattern of political thought is an entirely mundane one, and we should not think green political thought especially dogmatic, unrealistic, dangerous, or inflexible for being such.³

Its ideological status may be straightforward on this view, but the questions that we can ask about green ideology are certainly not. What are the key commitments or core principles of green ideology? Is there a common core or are the variants of what we may recognize as 'green' ideology radically

different? How do the different commitments of green ideology fit together? Are they coherent? Is green ideology ‘thin’ or ‘thick’, to use Freeden’s terminology? In other words does green ideology consist of a minimal set of propositions regarding our relationship with the natural environment, which can be attached to almost any other ‘conventional’ ideology, leaving us with a string of eco-hybrids such as eco-liberalism or eco-socialism. Or is the green core sufficiently constraining that certain potential hybridizations are ruled out? Finally, and despite its relative ‘newcomer’ status on the field of ideological battle, has the time of green ideology passed, at least in the form that it has taken up to now? Are we living, in some sense, in a ‘post-ecologist’ age?

This chapter will explore each of these questions in varying amounts of detail. We will begin with an exploration of the key commitments of ecological politics, as articulated in the literature of self-defined green thinkers, activists, and political parties. We will see that a complex but broadly coherent political landscape emerges. We will then turn to the question of the alleged ‘thinness’ of green ideology, and whether it is thus ripe for co-option by its ideological opponents. Finally, we will turn to the problems and tensions in green political thought, and the question of whether the time has come to radically rethink the nature of ecological politics.

THE KEY COMMITMENTS OF GREEN IDEOLOGY

I take the key commitments of green ideology to be those that are articulated in the self-defining green literature (books, pamphlets, party programmes, and so on) with both diachronic consistency and high salience. What do green thinkers and activists repeatedly come back to and tell us themselves to be important? This question has to be an empirical one if the problem of circularity is to be avoided. A survey of the primary literature reveals a set of conceptual and propositional commitments that, at a sufficiently abstract level, are widely shared and taken to be central to the green cause. The point about level of abstraction is important as we are inevitably taking a ‘broad brush’ approach to green ideology here. There may be many variations upon a theme in the primary literature, and in some texts certain ideas may be absent altogether, but the stress for our purposes will be upon common thematic elements, with important differentiations duly noted.

ECOLOGICAL RESTRUCTURING

One, possibly the key, conceptual commitment of green ideology is toward what I will call ‘ecological restructuring’. This refers to the idea that the relationship between humanity and nature has to be placed upon a radically different basis from that which currently exists. As with any ideology, a major part of the purpose of ecologism is to provide a critique of our existing ways of going on, and the focus of this critique is, of course, upon our currently unsustainable practices and the reasons for these. Green ideology thus offers an account of *what* is wrong with the current structure of humanity’s relationship with non-human nature, and also of *why* this defective relationship came about and is maintained. This analysis then provides the key for the transition to a sustainable society.⁴ At what many Greens⁵ take to be the most fundamental level of analysis, what ‘we’ (western thinkers and publics) have wrong is our basic conception of the order of the universe, that is, our metaphysics. Jonathon Porritt calls for a ‘metaphysical reconstruction’, and Robyn Eckersley insists that we should adopt an holistic rather than atomistic world-view. Similarly Arne Naess calls for the adoption of an holistic conception of reality, in which we would see ourselves as part, and only part, of an entity which has supervenient characteristics such that it is qualitatively different to the ‘sum of its parts’ (Naess 1989). Why should Greens adopt holism as a central pillar of their ideology?⁶ After all the suggestion that we should see ourselves as ‘knots in a biospherical net’, as opposed to autonomous individuals seems some way from the concerns about global pollution and biodiversity loss that instigated a distinctive form of ecological politics. This, however, is precisely the point, Greens seek to get to the ‘root’ of these surface manifestations of environmental problems—what gives depth to ‘deep’ ecology is meant to be the ‘depth of questioning’, which takes us right down to the fundamental problems with the value-orientations of contemporary western societies. Furthermore this new world-view is held to be in accord with the teachings of ecology,⁷ and gives us the continuing imprimatur of science (although an alternative science to the reductionist mainstream). We currently see the world, it is held, atomistically and reductively. This means that we see every element of the natural world as separable into its component parts, right down to the atomic or even sub-atomic levels, and we also believe that this level is where the most profound explanatory story lies. Not only can we not see the wood for the trees, we cannot see the tree for the cells, the cells for the organelles, the organelles for the molecules, the molecules for the atoms, or the atoms for the quarks and leptons. One of the grave dangers of this metaphysics of separability is that we also come to see humanity as radically separate from the rest of the natural world. Liberal dreams

of fully autonomous human beings are premised upon this atomistic world-view. In turn, a view of human beings as being morally superior to non-human nature, as being the sole bearer of intrinsic value, or as bearing the highest degree of intrinsic value, comes easily to us when we are convinced already of our separation from the rest of nature. From that it is but a short step to viewing the rest of nature as there for instrumental purposes with respect to us, and in this we see the moral foundation for our sorry history of exploitation of the natural world. If instead we see ourselves as mere knots in the biospherical net, we may see that (a) intrinsic value at one point in the net may imply intrinsic value throughout the net, which is after all a single (holistic) entity, and (b) that any ecological impact made at one point will ripple out through the net and may have worse or even disastrous impacts elsewhere. This metaphysical holism can therefore (on value grounds) be taken to justify an *ethical* holism as well. Where intrinsic value resides, there we find moral considerability, and to the extent that we find this in ecosystems we may be justified in switching to an ecocentric morality. The words of Aldo Leopold are often taken as exemplary in this regard: that ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (Leopold 1949). Rather than being arrogant and imperial in our attitude to nature we may learn humility and cooperation through the appropriate world-view—to be mere ‘members and citizens’ of the ecosystems we inhabit (Leopold 1949).

A second element of ‘ecological reconstruction’ is the idea that we should learn to use nature as a model, in some sense, for both our relationship to the non-human world and our intra-human forms of social organization. This notion of nature-as-model can take a number of forms and is not without problems. Green theorists are well aware that ‘nature’ is a malleable and multifaceted concept, which has been ‘read’, historically, in various ways. The view of nature as ‘red in tooth and claw’, operating via competitive selection has been used to justify a variety of forms of social Darwinism, and so most ecological writers are careful when entering this territory. In general it is the opposite of competition that is focused upon. The reading of nature takes place through the prism of the (political) reading of the science of ecology. Ecology is taken to show the value of symbiosis and mutual cooperation (Greens are more Kropotkinite than Darwinist) and in particular the alleged resilience of diverse eco-systems is taken to have a lesson for us in terms of the value of diversity in human life. Other values have also been read into nature, including opposition to hierarchy and self-renewal. Social ecologist Murray Bookchin was particularly keen to draw lessons from the natural world for humanity. He focused on symbiosis in nature,

and on the lack of hierarchy in the natural order. This supported his project of 'libertarian municipalism', as did his contention that hierarchy and the domination by some groups of humans of other groups of humans, paved the way for the domination of nature by human societies. Bioregionalists get political inspiration from the natural order in a different way, proposing that the boundaries of human communities should be set by the natural features of the surrounding environment, such as watersheds and mountain ranges, rather than by 'artificial' politically determined borders.

Another facet of this restructuring is ethical, and has been called anti-human chauvinism, of which ecocentrism is a prominent but not the only example. The locus here is the disvalued concept of (ethical) anthropocentrism, the view that humankind occupies the centre of the ethical universe—we saw above how this ethical view has been connected to metaphysical atomism by green thinkers. Our readiness to exploit human nature for what are seen as trivial human ends is taken by many Greens to be symptomatic of a warped set of ethical priorities. Any human desire, no matter how poorly it relates to our 'genuine' needs, has to be satisfied, whatever the consequences of that satisfaction may be for the rest of the natural world, which serves as the mere instrument of human satisfaction. Our entire industrial and economic system is thus seen as being in thrall to a human-centred utilitarian calculus, in which human desires, and only human desires, are translated into effective demand, and so determine the fate of the rest of nature. Against this, green thinkers set an array of alternative ethical standpoints. If we include animal rights activism within the green field of thought, then sentientism represents one alternative. What matters for animal rights activists such as Peter Singer is that all sentient creatures can suffer, and equal suffering should count equally in the utilitarian calculus. To deny this equality is 'speciesist', expressing a preference for the fate of humans over other species that is not based on any reasoned line of defence, but which represents instead raw prejudice. To the argument that the moral dividing line between human and non-human is not arbitrary, but rather based on some relevant capacity such as our ability to reason, sentientists can always point to marginal cases where some humans seem to possess these qualities to a lesser degree than at least some animals. So if we think the animals have only instrumental value for us, why not these humans as well? More fundamentally, the 'equal suffering' principle is dependent only on the supposition of an equal capacity to suffer, and is independent of the other qualities of either animals or humans.

For many green theorists, sentientism does not extend the circle of moral considerability far enough, and there are other proposals in the literature—for

example for biocentrism (all living beings as recipients of moral concern) (Taylor 1986) or ecocentrism itself (both living and non-living entities that make up entire eco-systems) (Eckersley 1992). We should note that a core ethical dimension is common but not universal in green political thought. In particular some variants of deep ecology seek to rely only on what follows from *metaphysical* holism, without the intervention of *ethical* holism at all (Fox 1990). If you see the world in the appropriate way, on this view, then actions to defend the natural world will follow from your identification with it, without the necessity for an intervening step of moral reasoning. What is important here is in extending your corporeal sense of individual ‘self’ to an ecological sense of ‘Self’ that sees the non-human natural world as part of its very identity.

It might be suggested that a thread that runs through all of this account of ecological restructuring is the desire to put the relationship between humanity and non-human nature on a sustainable footing. ‘Sustainability’ has become a key part of the discourse around the politics of the environment, and so it is worth pausing to consider its implications. Sustainability is a complex concept in green discourse, as it can refer to any of a broad range of objectives.⁸ What is it that is being sustained, upon what basis, and for how long? It is often taken as a modulator of ‘development’ to indicate that ongoing processes of development and industrialization need to be placed upon a ‘sustainable’ basis—most often rendered as ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.⁹ However, many of the green views canvassed above would be sceptical of anything resembling a standard account of development, so if they have an interest in sustainability, it is presumably in order to sustain something else. As sustainability is something of a ‘shell’ concept that can be filled with a variety of substantive content, we can recast the arguments above in terms of sustainability—Greens may be interested in sustaining ‘critical natural capital’, or the intrinsic values present in nature, or the various ‘knots’ in the holistic conception of nature, or the ability for individuals to achieve ecological self-realization. The concept of sustainability allows a certain translation of green goals into what appears to be a common conceptual vocabulary, but this appearance is deceptive, as it affects the substantive argument of each of these various green perspectives little if at all.

RADICAL DEMOCRATIZATION

A second key and related commitment of green ideology is towards some notion

of *radical democratization* of society, usually associated with decentralization and participatory forms of democratic organization. This commitment is often taken as a marker that distinguishes *green* political thought as such, from forms of environmentalism that do not pass green muster.¹⁰ Thus for example, the series of books and articles that followed the Club of Rome report *Limits to Growth*, which advocated the (possibly only temporary) creation of an authoritarian state that would have the capacity to mandate the environmental policies necessary to ensure planetary survival would not carry the ‘green’ imprimatur. This ‘eco-authoritarian’ literature shared the green concern with what it saw as the unsustainable practices of industrial societies, and sought to place technological development on a sustainable footing, but the *political* programme recommended is, on this view, inherently opposed to specifically green views about politics and democracy. Decentralization and participatory democracy are co-decontested in the green ideological framework, in that they are mutually supportive and interpenetrating. Forms of participatory democracy are taken to be feasible only within relatively small-scale political communities, certainly far smaller than the majority of nation-states that form the basic polities of today, and in turn the desirability of this ‘genuine’ form of democracy is part of what justifies the drive towards decentralization that Greens demand. Decentralization has other advantages as well, in that it facilitates the ecological reconstruction discussed above—the view being that people will find it easier to identify with nature if they have a *sense of place*, a geographical and environmental location that provides the focus for their transpersonal sense of identification.

ECOLOGICAL LAW

A third key conceptual commitment is some notion of a natural or higher form of law that can justify forms of action that lie outside of the remit of conventional statute law. The science of ecology sets out laws that apply to human societies independently of our will—Barry Commoner’s (1971) *The Closing Circle* is a good example this view in ecological literature. Commoner’s ‘five laws’ of ecology¹¹ apply, and although we may choose to disregard these laws in terms of our behaviour, just as we may ignore statute law, we cannot escape the consequences of persistently violating ecological laws, as eventually such human folly reaps its due rewards. It is a corollary of this view that it may sometimes be necessary to take actions that contravene conventional laws in order to uphold ecological law. This is particularly important for that part of green ideology that

serves as a justificatory discourse for forms of environmental direct action, where activists are taken to be following a higher moral law where their actions conflict with the positive law of their society. Indeed the law-breakers here are those governments, corporations, and individuals whose activities violate the laws of ecological sustainability, these are the ‘true rebels’ (in Locke’s language) who have to be constrained to live within natural limits.

NON-VIOLENCE

Non-violence is another central commitment of green ideology, although how this notion is to be decontested is itself a matter of debate within the movement. This might be seen as an adjacent or even peripheral element of green thought, concerning a principle about the *methods* by which it is appropriate to pursue the more important *ends* of green politics. This would, however, be a misreading, as for Greens perhaps more than any other ideological family, ‘the medium is the message’, in that the means by which green ends are pursued is itself a key ideological commitment. This view runs counter to some understandings of green political thought, at least superficially. For example Bob Goodin holds that green political thought is above all a substantive theory of value, and this is and should be distinctive from any theory about political processes (Goodin 1992). Thus there is no need for Greens to be wedded to democratic norms unless democracy provides a particularly effective means for realizing green aims. Given that we can find many environmental writers lamenting the failure of democracy to get to grips with our environmental problems, it may well be that, on the Goodin view, Greens should happily join hands with eco-authoritarians if that regime type can deliver green ends more effectively. Goodin may of course be right about how Greens *should* understand the relationship between green ends and political means, but in terms of understanding green ideology it is empirically the case that most green ideologues have seen democracy and political participation as inherent parts of the green ideal, not a superficial embellishment of mere process. Non-violent means are thus promoted not because they are more effective than violent methods, but because the commitment to non-violence actually constitutes one of the core commitments of green politics. This, however, is of course a relatively abstract claim, and how the notion of ‘violence’ is decontested at the juncture of ideas and political action varies. In particular the question of whether attacks on *property* should be seen as violent, or only attacks upon the *person* (or other living entity) is a key point of dispute. The claims of activist organizations such as the *Earth Liberation Front* (ELF) to be non-violent rest crucially upon a decontestation of violence as

relating to attacks upon living entities only, thus arson attacks on buildings or 4x4s are not violent as they attack inanimate property only, and indeed ELF activists are pressed to avoid harming any living creatures, including humans, in their arson attacks. An alternative view relates violence to any attempt to coerce by inflicting unwanted costs upon another party, and trading on the fear of further attack. Thus for example destroying somebody's house may well be 'only' an attack on property, but could also be part of a campaign of intimidation that deserves to be considered violent. More than mere semantics is at stake here, the ELF has been labelled as the USA's 'number one domestic terror threat' largely on the grounds of its campaigns of attacks on property being defined by the FBI as violent acts of terrorism.

THICK OR THIN?

I would suggest then, that green ideology has four conceptual commitments that are sufficiently central to, and persistent in, the green literature that they can be considered core concepts of the ideology—*ecological reconstruction*, *radical democratization*, *ecological law*, and *non-violence*. This is a relatively small cluster of concepts, if compared with, for example, Freedman's conceptual analysis of liberalism. Whilst it cannot be a simple question of numbers, a question does then arise as to whether the 'conceptual core' of green ideology is sufficiently well-developed for it to be considered a fully-fledged or 'thick' ideology; an ideology, that is, which has a sufficiently 'strong' core to provide a framework of decontestation for the series of further concepts that will be adjacent or peripheral to the core across the range of the terrain of the political. Is there a distinctively 'green' position across the full range of politics, given that Greens seem not to include such basic concepts as liberty, equality, or rationality amongst their core concerns? This matters, as if green ideology is merely 'thin' in this sense, it stands to be co-opted by other ideological formations that are able to incorporate the few basic green principles, perhaps in modified form, within their much broader conceptual frameworks. In his own sophisticated analysis of green ideology, Freedman suggests that green ideology is indeed 'thin' in terms of its set of core conceptual commitments. Green ideology on this view has insufficient core conceptual commitments to constrain and decontest concepts effectively in those areas of politics that lay outside of the core. So, for Freedman, a conceptual core of (i) concern for human-nature relations, (ii) valued preservation of the integrity of nature, (iii) holism, and (iv) the immediate implementation of qualitative human life-styles is not sufficient 'to conjure up a vision or interpretation of human and social interaction and purpose' (Freedman

1996: 527). In other words this thin set of core conceptual commitments is compatible with a wide variety of ideological positions with respect to those areas outside of the core: 'the indeterminacy of the green core concepts permits their mutual proximity to take a number of paths, which weave in and out of a wide range of political traditions' (Freeden 1996: 528). The 'thin' nature of green ideology would help to explain why we see such an array of ideological positions to which the 'eco' or 'green' prefix is attached, suggesting that (for example) eco-socialism, eco-Marxism, green liberalism, eco-fascism, green conservatism, and eco-feminism can all be genuinely 'ecological' variants which adapt the thin core to their respective ideological traditions. If this is the case then the relative indeterminacy of green ideas over major areas of social and political life entails a condition of multiple compatibility between the green core and other ideological families. As Freeden puts it 'Red, anarchist, or conservative classifications are a genealogical method of imposing order on green ideology' (Freeden 1996: 529). The green anarchist Murray Bookchin makes a similar claim about the potential cooptation of 'deep ecology' and other supposedly radical environmental ideas to socially regressive political forms (whilst excluding his own preferred brand of social ecology) (Bookchin 1995).

There is another interpretation of green ideology which sees it as much 'thicker', despite a more-or-less shared description of its core conceptual characteristics. That is, whilst all accounts of green ideology share the view that it is centrally concerned with reconstructing human-nature relations around an holistic metaphysics, they diverge on what they take to *follow* from such a core commitment. For Freeden even the core concepts of green ideology are indeterminately decontested, and so they do little to constrain even those political concepts that stand directly adjacent to them, such as biodiversity, community, decentralization, and self-sufficiency. There are even less constraining of concepts that stand relatively distinct from core green concerns, but which are present in the core of other ideologies, such as liberty and rationality. It is because of this indeterminate nature and narrow core commitments that ecologism is so easily adopted by other ideological traditions. On the alternative view, which would seem to reflect the position of many green ideologues as well as interpreters of green political thought such as Andrew Dobson, although the core is relatively narrow, it is far more constraining and determining with respect to other political concepts than Freeden's analysis would allow. Those promoting green politics were frequently keen to stress this point:

The range of Green Party policy covers all issues. In the manifesto you will find policies on

economics, employment and industry, health, education, foreign policy, overseas aid and development, social welfare, transport, public administration and government, human rights and civil liberties, taxation, decentralisation, defence, agriculture, energy, food, animal rights ... etc ... etc ... plus, naturally, our comprehensive range of directly environmental policies.

All that policy isn't there for the sake of it. All human and economic activity affects the environment, or is itself affected by environmental degradation. If you don't acknowledge that in *all* your policies, you can't begin to solve the immense problems we face (Icke 1990: 4–5).

What is important here is not *that* the Green Party has policies across a broad range of issues, which may just be necessary for any party claiming to have a programme of government, but that the *content* of these policies is taken to flow from the core concern with environmental degradation. The green claim to get to the 'root cause' of that degradation entails the need to reconstruct economy and society from the ground up, and that in turn entails a distinctively green position across the gamut of social and political questions. This is certainly the thrust of Dobson's analysis after a comparison of ecologism with a range of alternative ideological traditions: 'our conclusion must be that ecologism is an ideology in its own right, partly because it offers a coherent (if not unassailable) critique of contemporary society and a prescription for improvement, and partly because this critique and prescription differ fundamentally from those offered by other modern political ideologies' (Dobson 2007:, 188).

One way in which to 'test' this proposition, even if in an inevitably sketchy way, is to consider the green position on a concept that is by common assent taken to be outside of the core—liberty, for example. The UK Green Party 'affirms the importance of individual freedom and self-expression. We believe people should be free to make their own decisions on matters which do not adversely affect others'. This sounds a classically Millian line on freedom, invoking a version of the harm principle as the only legitimate constraint on personal freedom. This might add weight to a view that it would be easy for liberalism to hybridize into a green-liberal form without having to make fundamental adjustments to its own core commitments. However, it is worth noting that Greens view the harm principle quite differently to classical liberals, and 'individual freedom should not be exercised where that freedom depends on the exploitation or harm to any person or group in society, *or to the environment*'.¹² This means that 'harm' is interpreted in a very non-liberal manner, and how we understand 'exploiting the environment' becomes crucial. Arguably almost any form of economic activity involves 'exploiting' the environment if we take that to mean utilizing natural resources or natural sink capacities without some kind of 'due' or 'fair' consideration of its environmental impacts from a non-human perspective (although there is a danger here of

confusing two uses of the term exploitation, one of which roughly equates 'exploit' with 'use for instrumental purposes', and the other of which equates 'exploit' with 'take unfair advantage of'). Thus a fairly liberal-looking conception of liberty, when its 'greening' is fully understood, might actually make almost any form of economic activity subject to an exploitation test. This may or may not be normatively appropriate, but the point is that it looks nothing like classical liberalism, and does look distinctively green (Humphrey 2002).

My contention (Humphrey 2002) is that although what we could identify as a 'core' of green ideology is indeed 'thin' in the sense that it contains relatively few central commitments, and those that it does generally relate either directly or indirectly to humankind's relationship to the natural environment, this core is nonetheless still relatively constraining with respect to decontestations of adjacent political concepts. Whilst an environmental agenda may be tacked on to pre-existing ideological formations with relative ease (for example nationalists might stress the threat posed by cosmopolitan industrialism to the unique landscape and environmental heritage of this particular nation) (Coates 1993) a full-blown ecological politics contains a more thorough set of constraints with respect to the further chain of decontestations that can develop out of its core commitments.

GREEN IDEOLOGY: PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS

There was something of a wave of popular books explaining the 'meaning' of green politics in the 1980s and through to the early 1990s, linked with the rise of Green Parties and social movements across Europe and elsewhere (Porritt 1984; Kemp and Wall 1990; Irvine and Ponton 1988; Icke 1990; Spretnak and Capra 1984; Tokar 1992). Such work has become less common as green ideology has become more established¹³ and some of the most interesting ideas in recent years have come from those who seek to challenge what we might take as green orthodoxies, but from a broadly internal rather than external perspective. In other words these ideas do not seek to promote alternatives to green ideology (such as liberalism or conservatism) as much as suggest that green ideology has to change in order to achieve its initial objectives, or that it is based upon misguided empirical assumptions or illusions about what it is that the public in western societies desire. I will consider three such challenges to green ideology in this section. First, the relatively well-known work of 'sceptical environmentalist' Bjørn Lomborg, secondly the projected 'death of environmentalism' from Nordhaus and Shellenberger, and finally the suggestion of Ingolfur Blühdorn

that we have moved to a ‘post-ecologist’ era. These three arguments represent what are perhaps the strongest challenges to green ideology today. Each in its own way suggests that Greens, and the various parties that seek to embody green ideology in political institutions, are deeply misguided, and will not only fail to achieve their core objectives, but may do substantial harm to existing societies if their policy preferences should ever be enacted.

SCEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM

The ‘scepticism’ of Lomborg’s (1988) sceptical environmentalism relates largely to the empirical assertions that provide the backdrop for green policy prescriptions, thus the subtitle of *The Skeptical Environmentalist*, ‘Measuring the Real State of the World’. In Lomborg’s view the ‘environmental litany’—the empirical story that environmentalists tell in order to motivate environmental concern and mobilize support—is deeply flawed. The ‘litany’ tells a tale of a human-made fall from a state of balance, a potentially catastrophic interference with the cycles and harmonies of the natural world. This kind of account is common enough in green texts, and the following quote from Brian Tokar’s *The Green Alternative* is indicative.

Everything seems different now. Modern civilizations have abandoned the life-affirming qualities of primitive cultures and created a way of life that is increasingly mobilized for death.... In our time, the earth is being robbed of its ability to recover from the assaults of this civilization. Acid rain is destroying forests.... Radiation seeps through the air and toxic chemicals ooze out of the ground, spreading cancer and fear through the very water we drink and the food we eat. Carbon dioxide emissions from both cars and factories, as well as from the destruction of forests, are combining with other gases to cause a profound shift in global climate (Tokar 1992: 9–10).

On Lomborg’s view most of these assertions about the state of the world are, if not simply wrong, at least one-sided and misleading in that they constitute the selective use of examples in order to support the political case that Greens seek to make. Whilst this may be an entirely ordinary phenomenon as part of a political ideology, which seeks to make the case for the realization of its core values through public policy, it can also be very misleading and the implementation of policy based upon radically misguided empirical beliefs could be disastrous, particularly if these policies, such as deindustrialization, will have huge costs for existing societies. Lomborg’s main point in this regard is that we need a more genuinely scientific analysis of the environmental problems facing the world, one that cleaves to the empiricist’s core belief that you have to assess all of the relevant evidence, whether or not it is supportive of your initial assumptions:

Should you be so inclined, you could easily write a book full of awful examples and conclude that the world is in a terrible state. Or you could write a book full of sunshine stories of how the environment is doing ever so well. Both approaches could be using examples that are absolutely true, and yet both approaches would be expressions of equally useless forms of argument.... The point is that global figures summarize *all* the good stories and *all* the ugly ones (Lomborg 1998: 7).

On that basis Lomborg finds much of the ‘litany’ regarding air pollution, declining stocks of natural resources, overpopulation, the effects of pesticide and inorganic fertilizer use, food supplies and global hunger, and the unsustainability of industrial capitalism more generally, to be selective and overblown. Where there are genuine problems, such as with climate change, the preferred ‘green’ solution (mitigating CO₂ emissions) is both hugely costly and ineffective.

Lomborg advocates a more ‘rational’ approach to environmental policy, employing cost–benefit analysis and giving priority to those areas where we can improve human welfare more directly than by using environmental measures.

THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

In 2004 Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger published a controversial essay entitled ‘The Death of Environmentalism’.¹⁴ Here, in an argument pursued at length in the subsequent book, *Break Through* (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007), they held that the ‘environmental paradigm’ that had served the environmental movement well in the 1960s and 1970s was now outdated, and that we need to move towards a new ‘postenvironmental’ politics. This work constitutes an attack not only on the narrow, pollution-centred frame of ‘shallow’ ecology, but also the adherence to a politics of limits to growth and deindustrialization that form part of the core of a full-fledged green ideology. The central contention of Nordhaus and Shellenberger is that Greens have failed to understand the way in which the attachment to environmental values in western publics is entirely dependent upon the very prosperity brought about by the industrial system that Greens are so keen to attack. They tap into the ‘hierarchy of needs’ theory of Abraham Maslow, and build upon the sociological work done on this by Ronald Inglehart, claiming that expressions of environmental concern reflect the postmaterial values that come with, and only with, material security. They draw two important conclusions from this. First, green narratives of impending ecological collapse, limits to growth, deindustrialization, and so on will be counter-productive, as they arouse feelings of material insecurity in the public mind, and therefore trigger ecological fatalism, conservatism, and survivalism rather than a force for progressive social

change. On this view progressive social change, such as that coming about as a result of the civil rights movement, is normally associated with periods of relative material prosperity, whereas the retrenchment of such change is more likely during periods of economic decline. Worryingly, on this view, the second element Nordhaus and Shellenberger see is rising economic insecurity taking Americans back down the Maslovian hierarchy of needs toward more materialistic values. 'Post-environmentalism' needs to marry the ecological thinking, scientific questioning, and vision of humanity as part of nature that is part of green ideology, with an optimistic, positive vision of increasing prosperity via investment in new technology. In this Nordhaus and Shellenberger are in agreement with Lomborg, who also advocates large-scale research and development in clean technology as the best response to the problems associated with global environmental problems such as climate change. This approach will allow ecologism to run with existing social values, not cut against them. Support for environmental values is wide in contemporary western societies, but it is not deep, and it is very vulnerable to changes in economic expectations.

What, above all, green ideology needs to leave behind on this view, is the conception of a unitary and quasi-sacred 'nature' that is separate from, and which has at all costs to be protected from, humanity, combined with the belief that the only way in which this can be achieved is by adopting a politics of limits, and embracing material impoverishment through a massive decarbonization of the economy prior to the development of adequate substitute technologies. Propositions such as these will do little on Nordhaus and Shellenberger's view but trigger a materialist anti-environmental backlash.

POST-ECOLOGISM

The third variation of the 'sceptical' theme is articulated in Ingolfur Blühdorn's suggestion that we have moved into a 'post-ecologist' era. As with Lomborg, Blühdorn is at pains to make clear that his interpretation of the transformation of ecologism to post-ecologism is not rooted in an anti-environmental stance. It is a transition which is rather 'incompatible' with the hopes and beliefs 'I myself cherish *as an ecologist*' (Blühdorn 2000: xi, emphasis in original). However such attachments to the political cause of ecologism must not blind us to the lacunae and contradictions in it, or its failure to convince western publics of its message. As Blühdorn sees it, ecologism's diagnosis is 'wrong or at least seriously misleading', its utopia is unattractive, and its theory of social transformation is unconvincing. Furthermore the concept of sustainability has been 'hopeless' in

terms of providing ecological thought with a new focus or coherence. The belief that we face ecological crises was never based in a straightforward way on empirical facts about the natural world and our relationship to it. Blühdorn's social constructivism comes to the fore here, the notion of 'environmental crisis' is always 'discursively constructed and politically negotiated' (Blühdorn 2000: 11). This is, of course, not to deny that empirical indicators of ecological stress are 'real' in that we can measure rising global temperatures, increasing oceanic acidity, and so on, but rather that their understanding of such phenomena terms of 'crisis'—an urgent and important political problem, relies upon framing effects which are discursively constituted. Ecologism has failed to turn this crisis discourse into transformative political action. Instead environmental crises have just become 'normalized', and are now just part of the background conditions against which people live their lives. Capitalism is now seen as part of the solution, whereas in early green discourse it was a fundamental, causal part of the problem, and western publics have re-fixated on the materialist problematics of economic growth and security. Ultimately the eco-movement is not the spearhead of a new revolutionary set of values, but is the rearguard of a dying modernist culture. Modernism promised a rational, enlightened political and economic order, but this promise remains unfulfilled. Ecologism was on this view a final attempt to realize the promise of modernity, and with the passing of ecologism we enter fully the world of postmodernity, in which ecological discourse is just a 'simulation'—articulated with the appearance of sincerity but actually held at a constant ironic distance. There is a close echo of Nordhaus and Shellenberger in Blühdorn's claim that 'the allegedly superficial pleasures and satisfactions granted by material consumption remains much more tangible and attractive than the *real and lasting fulfilment* offered by ecologists' (Blühdorn 2000: 21, emphasis in original).

CONCLUSION

That green ideology, or ecologism, constitutes an ideology in Freeden's sense employed here I take to be uncontroversial, in that we have an identifiable set of political and philosophical ideas that are relatively stable through the short period of time that something recognizably 'ecologist' has existed. My claim is that this ideology is centred on the four key components of ecological restructuring, ecological law, radical democratization, and non-violence. A more interesting question is whether these components are sufficient to render ecologism a 'thick' as opposed to a 'thin' ideology. This is not straightforward, and Freeden's reading of ecologism as a thin ideology is based upon a plausible

understanding of the relationship between the few core components and the broader conceptual field, according to which the latter is significantly underdetermined by the former. On my reading there is a closer and more (although not completely) deterministic relationship here, as the decontestation of the key components has consequences for the ways in which we might consistently interpret adjacent and peripheral concepts. This is always a matter of emphasis and interpretation, and one might hold that ecologism qualifies as a full-fledged ideology whilst also accepting that the constraining effects of the core on the periphery is more tenuous than in some other ideological formations.

It may be a sign of the increasing maturity of green ideology that it now finds itself challenged not only from other ideological perspectives, but from those who claim to be doing so from within—the reformers and revolutionaries of the world of green political thought. Green ideology is often labelled the ‘newcomer’ in textbooks on ideology, and so it is of interest that some who have been active in the green movement are now writing its obituary. Of course they do not predict by this the end of concern about environmental problems, but rather the need for a new way of conceptualizing and understanding both these problems and more importantly the appropriate human response to them. Both Lomborg and Nordhaus, and Shellenberger stress the need (for somewhat different reasons) to maintain current levels of wealth and the life-styles adopted in the west, and to keep open the possibility of less developed nations also achieving current western levels of affluence, whilst moving toward cleaner development mechanisms. To this end for all of these authors, massive investment in research and development is the only available policy tool that might meet these requirements. Blühdorn’s message relates more to the view that western publics just will cleave to these life-styles, and western societies will choose the framing devices and discursive constructions that will continue to legitimate this choice. The message for green ideologues is equally pessimistic in all three cases—the dreams of green ideology will not be fulfilled, and environmental thinking (more broadly) just has to adjust to the prevailing social norms of ‘late-industrial’ society, perhaps along the lines of ecological modernization theory.

This does not mean that green ideology will disappear, but it does suggest that it will remain marginalized even if the worse case scenarios of environmental catastrophism come true, as the political success of green ideology is not linked in any straightforward way with the ecological state of the world.

NOTES

1. I will use the terms 'green politics' and 'ecological politics' as equivalents throughout this text.
2. Fascism is generally taken as a locus classicus of ideology in its guise as rigid, doctrinaire thinking. I am not of course equating fascism and green ideology in anything other than a structural sense.
3. For an alternative view that opposes a rigid green ideology to a flexible green political theory, see Barry (1999: ch.1).
4. Although what is to be sustained, and for what purpose, provides further grounds for divergence within the green ideological family.
5. Ecocentrics and deep ecologists, for example.
6. See also Freeden (1996: ch. 14).
7. Although on Worster's account only a subordinate strand of ecological science, see Worster (1994).
8. Dobson 1998 notes this.
9. <<http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm>>, accessed November 2010.
10. One of the 'four pillars' of the German green movement is 'grassroots democracy'; see Spretnak and Capra (1984).
11. Commoner's five laws are: 1. Everything is connected to everything else. 2. Everything has to go somewhere or there is no such place as away. 3. Everything is always changing. 4. There is no such thing as a free lunch. 5. Everything has limits.
12. For both Green Party Manifesto quotes see: <<http://policy.greenparty.org.uk/mfss/mfsspb.html>>, last accessed November 2010.
13. Although see Wall (2010); Woodin and Lucas (2004).
14. <<http://www.grist.org/article/doe-reprint/>>, accessed November 2010.

REFERENCES

- Barry, John. 1999. *Rethinking Green Politics*. London: Sage.
- Blühdorn, Igolfur. 2000. *Post-Ecologist Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Bookchin, Murray. 1995. *Re-enchanting Humanity*. London: Cassell.
- Coates, Ian. 1993. 'A cuckoo in the nest: The National Front and Green ideology', *Perspectives in the Environment*, 1, Aldershot, Avebury: 13–28.
- Commoner, Barry. 1971. *The Closing Circle*. New York: Knopf.
- Dobson, Andrew. 1998. *Justice and the Environment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dobson, Andrew. 2007. *Green Political Thought*, 4th edn. London: Routledge.
- Eckersley, Robyn. 1992. *Environmentalism and Political Theory*. London: UCL Press.
- Fox, Warwick. 1990. *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology*. Boston: Shambhala.
- Freeden, Michael. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Goodin, Robert. 1992. *Green Political Theory*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Griffin, Roger. 1993. *The Nature of Fascism*. London: Routledge.
- Humphrey, Mathew. 2002. 'The ideologies of Green welfare'. Pp. 43–60 in *Environment and Welfare*, ed. Tony Fitzpatrick and Michael Cahill. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Icke, David. 1990. *It Doesn't Have to be Like This*. London: Green Print.
- Irvine, Sandy and Alec Ponton. 1988. *A Green Manifesto*. London: Macdonald & Co.
- Kemp, Penny and Derek Wall. 1990. *A Green Manifesto for the 1990s*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Leopold, Aldo. 1949. *A Sand County Almanac*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Lomborg, Bjørn. 1998. *The Skeptical Environmentalist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Naess, Arne. 1989. *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Nordhaus, Ted and Michael Shellenberger. 2007. *Break Through*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Porritt, Jonathon. 1984. *Seeing Green*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Spretnak, Charlene and Fritjof Capra. 1984. *Green Politics*. London: Paladin.
- Stavrakakis, Yanis. 1997. 'Green ideology: A discursive reading', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2 (3): 259–79.
- Taylor, Paul W. 1986. *Respect for Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tokar, Brian. 1992. *The Green Alternative*, rev. edn. San Pedro: R&E Miles.
- Wall, Derek. 2010. *The No-nonsense Guide to Green Politics*. Oxford: New Internationalist.
- Woodin, Mike and Caroline Lucas. 2004. *Green Alternatives to Globalisation*. New York: Pluto Press.
- Worster, Donald. 1994. *Nature's Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 24 IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA

LYMAN TOWER SARGENT

SHOULD feminism be thought of as ideological or utopian? Obviously it is either both or it is ideological at times and utopian at times. It can be argued that what is called the first wave of feminism was predominantly utopian and that the second wave was initially utopian and became more ideological. Something similar can be said about most, if not all, of what we think of as ideologies; they are either both ideological and utopian or change their nature. But we also think of ideology and utopia as very different phenomena.

Here I try to sort out the problem of the relationship between ideology and utopia by first examining the thinkers who have discussed the two together, Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), Ernst Bloch (1885–1977), and Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005). Then I look at two contemporary theorists of utopianism, Fredric Jameson (b. 1934) and Ruth Levitas (b. 1949), and one of ideology, Michael Freeden (b. 1944). Jameson has also discussed ideology and has recently revised that discussion in ways that resonate with his discussion of utopia, which he has also modified. While Levitas has not dealt with ideology to the same extent she has with utopia, her recent work on utopia provides an interesting new direction, one that Jameson is also taking. Although he does not discuss utopia directly, Freeden is the primary theorist of ideology today.

In popular usage both ideology and utopia have negative, and somewhat similar, connotations. Utopia is thought to imply something naively idealistic (too good to be true) and, as a result, impossible to achieve due to the constraints of the ‘real world’ or because ‘human nature’ will get in the way. Ideology is also thought to imply being out of touch with the ‘real world’ by being blinkered by a set of beliefs that distorts one’s understanding of that ‘real world’. Whether there is a ‘real world’ outside of people’s perceptions and, if there is one, how to understand it are unasked questions.

The word *utopia* was coined by Thomas More (1478–1535) in 1516 as the name of the imaginary country described in his *Libellus vere aureus nec minus salutaris quam festivus de optimo reip[ublicae] statu, deq[ue] noua Insula Vtopia*, now known as *Utopia*. In coining the word, which is Latin but with Greek roots, More put together the prefix ‘u’ or ‘ou’ meaning ‘no’ or ‘not’ and ‘topos’ meaning ‘place’ or ‘where’. But he also used the prefix ‘eu’ meaning

‘good’ and, as a result, utopia has come to refer to a non-existing good place. While other words have been added to the utopian vocabulary, most notably ‘dystopia’ or ‘bad place’, which appears to have first been used in its modern meaning in 1747 (see Budakov 2010), the meaning of the words has not changed significantly from 1516 to the present (for histories of the word utopia see the two articles by Funke 1988 and 1991 for French language material and the article by Hölscher 1996 for German language material. For current usage, see Sargent 2010 and Vieira 2010). There have always been arguments about what constitutes a good or bad place, but the most significant changes regarding utopia have been in the material included under the rubric, and over time utopia has been applied to many different phenomena. Leszek Kolakowski (1927–2009) described the process, saying, ‘It is an interesting cultural process whereby a word of which the history is well known and which emerged as an artificially concocted proper name has acquired, in the last two centuries, a sense so extended that it refers not only to a literary genre but to a way of thinking, to a mentality, to a philosophical attitude, and is being employed in depicting cultural phenomena going back into antiquity, far beyond the historical moment of its invention’ (Kolakowski 1990: 131).

Utopianism has three facets, which I have called the ‘three faces of utopianism’ (Sargent 1967, 1994), two of which are largely irrelevant to ideology. These faces are utopian literature, intentional communities, which I have recently broadened to utopian practice (Sargent 2010), and utopian social theory. Both Mannheim and Ricoeur said that their conceptions of utopia have nothing to do with the genre of utopian literature (Mannheim 1936: 181–2; Ricoeur 1986: 15–16) and, while both used some aspect of utopian practice to characterize their conceptions of utopia, neither went beyond exemplification to generalization about such practices. While there have been utopian fictions reflecting virtually every ideology one can think of, and intentional communities have been established and other utopian practices undertaken that reflect these and other ideologies, it is utopian social theory that parallels ideology as a way of thinking.

Utopia says that things do not have to be the way they are but can be different and better. Thus, the basis of all utopianism is dissatisfaction. Crane Brinton once wrote that,

The utopian thinker starts with the proposition, by no means limited to the utopian thinker, that things (no more exact word is useful here) are bad; next, things must become better ... here on earth and soon; things will not improve to this degree by themselves, by a ‘natural’ growth or development of things-as-they-are; a plan must be developed and put into execution... (Brinton 1973: 50)

While there is much in his characterization of utopianism that most theorists would question today, he gets the basic motivation right. The negative connotation of utopia was initially expressed as part of an attack on More and Catholicism in John Foxe's (1516–87) *Book of Martyrs* (1570) and the sense that the word may refer to something 'too good to be true' began no later than the late sixteenth century when that phrase was used as part of the title of Thomas Lupton's *Siuqila* (1580). That negative use is the predominant one today.

And in the middle of the last century a number of thinkers, most prominently Karl R. Popper (1902–94), particularly in his 1945 *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, and Jacob Talmon (1916–80), particularly in his 1957 *Utopianism and Politics*, used utopia in a strongly negative sense equating it with totalitarianism; but to illustrate the closeness of utopia and ideology, what Popper and Talmon were attacking were what most people call ideologies, Communism and National Socialism. Their argument, as Popper puts it, is that 'I consider what I call Utopianism an attractive and, indeed, an all too attractive theory; for I also consider it dangerous and pernicious. It is, I believe, self-defeating, and it leads to violence' (Popper 1948/2002: 482). It leads to violence because those who believe in the utopia and have power will use violence to ensure its acceptance, but that sounds like the ideologies they are attacking, not a utopia.

The word *ideology* was coined by Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, comte de Tracy (1754–1836) on 20 June 1796 to refer to a new science of ideas. (For this very precise date and an argument that Destutt de Tracy intended the word to have a political meaning, see Kennedy 1978.) But it was characterized negatively almost immediately, with Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) using the word ideology early in 1800 to dismiss his opponents and the word *ideologue* as a label for people who held what he considered nonsensical opinions (for histories of the uses of ideology, see Lichtheim 1965; Barth 1976; Kennedy 1979; Larraín 1979; Dierse 1990).

Although a more recent coinage, ideology has developed a much more varied usage than utopia, and this volume is a testament to that fact. Beginning in the nineteenth century, ideology was defined almost exclusively in negative terms, particularly under the influence of Marx's labelling of ideology as reflecting political illusions and Engels's label of ideology as false consciousness, and it is only in the twentieth century that scholars have developed a neutral, or even partially positive, characterization of it.

Both words are commonly used in political debate to describe the ideas of opponents negatively, both have been used as essentially neutral descriptors of systems of belief, utopia has been used in arguing that something is desirable,

and a problem with both concepts is that they are often used within an ideological context, particularly when used negatively. Thus current usage is deeply conflicted and ideology can be considered an essentially contested concept (Freeden 2004).

Ideology and utopia have been associated since Karl Mannheim published his *Ideologie und Utopie* in 1929 (Mannheim 1936), most often as different ways of viewing the world that are in opposition to each other. Mannheim had used both words before 1929, particularly in his 1924 article 'Historicism' (Mannheim 1952), which is generally considered to be a precursor to the argument in *Ideology and Utopia*, but it is the 1929 book and the very different English version, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (1936) that are now identified with the concepts.¹ Here I examine the way their relationship has been treated, most prominently by Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur but including later thinkers who added to our understanding of one of the concepts in ways that may illuminate their relationship.² Then, building on a re-reading of Mannheim, Ricoeur, and the insights of some of the later thinkers, I suggest that they need to be understood as having a closer and more complex relationship than they have usually been seen to have.

Mannheim used the words to refer to radically different ways of viewing the world that depended on a person's place in the social/political structure, particularly whether one was a member of a group with or without power. His use of the words was adopted by others and used in many different contexts, but otherwise the concepts generally went their separate ways until Paul Ricoeur delivered a series of lectures at the University of Chicago in 1976 that were published in 1986 as *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. While Ricoeur's usages have not been as widely adopted as Mannheim's were, they are being used more and more often, and most work on the relationship between the two concepts is dependent on their analyses.

Mannheim was trying to determine the social and economic factors that conditioned the way people think, or, as he said, develop a sociology of knowledge, writing that 'The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured' (Mannheim 1936: 2), and two of these modes of thought are ideological and utopian thinking. Mannheim's treatment of utopia is largely forgotten or misused, but his discussion of ideology is credited with making it a serious subject of research in the social sciences.

He put the distinction this way:

The concept 'ideology' reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination.... The concept of *utopian* thinking reflects the opposite discovery of the political struggle, namely that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. (Mannheim 1936: 36, Original emphasis)

He further distinguished two meanings of ideology, the particular and the total: 'the particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent' (Mannheim 1936: 49). The total conception refers 'to the ideology of an age or a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group' (Mannheim 1936: 49–50).

While he never analyses utopia as carefully, he did write, 'A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs' (Mannheim 1936: 173), and he went on to say 'Only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time' (Mannheim 1936: 173). Also he wrote that 'Utopian' is used as unrealizable because from the point of view of those in power it cannot be realized (Mannheim 1936: 176–7). In addition he insisted that while we could do without ideology, we need utopia, saying,

whereas the decline of ideology represents a crisis only for certain strata, and the objectivity which comes from the unmasking of ideologies always takes the form of self-clarification for society as a whole, the complete disappearance of the utopian element from human thought and action would mean that human nature and human development would take on a totally new character. The disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing. We would be faced then with the greatest paradox imaginable, namely that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses. Thus, after a long tortuous, but heroic development, just at the highest stage of awareness, when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more man's own creation, with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it. (Mannheim 1936: 236)

Hence, despite the scholarship that sees Mannheim as primarily concerned with ideology, he contends that utopia is essential for the continuance of human civilization. The same argument is made by the Dutch sociologist Fred L. Polak (1907–85) in his *Images of the Future* (1961) but without reference to ideology.

While there were important theorists of ideology between Mannheim and Ricoeur, they rarely discussed utopia and most of them, like Clifford Geertz's (1926–2006) important 1964 article 'Ideology as a Cultural System', were

incorporated into Ricoeur's analysis. The only writer of substance that Ricoeur ignores is Ernst Bloch, who is one of the most important theorists of utopia and also had something to say about ideology, even though he rarely put the two together systematically (on Bloch on ideology and utopia, see Geoghegan 2004 and Hudson 1983; for a good introduction to Bloch, see Geoghegan 1996). For Bloch ideology and utopia are interwoven, with utopia central to, and much more important than, ideology. In addition ideology, but not utopia, reflects distorted thought, and Bloch often uses ideology as the equivalent to false consciousness.

Bloch contrasts what he calls 'abstract' and 'concrete' utopia. The abstract utopia reflects daydreams, fantasizing, wishful thinking, and the like and is disconnected from reality. The concrete utopia, which Bloch sometimes identifies with Marxism, is, unlike the abstract utopia, connected to reality. In Bloch's terms it is the 'Not Yet', which suggests the possibility of improving the human condition. Bloch finds traces of utopia everywhere, and his magnum opus *Das Prinzip Hoffnung/The Principle of Hope* (1955–59/English trans. 1986) is, particularly in the second volume, a compendium of such traces, which are particularly found in the arts and that Bloch sees as areas of at least potential challenge to the ruling ideology. But he also finds traces of utopia in ideology, and what he calls the 'utopian surplus' in ideology necessarily undermines the ideology. As he puts it, 'The ideology in a great work reflects and justifies its times, the utopia in it rips open the times, brings them to an end, brings them to that end where there would no longer be a mere past and its ideology...' (Bloch 1988: 39). Thus, although Bloch has a somewhat simplistic notion of ideology and a too expansive idea of utopia, he has a striking insight into the relationship between the two.

Although it is only a small part of his output and regularly ignored by scholars, Paul Ricoeur wrote a lot on both ideology and utopia, while mostly repeating the same understanding with relatively minor changes. Still, he had a more complex understanding of both ideology and utopia than Mannheim or Bloch, although, as with Mannheim, he spends much more space on ideology than utopia. He argues that both ideology and utopia have positive and negative characteristics, writing: 'They each have a positive and a negative side, a constructive and a destructive role, a constitutive and a pathological dimension' (Ricoeur 1986: 1). The three roles of ideology are distortion, legitimation, and integration or identity. Distortion has been seen as the primary characteristic of ideology for much of its history and is how an ideology is perceived by a non-believer and parallels Mannheim's 'particular conception'. The two positive

characteristics are the way an ideology is perceived by a believer, with an ideology pulling together a group, giving it an identity, and legitimating that identity. The parallel three roles of utopia are fantasy, 'an alternate form of power', and 'the exploration of the possible' (Ricoeur 1986: 310). Fantasy is the way a utopia is seen by someone who rejects the utopia. For someone who sees positive aspects to the utopia, it may also seem to be fantasy from the perspective of the present, but it can also be thought of as Bloch's 'Not Yet', as a possibility to come. In both cases Ricoeur says that the third function, identity and 'the exploration of the possible' are the most important functions. Clearly from outside distortion and fantasy are quite direct parallels, but the positive characteristics do not fall as neatly into parallels, and, as Ricoeur notes, the positives are much more important than the negatives.

The positive characteristics of ideology are much more clear-cut than those of utopia, and they are also tightly bound together. Ideology legitimates, integrates, and provides an identity for a group, and it does so by distorting the history of the group, particularly its founding. Ricoeur's use of ideology fits ideologies like nationalism particularly well. If one examines many of the stories about a nation, and particularly, about its founding or, particularly in the United States its so-called Founding Fathers, one discovers that many, if not most, are simply false. But such stories enter the national consciousness, provide an identity, and pull disparate peoples together.

'Alternative forms of power' and 'the exploration of the possible', on the other hand, are quite vague and open ended. What they do say quite clearly, and 'the exploration of the possible' says explicitly, is that things can be different, and in some ways the very vagueness is important. Although utopian fiction describes specific futures, the general point of utopia is not to say how things can be different, simply that they can be. As George Kateb put it, 'any serious utopian thinker will be made uncomfortable by the very idea of blueprint, of detailed recommendations concerning all facets of life' (Kateb 1967: 239). 'Alternative forms of power' suggests that power can be distributed differently, and is thus of a particular appeal to oppressed groups. Again the vagueness is important; it is not necessary, and would probably be damaging to the cause, to suggest specifically *who* would have power in the desired future, much better to suggest that a collective *we* will have power, supplanting the current oppressors.

A central problem, sometimes called the 'Mannheim Paradox', a phrase apparently first used by Clifford Geertz, is how does one understand an ideology from inside one. Mannheim believed that a 'free-floating intellectual', who, through social mobility, is freed from class and social origins will be able to do

so (For a discussion of the ‘free-floating intellectual’ in Mannheim, see Kettler et al. 1990: 1458). Ricoeur is aware of the problem, writing of ideology that ‘We think from its point of view rather than thinking about it’ (Ricoeur 1984: 137), but he explicitly rejects Mannheim’s solution (Ricoeur 1986: 172–3). And Ricoeur complicates the problem by insisting that it is important not to lose the positive functions of ideology.

It is at this point that Ricoeur brings ideology and utopia together because, for Ricoeur, utopia is the solution to the Mannheim paradox. He writes, ‘This is my conviction: the only way to get out of the circularity in which ideologies engulf us is to assume a utopia, declare it, and judge an ideology on this basis’ (Ricoeur 1986: 172). In other words, from the perspective of a vision of a significantly better life it will be possible to evaluate an ideology. This can be thought of as a thought experiment in which one provides oneself with a place to stand outside ideology that then allows one to judge an ideology. Of course the problem arises that the assumed utopia may be so contaminated by ideology as to simply be judging one ideology by another, and that certainly does not solve the Mannheim paradox. Still, such a thought experiment, even if contaminated, does allow judgement on a different ideology and assuming or constructing a utopia forces one to be explicit about the perspective from which one is judging.

Since Ricoeur there has been considerable work on both concepts separately but very little on the relationship between them and no theorist has tried to bring them together in the way Mannheim and Ricoeur did. This separate work, while rarely doing so explicitly, reveals a new sort of relationship that has its roots in Mannheim and Ricoeur but goes in a somewhat different direction. On ideology, the most important theorist is Michael Freeden, and his position can be found in Freeden 1996, 2003, 2006, and 2013. Freeden argues that ideologies are ‘a distinguishable and unique genre of employing and combining political concepts’ (Freeden 1996: 48), and they are ‘distinctive configurations of political concepts’ (Freeden 1996: 4). Each ideology has a core set of concepts through which the world is understood, and while Freeden never discusses utopia directly, it is implied to be part of the armory of ideology. In his *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (2003), he refers to a ‘utopian’ ideology (Freeden 2003: 75) and mentions the utopian aspects of socialism when discussing it as an ideology (Freeden 2003: 84, 89). And in the same book, one of the characteristics he assigns to ideology is ‘the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community’ (Freeden 2003: 32), which suggests that utopianism may have a role to play in ideology. The other contributions to the handbook collectively show

where ideology stands today.

The most influential post-Ricoeur theorist of utopia is Fredric Jameson. While Jameson also refers to ideology, he has generally worked within the Marxist perspective on ideology and that of Louis Althusser's (1918–90) essay 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' (1971) in particular. Although he does not use the phrase, Jameson is also aware of the 'Mannheim paradox'. He argues that most approaches to ideology require some sort of 'Archimedean point' from which to criticize the ideology, which is the same as Mannheim's and Ricoeur's attempts to find a place outside ideology to understand it. Jameson then notes that now that everything has collapsed into the one all encompassing ideology of global capitalism, no such point is available. Ultimately, though, Jameson comes quite close to Ricoeur in seeing utopia as playing a central role in challenging ideology. But he also writes, without noting that this raises the same problem of where to stand for utopia, 'I have argued that the most fruitful way of approaching a Utopian text or project lies not in judging its positive elements, its overt representations, but rather in seeking to grasp what it cannot (yet) think, what lies in it beyond the very limits of its own social system and of the empirical being it seeks to transcend' (Jameson 2009: 361).

Jameson wrote on utopia in his *Marxism and Form* (1971) before Ricoeur's *Lectures* were published and in his *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions* (2005) and reflects on his discussion of utopia in *Archaeologies* in an essay published in his *Valences of the Dialectic* (2009) where he also considers ideology more systematically than in most of his earlier publications, and to some extent he moves away from Althusser.

In *Valences* he considers both ideology and utopia, but in different chapters and he does not bring them together. In his discussion of ideology, based on a 1981 pamphlet, which he then updated in 1990 and for *Valences*, he initially concludes that ideology is no longer very useful because nothing is being hidden any longer, but he then argues that it is important to keep something of ideology, saying that in losing ideology something very important is lost, 'something, indeed, of Marxism itself'. He then goes on to say that it is possible to keep the concept because what he calls 'the system' leaves traces and that these traces demonstrate 'the patterns and the functions or operations of the system as it is replicated in all the multitudinous subsystems that make up postmodern life today everywhere' (Jameson 2009: 359). These traces have some similarity to Bloch's traces of utopia.

In the utopia chapter in *Valences* Jameson notes that in *Archaeologies* there was 'the repeated insistence that what is important in a Utopia is not what can be

positively imagined and proposed, but rather what is not imaginable and not conceivable. Utopia, I argue, is not a representation but an operation calculated to disclose the limits of our own imagination of the future, the lines beyond which we do not seem able to go in imagining changes in our own society and would (except in the direction of dystopia and catastrophe)' (Jameson 2009: 413). But he also says that 'a revival of futurity and of the positing of alternative futures is not in itself a political program nor even a political practice, but it is hard to see how any durable or effective political action could come into being without it' (Jameson 2009: 434).

Jameson sees ideology and utopia as closely related and, sometimes appears to use them interchangeably. For example, in one essay he writes 'The content of ideological or prophetic discourse is therefore what has elsewhere been called the Utopian impulse: put more weakly, the function of ideology is to produce mobilizing images of a radically and qualitatively different future, 'images ... fantasies and narratives ..., without which political activity is itself inconceivable' (Jameson 1983: 301). Clearly, like Bloch, Jameson sees a utopian thread in ideology, but he also sees an ideological thread in utopia, and his repeated reference to the importance in both of 'replication' reinforces the point.

It is probably not possible to get wholly outside the Mannheim Paradox. Mannheim's 'free-floating intellectuals' may exist in the sense of moving among social classes, but that does not necessarily free them from the beliefs of the group they have left or, perhaps equally important, of the group to which they aspire. Ricoeur argues that it is from a utopia that it is possible to see and judge an ideology. In suggesting that one 'posit a utopia' Ricoeur is proposing a thought experiment and one has to wonder if it is possible to think oneself outside an ideology; do not one's beliefs colour whatever utopia is posited? Some degree of empathy seems to be necessary also.

Ruth Levitas (2007) develops a theory of 'utopia as method', or 'The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society' (IROS). She says that IROS 'has both an *archaeological* or analytical mode, and an *architectural* or constructive mode' (2007: 47, original emphases). The former 'involves excavating and uncovering the implicit utopia or utopias buried in the political programs in question' (61), which can be seen as finding the utopian aspects of ideologies. The constructive mode concerns utopia as aspiration or goal, but '... necessarily ... a proposition for discussion and negotiation, the beginning of a process, not a statement of closure' (64), and this connects to her emphasis in her 1990 book and essay on 'the education of desire' or 'educated hope', which she draws from Ernst Bloch. The point is that ideology is generally closed whereas utopia is, or should be,

open to change through qualitative changes in what people hope for in response to their current dissatisfaction.

Jameson has also used the phrase 'utopia as method', and while there are similarities to Levitas's approach, Jameson is specifically interested in looking for utopian traces, the utopian impulse, in the dystopianism of the present. He argues that we must look for the positive in the currently negative, and writes 'what is currently negative can also be imagined as positive in that immense changing of the valences which is the Utopian future' (Jameson 2009: 423).

Obviously ideology and utopia are no longer considered to be as separate as they were by Mannheim or even by Ricoeur. But their relationship is also much less clear than it was for them. Today ideology and utopia are best seen as intimately connected in that there is a utopia at the heart of every ideology because all ideologies have some notion of the better world that will come about if the ideology is fully implemented. And one can become the other. A successful utopia can become an ideology and a failed ideology may become a utopia. But it is important to recognize that however closely related they may be, they are not the same, and in the rest of this chapter, I try to clarify their similarities and differences.

Ideology and utopia reflect different ways of viewing the world. There are, though, difficulties with keeping them separate. Utopia is easier to deal with than ideology because it at least starts without being ideological, whereas all ideologies have a utopian dimension, albeit quite small in some cases and quite controversially so in others. And a problem that bothers advocates of utopia is what might be called the dystopian utopia, utopias that we do not like (see Fitting 1991). There are racist utopias, and apartheid has been described in utopian terms (on racist utopias see Weitz 2003; on apartheid, see van den Bergh 1982).

The most basic utopian vision is having the most dissatisfactions met, a full stomach and adequate clothing and shelter. As a result, most of the earliest utopias focus on these issues, usually with the addition of no fear of wild animals. It does not matter how these needs are met; the point of utopianism is that people are not condemned to remain dissatisfied. As life becomes more complex, human dissatisfactions and the concomitant satisfactions also become more complex. A good example is found in the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights', adopted by the United Nations in 1948, and the fact that there is a different Islamic version of the Universal Declaration, adopted in 1981, indicates that ideologies can define needs differently.

Ideology is, as this volume demonstrates, even more contested than utopia,

and there is more agreement today on the nature of utopia than on the nature of ideology. Ideology is certainly no longer the relatively simple version developed by Mannheim as a contrast to utopia that described it as a disguise for the weaknesses of those in power. Ricoeur is clearly correct in arguing that ideology helps legitimate the beliefs of a group, often by providing foundational stories, but it must also be remembered that these stories are often simply false or at least ‘improve’ on what actually happened. But that is irrelevant to belief, and belief is fundamental to ideology, whereas utopia is known not to be true or, as Lamartine put it, ‘Utopias are often only premature truths’ (*‘Les utopies ne sont souvent que des vérités prématurées’*) (Lamartine 1850: 531, quoted in Mannheim 1936: 183).

The relationship between ideology and utopia is currently quite confused and while there are good reasons for that, there are still important distinctions that should be kept in mind. Ideology structures a system of belief. While it is certainly possible to believe in a utopia as something desirable, a utopia does not normally structure a person’s system of belief except when it is part of an ideology. A utopia reflects hope, desires, a dream of improvement; an ideology tells us what the world is like today not just what the world might become.

A utopia can become a system of belief but most do not. Ideologies are systems of beliefs, and one aspect of the system, often quite small but sometimes not, is the utopia that would be brought about if those beliefs were fully realized. One of the agreements on the nature of utopia is that it is or can be transgressive (Sargisson 1996) or disruptive (Jameson 2005, 2009; Levitas 2007). As such it directly challenges and undermines the beliefs on which ideology is built. Ideology says that this is the way things are; utopia, as Ricoeur regularly argues, says: no, there are alternatives. But while such an approach has a degree of validity, it is too simple, as both Jameson and Levitas recognize.

The relationship between ideology and utopia, as Jameson explicitly argues, is dialectical, with one at least potentially interacting with and changing the other. But not all ideologies interact with all utopias; some are so far apart that interaction is very unlikely. In addition, as has been noted from as early as Mannheim, they can at times be hard to tell apart because there is a utopian aspect to all ideologies, even if this cannot be seen from the viewpoint of other utopias, and a utopia can become an ideology.

NOTES

1. Mannheim did not use the terms consistently. His books were compiled from essays without substantial revision, and he defended this practice as appropriate for the current stage of knowledge in the areas he

studied, saying, 'If there are contradictions and inconsistencies in my paper this is, I think, not so much due to that fact that I overlooked them but because I make a point of developing a theme to its end even if it contradicts some other statements. I use this method because I think that in this marginal field of human knowledge we should not conceal inconsistencies, so to speak covering up the wounds, but our duty is to show the sore spots in human thinking at its present stage' (Letter of 15 April 1946 to Kurt H. Wolff quoted in Wolff 1971: 572).

2. The following discussion of Mannheim and Ricoeur is based on Sargent (2008).

REFERENCES

- Althusser, Louis. 1971. 'Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an Investigation)'. Pp. 127–86 in Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Barth, Hans. 1976. 'The ideology of Destutt de Tracy and its conflict with Napoleon Bonaparte'. Pp. 1–16 in Hans Barth, *Truth and Ideology*, trans. Frederic Lilge. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bloch, Ernst. 1986. *The Principle of Hope*. 3 vols, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Originally published as *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*. 3 vols. Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1955–1959.
- Bloch, Ernst. 1988. 'Ideas as transformed material in human minds, or problems of an ideological superstructure (cultural heritage)'. Pp. 18–71 in Ernst Bloch, *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature. Selected Essays*, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Brinton, Crane. 1973. 'Utopia and democracy'. Pp. 50–68 in *Utopias and Utopian Thought*, ed. Frank E. Manuel. Boston, MA: Beacon Press/London: Souvenir Press.
- Budakov, V[esselin] M. 2010. 'Dystopia: An earlier eighteenth-century use', *Notes and Queries*, 57 (1): 86–8.
- Dierse, Ulrich. 1990. 'Ideologie'. Pp. 131–69 in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, Vol. 3. Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta.
- Fitting, Peter. 1991. 'Utopias beyond our ideals: The dilemma of the right-wing utopia', *Utopian Studies*, 2 (1 & 2): 95–109.
- Freeden, Michael. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Freeden, Michael. 2003. *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeden, Michael. 2004. 'Editorial: Essential contestability and effective contestability', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9: 3–11, 225.
- Freeden, Michael. 2006. 'Ideology and political theory', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11: 3–22.
- Freeden, Michael. 2013. 'The morphological analysis of ideology'. Pp. 115–37. In this volume.
- Funke, Hans-Günter. 1988. 'L'évolution sémantique de la notion d'utopie en français'. Pp. 19–27 in *De l'Utopie à Uchronie: Formes, Significations, Fonctions. Actes du colloque d'Erlangen 16–18 Octobre 1986*, ed. Hinrich Hudde and Peter Kuon. Tübingen, Germany: Gunter Narr.
- Funke, Hans-Günter. 1991. 'Utopie, utopiste'. Pp. 6–104 in *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680–1820*, Vol. 11, ed. Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt in collaboration with Gerd van den Heuvel and Anette Höfer. München, Germany: Oldenbourg.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1964. 'Ideology as a cultural system'. Pp. 47–76 in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Geoghegan, Vincent. 1996. *Ernst Bloch*. London: Routledge.
- Geoghegan, Vincent. 2004. 'Ideology and utopia', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9: 123–38.
- Hölscher, Lucian. 1996. 'Utopie', trans. Kirsten Petrak with French quotations trans. Nancy Sloan Goldberg

- and Latin quotations trans. Annette Giesecke-Dunham. *Utopian Studies*: 1–65.
- Hudson, Wayne. 1983. 'Ernst Bloch: "Ideology" and postmodern social philosophy', *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne du théorie politique et sociale*, 7 (1–2): 131–45.
- Jameson, Fredric. 1971. *Marxism and Form*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jameson, Fredric. 1983. 'Science versus ideology', *Humanities and Society*, 6: 283–302.
- Jameson, Fredric. 2005. *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*. London: Verso.
- Jameson, Fredric. 2009. *Valences of the Dialectic*. London: Verso.
- Kateb, George. 1965/1967. 'Utopia and the good life'. Pp. 239–59 in *Utopias and Utopian Thought*, ed. Frank E. Manuel. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967. Originally published in *Daedalus* (1965) 94 (2): 454–73.
- Kennedy, Emmet. 1978. *A Philosophe in the Age of Revolution: Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of 'Ideology'*. Philadelphia, PA: The American Philosophical Society.
- Kennedy, Emmet. 1979. "'Ideology" from Destutt de Tracy to Marx', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 40–43: 353–68.
- Kettler, David, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr. 1990. 'Rationalizing the irrational: Karl Mannheim and the besetting sin of German intellectuals', *American Journal of Sociology*, 95 (6): 1441–73.
- Kolakowski, Leszek. 1990. 'The death of utopia reconsidered'. Pp. 131–45 in Leszek Kolakowski, *Modernity on Endless Trial*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis de Prat de. 1850. *Histoire des Girondins*. Bruxelles: Société de Belge.
- Larrain, Jorge. 1979. *The Concept of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson.
- Levitas, Ruth. 2007. 'The imaginary reconstitution of society: Utopia as method'. Pp. 47–68 in *Utopia Method Vision: The Use Value of Social Dreaming*. Vol. 1 of Ralahine Utopian Studies, ed. Tom Moylan and Raffaella Baccolini. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.
- Lichtheim, George. 1965. 'The concept of ideology', *History and Theory* 4 (2): 164–95.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. Trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co./New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. New ed. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1952. 'Historicism'. Pp. 84–133 in Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (1924) 52 (1).
- Polak, Fred[erick] L[odewijk]. 1961. *The Image of the Future: Enlightening the Past, Orientating the Present, Forecasting the Future*, trans. Elise Boulding. 2 vols. Leyden, The Netherlands: A.W. Sythoff/New York: Oceana Pub..
- Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. 2 vols. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1945.
- Popper, K[arl] R. 1948/2002. 'Utopia and violence', *Hibbert Journal*, 46 (January): 109–16. Reprinted in *World Affairs* (1986) 149 (1): 3–9; and in his *Conjectures & Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. London: Routledge Classics, 2002, 477–88. Book originally published London: Routledge, 1963.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1984. 'Ideology and ideology critique'. Pp. 134–164 in *Phenomenology and Marxism*, ed. Bernhard Waldenfels, Jan M. Broekman, and Ante Pažanin. Trans. J. Claude Evans. Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1986. *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, ed. George H. Taylor. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sargent, Lyman Tower. 1967. 'The three faces of utopianism', *The Minnesota Review*, 7 (3): 222–30.
- Sargent, Lyman Tower. 1994. 'The three faces of utopianism revisited', *Utopian Studies*, 5 (1): 1–37.
- Sargent, Lyman Tower. 2008. 'Ideology and utopia: Karl Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13: 263–73.
- Sargent, Lyman Tower. 2010. *Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Sargisson, Lucy. 1996. *Contemporary Feminist Utopianism*. London: Routledge.
- Talmon, Jacob. 1957. *Utopianism and Politics*. London: Conservative Political Centre.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>>, accessed 25 September 2010.
- Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. <<http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html>>, accessed 25 September 2010.
- van den Bergh, N. J. C. 1982. *The National States in South Africa and Utopian Thought*. KwaDlangezwa: University of Zululand.
- Vieira, Fátima. 2010. 'The concept of utopia'. Pp. 3–27 in *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*, ed. Gregory Claeys. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weitz, Eric D. 2003. *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wolff, Kurt H. (ed.) 1971. *From Karl Mannheim*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2nd exp. edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1992.

CHAPTER 25 NATIONALISM

ANDREW VINCENT

THE present chapter will focus on one crucial dimension of nationalism, that is nationalism as ideology. Despite the very precise focus on this domain, it is nonetheless still difficult to disentangle the ideological from the empirical and historical dimensions of work on nationalism. The various disciplinary strands often interweave; that is to say the ideological can configure the way we understand the historical or empirical. This essay will first review some of the background, genealogy, and theories of development of nationalism. It will then provide an overview of some the key ideological themes which pervade nationalist ideological debate.

NATIONALISM AND NATURAL ASSOCIATION

One pervasive folklore ingredient of nationalism is its purported naturalistic status. This latter status is in part underpinned by the accidents of etymology. The word nation derives from the Latin terms *nasci* (to be born) and *natio* (belonging together by birth or place of birth). The initial routine sense of *natio* is thus concerned, *prima facie*, with people related by the chance of birth or birth place. One important connotation of this point is that such an emphasis—on relation by birth—provides the groundwork for a sense of a ‘natural’ form of human association. The implication is that the agent does not choose their nation; they are, as it were ‘thrown’. One can begin to understand immediately the problems of categorizing nations—as many do—as human artefacts. The critic who considers that nations are just inventions or fictions can be fighting on a number of fronts, not least semantics and etymology.

The link between ‘nation’ and ‘natural’ is exemplified in the biological patina of some discussions, particularly of ethnic nationalism. In the late nineteenth century—chiefly from the 1870s to the 1940s—this biological reading of nationalism impacted very directly and interlinked with naturalistic understandings of race; although since the 1950s this view has gone markedly out of fashion amongst most serious scholars. Nationalism became integrated—in the earlier period—with theories of adaptation and change through competition, survival, and natural selection. Actions by nations were

consequently related (by a wide range of writers) to natural selection criteria. This formed a subtext to debates about imperialism, colonialism, civilization, and the idea of higher and lower races. The nation-state was in turn viewed as a natural phenomenon. Thus the dominance of land resources was seen as essential to the natural survival of the state. This in turn reinforced and gave an evolutionary gloss to the connection of land, territory, and boundaries (see Ratzel 1896, 1996). The vestiges of this method have continued in sociobiological theories (see, for example, Reynolds 1987; Kellas 1991). The fact that the biological dimension is being canvassed here should not shield us from the fact that this is still ideologically driven. Nationalism is not alone here. Ideologies such as anarchism, fascism, liberalism, conservatism, and socialism all employed evolutionary biological themes at the turn of the twentieth century. It gave the ideological perspective an unexpected but welcome gravitas.

However, scepticism has also been expressed on this issue by other commentators on nationalism, particularly in the post-1945 period. In fact, the peculiarity of this latter point can be brought out further with another oft-used synonym for nation, namely, culture. Many, over the last two decades, who have focused on facets of nationalist thought, dwell upon nationalism as an expression of a rationally liberal normative culture (see Yael Tamir 1993; Will Kymlicka 1995; Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz 1995; Kai Nielsen 1999; David Miller 1995; Catherine Frost 2006; Craig Calhoun 2007). Thus for Kai Nielsen, ‘all nationalisms are cultural nationalisms of one kind or another’ (Nielsen 1999: 127). Kymlicka also remarks that “‘a culture’ [is] ... synonymous with ‘a nation’” (Kymlicka 1995: 18; see also Bayart 2005; Leerssen 2007). The problem here is that the concept ‘culture’ remains profoundly vague. Minimally, though, culture is not typically linked to nature—as in the nature and nurture debate. In fact, it is more often than not regarded as a human construct or invention and separate from natural causation. In this sense, to make *culture* and the *nation* synonymous destabilizes the link between the *nation* and *natural*. For some, this destabilization is not a problem, for others it is a worry which detracts from the natural rootedness of nationalism.

DEBATES OVER ORIGINS

One inference from the naturalistic claim does coincide directly with debates over the origin of nationalist ideology. Logically, if one accepts the supposition that the nation is a natural form of association, then it follows that the origins of the ideology must somehow lie in a remote human prehistory. The crass

assumption here is that as long as humans have associated there have therefore been nations. Nation becomes a synonym for any and every remote tribe, ethnicity, or kinship group (see, e.g., Grosby 2005). One does not have look far into nationalist vernaculars to find this kind of slightly anomalous primordialist assertion. The claims of certain national groups to specific land or territory, as part their ancient spiritual heritage, is grist to the mill of virtually all nationalist conflict. Occasionally even God is drafted in as a cheering chorus for a natural *Heimat*. The nation is then seen as a concept of immemorial antiquity, virtually in some cases identifiable with the social instinct in human beings. This kind of claim still often circumscribes debates over nationalism (see for example Özkırmlı and Grosby 2007).

The question of origins is by no means resolved in this prehistory argument, since a large number of scholarly commentators on nationalist ideology clearly do not accept it. At most, some argue that nationalism is simply pre-modern, rather than primordial. This in turn weakens the naturalistic claim. More specific views on the origins of nationalism have thus focused on medieval Europe, although usually only in terms of the origin of the word nation (Snyder 1954: 29; Shafer 1972: 14; see also Reynolds 1984; Geary 2002). Neil MacCormick, Leah Greenfeld, and Adrian Hastings focus on nationalist origins in the sixteenth century (MacCormick 1982; Greenfeld 1992; Hastings 1997). Hans Kohn, the doyen of post-1945 early commentators on nationalism, also focused on the late 1600s as the seedbed of nationalist ideas, although he saw this as a more unconscious form of national awareness (Kohn 1945: 4; see also for discussion of Kohn's work, Liebich 2006). Hasting's work presents a more robust argument for this latter position (Hastings 1997). Lord Acton favoured the 1772 partition of Poland as the groundwork for European nationalism (Acton 1907). The eighteenth century is another favoured point of derivation for nationalism. Scholars, such as Elie Kedourie in the 1970s, are quite explicit though in tracing nationalism to the revolutions in eighteenth-century German philosophy, particularly in the work of thinkers such as Kant, Fichte, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Arndt. The most favoured point of origin is the period leading up to and immediately after the French Revolution (Kedourie 1974: 12; Kamenka 1976: 4; Birch 1989: 4; Berlin 1990: 244; Mayall 1990: 43; Vincent 2002; Baycroft and Hewitson 2006; Baycroft 2008).

Finally, some historians have argued that nationalism is very much a product of the early nineteenth century. Hobsbawm, for example, claims that the modern usage of nationalism, as distinct from ethnicity, is comparatively recent. It dates largely from the 1830s, although some aspects of its populist meanings were

traceable to the American and French Revolutions. This latter point more or less corresponds with the thrust of Ernest Gellner's, and to some extent Benedict Anderson's, works, which also present nationalism as a modern term corresponding with the growth and modernization of states in the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1992; Gellner 1983). Anthony Smith's voluminous work is a form of media between pre-modernist and modernist claims, asserting, in short, that early ethnicity is subtly transformed into modern nationalism. Smith argues that ethnicity is an essential preliminary to full-blown modern nationalism. Nations drew out and developed the ways in which members of *ethnie* associated and communicated. Unlike Gellner's and Anderson's stress on the modernity of nationalism, Smith emphasizes its continuity with the past, although he recognizes that certain profound changes transform *ethnie* into nationalism (see Anderson 1983; Smith 1986).

In sum there is little or no consensus over this historical origin. A great deal of recent writing in the last decade, though, still revolves inconclusively around this theme. Scholars carry on hammering away at their pet theories, whether primordialist, ethno-symbolist, or modernist (see, e.g., Smith 1981, 1986, 1991, 2001, 2008; Routledge 2003; Breuilly 2005; Grosby 2005; Ichijo and Uzelac, 2005; Roshwald 2006; Özkırımlı and Grosby 2007; Delanty et al. 2008; Drakulic 2008; Smith et al. 2008; Edwards 2009).

No sober-minded scholar of nationalism would deny, though, that the word nation, as a noun, first appeared in the English and French languages in approximately the fourteenth century. Its usage became more commonplace in literary circles, although what exactly it connoted remains less clear. However, as most commentators note, the term initially had no immediate connection with political ideology. Thus, nationalism—as ideology—can be kept distinct from the idea of the nation. Nationalism, as ideology, seeped into the European vocabularies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, often, although not always, in conjunction with the development of the state. Thus, many insist on a separation between the 'idea of the nation' and the 'ideology of nationalism'. Conceptually this is not terribly clear, but one can see why it might be argued. The term nation is taken as a less protean and more descriptive term than nationalism—a form of registered anthropological fact rather than an explicit political ideology. A nation can therefore exist in this argument as an empirical human community, but not coincide with an explicit avowal of an ideology called nationalism. Nationalism, as an ideology, is, for some, however, an altogether messier more inchoate term referring to 'a *process*, a kind of *sentiment* or identity, a *form of political rhetoric*, ... a *principle* or set of

principles, a kind of *social or political movement*' (see Norman 1999: 56). This argument is not only advocated by academic interpreters of nationalism, but also by many ideological proponents of nationalism. It can, for example, potentially salvage and add lustre to the argument concerning the antiquity of the nation—as opposed to modern rationalizations of nationalism. Others repudiate the use of *both* nationalism and nation. Thus, in the 1990s, David Miller, directly followed J. S. Mill in the 1860s, in advocating the term *nationality* as distinct from the other terms. Nationality, for Miller, avoided much of the confusing baggage of the other terms (Mill 1962; Miller 1995; Varouxakis 2002).

SIDELIGHTS ON THE HISTORY OF NATIONALISM

Present interests in nationalist ideology are in large part prefigured in early nineteenth-century debates. Most of the nationalist controversies and political practices, which figured during the later twentieth century, are echoes of those from the nineteenth century. Many contemporary nationalist movements have not outgrown the powerful myths and aspirations of these earlier debates. The nationalist myths, fantasies, and aspirations—often lovingly embodied in stories, lexicography, historical writing, painting, poetry, literature, and monuments during the nineteenth century—boiled over in the conflagration of the First World War, remained simmering under the surface of various political settlements in 1919, and then arose once again in the closing decades of the twentieth century. Old national battles of the nineteenth and early-twentieth century were being refought with reawakened hatreds.

A similar point holds for many anti- and postcolonial nationalisms of the twentieth century. The national upsurges of postcolonial regimes in Africa and Asia during the mid-twentieth century were, in large part, also a recovery of national myths promulgated, or, in some cases, foisted onto an earlier history. Many Africans from states across the continent to the present day can still feel puzzlement over the relation between their tribal loyalty as against their allegiance to an invented nationalism—a nationalism in many cases directly related to a European ex-colonial structure. The language of national recovery, in postcolonial terms, was itself adopted from the older European political vocabularies of the colonial era. Yet there is a sense in which nationalism always contains its own self-fulfilling historical prophecy, wherever it occurs. In effect, it commandeers literature, history and tradition to establish its own existence and ineffable continuity. Unless there are countervailing loyalties, then all history becomes literally the history of the nation, often claiming, in tandem, antiquity

and naturalness. One particular discipline—archaeology—despite its claim to neutrality and rigour, often gets embroiled in this nationalizing debate (see, for example, Kohl et al. 2007 or Díaz-Andreu 2007).

RESPONSES TO NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY

During the twentieth century there have been two broad overarching responses to the ideology of nationalism, both within political and historical studies as well as in the apprehensions of ordinary citizens of most states. One approach has been generally uneasy. This sense of unease was profoundly affected in most European states (and in some Asian states like Japan)—on theoretical and practical levels—by the events surrounding the Second World War. Thus, for many, national socialism, fascism, and extreme authoritarianism marked out early to mid-twentieth-century nationalism for specific repugnance. Many commentators, from the period of the 1930s up to 1989, consequently saw nationalism as an unduly narrow, tribalist, potentially totalitarian and bellicose doctrine. Furthermore, liberal, Marxist, and social democratic theories, in this same period (particularly post-1945), self-consciously developed more internationalist stances. This was the era of the setting up of the significantly titled ‘United Nations’. The only exception to this anti-nationalist process, for some, were the anti-colonial nationalisms, which had an emancipatory imprimatur and frequently utilized the vocabulary of self-determination.

The second approach to nationalism dates originally from the early nineteenth century and the first clear inception of the political ideology. This sees a positive social, political, and economic value in nationalism. In nineteenth-century writers such as Giuseppe Mazzini, Ernest Renan, Gottfried Herder, and J. S. Mill, amongst others, there was a strong sense of civic liberation attached to nationalism. Nationalism implied the emancipation of cultures from large scale empires and oppressive political structures. Yet, the later nineteenth century, and particularly the early twentieth century, also saw the growth of authoritarian, conservative, racial, and radical right and later fascist forms of nationalism. This latter development, in many ways, delivered a body blow to the ‘liberal’ emancipatory patina of the earlier nationalist ideology from the 1840s. Liberation and self-determination were still embedded in the argument, but the focus had shifted to something far more opaque and politically unpredictable.

However, two additional factors in recent years have highlighted the profile of nationalist ideology. Paradoxically, most current debates over nationalist ideology now acknowledge that it embodies a cluster of perspectives (Brown

1999; Spencer and Wollman 2002: 94ff; Vincent 2002). In this sense, it is accepted by most proponents of twentieth-century nationalism that there are ideological variations, both civic and liberal-minded as well as racist, insular, and bellicose forms. These complex variants were not envisaged by the early to mid-nineteenth-century ideologists of nationalism. Thus, nationalist ideology in the twentieth century appears as a much more varied and complex pattern of thought than previously imagined. Secondly, many have also seen a link between forms of nationalism and liberal ideological values like freedom, democracy, and popular sovereignty. Consequently, since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the changing political landscape of international politics, there has been a resurgence of theoretical and practical interest in nationalism in the Western academic environment. Not only are vast amounts being written about it, from both empirical and ideological perspectives, but it has once again become a key player in world politics. The practical flaw in this post-1989 post-communist interest in nationalism is that very little of it has been liberal in practice. If anything, the bulk of the nationalism seen, for example, in Europe in the last few decades has been quite markedly insular and xenophobic in character. This historical practice thus runs contrary to much of the more optimistic academic writing about nationalism in the liberal academy.

However, this is but one of a number of deep paradoxes running through nationalist ideology in the twentieth century. Historically, nationalism is a comparatively recent historical phenomenon. Conversely, one of its central substantive claims has been its longevity and antiquity. Further, nationalists often identify the roots of nationalism within nature. This arises out of the semantics of the word nation. Yet it is clear from even the most cursory study of the subject that nationalism is a comparatively modern artefact. In fact, for some, nationalism equates with modernity (Gellner 1983; Breuilly 2005; Malešević and Haugaard 2007). It is largely a phenomenon of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition, nationalism is in the peculiar position of claiming universality for its ideas, yet the ideology only makes sense in terms of its particularity and localism. Finally there is the power of nationalism in the actual practice of politics, coupled with the ideology's oft remarked crude simplicity.

TYPOLOGIES OF NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY

This section introduces the theme of types of nationalism, an issue which became central for all ideological discussion of nationalism during the twentieth

century. It was particularly crucial for writers in the post-1945 era to make explicit their difference from the more ethnically based fascist and national socialist ideologies. This kind of typology concentrates on distinctive ideas and modes of thought. Thus, it has now become a commonplace in the extensive ideological literature to find distinctions between ethnicity and nationalism, ethnic and civic nationalism, liberal and ethnic, liberal and cultural, civic and cultural, or, more crudely, civic and bellicose, or even good and bad nationalisms. Despite the interest, during the 1990s and early 2000s, in liberal and civic nationalism, for many others the more racially-orientated ethnic nationalism has been the preferable option. This would include many of the 1990s expressions of Serbian, Croatian, and Kosovar nationalisms (amongst many others), as well as the radical and extreme right expressions of nationalism, particular in Europe, Russia, and Scandinavia. In many ways, on the political ground, this latter more insular, ethnic, and racial view has been the more popular variant of nationalism during the last decades of the twentieth century.

Of course, one does not have to distinguish nationalisms along the above lines. Typologies of nationalism can, for example, be premised on differential nationalist strategies. In this context, one could distinguish unificatory and secessionist nationalisms, although the ideological complexion of, say, two secessionist nationalisms, might well be diametrically opposed. Alternatively, one could focus on historical phases in the growth of nationalism, as indicating different types, and so forth. Hobsbawm, for example, identifies three phases: initially 1830–80, which was dominated by liberal nationalism; then 1880–1914 which saw a sharp movement to conservative and authoritarian nationalism. Finally, the apogee of nationalism is identified with the period 1918–50 (see Hobsbawm 1992). It would now be an approximate rule of thumb to conclude that recent ideological discussion in the 2000s tends to adopt the ‘belief-based’ typology, usually distinguishing between civic and other forms of nationalism. However there is still little consensus on this issue.

METHODS OF STUDY OF NATIONALISM

Writings on nationalism have mutated through three main phases over the last two centuries. In the early to mid-nineteenth century, writers such as J. S. Mill, Giuseppe Mazzini, or Ernest Renan, stressed the political and moral dimension of nationalist ideology. This was the heyday of constitutionalist, emancipatory and more liberal expressions of the ideology. Severe doubts

concerning the destructive social and political affects of nationalism began to arise during the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, particularly in the context, initially, of the Boer Wars and much more significantly the First World War. Nationalism for some was equated with ‘jingoism’ and mass psychosis. However, the period 1920–45 initially saw another surge of interest in nationalist thought. Those who promulgated strong ideological nationalisms tended though to focus on authoritarian and fascist forms. This had—as indicated—an alienating effect on many more reflective observers. Thus, much of the academic writing on nationalism became more historical and distanced in character, while still retaining a residual interest in the ideological content. The Second World War period, 1939–45, particularly affected the character of this kind of work. Writers such as Hans Kohn, Hugh Seton Watson, Carlton Hayes, Alfred Cobban, and Louis Snyder dominated this period.

From the 1950s, American empirical political science eclipsed previous historical work, and the central theme of the research was premised on a commitment to empirical investigation, seeking to understand the causal or empirical patterns underpinning nationalism, rather than any ideological arguments. The key methods of investigation were modernization theory, functionalism, structural-functionalism, and development theories. With some rare exceptions, variants of modernization theory have informed the bulk of research on nationalism until comparatively recently. The key writers, through the 1960s and early 1970s, were academics such as David Apter, Karl Deutsch, Lucien Pye, and Clifford Geertz. This form of more empirically orientated research, focused on modernization, also informed the background to the work of 1980s and 1990s scholars, such as Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith. It also affected a great deal of the writings on decolonization. The explicit ideology of nationalism in this period became comparatively insignificant; what was of greater interest was nationalism’s social and economic function. In the last decade the emphasis has shifted again, to some extent. The methodological approach is still strongly empirical (and largely still disinterested in the ideas), but the emphasis has shifted to a proliferation of case-studies of nationalisms in particular locations, or more popularly, to large scale historical/comparative studies across many countries (see for example Díaz-Andreu 2007; Roeder 2007; Bouchard 2008; Herb and Kaplan 2008; Hill 2008; Tarling and Gomez 2008; Carvalho and Gemenne 2009).

Finally, since the events of 1989, there has been a recrudescence of arguments for the explicit ideology of nationalism. In this sense, there has been, on the one hand, a partial return, from the 1990s, to the positive, civic, and

emancipatory aspirations of the 1840s liberal nationalists. For a number of more academic commentators, the ideology of nationalism, in the last decades of the twentieth century, has been seen as something to be embraced. This has particularly dominated the work of a range of normative liberal theorists in the late 1990s and 2000s. On the other hand, the bulk of nationalist practice, in these same decades, has focused on the more insular and xenophobic forms of the ideology. It is also noteworthy that from 1945 to the present, there has also been a continuous and vigorous undercurrent across Europe of radical and extreme right variants of racially or ethnically based ideological nationalisms. However, this undercurrent has not been a major political player. It has not attained anywhere near the political unity and popular appeal that it had in the 1920s (see Griffin 2000).

THE PARADOX OF IDEOLOGICAL PRACTICE

There are two issues connected to the identification of nations and nationalism in the twentieth century. One is that ideological writing on nationalism has often been different from its actual operational practice. Praising ethnic or cultural purity in an ideological text is very different from the grubby and bloody business of actual pogrom, although the text might provide the practice with a moral imprimatur. It is also an oft noted paradoxical point that nationalist ideology, over the last two centuries, has often been *theoretically* naive, but, at the same time, immensely powerful in political *practice*. Thus, ideological incoherence can be combined with political power. There is possibly an ideological conceit lurking here, namely, that only sound ideologically coherent positions can have political effect. The reverse might well be the case. The second, related point—which expands and explains the first—is that the nation and nationalism may *not*, in fact, be fully theorizable in ideological terms. This latter point encompasses issues concerning the irrationality of nationalist ideology. Ironically, twentieth-century ideologists of nationalism have made their own contribution to this latter account. For example, the roots of the ‘untheorizable’ idea of the nation lie in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century romantic, vitalist, and intuitivist philosophies and psychologies. Conservative and radical right ideologies still find sustenance in the same ideas. The purported untheorizable mystery of the *Volk* is not an isolated case in nationalist literature. Many ideologies have deployed similar mythic and unanalysable concepts. There is, however, a complex range of issues implicit in this ‘untheoretical’ point when utilized by ideologists.

First, the idea that nationalism is basically untheoretical can elicit two responses, one positive and the other negative: the positive response, by ideologists of nationalism, sees the iconic mystery of the nation as that much more inviting and fruitful because it eludes all definition. For example, the quasi-religious mystery of the Serb or Russian (or any other) nation, for example, is that much more delectable when it transcends our feeble attempts at rationalization; the nation is seen as immemorial and time out of mind (see Judah 1997: 43–7). This corresponds quite precisely with those academic commentators who see a primordial quality to nationalism (for example, Routledge 2003; Grosby 2005). The only caveat to enter here is that untheoretical does not necessarily mean irrational, in the same sense that the non-rational may not be irrational. Something which is not easily theorizable or readily embodied in rational categories is not necessarily irrational. For Margaret Canovan, for example, nationhood is difficult to identify not for the reason that it is befuddled and irrational, but because it is so subtle (see Canovan 1999). Clarity is therefore not enough and vagueness may be embraced within an ideology. All organizations, especially the state, require some kind of collective identity or social cement. Thus there is a kind of ‘ghostly presence’ behind much politics. Nations are seen as powerfully present, in fact, conditionally necessary for states, yet often conceptually invisible (Canovan 1996: 68). Nations are therefore indispensable, if hard to deal with conceptually. In fact, Canovan suggests that self-consciously deployed nationalist ideology may be a stage in the evolution of the nation itself; the presence of nationalism may even mean the absence of the actual nation. Prima facie, this view is surprising given that the untheoretical character of nationalism is taken by other nationalist ideologists as a serious flaw.

The second negative response has two possible dimensions, one external and the other internal to nationalism. The external judgement sees nationalism as simply premised on mindless passions and irrationalism, in contrast to ideologies like liberalism which are premised on reason. Liberal theorists, such as Elie Kedourie, Friedrich Hayek, and Karl Popper, amongst many others in the post-1945 period, subscribed to this view. In other words, nationalism was disapproved of as an irrational tribalism. Fascist, national socialist, and authoritarian nationalisms were very much to the forefront of their minds in making this judgement.

The internal reading is promulgated by nationalist ideologists themselves, who also feel distinctly ill at ease with the ‘untheoretical’ claim. This view denies the ‘untheoretical’ claim and asserts the need for a rational theory of

nationalism. The recent 1990s liberal nationalist writer, Yael Tamir, for example, is quite insistent on this point (Tamir 1999: 67). For her nationalism is and ought to be theorizable. Thus, a theory of nationalism for Tamir structures itself ‘independently of all contingencies. Its basis must be a systematic view of human nature and of the world order, as well as a coherent set of universally applicable values’ (Tamir 1993: 82). This latter judgement is not helped by the fact that there are no great theoreticians of nationalist ideology. There are honorary figures, such as J. G. Fichte, Gottfried Herder, Giuseppe Mazzini, Ernest Renan, Julien Benda, amongst others, but one would hesitate to call them wholly self-conscious nationalist thinkers. The nationalist label is more of a retrospective judgement. Despite this, Tamir’s general position is shared by the majority of contemporary political theorists who are interested in nationalist ideology, such as Brian Barry, David Miller, Neil MacCormick, Craig Calhoun, Catherine Frost, and Kai Nielsen, amongst others. Thus, even Barry’s more lukewarm instrumental view of nationalism (largely inspired by the work of John Plamenatz), nonetheless sees it clearly rooted in a theoretical conception of common history and participation in a common way of life. Nationalism is taken to be important for a stable and democratic civic society, generating trust and commitment (see Barry 1983). Miller, Calhoun, Frost, and Tamir identify much stronger defensible liberal components to the nationalist ideology than Barry.

Before turning to a brief discussion of some of these ‘theoretical components’, one further point needs to be examined. This focuses on the question: can nationalism, by definition, offer a general theory of twentieth-century politics? One of the central claims, internal to nationalist argument, is that all meaning and value are particular to the nation. This is a crucial assumption for nationalism to work. Thus, it follows, how can the ideology offer a general or universal theory from a baseline which is by definition wholly particular? If all theory (unless it is the one exception to the nationalist theory of meaning and thus the one meta-theoretical truth in the world) is particular, then no theory—even a theory of nationalism—can be logically exempt. In this sense, could nationalists even have a universal view of human nature? Such a theory could not logically exist. In practice this has hamstrung all strongly nationalist orientated movements. Thus, for example, the attempts by some in 1935 to form a Fascist International foundered rapidly on this very rock of national particularity.

Everything depends here on our understanding of ‘theory’. Sociological, economic or more traditional anthropological theories tended to search for the causal conditions of nationalism in practice (see discussions in Özkırımlı 2005;

Harris 2009). In this sense, there could be a universal theory of nationalism—but the operative point here is that it is a theory ‘of’ or ‘about’. Nationalism is a *social object* to be explained via, say, its economic or social function. In this reading, nationalism can be universal, since, regardless of its empty internal rhetoric, in reality it performs other universal functional roles, particularly in developing societies. This approach to nationalism was very prevalent in much mid to late twentieth-century writing about nationalism.

However, others have contended that nationalism is *not* a social object, but is rather a *social subject* which has an important constitutive role in characterizing political realities. In this latter case, nationalist ideology is a normatively-inspired perspective which not only gives a descriptive account of political realities, but also prescribes what we ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ to do. In this sense, the ideology is a form of thought-behaviour which provides both an understanding of the empirical political world and a groundwork for political action. The problem of all such ideological theorizing is its level of abstraction. Raising the level of abstraction may increase logical rigour and widen the net of explanation, but it ignores the messier or untidier aspects of day to day politics. Yet, to over concentrate on the untidy particular aspects is often to thin down the rigour and consistency of the ideology. Thus, to superimpose an abstract ideology over a political event may in fact generate a distortion. For example, there are many forms of social and collective existence within which individuals are situated. Why should nationalism take priority in any such explanation? It clearly does not figure very predominantly in most people’s lives, except in extreme situations like war or civil conflict. So what reason can be offered for a superimposition of nationalist ideology over something which is far more complex and nuanced? One reasoned answer, which we have already canvassed, is that nationalism’s non-existence in our everyday consciousness may be a sign of successful or mature nationalism; namely, it is subliminal. Yet, it is difficult to see how this could be known or proved. An appeal to intuitions, common sense or the unconscious is never a very successful strategy in any process of rational argument. However, to be overly committed to the minutiae of the particular can thin down the theoretical force of the ideology. Most writings by nationalists are usually replete with the particular empirical details of political events. In fact, nationalism is theoretically committed to the significance of the particular. It is a key prop in the whole ideology. Yet, the exact line between rigorous abstract ideology and particular empirical facts is often very difficult to locate. Political ideology, in general, has this endemic problem. But nationalists, being ontologically rooted in particularity, are more subject to this pressure than other

ideologies, like liberalism or Marxism. Nationalist ideology during the twentieth century has been continually dogged by this problem.

One further reflection on the issue of nationalist ideology as a ‘social subject’: if ideological beliefs constitute the nation in practice then it follows that shared national characteristics cannot be embedded. To be embedded is by definition not to be intentionally constituted. If nationalist ideology does act constitutively, then the populace would always be reliant upon ideologists to create and feed them their nationalist pap. Nationalism itself would always be pure artifice superimposed on idiosyncratic political affairs, *even* when claiming to be natural. Nationalism, in this reading, is an abstract theory, but embedded within its abstractions is a false, if effective, claim about the importance of natural embedded particulars. In this sense, nationalist ideology, throughout the twentieth century, has been an elaborate, if profoundly successful, charade.

Alternatively, nationalist beliefs could be said to be already deeply embedded in the community, in which case an appeal to an ideology called nationalism would be utterly superfluous. This is indeed one strong argument underpinning the separation, referred to earlier, between *nation* and *nationalism*, as well as one of the forceful contentions concerning the purported untheoretical character of the nation. This latter view has been held by many conservatives and radical and extreme right ideologists during the twentieth century. It has also been put forward ironically by disinterested academic theorists (see Canovan 1999: 103ff). The problem with this embedded view is precisely the problem of particularity, mentioned earlier. How can an untheorizable embedded particular become a universal theory? I am not personally convinced that nationalist ideologist, throughout the twentieth century, have ever got round this conundrum. They have tried to in such forms such as liberal nationalism, or its kissing cousin ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, but ultimately they have failed to provide an adequate account.

REGULATIVE THEMES OF NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY

From its inception in the European political vocabulary in the early nineteenth century, there has been little consensual agreement as to what nationalism denotes as a body of beliefs. Admittedly, virtually all political concepts are subject to continuous contestation; however, there is something more serious to nationalism’s conceptual indistinctness. Yet, given we accept the disputed premise that nationalism has a clear conceptual content, what are the regulative beliefs which enable us to identify it? A rough and ready approximation would

focus on seven conceptual components.

First, humanity is understood to be fragmented into distinct groups, each with their own historical continuity, tradition, and language. Ethnicity is often used at this point to locate a national group. The word culture is also employed to capture these latter ideas. Such cultural (or ethnic) groups are valorized or seen as significant in some manner. Second, the idea of independent valorized cultural groups links directly with a strong sense of identity; that is to say human identity is linked with the idea of the nation (see Guibernau 2007). The human being is therefore recognized via their national identity. This theme also underpins the idea of national citizenship and raises a range of issues with regard to immigration (Ely and Palmowski 2008; Holtug et al. 2009). In the last decade this interest in national identity has also launched a series of speculative, if ineffectual, ventures hunting the elusive snark of English identity (see Aughey 2007; Gamble and Wright 2009; Bond et al. 2010; Kumar 2010). Third, the nation is also often identified with a territory, place, or *Heimat* with specific boundaries. Fourth, the nation is often regarded as sovereign over any other groups, and is thus the ultimate ground of legitimacy and loyalty. The sovereign is therefore the nation. This sovereignty may well be an unconscious will, but it is nonetheless regarded by some nationalists as foundational. Fifth, human beings must identify with their national culture for a meaningful existence. Other human values, like freedom, rights, or autonomy, only make sense in a national cultural context. Values are not seen to exist abstractly or universally. Values are always located in a specific national context. Sixth, nations are seen to be exclusive and self-determining entities. This argument concerning self-determination became particularly significant in the twentieth century within the vernaculars of the post-1945 international law and the United Nations. The above arguments raise immediate alarm bells for those who consider that our most fundamental values must be cosmopolitan. This particular academic debate has sharpened considerably in the last decade, due mainly to the comparatively recent and sudden acceleration of academic interest in cosmopolitan argument (see for example Brown and Held 2010).

This list could be modified, subtracted from or indeed added to; a great deal depends on the type of nationalism being articulated. It is important to emphasize at this point though that all of these themes are regulative, formal, and empty. Each is essentially contested. Any nationalist, from the most liberal to the most extreme fascist, could interpret each of these themes from within their own ideological perspective. This engagement between such ideologies is complex, though; thus whereas some liberals clearly detest nationalism, others—

such as liberal nationalists—entertain a very particular niche understanding of nationalism. Nationalism is thus usually coloured by another host ideology. In other words, the nationalist beliefs briefly outlined above only constitute an empty skeleton awaiting the arrival of some richer ideological flesh. These themes therefore provide only the barest of outlines. This can be illustrated if we analyse these themes in terms of three twentieth- and twenty-first-century ideologies, which have utilized the ideology of nationalism.

Focusing on the first two themes—namely, that humanity is understood to be fragmented into distinct units, each with their own historical continuity, tradition, culture, and language and that human identity is manifest through such national communities—the core of the nationalist point here is that we are socially contextual beings. There is therefore no sense of any universal humanity. Each and every human being is particularized. This argument also provides a conceptual framework which permits individuals to comprehend their own existence, positing that we cannot be prior to a national community. The only caveat here is that the logic of this latter argument needs to be explicated further. It is by no means simple.

Taking the question of identity first: it has been important for most liberal nationalists that individualism, and related liberal values such as liberty and rights, are embedded in a national community. Consequently, for liberal nationalists a social individualism—as against an atomistic abstracted individualism—has been advocated. This argument, it is worth noting, generated an ideological conflict within liberal ideology itself. Second, for such liberals national communities exist through valued normative beliefs, not via notions of race or ethnicity. Liberal nationalists usually feel a strong discomfort with any racial or ethnic claims. Although some liberal nationalists do have a residual sense that there must be something present prior to the existence of a liberal political state, most nonetheless accept that there is a overwhelming element of invention in nationalist thought. Third, for liberal nationalists the normative beliefs constitutive of such an identity ought to be liberal and democratic. Thus, national identity is in effect liberal normative identity transubstantiated. In the context of national identity, it is therefore liberal values that are crucial (Vincent 1997).

National identity has also been immensely important in conservative ideological thought. The nation stands for the continuity and destiny of a culturally unique community. This argument has underpinned a conservative-based perennial unease with the European Union to the present day—although the arguments are usually articulated through ill-defined understandings of

sovereignty and self-determination. Piety to the established order is seen as a necessary concomitant of realizing the importance of a conservative grasp of tradition. National tradition incorporates more subtle political wisdom than any individual, since it embodies a concrete manner of life over generations. National traditions could therefore be trusted, unlike the abstract rationalist theories arising from liberal or socialist ideologies. The national community, in this case, is, unlike liberal nationalism, premised on a belief in a pre-political or primordial order, occasionally articulated thought ethnic claims. This keys into the antiquity claims of nationalism. Such an order could not be invented—this would make it vulnerable to the corruptions of rationalism. In this context conservative nationalism has often been resistant to the idea of ‘invention’. Nationalism is a given. This sense of being pre-established and unavailable to ‘reasoned alteration’ has been central to traditionalist conservative ideology. Such conservative ideologists have, however, read the nature of that order in markedly different ways. The more religiously-minded (going to back to Burke or De Maistre) have seen God as the author. For this older generation of conservatives revolution was an offence against a divine order. The religious reading can still be found in some conservative interpretations (such as in T. S. Eliot) well into the twentieth century. The more prevalent argument during the twentieth century identified the secular national/historical tradition as the truly meaningful order.

For many conservatives national identity was also considered organically or naturalistically. One contemporary conservative ideologist thus predictably doubts that there could be any state without this natural sense of national identity, contending that national membership could only refer to ‘pre-political’ beliefs. In consequence he constructs three moments of membership: attachment, patriotism, and ideology. This applied the distinction, referred to earlier, between nation and nationalism. The ideology of nationalism is described as a ‘kind of emergency measure, a response to external threat.... Ideologies can be used to conscript people to an artificial unity; but they are neither substitutes for, nor friends of, the loyalties on which they mediate’ (Scruton 1990: 318). Genuine national attachment cannot be recovered once lost. In a move wholly characteristic of conservative ideologists, he insists that national feelings always arise organically.

Again the words organic and natural have shifting meanings. A rough approximate distinction should be drawn between ‘natural’, understood as simply the contrary to ‘invented’, and natural understood biologically. Both meanings have been used by conservative ideologists. It is also worth noting

here in passing that prior to the 1940s the concepts nation and race strongly overlapped in most of the relevant nationalist literature. Nationalism was as much about the culture, tradition, and language of a race. One deeply complex related issue here—which is often forgotten by modern commentators—is that between 1860 and 1930 nationalist and racial ideology were not only overlapping but both were profoundly inflected by social Darwinist or Lamarckian thinking. Thus, race and nationality were viewed frequently through the lens of evolutionary biology. Post-1945, race and nationality, as well as evolutionary claims, have largely parted ways, although the legacy of these overlaps still haunt nationalist ideology.

The older organic analogy in conservative ideology conveyed the idea that society was a mutually dependent interrelation of parts. Change or reform had to be consonant with the slow complex pace of the whole organism. Each individual had a place in the organism. This implied, for most conservatives, a natural hierarchy and inequality of rank and status. Entrenched social and political inequalities were nothing to be ashamed of in this setting. The organic analogy also implied a strong inclusive and insular sense of community which looked outward fearfully and suspiciously. Common identity (as well as intolerance) also formed a crucial motif in twentieth-century European fascist and national socialist ideology. The common features of fascist nationalism were, first, a focus on humans foremost as creatures of strong national communities. The overt links with race are much stronger here than in liberal nationalism. No humans, *per se*, exist, only Germans, Frenchmen, or Italians, and so forth. In many ways, this more insular and xenophobic use of nationalism was already integral to some conservative theories. Second, as in conservatism, there was an insistence on inclusive communities. True identity was found in the community of the nation and the nation was prior to the individual and any rights they might possess as individuals. In fact the notion of the individual was largely seen as a liberal fiction. As the Italian fascist Charter of Labour stated, ‘The Italian nation is an organic whole having life, purposes and means of action superior in power and duration to those of individuals ... of which it is composed’ (Oakeshott 1953: 184). Third, nationalism was used by fascists as a counterbalance to the Marxist conceptions of class struggle and the liberal conception of civil society. Fascist nationalism therefore prepared the nation for heroism, self-sacrifice, and ultimately war. The liberal perception undermined such ambitions and weakened human endeavours in materialistic longings and time-wasting parliamentary democratic politics.

There were however some differences between the German and Italian

variants of national identity. With Italian fascism, national identity was a more traditional xenophobic doctrine, not unlike an extreme variant of traditionalist conservatism. In national socialism, the identity expressed the *Volk* spirit and was underpinned by a quite overt biological doctrine of racial purity. To be German was to be of a particular biological racial stock. Again the concept of race here remains ambivalent even within liberal thinking during the late nineteenth century. However national socialism during the 1930s did focus heavily on the biological reading of race and nation. One explanation for these differences is the idiosyncratic intellectual heritage behind national socialism.

In summary, fascist and national socialist senses of common national identity were strongly organicist, inegalitarian, and, in the national socialist case, were heavily racially-based (in a social Darwinist sense of the term). Both doctrines were also antiliberal, anti-democratic, and anti-individualistic.

The third and fourth themes in nationalist ideology concern sovereignty and territory. Sovereignty usually implies absolute dominance over a particular space and population. For liberal nationalists sovereignty, however, did not necessarily follow from nationhood, trade-offs were possible; thus federal, confederal, and consociational policies were possible. Liberal nationalists thus contend that sovereignty, territory, and borders should not become fetishes. In fact, many recent liberal nationalists, such as Yael Tamir and Neil McCormick, have fought shy in their writings of firm connections between the concepts of nationalism and sovereignty. Further, it was seen as feasible for international law to place limits on national sovereignty. In addition, most liberal nationalists have taken for granted the essentially liberal belief of mutual respect between nations (Miller 1994: 145). The argument is that nations make up a part of our identity. Identity is deserving of respect. The principle of respect obliges us to respect that in others which constitutes their sense of their own identity. Thus there ought to be respect between nations (see McCormick 1982: 261–2; Tamir 1993: 73–4).

Conservative and fascist nationalisms have also focused, for different reasons, on the self-determining sovereign nation. However, unlike liberal nationalism, fascism and national socialism were quite self-consciously imperialistic, illiberal, aggressive, and militaristic and frequently premised on the superiority of particular nations. Territory, in this latter context, took on a sacrosanct quality. Little respect was shown, however, to other nations' territory or sovereignty. As the Italian fascist Giovanni Papini noted, 'in order to love something deeply you need to hate something else', thus, the true nationalist could not possibly be internationalist or cosmopolitan in any meaningful sense of the term (Papini 1973: 101–2). Nationalism, for fascists and conservatives,

implied not respect but suspicion, disdain, or abhorrence for other nations. In other words, such nationalism was premised upon a hierarchical or unequal understanding of nations. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation could not be compromised. If anything, in a basic social Darwinist sense, weaker nations should give way to the stronger. This was given a very vigorous and extensive rendering in the voluminous writings of Ratzel, the founder of the modern discipline of geography (Ratzel 1896).

A similar pattern of argument occurred over the question of the fifth theme of culture. Liberal nationalism has asserted most of the core liberal values (see for example Calhoun 2007; Frost 2006; Miller 1995; Tamir 1993). For liberal nationalists, individual autonomy does not conflict with nationalism. The liberal nation provides a freedom-enabling context for individuals. Self-determination by nations was consequently linked to the self-determining citizens within them. However, in conservative and fascist thought, the preference for organic and naturalistic analogies, combined with strong consensual readings of community, led to a profound suspicion of liberal individualistic autonomy. The individual was seen as part of an organic whole and could not be understood except through the whole. This theme figures continuously in the twentieth-century conservative writings of Charles Maurras, T. S. Eliot, Christopher Dawson, Russell Kirk, and Roger Scruton. Such writers see liberalism as premised on simple-minded asocial foundations, such as individual autonomy, which in the final analysis, undermine the nation. Thus, conservative theorists tend to exhibit a disdain for liberal individualism and its correlative individual autonomy, as against the virtues of a more traditional national community and hierarchical order.

The kind of national community envisaged by conservatives, despite its apparent homogeneity, was deeply unequal. Conservative theorists saw the nation as an ordered hierarchy, emphatically not a body of equal citizens. Leadership and political judgement were skills limited to the few and should be linked to the responsibilities of property ownership. Respect for an established order meant respecting the existing natural hierarchy and inequality. National order always entailed authority, authority entailed inequality and natural elites. Whereas previous generations of conservatives, such as Edmund Burke and de Maistre, focused on a more fixed hereditary and landed aristocracy, twentieth-century conservatives thought in terms of a broader elite—incorporating a cultural intelligentsia. For fascist ideologists, freedom also coincided with the nation. Freedom was never individualistic, though, and could never conflict with the ends of the nation. The stronger the national unity the richer the freedom. Freedom was therefore seen as a virtually ‘spiritual’ idea, usually contrasted to

the false ‘grubby materialism’ of liberal freedom. True freedom was an inner condition of the agent, willing the higher ends of the group. The Nazi ideologist Rosenberg was quite explicit on this point, focusing on the racial theme within German nationalism: freedom, he commented, literally meant ‘fellowship of race’ (Rosenberg 1971: 98).

Taking up the sixth theme: liberal nationalism has focused on very specific political arrangements. National communities should provide the political conditions conducive to the secure and free development of individual citizens. Once the liberal nation had valorized the rights and freedoms of the individual, this logically entailed democratic constitutional arrangements. Nationalism thus implied liberal democracy. This interpretation dates from the founding figure of liberal nationalism, Giuseppe Mazzini. This could be said to have followed from the principle of self-determination. Formally, each nationality should have its own state, but it must be one embodying constitutional government, democracy and the rights of the individual. Liberal nationalism basically assumed that each nationality, large enough to survive, should be independent, but with a free constitutional democratic government. The high point of this original expression of liberal nationalism (together with self-determination) could be seen at the Treaty of Versailles (1918) and more particularly in President Wilson’s contemporaneous Fourteen Points (Manela 2007). However, it remains a continuous motif amongst liberal nationalists.

At the turn of the twenty-first century liberal nationalists, such as David Miller, still sees national self-determination as significant, namely because it corresponds to the idea of nations as active communities. Self-determination followed from the earlier identity-based argument. If people share substantive normative beliefs, which are reflected in their acting representatives, then the nation could be said to act and determine itself. Nationalism and democracy are therefore indelibly linked. The state is therefore ‘likely to be better able to achieve its goals where its subjects form an encompassing community and conversely national communities are better able to preserve their culture and fulfil their aspirations where they have control of the political machinery in the relevant area’ (Miller 1994: 144–5).

However, the connections between nationalism and democracy and democracy and self-determination during the twentieth century are, to say the least, feeble. The emphasis on hierarchy and leadership led most conservatives and radical right ideologies during the twentieth century, despite being focused on nationalism qua self-determination, to a deep distrust of democracy—oddly a distrust shared by many liberals after the election of the National Socialists to

power in Germany in the 1930s. A nation in conservative and radical right ideology could still be self-determining and yet undemocratic. For conservatives, characteristically, perfect democracy implied perfect despotism. Ironically, fear of the mass mediocrity of democracy was also present in the liberal writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, and Friedrich Hayek, as well as in a wide spectrum of European writers, such as Jacob Burkhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche, and probably most notably, the Spanish conservative Ortega y Gasset, in his *The Revolt of the Masses* published in 1930 (Ortega y Gasset 1951). Thus, the link that some have made between nationalism and democracy during the very late twentieth century has to be severely qualified. For conservatives, humans cannot govern themselves, they needed wise guidance from national governing elites. Freedom is not necessarily acquired through democracy. Authority and hierarchy are incompatible with popular rule. Democracy and individual self-determination imply rampant self-interest and consumerism, a destruction of the national community into an alienated atomized mass or group chaos, and thus the end of authority and civilization (Carey 1992). This would also be the root to a similar conservative ideological unease with European multiculturalism in the 2000s.

In the early twentieth century, conservative nationalists such as Charles Maurras in France, Christopher Dawson and T. S. Eliot in Britain, and Carl Schmitt in Germany were led by the same logic (as just discussed) to criticize even limited representative parliamentary democracy. In the 1920s and 1930s, this was a path followed by most conservatives in Germany and Italy, although it had very different consequences to France and Britain. Fascists and national socialists also expressed deep contempt for liberal democracy. Nationalism was used by them to bestow legitimacy on certain more oblique senses of both democracy and socialism. These were often referred to in fascist writings as the ‘nobler democracy’ and ‘nobler socialism’. Socialism and democracy, when devoted to the primacy of the integral nation or *Volk*, were seen as superior to liberal democracy. The worst of all worlds, for the fascist, was the mutual contamination of socialism with liberal democracy. This would fatally undermine the nation.

In conclusion, therefore, for conservative and fascist ideologies the idea, which is promulgated by liberal nationalists throughout the twentieth century to the present day, that there is a substantive connection between individual self-determination, democracy, and national self-determination is demonstrably false. Although this argument remains pervasive in some areas of the academy, it makes little or no sense to other contemporaneous ideologies.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion represents a snapshot of nationalist argument over the last century. The analysis could have been considerably extended and illustrated much more fully. However, one important conclusion about nationalist ideology can be drawn from this analysis. The formal themes which have been used as thematic devices to analyse twentieth-century nationalist ideology are in themselves vacuous. What makes them significant is the entry of other thicker ideologies, which carry the argument forward. Thus, in examining any of the above regulative claims, one looks in vain for something highly distinctive about nationalism in itself. Another way of putting this is that nationalism, from its nineteenth-century inception in the European political vocabulary up to the 2000s, has been parasitic on other host ideologies to make any headway. Nationalism, per se, has had no answers in itself to any substantive political problems. It is not, in fact, equipped to answer them. It is other forms of thought (conservatism, liberalism, socialism, and fascism) which have provided answers or ways of being and acting in the world. It is to these compounds (for example, liberal nationalism) that we must look for the substance of nationalist ideology.

REFERENCES

- Acton, Lord (J.E.E.D.) 1907. 'Nationality' In Lord Acton, *History of Freedom and Other Essays*. London: Macmillan.
- Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Aughey, A. 2007. *The Politics of Englishness*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Barry, B. 1983. 'Self-Government revisited'. Pp. 121–54 in *The Nature of Political Theory*, eds. D. Miller and L. Seidentop. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois. 2005. *The Illusion of Cultural Identity*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Baycroft, T. 2008. *Inventing the Nation: France*. London: Hodder Education.
- Baycroft, T. and M. Hewitson (eds.) 2006. *What is a Nation? Europe 1789–1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berlin, I. 1990. *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*. London: John Murray.
- Birch, A. H. 1989. *Nationalism and National Integration*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Bond, R., Jeffery, C. and Rosie, M. 2010. 'The importance of being English: National identity and nationalism in post-devolution England', *Nations and Nationalism*, 16 (3): 462–8.
- Bouchard, G. 2008. *The Making of the Nations and Cultures of the New World: An Essay in Comparative History*, trans. Michelle Weinroth and Paul Leduc Browne. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Breuilly, J. 2005. 'Dating the nation: How old is an old nation?' Pp. 15–39 in *When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, eds. A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac. London and New York: Routledge.
- Brown, D. 1999. 'Are there good and bad nationalisms?' *Nations and Nationalism*, 5 (2): 281–302.

- Brown, G. W. and D. Held (eds.) 2010. *The Cosmopolitan Reader*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Calhoun, C. 2007. *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Canovan, M. 1996. *Nationalism and Political Theory*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Canovan, M. 1999. 'The Skeleton in the Cupboard: Nationhood, Patriotism and Limited Loyalties'. Pp. 69–84 in *National Rights and International Obligations*, eds. S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones. Oxford: Westview.
- Carey, J. 1992. *The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligensia 1880–1939*. London, Faber and Faber.
- Carvalho, S. and F. Gemenne. 2009. *Nations and their Histories. Constructions and Representations*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Delanty, G., J. Hutchinson, E. Kaufmann, U. Özkırmlı, and A. Wimmer. 2008. 'Debate on John Hutchinson's *Nations as Zones of Conflict*', *Nations and Nationalism*, 14 (1): 1–28.
- Díaz-Andreu, M. 2007. *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology: Nationalism, Colonialism and the Past*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Drakulic, S. 2008. 'Whence Nationalism?' *Nations and Nationalism*, 14 (2): 221–39.
- Edwards, J. 2009. *Language and Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ely, G. and J. Palmowski (eds.) 2008. *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth Century Germany*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Frost, C. 2006. *Morality and Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Gamble, A. and T. Wright (eds.) 2009. *Britishness: Perspectives on the British Question*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Geary, P. J. 2002. *The Myth of the Nation: the Medieval Origins of Europe*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gellner, E. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Griffin, R. 2000. 'Interregnum or endgame? The radical right in the "post-fascist" era', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5: 163–78.
- Grosby, S. 2005. *Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guibernau, M. 2007. *The Identity of Nations*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Harris, E. 2009. *Nationalism: Theories and Cases*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
- Hastings, A. 1997. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herb, G. H. and D. H. Kaplan (eds.) 2008. *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview*. Santa Barbara: CA: ABC-Clio Inc.
- Hill, C. L. 2008. *National History and the World of Nations. Capital, State, and the Rhetoric of History in Japan, France and the United States*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. 1992. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holtug, N., K. Lippert-Rasmussen, and S. Lægaard. 2009 *Nationalism and Multiculturalism in a World of Immigration*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hutchinson, J. 2005. *Zones of Conflict*. London and New York: Sage.
- Ichijo, A. and G. Uzelac (eds.) 2005. *When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Judah, T. 1997. *The Serbs*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kamenka, E. 1976. *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Kedourie, E. 1974. *Nationalism*. 2nd edn. London: Hutchinson University Library.

- Kellas, J. G. 1991. *Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kohl, P. L., M. Kozelsky, and N. Ben-Yehuda (eds.) 2007. *Selective Remembrances: Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kohn, H. 1945. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*. New York: Macmillan.
- Kumar, K. 2010. 'Negotiating English identity: Englishness, Britishness and the future of the United Kingdom', *Nations and Nationalism*, 16 (3): 469–87.
- Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Leerssen, J. L. 2007. *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Liebich, A. 2006. 'Searching for the perfect nation: the itinerary of Hans Kohn (1891–1971)', *Nations and Nationalism*, 12 (2): 579–96.
- MacCormick, N. 1982. *Legal Rights and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Malešević, S. and M. Haugaard (eds.) 2007. *Ernest Gellner and Contemporary Social Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Manela, E. 2007. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Margalit, G. and J. Raz. 1995. 'National self-determination'. Pp. 79–92 in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. W. Kymlicka. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mayall, J. 1990. *Nationalism and International Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mill, J. S. 1962. *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*. London: Dent.
- Miller, D. 1994. 'The Nation-State: A modest defence'. Pp. 133–58 in *Political Restructuring in Europe*, ed. C. Brown. London: Routledge.
- Miller, D. 1995. *On Nationality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Nielsen, K. 1999. 'Cultural nationalism, neither ethnic nor civic'. Pp. 119–30 in *Theorizing Nationalism*, ed. R. Beiner. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Norman, W. 1999. 'Theorizing nationalism (normatively): First steps'. Pp. 51–66 in *Theorizing Nationalism*, ed. R. Beiner. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Oakeshott, M. 1953. 'Charter of Labour'. Pp. 184–185 in *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe*, ed. M. Oakeshott. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ortega y Gasset, J. 1951. *The Revolt of the Masses*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Özkürmlü, U. 2005. *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: a Critical Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Özkürmlü, U. and S. Grosby. 2007. 'Nationalism theory debate: The antiquity of the nation', *Nations and Nationalism*, 13 (3): 523–37.
- Papini, G. 1973. *Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile*. ed. A. Lyttelton London: Jonathan Cape.
- Ratzel, Friedrich. 1896. *History of Mankind*. London: Macmillan.
- Ratzel, Friedrich. 1996. 'The territorial growth of the state'. Pp. 525–535 in *Human Geography: An Essential Anthology*, eds. J. Agnew, D. N. Livingstone and A. Rogers. Oxford : Blackwell.
- Reynolds, S. 1984. *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900–1300*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Reynolds, V., V. S. E. Falgar, and I. Vine 1987. *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and Nationalism*. London: Croom Helm.
- Roeder, P. G. 2007. *Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rosenberg, A. 1971. *Rosenberg: Selected Writings*. London: Jonathan Cape.

- Roshwald, A. 2006. *The Endurance of Nationalism: Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Routledge, B. 2003. 'The antiquity of the nation? Critical reflection from the ancient near East', *Nations and Nationalism*, 9 (2): 213–33.
- Scruton, Roger 1990. 'In defence of the nation'. Pp. 149–78 in *The Philosopher on Dover Beach*, ed. R. Scruton. London: Carcanet Press.
- Shafer, B. C. 1972. *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities Old Myths*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Smith, A. D. 1981. *The Ethnic Revival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, A. D. 1991. *National Identity*. Middlesex: Penguin.
- Smith, A. D. 2001. *Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Smith, A. D. 2008. *The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant, and Republic*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Smith, A. D., J. Breuilly, S.-M. Grant, and A. Roshvald. 2008. 'Debate on Aviel Roshvald *The Endurance of Nationalism*', *Nations and Nationalism*, 14 (2): 637–63.
- Snyder, L. 1954. *The Meaning of Nationalism*. New Brunswick and New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Spencer, P. and H. Wollman. 2002 *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Sage.
- Tamir, Y. 1993. *Liberal Nationalism*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Tamir, Y. 1999. 'Theoretical difficulties in the study of nationalism'. Pp. 67–90 in *Theorizing Nationalism*, ed. R. Beiner. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Tarling, N. and E. T. Gomez. 2008. *The State, Development and Identity in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Ethnicity, Equity and the Nation*. New York: Routledge.
- Varouxakis, G. 2002. *Mill on Nationality*. London: Routledge.
- Vincent, Andrew. 1997. 'Liberal nationalism: An irresponsible compound?' *Political Studies*, 45 (2): 275–95.
- Vincent, Andrew. 2002. *Nationalism and Particularity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 26 FASCISM

ROGER EATWELL

INTRODUCTION

OF all the major ideologies, fascism is the most elusive. Was there a fascist ideology before the founding of the *Fasci di Combattimento* in 1919 by Benito Mussolini, an apostate former leading socialist who renamed the group in 1921 the Italian National Fascist Party (PNF)?¹ Was fascism an alternative conception of modernity, or more a type of conservative politics based on modern forms of activism and style? Does the racism and virulent Manichaeism of German National Socialism make it *sui generis*? Was fascism in practice not driven more by nihilistic violence than ideology, encapsulated in the notorious Nazi (mis)quote ‘When I hear the word “culture”, I reach for my gun’?

Most historians challenge the validity of ideological approaches, stressing the importance of studying practice. Some hold that the differences between ‘fascisms’ make any form of model invalid, a point reinforced by the fact that few outside Italy termed themselves ‘fascists’. Others focus on the argument that the ideological approach is static, whereas its main manifestations in Germany and Italy went through distinct phases, including radical movement and both conservative and more totalitarian regime phases. An even more common criticism claims that ideological approaches tell us little about key historical issues, such as the role of conservative elites in bringing fascism to power, or the role of Adolf Hitler’s charisma in launching the Holocaust.

However, unravelling the nature of fascist ideology does not necessarily involve a lack of sensitivity to practice or a claim to wide explanatory power, although a fertile ideological approach should offer such insights. Nor does it involve the claim that policy necessarily followed the most radical forms of thought, a point clearly underlined by the fact that the Italian Fascist state never achieved the control and influence advocated by its ‘totalitarian’ theorists. Moreover, identifying a specific ideological tradition does not necessarily mean playing down differences, which exist in all the main ideologies and their concrete political forms.

If fascist ideology is seen in terms of a matrix rather than an essentializing ideal type, it becomes clear that there could be notable diachronic and

synchronic variations, including within as well as between forms (Eatwell 1992, 2009). The point of the matrix is to highlight that instead of simply prioritizing key words, or short definitions, we need to ask how fascists conceived such terms, including what they were defined against.

At the heart of fascist ideology lay three partly overlapping core themes. The first is the 'new man', which has been central to most attempts to distinguish fascism from the reactionary and reformist right. Second is the nature of its holistic nationalism, which lies at the heart of debates about whether it is possible to discern a generic fascism which includes both Fascism and the more overtly racist Nazism. The final theme is the quest for a new Third Way state which would reconcile classes and ensure prosperity, a goal neglected by those who stress fascism's more cultural and/or negative side. The resulting syntheses could produce porous borders with socialism as well as with conservatism. There were also notable differences about the relative roles of leadership, propaganda, and violence in achieving and consolidating power. Indeed, some leading fascists had a remarkably sophisticated view of propaganda, seeing violence as instrumental rather than self-actualizing. This in part reflected a belief that ideas could move mountains, and that fascism's ideological syncretism offered the possibility of reconciling antagonistic groups (Eatwell 2011).

Fascist ideology was mercurial, seeking a broad set of syntheses around its core themes, including: a commitment to science, for example in understanding human nature, and a more anti-rationalist, vitalist interest in the possibilities of the will; between the faith and service of Christianity and the heroism of Classical thought; and between private property relations more typical of the right and a form of extensive welfarism more typical of the left. As Mussolini wrote: 'From beneath the ruins of liberal, socialist, and democratic doctrines, Fascism extracts those elements which are still vital ... create[s] a new synthesis' (Mussolini 1935: 25–6, 58).

These opening observations will be developed in three following sections. The first will examine issues relating to the origins of fascist ideology, surveying seminal developments which took place around the turn of the twentieth century and during the First World War. The second and longest section will consider further the three themes identified in this introductory section as forming the core of this ideology, considering in passing more tactical issues relating to how to achieve and consolidate power. In the final section, attention will be paid to fascist thought in the hostile post-1945 era, which produced thematic variations such as 'Europe a nation' and tactically the desire to create a counter-hegemonic 'Gramsciism of the right'.

THE ORIGINS OF FASCIST IDEOLOGY

Although the first fascist movements emerged only after 1918, there have been various attempts to trace their ideological pedigree much further back in time. In a pioneering account Karl Popper traced the attack on the 'open society' to Plato and what he termed 'historicism', namely the belief that there were laws of history which could not be shaped by man (in the final days of Fascism, Mussolini kept Plato's works on his desk, annotated in his own hand). Although Popper's main target was Marxism, he saw fascism's belief in the inevitability of social hierarchies and war between nations and empires as part of the same broad historicist tradition (Popper 1945).

Shortly afterwards, Jacob Talmon traced the origins of both left- and right-wing 'totalitarian democracy' to the Enlightenment and French Revolution, especially Rousseau's depiction of man born free but held in chains by forces such as religion. When linked to monist truths about the nature of man, the result was a fanatical pursuit of the 'general will' at the expense of individuals who were forced to be 'free' from their deleterious conditioning (Talmon 1952). A later variation of the Enlightenment approach sought to trace a lineage not only in terms of ideas, but also in the way in which Nazism was allegedly a mirror copy of Stalinist terror against political opponents and the socially undesirable.

More typically, the search for progenitors has focused on the anti-Enlightenment. Zeev Sternhell, a pioneer of the ideological approach to fascism, argues that its key thinkers founded a major intellectual movement which anticipated the thought of twentieth-century 'conservative revolutionaries', such as Oswald Spengler and his seminal distinction between a 'Culture' which had deep roots and a 'Civilization' linked to views about the betterment of man (Sternhell 2010). On this account, Johann von Herder's belief in a *Volksgeist*, a primordialist view of the nation founded on a closed culture, was not merely nostalgia for an age when community and religion moulded men. More fundamentally, it sought to change the path of modernity in a way which made it more consistent with rootedness and tradition. Joseph de Maistre famously quipped that 'as for man, I declare I have never met him' (de Maistre 1829: 94), rejecting a priori views about human nature in favour of an empirical view of man implanted in religious and social traditions. On this view, decadence followed the atomization of man in the modern world.

This anti-Enlightenment gathered pace after the late nineteenth century, with a series of developments which seriously challenged Enlightenment teleologies based on rationality and linear progress. Although there were some notable

differences between the views of the protagonists, these intellectual developments can be grouped under three broad headings. First, there were developments in psychology, including Gustav Le Bon's work on the easily-swayed irrational crowd, which was based on the experience of the sudden rise and fall of Boulangism. Secondly, in sociology a key development was the rise of elite theorists such as Roberto Michels and Vilfredo Pareto, who argued that elites emerged in all societies and that the key issues were their efficiency and openness. Thirdly, there were developments in philosophy, such as Friedrich Nietzsche's emphasis on the power of the 'will' and 'superman', and Georges Sorel's celebration of the power of the mobilizing myth of the revolutionary general strike.

According to Sternhell, the first clearly fascist ideological synthesis took place in France immediately before 1914 (Sternhell 1994). It was spawned in the small Cercle Proudhon by the cross-fertilization of Sorel's 'anti-materialist revision' of Marxism and the 'integral' nationalism of Charles Maurras's Action Française, which sought to restore order based on the monarchy and the Catholic Church. Ideologically, this unholy alliance stemmed mainly from a shared rejection of liberal political values, and ethical hostility to a growing capitalist materialism and plutocracy. They also shared a desire to re-unite France after the bitter divisions of the Dreyfus Affair. Tactically, they were both seeking new paths to power at a time when even most socialists appeared to have rejected violence and accepted the parliamentary road. Both saw youth as the hope for the future. Maurras was interested in the potential appeal of Sorel's productivist rather than redistributionist socialism which did not reject private property, whereas Sorel was attracted by nationalism's ability to provide the great mobilizing myth.

However, in 1914 the core of these ideas was not sufficiently developed to see the Cercle as the birthplace of fully fledged fascist ideology. This approach also places excessive emphasis on developments on the left rather than the right, such as the growth of social Catholicism which shared an interest with syndicalists like Sorel in 'corporatism'. Although the Catholic version sought to secure peace between employer and worker rather than the centrality of the *syndicat*, the potential for a further synthesis was beginning to emerge given some syndicalists' emphasis on spirituality.

Moreover, although Maurras and Sorel shared strongly anti-semitic views, Sternhell does not explore the way in which nationalism was becoming increasingly linked to racism. This point is central to George Mosse, who has highlighted thinkers in the Romantic movement and their influence on the large

Volkisch movement which had grown notably in Germany during the late nineteenth century (Mosse 1964). The Romantics celebrated intuition and creative genius. They celebrated beauty, and identified the nature of people closely with their landscape. This led them to see Jews as an ugly, arid people of the desert. *Volkisch* economic thought envisaged a backward-looking corporatism within an autarchic Greater Germany extending eastwards beyond its current borders, in which the Jew was the rootless epitome of the modern city and exploitative occupations such as banking. Hitler was later to give *Volkisch* thought pride of place in the Nazi lineage, although the *Volkisch* movement differed in several ways including its elitist social conservatism, a point reflected by the rise around the turn of the twentieth century of new populist movements like the Navy League.

Racism in the sense of the rejection of the outsider has been traced at least as far back as Greek thought; anti-semitism was also strongly rooted in the Christian churches. However, racism in the sense of a body of scientific thought which seeks to argue that peoples can be divided into a clear hierarchy on biological and/or cultural traits derives more from the late nineteenth century. Indeed, by 1914 racial thinking was widespread within scientific communities, not least in Germany, where it was strongly linked to the eugenics and social Darwinist developments (Mosse 1978; Weindling 1989). Racism was not only implicit in developments like social imperialism within some conservative parties, but overt in the first anti-semitic parties which appeared in France and Germany at this time and which sometimes targeted left-wing voters with forms of 'idiots' socialism'.

Social Darwinism had international as well as domestic implications, and a full understanding of the birth of fascist ideology requires a strong focus on thinking about this dimension. From the late nineteenth century on, the ability of society to fight war became a concern for many nationalists. Maurice Barrès, who termed himself a 'National Socialist', sought a war of revenge against the post-1870 new Germany. However, he feared for the effects of liberal individualism and materialism on France, lamenting that on the tomb of bourgeois 'man' should be engraved the epitaph 'Born a Man, Died a Grocer'. Giovanni Papini's view of fellow Italians was even more damning, claiming in 1914 that the 'Italy of 1860 had been shit dragged kicking and screaming towards unification by a daring minority, and shit it remains'. After Japan's shock victory over Russia in 1905, some radical Italian nationalists sought to develop a variation of the Shinto ethic, seeking to replace bourgeois decadence with a new religion of nature and heroes. All such nationalists believed that Italy

had the right to fight for its own empire in the sun in order to provide the resources necessary for the country to prosper.

Nationalists like Enrico Corradini realized that economic power was needed to capture empire in the first place, which led him to admire the dynamism of the rising USA, though not its liberal political values. This helped to provide a link with the syndicalists in Italy who followed Sorel in emphasizing the need for high levels of production over redistribution. Further links can be found in his belief that new myths were necessary to free the working class of socialist myths, such as international brotherhood or the iniquities of private property, although those who came from the right tended to see myth more as exemplifying historical grandeur, rootedness, and appropriate behaviour than in terms of their mass mobilizing potential.

Before the formation of the Cercle Proudhon, there was a coming together in intellectual arenas such as the Florentine avant-garde and journals like *La Voce* of an even broader array of voices. Mussolini, a rising socialist journalist at the time, exchanged correspondence with the editor of *La Voce*. He wrote admiringly about Nietzsche, whose criticism of bourgeois decadence and views about superman fitted well with Mussolini's growing sense that he was a man destined to lead a revolution (Gregor 1979; Adamson 1993). Other developments which attracted Mussolini's attention were elite theory (he may have been taught by Pareto), including Michels's early celebration of the power of charismatic leadership. Mussolini was also aware of Michels's work on the way in which socialism in France, Germany, and Italy was based on leader worship with parties and factions taking their leaders' names. This struck a chord as the future *Duce* came from the Emilia-Romagna, whose socialists mimicked many aspects of Catholicism, including processions and naming children after socialist 'saints'.

However, whilst these intellectual developments challenged all the main ideologies and provided the basis for new syntheses, there was not a clear fascist ideology in 1914 let alone the paramilitary mass movement which characterized its main inter-war manifestations. It was only during the First World War that a clear core of fascist thought began to crystallize around three main themes rather than a myriad of potential poles. Although it is important to stress that the fascist matrix meant that these core themes could be interpreted in different ways and with different emphases, it is interesting to look at how war affected Georges Valois. A co-founder of the Cercle Proudhon, he broke with Maurras after the war to form a specifically fascist movement, the Faisceau.

Valois wrote that 'It was at Verdun that I managed to divest myself of the

final errors of the last century' (Valois 1921: 267). He believed that the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 had placed people in an equal state of nature, in which a new true sense of national community was forged above class, but in which natural hierarchies quickly emerged. In particular, war had underlined the importance of the great leader, who supported by new elites would remake the nation. Although France had been victorious, the nation remained threatened not just by a German quest for revenge but by the dual domestic and international threat of Communism. In order to create a non-bourgeois community and defeat the left, it was necessary to achieve a 'total revolution' (Valois 1924). However, this was to be a revolution of values rather than a violent one. It was also to be an economic one, which would not only bring worker and employer close together, but which would also see the state directing the private market in the national interest and creating a new culture and prosperity. As Valois wrote: 'It's not the case, as Marx believed, that the mode of production determines moral, political and intellectual life: rather, it is the intellectual, moral and political life which determines economic formations' (Valois 1919: 15–16).

The last point is an important corrective to an undue emphasis on the 'cultural' origins of fascism, as war was widely seen in the main combatant nations as demonstrating the productive capacity which could be achieved by new forms of economic organization which would both change capitalism's ethos and its endemic trade cycle. It also provided a point of contact with patriotic socialists who drew similar conclusions. A wing within the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) talked of a 'social market economy', and pointedly rejected the language of class warfare. Although Hitler claimed in *Mein Kampf* (1925) that he was anti-semitic prior to 1914 (Hitler 1977: 47ff), he appears to have come close to joining the SPD after the war. In his case the crucial epiphany came from his association of the Bolshevik and other communist revolutions with Jews, which helped lead him to join a new right-wing group he was observing for army intelligence and which he would soon turn into the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP).

THE CORE OF FASCIST IDEOLOGY

An influential approach to defining fascist ideology has been Roger Griffin's Weberian ideal typical claim that: 'Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism' (Griffin 1991: 26). The term 'palingenesis', referring to the quest for rebirth, had been used by others but Griffin made it the core of a wide-

ranging analysis which saw generic fascism as a revolutionary alternative form of modernity, whose mythical goal was the rebirth/palingenesis of the nation after a period of decadence.

Partly in response to those who argued that it offered little explanatory insight, Griffin became a convert to the political religion interpretation which can be found in the important work of both Mosse (1975) on Germany and especially Emilio Gentile (1996) on Fascism. Griffin held that fascism appealed to people suffering from a 'sense making crisis', a conclusion largely deduced from intellectuals' comments about 'decadence' and/or the isolation of the masses rather than the empirical study of public opinion (Griffin 2007). Whilst the broad approach is important to understanding both the fascist belief in the power of propaganda and its more fanatical side, it needs to be supplemented by a focus on the fact that people supported fascism for many reasons, including economic ones. Moreover, some fascists, including leaders like Léon Degrelle in Belgium, Ferenc Szálasi in Hungary, and Valois, were practising Catholics who sought to defend religious values rather than found a new sect. Although some Nazis like the SS Chief Heinrich Himmler sought to launch a new religion, Hitler was keen to avoid any confrontation with the established churches. Degrelle, who fought in the Waffen-SS, has written that Hitler told him that in the longer run the church would gradually fade away under the dual impact of science undermining its mysticism and consumerism alleviating its appeal to the poor.

Fascism was an ideology which sought to appeal to different sides of 'man'. Dressed in simple military uniform, Hitler's first speech to the German nation as Chancellor used terms such as 'mission', 'salvation', and 'resurrection'. However, the main thrust of the speech stressed the impact of the economic crisis on the *Mittelstand*, while his opening salute to '*Volksgenossen*' was clearly pitched at the working class who formed a large part of the six million unemployed. Hitler believed that the production of new goods could both bolster the Nazi regime and reduce social inequalities. The *Volkswagen* car was genuinely meant to be the people's car, at least once new *Lebensraum* in the east had been won which would provide the basis for long-term economic prosperity in the way Empire had helped Britain. In this vein Mussolini claimed that 'Man is integral, he is political, he is economic, he is religious, he is saint, he is warrior' (Mussolini 1935; 59)

Although the term 'new man' was not always prominent in fascist discourse, especially Nazism, the concept was. Alfred Rosenberg argued in the second biggest selling book in Nazi Germany, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930;

see Rosenberg 1934), that the goal was a hybrid mix of ‘a new, yet very old, type of German’. Similarly, ‘man’ was central to Valois’s thought, though he did not specifically elaborate on the ‘new man’. But what exactly was this ‘new man’?

In the short run, the primary concern of fascist ideology was the creation of a new type of leadership. After 1918, Mussolini talked of the need for a new ‘trenchocracy’, a dynamic and risk-taking young elite which had been forged in war. A leading Fascist philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, wrote that the success of the Risorgimento did not depend on ‘the Italian people’, but rather on ‘an idea become a person’, on ‘several determined wills which were fixed on determined goals’. Hitler wrote of the need for a leader of ‘genius’ to help the ‘mob’ understand, claiming that ‘the parliamentary principle of majority rule sins against the basic aristocratic principle of Nature’ (Hitler 1977: 73–4). The Romanian fascist leader, Corneliu Codreanu, argued in his book *The Iron Guard* (1936) that a new elite rather than people had to lead the nation, as the people could not hope to understand the complexity of problems. These views, which were influenced by both elite theory and developments in racial science, were hardly ‘populist’ in the sense of celebrating the wisdom of the people, though they were characteristic of populism in their attack on Establishment elites, who were depicted as at best effete and at worst corrupt.

The view of fascist mass man was similarly influenced by recent intellectual developments. Ferdinand Tönnies’s depiction of the move from traditional community (*Gemeinschaft*) to instrumental capitalist relationships leading to social isolation (*Gesellschaft*) had a strong resonance in sociology well beyond Germany. The Nazis promised to create a *Volksgemeinschaft*, which would unite the people, end anomie, and banish alienation (and those who were not part of the true racial-community!) In Italy, Gentile’s *The Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals* (1925) sought to counter decadence and develop the nation by developing a new body of ‘ethical’ Fascist doctrine which would inspire change in Italians. More typically, fascists placed an emphasis on building support and integrating man into the nation through a form of manipulated activism. People were encouraged to join the single party and a variety of linked organizations, such as factory, youth, and women’s groups.

The term ‘new man’ is particularly appropriate in the sense that fascism was a male-dominant ethic (De Grazia 1993; Stephenson 2001). Nazism typically portrayed women in terms of ‘*Kirche, Küche, Kinder*’ (Church, Kitchen, and Children), though its appeal to women was more varied than the stereotype of the 3Ks implies. For example, a 1928 Nazi poster showed both a woman at a desk and a mother and child, accompanied by the text: ‘Mothers, Working

Women—We Vote National Socialist’. Women, especially young ones, were given a public role under fascism: they could parade in the streets, even adopt leadership roles in their own organizations. With the onset of full employment in Germany by the late 1930s, women were also increasingly accepted in the workplace. In rare cases women could reach great prominence in their own right, such as the film director Leni Riefenstahl whose *Triumph of the Will* depicted the 1934 Nuremberg rally, and the test pilot Hanna Reitsch, who helped develop the first rocket-fighter. However, the ultimate role of women which was celebrated in fascist thought was the bearing and upbringing of a healthy new generation, which would strengthen the nation.

An important strand in fascist thinking about the new man concerned violence. Violence was seen as a central act of bonding in paramilitary groups. The violence of both early Nazism and Fascism, in turn, provided these movements with a litany of martyrs who were celebrated to inspire others to reject the comfortable bourgeois life. Given that war was seen as endemic in the international system, it was vital to motivate and prepare man to fight effectively. However, it is important not to overstate the self-actualizing, let alone death-cult, side of fascism. Early Fascist *squadristi* adopted the slogan ‘I don’t care a damn’ from First World War elite shock troops. However, many celebrated war more in terms of fostering ‘blood socialism’, a community of the trenches which counteracted the alienating and commercial nature of bourgeois society. The French literary fascist Pierre Drieu La Rochelle even argued that the romance of war had gone in an age of the machine gun, high explosives and mass death; he suggested cultivating the aesthetics of the body and sport as a way of preserving a healthy nation rather than cultivating militarism.

Drieu La Rochelle provides a further important corrective to the view that all fascists held a social Darwinist view of man. Many fascists held a more syncretic view. They argued that humans belong to a natural order which is governed by laws, including innate inequalities and the naturalness of warfare. However, Drieu held that humans, especially a talented elite, were to some extent free to impose their will and secure change.

Nation was at the heart of fascist thinking, but there were differences about how the nation was conceived. A common distinction is to contrast the cultural nationalism of Fascism with Nazism’s biological racism, which excluded Jews and other racial enemies from the national community. However, there were variations within both these paradigmatic forms, and in 1938 Italy introduced its own Nuremberg-style laws ostracizing Jews (Gillette 2002; Hutton 2005; Kallis 2008).

Among the leading Nazis, biological racism was far from universal. Josef Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister, had little interest in racial theory, seeing anti-semitism mainly in terms of its mobilizing power and ability to unite the German people. He considered Himmler's views on the occult and race as close to madness. Rosenberg saw race as spiritual, as a 'mythic experience', and was anti-Judaic rather than biological. Indeed, he specifically wrote of the right kind of ethnic 'hybridity' bringing strength to Germans. However, Hitler held that National Socialism was based on scientific knowledge, a reflection of the strength of racial thinking in German academia. Hitler also believed that the Jews were parasites who saw themselves as the master race, and were involved in a plot to undermine productive peoples through the dual threats of capitalism and communism.

Whereas Nazis believed that the nation was a *Volksgeist* based on deep roots, Mussolini frequently talked of the need to complete the work of the *Risorgimento*, underlining the way in which Italian Fascism believed that much work was to be done through the state and myth-making to create Italians. However, Fascist myths were not designed simply to mobilize people for production or war. Exemplar or identity myths, like the cult of *Romanità*, told Italians that they were not a divided, mongrel nation, but the proud descendants of ancient Rome. Such myths were also about the importance of great leaders and fulfilling one's duty, and of the dangers of decadence and miscegenation.

Views on race among Fascists were even more mixed. Gentile found biological racism and anti-semitism abhorrent. The main school of Italian academic racial thought was influenced by cultural rather than biological thinking, though the latter grew during the 1930s. This ridiculed the use of the term 'Aryan' in a racial context, and mocked Nordicists by contrasting the achievements of Ancient Rome with that of 'German' barbarians. In contrast to Nazi biological determinists, these Italianists generally supported a spiritual racism that emphasized the impact of environment or praised the Mediterranean race as the superior product of intermixing.

Mussolini for many years had a Jewish mistress, and Jews were prominent in the Fascist Party until Mussolini introduced Nazi Nuremberg style laws, mainly in an amoral attempt to re-radicalize Fascism. However, even before 1914 Mussolini had been concerned about Jewish power, a fear heightened by his belief following the imposition of sanctions after the Abyssinian invasion that world Jewry was at the heart of 'anti-fascism' and conspiring against Italy as well as Germany. Whilst Mussolini rejected the existence of biologically pure races, he wrote in the preamble to the 1921 Fascist Programme that 'The nation

is ... the supreme synthesis of all the material and immaterial values of the racial stock'. Other Fascists held views very close to Nazism. For example there were ideological similarities between Fascists who celebrated a mystical relationship between the people and the land on which it lived (*Strapaese*) and Nazi blood and soil (*Blut und Boden*) views. Among some scientists there were further clear affinities with Nazi biological racism, especially in eugenics-related fields such as breeding and health.

There were also parallels between the geopolitical view that Italy had a right to find living space (*spazio vitale*) and the Nazi quest for *Lebensraum* (Kallis 2000). Belief in the importance of German expansion into Eastern Europe was underpinned by the new discipline of geopolitics. A major luminary was Karl Haushofer who taught Rudolf Hess, a leading member of Hitler's inner court. This portrayed the world as divided into natural spheres, which should be controlled by particular states. Carving the world into such spheres of interest was seen as legitimate both for national productive development of great powers and as likely to reduce the risks of war. However, a difference between the core Nazi doctrine of *lebensraum* and earlier versions was its radical racist underpinnings. Hitler talked of the Volga as Germany's Mississippi, with clear allusions to ethnic cleansing. The SS slogan 'race is our frontier' was an ominous premonition of the fate which awaited not just Jews but other inferior peoples in lands conquered by Germany after 1939.

Mussolini's colonial ambitions in Africa have often been portrayed as no more than what the European Great powers achieved during the nineteenth century (a vast expansion of territory which meant that fascists in Britain and France did not seek further expansion). However, Italian expansion into Libya and Ethiopia was undertaken with great brutality at a time of growing liberal international norms. Moreover, Mussolini saw expansion not simply in geopolitical terms to secure prosperity, but also in terms of achieving the military power necessary to defend Italy and European culture more generally from the threat of rising nationalism among colonial peoples. As he wrote in the introduction to a German book on race published in the 1903s: 'the whole White race, the Western race, can be submerged by other coloured races which are multiplying at a rate unknown in our race' (Griffin 1995: 59). This Europeanist dimension also appears in some SS propaganda, though in this case the great enemy was what was seen as Jewish communism and the sub-human Slavs it ruled over.

A Europeanist strand can also be found among the Nazis who worked on early wartime economic planning, but economic policy rarely features

prominently in analyses of fascism. Typically, only broad features such as its autarchy and statism, or the contradictions between its modernist side and the back-to-the-land views of the Nazi Walter Darré and Fascist *Strapaese* school of thought, are stressed.

However, whilst fascists rejected the materialism of liberalism and Marxism, economic prosperity was central to the core ideology, both in terms of securing popular support and to underpin great power status. The first Fascist programme contained a high degree of radicalism, which if implemented would have made Italy a more egalitarian society. Several leading Fascist theorists, such as the former syndicalist Sergio Panunzio, sought to develop a Third Way between capitalism and socialism, in which corporatism would be the key institutional structure. In practice, the Corporate State developed more along the authoritarian social Catholic lines, advocated by Alfredo Rocco and others who came to Fascism through merger with the Italian Nationalist Association (ANI), rather than syndicalist osmosis. Nevertheless, the underlying ideological quest can be seen in the 1943 Verona Programme, when the Nazi puppet state, the Salò Republic, sought to return to a more radical socioeconomic programme.

Economics did not feature prominently in *Mein Kampf*, but there were other members of the party who took a strong interest. Notable in the early days was Gottfried Feder, who had lectured to Hitler while an army propagandist. Feder advocated a corporatist economy, in which the state would clamp down on 'parasitic' capital while ensuring that 'productive' capital operated in the national interest. After the Wall Street Crash in 1929, economic issues figured prominently in the Nazis' propaganda and the anti-capitalist side of their 'socialism' became even more prominent. However, propaganda was not solely negative and specific policies were developed for different sectors. There was also an emphasis on 'socialism of the deed', practical short-term solutions such as unemployed members of the Stormtroopers (SA) helping farmers undertake work they could not afford in return for being allowed to work plots of land.

After coming to power, the Nazis had to face the problem of not only having to rule mainly through the existing conservative bureaucracy, but having to deal with private business and landed interests (Barkai 1990). Initially, its most distinctive policies did not challenge this power, such as the establishment of the Strength through Joy (*Kraft durch Freude*) organization, which was modelled on the Italian *Dopolavoro*, and which sought to indoctrinate whilst providing leisure activities such as cheap holidays. Similarly, the beautification of the factories programme sought to diminish worker alienation whilst neither changing the nature of work itself, nor wages! Nevertheless, by the late 1930s the Nazis were

exerting far more control over business than vice-versa (Hayes 1987).

It is interesting to consider the development of fascist economic thinking by considering two countries where it did not have to face the compromises of power. In Belgium and France there developed a strand which stressed the importance of state planning to harness the dynamism of the private market to the nation's goals, including the welfare of all (Sternhell 1986). Key figures in this development were the former socialists Henri de Man and Marcel Déat. The leader of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), Sir Oswald Mosley, was another former socialist (though his career started as a Conservative). He advocated a form of authoritarian Keynesianism to create 'an economics of plenty', arguing that the scientific dynamism of countries like Britain and Germany meant that they could successfully face the challenge of rising powers like Japan, whilst solving 'the poverty problem'.

Fascists saw the freedoms of liberal democratic states as an illusion. In the words of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the leader of the Spanish Falange, if workers did not agree to the conditions of the rich they would die of hunger 'in the midst of the utmost liberal dignity' (Thomas 1972: 51). The desire to create a new form of welfare as well as a warfare state was central to much fascist thinking, although there were differences about the nature of this state, with some stressing the spiritual more than the economic benefits of the Third Way.

The term 'totalitarianism' was coined by an opponent, but it became increasingly common in the Fascist vocabulary after 1925 (Gregor 2005). Its leading theorist was Gentile, who sought an 'ethical' state which would deploy a religious style of politics to transcend social and political divisions and closely link people and government. Whilst it is widely accepted that the Fascist state bore only a limited resemblance to the later political science totalitarian model which was based more on Stalinism, there is much wider agreement that the fascist goal was totalitarianism (Roberts 2006). However, what precisely did this involve? Some Fascists sought the charismatization of the idea rather than the leader, and resented the *Duce* cult. The 'totalitarian' state never sought to unleash a major attack on private property. Indeed, the inauguration of the Industrial Reconstruction Institute (IRI) in the 1930s, and the subsequent major extension of state ownership, was driven by a pragmatic response to a banking crisis more than ideology. The anti-clerical Mussolini told Hans Frank, the Nazi Justice Minister, that a separation between church and state was crucial, as this provided the state with more freedom.

To the extent that there was a core in Fascist 'totalitarian' thinking, it lay in a rejection of a central aspect of the Western political tradition dating back to

Greek thought and especially the Enlightenment, namely the distinction between state and civil society. This meant that whilst most Fascists did not seek to replace the Catholic Church, or engage in policies such as mass nationalization, they believed that the state had the right to seek compliance with the national interest in these spheres. Nevertheless, this left considerable scope for debate about both the form and content of Fascism. For example, there were notable critics of Gentile linked to the journal *Il Secolo* who advocated anti-modernist views which had more in common with de Maistre and Maurras.

Discussing Nazi views of the state is difficult for a variety of reasons. One concerns the fact that the Nazis were highly critical of the Weimar state, which they saw as colonized by political opponents and unadventurous elites. The impossibility of removing all such people in 1933 meant that hostility to the state in this sense did not end with the establishment of a dictatorship. It is also important to remember that the Nazi regime was a brief one, with six out of twelve years spent fighting a major war. Predictably, the result at times was bureaucratic chaos, with divisions between party and state, and even within the Nazi Party which was factionalized and regionalized. However, this does not mean that Nazism should be seen as ‘anti-state’, or that it differed significantly in philosophical terms from Fascism.

Although the term ‘totalitarianism’ was not part of the core Nazi vocabulary, most Nazis believed in some form of a strong state. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler specifically warned that ‘There can be no such thing as state authority as an end in itself’, and he later developed vague ‘legal’ concepts such as the ‘people’s’ or ‘Führer’s’ will. His charismatic authority resulted in leading Nazis seeking to ‘work towards the Führer’, not least in a cumulative radicalization of policy towards Jews (Kershaw 1998). However, whilst there was a variety of views about the nature of the coming authoritarianism, never ‘did any major Nazi writer before 1933 prophesy a dictatorship’ (Lane and Rupp 1978: xii). This needs qualifying by adding that dictatorship was typically understood as ruling without the consent of the people, which was not necessarily to be manifested through elections. Nevertheless, there were Nazis who tried to set out more clearly how the people were to be represented, for example Feder’s depiction of a corporate state.

NEO-FASCISM

Since 1945, no regime or major movement has termed itself ‘fascist’. Some similarities can be found between nationalistic and personalized Third World

‘developmental dictatorships’, like Nasserism in Egypt (Gregor 2000). However, these typically lack features such as fascism’s racism. The term ‘Clerico’ or ‘Islamo’ fascism (Laqueur 1996) is even more misleading for a politicized, reactionary, and anti-semitic perversion of the Muslim religion, though it points to a spirituality which was present in classic fascist thought but lacking in many putative post-1945 ‘fascisms’.

Significant new parties such as the French National Front are better classified as ‘extreme right’. Whilst there are links through their nationalism, they differ from fascism in major ways, including their celebration of a silent majority and lack of overt support for violence. Even the Italian Socialist Movement (MSI), which had clear links through personnel and mirrored the PNF’s split between conservative and radical factions, eschewed its paramilitary side (though, as in Germany, this also reflected a ban on the reformation of fascist parties).

Seeking to renew the fascist ideological tradition has largely been undertaken by a small number of marginalized thinkers, most of whom have not termed themselves ‘fascist’. Indeed, one of the most influential, the Italian philosopher Julius Evola, had never been a member of the Fascist Party before 1945, which he saw as too populist, too concerned with creating a mass ‘new man’. Although he supported its cultural racism, he is debatably fascist in terms of its Third Way economics and prewar statism (Furlong 2011).

Maurice Bardèche, the brother-in-law of the French literary fascist Robert Brasillach, opens his book *What is Fascism?* (1961) with the words ‘I am a fascist writer’, a rare postwar use of the ‘f’ word in the first person. Although after 1933 Nazism had provided a more influential model, Bardèche sought to rehabilitate fascism by focusing on its radical Italian ideological roots, which he saw as rejuvenated in the ‘fascist socialism’ of the Salò Republic. Bardèche argued that the ‘new man’ at the heart of all fascisms was someone who rejected bourgeois materialism and unjustified hierarchies, but loved work and accepted the discipline necessary to build a strong nation. At the end of *What Is Fascism?*, Bardèche concluded that there were large numbers of people who shared this fascist spirit ‘without knowing it’. The task, therefore, was to reveal to people the ‘true’ fascism.

This view of man was very different to that espoused by Evola, an anti-modernist who sought to build a new European warrior-priest elite rather than a national mass movement. Much of his thought is obscure gnosticism, but this elitist aspect appealed to activists who realized that the fascist mass mobilization was in abeyance. It appealed in particular to those who saw violence in terms of spiritual self-actualization, which had been a central characteristic of the thought

of Codreanu, whose murder by the police in 1938 made him an iconic figure among what Evola termed 'political soldiers'. Such thinking was a major inspiration of the wave of neo-fascist terrorism in Italy during the 1960s and 1970s, although this was also fostered by factions within the state who hoped to use violence as a pretext for an authoritarian take-over in a country which had a large and growing Communist Party (Cento Bull 2007).

Another tactic which gathered support after the 1960s, though it was implicit in Bardèche's approach, was what Alain de Benoist termed 'Gramsciism of the right' (Bar-On 2007). Benoist was the key thinker in the self-styled European 'New Right' (*Nouvelle Droite*), which sought to counter what it saw as the intellectual hegemony of liberalism and the left by spreading knowledge of key thinkers whose work lent itself to the right. An important aspect of this concerned human nature, such as genetic inequalities in intelligence. The New Right also sought to spread post-1918 Conservative Revolutionary thought, which had been critical of Nazi attempts at mass mobilization rather than the creation of an intellectual elite (Spengler referred to the Nazis as 'prolet-Aryan').

Immediately after 1945, many neo-fascist theorists focused more on attracting support by recasting views about nationalism. The most important fascist leader to become active in postwar politics, Mosley, claimed to have moved 'beyond' fascism. In his voluminous postwar writings he set out the case for what he termed 'Europe a nation'. In 1951, a German magazine was set up entitled *Nation Europa*, taking its inspiration more from the Waffen-SS which was portrayed as a trans-European crusade against communism. Shortly afterwards, Bardèche set up a journal called *Défense de l'Occident*, whose title similarly reflected a desire to defend continental culture. De Benoist and the New Right sought to link this to regionalism, which would provide a stronger sense of immediate community than the nation.

This strand held that nationalism had led to a 'European civil war' after 1939, in which the victors were Soviet communism and American capitalism. Even the largest European states were seen as no longer capable of defending their own interests, which encouraged a call to make Europe a 'Third Force' capable of defending itself against these enemies and retaining existing empire. However, there were notable differences within this Europeanist camp. Mosley called for a full federal union, but for others the link was to be more cultural. There could also be a notable disjunction between Europeanist rhetoric and perceptions of the national interest. Thus Bardèche wanted to ban Swedish cars from France on the autarchic grounds that they were not needed.

This Europeanism was largely lacking in the new generation of extreme right

parties which began to emerge in Europe after the 1960s. Nationalism remained central to their programmes, reinforced by a growing emphasis on opposition to immigration. Initially, the latter tended to be less central to neo-fascist thinking, but an important change came with the New Right, which sought to popularize what it termed 'differencialism'. This held that there was not a hierarchy of races, but that peoples had different cultures which they had a right to retain. These arguments became increasingly common in extreme right parties, especially in relation to an allegedly un-assimilable Muslim culture.

There were more similarities compared to the early days concerning attitudes to Jews. Direct attacks on Jews became less prominent in the years after 1945, though anti-semitism remained central to Evola and others whose thought was centred on race. Bardèche and Mosley in particular sought to distance themselves from hatred of Jews as a people, arguing their main concern was Jewish power. However, this easily lapsed into a new form of conspiracy theory in the form of Holocaust Denial. As early as 1948 Bardèche wrote a book denouncing the Nuremberg verdicts, anticipating the later claim in a book widely circulated in neo-fascist and extreme right circles that the Holocaust was *The Hoax of the Century* (Butz 1977). This form of propaganda only declined as Islam rather than Jews became the main enemy, though a handful of radical neo-fascists were attracted by Islam's fanaticism and hatred of the United States.

In the face of full employment in the Western world, most neo-fascists focused on attacking bourgeois materialism rather than economic reform. However, Third Force thinking included an economic as well as military dimension and Mosley in particular wrote extensively about economic organization. He argued that a united Europe, combined with African empire, would provide a large trading bloc that would ensure long-term prosperity. Within the European sphere, Mosley sought to create a new synthesis of private enterprise, workers, and the state in which the workers would enjoy a power they lacked in Italian Corporatism. The state would deal with grand strategy, including fostering new industry, and intervene where private or worker power threatened to increase prices or wages unreasonably. Without such a change, Mosley believed that Europe was destined for a major crash in the face of American productive power and the growing threat of goods from low wage economies.

Other than in the esoteric thought of a small number such as Evola, the strong state remained a central concern, although the experience of pre-1945 fascism introduced some more cautionary elements. Some wrote of the need for referendums to approve major policies, glossing over various questions such as

who controls the issues chosen and reporting in the media. Mosley argued that a general strike by workers could overthrow a repressive government, a claim which did not sit easily with the power exercised by fascist and communist states. More tellingly, the 'socialist' wing of neo-fascism attacked democratic freedoms for focusing on equality before the law rather than equality of income.

Mosley defended Hitler against charges of dictatorship by arguing that he did not rule against the will of the majority: the problem was more that he accepted no 'moral limitations to the will' and suffered from 'what the classic Greeks called *hubris*'. Horia Sima, who succeeded Codreanu as leader of the Iron Guard, concluded that Hitler sought goals which were 'beyond the power of synthesis and his capacity for judgement' (Sima 1977: 24). Bardèche argued that the stress on the need for dynamic leaders did not mean that a more moderate fascism could not exist, although there was little by way of political checks and balances in his thought. However, the rise of new 'charismatic' leaders like Jean-Marie Le Pen was greeted with suspicion by de Benoist and others, as they held that they were really populists rather than bearers of the true word.

CONCLUSION

'When I hear the word "culture", I reach for my gun'. These words have frequently been used as shorthand to depict the nihilism of Nazism. However, they are a mistranslation from a play about the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 written by the Nazi intellectual, Hanns Johst. Johst does not threaten the murder of 'culture' in general. Rather, the threat is to elitist, traditionalist German high '*Kultur*'. Although Nazis celebrated the *Kulturation*, an idealized permanent community of blood and language which transcended Germany's ever-changing borders, this did not mean they fully accepted its passive Romanticism and the elitist complacency of the *Kultur* of intellectuals. The point was more to create an organization, a movement which was capable of synthesizing *Kultur* and *Technik*, and re-uniting the German diaspora in a *Mitteleuropa Volksgemeinschaft*.

The ideological origins of this mix of spirit and technology can be traced to developments well before the first fascist movement was formed in 1919. However, it was only after the First World War that a clear fascist ideology emerges within a matrix of three broad themes; the 'new man'; the nature of the nation; and the quest for a new form of Third Way state. As fascism was a highly syncretic mix, it was possible to read notably different conclusions into this mercurial brew. Thus both Hitler and Mussolini were able to appeal to members

of the Establishment as representatives of a new political form of traditional values, while appealing to others as harbingers of both a new spiritual community and national prosperity. The ensuing Nazi regime has been seen as the antithesis of modernity, a *sui generis*, racial state stripped of any concept of betterment (Burleigh and Wippermann 1991). However, fascist ideology was underpinned by scientific knowledge, not least in the field of race, though it rejected a purely rational conception of science and materialist conception of progress central to liberalism and socialism.

The widespread failure to accept that there has been a serious fascist ideology in part reflects the dominance of liberal and socialist intellectuals in post-1945 life. However, it is also important to stress that the heyday of fascist thought lasted for only a generation. Moreover, during the era since 1945 fascism has been a pariah, when even its ideologues have often dared not speak its name. Fascism still awaits both its Plato and philosopher king.

NOTE

* I would like to thank Michael Freeden and James Eatwell for comments on an earlier draft.

1. *Fasci* means bundle, or union in a political context. Italian Fascists subsequently adopted as their symbol the *fascis*, the Roman axe-bound-in rods symbol of authority. In keeping with common Anglophone practice, capital 'F' is used in this chapter to denote the specifically Italian variation and the lower case to refer to 'generic' fascism.

REFERENCES

- Adamson, W. L. 1993. *Avant-Garde Florence: from Modernism to Fascism*. Boston: Harvard University Press.
- Bardèche, Maurice 1961. *Qu'est-ce que le fascisme?* Paris: Les Sept Couleurs.
- Barkai, A. 1990. *Nazi Economics. Ideology, Theory and Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bar-On, T. 2007. *Where Have all the Fascists Gone?* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Burleigh, M. and W. Wippermann. 1991. *The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Butz, A. R. 1977. *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*. Brighton: Historical Review Press (originally published 1976).
- Cento Bull, A. 2007. *Italian Neofascism. The Strategy of Tension and the Politics of Nonreconciliation*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Codreanu, Corneliu 1939. *La Garde de Fer (Pour les Légionnaires)*. Paris: Editions Prométhée (original Romanian edn 1936).
- De Grazia, V. 1993. *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- de Maistre, Joseph 1829. *Considérations sur la France*. Google facsimile edition of Paris: Rusand (originally published 1797).
- Eatwell, R. 1992. 'Towards a new model of generic fascism', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4: 161–94.

- Eatwell, R. 2009. 'The nature of generic fascism: the "fascist minimum" and the "fascist matrix"'. Pp. 134–61 in *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, ed. C. Iordachi. Abingdon: Routledge. (Original publication in German 2003).
- Eatwell, R. 2011. 'Ideology, propaganda, violence and the rise of fascism'. Pp. 165–85 in *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism*, ed. A. Costa Pinto. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Furlong, P. 2011. *Social and Political Thought of Julius Evola*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gentile, E. 1996. *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*. Boston: Harvard University Press.
- Gentile, Giovanni 1925. *Manifesto degli Intellettuali del Fascismo*, first published in *Il Popolo d'Italia*, 21 April; accessed at <<http://www.maai.it/livello2/fascismo-manifesto.htm#manifestofascista>>, on 24 March 2013.
- Gillette, A. 2002. *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gregor, A. J. 1979. *The Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gregor, A. J. 2000. *The Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gregor, A. J. 2005. *Mussolini's Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Griffin, R. 1991. *The Nature of Fascism*. London: Pinter.
- Griffin, R. (ed.) 1995. *Fascism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Griffin, R. 2007. *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Hayes, P. 1987. *Industry and Ideology: I. G. Farben in the Nazi Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hitler, A. 1977. *Mein Kampf*. London: Hutchinson. (Original publication in German, 1925–6.)
- Hutton, C. M. 2005. *Race and the Third Reich. Linguistics, Racial Anthropology and Genetics in the Dialectic of the Volk*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kallis, A. 2000. *Fascist Ideology. Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922–1945*. London: Routledge.
- Kallis, A. 2008. *Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Kershaw, I. 1998. *Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis*. London: Allen Lane.
- Lane, B. M. and L. J. Rupp, (eds.) 1978. *Nazi Ideology before 1933. A Documentation*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
- Laqueur, W. 1996. *Fascism. Past, Present and Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mosse, G. L. 1964. *The Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*. New York: Grosset and Dunlap.
- Mosse, G. L. 1975. *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Mosse, G. L. 1978. *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Mussolini, B. 1935. *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions*. Rome: Ardita.
- Popper, K. 1945. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. 2 vols. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Roberts, D. 2006. *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe. Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Rosenberg, Alfred 1934. *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag (originally published 1930).
- Sima, Horia 1977. 'La Fin de la "Garde de Fer"' (interview), *Défense de l'Occident*, 146.
- Stephenson, J. 2001. *Women in Nazi Germany*. London: Longman.
- Sternhell, Z. 1986. *Neither Right, nor Left. Fascist Ideology in France*. Berkeley: University of California

Press.

Sternhell, Z. with Sznajder, M. and Asheri, M. 1994. *The Birth of Fascist Ideology. From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sternhell, Z. 2010. *The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Talmon, J. 1952. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. London: Secker and Warburg.

Thomas, H. (ed.) 1972. *The Selected Writings of José Antonio Primo de Rivera*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Valois, G. 1919. *L'économie nouvelle*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale.

Valois, G. 1921. *D'un siècle à l'autre. Chronique d'une génération, 1885–1920*. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale.

Valois, G. 1924. *La révolution nationale*. Paris: Nouvelle Librarie Nationale.

Weindling, P. 1989. *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 27 POPULISM

CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER

INTRODUCTION

POPULISM is one of the most contested concepts in the social sciences. While no important concept is beyond debate, the discussion about populism concerns not just exactly what it is, but even whether it exists at all. A perfect example of the conceptual confusion in the field is the seminal edited volume *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969), in which different authors define populism, among others, as an ideology, a movement, and a syndrome. To make things even more complicated, scholars working on different world regions tend to equate, and sometimes conflate, populism with quite distinct phenomena. For instance, in the European context populism is often used to refer to anti-immigration and xenophobia, whereas in the Latin American debate populism is frequently employed to allude to clientelism and economic mismanagement.

Part of the confusion stems from the fact that populism is a label seldom claimed by people or organizations themselves. Instead, it is ascribed to others, most often as a distinctly negative label. Even the few rather consensual examples of populism, like the Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón or the murdered Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn did not self-identify as populists. While today some political leaders, movements, and parties that adhere to the populist ideology exist, there is no defining text or prototypical case. At the same time, the term populism is used in the media around the world, denoting such diverse phenomena as a cross-class movement, an irresponsible economic programme, or a folkloric style of politics. For example, the term ‘populism’ is applied in the British newspapers to wholly different actors and issues (Bale et al. 2011), implying that it is hard to find any logic in the set of features that are associated with the term.

Some argue that this conceptual confusion is too big for populism to be a meaningful concept in the social sciences; others consider it primarily a normative term, which should be confined to media and politics. While the frustration is understandable, the term populism is too central to debates about politics from Europe to the Americas to simply do away with. Although a

consensual definition will probably never be developed, this is quite common within academia. However, what is feasible is to create a definition that is able to capture accurately the core of all major past and present manifestations of populism, while still being precise enough to exclude clearly non-populist phenomena.

Even though populism is mostly associated with Europe and the Americas, it probably exists in one form or another throughout the world.¹ The literature tends to distinguish at least three ideal-types, which loosely relate to specific geographical areas and time periods: agrarian populism in Russia and the USA at the turn of the nineteenth century; socio-economic populism in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century; and xenophobic populism in Europe in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This distinction is very rough, as the different types of populism existed outside of those areas and periods. We will here provide a short overview of the main ideas and movements of these three ideal types, before defining populism as a ‘thin-centred-ideology’, describe its three core concepts, and analyse its relationship to other key concepts like democracy, gender, and nationalism.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Although some people argue that populism is the mirror image of democracy, and hence is as old as the democratic idea, conventional wisdom places the origins of populism at the end of the nineteenth century, with the almost simultaneous occurrence of the so-called *Narodniki* in Russia and the People’s Party in the United States. A second, distinct wave of populism developed in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century, mostly associated with the Argentine military officer and politician Juan Domingo Perón. Finally, in the past decades populism has been associated very strongly with radical right parties in Western Europe, such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the French National Front (FN).

Each wave is not only related to a specific geographical area or time period, but also to particular accompanying ideological features. In the first wave populism was combined with agrarianism, in the second with a specific socioeconomic project, and in the third with a xenophobic type of nationalism. It is important to emphasize that, while these connections are accurate, the different ‘subtypes’ of populism described in this section are ideal types, representing one part of the diverse picture of populism in the world.

Agrarian Populism

Most scholars date the emergence of populism to two very different movements, the Russian *Narodniki* and the US People's Party, which emerged independently at the end of the nineteenth century. The term *narodniki* is usually translated as 'populist', but more accurately translates as 'peopleist', as it comes from 'going to the people'. The Russian *Narodniki* were a relatively small group of urban middle class intellectuals, who believed that the peasantry were biologically and morally the most healthy people, and that society should be based on an agricultural economy of rural cooperatives of small farms. In the 1870s they moved to the countryside to educate the peasantry on their crucial role in the revolt. While the original *Narodniki* found little response among the impoverished Russian peasantry, they would inspire many of the East European agrarian populist movements of the first decades of the twentieth century as well as the Russian socialists.

By far the most studied populist movement is the US American People's Party, which emerged around the same time but was unconnected to the *Narodniki*. Rather than urban and intellectual, the People's Party emerged from a true mass movement in the American heartland. It was in many ways a rural response to industrialization, which fundamentally changed American economics, politics, and society. The American Populists also considered the peasantry as the authentic people, connected to the earth and living virtuously, and rightfully saw industrialization as threatening their values and economic power. They combined both progressive and reactionary ideas, and became a powerful regional and even national political force (Postel 2007). In the end, the main populist discourse and ideas were integrated into the Democratic Party and the populist movement and party disappeared in time.

Today agrarian populism is almost absent from Europe and the USA, which are largely postindustrial and have only a tiny, and highly modernized, agricultural sector left. In the first decades after the Second World War there were a couple of electoral outbursts of partly agrarian populist parties, such as the French *Poujadists*, the Dutch Farmers Party, and the Finnish Rural Party, while Eastern Europe saw some occasional successes, notably by the Hungarian Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP) and the Polish Self-Defense, in the first two decades of post-communism. In an increasingly globalized (post)industrial world, agrarian populism is a dying breed that merely inspires some rural social movements in the developing world.

Socioeconomic Populism

With the advent of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Latin America experienced a critical juncture by which excluded masses started to be included into the political arena. In several countries of the region this process of political incorporation was led by populist leaders, who were able to mobilize large numbers of people against the establishment (e.g. Vargas in Brazil, Ibañez del Campo in Chile, Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, etc.). In fact, it was exactly because they appealed to the notion of ‘the people’, rather than employing the Marxist concept of the working class, that populist actors were so successful in many places. On the one hand, they were able to mobilize diverse popular constituencies and develop multi-class movements and parties. On the other hand, these populist figures fostered a transformation of the state–civil society relation, particularly in terms of the incorporation of social groups that until then had been excluded from the political community.

Without a doubt, the most paradigmatic example is Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina. He began his political career in the military government of 1943–6, where he became the Minister of Labor. From this position Perón forged networks with the trade unions in general and with the poor in particular. In 1946 he won the presidential elections and once in power he introduced radical reforms. His government promoted not only a vast nationalization of the economy and established several social rights, but also extended the suffrage to women. The radical impetus of Perón’s government polarized Argentine society, however. In 1955 a military coup ousted him from power and he went into exile. Although Peronism was banned, it gave birth to a political cleavage that still shapes the party system in Argentina today (Ostiguy 2009).

While these diverse manifestations of Latin American populism differed in many aspects, it is also true that they shared a particular view on the role of the state in the economy. All of them had a preference for the so-called ‘import-substituting industrialization’ (ISI) model, which was based on the idea that Latin American countries should become more self-sufficient through the local production of industrialized goods. While this economic model was quite successful in the short run, in the long run it was not. As it fostered growing state expansion, and thus fiscal deficit, it paved the way for severe financial crises. That is why some scholars have argued that Latin American populism should be conceived of as an irresponsible and damaging economic policy approach (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991).

The 1990s were marked by the rise of a new kind of populist figure, who

followed a neoliberal economic approach. Presidents like Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990–02), Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990–2000) and Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989–99) employed a populist ideology and implemented reforms in favour of the free market, with the aim of controlling inflation and generating growth (Weyland 1996). In sharp contrast, contemporary populism in Latin America criticizes neoliberalism and favours a greater state involvement in the economy. This is why populist presidents like Evo Morales in Bolivia (since 2006) and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998–2013) claim to be ‘socialist’ leaders. However, as this short review of different manifestations of Latin American populism reveals, the latter can take very different economic approaches, and in consequence, it makes little sense to define populism on the basis of a specific set of economic and/or social policies.

Xenophobic Populism

Western Europe does not have a long tradition of mass populism. Most states democratized as a consequence of carefully guided elite processes and even the mass parties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had strong elitist and paternalistic tendencies. Only in the 1980s did populist radical right parties start to establish themselves, largely as a consequence of a variety of social transformations, not least of mass immigration (e.g. Von Beyme 1988; Betz 1994). While parties like the French National Front (FN) gained significant electoral results in the mid-1980s, it would take until the 1990s, and particularly the first decade of the twenty-first century, for populist radical right parties to enter governments; most notably the Italian Northern League (LN) in 1994 and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 2000.

The rise of populist radical right parties is closely related to the growing importance of post-materialistic values in European societies (Inglehart 1977). While the ‘silent revolution’ of the late 1970s created the Green parties, the ‘silent counter-revolution’ of the 1980s gave way to the populist radical right parties (Ignazi 1992). In many ways, these two party families are mirror images, giving way to a new political divide: while the latter are in favour of libertarianism and multiculturalism, the former hold authoritarian and nationalist views (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Betz and Johnson 2004). However, neither party family relies on socioeconomic issues and materialistic values as the traditional party families do (most notably the liberals and social democrats); rather, they prioritize sociocultural issues and post-materialist identity values.

Populist radical right parties share a core ideology of nativism,

authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007). Their core ideological features are related to political issues such as immigration, crime, and corruption, respectively. They rail against ‘the establishment’—which not only includes all major political parties, but also cultural, economic, and media elites—arguing that they deceive the people by false electoral competition and by putting their (or immigrants’) interests above the general will of the (native) people. Initially nativism and authoritarianism were much more prominent in the propaganda of older parties like the FN and Belgian Flemish Block (now Flemish Interest, VB), which still had some elitist tendencies, but increasingly even those parties presented themselves as ‘the voice of the people’, sporting slogans like ‘we say what you think’.

Populist radical right parties do show a certain flexibility when it comes to defining the enemies of the people (Mudde 2007: ch. 3). Exemplary in this regard is the current emphasis on Muslims as the demonized out-group, a development closely related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States. In fact, before 9/11 populist radical right parties were primarily focused on non-European immigrants as a whole (i.e. ethnationally defined) rather than on Muslims (ethnoreligiously defined). By attacking Muslims, these parties nowadays try to portray themselves as defenders of liberal values, claiming that it is time to put limits to ‘the tolerance of the intolerant’ (Mudde 2010). Also, many of the older parties were passionate defenders of the European Community (EC), while many are fervent sceptics of the European Union (EU) today.

POPULISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

In the past decade a growing group of social scientists has defined populism predominantly by making use of an ‘ideational approach’, conceiving it as discourse, ideology, or world-view. While we are far from even nearing a consensus, ideological definitions of populism have been successfully used in studies across the globe, most notably in Western Europe, but increasingly also in Eastern Europe and the Americas (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012 and 2013). Most scholars who adhere to an ‘ideational approach’ share the core concepts of our definition, if not necessarily the peripheral concepts or the exact language.

Definitio ex Positivo

Beyond the lack of scholarly agreement on the defining attributes of populism,

there is little doubt that '[a]ll forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation and appeal to "the people," and all are in one sense or another anti-elitist' (Canovan 1981: 294). Accordingly, it is not too contentious to maintain that populism always involves a critique of the establishment and the adulation of the common people. Hence, we define populism 'as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people' (Mudde 2004: 543).

By conceiving populism as a 'thin-centred ideology', we follow Michael Freeden's (1996) approach, which is helpful for understanding the often alleged malleability of the concept in question. In fact, populism always severs itself from wider ideational contexts, and in consequence, it can by itself offer neither complex nor comprehensive answers to the political questions that societies generate. Unlike 'thick-centred' or 'full' ideologies (e.g. fascism, liberalism, socialism, etc.), populism has a restricted morphology, which necessarily appears attached to—and sometimes is even assimilated into—existing ideological families.

This means that populism can take very different shapes, which are contingent on the ways in which the core concepts of populism—the people, the elite, and the general will—appear to be related to other concepts, forming interpretative paths that might be more or less appealing for different societies. Seen in this light, populism must be understood as a kind of mental map through which individuals analyse and comprehend political reality. Nevertheless, populism should not be conceived of as a coherent ideological tradition, but rather as a set of ideas that in the real world appears in combination with quite different, and sometimes contradictory, concepts. As Ben Stanley (2008: 100) has noted, 'there is no Populist International; no canon of key populist texts or calendars of significant moments; and the icons of populism are of local rather than universal appeal'.

The very thinness of the populist ideology is one of the reasons why some scholars have suggested that populism should be conceived of as a transitory phenomenon: it either fails or, if successful, transcends itself (Weyland 2001: 14). We take a different view, however, and argue that the main fluidity lies in the fact that populism inevitably employs concepts coming from other ideologies, which are not only more complex and stable, but also enable the formation of 'subtypes' of populism. In other words, although populism as such can be relevant in specific moments, a number of concepts adjacent to the

morphology of the populist ideology are in the long run much more important for the endurance of populism. Hence, the latter seldom exists in pure form. It rather appears in combination with, and manages to survive thanks to, other concepts.

Definitio ex Negativo

One of the main critiques of discursive and ideological definitions of populism is that they are too broad and could potentially apply to all political actors, movements, and parties. This critique is particularly valid for the conceptual approach developed by Ernesto Laclau (2005). As Giovanni Sartori (1970) has argued, concepts are only useful for academic research if they not only include what is to be defined, but also *exclude* everything else. In other words, our definition of populism only makes sense if there is a non-populism. There are at least two direct opposites of populism, as defined here: elitism and pluralism.

Elitism shares populism's basic monist and Manichean distinction of society being ultimately divided between two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, but holds an opposite view on the virtues of the groups. Simply stated, elitists believe that the people are dangerous, dishonest, and vulgar, and that the elite are superior not only in moral, but also in cultural and intellectual terms (Bachrach 1967). Hence, elitists want politics to be exclusively or predominantly an elite affair, in which the people do not have a say; they either reject democracy altogether (e.g. Adolf Hitler or Augusto Pinochet) or support a limited and strictly representative democracy (e.g. José Ortega y Gasset or Joseph Schumpeter).

Pluralism is the direct opposite of the monist perspective of both populism and elitism, holding instead that society is divided into a broad variety of partly overlapping social groups with different ideas and interests. Within pluralism diversity is seen as a strength rather than a weakness. For pluralists a society should have many centres of power and politics should reflect the interests and values of as many different groups as possible through compromise and consensus. Thus, the main idea is that power is supposed to be distributed throughout society in order to avoid the possibility that specific groups—be they men, ethnic communities, economic, intellectual, military, or political cadres, etc.—might have the capacity to impose their will (Dahl 1982).

Although not directly an opposite of populism, it is important to establish its fundamental difference from clientelism, as these terms are often conflated in the

literature (particularly on Latin American politics). As Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (2007: 7–8) have pointed out, clientelism must be understood as a particular mode of ‘exchange’ between electoral constituencies and politicians, in which voters obtain some goods (e.g. direct payments or privileged access to employment, goods and services) for their support to a patron or party. Without a doubt, many Latin American populist leaders have employed clientelist linkages to win elections and remain in power. However, they are not the only ones doing this, and there is no reason to think that populism has an elective affinity to clientelism. While the former is first and foremost an ideology, which can be shared by different political actors and constituencies, the latter is essentially a strategy, used by leaders and parties to win and exercise political power.

The only probable similarity between clientelism and populism is that both are orthogonal to the left–right distinction. Neither the employment of clientelistic party-voter linkages, nor the adherence to left or right politics is something that defines populism. Depending on the socioeconomic and sociopolitical context in which populism emerges, it can take different organizational forms and support diverse political projects (Roberts 2006). This means that the thin-centred nature of populism allows it to be malleable enough to adopt distinctive shapes at different times and places. By way of illustration, in the last two decades Latin American populism has appeared mostly in a neoliberal guise in the 1990s (e.g. Fujimori in Peru) and in a mainly radical left-wing variant since the 2000s (e.g. Correa in Ecuador).

Core Concepts

As Michael Freeden has convincingly argued, every ideology has both core and peripheral concepts. While core concepts refer to the basic unit without which ideologies cannot exist, peripheral concepts are also important, though not so much for the actual political usage of ideologies, but rather for their adaptation to specific contexts, enabling them to attract the interest of large political groups (Freeden 1996: 77–80). Elaborating on this framework, Terrence Ball (1999: 391) has postulated: ‘A *core* concept is one that is both central to, and constitutive of, a particular ideological community to which it gives inspiration and identity’. Populism has three core concepts: the people, the elite, and the general will.

The People

Much of the scholarly debate around the concept and phenomenon of populism centres on the vagueness of the term 'the people'. Virtually all authors agree that 'the people' is a construction, at best referring to a specific interpretation (and simplification) of reality. Consequently, various scholars have maintained that this vagueness renders the concept useless, while others have looked for more specific alternatives; Paul Taggart (2000) famously prefers 'the heartland'. However, Laclau (2005) has forcefully argued that it is exactly the fact that 'the people' is an 'empty signifier' that makes populism such a powerful political ideology and phenomenon.

While 'the people' is undoubtedly a construction that allows for much flexibility, it is most often used in one (or a combination) of the following three meanings: the people as sovereign, the common people, and peoples as nations. In all cases the main distinction between the people and the elite is related to a secondary feature: authenticity, socioeconomic status, and nationality, respectively. All three discourses loosely relate to the three ideal types of populism described above: agrarian populism, socioeconomic populism, and xenophobic populism. Nevertheless, given that most manifestations of populism combine these secondary features, it is more than difficult to find cases in which only one of the mentioned meanings of the people comes to the fore.

The notion of the people as sovereign is based on the modern democratic idea that defines 'the people' not only as the ultimate source of political power, but also as 'the rulers'. This notion is closely linked to the American and French revolutions, which, in the famous words of American president Abraham Lincoln, established 'a government of the people, by the people, and for the people'. However, the formation of a democratic regime does not imply that the gap between governed and governors disappears completely. Under certain circumstances, the sovereign people can feel that they are not being (well) represented by the elites in power, and accordingly the former will criticize—or even rebel against—the latter.

As Margaret Canovan (2005: 29) has pointed out, '[t]he coexistence of popular government with the authority of the sovereign people in reserve was to set the stage for populism in the sense of movements "to give government back to the people"'. In other words, the notion of 'the people as sovereign' is a usual topic within different populist traditions, recalling that in democracies the ultimate source of political power derives from a collective body which, if not taken into account, may lead to mobilization and revolt. Indeed, that was one of the driving forces behind the US People's Party of the end of the nineteenth century, as well as other populist manifestations in the USA during the twentieth

century and today.

A second meaning is the idea of ‘the common people’, implying explicitly or implicitly a broader class concept that combines socioeconomic status with specific cultural traditions and popular values. Therefore, speaking of ‘the common people’ refers to a critique of the dominant culture, which views the judgements, tastes, and values of ordinary citizens with suspicion. In contrast to this elitist view, the notion of ‘the common people’ vindicates the dignity and knowledge of groups who objectively or subjectively are being excluded from power due to their socioeconomic status. This is the reason why populist leaders and movements usually adopt cultural elements which are considered markers of inferiority by the dominant culture (Panizza 2005: 26). For example, Perón promulgated new conceptions and representations of the political community in Argentina, which glorified the role of previously marginalized groups in general, and of the so-called ‘*descamisados*’ (the shirtless) and ‘*cabecitas negras*’ (black heads) in particular.

To address the interests and ideas of ‘the common people’ is indeed one of the most frequent appeals that we can detect in different experiences that are usually labelled as populist in the scholarly debate. It is worth noting that this meaning of the people tends to be both integrative and divisive: not only does it attempt to unite an angry and silent majority, but it also tries to mobilize this majority against a defined enemy (e.g. ‘the establishment’). This anti-elitist impetus has an elective affinity with the critique of institutions such as political parties, big organizations, and bureaucracies, which are accused of distorting the generation of ‘truthful’ links between populist leaders and ‘the common people’.

The third and final meaning is the notion of ‘peoples as nations’. In this case, the term ‘the people’ is used to refer to a whole national community; for example, when we speak about ‘the Dutch people’ or ‘the people of Brazil’. This implies that all those native to a particular country are included, and that together they form a community with a common life (Canovan 1984: 315). Accordingly, there are various communities of ‘peoples’ representing specific and unique nations that are normally reinforced by foundational myths. Nevertheless, the definition of the boundaries of the nation is everything but simple. To equate ‘peoples’ with the populations of existing states has proven to be a complicated task, because different ethnic groups often exist on the same territory. Defining the nation raises important issues, particularly concerning the internal and external boundaries of who ‘the people’ are (Näsström 2011).

In that sense, it is worth noting that nativism is *one* way amongst others of conceiving the nation. Nativism is a defining attribute of contemporary populist

radical right parties in Europe, and alludes to the idea that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state (Mudde 2007: 18—20). Hence, the xenophobic nature of current European populism derives from a very specific conception of the nation, which relies on an ethnic and chauvinistic definition of the people. This means that populism and nativism are nowadays experiencing a kind of marriage of convenience in Europe.

The Elite

Unlike 'the people', few authors have theorized about the meanings of 'the elite' in populism. Obviously, the main distinction is moral, as the distinction is between the *pure* people and the *corrupt* elite. But this does not say much about *who* the elite are. Most populists not only detest the political establishment, but will also critique the economic elite, the cultural elite, and the media elite. All of these are portrayed as being one homogeneous corrupt group that works against the 'general will' of the people. While the distinction is essentially moral, the elite are identified on the basis of a broad variety of criteria.

First, and foremost, the elite are defined on the basis of power, that is, they include most people that hold leading positions in politics, the economy, the media, and the arts. However, this obviously excludes populists themselves, as well as those leaders within these sectors that are sympathetic to the populists. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party would regularly critique 'the media' for defending 'the elite' and not treating the FPÖ fairly, but with one notable exception: *Die Kronenzeitung* (Art 2006). This popular tabloid, read by almost one in five Austrians, was for a long time one of the staunchest supporters of the party and its late leader, Jörg Haider, and was therefore considered a true voice of the people.

Because of the essentialist anti-establishment position of populism, many scholars have argued that populists cannot, by definition, sustain in power. After all, this would make them (part of) 'the elite'. But this ignores both the essence of the distinction between the people and the elite, which is moral and not situational, and the resourcefulness of populist leaders. From former Slovak premier Vladimir Mečiar in Slovakia to Hugo Chávez in Venezuela populists-in-power have been able to sustain their anti-establishment rhetoric by partly redefining the elite. Essential to their argument would be that the real power did not lie with the democratically elected leaders, that is, the populists, but with

some shadowy forces that continued to hold on to illegitimate powers to undermine the voice of the people, that is, the populists. It is here that 'the paranoid style of politics', as famed American historian Richard Hofstadter (1964) described populism, most clearly comes to the fore. Not unrelated to the definitions of the people, described above, the elite would be defined in economic (class) and national (authentic) terms.

While populists defend a post-class world, often arguing that class divisions are artificially created to undermine 'the people' and keep 'the elite' in power, they do at times define the elite in economic terms. This is mostly the case with left-wing populists, who try to merge some vague form of socialism and populism. However, even right-wing populists relate the ultimate struggle between the people and the elite to economic power, arguing that the political elite are in cahoots with the economic elite, and putting 'special interest' above the 'general interests' of the people. This critique is not necessarily anti-capitalist either; for example, many Tea Party activists in the United States are staunch defenders of the free market, but believe that big business, through its political cronies in Congress, corrupts the free market through protective legislation, which stifles small businesses (the true engines of capitalism) and kills competition (Formisano 2012).

Linking the elite to economic power is particularly useful for populists-in-power, as it allows them to 'explain' their lack of political success; that is, they are sabotaged by 'the elite', who might have lost political power, but continue to hold economic power. This argument was often heard in post-communist Eastern Europe, particularly during the transitional 1990s, and is still popular among contemporary left-wing populist presidents in Latin America. For instance, President Chávez often blamed the economic elite for frustrating his efforts at 'democratizing' Venezuela; incidentally, not completely without reason.

Populists also often argue that the elite do not just ignore the interests of the people, but they are even working against the interests of the country. Within the European Union (EU) many populist parties will accuse the political elite of putting the interests of the EU over those of the country. Similarly, Latin American populists have for decades charged that the political elites put the interests of the United States above those of their own countries. And, combining populism and anti-semitism, some populists believe the national political elites are part of the age-old anti-semitic conspiracy, accusing them of being 'agents of Zionism' (i.e. Israel or the larger Jewish community).

Finally, populism can be merged completely with nationalism when the distinction between the people and the elite is both moral and ethnic. Here the

elite are not just seen as *agents* of an alien power, they are considered alien themselves. Oddly enough, this rhetoric is not so much prevalent among the xenophobic populists in Europe, given that the elite (in whatever sector) is almost exclusively 'native'. Leaving aside the anti-semitic rhetoric in Eastern Europe, ethnic populism is also strong in contemporary Latin America. As Raúl Madrid (2008) has convincingly shown, a populist leader like Evo Morales has made a distinction between the pure 'mestizo' people and the corrupt and 'European' elites, playing directly on the racialized power balance in the case of Bolivia.

While the key distinction in populism is moral, populist actors will use a variety of secondary criteria to distinguish between the people and the elite. This provides them flexibility that is particularly important when populists obtain political power. While it would make sense that the definition of the elite be based upon the same criteria as that of the people, this is not always the case. For example, xenophobic populists in Europe often define the people in ethnic terms, excluding 'aliens' (i.e. immigrants and minorities), but do not argue that the elite are part of another ethnic group. They do argue, however, that the elite favour *the interests* of the immigrants over those of the native people. In many cases two, or all three, interpretations of the elite are mixed in one populist discourse. For example, contemporary American right-wing populists like Sarah Palin and the Tea Party will describe the elite as latte drinking and Volvo driving East Coast liberals; contrasting this, implicitly, to the real/common/native people who drink regular coffee, drive American cars, and live in Middle America (the heartland).

General Will

The third and last core concept of the populist ideology is the notion of the general will. By making use of this notion, populist actors and constituencies allude to a particular conception of the political, which is closely linked to the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As is well-known, Rousseau elaborated a distinction between the general will (*volonté générale*) and the will of all (*volonté de tous*). While the former refers to the capacity of the people to join together into a community and legislate to enforce their common interest, the latter denotes the simple sum of particular interests at a particular moment in time. Interestingly, populism's monist and Manichean distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite reinforces the idea that a general will exists.

Seen in this light, the task of politicians is quite straightforward: they should just be 'enlightened enough to see what the general will is, and charismatic

enough to form individual citizens into a cohesive community that can be counted on to will it' (Canovan 2005: 115). A prime example of this populist understanding of the general will is the following statement by Hugo Chávez in his 2007 inaugural address:

Nothing ... is in greater agreement with the popular doctrine than to consult with the nation as a whole regarding the chief points on which are founded governments, basic laws, and the supreme rule. All individuals are subject to error and seduction, but not the people, which possesses to an eminent degree a consciousness of its own good and the measure of its independence. Because of this its judgment is pure, its will is strong, and none can corrupt or even threaten it' (quoted in Hawkins 2010: 60).

In addition, by employing the notion of the general will, the populist ideology shares the Rousseauian critique of representative government. The latter is seen as an aristocratic form of power, in which citizens are treated as passive entities, mobilized periodically by elections, in which they do no more than select their representatives (Manin 1997). In contrast, populism appeals to Rousseau's republican utopia of self-government, that is the very idea that citizens are able both to make the laws and execute them. Not surprisingly, beyond the differences across time and space, populist actors usually support the implementation of direct democratic mechanisms, such as referenda and plebiscites. By way of illustration, from former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori to current president Rafael Correa in Ecuador, contemporary populism in Latin America is prone to enact constitutional reforms via referendums.

Hence, it can be argued that there is an elective affinity between populism and direct democracy, as well as other mechanisms that are helpful to cultivate a direct relationship between the populist leader and his/her constituencies. Put in another way, one of the practical *consequences* of the populist ideology is the promotion of strategies that are useful for enabling the putative will of the people. In fact, the adherents of populism criticize the establishment for their incapacity and/or disinterest in taking that will into account. And this critique is frequently not without reason. For instance, populist radical right parties in Europe condemn the elitist nature of the project of the European Union, while contemporary radical left-wing populism in Latin America is characterized by the development of new policies aiming at dealing with the 'real' problems of the people.

Rather than a rational process constructed via the public sphere, the notion of the general will employed by populist actors and constituencies is based on the notion of 'common sense'. This means that the general will is framed in a particular way, which is useful for both aggregating different demands and

identifying a common enemy. In the language of Laclau (2005), by appealing to the general will of the people, the populist discourse has the capacity to enact a specific logic of articulation; one that paves the way for the formation of a popular subject with a strong identity, who is able to challenge the status quo. From this angle, populism can be seen as a democratizing force, since it defends the principle of popular sovereignty with the aim of giving voice to groups that do not feel represented by the political establishment. This is exactly what Canovan (1999) has called the capacity of populism to enact the redemptive side of democracy.

However, populism also has a dark side. Whatever its manifestation, its notion of the general will may well lead to the support of authoritarian tendencies. In fact, populist actors and constituencies often share a conception of the political that is quite close to the one developed by Carl Schmitt (1932). According to Schmitt, the existence of a homogeneous people is essential for the foundation of a democratic order. In this sense, the general will is based on the unity of the people and on a clear demarcation of those who do not belong to the demos, and, consequently, cannot be treated as equals. In short, because the populist ideology implies that the general will is not only transparent but also absolute, it can morph easily into authoritarianism by legitimizing attacks on anyone who doubts the homogeneity of the people (Abts and Rummens 2007: 408–9).

Populism and...

While populism is related to many other concepts and ideologies, in practice and theory, we focus on three particulars here: democracy, nationalism, and gender. Most of the debate on populism is about its relationship with democracy, which is more complex than most scholars posit. Similarly, the relationship between populism and nationalism is regularly discussed in the academic debate, though often in fairly general and normative terms. Finally, the relationship of populism and gender has received only little explicit academic attention, despite the fact that much scholarship describes populism in particularly masculine terms.

Democracy

Populism and democracy maintain a complex relationship. Not by coincidence, many argue that populism represents one of the major challenges to contemporary democracy, while others believe that populism is first and

foremost a democratizing force. In reality, populism can be both a threat and corrective to democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). On the one hand, the democratic side of populism relies on its capacity to give voice to groups that, objectively or subjectively, are being excluded from the collective decision-making process. On the other hand, the undemocratic side of populism derives from its monist nature, which can lead to the undermining of minority rights and protections. In other words, whether populism has a positive or negative impact on democracy is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical, question.

To understand the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy, it is important to mention that populism is essentially democratic, but is at odds with the *liberal* democratic model (Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). The latter is a complicated type of government, which combines the principles of popular sovereignty and majority rule, essential to populism, with ‘checks and balances’ and minority rights, antithetical to populism. Populist actors and constituencies believe that nothing should constrain ‘the will of the (pure) people’, so they usually oppose unelected bodies, judicial institutions, and rules aimed at fostering the separation of powers. Accordingly, populism exploits the tensions that are inherent to the liberal democratic model, which tries to find a harmonic balance between popular will and constitutionalism (e.g. Mény and Surel 2002). Hence, populism can be seen as a form of democratic extremism, in the sense that it portrays ‘the pure people’ as the constituent subject par excellence, that is, the only one to have the right to (re)found and adapt the higher legal norms and procedural rules that regulate the exercise of power (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 195).

Finally, populism also maintains a complicated relationship with the process of democratization. By defending the will of the people, populist actors can foster the liberalization of autocratic regimes and even the transition to a democratic form of government (e.g. Lech Walesa in Poland or Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in Mexico). However, populist actors usually have problems with any limitations on majority rule, and in consequence, they will rally against the establishment of liberal democratic institutions. In other words, populism can play a positive role in the promotion of an electoral or minimal democracy, but it tends to play a negative role when it comes to fostering the development of a fully fledged liberal democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2010).

Nationalism

It is not surprising that populism is often linked to nationalism in the literature. As we saw before, at least one of the three ideal types, xenophobic populism, has

clear nationalist overtones, while one of the interpretations of ‘the people’ comes eerily close to that of ‘the nation’. This has led many scholars to argue that populism is *by definition* nationalist (e.g. Taguieff 1995). However, even if populism were always to be combined with nationalism in practice, which we incidentally do not believe to be the case, that is not the same as saying that nationalism is a definitional feature of populism.

As far as agrarian populism is concerned, nationalism played at best a marginal role in movements like the Russian *Narodniki* and US People’s Party. While there might have been ethnic aspects to the definition of the people, such as thinly concealed anti-semitism, the essence of the people was their status as ‘men of the soil’, not of ‘the nation’. While Latin American populism is traditionally mainly perceived through a socioeconomic lens, many observers have pointed to the role of ‘nationalism’ particularly in left-wing populism in the region (e.g. Germani 1978; de la Torre 2010). However, inasmuch as nationalism played a role in the ideology of populists like Perón and Chávez, it is a kind of pan-national or better regional *Americanismo*, which supports a common Latin American uprising against perceived US colonialism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011: 19, 2013: 16).

The most convincing interconnection between nationalism and populism can be found in the European populist radical right parties, which share a core ideology of authoritarianism, nativism, and populism (Mudde 2007). Still, even in this case, nativism and populism are two distinct features that do not fully overlap. Most notably, while ‘the people’ are defined both in populist (moral) and nativist (ethnic) terms, ‘the elite’ are not. Most contemporary populist radical right parties do not claim that the ‘native’ people are ruled by an ‘alien’ elite, as did many of the historic nationalists of the nineteenth century (Hroch 1985). At best, they argue that a ‘native’ elite put the interests of an ‘alien’ people (e.g. immigrants) above those of the ‘native’ people. But the prime distinction is both ethnic *and* moral!

Gender

So far the relationship between populism and gender has received little academic attention. When we think of populism, we think first and foremost of male leaders like Perón or Chávez, exhuming strong and traditional male role models and not shying away from machismo (Kampwirth 2010). But not all major populist leaders are or have been male; among the more famous female populists are Argentine former first lady Evita Perón, Australian former One Nation leader Pauline Hanson, and American firebrand Sarah Palin. While these women in

many ways played on fairly traditional female roles, they at least show that populism is not exclusively a masculine affair.

As an ideology, populism itself is gender-neutral; as with all other distinctions within society, gender is secondary to the primary struggle between the people and the elite. However, in practice populism espouses certain gender positions, in part as a result of the auxiliary ideology and national culture of the populist actors. For example, we see that male populist leaders in countries with a strong machismo culture, like Latin America and South Europe, use a more openly machismo discourse. This is probably nowhere as strong as in Italy, where both radical right populists like Northern League leader Umberto Bossi and neoliberal populists like former Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi are infamous for their macho behaviour and sexist remarks. At the same time, populists of whatever political persuasion in more emancipated Northern Europe tend to shy away from open sexism and generally employ a gender-neutral discourse.

Although cross-regional data are not available, there is ample evidence that populists are predominantly supported by men. This is most striking in the case of the xenophobic populist parties in Europe, which have most of a two-third male electorate. Similar structural data are not easily available for populists in other regions. At first sight Latin America seems to have a less clear pattern; for example, while the gender gap in Chávez' 1998 electorate was 20 per cent (Smilde 2004), in Morales' 2005 electorate it was only 8 per cent (Seligson et al. 2006). There is reason to suggest that the gender gap is not so much caused by the populism of these parties and politicians, but rather by their outsider status. Outsiders score in general lower among women, irrespective of their ideology; often the gender gap narrows once the populists become more mainstream.

CONCLUSION

Adopting an 'ideational approach', we have defined populism as a thin-centred ideology, which has come to the fore not only at different historical moments and parts of the world, but also in very different shapes or 'subtypes'. While populism has also been conceptualized in other ways, such as a multi-class movement (Germani 1978) or a political strategy (Weyland 2001), the 'ideational approach' has several advantages over alternatives when it comes to conceptualizing populism.

First of all, by conceiving of populism as a thin-centred ideology, it is possible to understand why populism is so malleable in the real world. Due to its

restricted morphology, populism necessarily appears attached to other concepts or ideological families, which normally are much more relevant than populism on its own. Not surprisingly, populism can be enacted from above (e.g. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela) as well as from below (e.g. Evo Morales in Bolivia). At the same time, it can emerge in well-organized political parties (e.g. the Swiss People's Party) as well as give rise to highly personalized parties (e.g. the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands). Hence, charismatic leadership should not be seen as a defining attribute of populism, but rather as a *facilitator* of the latter. Similarly, the alleged absence of intermediation between the populist leader and the masses is not inherent to populism, but rather a practical *consequence* of it.

Second, the very definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology implies that to explain its emergence, development, and failure both the demand-side and the supply-side of populist politics must be taken into account. This is not a trivial issue, because many scholars of populism tend to develop analyses centred on particular leaders, giving the impression that populism can be explained by a kind of modern version of Carlyle's great man theory. In short, populism should be considered less as a political strategy that is implemented by 'malicious' actors, and more as a Manichean world-view that could be raised by different political leaders *and* is shared by diverse constituencies. This means that it is flawed to assume that the people support populism because they are 'foolish' or 'seduced' by charismatic leaders.

Moreover, by taking into account both the supply- and demand-side of populist politics, it is possible to understand why it has not emerged all over the world. It might be the case that in specific moments in time many people do adhere to populism, but in most cases the main political actors do not sympathize with populism and no political entrepreneurs have been able to exploit it successfully. The interplay between the demand-side and supply-side is an important factor when it comes to explaining not only the emergence, but also the absence of populism. In fact, the study of negative cases of populism is still in its infancy. We simply do not know very well which factors hinder the rise of populism, and there seems to be no 'general law' for explaining its emergence. Economic crises or growing political distrust must be seen as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the rise of populism.

Third and final, by defining populism as a thin-centred ideology a particularly interesting research agenda comes to the fore, namely the study of the diffusion of populism. In other words, in what way, and under which circumstances, can populism spread from one society to another? On the one hand, and considering the demand-side, it is possible to think about a sort of

‘demonstration effect’, that is, people in one country are aware of the political developments in neighbouring countries, and in consequence, the emergence and employment of populist ideology in one place can spread to another. On the other hand, and reflecting the supply-side, organic intellectuals and political entrepreneurs can be very influential in terms of fostering a learning process, whereby the populist ideology gains a presence in political parties and/or social movements.

In conclusion, although there is little doubt that populism is a contemporary phenomenon that affects the day-to-day functioning of democracy worldwide, there is no scholarly agreement on how to conceptualize it. We have presented here a minimal definition of populism, which conceives of the latter as a particular thin-centred ideology that can be shared by different political actors and constituencies. Given the very thinness of populist ideology, it usually appears attached to other concepts, which normally play a key role in the rise and durability of populism.

NOTE

1. For reasons of significance and space, we will focus predominantly on past and present manifestations of populism in Eastern and Western Europe as well as North and South America. There are, however, also cases of populism in other parts of the world, such as Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran, and Jacob Zuma in South Africa.

REFERENCES

- Abts, K. and S. Rummens. 2007. ‘Populism versus democracy’, *Political Studies*, 55 (2): 405–24.
- Art, D. 2006. *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bachrach, P. 1967. *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.
- Bale, T., S. van Kessel, and P. Taggart. 2011. ‘Thrown around with abandon? Popular understandings of populism as conveyed by the print media: A UK case study’, *Acta Politica*, 46 (2): 111–31.
- Ball, T. 1999. ‘From “core” to “sore” concepts: Ideological innovation and conceptual change’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 4: 391–6.
- Betz, H.-G. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Betz, H.-G. and Johnson, C. 2004. ‘Against the current—stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9 (3): 311–27.
- Canovan, M. 1981. *Populism*. London: Junction Books.
- Canovan, M. 1984. ‘People, politicians and populism’, *Government and Opposition*, 19 (3): 312–27.
- Canovan, M. 1999. ‘Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy’, *Political Studies*, 47 (1): 2–16.
- Canovan, M. 2005. *The People*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Dahl, R. 1982. *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- de la Torre, C. 2010. *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, 2nd edn. Athens: Ohio University Press.

- Dornbusch, R. and S. Edwards. (eds.) 1991. *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Formisano, R. 2012. *The Tea Party*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Freeden, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon. Germani, G. 1978. *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Hawkins, K. 2010. *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hofstadter, R. 1964. 'The paranoid style in American politics', *Harper's Magazine*, November: 77–86.
- Hroch, M. 1985. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ignazi, P. 1992. 'The silent counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 22 (1–2): 3–34.
- Inglehart, R. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ionescu, G. and E. Gellner. (eds.) 1969. *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Kampwirth, K. 2010. 'Introduction'. Pp. 1–24 in *Gender and Populism in Latin America. Passionate Politics*, ed. K. Kampwirth. University Park: Pennsylvania State University.
- Kitschelt, H. and A. McGann 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kitschelt, H. and S. Wilkinson. 2007. 'Citizen-politician linkages: An introduction'. Pp. 1–49 in *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, eds. H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Laclau, E. 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Madrid, R. 2008. 'The rise of ethnopopulism in Latin America', *World Politics*, 60 (3): 475–508.
- Manin, B. 1997. *The Principles of Representative Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mény, Y. and Y. Surel. 2002. 'The constitutive ambiguity of populism'. Pp. 1–21 in *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, eds. Y. Mény and Y. Surel. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Mudde, C. 2004. 'The populist *Zeitgeist*', *Government & Opposition*, 39 (3): 541–63.
- Mudde, C. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C. 2010. 'The intolerance of the tolerant', *Open Democracy*, 20 October, <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/cas-mudde/intolerance-of-tolerant>>, last accessed 6 March 2013.
- Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2010. 'Populism and democratization: From friend to foe?', paper presented at the workshop 'Comparing transitions across regions', Oxford, UK, 6 November.
- Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.) 2012. *Populism in Europe and the Americas. Threat or Corrective to Democracy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Näsström, S. 2011. 'The challenge of the all-affected principle', *Political Studies*, 59 (1): 116–34.
- Ostiguy, P. 2009. 'The high-low political divide. Rethinking populism and anti-populism', CIDE, Mexico City: *Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series*, 35.
- Panizza, F. 2005. 'Introduction: Populism and the mirror of democracy'. Pp. 1–31 in *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, ed. F. Panizza. London: Verso.
- Postel, C. 2007. *The Populist Vision*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roberts, K. 2006. 'Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, 38 (2): 127–48.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. 2012. 'The ambivalence of populism: Threat and corrective for democracy', *Democratization*, 19: 184–208.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. 2013. 'The Responses of Populism to Dahl's Democratic Dilemmas', *Political*

Studies. Doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12038

- Sartori, G. 1970. 'Concept misformation in comparative politics', *American Political Science Review*, 64 (4): 1033–53.
- Schmitt, C. 1932. *Der Begriff des Politischen*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Seligson, M. et al. 2006. *Democracy Audit: Bolivia 2006 Report*. Nashville, TN: LAPOP.
- Smilde, D. 2004. 'Contradiction without paradox: Evangelical political culture in the 1998 Venezuelan elections', *Latin American Politics & Society*, 46 (1): 75–102.
- Stanley, B. 2008. 'The thin ideology of populism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13: 95–110.
- Taggart, P. 2000. *Populism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Taguieff, P. A. 1995. 'Political science confronts populism: From a conceptual mirage to a real problem', *Telos*, 103: 9–43.
- Von Beyme, K. 1988. 'Right-wing extremism in post-war Europe', *West European Politics*, 11 (2): 1–18.
- Weyland, K. 1996. 'Neopopulism and neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected affinities', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 31 (3): 3–31.
- Weyland, K. 2001. 'Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics', *Comparative Politics*, 34 (1): 1–22.

CHAPTER 28 REPUBLICANISM

CÉCILE LABORDE

THE republican tradition occupies a signal place in the Euro-Atlantic political heritage. Centred round ideals of political liberty, self-government, citizenship, equality, and virtue, it migrated from its ancient Athenian and Roman roots to flourish in medieval and Renaissance Europe. It provided a powerful language of political mobilization for French and American revolutionaries, and for the anti-imperial, anti-monarchical, and anti-capitalist struggles which punctuated the nineteenth century. To some extent, republicanism was a victim of its own success. In Anglophone countries, its most persuasive ideals were progressively absorbed by a triumphant liberalism, and republicanism was disqualified as a nostalgic ideal prone to degenerate into exclusive nationalism, tyrannical populism, and narrow-minded parochialism. To be sure, the republican tradition remained a central and ecumenical point of reference in other countries, such as France. Yet there, too, it functioned more as a rhetorical gesture towards past achievements than as a living language of political argument and debate.

From the 1980s onwards, the fortunes of republican theory were dramatically reversed. As historians of political ideas unburied the republican roots of the Euro-Atlantic political tradition, American constitutional lawyers, German critical theorists, French public intellectuals, British social democrats, Italian leftwing patriots, and Spanish reformers all began to talk the language of republicanism, in self-conscious opposition to the dominant liberal approach to politics. The republican revival has been spectacular and multi-faceted. It has affected real-world political life as well as academic discussions, across the various fields of history, law, philosophy, criminology, and political science. After the relative demise of socialism, communitarianism, and various postmodern alternatives, republicanism is now widely seen as the most plausible competitor—or interlocutor—to liberalism. In groundbreaking work, historian Quentin Skinner and philosopher Philip Pettit have sought to give this ‘neo-republicanism’ a coherent structure and firm conceptual basis, by anchoring it to a distinctive ideal of freedom as non-domination. This concept is meant to provide the hook on which a distinct and coherent republican ideology can be built, and the platform around which practical political proposals can be discussed. Thus Pettit and others have sought to develop a comprehensive,

distinctive political philosophy with a coherent, developing agenda for political reform.

But how distinctive is republican ideology? Many liberals have expressed the view that—much like the older republican movement—neo-republicanism can either be incorporated into liberalism, and is therefore redundant; or it has deeply illiberal tendencies, and is therefore unappealing. After presenting the recent republican revival, focusing in particular on the neo-republican school of thought, this essay will assess the exact nature of the differences between liberalism and republicanism. The tools of ideological analysis will be valuable in assisting us in this task (Freedman 1996). By drawing attention to the conceptual components, morphological structure, and political function of the two theoretical constructs, ideological analysis will help us locate the exact nature of disagreements between liberals and republicans. Some of these disagreements, it will appear, are *conceptual*; others are *normative*; and yet others are *strategic*. This is related to the fact that republicanism is not merely a professional academic theory, it is also an interpretation of a particular tradition of political thinking and an action-oriented way of organizing social life. Republicanism is both an academic theory and a public ideology, and it is at the interaction of these two levels of analysis that its most fruitful contribution to the study of politics can be found.

THE REPUBLICAN REVIVAL

From History to Contemporary Political Theory

The republican revival of the 1980s and 1990s was anticipated by the work of historians of political thought who retrieved a long forgotten tradition of republican political reflection. Challenging the conventional view that liberal modernity in the Anglo-American world emerged out of Lockean natural-rights ideology, revisionist historians showed that there was a coherent republican tradition, running from the neo-classical civic humanism of Renaissance Italy powerfully exhibited in Niccolò Machiavelli, through to the works of James Harrington and the ‘Commonwealthmen’, and later to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Madison, which deeply influenced English thought up to the late eighteenth century, and was a powerful inspirational force during the American Revolution (Baron 1955; Bailyn 1967; Fink 1962; Wood 1969; Pocock 1975; Skinner 1978, 1997). The ‘Machiavellian moment’, to use John Pocock’s

memorable title, stretched across several centuries and continents, and brought to the fore of political consciousness the themes of freedom, political participation, civic virtue, and corruption. In Quentin Skinner's seminal exploration of the foundations of modern political thought, the republican tradition was shown to crystallize most dramatically around a distinct concept of political liberty—the Roman ideal of *libertas*—which was invoked, developed, and defended by Italian and English republican writers. The potency of this tradition had been obscured by the dominant story of western liberal modernity, which charted the progressive emergence and triumph of a natural-law, contractual, individualist, rights-based liberalism. Yet this emerging liberal order, historians of republicanism pointed out, was always in tension with a civic tradition of political thinking, which worried about the fate of political liberty in a world that counter-posed a market-based privatized civil society with a sovereign state. Such anxieties coalesced into a powerful republican 'paradigm', 'language', 'ideology', or 'tradition' of popular participation and civic equality—a language whose integrity, coherence, and appeal had been obscured by a 'Whiggish', teleological history of liberalism. Traditional historians of ideas had been drawn to this teleological history because of the textualist, unhistorical methodologies to which they were wedded. Yet political ideas, Pocock, Skinner, and John Dunn stressed, should be studied as solutions to specific historical problems, not presented as answers to timeless philosophical questions or as contributions to present political debates. Methodologically, therefore, members of the 'Cambridge School' of intellectual history—with whom the republican revival is tightly associated—challenged traditional, textualist histories of political ideas and brought to light the historically contingent, context-bound, practice-orientated nature of political ideologies. Only proper *historical* work—the recovery of authorial intentions, the precise reconstruction of sociopolitical contexts, the analysis of available languages and conventions of political speech—could capture the meaning of past political utterances.

Yet if the republican tradition was to be firmly located in a discontinuous, discrete and unfamiliar past, was its retrieval not doomed to be only of antiquarian scholarly interest? Not so: unexpectedly perhaps, a historiographical methodological shift which denied the relevance of the past to the present turned out to inspire a spectacular republican revival in contemporary political theory. There are (at least) three possible methodological pathways between contextualist history and normative political philosophy, all of which have fed into the republican revival. First, the recovery of old, unfamiliar and *prima facie* counter-intuitive ideas—the conceptual link between public service and

individual liberty, for example—helped philosophers think new thoughts and ‘reflect’ about the blind spots and unconscious assumptions of the dominant ways of thinking they had inherited (Skinner 1997: 108). Second, the possibility was left open that fragments of the republican heritage were, in fact, still present, in inchoate and inarticulate form, in contemporary political consciousness. Third, republican historians were not, any more than the past authors they studied, detached from the political context of their interventions: by retrieving republican ways of thinking, they were, with varying degrees of intentionality and forcefulness, ‘doing things with words’ and investing (their own) ideas with social power. More specifically, republican historiography, by bringing to light richer, deeper, and more complex foundations of liberal democracy, resonated in contemporary political theory in that it offered a language able to give shape to and articulate ‘democracy’s discontents’ (Sandel 1996). If it was true, as republican history suggested, that the liberal democratic heritage incorporated the ideals of independence, participation, deliberation, and civic equality, not as nostalgic remnants of an aristocratic, pre-modern age, but as constitutive of modern political liberty, then the Euro-Atlantic political heritage was richer and more resourceful than suggested by the desiccated credo of liberty as non-interference, formal political equality, a strong public/private distinction, and limited popular input into politics. And as the latter were perceived as symptomatic of the 1970s crisis of liberal governance, the revival of the republican tradition was particularly timely.

Nowhere was the connection between historiographical revisionism and normative political theory more evident than in the USA. By the 1980s, historians such as Pocock, Gordon Wood, and Bailyn had illustrated how American revolutionaries, far from sharing a ‘spontaneously Lockean’ (Hartz) confidence in the self-regulating tendencies of the rights-based society, had articulated their concerns about democratic self-rule, individual independence, civic virtue, and distrust of corrupt elites and the commercial society in a distinctively republican language. Constitutional theorists such as Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein quickly grasped how such a constitutional lineage could inspire a left-leaning critique of mainstream liberalism. Their ideal of the deliberative republic was designed to reinvigorate civic life and emphasize the value of democratic reason-giving, explicit value commitments and public common purposes (Michelman 1988; Sunstein 1988). It updated a range of themes previously popularized by communitarian critiques of liberalism, which targeted the latter’s purported obsession with immunities and rights, commitment to procedural neutrality, and bias towards interest group pluralism. But the new

republicanism shed the communitarian emphasis on ethical consensus and thick ethno-cultural identities. Instead, republican deliberative democrats endorsed a more agonistic, more pluralistic and open-ended conception of democratic dialogue. On that view—recognizably indebted to Hannah Arendt's early reworking of the Athenian *agora*—what mattered was 'doing-in-common', rather than 'being-the-same'.

This insight was the foundation for a creative reworking of the fraught relationship between republicanism and nationalism, in Europe and elsewhere. A number of political theorists (Schnapper 1988; Habermas 1992; Viroli 1995; Nabulsi 1999; Miller 2000) drew on the old tradition of republican patriotism to show that the 'love of one's country' need not be motivated by ethnic membership, cultural affinity, or a thickly constituted national identity. It relied, instead, on pride in shared institutions and practices, insofar as these promoted democracy, freedom, and equality. A sense of collective identity and of shared purposes emerged from participation in common life, rather than being pre-requisites for it. The republican revival in political theory, in this way, repudiated the questionable ethical and sociological bases of nationalism and communitarianism. It is no surprise, therefore, that high-profile communitarian philosophers, such as Charles Taylor (1989) and Michael Sandel (1996) had by the early 1990s professed allegiance to republicanism, and went on greatly to contribute to its development. Given the new republicanism's explicit embrace of central tenets of liberal modernity, such as ethical pluralism and the importance of individual rights, a number of theorists sought, in parallel, to demonstrate the internal coherence, and normative plausibility, of the ideal of a 'liberal republicanism' (Sunstein 1988:, Dagger 1997:, Larmore 2001: Richardson 2002).

Doubts, however, subsisted. How much ethical and cultural diversity can the republic accommodate? Does it not require too much conformity on the part of dissenters and minorities? Should politics be about the search for common purposes and identity? And do republicans not unduly emphasize the ethical value of political participation and citizenship? Habermas, who situated his preferred version of deliberative democracy as a middle way between rights-based liberalism and virtue-based republicanism, put the problem neatly. He warned against the republican tendency to construe politics as a process of 'ethical self-clarification' of an ethnically and culturally homogenous community (instead of, as his preferred version would have it, as a process of deliberative reconstruction of the universally valid presuppositions of diverse ethical world-views) (Habermas 1997). The German theorist's scepticism about

the communitarian residue of modern republicanism was given credence by the circumstances of the revival of republicanism in neighbouring France in the 1980s and 1990s. In France, republicanism is not merely an esoteric academic school of thought; nor it is narrowly associated with anti-monarchical movements (as in the UK) or with a conservative political party (as in the USA). It is, rather, the shared language of ordinary, ecumenical politics: a rich, vibrant, and internally diverse tradition which was rooted in the Jacobin revolutionary experience and evolved in the nineteenth century to take on pluralistic, democratic, and *solidariste* commitments. Central themes of the tradition, throughout, were the ideals of equal citizenship, a strong, impartial state, secularism, popular sovereignty, and the importance of public education. It is by reference to republican ideals and conceptions that contemporary political battles—about the EU, taxation, the welfare state, education, urban policy, foreign policy—are fought. France has long been a fascinating laboratory of republicanism, a living political tradition where theory and practice are indissociably linked (Hazareesingh 2001; Berenson et al. 2011).

In the 1980s, the republican tradition underwent a spectacular revival and reworking. The intellectual left was struggling to respond both to the emergence of an individualistic, globalized ‘neoliberal’ market society and to the parallel rise of a far-right party, the National Front, intent on instrumentalizing immigration for its own reactionary, racist, and nationalist purposes. Both these pressures explain the distinctive shape taken by the republican movement in France in those years. It construed both ethno-cultural diversity and market-based liberalism as threats to the common political culture of citizenship, and sought to reinvigorate the latter by appealing to the integrative function of the state, public schools, and the values of *laïcité* (secularism). Quickly, however, as republican rhetoric was nearly exclusively mobilized around the successive ‘hijab controversies’ (*affaires du foulard*) of 1989, 1994, and 2004, it became overshadowed by a defensive, obsessive, neoconservative rhetoric pitting ‘the values of the republic’ against those attributed to immigrants of Muslim origin. Instead of opening up public debate about the terms of citizenship in a more diverse France, republicans tended to assert and impose conformity to a pre-determined, non-negotiable national identity (Bourdeau and Merrill 2008; Laborde 2008). It seemed that state-promoted republicanism, just as Habermas had feared, had degenerated into a conservative, communitarian official ideology, and its progressive, radically egalitarian and deliberative insights had been lost in the process. Where did that leave prospects for a republican revival? In 1996, liberal political theorist Alan Patten advanced a pithy diagnostic. Either

republicanism was compatible with liberalism, and differences between the two were purely semantic; or republicanism substantively departed from liberal principles, but in this case it was unattractive (Patten 1996).

Neo-republicanism and Freedom as Non-domination

The gist of Patten's complaint about republicanism was that, either republicans construed political participation as merely instrumental to the protection of basic liberal freedoms and rights; or they conceived of it as constitutive of liberty itself, as an essential component of the good life. Republicans, in other words, had to choose between what Isaiah Berlin (1990) called 'negative' freedom (roughly, freedom as non-interference by others) and 'positive' freedom (freedom as self-realization)—and only the former was compatible with liberalism properly understood. However, neo-republican writers, most prominently Philip Pettit, had by then begun to challenge the very terms of Berlin's dichotomy, and suggested that there was an alternative, distinctive ideal of freedom present in the liberal-democratic tradition, namely, that of freedom as absence of domination. In *Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government* (1997), Pettit recast the entire republican tradition by giving it a firm foundation: liberty as non-domination (Laborde and Maynor 2008). In so doing, he aimed to distance the republican tradition drastically from its communitarian, nationalist, and populist associations and, in addition, to provide conceptual coherence to the constellation of recent republican writings. A decade later, Pettit's theory had become the dominant, most influential, and most debated, version of academic republicanism—and the rest of this essay will be dedicated to assessing its contribution, notably as a response to Patten's challenge.

Pettit connected his theoretical strategy to the best of the historical republican writings. Since the mid-1980s, there had appeared a significant difference of approach between Baron and Pocock's 'neo-Athenian' interpretation of republican citizenship as the good, virtuous life on the one hand; and the 'neo-Roman' ideal of *libertas* unearthed by Skinner and Maurizio Viroli on the other. In revisiting the writings of the Italian defenders of the self-government of city-states, and the anti-Hobbesian English Commonwealthmen, Skinner initiated a paradigm shift in republican discourse. He showed that neo-Roman writers did not think of freedom in a positive sense: they did not see it as being tied definitionally to an Aristotelian teleological view of human purposes and a self-realization doctrine of positive freedom. Machiavelli, for example, defended an

apparently ‘ordinary negative analysis of liberty’ (as the unobstructed pursuit of one’s ends) in the *Discorsi*. Yet he also insisted that such liberty could only be maintained in a free state—a state where the *popolo* actively kept the ambitions of the *grandi* in check, and citizens were not subjected to the arbitrary power of rulers. Their liberty was maintained not, as Aristotelian writers had insisted, through the pursuit of an objective good by an ethical community, but by class conflict and the rule of law (Viroli 1998). In later writings on English seventeenth-century writers, Skinner went beyond his previous argument and contended that, in addition to the non-interference view of freedom, neo-Roman writers held a distinctive conception of freedom as non-dependency on the good will of others—with or without actual obstruction, interference, or coercion. Just living in a state of subjection or dependency, in their view, was incompatible with freedom (Skinner 2008).

It is this distinctive notion that was expanded on and developed by Pettit, who built a comprehensive political philosophy, inspired by classical republican sources, around the ideal of freedom as non-domination. Freedom as non-domination systematizes the neo-Roman ideal of freedom, understood not as self-mastery or self-government but as absence of mastery, or domination, by others. While freedom as non-domination has, therefore, an importantly ‘negative’ component (it does not specify the ethical ends to which freedom should be put), it importantly differs from freedom as non-interference. First, there can be domination without interference. Consider the classical republican paradigm of unfreedom: slavery. Even if your master is of a benign disposition, and does not interfere with your actions, you are dependent upon his will and vulnerable to his interference: this is what makes you unfree. Advocates of freedom as non-interference, according to Pettit, are unable to see that there is unfreedom when ‘some people hav[e] dominating power over others, provided they do not exercise that power and are not likely to exercise it’ (Pettit 1997: 9). Thus domination is a function of the relationship of unequal power between persons, groups of persons, or agencies of the state: the ideal of republican freedom is that ‘no one is able to interfere on an arbitrary basis—at their pleasure—in the choices of the free person’. This raises the possibility, secondly and conversely, that there can be interference without domination. This happens when interference is not arbitrary, for example, when it is subjected to suitable checks and controls and tracks what Pettit has called ‘commonly avowable interests’. For example, while the state interferes in people’s lives, levying taxes and imposing coercive laws, it may do so in a non-arbitrary way, if it only seeks ends, or employs only means, that are derived from the public good (the

common, recognizable interests of the citizenry). In this case, the law is not an affront on freedom; rather, as John Locke himself saw, it ‘enlarges freedom’.

The seminal contribution of Pettit’s work was to provide republicanism with an explicit and systematic basis in the concept of freedom as non-domination. Historically, republican theory was associated with a range of ideas (the rule of law, constitutionalism, the dispersal of power, equal citizenship) but it tended to lack an explicit basis. In addition to formulating a coherent basis for republican political philosophy, Pettit’s formulation decidedly distanced republicanism from two of its most unwelcome modern associations. The first was ‘populism’, the idea that the collective people should be the supreme and exclusive sovereign in the state. Pettit insisted that no such principle was demanded by the neo-Roman conception of politics, which required not that the people be the master, but that they had no master. In this way, Pettit distanced himself from the ‘strong’ neo-Aristotelian identification of civic freedom with participation in the making of the laws. The second unwelcome association acquired by republicanism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was with communitarian and nationalist politics. Here again, Pettit’s reworking of the republican ideal explicitly eschewed any reliance on pre-political bonds of culture, ethnicity, or religion. It re-connected with the older tradition of republican patriotism and civility, which saw the virtues of citizens as exclusively harnessed to the pursuit of a politically defined common good. Not only did Pettit’s neorepublicanism distance the tradition from unwelcome bedfellows, it also connected it, *via* the critical ideal of non-domination, to a range of progressive causes such as workers’ rights, women’s rights, and environmental politics. In sum, Pettit gave republicanism a firmer and more attractive foundation than it had had previously. In parallel, efforts were made, within the French republican tradition, to salvage the progressive, inclusive, democratic, and radical legacies of the republican ideal, in particular as a response to the multi-culturalist, multi-faith challenges of the 1980s and 1990s (Renaut 2005; Laborde 2008; Bourdeau and Merrill 2008). Important recent historical work has shown the internal complexity, diversity, breadth, and potency of France’s republican tradition—a far cry from the crude Jacobin homogeneous centralism often involved by both critics and defenders of *le républicanisme à la française* (Hazareesingh 2001; Rosanvallon 2004) and the under-appreciated locus of an original synthesis between individual liberty and socioeconomic equality (Spitz 2005). But as the republican tradition was in this way brought closer to the mainstream of left-of-centre egalitarian liberalism, it remained to be assessed whether republicanism was still relevantly different from liberalism.

NEO-REPUBLICANISM AND LIBERALISM

This section presents three possible responses to the liberal objection according to which neo-republicanism is in effect indistinguishable from liberalism. These responses are grounded in an understanding of both traditions as *ideologies*, which are characterized by (i) distinctive ‘building blocks’ or favoured concepts; (ii) specific conceptual arrangements and political prioritizations; and (iii) practical political platforms, not abstract philosophical schemes (Freeden 1996). Building on these three dimensions of ideology, this section elaborates on three republican responses to the liberal objection: (i) republicans have a distinctive understanding of the concept of liberty; (ii) their focus on non-domination and ‘anti-power’ shapes a more comprehensive, progressive political agenda; and (iii) their language is more effective as a critique of real-world neo-liberal politics.

A Different Core: The Concept of Freedom

For Pettit, freedom as non-domination differs from freedom as non-interference in two crucial ways. First, it undermines the ‘interference-only’ thesis: not only interference, but the threat or possibility of it, reduces freedom. I am unfree if I am subjected to an agent that operates like a master, even if the latter does not actually interfere with my actions. Second, freedom as non-domination undermines the ‘interference-always’ thesis. Interference *per se* does not reduce freedom; only alien, or arbitrary interference does. I am not unfree if I am constrained by a system of laws designed with appropriate checks and controls. What follows is a brief overview of the debates about whether each position is (i) distinctive of republicanism and (ii) compatible with liberalism.

Whether the first position is distinctive of republican theory has been the object of an analytically rigorous, sophisticated debate between Skinner and Pettit and advocates of the ‘pure negative’ theory of liberty such as Matthew Kramer (2008), Ian Carter (2008), and Keith Dowding (2011). Pure negative liberty theorists follow Hobbes in saying that one cannot be unfree to do what one actually does. Slaves are free to perform the action *x* they actually perform, even if they do so at their master’s discretion. However, what they are not free to do is to pursue the two conjunctively exercisable options of doing *x* *and* not incurring the risk of their master’s wrath. Their overall freedom is reduced, therefore, insofar as they cannot pursue a set of options simultaneously or sequentially. For Carter and Kramer, therefore, republicans and liberals reach

similar conclusions about equivalent levels of overall freedom. Negative liberty theorists are able to accommodate the republican view that there is a loss of freedom whenever a dominant party is able, without interference or the use of force, to reduce the option set available to the dominated agent. Republican theorists have resisted the implication that republican liberty is reducible to pure negative liberty, however capaciously this is now defined. They doubt that pure negative liberty theorists have genuinely freed themselves from the Hobbesian view of freedom as non-interference-only. Sticking points are whether the cost attached to options (by way of threat or penalties) is irrelevant to the meaningful availability of these options; and whether the loss of freedom for dominated agents is a measure of the probability of the dominating agent actually interfering with them (List 2004; Goodin and Jackson 2007; Pettit 2008b; Skinner 2008).

While this debate has been conducted within the terms set by pure negative liberty theorists, there is another, bolder version of the republican critique of the 'interference-only' thesis, which severs the relationship between domination and interference more radically. There are two versions of this. First, in the critical tradition of Karl Marx, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Iris Marion Young, domination is defined as a structural power relationship which affects, not necessarily the choice set available to the dominated agent but, rather, their ability to think of themselves as agents capable of choice in the first place (Young 1990; Bourdieu 1998). Thus members of subordinated social groups typically curtail their aspirations, adapt their preferences to the reduced social options that they (rightly or wrongly) take to be available to them. Their subordinated status remains deeply entrenched because it is internalized and 'naturalized' by them. Anglophone republican theorists have been reluctant to embrace this view of structural domination, because it appears to rely on an indeterminate and unspecific account of the agents of domination, and to point to internal rather than external constraints on freedom. In contrast to positive liberty theorists, they insist on construing constraints on freedom as both external (to the individual) and interpersonal (not impersonal) (Lovett 2010a: 47–9, 71–4). Yet if ideological conditioning can be traced back to deeply-entrenched, self-reproducing, pervasive social structures that allow the continued dominance of certain groups over others, without any need for interference or the threat thereof, there is reason to think that structural domination can be accommodated by the neo-Roman account of domination (Pettit 2008a). This opens fruitful avenues for theorizing the interconnections between domination and misrecognition, social humiliation and disrespect, as theorized by Charles

Taylor, Axel Honneth, and Iris Young (Laborde 2008; Garrau and Le Goff 2009; Lazzeri 2010). This structural view of domination points to the loss of freedom involved when individuals, because of their initial location within a structure of domination, have lost their ability to think of themselves as agents with actual options open to them. This is an instance of perfect, pure domination: because it is ideologically maintained, it does not need to be monitored or invigilated by those who benefit from it. Domination is structural in the sense that, although it is ultimately operated by agents on agents, it works in practice because it is perceived as a natural state of affairs (women in patriarchal societies think of themselves as ‘naturally’ vulnerable and subordinate to men) rather than the product of man-made, alterable social relationships.

A second, connected departure from the ‘interference-only’ thesis more radically detaches republican freedom from the individualistic ontology of liberalism—and, in particular, of Berlin’s theory of negative liberty. On this view, normative theory should not be based on a hypothetical consensual contract between individuals conceived as a-social, rational, and mutually self-disinterested. Instead, a more holistic republican ontology takes at its starting point the mutual dependency and mutual vulnerability of individuals-in-society, and envisages non-domination as a political response to the dangers of degeneration of (normal) dependency into (problematic) domination (Spitz 1995; Garrau and Le Goff 2009). Freedom here appears as an intrinsically social and relational good, one which is not achieved through the *absence* of (certain types of) institutions and relationships but rather through the presence (and active fostering) of the right kind of institutions and relationships. Thus Pettit talks of freedom as a ‘social status’ which generates subjective feelings of ‘security’ and inter-subjective mutual ‘recognition’. Such status is explicated in terms of ‘anti-power’, including the positive protections, resources, and dispositions which guarantee citizens’ ‘immunity’ against domination. The Berlinian contrast between positive and negative liberty does not adequately capture the unavoidably positive dimensions of republican freedom. To achieve mutual non-domination, citizens must be provided with basic resources and capabilities (including minimal autonomy) (Laborde 2008) and must display adequate other-regarding virtues and dispositions (Honohan 2002; Maynor 2003; Costa 2009a). In addition, because state law has not only a coercive but also an expressive dimension, a republican polity will take great care to express the equal status of citizens through its institutions and symbols, for example by rejecting the (even purely symbolic) establishment of religion (Laborde 2011).

Not only should republican freedom not be equated with the absence of

interference (even on the enlarged view of interference defended by negative liberty theorists), it is also, on the republican view, compatible with the presence of interference. Another set of debates, then, has been opened by Pettit's suggestion that the republican theory of freedom invalidates the 'interference-always' thesis. The suggestion is that while on a negative liberty view, interference always infringes on freedom, on a republican view, only arbitrary interference does so. Imagine I am constrained by a system of laws designed with appropriate checks and controls, which adequately track common values and interests. In this scenario, my option-freedom is limited (or 'conditioned', in Pettit's formulation) but my agency-freedom—freedom as non-domination *proper*—is not compromised, and remains intact (Pettit 2003). Interference by a non-arbitrary state, one suitably invigilated and checked by the constitutional people, does not compromise republican freedom. For republicans, therefore, there is no paradox involved in being 'free under the law': this, they posit, is in fact the core idea of a distinctive political and social conception of freedom. But how distinctive is the republican theory of 'freedom-friendly' interference, in relation to the liberal tradition of thought? To answer this question, it is important to distinguish between two different schools of liberalism, which we can call 'negative-liberty liberalism' and 'constitutional liberalism', respectively. As we shall see, the neo-republican theory of freedom is incompatible with the former, but bears important similarities with the latter.

Negative-liberty liberalism is a family of liberal theories which place a negative conception of liberty as non-interference at their core. These theories can be either moralized or descriptive. On the moralized version defended by libertarian philosophers such as Robert Nozick, freedom as non-interference is the supreme political value, and the state and its laws are the most important threats to freedom. A liberal state, therefore, is a state where legal interference is (rightly) minimized (Nozick 1974). On the descriptive version propounded by Carter and Kramer, freedom is also construed as a negative notion (as non-interference) but it is not integrated into a normative political theory. The aim of this approach is to provide a measurable theory of descriptive freedom. It has been endorsed by critics of Nozick, such as left-libertarians (van Parijs 1995; Steiner 2006) and Marxists (Cohen 2006) who have sought to detach the (valid) descriptive concept of liberty from the (misguided) normative defence of the minimal state. How can we locate Pettit's neo-republican theory in relation to negative-liberty liberalism? Evidently, Pettit's neo-republican ideal of the 'free person' is incompatible with the libertarian picture of freedom and the state. On Pettit's view, the minimal state is not an attractive political ideal: legal

interference in a republican state, if it adequately tracks the interests of citizens, does not impinge on freedom properly conceived. Citizens who live under the laws of a non-arbitrary state can be said to be free. This conceptual claim, however, has been questioned by advocates of the descriptive conception of freedom. The neo-republican conception of freedom, they contend, is a non-descriptive, moralized conception, which relies on a distinction between arbitrary—that is non-legitimate—and non-arbitrary—that is legitimate—interference, and therefore inevitably appeals to moral values which are distinct from, and independent of, a purely negative ideal of liberty (McMahon 2005; Carter 2008; Dowding 2011). Neo-republicans have rejected the charge. Pettit has insisted that freedom as non-domination is not a moralized notion, in that there is a ‘fact of the matter’ as to whether a particular interference is subjected to appropriate interest-tracking checks and controls (Pettit 2006a). Frank Lovett, for his part, has cashed out the notion of ‘appropriate’ or ‘non-alien’ control in purely procedural terms, emphasizing externally effective rules or regulations, with no reference to substantive interests (Lovett 2010a: 111–18). Neo-republicans, therefore, have struggled mightily to accommodate the negative-liberty critique and the charge of moralization.

Comparatively less energy has been spent assessing the considerable affinities between neo-republicanism and another school of liberalism—which we may call constitutional liberalism. This, by contrast to negative liberty liberalism, does not give normative nor conceptual primacy to a purely descriptive conception of freedom. In the spirit of the most prominent liberal theorists from John Locke through to J. S. Mill and John Rawls, it is rooted in a normative ideal of a constitutional state committed to the protection of core civil liberties—a system of legal protections and guarantees for morally significant spheres of personal and social freedom. As Charles Larmore and John Christman noted in early reviews of Pettit’s theory, the neo-republican idea that freedom is best protected under a constitutional state which adequately tracks the relevant interests of all citizens seen as free and equal is also at the heart of constitutional liberalism (Christman 1998; Larmore 2001; Costa 2009b). Rawls, for example, sets out a scheme of basic liberties, which protects individuals’ ‘moral powers’, and are arranged within a system of legal guarantees and protections. What is more, Rawls’s liberalism does not give prominent value to freedom as such: as a self-proclaimed theory of justice, it puts forward a recognizably ‘social democratic’ theory of egalitarian distribution (Rawls 1971). Other liberal philosophers, such as Ronald Dworkin, have severed the link between liberal constitutionalism and negative liberty even further, by suggesting that the core

ideal of liberalism is not liberty as such but, rather, equality and equal respect (Dworkin 2002). Constitutional liberalism, in sum, significantly diverges from negative liberty liberalism, in at least one of two ways. It does not value negative liberty as such, but rather the 'civil liberties' (or 'rights') which must be protected through the state and the rule of law; and/or it promotes a constellations of values, of which liberty is only one, and which has to be weighed against, or interpreted through, the demands of other ideals such as equal respect.

It should be apparent that constitutional liberalism radically departs from negative-liberty liberalism, and displays structural affinities with the neo-republican combination of freedom, the rule of law, and equality. While neo-republicans such as Pettit have perceived and acknowledged these affinities, they have not set out the distinctiveness of their own approach with sufficient precision. This is a pressing task for them, insofar as most academic liberals embrace constitutional rather than negative-liberty liberalism, and therefore are unmoved (and unaffected) by the neo-republican critique of libertarianism. The rest of this essay will attempt to identify the chief differences between neorepublicanism and constitutional liberalism. Many of these, it will turn out, are semantic and strategic, instead of substantive. While a purely analytical approach would dismiss such differences as undermining neo-republican claims to offer a truly distinctive normative theory, the deployment of ideological analysis will allow us to see why they matter to political debate and argument.

The most important disagreement between constitutional liberals and neo-republicans is that, for liberals, there is some loss of freedom every time a law interferes with an action, even if the law is otherwise legitimate because it secures a more important interest or freedom, or the freedom of others. While some neo-republicans, such as Skinner, accept this point (1997: 83), Pettit (2002) has insisted that a distinction be maintained between interferences which merely 'condition' freedom (by limiting a range of actions open to the individual) and interferences which 'compromise' it (and are an affront to the freedom of the agent, that is, to republican freedom). On the republican theory of freedom as non-domination, non-arbitrary law does not compromise freedom and (conversely) no freedom is possible outside the law, as freedom is an inter-subjective status that can only be enjoyed in the presence of others, and through adequate political and legal institutions. Liberals have retorted that the neo-republican conflation of law and liberty confuses liberty and the security of liberty. On their view, the law may make freedom more resilient over time, but it does not constitute it. So, it may be legitimate to use the law to restrict some

freedoms in the name of other freedoms, but this does not mean that the law itself makes us free. Constitutional liberals, therefore, remain committed to a distinction between freedom as non-interference (and its independent value) on the one hand, and the rule of law and civil liberties, on the other. In Pettit's theory, by contrast, republican liberty is a conceptually parsimonious idea which tightly connects political liberty with the legal and political institutions which instantiate it. Freedom as non-domination incorporates the liberal constitutionalist commitment to basic rights, the rule of law, democratic governances, and checks and balances into its definition itself. It also integrates the ideal of equality and equal respect central to Dworkinian liberalism. This is because freedom as non-domination, contrary to freedom as non-interference, cannot be increased for some without being increased for all: it is an intrinsically collective, egalitarian ideal of freedom.

In sum, neo-republicanism, like libertarianism, places liberty at the centre of its theory, but profoundly alters the adjacent concepts to which liberty is connected: not noninterference but the absence of arbitrary interference; not the silence of the laws but the presence of strong laws and institutions; not a minimal state but a protective state; not the freedom of the private individual but the public status of the citizen. Insofar as those adjacent concepts do not lend themselves to purely empirical, non-moralized descriptions and are charged with ethical, substantive (and controversial) meaning, republican liberty (*contra* Pettit) appears to be an inevitably moralized, normative conception of liberty. Like libertarianism, neo-republicanism grants prominent value to the ideal of liberty, but it defines liberty in a radically different way. Like constitutional liberalism, neo-republicanism offers a normative defence of a range of laws and institutions, but does so in a more parsimonious way than dominant liberal approaches, which promote a range of values, of which liberty is only one (List 2006). There are advantages, and disadvantages, to republican conceptual parsimony. What it may lack in conceptual precision, it gains in political and strategic import. This is because neo-republican ideology connects the rhetorically powerful ideal of liberty to egalitarian, democratic, and social democratic ideals. As a result, neo-republicanism is able to offer a useful corrective to both (i) the narrowly justice-centred, state-centred and ideal-theory-biased academic defences of liberal constitutionalism and (ii) the real-world, non-academic, commonsense libertarian view of freedom and the state. The last two sections of this chapter examine these two points in turn.

A Different Focus: Guarding against Public and Private Power

While neo-republicanism has clear affinities with the left-of-centre constitutional and egalitarian liberalism which is prominent in Anglo-American academic circles, it draws particular attention to the dangers both of *imperium* (arbitrary public power) and of *dominium* (arbitrary private power). By contrast, the focus of constitutional liberals inspired by Rawls and Dworkin has tended to be ideal theories of justice (with less focus on real-world mechanisms for reducing the arbitrariness of political rule) and a commitment to a strong distinction between the public and the private spheres of social life (with less focus on non-legal, informal structures of domination). Neo-republican ideology points to an extensive programme of state and societal reform, which aligns it with a more radically democratic and social egalitarian agenda than mainstream constitutional liberalism.

Let us start with the republican focus on *private* forms of domination. To see exactly where the difference between neo-republicanism and liberalism lies, imagine a liberal society, which protects basic individual rights and arranges schemes of social redistribution for the benefit of the worst-off. Now imagine that that society is also characterized by significant inequalities of income and wealth; and imagine, further, that informal social hierarchies and norms systematically reproduce an unequal gender-based division of labour in the family. Is this a problem for constitutional liberals? It depends. For some liberals, inequalities *per se* are not morally troublesome provided they benefit the most disadvantaged groups in society; and, assuming the institutional and political ‘basic structure’ of the state is just, individual choices in the private sphere must be respected. Left-liberals and socialist critics disagree. A more expansive understanding of the scope of Rawls’s basic structure and of the implications of his difference principle has led them to endorse a more comprehensive ideal of ‘social equality’. They have drawn attention both to the relevance of positional differentials to justice, as well as to the informal norms and ethos necessary to support just institutions (Cohen 1992; Anderson 1999; Miller 1995; Wolff 1998). Such an approach is congenial to neo-republicanism, and can be directly derived from the latter’s commitment to non-domination. Large inequalities of power and wealth are great sources of domination, insofar as they equip the rich and the powerful with resources they can use to entrench their positions in all spheres of social life. Rectifying large imbalances of arbitrary social power is one sure way of reducing domination in society (Lovett 2010a). One area where such imbalances are pronounced, yet have largely been ignored by liberal theorists, is in the workplace and marketplace (Dagger 2006; Spitz 2010). For neo-republicans, a totally unregulated labour market, even if it

maximizes salaries, profit, and growth, is problematic insofar as it places employees in a position of dependency on their employers. Neo-republicans, furthermore, castigate the evils of private domination within contexts where domination is maintained informally, through social mores and norms, rather than through laws and institutions. While a well-established republican theme has been that widespread social norms of equal regard and civility are essential to support the institutions of non-domination in the ideal republican society (Maynor 2003; Pettit 1997: 241–70), recent work has shown that the ideal of non-domination can, in turn, support the critique of norms and practices of oppression, disregard and misrecognition in non-ideal, existing societies (Laborde 2008; Garrau and Le Goff 2009; Lazzeri 2010). Neo-republicanism provides a radical language of critique of social and private relationships of domination. Because of the practical, consequentialist focus of the ‘domination complaint’ (Pettit 2005), neo-republicanism is more directly attuned to social critique than ideal-theory liberal constitutionalism. And it is also a more openly comprehensive ideal than Rawlsian political liberalism, in that it concerns itself, as a matter of justice, not with only political institutions and laws, but also with social norms and private relationships insofar as they support practices of domination.

Turning now to political power and state institutions, how distinctive is the neo-republican approach to the guarding of public power? After all, the robust advocacy of the rule of law, constitutional governance, popular consent, and the protection of basic rights has not been the preserve of the republican tradition, and has been central to modern constitutional liberalism from its inception. As recent critics of neo-republican theory have noted, republicans are not on safe grounds when they charge liberals with the (highly implausible) contention that they exhibit benign indifference towards the constitutional form of the polity. For insofar as an arbitrary power is a power that can discretionarily take away people’s rights and liberties, it is, paradigmatically, an illiberal power (Goodin 2003; Waldron 2007). Only Hobbes and, perhaps, some strands of negative-liberty liberalism endorse the view that freedom can be as extensive under an arbitrary monarchy as under a regime constrained by the rule of law. Now that this misconstrual has been clarified, we can formulate the republican critique of constitutional liberalism more accurately. It is this: liberal constitutional government can only be non-arbitrary if it allows for effective popular control of legislation and policies. Recall that, for republicans, freedom depends on the availability and quality of the controls that individuals have over the powers that interfere with them. Freedom, as Pettit put it in an early formulation, is a kind of

‘anti-power’ (Pettit 1996). Non-arbitrary power tracks interests, but one sure way to elicit and articulate relevant interests is through forums of democratic deliberation where all voices can be heard. While the collective people should, in Pettit’s account, not be the direct ‘authors’ of the laws, they should be its ‘editors’, through multi-layered and inclusive forums of ‘contestatory democracy’ (Pettit 2000). Neo-republicanism, then, follows recent democratic theory in its advocacy both of (*ex ante*) interest-identifying deliberation and of (*ex post*) popular control of political decisions. Such democratic input takes place in addition to the traditional liberal devices of electoral democracy and constitutional protections. An important debate has further ensued, among republicans, on the subject of which of the latter devices best promotes the ideal of republican non-domination. Pettit has taken the view that unrestrained electoral democracy risks degenerating into populism and majority domination, and has argued that robust schemes of constitutional protection, entrusted to judicial ‘anti-power’, best fit with the updated ideal of republican checks and balances. Other republican theorists, such as Richard Bellamy and Jeremy Waldron, disagree. They question the democratic legitimacy of counter-majoritarian judicial powers. They regard constitutionalism not as the subjection of the normal process of legislation to a ‘higher’ law protected by a separate judicial body, immune to popular control, but as resulting from the involvement of the public in a set of political institutions that ensure the process of law-making and adjudication gives equal consideration to their views. In Bellamy’s formulation, republicanism demands a robustly ‘political’ rather than a ‘legal’ form of constitutionalism (Bellamy 2007).

Republican discussions about how best to constrain arbitrary power have, in recent years, found fruitful applications in the sphere of normative international theory. Republican contributions to this debate have focused on shifting emphasis away from global theories of distributive justice and towards the normative scrutiny of transnational and international relationships of power, in light of the ideal of non-domination. What is gradually emerging is a ‘political’ analysis of global injustice, focused on a systemic critique of the international political order. While some republicans have articulated a ‘republican law of peoples’ and argued that states should be free of the domination of other international actors (Pettit 2010), others have advocated more extensive schemes of cosmopolitan democracy (Bohman 2004; Marti 2010) and global distributive justice (Lovett 2010b). Yet others have shown that the republican ideal of ‘the free citizen in the free state’ requires a combination of interstate and cosmopolitan reform, both political and socioeconomic (Laborde 2010). Despite

these differences, all neo-republicans advocate significant reform of the global order, and reject both the Westphalian status quo and the ideal of a cosmopolitan world state (Besson and Martí 2009). They take the main issue of global politics to be the proliferation of unchecked, arbitrary power—be it that of states, transnational corporations, or international organizations. They further take *political* justice—adequate control by affected individuals and groups of the powers they are subjected to—to be normatively prior to questions of *distributive* justice. This gives neo-republican theorizing a slightly different focus from liberal constitutionalist theories of justice, which tend to be more orientated towards both ideal theory and distributive questions.

Methodologically, however, neo-republicanism displays affinities with recent developments in the global justice literature, which locate the circumstances of (distributive) justice, within and across states, in actual sociopolitical relations—be they of association, domination, or coercion (Valentini 2011). Substantively, neo-republicans' take on the shape and form of political reform tends to align them with the more egalitarian, democratic, and radical strands of political theory.

Some have recently questioned whether the content of the ideal of non-domination is determinate enough to support the range of progressive, egalitarian causes that neo-republicans invoke (McMahon 2005; Pettit 2006b). It is true that republicans seek broad appeal through an ecumenically defined ideal of non-domination, yet they also defend substantive positions which firmly place them on the left, or left-of-centre, of the political spectrum. There is a parallel here with liberal theorists of 'public reason', where public reason is sometimes presented both as a meta-theoretical language of public debate and as generating the liberal, egalitarian substantive outcomes that liberals also favour (for example, on issues such as gay marriage or abortion). Arguably, both liberal 'public reason' and republican 'non-domination' are more indeterminate than their advocates recognize. Yet what is a worry for analytical philosophers may be a virtue for political activists. For the language of non-domination, while substantively indeterminate, is a powerful rhetorical alternative to the 'real-world' libertarian language of freedom and the state. To this rhetorical function of republican discourse we shall now turn.

Different Function: Progressive Politics in the Real Neoliberal World

We have seen that republican ideology has a distinctive conceptual 'core':

freedom as non-domination. This demarcates it clearly from libertarianism, which also places freedom at its core, but understands freedom as non-interference from the state. Yet the main normative desiderata associated with freedom as non-domination—the rule of law, constitutionalism, popular consent, civic virtue—align republicanism with liberal constitutionalist ideals. Disagreement here is more conceptual (about what liberty is) than normative (about how political institutions should be designed). Normatively, however, neo-republicans have not contented themselves with reformulating central liberal constitutional ideas. When fleshed out by neo-republicans, the agenda of non-domination points beyond liberal constitutionalism, and towards more radically democratic reform of public authorities, both domestic and international, and of private relations and institutions, both formal and informal. Neo-republican normative proposals, then, fit neatly with the more egalitarian and democratic strands of contemporary academic liberalism. Some left-liberals might be tempted to conclude that, even if neo-republican theory is plausible and attractive, it is structurally compatible with liberalism, and therefore redundant. To some extent, this response is evidence of the extraordinary resilience, elasticity, and capaciousness of the language of liberalism in Anglophone academia. But what it misses is the independent attractiveness of republican language in other contexts, notably non-academic and non-Anglophone, where republican ideals operate as powerful ideological rhetoric to defuse and combat the real-world, commonsense libertarian construal of freedom and the state. Whatever the attraction of neo-republicanism as an academic political philosophy, then, its advocates also intend it to resonate as a political language for the real world. Pettit, for example, has suggested that neo-republican proposals are not ‘analytically but rhetorically distinctive’, and that they have ‘not only normative but significant strategic import’ for progressive politics (Pettit 1997: 129–47). Pettit’s republican ideal of non-domination directly influenced Spanish socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who invited Pettit to deliver a report card on the republican achievements of his premiership (Marti and Pettit 2010). Here neo-republicans join hands with a long tradition of democratic reformers who have taken real politics, not philosophical utopias, as their main focus (Stears 2010).

What is it about the neo-republican ideal of non-domination, then, that makes it a particularly suitable language for the advocacy of politically progressive causes? Three points are worth noting. First, republicanism provides a language with which to criticize the common-sense, libertarian connection between the free market and individual freedom. Because the real world of existing liberal

democracies is not a Rawlsian world, where ideals of individual freedom and egalitarian social justice spontaneously cohere, and because in many non-Anglophone countries ‘liberalism’ is only a byword for the defence of economic liberties and market-based *laissez-faire*, there is a pressing need for a political ideology that can provide a powerful rhetorical counterpoint to libertarianism. Neo-republicanism, because (unlike socialism) it invokes the single, engaging value of freedom in arguing for state policies, unsettles the discursive monopoly that neoliberals claim over the ideal of freedom. It allows republicans to explain (in the vein of Rousseau and Marx) that formal consent is not sufficient to guarantee non-domination: workers, for example, are not free if they are entirely dependent on the arbitrary will of their employers. It also allows them to put forward a political critique of economic inequalities, one which points not to the intrinsic injustice of differential gaps in wealth and income but, rather, to their detrimental effects both on civic cohesion and solidarity (Sandel 1996) and on the dependence of the poor on the rich (Spitz 2010). Destitution, ill-health, and lack of employment are to be combated insofar as they make people structurally vulnerable to domination. In addition, republicans do not shy away from tightly connecting market freedoms and rights to social responsibilities—notably for those organizations, such as large firms and banks, on which the futures of many depend. Republican political economy attractively captures and reformulates key socialist, *solidariste*, and social-democratic ideals, without however embracing the top-down centralized statism, end-state egalitarianism, and anti-market rhetoric which have historically accompanied them. Many republicans value the market economy for instrumental reasons, because it disperses power, and because private property, as Rousseau insisted, guarantees a basic degree of citizens’ self-sufficiency (Pettit 2006a). This insight has been generalized into innovative proposals for the provision of a basic income, or of funds to all citizens, as a ‘civic minimum’ tied to their status as citizen and guaranteeing their independence (White 2003). The language of republicanism is compatible with a regulated market *economy*, and it resonates with the left-wing critique of the market *society* (White and Leighton 2008).

Second, neo-republicans connect the ideal of freedom to civic demands for rulers’ accountability and popular control. In an age of popular mobilization against the seemingly arbitrary forces of globalized financial capitalism and the steady erosion of democratically-authorized collective organizations it brings in its wake, the rhetorical and political effectiveness of the republican motto of resistance to ‘alien power’ cannot be underestimated. The concept of domination, in particular, provides a vivid and accurate description of the diffuse

sense of disempowerment and alienation characteristic of contemporary politics, notably in their globalized form. The idea of non-domination, in turn, can be cashed out through a range of strategies aiming at bringing sources of arbitrary power, both political and economic, under the closer ‘control’ of those who are subjected to it. Because the idea of popular control of power does not mandate a single political strategy (say, of direct democratic participation) it can be filled in by a range of different proposals. As a result, republicanism has provided an influential language for conceptualizing and defending practices of political liberty in a variety of political contexts, from the United Kingdom to South Korea and Chile (Kwak 2007; White and Leighton 2008; Vatter 2010).

Third, and lastly, the republican ideal of collective non-domination allows citizens and political activists to deploy a rich language of civic solidarity, pursuit of the common good of justice, and shared commitment to the republic, above and beyond the profound differences that otherwise divide them. As a language of civic solidarity, then, republicanism provides an attractive alternative to the nationalist and conservative politics of cultural or ethnic homogeneity. In Arendtian fashion, it draws attention to the politics of being-and mixing-together, rather than being-the-same—a vision with significant practical implications, for example in urban and education policy. The neo-republican vision of politics repudiates communitarian, identity-centred constructions of shared identity, yet it does not give up on collective projects, civic mobilizations, and shared identifications (Honohan 2001; Laborde 2008). To that extent, it provides a powerful ideological language for the Left in a variety of political traditions. Whether it has sufficiently deep and robust roots in Anglophone political theory to be an effective competitor or interlocutor to liberalism remains, however, open to question.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, E. 1999. ‘What is the point of equality?’, *Ethics*, 109: 287–337.
- Bailyn, B. 1967. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Baron, H. 1955. *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance. Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bellamy, R. 2007. *Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berenson, E., V. Duclert, C. Prochasson. (eds.) 2011. *The French Republic. History, Values, Debates*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Berlin, I. 1990. ‘Two concepts of liberty’. Pp. 118–72 in I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Besson, S. and Martí, J. L. 2009. eds. *Legal Republicanism. National and International Perspectives*.

- Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bohman, J. 2004. 'Republican cosmopolitanism', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 12 (3): 336–52.
- Bourdeau V. and R. Merrill. (eds.) 2008. *La République et ses démons. Essais de republicanisme appliqué*. Maisons-Alfort: Ére, 2008.
- Bourdieu, P. 1998. *La domination masculine*. Paris: Seuil.
- Carter, I. 2008. 'How are power and unfreedom related?' Pp. 58–82 in *Republicanism and Political Theory*, eds. C. Laborde and J. Maynor. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Christman, J. 1998. 'Review of: Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*', *Ethics*, 109 (1): 202–6.
- Cohen, G. A. 1992. 'Incentives, inequality, and community'. Pp. 263–329 *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, vol. 13, ed. G. Peterson. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Cohen, G. A. 2006. 'Capitalism, freedom and the proletariat'. Pp. 163–82 in *The Liberty Reader*, ed. D. Miller. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Costa, V. 2009a. 'Neo-republicanism, freedom as non-domination, and citizen virtue', *Politics, Philosophy, Economics*, 8: 401–19.
- Costa, V. 2009b. 'Rawls on liberty and domination', *Res Publica*, 15 (4): 397–413.
- Dagger, R. 1997. *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dagger, R. 2006. 'Neo-Republicanism and the civic economy', *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, 5: 151–73.
- Dowding, K. 2011. 'Republican freedom, rights and the coalition problem', *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, 10: 301–22.
- Dworkin, R. 2002. *Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Fink, Z. S. 1962. *The Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in 17th Century England*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Freeden, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Garrau, M., and A. Le Goff. 2009. 'Autonomie, vulnérabilité et non-domination. L'apport du néorépublicanisme', *Astérion*, 6. <<http://asterion.revues.org/1532>>, last accessed 6 March 2013.
- Goodin, R. E. 2003. 'Folie Républicaine', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6: 55–76.
- Goodin, R. E. and F. Jackson. 2007. 'Freedom from fear', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 35 (3): 249–65.
- Habermas, J. 1992. 'Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe', *Praxis International*, 12 (1): 171–206.
- Habermas, J. 1997. *Droit et démocratie*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Hazareesingh, S. 2001. *Intellectual Founders of the Republic. Five Studies in Nineteenth-Century French Republican Political Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Honohan, I. 2001. 'Friends, strangers or countrymen? Citizens as colleagues', *Political Studies*, 49 (1): 51–69.
- Honohan, I. 2002. *Civic Republicanism*. London: Routledge.
- Kramer, M. 2008. 'Liberty and domination'. Pp. 31–57 in *Republicanism and Political Theory*. eds. C. Laborde and J. Maynor. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kwak, J.-H. 2007. 'Democratic leadership: Machiavelli supplementing populist republicanism', *Korean Journal of Political Science*, 14 (3): 115–42.
- Laborde, C. 2008. *Critical Republicanism. The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laborde, C. 2010. 'Republicanism and global justice: A sketch', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9:

- Laborde, C. 2011. 'Political liberalism and religion: On separation and establishment', *Journal of Political Philosophy* Early view: July.
- Laborde, C, and J. Maynor (eds.) 2008. *Republicanism and Political Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Larmore, Ch. 2001. 'A critique of Philip Pettit's republicanism', *Philosophical Issues*, 11: 229–43.
- Lazzeri, C. 2010. 'Repenser le concept républicain de domination', *Diacritica*, 24/2: 129–64.
- List, C. 2004. 'The impossibility of a Paretian republican? Some comments on Pettit and Sen', *Economics and Philosophy*, 20: 1–23.
- List, C. 2006. 'Republican freedom and the rule of law', *Philosophy, Politics, and Economics*, 5: 201–20.
- Lovett, F. 2010a. *Domination and Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lovett, F. 2010b. 'Republican global distributive justice', *Diacritica*, 24: 13–30.
- Lovett, F. and P. Pettit. 2009. 'Neorepublicanism: A normative and institutional research program', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12: 11–29.
- Marti, J. L. 2010. 'A global republic to prevent global domination', *Diacritica*, 24 (2): 31–72.
- McMahon, C. 2005. 'The indeterminacy of republican policy', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 33 (1): 67–93.
- Marti, J. L, and P. Pettit. 2010. *A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Maynor, J. 2003. *Republicanism in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Michelman, F. 1988. 'Law's republic', *Yale Law Journal*, 97 (8): 1493–537.
- Miller, D. 1995 'Complex equality'. Pp. 197–225 in *Pluralism, Justice and Equality*, eds. D. Miller and M. Walzer. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Miller, D. 2000. *Citizenship and National Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Nabulsi, K. 1999 *Traditions of War. Occupation, Resistance and the Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nozick, R. 1974. *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Patten, A. 1996. 'The republican critique of liberalism', *British Journal of Political Science*, 26 (1): 25–44.
- Pettit, P. 1996. 'Freedom as antipower', *Ethics*, 106 (3): 576–604.
- Pettit, P. 1997. *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pettit, P. 2000. 'Democracy, electoral and contestatory'. Pp. 105–44 in *Designing Democratic Institutions, Nomos 42*, eds. I. Shapiro and S. Macedo. New York: New York University Press.
- Pettit, P. 2002. 'Keeping republican freedom simple. On a difference with Quentin Skinner' *Political Theory*, 30 (3): 339–356.
- Pettit, P. 2003. 'Agency-freedom and option-freedom', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 15 (4): 387–403.
- Pettit, P. 2005. 'The domination complaint'. Pp. 87–117 in *Political Exclusion and Domination, Nomos 46*, eds. M. Williams and S. Macedo. New York: New York University Press.
- Pettit, P. 2006a. 'Freedom in the market'. *Philosophy, Politics, and Economics*, 5(2): 131–149.
- Pettit, P. 2006b. 'The determinacy of republican policy: a reply to McMahon'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 34(3): 278–279.
- Pettit, P. 2008a. 'Republican freedom: Three axioms, four theorems'. Pp. 102–31 in *Republicanism and Political Theory*, eds. C. Laborde and John Maynor. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Pettit, P. 2008b. 'Freedom and probability: A comment on Goodin and Jackson', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 36: 206–20.
- Pettit, P. 2010. 'A republican law of peoples', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9: 70–94.
- Pocock, J. G. A. 1975. *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rawls, J. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Renaut, A 2005, *Qu'est ce qu'un peuple libre? Libéralisme ou républicanisme*. Paris: Grasset.

- Richardson, H. 2002. *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosanvallon, P. 2004. *Le modèle politique français. La société civile contre le jacobinisme de 1789 à nos jours*. Paris: Seuil.
- Sandel, M. 1996. *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schnapper, D. 1988. *Community of Citizens*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction.
- Skinner, Q. 1978. *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skinner, Q. 1997. *Liberty Before Liberalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skinner, Q. 2008. 'Freedom as the absence of arbitrary power'. Pp. 83–101 in *Republicanism and Political Theory*, eds. C. Laborde and J. Maynor. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Spitz, J.-F. 1995. *La Liberté politique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Spitz, J.-F. 2005. *Le Moment républicain en France*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Spitz, J.-F. 2010. 'Le Marché est-il une institution républicaine?' *Diacritica*, 24: 165–92.
- Stears, M. 2010. *Demanding Democracy: American Radicals in Search of a New Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Steiner, H. 2006. 'Individual liberty'. Pp. 123–40 in *The Liberty Reader*, ed. D. Miller. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Sunstein, C. 1988. 'Beyond the republican revival', *Yale Law Journal*, 97 (8): 1623–31.
- Taylor, C. 1989. 'Cross-purposes: The liberal-communitarian debate'. Pp. 159–82 in *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, ed. N. Rosenblum. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Valentini, L. 2011. *Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Parijs, P. 1995. *Real Freedom for All, What (if Anything) can Justify Capitalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Vatter, M. 2010. *La constitución de la libertad: Ensayos de teoría democrática radical*. Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales.
- Viroli, M. 1995. *For Love of Country: An Essay on Nationalism and Patriotism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Viroli, M. 1998. *Machiavelli*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Waldron, J. 2007. 'Pettit's molecule's'. Pp. 143–59 in *Common Minds. Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit*, eds. G. Brennan, F. Jackson, M. Smith, and R. Goodin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- White, S. 2003. *The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- White, S. and Leighton, D. (eds.) 2008. *Building a Citizen Society. The Emerging Politics of Republican Democracy*. London: Lawrence and Wishard.
- Wolff, J. 1998. 'Fairness, respect, and the egalitarian ethos', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 27 (2): 97–122.
- Wood, G. 1969. *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Young, I. M. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 29 IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE

DUNCAN BELL

INTRODUCTION

THE world in which we live is largely the product of the rise, competition, and fall of empires. To attempt a survey of the role of ideology in this vast historical panorama would be hubristic—that archetypical imperial vice. Consequently, in this chapter I limit my focus both geographically and temporally, concentrating attention on European, and principally British, imperialism during the last two hundred years. Moreover I confine it to a subset of the topics that it would be possible to discuss under the heading of ideology and empire. Even with these limitations in mind, my discussion will be synoptic and selective, drawing out some key issues while leaving many others unmentioned, or mentioned only in passing.

The terms empire and imperialism have no settled definition—indeed the attempt to control and delimit their meanings has often formed a significant dimension of ideological disputation. Contemporary scholarly definitions come in narrow and broad varieties. On a narrow view, empire connotes the direct and comprehensive political control of one polity over another. It is, Michael Doyle writes, ‘a relationship ... in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society’ (Doyle 1986: 45; see also Abernethy 2000: 19). Broad definitions, meanwhile, characterize an empire as a polity which exerts decisive or overwhelming power in a system of unequal political relations, thus encompassing diverse forms of control and influence (Ignatieff 2003: 2, 109; Ferguson 2004). The same variation holds for the concept of imperialism. On a narrow account, imperialism is a strategy or policy that aims to uphold or expand a territorial empire. According to broader definitions it a strategy or policy—or even an attitude or disposition—that seeks to create, maintain, or intensify relations of inequality between political communities. A cross-cutting issue concerns the connection between formal and informal imperialism. Some restrict the term to direct intervention in, or control over, a given territory; others allow imperialism to cover a wide range of formal and informal (non-territorial) modes of influence.¹ This can lead to considerable variation in the application of the terms. For example, utilizing a narrow

definition it is possible to deny that the contemporary United States is an empire while recognizing that it exhibits occasional imperialist aspirations (e.g. Ikenberry 2006), but invoking a broader definition supports the argument that it is and nearly always has been an empire (e.g. Ferguson 2003). Empire and imperialism, then, are essentially contested concepts. Sidestepping these thorny conceptual debates, this chapter discusses positions from across the spectrum, not least because imperial advocates and critics have often mixed the different accounts together. Conceptual precision is vital for the scholarly analysis of empires, but impassioned ideological contestation rarely adheres to strict academic conventions.

The study of empire straddles the humanities and social sciences. The last three decades have witnessed a renaissance of interest in imperial history, a development which has recently catalysed the increasingly popular field of ‘global history’ (Lieven 2002; Bayly 2004; Darwin 2007; Belich 2009; Burbank and Cooper 2010). Following the work of Edward Said (1978, 1993), Homi Bhabha (1994), and Gayatri Spivak (1988), among others, scholars of comparative literature have focused attention on the representation and legitimization of empire in diverse forms of cultural production, from the quotidian to the avant-garde. Such studies have illuminated the pivotal role of empire in the life-worlds of the modern ‘West’—indeed in their very construction. Anthropology, a field once deeply implicated in the justification of imperial activity, now offers one of the most incisive scholarly sites for its investigation and critique (e. g. Wolf 1982; Sahlins 1995; Cohn 1996; Stoler 2010). A similar case can be made about Geography (Driver 2001; Gregory 2004; Kearns 2009). Scholarship in all of these fields has been heavily influenced, though certainly not exhausted, by a range of ‘postcolonial’ challenges to the ‘Eurocentrism’ of western scholarly and popular discourse (Chatterjee 1986; Chakrabarty 2000; Hobson 2012; cf. Scott 2004). Rather ironically, International Relations (IR), a field putatively dedicated to the analysis of world politics, has yet to engage adequately with the practices and the legacies of imperialism. Like many of the other social sciences, the origins and early disciplinary development of IR were bound up with imperial projects (Long and Schmidt 2005; Vitalis 2010), but the dominant approaches in the field continue to conceptualize global order, past and present, in terms of the relations between autonomous states acting under conditions of ‘anarchy’ (Barkawi 2010; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004).² However, scholars of politics have not ignored the imperial turn entirely. Spurred on by shifts in the wider world, historians and political theorists have begun to demonstrate the assorted ways in which the

history of western political thinking is profoundly entangled with imperial encounters (Pitts 2010).

Practices of imperialism are not, of course, simply the product of a set of explicit theoretical arguments, and ideologies of empire cannot be analysed solely through deciphering written texts. Studying ideology is an interdisciplinary endeavour, exploring social, economic, political, cultural, and intellectual phenomena. It encompasses the interpretation of texts, the study of social practices, and the analysis of visual and material culture, soundscapes, the built environment, and much more besides. For heuristic purposes it is worth drawing an ideal-typical distinction between theory, ideology, and imaginary. (In reality, the three blur together.) *Theories* are systematic articulated bodies of argumentation—the kind of accounts of empire produced by Hannah Arendt, Frantz Fanon, V. I. Lenin, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. It is writing of this kind which has drawn the attention of historians of political thought in recent years. Following Michael Freeden, we can define *ideologies* as ‘clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide directives, even plans, of action for public policy-making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community’ (2004: 6; Freeden 1996). Such ideologies include liberalism, socialism, republicanism, conservatism, and fascism. Imperial ideologies, as I use the term in this chapter, are those elements of more general patterns of thought that relate to empire. Sophisticated theories often play a crucial role in such ideologies, but they do not exhaust them. Finally, ideologies are nested within, and given shape by, social *imaginaries*. Charles Taylor defines a social imaginary as ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’. Among other things, imaginaries constitute ‘that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (Taylor 2004: 23).³ Imaginaries are more basic than ideologies insofar as they establish the background cultural and cognitive conventions which structure and animate them. Just as ideologies contain multiple and often competing theories, so imaginaries are compatible with varied ideologies. One of the central contentions of this chapter is that rival ideologies of empire often share key assumptions about the nature of the social world, and that this can be explained through reference to underlying imperial imaginaries.

In the next section I explore aspects of the modern imperial imaginary. In the

subsequent sections I distinguish three ideal-typical aspects of imperial ideology: justification; governance; and resistance. Ideologies of justification are those patterns of thought that provide reasons, explicit or implicit, for supporting or upholding imperial activity. They seek to legitimate the creation, reproduction, or expansion of empire. Ideologies of governance articulate the modalities of imperial rule in specific contexts. Particular ideologies of justification may be compatible with diverse and conflicting ideologies of governance, while precluding others. Finally, ideologies of resistance reject imperial control. They too cover a broad spectrum, ranging from moderate positions that refuse only some aspects of imperial rule and seek accommodation with the existing order, through to justifications of violent rebellion.

IMPERIAL IMAGINARIES

Social imaginaries constitute ‘the macromappings of social and political space through which we perceive, judge, and act in the world’ (Steger 2008: 6). Throughout history they have animated imperial ideologies, underwriting relevant conceptions of time and space, philosophical anthropologies, ethical assumptions, cosmologies, and metaphysical belief systems—the ‘deeper normative notions and images’ that Taylor suggests mould expectations about human collective life (2004: 23). In ancient China, for example, imperial authority was construed as mediating between heaven and earth, with the Han Emperor serving as the ‘Son of Heaven’ (Colás 2007: 2). Early modern European imperialism had to be legitimated in Christian terms. Modern imperial ideologies, too, are rooted in a widely shared set of assumptions and beliefs about the character of the social world.

Charles Taylor and Manfred Steger have both probed the relationship between modern ideologies and social imaginaries. Steger argues that ‘ideologies translate and articulate the largely pre-reflexive social imaginary in compressed form as explicit political doctrine’ (2009: 426) and he contends that the key transition in the modern world is from a national imaginary to a global one, a process that was accelerated by the Second World War and is still unfolding today. The modern social imaginary, on this view, is constituted by various interlocking elements, including conceptions of linear time and progress, secularization, individualism, and forms of rationality and scientific knowledge. The spatial configuration of modern politics—a system of territorial states—is the institutional expression of this imaginary. Globalization signifies the on-going and uneven transition to an emergent ‘globalist’ system characterized by a

growing consciousness of the world as an interconnected whole (Steger 2008). For Taylor, meanwhile, the modern social imaginary is formulated in Lockean terms as a society of mutual respect among free autonomous agents, and it is institutionalized in the rise of civil society, popular sovereignty, and the capitalist system of market exchange (Taylor 2004).

My primary concern here is with what I will call the imperial imaginary—those aspects of social imaginaries which pertain to the justification or governance of empire. It is not clear how empire fits into Taylor's account, a lacuna that follows from his focus on the internal constitution of discrete societies—what we might call his methodological communitarianism. For Taylor the modern moral order, in contrast to its medieval predecessor, 'gives no ontological status to hierarchy or any particular structure of differentiation'. 'In other words', he writes, 'the basic point of the new normative order is the mutual respect and mutual service of the individuals who make up society' (Taylor 2004: 12). This fails to grasp the socio-political dynamics of modern imperialism, which is predicated on the hierarchical classification of peoples—the sorting and categorizing of the world in ways that denied (either temporarily or permanently) equality and autonomy to large swathes of it. Moreover, imperial practices helped fashion the internal ordering of western societies: empire cannot be bracketed off as something that happened elsewhere. As practitioners of the 'new imperial history' rightly insist, imperial metropolises and peripheries need to be viewed as part of a 'single analytic field'—as dynamically connected and interpenetrating (Cooper and Stoler 1997: 4).⁴ Above all, the modern social imaginary, in its imperial dimensions, encodes 'civilizational' (or racial) difference. This imaginary has framed European encounters with other peoples at least since the 'discovery' of the Americas in the fifteenth century (Todorov 1992; Pagden 1995). In the remainder of this section, I discuss three elements of the modern Euro-American imperial imaginary: civilizational difference; conceptions of time and space; and what I will call 'the comparative gaze'.

Perhaps the most consequential element of the modern imperial imaginary is the way in which the world is envisioned as a space of inequality and radical difference.⁵ Peoples and societies are arrayed in a hierarchical manner. 'Civilization', the meta-concept of the modern imperial imaginary, is the term most frequently employed to characterize this stratification. The term entered European political discourse in the mid-eighteenth century, first in France and then in England (Pocock 2005; Bowden 2009). But the underlying idea is not unique to modernity or to the West; the distinction was also common in Japan,

China, and the Islamic states. The Chinese historiographical tradition, for example, 'invariably assumed that, by virtue of its superior civilization, China stood at the centre and apex of the universe, and that its emperor enjoyed a mandate from heaven not only to rule the empire, but also to exact deference and tribute from all other peoples known and unknown to the Chinese' (O'Brien 2006: 18). Employing the language of 'civilization' invokes a standard of assessment and a regime of difference—it demands the drawing of normatively significant boundaries between the 'advanced' and the 'backward', the latter to be viewed as inferior to (and hence open to rule by) the former.

Conceptions of civilization have varied considerably in modern imperial discourse. The appellation can mark either a process or a telos. It can be theorized in constructivist or essentialist terms: as the product of time, chance, luck, and skill, or alternatively as the result of ingrained (usually biological) difference. Conceptions of civilization come in both dynamic and static forms. The dynamic account, which from the late eighteenth century drew in particular on the historical sociology of the Scottish Enlightenment and later on universalistic theories of progress, holds that, although the world is divided between societies at differential levels of ethical and material development, this situation is neither inevitable nor natural. This notion permeates assorted modern ideologies, including liberalism and socialism. Proponents of static accounts, which deny the implicit moral universality of dynamic perspectives, stress instead the immutable markers of a people or 'race', arguing that progress amongst at least some groups (with Aboriginal Australians and Africans regularly coded as paradigmatic) is virtually impossible. An extreme manifestation of this view, found in both scholarly and literary discourses throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, viewed the most 'uncivilized' peoples as unable to socially reproduce in a world dominated by advanced white civilizations, and consequently as doomed to extinction. They were, in a sense, self-annihilating. As Patrick Brantlinger observes, this discourse was 'a specific branch of the dual ideologies of imperialism and racism' (2003: 1). Most accounts of race and civilization in nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperial discourse blended together 'cultural' and 'biological' arguments to create a potent set of claims about the stratified character of world order. As such, they were figured as pervasive yet opaque biocultural assemblages.

Assumptions about European civilizational superiority were typically shared by enthusiastic imperialists and critics of empire alike, although they interpreted them in different ways. (This is one reason why the labels 'pro-imperial' and

‘anti-imperial’, whilst perhaps unavoidable in some instances, are usually too crude for satisfactory historical and theoretical discrimination). The justificatory argument from civilization was fairly straightforward: the civilized people of the world had a right, or even a duty, to spread civilization to the backward. Progress—human ‘improvement’—demanded it. Military and economic dominance proved to many Europeans the inherent superiority of their political and moral orders, justifying attempts to export their institutions and ideas across the globe. J. A. Hobson identified the connection commonly drawn between material superiority and ethical orientation when he dismissed the view that ‘the power to do anything constitutes a right or even a duty to do it’, as the ‘commonest ... of temperamental fallacies’ (1902: 157). But it is important to recognize that civilization was also a key category for those critical of expansion. This position assumed several forms. First, a case could be made that the attempt to export civilization would invariably fail given the intrinsic difficulty of the task, and in particular the perceived recalcitrance of the target communities. This argument was increasingly popular towards the end of the nineteenth century, as anthropological and sociological accounts of the structure of ‘native’ communities moved to the centre of imperial debate (Mantena 2010). Alternatively, even if the spread of civilization was both feasible and universally beneficial, there were more efficient or humane modes of transmission available—a case made by many liberal internationalists, for whom the primary engine of transformation was international commerce. Finally, and most commonly, it could be argued that regardless of whether imperialism was an effective vehicle of civilization, it inevitably damaged the imperial metropole. The ‘Spirit of Conquest’ (1814), as Benjamin Constant famously labelled it, threatened the achievements of civilization itself. This was the lesson that many post-Renaissance Europeans drew from the fall of Rome, and it formed a key element of the critiques of empire formulated by Bentham, Constant, Cobden, Spencer, and a long line of nineteenth-century radicals. It could also be argued, in an explicitly racist variation on this theme, that the pursuit of empire threatened the (racial) contamination of the civilized.

Conceptions of time and space structure the way in which ideologies and theories articulate political projects. Throughout history they have established the imaginative limits of the spaces that empires set out to conquer and rule. In Victorian Britain, for example, novel communications technologies altered the way in which individuals perceived the physical world and the political possibilities it contained. Political forms previously regarded as unfeasible came to be seen as realizable. This was the period in which ideas about the

‘annihilation of time and space’ began to be applied routinely to global politics (Kern 1983). Once again, this aspect of the imaginary was pervasive but politically indeterminate. Many saw technological developments as facilitating, even necessitating, the construction of imperial institutions that in the past would have seemed the stuff of dreams, but to others they intensified the dangers of interpolity competition. This cognitive revolution acted as a condition of possibility for the emergence of ideas about a globe-spanning polity, a ‘Greater Britain’ uniting Britain and its settler colonies in the south Pacific, north America, and southern Africa. It was claimed that instantaneous global communication could, for the first time in human history, sustain the bonds of identity between the members of a community—the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’—scattered across oceanic distances (Seeley 1883; Bell 2007). Ideas about the potential scope of ‘the people’ and the nature of ‘the public’ were reconfigured, in a racialized precursor to contemporary debates about the emergence of a global public sphere (Bell 2010b).

Finally, the constitution of specific historical sensibilities has played a vital role in the imperial imaginary. The manner in which individuals and groups emplot historical trajectories, and the process through which these representations shape narrative constructions of the present and future, help to configure the scope and content of political discourse. They generate a repertoire of analogies, metaphors, ‘lessons’, and precedents that give shape to the field of action and determine assorted ethical imperatives about how and why to act. Cyclical conceptions of historical time have structured much western imperial discourse. The trope of rise and fall infused accounts of empire from the ancient world until deep into the twentieth century. Empires, on this account, are impermanent structures, subject to the vagaries of time, and as such they are either to be rejected (as bound to end in failure) or designed in such a way as to maximize their potential longevity (to defer failure for as long as possible). Modernity saw the emergence of a novel conception of historical time tied to open-ended notions of progress, and this in turn reshaped the ways in which the temporality of empires was conceived. While modern progressivist accounts of empire have often been haunted by nightmares of eventual decline and fall, they have not been burdened with the same sense of historical inevitability. History, on this account, need not repeat itself.

Modern imperial thought has also been shaped by a habit of comparison, the imperial gaze stretching across the world and back through time. Other empires, past and present, have provided templates for ways of ruling, practices to emulate, as well as cautionary tales about what to avoid. Historiography has

been an authoritative mode of political thinking. Modern European imperialists turned to the ancient world for validation, and Rome, above all, ‘consistently provided the inspiration, the imagery and the vocabulary for all the European Empires from early modern Spain to nineteenth century Britain’ (Pagden 2001: 28). Civic humanism offered ideological support for justifying global exploration, conquest, and occupation in early modern Europe (Fitzmaurice 2003; Hörnqvist 2004), while the language of neo-Roman republicanism permeated eighteenth-century defences of the British empire, especially in the North American colonies (Armitage 2000). The most obvious manifestation of this historicized sensibility, though, resided in the frequent reiteration of the classical debate over the corrupting relationship between empire and liberty (Pagden 1995; Armitage 2002). Yet comparisons between the ancients and the moderns were always selective and the imaginative resources extracted from Rome and Greece fed a variety of conflicting desires and demands.

Comparison could also be employed as a strategy to ‘deflect moral anxiety’ about the governing practices of empire (Welch 2003). The brutality of conquest and imperial rule could be relativized, and thus downplayed, either by comparing it favourably to the gross atrocities of past empires (usually the Spanish) or by arguing (as was widespread in British, French, and American debates) that the subject populations were better off governed by the most beneficent imperial power, whatever its defects, than by another more rapacious imperial state. In a related move, it could be argued that Western imperial domination was invariably better than non-European alternatives. As James Mill once wrote about India, ‘[e]ven the utmost abuse of European power, is better, we are persuaded, than the most temperate exercise of Oriental despotism’ (1810: 371). Counterfactual reasoning was routinely put at the service of imperialism.

These elements of the imperial imaginary continue to shape our world: Western political discourse is still shadowed by the spectre of the civilizing mission. Although usage of the term ‘civilization’ declined precipitously through the twentieth century, it is at least arguable that the underlying ideas never disappeared—they were rearticulated in the form of ‘modernization’ theory during the 1960s and 1970s (Gilman 2004) and are now rendered in the more palatable language of ‘development’ and ‘democratization’. Purportedly novel conceptions of time and space lie at the very heart of debate over globalization. During the twentieth century, the apparent ‘shrinking’ of the world through ever-more advanced communications and transport technologies underpinned the array of proposals for trans-planetary political institutions—regional unions,

democratic alliances, even a world-federation (Wooley 1988; Pemberton 2001; Bell 2012). Finally, the fascination with the ancients and the power of the comparative gaze continues undiminished. In the post 9/11 world, for example, both critics and admirers of the United States have routinely compared it with the nineteenth-century British empire (Ferguson 2004; Porter 2006) and with Rome (Maier 2006; Malamud 2008), seeking to identify patterns of similarity and difference that shed light on the contemporary condition. Defenders of liberal imperialism, meanwhile, still resort to cost–benefit calculations to argue that it was better than the available alternatives (Ferguson 2003). Plus ça change?

IDEOLOGIES OF JUSTIFICATION

Justifications of empire are often blended together in practice to form a powerful if inconsistent ideological amalgam. However, for the purposes of analytical clarity it is worth delineating some of the ideal-typical forms of argument that have been employed to justify conquest and rule in the modern era.⁶ I will briefly outline five: commercial-exploitative, realist-geopolitical, liberal-civilizational, republican, and martialist. They embody distinct logics, although they overlap in assorted ways. It is also worth noting that each kind of justification has found sophisticated expression in social scientific or historical explanatory theories during the last one hundred and fifty years. Ideological affirmation has been transmuted into canons of systematic scholarship. For example, the everyday arguments of imperial strategists and military planners find their contemporary academic analogue in ‘realist’ explanations of imperial expansion offered by IR scholars and diplomatic historians. Meanwhile, arguments once adduced on behalf of the financial benefits of empire are now the raw material of economic historians of western expansion. This highlights the complex entanglement of imperial politics and the evolution of the modern human sciences.

Realist-geopolitical arguments focus attention on power politics. According to such views, imperial consolidation or expansion is often regarded as necessary to balance or trump the power of competing imperial states. The world is envisaged as a geopolitical chessboard, with imperial strategy a vital ingredient of ultimate success. Imperialism is rarely seen as an end in itself but rather as a means to secure geopolitical advantage. This was the kind of argument proffered by Bismarck in Germany and Lord Salisbury in Britain. An underlying assumption is that scale translates into power; that the governance of large

territorial spaces is a perquisite of ‘great power’ status. Realist-geopolitical arguments play a starring role in much IR and historical scholarship. For example, they were central to Robinson and Gallagher’s (1961) seminal work on the ‘official mind’ of British imperialism in the nineteenth century. In a recent iteration of the argument, Brendan Simms (2007) contends that the fulcrum of British foreign policy throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to be found in Europe, not the empire, and insofar as Britain engaged in imperial activity in North America and Asia it was primarily to maintain the balance of power within Europe. One feature of this type of scholarship is that while it takes calculations of power and interest seriously, it pays little attention to wider ideological currents, focusing its attention on the views of small groups of elite policy-makers.

‘Commercial-exploitative’ arguments justify empire principally in terms of the economic benefits that it generates for the metropole (or specific interests therein). Throughout history, empires have acted as engines of wealth extraction and redistribution, moving raw materials, manufactured products, and countless people—whether administrators, workers, soldiers, or slaves—through complex circuits of production and exchange. It is unsurprising, then, that economic concerns have stood at the heart of many imperial ideologies. But the particular form of justificatory argument employed has evolved over time, especially as the state of economic ‘knowledge’ developed. There have been, in other words, performative consequences to the evolution of the discourse of political economy, from its origins in early modern Europe to the current dominance of its neoclassical variants. Commercial-exploitative arguments tend to focus on either the extraction of raw materials from an occupied territory or on opening new markets for trade. The shift in emphasis from the former to the latter represents one of the major ideological shifts in the modern history of empire (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 219–51; Pagden 2001: 103–77). Whereas deep into the early modern era imperial conquest was often legitimated through mercantilist arguments—with the Spanish empire in the Americas serving as an exemplar (Elliott 2006; Pagden 1995)—during the eighteenth century political economists began to insist that free trade was the best strategy to secure national economic development. Adam Smith’s critique of the ‘old colonial system’ in the *Wealth of Nations* (1776) was the most sophisticated elaboration of this argument. This shifted the burden of justification: imperial territories were increasingly regarded as either economic liabilities to be discarded or (more commonly) their role in the imperial order was reimagined. They were cast as nodes in a vast global trading system—as reservoirs of cheap labour and goods, or as profitable zones

for market exchange.

The relationship between capitalism and empire, then, stands at the core of debates over economic justifications of empire. Marx was ambivalent about imperialism. While critical of the violence and cupidity of European expansion, he nevertheless approved of its power to transform societies stifled by moribund ('oriental') traditions (Stedman Jones 2007). The task of developing a systematic theory of capitalist imperialism was taken up by many of his acolytes (Brewer 1990; Wolfe 1997), among whom the most influential were Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Nikolai Bukarin, and Vladimir Illich Lenin (1917), who famously argued that imperialism was the 'highest stage' of capitalism. With the partial exception of Luxemburg, all of them focused on the dire consequences for European politics, largely ignoring the impact of empire on those subjected to it. Marxist theorizing was later reworked by scholars in colonial and postcolonial states. Most influential of all were the *dependencia* theories that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (Brewer 1990: 136–98), though as with earlier Marxist accounts, their advocates downplayed the role of ideology in seeking to explain the dynamics of imperialism. (Indeed the lack of attention paid to ideology was one of the main criticisms levelled at Marxist analyses by scholars working in a postcolonial idiom). Arguments linking capitalism to imperialism are not, of course, the preserve of Marxists. Lenin himself drew on the writings of the British radical liberal J. A. Hobson, who dedicated his seminal *Imperialism: A Study* (1902) to exposing the dynamics of the 'new imperialism' of the late nineteenth-century. Joining a long line of radical critics of empire, all of whom stressed the economic imperatives driving imperialism, he concluded that capitalism itself was not at fault, only a distorted financial variant of it (Cain 2002; Claeys 2010). Other important analyses of the socioeconomic conditions generating European imperialism were penned by Hannah Arendt (1951), Karl Polanyi (1944), and Joseph Schumpeter (1919). Most work linking capitalism and imperialism is critical of either one or both of them, but there are exceptions. Neo-imperialists like Niall Ferguson (2004), for example, have been quick to praise the conjoined transformative energies of capitalism and liberal empire.

It would be impossible to deny the role of capitalism in motivating modern imperial activity, but it is nevertheless worth noting that, at least in the last two hundred years or so, few prominent thinkers have justified empire solely, or even primarily, in economic terms. Even Joseph Chamberlain, a British politician famous for his arguments about the economic benefits of empire, emphasized the absolute centrality of national honour and moral character in legitimating

imperialism (Cain 2007). What, then, is the relationship between imperial discourse and practice? One possibility is that the profession of non-economic justifications is a self-serving distortion of reality—ideology in the pejorative Marxist sense. Another possibility is that most imperial thinkers were motivated primarily by non-economic factors. (This option is compatible with the claim that governments and capitalist enterprises were driven by economic imperatives.) Perhaps most plausible is the idea that reflective imperialists typically had mixed motives, interweaving views on the economic gains generated by empire with a variety of other arguments, including those emphasizing its ability to protect important national (or racial) security interests and the world-transformative power of civilization. But not all advocates of empire were quite so panglossian. Recognizing that trade-offs were necessary, John Stuart Mill, to give one prominent example, argued that the British should retain their settler colonies if possible, but that doing so would invariably amplify their military vulnerability (1861: ch. 18). Costs had to be weighed against benefits. Difficult choices had to be made.

The relationship between liberalism and empire has generated a substantial body of scholarship (Mehta 1999; Morefield 2004; Pitts 2005; Sartori 2006). Arguments range from the claim that liberalism is inherently imperial to the Schumpeterian position that the two are antithetical. Both poles of the spectrum are implausible, not least because liberalism is such an inchoate ideological tradition that generalizations about its content are usually misleading. It contains resources both to justify and to critique imperialism. Despite this qualification, it is undoubtedly the case that during the last two centuries a particular strand of ‘liberal civilizing imperialism’ has thrived. Maintaining that liberal states have a right (even a duty) to spread ‘civilization’ to the purportedly non-civilized peoples of the world, its advocates insist that empire is only legitimate if it is primarily intended to benefit the populations subjected to it. Any other benefits that it generates are derivative and incidental. As Mill wrote in *On Liberty* (1859: 224), ‘[d]espotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end’. Giuseppe Mazzini, writing in the early 1870s, likewise endorsed the ‘moral mission’ of civilizing colonialism, suggesting that the Europeans were destined to transform Asia and that Italy ‘should not lose out on this wonderful new movement’ (2009: 238). At the turn of the twentieth century Chamberlain recorded the shift towards this ‘altruistic’ vision of empire: ‘the sense of possession has given place to a different sentiment—the sense of obligation. We feel now that our rule over their territories can only be justified if

we can show that it adds to the happiness and prospects of the people' (1897: 3). Most articulations of this argument link civilization to nationality and sovereignty. Civilization is seen as a necessary though not sufficient condition for the emergence of national self-consciousness, which in turn is regarded as essential to trigger liberal claims to the right of political self-determination. Once a society had developed to the point where it could be classified as civilized, and once it exhibited authentic national self-consciousness, it could justifiably claim independence, and the job of the liberal imperial power was complete. But the temporal coordinates were very rarely specified; freedom was deferred to some indefinite point in the future. In the meantime, attention was focused on refining the modes and modulations of imperial rule—on ideologies of governance.

Liberal civilizing imperialism co-existed with another kind of justificatory argument which we might characterize as 'republican'. Republican imperialism is primarily motivated by a concern with the character of the imperial power, justifying empire in terms of a particular class of benefits that it generates for the state. Its proponents seek to foster individual and collective virtue in their compatriots, while upholding national honour and glory. Any other benefits that empire generates—including economic gain and 'civilization'—are derivative and incidental. This kind of argument has deep roots in western political thought, traceable to Rome. During the nineteenth-century Alexis de Tocqueville, and a range of British commentators, including the historians J. R. Seeley and J. A. Froude, articulated republican defences of empire. Though they employed the language of civilization to classify and order the world—as we would expect, given its central role in the imperial imaginary—they tended not to justify imperialism principally in terms of its civilizing agency. For example, although Froude often boasted about the greatness of the British empire, he placed little emphasis on 'civilizing' occupied territories, focusing instead on the virtues that such power fostered in the British population (Bell 2009). Republican justifications predate liberalism by centuries, and they offer a different kind of argument about the character and purpose of empire, as well as its potential fate.

Finally, we can isolate a 'martialist' justification of empire. Martialism is the view that 'war is both the supreme instrument and the ultimate realization of all human endeavour' (Nabulsi 1999: 126). It stresses the transcendent role of violence in shaping individual and collective character. The field of battle is seen as a space for enacting a warrior masculinity, and for inculcating virility in a population. Although it found its most ardent supporters in *fin de siècle* Germany—including Helmut von Moltke and Heinrich von Treitschke—a 'martialist *Zeitgeist*', Karma Nabulsi contends, infused the thought and practice

of many British soldiers, imperial administrators and civil servants in the nineteenth century. It was expressed, though rarely in an explicit and straightforward sense, in the utterances of writers such as Thomas Carlyle and J. A. Cramb (Nabulsi 1999: 110–19), and it can also be located in the works of some of the more jingoistic British poets of the age, such as W. E. Henley, who once proclaimed that ‘War, the Red Angel’ was the lifeblood of the nation (1897: 241). Empire, on this view, is a space for forging character through rituals of destruction.

IDEOLOGIES OF GOVERNANCE

Governance includes the discrete institutions of government but it also encompasses the assorted practices and structures—educational systems, market orders, civil society actors, cultural agencies—through which populations are administered and regulated. It focuses, then, on the multiple vectors for creating, maintaining, and contesting, political legitimacy. The modalities of governance employed to rule empires, and to construct pliant imperial subjectivities, have varied greatly across time and space.

For much of human history the ability of governments to rule territory was severely constrained by practical concerns, above all the difficulties of creating effective administrative systems. Only in the last couple of hundred years—and in particular during the last century—have states gained the capacity to systematically observe, measure, and regulate large populations, thus providing the necessary condition for comprehensive sovereign power (Scott 1998, 2009).⁷ Governance of this kind has ascribed a central role to the politics of knowledge. In the British empire, for example, administrators and scholars were set to work classifying different castes in India, tribes in Africa, languages, legal systems, sexualities, geographies, even dreams (Linstrum 2012). Such exercises created the ‘colonial knowledge’ thought necessary to police and rule space, though it was rarely as effective as its advocates proclaimed (Cohn 1996; Bayly 1999; Dirks 2001). Mapping the ‘human terrain’, as it has come to be called in the post-9/11 era, was a central element of imperial governance.

The question of whether formal or informal rule is the most effective runs through modern imperial discourse. The scholarly debate on the topic was initiated by Robinson and Gallagher’s famous argument about the ‘imperialism of free trade’ in the nineteenth century. Where possible, they argued, the British preferred to subordinate other societies through economic instruments rather than formal occupation—‘trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule

when necessary' (1953: 13). It was not necessary to exercise *de jure* sovereignty over a political community to wield profound and pervasive control over it. The mid-nineteenth century, then, was marked less by a retreat from empire, as was once commonly assumed, than a turn to novel non-territorial forms of imperial governance. This kind of argument highlights how economic regimes—specific configurations of state, market, and knowledge—can shape modes of rule. Mike Davis (2003), for example, argues that Britain's commitment to classical liberal economics facilitated the famines which ravaged the population of British India in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, killing uncounted millions. Linking imperialism directly to liberal economic ideology opens a space for arguing that the postcolonial world remains structured by imperialism (Harvey 2003; Callinicos 2009). On this account, even if formal empires have retreated to the wings, imperialism remains embedded in the structures and ideology of the current global economic order. Neoliberalism can be seen as the latest manifestation of capitalist imperialism (Harvey 2005).

A key issue in imperial governance concerns the degree to which an imperial power tries to (re)construct the subjected society in its own image—the extent to which empire becomes a totalizing project. This was a contested issue in the nineteenth-century debates over how and why the British should rule India. A new generation of liberal civilizing imperialists attacked what they saw as an outdated policy in which European intervention in local Indian affairs was minimized (whether this was a realistic picture is a separate question). They were adamant that the primary aim of empire was to civilize a barbarian land and not simply to extract revenue or provide an outlet for British geopolitical ambition. These contrasting ends implied very different governing means. In particular, the civilizational model demanded a much more intrusive governance regime. The character of public education assumed a fundamental role, spawning a famous ideological dispute between 'Orientalists' and 'Anglicizers'. Professing respect for Indian cultural achievements, the Orientalists favoured allocating money to teaching Sanskrit and Arabic, while the Anglicizers insisted on making English the primary language (Zastoupil and Moir 1999). This was the occasion for T. B. Macaulay's notorious 'Minute on Indian Education' wherein he proclaimed that 'a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia' (1835: 721). English should be supported because it conveyed the teachings of a superior civilization—language was a vehicle for progress. At stake here was a question about both the purpose and the most appropriate governing technologies of empire.

A significant transition occurred in the governing ideology of the British

empire in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Karuna Mantena has characterized this as a shift from ‘ethical’ modes of imperialism (exemplified by John Stuart Mill) to informal ‘alibis’ of empire (exemplified by Henry Maine). The British retreated from attempting to create imperial subjects in their own image, and instead turned increasingly to modes of rule that they claimed protected fragile native communities. ‘Rather than eradicated or aggressively modernized, native social and political forms would now be patronized as they became inserted into the institutional dynamics of imperial power’ (Mantena 2010: 2).⁸ Although this argument understates the extent to which ‘ethical’ justifications continued to circulate, the gradual emergence of more indirect styles of governance was highly significant. The major practical impact of this ideological shift was the transition towards government by indirect rule in Britain’s African colonies and the later development of notions of trusteeship under the League of Nations.

Settler colonialism presented its own range of distinctive justificatory and governing strategies (Veracini 2010). In a standard conceptual move, Mill distinguished two classes of British ‘dependencies’: those composed of people of a ‘similar civilization’ that were ‘capable of, and ripe for, representative government’, and those, defined in hierarchical opposition, that remained ‘a great distance from that state’ (2001: 562). The former group included Australia, Canada, New Zealand—and had once included the United States—while the latter encompassed India and British territories in the Caribbean and Africa. Since the settler colonies were seen as already populated by civilized subjects, they were justified and governed in different ways from the rest of the empire. In India the primary target of imperial governance, and the postulated locus of the problem it sought to rectify, was the mind of the ‘barbarian’. Discussion of the settler empire was likewise saturated with the imagery of childhood, except here the referent was different. The target was not the people, who were after all descendants or relations of the inhabitants of Britain, but rather the polities in which they lived. The collective not the individual, the whole not the part, required supervision. It was Australia, Canada, and New Zealand that were ‘young’ and ‘immature’. They were governed in a different manner from the rest of the British empire: from the middle of the nineteenth century, for example, they were granted increasing political autonomy (‘responsible government’).⁹ Furthermore, from the 1850s onwards most advocates of settler colonialism argued that the formal connection between ‘mother country’ and colonies was only legitimate if subject to reciprocal assent. This stands in stark contrast to attitudes to the rest of the empire, where subjects were not regarded as

sufficiently developed, politically, cognitively, or morally, to enter into such voluntaristic relations.

Violence, and the threat of violence, is a necessary element of imperial governance. Empires are typically administered through a complex pattern of central rule and local collaboration, but violence is an ever-present possibility, employed both to enforce the existing order and to challenge it. During the nineteenth century the utility of violence triggered disagreement between otherwise putatively 'liberal' defenders of empire. For Tocqueville, an ardent proponent of French rule in Algeria, empire sometimes required brutal extra-judicial measures. 'In order for us to colonize to any extent', he asserted, 'we must necessarily use not only violent measures, but visibly iniquitous ones', and as such it was sometimes acceptable to 'burn harvests, ... empty silos, and finally ... seize unarmed men, women, and children' (Tocqueville 2001: 83, 70). This kind of position horrified John Stuart Mill and many of his followers (Pitts 2005). For Mill, upholding the rule of law and treating subjects with due consideration was an indispensable element of enlightened imperialism, differentiating it from illegitimate despotism. This belief underpinned support for the campaign, in which Mill played a prominent role, to bring Governor Eyre to justice for his abuse of power in Jamaica in the 1860s (Kostal 2005). However, liberal imperialists were almost invariably blind to the lived experience of imperial rule, failing to recognize that routinized violence was inescapable in governing conquered spaces. While Mill became increasingly perturbed by the prevalence of colonial violence towards the end of his life, he nevertheless continued to preach the benefits of civilizing imperialism (Bell 2010a).

In recent years, the legacy of imperial governance has shaped various aspects of world order. Imperial administrative practices forged in the early twentieth century have found a new lease of life as trusteeships and protectorates have played a starring role in United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere (Bain 2003; Mayall and Soares de Oliveira 2011). Methods of colonial policing, meanwhile, have been widely employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 'counter-insurgency' activities have been launched against resistance movements of various kinds. Western militaries are far more open about the colonial origins of such strategies—forged in the battlespaces of Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam, among others—than the governments who sent them there. Indeed learning the lessons of previous colonial wars has been a central feature of the post-9/11 national security apparatus. A further legacy of imperial governmentality can be seen in the deployment of social scientists—and above all, anthropologists—to

the global south to provide the ‘cultural knowledge’ necessary to fight insurgencies (Kelly 2010).

IDEOLOGIES OF RESISTANCE

There are as many ideologies of resistance as there are of justification and governance. Excavating them would involve working at multiple levels of analysis, and in a variety of scholarly registers, spanning what James Scott labels ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ (1985, 1990), through the ideas animating revolutionary movements, to the sophisticated theoretical critiques developed by philosophers. For the sake of convenience, we can divide such ideologies into two broad families. The first set emanates from the imperial metropole; they constitute a form of internal opposition to the practices of imperialism. The second set is produced by subjects of imperial rule. Historically the most prominent strands of metropolitan opposition focused largely (though not exclusively) on the damage that imperialism wreaks on the imperial power itself, paying scant attention to those subjected to the violence and the humiliation of empire. The second form of imperial resistance argument focuses largely (though not exclusively) on that violence and humiliation.

The term ‘anti-imperialism’ is often misleading when applied to ideologies of resistance. Many of the arguments lumped under the umbrella do not reject imperialism in principle—instead they focus on certain kinds of imperialism. An important body of scholarship has sought to anatomize the tradition of ‘liberal’ imperial critique in Western Europe, demonstrating that an array of important thinkers, including Diderot, Herder, Smith, Bentham, and Kant opposed imperial conquest (Muthu 2003; Pitts 2005).¹⁰ Despite this opposition, however, it is worth bearing in mind that much ‘Enlightenment’ thought was nevertheless shaped by the imperial imaginary. Edmund Burke has also been reinterpreted as an important source of anti-imperial theorizing, albeit less convincingly (Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005; cf. Kohn and O’Neill 2006). It is sometimes suggested that anti-imperial arguments were marginalized by the middle of the nineteenth century, supplanted by the unabashed liberal imperialism exemplified by John Stuart Mill. This is misleading, however, for the nineteenth century saw stinging attacks on empire—as passionate and comprehensive as any launched by Smith, Bentham, or Kant—from esteemed liberal philosophers (such as Herbert Spencer), politicians (such as Richard Cobden), and political economists (such as J. A. Hobson). Like the late eighteenth-century critics, though, they were rarely opposed to *all* forms of empire; the ‘anti-imperial’ critique only cut so

deep. For example, many of them opposed the violent usurpation and rule of European powers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America while simultaneously endorsing the seizure of ‘unoccupied’ lands by European settlers—the kind of settler colonialism that led to the dispossession and death (sometimes through genocide) of innumerable people in Australasia and North America, among other places (Moses 2004, 2008). Hobson, who is often regarded as an archetypal anti-imperialist, was an ardent supporter of settler colonialism (1902). Given the ubiquity of the imperial imaginary, it is unsurprising that arguments explicitly critical of empire were nevertheless typically underpinned by racial and civilizational assumptions.

Liberalism was not an ideology confined to the metropole—it was both a product and an agent of globalization. During the course of the nineteenth century it was spread throughout the world by European imperial powers, but it was then often indigenized, adapted to local circumstances and traditions to provide a repertoire of arguments which could be utilized as part of an anti-imperial struggle. As C. A. Bayly notes, the leaders of anti-imperial protests ‘in places as far distant as Santiago, Cape Town and Canton invoked the notion of their ‘rights’ as individuals and as representatives of nations’ (Bayly 2011: 835; Reus-Smit 2011). An emergent Indian liberal tradition provided a powerful ideological resource to oppose empire (Bayly 2012). Modern western empires often carried the ideological virus which eventually helped to kill them.

Like liberalism, republicanism is capable of being utilized for both imperial and anti-imperial ends. Whereas republican imperialism contends that the pursuit of empire is important (or even necessary) for maintaining a virtuous political community, republican anti-imperialism asserts that the very existence of the republic is endangered by imperial activity: republican virtues are corroded by the ‘spirit of conquest’. According to republicans, Quentin Skinner argues, ‘[y]ou can hope to retain your individual freedom from dependence on the will of others if and only if you live as an active citizen of a state that is fully self-governing, and is consequently neither dominating nor dominated’ (2010: 100). Offering a contemporary gloss on this venerable theme, Philip Pettit suggests that ‘the free individual is protected against the domination of others by the undominating and undominated state’ (Pettit 2010: 77). Republican anti-imperial arguments have been popular during the last couple of centuries, most notably in the United States, where the founding has been mythologized as an archetypal anti-imperial moment (Mayers 2007). Today they are deployed to challenge American hegemony. Chalmers Johnson (2007), for example, laments that the American republic is being destroyed by militarism and the pursuit of global

empire—it faces nemesis, the product of hubris.

The Marxist arguments I mentioned in the third section of this chapter can be seen both as attempts to explain the dynamics of imperialism and as contributions to ideologies of resistance. Marxism provided much of the intellectual impetus for anti-imperial praxis throughout the twentieth century, and variants of Marxism remain central to both anti-imperial social movements and to the politico-intellectual attack on the neo-liberal order. In one of the most widely discussed recent interventions, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004) argue that we are witnessing the emergence of a new form of network ‘Empire’. On this interpretation, Empire is ‘a *decentred* and *deter-ritorialis*ing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers’. Empire, they continue, can ‘only be conceived as a universal republic, a network of powers and counterpowers structured in a boundless and inclusive architecture’ (2000: xii, 166). (Their argument is notable among other things for underplaying the continued salience of the United States.) Traditional styles of resistance, based on nationalist forms of belonging, are as obsolete as the territorial modes of imperialism they originally challenged. Instead, Empire spawns its own agent of resistance—the ‘Multitude’, the ‘productive, creative subjectivities of globalization’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 60). An amorphous, heterogeneous assemblage of workers, the dispossessed and the oppressed, the multitude is (somehow) supposed to offer an alternative way of being (Hardt and Negri 2004). Empire dialectically generates the specific mode of resistance that will dissolve or transcend it. Other Marxist theorists have recoiled from Hardt and Negri’s grandiose metaphysics of resistance, and focused instead on unravelling the social dynamics of contemporary forms of neoliberal imperialism and its alternatives (Harvey 2003; Anievas 2010).

A plethora of anticolonial movements and ideologies sprang up in the world’s occupied zones during the twentieth century. While impossible to do them justice in such a short space, it is worth highlighting two influential but contrasting models: the Gandhian and Fanonian. Perhaps more than any other anti-imperialist, Gandhi combined theory and practice as part of a seamless whole (Parekh 1989; Steger 2000; Parel 2006; Mantena 2012). In *Hind Swaraj* (1909) he sketched both a stringent critique of Western civilization and elaborated an alternative non-violent form of nationalist politics rooted in the celebration of Indian cultural practices. For Gandhi, western civilization was poisoned by its materialism, its moral myopia, and its destructive individualism—it was hypocritical to the core. Adopting a strategy of ‘reversal’, he denigrated the claims to normative superiority used by the British to legitimate their empire

while affirming many of the ‘traditional’ practices that they had belittled, finding in Indian civilization a productive source of ethical guidance and spiritual development.¹¹ True (Indian) civilization embodied the virtues—self-abnegation, duty, good conduct, self-control—that Western culture was incapable of sustaining (Gandhi 1997: 67–8). Mixing romantic nostalgia, hard-headed political criticism and an iconoclastic account of nationalism, *Hind Swaraj* served as a seminal (though selectively appropriated) text for the Indian nationalist movement and a source of inspiration for many anticolonial movements.

Frantz Fanon, an Algerian psychiatrist and journalist, defended a radically different kind of resistance. Drawing on Marxism and psychoanalysis, his work illuminated the complex intersections of race and economic exploitation undergirding European empires (Gibson 2003). In his analyses of the social and racial dynamics of imperialism—most famously *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963, Fanon 2001)—he emphasized its extreme violence and the damaging psychic consequences for the oppressed. Like Gandhi he dissected the hypocrisy of western universalism, deriding its claims to superiority: ‘when the native hears a speech about Western culture he pulls out his knife’ (Fanon 2001: 43). Yet he diverged from Gandhi in at least two important respects. First, he was highly ambivalent about nationalism. Recognizing it as a necessary stage of anticolonial politics, he ultimately sought to transcend it, for rather than offering a vehicle to escape colonial rule, nationalism promised to reinscribe its hierarchical structures in novel forms. Fostering national consciousness served as a symbolic way for the new postcolonial elites to mask the mimetic dynamics of exploitation. The problem of oppression was not resolved by granting formal freedom, because capitalism was necessarily exploitative and freedom-constraining. This line of argument marked a powerful move, for much early anticolonial thought and practice was framed within the terms of a national imaginary. Indeed the nationalist impulse of much anti-colonial activism provided one of the main targets for a later generation of postcolonial scholars (Chatterjee 1986, 1993). The second, and most controversial, way in which Fanon diverged from Gandhi was in his defence of the utility of violence in colonial contexts. Violence was an essential part of the anti-imperial struggle, necessary both to overcome the overwhelming power of the colonial state and to provide a form of catharsis for its victims. Liberation—both political and psychological—was only possible through a brutal clash of wills. It is in part through the exercise of such violence that colonial subjects can regain their agency. ‘At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the

native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect' (2001: 74). Fanon's arguments resonated widely in a world caught in the throes of anticolonial struggle, while generating sharp criticism from those who rejected his advocacy of violence (Arendt 1970; Walzer 1978: 204–6).

We are left with a question about what forms of resistance are appropriate in the contemporary world. Modern history offers a range of answers, each of which finds its contemporary exponents. Liberal and republican thinkers and activists have offered forceful criticisms of imperial action, while Marxism continues to inspire social movements throughout the world, its arguments and strategies adapted to new forms of oppression. Gandhian non-violence still finds enthusiasts (e.g. Tully 2008). What of violent resistance? This is a topic that is rarely explored in contemporary political theory, yet if the current global order is a site of vast injustice, as many theorists suggest, should violence be ruled out? After all, to deny victims the right to resist their oppressors seems to conspire in their subjugation. The ghost of Fanon has not yet been exorcised.

CONCLUSION

One of the most famous passages written about imperialism can be found in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*:

The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it, not a sentimental pretence but an idea: and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to (Conrad 1996: 21).

Conrad here penetrates to the core of the issues that I have discussed in this chapter. Empire is never a 'pretty thing', and while no idea redeems it—despite the claims of Conrad's narrator and the protestations of contemporary neo-imperialists—modern imperialism cannot be understood adequately without grasping the ideas that have motivated its advocates, legitimated its practices, and animated resistance to it. We live in a world shaped by the histories, memories, and myths of past empires, and in which imperial power still determines the life chances of countless millions of people. It should remain a central topic of concern for students of ideology.

NOTES

1. For discussions of different conceptions of (largely European) empire, see Pagden (1995); Wolfe (1997); Armitage (1998); Muldoon (1999).
2. For some notable exceptions, see Doyle (1986); Motyl (2001); Cooley (2005); Nexon (2009).
3. Taylor distinguishes imaginaries from theories, the latter explicit bodies of doctrine, the former often unstructured background features of social existence (Taylor 2004: 24–5). In line with Manfred Steger (2008), I suggest that ideologies occupy a middle position, nested within social imaginaries, but themselves (often) containing a variety of more or less distinguishable theories. Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive.
4. Among historians of modern Britain there is a heated dispute about the extent to which society was (and is) shaped by empire (Mackenzie 1986; Hall 2002; Porter 2004; Thompson 2005).
5. The following discussion draws on material from Bell (2006).
6. Inconsistency is no bar to the political efficacy of an ideology; indeed there are ideological benefits to vagueness (Freedman 2005).
7. The work of Michel Foucault has proven especially insightful in delineating the various modulations of power and ‘governmentality’ involved in imperial subjugation. See, for prominent examples, Mitchell (1991, 2002) and Stoler (1995).
8. Again highlighting the interpenetration between the modern social sciences and empire, Mantena (2010) shows how the origins of modern social theory were inflected with imperial concerns, not least through the development of the category of ‘traditional society’.
9. James Belich (2009) argues that the early nineteenth century saw a ‘Settler Revolution’ that led to the explosive settlement of two related geo-economic regions, the ‘American West’ and the ‘British West’ (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa). This revolution cemented the rise of the ‘Anglo-world’, which continues to exert great power today (see also Vucetic 2011).
10. Edmund Burke has also been reinterpreted as an important source of anti-imperial theorizing, albeit less convincingly (Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005; cf. Kohn and O’Neill 2006).
11. On anti-colonial strategies of reversal, see Kohn and McBride (2011: 144): ‘Reversal describes attempts to undermine power relations by valorizing the cultural markers that the colonial system had denigrated as inferior’.

REFERENCES

- Abernethy, D. 2000. *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Anievas, A. (ed.) 2010. *Marxism and World Politics: Contesting Global Capitalism*. London: Routledge.
- Arendt, H. 1951. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Schocken.
- Arendt, H. 1970. *On Violence*. New York: Mariner.
- Armitage, D. (ed.) 1998. *Theories of Empire, 1450–1800*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Armitage, D. 2000. *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Armitage, D. 2002. ‘Empire and liberty’. Pp 29–47 in *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, Vol. II., eds. M. van Geldren and Q. Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bain, W. 2003. *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barkawi, T. 2010. ‘Empire and order in international relations and security studies’. Pp. 1360–79 in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, Vol. III, ed. R. Denemark. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bayly, C. A. 2004. *The Birth of the Modern World: Global Connections and Comparisons 1780–1914*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bayly, C. A. 2011. ‘European political thought and the wider world during the nineteenth century’. Pp. 835–63 in *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth Century Political Thought*, eds. G. Claeys and G. Stedman

- Jones. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bayly, C. A. 2012. *Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bayly, S. 1999. *Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Belich, J. 2009. *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, D. 2006. 'Empire and international relations in Victorian political thought: historiographical essay', *The Historical Journal*, 49: 281–98.
- Bell, D. 2007. *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bell, D. 2009. 'Republican imperialism: J. A. Froude and the virtue of empire', *History of Political Thought*, 30: 166–91.
- Bell, D. 2010a. 'John Stuart Mill on colonies', *Political Theory*, 38: 1–31.
- Bell, D. 2010b. 'Imagined spaces: nation, state, and territory in the British colonial empire, 1860–1914'. Pp. 197–214 in *The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History*, eds. B. Simms and W. Mulligan. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Bell, D. 2012. 'The project for a new Anglo century: race, space, and global order'. Pp. 33–56 in *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities beyond West and East*, ed. P. Katzenstein. London: Routledge.
- Bhabha, H. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Bowden, B. 2009. *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brantlinger, P. 2003. *Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1800–1930*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Brewer, A. 1990. *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.
- Burbank, J. and F. Cooper. 2010. *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Burke, E. 1991. 'Opening of impeachment [16 Feb 1788]'. Pp. 312–73 in *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke: Vol. VI, India: The Launching of the Hastings Impeachment 1786–1788*, ed. P. J. Marshall. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cain, P. 2002. *Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance, 1887–1938*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cain, P. 2007. 'Empire and the languages of character and virtue in later Victorian and Edwardian Britain', *Modern Intellectual History*, 4: 249–73.
- Callinicos, A. 2009. *Imperialism and the Global Political Economy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Chakrabarty, D. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Chamberlain, J. 1897. 'The true conception of the empire'. Pp. 1–6 in *Mr Chamberlain's Speeches*, vol. II, ed. C. Boyd. London: Constable.
- Chatterjee, P. 1986. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*. London: Zed Books.
- Chatterjee, P. 1993. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Claeys, G. 2010. *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850–1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohn, B. 1996. *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Colás, A. 2007. *Empire*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Conrad, J. 1996. *Heart of Darkness*, ed. R. Murfin, 2nd edn. London: St. Martins.

- Constant, B. 1814. 'The spirit of conquest and usurpation and their relation to European civilization'. Pp. 51–165 in B. Constant, *Political Writings*, ed. B. Fontana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooley, A. 2005. *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Cooper, F. and A. L. Stoler. (eds.) 1997. 'Between metropole and colony: rethinking a research agenda'. Pp. 1–59 in *Tensions of Empire*, eds. F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Darwin, J. 2007. *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400–2000*. London: Penguin.
- Davis, M. 2003. *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World*. London: Verso.
- Dirks, N. 2001. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Doyle, M. 1986. *Empires*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Driver, F. 2001. *Geography Militant: Cultures of Exploration and Empire*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Elliott, J. H. 2006. *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830*. London: Yale University Press.
- Fanon, F. 2001. *The Wretched of the Earth*. London: Penguin.
- Ferguson, N. 2003. *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*. London: Penguin.
- Ferguson, N. 2004. *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*. London: Penguin.
- Fitzmaurice, A. 2003. *Humanism and America: An Intellectual History of English Colonization, 1500–1625*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Freeden, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freeden, M. 2004. 'Ideology, political theory and political philosophy'. Pp. 3–17 in *Handbook of Political Theory*, eds. G. Gaus and C. Kukathas. London: Sage.
- Freeden, M. 2005. 'What should the "political" in political philosophy explore?' *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 13: 113–34.
- Gandhi, M. 1997. *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, ed. A. Parel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson, N. 2003. *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Gilman, N. 2004. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore: JHU Press.
- Gregory, D. 2004. *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hall, C. 2002. *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hardt, M. and A. Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, M. and A. Negri. 2004. *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, D. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Henley, W. E. 1897/1926. Epilogue. In W. E. Henley, *Poems*. London: Macmillan.
- Hobson, J. A. 1902. *Imperialism: A Study*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Hobson, J. 2012. *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hörnqvist, M. 2004. *Machiavelli and Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ignatieff, M. 2003. *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*. London: Vintage.
- Ikenberry, J. 2006. *Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Inayatullah, N. and D. Blaney. 2004. *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*. New York: Routledge.

- Johnson, C. 2007. *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Kearns, G. 2009. *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kelly, G. (ed.) 2010. *Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kern, S. 1983. *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1914*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kohn, M. and K. McBride. 2011. *Political Theories of Decolonization: Postcolonialism and the Problem of Foundations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kohn, M. and D. O'Neill. 2006. 'A tale of two Indias: Burke and Mill on empire and slavery in the West Indies and America', *Political Theory*, 34: 198–228.
- Kostal, R. 2005. *A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lenin, V. I. 1917 [1996]. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline*. London: Junius.
- Lieven, D. 2002. *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Linstrum, E. 2012. 'The politics of psychology in the British empire, 1898–1960', *Past and Present*, 215: 214–33.
- Long, D. and B. Schmidt, (eds.) 2005. *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Macaulay, T. B. 1835 [1957]. 'Minute of 2 February 1835 on Indian Education'. In *Macaulay, Prose and Poetry*, ed. G. M. Young. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mackenzie, J. (ed.) 1986. *Imperialism and Popular Culture*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Maier, C. 2006. *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Malamud, M. 2008. *Ancient Rome and Modern America*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mantena, K. 2010. *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mantena, K. 2012. 'Another realism: the politics of Gandhian nonviolence'. *American Political Science Review*, 106: 455–70.
- Mayall, J. and Soares de Oliveira, (eds.) 2011. *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst.
- Mayers, D. 2007. *Dissenting Voices in America's Rise to Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mazzini, G. 2009. 'Principles of international politics (1871)'. Pp. 224–41 in *A Cosmopolitanism and Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building and International Relations*, eds. Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mehta, U. 1999. *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mill, James. 1810. 'Review of Voyage aux Indes Orientales', by Le P. Paulin De S. Barthélemy, *Edinburgh Review*, 15: 363–84.
- Mill, J. S. 1861. *Considerations on Representative Government*. 1977. Pp. 371–577 in *John Stuart Mill: Essays on Politics and Society*, vol. 18, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press/Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Mill, J. S. 1859. *On Liberty*. Pp. 213–310 in *John Stuart Mill: Essays on Politics and Society*, vol. 18, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press/Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Mill, J. S. 1984. 'A few words on non-intervention'. Pp. 111–24 in *John Stuart Mill: Essays on Equality, Law, and Education*, vol. 21, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press/Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Mitchell, T. 1991. *Colonising Egypt*. University of California Press.
- Mitchell, T. 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California

- Press.
- Morefield, J. 2004. *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moses, A. D. (ed.) 2004. *Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History*. New York: Berghahn.
- Moses, A. D. (ed.) 2008. *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History*. New York: Berghahn.
- Motyl, A. 2001. *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Muldoon, J. 1999. *Empire and Order: the Concept of Empire, 800–1800*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Muthu, S. 2003. *Enlightenment Against Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nabulsi, K. 1999. *Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nexon, D. 2009. *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- O'Brien, P. 2006. 'Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history', *Journal of Global History*, 1: 3–39.
- Pagden, A. 1995. *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, 1500–1850*. London: Yale University Press.
- Pagden, A. 2001. *Peoples and Empires: Europeans and the Rest of the World, from Antiquity to the Present*. London: Phoenix.
- Parekh, B. 1989. *Gandhi's Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination*. London: Macmillan.
- Parel, A. 2006. *Gandhi's Philosophy and the Quest for Harmony*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pemberton, J.-A. 2001. *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World*. London: Pluto.
- Pettit, P. 2010. 'A republican law of peoples', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9: 70–94.
- Pitts, J. 2005. *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pitts, J. 2010. 'Political theory of empire and imperialism', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13: 211–35.
- Pocock, J. G. A. 2005. *Barbarism and Religion: Vol. 4: Barbarians, Savages and Empires*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon.
- Porter, B. 2004. *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Porter, B. 2006. *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America, and the World*. London: Yale University Press.
- Reus-Smit, C. 2011. 'Struggles for individual rights and the expansion of the international system', *International Organisation*, 65: 207–42.
- Robinson, R. and J. Gallagher. 1953. 'The imperialism of free trade', *The Economic History Review*, 6: 1–15.
- Robinson, R. and J. Gallagher, with A. Denny. 1961. *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*. London: Macmillan.
- Said, E. 1978. *Orientalism*. London: Routledge.
- Said, E. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Sahlins, M. 1995. *How 'Natives' Think: About Captain Cook, for Example*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sartori, A. 2006. 'The British empire and its liberal mission', *Journal of Modern History*, 78: 623–42.
- Scott, D. 2004. *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*. Durham, NC: Duke

- University Press.
- Scott, J. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. 1990. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*. London: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. 2009. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Schumpeter, J. 1919 [1955]. *Imperialism: Social Classes: Two Essays*. New York: Meridian.
- Seeley, J. R. 1883. *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures*. London: Macmillan.
- Simms, B. 2007. *Three Victories and a Defeat. The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–1783*. London: Penguin.
- Skinner, Q. 2010. 'On the slogans of republican political theory', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9: 95–102.
- Spivak, G. 1988. 'Can the subaltern speak?' Pp. 271–313 in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Stedman Jones, G. 2007. 'Radicalism and the extra-European world: the case of Marx'. Pp. 186–215 in *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth Century Political Thought*, ed. D. Bell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Steger, M. 2000. *Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Steger, M. 2008. *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Steger, M. 2009. 'The changing face of political ideologies in the global age', *New Political Science*, 31 (4):423–30.
- Stoler, A. 1995. *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Stoler, A. 2010. *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Taylor, C. 2004. *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Thompson, A. 2005. *The Empire Strikes Back: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain since the Mid-Nineteenth Century*. London: Longmans.
- Todorov, T. 1992. *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans. R. Howard. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Tocqueville, A. 2001. 'Essay on Algeria (October 1841)' in Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, ed. J. Pitts. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Tully, J. 2008. *Public Philosophy in a New Key*, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Veracini, L. 2010. *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Vitalis, R. 2010. 'The noble American science of imperial relations and its laws of race development', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 52 (4): 909–38.
- Vucetic, S. 2011. *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Walzer, M. 1978. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. London: Allen Lane.
- Welch, C. 2003. 'Colonial violence and the rhetoric of evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria', *Political Theory*, 31: 235–64.
- Wolf, E. 1982. *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Wolfe, P. 1997. 'History and imperialism: A century of theory, from Marx to postcolonialism', *American Historical Review*, 102: 388–420.
- Wooley, Wesley T. 1988. *Alternatives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism since World War II*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Zastoupil, L. and Moir, M. (eds.) 1999. *The Great Indian Education Debate: Documents Relating to the Orientalist-Anglicist Controversy, 1781–1843*. London: Curzon.

CHAPTER 30 FEMINISM

CLARE CHAMBERS

FEMINISM is a refusal of that which is genuinely ideological: patriarchy. Patriarchy is so paradigmatically ideological, in the Marxist sense, that it is able to conceal its existence as such—and so is rarely discussed as an ideology except in connection with feminism.¹ Patriarchy is the ideology by which men constitute the dominant social group and masculinity is the dominant social practice. Under patriarchy this masculine perspective is presented as universal, and thus invisible as a perspective. Feminism's first priority has been to point out that patriarchy is an ideology, that its supposedly universal perspective is the perspective of a specific group that is unjustly dominant, and that it is so successful ideologically that it has become the default perspective of the subordinate group as well.

Staying for the moment with a Marxist conception of ideology, there are three senses in which feminism is an ideology and three in which it is not. Feminism is an ideology, first, because it presents a distinctive analysis of how things are; it interprets reality. Secondly, it emerges from the standpoint of a particular social group; it expresses the perspective of women as women. Thirdly, it has an inescapably reforming or revolutionary nature; it demands change. This third feature means that feminism is also ideological in the sense defined by Freeden (2004: 6).

Feminism is *not* an ideology in the Marxist sense, first, because its analysis of reality is not widely accepted; it is not mainstream. Secondly, it does not represent the standpoint of the powerful or dominant group; it is not hegemonic. Thirdly, feminism is inherently diverse, encompassing contrasting female perspectives and contrasting policy prescriptions; it is neither dogmatic nor pre-determined. Indeed, as bell hooks notes, 'A central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is or accept definitions that could serve as points of unification' (hooks 1997: 22).

hooks' observation makes the task of writing this chapter particularly fraught: how to capture the nature of feminist ideology, while doing justice to its myriad histories and existences, in one short piece? This chapter is necessarily a simplification, and some feminist voices will be emphasized more than others.

Later in this chapter I outline a set of criteria for feminism, which I call the three theses of feminism. These are designed to be compatible with feminist diversity. Nevertheless, they focus on some aspects of feminist ideology more than on others.

There are various ways of distinguishing between feminisms. One possible distinction is between academic and activist feminism, with some writers noting that feminism enjoys a predominance within the academy that it has lost in the active political arena (Kemp and Squires 1997). Some academic feminism remains close to its activist roots.² But other academic feminists, particularly those associated with poststructural and psychoanalytical feminism, maintain an overtly theoretical approach, with work that can be inaccessible to those who are not already versed in the relevant terminology and discourse.³ Such feminist work contrasts the more accessible feminist works that are read more widely by non-academic readers, and whose success helps to energize new generations of readers.⁴

Within academic feminism there has also been a shift in descriptions of the discipline, from ‘women’s studies’ to ‘gender studies’. The term ‘women’s studies’ emphasized the distinctiveness of feminist thought, its significance for women, and its rejection of traditional disciplinary boundaries. As Michele Barrett notes, though, it has the disadvantage of leaving mainstream academic disciplines and departments ‘unchallenged and even denuded of feminist scholars’ (Barrett 1997: 115), and of sidelining issues concerning men and masculinity. Feminism needs to consider maleness so as to emphasize that it is not only women who are constructed and affected by patriarchy. So many academic departments and centres of feminist thought have become self-defined centres of gender studies rather than of women’s studies. For example, the Department of Women’s Studies at the University of California–Berkeley (founded as the Women’s Studies Program in 1976) changed its name to the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies in 2005.⁵ Similarly the Yale University Women’s Studies Program, started in 1979, has changed its name twice: to Women’s and Gender Studies in 1998 and again to Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies in 2004—marking the increasing salience of sexuality and queer theory to feminist thought.⁶ In Britain, too, centres of women’s studies tend to pre-date centres of gender or gender studies.⁷ While the names of some academic centres combine women’s studies, feminism, and gender studies,⁸ thus emphasizing their complementarity at the same time as their distinctiveness, the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies states prominently on its website that “‘Gender’ is not a synonym for “‘women” or “‘feminism””.⁹

These trends reflect a general ambiguity within feminist thought broadly conceived about the specific relevance of *women* to feminism and to gender. Just as the move to gender studies de-emphasizes women, so too some feminists have sought to question the nature and relevance of womanhood. As is explored later in this chapter, this contestation of the category ‘woman’ can come from various angles, including difference feminism, queer theory, and poststructuralism. At the same time, other feminists, such as those associated with the ethics of care and ecofeminism, argue for the protection of the category ‘woman’ and the value of womanhood. As Monique Wittig puts it, ‘For many of us [feminism] means someone who fights for women as a class and for the disappearance of this class. For many others it means someone who fights for woman and her defense—for the myth, then, and its reinforcement’ (Wittig 1997: 223).

And yet despite this ambiguity within feminism there is a recognizable core, such that it does make sense to think of feminism as an ideology. One way in which feminism is ideological is that it is inescapably political: feminism both analyses the political and engages in political struggle. The fundamentally political nature of feminism is perhaps easiest to see when considering feminism through traditional categories such as liberal feminism, Marxist and socialist feminism, and radical feminism, for these categories are distinguished by their analysis of political reality and their ideological approach to reform, and the labels of these approaches place feminists in recognizable places on a pre-existing political spectrum. But these traditional categories of feminism can seem rather dated and unappealing. As Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires argue, such taxonomies problematically imply ‘that feminist theory understand[s] itself as simple modification of the pre-existing canon’ and have ‘at times worked to polarize perspectives and rigidify conflicts’ (Kemp and Squires 1997: 9). This chapter is thus not structured around such divisions, although I do indicate moments where there are differences between feminists along ideological lines.

The ideological nature of feminism is perhaps best seen in two parts: what feminism is *against*, and what feminism is *for*. The rest of this chapter considers these two parts. Feminism’s critical aspect comes first so as to capture its rejection of patriarchy. Patriarchy structures social and political life everywhere, but for reasons of space I focus on the forms of patriarchy and feminist resistance that are found in Western liberal capitalist societies.

AGAINST: THE FETISHISM OF CHOICE AND THE PRISON OF BIOLOGY

In Western liberal capitalist societies feminist resistance to patriarchy must fend off two contrasting challenges: the fetishism of choice and the prison of biology. Neither biology nor liberalism is inevitably patriarchal (there are both feminist biologists and liberal feminists), but both have been appealed to in support of patriarchy. Patriarchal ideology in Western liberal societies insists both that women and men are ineluctably different, such that social inequality is premised upon biological difference (the prison of biology), and that any putative injustice of this inequality is mitigated by the liberal capitalist focus on individual choice (the fetishism of choice). In other words, gender inequality is inevitable yet unproblematic.

To expand this patriarchal story: women and men cannot be equal in the sense of identical, for they are constrained both physically and socially by their biology. Women and men are bound to lead different sorts of lives with different sorts of preferences, activities, positions in the family and workplace, and so on. These supposedly inevitable differences might look problematic from the perspective of liberalism, which prioritizes equality but understands equality largely to mean sameness, until choice is brought in. For liberals of many varieties a situation can be unequal without being unjust, so long as those involved are able to make choices about their lives. If people have chosen things that disadvantage them or that entrench differences, then the liberal is untroubled (Chambers 2008). This liberal commitment to choice entrenches patriarchy if and when it is asserted that women in general do exercise free choice. Gender inequality thus becomes the result of some combination of natural difference and free choice, and disrupting it becomes both unnatural and unjust.

Against this patriarchal story, feminism insists that women are neither imprisoned by biology nor liberated by individual choice. Gender inequality is entrenched, pervasive and profound in its effects, but its domain is the social rather than the biological, and that which is created in the social arena can be disrupted there too.

The Fetishism of Choice

The ideal-typical liberal citizen is *in control*: of her career, of her consumer choices, of her family life, of her relationships, of her sex life, of her appearance, of her body. Members of Western liberal capitalist democracies are encouraged to take this ideal-type to heart and to see themselves as equal choosers. Feminism, particularly liberal feminism, does not reject the value of choice as an ideal. But feminism insists that we confront the ways in which we are

constrained and unequal, disrupting the self-image of the liberal citizen. Feminism suggests that all women, even those who feel liberated and powerful, are affected by female social inferiority, and that all men, even those who feel disadvantaged, benefit from male privilege. This need not mean that women are victims and men are agents: feminism argues that all people, women and men, are constrained by socially-constructed gender norms. To put it another way: feminism insists on the reality and ubiquity of sexist oppression, and demands an end to that oppression (hooks 1997).

The idea that liberal capitalism safeguards our freedom of choice is so entrenched that feminist insistence on the social constraints of gender inequality is anathema to many. Feminism confronts women and men with the idea that they are not in control. Their choices are shaped by the social construction of appropriate gendered behaviour. Their careers are shaped by pervasive sexism, ranging from straightforward discrimination and wage inequality to the more subtle but absolute clash between the norm of maternal care and the norm of the ideal worker (Williams 2000). Their sexual relationships take place within a socio-legal framework that refuses to guarantee women the sexual autonomy it sells.¹⁰ While some women encountering feminist theory for the first time find it profound and motivating, others find its challenge to their self-image of unconstrained agency enraging. While some men recognize that gender norms both limit and privilege them, others react angrily to the idea that they are beneficiaries of injustice.¹¹ So someone encountering feminist ideas for the first time can feel as though it is *feminism* that constrains, unless and until she realizes that feminism identifies these constraints precisely so as to urge their destruction.

To take an example, many feminists criticize the beauty norms to which women submit apparently willingly and even with pleasure.¹² In Western societies women are assumed to take great pride in their appearance and to enjoy spending large amounts of time and money improving it. Having one's rough skin rubbed away, one's cuticles cut off, and one's nails filed down is 'pampering'. Wearing extortionately expensive and excruciatingly uncomfortable high-heeled shoes is a luxurious indulgence. Spending money and energy on choosing, applying, removing, and re-applying hair products is justified 'Because You're Worth It' (as L'Oreal would have it). At all levels women are supposed to enjoy submitting themselves to beauty rituals and judging themselves by prevailing standards, and many women do indeed adopt the cultural meaning of these practices as pleasurable and choice-worthy.

However, feminist analysis demonstrates that the beauty norms by which

women are assessed are deeply problematic from the point of view of equality. Some beauty practices are damaging or risky in themselves, such as sun beds, high-heeled shoes, and cosmetic surgery. Some beauty standards, such as unwrinkled skin and non-grey hair, are unachievable beyond a certain age, leading to feelings of sadness or even shame. Some beauty standards may increase the prevalence of psychological illness such as eating disorders. Other beauty practices are simply burdensome, effortful, and expensive. The sum of beauty practices to which women are subjected contributes to their inferior status in society for several reasons: it saps their finances and energy which could otherwise be devoted on other things, it imposes standards on women that are simply not imposed on men, and it makes the typical woman and girl at best dissatisfied with, and at worst ashamed of, her own body and in her own skin (Jeffreys 2005; Chambers 2008).

The feminist conclusion is not that no woman actively chooses beauty practices, or that no woman enjoys participating in them. The conclusion is rather that it does not make sense to use a woman's choices as the sole measure of the justice of the context in which she is choosing (Chambers 2008). It is inevitable that women and men should find some enjoyment in conforming to cultural standards, should want to engage in behaviour that is culturally recognized as appropriate for them, and should take pleasure and pride in succeeding in the endeavours that are culturally mandated. What is at issue is whether those cultural standards are themselves compatible with equal status and genuine autonomy. The choice to abide by a cultural standard does not in itself legitimate that standard.¹³

The Prison of Biology

Feminism thus resists the liberal idea that we are atomistic, autonomous individuals in need only of basic legal rights to protect our freedom of choice. Gender inequality is more salient than liberal theory allows. Yet it also resists the idea that gender inequality rests on biological inevitability. This idea has accompanied patriarchy for centuries, and though the details have shifted, its pervasiveness has not. Feminist historians of philosophy have pointed out that most 'great thinkers' of the philosophical canon have misogynist views, often premised on the notion of biological inferiority, and that the mainstream philosophical attitude of benign neglect of such views is incoherent (Pateman 1988; Shanley and Pateman 1991; Harding and Hintikka 2003; Zerilli 2008).

While the particular beliefs of philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato,

Rousseau, Hegel, and Nietzsche as they concern the natural inferiority of women are seldom found convincing today, the same is not true of theories about the biological basis of gender inequality in general. Views about women's natural inability to think rationally, pursue careers, or participate in politics may seem ridiculous to contemporary sensibilities, but there is a resurgence in 'natural' explanations for gender difference. Contemporary theses about the naturalness of gender difference include theories based on evolutionary psychology (Cronin 1991; Miller 2000; Thornhill and Palmer 2000), theories based on neuroscience (Baron-Cohen 2003; Brizendine 2006, 2010; Pinker 2008), theories based on foetal exposure to testosterone, and others (Fine 2010). These theories purport to explain an astonishing variety of gendered behaviour as biologically hard-wired, ranging from map-reading ability, emotional sensitivity, attitude to pink, career choice, and rape.

There are a variety of feminist responses to such theories. In 1869 John Stuart Mill pointed out:

So true is it that unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural.... I deny that any one knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have only been seen in their present relation to one another. (Mill 1996: 128–36)

In a similar, if less speculative vein, many contemporary feminist scientists have pointed out the dire inadequacy of the science behind these modern-day just-so stories (Fausto-Sterling 1985, 2000; Dupre 2001; Rose and Rose 2001; Travis, 2003; Cameron 2007; Fine 2010). Even a non-scientist can see the simple truth of Mill's observation that there is a great deal that is social. Moreover, normativity is inescapably social: regardless of what is, we can always ask what ought to be or what follows from what is.

FOR: THE THREE THESES OF FEMINISM

In the remainder of this chapter I present three theses with which feminism steers a path between the fetishism of choice and the prison of biology. The three theses of feminism can be found in all forms of feminism, albeit interpreted in different ways by different feminists. Moreover, feminists differ in the weight they give to each thesis, and the theses do not exhaust feminist concerns. But they provide a way to identify and analyse feminist thinking. The theses are deliberately vague, so as to ensure their compatibility with the wide range of feminist thought.

The three theses of feminism are:

1. *The Entrenchment of Gender*. Gender is a significant social cleavage, one that is enduring and has endured.
2. *The Existence of Patriarchy*. The social cleavage of gender is not normatively neutral: it is profoundly unequal, with women the disadvantaged and men the advantaged group.
3. *The Need for Change*. The fact of entrenched patriarchal gender division is normatively wrong, and political action is needed to lessen and ultimately overcome it.

The first and second theses are different in kind from the third. The first two theses are claims about what society *is* like, whereas the third thesis is a claim about what society *should* be like.¹⁴ To put it another way: the assertion of the Need for Change is in part the demand that the Existence of Patriarchy should ultimately become false—a change which, for some feminists, also requires the end of the Entrenchment of Gender. So, when discussing the first two theses it is important to note that feminists believe that they are in fact true, not that they ought to remain true.

The Entrenchment of Gender

For all feminists there is something special about gender difference. Most basically, it exists. More substantively, it is significant. Indeed, feminism insists that gender is more significant than at least some other cleavages at least some of the time; to put it another way, gender has explanatory power. More controversially, many feminists argue that gender is one of the most significant social cleavages.

The claim that gender difference exists can take many forms within feminism and can also be endorsed by non-feminists. But what is gender? It is commonplace to note that there is, speaking generally, a biological difference between male and female. This difference inheres in the physical shapes of our bodies: in the complementary yet by no means straightforwardly coherent dualities of vulva/penis, uterus/testes, XX/XY chromosomes, less/more bodily hair, different proportions of oestrogen and testosterone, and so on. It inheres in the functions of those bodies: women and not men (again, generally rather than universally) can gestate and lactate, men and not women have certain forms of physical strength. And it inheres in the different behaviours and attitudes that are associated with and expected of women and men, with respect to the priority and urgency given to things such as nurturing, competition, beauty, romance, sexual

stimulation, violence, relationships, family, money, and power.

The biological and sociological reality of such dichotomies cannot reasonably be disputed. The Entrenchment of Gender becomes a feminist thesis because feminists *analyze* and *question* gender difference. Feminists point out that gender has crucial significance and wide-ranging consequences. At the same time they insist on its complexity and need for analysis, undermining the idea that gender difference is inevitable, immutable, and desirable. In particular, feminists dispute any idea that gender difference is desirable *because* it is natural: they dispute the Prison of Biology.

One paradigmatic feminist method for problematizing gender difference while maintaining the Entrenchment of Gender is the sex/gender distinction. According to this distinction, patriarchal discourse blurs two discrete phenomena. There is *sex*, which is the natural (and hence inevitable and unproblematic) biological distinction between male and female humans, and there is *gender*, which is the social (and hence mutable and open to problematization) categorization of people into masculine and feminine. In insisting that sex and gender are distinct, feminists call attention to the fact that much of what is often attributed to biology should more properly be attributed to culture.

The idea of the sex/gender distinction is at once basic to feminism and problematic within it. There are many opportunities for contention. For some feminists the liberatory potential of distinguishing sex from gender lies in the claim that very little is, in fact, sex; that most of the differences we observe between men and women, differences which are often attributed to biology, result instead from culture. This claim can take a number of forms. J. S. Mill argued that ‘what is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulation in others’ (Mill 1996: 136). Simone de Beauvoir wrote that ‘one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman’ (de Beauvoir 1952: 249). Germaine Greer begins *The Female Eunuch* with a sustained argument for the indeterminacy of biology (Greer 1991). Typically, as in these examples, feminists have focused their claims on women, but the same arguments apply equally to men: a boy must learn masculinity in just the same way as a girl learns femininity. Such claims are liberating because they suggest that we are not imprisoned by our biology; that we can be male and female without being masculine and feminine. It is this insight, basic and yet profound, which in many ways forms the *core* of feminist ideology.

However, there are a number of challenges to the sex/gender distinction even

from within feminism. Feminists have challenged the idea that sex and gender are distinct, as well as the idea that their distinctiveness is necessary for, or even conducive to, liberation. Some feminists insist that the sex/gender distinction helps the project of liberation only on problematic assumptions. First, one must assume that socially motivated and maintained behaviour is more malleable than biologically motivated and maintained behaviour, and this is by no means obvious (Chambers 2008). Secondly, one must assume not only that biology and culture are different phenomena, but also that they do not interact: that there is no such thing as a socially affected biology or a biologically grounded sociality.

Take the example of parenthood, and the differences between motherhood and fatherhood. Using the feminist sex/gender distinction in a traditional, unproblematized way we might say: there is biological mothering and there is cultural mothering. People of sex female are different from people of sex male, in that the former and not the latter are capable of gestating, birthing, and breastfeeding a child. But this sex difference does not in itself necessitate or legitimate the cultural, gendered difference that results when women are given significantly longer parental leave than men, are more likely to be full-time parents than are men, and are consequently less likely to be successful in the workplace (where success is measured by conventional (=patriarchal) indicators such as money and prestige) than are men. There is therefore no reason why mothers and fathers should not play equal roles as parents, where equal means identical, in all areas aside from those very few biologically mandated areas of gestation, birth, and breastfeeding.

This feminist use of the sex/gender distinction has been dominant in liberal feminism, and feminist arguments such as these have played a key role in a great many of the landmark victories of the struggle for women's liberation: female suffrage, sex discrimination legislation, demands for equality within the family. But this approach has several flaws. It may be too optimistic, insofar as it suggests that cultural change is easier than biological change, and yet there is surely nothing easy in changing entrenched patterns of male and female parenting and employment (Williams 2000). It may be dystopian, insofar as it suggests that even biological sex differences would be better obliterated for they stand in the way of equality-as-identity. And this yoking of equality to identity implies that women must be like men in order to be valued.¹⁵ Would it be better still for women's equality if they did not gestate their children (Firestone 1979)? Is breastfeeding anti-feminist (Rosin 2009)? Is a woman who returns to work five days after giving birth¹⁶—just like most men return to work only days after becoming fathers—better than one who stays at home? While some feminists

have answered 'yes' to these questions others would vehemently disagree, fearing that the value of womanhood can be all too easily erased.

So a feminist insistence on the Entrenchment of Gender need not rely on a traditional understanding of the sex/gender distinction. For some feminists the social construction of differences between men and women burrows beneath what is usually thought of as gender to reach even the biological category of sex (Fausto-Sterling 1985, 2000; MacKinnon 1989; Greer 1991). Cultural practices such as cosmetic surgery, high heels, and corsets literally shape our bodies, as do rules of behaviour such as the requirement that women should keep their legs closed when seated, be or appear shorter than men (even while wearing high heels),¹⁷ or engage in physical activities only with restricted deportment (Greer 1991; Bourdieu 2001; Young 2005). And even parts of our bodies not yet *physically* shaped by social, gendered requirements are nevertheless imbued with gendered *significance* only by contingent social practices. It is biology not culture that dictates that human fertilization involves sperm and egg. But it is culture not biology that portrays that process as one in which active sperm compete among themselves to conquer a passive egg, a standard portrayal that ignores the agency of the female reproductive system in sorting and selecting sperm (Blackledge 2003). As Catharine MacKinnon writes,

Distinctions of body or mind or behavior are pointed to as cause rather than effect, with no realization that they are so deeply effect rather than cause that pointing to them at all is an effect. Inequality comes first, difference comes after. (MacKinnon 1989: 219)

Another feminist controversy around the Entrenchment of Gender comes to light when considering queer theory. The core of queer theory is a critique of heteronormativity, a critique which has clear affinities with feminism. But beyond this core there are complexities and controversies, with some feminists arguing that queer theory is not feminist (Jeffreys 2003).

Some queer theorists argue that gender is entrenched but that its entrenchment is an illusion of patriarchy that must be dispelled. For example, Judith Butler's famous claim that gender is 'performative' can be read as a claim about the essential non-essentiality of gender (Butler 1999a, 1999b). If we view gender in this way, as a category without stable roots in physical sex difference, then the entrenchment of gender becomes crucial to the project of patriarchy, and uprooting it becomes crucial to the project of feminism. On this analysis, gender is entrenched as a social construct precisely because it lacks a solid grounding in biology: if femaleness does not require femininity then femininity's compulsion must be located elsewhere. Resistance becomes possible, located in alternative

performances or in acts that make clear that gender is performed and not natural.

On the other hand, there can be a temptation for the gay rights movement to insist on the biological or at least unchosen nature of sexuality. There is great political mileage in the idea of immutable biological sexuality, for if sexuality is natural then homosexuality cannot be unnatural; if people do not choose to be gay then they cannot be asked to choose *not* to be gay. Indeed, public support for gay rights is correlated with the belief that homosexuality is the result of biology or genes and is thus uncontrollable (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008). Such rhetoric has doubtless been vital to much political action against homophobia, and coheres with most people's interpretations of their own sexuality, whether it be homo- or heterosexual. But it is a form of analysis that does not sit easily with feminist concerns about biological essentialism. Radical lesbian feminists insist that it is possible to choose to be homosexual: that living with and for other women can be both a personal choice and a political imperative (Bunch 1997; Radicalesbians 1997).

Disagreements come to a head with the issue of transgenderism and transsexuality. While the precise meaning of these terms is not fixed it is common to distinguish the *transsexual* desire to live as a person of the sex not ascribed at birth, ultimately or ideally through sex reassignment surgery, from the *transgender* desire to live according to gender norms that do not correspond with the sex ascribed at birth, without surgery. A transgendered person might wish either to take on the gendered practices of the opposite sex without disrupting those practices, or to disrupt the gender binary by eschewing gendered practices or combining practices from both genders.

Transgenderism and transsexualism can be seen as either complementary or opposed to feminism. The two are complementary insofar as transgenderism or transsexualism call into question the rigidity of gender difference and assert the importance of disrupting the gender binary, a stance sometimes known as transfeminism (Bornstein 1995; Califia 1997; Feinberg 1998; Heyes 2003).¹⁸ But some feminists argue that certain forms of transgenderism or transsexualism undermine feminism by entrenching the gender binary, as when transsexualism uses the idea of a biological truth of gender into which each person naturally belongs, or when forms of transgenderism maintain rigidly gendered behaviours. Feminists have also criticized Male to Female transsexuals for infiltrating women-only space and Female to Male transsexuals for undermining lesbianism (Raymond 1979; Hausman 1995; Penelope 1997; Jeffreys 2003).

The tensions that arise within feminism when considering the implications of queer and transgender theory reflect a general ambiguity within feminism. It has

been, and remains, crucial to feminism to insist on both the importance of embodied experience and the irreducibility of women to their bodies. So much feminist work rails against the traditional dualist claim that the mind is distinct from and superior to the body, along with the idea that reason is distinct from and superior to emotion. Feminists argue that bodily experience is crucial to both subjectivity and politics (Weitz 2003; Young 2005). At the same time feminists reject the patriarchal reduction of women to their bodies. Feminists insist that bodily experience is crucial to both women and men, and that there should not be a hierarchy between the physical or emotional and the mental or rational. These phenomena are inextricably interwoven, inevitably social, and inescapably political.

While all feminists assert the thesis of the Entrenchment of Gender, feminists differ in their views about the categories of 'women' and 'men' which it creates. All feminists agree there is something that women have in common by virtue of being women, but there is controversy about how much women share and about the salience of gender as opposed to other social cleavages such as race, class, sexuality, and culture. But feminists such as bell hooks argue that much second-wave feminism is unthinkingly focused on the experience of a sub-category of women: those who are middle-class and white (hooks 1983). For hooks, classic feminist tracts such as Betty Friedan's (1983) *The Feminine Mystique* claim to speak for all women, identifying the 'problem that has no name' of housewives' experience of alienation and isolation and asserting that liberation for women lies in accessing the workplace and the public sphere. But hooks points out that the problems faced by housewives are problems of women who are economically privileged enough to be able to afford not to work outside the home, a privilege which, in the twentieth-century USA of Friedan's writing, was a privilege mainly reserved for white women.

In general hooks argues that black women are often ignored by both the feminist and the black liberation movements. Those movements use terms such as 'women' and 'black people' without acknowledging that what is really meant by such terms is 'white women' and 'black men', so that black women become invisible (hooks 1983; Spelman 1990). For example, when some women in the suffrage movement argued that 'women' should have the vote before 'blacks', what was really meant was that *white* women should have the vote before black *men*. Black women disappear from this picture. On hooks' analysis black women's experience of gender is not like white women's experience of it: there is an intersectionality between categories that requires its own theorizing and activism.

While it is undoubtedly true that different women have different experiences and locations in the various dimensions of relative privilege, it does not follow that feminism does not make sense as a unifying movement or that we cannot speak of the interests of women as a group. Women are differently-placed in their abilities to compensate for the disadvantages of being a woman in patriarchy, and vulnerable to different aspects of a hierarchical society. But all women face the task of negotiating their identity as the dominated sex in a society that places great weight on the maintenance of gender difference.

A feminist insistence on the entrenchment of gender need not undermine the salience of other social cleavages; indeed, it may be that gender inequality is interwoven with other inequalities such as those pertaining to race and class. For example, Andrea Dworkin argues that the logic of gender inequality and the logic of racism are highly complementary (Dworkin 2000)¹⁹—even though sexism is often exonerated while racism is, at least publicly, condemned (MacKinnon 2006).

Another significant aspect of differences between women is culture. Multiculturalism has many similarities with feminism. Both argue that group identities matter: whereas liberalism tends to focus only on the individual, both feminism and multiculturalism point out that inequality can be based on other group identities (gender and culture). Both feminists and multiculturalists argue, as a result, that we should focus on marginalized groups, and criticize prevailing political structures for failing to secure equality for all. Indeed, both feminists and multiculturalists claim that existing political structures or philosophical approaches cannot provide equality for all without significant change. And both feminists and multiculturalists are suspicious of ‘universal’ claims that actually reflect the standpoint of dominant groups, and insist that justice must take account of differences between people. As a result a significant number of feminist multiculturalists defend both the claims of culture and the claims of women (Young 1990; Shachar 2001).

However, some feminists argue that multiculturalism is problematic for feminism—or, in the words of Susan Moller Okin, that multiculturalism is ‘bad for women’ (Okin et al., 1999). According to Okin, most cultures are patriarchal; and, in multicultural societies, the minority cultures are often more patriarchal than the dominant (liberal) culture. For Okin, then, women and feminism are best served by a strong commitment to liberal universalism, and a focus on the rights of women as individuals.

The Existence of Patriarchy

Feminists add to the Entrenchment of Gender the thesis of the Existence of Patriarchy: gender *difference* means gender *inequality*.²⁰ Women suffer from gender difference, and men benefit. Feminists need not claim that patriarchy is an inevitable consequence of gender difference, but they do claim that it accompanies actually-existing difference in actually-existing societies. The Existence of Patriarchy is thus an empirical claim about the position of women and men in society. Feminists employ a variety of methods to establish the Existence of Patriarchy, some of which are familiar to non-feminist social theorists.²¹ Other methods, such as consciousness-raising, are specifically feminist.²²

As with each of the three feminist theses, the Existence of Patriarchy is developed in different ways within feminist ideology. The simplest conception of a patriarchal society, and the one associated with liberal feminism,²³ is one in which there are clear, measurable inequalities: unequal legal rights, sex discrimination, unequal pay, unequal representation in the job market and in positions of power.

Unequal legal rights have been the lot of women in most societies, and those societies which are now broadly equal in this respect have become so only recently.²⁴ Fights for women's rights to vote, to hold property, to have custody of their children, to be educated, to be employed, to be considered as legal persons, to have bodily integrity, and to retain these rights even if married or mothers, have been crucial and arduous feminist struggles. Unequal representation and unequal pay are, for most feminists, both symptoms and causes of patriarchy. Because women are relatively powerless they are unable to access powerful positions and command high (or just equal) salaries. Because women tend to be paid less than men, their interests and careers tend to be subordinated to those of men. And because women lack power, in politics and in business, it is difficult for them to change these facts.

Liberal feminists face an enormous challenge when asserting the Existence of Patriarchy: the Fetishism of Choice discussed above. Choice is a key liberal value: for a liberal, one respects individuals by respecting their choices. And so liberals are always vulnerable to the charge that a putative unjust inequality is actually a chosen, and therefore just, inequality. Within liberalism choice is a *normative transformer*: something that, by its mere presence, transforms an unjust (because unequal) situation into a just one. For example, it might be said of a woman who becomes economically dependent on her husband by leaving

paid employment in favour of domestic work that the subsequent inequality between husband and wife is unproblematic because it results from a choice.

Liberal feminists must adopt one of the following strategies in response. On one hand, a liberal feminist might bite the bullet, arguing that any woman who chooses an unequal position for herself is therefore not oppressed. A lot then hangs on the concept of choice. If choice is defined as the mere absence of coercion, liberal feminism becomes a very weak ideology, indistinguishable from liberalism that is not specifically feminist. The Entrenchment of Gender hardly matters to such a position.

On the other hand, then, the liberal feminist might dispute the extent to which women really do choose things that make themselves unequal. She might argue that much of our action is socially mandated, that many of our preferences are socially constructed, and that even if we choose certain activities (such as mothering) we do not choose that those activities should bring with them decreased status and resources (Chambers 2008). Indeed, it is a hallmark of most feminist thought to recognize the pervasiveness of social construction, for this recognition makes sense of the otherwise puzzling entrenchment of gender difference despite legal change. As a result many feminists move away from liberal theory's relative blindness to the cultural conditions of choice and towards radical analysis and critique of social construction.

Analysis and critical perspective on social construction that can be useful to feminism can come from social theorists who do not themselves explore gender (Foucault 1991), from social theorists who sometimes consider gender (Bourdieu 2001), and from theorists who are explicitly feminist (Greer 1991). Jane Flax argues that this recognition of social construction invites an affinity between feminism and postmodernism:

Despite an understandable attraction to the (apparently) logical, orderly world of the Enlightenment, feminist theory more properly belongs in the terrain of postmodern philosophy. Feminist notions of the self, knowledge, and truth are too contradictory to those of the Enlightenment to be contained in its categories. (Flax 1997: 173)

And yet, as Flax also notes, the relationship between feminism and postmodern theory is a tense one. Feminists emphasize the existence of patriarchal social construction and the insufficiency of free choice, and yet feminism is also a movement that is based on listening to the experiences of women and valuing their choices. Feminists are thus uneasy with a position that implies that women are acting wrongly. Two things ease this tension: the Existence of Patriarchy and the feminist commitment to consciousness-raising. The Existence of Patriarchy

reminds us that women (and men) are choosing and acting within a patriarchal context. It therefore follows that both our options and our preferences are shaped by this context. We *can* only act within the options that are available to, and cast as appropriate for, us. And we *want* to act in ways that situate us happily within a social context, as deserving of social approval. Moreover, it is rational for us to make choices that are compatible with the options open to us and the expectations placed on us, for such choices enable us to succeed within our context. So highlighting the constraints in which we all choose does not entail that we are poor choosers.

The feminist method of consciousness-raising also enables feminists to highlight the constraints on women's action at the same time as valuing women's experiences.²⁵ Consciousness-raising is the process by which group reflection on the everyday lives of their members highlights and makes explicit commonalities of experience and broader political phenomena. If women's experiences are profoundly shaped by patriarchy then introspection on and discussion of those experiences goes beyond the individual and provides insight into the structures of patriarchy (Chambers 2008; Chambers and Parvin 2013).

The Need for Change

All feminists are committed to the Need for Change. One cannot be a feminist without believing that the gender inequality highlighted by the first two theses is unjust and must be abolished. Feminism is thus inherently a reforming or revolutionary movement. But this commitment to change also leaves feminism particularly vulnerable to internal disputes. Feminists want to change aspects of current society and to label existing social arrangements as unjust. Moreover, feminists locate many of the injustices of patriarchy within personal life: in our intimate relationships with our families, in our sexual behaviour, in our appearance. It is unsurprising that women as well as men can feel threatened by the challenges of feminism.

It is thus crucial to feminism as an ideology to articulate the Need for Change clearly and persuasively. Some areas for reform are uncontroversial both within and outside feminism—for example, most citizens in liberal democracies will agree that there should be legal equality between the sexes. Other reforms are uncontroversial within feminism but face challenges in the mainstream, such as the idea that equality in the workplace requires more than simple legal anti-discrimination measures as these have proved consistent with a persistent gender pay gap. Still more reforms are controversial even within feminism, with

ongoing debates about what feminism implies for such things as pornography, transgenderism, and beauty practices.²⁶

One way of making sense of the panoply of feminist reforms is to think in terms of reforming each of the first two theses of feminism. Some feminists want to change the Entrenchment of Gender, arguing that gender categories themselves must be transcended. One approach to transcendence, known as genderqueer, builds on aspects of transgenderism and queer theory to develop a vision of a society that is not built on the gender binary of male versus female (Nestle et al. 2002). Butler develops a theory that is based both on unsettling the gender binary through parodies such as drag and on developing a transformative politics (Butler 1999a). Nancy Fraser argues, from a socialist/postcolonial perspective, for a transformative reconfiguration of group identities such as gender (Fraser 1997). Liberal feminist Okin urges her readers to 'put our best efforts into promoting the elimination of gender' (Okin 1989: 184). These and other feminists who advocate changes to the Entrenchment of Gender do so because they argue that such changes will also have implications for patriarchy. That is to say, feminists do not usually advocate androgyny or destabilizing the gender binary as an end in itself, but as part and parcel of the destruction of patriarchy. So Okin argues that eliminating gender will facilitate equality within the family and lead to a 'humanist justice' (Okin 1989: 184), and Fraser argues that transformation is needed to overcome the twin injustices of recognition and redistribution that women and other 'bivalent groups' suffer (Fraser 1997: 16ff).

Radical feminism is an excellent example of a feminist analysis of patriarchy that sees gender difference and gender inequality as deeply entangled.²⁷ For radical feminists patriarchy is a system and ideology based on male domination and female submission. That is to say, patriarchal gender norms cast the male as dominant and the female as submissive, an elucidation of gender difference that is inherently unequal. Radical feminists argue that patriarchy upholds this form of gender difference in all areas of life: in family life, in the workplace, in public political life. But its logic can most clearly be seen in patriarchal understandings of sex, and in the sexual practices and industries that are so central to Western societies: prostitution, pornography, rape, and child abuse. All feminists see ending sexual violence as a priority, but radical feminists insist that this is not a goal that can be achieved merely by legal remedies that do not disrupt the underlying gender system. For example, rape tends to have very low prosecution rates, such that laws against rape do not act as an effective deterrent or punishment (Lees 2002). Sexual violence is not an aberration but part and parcel of a system that treats women as sexual objects to be bought and sold to meet

men's desires and maintain their position of dominance.

Other feminisms (or other aspects of feminism) focus on the need to change the patriarchal associations of gender difference, rather than that difference itself. So difference feminists argue that gender equality can be compatible with gender difference, even if current patriarchal structures prevent this. Such feminists argue that justice requires that feminine roles are properly valued and rewarded, and that the women who take them on are afforded the status traditionally reserved for male activities. It is not enough, then, to be content with the status quo: extensive political and social change is required.

The most prominent idea of difference feminism is the ethics of care (Gilligan 1982; Held 2005). The thesis of the ethics of care is that there are two different ways of thinking about morality, one based on justice (impersonal, abstract, impartial rules of entitlement) and one based on care (relational, particular, nuanced duties and obligations). Proponents of the ethics of care claim that these modes of moral thinking are gendered, with women associated with care and men associated with justice. Equality for such feminists requires not the elimination of difference but a revaluing of women's distinctiveness: care-based thinking needs to be recognized as a distinct and valuable method of being and acting in the world, not dismissed as a facet of unreason. Associated with this valuing of traditionally-female thinking is the valuing of traditionally-female activities, such as caring work.

Difference feminists are indeed feminists because they recognize that inequality attaches to women's identification with distinct activities such as care, even if they argue for the preservation of these activities or their femininity. In other words, difference feminists envisage a world in which difference is compatible with inequality, but they argue that such a world is not our world.

Another way of asking what is required by the Need For Change is to ask how and why patriarchy accompanies gender. For some feminists the answer lies beyond either patriarchy or gender: other social phenomena account for the inequality between men and women. Thus Marxist and socialist feminists situate gender inequality within the broader ambit of economic and class inequality that are endemic to capitalism (Davis 1983, Delphy 1984). More recently, feminists have begun to analyse the gendered implications and effects of the global system of politics and of globalization. They point out that women are adversely and specifically affected by many aspects of globalization, and that existing transnational structures for implementing global justice and human rights can ignore the position of women. (MacKinnon 2006; Jeffreys 2008; Jaggar 2009). Such work opens up an ever-expanding arena in which change must occur.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has touched on just a small sample of feminist thinking. But it aims to capture the challenges facing feminism in the current context. In Western liberal orthodoxy patriarchy rarely publicly presents women as inferior; instead it presents women as differently-choosing. The fact is that this re-presentation does nothing to shift women's material position in society: their disproportionate vulnerability to economic disadvantage, to sexual violence, to clashes between career and family, to under-representation in formal power structures, is somehow obscured. Feminists expose gender inequality and demand its abolition.

NOTES

1. I am grateful to Rebecca Flemming for observations on this point.
2. For example the feminist legal scholar Professor Catharine MacKinnon has always both written theory and engaged in political and legal practice on matters such as sexual harassment, war crimes against women, and pornography—the latter in a long-term collaboration with the non-academic feminist writer and activist Andrea Dworkin.
3. For example, Martha Nussbaum writes of Judith Butler that 'It is difficult to come to grips with Butler's ideas, because it is difficult to figure out what they are.... Her written style ... is ponderous and obscure. It is dense with allusions to other theorists, drawn from a wide range of theoretical traditions'. (Nussbaum 1999: 38)
4. For example Greer 1991; Fine 2010; Walter 2010.
5. <<http://womensstudies.berkeley.edu/about/history>>
6. <<http://www.wgss.yale.edu>>.
7. For example, the University of York's Centre for Women's Studies was founded in 1984, whereas the LSE's Gender Institute and the Leeds University Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Studies were founded in 1993 and 1997 respectively.
8. As well as the UC-Berkeley and Yale examples already described, consider the Cornell University Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program and the Harvard University Committee on Degrees in Studies of Women, Gender, and Sexuality.
9. <<http://www.gender.cam.ac.uk/about/>>. One way of explaining this claim could be to say that a theory of gender informs the political practice of feminism. I am grateful to Juliet Mitchell, founder of the Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, for this suggestion.
10. Women's sexual autonomy is sold both literally and figuratively. Figuratively, women are sold through advertising and other media the idea that they are and must be in control of their own sexuality, where 'being in control of' means 'using in order to succeed'. Literally, women's sexual autonomy is sold to others in prostitution, pornography, and traditional marriage.
11. A classic example is Susan Brownmiller's claim that rape 'is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which *all* men keep *all* women in a state of fear' (Brownmiller 1975: 15, emphasis in the original). Men tend to react angrily to this statement, insisting that they have never raped nor do they desire to rape, thereby missing Brownmiller's point that women have no reliable way of distinguishing a rapist from a non-rapist and so rape places all men in a dominant position.
12. See, for example, Dworkin 1974; Bartky 1997; Wolf 1990; Bordo 2003; Chambers 2008; Jeffreys 2005.
13. One might ask what would legitimate a cultural standard. The answer must surely be that the standard

itself should be subject to scrutiny, not just the question of whether any individual will comply. When feminists have scrutinized standards of beauty they have come up with many alternative, more rational standards of appearance, such as the nineteenth-century Rational Dress Society and the multi-pocketed trousers and smocks worn in Gilman (1979).

14. By 'society' I mean whichever society the feminist thought under consideration is criticizing—which, in practice, means all actually-existing societies.
15. For feminists who reject the idea that equality must be premised upon sameness see Fraser (1997) and MacKinnon (2006).
16. As Rachida Dati, French Justice Minister, did in 2009. See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2009/jan/09/women-maternitypaternityrights?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487>.
17. See, for example, the debate about how Tom Cruise managed to appear taller than Cameron Diaz at the premier of *Knight and Day* at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/22/tom-cruise-cameron-diaz-i_n_656203.html along with the website devoted to Cruise's height <http://www.tomcruiseheight.com>.
18. It might seem that transgenderism is more amenable to this sort of complementarity with feminism than is transsexualism, but Califia is a Female To Male transsexual and a self-identified transfeminist.
19. Sheila Jeffreys compares the 'ick factor' that some gay men express about women's bodies with 'visceral racism' in (Jeffreys 2003: 5).
20. I use the term 'patriarchy' to refer to a society characterized by inequality between women and men, with men as the advantaged and women the disadvantaged. This definition does *not* entail claims such as: men are in positions of power, political or otherwise; men actively choose and maintain inequality while women are passive victims; there is a male conspiracy; men like inequality and women dislike it; all men are better off than all women. Some of these claims may be true of any particular patriarchal society, but none of them are necessary, individually or jointly.
21. For example, Sheila Jeffreys describes her book *The Industrial Vagina* (Jeffreys 2008) as a work of political economy.
22. Catharine MacKinnon describes consciousness-raising as 'feminism's method' (MacKinnon 1989: 83). For further discussion of consciousness-raising see Chambers (2008: 58–63) and Chambers and Parvin (2013).
23. For a discussion of liberal feminism see Abbey (2011).
24. For example, the vote was not extended to all women until 1928 in the UK and 1920 in the USA. Britain has had only one female Prime Minister out of 53, and there has never been a female President of the USA.
25. Men's actions are also constrained by patriarchy, and there were consciousness-raising groups for men, but feminism has focused on women's experiences.
26. For examples of opposing feminist views on pornography see MacKinnon (1996) vs. Assiter (1989); on trans-genderism see Califia (1997) vs. Jeffreys (2003); on beauty practices see Wolf (1990) vs. Walter (1999). Indeed, for an example of a feminist who unashamedly changed her mind on many key issues of feminism see Walter (1999) vs. Walter (2010).
27. Radical feminists include Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, Sheila Jeffreys, Shulamith Firestone, Mary Daly, and Robin Morgan, to name but a few.

REFERENCES

- Abbey, R. 2011. *The Return of Feminist Liberalism*. Durham: Acumen.
- Assiter, A. 1989. *Pornography, Feminism, and the Individual*. London: Pluto Press.
- Baron-Cohen, S. 2003. *The Essential Difference: Men, women and the extreme male brain*. London: Allen

Lane.

- Barrett, M. 1997. 'Words and things: Materialism and method'. Pp. 112–19 in *Feminisms*, eds. S. Kemp, and J. Squires. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bartky, S. L. 1997. 'Foucault, femininity and the modernization of patriarchal power'. Pp. 92–111 in *Feminist Social Thought: A Reader*, ed. D. T. Meyers. London: Routledge.
- Blackledge, C. 2003. *The Story of V*. London: Phoenix.
- Bordo, S. 2003. *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Bornstein, K. 1995. *Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women, and the Rest of Us*. New York: Vintage.
- Bourdieu, P. 2001. *Masculine Domination*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brizendine, L. 2006. *The Female Brain*. New York: Morgan Road/Broadway Books.
- Brizendine, L. 2010. *The Male Brain*. New York: Morgan Road/Broadway Books.
- Brownmiller, S. 1975. *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Bunch, C. 1997. 'Lesbians in revolt'. Pp. 420–3 in *We Are Everywhere: A Historical Sourcebook of Gay and Lesbian Politics*, eds. M. Blasius and S. Phelan. London: Routledge.
- Butler, J. 1999a. *Gender Trouble*. London: Routledge.
- Butler, J. 1999b. 'Performativity's social magic'. Pp. 113–29 in *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader*, ed. R. Shusterman. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Califa, P. 1997. *Sex Changes: Transgender Politics*. San Francisco: Cleis Press.
- Cameron, D. 2007. *The Myth of Mars and Venus: Do Men and Women Really Speak Different Languages?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chambers, C. 2008. *Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Chambers, C. and Parvin, P. 2013. 'What kind of dialogue do we need? Gender, deliberative democracy and comprehensive values'. In J. Browne, ed., *Dialogue, Politics and Gender*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cronin, H. 1991. *The Ant and the Peacock: Altruism and Sexual Selection from Darwin to Today*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davis, A. 1983. *Women, Race, and Class*. New York: Vintage Press.
- de Beauvoir, S. 1952. *The Second Sex*. New York: Bantam.
- Delphy, C. 1984. *Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women's Oppression*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts.
- Dupre, J. 2001. *Human Nature and the Limits of Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dworkin, A. 1974. *Woman Hating*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- Dworkin, A. 2000. *Scapegoat: The Jews, Israel and Women's Liberation*. London: Virago.
- Fausto-Sterling, A. 1985. *Myths of Gender: Biological Theories About Women and Men*. New York: Basic Books.
- Fausto-Sterling, A. 2000. *Sexing the Body*. New York: Basic Books.
- Feinberg, L. 1998. *Trans Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue*. Boston: Beacon.
- Fine, C. 2010. *Delusions of Gender: The Real Science Behind Sex Differences*. London: Icon.
- Firestone, S. 1979. *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution*. London: The Women's Press.
- Flax, J. 1997. 'Postmodernism and gender relations in feminist theory'. Pp. 170–8 in *Feminisms*, eds. S. Kemp and J. Squires. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Foucault, M. 1991. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Fraser, N. 1997. *Justice Interruptus*. London: Routledge.
- Freedman, M. 2004. 'Ideology, political theory and political philosophy'. Pp. 3–17 in *Handbook of Political Theory*, eds. G. Gaus and C. Kukathas. London: Sage.

- Friedan, B. 1983. *The Feminine Mystique*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Gilligan, C. 1982. *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gilman, C. P. 1979. *Herland*. London: The Women's Press.
- Greer, G. 1991. *The Female Eunuch*. London: Flamingo.
- Haider-Markel, D. P. and M. R. Joslyn. 2008. 'Beliefs about the origins of homosexuality and support for Gay rights: An empirical test of attribution theory', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 72: 291–310.
- Harding, S. and M. Hintikka. (eds.) 2003. *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science*. New York: Springer.
- Hausman, B. L. 1995. *Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Held, V. 2005. *The Ethics of Care*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heyes, C. J. 2003. 'Feminist solidarity after queer theory: The case of transgender', *Signs*, 28: 1093–120.
- hooks, b. 1983. *Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism*. London: Pluto Press.
- hooks, b. 1997. 'Feminism: A movement to end sexist oppression'. Pp. 22–6 in *Feminisms*, eds. S. Kemp and J. Squires. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jaggar, A. (ed.) 2009. Global Gender Justice edition of *Philosophical Topics*, 37.
- Jeffreys, S. 2003. *Unpacking Queer Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jeffreys, S. 2005. *Beauty and Misogyny: Harmful Cultural Practices in the West*. Hove: Routledge.
- Jeffreys, S. 2008. *The Industrial Vagina: The Political Economy of the Global Sex Trade*. London: Routledge.
- Kemp, S. and Squires, J. (eds.) 1997. *Feminisms*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lees, S. 2002. *Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial*. London: The Women's Press.
- MacKinnon, C. A. 1989. *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- MacKinnon, C. A. 1996. *Only Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- MacKinnon, C. A. 2006. *Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mill, J. S. 1996. 'The subjection of women'. In *On Liberty and The Subjection of Women*. Ware: Wordsworth.
- Miller, G. 2000. *The Mating Mind*. London: William Heinemann.
- Nestle, J., R. Wilchins, and C. Howell. (eds.) 2002. *GenderQueer: Voices From Beyond the Sexual Binary*. Boston: Alyson Books.
- Nussbaum, M. 1999. 'The professor of parody', *The New Republic*, 22 (2): 37–45.
- Okin, S. M. 1989. *Justice, Gender, and the Family*. New York: Basic Books.
- Okin, S. M., J. Cohen, M. Howard, and M. Nussbaum. 1999. *Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pateman, C. 1988. *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Penelope, J. 1997. 'Wimmin- and lesbian-only spaces: Thought into action'. Pp. 781–6 in *We Are Everywhere: A Historical Sourcebook of Gay and Lesbian Politics*, eds. M. Blasius and S. Phelan. London: Routledge.
- Pinker, S. 2008. *The Sexual Paradox: Men, Women, and the Real Gender Gap*. New York: Scribner.
- Radicalesbians, 1997. 'The Woman-identified Woman'. Pp. 396–9 in *We Are Everywhere: A Historical Sourcebook of Gay and Lesbian Politics*, eds. M. Blasius and S. Phelan. London: Routledge.
- Raymond, J. 1979. *The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male*. New York: Teachers College.
- Rose, H. and S. Rose. 2001. *Alas Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology*. London: Vintage.
- Rosin, H. 2009. 'The case against breast-feeding'. In *The Atlantic Magazine*.

- <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/04/the-case-against-breast-feeding/7311/>>.
- Shachar, A. 2001. *Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shanley, M. L. and C. Pateman. (eds.) 1991. *Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Spelman, E. 1990. *Inessential Woman. Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought*. London: The Women's Press.
- Thornhill, R. and C. T. Palmer. 2000. *A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Travis, C. B. (ed.) 2003. *Evolution, Gender, and Rape*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Walter, N. 1999. *The New Feminism*. London: Virago.
- Walter, N. 2010. *Living Dolls: The Return of Sexism*. London: Virago.
- Weitz, R. 2003. *The Politics of Women's Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, J. 2000. *Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What To Do About It*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wittig, M. 1997. 'One is not born a woman'. Pp. 220–6 in *Feminisms*, eds. S. Kemp and J. Squires. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wolf, N. 1990. *The Beauty Myth*. London: Vintage.
- Young, I. M. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Young, I. M. 2005. *On Female Body Experience: 'Throwing Like A Girl' and other Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zerilli, L. 2008. *Feminist theory and the canon of political thought [oxfordhb-9780199548439-e-5]*. Pp. 106–24 in *Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, ed. A. Phillips, B. Honig and J. S. Dryzek. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 31 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

JOSÉ ANTONIO AGUILAR RIVERA

LATIN America is a part of the Western world.* The ideological traditions and families that were developed there partake in a wider intellectual and philosophical universe. From the early stages of colonization of the Americas, political theories informed the actions of the Europeans settlers. As Anthony Pagden asserts:

Like the Roman, the Spanish Empire became, as much for those who came under its aegis as for those who did not, the image of a particular kind of polity. For nearly two centuries, despite the decline that began in the 1590s, the Spanish Monarchy was the largest single political entity in Europe. Even after the division of the Habsburg lands by Charles V in 1556 and the effective loss of the northern Netherlands in 1609, it still controlled, until the War of Succession, more than two-thirds of Italy and the whole of Central and South America. (Pagden 1998: 1–2)

Several Latin American political theorists and theologians, like Francisco Clavigero and Juan Pablo Viscardo developed original arguments regarding political authority during the colonial era. Yet, I will focus here on the ideological families and traditions that became prominent during the national period after the new nations achieved independence from the Spanish Empire. There are several significant ideological traditions that were developed in Latin America. Here I will discuss Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism, Nationalism/Populism, and Multiculturalism.

LIBERALISM

Liberalism can be conceived as a clearly identifiable set of principles and institutional choices endorsed by specific politicians, publicists, and popular movements (Holmes 1995: 13). From a liberal perspective, the highest political values are ‘psychological security and personal independence for all, legal impartiality within a single system of laws applied equally to all, the human diversity fostered by liberty, and a collective self-rule through elected government and uncensored discussion’ (Holmes 1995: 16).

The liberal tradition has been present in the Spanish world since the early nineteenth century. The terms ‘liberalism’ and ‘liberal’ were coined by the Spanish Cortes in Cádiz, while drafting the 1812 constitution.¹ After their

independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, all of the new nations of Spanish America (except for the brief and ill-fated Mexican Empire) adopted the same model of political organization: the liberal republic. All of the revolutionary leaders moved quickly to write constitutions. Almost all of these constitutions: 'proclaimed the existence of inalienable natural rights, (liberty, legal equality, security, property); many provided for freedom of the press and some attempted to establish jury trials. Almost all sought to protect these rights through the separation of powers and by making the executive branch relatively weaker than the legislature' (Safford 1995: 359–60).

The strand of liberalism that was initially pervasive in Latin America was developed by French theorists like Benjamin Constant in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Restoration. Not Rousseau, but Constant would prove to be the most relevant influence for Spanish Americans in the early nineteenth century. The universal influence of Constant in the 1820s and 1830s, Safford states, 'is only one indication of the hegemony of moderate European constitutional ideas among Spanish American intellectuals'.² The influence of Constant is important because modern liberalism owes much to him.³ Many of Constant's ideas, particularly those developed in response to the Terror and its Thermidorian aftermath (such as the limited nature of popular sovereignty, the freedom of the press, the inviolability of property, and the restrictions upon the military), became incorporated in the liberal theory that still informs many of the constitutions of democratic countries today.

A remarkable trait of early liberalism in Latin America was that for some time it remained uncontested by rival ideologies. Republicanism in that part of the world meant liberal republicanism (Aguilar Rivera and Rojas 2003). It was the single political theory that offered political elites a clear blueprint (Constant wrote a manual on constitution-making) of nation-building (Constant 1820). While liberal constitutionalism was pervasive among the Latin Americans there were some important differences with their European models. Latin American liberals were obsessed with constitution-making. This also holds true for France at the time, but some French liberals, such as Tocqueville, also developed the moral and social aspects of liberalism. Deeper philosophical reflections were uncommon in Spanish America.⁴ The result was a peculiar one-sidedness and a naive faith in the mighty power of constitutions to reshape societies. Likewise, while Constant and other liberals supported religious toleration, everywhere in Spanish America the Catholic Church was preserved as the established church and other religions were banned. Early liberals did not see a conflict between their ideas regarding personal freedom and religious intolerance. López, the

translator of Constant's *Curso*, omitted the chapter on religious freedom arguing that such a topic was not relevant for Spaniards since they were mostly Roman Catholics.

Early Latin American liberalism faced many challenges. Very soon a conflict erupted between Spanish American polities (corporatist in nature) and liberal policies. Liberals, such as the Mexican José María Luis Mora, faced a paradox: in order to create a liberal polity, with a limited state, they had first to create a powerful state machinery that would reconstruct society following liberal lines. After 1830, liberals could no longer overlook the reality of entrenched corporate privilege, epitomized by 'the juridical privileges of the church and the army and by the vast ecclesiastical property holdings' (Hale 2008). Many became sceptical of rigid limits to political authority. Yet, this is not a paradox new to the liberal tradition. Some of the originators of the liberal defence of religious toleration, such as Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), were at the same time absolutists; they advocated the increase of the powers of the crown. Political opponents of the church 'naturally enlisted the support of the secular power. Only a powerful centralized state could protect individual rights against local strong men and religious majorities' (Holmes 1995: 19–20).

The main ideological cleavage of the era emerged when liberals attempted to reclaim an important part of public life from church authority. Committed to equality before the law they sought to repeal special laws concerning the army and religious corporations. The secular state sought control over education and other public services that had traditionally been in the hands of the church. In many countries civil registries were created to record births and deaths. Civil graveyards were also established. This political and ideological offensive was countered by a conservative reaction.

This first stage of liberalism could be called doctrinaire. It came under attack as early as the 1830s. The failure to create a stable political order resulted in a critique of some ideas, such as the precedence of individual rights and the necessity of limits imposed on governments. Many liberals came to the conclusion that governments simply had to be stronger. Constitutions should provide for emergency provisions and strong, centralized, governments to counter the regional and political fragmentation produced after independence. (Simón Bolívar, liberator of South America, had asserted these ideas since 1819, but many liberals chose instead to follow the example of the United States, establishing federal systems.) Likewise, the electoral franchise had to be restricted to property owners. The regimes of presidents Benito Juárez in Mexico and Diego Portales in Chile are examples of this conservative liberalism.

Conservative liberals in Latin America still aimed at constructing liberal polities but they had come to realize the importance of political order and stability (Merquior 1991: 75–80).

By the second half of the nineteenth century liberalism underwent in many countries a significant ideological transformation. Many conservative liberals adopted arguments from a non-political social theory: positivism (Hale 1989). As Hale asserts: ‘the political consensus of the late nineteenth century was upheld by a set of philosophic and social ideas that proclaimed the triumph of science in Latin America’.⁵ European thinkers such as Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer were highly influential among Latin American intellectuals such as Justo Sierra in Mexico and José Victorino Lastarria in Chile (Sierra 2007; Victorino Lastarria 2007). The transformation into positivism changed some of the key ideological assumptions of liberalism. As a set of social ideas positivism claimed that society was a developing organism and not a collection of individuals. The new advocates of ‘scientific politics’ chided the old liberals for their outmoded ‘metaphysic’ beliefs in natural rights. Scientific politics, more utilitarian, asserted that the methods of science could be applied to national problems. Politics was seen as an experimental science, based on facts. Statesmen ‘should no longer be guided by abstract theories and legal formulas which had led only to revolutions and disorder’ (Hale 1986).

As an ideology that placed individuals at the centre of the moral universe and that sought to contain governments by different institutional strategies, liberalism faced numerous obstacles in Latin America. In the nineteenth century the conservative reaction to liberal innovations produced civil wars in Mexico and Colombia. While liberals triumphed in the former country, they were defeated in the latter. Even victorious liberalism changed into a different ideological being, hardly recognizable. However, this transformation was opposed in Mexico by some of the ‘old’ doctrinaire liberals, such as José María Vigil. In Argentina conservative liberalism became hegemonic, but in the last decade of the century a reformist group of liberals rejected *laissez faire* and proposed social reforms. They, however, opposed revolution and radical political change (Zimmermann 1994).

At the dawn of the twentieth century liberalism in Latin America was either disfigured by positivism or under fire for its attachments to the idea of *laissez-faire*. Yet, things would get worse after 1910. Two revolutions produced a tidal wave of illiberal ideas: the Mexican Revolution (1910) and the Russian Revolution (1917). The social and political movements produced two formidable ideological adversaries: national populism and communism. Neither the 1917

Mexican Constitution nor the revolutionary Mexican state were liberal in nature or character. Nor could they be, since they were the products of an illiberal revolution. Once Francisco I. Madero was defeated and murdered at the outset of the Revolution, a wing took hold of the movement. That wing sought a strong, interventionist, state. The new regime had, as its subjects, not individuals but corporations and collective actors. It aimed to recreate communities in order to incorporate them in a corporatist structure of power. Unlike the 1857 liberal constitution, the 1917 constitution did not protect property rights. It was unfriendly to an open market economy, although not necessarily to a 'mixed' version of capitalism. The state that took shape in twentieth-century Mexico was interventionist, not only in the economic sphere, but also in the political and cultural realms (Garcíadiego 1999: 83–4). The Mexican polity would not be a liberal one, but a national-revolutionary one.

Starting in the 1920s liberalism and democracy were seen as weak and decrepit. Latin America was no exception (García Sebastián and del Rey Reguillo 2008). In some countries, such as Mexico, the liberal past of the nineteenth century was revered while collectivistic policies were pursued by the government. In the 1930s Colombian Presidents Alfonso López Pumarejo and Enrique Olaya Herrera saddled their governments to policies that followed the New Deal in the United States (Molina 1977). They asserted that free markets do not regulate themselves, and that the action of the state was needed in order to counter the Great Depression. A broad coalition of workers and business should take place. López Pumarejo started the 'Revolución en marcha', a reformist programme in fiscal matters.

In the twentieth century political liberalism never regained the prominence it once had in Latin America. It survived mainly as a source of inspiration to some critics of authoritarian regimes. Democracy, a key component of the liberal tradition, was lost. This is important, because the weakness of political liberalism prepared the ground for the neoliberal revolution that started in the 1980s. There was no qualification or counterbalance to the more extreme versions of economic liberalism that came from without during the years of structural reform in the world. In many countries the term liberalism relates only to economics. However, classical liberals were not libertarians. In spite of this, the ideological belief that states were inefficient and should always be drastically reduced found no native resistance in Latin America. As Przeworski argued, neoliberal ideology claimed that 'there is only one path to development, and it must be followed. Proponents of this ideology argue as if they had a Last Judgement picture of the world, a general model of economic and political

dynamics that allows them to assess the ultimate consequences of all partial steps' (Przeworski 1992: 46). Only experience would prove that belief wrong (Fukuyama 2004). Thus democracy, a constitutive part of liberalism, did not constrain market reforms. The technocratic elites that swiftly introduced market-oriented reforms in their countries, while embracing whole-heartedly neoclassical economics, knew—or cared—nothing of political liberalism (Centeno 1994). Nothing tempered excessive ideological zeal. Likewise, intellectual liberalism was clueless when it was confronted by illiberal multiculturalism. It was overly legalistic in its approach. And liberals had very few philosophical arguments to confront the demands for the reestablishment of special rights and privileges that were made in the 1990s. Neoliberalism has been associated with all forms of liberalism. Yet the liberal tradition in Latin America is alive. It has been energized by the challenges of indigenism and by the revival of neopopulism in many countries.

CONSERVATISM

In 1905 the bishop of Pasto, Colombia, Ezequiel Moreno wrote in his last will the following lines:

liberalism has had an unspeakable victory and this horrendous fact makes evident the utter failure of the desired concord between those that love the altar and those that hate the altar; between Catholics (that is, conservatives) and liberals (that is, atheists). I must admit once more that LIBERALISM IS A SIN, a fatal enemy of the Church and of the kingdom of Jesus Christ. It will cause the ruin of peoples and nations. Since I wish to teach this truth even after my death, I desire that a large sign be posted in plain view in the room where my dead body will be laying, even at church during my funeral, stating: LIBERALISM IS A SIN. (Palacios 1995: 189)

Bishop Moreno's indictment of liberalism was shared by many conservatives. For the most part the conservative tradition in Latin America was non-secular. It was critically linked to religion and to the Roman church. The defence of Catholicism often entailed a defence of the social order that prevailed during the colonial past. Conservatives valued the stabilizing role that the church played in colonial society and regarded that institution as a necessary intermediate body. While the roots of conservative ideology can be traced back to the practices and ideas that Spain and Portugal brought to the New World, conservatism only became fully fledged after independence (Wiarda 2001). Conservatism is an ideology that rejects radical change and innovations. The specificity of history and experience is a common trait of conservatism (Nisbet 1986). Since the liberalism of the founders of the new countries was moderate and rejected the excesses of the French Revolution, in the beginning there was no conservative

reaction to independence. Furthermore, for a time, an ideological consensus existed regarding the status of the church and the political role of the catholic religion in the new nations. Thus, in Latin America there was little enthusiasm for the writings of the Traditionalist writers, such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald. For some time moderate liberalism was an umbrella. Even one of the most important conservative figures of the nineteenth century, the Mexican Lucas Alamán, only became truly conservative after 1847.

Conservatism proper began only when the original ideological consensus broke down. Liberals everywhere launched political and social reforms to secularize their societies. This movement was vigorously opposed by conservatives everywhere. Latin Americans share with other conservatives a rejection of radical change. The secularizing enterprise of the liberal reformers was seen by conservatives as reckless and dangerous. As many Latin American nations failed to create stable representative governments, conservatives blamed the liberals for the inability to produce political order. As Alamán argued in 1853, the stable bases of social and political order were to be found in colonial society (Alamán 1885). However, liberals had recklessly destroyed the corporate organization of society (Aguilar Rivera 2008).

Conservative ideology sought to preserve or restore the place and standing of the church in society and to prevent further secularization. In some countries, such as Colombia and Mexico, civil wars were waged between conservatives and liberals. As a result of ideological polarization, Mexican conservatives became ever more radical. If Maistre and Bonald had been absent during the foundation of the new nations, they (along with other minor Traditionalists such as the Abbé Thorel) were rediscovered during the mid century. In the late 1840s Mexican conservatives published scathing attacks in their daily *El Universal* against the ideas of the social contract, individual rights, and popular sovereignty (Palti 1998). This was an onslaught against the principles of modern representative government. Such critique is most remarkable, since at the time conservatives in Europe were fighting to stay the democratic tide. The foundational debates over representative government belonged to the eighteenth century. However, the most radical wing of the Latin American conservative tradition was annihilated in the civil war that ensued in Mexico. Conservatives received a fatal blow when the Austrian Emperor Maximilian was defeated and shot in 1867.

However, at the turn of the nineteenth century conservatism was alive in Latin America. For instance, in 1903 a Chilean, Alberto Edwards, argued in his *Bosquejo histórico de los partidos políticos* that the national crises that Chile had

experienced were due to the displacement of the conservative tradition and to the democratic turn of liberalism (Edwards 1903). Liberals had delivered the country to the corrupted masses. As a result, they had weakened the principle of authority. Strong men from the past, such as the nineteenth-century ruler Diego Portales, were needed to reassert this principle. Edwards called for the retrieval of 'live' traditions and feelings that constituted the inner and vital spirit of a people, unlike the dead letter of alien laws.

Edwards was not the only Latin American conservative who believed that strong men were the key to social and political order. The Venezuelan Laureano Vallenilla Lanz wrote *Cesarismo democrático* in 1919. Vallenilla Lanz claimed that political chaos after independence was a natural Spanish American phenomenon (Vallenilla Lanz 1991). Strong governments commanded by caudillos, not by unrealistic written constitutions, were needed to address this problem. Vallenilla Lanz used sociology to establish that caudillos were a necessity in Latin America to prevent 'spontaneous' anarchy. His model in turn was José Antonio Páez, a strongman involved in attaining Venezuelan independence.

Conservatism espoused a reactive kind of nationalism. In the beginning it was articulated as a means to counter the cultural influence of Anglo-American protestant culture.⁶ The Spanish legacy was conceived as a bulwark against the invasions of the materialistic culture of the north. Yet, in the second half of the twentieth century a conservative mixture of libertarian economics (Hayek and the Chicago School) and traditional ideas was produced. Jaime Guzmán, a Chilean lawyer, was the best example of this ideological synthesis. Guzmán was very influential in the drafting of the 1980 Chilean constitution during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (Cristi 2000: 6–8). In the 1970s the military regimes of the South America developed a doctrine of 'National Security'. Its inspiration came from the foreign policy of the United States during the Cold War era. According to this doctrine, the main aim of governments was to preserve domestic order and to prevent communist subversion. This doctrine gave the military the task of defending western values, such as Christianity (Garcia 1991).

Some families within the conservative tradition were strongly anti-individualistic and favoured corporatist arrangements. Some conservatives drew inspiration from the Spanish modernizing dictatorship of the general Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923–30). Corporatism and nationalism had an affinity with fascism. Thus in several countries in the years leading to the Second World War a number of conservatives espoused sympathy towards fascist Italy and Nazi

Germany. Some local fascists groups arose in Mexico and South America.⁷ When socialism entered the stage conservatives had one more ideological enemy. Latin American conservatism is strongly anti-communist. Thus, during the Cold War, conservatives took the side of the United States. Anti-communism was stronger in countries where socialist and communist organizations had a significant presence and where left-wing guerrillas operated.

SOCIALISM

According to Vincent Geoghegan, all forms of socialism include three basic ingredients: a critique, an alternative, and a transition theory (Eccleshall et al. 1999: 119). That is, they make the defects of a society evident, they propose a better arrangement of things and they point at the ways to bring about these improvements. Socialism deploys an egalitarian critique of capitalism. It portrays it as a system in which a minority owns the greatest share of wealth of society and in which the majority suffers poverty. Socialism also decries capitalism because it allegedly creates isolated and egotistical individuals. As Freeden asserts, the socialist core contains five concepts or conceptual themes: ‘the constitutive nature of the human relationship, human welfare as a desirable objective, human nature as active, equality, and history as the arena of (ultimately) beneficial change’ (Freeden 1996: 25).

Ideologically and politically the Latin American Left can be broken down into four groups: traditional Communist parties, the nationalist or populist left, the political-military organizations, and the region’s reformists (Castañeda 1994: 19). Within the socialist ideological family, Marxism has been the most important member, but not the only one. Socialism in Latin America dates back to the nineteenth century. A few intellectuals there were followers of French utopian ideas, like those espoused by Saint-Simon and Proudhon. While many intellectuals were acquainted with Marx’s writings, Marxism did not make much headway. In contrast, Positivism was a more influential social theory. The European revolutionary movements of 1848 had some impact on the region, but until the end of the nineteenth century socialist ideas attracted only ‘fashionable curiosity’ and registered little impact in Latin America (Jorrín and Martz 1970: 271).

Things began to change at the end of the century with large-scale immigration from southern Europe to Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. The socialism that emerged in Latin America at the time reflected the countries of origin of the immigrant workers as well as the ‘ideas and movements prevailing

there' (Wiarda 2001: 219). In Italy and Spain anarchism and anarchist movements were strong, thus anarchism had a significant influence on early Latin American Marxism and unionism. Anarchism's emphasis on violence as an instrument of political and social change affected the development of labour movements in several countries. Writers such as Ferdinand Pelloutier and Georges Sorel were also influential. Argentina and Uruguay had small anarchist movements as early as 1870 (Wiarda 2001: 221). Likewise, there was anarchist influence in Chile, Peru, and Mexico.

In Argentina, Juan B. Justo, a medical doctor, founded the first socialist party (Partido Socialista Argentino) in Latin America in 1895. Justo read Marx in German and translated it into Spanish. Justo and his group helped to found similar socialist movements in Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Justo was inspired by the II International, but later Marxists considered him as 'partly liberal' and too 'eclectic' (Löwy 1982: 16). For example, he was in favour of free trade. A dissenter from Justo's ideological line, Luis Emilio Recabarren, founded a more radical party (Partido Obrero Socialista) in Chile in 1912. Recabarren produced a Marxist reading of Chile's history. The party became the Chilean Communist Party in 1922.

In Latin America, as in the rest of the world, the 1917 Russian revolution was a turning point. In the aftermath of the revolution, communist parties were created in Argentina (1918), Mexico (1919), Brazil (1921), and many other countries. However, their membership was reduced. The largest party (the Chilean Communist Party) had less than 5000 members. These early communist parties 'were riven by ideological differences, rivalries among leaders and numerous schisms—mainly those dividing socialist, communists, and anarcho-syndicalists as well as various subgroups' (Wiarda 2001: 224). In spite of local differences, Latin American communist parties had to deal with the 'increasingly detailed orthodoxies emanating from Moscow' (Wiarda 2001: 224). Ideologically, the Soviet influence was important. It gave the early organizations a particular outlook. There were several reasons. First, the Comintern pressed the local organizations to get rid of democratic-socialists, Trotskyites, and others who did not conform to the Soviet version of Marxism. Second, during the first years the local communist parties drew ideological guidance from the decisions of the Third International. The Comintern issued two documents in 1921 and 1923 that pertained in particular to Latin America.⁸ These resolutions urged communists to forge alliances between the working classes and the peasantry. Class alliances were conceived as part of an 'uninterrupted' revolution. It was argued that Latin American societies could transit directly from backward and

dependent capitalism to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The need for an intermediate stage of independent capitalism was denied because the local bourgeoisies colluded with imperialism. The call for immediate revolution reinforced the anarchist ideological legacy and discouraged strategies of cooperation among social classes.

Yet, it was at this time that an effort to produce an indigenous Marxism in Latin America began with the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui (1894—1930). Mariátegui became a socialist in 1918 and he discovered Marxism and communism during a long trip to Europe in the early 1920s. When he returned to Peru, he joined the workers movement. In 1926 he founded *Amauta*, a literary and political magazine. He was strongly impressed by the French socialist Henri Barbusse and the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci. Indeed, Mariátegui was a ‘discoverer of Gramsci’s revisionist Marxism, in which Gramsci urged a conquest of the ‘commanding heights’, including cultural and educational institutions, long before that approach was popularized in the United States and Europe’ (Wiarda 2001: 227). Mariátegui’s political thought fused Marxism and the cultural and traditional practices of indigenous peoples. In his influential *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (1928) he argued that a progressive bourgeoisie, with a national feeling, liberal, and democratic, had never existed in Peru (Mariátegui 1979). However, his greatest contribution was to adapt Marxism to Peruvian society. Since Latin America had very little industrialization and a limited industrial proletariat the revolutionary class was absent. The answer to this void was in the native peoples. Mariátegui saw in the pre-Columbian collectivism of the descendants of the Incas a potential for socialism. Mariátegui asserted that ‘inca communism’ could serve as the foundation of socialism. He believed that a combination of students, intellectuals, the small working class, and the great mass of indigenous elements ‘could successfully carry out a Marxist revolution’ (Wiarda 2001:, 28). The emphasis on the peasantry and collectivism presaged events in China, whose revolution shared many of the same principles. As Wiarda asserts, Mariátegui’s ideological synthesis ‘was the first attempt ever in Latin America—maybe anywhere in the Third World—to adapt Marxian principles to indigenous realities. Rather than slavishly echoing Marx’s precepts, Mariátegui actually built a Latin American reality—the large indigenous populations of Peru—into the Marxian equation’ (Wiarda 2001:, 229).

When Nazi Germany threatened the Soviet Union in the 1930s, Moscow changed the Comintern’s policy towards Latin America. Instead of seeking immediate revolution, communist parties were to form broad class alliances with

reformist and democratic parties to oppose fascism. American imperialism was not the primary evil. Starting in 1935, the strategy of the 'Popular Front' changed the ideological lines of communist parties in Latin America. Ideologically, the need to go through a national stage of democratic and independent capitalism was reasserted. Communist parties moderated their radical ideology, accepted more nationalistic themes and sought to become legal. This strategy increased their legitimacy in the eyes of other political actors.

The process of ideological conformity among Latin American communist parties accelerated after 1936. The leadership became increasingly authoritarian and subservient to Moscow. Stalin's doctrine of revolution by stages was adopted as well as his ideas regarding the four core social classes: proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. Stalin's doctrine asserted that conditions for a socialist revolution in backward, semi feudal societies were not ripe (Löwy 1982: 30).

Leftist opposition to communist parties soon appeared. The most important dissenters were the Trotskyites. For a time the Latin American followers of Leon Trotsky saw themselves as heirs of the revolutionary ideas of the 1920s. In particular, they claimed Mariátegui as their precursor.

An ideological shift within communist parties occurred when the Cold War began. Many communist parties were once again made illegal. The wartime alliances of the Popular Front came to an end. While the communists were persecuted and in decline, the socialists and social democrats were ascendant in the 1950s. However, the 1959 Cuban revolution changed the ideological make-up of Latin American socialism in a radical manner. Cuba became the first Marxist-Leninist state in the Western hemisphere. Cuba's socialism, nationalism, and defiance of the United States became very popular in Latin America. Also, the Cuban revolution 'inspired and—and often sponsored—a variety of imitators throughout Latin America' (Wiarda 2001:, 237). Cuba reinvigorated Marxist thought and action in Latin America and also created new divisions within socialism. Fidel Castro's revolutionary group rejected the evolutionary blueprint of traditional communism. The revolution would perform the tasks ordinarily assigned to modern national capitalism. The Cuban revolution demonstrated that armed struggle could be a successful road to a new social order. There were, after all, shortcuts to communist society. The success of armed struggle in Cuba encouraged the appearance of insurgent groups in several Latin America countries. As a result, starting in 1959 Latin American Marxism began a new revolutionary cycle. Many of the ideas of 1920s communism were retrieved. The most representative figure of this stage of Latin American Marxism was an

Argentinean, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (1928–67). Guevara, a key actor in the Cuban revolution, elaborated a theory of rural guerrilla war. He developed the idea of an insurgency nucleus (*foco*) in the countryside. According to these ideas, a small number of persons could trigger a successful rebellion if they chose carefully their operational grounds. He preached by example and himself led rebel guerrillas in several countries.

Legal socialism also received a blow when the democratically elected government of president Salvador Allende was toppled by a military coup in Chile in 1973. The impact of Allende's fall was to discredit reformist socialists and to harden the radicals of the underground military organizations. While the success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua (1979) gave some encouragement to leftist insurgent groups in other countries, most attempts to overthrow governments by the use of violence failed. Guevara himself was killed in Bolivia by the military in 1967. The ideal of revolution began to lose its appeal in Latin America. Yet, new ideological syntheses appeared. Such is the case of Liberation Theology: a fusion of Marxism and Christian thought that was developed in Brazil, Mexico, and other countries. Catholic reformist activists were also persecuted by military regimes. They went underground where they met activists from the Left. They also discovered Marxism (Meyer 1999: 314). Political repression encouraged religious activists to accept violence as an acceptable form of political action. Liberation theology adopted the class struggle as an analytic tool and employed Marxism as the scientific method to account for social facts.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a cataclysmic event for socialism in Latin America. By the 1990s, 'Marxism in Latin America (and elsewhere) was in steep and precarious decline. Almost everywhere democracy and free markets appeared to have triumphed' (Wiarda 2001: 239). The Latin American Left had been completely and utterly defeated (Castañeda 1994: 3). Many old socialist parties even changed their names. Ideologically the axioms of Marxism were called into question. From 1989 to 1994 it appeared as if the only road open to Latin American socialism was some kind of social democracy. However, against all odds, the Cuban communist regime of Fidel Castro did not collapse. And in 1994 the Mexican Zapatista rebels started an armed movement, which sought to defeat the Mexican army and capture Mexico City (*Primera Declaración* 1994). While the armed stage of the Zapatista revolt was brief, although not bloodless, the rebels signalled that utopia was not unarmed. The ideological discourse of the Zapatistas soon changed from classical Marxism-Leninism to Indigenism, but the movement effectively stalled the fledgling ideological turn of the Left

towards reformism. The Cuban revolution gained a second wind and the budding criticism of Castro's regime ceased. The Zapatista demonstrated that an illiberal ideological option was possible after the fall of socialism. Also, it showed that, notwithstanding the demise of Marxism, many former socialists in Latin America were not willing to forsake some of its ideological tenets, such as the idea of revolution. More broadly, the void left by communism and Marxism was filled by Multiculturalism and Indigenism. As in other parts of the world, ex-Marxists embraced various forms of relativism and postmodernism rather than a 'non-Marxist version of universalistic egalitarianism' (Barry 2001: 4).

The downfall of Marxist ideology left one of the traditional groups in the Left almost untouched: the populists. In the last decade of the twentieth century, populism regained political and ideological strength. Populist discourse had been out of fashion since the 1980s, but it came back in the wake of neoliberalism. Some populist leaders have sought to create an ideological synthesis between socialism and nationalism. For example, the former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez named the ideology of his regime the 'socialism of the twenty-first century'. Chávez admired the Cuban revolution. Anti-imperialism is a key tenet of *chavismo*. Likewise, former Marxists, such as the sociologist Marta Harnecker (former student of the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser), have been attracted to the populism of Hugo Chávez.⁹

NATIONALISM AND POPULISM

The 1910 Mexican Revolution was a turning point in the ideological development of Latin America. Mexico made its own contribution to the obsolescence of liberalism. While fascist or socialist parties and movements fought liberal governments in other countries, Mexico established a revolutionary state that was not socialist, fascist, or liberal. That political regime was ideologically eclectic: it did not oppose elections, but electoral processes were not the source of its legitimacy. It was nationalistic, populist, corporatist, and anticlerical (Knight 1986). It favoured state intervention in the economy. Key transnational industries, such as foreign oil companies, were expropriated by the government in the 1930s. A single party ruled. The 1917 constitution embraced both individualism and collectivism. Revolutionaries claimed that the aims of the revolution had been democracy, the fight against injustice, political oppression, and exploitation (Córdova 1989: 58, Córdova 1973). Ideologically, the Mexican Revolution shared some ideas with other ideological families but it did not belong to any of them. Due to these reasons, the Mexican Revolution

was a strong source of illiberal influence for the rest of Latin America. It offered other countries a third way among competing world ideologies.

The ideology of the Mexican Revolution had a significant impact on the Peruvian intellectual Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Haya de la Torre founded a political party, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), in 1924. This party became 'one of Latin America's first genuinely mass-based political parties and an inspiration to other left-of-center, reformist parties in other countries' (Wiarda 2001: 229; Kantor 1953). APRA's ideology embraced anti-imperialism, social justice, agrarian reform, and Pan-Latin Americanism. APRA created a corporatist internal structure, with organized sections for youth, women, peasants, workers, and intellectuals (Kantor 1953: 131). The party believed in parliamentary and democratic methods and rejected revolution. APRA also became a member of the Socialist International, an organization of social-democratic parties that believes in democratic social reform.

Often nationalism and populism have been closely related. Such was the case of the *cardenismo* in Mexico and the *peronismo* in Argentina. The regime of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil is also considered as populist. Getúlio Vargas, a politician from the province of Rio Grande do Sul came to power by military fiat that deposed the ruling president in 1930 (Braun 2008: 372). Starting in 1937 Vargas launched a transformation of the Brazilian regime. His *Estado Novo* lasted until he was ousted in 1945.

Cárdenas was president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940. Cárdenas launched an ambitious programme of agrarian reform, campaigned throughout the country, both before his election and after, and nationalized the oil industry from foreign companies. Cárdenas 'barnstormed the country, descending on remote regions and obscure pueblos, meeting peasant delegations, fixing local problems, inscribing his personality in the collective memory of communities which had never before seen a state governor, let alone a president' (Knight 1998: 236). He also established 'socialist' education in public schools. As did other populist leaders, Cárdenas attempted to reform and expand the public educational system to balance the influence of the Catholic Church. Cardenista policies elicited vigorous criticism and opposition (Córdova 1974).

However, the heyday of populism took place between 1940 and 1960. This period saw populism emerge as the 'main form of politics in many countries; in others, it challenged traditional leaders to become more representative' (Conniff 1991: 11). In Argentina Juan Domingo Perón won power in 1946 and then was reelected in 1952. He ruled until 1955 when he was ousted by a military coup. The regimes of Vargas and Perón drafted new laws that expanded executive

authority and allowed them to stay in power longer (Braun 2008: 379).

In the 1990s populist leaders pursued neoliberal reforms, as in the case of Argentina (Saúl Menem) and Perú (Alberto Fujimori) (Knight 1998: 244–7). Likewise, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, populism has regained momentum, as an ideology and as a political movement. Populist leaders have come to power in Venezuela (Hugo Chávez), Bolivia (Evo Morales), Ecuador (Rafael Correa), and elsewhere.

As an ideology, populism remains elusive and highly controversial. More than a set of ideas, populism seems to be a political ‘style’. Yet it is an enduring trait of the Latin American ideological landscape. As Knight asserted more than a decade ago: ‘pronounced dead, buried, unlamented, with a stake through the heart, populism returns, like the living dead of Latin American politics, to haunt the sentient world, undeterred by the bright dawn of democracy and neo-liberalism’ (Knight 1998: 226). Both Left and Right have used populist arguments in different political and social settings. Thus, there seems to be an ideological indeterminacy in populism. Some scholars have sought to define the concept without much success (Wiles 1969). Moreover, some academics both distrust and dislike populism (Canovan 1991). For example, Guido Germani deplores the authoritarian strains of populism (Germani 1962). For many observers populism has strongly negative connotations. Yet, populism has recently attracted more favourable views. Thus, Ernesto Laclau attempts to show ‘that populism has no referential unity because it is ascribed not to a delimitable phenomenon but to a social logic whose effects cuts across many phenomena. Populism is, quite simply, a way of constructing the political’ (Laclau 2005: xi). Yet, while populism does not have the ideological coherence of liberalism or socialism it embodies some ideas that are common to most populist movements. Key among them is the idea that there is a close bond between the leader and the people. Populism ‘offers a particularly intense form of “bonding”, usually associated with periods of rapid mobilization and crisis’ (Knight 1998: 227). Populism creates a dichotomous political world, where the ‘people’ confront the ‘other’: foreigners, traitors, the ‘oligarchs’, etc. For this reason, populism easily converts into chauvinism. It also adopts an anti-institutional stance since the populist leader or movement ‘represents a repudiation of entrenched vested interests’ (Knight 1998: 230). Social harmony is often invoked by populist leaders. Thus there is an anti-pluralist strain present in populist ideology. The aim of eliminating the sources of social conflict serve to justify the exclusion of certain social actors from legitimate political participation. The ‘people’ and ‘nation’ are one and the same, an organic unity that transcends individual

members. Therefore the nation shares a common history and destiny. There is a single identity embodied by the populist movement or leader. For both populisms of the Left and the Right, universal ideologies such as liberalism and socialism are a threat to national unity (Zanatta 2008:, 330–7).

Historically, populism was ‘a repudiation of those forces hindering popular representation, social mobility and rising standards of living for the masses. Almost all the early populist movements contained a mixture of reactionary and progressive sentiments’ (Conniff 1982:, 5). What are the main traits of Latin American populism as an ideology? According to Conniff, social integration of the masses can be regarded as the ideology of populism. While populists tended to draw upon eclectic philosophical sources, ‘the call for social integration was crucial to twentieth-century populism because it simultaneously satisfied the desire for organic society, addressed the social question, promised citizen participation in government, and provided a winning strategy for reform-minded groups to come to power peaceably’¹⁰ (Conniff 1982: 11). Populism both rejected oligarchic government and communist revolution. It sought a middle ground. It also created a new awareness among the masses, ‘which has been one of its enduring legacies. It encouraged study of folkways and popular art forms ... the search for a popular culture answered an existential need to define the ‘people’ whose role in national life was expanding, and in whose name the populist campaigned’ (Conniff 1982: 21).

NEO-INDIGENISMO AND MULTICULTURALISM

Latin America has seen in recent decades a wave of constitutional reform.¹¹ Transitions to democracy often involved rewriting charters to end authoritarian regimes. Among the reforms introduced in the constitutions are cultural rights for minorities as well as referenda and other direct democracy mechanisms. Over the past 15 years seven Latin American countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru) adopted or modified constitutions to recognize the multiethnic, multicultural nature of their societies. While many countries where democratic rule has been well established for a long time have debated these provisions for decades, many Latin American nations have moved swiftly to introduce them in their charters. Some of the most dramatic and unexpected achievements in the constitutional recognition of cultural differences have occurred in Latin America (van Cott 2000). The ideology of neo-Indigenismo supports many of these reforms. Multiculturalism has been, for the most part, an intellectual enterprise of Anglo-American political philosophers

and social theorists (Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Tully 1995). However, not all sources of neo-Indigenismo are foreign. Latin American intellectuals fashioned Indigenismo in the first half of the twentieth century. Indigenismo rejected the Europhilic political traditions of the past and turned its attention to the Indian,

both as a symbol of the national type and the object of reform. Though they shared no coherent ideology, revolutionary Indigenistas were united by their sympathy for the Indian and their desire to incorporate Indians into a reconstructed modern nation, in which living Indians were treated with respect and dignity, and their traditions accorded respect as the true national past. (Dawson 2004:, xiv–xv)

Not only José María Arguedas in Perú, but also Manuel Gamio in Mexico placed the indigenous peoples at the centre of national identity (Dawson 1998, 2004: 3–127).¹² While old Indigenismo was conceived as an ideological tool for nation-building, the new Indigenismo does not propound the ethnic integration of indigenous minorities but seeks instead to establish a regime of separate cultural rights, recognition, autonomy, and self-determination for these groups.¹³ Neo-Indigenismo in Latin America also partakes from a broader international movement that aspires to ‘promote and protect the rights of the world’s “first peoples”’ (Niezen 2003: 4). Indigenism at the global scale refers to ‘a primordial identity, to people with primary attachments to land and culture, “traditional” people with lasting connections to ways of life that have survived “from time immemorial”’ (Niezen 2003: 3). While some American academics, such as Iris Marion Young, have been bold in their proposals for group rights and institutions that encompass new understandings of cultural diversity, the institutional arrangements of the UK, the United States, and even Canada have not seen a sharp departure from the model of liberal democracy (Young 1990). Much of the multicultural theory remains confined to professional journals and campuses. At the same time that many countries are struggling to establish liberal constitutions after decades of communist or military rule, political theorists in the West were rejecting precisely these ideals. For instance, Tully argued that

constitutions are not fixed and unchangeable agreements reached at some foundational moment, but chains of continual intercultural negotiations and agreements in accord with, and in violation of, the conventions of mutual recognition, continuity and consent. In sum, as the people remove modern constitutionalism from its imperial throne and put in its proper place, what remains to be seen looks to me like the outlines of the black canoe in dawn’s early light. (Tully 1995: 183–4)

If equality before the law, common institutions and individual rights are not defining traits of modern constitutionalism, then what is? According to Tully, a contemporary constitution can recognize cultural diversity if it is conceived as a form of accommodation of cultural diversity. It should be seen as an activity, an

intercultural dialogue in which the culturally diverse sovereign citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements on their ways of association over time in accord with the conventions of mutual recognition, consent and continuity (Tully 1995: 184).

The result of this approach is to see constitutionalism as merely one of many 'discourses' available to 'culturally-situated' persons. Therefore, for Tully Instead of a grand theory, constitutional knowledge appears to be a humble and practical dialogue in which interlocutors from near and far exchange limited descriptions of actual cases, learning as they go along. Accordingly, the language and institutions of modern constitutionalism should now take their democratic place among the multiplicity of constitutional languages and institutions of the world and submit their limited claims to authority to the three conventions, just like all the others.(Tully 1985: 185–6)

Tully aims to describe a 'post-imperial' view of constitutionalism (Tully 1985: 186). These theories can, and have, inspired constitution-makers in Latin America and other countries.¹⁴ Western political theorists tell constitution-makers in Latin America that the old idea of constitutionalism will not work anymore. Those countries, they argue, would be better off if they would let go the idea. William Galston argues that 'the conclusions of liberal theory, whatever they may be, are manifestly inadequate as blueprints for practical policy making in the post-Cold War world' (Galston 2002: 63).

As we have seen, during the early nineteenth century, Latin American constitution-makers looked for advice in Europe and the United States. Books such as Benjamin Constant's *Handbook of Constitutional Politics* were avidly read by politicians eager to learn how to draft liberal constitutions. While some of the institutions of representative government were then quite new, because not forty years had elapsed since the US Constitution had been enacted, Latin Americans took at face value all the theories that came from France and North America. With a few exceptions, such as Simón Bolívar, they lacked a critical perspective to assess what was offered as a fool-proof constitutional model. Perhaps, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the same phenomenon is occurring again. Many Latin American politicians and legal scholars have accepted the ideology of 'liberal pluralism', 'multicultural citizenship', or 'legal pluralism'. Such an ideology has become the philosophical foundation of neo-Indigenismo.

In spite of the actual shortcomings of constitutions, until very recently most Latin Americans recognized as valid the inherited ideals of nineteenth-century liberal constitutionalism, such as equality before the law and a political (not

cultural) notion of citizenship. The distance between ideal and reality was seen as a challenge that had to be bridged. Here enters Anglo-American multiculturalism. Such theories found a keen ear among Latin American elites. Unlike previous anti-liberal movements that directly challenged liberal democracy and capitalism, multiculturalism does not present itself as a rival of liberalism. It disguises itself as a reform movement within liberalism. At the starting point of his theoretical voyage, Will Kymlicka acknowledged that his brand of 'liberalism' was different from what Latin Americans had until then considered as liberalism. In his seminal book, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Kymlicka argued that:

My concern is with this modern liberalism [from J.S. Mill to Rawls and Dworkin], not seventeenth-century liberalism, and I want to leave it entirely open what the relationship is between the two. It might be that the developments initiated by the 'new' liberals' are really an abandonment of what was definitive of classical liberalism' (Kymlicka 1989: 10).

This move is telling, since neither John Stuart Mill nor John Rawls saw themselves as departing from the tradition of Locke, Montesquieu, or Tocqueville. Previous critics of liberalism had been open in acknowledging that they were *not* liberals, but something else (Holmes 1993). However, Kymlicka and others in his camp dressed their theory with the robes of liberalism.¹⁵ By the time multiculturalism became prominent in the academic world, relativism had spread widely in Latin America. How this happened is not clear and an account of the rise of relativism in Latin America and elsewhere falls beyond the scope of this chapter. After successive waves of colonizing ideologies, liberalism, positivism, Marxism, populism, etc. relativism captured the imagination of Latin Americans. While relativism also made inroads in countries where liberal democracy was well established, in Latin America it found a fertile soil to grow. Since liberalism in Spanish America was mainly imported from France, it was mostly concerned with constitutional limitations of power, not with the philosophical foundations of liberalism. Also, the memories of injustices committed against the indigenous peoples in the past (and present) contributed to the success of the agenda of multiculturalism. In most countries guilt was pervasive and policies such as symbolic recognition afforded a cost-effective means to appease it (Aguilar Rivera 2001).

Multiculturalism called into question the historically unfulfilled objectives of achieving equality before the law and to subject all citizens, including the most powerful among them, to a single body of norms. Traditionally, the rich and powerful have managed to exempt themselves from the common laws. If this is true everywhere, it is even more so in Latin America. The founding idea of legal

equality was that these rights should be assigned to individual citizens, with no special rights (or disabilities) accorded to some and not others on the basis of race or group membership.

Special self-government rights for minorities are well-known in Latin America. Before independence in the nineteenth century, Indians lived in separate towns and enjoyed some degree of self-government. These were the *repúblicas de indios*. This arrangement followed the common practice among empires throughout history of ruling outside their core area by recognizing (or creating) local leaders who were expected to maintain order and produce some amount in taxes or tribute. The Spanish colonial authorities considered Indians as permanently underage and therefore they merited paternalistic protection. The term ‘legal pluralism’ connotes the simultaneous existence of distinct normative systems within a single territory, a condition usually associated with colonial rule (van Cott 2000: 209). Today many multiculturalists seek to revive pre-modern ways of thinking about political authority.

Many constitution-makers around Latin America see themselves as partaking in a broader ideological movement of ‘post-nationalist’ constitutionalism. They have learned that post-nationalist constitutions reject universalistic notions of citizenship based exclusively on uniformly applied individual rights and emphasize multiple forms of citizenship through a variety of institutions and autonomous domains of sovereignty that maximize the effective participation of diverse groups in society. This brand of constitutionalism argues that the Western constitutional tradition lacks a conception of culturally alienated peoples or groups. ‘Old’ constitutionalism was, allegedly, developed to facilitate contestation within a culturally and socially homogeneous political community. While this argument is a mistaken reading of the historical record (Katznelson 1996: 131–58), it is widely accepted in Latin America. For multicultural constitutionalism, democratic deliberation understood as the reasoned exchange of arguments is inadequate. Instead, deliberation becomes a new form of ‘cultural dialogue’. According to Tully,

The exchange of public reasons also cannot be separated from the cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and gender of those participating or from their substantive conceptions of the good, as the earlier theorists of deliberation sometimes assumed. Just as deeply ingrained sexist, racist, and diversity-blind attitudes can operate to exclude oppressed and subordinated people, they can also operate to discount and ignore their modes of argumentation once they are included, both in practice and in theories of deliberation. (Tully 2002: 224)

Not only is the exclusion of cultural groups a problem for post-nationalist constitutionalism. Even if the excluded can exercise power over their lives, the

issue of cultural assimilation still remains. Active participation will not suffice.¹⁶

CONCLUSION

The ideological traditions of Latin America can be dated back to colonial times or even to the pre-Hispanic era. Some scholars argue that the whole ideological evolution of Latin America was determined at the onset by the political culture of the Spanish settlers. (Wiarda 2001: 19–112). For Richard Morse, for example, the key to understanding Spanish America lies in the Spanish patrimonial state (Morse 1954, 1964, 1989). The State was embodied in the patrimonial power of the king, who was the source of all patronage and the ultimate arbiter of all disputes. Without the presence of the king, the system collapsed. According to Morse, Spanish American leaders in the nineteenth century were constantly trying to reconstruct the patrimonial authority of the Spanish crown. One factor obstructing the reconstruction of authority along traditional Spanish lines, Morse argues, was the meddling of Western constitutional ideas. Anglo-French liberal constitutionalism—with its emphasis on the rule of law, the separation of powers, constitutional checks on authority and the efficacy of elections—stood as a contradiction to those traditional attitudes and modes of behaviour which lived in the marrow of Spanish Americans. Because liberal constitutionalism was ill-adapted to traditional Spanish American culture, ‘attempts to erect and maintain states according to liberal principles invariably failed’ (Safford 1995: 416). The authority of imported liberal constitutional ideas, while insufficient to provide a viable alternative to the traditional political model, was often sufficient to undermine the legitimacy of governments operating according to the traditional model. Yet, this interpretation is over-deterministic and fails to account for ideological change and innovation in that part of the world. The political ideologies that developed in Latin America over time (liberalism at first, followed by conservatism and socialism) had a significant impact and became incorporated into the political rules, institutions, and discourses of different countries. These ideological families often interbred and produced new hybrids. But then, such is the case in the rest of the world.

NOTES

*. The author wishes to thank Fabiola Ramírez and Alberto Toledo for their research assistance.

1. For the Spanish origin of the term ‘Liberal’ see Llorens (1967). ‘Liberal’, as a political label, J. G. Merquior asserts, ‘was born in the Spanish Cortes of 1810, a parliament that was rebelling against absolutism’ (Merquior 1991: 2). Claudio Véliz asserts: ‘It is fair to add that its [the term Liberal] international career was actually launched by the poet Robert Southey, who in 1816, used the Spanish

form as a scornful epithet addressed to the British Whigs whom he described as 'British *liberales*' in an obvious reference to the Spanish political faction responsible for the disorderly and ultimately unsuccessful reforms initiated by the Cortes of Cádiz in 1812' (Véliz 1994: 130). See also Breña (2006).

2. '... the three authors most frequently encountered were Montesquieu, Constant, and Bentham. Rousseau, of great help in justifying the establishment of revolutionary governments between 1810 and 1815, was decreasingly relevant to Spanish American concerns after 1820' (Safford 1995: 367). See also Levene (1956:, 179–218).
3. On Constant see Constant (1988); Dodge (1980); Holmes (1984); Hofmann (1980); Gauchet (1980).
4. An exception was the 1845 publication *Facund* (1845), by the Argentinean Domingo Sarmiento, that dwelt on the relation between urban life and civilization.
5. 'This set of ideas is commonly referred to as positivism, although there is no accepted definition of the term. In its philosophic sense, Positivism is a theory of knowledge in which the scientific method represents man's only means of knowing. The elements of this method are, first, an emphasis on observation and experiment, with a consequent rejection of all a priori knowledge, and secondly, a search for the laws of phenomena, or the relation between them' (Hale 1986: 382–3).
6. Some of them drew inspiration from José Enrique Rodó's cultural manifesto: *Ariel* (1900).
7. For example, the Camisas Doradas in Mexico, the Movimiento Nacional Socialista in Chile, and the Acción Integralista in Brazil.
8. 'Acerca de la revolución en América, llamado a la clase obrera de las dos Américas' (1921) and 'A los obreros y campesinos de América del Sur' (1923) (Löwy 1982: 73–83).
9. See the long interview with Hugo Chávez that Harnecker conducted (Harnecker 2002).
10. Social integration, in turn, 'suggests the insertion of an individual into a complex society in which he will be free to move vertically or horizontally according to his talents' (Conniff 1982: 11).
11. Latin American countries replacing or reforming constitutions in recent years include: Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1994), Brazil (1988, 1994, 1997), Chile (1989, 1994, 1997), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1996, 1997), Dominican Republic (1996), Ecuador (1996, 1998), Mexico (1994, 1995, 2001), Nicaragua (1987, 1995), Panamá (1994), Paraguay (1992), Perú (1993), Uruguay (1997), and Venezuela (1999).
12. On Arguedas see Vargas Llosa (1996). On indigenism in Mexico see Brading (1988).
13. For a sample, see Villoro (1998); Díaz-Polanco (2006).
14. Will Kymlicka, for instance has deliberately sought to influence constitution making in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. His theory of multicultural citizenship has found receptive ears in several countries. In a laudatory article in the *Wall Street Journal* Kymlicka is described as 'a slight, self-effacing philosophy professor with a habit of wearing red Converse sneakers at formal occasions'. According to the *WSJ*, for critical guidance Estonian officials called on Kymlicka. The Council of Europe has asked Mr Kymlicka for advice on how to better define European citizenship. Germany's Free Democrats, the leading liberal political party, have asked the philosopher to help draft a charter on minority rights. The Canadian government has sought his views on special arrangements for Native Americans and French-speaking Quebec. Mr Kymlicka is also credited with influencing debates on the minority status of Arabs in Israel, Catalans in Spain, Maoris in New Zealand, and the Hungarian minority in Romania. See Kymlicka and Opalski (2001); Zachary (2000).
15. In regard to multiculturalism, Brian Barry asserts: 'The deeper point is that the policies advocated in its name are not liberal. If this is so, it is natural to ask why it should be thought by anybody that policies aimed at promoting diversity or tolerance (as they are defined by contemporary political philosophers) have any claim to count as implications of liberalism. The most important reason is that liberalism has in recent years been equated by many people with cultural relativism' (Barry 2001: 127).
16. As Tully claims, '... the recent repatriation of limited self-governing powers by indigenous peoples from the states that have taken their lands, destroyed their customary practices of government and reduced their populations to a fraction of pre-contact levels perpetuates a powerful form of assimilation

called domestication or internal colonization' (Tully 2002: 224).

REFERENCES

- Aguilar Rivera, J. A. 2001. *El Fin de la Raza Cósmica: Consideraciones sobre el Esplendor y Decadencia del Liberalismo en México*. México: Oceano.
- Aguilar Rivera, J. A. 2008. 'Las ideologías políticas: de la metamorfosis a la transformación del liberalismo'. Pp. 229–49 in *Historia General de América Latina, vol. 7 Los Proyectos Nacionales Latinoamericanos: Sus Instrumentos y Articulación, 1870–1930*, eds. E. Ayala and E. Posada. Madrid: UNESCO/Trotta.
- Aguilar Rivera, J. A. and R. Rojas. (eds.) 2003. *El Republicanismo en Hispanoamérica*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Alamán, L. 1885. *Historia de México*, vol. V. México: Imprenta de J.M. Lara.
- Barry, B. 2001. *Culture and Equality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brading, D. 1988. 'Manuel Gamio and official Indigenism in Mexico', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 7 (1): 75–89.
- Braun, H. 2008. 'Populismos Latinoamericanos'. Pp. 371–94 in *Historia General de América Latina. América Latina desde 1930*, vol. 8, eds. M. Palacios and G. Weinberg. Madrid: UNESCO/Trotta.
- Breña, R. 2006. *El primer liberalismo hispánico y los procesos de emancipación de América 1808–1824*. Mexico: El Colegio de México.
- Canovan, M. 1991. *Populism*. London: Junction Books.
- Castañeda, J. 1994. *Utopia Unarmed. The Latin American Left after the Cold War*. New York: Vintage.
- Centeno, M. A. 1994. *Democracy within Reason*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Conniff, M. L. 1982. 'Introduction: Toward a comparative definition of populism'. Pp. 3–30 in *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, ed. M. L. Conniff. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Conniff, M. L. 1991. 'Introduction'. Pp. 1–21 in *Populism in Latin America*, ed. M. L. Conniff Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Constant, B. 1820. *Curso de Política Constitucional*. Translated by Marcial Antonio López. Madrid, Imprenta de la Compañía.
- Constant, B. 1988. *Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Córdova, A. 1973. *La Ideología de la Revolución Mexicana. La Formación del Nuevo Régimen*. Mexico: Era.
- Córdova, A. 1974. *La Política de Masas del Cardenismo*. Mexico: Era.
- Córdova, A. 1989. *La Revolución y el Estado en México*. Mexico: Era.
- van Cott, D. L. 2000. 'A political analysis of legal pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 32 (1): 207–34.
- Cristi, R. 2000. *El Pensamiento Político de Jaime Guzmán*. Santiago: LOM.
- Dawson, A. S. 1998. 'From models for the nation to model citizens: indigenismo and the 'revindication' of the Mexican Indian, 1920–40', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 30 (2): 279–308.
- Dawson, A. S. 2004. *Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Díaz-Polanco, H. 2006. *Elogio de la Diversidad. Globalización, Multiculturalismo y Etnofagia*. Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Dodge, G. H. 1980. *Benjamin Constant's Philosophy of Liberalism. A Study in Politics and Religion*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Eccleshall, R., V. Geoghegan, R. Jay, and R. Wilford. 1999. *Ideologías Políticas*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Edwards, A. 1903. *Bosquejo Histórico de los Partidos Políticos*. Santiago: G. Miranda.

- Freedman, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Fukuyama, F. 2004. *State-Building, Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Galston, W. A. 2002. *Liberal Pluralism. The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- García, A. L. 1991. *La Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional (1958–1983)*. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
- García Sebastián, M. and F. del Rey Reguillo. (eds.) 2008. *Los desafíos de la libertad. Transformación y crisis del liberalismo en Europa y América Latina*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
- Garcíadiego, J. 1999. 'Dónde quedó el liberalismo?' Pp. 79–90 in *Recepción y Transformación del Liberalismo en México. Homenaje al Profesor Charles A. Hale*, eds. F. Escalante, M. del Refugio González, J. Zoraida Vázquez, et al. Mexico: El Colegio de México.
- Gauchet, M. (ed.) 1980. *Benjamin Constant: De la Liberté chez les Modernes*. Paris: Le Livre de Poche.
- Germani, G. 1962. *Política y Sociedad en una Época de Transición: de la Sociedad Tradicional a la Sociedad de Masas*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Hale, C. H. 1986. 'Political and social ideas in Latin America, 1870–1930'. Pp. 367–441 in *The Cambridge History of Latin America* Vol. IV, ed. L. Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hale, C. H. 1989. *The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hale, C. H. 2008. *Emilio Rabasa and the Survival of Porfirian Liberalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Harnecker, M. 2002. *Hugo Chávez. Un Hombre, un Pueblo*. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Hofmann, E. 1980. *Les 'Principes de Politique' de Benjamin Constant*, 2 vols. Geneva: Droz.
- Holmes, S. 1984. *Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Holmes, S. 1993. *The Anatomy of Anti-liberalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Holmes, S. 1995. *Passions and Constraint. On the Theory of Liberal Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jorrín M., and J. D. Martz. 1970. *Latin American Political Thought and Ideology*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kantor, H. 1953. *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Katznelson, I. 1996. *Liberalism's Crooked Circle*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Knight, A. 1986. *The Mexican Revolution*, 2 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Knight, A. 1998. 'Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 30 (2): 223–48.
- Kymlicka, W. 1989. *Liberalism, Community and Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. and M. Opalski. (eds.) 2001. *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laclau, E. 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Levene, R. 1956. *El Mundo de las Ideas y la Revolución Hispanoamericana de 1810*. Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile.
- Llorens, V. 1967. Sobre la aparición de *Liberal*. *Literatura, Historia, Política: Revista de Occidente*. Madrid: n.p.
- Löwy, M. 1982. *El Marxismo en América Latina*. Mexico: Era.
- Mariátegui, J. S. 1979. *Siete ensayos de interpretación sobre de la Realidad Peruana*. Mexico: Era.

- Merquior, J. G. 1991. *Liberalism Old & New*. Boston: Twayne Publishers.
- Meyer, J. 1999. *Historia de los Cristianos en América Latina*. Mexico: Jus.
- Molina, G. 1977. *Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia de 1935 a la iniciación del Frente Nacional*. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo.
- Morse, R. 1954. 'Toward a theory of Spanish American government', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 15: 71–93.
- Morse, R. 1964. 'The heritage of Latin America'. Pp. 159–69 in *The Founding of New Societies; Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia*, ed. L. Hartz. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Morse, R. 1989. *Soundings of the New World. Culture and Ideology in the Americas*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Niezen, R. 2003. *The Origins of Indigenism. Human Rights and the Politics of Identity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nisbet, R. 1986. *Conservatism: Dream and Reality*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Pagden, A. 1998. *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Palacios, M. 1995. *Entre la Legitimidad y la Violencia. Colombia, 1875–1994*. Bogotá: Norma.
- Palti, E. (ed.) 1998. *La Política del Disenso. La 'Polémica en Torno al Monarquismo' (México, 1848–1850) y las Aporías del Liberalismo*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona*. 1994. Mexico, January.
- Przeworski, A. 1992. 'The neoliberal fallacy', *Journal of Democracy*, 3 (3): 45–59.
- Rodó, J. E. 1900. *Ariel*. Montevideo: Colombino.
- Safford, F. 1995. 'Politics, ideology and society in post-independence Spanish America'. Pp. 347–421 in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Vol. 3, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarmiento, D. F. 1845. *Facundo. Civilizacion e Barberie*. Santiago: Imprenta del Progreso.
- Sierra, J. 2007. 'The present era'. Pp. 275–89 in *Nineteenth-Century Nation Building and the Latin American Intellectual Tradition. A Reader*, eds. J. Burke and T. Humphrey. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Taylor, C. 1994. *Multiculturalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tully, J. 1995. *Strange Multiplicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tully, J. 2002. 'The unfreedom of the moderns in comparison to their ideals of constitutional democracy', *Modern Law Review*, 65 (2): 204–28.
- Vallenilla Lanz, L. 1991. *Cesarismo Democrático y Otros Textos*. Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho.
- Vargas Llosa, M. 1996. *La Utopía Arcaica. José María Arguedas y las Ficciones del Indigenismo*. Mexico: FCE.
- Véliz, C. 1994. *The New World of the Gothic Fox. Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Victorino Lastarria, J. 2007. 'Investigations regarding the social influence of the Conquest and the Spanish Colonial system in Chile'. Pp. 74–101 in *Nineteenth-Century Nation Building and the Latin American Intellectual Tradition. A Reader*, eds. J. Burke and T. Humphrey. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Villoro, L. 1998. *Estado Plural, Pluralidad de Culturas*. Mexico: Paidós.
- Wiarda, H. J. 2001. *The Soul of Latin America. The Cultural and Political Tradition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wiles, P. 1969. 'A syndrome, not a doctrine: Some elementary theses on populism'. Pp 163–79 in *Populism. Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, eds. G. Ionescu and E. Gellner. London: Macmillan.
- Young, I. M. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zachary, G. P. 2000. 'A philosopher in red sneakers gains influence as a global guru. From Estonia to New

Zealand, nations with ethnic strife turn to Will Kymlicka', *Wall Street Journal*: March 28.

Zanatta, L. 2008. 'Liberales y católicos, populistas y militares. El imaginario organicista y la producción del enemigo interno en la historia de América Latina'. Pp. 320–45 in *Los desafíos de la libertad. Transformación y crisis del liberalismo, Europa y América Latina (1890–1930)*, eds. M. García Sebastiani y F. del Rey Reguillo. Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid.

Zimmermann, E. 1994. *Los Liberales Reformistas. La Cuestión Social en la Argentina 1890–1916*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana/Universidad de San Andrés.

CHAPTER 32 MODERN AFRICAN IDEOLOGIES

JOY HENDRICKSON AND HODA ZAKI

I find myself suddenly in the world and I recognize that I have only one right alone: That of demanding human behavior from the other.

Frantz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks*

AFRICAN political ideologies are rooted in and shaped by a complex interplay of local cultures, regional and continental social and economic alliances and tensions, and global forces.* In this sense they are no different from ideologies found elsewhere, as all modern systems of thought are a hybrid mix of universal and particular concerns. To analyse the set of ideas that motivate people to political action, one must pay attention to the documents, speeches, and activities of leaders, activists, and scholars existing within a particular historical framework and space. This article focuses on what Africans have said about ideology and how they developed its meanings over time. We have restricted the discussion in this chapter to the development of African ideologies beginning with the eighteenth century. While African ideologies are universal in that they elaborate on the connections between politics and human needs and desires, an aspect they share with other ideologies, they also address the particular concerns of African populations on the continent and in the African Diaspora. Two central features of these ideologies will be discussed: first, their global authorship and scope of concerns, composed of intellectuals and movements from the continent and the African Diaspora, and second, their sustained defence of human rights over three centuries.

Africa's populations were among the first to experience the brunt of an emergent yet powerful European capitalism in the process of creating a global capitalist system. The brutal Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, recently defined as a crime against humanity, (*Declaration* 2002: 16) and the development and institutionalization of racial slavery separated millions from their communities and created an African Diaspora in Europe and the New World. In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, this Diaspora was to provide intellectuals, ideologies, and social movements which focused on the development and well-being of African peoples. Many of the ideas generated from the experiences of African descendants in the New World influenced

African politics and ideologies. This movement of ideologies between continental Africans and their descendants in the present-day Western Hemisphere is a distinguishing characteristic of African ideologies, and is evident in the ideologies of Abolitionism, cultural nationalism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, and the many varieties of African socialism.

Our definition of African political ideologies is thus a broad one in that we do not define our subject matter by geography alone. We note as well that many of the ideologies were written in European languages by an elite educated in the land of their respective oppressors. J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast native and West African patriot of the 1920s, remarked to the British: 'I did not need to learn your language as a vehicle of thought, but as a means of more intimately studying your philosophy ...'. (Casely Hayford 1969: 5). Indeed, Africans have thought for themselves for several millennia. The ideas of ancient Egyptians, the epics of traditional societies and the religious and philosophical utterances of Africans since the beginnings of human society itself will only be included in our discussions when Africans composing modern ideologies make reference to them. (Okpewho 1979; Mbiti 1982; Hountondji 1996).

Africa's pre-colonial political landscape varied widely in its political structures and beliefs. Ancient empires with complex political structures rose and declined in Egypt and Carthage. In Egypt's case centralized political power was established which relied on religion to legitimize its ruling class. We know little about Carthage as the Roman destruction of its cities destroyed the evidence needed to reconstruct its civilization. A similar lack of evidence about other political structures in pre-colonial African societies is also the case, although for different reasons. In the fifth century CE feudal kingdoms with complex political structures emerged in Western Sudan, an area that includes Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. The thirteenth century witnessed the rise of an empire under the leadership of Sundiata who centralized power and established an empire to control lucrative trade routes. Other large political structures emerged in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. In some instances, they were highly stratified and existed for millennia, as in the case of Ethiopia. Alongside these large political formations, smaller political units existed in pre-colonial Africa and they differed widely in membership, scope, and social structures, varying from small, nomadic bands composed of one clan to larger political units that included many ethnic groups. In some instances, societies were patrilineal, in others, matrilineal. Religious systems of belief varied as did political beliefs. Often, Islam was an important tool for the unification and administration of large political units that transcended the narrower boundaries of clan and tribe.

Pre-colonial African societies are typically described as ‘tribal’, a term that has been used to simplify and denigrate African political systems. The term obfuscates more than it clarifies. It is usually deployed to describe primordial loyalties immune to historical forces which supposedly are endemic to the continent. Tribalism is also blamed for contemporary African countries’ corruption and instability. It is therefore important to note that tribes were and are evolving associations capable of change and their political leadership varied considerably, from elite aristocracies in small kingdoms to gerontocracies. Thus the types of leadership and the ways in which leadership were legitimized within ethnic groups or tribes (we use the term interchangeably) should not be viewed as uniform. In some instances, hereditary rule was exercised, where succession was based on a family or more broadly, a lineage group. Sometimes power was non-centralized, at others it was centralized. In most cases, pre-colonial chiefs did not enjoy absolute power. Mechanisms to constrain and overturn leaders—termed ‘de-stool’ in West Africa—were implemented. Processes of consultation and for achieving consensus were created and groups with specific interests exercised power. Sometimes these groups were based on age or gender, and they functioned as political groups that articulated specific interests. This broad variety of pre-colonial social and political systems was to be useful to leaders in the mid- to late-twentieth century who reconstructed Africa’s political history to suit their nationalist ideologies and to promote particular policies, claiming them to be authentically African.

The arrival of Europeans to Africa signalled the end of pre-colonial African political and economic autonomy. The ability of Europeans to exploit the continent’s human and material resources led Africans to confront a new reality. We find that central to the tenets that make up African ideologies is the concept of human rights. African interpretations of the unjust behaviour of the Europeans revolved around demands to be treated as equal human beings. There was a need to defend African traditions, institutions, lands, bodies, and souls as Europeans promoted their economic interests to the detriment and underdevelopment of the continent. Ideologies were developed to justify emerging movements of discontent which directly challenged slavery, racism, colonialism, and underdevelopment.

As we examine the ideas of influential authors over three centuries alongside the scholarly discussion of their works, we note that for Africans, the crucial measure of the value of a set of beliefs that mobilized people to collective action depends on its source. Did the source of the ideology lead inexorably to a view that will provide an outcome commensurate with the needs and interests of the

populace? Did this source turn away from the continent to engage in a dialogue with the West in efforts to vindicate the race, or did it look inward to fellow Africans in an attempt to find solutions to contemporary problems besetting the continent? Our historical examination of ideologies highlights the first source as Africans of the Diaspora.

Modern African political ideologies emerged within the Abolitionist movement when Africans and blacks in the Diaspora participated in the global movement to end the Slave Trade and slavery in the late eighteenth century. This movement was also a struggle against the powerful ideology of racism. Methods of argumentation and a set of ideals were developed in the movement that continued to be influential for over two centuries after the Slave Trade was abolished in 1807 (Ogude 1996: vii–xiv; Shepperson 1964).

The most prominent African Abolitionist, Olaudah Equiano, developed a unique method to counter racial ideology by writing a narrative of his life. Published in 1789, his autobiography, *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vassa the African*, was widely read, and became an important weapon of the Abolitionist movement (Equiano 1996). In his autobiography, Equiano describes an idyllic youth spent in the West African village ‘Essaka’, his capture and forced march to the coast at the age of ten years, his experiences during the Middle Passage, his work as a maritime slave in Europe and the West Indies, his conversion to Christianity, and his various economic endeavours that allowed him to purchase his freedom. In his narrative, Equiano attacked the institution of slavery, demolished the myth of racial inferiority so important to the ideology of racism, and proposed solutions.

By his writing and activism, Equiano became the spokesman for all Africans, asserting the rights of those who were unable to speak on their own behalf. He proposed that ending slavery could usher a new basis for the relationship between Africa and Europe that would be mutually beneficial and generate an increased demand for European products. (Equiano 1996: 145) His anti-slavery work included his debating pro-slavery opponents, publicizing the maltreatment of slaves, and working to establish Sierra Leone as a colony for freed slaves (Carretta 2005: 256–69; Ogude 1983).

The veracity of Equiano’s autobiography has been questioned. Equiano, Ogude states, wrote a fictional account, ‘an imaginative reorganization of a wide variety of tales about Africa’ (Ogude 1983: 134). Though Ogude maintains that Equiano had to have used European sources to construct his narrative about Essaka, he asserts that ‘the integrity of Equiano’s purpose remains unimpaired’ (Ogude 1983: 138). More recently, Equiano’s birthplace has been challenged by

Vincent Carretta who discovered documents that perhaps placed his birthplace in South Carolina (Carretta 2005). Carretta's work has come under criticism from various scholars and groups (Rolinger 2004), and Equiano's identity remains a contested terrain. Earley contends that Equiano carved out for himself a position 'that allowed him to be both "African" and "Englishman" simultaneously'. (Earley 2003: 10) Ogude notes that '[i]n every sense of the word, Equiano was the first *modern* African. He was proud of his culture and conscious of his roots, yet he was steeped in other people's way of life and religion' (Ogude 1996: viii, italics in the original).

Equiano's identity of African, Englishman, Igbo, Abolitionist, Christian, capitalist, and citizen of the Diaspora were all valid and illustrate our contention that Diasporan and continental connections were vital in the development of African political ideologies. It is clear from the subtitle of his narrative where Equiano identified himself as 'The African' that he had come to embrace a continental identity which included an activism for the human rights of all Africans. The influence of African Abolitionism can be seen in the writings of activists such as C. L. R. James, Eric Williams, and George Padmore (Shepperson 1964: 26). Ogude notes that Equiano's concerns continued to be those that dominated the thinking of twentieth-century African writers (Ogude 1996: viii).

In the nineteenth century, Diasporan Africans found their way 'back to Africa', and the ideas of the 'returnees' and 'recaptives' of Liberia and Sierra Leone were formulated by spokesmen for these groups who tended to lean heavily on the West as a model for the future development of African states. One segment of this group, however, developed a more critical view of the West: the cultural nationalists. Cultural nationalism developed as an ideology to oppose cultural imperialism. Men like Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832–1912), who was born in the Virgin Islands but emigrated to Liberia, wished for Africans to turn away from the manners, names, and ideas of their oppressors and return to the culture of their unexpatriated brethren. They demanded a right to Africa's cultural heritage. Africans had a right to retain their cultural practices and not allow Europeans to sweep them away in the name of 'progress and civilization'. Fundamentally, Africans had a right to be themselves and to be different from the white man. The race must be free to develop a separate and distinct African personality. (Blyden 1967) Generally hailed as the precursor to the ideas of Pan-Africanism, African Socialism, and Negritude, Blyden's works were pivotal in the formation of modern African ideologies. V. Y. Mudimbe has argued that it was Blyden who first established the need to 'question all discourses interpreting

Africans and their culture' (Mudimbe 1988).

Blyden's discussion of the positive aspects of 'African Life and Customs', however, was simplified and generalized in order to combat racist charges that Africans as a whole had no history or culture (Hendrickson 1998). His call to forge new ideas inspired by the traditions of one's ancestors went virtually unheeded in Liberia. But in the then-Gold Coast, modern day Ghana, his message was not lost. Cultural nationalism flourished and in the hands of men like John Mensah Sarbah (1864–1910) and J. E. Casely Hayford (1866–1930) the movement blossomed into an embryonic form of political nationalism.

The next stage of the development of modern ideologies begins with the scholarly studies of specific communities produced by Africans who were sons of the soil, born and bred on the continent but educated in the capitals of Europe to be journalists, lawyers, and clergymen. Monographs were written to marshal arguments against the British attempt to declare all land in the Gold Coast to be Crown Lands. Learned authors from the Gold Coast reminded the British that historically, their leaders had negotiated with the Europeans and occasionally accepted them at first as a 'protecting power'. Africans did not relinquish their control over internal affairs. Moreover, African traditions and customary law indicated that the people had a right to install and destool their own chosen rulers. It was with reference to their specific traditional cultures that Africans claimed the ancestral rights to their land and even their rights to representation in the emerging nation-states. It was argued that all of these rights were embedded in African institutions.

The claim to manage their own internal affairs did not stop at the local level. Africans demanded the right to play a role in the wider colonial government set-up. Mensah Sarbah and Casely Hayford fought for the rights of Africans first as members of the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society and then as members of the colonial Legislative Council. They argued strongly for an increase in African membership in that body. The racial prejudice of the colonialists denied qualified Africans a place in the administration of their own country. The educated elite wanted Africans to be trained by Africans with an African outlook and demanded the early foundation of a West African University.

These demands may appear to be the class interests of the educated elite in the colonial setting which ignored the interest of the masses. Not surprisingly, the colonists portrayed those with Western education as scoundrels, counterfeit Europeans and dismissed them as 'unrepresentative'. Yet, Casely Hayford saw himself as a native, and a member of an African family and community.

According to Kwaku Korang, Hayford was able to bridge this division between his class position and the natives. Hayford's extensive knowledge of the cultural complexities of his people made it possible for him to represent the masses. Hayford's nativism can be traced back to his mentor, Blyden (Korang 2003).

The Ethiopianism of Blyden represented a means of salvation for the whole world. Ethiopianism was primarily a religious concept. Ethiopia, the only African state that had not been colonized, became a metaphysical Black heaven (Essien-Udom 1962). Casely Hayford added the political component to Blyden's messianic views. Ethiopia, all of Africa, could be 'Unbound' and all mankind would be better off because of it (Casely Hayford 1969).

The core of the ideology propounded by the educated elite shifted to a unity of race that was identified with the idea of a nation. The African personality had become a collective African nationality. The African population generally constituted a nation. The status of nationhood was demanded as a right of the race by African peoples whether or not their nations had the attributes of European nationalities, such as common languages or common customs. Any denial of nationhood was seen as a racial slur because it was accompanied by an argument which declared Africans as 'unripe' for independence.

In the 1920s Casely Hayford launched the National Congress of British West Africa as an organization designed to represent the interests of all Africans in all the British-controlled territories of West Africa. Casely Hayford spoke of the defence of 'national rights and national integrity'. He argued that Africans must not stop at West African unity, but must pursue 'an African nationality which will tend to focus world opinion upon African interests generally' (Kimble 1963: 550). He also acknowledged the interests of Diasporan Africans, for his rights to an African nationality included all people of African descent.

Before the Second World War, a small number of African and West Indian students from France's colonies travelled to France to further their education. They wrote protest poetry, published journals, held salons, and developed ideas about race, politics, and colonization. This group included Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906–2001) (Senegal) and Aimé Césaire (1913–2008) (Martinique) who were friends in the 1930s. Césaire was a poet, Surrealist, polemicist, the mayor of Fort-de-France for over four decades, a member of the French National Assembly, and at one point was a member of the Communist Party of Martinique. He was to note that the mingling of Africans, West Indians, and black Americans in France generated a realization that Africa had contributed to world civilization, a resistance to France's policy of assimilation, and a sense of solidarity (Depestre 2000: 88–92). Although Césaire coined the term *Négritude*

(Senghor 1970: 180), he viewed its development as a philosophy as a collective effort (Depestre 2000: 88). This philosophy was to become an ideology when its subscribers became leaders in their countries. While Césaire's works, such as *Discourse on Colonialism*, were militantly anticolonialist, a disjuncture between his radicalism in print and his more moderate politics as a politician has been noted (Murdoch 2010: 10; Hale and Véron 2010). Césaire's work influenced not only Senghor but many others, including Frantz Fanon (1925–1961), his student. Years later, Césaire recalled that Senghor and he saw themselves as leftists, 'but both of us refused to see the black question as simply a social question.... I think that the economic question is important, but it is not the only thing' (Depestre 2000: 94) Race, in other words, could not be subsumed under class.

Césaire's friendship with Senghor exposed him to African history and culture, which he supplemented by reading ethnographic reports. In *Discourse on Colonialism* Césaire attacked the bourgeoisie for its 'pseudo-humanism', which he stated, 'for too long ... diminished the rights of man, ... its concept of those rights has been—and still is—narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, sordidly racist' (Césaire 2000: 37). In discussing the degrading influence of colonialism on the colonizer, Césaire famously noted that fascism became an atrocity only when it was applied to Europeans. Hitler was attacked, he stated, '[for] the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the "coolies" of India, and the "niggers" of Africa' (Césaire 2000: 36). His analysis of the ideology of colonialism as resting firmly on racism and fascism was to be echoed in later works by other anti-colonialists such as Albert Memmi (1920–) (Tunis).

Senghor was to be Negritude's greatest explicator (Irele 1990). It was, he stated, 'the *African Personality*', and he defined it to be '*the sum of the cultural values of the black world; that is, a certain active presence in the world*' (Senghor 1970: 179–80, italics in the original). Europeans depended upon reason to understand the world; Africans emotion. Senghor asserted the primacy of the non-material or spirit world 'spirit matter' over materialism, a reason for his critical stance to Marxism (Senghor 1970: 183). African civilizations had achieved a balance between promoting the interests of the community yet allowing individuals to flourish. Negritude was Africa's contribution to the 'Civilization of the Universal', as evidenced by its promoting cooperation between nations, peace in the United Nations, and ensuring that decolonization took place almost without bloodshed (Senghor 1970: 187).

Negritude has been described as an ideology that moved first from a statement of personal identity in the 1930s, to later promoting the formation of a national identity in the 1960s, and finally, developing as an ideology for economic development in the post-independence period in Senegal (Markovitz 1969 quoted in Spleth 1985: 21–2). In Senghor's case, his philosophy of Negritude was most aggressive and militant in the 1930s, but became increasingly conservative. Ideologically, Senghor's Negritude allowed him to propose a political federation with France instead of complete independence (Spleth 1985: 24). Senghor was comfortable and adept in French politics, having served a number of terms in the French parliament in the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

Reactions to Negritude varied. It was lauded by Jean-Paul Sartre as 'anti-racist racism' in his essay 'Black Orpheus' (Sartre 1948). Long viewed as a definitive interpretation, the essay has been criticized for advancing Negritude as a philosophy while its creators had intended for it to be an artistic movement (Mudimbe 1988; Howe 1998). In Howe's view, Senghor's distinction between an African and European ontology had been tentative, only 'psychological tendencies, no more' (Howe 1998: 26). Many of Negritude's critics were from anglophone Africa who had not experienced French colonial policy, such as Ezekiel Mphahlele (South Africa), and Wole Soyinka (Nigeria) who famously stated that a tiger did not have to proclaim his tigritude. Yet some critics who hailed from France's empire were also deeply sceptical of Negritude, as in the case of Frantz Fanon, who took issue with Senghor's formulation of traditional African society (Spleth 1985: 31). More recently, Patrice Nganang (Cameroon) explores the usage of Negritude's logic and epistemology in promoting genocides and massacres on the African continent, and points to Senghor's reticence in demanding justice for Africans who were slaughtered by colonial powers. He cites these two criticisms as central deficits of Negritude. Nganang proclaims the death of Senghor's philosophy, stating: 'Rwanda is the grave of Negritude' (Nganang 2009: 93).

Negritude provided a delineation of an African Personality, an ethos that stressed cooperation, and an African ontology and aesthetic. Although nebulous and indeterminate as an ideology, some of its tenets were used by many African revolutionaries and statesmen who utilized their particular definition of socialism to defend their national institutions and ideologies. It continues to be popular and influential in Afrocentrist thought in Europe and North America, although Howe notes that some Afrocentrists utilize Senghor's ideas to promote separatism from mainstream society, an idea he did not support (Howe 1998: 24–

5).

As imperialism advanced, the resistance to it became increasingly radical in its ideological formulation. After the Second World War, African nationalists demanded immediate self-government. At the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England, rule by consent was no longer the ultimate goal. Self-government was the only way to defeat the exploitative intentions of the imperialist powers. The Cold War also influenced African demands to end colonialism. Leaders of nationalist independence movements embraced socialism and rejected capitalism as a choice because it was too closely associated with the ideologies of colonial domination. Rather, the question posed by Zanzibari nationalist A. M. Babu was: 'African Socialism or Socialist Africa?' (Babu 1981).

Leaders across the continent developed a myriad of socialist ideologies, more or less Marxist, that were tied to the pre-colonial past. In Kenya, Tom Mboya spoke of the 'wide umbrella' of African Socialism (Mboya 1979: 73). In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda declared 'African Humanism' to be the true representation of what it meant to be a man in Africa (Kaunda 1981). And in Senegal, Senghor used Negritude to develop a francophone version of African Socialism. African leaders rejected the view that Africans were incapable of independent conceptions of the good life, and boldly declared that there was a third way. The most significant of these varieties of socialism came from the pens of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (1909–72) and Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania (1922–99), and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (1918–70).

The people called him 'Osagefo', their Redeemer. Ali Mazrui called him the Leninist Czar (Mazrui 1966). C. L. R. James considers him to be one of the greatest leaders of African independence who deserves an honored place in the history of human emancipation. According to the Beninois philosopher Paulin Hountondji, Nkrumah preferred the term 'socialism in Africa' and ultimately argued for class struggle on an international scale. This perspective emerges over time as Nkrumah's ideology grows and responds to a deeper understanding of the forces at work in the battle against colonialism. Indeed, Nkrumah's *Neocolonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism* deliberately echoes Lenin's work *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Hountondji 1996; James 1996; Mazrui 2001).

Nkrumah acknowledged his debt to Marxist-Leninism and it is evident in his first book *Towards Colonial Freedom*. This work written in 1945 by a youthful Nkrumah ending his ten-year sojourn in the United States, ends with a chapter on 'what must be done' with the words 'Peoples of the Colonies Unite: The

working men of all countries are behind you' (Nkrumah 1962: 43). By 1964, in *Consciencism*, Nkrumah formulated a philosophical foundation for the ideology of socialism in Africa. He argued that traditional African society was egalitarian. Land was owned by the community as a whole. A transition to socialism would be merely a logical extension of this communal way of life. Hountondji describes this argument as 'ideological continuity' which implies that current African revolutionaries are the truest traditionalists (Hountondji 1996).

Nkrumah was inspired also by Jamaican Marcus Garvey. Garvey's idea of Africa for Africans and his call to unite the continent from Cape to Cairo was an influence on Nkrumah's development of Pan African nationalism. Garvey's venture with his Black Star Shipping Line led to the Black Star on Ghana's national flag. Other influences from the African Diaspora include George Padmore, Shirley Graham Du Bois, and W. E. B. Du Bois. Nkrumah's role in the Manchester Pan African Conference of 1945 had led to a close collaboration with Padmore, and Du Bois and Graham Du Bois had accepted Nkrumah's invitation to reside in Ghana as guests of the state subsequent to Du Bois's ordeal with Red-baiting in the United States.

But Nkrumah was not satisfied with the independence of Ghana, and envisioned a Pan-African nationalism and the liberation of the entire continent from the shackles of imperialism. 'Africa Must Unite' so that the African personality could assert itself in the international arena. An early call for the immediate formation of a continental government, a United States of Africa, was superseded in the *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* where Nkrumah had come to realize that not all members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were dedicated to the anti-imperialist struggle. Only with the elimination of puppet regimes would such a body further the interests of African peoples on the continent and around the world.

Hountondji cautions that we must read Nkrumah's works in an *historical* manner not as if they were all written at the same time. *Consciencism* is the last work of the first period. While classes did not exist in traditional communities, the neocolonial period saw the emergence of such divisions as an extension of class struggle occurring in Western industrial societies. This new reality forced the exploited peoples around the world to resort to armed struggle. This is a far cry from the call for 'positive action' when Nkrumah declared himself a disciple of Gandhi and advocated peaceful resistance that was legal and non-violent in the form of mass protests and strikes to bring an end to colonialism in the Gold Coast.

Caught in the international struggles of the Cold War, many African leaders

like Nkrumah saw the core of the ideological struggle in the new nations as a battle between capitalism and socialism and not between democracy and dictatorship. This type of ideology ossified into a set of beliefs that the government mandated to be held by all its citizens. Deviations were unacceptable; complete unity of thought and purpose was necessary to combat the international threat of neocolonialism. One-party regimes were justified in the fight for the freedom of people of African descent around the world. The mass party created by Nkrumah and dominated by the 'verandah boys' was eventually handed over to the party 'gangsters' according to C. L. R. James (1996).

This development in Ghana became known as 'Nkrumaism'. The party in power, Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party, encouraged a systematic and static reading of his works, making it a closed system. Nkrumaism became a dogmatic faith. Folson argues that this process was not peculiar to Ghana. Once the leader became the sole author, interpreter and enforcer of the ideology, the necessary outcome would be an authoritarian political system. 'It was the essence of the ideology that the party in Ghana, as in Guinea and in Tanzania should be proclaimed supreme and that its existence should be made incompatible with the existence of any other party' (Folson 1973: 16).

Julius K. Nyerere, a committed socialist, was able to implement many tenets of his ideology of African Socialism as the president of Tanzania for a quarter of a century (1961–85). A teacher (hence his title of 'Mwalimu', meaning teacher in Swahili) and an activist, Nyerere's activism in the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) catapulted him into the political arena as the leader of his nation. Nyerere merged a number of strands of thought into his particular conception of socialism: his understanding of African traditional values, Pan-Africanism, self-reliance, China's form of communism, and selected Western ideas of democracy, especially those that promoted egalitarian societies which eliminated large differences in wealth. He utilized his ideology to formulate his domestic and foreign policies, using it to collectivize agriculture, nationalize sectors of the economy, mobilize the citizenry, construct a one-party state, and promote the liberation of Southern Africa from apartheid.

'Socialism—like democracy', Nyerere declared, 'is an attitude of mind' (Nyerere 1968d: 1). He constructed his original vision of socialism by rejecting class struggle and by utilizing a definition of traditional society which maintained that socialism was not foreign to Africans, but part of its intellectual, economic, and social history. Nyerere's socialism, or 'ujamaa' (familyhood in Swahili) was based on three principles deemed to be the founding blocks of

traditional society: respect between the members of society, or ‘a recognition of mutual involvement with one another’; holding property in common and instituting a fair distribution of wealth; and a mutual understanding that work was an ‘obligation’ for all (Nyerere 1968b: 107–8).

In 1964 academics like Friedland and Rosberg attempted to dissect the ‘anatomy of African Socialism’ (Friedland and Rosberg 1964). More recently, studies have been conducted on what is referred to as African socialism and postsocialisms (Askew and Pitcher 2006). Some of the analysis has been critical, although for different reasons. For example, P. O. Bodunrin critiques attempts to base a modern African socialism on traditional African values of humanism and community by pointing out that Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Senghor had a romantic understanding of traditional, rural societies which historically were often tension-ridden and parochial. They lacked an appreciation of the impact of urbanization and the disappearance of traditional economic and social structures. Finally, Bodunrin queries the African-ness of these ideologies since all three thinkers were educated in the West and were deeply influenced by non-African ideas (Bodunrin 1981: 166–7). Van Hensbroek sees all the variants of African socialism as constituting a Golden Age in the 1960s, yet failing as a development strategy (van Hensbroek 1999: 113–18). He characterizes the heyday of African socialisms, as ‘a peculiar episode that was tailored to the ideological needs of the new African elites’ (van Hensbroek 1999: 119).

Acknowledging the failures of ujamaa on the economic front, other assessments focused on the successes of Nyerere’s leadership in areas such as education and health (Legum and Mmari 1995). Nyerere’s death in 1999 was an occasion for the re-evaluation of the ideology of ujamaa. Ibhawoh and Dibua see that the legacy of ujamaa should not be assessed solely on economic terms. For them, one of ujamaa’s drawbacks was its inclusion of a ‘developmentalism’ found in both capitalism and socialism (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003: 75). Yet ujamaa can provide important lessons for African economic and social development in a post-Cold War era, where there is a pressing ‘need for alternatives which draw from universal ideals but are yet grounded in indigenous realities and aspirations’ (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003: 76). Pratt sees Nyerere’s defence of one-party state rule in Tanzania not as vanguardist but as ‘a highly original effort’ to promote democracy and political participation, and sees it as significant that Tanzania was able to transition into a multi-party system peacefully (Pratt 1999: 144).

A third example of an African leader who formulated an understanding of socialism to fit the particular needs of his country would emerge in Egypt with

the figure of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Here we will discuss only briefly his ideology and note his leadership in the global Non-Aligned Movement in which many African leaders participated. Nasser emerged as Egypt's leader shortly after the country won its independence, and he articulated his goals in a pamphlet, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Nasser n.d.). This personal reflection makes evident the mix of nationalist sentiments, vanguardism, a lack of an adherence to any existing ideology, and the rejection of class conflict that Nasser shared with most of the Egyptian army elite that was to rule Egypt after 1952. Later, Nasser was to exert a great deal of influence in North Africa and the Middle East and he went on to embrace and implement an ideology of Arab Socialism.

Nasser's adherence to Pan-Africanism as well as Pan-Muslim and Pan-Arab ideologies is evident in his attempt to recreate the Egyptian political identity of three concentric 'circles', which were sources of strength. The first was the Arab Circle, the second was the 'African Continent Circle'. The struggle against apartheid, Nasser stated, was important to Egypt. 'We cannot stand aloof for one important and obvious reason—we ourselves are in Africa. Surely the people of Africa will continue to look at us—we who are the guardians of the Continent's northern gate, we who constitute the connecting link between the Continent and the outer world' (Nasser n.d.: 67). Ironically, Nasser's discussion of the African Circle shows evidence of colonial ideology: Egypt's role was to 'help in spreading the light of knowledge and civilization up to the very depth of the virgin jungles of the continent', he stated (Nasser n.d.: 68). Nasser's third circle, the Muslim Circle, was to be a source of power if cooperation took place between the millions of Muslims living in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Nasser was to use these new notions of Egyptian identity to assume a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Marxist critics of Nasser's ideology, Nasserism, pointed to the limited redistribution of land and the disempowerment of the masses, while feminists noted the continued dominance of men in the public sphere and political corruption in post-independence politics (Abdel-Malek 1968; El Saadawi 1983).

The Non-Aligned Movement was rooted in racial and colonial oppression, and early gatherings included the 1927 Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and the 1947 Asian Relations Conference (Singh 1994: 236). The 1955 Bandung Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia was a significant moment in the movement's history. Leaders of twenty-nine independent states in Africa and Asia attended to promote the national development of the former colonies, world peace, and security. Richard Wright, US novelist, attended Bandung and observed there a mixture of a racial consciousness along with a defence of

traditional religious practices. This set of emotions, he noted, was a backlash to the West's ideology of racial supremacy, and would become a transnational force to be reckoned with (Wright 1994: 140). Bandung was followed by a second summit in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, attended by heads of state of Egypt, Ghana, India and Yugoslavia, among others. Nasser was to become one of the founders of the movement along with Nehru and Tito. Although Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement were viewed with deep distrust by the West for their anti-colonial and anti-Western positions, it has also been interpreted as an international human rights movement that attempted to found a political organization for Third World countries (Burke 2006).

The next subset of intellectuals is best represented by Franz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral (1924–73) who developed theories of liberation and revolution that went beyond the early nationalist ideologies and attempted to return to the source of their own history, the peoples of Africa. These two activists, one born in Martinique, and the other from Guinea Bissau, West Africa, were active in revolutionary movements to free the continent from all vestiges of imperialism. Their ideological approach advocated violence and armed struggle as a necessary tactic to overcome the most intransigent forms of colonial rule in Africa, France's claims to Algeria, and the Portuguese stranglehold on its colonies. Neither Fanon nor Cabral defined themselves as Marxists. Although Cabral did not 'commit himself to any ideology or theory', Patrick Chabal concludes that Cabral created an 'original body of ideas which would both reflect and inspire the development of the revolution in Guinea' (Chabal 1983: 187).

Cabral helps to clarify the meaning of ideology when he said, '[t]o have ideology doesn't necessarily mean that you have to define whether you are communist, socialist or something like this. To have ideology is to know what you want in our own condition' (Cabral 1973: 88). To Cabral, the people know what they want: 'the people are not fighting for ideas.... They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, ... to guarantee the future for their children' (Cabral 1969: 86).

Fanon trained as a psychiatrist and Cabral as an agronomist and both added the viewpoints of their respective disciplines to an understanding of a new approach to the liberation of humanity. Unafraid to utilize a revised interpretation of the Marxist concept of class which was made to fit their particular conditions, Fanon and Cabral analysed African populations in terms of their support or non-support for the struggle to end imperialist domination.

While Fanon relied heavily on the spontaneous violence of the peasantry to

bring down the colonial structure in Algeria, Cabral was wary of some semi-feudal groups in rural Guinea-Bissau who were likely to follow their traditional leaders' advice and side with the colonialists. To Fanon, the proletariat benefitted from the colonial presence and only the lumpen-proletariat would play the role of spearheading the armed conflict to end colonialism. Cabral organized sympathizers from the urban milieux connected with the countryside to educate and lead the more egalitarian peasants in the revolutionary struggle. Fanon also saw limitations to the spontaneity of the peasants. 'Hatred alone cannot draw up a program' (Fanon 1963: 139). A new wave of intellectuals was needed to lead the peasants to the sustained anti-imperialist effort that would be needed for victory.

However, both agreed that the nationalist parties, once in power, become the neocolonial stooges of their former colonial masters. Liberation will not take place unless the inheritors of the colonial state, the petty bourgeoisie, continue the revolutionary movement for change. To do so, Cabral argued, they must 'be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers' (Cabral 1969: 110). Fanon echoed this concept when he said that this class 'must repudiate its nature so far as it is bourgeois ... and make itself the willing tool of that revolutionary capital which is the people' (Fanon 1963: 150).

Africans must be liberated from the European image of the native. The colonialists deliberately sought to convince Africans that colonialism came to lighten their darkness/savagery. For the colonialists, the idea must be driven into Africans' heads 'that if the settlers were to leave, they would at once fall back into barbarism, degradation, and bestiality' (Fanon 1963: 211). Only the performance of violent acts could erase this erroneous picture of the native. Psychologically it becomes necessary to perform violent acts to extricate this vision of themselves from the minds of the colonized. 'Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths ...'. (Fanon 1963: 147).

Agreeing with Fanon's argument that violence was necessary to liberate Africans and the Third World generally, Cabral emphasized the social and economic aspects of the end of the conflict. National liberation can be said to have accomplished its objective only when the people have regained their 'historical personality'. While this would include a truer picture of the people's past accomplishments in cultural terms, national liberation 'exists only when the national reproductive forces have been completely freed from all and any kind of foreign domination' (Chabal 1983: 171). This would include the elimination of a local pseudo-bourgeoisie controlled by the ruling class of the dominating

country.

However, it is a travesty, according to Edward Said, to read Fanon and Cabral as merely some of the earliest critics of the agendas of the successful nationalist parties dominated by the African petty bourgeoisie. Said considers the work of Fanon and Cabral as a theory not just of resistance and decolonization, but of liberation (Said 1993: 276). This difference is no less than an 'immense cultural shift from the terrain of nationalist independence to the theoretical domain of liberation' (Said 1993: 286). Liberation is a process that continues once national independence has been won. These theories of liberation amount to what Said calls 'real humanism', a perspective steeped in universalism. Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* is a hybrid work, according to Said (Said 1993: 269). Fanon argued that the first thing the native learned was to stay in his place. Said goes so far as to say that Fanon broke down the barriers created by imperialism and thus 'represents the interests of a double constituency, native and western moving from confinement to liberation' (Said 1993: 278). The works of Fanon and Cabral strove to liberate all humanity from imperialism. This would lead to a desire of future postcolonial authors to 'write our histories and cultures in a new way', to recognize that we share the same histories with the colonialists (Said 1993: 274). This overlapping, intertwining understanding of the past, present and future was the new path ideologies in Africa began to take.

The next generation of ideologies came from grass-roots activists who rejected the need to only address Western audiences and to defend the purity of African ideas and identities. Instead they forged movements that tackled the problems of the continuing legacies of colonial and postcolonial misrule. The end of the Cold War witnessed a surge of grass-roots movements and ideologies that debated African politics and development. Critical of the political and ideological status quo, these movements were to be found in civil society throughout the continent. We describe only a few of the important movements, turning first to African feminism.

It is inaccurate to assume that feminism is foreign to Africa, imported from outside the continent. African feminism should be seen as an independent ideology based on the realities of African women of the past, present, and future. Pre-colonial African communities generally provided spheres of influence where women were dominant. Despite the sexual division of labour, women's work was not considered inferior to the activities of men. The separate worlds inhabited by male and female in Africa were more complimentary than hierarchical. Women wielded political, economic, and social power in their own domains. This state of affairs amounted to nothing less than a bisexual

alternative to the unisexual model of a Western political system (Okonjo 1985; Terborg-Penn et al. 1987). In manifestos written by organized groups like Women in Nigeria (WIN), women's rights were envisioned as human rights, part of the 'struggle to create and develop a just society for all' (WIN 1985: 5).

Gwendolyn Mikell claims to have witnessed the birth of successive waves of modern African feminisms each responding to the United Nations Decade of Women (1975–85), the imposition of structural adjustment programmes by the IMF in the 1980s and the disruptions caused by civil wars in the 1990s (Mikell 1995). In each case African women's movements agitated for an increase in their political, economic, and legal rights to combat gross violations that were being perpetuated upon women specifically. By responding to the crises of their times with organized action on behalf of women's interests, women were only carrying on the traditions of their maternal ancestors. By action and thought, African women 'reclaimed and reaffirmed the anteriority of an African feminism' as compared to modern Western versions of the ideology (Nfah-Abbenyi 1997).

Songs, orature, and fictional works composed by women tackle the 'African woman question' (Sutherland-Addy and Diaw 2005). They redefine difference and reshape gender relations, challenging not only their male counterparts but also the hegemony of global feminism. Writing a realistic narrative depiction of their cultural conditions is tantamount to constructing 'books as a weapon' according to Mariama-Bâ (Nfah-Abbenyi 1997: 148). Listening to the voices, reading and consulting the works of women 'writing Africa' are clearly pathways leading back to the source.

Concern for the destruction of the continent's environments and the plundering of its resources led to the founding of environmental movements. In East Africa, a grass-roots environmentalist and women's movement, the Green Belt Movement in Kenya in 1977 was established under the leadership of Wangari Maathai, who articulated a critique of the Kenyan patriarchal power structure. She connected the destruction of Kenya's environment with the lack of democracy in its political structures. In her autobiography she connected democracy and environmentalism:

I was inspired by a traditional African stool that has three legs and a basin to sit on..... The first leg stands for democratic space, where rights are respected, whether they are human rights, women's rights, children's rights, or environmental rights. The second represents sustainable and equitable management of resources. And the third stands for cultures of peace that are deliberately cultivated within communities and nations. The basin, or seat, represents society and its prospects for development. Unless all three legs are in place, ... no society can thrive. (Maathai 2006: 294)

In West Africa, Kenule Saro-Wiwo articulated the aspirations of the Ogoni

people in Nigeria's Delta region for greater control over their environment and a share of the wealth from the oil revenues paid to the Nigerian state. He attacked the Nigerian political elite for executing an 'indigenous colonialism' (Saro-Wiwo 1995: 63): certain minorities in Africa such as the Ogoni, constituted an 'indigenous and tribal peoples identical to those found in Australia and New Zealand'. Indigenous minorities shared a common history: 'the usurpation of their land and resources, the destruction of their culture and the eventual decimation of the people' (Saro-Wiwo 1995: 131). Saro-Wiwo was executed for his activism which included proposals to restructure Nigeria's federal government. Additional criticisms of the postcolonial state are articulated by many African intellectuals, such as Wole Soyinka (1996). A third ideology developed in South Africa focused on the related issues of violence, justice, and forgiveness. Forgiving European perpetrators of violence was theorized in the modern era by Equiano (Potkay 1994). In the wake of the establishment of a democracy in South Africa and the genocide in Rwanda, justice and forgiveness became urgent national issues. In South Africa the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) goals were articulated by Bishop Desmond Tutu, who based part of the Commission's ideals on 'ubuntu', a traditional value of forgiveness. The resulting process was formulated to be an alternative form of justice from Western notions of tribunals, (Tutu 1999) and has garnered adherents and practitioners in South America, South Korea, and in Rwanda, which used similar commissions to achieve justice in a post-genocide society.

In the 1960s, Fanon lamented the lack of an ideology that would unify the emerging nation-states into a single entity with a common purpose, that of the improvement of the lives of African peoples. He stated: '[c]olonialism and its derivatives do not, as a matter of fact constitute the present enemies of Africa ... the deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology' (Fanon 1967a: 186). His fears were to prove prescient after decolonization was completed, as the scramble for Africa began anew when military coups, border conflicts, and civil wars erupted in which various factions were supported by former colonial powers interested in neocolonial control over coveted resources. There was a need for new ideologies developed by Africans to come to grips with the disintegrating effects of postcolonial rule and neocolonialism.

In the twenty-first century Fanon's concerns are echoed in postcolonial ideologies. The primary task of such ideologies remains the struggle for human rights, a goal that remains unfulfilled. But Africans can only begin to accomplish this if they search for solutions amongst themselves and desist from addressing

Western audiences in the discourse of racial vindicationism. In the emergent ideologies we see evidence of new discourses that have jettisoned the need to establish the humanity of Africans, as well as the renewed appreciation for selected aspects of traditional cultural practices.

Many of these emerging ideologies stress the continued fight for human rights. The second wave of independence movements in the 1990s brought down dictators and established multiparty democracies in many countries. While these were heralded as the extension of democratic rights to African peoples, some were sceptical of their import. These developments did little to improve the conditions of life on the continent and Africans continue to search for solutions to problems of development. The solutions still seem to lie somewhere within the doctrine of 'universal' human rights. African academics had begun to question Western forms of this concept as early as two decades ago. They insisted that human rights must be specific to African historical conditions as well as cultural values (Eze 1984; Shivji 1989).

The questioning continues up to the present. Makau Mutua doubts the 'universality' of any social phenomenon. He claims instead that they are 'always constructed by an interest for a specific purpose, with a specific intent, and with a projected substantive outcome in mind'. To make it useful as an antidote to the ills of the African postcolonial state, the human rights doctrine cannot be adopted wholesale with its hidden connection to the ideology of free market liberalism. Africans are in need of a doctrine of human rights that addresses 'human powerlessness in all of its dimensions'. Humans need protection from asymmetries of power however they manifest themselves. Mutua is convinced that Africans themselves must 'imagine other solutions' and 'rethink and retool' the ideology of human rights (Mutua 2011: 335).

In conclusion, our examination has shown that the differing ideologies can be understood in terms of an emphasis on the particular violations of human rights suffered by African peoples at different historical epochs. Different groups dominated the production of ideological frameworks that directed mass action aimed at the protection of these rights. Starting in the eighteenth century with the narratives of the formerly enslaved, the discourse continued in the nineteenth century with the visions and dreams of those who returned to the continent. In the twentieth century the leaders of the newly independent states constructed ideologies, while radical intellectual activists opposed them. In the twenty-first century we witness individuals located in civil society who initiate grass-roots movements, utilizing sources of indigenous inspiration found in their history and culture. The cultural pluralism reflected in the emerging ideologies is what

Hountondji declared to be necessary for the liberation of ‘the collective initiative of our peoples’ (Hountondji 1996: 169). The need for a collective road map that identifies obstacles and provides signposts toward a common destination may generate multiple ideologies whose source is the resilience and determination of Africans.

NOTE

- *. We wish to acknowledge the support of Drs Mohammed B. Sillah, Hampton University, and Alex Willingham, Williams College, for their comments, and the McCardell Professional Development Grant, Hood College.

REFERENCES

- Abdel-Malek, Anouar. 1968. *Egypt: Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under Nasser*. Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Random House.
- Askew, K. M. and A. Pitcher. 2006. ‘African socialisms and postsocialisms’, *Africa*, 76 (1): 1–14.
- Babu, A. M. 1981. *African Socialism or Socialist Africa*. London: Zed Press.
- Blyden, E. W. 1967. *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Bodunrin, P. O. 1981. ‘The question of African philosophy’, *Philosophy*, 56: 161–79.
- Burke, Roland. 2006. ‘“The compelling dialogue of freedom”: Human rights at the Bandung Conference’, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 28 (4): 947–65.
- Cabral, A. 1969. *Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Cabral, A. 1973. *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Carretta, Vincent. 2005. *Equiano the African: Biography of a Self-Made Man*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Casely Hayford, J. E. 1969 [1911]. *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation*. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Casely Hayford, J. E. 1970 [1903]. *Gold Coast Native Institutions with Thoughts Upon a Healthy Imperial Policy for the Gold Coast and Ashanti*. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Césaire, Aimé. 2000 [1955]. *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham. Introduced by Robin D. G. Kelley. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Chabal, P. 1983. *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People’s War*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Declaration and Programme of Action*. 2002. *World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*. New York: United Nations.
- Depestre, René. 2000. ‘An interview with Aimé Césaire’. Pp. 81–94 in *Discourse on Colonialism*, by Aimé Césaire, ed. Robin D. G. Kelley. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Earley, Samantha Manchester. 2003. ‘Writing from the center or the margins? Olaudah Equiano’s writing life reassessed’, *African Studies Review*, 46 (3): 1–16.
- El Saadawi, Nawal. 1983 [1975]. *Woman at Point Zero*, trans. Sherif Hetata. London: Zed Books.
- Equiano, Olaudah. 1996 [1789]. *Equiano’s Travels: The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vassa the African*, abridged and ed. by Paul Edwards. New Haven: Heinemann Educational Publishers.
- Essien-Udom, E. U. 1962. *Black Nationalism: The Search for Identity*. Chicago: University of Chicago

- Press.
- Eze, O. C. 1984. *Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
- Fanon, F. 1963. *Wretched of the Earth*, trans. E. Farrington. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
- Fanon, F. 1967a. *Black Skins, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
- Fanon, F. 1967b. *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. H. Chevalier. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
- Folson, B. D.G. 1973. 'Ideology in African politics', *Transition*, 43: 11–19.
- Friedland, W. H. and C. G. Rosberg. 1964. *African Socialism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hale, Thomas A. and Kora Véron. 2010. 'Is there unity in the writings of Aimé Césaire?', *Research in African Literatures, Aimé Césaire, 1919–2008: Poet, Politician, Cultural Statesman*, 41 (1): 46–70.
- Hendrickson, J. 1998. 'An African perspective on human rights: The contributions of Edward Wilmot Blyden', *Virginia Social Science Journal*, 33: 15–30.
- Hountondji, Paulin J. 1996. *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Howe, Stephen. 1998. *Afrocentrism: Mythical Past and Imagined Homes*. London: Verso.
- Ibhawoh, Bonny and J. I. Dibua. 2003. 'Deconstructing ujamaa: The legacy of Julius Nyerere in the quest for social and economic development in Africa', *African Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1): 59–83.
- Irele, Abiola. 1990. *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- James, C. L. R. 1996. 'The rise and fall of Nkrumah'. Pp. 573–88 in *African Intellectual Heritage: A Book of Sources*, ed. M. K. Asante and A. S. Abarry. Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
- Kaunda, K. 1981. *Zambia Shall Be Free*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. (first published 1962).
- Kimble, David. 1963. *A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of the Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850–1928*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Korang, K. L. 2003. *Writing Ghana, Imaging Africa*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
- Legum, Colin and Geoffrey Mmari (eds.) 1995. *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Maathai, Wangari. 2006. *Unbowed: A Memoir*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Markovitz, I. L. 1969. *Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude*. New York: Atheneum.
- Mazrui, Ali. 1966. 'Nkrumah: the Leninist czar', *Transition*, 26 (Nov.): 10–15.
- Mazrui, Ali. 2001. 'Ideology and African political culture'. Pp. 97–132 in *Explorations in African Political Thought*, ed. T. Kiros. New York: Routledge.
- Mbiti, John S. 1982. *African Religions and Philosophy*. Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books (first published 1969).
- Mboya, T. 1979. *The Challenge of Nationhood*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. (first published 1970).
- Memmi, Albert. 1991 [1957, 1967]. *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. Introd. Jean-Paul Sartre, Afterword by Susan Gilson Miller. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mensah, Sarbah, J. 1968a [1897]. *Fanti Customary Laws*. London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.
- Mensah, Sarbah, J. 1968b [1906]. *Fanti National Constitution*. London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.
- Mikell, G. 1995. 'African feminism: Toward a new politics of representation', *Feminist Studies*, 21 (2): 405–24.
- Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988. *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Murdoch, H. Adlai. 2010. 'Ars poetica, ars politica: *The double life of Aimé Césaire: Editorial Introduction*', *Research in African Literatures*, special volume: Aimé Césaire, 1913–2008: Poet,

- Politician, Cultural Statesman. 41 (1): 1–13.
- Mutua, Makau. 2011. 'Human rights in Africa: The limited promise of liberalism'. Pp. 334–50 in Peyi Soyinka-Airewele and Rita Kiki Edozie, eds. *Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, Culture, and Society in the Global Era* Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel. No date. *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Introduction by Dorothy Thompson. Cairo: General Organization for the Government Printing Offices.
- Nfah-Abbenyi, J. M. 1997. *Gender in African Women's Writing*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Nganang, Patrice. 2009. 'The Senghor complex'. Trans. by Cullen Goldblatt. Pp. 87–104 in *Gods and Soldiers: The Penguin Anthology of Contemporary Writing*, ed. Rob Spillman. New York: Penguin.
- Nkrumah, K. 1962. *Towards Colonial Freedom*. London: Panaf Books Ltd.
- Nkrumah, K. 1963. *Africa Must Unite*. London: Panaf Books Ltd.
- Nkrumah, K. 1964. *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation*. London: Panaf Books Ltd.
- Nkrumah, K. 1970. *Class Struggle in Africa*. New York: International Publishers.
- Nyerere, Julius K. 1968a. 'The Arusha declaration'. Pp. 13–37 in *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.
- Nyerere, Julius K. 1968b. 'Socialism and rural development'. Pp. 106–44 in *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.
- Nyerere, Julius K. 1968c. 'After the Arusha declaration'. Pp. 145–77 in *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.
- Nyerere, Julius K. 1968d. 'Ujamaa—The basis of African socialism'. Pp. 1–12 in *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.
- Ogude, S. E. 1983. *Genius in Bondage: A Study of the Origins of African Literature in English*. Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press.
- Ogude, S. E. 1996. 'Introduction to the new edition'. Pp. vii–xiv in *Olaudah Equiano, Equiano's Travels: The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vassa the African*, abridged and edited by Paul Edwards. New Haven: Heinemann Educational Publishers.
- Okonjo, Kamene. 1985. 'Women's participation in Nigeria'. Pp. 79–103 in *The Black Woman Cross-Culturally*, ed. F. C. Steady. Rochester, New York: Schenkman Books, Inc.
- Okpewho, I. 1979. *The Epic in Africa*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Potkay, Adam. 1994. 'Olaudah Equiano and the art of spiritual autobiography', *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 27 (4). African American Culture in the Eighteenth-Century (Summer): 677–692.
- Pratt, Cranford. 1999. 'Julius Nyerere: Reflections on the legacy of his socialism', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 33 (1): 137–52.
- Rolingher, Louise. 2004. 'A metaphor for freedom: Olaudah Equiano and slavery in Africa'. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 38 (1): 88–122.
- Said, Edward W. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Saro-Wiwo, K. 1995. *A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary*. Introd. William Boyd. New York: Penguin Books.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1948. *Black Orpheus*, trans. S. W. Allen. Paris: Presence Africaine.
- Senghor, Léopold Sédar. 1970. 'Negritude: A humanism of the twentieth century'. Pp. 178–92 in *The Africa Reader: Independent Africa*, eds. Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson. New York: Random House.
- Shepperson, George. 1964. 'Abolitionism and African political thought', *Transition*, 12 (Jan–Feb.): 22–6.
- Shivji, I. 1989. *The Concept of Human Rights in Africa*. London: Codesria Book Series.
- Singh, Amritjit. 1994. 'Afterword'. Pp. 223–45 in Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
- Soyinka, Wole. 1996. *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Spleth, J. 1985. *Léopold Sédar Senghor*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985.

- Sutherland-Addy and Aminata Diaw. (eds.) 2005. *Women Writing Africa: West Africa and the Sahel*. New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York.
- Terborg-Penn, R., S. Harley, and A. B. Rushing. (eds.) 1987. *Women in Africa and the African Diaspora*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.
- Tutu, Desmond. 1999. *No Future without Forgiveness*. New York: Doubleday.
- Van Hensbroek, Pieter Boele. 1999. *Political Discourses in African Thought: 1860 to the Present*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- WIN. 1985. *The WIN Document: Conditions of Women in Nigeria and Policy Recommendations to 2,000 A.D.* Zaria, Nigeria: Women in Nigeria.
- Wright, Richard. 1994 [1956]. *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, Banner Books.

CHAPTER 33
ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

MICHAELLE BROWERS

**ORIGINS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF
ISLAM**

BOTH Western scholars of Islam and many Muslims tend to describe Islam as ‘*din wa dawla*’ (religion and state) in order to assert both Islam’s comprehensiveness and its fundamentally political character. However, the belief that Islam presents something tantamount to a political ideology by its very nature is of relatively recent origin (Ayubi 1991: 3). While there were earlier movements with political projects in Islamic history, a fully ideological understanding of Islam only develops in the modern period with the rooting of nation-states in the region. In contrast, premodern Islamic movements were mainly internally motivated. For example, Salafism emerged as a reaction to a perceived corruption of Islam and refers to an interpretation of Islam that seeks to restore Islamic faith and practice to the ways of the time of Muhammad and the early generations of his followers. It condemned both the rigid adherence to specific schools of Islamic law and the popular religious practices of Sufism, or mystical Islam, which is widely practised throughout the Muslim world among both Sunnis and Shi‘is.

While in contemporary parlance ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘Salafi’ are often used interchangeably, the terms have distinct origins. Wahhabism started as a theological reform movement founded by Muhammad Bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) with the aim of calling (*da‘wa*) people to restore the true and literal meaning of *tawhid* (oneness of God or monotheism) and to fight disciplines and practices classified as *shirk* (idolatry or polytheism), *kufr* (unbelief in God), *ridda* (apostasy), and *bida‘* (innovation), associated with such things as visiting the shrines of venerated individuals. Thus, Wahhabism is a more narrow designation: Wahhabis are Salafis, but not all Salafis are Wahhabis.

Salafiyya offers an umbrella term for those Sunni Muslims who look to the time of Muhammad and the early generations of Muslims (known as the *Salaf*, or the {righteous} predecessor—hence the adjective Salafi) as the only source for how Islam should be understood and practised today. For Sunni Muslims this early period represents a sort of ‘golden age’ of Islam. The term is not typically

applied to Shi‘i Muslims, who dispute the form succession took after Muhammad’s death.¹

Traditionally Salafis have taken an ambiguous, even quietist, political stance, subscribing to ideas embodied in ninth- and tenth-century Sunni texts commanding Muslims not to rebel against a Muslim ruler no matter how unjust or impious he is while at the same time teaching that if a ruler ceases to be a Muslim, he can be opposed. Salafis also maintain that the only valid system of rule for Muslims is based on Shari‘a law. However, Salafi activism typically focuses on the purification of belief and daily practices that emulate the pious ancestors, thus, tending to focus on individual comportment rather than projects of a more directly political nature. As a result, the emergence of transnational *jihadis* and political parties donning the ‘Salafi’ appellation suggests a considerable development in Salafi Islamism. As Nathan Brown notes: ‘the decision of Egyptian Salafis to form political parties and enter the realm of electoral politics [after the overthrow of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 2010] thus marks a significant departure from the typical Salafi position’ (Brown 2011: 4).

Whereas pre-modern revivalist movements were primarily focused on local sources of decline, modern movements had to respond not only to internal problems and weaknesses, but also to the forces in the modern world that they saw as hindering the existence of authentic Islamic communities: corrupt states, mass unemployment, chaotic urbanization, a sense of external domination, spurious democratic systems, and secular values. The very programmes Islamists offer and the ideas they propound, for all their Qur’anic and religious form, developed in a manner similar to those of other Third World radical and populist movements, emphasizing such themes as oppression and liberation, corruption and authenticity, elite and mass.

However, the ideological understanding of Islam is only one of several competing discourses that emerge in the context of attempts to ‘modernize’ and reform Islamic societies and in response to the challenges presented by the expansion of European military, economic, and political power over the Middle East and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The intellectual project that sought to address the decline of Islam in the context of the power and secular culture of modern states—both the new nation-states of Europe that were colonizing Muslim-majority lands and the newly emerging states in the region—came to be known as the *Nahda* (renaissance or awakening): ‘a vast political and cultural movement that dominate[d] the period of 1850–1914 [that] sought ... to assimilate the great achievements of modern European civilization, while

reviving the classical Arab culture that antedates the centuries of ... foreign domination' (Laroui 1976: vii).

Many Muslims during this period, such as Muhammad 'Abduh (Egypt, 1849–1917) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Iran, 1838–79), sought to revive Islamic thought by both affirming continuity with the past and by assimilating what they saw as the achievements of modern Europe—specifically, modern material technology, modern techniques of social organization, and mobilization, as well as modern political institutions, such as parliaments. They also sought to give Islamic thought a more rationalist, futuristic, and universalistic orientation. 'Abduh and Afghani's thought is usually termed 'Islamic modernism'. As Kurzman notes, 'the movement was not simply "modern" (a feature of modernity) but also "modernist" (a proponent of modernity)' (Kurzman 2002: 4).

The notion of strengthening Islam by accommodating its principles to the requirements of global modernity was only one response to decline and colonization. Many thinkers in the region sought their response in secular ideologies. So too, there were thinkers who regarded modern values as the very source of decay and sought to distance Islam from the West. These thinkers offered a critique of Western materialism, relativism and selfish individualism, seeking instead what they deemed a more authentic approach to the contingencies of development and renewal and shared Rashid Rida's (Ottoman Syria, 1865–35) view that 'all that the [European] laws possess that is good and just has long since been laid down by our shari'a' (quoted in Black 2001: 315). The 'Islamic awakening' (*al-sahwa al-Islamiyya*) or 'Islamic revivalism' begun by the Islamic modernists—that is, the politicization and ideologization of Islam was given greater force and intensified with the failures of secular ideologies and states in the region and the next generation of Islamic thinkers. By the mid-1930s one saw the emergence of thinkers who asserted an Islamist ideology as a distinct way. The most important example of this was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906–49) as a youth organization aimed at moral and social reform. The Brotherhood became further politicized in the 1930s and officially became a political group in 1939. The group began sending envoys to surrounding countries with the mission of spreading the movement by setting up local branches. Palestinian Hamas, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, and Yemen's Islah Party each evolved out of Muslim Brotherhood branches in those countries. In its early days, certainly during the 1940s and 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups struggled alongside stronger and more popular nationalist groups against the common enemy of European colonialism and imperialism. As these nationalist groups

came into power, many Islamists began to develop a more revolutionary outlook that directly challenged the newly formed governments.

Among the early ideologues of Islamism as such is Abul Ala Maududi (1903–79), founder (in 1941) of the Jama‘at-i Islami in still-united India, who, in a 1939 lecture, declared that ‘Islam is a revolutionary ideology and programme which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals’ (Maududi 1976: 5). Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) similarly viewed Islamism as offering a political system that could provide an alternative to secular ideologies such as communism and capitalism. Qutb’s response in *Social Justice in Islam* (Qutb 2000) was to assert notions of mutual social responsibility (*al-takaful al-ijtima‘i*), human equality (*al-musawa al-insaniyya*), and intrinsic existential emancipation (*al-taharrur al-wijdani*) as the Islamic solution to the problems of social injustice and poverty.

One finds a similar conceptualization in the work of the Shi‘i cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Iraq 1935–80), who was the intellectual force behind the formation of the first revolutionary Shi‘i Islamist party, Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya and whom Ruhollah Khomeini (1981a: 47) deemed ‘the prize of Islamic universities’. Sadr argued that neither communism nor capitalism (which he viewed as the two chief ideological rivals of his time) can offer real fulfilment to human beings, as he details what he takes to be the flaws and shortcomings of each, in contrast to the truths and benefits of Islam. It is in this spirit that Sadr takes up the ‘social issue’ in his 1959 work, *Our Philosophy (Falsafatuna)*, which he defines as the broaching of the following question: ‘Which system is good for human beings and provides them with a happy social life?’ (al-Sadr 1987: 5). Where capitalism subordinates society to the individual, communism makes the opposite error in completely subordinating the freedom of the individual to the needs of society. Sadr rejects the notion that individual freedom is a price that must be paid in order to establish the ideal society. *Our Philosophy* was followed in 1961 by *Our Economy (Iqtisaduna)*, which attempted to counter the communist appeal toward redressing the ‘social balance’ and communist criticisms that Islam lacked concrete solutions to contemporary problems.

ISLAMIST WOMEN

While many Islamist groups have tended to give patriarchal rules religious sanction, Islamist and other Muslim women have not passively accepted secondary status. In fact, women have been active participants in the Islamist movements from the beginning. Zaynab al-Ghazali (1917–2005) began her

activism as a member of the Egyptian Feminist Union, founded in 1923 by feminist and nationalist writer Huda al-Sha'rawi. Resigning her membership due to intellectual disagreements, Ghazali founded the Muslim Women's Association in 1936 with the aim of organizing women's activities for Islamic purposes. According to Ghazali, Islam permits women to take an active part in public life, through employment, political engagement, and any other activity in the service of an Islamic society (Hoffman 1985). However, she also believes that a Muslim woman's first duty is to be a mother and a wife, and that it is only after her first duty is fulfilled that women are free to participate in public life. When Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sought to create a division of Muslim Sisters, he asked Ghazali to bring her Association into the Brotherhood and lead the new division. However, Ghazali rejected the offer to merge while promising to cooperate with the Brothers. When Egyptian president Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir cracked down on Islamists, Ghazali and other women, such as Zaynab al-Ghazali, Khalida al-Hudaybi, and Sayyid Qutb's sisters, Hamida Qutb and Amina Qutb, played a central role in transmitting messages among Islamist leaders, visiting imprisoned activists, and facilitating the publication and circulation of Qutb's texts. These women were themselves imprisoned for their activities.

The tradition of Islamist women's activism has continued into the present. Although many Islamists continue to express views in tension with women's full and equal participation, most Islamist groups and parties have a women's section and encourage their female members to vote; some have even put forward female candidates for elections. As Clark and Schwedler have demonstrated in the cases of Jordan and Yemen, rather than resulting from ideological changes among Islamists, women's mobilization and advancement in Islamist groups has resulted when 'they seized opportunities created by internal party tensions often unrelated to the subject of women' (Clark and Schwedler 2003: 308).

REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMISM AND THE ISLAMIC STATE

Maududi, Qutb, and Sadr rejected the identification of Islamism with notions such as 'capitalism', 'communism', 'democracy', and 'dictatorship', though one can find aspects of such systems in their thought. According to Maududi, those who seek to draw such parallels hold the mistaken 'belief that we as Muslims can earn no honor or respect unless we are able to show that our religion resembles modern creeds' (Maududi 1975: 118). However, other Islamists trace a distinct tradition of 'Islamic socialism' to the thought of Mustafa al-Siba'i

(Syria, 1915–64), who was dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law at the University of Damascus and a leader in the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Written during the union between Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic, Siba'i's 1959 work, *The Socialism of Islam (ishtiragiyya al-islam)* seeks to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and socialism based upon a notion of 'mutual social responsibility' (*al-takaful al-ijtima'i*). One will note that this is the same concept utilized by Sayyid Qutb and one finds many similarities between their views, though Qutb would clearly reject the association of socialism with his conception of social justice based on its confusion of God's principles with man-made (*jahili*) systems. Lest we think for a moment that there is any consensus on this view, one should note that the concept of mutual social responsibility is criticized by Maududi for its too close association with socialist and communist thinking. He prefers to speak specifically of 'Islamic Justice' (Maududi 1999: 100, 109). Maududi's concept of an Islamic economic system relied more upon eliminating the excesses of capitalism (Maududi 1979: esp. 58–67).

Despite many important differences among particular thinkers, the chief aim of Islamist thinkers at this stage was to offer a distinctly Islamic conception of politics as part of a revolutionary project aimed at establishing what they saw as a proper Islamic order in the present. Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egypt, b. 1926) links the Islamist *nahda* (awakening) to the *nakba* (disaster) of the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland in 1948, and the *naksa* (fall), which occurred when during the Six Day War of 1967, instead of recapturing Palestine, the Arab forces led by Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser of Egypt, lost further territory (al-Qaradawi 1990). Both events shook the credibility of the secular Arab nationalist regimes and provided fertile soil later tilled by Islamist forces. As the corrupt and inefficient nature of a number of existing (Arab nationalist and socialist) states in the region became apparent to all, Islamists—most of whom rejected the Western model of the state but some of whom seem to have appropriated revolutionary models aimed at seizing state power—became a force to be reckoned with in a number of Muslim countries.

Qutb and Maududi were central in politicizing the Islamic concepts necessary for the development of this ideological understanding of Islam. For example, in *Milestones*, Qutb juxtaposes the concept of God's sovereignty (*hakimiyya*) to the idea of *jahiliyya*. Qutb uses *jahiliyya*, the time of 'ignorance' that existed prior to God's message to the Prophet Muhammad, to describe a condition that can exist at any time that human beings do not live up to God's plan. In Qutb's assessment, the contemporary age is one of ignorance, godlessness, and

perplexity—summed up by the notion of *jahiliyya*—and Muslims must withdraw from *jahili* society, establish a truly Islamic social order (*al-nizam al-islami*) and, ultimately, (re)conquer the existing ignorant order (*al-nizam al-jahili*). According to this perspective, Islam is incompatible with the secularism, individualism, and general moral disintegration that characterizes modern reality, and the Islamic *umma* can only grow and flourish at the expense of this reality. The only antidote to the current state of *jahiliyya*—especially Western materialism, which he saw as the chief contaminant, which enslaves men to their passions, and to consumerism, and pits individual against individual in a system of competition, and enslaves one man to another in a system of exploitation—was the *hakimiyya* of God: a total Islamic view of life and a divinely ordained Islamic system. The harbinger of this new order is a body of believers Qutb refers to as a ‘vanguard’. It is this vanguard that undertakes the task of purging themselves of corruption—a sort of *hijra* in the manner undertaken by the Prophet Muhammad when he left for Medina after facing opposition from Meccan authorities, only to return a few years later to conquer Mecca—and undertake *jihad* against the forces of *jahiliyya*.

Both Qutb and Maududi articulate a notion of political struggle aimed at gaining political power, before all other considerations, in order to establish an Islamic state. Maududi sees Islam as a ‘revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets’. In pursuing that aim he calls for the establishment of an ‘International Revolutionary Party’ aimed at waging *jihad* against tyrannical governments (Maududi 1976: 3, 17–18). In Qutb’s view, *jihad* is a reflection of human beings’ desire for freedom from the servitude of other human beings. Central to this perspective is Qutb’s (1981) division of the world into two spheres in *Milestones: dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*. The first sphere includes every country in which the legal judgments of Islam are applied, regardless of whether Muslims, Christians, or Jews form the majority of citizens so long as those who wield power are Muslim and adhere to the injunctions of their religion. The second sphere consists of every territory in which Islamic rules are not applied, irrespective of whether its rulers claim to be Muslim. Qutb argues that *jihad* is not only a duty incumbent on all true Muslims, but it is also offensive in nature. The aim of *jihad* is to ‘remove any wall between Islam and individual human beings’ so that they are ‘free to choose to accept or reject it’. Either the *jihad* must completely destroy the existing un-Islamic system or force them to ‘submit to [Islam’s] authority by paying *Jizyah* [tax paid by non-Muslims in an Islamic state], which will be a guarantee that they have opened their doors for the

preaching of Islam and will not put any obstacle in its way through the power of the state' (1981: 72–3). In this, *jihad* is a necessary component of *da'wa* (the call to Islam).

Qutb's thought had contained an innovation which proved to be of particular significance for the Islamists he inspired: in declaring that not only non-Islamic governments, but also those led by Muslims could be considered to be existing in a state of *jahiliyya*, he gave Islamic sanction to Muslims' opposition to and overthrow of the governments that ruled them. Up until this time, Islamists in Egypt viewed the British as the enemy, though occasionally the Egyptian monarchy and capitalism were also viewed this way. However, Qutb's final work, *Milestones*, constituted a harsh critique of the *jahiliyya* and, hence, illegitimacy, of the Nasser regime. Whereas the traditional Sunni view holds that Muslims must submit to any political authority as long as it does not openly and grossly violate the Islamic faith, Qutb suggests Muslims are permitted to seize state power from secular governments. However, Qutb only conceded the occasional necessity for violence to overcome institutional barriers to human freedom (to submit to God) fairly late in his life and personally seemed to have greatly preferred to do intellectual rather than physical battle with heretics and others ignorant of Islam's call (*da'wa*).

In the work of subsequent Islamists, such as Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj (Egypt, 1954–82), *jihad* is further radicalized. Faraj argues that *jihad*—which he defines as armed battle against infidels and apostates from the Islamic faith—is the sixth, 'forgotten' or 'neglected' pillar of Islam that is incumbent on all Muslims. Faraj was executed in 1982 for his role in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Faraj draws (selectively) upon medieval Islamic tracts—most notably, Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328)—in making his argument. When the Mongols destroyed the 'Abbasid caliphate in 1258, even though they later converted to Islam, Ibn Taymiyya argued that their mixing of their own traditions with aspects of Islamic law rendered their rule illegitimate and the struggle against them legitimate. Faraj compares contemporary leaders (Sadat is not mentioned by name) to Genghis Khan while arguing that the former are worse than the latter in that not only do they not implement Islamic law, they do the bidding of foreign powers. Faraj's (1982) pamphlet is still commonly referred to by those engaged in militant *jihad*. However, it is important to note that Faraj focuses on the struggle (*jihad*) against the near enemy or the enemy within: corrupt leaders of Muslim states (hence, the assassination of Sadat that was said to result from its publication). Faraj maintained that it is more important to fight the enemy within than to fight external enemies because one

cannot successfully undertake the latter until Islam's own house is in order. It was only later that Islamist individuals and groups transcended the nation-state as a primary concern and refocused *jihad* against the far away enemy.

The radical Shi'i version of Islamism is realized in the thought Ruhollah Khomeini (Iran, 1902–89) and given its full expression in the 1979 revolution in Iran. Activism and quietism have long coexisted in a state of tension within Shi'i religio-political discourses. For centuries the dominant image of Shi'is was one of fatalistic believers, awaiting the return of the Mahdi. Quietism did not mean complete withdrawal from political affairs. In fact, traditional quietism was often accompanied by a denial of legitimacy on the part of existing regimes, but it was also only rarely associated with political activism, that is, with efforts aimed at removing illegitimate rulers and replacing them with a rightful successor. This quietism was fed by the development of a hierarchical but decentralized structure of authority in which scholars (*'ulama*) acted as community leaders in the absence of an Imam² (divinely guided descendent of 'Ali), the faithful are required to follow or imitate (*taqlid*) a *mujtahid* (one qualified to practise *ijtihad*, the interpretation of Islamic law) in the conduct of life. Most Shi'i clerics have remained focused on providing, within the context of interpreting Islamic law, a means of accommodating *de facto* powers.

Khomeini sought a resolution to the problem of government posed by the absence of the Imam and the existence of corrupt rulers like the Shah by conferring responsibility for government on the jurist, by virtue of his knowledge of the sacred law. In Khomeini's thought (1981b), jurists as such are not mere experts of religious law to be consulted and emulated solely in religious matters, but designates of God and successors to the Imams in all affairs related to the community. Khomeini argued that a single jurist, possessing knowledge and moral rectitude, could rise to be a supreme jurist, holding authority over the people. The idea of guardianship or rule of the jurist (*wilayat al-faqih*) constituted the official ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran that Khomeini helped establish and was enshrined in articles 5 and 107 of the 1979 Iranian constitution. Under Khomeini, the supreme jurist acquired absolute powers. However, after Khomeini's death in 1989, the Iranian constitution was revised and the qualification that the jurist be a 'source of emulation' (*marja' taqlid*) was omitted, thus no longer conferring absolute or supreme status on the guardian.

Many aspects of Khomeini's thought had a wider influence on contemporary Islamism elsewhere, such as his use of Qur'anic notions to draw a picture of Muslims as 'the downtrodden (*mustad'ifun*) of the earth'—who have been

dominated and ruled over by the ‘arrogant’ (*mustakbirun*)—his critique of Western ‘materialism’, and his populism. However, the particular form his rule took, juridical rule, remained largely confined to Iran and failed to offer a prototype of the just Islamic polity even for Shi’is in other contexts. One of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s later works, *Introduction to Islamic Political System*, contains a discussion of the Islamic Republic in Iran in response to a question put to him by Lebanese religious scholars: ‘what is the intellectual basis of the Islamic republic {in Iran}?’ (al-Sadr 1982: 69). He prefaces his remarks on the latter by affirming that ‘absolute sovereignty belongs to God’ and means that man is free, since, no ‘individual, nor any class or group possesses a supreme power and authority over him.... This principle does away with every kind of oppression and one man’s exploitation by another man’ (al-Sadr 1982: 75). Sadr argued that Islamic rule embodied not only God’s sovereignty and a basis in Islamic law, but also the principles that, while the clerics had religious authority, human beings in general represent God’s vicereagents on earth and are entrusted with legislative and executive powers. In political terms, Sadr argues in this work for a moderate supervisory role for the clergy in judicial matters and retained a broader vision of involvement in politics on the part of the community. Rather than *wilayat al-faqih* (the rule of the jurist), Sadr puts forth the concept of *wilayat al-umma ala nafsiha* (the self-rule of the community), recognizing the popular basis of political authority. We see this difference of opinion even in Sadr’s justification of Khomeini’s rule. He does not use Khomeini’s argument to justify his authority. Rather, he argues Khomeini’s authority is ‘religious’ and his eligibility to hold the position of supreme representative of Islamic government is based on several qualifications: that he be a *mujtahid* of first rank, that his religious authority complies to *Shari‘a*, that he has the support of the majority of the members of the consultative council, and that the people, as the ‘rightful bearers of the trust of government’ possess the right to vote and take part in politics (al-Sadr 1982: 79).

Perhaps the most lasting legacy of the Islamic revolution in Iran was its success. The takeover of the US embassy and the taking of US hostages by Iranian students on 4 November 1979 was an event greeted throughout the Muslim world as a victory of Islam over the infidels. Iranian students managed to humiliate the great American superpower—a confirmation of the Islamist belief that by acting fearlessly in the name of Islam, Muslims could defeat the infidels and transform earlier Islamist anti-imperialist discourse aimed at Europe into a discourse aimed at American imperialism and Zionism. The fact that this was a victory by Shi‘ites, a minority group in the Islamic world, only offered a

minor detraction from the sense of achievement among Islamists in general. Thus, the Islamic revolution in Iran, though Shi‘i in character, provided an inspiration to many radical Islamists and gave substance to the view that the Islamic state could be realized.

TRANSNATIONAL RADICAL ISLAMISM

While in the wake of the rise of international terrorism undertaken in the name of Islam, Paul Berman (2003a, 2003b) and others identified Sayyid Qutb as the ‘ideologue of Islam’, the ‘Marx of global jihad’, and the ‘philosopher of terror’, the influences on the myriad varieties of Islamism are many and to explain the rise of al-Qa‘ida [al Qaeda] one must look to the struggle of the Afghani people against the Soviet invasion of their country in December 1979. As Hegghammer rightly notes, the rise of foreign fighters posits ‘the emergence of a qualitatively new ideological movement or subcurrent of Islamism that did not exist before the 1980s’ (Hegghammer 2010/11: 71). Hegghammer identifies ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam (Palestine, 1941–89) as the most important ideologue of this new variety of Islamism. The most significant change in thinking with this new strand is the belief that Muslims face an existential threat from an external enemy that requires all able Muslim men to fight it wherever they can. ‘Azzam argued that it was a requirement of Islamic law that each Muslim has an undeniable duty to respond in defence of Muslim territory (‘Azzam n.d.). ‘Azzam is utilizing Ibn Taymiyya’s distinction between a collective duty (*fard kifaya*), which are to be fulfilled by a group of Muslims on behalf of the Muslim community, and individual duty (*fard ‘ayn*), which each Muslim must undertake to avoid falling into sin. According to Ibn Taymiyya,

jihad is obligatory if it is carried out on our initiative and also if it is waged as defence. If we take the initiative, it is a collective duty [which means that] if it is fulfilled by a sufficient number [of Muslims], the obligation lapses for all others and the merit goes to those who have fulfilled it.... But if the enemy wants to attack the Muslims, than repelling him becomes a duty for all those under attack and for the others in order to help him. (Ibn Taymiyya 2005: 53)

Following Ibn Taymiyya, ‘Azzam argues further that if an enemy attacks any Muslim lands, if those living in the area are unable to repel the aggressors on their own, it becomes an individual duty for all Muslims to do so until enough holy warriors (*mujahidun*) have succeeding in restoring the land to Muslim hands. Thus, ‘Azzam concludes, fighting against the communist invasion in Afghanistan is an individual obligation. ‘Azzam had an unmitigable influence on the thinking of al-Qa‘ida and was a teacher and mentor to many of its key

members, including Usama Bin Laden. However, Hegghammer notes some important differences between Azzam and the doctrine al-Qa'ida develops: 'Whereas Azzam advocated conventional military tactics in confined theaters of war, Osama bin Laden's famous 1998 declaration sanctioned all means in all places' (Hegghammer 2010/11: 75). Al-Qa'ida further extended 'Azzam's argument about the obligations of the *jihad* against external enemies to justify attacks against the United States, as well as its allies, who were said to be occupying Muslim lands after King Fahd authorized the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990.

CONSERVATIVE AND MODERATE ISLAMISM

Despite the recent growth of transnational terrorist actions by radical Islamists against Western countries and their citizens, the primary target of most Islamists has always been and remains the secular or un-Islamic states, leaders and institutions in Muslim-majority countries, and their ultimate aim is the establishment of an Islamic state within the framework of existing nation-states. The state they envision is one in which the Qur'an acts as the constitution, and the ruler implements the *Shari'a*, to which he is also bound, and ruler engages in *shura* (consultation). In this sense, political Islam develops in response to secularism, which it attempts to render alien to Islam. This mode of argumentation often involves establishing secularism in terms that render it specific to the Western historical experience. According to this line of argumentation, secularism emerges in Europe in response to the development of Christian theocratic rule in the Middle Ages. Since Islam has no church structure to intervene in or conflict with the state, so the argument goes, Islam did not need to adopt secularism in order to protect politics from religious absolutism. Rather, Islam as a comprehensive way of life is already infused throughout the polity.

Throughout, the 1970s to early 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the idea of direct participation in political process, parliament, and trade unions. They focused chiefly on rebuilding the organization's structures and avoiding confrontations with the regime that might provoke repression of the movement. By the mid-1980s, they gradually began to participate in parliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties. What accounts for this shift of strategy? After the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat by the Islamic Jihad group in October 1981, many of the leading theorists of the Islamic revival (*al-sahwa al-islamiyya*) sought to clarify their position from the political turmoil

engulfing the country and from the extremist forces that contributed to its emergence.

Ismail terms groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the forces of the Islamist alliance that formed in Egypt 1987 for electoral purposes ‘conservative Islamism’, ‘because of their willingness to work within the established order and because they promote hierarchical and patriarchal values reinforcing the status quo’ (Ismail 2006: 28). She distinguishes conservative from radical Islamists in three areas: modes of action, ideological basis, and socioeconomic visions. Radical Islamists adopt violent means of establishing an Islamic state where conservative Islamists work within the existing political system. Where the former indict contemporary society as *jahaliyya* (ignorant of Islam) and seek to establish an Islamic state based on *hakimiyya* (God’s sovereignty), the latter ‘anchor their discourse in popular traditions with concerns about the afterlife, the spirits, and rituals’. Where radical Islamists speak of ‘*Islam al-thawra*’ (Islam of revolution) and draw from socially and economically marginalized segments of society, conservative Islamists refer to ‘*Islam al-tharwa*’ (Islam of riches) and tend to identify with professional classes as well as with petro-dollars (Ismail 2006: 29).

However, there is some overlap between what Ismail terms ‘conservatism Islamism’ and a group of Islamists who have begun articulating principles that they characterize as moderate or centrist (*wasatiyya*). Other scholars have called these individuals ‘the new Islamists’ and emphasize their focus on intellectual activity rather than on political organizing (Baker 2003). The individuals associated with this trend consist primarily of Egyptian Islamists working outside of organized groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood—for example Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917–96), Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fahmi Huwaydi (b. 1936), Kamal Abu al-Majd (b. 1930), Muhammad al-‘Imara (b. 1931), and Muhammad Salim al-‘Awa (b. 1942). To the list of Egyptian intellectuals, one must add a number of Islamists from other countries often rightly linked with the *wasatiyya* trend, including Rashid al-Ghannushi (Tunisia/England, b. 1941) and Hasan al-Turabi (Sudan, b. 1932). Many of these figures offered early iterations of their visions in speeches given to youth groups and carrying such titles as ‘the priorities of the Islamic movement in the coming phase’ (al-Qaradawi 2000) or ‘the priorities of the Islamic trend in the coming three decades’ (Turabi and Lowrie 1993). The main components of this intellectual trend were outlined in a pamphlet entitled *A Contemporary Islamic Vision: Declaration of Principles* and penned by Kamal Abu al-Majd, a professor of law at Cairo University (1992). These principles were the basis for a number of former Brotherhood members

and others, including several women and a number of Copts, who sought to create a new party in 1996 called al-Wasat. Other groups have attempted to create new or reform old Islamist political parties and groups explicitly based on *wasatiyya* principles: for example the Nahda Party in Tunisia, the Justice and development Party in Morocco, the reform party in Algeria, the Jordanian Islamic Action Union, the Umma Party in Kuwait, the Yemeni Reformist Union (Islah). They have also had a considerable impact on the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood itself.

Moderate Islamists draw attention to the deficiencies of secular democracy in the normative sphere and offer their own alternative that can not only coexist with democracy and pluralism, but places Islamic values at the centre of their vision. So, on the one hand, individuals like Yusuf Qaradawi aim to demonstrate Islamist support of such things as democracy, pluralism, and human rights; while, on the other hand, they seek to halt any assimilation of 'Western values' through the strengthening of an Islamic civilizational identity without which, in their view, neither effective resistance to the Western assault nor reform against the present authoritarianism is possible.

Qaradawi identifies his moderate view as an 'ideology' based on the understanding of Islam as a comprehensive way of life. Clearly *wasatiyya* Islamism is intended as an alternative to secular ideologies. The editor of Qaradawi's *Priorities* notes in his introduction to the work that the understanding of 'Islam as a complete code of life' remains an 'ideological obstacle' common among many Muslims who consider 'Islam completely compatible with secularism' (al-Qaradawi 2000: 10). Islamists envision a state in which Islamic law is the basis of the constitution, to which all are accountable, and where governance is conducted through a process of consultation (*shura*). However, while many early Islamists were quick to resist equations of *shura* with democracy, the *wasatiyya* intellectuals have sought to reconcile Islamic thought with democratic elections, rotation of power, party pluralism, and a respect for the basic rights of citizens. In contrast to Qutb and Maududi, who argued that democracy is a *jahiliyya* form of government, since it based on popular sovereignty rather than God's sovereignty (*hakimiyya*), Islamic moderates have maintained that a democratic system best codifies and preserves the rights and duties that can curtail arbitrariness and authoritarianism on the part of the state. Qaradawi emphatically states: 'I cannot imagine that the Islamic movement would support anything other than political freedom and democracy' (1990: 187). However, he clarifies that Muslims must support 'a true, not false democracy'. True democracy, according to Qaradawi entails the freedom for

Muslims to perpetuate their message and compete fairly in majoritarian elections. In Qaradawi's view, democracy does not conflict with the Islamic notion of *hakimiyya*, in placing human sovereignty over God's, since any population that has a Muslim majority would presumably not legislate in a way that contradicts Islamic law. Yet, to insure the Islamic basis of democratic rule, Qaradawi argues that only one constitutional provision is required: 'stipulating that any legislation contradicting the incontestable provisions of Islam shall be null and void' (al-Qaradawi 1990: 188-9). This will not conflict with democracy, in his view, since the binding texts are few and the texts themselves are so flexible that the scope of legislation and democratic activity would remain wide.

Wasatiyya intellectuals emphasize a piecemeal approach to politics: 'The realization of [the Islamic state]', Qaradawi argues, 'is conditional upon a number of imperatives, some of the most important of which are: to unite all efforts, to remove all obstacles, to convince the suspecting minds of the nobility of the cause, to bring up Islamically-oriented youngsters, and to prepare local as well as international public opinion to accept their ideology and their state' (al-Qaradawi 2000: 163). Islamic moderates focus primarily on grass-roots mobilization, education, and charitable work, while also affirming that the greatest obstacle to the realization of both an Islamic state and society remains the existing un-Islamic regimes. Qaradawi, for example, asserts that 'it is the duty of the movement in the coming phase to stand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people's rights' and that 'the most serious danger threatening the Muslim Ummah and the Islamic Movement is the rule of the Pharaohs' (al-Qaradawi 1990: 186, 189). There is no doubt that he refers to contemporary leaders of Arab states—and the reference to Pharaohs draws particular attention to Egypt's head of state. However, in this context, Qaradawi does not call for violence or revolutionary efforts aimed at seizing the state through a frontal assault.

Like many Islamic thinkers, Qaradawi distinguishes between offensive and defensive *jihad*. He cites Maududi and Qutb as advocates of the offensive view of *jihad* and lists among advocates of defensive *jihad* Rashid Rida, Mahmud Shaltut (Egypt, 1893–1963), Muhammad Abu Zahra (Egypt, 1898–1974), Muhammad al-Ghazali, and 'Abdullah Ibn Zad al-Mahmud (Qatar). Qaradawi argues that defensive *jihad* is compulsory and should be the priority of the Islamic movement: 'it is the duty to defend every land invaded by the *kuffar*' (literally, nonbelievers; here: non-Muslims) (al-Qaradawi 1990: 163). In this regard, Qaradawi affirms the priority given to Palestine—and, thus, the fight against Zionism—in the letters of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan

al-Banna: 'Palestine is the first and foremost Islamic Cause, and its liberation is the first and foremost duty' (al-Qaradawi 1990: 164–5). While Qaradawi may seem to be suggesting that offensive *jihad* can only be undertaken once defensive *jihad* has been achieved, other passages clarify that this is not the case. Rather than restricting offensive *jihad*, Qaradawi's understanding of balancing priorities and reality, leads him to conclude that it is best fought through the written and spoken word to 'convey our *daw'ah* [call] to the whole world' and that mastery of the latest innovations and technologies in mass media for this purpose must also be a priority of the Islamic movement (al-Qaradawi 1990: 121). Among the considerations Qaradawi discusses are the fact that the development of new communication technologies facilitates this form of *jihad* and the fact that fighting non-Muslims in an offensive military *jihad* risks considerable harms, including the loss of the weapons these countries supply Muslims for their defensive *jihad* (al-Qaradawi 1990: 122). Thus, Qaradawi concludes, in the present, military *jihad* is best pursued in defensive form and offensive *jihad* is best undertaken through non-military means. Qaradawi and other Islamists who associate themselves with the *wasatiyya* trend have been out-spoken opponents of offensive *jihadi* actions, such as those undertaken by al-Qa'ida in the United States and Europe.

Absent democracy and political freedoms, Qaradawi advises Islamic movements to seek alliances and political participation through whatever channels are available to them. He cites '[Hasan] Turabi and his brothers', who through joining the Socialist Union and accepting appointments under Numairi's government succeeded in establishing Islamic law in the Sudan, as a positive example of what can be achieved by allying with non-Islamic forces and participating in non-Islamic rule (al-Qaradawi 1990: 50–1). Similarly, the leader of Tunisia's Nahda party (in exile in London), Rashid Ghannushi (1993), has argued that in light of the fact that Islamic government exists only as an idea, yet unrealized in contemporary circumstances, Islamic movements must participate in those areas that remain available to them in existing states. Ghannushi encourages Muslims to participate and share power in existing non-Islamic governments as a nonviolent means of laying the foundation for a truly Islamic social order.

It is in this context that the Muslim Brotherhood began participating in elections through alliances with other groups (since Islamist parties were banned in Egypt). They also began outlining an electoral programme in 1995, a reform initiative in 2004, and another electoral programme in 2005. Their documents and statements published during this period assert that a commitment to the civic

nature of political authority is consistent to their adherence to the principles of the Shari'a; a respect for the basic values and instruments of democracy; respect for public freedoms, acceptance of pluralism; transfer of power through 'clean' and free elections; sovereignty of the people; separation of power; rejection of the use of violence and advocacy of gradual and legal means to achieve reform; affirmation of citizenship as the basis for rights and responsibilities for Muslims and non-Muslims; and support for human rights, including the rights of women and Copts.³

POST-ISLAMISM?

Over the past two decades the concept of 'post-Islamism' has emerged to describe what many see as a new phenomenon in the region. The concept was first put forth by French scholars (Roy 1994, among others) who asserted that Islamism had failed, both intellectually and politically, and that Islamists were increasingly articulating secular or apolitical positions as a result. Since that time, writers in other contexts have criticized and revised notions of post-Islamism that are too closely tied to a historical narrative premised on Islamism giving way to secularism. Thus, Asef Bayat suggests that the anomalies of Islamist politics have opened up a productive space that is

neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic nor secular. Rather it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scripture, and the future instead of the past. (Bayat 2007: 11)

Bayat defines Islamism as a project seeking to set up an 'ideological community', including the establishment of an Islamic state and implementing Islamic laws and moral codes. In contrast, 'post-Islamism' involves a 'conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains' (Bayat 2007: 11), in which religiosity coexists successfully with human rights and political freedoms. Bayat argues that post-Islamism develops when Islam fails to properly harness the political aspirations of normal everyday citizens such that 'the appeal, energy and sources of legitimacy of Islamism are exhausted' (2007: 10–11). A central aspect distinguishing post-Islamism from Islamism is its view on the concept of the Islamic state. Whereas the notion of an Islamic state became central to Islamist projects in the 1950s, post-Islamism accepts the notion of public religion or a civil state with an Islamic referent, which leads many to

identify the project and the ‘new’ in the thinking of many moderate (*wasatiyya*) Islamists to the development of a post-Islamist mode of politics.

THE ‘ARAB SPRING’

The 2011 uprisings in the Arab world have overturned much conventional thinking on the region. Contradicting longstanding claims that the only real threat to states in the region was Islamist (which also stood as a justification for not pushing democratization efforts too forcefully), throughout the protests activist showed little interest in defining their uprising in totalizing terms as either Islamic or secular; neither did they aim to oppose their movement to secularism or to Islam. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood came rather late to the protests and never led them. In fact, one of the most striking aspects of these popular uprisings is the way in which they call into question the main interpretive lenses through which the politics of the Arab and Islamic world has been viewed: a dichotomy between religion (Islam) and secularism. Despite the many critiques to which this thesis has been subject, it has somehow endured as perhaps the main narrative for explaining what the Arab region was thought to lack: democracy, development, and modernity. Yet, while Islamists did not cause these revolutions, they are primed to be one of the main beneficiaries as we see the *Nahda* party in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt winning the countries’ first open and free elections. While it is yet too early to benefit from the clearer view of hindsight, thus far these revolutions seem to demonstrate two things. First of all, Islamism has emerged as a language of popular political dissent and reform for many in the region. Second, the point has been driven home that for most people in the region Islamism is not the problem; the problem was the corrupt and oppressive authoritarian rule that has been overthrown. The question that remains is: if Islamism was not the problem, is it the solution to the pressing political and economic problems in the region?

NOTES

1. The split between the two main branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi‘i has its origins in a dispute over who should lead the faithful after the prophet Muhammad’s death in 632. Those who came to be called the Sunnis (from ‘*ahl al-Sunna*’, or ‘people of the traditions {of the prophet Muhammad}’) favoured Abu Bakr, one of the prophet’s closest companions. Those who argued that direct descendants of the prophet should lead the community came to be known as Shi‘is, from ‘*shi‘a ‘Ali*’, or ‘partisans of ‘Ali’, after the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law ‘Ali, whom they favoured to succeed. Today Sunnis are thought to make up somewhere between 75–90% of all Muslims.
2. Shi‘is believe that the Imamate ended when the eleventh Imam died without leaving a son to act as twelfth Imam. Different Shi‘i factions have different explanations of this end. The largest Shi‘i group,

- the Twelver Shi'a, maintain that the twelfth imam was born but went into occultation in 939.
3. See Browsers 2009 for a more critical assessment of their thinking on these issues.

REFERENCES

- Ayubi, Nazih. 1991. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London: Routledge.
- 'Azzam, 'Abdallah. n.d. 'Defense of Muslim lands: The first obligation after Imam'. Accessed at http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_1_table.htm 15 March 2013.
- Baker, Raymond William. 2003. *Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bayat, Asef. 2007. *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Berman, Paul. 2003a. 'The philosopher of Islamic terror', *The New York Times Magazine*. 23 March.
- Berman, Paul. 2003b. *Terror and Liberalism*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Black, Antony. 2001. *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present*. New York: Routledge.
- Browsers, Michaelle. 2009. *Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, Jonathan. 2011. *Salafis and Sufis in Egypt*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: The Carnegie Papers.
- Clark, Janine Astrid and Jillian Schwedler. 2003. 'Who opened the window? Women's activism in Islamic parties', *Comparative Politics*, 35, 3: 293–312.
- Faraj, Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam. 1982. *al-Jihad: al-farida al-gha'iba*. Egypt: n.p. Jerusalem-Palestine: Maktabat al-Batal 'Izz-al-Din al-Qassam.
- Ghannouchi, Rashid. 1993. 'The participation of Islamists in a non-Islamic government'. Pp. 271–78 in *Power Sharing Islam?* ed. Azzam Tamimi. London: Liberty Publications.
- Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010/11. 'The rise of Muslim foreign fighters: Islam and the globalization of jihad', *International Security*, 35 (3): 53–94.
- Hoffman, Valerie. 1985. 'An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-Ghazali'. Pp. 233–54 in *Women and the Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Change*, ed. Elizabeth Fernea. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad. 2005. 'The religious and moral doctrine of Jihad'. Pp. 43–54 in *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader*, ed. Rudolph Peters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ismail, Salwa. 2006. *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Khomeini, Ruhollah. 1981a. *The Selected Messages of Imam Khomeini Concerning Iraq and the War Iraq Imposed upon Iran*. Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance.
- Khomeini, Ruhollah. 1981b. *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Berkeley: Mizan Press.
- Kurzman, Charles. 2002. *Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Sourcebook*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laroui, Abdallah. 1976. *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- al-Majd, Ahmad Kamal Abu. 1992. *Ruya islamiyya mu'asira*. Cairo: Dar al-shuruq.
- Maududi, Abu'l Ala. 1975. *The Islamic Law and Constitution*. Lahore: Islamic Publications.
- Maududi, Abu'l Ala. 1976. *Jihad in Islam*. Lahore: Islamic Publications.
- Maududi, Abu'l Ala. 1979. *Islamic Way of Life*. Lahore: Islamic Publications.
- Maududi, Abu'l Ala. 1999. *Economic System of Islam*. Lahore: Islamic Publications.
- al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 1990. *Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism*. Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought.

- al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 2000. *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*. Swansea: Awakening Publications.
- Qutb, Sayyid. 1981. *Milestones*. Cedar Rapids, IA: The Mother Mosque Foundation.
- Qutb, Sayyid. 2000. *Social Justice in Islam*. New York: Octagon Books.
- Roy, Olivier. 1994. *The Failure of Political Islam*, tr. Carol Volk. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir. 1961. *Iqtisaduna*. 2 volumes. Najaf: Matba'at al-nu'man.
- al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir. 1982. *Introduction to Islamic Political System*. Karachi: Islamic Seminary.
- al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir. 1987. *Our Philosophy*. London: Muhammadi Trust.
- al-Siba'i, Mustafa. 1959. *al-Ishtiraqiyya al-Islam*. Damascus: Mu'assasa al-matba'a al-'arabiyya.
- Turabi, H. and Arthur L. Lowrie. 1993. *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Roundtable with Dr. Hasan Turabi. 10 May 1992*. (Tampa, FL: World and Islam Studies Enterprise).

CHAPTER 34 CHINESE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

LEIGH JENCO

MODERN Chinese political ideologies emerged out of nearly two centuries of profound and turbulent transformations in Chinese social, cultural, and political life. As late as the early 1900s, China was a crumbling empire ruled by the Manchus, foreign invaders who perpetuated the Confucian social and moral orders established by earlier Chinese dynasties. But after a republican and then a communist revolution, in 1911 and 1949 respectively, China ended the twentieth century as one of the modern world's economic superpowers. Its success, leaders claim, is grounded on a model of modern authoritarian development called 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. These dramatic vicissitudes, not surprisingly, gave rise to a diverse range of political ideologies. These ideologies drew from both indigenous and exogenous sources to navigate the challenges of China's long twentieth century, particularly its unprecedented scope of engagement with global order. Modern Chinese political ideologies engage a wide variety of dilemmas that mark modern life experience for many people around the globe. At the same time, they offer a series of reflections on distinctive themes that recur throughout much Chinese twentieth-century debate, including the role of educated elites in political decision-making, the importance of individual moral aptitudes over political institutions, and the capacity of revolution to sustain political life.

Many studies of modern Chinese thought begin in the mid-twentieth century, with the establishment of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949. However, gaining critical purchase on how these ideologies respond to China's modern predicament demands a more wide-ranging scope—unconstrained by historical narratives that define China through the goals it is supposed to be pursuing (whether democratization, socialist revolution, or economic liberalization). This chapter therefore begins by examining the political ideologies of the late Qing dynasty, when political elites began exploring foreign and native ideas that would eventually inform a range of Sinophone ideological views far more diverse, and more geographically dispersed, than those supported by the Communists. These earlier conversations mark what is arguably the most significant transitional period in Chinese ideological history, broaching questions that would recur throughout twentieth-

century debates: what is to become of China's identity in a world now much larger than heretofore realized? To what extent can its received intellectual and political heritage, however that is perceived, fit within a world order largely centred outside its borders? As faith wanes in communism as a totalizing political ideology, contemporary intellectuals across the ideological spectrum return to these precedents to counter, at least in part, the inevitability of modernization, scientism, and liberalization being pursued by the contemporary (and persistently censorious) Chinese state.

The past, in other words, remains very much a part of China's present. This is not a result of some indelible influence on the Chinese by received historical legacies, or the persistence of putatively 'traditional' elements in Chinese culture. Rather, it has more to do with the particular ideologies invoked to interpret the past at different moments in time, for a variety of political purposes. The roughly chronological account offered below emphasizes the constantly shifting terrain of political argument as the present engages the past to argue for a certain kind of future. It avoids reading into Chinese political ideologies a specific telos of development, in favour of letting these ideologies speak for themselves, about each other, and to the constituencies they invoke.

SELF-STRENGTHENING AND THE 'FOREIGN AFFAIRS' MOVEMENT

The Western incursions of the mid-nineteenth century were of course not the first time China had encountered foreign ideas. Historically China had been successful in assimilating foreign knowledge of all kinds, including Tychonic astronomy and mathematics from Jesuit priests in the seventeenth century. Most profoundly, Buddhism had entered China from India during the Han dynasty, generating distinctive Chinese schools of inquiry and practice. But the successful military attempts by the British empire to open inland trade with the Qing (during the Opium Wars of 1838–40 and 1856–60) did more than simply achieve their stated goals of establishing foreign commercial interests in Qing-controlled territory. They transformed not only China's stock of knowledge, but its very relationship to the foreign world that produced such knowledge. These incidents, and similar foreign threats, have traditionally been figured as provoking China's entry into modernity. Regardless of their interpretation, they gave rise to an ongoing and (as it would turn out) deeply transformative examination of China's self-identity, its place in the world, and the future significance of its long-revered philosophical traditions such as Confucianism. The powerful military

technology, economic prosperity, and novel political organization of European and American nations led Chinese elites to reconsider for the first time the state-focused ethnocentrism that heretofore characterized Chinese political ideologies.

The first wave of self-transformation began with the ‘self-strengthening movement’, led by concerned scholar-officials (*shi*, also translated as ‘literati’) such as Wei Yuan. Identifying Western wealth and power with the military technologies that had made foreign incursions on Chinese territory possible, literati elites increasingly urged the adoption of Western scientific education to enable the Chinese to produce guns, ships, and cannons of their own—a technique Wei called ‘learning from the barbarians’ skills as a means to control the barbarians’. These scholar-officials believed that Western success arose from an imitable strategy of military and industrial development. When reproduced in the Chinese context, Western factories and gunships would lead to similar shows of international strength, without displacing China’s existing ways of life or threatening the legitimacy of Manchu rule.

Although seemingly merely instrumental, these early confrontations with the foreign or ‘barbarian’ threat actually advanced comparative inquiry which produced novel forms of self-understanding. Many scholar-officials originally postulated somewhat anachronistic caricatures of the Chinese tradition as counterweights to—or ready-made hooks for—selective Western ideas seen to be integral to Western economic and political success. Zhang Zhidong is a significant and influential case in point. Zhang is known somewhat inaccurately as the originator of the slogan which many used to summarize Chinese attitudes to Western thought during this period: ‘Chinese learning for substance (*ti*), Western learning for use (*yong*)’. In his tract *Exhortation to Learning*, Zhang arguably does not defend Chinese ‘substance’ so much as call it into being, identifying it with a list of key values he claims have characterized the Chinese essence throughout its civilized past. He goes on to compare these values to a series of Western ones that sometimes complement, and sometimes conflict, with Chinese moral and political systems (Zhang 2002).

Zhang’s dichotomy soothed widely shared conservative anxieties by claiming that Chinese values were not only superior to Western ones, they were also metaphysically more powerful than the technical knowledge China so desperately wished to acquire. At the same time, however, the essence/function dichotomy enabled Zhang and his colleagues to advance what for the time was quite radical reform in long-established educational and political priorities. The civil exam system that formed the doorway to government service for all educated males, and which historically exclusively tested examiners’ mastery of

the Confucian classics, was now widened to include a greater variety of disciplines related to science and technology. The inclusion of these new forms of knowledge had the effect of no less than fundamentally transforming what political life meant under the Empire. The exam contents typically shored up a patriarchal ideology in which literati, in their roles as bureaucrats, helped the Emperor care for the masses as a father to his children—an arrangement thought to secure social order through the mirroring of a normative, cosmological hierarchy. With math and science recognized as critical components of political administration, however, the traditional Confucian idea of politics as a purely ethical exercise gradually weakened. These developments in response to the Western threat dovetailed with existing indigenous ideologies of ‘statecraft’ (*jingshi*) and ‘practical studies’ (*shixue*), which sought to enhance the efficacy of government bureaucrats by training them in practical rather than purely literary or ethical knowledge.

Later, radical thinkers at court associated with the ‘Foreign Affairs School’ that emerged in the 1860s went so far as to consider hiring foreign teachers to train young literati in the methods of mathematics and science, arguing that such knowledge had its roots in ancient Chinese methods (Zhongguo Shixue hui 1961; Hutters 2005: 23–42). Although seemingly reactionary (and even culturally chauvinist), the ‘China origins for Western knowledge’ thesis actually enabled reformers to counter conservative beliefs in the self-sufficiency of Chinese knowledge. The thesis held strong sway over public opinion until 1895, when China unexpectedly lost a territorial dispute and war with its erstwhile tribute state Japan. At that time, scholar-officials began to contemplate the need for more thorough reform if Chinese political organization were to survive.

1895 TO THE 1911 REVOLUTION

Pioneering the radical political ideologies that emerged in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries were a loosely associated group of reformers both inside and outside the Qing court. Gaining the ear of the young Guangxu Emperor, young reformers associated with the utopian and iconoclastic thinker Kang Youwei inaugurated the ‘100 Days Reform’ to modernize the monarchy through the introduction of parliamentary government (Kwong 1984). These reformers interpreted the Western ideal of ‘democracy’ not as a form of direct mass participation in political decision-making, but as a device for enhancing communication ‘between above and below’ and for concentrating otherwise dispersed local energies on central state-building in the pursuit of

national 'wealth and power'. Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong, and others combined this democratic understanding with an existing ideology of 'fengjian', or local self-rule, to argue for the inclusion of greater numbers of local gentry elites in the day-to-day administration of the Empire (Liang 1994: Tan 1984).

Although overtly connected to concrete political reforms, these young radicals recognized that their agenda threatened not simply the institutions, but also the historical grounding, of existing Chinese political practice. Like the self-strengtheners of a generation ago, these radicals turned to the past to legitimate transformation of the present. Liang invokes the venerated ancient sages as precedents for changing with the times:

I have heard that a sage considers the times and then acts. If the sages of old were born today, I know that the acuteness of their changes to the laws would exceed even that of Peter the Great, Wilhelm I, or [the Meiji emperor] Matsuhito. So bear in mind: when imitating the laws of the first kings, you should imitate their meaning. But today we are slavishly following the first kings' laws, and completely opposing their meaning. How can this be considered to be following the first kings well? (Liang 1994: 5)

Such ideological work was significantly aided by an emerging popular press centred on treaty ports such as Shanghai, where European political ideologies such as social Darwinism, liberalism, and democracy flowed into China through Chinese or Japanese translations and were subsequently assimilated into ongoing Chinese debate. Earlier 'comprador intellectuals', such as Wang Tao, had emerged from the hybrid world of the treaty port to urge the centrality of foreign learning, particularly the study of European languages, Christianity, and science, to China's political health. As the century progressed, with more scholars trained outside the traditional Confucian exam curriculum, new ideas about the very purpose of politics emerged. The influential translator Yan Fu, himself a product of the British naval academy in Tianjin, argued that the way of life presented by the Western nations was an inevitable world trend. To avoid being crushed, China must somehow find a way to imbue in its people the spirit of freedom so as to strengthen their capacities to flourish economically and politically (Yan 1986a). Although sometimes called China's first liberal, Yan's idea of freedom drew from the Spencerian Darwinism his own translations helped to promote. Like other thinkers writing around the same time, including Liang, Yan's ideology did not focus on the establishment of constitutionally protected rights or the practice of unconstrained liberty per se, so much as the self-cultivation of aggressive, Faustian energy to develop the Chinese masses into modern citizens of an internationally competitive nation-state (Yan 1986b). As these progressive ideas of social evolution and nation-building filtered into popular consciousness

at the start of the twentieth century, Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing, and other revolutionaries outside the court urged the overthrow of the Manchu rulers of the Qing. The Manchus were widely held to be the cause of China's international humiliation in the face of Japan's spectacular success at modernization. Qing rule came to symbolize the corrupt practices of China's backward past, such as bureaucratization, opium-smoking, and foot-binding. Sun's alternative, 'The Three Principles of the People'—comprising support for the people's power, livelihood, and nationality—came to be one of the most influential statements of the social-democratic ideology underlying support for the Revolution of 1911 (Sun 1927). Although meant to modernize China, the Three Principles incorporated a long-standing if ambivalent Confucian ideal of 'the people as root' (*minben*), where the people were inscribed as the responsibility—rather than the sovereigns—of the government. After the failure of the Republic, including the 1915 attempt by its Provisional President Yuan Shikai to install himself as Emperor, Sun emphasized the need for an indefinite period of political tutelage under the leadership of his Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) before transitioning to constitutional republican rule. The Three Principles would later inform KMT rule in the Republic of China on Taiwan after 1949, where leaders advanced industrialization and progressive social welfare policies under martial law before fully democratizing.

These ideologies of constitutional republicanism and democracy were interpreted for the Chinese context by groups of elites who moved easily and frequently between China and abroad, as well as between politics and academia. The most prominent of these was Liang Qichao, mentioned already, whose serial publication *On the New People* (1902–03) linked successful democratic nation-building to a moral-psychological regeneration of citizen consciousness. To Liang, Sun, and many of their colleagues, the Chinese people were not the natural communitarians that late-twentieth-century 'Asian Values' discourse would assume. Rather, they were atomized and apolitical individuals who comprised, in Sun's famous words, a 'sheet of loose sand', who were at present incapable of the collective and public-oriented activities of modern nation-building. Although Liang attributed these attitudes to a Confucian world-view, the solutions he offers in *On the New People* actually turn on a longstanding Confucian belief in the connection between individual practices of self-cultivation and the larger political system (Liang 1936). These beliefs led Liang to oppose the focus on political institution-building that had characterized the ideological support for the 1911 Revolution, and to urge instead closer attention to what he called 'the work of society'—in some ways foreshadowing the

Communist emphasis on ideological rectification in the 1950s and 1960s. Only once social and individual attitudes had been recalibrated to a modern, democratic register, Liang argued, would political institutions enjoy any efficacy or meaning (Liang 1915).

On an institutional level, Zhang Shizhao, considered to be one of the more knowledgeable participants in debates before and after the 1911 Revolution, urged China's nascent democracy to follow a British parliamentary model rather than an American presidential one. Recognizing the need for a vibrant public sphere that could support a diversity of opinions, Zhang advocated attitudinal changes that not only respected but cultivated dissent and idiosyncrasy in everyday life (Zhang 2000). Like many of his contemporaries, however, Zhang confronted the paradoxical dilemma of how to found a democratic regime—and cultivate democratic sensibilities—where democracy did not currently exist (Jenco 2010). He and his colleagues (including Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, both of whom were later to help found the Chinese Communist Party) advanced careful research about the specific kinds of institutional measures that could ensure China's republican future, introducing or further elaborating to the Chinese reading public concepts such as habeas corpus, enumerated rights, and opposition parties. However, later radicals would agree with Liang Qichao that the right solutions were necessarily cultural. In their view, 'saving the nation' (*jiu guo*) had more to do with literature, civilizational dispositions, and capacities for self-expression than particular kinds of political institutions or practices.

THE MAY FOURTH ERA: RADICALS AND MODERATES

This renewed emphasis on cultural construction came about soon after the revolution of 1911. The weakness of the nominally democratic regime founded by the revolution was underscored for many by the humiliating dismissal of Chinese demands during negotiations over the Versailles Treaty ending the First World War. These disappointments provoked young intellectuals to initiate a jarring process of self-reflection, leading them eventually to insist that the success of democracy and liberalism in China demanded thoroughgoing cultural transformation. The ideologies put forward under the rubric of this 'May Fourth Movement' (considered to last from approximately 1919 to 1925; Chow 1960) would turn out to influence significantly all future debate by China's intellectuals about their self-identity—particularly their relationship to the perceived Chinese past, to the West believed to herald the future, and to the

Chinese masses whose poverty and illiteracy undermined the realization of a truly democratic polity.

May Fourth political goals were promoted widely by publicists such as Chen Duxiu through journals such as the revealingly named *New Youth*, as well as by academics who around this time began building modern, European- and American-style universities in China. Generally, May Fourth radicals invoked the ideal of Enlightenment reason to promote the emancipation of individuals from 'traditional' constraints. In the Chinese case, these constraints were embodied in institutions such as rituals of filial piety and mourning, traditional Chinese medicine, ancestor worship, and arranged marriage. Radicals like Chen looked to Western countries such as France and the United States for new models of social order, and chose to promote the freedom of emotion as well as of expression, the extension of scientific experimentation into increasingly greater realms of life including politics, and voluntary marriages based on gender equality (Chen 1915). As these goals indicate, their approach to reform extended beyond promotion of a single political platform. May Fourth radicals set out to modernize or eliminate all of what they perceived to be China's traditional ways, from its 'feudal' folk religious practices all the way to its elite modes of knowledge-production. As Chen explains, using provocative and galvanizing rhetoric, the extremity of such reform was unavoidable:

If you want to endorse Mr. Democracy, you cannot but oppose Confucian religion, the system of rites, chastity, old ethics, and old government. If you want to endorse Mr. Science, you cannot but oppose old art and old religion. If you want to endorse Mr. Democracy, you cannot but endorse Mr. Science, and you cannot but oppose national essence and the old culture (Chen 1919: 317).

May Fourth radicals therefore gained a reputation for being aggressively anti-Confucian Westernizers, seeking the destruction of what they called 'the Confucian shop' and telling young people 'don't read old books'. This depiction of May Fourth intellectuals as progressive saviours of feudal China was developed and perpetuated by their own acts of history writing, which self-consciously adopted the linear teleology of Western modernity to inscribe their political activities as necessary steps for awakening China. Their rhetoric was so powerful that it would influence all subsequent characterizations of twentieth-century Chinese history, generating a particularly distorted picture of imperial Confucianism as communalistic, feudal, and anti-scientific. To their credit, however, young May Fourth radicals were instrumental in confronting the illiteracy and poverty of China's largely agricultural masses, recognizing the need for universal education if a Western-style democratic model were to succeed (Schwarcz 1986). Just as integral to their modernization schema,

radicals also agitated for the vernacularization of Chinese literary prose (*wenyan*), whose abstruse style was believed to prevent widespread literacy and to enforce an elitist, narrow view of arts and literature. Although seemingly unrelated to politics, literary fluency was traditionally seen as an embodiment of moral capacity and therefore of fitness for political administration. The popularization, modernization, and expansion of literature therefore played a major role in May Fourth political ideology by countering Confucian political ideals on their own ground. Hu Shi and others argued that Chinese culture extended beyond the *belles lettres* of scholar-officials, to include the popular novels, dramas, and operas that circulated in oral form in a variety of dialects. Hu, in particular, urged vernacularization as a necessary (and indeed, inevitable) step for modernity and nation-building. Following in the footsteps of countries like France and Germany, China too could unify its language to produce a distinctive national history. Hu insisted, however, that May Fourth efforts are not 'slavish worship of the Western civilization', but 'the rebirth of an old civilization under the influence of a new impulse and a new attitude which direct contact with the ideas and methods of the modern world has produced' (Hu 2003: 681).

The May Fourth movement as a whole cannot be encapsulated as a project of radical Westernization or modernization, however. Increasingly cognizant of the elisions of twentieth-century Chinese historiography, most of it written by May Fourth radicals themselves or their students, contemporary scholars have begun to mine this era for alternative visions of human progress. Many of these scholars are Chinese who, reacting to the failures of modernization in their own time (see 'Reform and Opening Up'), searched for ways in which both Western and Chinese experience could be hybridized to produce a more peaceful and just global order. Shortly after the end of the First World War, moderate thinkers such as Du Yaquan (editor of the widely influential and nonpartisan journal *Eastern Miscellany*) advanced just such a position when he suggested that a future world culture would emerge out of the blending of Chinese and European ethics. Noting the crisis of faith in progress and science in Europe after the war, Du echoes contemporary thinkers such as Rabindranath Tagore when he urges both Europeans and fellow Chinese to learn 'spiritual' lessons from traditional Confucianism while pursuing a chastened understanding of scientific progress (Du 1916). Although Du's own categories were essentialist, and tended (as his critic Chen Duxiu frequently pointed out) to romanticize a traditional life that was in actuality marked by deep social inequality, he and his journal opened a space for others to dissent from May Fourth radical orthodoxy.

CONSERVATIVES AND THE 'THIRD FORCE' OF THE 1930s AND 1940s

Moderate and conservative opinion throughout the 1920s and 1930s took diverse forms, much of it interrogating the scientism that was both factor and goal for May Fourth radicalism. The still-influential Liang Qichao, after a year-long visit to war-torn Europe, found renewed faith in the Chinese culture that he had earlier compared so unfavourably to Western versions of science and progress. Liang's conservative turn matched that of Yan Fu, who like Liang had stridently urged radical reform along Western lines during the late nineteenth century. These crises of confidence resonated with the view of emerging cultural conservatives such as Liang Shuming, a former Buddhist who gained fame for advocating a revival of Confucianism. Liang Shuming's *Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies* (1921) identified Confucianism (or 'Chinese culture') as the final of three necessary 'stages' of progress, which alone could avoid the extremes of the first two: the Indian, which he deemed importantly spiritual, but lacking appropriate emphasis on material concerns and tending to unwisely negate inevitable human desires; and the Western, whose material progress he found to be of significant but overemphasized importance, and ultimately inadequate in formulating a satisfying spiritual life. The result was a critical embrace of Confucian philosophy, which embodied the 'harmonization' that Liang deemed to be Chinese culture's constitutive feature. This question of 'culture' also informed Liang's emphasis on 'rural reconstruction', one of the first programmes to address forthrightly the economic and political situation of rural villages. He suggested a village-organized community compact, like that advanced by Confucian thinkers in the Tang and Song dynasties, to invigorate the politically inert and economically impoverished rural communities whose problems rarely featured in the (largely elite and urban) political ideologies of the early twentieth century (Alitto 1986). Like May Fourth radicals, he too insisted that such a transformation of villages from passive receivers to active makers of political policy necessarily turned on bottom-up cultural renewal (guided, of course, by the benevolent influence of self-appointed intellectual elites), rather than the top-down establishment of political institutions.

This conservative mood contributed to an ongoing critique, launched by Zhang Junmai in the 1930s, of the exclusive status granted by his Chinese contemporaries to science as a solution to all human problems. Drawing on the philosophies of Eucken and Bergson, as well as of the neo-Confucians Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, Zhang emphasized the need for a spiritual, intuitive basis

for the state. Zhang would go on to found the State Socialist Party in 1932, whose moral emphasis on restraining individual acquisitiveness mirrored that of traditional Confucianism. The SSP's platform did not embrace Marxism or class struggle. Instead, Zhang and his fellow party-members sought solutions to China's underdevelopment by appealing to economic democratization (Fung 2010: 199–210). These socialists promoted democracy as a state-building device, echoing views from the 1890s that sought to strengthen rather than weaken centralized authority through mechanisms of popular participation. Like Liang Shuming and Du Yaquan, Zhang expressed a common sentiment that China could become the site of a great potential synthesis of world culture, which could harmonize capitalism and socialism, democracy and dictatorship, freedom and authority. Zhang became political as well as ideological partners with Liang in the 1940s, when the two founded the Chinese Democratic League as a democratic 'Third Force' opposing both of the two dominant warring factions, the Nationalists (now under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek) and the Communists. The League promoted a range of progressive policies, including universal suffrage and social welfare programmes, but the Communist victory over the Nationalists in 1949 ended these multi-party conversations and installed the CCP's interpretation of Marxist-Leninist thought as dogma.

CHINESE COMMUNISM

Ideologically communism was greatly indebted to May Fourth radicalism, though its sociological roots could be traced to early twentieth-century anarchist cells. Its leaders (particularly Mao Zedong) were to dominate Chinese political ideology on the mainland for much of the latter half of the twentieth century, suppressing the vibrant political debate that characterized prior eras of Chinese ideology. In its early stages, the aims of communism flowed together with the May Fourth movement's broader emphasis on equality and social justice. Early interpreters of Bolshevism, such as Li Dazhao, adopted the socialist elements of Marxism; yet he continued to insist, contrary to the doctrine of historical materialism, on the voluntaristic capacities of individuals to shape their own histories (Li 1924, 1984 [1918]). Although Li's contribution to Chinese communist ideology was later underplayed by Maoist historiography, he nevertheless played an important role in early Communism (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 1995). Like later Chinese Marxists, including Mao, Li rejected Marx's characterization of China as an 'Asiatic' society differentiated from the typical Western stream of historical development. Recognizing China as 'semi-colonial', Li and other early communists identified China's struggle as both an

international and domestic one: in order to extricate China from the global systems of oppression that had constrained and humiliated it for nearly a century, the Chinese must immediately work to build a strong nation internally. They did not need to await total cultural or political transformation before beginning to solve China's problems (Li 1919; Meisner 1967).

The plea for immediate political action deeply influenced Li's protégé, Mao Zedong, who would go on to 'Sinicize' Marxism by centring it on the economic plight of rural peasants rather than waiting for the development of a self-aware urban proletariat. His thought became the definitive philosophy of the CCP during the Rectification Campaigns of 1942–44, ensuring its dominance over the political ideology for much of the later twentieth century. In a series of speeches and reports issued throughout the 1930s and 1940s, after the Communists' first 'united front' with Chiang's Nationalists had ended in the brutal Nationalist massacre of urban CCP cadres, Mao put forward a Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism that urged immediate land reform throughout the countryside. Mao also promoted a version of what he called 'New Democracy', which echoed May Fourth radicalism in its call to create a new culture in China better in tune with wider global trends. Mao cast the Chinese past since the Opium Wars within the history of imperialist aggression, and demanded a revolutionary New Democracy to advance the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes rather than the private interests of some elected few (Mao 1940).

In his early essay 'On Practice' (Mao 1937), Mao invoked Marxist dialectics to argue that communist theory must evolve from and be informed by practice that is tightly linked to the challenges of the rural masses, under the leadership of the Party. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, these ambitious goals were accomplished through careful maintenance of party supremacy, which oversaw the increasingly massive network of local party cells and national organizations, and the use of mass campaigns to rally national support for attacks on common enemies. These tools were famously marshalled to effect what Mao called 'continuous revolution', designed to counter the complacency and increasing bureaucratization of the CCP after 1949. In his essay 'On the Resolution of Contradictions Among the People' (Mao 1957), Mao originally offered a less radical strategy to restore a critically engaged Communism (Cheek 2002: 23–4, 127–9). In a move to be replicated later by Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents' (see the next section), and strongly reminiscent of early twentieth-century state-building ideology, Mao recognized the importance to national strength of a range of classes heretofore excluded from (or even aggressively criticized by) Communist ideology. His 'Contradictions' originally opened the

Party to reflective criticism by classifying China's intellectual and technical elite as non-antagonistic, internal critics, distinguished from the antagonistic, external (i.e. foreign) enemies of the people. He encouraged China's long-derided intellectuals to speak up and contribute to nation-building by pointing out tactical errors in Communist leadership.

The sharp criticism of one-party rule that flowed from this invitation led not to constructive engagement by the CCP, but to its brutal crackdown against 'rightists'. After these violent reactions to criticism, few within or outside the Party remained willing or able to comment on Mao's economic and political policies. Eventually Mao placed the mantle of continuous revolution on China's youth, culminating in the collective violence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–76. Once again, culture—here understood as the domain of literature and elite learning—was perceived as the most obvious lever of political reformation. Mao believed the youths' aggressive, and often physically brutal, critiques of 'feudal' thinking represented by their elders, teachers, and intellectuals in general were the key to China's ongoing socialist development. Chanting Maoist epigrams from 'The Little Red Book', young Red Guards throughout the country elevated Maoism into near-religious dogma. Their religious devotion to Mao would inaugurate patterns of popular worship that would continue even after Mao's death. These deifications combine political ideology with religious sentiment in a way that many see as replicating, ironically, the traditional folk religious practices of socialist ideology condemned as superstitious (Barme 1996).

Until his death in 1976, Mao was the dominant, but not the only, voice in Communist China. A series of critics both before and after the establishment of the republic advanced a series of views, formulating ideologies often indebted to the May Fourth idealism from which Communism sprang. At the communist base camp in Yan'an in the 1930s, thinkers such as Ding Ling and Wang Shiwei assumed their role as artists to advance public critique, raising the question of who was authorized to articulate the true interests of the masses. Both drew attention to the elisions of communist practice and the failure of Maoist interpretations to live up to the promise of Communism's ambitious egalitarianism. Ding famously critiqued the treatment of women cadres, whose revolutionary activities turned out to intensify rather than eliminate the traditional pressures to marry and have children (Ding 1989). Wang suggested a broader base for Communist theory, drawing from plural international experience to build an alternative socialism that relies on artists to provide critical purchase on the system's abuses (Dai 1994). Meanwhile, Liang Shuming

and Zhang Shizhao—both, like Mao, from Hunan province, and protected somewhat on the basis of their pre-1949 relationships with the Chairman—personally and trenchantly critiqued Mao’s relentless suppression of dissent.

Even within CCP leadership, Liu Shaoqi offered a vision of communist virtue that drew explicitly on neo-Confucian models of self-cultivation to advance party loyalty and morale (Liu 1952 [1939]). His management of the Chinese economy after the disastrous Great Leap Forward, inaugurated by Mao as an attempt to carry China’s socialist industrial development forward to more quickly realize communism, restored some measure of stability to peasant agricultural production. He opposed Maoist policy by returning collectivized land to peasants and instituting economic incentives. Criticized by Mao and the CCP in 1968 for being a ‘capitalist roader’, Liu’s status in the Party would later be rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping—whose own economic development policies in the 1980s and 1990s required the telling of a new, less revolutionary version of Chinese history.

REFORM AND OPENING-UP

Despite the relative lack of open debate on the Chinese mainland under Communist rule, Sinophone ideology continued to develop in diverse ways elsewhere, as large numbers of political and intellectual leaders fled abroad after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949. These exiles remained for the most part politically impotent, yet nevertheless continued to reflect upon the future of ‘China’—a now deterritorialized cultural imaginary, seen as capable of sustaining both traditional (i.e. Confucian) as well as alternative modern (i.e. liberal-democratic) political ideologies even in the face of the Communist victory. Most prominent among these ideologies-in-exile was New Confucianism, promoted by a diverse group of academics and political thinkers as a means of combining the best aspects of traditional Chinese morality with modern Western science and technology. Echoing the essence/function paradigm of the Self-strengthening movement a century before, New Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan—including the historian Xu Fuguan, the metaphysician Mou Zongsan, and the philosopher Carsun Chang—defended a vision of modernity in which ‘Chinese’ values of cosmological holism and benevolence complemented the scientific pursuit of knowledge and democracy (Mou et al. 1958).

Tracing its heritage back to Liang Shuming’s culturally self-reflexive attempt to generate a place in the world for Chinese philosophy, the New Confucian

movement entailed an ambivalent legacy. Prominent voices in the Sinophone diaspora, such as the Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kwan Yew, and the Harvard academic Tu Wei-ming, defied Max Weber's claims about the 'Protestant ethic' behind capitalist development to declare Confucianism as the cultural foundation of Asia's spectacular economic growth in the 1980s. When later taken up by nationalists in mainland China in the late 1980s and 1990s, New Confucianism sometimes degenerated into a device of cultural chauvinism. Yet at the same time, some of its practitioners—including most famously Mou—promoted a range of complex, culturally self-reflective, and philosophically innovative insights that remain seminal for modern Chinese political thought and comparative philosophy. For example, despite the invocation of Confucianism by certain political leaders to justify their authoritarian regimes, New Confucian ideology recognizes democracy as solving a longstanding Confucian dilemma between the 'inner sage' and the 'outer king': democracy could ensure that everyone enjoys opportunities for participation in the external world-ordering held to be integral to the successful internal practice of self-cultivation. Although never a dominant voice in Sinophone politics, Confucian democracy continues to inform debates in the public spheres of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere.

On the mainland, the series of disastrous political and economic policies promoted by the CCP under Mao had culminated, by the late 1970s, in the death or psychological victimization of tens of millions of Chinese. Recognizing the inability of such policies to help China achieve the 'wealth and power' it had sought since the Qing dynasty, Premier Zhou Enlai identified industrial development—specifically, the 'Four Modernizations' of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defence—and not Maoist class struggle as the true goal of socialism. This new interpretation authorized a dramatic revision in communist political ideology in China. With the death of Mao in 1976, the twice-purged CCP member Deng Xiaoping inaugurated a 'reform and opening up' (*gaige kaifang*) to industrialize China on a more overtly capitalist model, and to restore China's political, economic, and cultural interaction with the rest of the world. The 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' Deng promoted refused to ascribe China's double-digit economic growth to capitalism; rather, Deng argued, China was pursuing its own form of socialism designed to address its unique historical conditions. Like Mao, Deng revised Marxist doctrine to account for China's apparent failure to produce either bourgeois capital development or the proletarian class necessary for true communism to emerge. Deng's socialism with Chinese characteristics was designed to address these problems by attending to the cultivation of productive forces necessary for

improving the people's material and cultural life; at the same time, it could temper the inequalities of Western industrialized society by upholding socialist principles of distribution according to need (Deng 1984).

Although China had been dominated by the ideology of one party for more than three decades, greater demands for democratization emerged in step with the relative international openness and economic freedom promised by Deng's economic policies. For only the second time since 1949, interests outside of the party state claimed space to assert political demands, contributing a still-increasing variety of dissident (or at least critical) ideologies to modern Chinese discourse. Wei Jingsheng and the 'Democracy Wall' protests of 1978 urged democracy as the 'Fifth Modernization', but like their late nineteenth-century predecessors did not interpret democracy as a system of representative institutions. Rather, Wei saw it as a moral device in which tolerance and open expression could strengthen Chinese society and open channels of communication through which the people could chasten their political leaders (Wei 1997).

Like many at the time, Wei believed full economic development was impossible without democratic institutions. China's tremendous economic growth for the next two decades would subvert such predictions. More tragically, the eventual crackdown of democracy protestors at Tiananmen in June 1989 reasserted a longstanding belief of Chinese leaders that market institutions and scientific technology could be adopted independently of the moral and political systems that supported them elsewhere. To restate these beliefs using the categories of an earlier time, the *yong* of Western-style capitalism need not affect the *ti* of Chinese socialist virtue. However, in light of the social unrest produced by economic restructuring the Party eventually came to recognize the importance of its role as a popular representative. Deng's successor, Jiang Zemin, essentially modified the character of the CCP when, to gain cooperation for nation-building and economic development from all sectors of society, his doctrine of the 'Three Represents' declared the CCP to be the true representative of all social classes and interests in China—workers, artists, and even capitalists (Communist Party of China 2003). Hu Jintao would later urge the diverse social interests produced by China's mindblasting growth to create a 'harmonious society' (*hexie shehui*) under Party leadership, as a means of promoting domestic stability through balancing rural and urban concerns, addressing environmental degradation, and strengthening a socialist rule of law regime (Seventeenth National Congress of the PRC 2007).

As reforms progressed in the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese outside the Party

built new bridges (or, in many cases, revived long-derelict connections) to Western social and political ideologies, experimenting with a wide range of Western academic theories from Derrida and Foucault to Rawls and Habermas. These developments were aided by the increasing institutionalization of scholarship and university administration. Disrupted for over a decade during the Cultural Revolution, higher education in China recovered enough in the 1980s to begin producing professionalized academics who took over the ambivalent mantle once occupied by Confucian scholar-officials. No longer welcome to participate directly in governance, and existing sometimes in salient tension with Party policy, academics across the ideological spectrum have largely turned their attention to what China scholar Gloria Davies has called ‘patriotic worrying’ (*you huan*)—that is, ‘worrying about the problems that prevent China from attaining perfection, not only as a nation but also as an enduring civilization’ (Davies 2007: 1).

Central to this patriotic worrying are questions that have recurred throughout China’s experience with modernity since the 1860s. These include not only the familiar questions of how China’s historical experience may have hindered the expansion of intellectual enlightenment, technological development, and modern consciousness, but increasingly also questions about the extent to which China’s heritage may offer a critical alternative to the environmental, social, and cultural costs of the Chinese state’s market development model. It is these questions and the contested responses to them—rather than the often-applied labels of ‘liberalism’ and ‘New Left’—that better describe the complex and evolving political ideologies of China’s contemporary intellectuals.

Responding critically to the first question are thinkers such as Xu Jilin, who have turned to China’s past to recover a May Fourth enlightenment legacy they believe has been lost amid a growing cultural and political statism. To Xu, the May Fourth movement was not a patriotic movement in the sense that it supported unapologetic nationalism, but rather one that looked critically at the relationship between the state and the people. Xu re-interprets the May Fourth Movement and its constructive critics—including, most prominently, heretofore forgotten moderates such as Du Yaquan—to construct a new genealogy of Chinese cosmopolitan sentiment. To Xu, modern Chinese should realize from their own disastrous past that the nation can have value only to the extent that it betters not only its own citizens, but also the entire world (Xu 2009). In contrast, however, Wang Hui and others urging a critical re-engagement with Marxism have argued powerfully that the crises of contemporary society can no longer be attributed to some outmoded Chinese tradition or to the failures of socialism.

This is because many of these problems are produced by the process of modernization itself, and their rectification requires analysis from multiple global contexts, including from the perspective of political economy (Wang 2001: 145, 155). Wang urges Chinese intellectuals to see European modernity as itself an object of critical reflection, in the way Marxism as well as Maoist development theory originally did, rather than an unquestioned goal. The paradoxes of inhabiting a modernizing nation whose Marxist policies nevertheless exist in critical tension with such modernization can offer an opportunity for uncovering new historical meanings and possibilities within now-global processes of modernization (Wang 2002: 133).

A key motivation behind the political and intellectual ideological debates of the 1990s and after is the growing recognition that China has continually defied all predictions made about its future—frustrating attempts to fix its present identity or determine the precise relevance of its past. No longer totally socialist but still not quite capitalist, neither fully democratic nor purely authoritarian, China's future development in whatever direction will no doubt lead to ever more complex and open-ended debate about China's significance—not just to its own people, but to the world of which it now, after nearly two centuries of reform, forms an indelible part.

REFERENCES

I have cited English-language sources where available. Translations of citations taken from Chinese-language sources are my own.

- Alitto, G. 1986. *The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Barme, G. 1996. *Shades of Mao*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Cheek, T. 2002. *Mao Zedong and China's Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents*. New York: Palgrave.
- Chen Duxiu. 1915. 'Fa lan xi ren yu jin shi wenming' (French people and contemporary civilization), *New Youth*, 1 (15 September).
- Chen Duxiu. 1919. 'Xin Qingnian zui an zhi da bian shu' (Letter responding to the accusations against *New Youth*), *New Youth*, 6 (15 January).
- Chow, T. T. 1960. *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Communist Party of China, International Department Central Committee. 2003. *On the Three Represents*. Beijing: Communist Party of China.
- Dai Qing. 1994. *Wang Shiwei and 'Wild Lilies': Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942–1944*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Davies, Gloria. 2007. *Worrying About China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Deng Xiaoping. 1984. 'Building a socialism with a specifically chinese character', accessed at: <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1220.html>> on 5 October 2011.
- Ding Ling. 1989. *I Myself Am a Woman: Selected Writings of Ding Ling*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Du Yaquan. 1916. 'Jing de wenming yu dong de wenming' (Passive Civilization and Active Civilization), *Eastern Miscellany*, 13 (October).
- Fung, S. K. F. 2010. *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hu Shi. 2003. 'The Chinese Renaissance', *Hu Shi Quanji* vol. 35. Anhui: Anhui Jiaoyu chubanshe; originally published 1933.
- Huters, Theodore. 2005. *Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Jenco, L. 2010. *Making the Political: Founding and Action in the Political Theory of Zhang Shizhao*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kwong, L. K. S. 1984. *A Mosaic of the Hundred Days: Personalities, Politics, and Ideas of 1898*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Li Dazhao. 1919. 'Wuzhi Biandong Yu Daode Biandong' (Material Changes and Morality Changes), *Xin Chao*, 2 (2).
- Li Dazhao. 1924. *Shi xue yao lun* (Essentials of Historical Study). Shanghai: Commercial Press.
- Li Dazhao. 1984. 'Xin de! Jiu de! (New! Old!)', *Li Dazhao wenji*, vol. 1: 537–40. Beijing: Renmin; originally published 1918.
- Liang Qichao. 1915. Zhengzhi zhi jichu yu yanlunjia zhi zhizhen (The Foundations of Government, with a Directive for Public Opinion Leaders). *Da Zhonghua Zazhi*, 233–55. Taipei: Wenhua chubanshe (reprint).
- Liang Qichao. 1936. Lun gong de. In *Xinmin shuo* (On the New People), *Yin bing shi zhuan ji*, vol. 162. Shanghai: Zhonghua; originally published 1902–03.
- Liang Qichao. 1994. *Bianfa tongyi* (General Discussion on Reform). *Yinbingshi heji* vol. 1: *Yinbingshe wenji* no. 1. Beijing: Zhonghua; originally published 1896–97.
- Liang Shuming. 1921. *Dong Xi wenhua jiqi zhixue* (Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies). Taipei: Liren.
- Liu Shaoqi. 1952. 'Training of the Communist party member'. Pp. 108–155 in *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942–44*, ed. B. Compton. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Mao Zedong. 1937. 'On practice'. In *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975.
- Mao Zedong. 1940. 'On new democracy'. in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975.
- Mao Zedong. 1957. 'On the correct handling of contradictions among the people'. In *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975.
- Meisner, Maurice J. 1967. *Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mou Zongsan et al. 1958. 'A manifesto for a re-appraisal of sinology and reconstruction of Chinese culture'. Pp. 455–83 in C. Chang, *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*, vol. 2. New York: Bookman.
- Schwarcz, V. 1986. *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Seventeenth National Congress of the PRC. 2007. 'Harmonious society'. *China Daily*, 29 September, accessed at: <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html>> on 15 March 2013.
- Sun Yat-sen. 1927. *The Three Principles of the People, San Min Chu I*. trans. F. W. Price. Taipei: China Publishers.

- Tan Sitong. 1984. *Zhuang Fei Lou zhi shi shi pian* (Ten Essays on Ordering Affairs from the Studio of Soaring Flight). In *Tan Sitong Quanjì* vol. 2. Beijing: Zhonghua; originally published 1898.
- Wang Hui. 2001. 'Contemporary Chinese thought and the question of modernity', trans. R. Karl. Pp. 161–98 in *Whither China?* ed. X. Zhang. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Wang Hui. 2002. 'Alternative globalizations and the question of the modern', trans. T. Hutters. Pp. 116–38 in *China's New Order*, ed. T. Hutters. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wei Jingsheng. 1997. *The Courage to Stand Alone*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, S. 1995. 'What is wrong with Li Dazhao?' Pp. 56–74 in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, eds. T. Saich and H. J. Van de Ven. London: M. E. Sharpe.
- Xu Jilin. 2009. 'Historical memories of May Fourth: Patriotism, but of what kind?', trans. D. Campbell. *China Heritage Quarterly*, 17 (March).
- Yan Fu. 1986a. *Lun shi bian zhi ji* (On the urgency of change in the world). *Yan Fu ji* vol. 1. Beijing: Zhonghua. Originally published 1895.
- Yan Fu. 1986b. *Yuan qiang* (On strength). *Yan Fu ji* vol. 1. Beijing: Zhonghua; originally published 1895.
- Zhang Shizhao. 2000. 'Tiaohe li guo lun' (Accommodation to build a nation). In *Zhang Shizhao Quanjì*, vol. 3. Shanghai: Wenhui; originally published 1914.
- Zhang Zhidong. 2002. *Quan Xue Pian* (Exhortation to Learning). Beijing: Huaxia; originally published 1898.
- Zhongguo Shixue hui (eds.) 1961. *Yangwu yundong* (The Foreign Affairs Movement). vol. 2 of 8 vols. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin.

CHAPTER 35
SOUTH ASIAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN IDEOLOGIES

ROCHANA BAJPAI AND CARLO BONURA

INTRODUCTION

As in any expansive geographical region, ideological composition in South and Southeast Asia is highly diverse and complex. The regions themselves are recently created categories left in the aftermath of the colonial geopolitics of the Second World War. As such, they can be understood as ideological articulations continually changing in their relevance to national politics, international geopolitics, and the regional organization of power. Although a ‘survey’ of ideology in South and Southeast Asia is challenged by the prospect of accounting for detailed nuances in ideology across such a large political and historical expanse, a number of common dynamics shaped the conceptual forms and political trajectories of ideologies across the regions.

Foremost among these dynamics, European colonialism, (including British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and American colonial projects) affected nearly all of South and Southeast Asia. In addition to the global expansion of networks of capital, colonial rule depended upon numerous interventions by colonial administrations into the management of education, race, family and sexual relations, religious practice, and law. In its final stages, ‘high’ or ‘liberal’ colonialism resulted in a complex ideological field, including the formation of nationalist and communist movements, and critiques of majoritarian nationalism. The shock of the Second World War and the success of a wide variety of anti-colonial struggles resulted in a heterogeneous period of decolonization and the constitution of postcolonial polities. Newly independent nations exhibited a complex political nexus that framed the ideological contours of postcolonial politics, encompassing neo-imperialism; nation-building within contexts of immense linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity; weak authority of central administrations; and strong movements of resistance to newly formed nations. Out of this conjuncture emerged an intense ideological diversity that informed nationalist and postcolonial struggles as well as the cultivation of new political sensibilities and subjectivities more broadly. The varied ideological articulations and contestations of decolonization were also shaped by geopolitical context. The Cold War constrained ideological horizons, but also led to novel

transnational collaborations, such as commitments to non-alignment articulated by Jawaharlal Nehru and Sukarno at the Bandung Conference in 1955. The architecture of global economic unevenness that emerged under colonialism also continues to shape ideological formations in South and Southeast Asia, reflected in the integration of South and Southeast Asian markets, labour forces, and cultures of consumption into global flows of capital.

In this chapter we examine how transnational currents of political thought and national ideological formations are intertwined. We show how a regional perspective can attain a universal scope, engaging both in a conceptual morphology (Freedden 1996) and a comparison of ideology in different political contexts. Toward this end, the chapter is divided into five ideological categories of relevance to comparative research: liberalism; communism; nationalism; religious ideologies; and ideologies of race, indigeneity and caste. Our chapter is not intended to be exhaustive but rather to be diagnostic of the broad contours of the principal ideological fields across South and Southeast Asia, thereby serving as a basis for further comparative inquiry into the complex composition of ideology beyond conventional Eurocentric perspectives.

LIBERALISM AND ITS LIMITS

The historical trajectory of liberalism in South and Southeast Asia spans from colonial rule, through the politics of independence and decolonization, to contemporary forms of rights activism. Often subsumed within colonial, nationalist, and socialist frames, liberal ideologies in South and Southeast Asia have been more influential and innovative than is commonly believed, expressing distinctive visions of political modernity that have informed state-building as well as anti-state movements for civil and political rights.

South Asian and Southeast Asian liberalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries emerged in response to colonial liberalisms. Colonial policies in areas such as land revenue, criminal law, education, and representation were shaped to an extent by the growing influence of liberal ideas in Europe (Stokes 1959; Metcalf 1994), although these were also constrained by authoritarian and conservative strands of imperialism and infused by notions of racial superiority. Colonial liberalisms instituted notions of constraint on executive power and the rule of law, equality before the law, and, most influentially, mass education, with laws and policies serving as important bearers of liberal ideologies. In India, for instance, land revenue policies such as Cornwallis's Permanent Settlement (1793) embodied Whig ideas of the limitation of the discretionary powers of the

executive through the rule of law and the benefits of rights to private property in land, whereas Macaulay's design for a common criminal law for all of India bore the clear imprint of Benthamite strictures in favour of a rational and uniform system of law (Stokes 1959). The most influential liberal reform, which affected native colonial elites across the two regions, was in the realm of education, where the introduction of European languages as the medium of instruction and a liberal arts based curriculum taught by anti-colonial liberals who served as instructors spurred the formation of a European educated elite who began to fashion a political distance both from local society and colonial rule.

The key tension that has shaped liberalisms in South Asia has been how to pursue social and political reform, while resisting Western power. This has produced ideological elaboration along two main dimensions: critiques of illiberal aspects of colonial rule and retrieval of liberal features of local traditions and practices. For instance, Raja Rammohan Roy (1772–1833), regarded as the father of liberalism in India, pressed for liberal reform of British rule in India, arguing passionately against its restrictions on press freedom and for greater legislative checks on the executive power of the East India company, through the representation of Indians and other colonials in the Westminster Parliament (Bayly 2012). At the same time, however, Rammohan also sought to enlist the colonial state for his campaigns against oppressive Hindu practices such as widow burning, rituals of purity and pollution, and the monopoly of the priestly class over education. Furthermore, while campaigning against contemporary Hindu practices, he also sought to ground liberal projects such as a mixed constitution with a separation of powers in an ancient, lost Hindu tradition, arguing that liberal institutions had, contrary to British misrepresentations, substantial Indian precedents (Bayly 2012) in ancient judicial institutions such as the *Panchayat*, as well as more recent Mughal India's *akhbarat* and *akhbar navis* (news writers).

Indian liberalisms have been characterized by a strong belief in state intervention for achieving liberal ends (Bajpai 2012). Jurist and social reformer Justice M. G. Ranade (1842–1901) criticized prevalent doctrines of laissez-faire, arguing for state supported capitalist industrialization in India along the lines of European countries as the state was now 'more and more recognized as the National Organ for taking care of National needs in all matters in which individual and cooperative efforts are not likely to be so effective and economic'. He also pressed for state action on behalf of the poor on paternalist liberal grounds: the fixing of rents, tenures, and rates of interest for tenants were all 'legitimate forms of protection', necessary to 'check the abuse of

Competition' (Ranade 1906: 21, 31; Vora 1986). Like other Hindu social reformers, Ranade criticized contemporary Hindu practices oppressive of women and the lower castes but sought to reform these practices in part by invoking a more liberal Hindu past of Vedic and Bhakti traditions. While radical low caste thinkers such as Mahatma Jyotirao Phule (1827–90) and Dr B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956) saw the Hindu past as culminating in the enslavement of lower castes and its religious fundamentals as beyond redemption, like Rammohan and Ranade, they also argued for greater state intervention in support of liberal ends. For Ambedkar, the protection of oppressed minorities required constitutional safeguards in the form of quotas for Untouchables. He criticized the British for their narrow understanding of the contextual requirements of liberal principles, and argued, adapting constitutional liberalism, that quotas were essentially checks similar to fundamental rights and a separation of powers found in liberal constitutions, necessary to save Untouchables from domination by upper castes (Ambedkar 1991: 232, 173). The Indian Constitution of 1950, a legatee of all three liberalisms—colonial, elite, and radical—reposed faith in state action for achieving social reform and instituted quotas for disadvantaged groups, and in this sense went further than existing institutional liberalisms of the time (Panikkar 1962).

The trajectories of liberal ideas in South and Southeast Asia attest to the uneasy relationship of liberalism and democracy. On the one hand, nationalist liberals across South Asia were largely drawn from elite strata of society and saw themselves as the spokesmen of the poor, illiterate masses. In India, nationalist liberals such as Rammohan and Ranade were sceptical about the capacity of democratic institutions to produce liberal outcomes. On the other hand, minority nationalisms in South Asia have consistently invoked liberal principles against majoritarian democracy. Muslim liberals in twentieth-century India, for instance, worried about the numerical weakness of minorities in a democratic framework, and sought mechanisms such as separate electorates and the minority veto to limit the scope of majority opinion in colonial legislatures. Tamil liberals in Sri Lanka unsuccessfully sought minority safeguards against Sinhala dominance during the transition from colonial rule. More generally, minorities in South Asia have often invoked liberal values of non-discrimination, equal citizenship, and equality of opportunity to counter the claims of majoritarian nationalisms.

Advocacy for visions of liberal politics in Southeast Asia predominantly takes place in the form of metropolitan activism. Liberal civil society activism, which appears across both regions, is a contingent form of politics, typically

facing political fields dominated by states and markets seeking to mute liberal criticism. Although often politically marginal, liberal activism has informed influential discourses in South and Southeast Asia on human rights, civil rights, freedom of speech and censorship, state violence, the plight of the rural and urban poor, immigration and human trafficking, corruption, and environmentalism. Part of the limited nature of such activism in many countries relates to the usually small core network of individuals responsible for a large amount of organizational and intellectual energy. Liberal activists are often viewed as an urban, middle-class minority. Metropolitan activism is often based on an NGO structure in which small organizations with access to international funding and support can acquire a relatively high national profile, resulting in a transnational ideological current of liberal activist communication and global funding (Weiss and Hassan 2004). At times the political space opened by 'liberal activism' may actually represent an amalgamation of potentially more radical ideological positions critical of autocratic rule, racial or religious chauvinism, and economic injustice (Hassan 2005). In states with particularly limited opportunities for 'public' activism, small metropolitan organizations with a liberal political agenda may actually provide a form of political 'shelter' for other ideological positions that would be impossible to advance independently (Hewison 1999). In Southeast Asia, the suppression of 'leftist politics' in the complex context of the instability of decolonization and the regional militarism of the Cold War resulted in drastic constraints for the political possibilities for civil society (Hedman 2001). Anti-communist ideological sentiment, Cold War interventions and national conflicts over communism resulted in the bolstering of authoritarian forces and the suppression not only of communist activity, but also other liberals and nationalists associated with communism (Hewison 1999).

Popular mobilizations that articulate demands for reform in liberal terms do not always result in political outcomes supportive of liberal ideals, as the contrasting outcomes of massive anti-government protests in Southeast Asia since the 1990s illustrate. A wide variety of ideological and political landscapes appear when considering protests such as the People's Power movement in the Philippines, the 1992 anti-coup protests in Thailand and the competing public mobilizations in Thailand from 2004 onwards (Kitirianglarp and Hewison 2009), and post-financial crisis mobilizations (especially in the *reformasi* movements in Indonesia and Malaysia, Weiss 2006). Protests on this scale take place within established political, economic, and ideological contexts that constrain inevitable outcomes, including the 'legacies' of previous protest movements and 'collective memories' (Hedman 2001: 923–4). Even though there always remains the

possibility for new ideological positions to emerge from such events (whether liberal or more radical positions), those ideological conceptualizations that have emerged have often times been contradictory or fleeting in nature.

TRAJECTORIES OF COMMUNISM

Nearly every country in South and Southeast Asia has had some form of communist politics. Across the regions communism took multiple forms: revolutionary and then statist forms in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (in the form of the Maoist Khmer Rouge); anti-colonial mobilization and an embattled postcolonial political experience in Indonesia, and insurgencies in Nepal, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Communist parties in Southeast Asia were established in the 1920s and early 1930s. Among the largest communist parties in Southeast Asia were the Indonesia Communist Party, the Indochina Communist Party, and Malayan Communist Party, established in 1921, 1930, and 1930 respectively.

Communist movements in South and Southeast Asia faced three main challenges: the need to organize along class lines in the absence of a sizeable industrial proletariat; the demands of anti-colonial struggles that required alliances with political elements of the local capitalist class, and the need to respond to new communist politics and ideological thought occurring internationally in other parts of Asia as well as in the Soviet Union and Europe. Regional communist organizing was supported by a network of Comintern activists and reflected a complicated relationship between European communists and communist movements in Asia (McVey 1965). This relationship often revealed disagreements over whether to prioritize ideological orthodoxy over practical political strategy. Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in the efforts by Vietnamese communist leader (and founding member of the French communist party) Ho Chi Minh and the Indonesia communist Tan Malaka to pose theoretical questions regarding the specific conditions faced by communists in Asia, namely the marginal position of colonial nations in European communist thought for Ho Chi Minh and the inappropriate nature of theories of economic development for predominantly agricultural colonial societies in Tan Malaka's critique (Christie 2001: 38–40). Effectively what Ho Chi Minh and Tan Malaka considered was not simply the unevenness of capitalist development but the linear developmentalism at the basis of post-Leninist, Soviet Communist understandings of how communism would and should develop in the colonial world. Contrary to this single trajectory for communist development, Ho and Tan

emphasized the differentiated nature of capitalism under colonialism and the necessity of conceptualizing paths of historical development differently within different, yet still coterminous, 'times', (in other words, they recognized precisely what Louis Althusser (1998: 106) refers to as the 'present of the conjuncture').

In contrast to their Southeast Asian counterparts, Indian communists were more attached to the traditional categories of Marxist analysis, less willing to accept that the shape and disposition of the building blocks of Marxist theory would differ under Indian conditions (Kaviraj 1986; Alam 1997). M. N. Roy (1887–1954), celebrated for his debate with Lenin during the Second Communist International, insisted that Marx's model of class analysis could be applied without modification to India. Whereas Lenin proposed that the colonial situation was different from that of late capitalist societies, and that in colonized countries, communists should ally with bourgeois national movements while seeking to push these in more radical directions, Roy argued that the bourgeois national movement represented a reactionary force that would give way to feudal and imperialist forces and as such needed to be opposed by revolutionary parties, if nationalist goals were to be realized (Kaviraj 1986: 221–3). In transposing Marx's categories derived from nineteenth-century European experience to the Indian context, Roy and later Indian communists neglected the role of the peasantry and gave too little weight to caste, the primary category of social inequality in India (Kaviraj 2009: 197). These ideological failings have had political consequences, limiting the political reach of communism in India.

Nevertheless, even an overly literal application of Marxist categories has offered, in the South Asian context, novel and liberating paths of critique and activism. Class analysis has served to illuminate the failure of the Indian state to address economic inequalities. In their adherence to the model of the former USSR, Indian communists went further than nationalists in emphasizing India's multi-national identity, a stance deemed unpatriotic at the time (Alam 1997: 348), but ripe for renewal in the current conjuncture. South Asian communists have been more thorough-going critics of religious traditions and social customs than most liberals, more willing to break with the past (Parekh 2003). In doing so, communism has provided an alternative platform for creating enduring solidarities across lines of community for struggles against injustice. For all their rhetorical orthodoxy, South Asian communists have for most part forsworn violent revolution (with the exception of Maoists) and sought to work within liberal democratic institutions, with communist parties participating regularly in elections (one of the first elected communist governments in the world was in

the Indian state of Kerala).

NATIONALISM, DEVELOPMENTALISM, AND TRADITION

The varying experiences of colonial domination, national revolution, and the postcolonial cultivation of national subjects in South Asia and Southeast Asia demonstrate the difficulty of insisting on a single historical trajectory of nationalism. Particularly in the early and middle parts of the twentieth century, as anti-colonial movements were simultaneously gaining momentum, debates over what the nation meant and what were the most effective idioms through which to convey this meaning were scattered across a wide ideological landscape. Nationalism in South and Southeast Asia did not connote a complete break with the colonial past; in fact in several countries there would be a degree of 'continuity between the colonial regimes and the independence regimes that emerged after the war' (Christie 2001: 112). This does not, however, negate the distinctive ideological substance of nationalism in South and Southeast Asia, so much as suggest how political and national communities came to be constituted. In ideological and political terms, South Asian and Southeast Asian nationalisms have faced two main challenges: how to oppose colonial rule while seeking economic and social advancement along Western lines, and how to define a national good which is common across lines of religious, racial, linguistic, and class difference. Nationalisms have responded to the challenges posed by colonialism as well as ethnic particularism by elaborating novel notions of developmentalism as well as by recasting indigenous traditions. Both developmentalism and tradition have been invoked for nation-state building as well as by movements contesting state policies.

Developmentalism was central in the definition of Indian nationalism from the start. Many early Indian nationalists welcomed British rule as an agent of modernization; their criticism was that it did not go far enough with respect to social reform and development of the Indian economy. In his aptly titled *Poverty and Un-British rule* and elsewhere, the doyen of Indian nationalism, Parsi leader Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917), propounded the 'drain of wealth' theory, arguing that Indian revenues were being diverted to Britain for its exclusive benefit, instead of being reinvested in India for its development (Seth 1999). This became a key article of faith for Indian nationalists, forming part of the economic critique of colonialism, together with excessive taxation of the Indian peasantry, the destruction of indigenous industry to create a market for British manufactures, and the use of Indian monies to pay for British wars abroad

(Chandra 1966). The developmentalist critique of colonialism was pressed further by Ranade—among the earliest to argue against Britain’s laissez-faire approach as inadequate for India’s economic development. He pointed to the central role of the state as the ‘national organ’ in Germany and other European countries in fostering industrialization through the protection of local industry and the creation of a national banking system (Ranade 1906; Bayly 2012). By the time Nehru assumed the reins of the Indian national movement, the need for state-led industrialization for national economic regeneration was an established feature of nationalist discourse, espoused by those on the left as well as the right. For the nation to be able to overcome its backwardness, and ‘catch up’ with the advanced industrialized Western world, the state needed to direct the allocation of resources for rapid industrialization (Chatterjee 1993). While development was construed primarily in economic terms, as implying both economic growth and poverty amelioration, it was also linked more broadly to notions of social modernization. For Nehru and many others on the left, all social problems—the Hindu–Muslim conflict, caste oppression—were at bottom problems of underdevelopment and would fade away as processes of economic growth and social modernization, arrested under colonial rule, got underway. The nation, it was felt, was the appropriate locus for identity in a modern developed country: to think in terms of religious, caste, or linguistic identities as Indians were still wont to do, was backward, not in keeping with the aspiration to developed status (Bajpai 2011). Even as the confidence in state-led industrialization has waned in India and elsewhere, as has the belief that, with modernization, religious and other ethnic identities would decline in significance, development has remained a key legitimating concept for defining a national interest and a common identity that stands above particular group interests. In India, as elsewhere, developmentalism has been in some tension with democracy, serving to insulate economic decision-making from the pressures of mass-based politics. Nehruvian development planning was deemed too complicated for broad sections of the democratic public, and served to legitimize decision-making by a technocratic and political elite, as well as their pedagogical role in explaining to the people precisely what was needed for national development (Chatterjee 1993). Although Indian development policies have changed radically since and are now oriented towards economic liberalization, these too have most often been pursued through executive decision-making to circumvent contentious legislative deliberation and mass-based or representative politics (Jenkins 1999).

In Southeast Asia, developmentalism appears somewhat later as a formal piece of the nationalist imagination, and has been in much more overt tension

with democracy. With high growth rates and extensive national infrastructure projects as its unquestionable aims, Southeast Asian developmentalism holds preservation of political stability as its premiere political value and, in support of stability, has often justified constraints on political expression and electoral competition. As such ideologies of developmentalism have legitimated forms of authoritarian nationalism and semi-democracies in past and present developmentalist states, particularly in Indonesia (under the Suharto regime), Malaysia, and Singapore. For developmentalism requires a 'procedural democracy' rather than a 'participatory democracy' (Loh 2005), nor is it necessarily opposed to traditional values; in fact the two have worked in tandem to shape authoritarian nationalism in Southeast Asia (Loh 2005: 36–7). For example, in Singapore, developmentalism is expressed in explicitly communitarian terms and articulates a nationalist vision of a stable, prosperous, and culturally diverse nation (Huat 2004). It also involves a vision of politics that privileges pragmatism over open contestation, developed conceptually by Gok Keng Swee, one founder of the People's Action Party (the only political party to have ever governed Singapore). The pragmatism of the People's Action Party, with its privileging of meritocracy and elitism, 'champions the role of technocratic political elites at the expense of ideas of representation and citizenship rights' (Rodan and Jayasuriya 2009: 30). This conceptualization of communitarianism argues for the role of the state not only in crafting the cultural contours of Singapore's ethnic and religious communities (particularly in policies of bilingualism and an insistence on a secular public sphere), but also in actively intervening in the management of social and family life (Hill and Fee 1995).

The complementarity between developmentalism and tradition in authoritarian nationalisms and managerial or autocratic governance is exemplified in the debates over the concept of 'Asian values', their uniqueness and relation to liberal democratic values. Asian values gained their most salience as an ideological concept from the middle of the 1980s to 1997, when the political shock of the financial crisis began to challenge the ideological justifications of developmentalist regimes (Khoo 1999). Although never reflective of a single definition of 'Asia', Asian values typically included an equilibrium between social duties and rights, some culturally determined communitarian vision, and the presumption that social consensus takes precedence over individualism and social or political contestation. Much of the 'global' debate focused on the question of respect for human rights versus Asian values and their ability to contribute to notions of 'good governance' and 'good

society’, which grew in circulation in tandem with the popularity of Asian values.

The question of Asian values also points to ideological efforts beyond the context of developmentalism in which indigenous concepts, philosophies, and cultural institutions are employed in the articulation of ideologies of nation and state. An example of this can be seen in the rise of the economic ideology of ‘sufficient economy’ introduced by Thailand’s King Bhumipol Adulyadej. ‘Sufficiency economy’ brought together a critique of capitalist consumption with Buddhist notions of balance and social harmony as the basis for the restoration of local community in the face of rapacious capitalist development. Beyond its immediate relevance to an instance of a deep crisis of capital (namely, the simultaneous crisis of finance capital and the domestic market), the ideological currency of a sufficiency economy related directly to the broader ideological project of ensuring the centrality of the Thai monarchy in Thai politics and the popular imagination of the Thai nation (Ivarsson and Isager 2010). Here, sufficiency economy is one of a much wider array of political interventions related to the contemporary struggle over royal authority in Thailand.

Perhaps, the most influential alternative to development-based nationalism is to be found in the recasting of tradition in the thought and practice of M. K. Gandhi. Gandhi’s vision of *swaraj* or self-rule went beyond self-government or political independence from British rule and was part of a larger critique of modern Western civilization and its pursuit of material prosperity. Reducing dependence on the accoutrements of modern life was the key to self-rule—the ‘expulsion of the English’ was not sufficient, or even strictly speaking necessary for *swaraj* (Gandhi in Parel 2009: 71). Self-rule centred ultimately on self-discipline and self-transcendence on the part of the individual and involved a containment of the urges of greed and aggression, as well as the cultivation of self-less service to fellow citizens of all castes and creeds (Parekh 1989; Parel 2009: xix, xx). It was this moral transformation of the individual that was to be the means for achieving social progress and national regeneration, not industrialization and modernization, which fostered selfishness and the pursuit of limitless consumption. Gandhi’s insistence that inner transformation of the individual was fundamental and that politics should be informed by the moral and spiritual values of religion broadly defined, drew upon the ethical values of several religious traditions, while distancing itself from all organized religions. The notion of *swaraj*, and the distinctive methods of struggle that Gandhi forged—*satyagraha*, *ahimsa*, fasting—invoked concepts from Hindu traditions (e.g. the control of the mind over itself and passions in the *Gita*), while infusing these

with values of other religious traditions, notably Christian notions of the importance of conscience and of service and the Jain doctrine of the ‘many-sidedness of truth’ (Parekh 1989; Parel 2009). While disavowing narrow nationalism, Gandhi’s reworking of tradition reflected a fundamental nationalist impulse of seeking to restore the integrity of, and self-confidence in, one’s own traditions that are broken by colonialism. Gandhi’s vision, was not, however, statist: he rejected the modern state as an embodiment of violence, and the greatest appeal of his ideas has been to movements fighting against state power across the world, notably the civil rights movement in the USA and contemporary environmental campaigns. It remains one of the best examples of the recasting of tradition for fashioning a modern model of resistance, that of opposing a superior physical force with the moral power of righteous, non-violent protest, and a reminder of the universal and continuing appeal of non-materialist ethical values.

RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY

Two opposing approaches dominate thinking on the relationship between religion and ideology and potentially foreclose more thorough consideration. The first approach considers religion merely as a frame for ideological principles or conflicts. Here religion plays an instrumental role in ideological conflict and piety in general is viewed largely as a product of false consciousness. The second approach sees ideological expression and political behaviour as determined entirely by religious principles and the pursuit of particular religious world-views. Within the limits of these two opposing approaches, piety and religious practice are either completely devoid of any true agency or essentially definitive of all political and social forms within a given society. An alternative lies in two related inquiries. First, it is necessary to examine more closely the relationship between a particular ideology and its conceptualization of religion: how ideologies themselves define religion, demand secularism, or circumscribe the relation of religion and politics. Second, it is important to turn to the possibilities for complex ideological expression within religious practice and the politics that emerges from the public definition of religious community. This is especially important for those ideological articulations in which the political and the religious are presumed to be perfectly aligned (as in the ideological coupling ‘political Islam’). Moving beyond questions of agency and essence, our approach in this section will trace both ideological conceptualizations of religion *and* the emergence of new forms of ideological expression in explicitly religious terms. We suggest that religion is both the object of ideology (shaped by external

forces), as well as a source for ideological expression (as the articulation of religious belief for new publics may demand new ideological concepts and idioms).

State ideologies have shaped the character and scope of religion in South Asia and Southeast Asia. State interventions in the formalization of religious law and the establishment of religious legal systems have sought to manage religious practice and potential popular mobilizations. Colonial and postcolonial states have sought to legitimate their rule through respect for the religions of their subjects. In India and the Dutch East Indies, religious law came to be defined and codified from the late eighteenth century by colonial authorities in ways that privileged textual sources over customary practices, and homogeneity over plural interpretations. Similar codifications also occurred along with the creation of the discrete fields of family and customary law. The postcolonial Indian state has retained separate family laws for major religions—Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Parsi—as a mark of respect for religious beliefs of its citizens, but has sought to reform oppressive practices (particularly within the dominant religion, Hinduism), with courts often declaring these to be outside the essential protected core of religion. Ideologies of national identity have informed such interventions as well, as in the case of rural Islamic courts in Malaysia where ideologies of Malayness inform the state's efforts in creating particular family structures through the deliberation in Islamic courts (Peletz 2002). Military regimes have sought legitimacy through support for religion, reshaping religious institutions in the process. In Pakistan, General Zia's regime (1977–88) offered state patronage to madrasas in the form of increased financial support as well as employment opportunities for their graduates in state institutions, transforming madrasas into training organizations for a new breed of militant and political Islamic activists (Nasr 2000—Taliban literally means madrasa student). The rise of religious extremist ideologies in South Asia is a complex phenomenon, in which several factors have played a role: political parties pursuing muscular nationalism who have allied with religious actors (e.g. the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaate-Islami in Bangladesh); state abuses of the rights of minorities and refugees have created willing recruits for extremist ideologies; international state funding from Saudi Arabia for madrasa education has fuelled the growth of Wahabism (as among Biharis and Rohingyas in Bangladesh—see Hussain 2007).

Democratic institutions have also strengthened ideologies of religion in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Following on from censuses which had condensed myriad lines of social difference into a few categories defined by religion, race,

caste, and tribe, the introduction of elections led to an increasing consciousness of group membership and of the significance of its numbers. Religious majoritarianisms—Hindu nationalism in India, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, Malay Muslim nationalism in Malaysia (often overlapping with race and language categories)—were fuelled by a sense that the majority community was not getting its due share of recognition and resources from the state, reflecting a ‘minority complex’ of victim-hood (Tambaiah 1986; Hansen 1999). Religious majoritarianisms have sought a greater role for the majority religion commensurate with its numbers, and in doing so, have sought to reduce the role of minorities in nationalist imaginings, as well as in state education and employment institutions. Popular religious majoritarianisms reflect less interest in religion as a belief system and more in collective demonstrations of fervour and of number in public arenas. Religion is often simplified into a few symbols of aggressive manhood seen to offer protection from external and internal threats. The assertion of religion in the public sphere here serves as a measure of popular revolt against the liberalism of the nationalist (largely upper class) elite that led movements of independence from European rule and sought to restrain the expression of religion and the articulation of ethnicity, more broadly, in public affairs. Appealing to populations dislocated from traditional moorings clutching at a semblance of certainty, majoritarianisms of religion (as those of race, language, and caste), pit democratic urges against liberal values of respect for equal rights of citizenship and equality of opportunity for all.

In addition to how religious expression comes to be constituted through state practices, it is also important to consider the ways that religion has become a source for new ideological concepts and expression. In South and Southeast Asia, the requirement for religion to establish its relevance to modern life was mediated by the experience of colonialism. Thus arose the imperative to demonstrate that Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions offered comparable or superior resources with regard to modern values of equality, liberty, and science. As part of transformations that introduced modernist thought across the Muslim world, prominent nineteenth-century Muslim leaders in India sought to demonstrate that modern science was consistent with the tenets of Islam. Some sought to do so through engagement with religious theology (Habib 2000): Syed Ahmed Khan, for instance, argued for reinterpreting the Qur’an to remove any apparent contradictions with scientific truths. Others sought to do so by attacking the *ulema*’s prohibitions on scientific learning as unIslamic, as in the case of Jamaluddin Afghani. Khan and Afghani argued for accepting the authority of modern science while seeking to support it through Islamic sources. Support for

science in this modernist frame emerged not simply out of deep religious belief, but out of the need to fashion new conceptualizations within Islamic thought that would equip Muslims for the modern world, while resisting colonization by the West. Revivalist thinkers such as Maulana Mawdudi have also affirmed modern science, while rejecting Western culture, seeking to 'Islamize modernity' (Nasr 1996).

The relationship of religion and political prescription is complex. Deep religious belief and an affirmation of religious fundamentals have been associated both with critiques of religious nationalism, as well as with calls for religious nation-states. For Maulana Azad (1888–1958), acceptance of the supreme authority of the Qur'an, for instance, dictated righteous struggle (*jihad*) against British rule on the part of the Muslim faithful across the world (*ummah*) (Jalal 2007). In Azad's case, however, an Islamist vision of return to religious fundamentals existed alongside a staunch commitment to Hindu–Muslim unity, and a steadfast opposition to the demand for Pakistan, which to him implied a denial of the history of Muslims in India (Douglas 1972). Azad remained an Indian nationalist, urging Muslim participation in Congress campaigns for Indian independence and, notwithstanding his Islamist vision, is acclaimed as a secularist in accounts of Indian nationalism due to his abiding commitment to Hindu–Muslim unity. Similar to Azad, Indian Islamic scholars such as Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi and Numani rejected the call for a theocratic state for its emphasis on worldly power and neglect of spiritual salvation of Muslims. An Islamic state, it was argued, constituted a departure from the major traditions of interpretation of Islam, as well as the history of Islam with its many instances of separation of religion and politics (Nasr 1996: 60, 65). Although several religious fundamentalists have opposed the clergy's involvement in politics as debasing for religion (Parekh 2003: 573), others have argued for the necessity of Islamic states, as in the case of Maulana Mawdudi. Mawdudi sought to reorient Islamic theology away from spiritual and metaphysical concerns into a programme for collective social action (Nasr 1996). True faith demanded absolute obedience to God, and could only be realized through politics: philosophy, literature, the arts, customs were, in this puritanical vision, 'syncretic and impure' adulterations (Nasr 1996: 59). There was, and ought to be, no distinction between religion and politics: religion could not be preserved or realized except through politics (Islam 'could not be understood through mere contemplation; it could only find meaning when implemented by *amali shahadat* ... testimony of faith through practice ...'. (Nasr 1996: 80). Mawdudi's reconstruction of Islam exemplified several ideological moves: the

reconfiguration of key religious concepts (*Ilah, rabb, ibadah, din*) in ways better suited to motivate political action, the demarcation of boundaries to separate the faithful from outsiders (Muslims and non-Muslims), which for Mawdudi, included not just the West, but also proximate others (in contrast to Azad)—Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and other internal minorities (Nasr 1996: 99). In Sri Lanka too, Buddhist revival has been associated both with projects for distancing state power from religious affairs, with piety as a matter of private practice as sought by an orthodox elite, as well as with efforts to fuse religion and state power, as illustrated in the *sangha* activities of rural monks (Tambaiah 1986). South Asian trajectories thus caution against drawing any simple link between religious fundamentalism and political extremism.

Currents of reform in religious thought at the turn of the twentieth century also extended to Southeast Asia. The turn toward science and certain aspects of modernism were accompanied by the impulse to strengthen Islamic practice and piety. Tensions resulting from the introduction of new approaches to understanding Islam led to new religious and political movements in Muslim communities in Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, for instance, the entrance of modernist thinking hampered the possibility of Muslim unity in early mobilizations against Dutch colonial rule. The mass organization Syarikat Islam, established in 1911, was challenged internally by two ideological schisms, first by communists and then by modernists (Kahin 1952). The complex anti-colonial politics in the Dutch East Indies involved competition between communists, nationalists, Muslim modernists (represented by Muhammadiyah), and Muslim traditionalists (represented by Nadatul Ulama). The ideological contestation over the very terms of Indonesian independence reflected these divisions, particularly among Indonesian Muslims. At stake in independence was the status of Islam not only as a public religion, but one enshrined in the new constitution as the religion of the state. The different sides taken in this debate over the new constitution were most clearly argued by Mohammed Natsir and Soekarno (later Indonesia's first president). Natsir conceptualized a form of Muslim nationalism that demanded that as a Muslim majority nation Indonesia be ruled under Islamic law. To the contrary, Soekarno believed that Islam, Marxism, and nationalism were not incongruous: 'the authenticity of an Islamic state was found not so much in the formal and or legal adoption of Islam as the ideological and constitutional basis for the state but more on the personal and mass manifestation of the flame and the spirit of Islam' (Effendy 2003: 23). In the end, the state ideology of Indonesia, called Pancasila (which includes an unchallengeable commitment to nationalism, internationalism, democracy, and social welfare)

retained the non-sectarian language of a ‘belief in one god’, rather than the proposed ‘belief in god with the obligation to carry out Islamic sharia for its adherents’ (referred to as the ‘Jakarta Charter’).

This contrasts with ideological efforts in early postcolonial politics in which Buddhist socialism was developed as a means of reconceptualizing new forms of national community. In the 1950s, Prime Minister U Nu in Burma and Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka both developed visions of political modernity based on the idea of Buddhist socialism. Socialism in this ideological couplet was ‘conceived not in Marxist, social democratic, or even Maoist terms, but according to the egalitarian and democratic principles of Theravada Buddhism’ (Gyallay-Pap 2007: 87). In Cambodia during this period, the notion of Buddhist socialism extended further than nationalist or democratic ends. Prior to elections held in 1955, Norodom Sihanouk abdicated his position as king in order to contest the elections representing the ‘People’s Socialist Community’ (*Sangkum Reastr Niyum*), which Gyallay-Pap describes as a ‘supra-party royalist movement’. The ideological link between royalism and Buddhist conservatives also motivates contemporary efforts to defend the contested role and status of the Thai king in Thai politics and society.

IDEOLOGIES OF RACE, INDIGENITY, AND CASTE

Both colonial efforts to manage native populations as well as postcolonial struggles to create political community have depended on the constitution of communal categories of race, caste, as well as the autochthonic and aboriginal. These categories have reflected broader political projects to privilege certain communities in political as well as cultural fields. Ideologies of race have been crucial in the constitution of hierarchal communities in pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial polities. These have also been deployed to challenge the inferior status of subordinate groups (Robb 1995).

Biologically based notions of difference have been invoked for the legitimation of power in pre-colonial as well as colonial polities in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Racial ideologies predate European colonialism. Ideologies of kingship in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sri Lanka required that the ruler be Kshatriya (Rogers 1995); ideologies of martial and non-martial groups in eighteenth-century Nepal held that only certain *jat* (castes or tribes) should be recruited into the army (Caplan 1995). More generally, a preference for fairer over darker skin obtains that has ancient roots: in Hindu epics, for instance, heroes are depicted as fair-skinned, and villains as dark-skinned (Robb 1995).

Racial ideologies gained significance in South Asia and Southeast Asia in the era of European colonialism from the mid-nineteenth century. The salience of race derived in part from the ascendancy of ideas of evolutionism, eugenics, and ethnology in Europe (Bayly 1995). Racial characterizations were associated with scientific advance, and attached also to notions of nationality, for example to distinguish the English from the Germans or the Celts. Acquiring particular salience in the context of empire, racial ideologies served to justify colonial rule in the late nineteenth century. British rule in India, as with other instances of European colonial rule, was rationalized as civilizing barbarian races, both by those for whom the 'superiority of the conquering race' marked an inherent, permanent line of difference (James Fitzjames Stephen, cited in Metcalf 1994: 57), as well as those for whom the civilizational distance of 'backward' races could, at least in principle, be overcome. J. S. Mill held foreign despotic rule to be the right form of government for Indians and other Oriental races, a necessary means for pulling them up along the ladder of civilization, until they had acquired the capacity for self-government (Metcalf 1994: 32). As liberal and democratic ideologies developed in Europe, race became more prominent in the imperial enterprise. For once equal civil and political rights were accepted for all men, inequality in the rights of the colonized and the colonizers required justification, which was supplied by notions of racial difference and hierarchy (Chatterjee 1993). Unequal treatment of Indians and Europeans in areas such as legal privileges in trials, access to franchise, and freedom of movement invoked notions of the superiority of the conquering race (Metcalf 1994). Racial characterizations in the era of European colonialism did not always cast colonized groups as different or inferior. The Aryan theory of race of the eighteenth century, as expounded by Orientalist scholars such as William Jones (1746–94), valorized ancient Hindu civilization, building upon findings of linguistic similarity between Sanskrit and other European languages to suggest that Hindus and Europeans shared a common Aryan origin (Metcalf 1994; Bayly 1995). The notion of martial races and tribes identified desirable manly military traits of discipline, stoicism, and valour with particular sections of the native population, for example the Gurkhas of Nepal (Caplan 1995). Gurkhas and other martial races were seen as sharing these attributes with Europeans, as exemplifying the dying traits on which the edifice of empire had been built.

Race has also been influential in the constitution of nationalisms in South Asia and Southeast Asia, to determine who is the true subject of the nation, the legitimate inheritors of sovereignty after colonialism. Nationalisms of majority groups have elaborated ideologies of race to establish their claims to the nation

on grounds of indigenity, as in Malay claims to *bumiputera* status and Sinhala claims of racial distinctiveness. In both cases, population numbers and demographic trends have been used to justify claims for preferential treatment in education and employment in favour of majority groups. In Sri Lanka, notions of racial difference between the presumably Aryan, fair-skinned Sinhalese and Dravidian dark skinned Tamils have been invoked to establish the exclusive claim to the land of Sri Lanka of the Sinhalese and the withholding of citizenship rights and equal status for Tamils. In both cases, religion has overlapped with race—Buddhism and Sinhala in Sri Lanka, Islam and Malay in Malaysia—which has enabled race to function as an ethnicity of sorts, allowing a few from different racial backgrounds to *become* Sinhala or Malay. Interestingly, in India, the concept of race has not been significant in the dominant nationalisms, secularist or Hindu. The official ideology of secularism has been a civic nationalism that seeks explicitly, in theory at least, to transcend differences of race, religion, and caste. Hindu nationalists have used the term race in relation to Hindus, but have not relied substantially on the concept, elaborating nationalism primarily in ethno-cultural terms, as capable of accommodating all races that recognize the preeminence of Hindu culture in India, within a framework of upper caste domination (Jaffrelot 1995). Perhaps race or indigenity have not played an important role in the dominant Indian nationalisms because of the appeal of Orientalist theories which cast the majority Hindus as Aryans who shared a common racial origin with Europeans and had invaded India, subjugating the native Dravidians.

Racial ideologies have also been elaborated in narratives of oppressed groups to inform challenges to ascribed inferior status and establish the preeminence of their claims to the nation (Robb 1995). Lower caste anti-Brahmin leader Jyotirao Phule deployed the Aryan theory of race to argue that Shudras and Dalits were the original inhabitants of India, an egalitarian and prosperous peasant community that was defeated in war by invading Aryans. These groups were consigned thereafter to inferior ritual status by the religious ideology of the Brahmin-Aryans that sought to justify their rule (O'Hanlon 1985; Omvedt 1994). The popular dalit 'adi' movements that emerged in many Indian regions in the 1920s professed a racial ideology based on indigenity, claiming that Dalits were aborigines, the original non-Aryan people of India, and were a distinct community from the Hindus who were descendants of the Aryan invaders (Omvedt 1994: 122–3). Race was not central in all anti-caste ideologies—the great Dalit leader Dr B. R. Ambedkar described caste as 'a social division of people of the same race' (Ambedkar, *Annihilation of Caste*, cited in Omvedt

1994: 245)—nevertheless, there was a racial element in his reconstruction of the Hindu past, with the identification of heroes with non-Aryans (Omvedt 1994: 246).

Anti-caste ideologies that attack the inequities of the Hindu caste system have sought to respond to three main challenges: to counter the Indian national movement, to address economic as well as social inequalities, and to forge unity among the lower castes. Anti-caste thinkers such as Mahatma Phule and Dr Ambedkar invoked liberal values such as the inalienable rights of all individuals, condemned the caste system for its denial of individual merit, effort, and choice, and argued for quotas as liberal mechanisms to check the exercise of power by the dominant castes (see Bajpai 2012). In doing so, they have extended Indian nationalism's liberal critique of colonial rule in a more radical egalitarian direction, arguing that the national movement represented the sectional interests of the Brahmin-bourgeois classes. Anti-caste thinkers such as Phule also recast influential myths such as the Aryan origin of Hindus and popular religious legends to suggest that the subordination of lower castes was a result of historical conquest: as such the Shudras and Dalits were not inherently inferior, only on the wrong side of history (Bayly 2012), and their inferior status was an ideological weapon that served to justify the rule of the victors, the Brahmin-Aryans. Thinkers such as Phule and Ambedkar explicitly construed the position of Shudras and Dalits as enslavement, similar to the slavery of Blacks in the United States (Rodrigues 2006). Anti-caste thinkers and movements addressed the class exploitation of the lower castes: Phule saw the Sudra peasantry as the 'primary producers looted by the state' through its Brahmin dominated bureaucracy. Ambedkar sought to create political parties of all peasants and workers, initiated working class strikes with the communists, and argued for a socialist state (Omvedt 1994). Nevertheless, despite sharing an egalitarian thrust, anti-caste ideologies are distinct from class-based critiques in asserting that social oppression underpinned by religion is the fundamental source of inequality in Indian society and not simply an adjunct to class exploitation; that self-respect, dignity, and recognition of equal worth of inferior groups are an important object of the struggle for equality, and that a share in political power for Dalits and Shudras is fundamental to achieving social transformation. Lower caste leaders have insisted on quotas for Dalits and Shudras in legislatures and bureaucracy, not so much on grounds of indigeneity or compensatory justice, but as a means of reversing the relations of social subordination seen to underpin the economic marginalization of lower castes (Bajpai 2011).

CONCLUSION

Analyses of ideology across the regions of South and Southeast Asia have been rare. Among the contributing reasons are the following. Although ideology has been a critical category within the field of political theory, both in Anglo-American as well as European continental thought, it has not received sustained attention in the comparative study of politics over the last thirty years. With the rise of positivist political science, ideology appears as an inexplicable force, complicating the question of an actor's rational intent thereby incapable of sustaining causal analysis. The influence of Marxist and post-Marxist paradigms has meant that approaches in area studies that discuss ideology attempt to supplant it, because ideology is understood primarily as false consciousness.

South Asian and Southeast Asian studies have produced some of the most theoretically innovative and influential accounts of political dynamics of nationalism, peasant agency, and political violence. Nevertheless, here too, ideology does not appear as a general category of analysis. In the influential critiques of Eurocentrism (including within Marxist historiography) put forward by Subaltern Studies scholars (Guha and Spivak 1988); in the pioneering debates in Southeast Asian studies over peasant resistance, understood to be the product of rational calculation on the one hand (Popkin 1979) and, on the other, of such resistance only becoming apparent through the form of hidden transcripts of surreptitious strategy (Scott 1985); in the now classic accounts of nationalism as a modular, imagined community derived from South Asian and Southeast Asian materials (Anderson 1983; Chatterjee 1993), ideology plays little part.

The purpose of this chapter has been less to insist upon the primacy of ideology, than to show that ideology constitutes an important terrain for analysing the dynamics of the politics of domination and resistance, of states as well as social movements. By drawing together a highly disparate ideological field in the politics of South and Southeast Asia, we have sought to show how an analysis of different categories of ideology can illuminate the breadth of politics contained within the borders of these regions, which are themselves products of ideology. The ideological sources of such politics emerge from a nexus of global currents of political thought and local visions of political modernity. As such, a comparative inquiry of ideology demonstrates how understandings of general categories of ideology familiar from 'North Atlantic' debates (e.g. liberalism or communism), as well as of particular categories of ideology conventionally associated with South Asia and Southeast Asia (e.g. religion or race) can be advanced in a framework that explores their mutual interaction and influence.

REFERENCES

- Alam, J. 1997. 'Nation: Discourse and intervention by the Communists in India'. in *State and Nation in the Context of Social Change*, ed. T. V. Sathmurthy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Althusser, L. 1998. *Reading Capital*. New York: Verso.
- Ambedkar, B. R. 1991. *What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables reprinted in Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches*, Vol. 9, edited by Vasant Moon. Bombay: Government of Maharashtra.
- Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Bajpai, R. 2011. *Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Bajpai, R. 2012. 'Liberalisms in India: A sketch'. Pp. 53–76 in *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden*, eds. B. Jackson and M. Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bayly, C. 2012. *Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bayly S. 1995. 'Caste and "race" in the colonial ethnography of India'. Pp. 165–218 in *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, ed. P. Robb. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Caplan, L. 1995. 'Martial Gurkhas: The persistence of a British military discourse on "race"'. Pp. 261–81 in *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, ed. P. Robb. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Chandra, B. 1966. *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
- Chatterjee, P. 1993. *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Christie, C. J. 2001. *Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia, 1900–1980: Political Ideas of the Anti-Colonial Era*. London: Routledge.
- Chua B. H. 2004. 'Communitarian politics in Asia'. Pp. 1–25 in *Communitarian Politics in Asia*, ed. B. H. Chua. London: Routledge.
- Douglas, I. H. 1972. 'Abul Kalam Azad and Pakistan: A Post-Bangladesh reconsideration of an Indian Muslim's opposition to Pakistan', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 40 (4): 458–79.
- Effendy, B. 2003. *Islam and the State in Indonesia*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
- Freeden, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guha, R. and G. C. Spivak. 1988. *Selected Subaltern Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gyallay-Pap, P. 2007. 'Reconstructing the Cambodian polity: Buddhism, kingship and the quest for legitimacy'. Pp. 71–103 in *Buddhism, Order, and Political Power*, ed. I. C. Harris. London: Routledge.
- Habib, I. S. 2000. 'Reconciling science with Islam in 19th century India', *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 34 (1): 63–92.
- Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. *The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hassan, S. 2005. 'NGOs in the discourse on political change and democratization in Malaysia'. Pp. 255–75 in *The Power of Ideas: Intellectual Input and Political Change in East and Southeast Asia*, eds. C. Derichs and T. Heberer. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Hedman, E. L. 2001. 'Contesting state and civil society: Southeast Asian trajectories', *Modern Asian Studies*, 35: 921–51.
- Hewison, K. 1999. 'Political space in Southeast Asia: "Asian-style" and other democracies', *Democratization*, 6: 224–45.
- Hill, M. and L. K. Fee. 1995. *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*. London:

Routledge.

- Hussain, I. 2007. 'Fundamentalism and Bangladesh: no error, no terror', *South Asian Survey*, 14 (2): 207–29.
- Ivarsson, S. and L. Isager. 2010. 'Strengthening the moral fibre of the nation: The King's sufficiency economy as etho-politics.' Pp. 223–49 in *Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand*, eds. S. Ivarsson and L. Isager. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
- Jaffrelot, C. 1995. 'The idea of the Hindu race in the writings of Hindu nationalist ideologues in the 1920s and 1930s: A concept between two cultures'. Pp. 327–54 in *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, ed. P. Robb. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Jalal, A. 2007. 'Striking a just balance: Maulana Azad as a theorist of trans-national Jihad', *Modern Intellectual History*, 4 (1): 95–107.
- Jenkins, R. 1999. *Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kahin, G. M. 1952. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. Ithaca: SEAP Publications.
- Kaviraj, S. 1986. 'The heteronomous radicalism of M.N.Roy'. Pp. 209–35 in *Political Thought in Modern India*, eds. T. Pantham and K. L. Deutsch. Sage: New Delhi.
- Kaviraj, S. 2009. 'Marxism in translation: Critical reflections on Indian radical thought'. Pp. 172–200 in *Political Judgement: Essays for John Dunn*, eds. Richard Bourke and Raymond Geuss Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Khoo, B. T. 1999. 'The value of a miracle: Malaysian and Singaporean elite constructions of Asia', *Asian Studies Review*, 23: 181–92.
- Kitirianglarp, K. and K. Hewison. 2009. 'Social movements and political opposition in contemporary Thailand', *The Pacific Review*, 22: 451–77.
- Loh, F. K. W. 2005. 'Globalization, development and democratization in Southeast Asia'. Pp. 17–54 in *Southeast Asian Responses to Globalization: Restructuring Governance and Deepening Democracy*, eds. K. W. F. Loh and J. Öjendal. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
- McVey, R. T. 1965. *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) PTE, LTD.
- Metcalf, T. R. 1994. *Ideologies of the Raj*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nasr, S. V. R. 1996. *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nasr, S. V. R. 2000. 'The rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan: The changing role of Islamism and the ulama in society and politics', *Modern Asian Studies*, 34 (1): 139–80.
- O'Hanlon, R. 1985. *Caste, Conflict, and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste Protest in Nineteenth-Century Western India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Omvedt, G. 1994. *Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Panikkar, K. M. 1962. *In Defence of Liberalism*. New York: Asia Pub. House.
- Parekh, B. C. 1989. *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Parekh, B. C. 2003. 'Non-Western political thought'. Pp. 553–78 in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought*, ed. T. Ball and R. Bellamy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parel, A. 2009. *M.K. Gandhi Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peletz, M. G. 2002. *Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Popkin, S. 1979. *The Rational Peasant: the Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ranade, M. G. 1906. *Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches*. Madras: G.A. Natesan and Co.
- Rigg, J. et al. 1999. 'Understanding languages of modernization: A Southeast Asian view', *Modern Asian*

Studies, 33: 581–602.

- Robb, P. (ed.) 1995. *The Concept of Race in South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Rodrigues, V. 2006. 'Dalit-Bahujan discourse in modern India'. Pp. 46–72 in *Political Ideas in Modern India*, eds. V. R. Mehta and T. Pantham New Delhi: Sage.
- Rodan, G. and K. Jayasuriya. 2009. 'Capitalist development, regime transitions and new forms of authoritarianism in Asia', *The Pacific Review*, 22: 23–47.
- Rogers, J. 1995. 'Racial identities and politics in early modern Sri Lanka'. Pp. 146–64 in *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, ed. P. Robb. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Scott, J. C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Seth, Sanjay. 1999. 'Rewriting histories of nationalism: The politics of "moderate nationalism" in India, 1870–1905', *American Historical Review*, 104, 1: 95–116.
- Stokes, Eric. 1959. *The English Utilitarians and India*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tambaiah, S. 1986. *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy*. London: I.B. Tauris and Co.
- Vora, Rajendra 1986. 'Two strands of Indian liberalism: The ideas of Ranade and Phule'. Pp. 92–108 in *Political Thought in Modern India*, eds. Thomas Pantham and Kenneth L. Deutsch. New Delhi: Sage.
- Weiss, M. 2006. *Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Weiss, M. and S. Hassan. (eds.) 2004. *Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGOs*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

NAME INDEX

Note: Includes all referenced authors.

- Aalota, Elissa [398](#)
Abdel-Malek, Anouar [618](#)
Abduh, Muhammad [628](#)
Abercrombie, N [243](#)
Abramowitz, A I [243](#)
Abts, K [506](#)
Acton, Lord [454](#)
Adams, Brooks [78](#)
Adams, Henry [78](#)
Adams, Herbert Baxter [76](#)
Adams, J [396](#)
Adams, John [5](#)
Adamson, W L [478](#)
Adcock, R [74](#)
Adorno, Theodor [27](#), [80](#), [107](#), [233](#), [235](#), [243](#)
 and end of ideology thesis [93–4](#)
 and ideology [12](#)
 and manufacture of consent in consumer capitalism [139–40](#)
 and suffering [146](#)
Afghani, Jamaluddin [628](#), [672](#)
Aguilar Rivera, J A [584](#), [588](#), [599](#)
Ahmad, Aijaz [273](#), [281](#), [282](#)
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud [510n1](#)
Alam, J [666](#)
Alamán, Lucas [588](#)
Al-‘Awa, Muhammad Salim [637](#)
Albert, Michael [395–6](#)
Albrow, M [221](#)
Alitto, G [652](#)

Allende, Salvador [407](#), [593](#)
Allport, G W [235](#)
Almond, Gabriel [84](#), [312–13](#)
Altemeyer, B [235](#), [241](#)
Althusser, Louis [21](#), [27](#), [133](#), [445–6](#), [594](#), [666](#)
 and function of ideology [32](#)
 and ideological moulding of individuals [33–4](#)
 and ideological state apparatuses [32](#)
 and ideology [31–4](#)
 compared with Marx's account [31–2](#)
 descriptive account of [34](#)
 as experiential relation [32](#)
 and universality of ideology [34–5](#)
Alwin, D F [241](#)
Ambedkar, B R [663–4](#), [676](#), [677](#)
Amendola, Giovanni [13](#)
Amodio, D M [238](#)
Andersen, J [352](#)
Anderson, Benedict [217](#), [219](#), [396](#), [454](#), [678](#)
Anderson, E [526](#)
Anderson, Joel [141](#), [146](#)
Anderson, P [27](#)
Andersson, J [359](#)
Anievas, A [552](#)
Appadurai, A [221](#)
Appiah, Kwame Anthony [281](#)
Appleby, J [339](#)
Apter, David [105](#), [106](#), [122](#), [459](#)
Arendt, Hannah [38](#), [538](#), [545](#), [554](#)
 and totalitarianism [14](#), [66](#), [69](#)
Arguedas, José Maria [597](#)
Aristotle [34](#), [201](#), [208](#), [209](#)
Armitage, D [542](#)

Arndt, J [239](#)
Aron, Raymond [109](#)
 and criticism of Mannheim [38](#)
 and end of ideology thesis [97–8](#)
 and totalitarianism [69, 70–1](#)
Aronovitch, H [208](#)
Askew, K M [616](#)
Atkinson, Max [200](#)
Aubert, R [320](#)
Aughey, A [463](#)
Augoustinos, N [177](#)
Aung Sang Suu Kyi [164](#)
Austen, Jane [276](#)
Austin, John [158, 171n9](#)
Avineri, Shlomo [367](#)
Ayubi, Nazih [627](#)
Azad, Maulana [673](#)
al-‘Azm, Sadik Jalal [273](#)
Azzam, Abdallah [635–6](#)

Babeuf, Gracchus [365](#)
Babu, A M [614](#)
Bachrach, P [85, 499](#)
Bacon, Francis [73](#)
Baddeley, A [179](#)
Bailyn, B [514, 516](#)
Bain, W [550](#)
Bajpai, R [663, 677](#)
Baker, Raymond William [637](#)
Bakunin, M [386, 390](#)
Bale, T [493–4](#)
Balibar, E [36n5](#)
Balkin, J M [116](#)

Ball, John [364](#)
Ball, T [74](#), [155](#), [228n3](#), [500](#)
Bandaranaike, S W R D [674](#)
Bankovsky, Miriam [145](#)
al-Banna, Hassan [629](#), [630](#)
Barat, L P [228n3](#)
Barbusse, Henri [591](#)
Bardèche, Maurice [486–7](#), [488](#), [489](#)
Barkai, A [484](#)
Barkawi, T [537](#)
Barker, Rodney [202](#)
Barme, G [654](#)
Baron, H [514](#), [518](#)
Bar-On, T [487](#)
Baron-Cohen, S [567](#)
Barrés, Maurice [478](#)
Barrett, M [170n3](#), [563](#)
Barry, Brian [263](#), [461](#), [594](#), [602n15](#)
Barry, N [415](#)
Bartels, L M [241](#)
Barth, Hans [441](#)
Barth, Karl [323](#), [325](#)
Barton, A [235](#)
Batista, Fulgencio [379](#)
Baudrillard, Jean [399](#)
Baumeister, A T [338](#)
Bayart, J-F [453](#)
Bayat, Asef [640–1](#)
Baycroft, T [454](#)
Bayle, Pierre [585](#)
Bayly, C A [537](#), [551](#), [552](#), [663](#), [668](#), [675](#), [677](#)
Beaugrande, R de [133](#)
Beauvoir, Simone de [569](#)

Beck, Ulrich [149](#)
Beech, M [308](#)
Beer, Francis A [208](#)
Beetham, D [333](#)
Belich, J [555n9](#)
Bell, Daniel [13](#), [81](#), [106](#), [123](#), [537](#), [542](#), [543](#), [547](#), [550](#)
 and absence of viable left in America [104–5](#)
 and *The End of Ideology* [90](#), [98](#), [99](#), [104](#), [412](#)
 and end of ideology thesis [100](#), [103–4](#)
 and intellectuals [258](#)
 and postindustrial society [104](#)
Bellamy, E J [169](#)
Bellamy, R [528](#)
Benda, Julien [252](#), [254–5](#), [256](#), [461](#)
Benedict XV, Pope [320](#)
Benhabib, Seyla [142](#), [144](#), [149](#)
Bennett, S [234](#)
Bennett, Walter [106](#)
Bennington, G [172n29](#)
Benoist, Alain de [298](#), [487](#)
Bénoit, F-P [59](#)
Bentham, Jeremy [206](#), [207](#)
Bentley, Arthur [77](#), [83](#)
Berelson, Bernard [81](#)
Berenson, E [517](#)
Bergmann, Gustav [170n1](#)
Berinsky, A J [234](#)
Berkman, Alexander [386](#)
Berkman, B [388](#)
Berlin, I [454](#), [518](#), [522](#)
Berlusconi, Silvio [508](#)
Berman, Paul [635](#)
Berman, S [349](#)

Bernal, J D [109n2](#)
Bernstein, Eduard [9](#), [349–51](#)
Berry, Craig [252](#), [260](#), [262](#), [265](#)
Besson, S [528](#)
Betz, H-G [497](#)
Beveridge, William [335](#), [353](#)
Bevir, Mark [204](#)
Bhabha, Homi [537](#)
 and colonial stereotypes [274–5](#)
 and mimicry [275](#)
 and national culture [276](#)
 and postcolonialism [274–6](#), [280–1](#), [286](#)
 and religious conversion in colonial India [275–6](#)
Bhaduri, Bhuvaneswari [278–9](#)
Bhumipol Adulyadej [669](#)
Bidault, Georges [324](#)
Billig, M [192](#), [201](#), [241](#)
Billington, J H [61](#)
Bin Laden, Osama [225](#), [226](#), [227](#), [229n13](#), [636](#)
Birch, A H [454](#)
Birnbaum, N [121](#)
Bismarck, Otto von [544](#)
Bitzer, Lloyd [205](#)
Bizzell, Patricia [201](#)
Black, Antony [629](#)
Black, Bob [388](#)
Blair, Tony [207](#), [223](#)
Blaney, D [537](#)
Bloch, Ernst [439](#), [443–4](#)
Block, J [235](#)
Block, J H [235](#)
Blond, P [307](#)
Blühdorn, Ingolfur [431](#), [434–5](#)

Blyden, Edward Wilmot [610–11](#)
Bogdanor, Vernon [305](#)
Böhm, Franz [301](#)
Bohman, James [142](#), [528](#)
Bolivar, Simón [585](#)
Bolívar, Simón [585](#)
Bonald, Louis de [588](#)
Bonanno, G A [240](#)
Bond, R [463](#)
Bondunrin, P O [616–17](#)
Bookchin, Murray [387](#), [388](#), [393](#), [398](#), [400](#), [425](#), [430](#)
Boorstin, Daniel [80](#)
Booth, Wayne [201](#)
Borkenau, Franz [13](#)
Bornstein, K [571](#)
Bossi, Umberto [508](#)
Bosteels, Bruno [151](#)
Bottici, C [162](#), [172n23](#)
Bouchard, G [459](#)
Boucher, D [331](#)
Bourdeau, V [517](#), [520](#)
Bourdieu, Pierre [142](#), [143](#), [149](#), [217](#), [521](#), [570](#), [575](#)
Bowden, B [540](#)
Bracher, Karl D [64–5](#), [124](#)
Bradbury, Jonathan [260](#)
Branting, Hjalmar [349](#)
Brantlinger, P [540](#)
Brasillach, Robert [486](#)
Braun, H [595](#)
Breuilly, J [455](#), [457](#)
Brewer, A [545](#)
Brezhnev, Leonid [380](#)
Brinton, Crane [440](#)

Brittan, Samuel [301](#)
Brizendine, L [567](#)
Brontë, Charlotte [279](#)
Brooke, S [355](#)
Brooks, F [394](#)
Brown, Archie [367](#), [379](#), [381](#)
Brown, D [457](#)
Brown, Garrett [262](#)
Brown, Gavin [397](#)
Brown, G W [464](#)
Brown, L B [115](#)
Brown, L Susan [389](#)
Brown, Nathan [628](#)
Brown, Wendy [148](#)
Brownmiller, Susan [578n11](#)
Brunner, Otto [4](#), [7](#)
Brus, W [375](#)
Bryce, James [78](#)
Brym, Robert [258](#)
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K [70](#)
Buchanan, James [306](#), [405](#), [415–16](#), [417](#)
Buchanan, Patrick [227](#)
Budakov, V M [440](#)
Budge, I [130](#)
Bukharin, Nikolai I [31](#), [545](#)
Bull, Peter [200](#)
Bullock, J [234](#), [235](#)
Bunch, C [571](#)
Burbank, J [537](#), [544](#)
Burgess, John W [76](#)
Burke, Edmund [59](#), [60](#), [103](#), [106](#), [235](#), [293](#), [299](#), [551](#)
Burke, Kenneth [106](#), [207](#)
Burke, Roland [618](#)

Burkhardt, Jacob [469](#)
Burleigh, M [489](#)
Burnyeat, Myles [208](#)
Bush, George W [239](#)
Busseri, M A [238](#)
Butler, Judith [148–9](#), [571](#), [576](#), [578n3](#)
Butt, Ronald [305](#)

Cabet, Étienne [366](#)
Cabral, Amilcar [618–20](#)
Cain, P [545](#)
Caldas-Coulthard, C R [176](#)
Calhoun, C [228n6](#), [453](#), [461](#), [467](#)
Califia, P [571–2](#)
Call, Lewis [399](#)
Callinicos, Alex [260](#), [548](#)
Cameron, D [567](#)
Cameron, David [263](#), [308](#), [309n12](#)
Campanella, Tomasso [365](#)
Campbell, K K [201](#)
Camus, Albert [94](#)
Canovan, Margaret [460](#), [463](#), [498](#), [501](#), [502](#), [505](#), [506](#), [595](#)
Caplan, L [675](#)
Capra, Fritjof [431](#)
Caprara, G V [235](#), [242](#)
Cárdenas, Cuauhtémoc [507](#), [595](#)
Carey, J [469](#)
Carlyle, Thomas [300](#), [509](#), [547](#)
Carnap, Rudolf [81](#)
Carney, D [235](#), [239](#)
Carpenter, Edward [396](#)
Carr, E H [13–14](#)
Carraro, L [240](#)

Carretta, Vincent [610](#)
Carsey, T M [233](#), [241](#), [243](#)
Carsun Chang [655](#)
Carter, Ian [521](#), [523](#)
Cartwright, D [233](#)
Carvalho, S [459](#)
Casely Hayford, J E [608](#), [611–12](#)
Castañeda, J [590](#), [593](#)
Castro, Fidel [379–80](#), [592–3](#)
Catlin, G E G [77](#)
Cavell, Stanley [143](#), [171n13](#)
Centeno, M A [587](#)
Cento Bull, A [487](#)
Cerny, Philip [260](#)
Césaire, Aimé [284](#), [286](#), [612–13](#)
Chabal, Patrick [618](#), [619](#)
Chaiken, S [177](#)
Chaitin, G D [159](#)
Chakrabarty, Dipesh [280](#), [537](#)
Challand, B [162](#), [172n23](#)
Chamberlain, Joseph [545](#), [546](#)
Chamberlain, Wilt [415](#)
Chambers, C [565](#), [566](#), [569](#), [574](#), [575](#)
Chambers, Samuel [207](#)
Chambers, Simone [140](#), [141](#)
Chandra, B [667](#)
Charteris-Black, Jonathan [208](#)
Chatterjee, Partha [276–7](#), [279](#), [537](#), [553](#), [668](#), [675](#), [678](#)
Chattopadhyay, Bankim Chandra [283](#)
Chávez, Hugo [496](#), [503–4](#), [505](#), [508](#), [509](#), [594](#), [595](#)
Cheah, Pheng [143](#), [144](#)
Cheek, T [654](#)
Chen Duxiu [649](#), [650](#)

Chiang Kai-shek [653](#)
Childs, Peter [275](#)
Chilton, P A [176](#)
Chirumbolo, A [237](#)
Chomsky, N [391](#), [395](#)
Chouliaraki, Lilie [200](#)
Chow, T T [650](#)
Christie, C J [666](#), [667](#)
Christman, John [524](#)
Churchill, Winston [409](#)
Claeys, G [545](#)
Clark, Janine Astrid [631](#)
Clark, John P [385](#)
Clarke, P [352](#)
Clavigero, Francisco [583](#)
Clay, R [240](#)
Cleaver, Eldridge [103](#)
Clegg, H [355](#)
Clinton, Bill [222](#)
Coassin-Spiegel, H [36n5](#)
Coates, Ian [431](#)
Cobban, Alfred [459](#)
Cobden, Richard [551](#)
Cockett, R [407](#)
Codreanu, Corneliu [481](#), [487](#)
Cohen, F [239](#)
Cohen, G A [53](#), [54](#), [523](#), [526](#)
Cohen, G L [241](#)
Cohn, B [537](#), [548](#)
Cohn, J [386](#), [399](#)
Cohn, Norman [364](#)
Cohrs, J C [239–40](#)
Colás, A [539](#)

Coleman, Peter [95](#)
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor [300](#)
Collor de Mello, Fernando [496](#)
Commoner, Barry [427](#), [437n11](#)
Comte, August [59](#), [73](#), [585](#)
 and anti-liberalism [63](#)
 and progress [60](#)
 and sociology [3–4](#)
Conniff, M L [595](#), [596](#)
Connolly, W E [75](#), [170n2](#), [218](#)
Conover, P J [241](#)
Conrad, Joseph [554](#)
Constant, Benjamin [58](#), [299](#), [330–1](#), [541](#), [584](#), [598](#)
Converse, P E [233](#), [234](#)
Conze, Werner [4](#), [318](#)
Cooper, Chris [388](#)
Cooper, F [537](#), [539](#), [544](#)
Corbyn, Jeremy [189](#), [192](#)
Córdova, A [594](#), [595](#)
Cornford, F M [205–6](#)
Corradini, Enrico [478](#)
Correa, Rafael [505](#), [595](#)
Costa, V [522](#), [524](#)
Costello, K [240](#)
Cott, D L van [597](#), [600](#)
Coulter, Anne [207](#)
Cowley, P [307](#)
Cox, A [132](#)
Cramb, J A [547](#)
Crick, Bernard [75](#)
Cripps, Stafford [324](#)
Cristi, R [589](#)
Croce, Benedetto [31](#)

Croly, Herbert [335](#)
Cronin, H [567](#)
Crosland, C A R [98](#), [356–7](#)
Crossman, Richard H [376](#)
Cunningham, W A [236](#)
Curtis, M R [296](#)

Dagger, R [228n3](#), [516](#), [527](#)
Dahl, Robert [81](#), [83–4](#), [85](#), [500](#)
Dallmayr, F [155](#), [170n2](#)
Daly, Mary [579n27](#)
Darré, Walter [484](#)
Darwin, J [537](#)
Davies, Gloria [657](#)
Davies, J C [241](#)
Davis, A [577](#)
Davis, D W [240](#)
Davis, Laurence [388](#), [393](#)
Davis, M [548](#)
Dawson, A S [597](#)
Dawson, Christopher [468](#), [469](#)
Day, Richard [399](#)
Deary, I J [238](#)
Déat, Marcel [484](#)
De Clerye, Voltairine [394](#)
De Gasperi, Alcide [313](#), [324](#)
De Grazia, V [481](#)
Degrelle, Léon [480](#)
Delanty, G [455](#)
de la Torre, C [507](#)
Delli Carpini, M X [234](#)
Delphy, C [577](#)
del Rey Reguillo, F [586](#)

Deng Xiaoping [374](#), [381](#), [655](#), [656–7](#)
Depestre, René [612](#), [613](#)
Deranty, Jean-Philippe [145](#), [147](#)
de Romilly, Jacqueline [201](#)
Derrida, Jacques [171n6](#), [171n15](#)
De Ruggiero, G [331](#), [332](#)
Destutt de Tracy, Antoine Louis Claude [4](#), [5](#), [175](#), [441](#)
Deutsch, Karl [459](#)
Devji, F [227](#), [229n14](#)
Dewey, John [77](#), [79](#), [94](#), [104](#), [337](#)
Díaz-Andreu, M [456](#), [459](#)
Dibua, J I [617](#)
Dicken, Peter [260](#)
Dickens, Charles [276](#)
Dickinson, John [78](#)
Dierse, Ulrich [4](#), [5](#), [6](#), [8](#), [441](#)
Dikötter, Frank [380](#)
Ding Ling [655](#)
Dirks, N [548](#)
Dirks, Walter [325](#)
Dirlik, Arif [281](#), [282](#)
Dirven, R [176](#)
Disraeli, Benjamin [300–1](#)
Dobson, Andrew [430](#), [431](#)
Domhoff, G W [85](#)
Donner, W [334](#)
Donoso Cortes, Juan [294](#)
Dornbusch, R [496](#)
Dossetti, Giuseppe [325](#)
Doty, R [240](#)
Douglas, I H [673](#)
Douglas, Roger [405](#)
Dowding, Keith [521](#), [523](#)

Doyle, Michael [536](#)
Drakulic, S [455](#)
Dreyfus, Alfred [102](#)
Drieu La Rochelle, Pierre [482](#)
Drilik, A [396](#)
Driver, F [537](#)
Driver, S [307](#)
Drolet, J-F [341](#)
Dryberg, T B [131](#)
Dryzek, John [142](#), [203–4](#)
Du Bois, W E [615](#)
Dumont, L [219](#)
Dunn, John [158](#)
Dupre, J [567](#)
Durham, M [419](#)
During, Simon [285](#)
Du Yaquan [651](#), [652](#), [658](#)
Dworkin, Andrea [573](#), [579n27](#)
Dworkin, R [337](#), [524](#), [526](#)

Eagly, A H [177](#), [241](#)
Easton, David [80](#), [81](#), [82](#), [85](#), [86](#)
Eatwell, R [475](#)
Ebenstein, A [409](#)
Eccleshall, R [590](#)
Eckersley, Robyn [424](#), [426](#)
Eckstein, Harry [84](#)
Edelman, M J [204](#)
Edwards, Alberto [589](#)
Edwards, J [455](#)
Edwards, S [496](#)
Effendy, B [674](#)
Eidelman, S [238](#)

Elcock, Howard [260](#)
Eley, G [357](#)
Eliot, T S [295](#), [296](#), [465](#), [468](#), [469](#)
Elliott, A [222](#)
Elliott, G [31](#)
Elliott, J H [544](#)
Elliott, W Y [77](#)
El Saadawi, Nawal [618](#)
Elster, J [20](#), [26](#)
Ely, G [463](#)
Engels, Friedrich [8](#), [20](#), [116](#), [234](#), [241](#), [242](#)
 and class [8](#)
 and Communism [366–7](#), [368](#)
 and end of ideology thesis [92–3](#)
 and *German Ideology* [7–8](#)
 and ideology [8–9](#), [36n3](#), [175](#)
 negative conception of [62](#)
English, Richard [264](#)
Epstein, M [66](#)
Equiano, Olaudah [609–10](#)
Erhard, Ludwig [325](#)
Erikson, R S [234](#)
Esping-Andersen, G [353](#), [354](#)
Essien-Udom, E U [612](#)
Eucken, Walter [301](#), [409](#)
Eulau, Heinz [85](#), [86](#)
European ideology [15](#)
Evans, G [236](#)
Evola, Julius [296](#), [486](#), [488](#)
Evren, Süreyya [399](#)
Eze, O C [622](#)

Fairclough, N [176](#), [200](#)

Fanon, Frantz [284–5](#), [286](#), [538](#), [553–4](#), [607](#), [613](#), [614](#), [618](#), [619–20](#), [622](#)
Faraj, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam [633](#)
Farganis, Stephen [101–2](#)
Farr, J [74](#)
Farrar, Cynthia [201](#)
Fast, Howard [376](#)
Faure, Sébastien [391](#)
Fausto-Sterling, A [567](#), [570](#)
Fazio, R H [238](#)
Feder, Gottfried [484](#)
Federico, C M [234](#), [236](#), [237](#), [238](#)
Fee, L K [669](#)
Feinberg, L [571–2](#)
Feldman, S [235](#), [241](#)
Femia, Joseph [255](#)
Ferguson, Adam [367](#)
Ferguson, Kathy [207](#)
Ferguson, N [536](#), [537](#), [543](#), [545](#)
Festenstein, M [228n3](#)
Feuerbach, Ludwig [7](#)
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb [63–4](#), [461](#)
Fine, C [567](#)
Fink, Z S [514](#)
Finlayson, A [171n14](#), [204](#), [205](#), [207](#), [266](#)
Fiore, G [28](#)
Firestone, S [570](#), [579n27](#)
Fischer, Frank [204](#)
Fishman, W [394](#), [395](#)
Fiske, S T [177](#)
Fitting, Peter [448](#)
Fitzmaurice, A [542](#)
Fitzpatrick, Sheila [374](#)
Flatham, R [331](#)

Flax, J [575](#)
Foner, E [334](#), [344](#)
Fording, R C [117](#)
Forst, Rainer [149](#), [150](#)
Forsyth, M [304](#)
Fortuyn, Pim [493](#)
Foucault, Michel [146–7](#), [149](#), [158](#), [159](#), [272](#), [521](#), [575](#)
Fourier, Charles [59](#)
Fowler, R [176](#), [190](#)
Fox, Warwick [426](#)
Foxy, John [440](#)
Franco, Francisco [322](#)
Frank, Hans [485](#)
Franklin, J [361](#)
Franks, B [390](#)
Fraser, C [177](#)
Fraser, Nancy [138](#), [145](#), [148–9](#), [150](#), [576](#)
Freeden, Michael [10](#), [11](#), [12](#), [14](#), [16](#), [53](#), [120](#), [121](#), [122](#), [124](#), [128](#), [242](#), [243](#), [266](#),
[335](#), [336](#), [341](#), [352](#), [372](#), [439](#), [514](#), [520](#), [538](#)
 and anarchism [388](#)
 and conceptual analysis of ideologies [157–8](#), [198](#), [386](#), [445](#), [500](#)
 and decontestation [171n7](#), [216](#)
 and definition of ideology [314](#)
 and green ideology [429](#), [430](#)
 and ideological morphology [17](#)
 and ideologies as everyday phenomena [17](#)
 and nature of ideologies [314](#)
 and socialist core concepts [590](#)
 and total ideology [59](#)
 and utopia [445](#)
Freeman, J [396](#)
Frenkel-Brunswik, E [233](#)
Freud, Sigmund [20](#), [34](#)

Friedan, Betty [572](#)
Friedland, W H [616](#)
Friedman, David [389](#), [391](#)
Friedman, Milton [222](#), [306](#), [359](#), [405](#), [407](#), [409](#), [411](#), [418](#), [419](#)
Friedrich, C J [66](#), [70](#)
Friesen, J [243](#)
Frisby, D [52](#)
Frost, Catherine [453](#), [461](#), [467](#)
Froude, J A [547](#)
Fujimori, Alberto [496](#), [505](#), [595](#)
Fukuyama, Francis [14](#), [108](#), [342](#), [587](#)
Fung, S K F [652](#)
Funke, H-G [440](#)
Furedi, Frank [259](#)
Furlong, P [486](#)

Gadamer, H-G [122](#)
Gagarin, Michael [201](#)
Gaitskell, Hugh [98](#)
Gallagher, J [544](#), [548](#)
Gallie, W B [119](#), [120](#)
Galston, W A [598](#)
Gamble, Andrew [260](#), [262](#), [463](#)
Gamio, Manuel [597](#)
Gandhi, Leela [277](#)
Gandhi, Mohandas K [283](#), [553](#), [669–70](#)
Garcia, A L [589](#)
Garcíadieago, J [586](#)
García Sebastián, M [586](#)
Garnham, A [179](#)
Garrau, M [522](#), [527](#)
Garvey, Marcus [615](#)
Gaskell, G [177](#)

Geary, P J [454](#)
Geertz, Clifford [219](#), [443](#), [459](#)
 and ideology [105–6](#)
 and Mannheim Paradox [38](#), [445](#)
 and social and symbolic mapping [122](#)
Gehler, M [322](#)
Gellner, Ernest [454](#), [457](#), [459](#), [493](#)
Gemenne, F [459](#)
Gentile, Emilio [480](#)
Gentile, Giovanni [13](#), [67](#), [480](#), [481](#), [482](#), [485](#)
Gentner, D [179](#)
Geoghegan, V [443](#), [590](#)
George, S [224](#)
Geras, N [25](#)
Gerber, A S [235](#), [239](#), [242](#)
Gerges, F A [229n12](#)
Germain, Randall [255](#), [262](#)
Germani, G [507](#), [509](#), [595](#)
Germino, Dante L [11](#)
Gerstle, G [334](#), [344](#)
Geuss, R [21](#), [24](#), [54](#), [122](#), [123](#)
al-Ghannushi, Rashid [637](#), [640](#)
al-Ghazali, Muhammad [637](#), [639](#)
al-Ghazali, Zaynab [630](#)
Gibson, N [553](#)
Giddens, Anthony [260](#), [261–2](#), [359](#), [360](#)
Gillette, A [482](#)
Gilligan, C [577](#)
Gilman, N [543](#)
Gilroy, Paul [263](#)
Girardet, R [58](#)
Gleason, A [64](#)
Glyn, A [354](#), [358](#)

Glynos, J [133](#), [167–8](#), [172n30](#), [199](#)
Goebbels, Josef [482](#)
Gok Keng Swee [669](#)
Goldfarb, Jeffrey [259](#)
Goldman, Emma [385](#), [390](#), [396](#)
Gomez, E T [459](#)
Goodin, R E [428](#), [521](#), [527](#)
Goodman, Paul [387](#)
Gorbachev, Mikhail [377](#), [380](#), [381–2](#)
Goren, P [235](#), [237](#), [238](#), [241](#)
Gorman, Teresa [182–8](#), [189](#), [191](#), [194](#)
Graeber, D [390](#)
Graham, G [117](#)
Graham, J [240](#)
Graham Du Bois, Shirley [615](#)
Gramsci, Antonio [11](#), [21](#), [27](#), [116](#), [298](#), [591](#)
 and civil society [28–9](#)
 and communism [377–8](#)
 and hegemony [28](#)
 and ideology [28–31](#)
 expansive conception of [29](#), [30](#)
 narrow conception of [30](#)
 and integral state [28](#)
 and intellectuals [29](#), [252](#), [255](#), [256](#)
 and language [159](#)
 and *Prison Notebooks* [28](#), [159](#), [252](#)
 and rejection of critical accounts of ideology [30–1](#)
 and subalterns [277](#)
Grant, Charles [275](#)
Grassi, Ernesto [204](#)
Gray, John [304](#)
Green, D P [232](#), [241](#)
Greene, P [85](#)

Greenfeld, L [220](#), [454](#)
Greer, Germaine [569](#), [570](#), [575](#)
Gregor, A J [478](#), [485](#), [486](#)
Gregory, D [537](#)
Gregory XVI, Pope [315–16](#)
Grewal, Inderpal [279](#)
Griffin, Roger [422](#), [459](#), [479–80](#), [483](#)
Grosby, S [453](#), [454](#), [455](#), [460](#)
Guevara, Che [379](#), [593](#)
Guha, Ranajit [277](#), [678](#)
Guibernau, M [463](#)
Gunnell, J [75](#), [77](#), [79](#), [81](#), [86](#)
Guzmán, Jaime [589](#)
Gyallay-Pap, P [674](#)

Haber, Robert A [100–1](#)
Habermas, Jürgen [12](#), [140–1](#), [218](#), [258–9](#), [333](#), [516](#)
 and colonization of the lifeworld [145–6](#)
 and communicative reason [141](#)
 and deliberation [141](#), [144](#)
 and domination [141–2](#)
 and justice [146](#)
 and misrecognition [145–6](#)
 and participation [142](#)
 and republicanism [517](#)
Habib, I S [672](#)
Haider, Jörg [503](#)
Haider-Markel, D P [571](#)
Haidt, J [240](#)
Hajer, M [204](#)
Hale, C H [585](#), [586](#)
Hale, Thomas A [612](#)
Hall, J A [332](#)

Hall, Stuart [207](#)
Halle, L J [124](#)
Halley, Janet [148](#)
Hallowell, John [80](#), [336](#)
Hamburger, J [332](#), [334](#)
Hamill, R [241](#)
Hamilton, Alexander [416](#)
Hamilton, D L [177](#)
Hamilton, M B [115](#)
Hampshire, Stuart [206](#)
Hansen, Thomas Blom [672](#)
Hanson, Pauline [508](#)
Hansson, Per Albin [351](#), [352](#)
Hardie, Keir [349](#)
Hardin, C D [241](#)
Harding, Neil [369](#)
Harding, S [567](#)
Hardt, Michael [552](#)
Harnecker, Marta [594](#)
Harrington, James [514](#)
Harris, E [461](#)
Harris, N [176](#)
Harrison, R [332](#)
Harrisson, T [121](#)
Hart, Albert Bushnell [78](#)
Hartz, Louis [80](#), [305–6](#), [337](#), [405](#)
Harvey, D [407](#), [548](#), [552](#)
Hassan, S [664](#)
Hastings, A [454](#)
Haugaard, M [457](#)
Haushofer, Karl [483](#)
Hausman, B L [572](#)
Hay, Colin [202](#), [260](#)

Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl [594](#)
Hayden, Tom [100–1](#)
Hayek, Friedrich August [222](#), [359](#), [405](#), [406](#), [407](#), [414](#), [419](#), [461](#), [469](#)
 and *The Constitution of Liberty* [412](#)
 and criticism of [304](#)
 and *Law, Legislation and Liberty* [418](#)
 and New Right [302–4](#)
 and *The Road to Serfdom* [97](#), [408–9](#)
 and threat of collectivism [411](#)
 and true and false individualism [409](#)
Hayes, Carlton [459](#)
Hayes, P [484](#)
Hayward, J [295](#)
Hazareesingh, S [216](#), [517](#), [520](#)
Heath, Edward [406](#)
Heckert, J [397](#)
Hedman, E L [665](#)
Heffer, Simon [264](#)
Hegel, G W F [59](#), [60](#), [63](#), [108](#)
Hegghammer, Thomas [635](#), [636](#)
Heine, Heinrich [6–7](#)
Held, David [260](#), [262](#), [464](#)
Held, V [577](#)
Heller, Agnes [150](#)
Helzer, E G [240](#)
Hempel, Carl [81](#)
Hendrickson, J [611](#)
Henley, W E [547](#)
Herb, G H [459](#)
Herder, Gottfried [456](#), [461](#)
Herder, Johann von [476](#)
Herring, Pendelton [78](#), [79](#), [82](#)
Herzberg, Bruce [201](#)

Hess, Rudolf [483](#)
Hetherington, M J [241](#)
Hewison, K [664–5](#)
Hewitson, M [454](#)
Heyes, C J [571–2](#)
Heywood, A [228n3](#), [388](#)
Higgins, E T [241](#)
Hilferding, Rudolf [545](#)
Hill, C L [459](#)
Hill, M [669](#)
Himmler, Heinrich [480](#), [482](#)
Hindess, Barry [202](#)
Hinich, M J [131](#), [234](#)
Hintikka, M [567](#)
Hirschman, Albert O [205](#)
Hirsh, J B [242](#)
Hirst, Paul [260](#)
Hitchens, Peter [264](#)
Hitler, Adolf [67](#), [69](#), [233](#), [298](#), [474](#), [477](#), [479](#), [480–1](#), [482](#), [484](#), [486](#), [489](#)
Hobbes, Thomas [527](#)
Hobhouse, L T [335](#), [336](#)
Hobsbawm, Eric [219](#), [376](#), [454](#), [458](#)
Hobson, J A [121](#), [335](#), [537](#), [541](#), [545](#), [551](#)
Ho Chi Minh [666](#)
Hodge, R [190](#)
Hodson, G [238](#), [240](#)
Hoffman, Valerie [630](#)
Hofstadter, Richard [103](#), [106](#), [503](#)
Holmes, S [583–4](#), [585](#), [599](#)
Hölscher, Lucian [440](#)
Holtug, N [463](#)
Honig, Bonnie [143](#)
Honneth, Axel [144–8](#), [522](#)

Honohan, I [522](#), [531](#)
Hook, Sidney [91–2](#)
hooks, b [562](#), [565](#), [572](#)
Hoover, Herbert [79](#)
Hoover, K [407](#)
Horkheimer, Max [12](#), [80](#), [107](#)
 and end of ideology thesis [93–4](#)
 and manufacture of consent [139–40](#)
Hörnqvist, M [542](#)
Hountondji, Paulin J [608](#), [614–15](#), [623](#)
Howarth, D [133](#), [167–8](#), [172n30](#), [198](#)
Howe, Stephen [613–14](#)
Hroch, M [508](#)
Huang Xing [648](#)
al-Hudaybi, Khalida [630](#)
Huddart, David [275](#)
Hudson, W [443](#)
Hughes, H Stuart [95](#)
Hughes, Stephen [260](#)
Hu Jintao [657](#)
Hume, David [298](#), [299–300](#)
Humphrey, M [35](#), [122](#), [431](#)
Hunt, Lynn [16](#)
Huntington, Samuel [15](#)
Hunyady, O [242](#)
Hus, Jan [364](#)
Hu Shi [651](#)
Hussain, I [671](#)
Hutchins, Robert [80](#)
Huters, Theodore [647](#)
Hutton, C M [482](#)
Hutton, Will [261–2](#)
Huwaydi, Fahmi [637](#)

Hyde, Douglas [376](#)

Ibhawoh, Bonny [617](#)

Ichijo, A [455](#)

Icke, David [430](#)

Ignatieff, M [536](#)

Ignazi, P [497](#)

Ikenberry, J [537](#)

al'Imara, Muhammad [637](#)

Inayatullah, N [537](#)

Inbar, Y [240](#)

Inglehart, Ronald [434](#), [497](#)

Ionesco, Ghita [493](#)

Irele, Abiola [613](#)

Irvine, Sandy [431](#)

Isaac, J [74](#)

Isager, L [669](#)

al-Islamiyya, Hizb al-Da'wa [630](#)

Ismail, Salwa [637](#)

Isocrates [210](#)

Iton, R [340](#)

Ivarsson, S [669](#)

Jackson, B [352](#), [355](#), [357](#), [409](#)

Jackson, F [521](#)

Jackson, J E [131](#)

Jacoby, Russell [103](#), [259](#)

Jacoby, W G [236](#)

Jacques, Martin [207](#)

Jaffrelot, C [676](#)

Jaggar, A [577](#)

Jalal, A [673](#)

James, C L R [610](#), [614](#), [615](#), [616](#)

James, P [228n11](#)

James, William [77](#)
Jameson, Fredric [439](#), [445–7](#), [448](#)
Jamieson, K H [201](#)
JanMohamed, Abdul R [281](#)
Jaspers, Karl [38](#)
Jaurès, Jean [9](#), [349](#), [361](#)
Jayasuriya, K [669](#)
Jefferson, Thomas [5–6](#)
Jeffreys, S [566](#), [571](#), [572](#), [577](#), [579n27](#)
Jenco, L [649](#)
Jenkins, R [668](#)
Jenkins, Roy [98](#)
Jennings, J [393](#)
Jennings, M K [241](#)
Jiang Zemin [654](#), [657](#)
Joas, Hans [149](#)
Johnson, C [389](#), [390](#), [393](#), [497](#), [552](#)
Johnson, Lyndon B [305](#)
Johnson-Laird, P N [179](#)
John XXIII, Pope [325–6](#)
Johst, Hanns [489](#)
Jones, William [675](#)
Jorrín, M [590](#)
Joseph, Keith [412](#)
Joslyn, M R [571](#)
Jost, John T [121](#), [176–7](#), [180](#), [232](#), [233](#), [234](#), [238](#), [240](#), [242](#), [243](#)
 and distinction between left- and right-wing ideology [234](#), [236](#)
 and ideology as motivated social cognition [235](#), [237](#), [239](#)
 and system justification [241](#)
Journet, Charles [323](#)
Jouvenel, Bertrand de [97](#)
Joyce, James [286](#)
Juárez, Benito [585](#)

Judah, T [460](#)
Judt, Tony [109–10](#), [361](#)
Jünger, Ernst [297](#), [298](#)
Justo, Juan B [590–1](#)

Kahin, G M [674](#)
Kaiser, W [322](#)
Kaldor, Mary [262](#)
Kalinna, H E J [326](#)
Kallis, A [482](#), [483](#)
Kamenka, E [454](#)
Kampwirth, K [508](#)
Kanai, R [238](#)
Kang Youwei [647](#)
Kantor, H [594](#), [595](#)
Kaplan, Abraham [82](#)
Kaplan, D H [459](#)
Karam, A [228n9](#)
Kateb, George [444](#)
Katznelson, I [336](#), [344](#), [600](#)
Kaunda, Kenneth [614](#)
Kautsky, Karl [9](#), [228n7](#), [371](#), [545](#)
Kavanagh, D [307](#)
Kaviraj, S [666](#)
Kay, A C [236](#), [238](#), [243](#)
Kearns, G [537](#)
Keating, Michael [260](#)
Kedourie, Elie [454](#), [461](#)
Keeter, S [234](#)
Kellas, J G [453](#)
Kelly, G [550](#)
Kelly, P [331](#)
Kemp, Penny [431](#)

Kemp, S [563](#), [564](#)
Kennedy, E [4](#), [441](#)
Kennedy, John F [99](#)
Kenny, M [228n3](#), [251](#), [255](#), [258](#), [262](#), [263](#)
Kepel, G [228n10](#)
Kepel, K [228n9](#), [229n12](#)
Kern, S [541](#)
Kerry, John [239](#)
Kershaw, I [486](#)
Kettler, D [51](#), [54n1](#), [54n2](#), [445](#)
Keynes, John Maynard [353](#), [415](#)
Khan, Syed Ahmed [672](#)
Khomeini, Ruhollah [630](#), [633–4](#), [635](#)
Khoo, B T [669](#)
Khrushchev, Nikita [377](#), [378](#)
Kim, H [117](#)
Kimble, David [612](#)
King, Desmond [340](#)
King, Martin Luther, Jr [103](#)
Kingdon, J W [131](#)
Kinna, Ruth [386](#), [387](#), [390](#), [393](#), [394](#), [397](#)
Kintsch, W [179](#)
Kirchheimer, Otto [96](#), [325](#)
Kirk, Russell [305](#), [468](#)
Kitirianglarp, K [665](#)
Kitschelt, H [357](#), [497](#), [500](#)
Klaus, Vaclav [405](#)
Kloppenber, J [349](#), [351](#), [352](#), [361](#)
Kluegel, J R [242](#)
Knight, A [594](#), [595](#), [596](#)
Knight, Frank [409](#)
Knight, K [131](#), [242](#)
Knutsen, O [131](#)

Koestler, Arthur [92](#), [94–5](#)

Kohl, P L [456](#)

Kohn, Hans [454](#), [459](#)

Kohn, M [551](#)

Koizumi, Junichiro [405](#)
Kołakowski, Leszek [348](#), [361–2](#), [365](#), [377](#), [440](#)
Kom'boa Ervin, Lorenzo [397](#)
Kompridis, N [141](#)
Korang, K L [612](#)
Korchak, A [67](#)
Kornai, János [375](#)
Kornegger, P [396](#)
Koselleck, Reinhart [3](#), [4](#), [13](#), [132](#)
 and Cold War ideological polarization [12](#)
 and German conceptual history [15](#)
 and time philosophy [17](#)
Kostal, R [550](#)
Kramer, Matthew [521](#), [523](#)
Kress, G R [190](#)
Kristol, Irving [306](#)
Kropotkin, P [388](#), [390](#), [394](#), [395](#), [397](#)
Kuhn, Thomas [86](#), [171n11](#)
Kuklinski, J H [234](#)
Kumar, K [463](#)
Kurzman, Charles [258](#), [629](#)
Kwak, J-H [531](#)
Kwong, L K S [647](#)
Kymlicka, Will [263](#), [453](#), [597](#), [599](#), [602n14](#)

Laborde, C [517](#), [518](#), [520](#), [522](#), [527](#), [528](#), [531](#)
Lacan, Jacques [33](#), [133](#), [159](#)
Laclau, E [168](#), [171n17](#), [172n18](#), [172n27](#), [198](#), [499](#)
 and *catathresis* [199](#)
 and empty signifiers [162–3](#), [169](#)
 and identification [164](#)
 and ideology [132–3](#), [161](#)
 and myth [161](#)

and populism [501](#), [505](#), [596](#)
and the social world [160](#)
and subjectivity [162](#)
Lacordaire, Henri [315](#)
Lakoff, G [187](#)
Lamartine, Alphonse M [448](#)
Lammenais, F R [315](#)
Landau, M J [239](#)
Landtsheer, C [208](#)
Lane, B M [486](#)
Lane, R E [121](#), [242](#)
Lange, F A [349](#)
Langewiesche, D [333](#)
LaPalombara, Joseph [101](#)
Laqueur, Walter [11](#), [486](#)
Larmore, C [516](#), [524](#)
Laroui, Abdallah [628](#)
Larrain, J [27](#), [441](#)
Laski, Harold [77](#)
Lassalle, Ferdinand [6](#)
Lasswell, Harold [77](#), [82](#)
Latham, Earl [83](#)
Lau, R R [241](#)
Laurin, K [243](#)
Lawrence, B [226](#), [228n10](#)
Layman, G C [233](#), [241](#), [243](#)
Lazarsfeld, P [235](#)
Lazarus, Neil [271](#), [281](#)
Lazzeri, C [522](#), [527](#)
Leadbetter, Charles [262](#)
Le Bon, G [121](#), [476](#)
Lee, S [308](#)
Leeder, E [396](#)

Lee Kwan Yew [656](#)
Leerssen, J L [453](#)
Lees, S [577](#)
Lefort, Claude [160](#), [164](#)
Le Goff, Alice [145](#), [522](#), [527](#)
Legum, Colin [617](#)
Leighton, D [530](#), [531](#)
Leiter, B [20](#), [36n6](#)
Lemert, C [222](#)
Lenin, V I [67](#), [200](#), [228n7](#), [538](#)
 and communism [369–71](#)
 in colonial countries [666](#)
 and cult of [68](#)
 and ideology [27–8](#)
 and imperialism [545](#)
 on Mensheviks [373](#)
Lenk, Kurt [12](#)
Leo, Heinrich [6](#)
Leone, L [237](#)
Leonhard, J [330](#)
Leopold, Aldo [425](#)
Leo XIII, Pope [316–18](#), [319](#)
Le Pen, Jean-Marie [227](#), [489](#)
Lester, J [389](#), [391](#)
Levine, C [396](#)
Levinson, D J [233](#)
Levinson, S [85](#)
Levitas, Ruth [439](#), [447](#), [448](#)
Levy, S [240](#), [241](#)
Lewis, B [228n10](#)
Leyens, J P [177](#)
Liang Qichao [647–8](#), [649](#), [652](#)
Liang Shuming [652](#), [655](#), [656](#)

Lichtheim, George [441](#)
Li Dazhao [649](#), [653](#)
Lieber, Francis [76](#)
Liebich, A [454](#)
Lieven, D [537](#)
Lincoln, Abraham [501](#)
Lindblom, Charles [83](#), [84](#)
Linstrum, E [548](#)
Linz, Juan J [71](#), [235](#)
Lippmann, Walter [78](#), [335](#), [409](#)
Lipset, Seymour Martin [84](#), [235](#), [242](#)
 and end of ideology thesis [92](#), [98–9](#), [100](#)
 and *Political Man* [98](#), [99](#), [412](#)
List, C [521](#), [525](#)
Liu Shaoqi [655](#)
Lively, J [295](#)
Loader, Colin [11](#), [54n2](#)
Locke, John [206](#), [519](#), [524](#), [538](#)
Lockman, Zachary [273](#)
Lodge, Guy [263](#)
Loh, F K W [668–9](#)
Lomborg, Bjørn [431](#), [432](#), [434](#), [436](#)
Long, D [537](#)
Long, R [389](#)
López Pumarejo, Alfonso [586](#), [587](#)
Lovett, F [521–2](#), [524](#), [526](#)
Lowell, A Lawrence [78](#)
Lowi, Theodore [85–6](#)
Lowrie, Arthur L [637](#)
Löwy, M [591](#), [592](#)
Lucaites, J [201](#)
Luhmann, Niklas [12](#)
Luis Mora, José Maria [585](#)

Lukács, Georg [27](#)
Lukes, S [298](#), [307](#)
Lupia, A [234](#)
Lupton, Thomas [440](#)
Lüthi, Lorenz M [380](#)
Luxemburg, Rosa [545](#)
Lyotard, Jean-François [107](#), [286](#), [399](#)
Lysenko, Trofim [378](#)

Maathai, Wangari [621](#)
Macaulay, Thomas Babington [275](#), [549](#), [663](#)
McCann, S J H [240](#)
McCarthy, Thomas [139](#), [144](#), [149](#)
McCauley, D [228n11](#)
McClelland, J S [295](#)
McClintock, Anne [271](#)
McConnell, Grant [85](#)
MacCormick, N [454](#), [461](#), [467](#)
McCoy, C A [75](#)
Macdonald, Dwight [94](#)
McDougall, William [232](#)
McGann, A [497](#)
McGregor, I [240](#)
McGrew, Anthony [260](#)
McGuire, W J [234](#)
Machan, T [389](#)
Machiavelli, Niccolo [514](#), [518](#)
Machin, D [176](#)
McIlwain, C H [79](#)
MacIntyre, Alasdair [387](#)
MacIver, Robert M [90](#), [91](#)
McKay, I [390](#), [391](#), [393](#), [394](#), [395](#), [396](#), [397](#)
McKay, John Henry [385](#)

MacKinnon, C A [570–1](#), [573](#), [577](#), [578n2](#), [579n27](#)
McLaughlin, Paul [385](#), [387](#)
McLellan, D [157](#), [378](#)
McLuhan, Marshall [387](#)
McMahon, C [523](#), [529](#)
Macmillan, Harold [301](#)
McNay, Lois [142](#), [144](#), [149](#), [151](#)
McVey, R T [665](#)
Madero, Francisco I [586](#)
Madge, C [121](#)
Madison, James [78](#), [83](#), [514](#)
Madrid, Raúl [504](#)
al-Mahmud, ‘Abdullah Ibn Zad [639](#)
Maier, C [543](#)
Maine, Henry [549](#)
Maistre, Joseph de [59](#), [60](#), [294–5](#), [315](#), [476](#), [588](#)
al-Majd, Kamal Abu [637](#)
Malamud, M [543](#)
Malatesta, Errico [390](#), [394](#)
Malešević, S [457](#)
Malrieu, J P [176](#)
Mamdani, Mahmood [275](#)
Man, Henri de [484](#)
Mandela, Nelson [164](#)
Manela, E [468](#)
Mani, Lata [279](#)
Manin, B [505](#)
Mannheim, Karl [10–11](#), [175](#), [439](#)
 and attack on epistemology and a priori ethics [40](#)
 and contribution to contemporary political theory [52–4](#)
 and criticism of [38](#)
 and dynamic nature of truth [40](#)
 and dynamic relationism [43](#), [45](#), [46](#), [47](#), [49](#)

- and education of ideologically located partisans 51–2
- and end of ideology thesis 93
- and evaluation of political ideologies 45
- and evaluative ideology 43, 44
- and false consciousness 42–4
- and historicism 40, 42
- and *Ideology and Utopia* 10, 38, 39, 40, 41, 47, 54n1, 252, 253, 441
- and ideology and utopias 44–5, 254, 440, 441–3
- on inconsistencies in his work 449n1
- and intellectuals 252, 253, 254, 256, 257–8
- and Marxism 45–7
- and misunderstanding of 39
- and modern political ideologies 50–1
 - historical conservatism 50–1
 - liberalism 51
 - Marxism 51
- and new political science 39, 41, 47–9
 - criticisms of 52
 - dynamic synthesis 49–50
 - political reading of Marx 45–7
 - possibility of developing 47–9
 - relation to object of inquiry 48
 - Weberian background 41–2
- and paradox of ideology 38, 39, 54
- and political thinking 44
- and realist dialectic 46–7
- and relationism 42–3, 253
- and relation of ideology to politics 41
- and social free floating intellectuals 51–2
- and sociology of knowledge 39, 40–1, 253
 - origins of 42
- and style of thought of partisan positions 48
- and total ideology 59

Mansfield, Harvey, Jr [305](#)
Mantena, K [541](#), [549](#), [553](#)
Manteuffel, Otto von [6](#), [18n3](#)
Mao Zedong [374](#), [380–1](#), [653–4](#), [656](#)
Marchi, M [324](#)
Marcuse, Herbert [96](#)
Margalit, A [453](#)
Mariátegui, José Carlos [591–2](#)
Maritain, Jacques [301](#), [321–2](#), [323–4](#)
Markovitz, I L [613](#)
Marquand, David [263](#)
Marsella, M [391](#)
Marshall, T H [353](#)
Marti, J L [528](#)
Martin, J [205](#), [530](#)
Martz, J D [590](#)
Marx, Karl [10](#), [59](#), [116](#), [234](#), [241](#), [242](#)
 and anti-liberalism [63](#)
 and class [8](#), [22–3](#)
 and Communism [366–8](#)
 and dictatorship of the proletariat [63](#)
 and domination [521](#)
 and emancipatory ambition of [35](#)
 and *German Ideology* [7–8](#), [20](#)
 and ideology [8–9](#), [20](#), [175](#)
 camera obscura analogy [8](#), [20](#)
 in class-divided societies [22–3](#)
 class function of [25](#)
 critical account of [21](#), [23](#)
 critical concerns about [26](#)
 descriptive account of [21](#)
 development of theory in Marxist tradition [27–8](#)
 as element of his sociology [22](#)

- epistemological standing of [24](#)
- false ideas [22](#), [23](#), [25](#), [26](#)
- little discussion of [20](#)
- negative conception of [62](#)
- positive account of [21](#)
- role in his thought [21–3](#)
- social ideas [23–4](#)
- social origin of [24–5](#)
- and imperialism [545](#)
- and Mannheim's reading of [45–7](#)
- as 'master of suspicion' [20](#)
- as Orientalist [273](#)
- and progress [60](#)
- on Proudhon [365–6](#)

Maslow, Abraham [434](#)

Masterman, C F G [334](#)

Mathiessen, F O [91](#)

Maududi, Abu'l Ala [629](#), [631](#), [632](#), [638](#), [639](#), [672](#), [673](#)

Maurras, Charles [295](#), [296](#), [468](#), [469](#), [477](#)

Mawson, John [260](#)

May, T [386](#)

May, Todd [399](#)

Mayall, J [454](#), [550](#)

Mayers, D [552](#)

Maynor, J [518](#), [522](#), [527](#)

Mayr, A [176](#)

Mazower, M [336](#)

Mazrui, Ali [614](#)

Mazzini, Giuseppe [63–4](#), [456](#), [458](#), [461](#), [468](#), [546](#)

Mbiti, John S [608](#)

Mboya, Tom [614](#)

Mečiar, Vladimir [503](#)

Medearis, John [143](#)

Megill, Allan [108](#)
Mehring, Franz [36n3](#)
Mehta, U [546](#)
Meidner, R [358](#)
Meisel, J [201](#)
Meisner, Maurice J [653](#)
Meja, V [54n1](#), [54n2](#)
Mella, Ricardo [394](#)
Melloni, A [326](#)
Memmi, Albert [613](#)
Menczer, B [294](#)
Mendel, Iris [254](#), [257–8](#)
Menem, Carlos [496](#), [595](#)
Mennell, S [303](#)
Mensah, Sarbah, J [611](#)
Mény, Y [507](#)
Menzel, Wolfgang [18n2](#)
Mephram, J [21](#)
Merquior, J G [330](#), [585](#), [601n1](#)
Merriam, Charles [77](#), [80](#)
Merrill, R [517](#), [520](#)
Metcalf, T R [662](#), [675](#)
Meyer, J [593](#)
Meyer, M [176](#)
Michelman, Frank [516](#)
Michels, Robert [93](#), [476](#), [478](#)
Michnik, A [338](#)
Micklethwait, Brian [388](#), [389](#)
Mikell, Gwendolyn [620–1](#)
Milelli, J-P [228n10](#)
Miliband, Ralph [371](#)
Mill, James [543](#)
Mill, John Stuart [73](#), [332](#), [333–4](#), [455](#), [456](#), [458](#), [469](#), [524](#), [538](#), [546](#), [549](#), [550](#),

[551](#), [567](#), [569](#), [599](#), [675](#)

Millar, John [367](#)

Miller, David [257](#), [385](#), [453](#), [455](#), [461](#), [467](#), [468–9](#), [516](#), [526](#)

Miller, G [567](#)

Mills, C Wright [83](#), [85](#), [101](#), [102](#)

Minogue, K [124](#)

Mises, L von [408](#), [409](#)

Mmari, Geoffrey [617](#)

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade [279](#)

Moir, M [549](#)

Molina, G [586](#)

Moltke, Helmut von [547](#)

Mondak, J J [235](#), [239](#), [242](#)

Montalambert, Charles de [315](#)

Montesquieu, Baron de [366–7](#)

Montherlant, Henri de [296–7](#)

Moon, Donald J [150](#)

Moore, C [305](#)

Morales, Evo [496](#), [504](#), [508](#), [509](#), [595](#)

Moran, J [385](#)

More, Thomas [365](#), [439–40](#)

Morefield, J [546](#)

Moreno, Ezequiel [587–8](#)

Morès, Marquis de [295–6](#)

Morgan, Kevin [376](#)

Morgan, Robin [579n27](#)

Morone, J [334](#)

Morrice, D [157](#)

Morris, J [398](#)

Morse, R [600–1](#)

Morstein-Marx, F [68–9](#)

Morton, Stephen [278](#)

Mosca, Gaetano [95](#)

Moscovici, S [233](#), [241](#)
Moses, A D [551](#)
Mosley, Oswald [484–5](#), [487](#), [488–9](#)
Mosse, George L [11](#), [477](#), [480](#)
Mouffe, C [132](#), [150](#), [160](#), [161](#), [171n17](#), [198](#)
Mounier, Emanuel [322](#), [325](#)
Mount, Ferdinand [305](#)
Mou Zongsan [655–6](#)
Mozaffari, M [228n9](#)
Mphahlele, Ezekiel [614](#)
Mubarak, Hosni [628](#)
Mudde, C [497–8](#), [502](#), [506](#), [507](#)
Mudimbe, V Y [611](#), [613](#)
Müller, Adam [60](#)
Müller, J-W [121](#), [333](#)
Munger, M C [131](#), [234](#)
Munro, Martin [283](#)
Müntzer, Thomas [364](#)
Murdoch, H [612](#)
Murray, Charles [306](#)
Musil, J [339](#)
Mussolini, Benito [13](#), [67](#), [474–6](#), [478](#), [480](#), [483](#), [489](#), [663](#)
Muthu, S [551](#)
Mutua, Makua [623](#)
Myddleton, D [389](#)
Myrdal, Gunnar [337](#)

Nabulsi, K [516](#), [547](#)
Nadwi, Abul Hasan Ali [673](#)
Naess, Arne [424](#)
Nail, P R [240](#)
Nairn, T [219](#)
Nandy, Ashis [283](#), [285](#)

Naoroji, Dadabhai [667](#)
Napier, J L [242](#), [243](#)
Napoleon I [4–5](#), [7](#), [175](#), [441](#)
Napoleon III [63](#)
Nasr, S V R [671](#), [672](#), [673](#)
Nasser, Gamal Abdel [614](#), [617–18](#), [630](#), [631](#)
Näsström, S [502](#)
Natsir, Mohammed [674](#)
Negri, Antonio [552](#)
Nehru, Jawaharlal [662](#), [668](#)
Nelson, T D [177](#)
Nestle, J [576](#)
Neuhaus, Richard [306](#)
Neumann, S [65](#)
Newman, S [386](#), [399](#)
Nfah-Abennyi, J M [621](#)
Nganang, Patrick [614](#)
Nicholls, A [406](#)
Niebuhr, Reinhold [323](#)
Nielsen, Kai [453](#), [461](#)
Niemi, R G [241](#)
Nietzsche, Friedrich [3](#), [20](#), [469](#), [477](#)
Niezen, R [597](#)
Nisbet, R [588](#)
Nkrumah, Kwame [105](#), [614–16](#)
Nordhaus, Ted [433–4](#), [436](#)
Norman, W [455](#)
Norval, A [133](#), [162](#), [165](#), [172n24](#), [172n32](#), [198](#), [208](#)
Nosek, B A [236](#)
Novalis (G F Ph Von Hardenberg) [315](#)
Nove, Alec [374](#)
Nozick, Robert [305](#), [389](#), [405](#)
 and freedom [523](#)

and minimal state [414–15](#)
Nunn, Heather [207](#)
Nussbaum, Martha [578n3](#)
Nuttall, Jeremy [392](#)
Nyerere, Julius K [614](#), [616–17](#)

Oakeshott, Michael [116](#), [304](#), [466](#)
Oakhill, J [179](#)
Obama, Barack [227](#)
Oborne, Peter [308](#)
O’Brien, P [540](#)
Odegard, Peter [78](#)
Oertel, Horst [4](#)
Offe, C [408](#)
Oglesby, Carl [338](#)
Ogude, S E [609](#), [610](#)
O’Hanlon, R [676](#)
Okin, S M [573](#), [576](#)
Okonjo, Kamene [620](#)
Okpewho, I [608](#)
Olaya Herrera, Enrique [586](#)
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L [201](#), [208](#)
Omvedt, G [676](#), [677](#)
O’Neill, D [551](#)
Ortega Y Gasset, J [295](#), [296](#), [469](#)
Ostiguy, P [496](#)
Ottaviani, Alfredo [326](#)
Owen, David [145](#)
Owen, Robert [59](#), [61](#), [366](#)
Owens, Lyn [258](#)
Oxley, D R [240](#)
Ozanam, Frédéric [316](#)
Özkirimli, U [454](#), [455](#), [461](#)

Ozouf, M [61](#)

Padmore, George [610](#), [615](#)

Páez, José Antonio [589](#)

Pagden, A [540](#), [542](#), [544](#), [583](#)

Palin, Sarah [207](#), [504](#), [508](#)

Palmer, C T [567](#)

Palmowski, J [463](#)

Palonen, Kari [201](#)

Palti, E [588](#)

Panagia, Davide [208](#)

Panikkar, K M [664](#)

Panizza, F [502](#)

Panunzio, Sergio [484](#)

Papini, Giovanni [467](#), [478](#)

Parekh, Bikhu [263](#), [283](#), [553](#), [666](#), [670](#), [673](#)

Parel, A [553](#), [670](#)

Pareto, Vilfredo [95](#), [476](#), [478](#)

Parry, Benita [281](#)

Parsons, Lucy [394](#), [395](#), [396](#), [397](#)

Parsons, Talcott [12](#), [241](#), [242](#)

Parvin, P [575](#)

Pateman, Carole [85](#), [567](#)

Paterson, Isabel [13](#)

Patten, Alan [518](#)

Paul, Ron [309n11](#)

Payne, Anthony [260](#)

Peacock, A [406](#)

Pechoux, Michel [228n4](#)

Peletz, M G [671](#)

Pelloutier, Fernand [395](#), [590](#)

Pemberton, J-A [543](#)

Penelope, J [572](#)

Perlman, Chaim [201](#), [208](#)
Perlman, M [417](#)
Perón, Evita [508](#)
Perón, Juan Domingo [493](#), [496](#), [595](#)
Pettit, P [513](#), [518–25](#), [527–30](#), [552](#)
Phule, Mahatma Jyotirao [663](#), [676](#), [677](#)
Pines, C L [24](#)
Pinker, S [567](#)
Pinochet, Augusto [405](#), [407](#), [418](#), [589](#)
Pitcher, A [616](#)
Pitkin, H F [170n2](#)
Pitts, J [537](#), [546](#), [550](#), [551](#)
Pius IX, Pope [316](#)
Pius X, Pope [319–20](#)
Pius XI, Pope [320](#)
Pius XII, Pope [313](#), [323](#)
Pizarro, D A [240](#)
Plamenatz, John [367](#), [461](#)
Plant, R [407](#), [415](#)
Plant, S [399](#)
Plato [5](#), [209](#)
Playford, J [75](#)
Plekhanov, Georgy [369](#)
Pocock, J G A [157](#), [158](#), [170n2](#), [171n11](#), [514](#), [516](#), [518](#), [540](#)
Polak, Fred L [443](#)
Polanyi, Karl [348](#), [545](#)
Polanyi, Michael [97](#), [109n2](#)
Pombeni, P [313](#), [322](#), [324](#)
Ponton, Alec [431](#)
Pontusson, J [359–60](#)
Popkin, S [678](#)
Popper, Karl [57](#), [409](#)
 and historicism [476](#)

and nationalism [461](#)
and *The Open Society and Its Enemies* [14](#)
and utopia [441](#)
Porritt, Jonathon [422](#), [431](#)
Portales, Diego [585](#), [589](#)
Porter, B [543](#)
Potkay, Adam [621](#)
Pouget, Émile [394](#)
Pratt, Cranford [617](#)
Pratto, F [242](#)
Primo de Rivera, José Antonio [485](#)
Primo de Rivera, Miguel [589](#)
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph [365](#), [390](#), [590](#)
Przeworski, A [352](#), [353](#), [587](#)
Purchase, Graham [398](#)
Pye, Lucien [459](#)
Pyszczyński, T [239](#)

al-Qaradawi, Yusuf [631](#), [637](#), [638–40](#)
Qutb, Amina [630](#)
Qutb, Hamida [630](#)
Qutb, Sayyid [629](#), [631](#), [632–3](#), [635](#), [638](#), [639](#)

Raab, E [235](#), [242](#)
Raban, J [307](#)
Rajchman, J [159](#)
Ranade, M G [663](#), [667–8](#)
Rand, Ayn [305](#), [306–7](#), [389](#), [405](#)
Rankin, L [242](#)
Ranney, Austin [85](#)
Rao, Rahul [279](#)
Rathbun, B C [235](#)
Ratzel, Friedrich [453](#), [467](#)
Rauh, Hans-Christoph [4](#)

Rawls, John [35](#), [342](#), [524](#), [526](#), [599](#)
Raymond, J [572](#)
Raz, Joseph [453](#)
Reagan, Ronald [405](#), [407](#)
Recabarren, Luis Emilio [591](#)
Reclus, Elisée [397](#)
Redlawsk, D [241](#)
Rehmann, J [36n4](#)
Reitsch, Hanna [481](#)
Renan, Ernest [456](#), [458](#), [461](#)
Renault, Emmanuel [145](#)
Renaut, A [520](#)
Renner, Karl [9](#)
Rentfrow, P J [239](#)
Reus-Smit, C [551](#)
Reynolds, S [454](#)
Reynolds, V [453](#)
Rhodes, R A W [204](#), [260](#)
Ribeiro, P [397](#)
Richards, I A [209](#)
Richardson, H [516](#)
Ricouer, P [20](#), [122](#), [228n5](#), [439](#)
 and utopia [440](#), [442](#), [444–5](#), [447](#)
Rida, Rashid [629](#), [639](#)
Riefenstahl, Leni [481](#)
Riff, M A [117](#)
Riker, William [202–3](#)
Robb, P [675](#), [676](#)
Robbins, Lionel [409](#)
Roberts, D [485](#)
Roberts, K [500](#)
Robertson, Roland [214](#), [222](#)
Robinson, R [544](#), [548](#)

Rocco, Alfredo [484](#)
Rocker, Rudolf [388](#), [390](#), [394](#), [395](#)
Rodan, G [669](#)
Rodó, José Enrique [602n6](#)
Rodriques, V [677](#)
Roeder, P G [459](#)
Rogers, J [675](#)
Rohmer, Theodor [18n3](#)
Rojas, R [584](#)
Rokeach, M [235](#), [238](#)
Rolingher, Louise [610](#)
Roosevelt, Franklin D [79](#)
Rooum, Donald [386](#), [395](#)
Röpke, Wilhelm [301](#), [409](#)
Rorty, Richard [170n1](#)
Rosamond, Ben [260](#)
Rosanvallon, P [520](#)
Rosberg, C G [616](#)
Rose, H [567](#)
Rose, S [567](#)
Rosen, M [21](#), [25](#)
Rosenau, J N [229n16](#)
Rosenberg, A [468](#), [480](#), [482](#)
Roshwald, A [455](#)
Rosin, H [570](#)
Ross, D [73](#)
Rothbard, Murray [389](#), [392–3](#), [405](#), [413](#), [415](#)
Rousseas, Stephen [101–2](#)
Rousseau, Jean Jacques [63](#), [476](#), [504](#), [514](#), [530](#)
Routledge, B [455](#), [460](#)
Rovira Kaltwasser, C [498](#), [506](#), [507](#)
Rowan, Henry S [381](#)
Roy, M N [666](#)

Roy, O [226](#), [228n9](#), [640](#)
Roy, Raja Rammohan [663](#)
Rummens, S [506](#)
Rupp, L J [486](#)
Rusinow, Dennison [379](#)
Ruthven, M [228n9](#)

Sabine, George [78](#), [79](#)
Sadat, Anwar [633](#), [637](#)
al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir [629–30](#), [634–5](#)
Safford, F [584](#), [601](#)
Sahlins, M [537](#)
Said, Edward [537](#), [620](#)
 and contrapuntal reading [276](#)
 and criticism of [273](#)
 and *Culture and Imperialism* [276](#)
 and discourse [274](#)
 and intellectuals [256–7](#), [259](#)
 and Orientalism [272–3](#)
 and postcolonialism [272](#), [286](#)
 and poststructuralism [273–4](#)
Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de [58](#), [59](#), [60](#), [61](#), [63](#), [366](#), [590](#)
Salisbury, Lord [301](#), [544](#)
Samuel, Raphael [376](#)
Sandel, M [515](#), [516](#), [530](#)
Sanders, Lynn [142](#), [203](#)
Sanford, R N [233](#)
Sargent, L T [117](#), [216](#), [228n3](#), [440](#)
Sargent, M [237](#)
Sargisson, Lucy [448](#)
Sarmiento, Domingo [601n4](#)
Saro-Wiwo, Kenule [621](#)
Sartori, A [546](#)

Sartori, Giovanni [499](#)
Sartre, Jean-Paul [284](#), [613](#)
Sassen, S [222](#)
Sassoon, D [355](#), [358](#), [377](#)
Saunders, Frances Stonor [95](#)
Scarbrough, E [131](#)
Schacht, Hjalmar [408](#)
Schattschneider, E E [85](#)
Scheuerman, William E [141](#)
Schimel, J [239](#)
Schmidt, B [537](#)
Schmidt, Ernst Günther [4](#)
Schmitt, Carl [297–8](#), [469](#), [506](#)
Schnapper, D [516](#)
Schneider, M [234](#)
Schumpeter, Joseph [545](#)
Schurmann, Franz [66](#)
Schwarcz, V [650](#)
Schwedler, Jillian [631](#)
Scott, J [537](#), [548](#), [550](#), [678](#)
Scruton, R [123](#), [264](#), [302](#), [465](#), [468](#)
Sears, D O [234](#), [240](#), [241](#)
Seeley, J R [542](#), [547](#)
Seldon, A [411](#), [417](#)
Seligson, M [508](#)
Senghor, Léopold [283–4](#), [612](#), [613–14](#)
Seth, Sanjay [667](#)
Seton-Watson, Hugh [459](#)
Seymour, H [390](#)
Shachar, A [573](#)
Shafer, B C [454](#)
Shafer, B E [337](#)
Shakhnazarov, Georgiy [372](#)

Shaltut, Mahmud [639](#)
Shanley, M L [567](#)
Shapiro, Ian [152](#), [170n2](#), [232](#)
al-Sha'rawi, Huda [630](#)
Sharpe, M [167](#)
Shaw, Martin [262](#)
Shaw, W [26](#)
Shellenberger, Michael [433–4](#), [436](#)
Shepard, Walter [78](#)
Shepperson, George [609](#), [610](#)
Shepsle, Kenneth A [203](#)
Shilliam, Robbie [283](#)
Shils, Edward [97](#), [123](#)
Shinawatra, Thaksin [510n1](#)
Shivji, I [622](#)
Shonfield, Andrew [412](#)
Shook, N J [238](#), [240](#)
Shubert, Glendon [84–5](#)
Sidanius, J [232](#), [235](#), [236](#), [242](#)
Sierra, Justo [585](#)
Sihanouk, Norodom [674](#)
Šik, Ota [375](#)
Silver, B D [240](#)
Sima, Horia [489](#)
Simms, B [544](#)
Simon, Herbert [82](#)
Singer, Peter [426](#)
Singh, Amritjit [618](#)
Skinner, Q [121](#), [158](#), [171n10](#), [171n12](#), [201](#), [518](#), [519](#), [521](#)
 and freedom [552](#)
 and republicanism [513](#), [514–15](#), [525](#)
 and rhetoric [202](#)
Skitka, L J [238](#), [240](#)

Smilde, D [508](#)
Smith, Adam [367](#), [544–5](#)
Smith, Anthony [219](#), [454](#), [455](#), [459](#)
Smith, E R [242](#)
Smith, K B [235](#), [240](#)
Sniderman, P M [233](#), [234](#), [235](#), [241](#)
Snyder, L [454](#), [459](#)
Solomon, S [239](#)
Somit, Albert [75](#)
Sorel, Georges [477](#), [590](#)
Souchy Bauer, Augustin [395](#)
Southey, Robert [601n1](#)
Sowell, Thomas [306](#)
Soyinka, Wole [614](#), [621](#)
Spelman, E [572](#)
Spencer, Herbert [551](#), [585](#)
Spencer, P [457](#)
Spengler, Oswald [296](#), [476](#), [487](#)
Spiro, H J [64](#)
Spitz, J-F [522](#), [527](#), [530](#)
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty [537](#), [678](#)
 and essentialism [286](#)
 and subaltern studies [277–9](#)
Spleth, J [613](#), [614](#)
Spooner, Lysander [389](#)
Spretnak, Charlene [431](#)
Sprute, Jurgen [201](#)
Squires, J [563](#), [564](#)
Stalin, Joseph [67](#), [68](#), [369](#), [370](#), [377](#), [378–9](#)
Stanley, Ben [499](#)
Stapfer, Philipp Albert [18n1](#)
Stapleton, Julia [264–5](#)
Starr, P [335](#), [343](#)

Staten, H [171n13](#)
Stavrakakis, Y [172n31](#), [199](#), [422](#)
Stears, M [54](#), [143](#)
Stedman Jones, G [545](#)
Steger, M B [215](#), [216](#), [223](#), [224](#), [349](#), [538](#), [539](#), [553](#)
Steiner, H [523](#)
Steinfels, Peter [99](#)
Steinmetz, W [132](#)
Stephen, James Fitzjames [675](#)
Stephen, Leslie [366](#)
Stephenson, J [481](#)
Sternhell, Zeev [476](#), [477](#), [484](#)
Stevens, A L [179](#)
Stimson, J A [234](#), [243](#)
Stirner, M [394](#)
Stokes, Eric [662](#), [663](#)
Stoler, A [537](#), [539](#)
Stone, J [303](#)
Storing, Herbert [85](#)
Stråth, Bo [11](#), [123](#)
Strauss, Leo [80](#), [83](#), [306](#)
Sturzo, Luigi [320](#)
Suda, Z [339](#)
Sukarno, President [662](#), [674](#)
Sullivan, A [307](#)
Sundiata [608](#)
Sunstein, Cass [516](#)
Sun Yat-sen [648](#), [649](#)
Surel, Y [507](#)
Swift, A [122](#)
Szacki, J [339](#)
Szalasi, Ferenc [480](#)

Taggart, Paul [501](#)
Tagore, Rabindranath [651](#)
Taguieff, P A [507](#)
Talmon, Jacob [63](#), [476](#)
Tambaiah, S [672](#), [673](#)
Tamir, Y [453](#), [461](#), [467](#)
Tanenhaus, Joseph [75](#)
Tan Malaka, Ibrahim Datuk [666](#)
Tannenbaum, E R [296](#)
Tanner, D [349](#)
Tan Sitong [647](#)
Tarling, N [459](#)
Taylor, A J P [312](#)
Taylor, Charles [143](#), [145](#), [148](#), [217](#), [263](#), [516](#), [522](#), [538](#), [539](#), [597](#)
Taylor, Paul W [426](#)
Taylor, S E [177](#)
Taymiyya, Ibn [633](#), [636](#)
Tedin, K L [234](#)
Terborg-Penn, R [620](#)
Terrizzi, J A [240](#)
Tetlock, P E [235](#), [238](#)
Thatcher, Margaret [207](#), [304](#), [305](#), [405](#), [407](#), [415](#)
Thomas, Peter [255](#)
Thompson, Grahame [260](#)
Thompson, K [176](#)
Thorel, Abbé [588](#)
Thorisdottir, H [237](#)
Thornhill, R [567](#)
Thrower, J [68](#)
Tillich, Paul [321](#)
Tilton, T [335](#), [352](#), [358](#), [361](#)
Tito, Josip Broz [379](#)
Tocqueville, Alexis de [76](#), [303](#), [469](#), [547](#), [550](#), [584](#)

Todorov, T [540](#)
Tokar, Brian [431–2](#)
Tomkins, S S [235](#)
Toniolo, Giuseppe [318](#)
Tönnies, Ferdinand [481](#)
Toolan, M J [176](#)
Torrance, J [35n2](#)
Travis, C B [567](#)
Treitschke, Heinrich von [547](#)
Trentmann, Frank [265](#)
Trevelyan, G [334](#)
Troeltsch, Ernst [321](#)
Trotsky, Leon [369](#), [370](#), [592](#)
Truman, David [83](#)
Tullock, Gordon [415–16](#), [417](#)
Tully, James [158](#), [159](#), [170n2](#), [171n13](#), [333](#), [554](#), [597–8](#), [602n16](#)
Tulving, E [179](#)
Tumarkin, N [68](#)
al-Turabi, Hasan [637](#), [640](#)
Turgot, A R J [366–7](#)
Turner, B [40](#)
Turner, R [406](#), [409](#)
Tutu, Desmond [622](#)
Tu Wei-ming [656](#)
Tyler, T R [242](#)

Ullrich, J [239–40](#)
U Nu [674](#)
Uzelac, G [455](#)

Valentine, J [171n14](#)
Valentini, L [528](#)
Vallenilla Lanz, L [589](#)
Valois, Georges [479](#), [480](#)

Van Den Brink, Bert [145](#)
Vandenbroucke, F [360](#), [361](#)
Van den Bruck, Muller [297](#), [298](#)
Van Dijk, T A [117](#), [175](#), [176](#), [177](#), [178](#), [179](#), [181](#)
Van Hensbroek, P B [617](#)
Van Hiel, A E [237](#), [238](#)
Van Leeuwen, T J [176](#), [188](#)
Van Parijs, P [523](#)
Van Ree, Eric [379](#)
Vargas, Getulio [595](#)
Varouxakis, G [455](#)
Vatter, M [531](#)
Véliz, C [601n1](#)
Veracini, L [549](#)
Verba, Sidney [84](#)
Verdi, Giuseppe [276](#)
Véron, Kora [612](#)
Victorino Lastarria, José [585](#)
Vieira, F [440](#)
Vigil, J M [240](#), [586](#)
Vincent, A [120](#), [454](#), [457](#), [465](#)
Viroli, M [516](#), [518–19](#)
Viscardo, Juan Pablo [583](#)
Vitalis, R [537](#)
Voegelin, Eric [80](#), [83](#), [306](#)
Voline (Vsevolod Eichenbaum) [391](#)
Von Beyme, K [497](#)
Vora, Rajendra [663](#)

Wagner, R [416](#)
al-Wahhab, Muhammad Bin ‘Abd [627](#)
Wakslak, C J [242](#)
Waldo, D [82](#)

Waldron, J [527](#), [528](#)
Walesa, Lech [507](#)
Walicki, Andzej [382](#)
Wall, Derek [431](#)
Wallas, Graham [232–3](#)
Walsby, H [121](#)
Walzer, M [163](#), [265–6](#), [554](#)
Wang Hui [658](#)
Wang Shiwei [655](#)
Wang Tao [648](#)
Wang Yangming [652](#)
Ward, Colin [387](#), [397](#)
Warren, Josiah [389](#)
Weber, Max [41–2](#), [74](#), [93](#), [313](#), [333](#), [408](#), [656](#)
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, S [653](#)
Wei Jingsheng [657](#)
Weindling, P [477](#)
Weiss, G [176](#)
Weiss, M [664](#), [665](#)
Weitling, Wilhelm [61](#)
Weitz, Eric D [378](#)
Weitz, R [572](#)
Wei Yuan [646](#)
Welch, C [543](#)
Weller, K [390](#)
Weyl, Walter [335](#)
Weyland, K [496](#), [499](#), [509](#)
White, J [131](#)
White, Stephen K [150](#), [530](#), [531](#)
Wiarda, H J [588](#), [590](#), [591](#), [592](#), [593](#), [594](#), [600](#)
Wigforss, Ernst [361](#)
Wilbur, S [386](#), [399](#)
Wiles, P [595](#)

Wilhelm I of Württemberg [6](#)
Wilkinson, Rorden [260](#)
Wilkinson, S [500](#)
Willer, R [240](#)
Willgerodt, H [406](#)
Williams, D [394](#), [397](#)
Williams, Eric [610](#)
Williams, J [565](#), [570](#)
Williams, Patrick [275](#)
Willoughby, W W [76](#)
Wilson, E K [224](#)
Wilson, G D [235](#)
Wilson, Woodrow [76](#), [79](#), [468](#)
Wippermann, W [489](#)
Wittgenstein, L [127](#), [158](#), [171n9](#)
Wittig, Monique [563–4](#)
Wodak, R [176](#)
Wolf, E [537](#)
Wolf, Robert Paul [85](#)
Wolfe, Bernard [66](#)
Wolfe, P [545](#)
Wolff, J [25](#), [526](#)
Wolff, Robert P [389](#)
Wolin, Sheldon [80](#), [84](#), [85](#), [332](#)
Wolley, W T [543](#)
Wollman, H [457](#)
Wood, A W [21](#)
Wood, G [514](#), [516](#)
Woodcock, George [388](#), [396](#)
Woodruff, Paul [201](#)
Woods, R [297](#)
Woolsey, Theodore [76](#)
Wright, Martin [397](#)

Wright, Richard [618](#)
Wright, T [463](#)
Wrong, Dennis [102](#)
Wundt, Wilhelm [232](#)
Wycliffe, John [364](#)

Xu Fuguan [655](#)
Xu Jilin [658](#)

Yan Fu [648](#), [652](#)
Young, I M [203](#), [570](#), [572](#), [573](#), [597](#)
 and domination [521](#), [522](#)
Young, Robert [275](#), [282](#), [285](#)
Yuan Shikai [648](#)

Zahra, Muhammad Abu [639](#)
Zaller, J [233](#), [234](#), [235](#)
Zanatta, L [596](#)
Zapatero, José Luis Rodriguez [530](#)
al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab [225](#)
Zastoupil, L [549](#)
Zasulich, Vera [367](#)
al-Zawahri, Ayman [225](#), [226](#)
Zerilli, L M G [164](#), [172n22](#), [204](#), [567](#)
Zerzan, John [398](#)
Zhang Junmai [652](#)
Zhang Shizhao [649](#), [655](#)
Zhang Zhidong [646](#)
Zhongguo Shixue hui [647](#)
Zhou Enlai [656](#)
Zhu Xi [652](#)
Zia-al-Haq, Mohammad [671](#)
Zimbardo, P [235](#), [242](#)
Zimmermann, E [586](#)

Žižek, Slavoj [133](#), [155](#), [160](#), [172n20](#), [172n27](#), [172n33](#)
and psychoanalytic account of ideology [165–8](#), [169–70](#)
Zola, Emile [102](#)
Zuma, Jacob [510n1](#)

SUBJECT INDEX

Abolitionist movement, and African ideologies [609–10](#)

Action Française [295](#), [296](#), [477](#)

Adam Smith Institute [389](#), [405](#)

Afghanistan [550](#), [635](#), [636](#)

African ideologies:

 and Abolitionist movement, Equiano's autobiography [609–10](#)

 and African Diaspora:

 Abolitionist movement [609–10](#)

 influence of [607–8](#), [610](#)

 and African nationality [612](#)

 and anti-imperialism:

 Cabral [618–20](#)

 Fanon [618](#), [619](#), [620](#)

 Nkrumah [614–16](#)

 violence [619](#)

 and Cold War [614](#), [616](#)

 and cultural nationalism [610–11](#)

 and cultural pluralism [623](#)

 and definition of [608](#)

 and demands to manage own affairs in colonial period [611](#)

 and emerging ideologies [622](#)

 and environmentalism [621](#)

 and Ethiopianism [612](#)

 and feminism [620–1](#)

 and grass-roots movements [620](#)

 and human rights [609](#), [622–3](#)

 and influences on [607](#)

 and justice and forgiveness [621–2](#)

 and liberation [620](#)

 and Marxism [614](#)

- and Nasserism [617–18](#)
- and Negritude [612–14](#)
- and Non-Aligned Movement [617](#), [618](#)
- and one-party rule [616](#), [617](#)
- and Pan Africanism:
 - Nasser [617](#)
 - Nkrumah [615](#)
- and particular nature of [607](#)
- and postcolonialism [622](#)
- and pre-colonial Africa [608–9](#)
 - tribalism [608–9](#)
- and slavery [607](#)
- and socialism [614](#)
 - academic critiques of [616–17](#)
 - Nasser [617](#)
 - Nkrumah [614–16](#)
 - Nyerere [616](#), [617](#)
 - ujamaa [616](#), [617](#)
- and source of [609](#)
- and universal nature of [607](#)
- agonist democracy [150–1](#)
- agrarian populism [495](#), [507](#)
- agreeableness, and ideological orientation [242](#)
- Algeria [619](#)
- Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) [594–5](#)
- al-Jazeera [227](#)
- al Qaeda [225](#), [226–7](#), [635](#), [636](#)
- Alternative Libertaire* [394](#)
- al-Wasat (Egyptian political party) [638](#)
- American Association for Public Opinion Research [81](#)
- American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF) [95](#)
- American Political Science Association [77](#), [86](#)
- American revolution, and liberalism [331](#)

American Sociological Association 100

anachronism 280

anarchism:

- and anarcha-feminism 396, 397

- and anarchist communism 394, 395–6

- and anarcho-syndicalism 394–6

- and anti-statism 386–7, 388

- and black anarchism 396–7

- and conceptual analysis of 386–7

- and different formations of 386

- and difficulty in defining 385

- and egoistic anarchism 388

- and environmental anarchisms 397–8

- and everyday practices 387

- and green anarchisms 398

- and ideological synthesis 391–4, 400

 - anarcho-capitalism and social anarchism 392–3

 - forms of 392

- and individualist anarchisms 386, 388, 389–90

 - anarcho-capitalism 389, 413, 414

 - anti-statism 389–90, 391

 - existential versions of 389

 - philosophical anarchism 389

 - property rights 389

 - rejection of coercion 390

 - variety of 389

- and individualist-socialist divide 388, 399–400

- and Latin America 590

- and liberalism 388

- and misrepresentations of 385–6

- and post-anarchism 399

- and primacy of the individual 57

- and queer anarchism 397

- and rejection of statist politics [385](#)
- and social anarchisms [386](#), [388](#), [390–1](#)
 - anti-statism [391](#)
 - direct action [390](#)
 - hybridization [400](#)
 - organizations [390–1](#)
 - principles of [390](#)
- and socialism [388](#)
- Anarchist Federation [390](#), [394](#)
- Anarchist Frequently Asked Questions (AFAQ) [391](#)
- Anarchist Media Group [386](#)
- anarcho-capitalism [389](#), [392–3](#), [405](#), [413](#), [414](#)
- animal rights [426](#)
- anthropocentrism [425](#)
- anti-communism [94–5](#)
 - and Latin America [589–90](#)
 - and South and Southeast Asia [665](#)
- anti-Enlightenment [476–7](#)
- anti-Semitism:
 - and fascism [482](#), [483](#)
 - and National Socialism [482](#)
 - and neo-fascism [488](#)
 - and populism [504](#)
 - and reactionary conservatism [295](#)
 - and Romanticism [477](#)
- anti-statism, and anarchism [386–7](#), [388](#)
 - individualist anarchisms [389–90](#), [391](#)
 - social anarchisms [391](#)
- Arab Spring [641–2](#)
- archaeology, and nationalism [456](#)
- Argentina:
 - and anarchism [590](#)
 - and communism [591](#)

- and neoliberalism [595](#)
 - and populism [496](#), [595](#)
 - and socialism [590–1](#)
- arguments, and ideology [199–200](#)
- Army of God [227](#)
- articulation [171n17](#)
- Asian Relations Conference (1947) [618](#)
- Asian values [669](#)
- attitudes:
 - and ideological orientation [234–5](#), [236](#), [238–9](#)
 - and ideologies [178–9](#)
- Aum Shinrikyo cult [227](#)
- Australia [406](#)
- Austrian School [405](#), [408](#)
 - and role of the state [415](#)
- authoritarianism:
 - and Africa [616](#)
 - and populism [506](#)
 - and South and Southeast Asia [668–9](#)
 - and xenophobic populism [497](#)
- authoritarian personality [233](#)
- Babouvism [365](#)
- Bandung Conference (1955) [618](#), [662](#)
- Bangladesh Nationalist Party [671](#)
- behaviouralism [75–6](#)
 - and Cold War [74–5](#)
 - and political science [80](#)
 - defence of interest-group liberalism [81](#)
 - public opinion [81](#)
 - and scientism [74](#)
- Belgium [316–17](#)
- beliefs:

- and ideology [177–8](#)
 - structure of [178](#)
 - and knowledge [177](#)
- Berlin Wall [410](#)
- Big Society [307–8](#)
- Bildung* [333](#)
- biocentrism [426](#)
- bioregionalists [425](#)
- black anarchism [396–7](#)
- Bolivia:
 - and populism [496, 504, 509, 595](#)
 - and socialism [591](#)
- Bolsheviks [369, 370](#)
- Bolshevism [65, 66](#)
 - and ideology [67, 68](#)
 - and universal appeal of [70](#)
- Boulangism [476](#)
- Brazil:
 - and communism [591](#)
 - and populism [496, 595](#)
- British Union of Fascists (BUF) [484–5](#)
- Buddhism [645, 673, 674](#)
- bureaucratic centralism [373](#)
- Burma [674](#)
- Cambodia [665, 674](#)
- Cambridge School of intellectual history [515](#)
- Camelots du roi* [296](#)
- capitalism:
 - and Bernstein on [350](#)
 - and imperialism [545](#)
 - and postcolonialism [282](#)
- care, ethics of [577](#)

Carthage [608](#)

catachresis [199](#), [203](#)

Catholic Church:

- and Christian Democracy [313](#), [315](#)

- dispute over authority over [319–20](#)

- in inter-war years [320–1](#)

- Leo XIII's 'Immortale Dei' encyclical [317–18](#)

- Leo XIII's 'Rerum Novarum' encyclical [319](#)

- Pius X's 'Pascendi Dominicus Gregis' encyclical [320](#)

- and democracy:

- John XXIII [325–6](#)

- Pius XI's condemnation of [316](#)

- Pius XII on [323](#)

- Toniolo's definition of [318](#)

- and liberalism, danger of [315–16](#)

- and Second Vatican Council [326](#)

Cato Institute [389](#), [405](#)

Caucus for a New Political Science [85](#)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [95](#)

central planning:

- and Communist states [374](#), [375](#)

- and economic libertarians' critique of [419](#)

Cercle Proudhon [477](#), [478](#), [479](#)

certainty, and system justification [237–9](#)

Chad [608](#)

Cheka [370](#)

Chicago School [306](#), [405](#)

Chile:

- and anarchism [590](#)

- and communism [591](#)

- and conservatism [589](#)

- and economic libertarianism [406](#), [407](#), [418](#), [589](#)

- and military coup [593](#)

- and socialism 591
- Chilean Communist Party 591
- China 372, 644
 - in 1930s-40s 651–3
 - conservative opinion 651–2
 - renewed faith in Chinese culture 652
 - rural reconstruction 652
 - Third Force 652–3
 - and Buddhism 645
 - and Chinese communism 653–5
 - continuous revolution 654
 - critiques of 654–5
 - early period 653
 - Mao's ideology 653–4
 - New Democracy 653–4
 - and Chinese Communist Party 644, 657
 - monopoly on power 381
 - Three Represents doctrine 657
 - and Confucianism 645, 649, 651, 652
 - and contemporary political and ideological debates 658
 - and Cultural Revolution 380–1, 654
 - and democracy, demands for 657
 - and democratic centralism 381
 - and economic reform 381, 656, 657
 - and future development of 658
 - and Great Leap Forward 380, 655
 - and higher education 657
 - patriotic worrying 657–8
 - and Hundred Flowers Movement 380
 - and imperial imaginaries 539, 540
 - and industrial development 656
 - and May Fourth Movement 650–1, 658
 - vernacularization 651

- and mixed economy [381](#)
- and New Confucianism [655–6](#)
- and Qing dynasty [644](#)
 - Chinese values [646](#)
 - foreign affairs movement [647](#)
 - overthrow of [648](#)
 - political reform [647](#)
 - reform of civil exam system [646](#)
 - self-strengthening movement [646–7](#)
 - using past to legitimize transformation [647–8](#)
 - Western influences [645, 648](#)
- and Revolution of 1911 [648](#)
 - cultural construction [649](#)
 - Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles' [648](#)
- and self-identity [645, 650](#)
- and Sinophone diaspora [655, 656](#)
- and socialism with Chinese characteristics [644, 656](#)
- and socialist market economy [374](#)
- Chinese Democratic League [652–3](#)
- Christian Democracy:
 - and Belgium [316–17](#)
 - and catch-all parties [325](#)
 - and Catholic Church [313, 315](#)
 - dispute over authority [319–20](#)
 - Gregory XVI on danger of liberalism [315–16](#)
 - in inter-war years [320–1](#)
 - Leo XIII's 'Immortale Dei' encyclical [317–18](#)
 - Leo XIII's 'Rerum Novarum' encyclical [319](#)
 - Pius X's 'Pascendi Dominicus Gregis' encyclical [320](#)
 - Pius XI's condemnation of democracy [316](#)
 - Pius XII's views on democracy [323](#)
 - Toniolo's definition of democracy [318](#)
 - and Cold War context [325](#)

- and development during Second World War [322–4](#)
- and France [315](#)
- and Germany [317](#)
- and ideal-type of [318](#)
- and ideology of [314](#)
 - elements of [314](#)
 - formation of [317](#)
 - pillars of [313](#)
- in inter-war years [321–2](#)
- and market social economy [325](#)
- and origins of term [314](#)
- and the people [315](#)
- and personalism [313](#), [322](#)
- and pluralism [313](#)
- and postwar academic attention towards [312–13](#)
- and postwar ideological evolution [324–5](#)
- and postwar reconstruction [324](#)
- and Protestant confessions [318](#)
- and religion:
 - role of Catholic church [315](#)
 - vision of Christian past [314–15](#)
- and solidarism [313](#)
- as third force [313](#)
- and variety of parties [313](#)

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (Germany) [325](#)

Christian Identity [227](#)

Christianity:

- and communist ideas [364](#)
- and decline in hegemony of [56](#)
- and progressive total ideologies [61](#)

civic humanism, and imperialism [542](#)

civil association, and New Right [304–5](#)

civilization, and imperialism [539](#), [540–1](#), [546](#)

- civil society, and Gramsci 28–9
- clash of civilizations 15
- class:
 - and Marx 8, 22–3, 25
 - and paradox of class struggle 166
- class consciousness 8
- classical liberalism 405
- class struggle:
 - and Bernstein's scepticism over 350
 - and Marx 368
 - and paradox of 166
- clientelism, and distinction from populism 500
- Club of Rome 427
- Cold War:
 - and African ideologies 614, 616
 - and behaviouralism 74–5
 - and Christian Democracy 325
 - and economic libertarianism 408
 - and end of ideology thesis 91–2, 94–7
 - and ideological polarization 12
 - and Latin America 592–3
 - and South and Southeast Asia 662, 665
- collective bargaining 355
- Colombia 586–7, 588
- Comintern 285, 378
 - and Latin America 591, 592
 - and South and Southeast Asia 665
- communicative reason 141, 258
- communism:
 - and anarchist communism 394, 395–6
 - and China 653–5
 - continuous revolution 654
 - critiques of 654–5

- early period [653](#)
- Mao's ideology [653–4](#)
- New Democracy [653–4](#)
- and India [666](#)
- and Latin America [591](#), [592](#)
- and Lenin [369–71](#)
- and Marx:
 - class struggle [368](#)
 - The Communist Manifesto* [368](#)
 - dialectic [367](#)
 - stages of development [367](#)
- and Plekhanov [369](#)
- and pre-Marxian communist ideas [364–6](#)
 - Babouvism [365](#)
 - Cabet [366](#)
 - Campanella's *The City of the Sun* [365](#)
 - Christianity [364](#)
 - French Revolution [365](#)
 - More's *Utopia* [365](#)
 - Owen [366](#)
 - Proudhon [365–6](#)
 - Saint-Simon [366](#)
- and South and Southeast Asia [665–7](#)
 - challenges facing [665](#)
 - critiques by [666](#)
 - disagreements over ideological orthodoxy [666](#)
 - political participation [667](#)
- and Trotsky [370](#)
- see also* Marxism; Soviet Communism
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) [369](#)
- Communist states:
 - and abandonment of Communist ideology [381–2](#)
 - and aspiration to build communism [376](#), [377](#)

- and bureaucratic centralism [373](#)
- and central planning [374](#), [375](#)
- and Communist Party's monopoly on power [372–3](#)
- and Cuba [379–80](#)
- and democratic centralism [373–4](#)
- and discrediting of [410](#)
- and ideological variation among [372](#)
- and International Communist Movement [376–7](#), [378](#)
- and leaders' belief in ideology [377](#)
- and names of [372](#)
- and oppressive character of [372](#)
- and public ownership [374–5](#)
- and role of ideology in excluding economic reforms [375](#)
- and socialist market economy [374](#)
- and Stalinism [378–9](#)
- and Yugoslavia [372](#), [375](#), [379](#)
- see also* China
- communitarianism:
 - and republicanism [516](#), [519–20](#)
 - and Singapore [669](#)
- comparative gaze, and imperialism [542–3](#)
- compassion, and ideological orientation [242](#)
- conceptual history and ideology [3–17](#)
 - and contention over concept of ideology:
 - 19th century German debate [6–7](#)
 - 19th century social democrats [9](#)
 - Cold War period [12](#)
 - early American debate [5–6](#)
 - end of ideology school [12–13](#)
 - French Enlightenment [3–4](#)
 - function of ideologies [12](#)
 - inter-war years [10–11](#)
 - linguistic turn [15–16](#)

- Marx and Engels 7–9
- Napoleon’s critique 4–5
- post-Second World War 11–13
- totalitarianism 13–14
- and discursive struggles 3, 15–16
- and ideology as action-oriented concept 7
- and indefinability of ideology 3
- and linguistic turn 15–16
- and morphological analysis of ideology 132
- and nature of democratic politics 3
- and strength of approach 17
- and time philosophy 16–17
- and weakness of approach 17
- Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT) 395
- Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) 92, 95, 97, 98, 106
- Congress of Oppressed Nationalities (1927) 618
- conservatism 57
 - and Big Society 307–8
 - and constitutionalism 305
 - and critique of ideology 6
 - and democracy 469
 - and inequality 57, 468
 - and Latin America 587–90
 - in 19th century 588–9
 - in 20th century 589–90
 - hostility to liberalism 587–8
 - religion 588
- and limits on scope of political action 293–4
- and mistaken assumptions of radical politics 293
- and moderate conservatism 298–301
 - accommodation with mass democracy 300–1
 - assuming all men to be knaves 299–300
 - commitment to limited state 300

- ideal of 298–9
- middle-way strategy 301
- organic vision of society 300
- role of the state 300–1
- theological ground for 299
- tragic vision 299
- as modernizing project 308
- and national identity 465–6
- and national sovereignty 467
- and New Right:
 - civil association 304–5
 - concerns of 301–2
 - defence of free market 302–4
 - Hayek's thought 302–4
 - national identity 302
 - reformulation of organic position 302
- as positive ideology 293
- and radical conservatism 297–8
 - association with Nazism and fascism 298
 - inter-war Germany 297–8
 - post-war strategies 298
 - problems with 298
- and reactionary conservatism 294–7
 - abandonment of politics 296–7
 - charismatic leadership 296
 - critique of democracy 295
 - demonizing of groups 295
 - extra-constitutional strategies 295–6
 - fascism 296
 - instability of 295
 - joining with revolutionary party 296
 - marginalization of 295
 - religion 294

- strategies of 295–7
- utopianism of 295, 297
- and schools of 294
- and United States 305–7
 - Chicago school 306
 - libertarianism 305
 - neoconservatism 306
 - New Conservatism 305–6
 - Paleoconservatism 306
 - rational choice theory 306
 - Tea Party 306–7
- conservative nationalism 465–6, 467–8
- Conservative Party (UK) 412–13
 - and Big Society 307–8
- constitutionalism 597–8
 - and conservatism 305
 - and cultural diversity 598
 - and Latin America 596–7, 598, 600
 - and post-nationalist 600
- constitutional liberalism 524–5
- constitutional patriotism 333
- constitutions, and ideology 131–2
- context models, and ideological discourse 181–2
- contrapuntal reading 276
- Convention People's Party (Ghana) 616
- corporatism 477
 - and fascism 484
 - and social democracy 355
- cosmopolitan democracy 143–4
 - and emancipation 143–4
 - and republicanism 528
- cosmopolitanism, and British intellectuals 262
- courts, and liberalism 337

critical discourse analysis (CDA) [134](#), [176](#)

critical theory:

and contemporary state of [149–52](#)

and distinctive contribution of [138](#)

and domination [138](#), [141–4](#)

and emancipation [138](#), [141](#)

and founding premise of [138](#)

and guiding principle of [138](#)

and Habermasian thought [140–4](#)

and ideology [11–12](#)

and impasse in [141](#)

and interdisciplinary nature of [139](#)

and liberalism [139](#)

and poststructuralism [146–8](#)

and reflexivity [139](#)

see also ideology critique

Cuba [379–80](#)

and influence in Latin America [592–3](#)

cultural anthropology [115](#)

cultural diversity, and constitutionalism [598](#)

cultural identity [276](#)

cultural nationalism, and African ideologies [610–11](#)

culture:

and economic libertarianism [419](#)

and nationalism [453](#), [467–8](#)

cynicism, and ideology [165](#), [200](#)

decentralization, and green ideology [427](#)

decolonization [100](#), [105](#)

decommodification [353](#)

deconstruction [159](#), [171n4](#)

decontestation [161](#), [171n7](#), [216–17](#)

and morphological analysis of ideology [118](#), [120–1](#), [123](#), [129](#), [130](#)

- and national imaginary 221
- deep ecology 424, 426
 - and green anarchisms 398
- deliberation 141, 258
 - and cosmopolitan democracy 143–4
 - and domination 141–4
 - and rhetoric 203–4
- democracy:
 - and Catholic Church:
 - John XXIII 325–6
 - Pius XII on 323
 - Pius XI's condemnation of 316
 - Toniolo's definition of 318
 - and conservatism 469
 - and developmentalism 668–9
 - and economic libertarianism 417–18
 - and fascism 469
 - and ideology 323
 - and intellectuals 258–9
 - and Latin America 587
 - and moderate Islamism (*wasatiyya*) 638–9
 - and nationalism 469
 - and National Socialism 469
 - and populism 505–6
 - relationship between 506–7
 - and reactionary critique of 295
 - and rhetoric 209
 - and suspicion of 469
- democratic centralism 373–4
 - and China 381
- democratization 121
 - and green ideology 427
 - and imperialism 543

- and populism 507
- dependency culture 306, 407
- development:
 - and ideology 105
 - and imperialism 543
- developmentalism, and South and Southeast Asia 667–9
 - democracy 668
- difference feminism 577
- direct action:
 - and green ideology 428
 - and social anarchisms 390
- direct democracy, and populism 505
- discourse and ideology 133–4, 175, 176, 180–1
 - and approach to studying ideologies 198, 199
 - and context models 181–2
 - and formal structures of discourse 188–9
 - argumentation 193
 - fallacies 193–4
 - lexicon 189–90
 - narration 193
 - order 192–3
 - salience 193
 - syntax 190–2
- and ideology as social cognition 176–8
 - attitudes 178–9
 - mental models 179–80
 - structure of ideologies 178
- and methods of discourse analysis 176
- and neglect of 175
- and reproduction of ideology 175
- and semantics of ideological discourse 182–8
 - actor descriptions 185–6
 - disclaimers 187

- implications and presuppositions [185](#)
- levels of generality and specificity [186–7](#)
- local coherence [184–5](#)
- metaphor [187](#)
- modalities [183–4](#)
- propositions [183](#)
- topic [182–3](#)
- as social practice [176](#)
- discourse ethics [142](#)
- disgust, and ideological orientation [240](#)
- divine right of kings [56](#)
- domination [138](#), [141–4](#)
 - and ideology [175](#)
 - and republicanism:
 - constraining private power [526–7](#)
 - constraining public power [526–8](#)
 - freedom as non-domination [518–26](#)
- Dreyfus Affair [477](#)
- dystopia [440](#), [448](#)
- Earth Liberation Front (ELF) [428–9](#)
- Eastern Europe:
 - and agrarian populism [495](#)
 - and economic libertarianism [406](#)
 - and liberalism [338–9](#)
- ecocentrism [425](#), [426](#)
- ecological law, and green ideology [427–8](#)
- ecologism, *see* green ideology
- economic liberalism [405](#)
- economic libertarianism [406](#)
 - and campaign against collectivism:
 - alliances with anti-collectivist forces [411](#)
 - communist economies [410](#)

- moral certainty [411](#)
- social democracy [410–11](#)
- and central planning, critique of [419](#)
- and culture [419](#)
- and democracy, distrust of [417–18](#)
- and dilemma in economic thought of [418](#)
- and diversity of [407–8](#)
- and freedom [414](#)
- and influence of [406](#)
- and knowledge, attitude to [418–19](#)
- and market failure [419](#)
- and opposition to [406](#)
- and origins and development of [406–7](#)
 - campaign against collectivism [410–11](#)
 - Cold War [408](#)
 - crisis of 1970s [412–13](#)
 - experience of Nazism and Stalinism [408](#)
 - Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* [408–9](#)
 - Mont Pelerin Society [409](#)
 - post-war consensus [411–12](#)
 - post-war period [409–10](#)
 - power of ideas [410](#)
 - reaction against state expansion [408](#)
- and paleo-libertarians [419](#)
- and revival of free market doctrines [405](#), [406](#)
 - puzzling nature of [406](#)
- and the state [413–16](#)
 - Austrian School [415](#)
 - coercive nature of [413–14](#)
 - depoliticization of economic policy [416](#)
 - dismantling of [413](#)
 - minimal state [414–15](#)
 - new public management [416](#)

- protection of market order 415
- suspicion of 413
- Virginia public choice school 415–16
- economic policy, and depoliticization of 416
- economics, and justification of imperialism 544–5
- Ecuador, and populism 505, 595
- education, and expansion of 99–100
- Egypt 608, 617–18
 - and moderate Islamism (*wasatiyya*) 637, 638
 - and Muslim Brotherhood 629, 637, 640
- Egyptian Feminist Union 630
- elites:
 - and discursive superstructure 233–4
 - and disproportionate influence of 234
 - and elite theory 476, 478
 - as ideological codifiers 216
 - and populism 502–4
- elitism 499
- emancipation, and liberalism 331
- empty signifiers 162–4, 169
- end of ideology thesis 12–13, 90, 221
 - and antecedents of 92–4
 - Engels 92–3
 - German social theory 93–4
 - response to totalitarianism 94
- and change in material circumstances 107
- and Cold War context of 91–2, 94–7
 - anti-Communism 94–5
 - conservative and dampening effect 95–6
 - limiting of debate and criticism 96
 - Milan conference of CCF (1955) 97
- and conservative sensibility 106–7
- and end of ideology debate 99–107

- afterglow of 107–10
- criticism of thesis 101
- Daniel Bell 100, 103–5
- meaning of ideology 100–1
- misguided criticism of thesis 103–4
- responses to welfare-state capitalism 101–2
- role of intellectuals 102–3
- Seymour Martin Lipset 100
- socialism's irrelevance 101
- and Fukuyama's *The End of History* 108
- as ideology of progress 91
- and Judt's *Ill Fares the Land* 108–10
- and morphological analysis of ideology 123
- and multiple meanings of 91, 92
- and other discussion of ideology in 1960s 105–7
- and overdetermined character of 92
- and postmodernism 107–8
- and poststructuralism 156
- and social-democratic liberalism 98
- and structure of feeling embodied by 106
- and uncertain meaning of ideology 90–1

Enlightenment:

- and origins of ideology 3–4
- and totalitarian democracy 476

environmental anarchisms 397–8

environmentalism:

- and Africa 621
- and death of 433–4
- and sceptical environmentalism 432–3
- see also* green ideology

epistemic communities, and knowledge 177

epistemic motivation, and system justification 237–9

equality, and left-right attitudes towards 235–6

essential contestability, and morphological analysis of ideology [119–20](#), [121](#)
essentialism, and postcolonialism [286](#)
Ethiopia [608](#)
Ethiopianism [612](#)
ethnic nationalism [458](#)
eurocommunism [11](#)
European integration:
 and British intellectuals [261](#)
 and radical conservatism [298](#)
Europeanism, and neo-fascism [487–8](#)
evolutionary biology:
 and ideologies [453](#)
 and nationalism [466](#)
exclusion, and ideology [15](#)
exemplarity [172n24](#)
existential motivation, and system justification [239–40](#)

Fabian Society [349](#)
Faisceau (fascist movement) [479](#)
false consciousness [35](#), [42–4](#), [54n3](#), [62](#), [94](#), [160](#), [176](#), [441](#), [677](#)
Falun Gong [227](#)
fantasmatic logics [167–8](#)
fantasy [165–6](#), [168](#)
Farmers Party (Netherlands) [495](#)
fascism [13](#), [14](#), [65](#), [66](#), [69](#)
 and anti-Semitism [482](#), [483](#)
 and colonial ambitions [483](#)
 and corporatism [484](#)
 and democracy [469](#)
 and economic policy [484–5](#)
 and elusiveness of [474–5](#)
 and Europeanist thinking [483–4](#)
 and freedom [468](#)

- and ideology 67, 68
 - consistency with 70
 - denial of possession of 69
- and Latin America 589
- and leadership 480–1
- and living space 483
- as male-dominated ethic 481
- and manipulated activism 481
- and myths 482
- and nationalism 466, 467–8, 475
- and neo-fascism 486–9
 - anti-Semitism 488
 - Bardèche's attempt to rehabilitate fascism 486–7
 - economic thinking 488
 - Europeanism 487–8
 - European New Right (*Nouvelle Droite*) 487
 - Evola's elitist approach 487
 - Holocaust denial 488
 - immigration 488
- and the 'new man' 475, 480, 481
- and origins of 476–9, 488
 - anti-Enlightenment 476–7
 - elite theory 478
 - Enlightenment thought 476
 - First World War 479
 - French Revolution 476
 - Plato 476
 - pre-First World War France 477
 - racial thinking 477–8
 - social Darwinism 478
 - Volkisch* movement 477
- as political religion 480
- and propaganda 475

- and racism 482–3
- and radical conservatism 298
- and reactionary conservatism 296
- and rebirth 479–80
- as revolutionary form of modernity 480
- and role of leader 68
- and sacralization of politics 68
- and short duration of 490
- and the state 485
- and syncretic nature of 482, 488
- and Third Way 475, 484
- and totalitarianism 485
- and variations within 475
- and violence 481–2
- and welfare state 485
- and women 481
- see also* National Socialism

feminism:

- and academic feminism 563
- and activist feminism 563
- and African feminism 620–1
- and ambiguity within 563–4, 572
- and anarcha-feminism 396, 397
- and beauty practices 566
- and black women 572
- and bodily experience 572
- and consciousness-raising 575
- and diversity of 562
- and entrenchment of gender 568–73
 - behaviours and attitudes 568
 - biological differences 568
 - cultural practices 570–1
 - culture 573

- differences between women 572–3
- queer theory 571
- questioning of gender difference 568–9
- sex-gender distinction 569–70
- transgenderism and transsexuality 571–2
- and fetishism of choice 564, 565–6
- and gender inequality 564, 565, 566
- and gender studies 563
- as ideology 562, 564
- and multiculturalism 573
- and need for change 575–7
 - commitment to 575
 - difference feminism 577
 - feminist reforms 576
 - gender categories 576
 - genderqueer 576
 - radical feminism 576–7
- and patriarchy 564, 579n20
 - existence of 573–5
 - gender inequality 564–5
 - as ideology 562
 - refusal of 562
 - social construction 574–5
- and political nature of 564
- and postcolonial feminism 279
- and postmodernism 575
- and prison of biology 564, 566–7
- and sex-gender distinction 569
 - parenthood 569–70
- and sexist oppression 565
- and sexual violence 576–7
- and three theses of 567–8
- and transfeminism 571

- and utopianism [439](#)
- and women [563–4](#)
- and women's studies [563](#)

Finland [495](#)

First World War, and origins of fascism [479](#)

Flemish Block (Flemish Interest) [497](#)

floating signifiers [163](#)

Ford Foundation [74](#)

France:

- and agrarian populism [495](#)
- and Christian Democracy [321–2](#)
- and debate on ideology [4–5](#)
- and fascism [477](#)
- and liberalism [330](#)
- and republicanism [517](#), [520](#)
- and social Catholicism [315](#), [316](#)

Frankfurt School [80](#)

- and end of ideology thesis [93–4](#)

Free Democratic Party (Germany) [333](#)

freedom:

- and anarcho-capitalism [389](#)
- and constitutional liberalism [524–5](#)
- and economic libertarianism [414](#)
- and fascism [468](#)
- and green ideology [431](#)
- and interpretations of [177–8](#)
- and liberalism [520–6](#)
- and National Socialism [468](#)
- and negative freedom [518](#)
- and neoliberalism [341](#)
- and positive freedom [518](#)
- and republicanism [518–26](#)

Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) [494](#), [497](#), [503](#)

free market:

- and liberalism [332](#)

- and New Right's defence of [302–4](#)

- and revival of doctrines of [405](#)

- see also* economic libertarianism

free trade:

- and imperialism [548](#)

- and liberalism [332](#)

French Revolution:

- and communist ideas [365](#)

- and ideology [3](#), [4–5](#), [56](#), [216](#)

- and revolutionary language [16](#)

- and Revolutionary rhetoric [16](#)

- and totalitarian democracy [476](#)

functionalism [10](#), [12](#)

Furious Five Revolutionary Collective [397](#)

gender:

- and entrenchment of [568–73](#)

 - behaviours and attitudes [568](#)

 - biological differences [568](#)

 - culture [573](#)

 - differences between women [572–3](#)

 - queer theory [571](#)

 - questioning of gender difference [568–9](#)

 - sex-gender distinction [569–70](#)

 - transgenderism and transsexuality [571–2](#)

- and populism [508](#)

- and sex-gender distinction [569](#)

 - parenthood [569–70](#)

- and transforming gender categories [576](#)

- see also* feminism

gender inequality [564](#), [565](#)

- and feminism [566](#)
- genderqueer [576](#)
- gender studies, and feminism [563](#)
- general will [63](#)
 - and fascism [476](#)
 - and populism [498](#), [504–6](#)
- geopolitics, and justification of imperialism [544](#)
- Germany:
 - and Christian Democracy [317](#)
 - in inter-war years [321](#)
 - and debate on ideology [6–8](#)
 - and liberalism [333](#)
 - and neoliberalism [406](#)
 - and Ordo Liberals [408](#)
 - and radical conservatism [297](#)
 - and reconstruction of [411](#)
 - and social democracy [349](#), [355](#)
- Ghana [611](#)
 - and Nkrumaism [616](#)
- global civil society [262](#)
- global financial crisis [15](#)
- global imaginary [221–2](#), [539](#)
- globalization [14–15](#)
 - and contemporary globalisms [215](#)
 - and creation of new identities [214](#)
 - and global imaginary [214](#), [539](#)
 - and impact on ideologies [214–15](#), [221–2](#)
 - academic neglect of [215](#)
 - and intellectuals' characterization of [260](#)
 - and justice globalism [215](#), [224–5](#)
 - ideological claim of [224](#)
 - policy proposals [224–5](#)
 - tasks of [224](#)

- and market globalism 215, 222–3
 - challenges to 224, 225
 - codifiers of 223
 - emergence of 223
 - ideological claims of 223
 - variations of 222–3
- as multidimensional set of processes 221–2
- and religious globalism 215, 225–7
 - Islamism 225–7
- and subjective aspects of 214
- global justice movement 224
- Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society 611
- governance, and imperialism 547–50
- gradualism, and radical conservatism 298
- green anarchisms 398
- Green Belt Movement (Kenya) 621
- green ideology 422–3
 - and Africa 621
 - and challenges to 432, 436
 - death of environmentalism 433–4
 - post-ecologism 434–5
 - sceptical environmentalism 432–3
 - and decentralization 427
 - and direct action 428
 - and ecological law 427–8
 - and ecological restructuring 423–7
 - anthropocentrism 425
 - anti-human chauvinism 425
 - biocentrism 426
 - ecocentrism 426
 - ethical aspects of 425–6
 - meaning of 423–4
 - metaphysical holism 424–5

- nature as model [425](#)
- sentientism [426](#)
- sustainability [426–7](#)
- and hybrid forms of [429–30](#)
- and key commitments of [423](#), [429](#), [435](#)
- and liberty [431](#)
- and marginalization of [436](#)
- and non-violence [428–9](#)
- and participatory democracy [427](#)
- and radical democratization [427](#)
- as ‘thick’ ideology [430–1](#), [436](#)
- as ‘thin’ ideology [429–30](#), [435–6](#)
- Green Party (UK) [430](#), [431](#)
- guerrilla warfare [593](#)
- Guinea-Bissau [619](#)
- Gurkhas [675](#)
- Hamas [629](#)
- happiness, and ideological orientation [242–3](#)
- hegemony [11](#), [28](#), [161](#)
- heresthetic [202–3](#)
- Heritage Foundation [389](#)
- hermeneutics [115](#)
- historicism [476](#)
- Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya [630](#)
- holism, and green ideology [424–5](#)
- holistic ideologies [57–8](#)
 - and common assumption of [58](#)
 - and organic nature of society [58](#)
 - and political orientation [58](#)
 - and total ideologies [59–62](#)
 - and typical concepts of [59](#)
- Holocaust denial [488](#)

human rights, and African ideologies [609](#), [622–3](#)

Hungary [375](#), [410](#)

and agrarian populism [495](#)

Hussite movement [364](#)

hybrid ideologies [392](#)

hybridization:

and green ideology [429–30](#)

and ideological synthesis [392](#)

and social anarchisms [400](#)

identity:

and breakdown of political order [162](#)

and discursive constitution of [162](#)

and language [159](#)

and post-Marxist discursive account of ideology [169](#)

and psychoanalytic account of ideology [169](#)

and psychoanalytic thought [159](#)

and relational nature of [171n16](#)

ideological discourse, *see* discourse and ideology

ideological morphology, *see* morphological analysis of ideology

ideology:

as action-oriented concept [7](#), [56](#)

and approaches to analysis of [157–9](#), [198–9](#)

and association with domination [175](#)

and attitudes [178–9](#)

and attribution to Others [175](#)

as belief systems [177](#)

and cognitive nature of [176–7](#)

and conceptual analysis of [157–8](#), [198](#), [386](#)

and contention over concept of ideology:

clash of civilizations [15](#)

globalization [14–15](#)

post-Cold War period [14–15](#)

- as contested concept [441](#), [448](#)
- and contextual nature of [216](#)
- and continued use of term [156](#)
- and core concepts [124–5](#), [216](#), [386](#), [500](#)
- and cynical mode of functioning [165](#)
- and definitions of [6](#), [90](#), [91](#), [105](#), [216](#), [314](#), [445](#), [538](#)
- and exclusion [15](#)
- and French Revolution [4–5](#)
- and history of concept [56–7](#)
 - 19th century German debate [6–8](#)
 - 19th century social democrats [9](#)
 - clash of civilizations [15](#)
 - Cold War period [12](#)
 - early American debate [5–6](#)
 - end of ideology school [12–13](#)
 - French Enlightenment [3–4](#)
 - French Revolution [3](#), [4–5](#), [56](#), [216](#)
 - globalization [14–15](#)
 - inter-war years [10–11](#)
 - linguistic turn [15–16](#)
 - Marxism [7–9](#)
 - Napoleon's critique [4–5](#)
 - post-Cold War period [14–15](#)
 - post-Second World War [11–13](#)
 - totalitarianism [13–14](#)
- and Honneth's thought [144–8](#)
- and hybrid ideologies [392](#)
- and ideological synthesis [391](#), [392](#)
 - hybridization [392](#)
- and integrative role of [216](#)
- and knowledge [177](#)
- as language of politics [159](#)
- and Mannheim Paradox [38](#), [445](#), [447](#)

- and media of expression 387
- and mental models 179–80
- and morality of 122
- and negative connotations of 7, 8, 9, 17, 439, 441
- and origins of term 3–4, 441
- and peripheral concepts 125–6, 500
- and polarized nature of 175, 178
- and political function of 12
- and psychological dimension of 10–11
- and religious aspects of 216
- as social cognition 176–8
- and social imaginaries 217–18, 539
- as socially shared belief system 177
- and sociology 4
- and structure of 178
- see also* conceptual history and ideology; discourse and ideology; end of ideology thesis;
- morphological analysis of ideology
- ideology critique 133
 - and central problem for 139
 - and central role of 138–9
 - and contemporary state of 149–52
 - and deliberation 141–4
 - and disclosure 139
 - and domination 141–4
 - and emancipation 139, 140
 - and enduring relevance of 152
 - and Habermasian thought 140–4
 - and labour 147–8
 - and obstacles in practical realization of 139–40
 - and organized self-realization 147
 - and poststructuralism 146–8
 - and recognition 144–6, 148–9

- and reflexivity 139
- and suffering 145, 146
- images 164–5
- imaginaries 161, 168
 - and definition of 538
- imagined communities 217, 219
- immigration:
 - and neo-fascism 488
 - and xenophobic populism 497
- imperialism 536
 - and capitalism 545
 - and criticism of, civilizational argument 541
 - and definition of 536
 - formal and informal imperialism 536–7
 - and definition of empire 536
 - and governance, ideologies of 538, 547–50
 - administrative capacity 547–8
 - contemporary influence 550
 - formal and informal rule 548
 - indirect rule 549
 - knowledge acquisition 548
 - public education 548–9
 - settler colonialism 549
 - violence 550
 - and hierarchical classification of peoples 539
 - and imperial imaginaries 538–43
 - civilizational difference 539, 540–1
 - comparative gaze 542–3
 - conceptions of time and space 541–2
 - contemporary influence 543
 - historical sensibility 542
 - meaning of 539
 - and justification, ideologies of 538, 543–7

- civilizational argument 541
- commercial-exploitative 544–5
- liberal-civilizational 546
- martialist 547
- non-economic factors 545–6
- realist-geopolitical 544
- republicanism 546–7
- scholarly expression of 543–4
- and liberalism 332, 338, 546
 - anti-imperialism 551–2
- and Marxism 545, 547
- and multi-disciplinary study of 537
- and neoliberalism 548
- and race 540–1, 675
- and resistance, ideologies of 538, 550–4
 - contemporary world 554
 - Fanon 553–4
 - Gandhian non-violence 553
 - internal opposition 551–2
 - liberal criticism of 551–2
 - Marxism 547
 - violence 553–4
- and technological development 541–2
- import-substituting industrialization (ISI) 496
- Independent Labour Party (ILP) (UK) 349
- Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP) (Hungary) 495
- India:
 - and anti-colonial thought 283
 - and British imperialism 675
 - public education 548–9
 - and caste 676–7
 - and communism 665, 666
 - and Constitution of (1950) 664

- and democracy 664
- and developmentalism 667–8
- and liberalism in colonial period 663
- and nationalism 667–8
 - Gandhi's vision of self-rule 669–70
- and race 676
- and religion 671, 673
- and secularism 676
- indigenism:
 - and constitutionalism 597–8
 - and Latin America 592, 593
- indigenism, and Latin America 594, 597
- indirect rule, and imperialism 549
- individualism, and liberalism 330
- individualist ideologies 57
 - and political orientation 58
- individuality, and liberalism 333, 334
- Indochina Communist Party 665
- Indonesia:
 - and communism 665
 - and developmentalism 668
 - and Pancasila 674
 - and popular protests 665
 - and religion 673–4
- Indonesia Communist Party 665
- industrial revolution 57
- Industrial Workers Association (IWA) 395
- Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 393, 395
- inflation, and New Right attitude towards 304
- Institute for Humane Studies 405
- Institute of Economic Affairs 389, 405, 411
- institutions 387
- Institut National des Sciences et Arts 4–5

intellectuals:

- and democratic contribution of 258–9

- and detachment from national political cultures 251, 254, 255, 257, 259

 - criticism of 265–6

- as exiles 257

- and expertise of 257–8

- and fallacy of transcending ideological influence 252

- and ideology 252–5

- and national and social constitution of 256–7

- and nature and role of 102–3, 251, 266–7

 - Antonio Gramsci on 252, 255, 256

 - Daniel Bell on 258

 - Edward Said on 256–7, 274

 - Jeffrey Goldfarb on 259

 - Julien Benda on 252, 254–5, 256

 - Karl Mannheim on 252–4, 256, 257–8

 - Michael Walzer on 265–6

- and political theory's neglect of 251

- and politics of nationhood in United Kingdom 259–66

 - anti-intellectualism 264

 - anti-national stance 260

 - characterization of globalization 260

 - cosmopolitanism 262

 - decline of nation-state 260–1

 - English identity 263–4

 - European integration 261

 - global civil society 262

 - multiculturalism 262–3

 - recasting British identity 263

 - role of nationalist ideas 264–5

 - shift from government to governance 260

- and turn towards the post-national 251–2, 257, 267

International Communist Movement 376–7, 378

internationalism [221](#)

and Communism [376](#)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) [224](#), [407](#), [620](#)

International Relations, and imperialism [537](#)

Iran [634](#), [635](#)

Iraq [550](#)

Islah Party (Yemen) [629](#), [638](#)

Islam:

and critique of Western materialism [629](#), [632](#)

as '*din wa dawla*' (religion and state) [627](#)

and Islamic awakening (*al-sahwa al-Islamiyya*) [629](#)

and Islamic modernism [628–9](#)

and Muslim Brotherhood [629](#)

and *Nahda* (renaissance or awakening) [628](#)

and origins of ideological understanding of [627–30](#)

and politics [673](#)

and response to decline and colonization [628–9](#)

and Salafism [627](#), [628](#)

and Sharia law [628](#)

and Shi'i Muslims [628](#), [642n1](#)

and Sufism [627](#)

and Sunni Muslims [628](#), [642n1](#)

and Wahhabism [627](#), [671](#)

Islamic Action Front (Jordan) [629](#), [638](#)

Islamism:

and Arab Spring [641–2](#)

and conservative Islamism [637](#)

distinction from radical Islamism [637](#)

and expulsion of Palestinians (1948) [631](#)

and ideologues of:

al-Sadr [629–30](#)

Maududi [629](#)

and Islamic socialism [631](#)

- and Islamic state [634–5](#), [636](#), [638](#)
- and moderate Islamism (*wasatiyya*) [637–9](#)
 - democracy [638–9](#)
 - jihad* [639–40](#)
 - political participation [640](#)
- and Muslim Brotherhood [629](#), [637](#), [640](#)
- and post-Islamism [640–1](#)
- and religious globalism [225–7](#)
- and revolutionary Islamism [631–3](#), [637](#)
 - Iranian revolution [633](#), [634](#), [635](#)
 - jahiliyya* [632](#), [633](#)
 - jihad* [632–3](#)
 - near enemy [633](#)
 - radicalization of Shi'i Islam [633–5](#)
 - Ruholla Khomeini's thought [633–4](#)
 - seizing power from secular governments [633](#)
 - vanguard [632](#)
- and secularism [636](#)
- and Six Day War (1967) [631](#)
- and transnational radical Islamism [635–6](#)
- and women [630–1](#)

Italian Nationalist Association (ANI) [484](#)

Italian Socialist Movement (MSI) [486](#)

Italy:

- and 1848 revolution [316](#)
- and populism [497](#), [508](#)

Jacobinism [58–9](#), [63](#)

Jama'at-i Islami (India) [629](#), [671](#)

Japan [411](#)

Jordan [631](#)

Justice and Development Party (Morocco) [638](#)

justice globalism [215](#), [224–5](#)

- and ideological claim of [224](#)
- and policy proposals [224–5](#)
- and tasks of [224](#)

Kenya [614](#), [621](#)

Keynesianism [353](#), [354](#)

Khmer Rouge [665](#)

knowledge:

- and economic libertarianism [418–19](#)
- and ideology [177](#)
- and knowledge criteria [177](#)
- and nature of [177](#)
- and semantic evaluation of [129](#)
- as shared beliefs [177](#)

Konfederatsiya Revolyutsionnikh Anarkho-Sindikalistov [395](#)

Kuomintang (KMT) [648](#)

labour, and ideology critique [147–8](#)

Labour Party (UK) [355](#)

- and Crosland's *The Future of Socialism* [356–7](#)
- and welfare state [354](#)

language [150](#)

- and analysis of political ideas [158–9](#)
- and discourse analysis [133–4](#)
- and identity formation [159](#)
- and ideology [159](#)
- and political thought [158](#)

Laos [665](#)

Latin America:

- and anarchism [590](#)
- and anti-communism [589–90](#)
- and clientelism [500](#)
- and conservatism [587–90](#)
 - in 19th century [588–9](#)

- in 20th century 589–90
- hostility to liberalism 587–8
- religion 588
- and constitutionalism 598
 - post-nationalist 600
- and constitutional reforms 596–7, 602n11
- and democracy 587
- and fascism 589
- and ideological traditions 600–1
- and import-substituting industrialization 496
- and indigenism 592, 593, 594, 597
- and legal pluralism 599–600
- and liberalism 583–7
 - in 20th century 585–7
 - in early 19th century 584–5
 - in later 19th century 585–6
- and Mexican Revolution (1910), influence of 594–5
- and multiculturalism 596–7, 598–9, 600
- and nationalism 595
- and neoliberalism 587
- and populism 495–6, 504, 507, 594, 595–6
 - direct democracy 505
 - social integration 596
- and positivism 585–6, 590
- and relativism 599
- and socialism 590–4
 - in 19th century 590
 - in 20th century 591–4
 - Cold War period 592–3
 - communist parties 591, 592
 - Cuban influence 592–3
 - Liberation Theology 593
 - Marxism 591–3

- Soviet influence [591](#), [592](#)
- Trotskyism [592](#)
- and Spanish Empire [583](#)
- La Voce* (journal) [478](#)
- law, and liberalism [337](#)
- leadership, and fascism [480–1](#)
- left-wing ideology:
 - and characteristics of [235](#)
 - and distinction from right-wing ideology [235](#)
 - and individual psychological needs [236](#)
 - and system justification [236](#)
 - epistemic motivation [237–9](#)
- legal pluralism [600](#)
- lexicon, and discourse analysis [189–90](#)
- liberalism [329–30](#), [344](#)
 - and American political thought [79](#)
 - academic dominance of [80–1](#)
 - as contested concept [81](#)
 - and anarchism [388](#)
 - and Catholic Church on danger of [315–16](#)
 - and contemporary liberal ideologies [342–4](#)
 - as ideology of the universal [344](#)
 - political difficulties [343–4](#)
 - in political philosophy [342–3](#)
 - strength and weakness of [342](#)
 - and core concepts [341](#)
 - and criticism of
 - defenders of established order [339](#)
 - exclusionary nature of [339–40](#)
 - Marxist criticism of [339](#)
 - socialists [339](#)
 - vulnerability to [340](#), [341](#)
 - and diversity of [329](#), [330](#)

and durability and adaptability of [329](#)
and freedom, differences from republican conception of [520–6](#)
and highest political values [583–4](#)
and historical development of [330–9](#)
 American progressivism [335](#)
 American revolution [331](#)
 British new liberalism [335](#), [336](#)
 cultural elitism [334](#)
 developmental strand of [334–5](#)
 early twentieth century [335–6](#)
 Eastern Europe [338–9](#)
 emancipation [331](#)
 ethical character of [333–4](#)
 free markets [332](#)
 free trade [332](#)
 Germany [333](#)
 ideology of protection [337](#)
 impact of Second World War [336](#)
 imperialism [332](#), [338](#)
 individuality [333](#), [334](#)
 inter-war years [336](#)
 John Stuart Mill [333–4](#)
 middle class [333](#)
 multiculturalism [338](#)
 natural rights theories [331](#)
 nineteenth century [330–1](#), [332–4](#)
 origins of [331](#)
 philosophical radicalism [332](#)
 pluralism [338](#)
 post-war years [336–9](#)
 proto-liberalisms [331](#)
 rights [336–7](#)
 role of courts [337](#)

- social contract [331](#)
- social justice [337](#)
- tension between universal and particular [334](#), [337–8](#)
- welfare state [335](#)
- and imperialism [332](#), [338](#), [546](#)
 - anti-imperialism [551–2](#)
- and India, colonial period [663](#)
- as individualist creed [330](#)
- and influence of [64](#)
- and Latin America [583–7](#)
 - in 20th century [585–7](#)
 - Constant's influence [584](#)
 - in early 19th century [584–5](#)
 - in later 19th century [585–6](#)
- and multiculturalism [602n15](#)
- and neoliberalism [341](#)
- and primacy of the individual [57](#)
- and republicanism, differences between [514](#), [518](#)
 - conceptions of freedom [520–6](#)
 - constraining private power [526–7](#)
 - constraining public power [527–8](#)
 - focus of [526–9](#)
- and significance of [329](#)
- and South and Southeast Asia [662–5](#)
 - colonial period [662–4](#)
 - democracy [664](#)
 - metropolitan activism [664–5](#)
- and Spanish origins of term [601n1](#)
- and varieties of [341–2](#)

liberal nationalism:

- and individual autonomy [467](#)
- and national identity [464–5](#)
- and self-determination [468–9](#)

- and sovereignty [467](#)
- Liberation Theology [593](#)
- Liberia [610](#), [611](#)
- Libertarian Alliance [389](#)
- libertarianism [405](#)
 - see also* economic libertarianism
- libertarian municipalism [425](#)
- Libertarian Party [389](#)
- libertarian paternalism [308](#)
- liberty, *see* freedom Liberty Foundation [405](#)
- linguistic turn [15–16](#), [115](#), [155–6](#), [170n1](#)
- List Pim Fortuyn [509](#)
- Malayan Communist Party [665](#)
- Malaysia:
 - and communism [665](#)
 - and developmentalism [668](#)
 - and indigeneity [676](#)
 - and popular protests [665](#)
 - and religion [671](#)
- Mali [608](#)
- Mannheim Paradox [38](#), [445](#), [447](#)
- Maoism [380–1](#), [653–4](#)
- market failure, and economic libertarianism [419](#)
- market globalism [215](#), [222–3](#)
 - and challenges to [224](#), [225](#)
 - and codifiers of [223](#)
 - and emergence of [223](#)
 - and ideological claims of [223](#)
 - and variations of [222–3](#)
- Marshall Aid [411](#)
- martialism, and imperialism [547](#)
- Marxism [129](#), [175](#)

- and Africa 614
- and Althusser 31–4
 - compared with Marx’s account 31–2
 - descriptive account of 34
 - as experiential relation 32
 - ideological moulding of individuals 33–4
 - ideological state apparatuses 32
 - universality of 34–5
- and class struggle 368
- and decline in influence of 107
- and development of theory of 27–8
 - emancipatory loss 35
 - explanatory loss 34
 - loss in eclipse of critical accounts 34–5
 - more prominent role of 27
 - non-critical accounts 27–8
- and dialectic 367
- and Gramsci 28–31
 - civil society 28–9
 - expansive conception of 29, 30
 - hegemony 28
 - integral state 28
 - narrow conception of 30
 - Prison Notebooks* 28
 - rejection of critical accounts 30–1
- and imperialism 545, 547
- and Latin America 591–3
- and liberalism, criticism of 339–40
- and Mannheim’s reading of 45–7
- and Marx’s approach 8–9, 20

- camera obscura analogy [8](#), [20](#)
- in class-divided societies [22–3](#)
- class function of [25](#)
- critical account of [21](#), [23](#)
- critical concerns about [26](#)
- descriptive account of [21](#)
- as element of his sociology [22](#)
- epistemological standing of ideology [24](#)
- false ideas [22](#), [23](#), [25](#), [26](#)
- German Ideology* [7–8](#), [20](#)
- little discussion of [20](#)
- positive account of [21](#)
- role in his thought [21–3](#)
- social ideas [23–4](#)
- social origin of ideology [24–5](#)
- and postcolonialism [273](#), [281–2](#), [285](#)
- and stages of development [367](#)
- and subaltern studies [280](#)
- as total ideology [62](#)
- see also* communism; post-Marxism
- Mauritania [608](#)
- media, and expression of arguments [387](#)
- Mensheviks [369–70](#)
- mental maps, and ideologies as [217](#)
- mental models:
 - and ideological discourse [180](#)
 - and ideologies [179–80](#)
- Mexico:
 - and anarchism [590](#)
 - and communism [591](#)
 - and conservatism [588–9](#)
 - and indigenism [597](#)
 - and Mexican Revolution (1910) [586](#), [594](#)

- influence of 594–5
 - and national-revolutionary polity 586
 - and populism 595
 - and Zapatista revolt 593
- middle class, and liberalism 333
- mimicry 275
- Mises Institute 389
- modernity:
 - and dynamics of 218
 - and meaning of 218
 - and nationalism 219
 - and origin of ideologies 56–7
- modernization theory:
 - and imperialism 543
 - and nationalism 459
- Mongolia 372
- Mont Pelerin Society 409
- morality, and ideology 122
- morphological analysis of ideology 17, 115, 134
 - and aims of 116
 - and appraisive nature of 133
 - and attributes of ideology 126
 - and boundaries between ideologies 128–30
 - challenge to notion of 128–9
 - collective self-identification 129
 - and broadening of political thought and philosophy 121
 - and coherence and cohesion 120
 - and conceptual history 132
 - and constitutions 131–2
 - and constraints on ideologies 126
 - and decontestation 118, 120–1, 123, 129, 130, 171n7, 216
 - and discourse analysis 133–4
 - and essential contestability 119–20, 121

- and evaluation of ideologies 133
- and features of 116–19
 - attention to breadth of political discourse 117–18
 - focus on micro-structures 116–17
 - ideologies as discursive competitions 117
 - ideology as permanent form of political thinking 116
 - inclusiveness of 116
 - political concepts 116
 - political ideas as ideologies 118–19
- and ideological families 127–8
- and ideologies as differentiated phenomena 117
- and inconceivability of non-ideological thinking 123–4
- and mapping feasibility of political solutions 118
- and move away from notions of rigid ideologies 124
- and non-idealized politics and political thinking 122–3
- and patterns in thinking about politics 115, 128
- and political concepts 116, 126
 - adjacent concepts 125, 216–17
 - changes in 126
 - core concepts 124–5, 216, 386
 - interplay between 125
 - peripheral concepts 125–6
- and political language 120
- and political parties 130–1
- and polysemy 120, 121, 129
- and post-Marxism 132–3
- and poststructuralism 132–3
- and prescriptive and interpretative realism 122–3
- as reaction to negative portrayal of ideology 116
- and rejection of beginning of ideology thesis 123
- and rejection of end of ideology thesis 123
- and resistance to prescription/description dichotomy 121–2
- and truth 129

- and visual displays of ideologies 126
- mortality awareness, and ideological orientation 239
- Mouvement Républicain Populaire* 312
- multiculturalism 262–3
 - and constitutionalism 597–8
 - and feminism 573
 - and Latin America 596–7, 598–9, 600
 - and liberalism 338, 602n15
- Muslim Brotherhood 629
 - and moderate Islamism (*wasatiyya*) 638
 - and political participation 637, 640
- Muslim Sisters 630
- Muslim Women’s Association 630
- mutual aid societies 393
- myths 11, 161, 168
 - and fascism 482
 - and founding stories 444, 448
- Nahda Party (Tunisia) 638, 640, 641
- Narodniki* 495
- National Congress of British West Africa 612
- National Fascist Party (PNF) (Italy) 474
- National Front (France) 486, 494, 497, 517
- national identity 463
 - and conservatism 465–6
 - and fascism 466
 - and liberal nationalism 464–5
 - and National Socialism 466–7
 - and New Right 302
- national imaginary:
 - and decontestation 221
 - and ideologies 220–1
 - and social imaginary 219–20

nationalism:

- and approaches to study of 458–9
- and beliefs of 463–4
- and biological reading of 452–3
- as comparatively modern phenomenon 457
- as component of modern social imaginary 219
- and conceptual indistinctness 463, 470
- and conservative nationalism 465–6, 467–8
- and culture 453, 467–8
- and definition of 219
- and democracy 469
- and difference between theory and practice 459–60
- and distinct ethnic/cultural groups 463, 464
- and distinction from national loyalty 302
- and diversity of 457
- and etymology of term 452
- and fascism 466, 467–8, 475
- and ideology 221
- and India 667–8
 - Gandhi's vision of self-rule 669–70
- and individual autonomy:
 - conservative nationalism 467–8
 - fascism 467–8
 - liberal nationalism 467
- and influence of 63–4
- and influence of nineteenth century debates on 455
- and irrationality of 461
- and Latin America 595
- and liberal ideological values 457
- and liberal nationalism 464–5, 467, 468
- and modernity 219
- and national identity 463, 464
 - conservative nationalism 465–6

- fascism 466
- liberal nationalism 464–5
- National Socialism 466–7
- and National Socialism 466–7
- and national sovereignty 464, 467
 - conservative nationalism 467
 - liberal nationalism 467
- and national values 464
- and origins of 453–5
 - debate over 454–5
 - distinction from idea of nation 455
 - prehistory argument 453–4
- and paradox of embeddedness of nationalist beliefs 462–3
- and paradox of ideological practice 459–63
- as parasitic on other ideologies 470
- and populism 507–8
- and postcolonial regimes 456
- and primacy of the collective 57
- and purported naturalistic status 452
- and race 466
- and racism 477
- and regulative themes in ideology 463–70
- and renewed interest in 457
- and republicanism 516, 519–20
- and responses to:
 - negative 456
 - positive 456–7
- and self-determination 464, 468–9
 - liberal nationalism 468–9
- as social object 462
- as social subject 462–3
- and South and Southeast Asia 667
 - developmentalism 667–9

- tradition 669–70
- and subliminal nature of 462
- and tension between universal and particular 457, 461–2, 463
- and territory 463–4, 467
 - fascism 467
- National Socialism 467
 - and theoretical naivety and political power 460
 - as total ideology 61
 - and typologies of 457–8
 - and untheorizability of 460
 - negative response to 460–1
 - positive response to 460
 - and xenophobia 457
- nationality 455
- National Socialism (Nazism) 13, 14, 65, 66
 - and anti-Semitism 482
 - and democracy 469
 - and economic policy 484
 - and freedom 468
 - and ideology 67–8
 - consistency with 70
 - denial of possession of 69
 - and *Kulturation* 488
 - and *Lebensraum* 483
 - and the nation 482
 - and racism 466–7, 482, 483
 - and radical conservatism 298
 - and role of leader 68
 - and sacralization of politics 68
 - and the state 485–6
 - and Strength through Joy 484
 - and territorial identity 467
 - and *Volkisch* thought 477

- and women [481](#)
- National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) [479](#)
- nativism:
 - and populism [502](#)
 - and xenophobic populism [497](#)
- natural rights theories [331](#)
- Navy League [477](#)
- Nazism, see National Socialism
- Negritude [283–4](#), [612–14](#)
- neoconservatism [306](#)
- neofascism [486–9](#)
 - and anti-Semitism [488](#)
 - and Bardèche's attempt to rehabilitate fascism [486–7](#)
 - and economic thinking [488](#)
 - and Europeanism [487–8](#)
 - and European New Right (*Nouvelle Droite*) [487](#)
 - and Evola's elitist approach [487](#)
 - and Holocaust denial [488](#)
 - and immigration [488](#)
- neoliberalism [405](#)
 - and exaggerated coherence of [407–8](#)
 - and imperialism [548](#)
 - and individual autonomy [147](#)
 - and Latin America [587](#), [595](#)
 - and liberalism [341](#)
 - and liberty [341](#)
 - as new dominant orthodoxy [407](#)
 - and origins and development of [406–7](#)
 - and social democracy:
 - accommodated by [359–61](#)
 - criticism of [358–9](#)
 - see also economic libertarianism; market globalism
- neo-republicanism, see republicanism
- Nepal [665](#), [675](#)

Netherlands, and populism [495](#), [509](#)
neuroscience, and epistemic processes and ideology [238](#)
New Conservatism [305–6](#)
New Economic Policy (NEP) [373](#), [374](#)
New Harmony [366](#)
New Labour:
 and intellectual influences on [266](#)
 and partial adoption of New Right doctrine [307](#)
New Left [221](#), [358](#)
new liberalism [335](#)
new public management [416](#)
New Right [221](#)
 and civil association [304–5](#)
 and concerns of [301–2](#)
 and defence of free market [302–4](#)
 and Hayek [302–4](#)
 and national identity [302](#)
 and reformulation of organic position [302](#)
 and rise of [407](#)
 and social democracy, criticism of [358–9](#)
New Zealand [406](#)
Nicaragua [593](#)
Niger [608](#)
Nigeria [621](#)
Non-Aligned Movement [617](#), [618](#)
non-violence:
 and Gandhi [670](#)
 and green ideology [428–9](#)
 and resistance to imperialism [553](#)
Northeastern Federation of Anarchist Communists [394](#)
Northern League (LN) (Italy) [497](#), [508](#)
ontological turn [149–50](#)

Ordo Liberals [405](#), [406](#), [408](#)

organicism:

and conservative nationalism [465–6](#)

and moderate conservatism [300](#)

and New Right [302](#)

Organization of African Unity (OAU) [615](#)

organized self-realization [147](#)

Orientalism [272–4](#)

and consistency across time [272–3](#)

and criticism of [273](#)

and definition of [272](#)

Pakistan [671](#)

Paleoconservatism [306](#)

paleo-liberals [405](#)

paleo-libertarians [419](#)

Pan African Conference (1945) [614](#), [615](#)

Pan Africanism:

and Nasser [617](#)

and Nkrumah [615](#)

parliamentary sovereignty [305](#), [418](#)

participatory democracy, and green ideology [427](#)

Participatory Economics [395](#)

Partido Obrero Socialista [591](#)

Partido Socialista Argentino [590](#)

patriarchy [579n20](#)

and feminism [564](#)

existence of [573–5](#)

social construction [574–5](#)

and gender inequality [564–5](#)

as ideology [562](#)

the people, and populism [498](#), [501–2](#)

People's Action Party (Singapore) [669](#)

People's Party (USA) [495](#), [501](#), [507](#)

perestroika [381](#), [382](#)

Peronism [496](#)

personalism, and Christian Democracy [313](#), [322](#)

personality:

- and ideological orientation [234–5](#), [236](#), [238–9](#), [242](#)

- and system justification [237](#)

 - epistemic motivation [237–9](#)

 - existential motivation [239–40](#)

 - relational motivation [240–2](#)

Peru:

- and Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) [594–5](#)

- and anarchism [590](#)

- and indigenism [597](#)

- and Marxism [591–2](#)

- and neoliberalism [595](#)

- and populism [496](#), [505](#)

Philippines [665](#)

planning, and New Right criticism of [302–3](#)

pluralism [499–500](#)

- and Christian Democracy [313](#)

- and legal pluralism [599–600](#)

- and liberalism [338](#)

- and political science [77](#), [84](#)

 - critique by [84–6](#)

 - rearticulation of [79–80](#), [83–4](#)

- and populism [499–500](#)

Poland [495](#)

politeness, and ideological orientation [242](#)

political parties, and ideology [130–1](#)

political psychology [232](#)

political rhetoric, *see* rhetoric

political science:

- and American democratic thought 75
- as an American social science 75
- and behaviouralism 75–6
 - public opinion 81
- and behavioural revolution 80, 82–5
 - commitment to scientific approach 82–3
 - defence of interest-group liberalism 81
 - definition of 85
 - reaction against 85
- and conception of the State 76
- and descriptive method for constructing democratic theory 83–4
- and development of:
 - inter-war years 78–9
 - nineteenth century 76
 - post-Second World War 80–7
 - pre-First World War 77–8
- and distancing from American political culture 75
- and formation of American Political Science Association 77
- and group politics 78, 83–4
- and ideological and methodological break with past 77
- and liberalism 79
 - academic dominance of 80–1
 - as contested concept 81
 - critique of 84–5
 - liberalism 79
- and pluralism 77, 84
 - critique of 84–6
 - rearticulation of 79–80, 83–4
- and post-behavioural era 86–7
- and scientific status 77
- and scientization of 81–2
- and tension in 75

politics:

- and ideologization of 64–5
- and sacralization of 61, 68
- polysemy 120, 121, 129
- Popular Front 91, 94, 378, 592
- popular sovereignty 56
 - and populism 501
- populism:
 - and agrarian populism 495, 507
 - and anti-elitism 498, 502–4, 596
 - economic power of elites 503–4
 - elites as agents of alien powers 504
 - elites as alien 504
 - identifying elites 503
 - sustaining when in power 503
- and anti-Semitism 504
- and authoritarianism 497, 506
- and clientelism, distinction from 500
- and conceptual confusion over 493–4
- as contested concept 493, 595–6
- and definitions of 498
- and democracy 505–6
 - relationship between 506–7
- and democratization 507
- and diffusion of 509–10
- and diversity of 500
- in Eastern Europe 495
- in European context 493
- and explaining emergence or absence of 509
- and flexibility of 498, 499, 500, 504, 509
- and gender 508
- and the general will 498, 504–6
 - direct democracy 505
 - suspicion of representative government 505

- and Latin America [493](#), [495–6](#), [507](#), [594](#), [595–6](#)
 - social integration [596](#)
- and media use of term [493–4](#)
- as mental map [498–9](#)
- and nationalism [507–8](#)
- and nativism [497](#), [502](#)
- and opposites to:
 - elitism [499](#)
 - pluralism [499–500](#)
- and origins of [494](#)
- and the people [498](#), [501–2](#), [596](#)
 - common people [501–2](#)
 - peoples as nations [502](#)
 - as sovereign [501](#)
- as political style [595](#)
- and radical right parties:
 - core ideology of [497](#)
 - emphasis on Muslims [497–8](#)
 - nationalism [507–8](#)
- and republicanism [519](#)
- in Russia [495](#), [507](#)
- and socioeconomic populism [495–6](#)
- as ‘thin’ ideology [498–9](#)
 - advantages of conceptualizing as [508–10](#)
- and types of [494](#)
- in United States [495](#), [507](#)
- in Western Europe [497–8](#), [507–8](#)
 - and xenophobic populism [497–8](#)
- positivism [5](#), [59](#), [60](#), [62](#), [63](#), [82](#), [601n5](#)
 - and Latin America [585–6](#), [590](#)
- post-anarchism [399](#)
- postcolonialism [271–2](#)
 - and Africa [622](#)

- and anti-colonial archive 282–7
 - critique of nativist and national consciousness 285
 - Pan-Africanist thought 283–4
 - reverse ethnocentrism 285–6
 - scepticism of universalism 286
 - synthesis 286
 - tensions within 283
- and capitalism 282
- and change in meaning of 271
- and criticism of 281–2
- and Edward Said 272–4
 - contrapuntal reading 276
- and essentialism 286
- and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 277–9
- and Homi Bhabha 274–6, 280–1
 - colonial stereotypes 274–5
 - mimicry 275
 - religious conversion in colonial India 275–6
- and Marxism 273, 281–2, 285
- and nationalism 456
- and Orientalism 272–4
 - consistency across time 272–3
 - criticism of 273
 - definition of 272
- and origins of 272
- and perspective of 280–1
- and postcolonial feminism 279
- and poststructuralism 273–4
- and subaltern studies 277–9, 280
 - critique of 277–9
 - Marxism 280
- post-Marxism:
 - and ideology 132–3, 160–1, 168–9

- empty signifiers [162–4](#), [169](#)
- images [164–5](#)
- myths and imaginaries [161](#), [168](#)
- subjectivity [162](#)
- postmodernism [107](#)
 - and feminism [575](#)
- poststructuralism:
 - and broad conception of [156](#)
 - and critical theory [146–8](#)
 - and Edward Said [273–4](#)
 - and end of ideology thesis [156](#)
 - and ideology [132–3](#), [155](#), [156](#)
 - approach to analysis of [157](#)
 - and language [159](#)
 - and linguistic turn [155](#)
 - and political theory [159](#)
 - and post-Marxist discursive account of ideology [160–1](#), [168–9](#)
 - empty signifiers [162–4](#), [169](#)
 - images [164–5](#)
 - myths and imaginaries [161](#), [168](#)
 - subjectivity [162](#)
 - and psychoanalytic account of ideology [165–8](#), [169–70](#)
 - distinction from post-Marxist approach [166](#)
 - fantasmatic logics [167–8](#)
 - fantasy [165–6](#), [168](#)
 - the real [166](#), [172n26](#)
 - sublime objects [167](#)
 - and reclaiming ideology [157–60](#)
 - approaches to analysis of [157–9](#)
 - and ubiquity of ideology [156](#), [157](#), [163–4](#)
- Poujadists* [495](#)
- power politics, and justification of imperialism [544](#)
- practices [387](#)

- Prague Spring [410](#)
- prefixes, and proliferation of [215](#)
- prejudice [142](#)
- primitivism, and green anarchisms [398](#)
- progress:
 - and faith in [57](#), [60](#)
 - and rejection of idea of [60](#)
- progressive taxation [354](#)
- progressive total ideologies [60](#)
 - and political messianism [61](#)
 - and religion [60–1](#)
 - and revolutionary faith [61](#)
 - as secular religions [61](#)
- propaganda, and fascism [475](#)
- property rights, and individualist anarchisms [389](#)
- Protestantism, and Christian Democracy [318](#)
- psychoanalytic thought:
 - and identity formation [159](#)
 - and ideology [165–8](#), [169–70](#)
 - fantasmatic logics [167–8](#)
 - fantasy [165–6](#), [168](#)
 - the real [166](#), [172n26](#)
 - sublime objects [167](#)
- public choice economics [405](#)
 - and depoliticization of economic policy [416](#)
 - and the state [415–16](#)
- public goods, and state intervention [414](#)
- public opinion [81](#)
 - and elite influence on ideological positions [234](#)
- public ownership, and Communist states [374–5](#)
- public reason [529](#)
- public sector:
 - and libertarian public choice theory [415–16](#)

- and new public management [416](#)
- queer anarchism [397](#)
- queer theory, and entrenchment of gender [571](#)
- racism:
 - and fascism [482–3](#)
 - and imperialism [540–1](#), [675](#)
 - and influence of [64](#)
 - and late 19th/early 20th-century [477–8](#)
 - and nationalism [466](#), [477](#)
 - and National Socialism [466–7](#), [482](#), [483](#)
 - and South and Southeast Asia [675–6](#)
 - as total ideology [61](#)
- racist discourse [181](#)
- Rainbow Circle [336](#)
- rational choice analysis [82](#), [202–3](#)
- rational choice theory, and conservatism [306](#)
- reactionary ideologies [57](#)
 - and total ideology [60](#)
- realism:
 - and justification of imperialism [544](#)
 - and prescriptive and interpretative [122–3](#)
- Rechtsstaat* [333](#)
- recognition, and ideology critique [144–6](#), [148–9](#)
- Red Toryism [307](#)
- relational motivation, and system justification [240–2](#)
- relationism [42–3](#), [253](#)
- relativism, and Latin America [599](#)
- religion:
 - and Christian Democracy:
 - role of Catholic church [315](#)
 - vision of Christian past [314–15](#)
 - and ideology [670–1](#)

- and reactionary conservatism [294](#)
- and South and Southeast Asia [671–4](#)
 - democratic institutions [671–2](#)
 - Islam [673–4](#)
 - religious extremism [671](#)
 - religious majoritarianism [672](#)
 - source of ideological concepts and expression [672–3](#)
 - state intervention [671](#)
- and total ideology [60–1](#)
- see also* Catholic Church; Christianity; Islamism
- religious globalism [215](#), [225–7](#)
 - and Islamism [225–7](#)
- representation, and meanings of [278](#)
- republicanism:
 - and communitarianism [516](#), [519–20](#)
 - and constraining private power [526–7](#)
 - and constraining public power [527–8](#)
 - and cosmopolitan democracy [528](#)
 - and Euro-Atlantic political tradition [513](#)
 - and France [517](#), [520](#)
 - and freedom:
 - differences from liberal conception of [520–6](#)
 - as non-domination [518–26](#)
 - and global politics [528](#)
 - and imperialism [542](#), [546–7](#)
 - anti-imperialism [552](#)
 - and liberalism, differences between [514](#), [518](#)
 - conceptions of freedom [520–6](#)
 - constraining private power [526–7](#)
 - constraining public power [527–8](#)
 - focus of [526–9](#)
 - and nationalism [516](#), [519–20](#)
 - and populism [519](#)

- and progressive politics 520, 528–31
 - accountability and popular control 530–1
 - civic solidarity 531
 - language to criticize neoliberalism 530
 - and revival of 513–18
- revolution, and total ideology 61
- rhetoric:
 - and connotations of 200
 - as constitutive part of Western political tradition 201–2
 - and context of ideological rhetoric 205–6
 - and definition of 201
 - and deliberation 203–4
 - and democracy 209
 - and growth of interest in 202, 203, 205
 - and heresthetic 202–3
 - and ideological argumentation 208
 - appeal to authority 206–7
 - appeal to emotion 207
 - appeal to ethos 206–7
 - enthymeme 208
 - political style 207
 - quasi-logical forms of 208
 - and necessity of 201
 - and policy analysis 204
 - and political leadership 204–5
 - and political thought 203–4
 - and rational choice analysis 202–3
 - and stasis theory 205–6
 - and study of ideologies 197–8, 201, 209–10
 - and study of politics 202–5
 - and virtues of 200–2
- rights, and liberalism 336–7
- right-wing ideology:

- and characteristics of 235
- and distinction from left-wing ideology 235
- and individual psychological needs 236
- and system justification 236
 - epistemic motivation 237–9
 - existential motivation 239–40
 - relational motivation 241–2
- right wing radical parties (Western Europe) 497–8
 - and core ideology of 497
 - and emphasis on Muslims 497–8
 - and nationalism 507–8
- Rockefeller Foundation 74, 82
- Romanticism:
 - and anti-Semitism 477
 - and influence on *Volkisch* movement 477
 - and total ideology 61–2
- Runnymede Trust, and Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 263
- Rural Party (Finland) 495
- Russia, and agrarian populism 495, 507
 - see also* Soviet Communism
- Russian Revolution 586, 591
 - and Bolshevik seizure of power 370
 - and Marx's view of 368–9
- Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) 369, 371
- Rwanda 622
- Salafism 627, 628
- Salò Republic 484, 487
- Sandinistas 593
- Saudi Arabia 671
- security, and system justification 239–40
- Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland 495
- self-determination, and nationalism 464, 468–9

self-rule (*swaraj*), Gandhi's vision of [669–70](#)
Senegal [613](#), [614](#)
sentientism [426](#)
sexual violence [576–7](#)
Sharia law [628](#)
Sierra Leone [610](#)
signifiers:
 and empty signifiers [162–4](#), [169](#)
 and floating signifiers [163](#)
 and study of ideologies [198](#)
Singapore [668](#), [669](#)
Situationist International [388](#)
slavery [519](#), [521](#)
 and Abolitionist movement [609–10](#)
 and Africa [607](#)
social change, and left-right attitudes towards [235–6](#)
social choice theory [202–3](#)
social cognition, and ideology as [176–8](#), [235](#)
 attitudes [178–9](#)
 mental models [179–80](#)
social contract, and liberalism [331](#)
social Darwinism [425](#), [466](#)
 and origins of fascism [478](#)
social democracy:
 and achievement of [362](#)
 as compromise between capitalism and socialism [348](#)
 and definition of [348](#)
 and economic libertarianism, opposed by [410–11](#)
 and emergence of [349–52](#)
 Bernstein's revisionary socialism [349–51](#)
 construction of cross-class coalitions [352](#)
 debate over policy [352](#)
 democratic commitment of [352](#)

- inter-war years [351](#)
- labour movements of north-west Europe [349](#)
- late nineteenth century [349–51](#)
- political theory [352](#)
- role of legislation and government policy [352](#)
- Sweden [351](#), [352](#)
- and golden age of [352–7](#)
 - confidence of [357](#)
 - as contestable concept [352](#)
 - corporatism [355](#)
 - Crosland's *The Future of Socialism* [356–7](#)
 - economic democracy [354–5](#)
 - impact of Second World War [353](#)
 - Keynesianism [353](#), [354](#)
 - new economic thinking [353](#)
 - post-war economic boom [354](#)
 - progressive taxation [354](#)
 - reduced salience of public ownership [354](#)
 - revisionism of 1950s [355–6](#)
 - socialization of income flows [354](#)
 - welfare state [353–4](#)
- and late-twentieth century crisis in [357](#)
 - acceptance of constraints on political action [360](#)
 - accommodation with neoliberalism [359–61](#)
 - change in employment patterns [357](#)
 - cultural changes [357](#)
 - gender equality [360–1](#)
 - radicalization [358](#)
 - rise of neoliberalism [358–9](#)
 - sociological context of [357](#)
 - supply-side social democracy [360](#)
 - Sweden [358](#)
- and provisional utopianism [361–2](#)

- and Sweden [351](#), [352](#), [358](#)
 - Meidner plan [358](#)
- Social Democratic Party (SAP) (Sweden) [351](#), [358](#)
 - and welfare state [354](#)
- Social Democratic Party (SPD) (Germany) [349](#), [355](#), [479](#)
 - and Bad Godesberg programme [356](#)
- social ecology, and green anarchisms [398](#)
- social imaginaries:
 - and definition of [538](#)
 - and global imaginary [221–2](#)
 - and ideologies [217–18](#), [539](#)
 - and meaning of [217](#)
 - and national imaginary [219–21](#)
 - decontestation [221](#)
 - ideology [220–1](#)
 - and reality of [217](#)
 - and solidity of [217–18](#)
 - and temporary nature of [218](#)
 - see also* imperialism, and imperial imaginaries
- social imperialism [478](#)
- social investment state [360](#)
- socialism:
 - and Africa [614](#)
 - academic critiques of [616–17](#)
 - Nasser [617](#)
 - Nkrumah [614–16](#)
 - Nyerere [616](#), [617](#)
 - ujamaa [616](#), [617](#)
 - and anarchism [388](#)
 - and basic ingredients of [590](#)
 - and Bernstein's revisionism [349–51](#)
 - and Buddhism [674](#)
 - and core concepts [590](#)

- and critique of ideology 6
- and Islamic socialism 631
- and Latin America 590–4
 - in 19th century 590
 - in 20th century 591–4
 - Cold War period 592–3
 - communist parties 591, 592
 - Cuban influence 592–3
 - Liberation Theology 593
 - Marxism 591–3
 - Soviet influence 591, 592
 - Trotskyism 592
- and origins of 57
- and primacy of the collective 57
- see also* Marxism
- socialist market economy 374
 - and Yugoslavia 379
- Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) 370
- socialization, and ideological beliefs 240–1
- social justice:
 - and inability to objectively determine 303
 - and liberalism 337
- social market economy, and neoliberalism 406
- social psychology, and ideologies 242–3
 - and development of study of 232–3
 - and motivational substructure 234–6
 - attitudes towards social change and equality 235–6
 - definition of 233
 - ideology as motivated social cognition 235
 - individual psychological needs 236
 - personality 234–5
 - system justification 236
 - and socially constructed discursive superstructure 233–4

- definition of [233](#)
- elite formation of [233–4](#)
- examples of [233–4](#)
- and system justification [236](#), [237](#), [242–3](#)
 - epistemic motivation [237–9](#)
 - existential motivation [239–40](#)
 - relational motivation [240–2](#)
- Social Science Research Council [74](#), [82](#)
- social sciences:
 - in 1960s [100](#)
 - and claims of scientific authority [73](#)
 - and ideology [73](#)
 - and nineteenth-century roots of [73](#)
 - and value-judgments [74](#)
 - and Weber's essay on objectivity in [74](#)
- social stability, and Marx [22–3](#)
- socioeconomic populism [495–6](#)
- sociology [4](#)
- sociology of knowledge [10](#), [40–1](#), [253](#), [442](#)
 - and evaluation of political ideologies [45](#)
 - and origins of [42](#)
 - and relationism [42–3](#)
- solidarism, and Christian Democracy [313](#)
- Solidarity Federation [391](#), [395](#)
- South Africa [622](#)
- South and Southeast Asia:
 - and anti-communism [665](#)
 - and Asian values [669](#)
 - and authoritarianism [668–9](#)
 - and Cold War [662](#), [665](#)
 - and communism [665–7](#)
 - challenges facing [665](#)
 - critiques by [666](#)

- disagreements over ideological orthodoxy 666
- political participation 667
- and decolonization 661, 662
- and developmentalism 667–9
 - democracy 668
- and European colonialism 661
- and ideological diversity 661, 662
- and liberalism 662–5
 - colonial period 662–4
 - democracy 664
 - metropolitan activism 664–5
- and nationalism 667
 - developmentalism 667–9
 - tradition 669–70
- and popular protests 665
- and postcolonial politics 661–2
- and race:
 - caste 676–7
 - indigeneity 676
- and racism 675–6
- and religion 671–4
 - democratic institutions 671–2
 - Islam 673–4
 - religious extremism 671
 - religious majoritarianism 672
 - source of ideological concepts and expression 672–3
 - state intervention 671
- sovereignty, and nationalism 464, 467
- Soviet Communism 65
 - and abandonment of Communist ideology 381–2
 - and aspiration to build communism 376, 377
 - and Bolshevik seizure of power 370
 - and bureaucratic centralism 373

- and central planning [374, 375](#)
- and Communist Party's monopoly on power [372–3](#)
- and democratic centralism [373–4](#)
- and discrediting of [410](#)
- and ideology [67, 70](#)
- and International Communist Movement [376–7, 378](#)
- and leaders' belief in ideology [377](#)
- and perestroika [381, 382](#)
- and public ownership [374–5](#)
- and role of ideology in excluding economic reforms [375](#)
- and sacralization of politics [68](#)
- and Stalinism [378–9](#)

Spain:

- and anarcho-syndicalism [395](#)
- and liberalism [330](#)

Spanish civil war [322](#)

Sri Lanka [664, 673, 674, 675, 767](#)

Stalinism [13, 14, 378–9](#)

see also Soviet Communism

state:

- and economic libertarian views of [413–16](#)
 - Austrian School [415](#)
 - coercive nature of [413–14](#)
 - depoliticization of economic policy [416](#)
 - dismantling of [413](#)
 - minimal state [414–15](#)
 - new public management [416](#)
 - protection of market order [415](#)
 - suspicion of [413](#)
 - Virginia public choice school [415–16](#)
- and fascism [485](#)
- and National Socialism [485–6](#)
- and Ordo Liberals [406](#)

State Socialist Party (SSP) (China) [652](#)
Students for a Democratic Society [100](#)
subaltern studies [277–9](#), [280](#)
 and critique of [277–9](#)
 and Marxism [280](#)
subjectivity [171n14](#)
 and ideological analysis [162](#)
 and theorization of [160–1](#)
sublime objects [167](#)
suffering [145](#), [146](#)
Sufism [627](#)
sustainability, and green ideology [426–7](#)
swaraj (self-rule), Gandhi's vision of [669–70](#)
Sweden:
 and social democracy [351](#), [352](#), [358](#)
 and welfare state [354](#)
Syarakat Islam (Indonesia) [673–4](#)
syndicalism [477](#)
syntax, and discourse analysis [190–2](#)
system justification [236](#), [237](#), [242–3](#)
 and epistemic motivation [237–9](#)
 and existential motivation [239–40](#)
 and relational motivation [240–2](#)

Taborites [364](#)
Taliban [671](#)
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) [616](#)
Tanzania [616](#)
Tea Party [306–7](#)
technological development, and imperialism [541–2](#)
terror management theory (TMT) [239](#)
Thailand:
 and communism [665](#)

- and contested role of king 674
 - and popular protests 665
 - and sufficient economy 669
- theories, and definition of 538
- Third Way, and fascism 475
- threat, and ideological orientation 239–40
- Tobin Tax 225
- total ideologies 59–62
 - and anti-democratic 63
 - and anti-individualism 63
 - and anti-liberalism 63
 - and apocalyptic messianism 62
 - and authoritarian implications 63
 - and definition of 59
 - and distinction from totalitarian ideologies 65–6
 - and diversity of 59
 - and features of 59
 - and Marxism 62
 - and myth of the new man 61
 - and nationalism 61, 63–4
 - and political messianism 61
 - and progressive total ideologies 60–1
 - as secular religions 61
 - and racism 61, 64
 - and reactionary total ideologies 60
 - and regeneration 61
 - and revolutionary faith 61
 - and Romanticism 61–2
 - and teleological representation of history 59–60
 - and traditionalist total ideologies 60
- totalitarianism 13–14, 64–71
 - and characteristics of totalitarian regime 65
 - and controversy over use of term 64

- and definition of [65](#)
- and fascism [485](#)
- and ideologization of politics [64–5](#)
- and origins of [476](#)
- and origins of term [64](#)
- and sacralization of politics [68](#)
- and terror [69](#)
- and totalitarian ideologies:
 - definition of [64](#)
 - distinction from total ideologies [65–6](#)
 - functions of [65](#)
 - instrumental function of [69](#)
 - as organizational ideologies [66–7](#)
 - political action [67–8](#)
 - role of [68–71](#)
 - as secular religions [68](#)
- see also* Bolshevism; Fascism; National Socialism; Soviet Communism
- traditionalist ideologies [57](#)
 - and total ideology [60](#)
- transfeminism [571](#)
- transgenderism [571–2](#)
- transsexuality [571–2](#)
- tribalism, and pre-colonial Africa [608–9](#)
- Trotskyism, and Latin America [592](#)
- truth:
 - and dynamic nature of [40](#)
 - and ideological morphologies [216–17](#)
 - and ideologies' claims to [216](#)
 - and morphological analysis of ideology [129](#)
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa) [165](#), [622](#)
- ujamaa [616](#), [617](#)
- Umma Party (Kuwait) [638](#)

uncertainty, and system justification 237–9

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 372

see also Soviet Communism

United Kingdom:

and economic libertarianism 406

and intellectuals and the politics of nationhood 259–66

anti-intellectualism 264

anti-national stance 260

characterization of globalization 260

cosmopolitanism 262

decline of nation-state 260–1

English identity 263–4

European integration 261

global civil society 262

multiculturalism 262–3

recasting British identity 263

role of nationalist ideas 264–5

shift from government to governance 260

and neoliberalism 406, 407

and social democracy 355

Crosland's *The Future of Socialism* 356–7

and welfare state 354

United Nations Decade of Women (1975–85) 620

United States:

and agrarian populism 495, 507

and conservatism 305–7

Chicago school 306

economic libertarianism 411

libertarianism 305

neoconservatism 306

New Conservatism 305–6

Paleoconservatism 306

rational choice theory 306

- Tea Party [306–7](#)
- and early debates on ideology [5–6](#)
- and economic libertarianism [406](#)
 - alliance with conservative movement [411](#)
 - constraining federal power [416](#)
- and imperialism [537](#)
- and liberalism [337](#)
 - as contaminated term [405–6](#)
 - difficulties faced by [343–4](#)
 - progressivism [335](#)
- and neoliberalism [407](#)
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and different versions of [448](#)
- Uruguay:
 - and anarchism [590](#)
 - and socialism [591](#)
- utopianism and ideology [447–9](#)
 - and basic vision of [448](#)
 - and Bloch [443–4](#)
 - and Campanella's *The City of the Sun* [365](#)
 - and dissatisfaction [440](#), [448](#)
 - and etymology of term [439–40](#)
 - and feminism [439](#)
 - and Freeden [445](#)
 - and intentional communities [440](#)
 - and Jameson [445–7](#)
 - and Levitas [447](#)
 - and Mannheim [44–5](#), [254](#), [440](#), [441](#), [442–3](#)
 - and Mannheim Paradox [445](#)
 - and More's *Utopia* [365](#), [439–40](#)
 - and negative connotations of [439](#), [440–1](#)
 - and Popper [441](#)
 - and reactionary conservatism [295](#), [297](#)
 - and Ricouer [440](#), [442](#), [444](#), [445](#), [447](#)

- and three facets of [440](#)
- and utopian literature [440](#)
- and utopian social theory [440](#)
- and violence [441](#)

value cleavages [131](#)

Venezuela, and populism [496](#), [509](#), [595](#)

Versailles, Treaty of (1918) [468](#), [650](#)

Vietnam [665](#)

violence:

- and fascism [481–2](#)
- and imperialism [547](#), [550](#)
 - resistance to [553–4](#)
- and martialism [547](#)
- and meaning of [428–9](#)
- and sexual violence [576–7](#)
- and utopianism [441](#)

Virginia public choice school [415–16](#)

Völkisch movement [477](#)

Wahhabism [627](#), [671](#)

Waldorf Peace Conference (1949) [91](#)

war, and imperialism [547](#)

welfare provision:

- and neoconservative critique of [306](#)
- and New Right [303](#)

welfare state:

- and fascism [485](#)
- and liberalism [335](#)
- and social democracy, golden age of [353–4](#)

well-being, and ideological orientation [242–3](#)

Western Europe, and xenophobic populism [497–8](#), [507–8](#)

Western Marxism, and ideology [27](#)

women:

- and fascism [481](#)
- and Islamism [630–1](#)
- and National Socialism [481](#)
- and populism [508](#)
- and pre-colonial Africa [620](#)
- see also* feminism
- Women in Nigeria (WIN) [620](#)
- women's studies, and feminism [563](#)
- work, and ideology critique [147–8](#)
- World Bank [407](#)
- World Social Forum (WSF) [224](#)
- World Trade Organization (WTO) [224](#)
- xenophobia:
 - and nationalism [457](#)
 - and xenophobic populism [497–8](#)
- Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) [100](#)
- Yugoslavia [372](#), [375](#), [379](#)
 - and socialist market economy [374](#)
- Zabalaza Anarchist Communist Front [394](#)
- Zambia [614](#)
- Zentrum* (Germany) [317](#), [321](#)
- Zimbabwe [608](#)