NIALL FERGUSON: This is a tale of two ships.
On board one, landing in northern Peru in 1 528,
were 1 3 Spaniards accompanying the conquistador Francisco Pizarro.
Their ambition was to annex a vast new continent for the King of Spain.
On board the second ship, landing in North America a century later,
were ordinary English labourers
who simply wanted to earn a little land for themselves
by the sweat of their brows.
The two ships symboIise this taIe of two Americas.
On one, conquistadors. On the other, indentured servants.
One Iot dreamt of pIunder, mountains of Inca goId.
The other lot knew they had years of hard slog ahead of them.
A fundamental difference between these two sets of shipmates
would change the entire course of Western history...
...propelling one of the Americas to the very top of the league table
of prosperity and power.
What was it?
In this series I'm identifying six unique factors.
I'm caIIing them the kiIIer appIications that put the West on top of the rest.
The first two were competition and science.
In this fiIm, I'm turning to kiIIer app number three
and showing why the property-owning democracy
arose in North America but not in South.
I'm aIso asking if we Iose our monopoIy over apps Iike these,
couId Western civiIization be consigned to history?
lt was a new world,
but it was to be the West's world.
lt was Europeans that reached out across the Atlantic Ocean
to take possession of a vast land mass
that prior to 1 507 simply didn't appear on maps.
America.
lt was Europeans - above all from Spain and from England -
who, furiously vying for souls, gold and land,
were willing to cross oceans and conquer whole continents.
This was one of history's great natural experiments.
Take two European cultures, export them
and impose them on a wide range of different lands and peoples -
Britain's culture in the north, Spain's in the south -
and then see which does better.
ln the end, there could be only one winner.
Looking at the worId four centuries on, it's pretty cIear that the United States
is now the dominant force in Western civiIization.
But just how and why did that come about?
WeII, you might be forgiven for thinking
it's because the peopIe here were more industrious,
or because the soiI was more fertiIe,
or because there was more oiI or goId underneath that soiI.
But, actuaIIy, it was none of those reasons.
The key to the rise of America was an idea -
an idea that changed the worId.
ln 1 67 0 a modest English ship, the Carolina,
arrived at an island off the coast of what today is South Carolina.
Among those on board were servants
who had decided to risk their lives on a transatlantic crossing
to escape a life of grinding poverty in England.
Ahead of them lay years of hard toil in alien surroundings.
But at the end of it,
they wouId receive one of the worId's most attractive assets -
prime North American reaI estate pIus a say in the process of Iaw-making.
ReaI estate pIus representation - that was the North American dream.
Yet, at the outset, it wasn't these poor English migrants in North America
but the conquistadors in South America who seemed destined for greatness.
Because South America was where the money was,
and the Spaniards had got there first.
During the 1 6th century,
the work of colonising the Americas was left
almost entirely to the people of Spain.
Great native empires were subjugated by Spanish adventurers.
Here in Peru,
Pizarro and his conquistadors overthrew the mighty Andean empire of the lncas.
One of the Spaniards who had sailed on that first ship,
and one of Pizarro's most trusted confederates,
was a young captain from Segovia named Jeronimo de Aliaga.
For de Aliaga, Peru was as weird as it was wonderful.
This is Machu Picchu - the Iegendary Iost city of the Incas.
WeII, not so much Iost, just never found by the Spaniards,
despite the fact that it's onIy 50 miIes away from the Inca capitaI Cuzco.
By the time Jeronimo de AIiaga and his feIIow conquistadores
came to this region of Peru,
they'd aIready captured and kiIIed the Inca emperor AtahuaIpa
and Iaid cIaim to his entire empire in the name of the Spanish king.
Machu Picchu is an extraordinary, mysterious pIace.
It's a sobering reminder that no civiIization is immortaI,
no matter how powerfuI and mighty it may seem to itseIf.
While the indigenous population was ravaged
by alien diseases and systematic slaughter,
a quarter of a million Spaniards came to the Americas
to impose their version of Western civilization,
lured by tales of vast wealth.
Everywhere they looked, it seemed, there was gold and silver.
As Pizarro's chief accountant, Jeronimo de Aliaga
was in the best position to grasp the extent of this new-found wealth.
Between 1 500 and 1 800,
precious metal worth roughly £ 1 00 billion at today's prices
was shipped from the New World to Europe.
Men like de Aliaga became very rich indeed.
To give concrete expression to his wealth,
and to the subjugation of the native people,
de Aliaga built this magnificent house in Lima
on the foundations of an lnca temple.
lt's been occupied by his descendants ever since.
Secure in the conviction that their mission had the bIessing
of both God and the Pope,
the Spaniards seemed to be on the verge of creating
a spectacuIar new version of Western civiIization.
It was a civiIization that wouId be run from a few spIendid cities
by a tiny, super-rich, Spanish-born eIite.
The cities of Spanish America grew and flourished.
Hundreds of lavishly adorned churches were built.
Franciscans and Jesuits flocked to South America in their thousands
to convert what remained of the indigenous population.
But while the church was influential, ultimate power
resided with the Spanish Crown,
and, crucially, it owned all the land.
This was in complete contrast to the story of land ownership in North America.
ln 1 67 0, a penniless young couple who'd signed up for years of servitude
stepped off the first ship to land on the shores of Carolina
after a harrowing journey across the Atlantic from England.
How very different America must have seemed
to Abraham Smith and MiIIicent How
when they arrived here on the forbidding shores of CaroIina in 1670.
The Spaniards had found goId and siIver IiteraIIy in mountains in Peru and Mexico.
CaroIina seemed to be just a boneyard of dead trees.
When How and Smith arrived here, they found no El Dorado.
lnstead, settlers in North America had to plant corn to eat
and tobacco to trade.
For many years, Britain's American colonies
remained a patchwork of farms and villages,
with a few towns and virtually no true cities.
And here the natives were far from docile.
You could have been forgiven for thinking that Jeronimo de Aliaga's Spanish America
was the land of the future,
while Millicent How and Abraham Smith's British America
was destined to remain a rural backwater.
Western civilization, it seemed, was destined for South America alone.
But it didn't quite turn out that way.
Land.
Thousands of square miles of virgin land.
The New World represented a vast addition of territory
to the West European monarchies.
The key question that faced the new settlers in the Americas -
Spaniards in the South, Britons in the North -
was how to allocate all this new land.
Their answers to this question
would decide the future leadership of Western civilization.
The answers could scarcely have been more different.
When the captain of the first ship to arrive in Carolina stepped onto the beach,
he brought with him a revolutionary blueprint for a new world,
which had the issue of land at its heart.
This is a truIy remarkabIe document.
The Fundamental Constitutions Of Carolina,
designed by the phiIosopher John Locke to bring order
to this newIy settIed wiIderness.
It's funny, because Locke envisaged not a democracy here, but an aristocracy -
a hierarchicaI society compIete with margraves and barons.
AII of that, the coIonists more or Iess ignored.
The thing that caught their eye, though,
was Locke's assumption that practicaIIy everybody here
wouId end up owning some Iand, even if it was as IittIe as 50 acres.
That was to prove the bIueprint for a whoIe new way of organising society.
This emphasis on the widespread distribution of land
as the basis for Britain's new colonies
reflected Locke's deeply held political conviction
that freedom was inseparable from the ownership of private property.
Everything, therefore, hinged on how the land in Carolina would be divided up.
For months it was thought that
the first fIeet bound for CaroIina had been Iost at sea.
But when the good news came through that they'd made it,
this document, the Barbados Proclamation, was drawn up
to reguIate the distribution of the Iand there.
And the criticaI point was there was a guaranteed minimum.
''To every freeman that shaII arrive there to pIant and inhabit
''before the 25 March, 1672, 100 acres Iand to him and his heirs for ever.''
And there were pIenty of those acres to go round.
There was just one problem in realising Locke's vision.
Without a large native population,
the new colony faced a severe labour shortage.
The answer was to bring in more Europeans
who, in return for their passage and keep, would initially work for nothing.
And in Britain, there was no shortage of volunteers -
men and women like Abraham Smith and Millicent How,
who'd signed their lives into service with a deed of indenture.
And here it is, dated 20th September, 1669.
''Know aII men that I, MiIIicent How of London, spinster,
''the day of the date hereof do firmIy bind and obIige myseIf
''as a faithfuI and obedient servant in aII things whatsoever, to serve
''and dweII with Captain Joseph West,
''merchant, in the pIantation or province of CaroIina.''
And once you'd signed, you saiIed.
Over the entire Colonial period,
some three-quarters of European migrants to British America
came as indentured servants.
Life in England had been tough for Smith and How.
But there was one crucial incentive to risk a one-way Atlantic crossing.
After indentured servants had served their time, they would receive land.
Even the lowest of the low
had the chance to get a first foot on the property ladder.
Every land transaction since the arrival of the first settlers
is recorded here in the North Charleston conveyancing office,
covering everything from the large plantations of the settler elite
to the small plots granted to the men and women who'd served out their indenture.
And this was how the system worked for MiIIicent How and Abraham Smith.
These are the originaI warrants
dated 1672 and 1678 granting them, respectiveIy,
100 acres and 270 acres of virgin Iand. Here's the key Iine.
''You are forthwith to add measure and Iayout for Abraham Smith 270 acres of Iand
''in some pIace not yet Iaid out or marked to be Iaid out
''for any other person.''
They got the Iand to do with as they wished - to farm it or to seII it.
They had arrived.
And they had arrived not only economically but also politically.
For John Locke made it clear in his FundamentaI Constitutions
that in Carolina, it would be landowners who held political power.
The cruciaI point was this.
If you were a man Iike Abraham Smith - though not a woman Iike MiIIicent How -
and you owned property, then you got to vote.
And it was this reIationship between property ownership and democracy
that wouId fundamentaIIy transform Western civiIization.
It was a pretty homespun affair to begin with.
This is where the eIected representatives of South CaroIina originaIIy met -
upstairs at number 13 Church Street.
50 acres of land guaranteed a free man a vote,
and since every Englishman who arrived here had the chance to work his way
to at least 50 acres,
it was a recipe for near-universal suffrage.
The property-owning democracy,
that revolutionary idea of linking property ownership with voting rights,
was born in the British colonies of North America 300 years ago.
lt was the birth of the American Dream.
The pattern was repeated right across North America
as people moved relentlessly westwards,
and white settlers displaced American lndians as owners of the land.
That was why the way the British organised their coIonies was so important.
It was aII about sociaI mobiIity.
The fact that a man Iike Abraham Smith
couId arrive here on a godforsaken beach in the middIe of nowhere, penniIess,
and then end up, within just a few years, a property owner and a voter.
How very different it was in the Spanish colonies to the south.
Here in this breathtaking valley,
the Callejon de Huaylas in the Peruvian Andes,
the conquistador Jeronimo de Aliaga
found himself surrounded by boundless natural resources.
The valley was abundantly fertile,
the mountains full of gold and silver.
The question facing de Aliaga was how to exploit these vast resources.
The answer was a very different one
from that devised by John Locke for North America.
This remarkabIe document from 1544 of a court case
aIIows us to see just how it was
that Jeronimo de AIiaga made his vast fortune.
It describes how Francisco Pizarro
granted haIf of this entire vaIIey,
something Iike 30 miIes Iong, to de AIiaga and his partner
Sebastian de Torres.
But it wasn't the Iand they were given,
it was the Iabour of the 6,000 or so Indians who Iived here.
UnIike in British America, where Iand was wideIy distributed to settIers,
here it was Iabour that was parceIIed out to a tiny eIite.
Previously, the lndians had worked for the lnca emperor.
Now their lot was to work for the Spaniards.
The encomiendas were essentially a tribute system,
and tribute took the form of toil.
The lndians were de Aliaga's to direct as he pleased -
to work the farms
or to dig gold and silver out of the hills.
lndian labour made de Aliaga a rich man, built this fine house...
(BELL TOLLS)
...and paid for this beautiful church.
The consequence of all this was that the conquistador class
now became the idle rich of America.
Gradually, as land began to pass from the Spanish crown to the settler elite,
encomiendas evolved into vast hereditary estates - haciendas.
The majority of people were left with no land at all.
This was diametrically different from the model of broad property ownership
that evolved in North America.
Under Spanish ruIe,
there was none of the sociaI mobiIity that characterised British America.
That heIps expIain the distinctive pattern of Iand distribution here in ruraI Peru,
with Iots of tiny IittIe pIots where the indigenous popuIation, even today,
bareIy scrape a Iiving.
But it aIso expIains the very different paths
taken by North and South America to poIiticaI independence.
ln 1 77 5, despite all the profound economic and social differences that had developed,
both North and South America were still composed of colonies
ruled by distant kings.
That, however, was all about to change.
On 2nd JuIy, 1 776,
a crowd gathered here on the steps of the CharIeston Exchange
to hear the independence of South CaroIina procIaimed from Great Britain.
WeII, about 40 years Iater, something simiIar happened in South America
where Spanish ruIe was overthrown.
But the revoIution that happened here
cemented the democratic rights of property hoIders
and paved the way to two centuries of prosperity.
The other revoIution condemned a continent to two centuries of underdeveIopment.
Why was that?
Once upon a time, there was a brilliant general who overthrew an empire
and replaced it with the greatest democracy the world has ever seen.
His name was George Washington,
and he led 1 3 of Britain's North American colonies to independence.
- (GUNSHOT) - But this is not his story.
lt's the story of a South American general who also overthrew an empire - Spain's -
but failed to create a United States Of South America.
His failure explains why it was North America
that rose to claim the leadership of Western civilization.
The South American general was Venezuela's favourite son -
Simon Bolivar.
Bolivar was born in Caracas in 1 7 83, the son of a wealthy cocoa planter.
lnspired by Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1 808,
he resolved to lead not just Venezuela but the whole of South America
to independence from Spain,
to transform a continent from autocracy to democracy.
And yet, while the American Revolution had set the United States
on the road to power and prosperity as well as political liberty,
independence from Spain left South America
with an enduring legacy of conflict, inequality and dictatorship.
So why did capitaIism and democracy do so badIy in Latin America?
Why, when I asked a Harvard coIIeague
if he thought Latin America beIonged to the West, wasn't he sure?
Why, in short, was Simon BoIivar not the Latin George Washington?
Certainly at the beginning, Bolivar received passionate support
from the very people Washington had fought against.
McGregor, Robertson, Brown, Farriar and even Ferguson.
Rather incongruous names to find
on a monument to the founding fathers of VenezueIa
right here in the heart of Caracas.
But these were just a few of the British and Irish soIdiers
who fought and in some cases died
for the cause of Latin American freedom and democracy.
Between 1 81 7 and 1 824, around 7,000 British and lrish volunteers
signed up for an extraordinary military adventure.
Their aim was to help liberate South America from Spanish rule.
Some of these British soldiers were veterans of the Napoleonic Wars
who, like the British migrants to North America,
were attracted by promises of land.
But many were military novices
inspired with the loftier cause that Bolivar seemed to stand for -
liberating South Americans from a repressive system of government.
Among them was a young captain from Manchester called Thomas Farriar
who soon found himself in command of a brigade called the British Legion.
This was his first view of the new Bolivarian America -
the inhospitable banks of the Orinoco River.
And this is where Farriar and his colleagues ended up -
a town called Angostura, where the bitters came from,
without a few drops of which a Pisco Sour just doesn't taste right.
lt was from here that Farriar and his men set out to liberate South America.
For four years, they fought and died
in a succession of battles from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Finally, on 24th June 1 821, the British Legion reached Carabobo.
This was to be the decisive battle of Bolivar's Venezuelan campaign.
6,500 of his men faced 5,000 royalists loyal to Spain.
lf Bolivar's men could defeat the Spanish army here,
the capital Caracas would be theirs.
BoIivar ordered Farriar and his men to outfIank the Spaniards
who were dug in on that hiII over there.
It was fine as Iong as they remained hidden from view in those guIIies,
but as soon as they were spotted, the Spaniards Iet them have it
with at Ieast two cannon and 3,000 muskets.
In vain and the sweItering heat,
Farriar waited for BoIivar to send reinforcements.
ln spite of the carnage,
the British Legion held firm until at last the word was given to advance.
The charge that followed was one of the greatest feats ever seen
on the battlefields of South America.
With bayonets fixed, the British Legion finaIIy took the Spanish position,
but their commander, Thomas Farriar, Iay fataIIy wounded.
After the battle, Bolivar called the British soldiers
''salvadores de mi patria'',
''saviours of my country''.
At last, the road was open to Caracas
and to independence for the new nation-states of Latin America.
Today Simon BoIivar is revered, even idoIised,
as the man who Iiberated not onIy VenezueIa but aIso BoIivia,
Peru, Ecuador
and CoIombia from Spanish ruIe.
That was what earned him the nickname eI Libertador - the Liberator.
And yet, on cIoser inspection, Iiberation from Spain
wasn't quite the same as freedom in the North American sense.
Simon BoIivar's idea of Iiberation was something very different
from George Washington's notion of Iiberty.
Bolivar's experiences of factional infighting
and regional rivalry during the revolution
had set him against the parliamentary democracy he'd once avowed.
Two years before the British Legion's heroics at Carabobo,
Bolivar had addressed the newly formed Congress
here in Angostura to set out his ideas for the new republic's constitution.
In fact, BoIivar was reaIIy rather contemptuous of the North American system.
Here's what he had to say on the subject in this very room.
''AIthough their nation was cradIed in Iiberty, raised on freedom
''and maintained by Iiberty aIone, it is a marveI
''that so weak and compIicated a government as the federaI system
''managed to ruIe them through aII the difficuIties of their past.''
As far as BoIivar couId see,
the United States constitution needed ''a repubIic of saints'' to work.
Part of the problem was the unequal legacy of Spanish rule.
After all, Bolivar's own family had five large estates,
covering more than 1 20,000 acres.
Part of the problem was that democracy seemed much too risky
in a society with a much larger native population than in the north.
BoIivar's dream turned out to be
not democracy - British or American styIe - but dictatorship,
not federaIism but the centraIisation of authority.
Why? Because, as he put it himseIf, ''Our feIIow citizens are not yet ready
''to exercise their rights in the fuIIest measure,
''because they Iack the poIiticaI virtues that characterise true repubIicans.''
For the British soldiers who'd come to fight for liberty,
this was tantamount to a betrayal.
They never got their land,
nor did they get a vote.
There would be no property-owning democracy in Bolivar's South America.
Just before his death from tuberculosis in December 1 830,
the Liberator wrote a last, despairing letter.
ln it, he concluded
that South America was simply ungovernable, lamenting that,
''lf it were possible for any part of the world to revert to primitive chaos,
''it would be America in her final hour. ''
lt was a painfully accurate description of the future of Latin America.
Societies that began with extreme inequality
evolved highly unstable political institutions that reinforced
that inequality and provoked constant conflict.
The resuIt has been nearIy 500 years
of sociaI strife, civiI war and red revoIution
as the propertyIess have struggIed for just a few acres more.
Peru today is in the grip of a wave of peasant protests,
and the issue's aIways the same - Iand.
But wait a second.
Before we can cheerfuIIy acknowIedge that the British modeI of coIonisation
came up with arguabIy the greatest
of aII of Western civiIization's poIiticaI achievements -
the United States Constitution - we have to acknowIedge that
that constitution itseIf was tainted by a kind of originaI sin.
lt was the colour of your skin,
in North America as much as in South America,
that determined your property rights and your political rights.
African-Americans, Iike American Indians,
were excIuded from the post-revoIutionary repubIic.
Over there, on the steps of the CharIeston Exchange,
where they read aIoud the DecIaration Of Independence, they aIso soId sIaves.
So how do we resoIve this paradox at the very heart of Western civiIization?
A revoIution that procIaimed itseIf in the name of Iiberty
was made by the owners of sIaves.
This story is also about two ships
bringing a very different kind of immigrant to the Americas.
Both left from the island of Goree off the coast of Senegal.
One was bound for northern Brazil,
the other for Charleston, Carolina.
Both carried African slaves,
just a small fraction of the 8,000,000
who crossed the Atlantic between 1 450 and 1 820.
These sIaves were saiIing towards very different new worIds.
One, Latin America, wouId turn out to be a raciaI meIting pot
where whites wouId mix freeIy with the indigenous popuIation.
In the North, by contrast, the coIour Iine, the division between the races,
wouId be much more strictIy maintained.
The question is, how wouId these different attitudes towards race
affect the future deveIopment of the two Americas?
Why did the New World need the ancient institution of slavery so badly?
The answer had everything to do with manpower.
This is the house that John Boone built.
Boone had arrived in Carolina
on the same ship as Millicent How and Abraham Smith in 1 67 0.
As a member of the colony's governing Grand Council,
he had a head start when it came to accumulating property.
Within 20 years he had amassed estates covering 1 7,000 acres.
And the Boones soon found things to grow on their land
that turned out to be almost as profitable as the conquistadors' gold -
first tobacco and then cotton to supply the textile mills of industrial England.
But indentured EngIish servants were neither numerous enough
nor tough enough to stand the toiI of the CaroIina cotton fieIds.
Another source of Iabour had to be found, and that, of course, was African sIaves.
This is where some of John Boone's Iived.
But this was aIways part of the pIan.
Remember John Locke,
who made private property the basis for Iife in the CaroIina coIony?
WeII, in articIe 1 10 of his Fundamental Constitutions,
he stated cIearIy that every CaroIina freeman
had ''absoIute power and authority over his negro sIaves''.
For Locke, the ownership of peopIe was just as important
as the ownership of Iand.
And these human beings would be neither landowners nor voters.
Here, it seemed, there was nothing superior about British colonisation.
The legacy of segregation would endure for centuries.
WOMAN: # Go with me to that land
# Come and go with me to that land
# Where l'm bound, where l'm bound
# Whoa, come and go with me... #
FERGUSON: This is the land of the Gullah,
the region stretching from Sandy lsland, South Carolina, to Amelia lsland, Florida,
known as the Gullah Coast.
Here you can see clearly one of the biggest differences
between North and South America.
# Nothing but toiI in that Iand
# Nothing but toiI in that Iand... #
Anthropologists believe that
''Gullah'' is a corruption of ''Angola'',
where the inhabitants' ancestors came from.
The fact that there are traces of AngoIa
stiII to be found here in South CaroIina today
teIIs us something reaIIy significant.
The peopIe who Iive on these isIands
are the direct descendants of sIaves from AngoIa
who came here to work on some of the most profitabIe pIantations of the South.
# ...To that Iand... #
ln contrast to South America,
where white and black blended into many shades of brown,
the survival of Gullah culture
is testament to the much stricter enforcement of the colour line
in the slave states of North America.
lronically, the land of the free
looked like being, for around a fifth of its population,
the land of the permanently unfree.
Slavery had become hereditary.
# ...Where I'm bound. #
In 1846, after 47 years of servitude, a sIave by the name of Dred Scott
sued for his freedom in this courthouse in Saint Louis.
WeII, the suit was thrown out,
and that judgment was upheId by the US Supreme Court.
Here was the great paradox of the New WorId -
the Iiberty-Ioving EngIish settIers who produced the US Constitution
were aIso determined to maintain the difference
between white freedom and bIack sIavery.
The property-owning democracy was based on a foundation of raciaI inequaIity.
ln the end, the paradox of slavery in a supposedly free society
could be resolved only by war.
The American Civil War,
between the pro-slavery states of the South, like the Carolinas,
and the anti-slavery states of the North.
Appropriately, it was a war that began in Charleston.
Yet although the Civil War ended slavery,
many white Americans continued to believe that they owed their prosperity
to the dividing line between white and black.
Segregation now! Segregation tomorrow!
And segregation for ever!
As recently as 1 963, Alabama governor George Wallace
could put segregation right at the heart of the American success story.
This was compIete nonsense.
It was pure rubbish to beIieve, as George WaIIace did, that the United States
owed its prosperity and its greater stabiIity than a country Iike this one,
VenezueIa, to the fact of raciaI segregation.
On the contrary, North America did better than South America pureIy and simpIy
because the British modeI of wideIy distributed property ownership
and democracy worked better than the Spanish modeI
of concentrated weaIth and authoritarian ruIe.
Far from being indispensable to its success,
slavery and segregation were quite simply the original sin of the United States,
giving the lie for more than two centuries to the American claim
to be the zenith of Western civilization.
Today, however, a man with an African father
is President of the United States,
and the cities of the North increasingly resemble those of South America.
Large-scale migration from Latin America means that in 40 years' time,
non-Hispanic whites will be a minority of the US population.
But if the United States is suffering harder economic times these days,
it's certainIy not because of the end of white supremacy.
After aII, one of star performers
of the worId economy now is none other than muIti-coIoured BraziI.
And that's because economic reform has finaIIy given
a rising share of the popuIation a chance to own property and to vote.
500 years since the process of conquest and coIonisation began,
the great divide between British America and Latin America
is finaIIy cIosing.
Throughout the Western hemisphere,
a single civilization is finally and belatedly emerging.
But as we'll see in the next programme,
200 years ago, Western civilization looked very different - and very white -
to the people on the receiving end of the next great wave of European expansion...
into Africa.