NARRATION: As the colonial era drew to a close,
the Soviet Union believed the world would turn
to socialism and preached that message in its propaganda.
The United States was concerned.
JOSEPH SISCO: The feeling was very strong in Washington that
the Soviets were pursuing a policy of expansion into
the Third World and our objective was to prevent that.
NARRATION: Nikita Khrushchev and Gamal Abdel Nasser
change the face of Egypt.
[ explosion ]
After the West had refused a loan for a dam across the Nile,
the Soviet Union took over.
The emerging nations used the Cold War to get money and arms.
The Developing World was being courted.
[speaking Russian ]
In Europe, the borders were set in stone
and there was no opportunity of expansion
there for either side -
it would have started a new world war.
Where could the hunting take place?
To be rather crude,
in those areas where there was still prey.
That was the Third World
and each side tried not to miss a chance.
[ Chanting ]
NARRATION: In the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union
backed two rival and opposed regimes.
For America,
this was evidence of Soviet expansion.
In Angola, thousands of Cubans poured in to fight
South African troops backed by the United States.
In Egypt
the Soviet Union supplied arms cheaply and on credit.
But President Nasser wasn't easily influenced.
VADIM KIRPICHENKO: [speaking Russian ]
One shouldn't think of our relations with Nasser
as the relations of master and servant.
Nasser always pursued his own policy.
SAAD EL-SHAZLY: He was able to understand the global strategy and now,
we can benefit from the disagreement between the
Soviet Union and between the United States and the West,
and make benefit of this situation to
to raise our capabilities militarily and economically.
NARRATION: Nasser was the hero of the Arab world.
The Egyptians rallied for war.
[ Chanting ]
[ Crowds ]
Nasser and the Arab States wanted to destroy Israel.
Moscow did not.
In 1948,
the Soviet Union had supported the creation
of the state of Israel on Arab lands.
By 1967, Israel's two and half million Jews
were surrounded by 90 million hostile Arabs.
Israel felt insecure.
The threat from Egypt became intense.
Israel had America's political backing
but not her weapons.
Would Israel get America's support for a surprise attack?
ROBERT McNAMARA: President Johnson asked us to bring Israel's Foreign Minister
to the family quarters of the White House and,
to speak rather crudely about it,
the intent was to work him over, to persuade him is perhaps
a more polite term, to...
to avoid a pre-emptive attack.
We thought we had persuaded him.
[ Alarms ]
NARRATION: Israel struck first.
In less than three hours, 90% of the Egyptian air force was
destroyed on the ground.
The Israelis seized East Jerusalem-
Jews were able to pray at the Wailing Wall again.
The Israelis pressed on.
Within six days, the armies of Egypt, Syria
and Jordan were routed.
The Map of the Middle East was transformed.
Israel had trebled its size.
SIMCHA DINITZ: In the contest between Russia and America within
the Cold War in the Middle East,
Israel was an automatic ally of the West.
Since the Six Day War, this automatic ally
became a strategic asset.
NARRATION: America became Israel's principal source of arms.
In the occupied territories, a million Arabs fell under
Israeli rule.
It was a devastating blow to Arab morale.
The Soviets counted the cost.
[speaking Russian ]
Our weapons turned out to be less effective
than we calculated.
We felt that it was our duty to compensate,
to supply more arms,
and looking at the wider context-
not to let the West win.
NARRATION: September 1970:
grief in Egypt at the death of President Gamal Abd Al Nasser.
The Developing World mourned an outstanding leader.
So did Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin.
The mourners were uneasy, as were the Russians -
who could follow Nasser?
I shall do my best to follow the policy of my late President,
my dearest friend President Gamal.
But no-one will capitulate here in this country.
I'm not ready to capitulate or
to surrender one inch or a bit of sand.
NARRATION: At the Moscow summit of 1972 the super- powers agreed
on a code of conduct - détente.
Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev agreed not to seek
advantage at the other's expense.
Better ties with America outweighed Moscow's
commitments to the Arabs. [ applause ]
This angered Sadat because he felt that they were
giving priority to détente with the Americans,
rather than helping Egypt wage a war.
NARRATION: But détente didn't stop American efforts
extend its influence in the Middle East at Moscow's expense.
Our policy in '72 was really
to try to minimize and reduce the role -
I'll go further -
to keep the Soviets out of the situation.
We established the policy that
we would thwart any move,
backed by Soviet arms,
until some Arab leader would become so frustrated
that he would turn to us for diplomacy
and then we would try to take as even-handed
a position as we were capable of developing.
NARRATION: In Egypt,
as in many other developing nations,
the Soviet presence was huge.
In July 1972, Sadat told the 15,000 advisers
and their families to pack up and go.
It was a bold power play.
Sadat's move boosted his popularity
and showed how little control the Russians really had.
By October '72,
they decided to come back to the support of Egypt.
And then Sadat make benefit from that;
he says "Well I expelled them to express power,
so that they would give us what we need."
And strange enough, we had arms deal after
October which was one of the biggest arms
deals we've got with the Soviet Union.
Sadat needed the arms.
He was planning to end the uneasy peace.
He wanted to go to war -
he needed to go to war.
He felt he couldn't do otherwise.
He considered that negotiations were impossible without
some heating of the whole process -
I mean, some shock therapy.
NARRATION: Yom Kippur, Israel's most holy day.
Four thousand Egyptian troops
and tanks surged over the Suez Canal.
[speaking Egyptian ]
We'd been waiting for this moment for five years,
the moment of crossing the canal.
Our cries shook the ground under the Israeli enemy.
The cry of 'God is Great'
made all our hair stand up on end.
[ Chanting ]
NARRATION: The Egyptian army sped ahead -
eager to retake lost territory.
[chanting slogans]
American Jews demanded immediate help for Israel.
Washington was in a dilemma.
Supplying its ally Israel risked sacrificing Arab goodwill.
The State Department stalled.
There was an argument as to whether
transport was available and the Pentagon suggestion
was that private transport be leased.
[speaking Israeli ]
We were very disappointed and angry that supplies
were arriving so slowly and only on EIAI planes.
The air convoy was delayed again and again.
NARRATION: The Egyptians kept up their attack.
ABBA EBAN: The United States began to understand that we were
in a serious situation when we suddenly changed
our tune from this very blithe,
typically Israeli self-confidence
to a report that,
as a result of what happened, we were losing our life-blood.
[ Applause ]
NARRATION: Sadat was triumphant;
he had regained land Egypt lost in the Six Day War.
But the Russians sensed disaster ahead.
They urged Sadat to accept a ceasefire.
[speaking Russian ]
He would benefit from a ceasefire -
otherwise, he'd be forced to retreat.
But Sadat wouldn't listen.
NARRATION: in Washington, President Nixon
ended the delay over the arms shipments.
Nixon said when the option was brought
to him to send two or three American planes,
said "Let's send a lot,
because we are going to be criticized anyhow
and we will be criticized for whatever we do,
for one plane or two planes, as for 40 planes,
so let's do it in an effective way."
NARRATION: The airlift put the world's largest
power publicly alongside Israel.
Now, it was Moscow's allies that faced defeat.
Now the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt.
Soon, most of the Egyptian army would be stranded in the Sinai.
ANATOLY DOBRYNIN: [speaking Russian ]
Then Sadat got terrified.
He spoke on the phone directly to Brezhnev.
I was there.
I remember him begging, "Save us,
save us from these Israeli tanks!"
[tank fire]
NARRATION: Cut off in the desert, the Egyptians faced defeat.
Moscow called for a ceasefire.
They realized that the greater the military victory
on the part of the Israelis,
the greater defeat of Soviet supply
and a general weakening of the Soviet position
in the entire region.
The Soviets and Henry Kissinger
rapidly agreed proposals for a cease-fire.
As Kissinger arrived in Israel to break the
news to the Israelis, the superpowers' ability
to restrain their allies would be tested.
He had made commitments which some of our leaders,
especially Golda Meir, our Prime Minister,
believed to have been rather rash.
And when he landed he said,
"I'm going to be chastised for this".
[ Applause ]
NARRATION: Israel wasn't yet willing to end the war.
SIMCHA DINITZ: Kissinger explained what happened,
and he vowed to continue to help Israel in case
there is a renewal of fighting.
With America's connivance, Israel stepped up its onslaught.
The Soviets were outraged.
[speaking Russian ]
Brezhnev wrote a letter to Nixon saying,
"How is it, when we've agreed to act jointly,
that the Israelis are continuing to advance.
It is undermining all our attempts to make peace."
We suggested that both the Americans
and the Soviets send troops to the Middle East
to make Israel accept the ceasefire.
But there was also a sentence that said:
"If you won't do it, we will have to consider
unilateral action."
The Soviet leaders had every reason to look
at this as if there had been some sort of a plot
and they reacted very violently
and they sent us an extremely tough note saying that they
wanted joint American-Soviet intervention,
and if not, they would act unilaterally.
NARRATION: Kissinger deliberately upped the ante.
Determined to forestall any Soviet intervention
in the Middle East,
he placed American nuclear forces on heightened alert.
The basic purpose was to generate
a lot of traffic that the Soviet Union
would pick up before they received our reply,
to know that this was getting serious.
NARRATION: Moscow didn't react to the alert.
They had already abandoned the
idea of unilaterally sending troops.
That was a clearly a political
victory for the United States,
a major political victory that had repercussions
in the Cold War, far beyond the Middle East.
NARRATION: Under American pressure,
Israel allowed food and water to reach the trapped Egyptian army.
Kissinger wanted Egypt defeated but not destroyed.
With the Israelis just 100 kilometers from Cairo,
the Egyptians were
forced into their first ever face to face talks with Israel.
Moscow was not involved.
JOSEPH SISCO: The Egyptians saw that the vehicle
for getting on with what subsequently became
the disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel,
that it was the United States that carried all the cards.
NARRATION: Henry Kissinger became the world's most famous
frequent flyer.
Shuttle diplomacy gave him easy access to Sadat.
MOHAMED SID AHMED: The relationship had fundamentally changed.
I mean, since the war, Sadat believed that the main global
party he should woo was the Americans.
NARRATION: Kissinger's travels didn't bring about permanent peace.
They showed America was winning the Cold War in the Middle East.
But there was a price to pay.
[speaking Russian ]
These events unfavorably affected the process of detente.
They strengthened the mistrust of the Soviet Union
towards the United States.
NARRATION: Africa, 1975.
The last colonial empire was dying
and the people of Angola reached for freedom
fresh hunting grounds for the Cold War superpowers.
As Portuguese troops pulled out of Angola,
three groups jostled for power.
Americas fears were aroused.
When Bill Colby the CIA director
went to brief the National Security Council
in the White House the first time on this
his briefing was literally:
"Gentlemen, this is a map of Africa, and here is Angola.
Now in Angola we have 3 factions,
there's the MPLA they're the bad guys.
The FNLA they're the good guys
and there's UNITA and Jonas Savimbi we don't know too well."
And that was to get the
National Security Council involved in this thing.
NARRATION: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola -
the MPLA, the largest group - was left wing.
Based in and around the capital, Luanda,
its multi-ethnic membership was led
by Agostinho Nets and Ludo Lara.
In the 1960s it had received training from Cuba
and arms from Moscow.
The National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the FNLA,
operated largely in the north of the country.
Its leader, Holden Roberto - a strident anti-communist
had close links with neighboring Zaire,
which supplied him with outdated American arms.
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola,
UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, was based in the south of Angola.
A charismatic leader, Savimbi
decided that American backing was the key to power.
At Alvor in Portugal,
the three rival groups got together.
They agreed on arrangements for independence and elections.
JOHN STOCKWELL: The United States scotched that absolutely.
Our solution was the CIA,
without approval from the National Security Council,
delivered $300,000 to Holden Roberto, and...
and ordered him to send his people into Northern Angola.
INTERPRETER: We weren't worried about receiving American aid.
We knew that the Soviet Union was
supporting the MPLA and we had no possibility
of countering that.
NARRATION: Secretly channelled through Zaire,
American money helped pay for Roberto's war on the MPLA.
His side was always the bloodiest, the most violent.
They went down and promptly killed 15 MPLA
political activists, and from that time on,
it was all cast,
you know the fate of Angola was cast,
it was written in blood.
NARRATION: The Americans were not sure that Roberto's troops
could defeat the MPLA.
The Central Intelligence Agency sent John Stockwell
to investigate.
JOHN STOCKWELL: Roberto said he had 30,000.
I had trouble counting 30.
Badly armed, disorganized, kind of rabble kind of troops.
And he was a cocktail party cowboy.
He'd spent his whole career politicking in Kinshasa.
He knew nothing of military operations or logistics
or organization.
NARRATION: Stockwell went south to UNITA's headquarters.
Stockwell met UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi.
JOHN STOCKWELL: I found a different kind of a revolutionary.
He'd spent the entire time inside Angola - 20 years.
He had led the guerrilla fighting himself.
Whatever the consequences,
whatever the results we will continue to fight
because we don't want to be slaves of Russia
in Angola, in our own country.
NARRATION: America was now backing two of
the three independence movements.
Washington ruled out intervention
in Angola with American troops -
instead it turned, secretly,
to South Africa.
The United States, at the highest level,
requested assistance,
or rather requests South Africa to go in
and assist UNITA.
We did maintain a position of
of disapproval of apartheid.
But on the other hand,
the South African Government was extremely powerful.
[ Speaking Afrikaans ]
South Africa was isolated.
Although it was done secretly, it was good for South Africa
to be co operating with a big force like the USA,
even though it was clandestine.
There were many people in policy-making
positions in the Department of State
who were essentially willing to...
to have a funny,
ambiguous relationship with South Africa.
The focus was on Soviet penetration
and the possibility of the Soviet Union using unstable
situations in Africa to benefit itself,
to take root and foment trouble.
[speaking Portuguese]
They were afraid of the MPLA.
They called us communists.
The South Africans were terrified of the MPLA.
They didn't have that terror of the FNLA or UNITA;
they were allies.
They didn't like the MPLA because the MPLA declared
itself against apartheid.
NARRATION: In Luanda, the MPLA was staging parades.
In the countryside it was losing control.
[speaking Portuguese]
We were alone, poorly equipped,
poorly trained, poorly armed.
We requested help from the Cubans to help
us resist that aggression.
NARRATION: Keen to show leadership in the Developing World,
Cuba sent 400 military instructors to Luanda.
Moscow hadn't been consulted.
[ Speaking Spanish ]
The Soviets knew absolutely nothing about it.
We took the decision because of our long
standing relations over many years with Neto,
and with the independence movement in Angola.
We were very unhappy.
I mean, obviously we...
we had no desire to see Fidel Castro extend his...
his influence in the African continent.
Our government in Washington perceived Fidel Castro
as a Soviet proxy.
We thought with respect to Angola,
that if the Soviet Union could intervene at such distances
from areas that were far from the traditional Russian
security concerns,
and when Cuban forces could be introduced
into distant trouble spots,
and if the West could not find a counter to that,
that then the whole international system
could be destabilized.
[ Speaking Spanish ]
It was a question of globalizing our struggle,
vis-a-vis the globalized pressures
and harassment of the US.
In this respect he did not coincide with
the Soviet viewpoint.
We acted... but without their co-operation.
Quite the opposite!
There were criticisms. So?
NARRATION: North of Luanda,
Holden Roberto's FNLA troops were heading for the capital.
They wanted to seize it before Angola's Independence Day.
They had high hopes of success.
We actually had a celebration party
in the CIA headquarters in Washington.
We expected the news by the end of the day
that we would have captured Luanda.
NARRATION: Led by Cubans -
the MPLA troops halted Roberto's advance.
JOHN STOCKWELL: In the middle of the valley about 2000122 mm
rockets began landing,
and we had nothing to answer with,
and our forces broke and ran.
NARRATION: The military force of the FNLA had been blunted-
America's ally was in trouble.
A bigger challenge now faced the MPLA.
In October 1975, South African troops had invaded Angola.
From their bases in Namibia they had joined forces with UNITA.
COL. JAN BREYTENBACH: We advanced approximately, I think,
something like 80 kilometers a day.
By this time my troops were getting good
I mean, they were really getting on with it now -
they were out of those vehicles and into...
into assault formations.
We'd shoot the hell out of these people, you see,
and then they would pack up and move,
because they didn't expect us.
[speaking Portuguese]
The South Africans were helping UNITA
and Zaire was supporting the FNLA.
So it was only fair that the MPLA asked the Cubans to come
and support us in the struggle against the invasions.
NARRATION: Just two days before independence,
thousands of Cuban combat troops
began arriving in Luanda.
KAREN BRUTENTS: [speaking Russian ]
INTERPRETER: In Moscow this was greeted without enthusiasm.
It was only when the Cubans had landed that we got involved.
Because the Cubans kept asking us for help.
They wanted weapons;
they wanted food supplies.
Once we started sending things to Angola -
we were soon in over our heads-
even though it wasn't in our plans to go there.
[ship's horn]
NARRATION: Moscow began shipping hundreds of tons of arms,
tanks and missiles direct to Luanda.
As the MPLA began rehearsals for Independence Day,
battles were still raging just miles from the capital.
[speaking Portuguese]
In spite of that,
it was important for us to proclaim independence-
and we did so.
NARRATION: The MPLA celebrated Angola's independence in Luanda.
Its enemies had failed to take the capital.
[speaking Portuguese]
The 11th November 1975 was the hardest day in my life.
I remembered the 14 years I'd been fighting;
I remembered the dead,
all those who had made sacrifices.
[announcement]
NARRATION: Agostinho Neto greets the Soviet ambassador.
The MPLA was recognized as Angola's government
by the Soviet Union,
Cuba and most of Africa.
Its fight against South African troops gave the MPLA
political credibility.
South of Luanda the Cubans prepared to end
the South African advance.
RENE HERNANDEZ: [speaking Spanish]
It was a decisive battle
because if they broke our defense
it would be very difficult then to stop them getting to Luanda.
There were roads going to the north,
roads going to the centre -
many roads, which would have made their advance
very powerful and fast.
[ Radio message ]
NARRATION: The Cubans were ready waiting.
FIDEL CASTRO: [speaking Spanish]
Angola would have been lost.
Mobutu's troops were close to Ruanda.
The South Africans had penetrated
over a thousand kilometers -
they were close to Ruanda.
[mortar & cannon fire]
NARRATION: The Cuban and MPLA forces out-gunned the South Africans.
COL.JAN BREYTENBACH: They were shot up very badly.
I just saw these lorries with blood dripping out of it,
and it wasn't very nice to...
And then to go and investigate,
and for the first time you see that actually
your own troops are... it wasn't very nice at all.
[speaking Portuguese]
They left everything oh the field: men, vehicles, weapons.
It was a great victory over the South Africans.
NARRATION: South African and American hopes
of a quick victory over the MPLA were crushed.
Washington was running out of options.
Right after Vietnam the American people in no way,
and the Congress and the media would put up
with the US putting its forces in to control the outcome
of a country that none of us,
none of the American people were interested in.
The administration fell back on the CIA.
It secretly provided money for Roberto
and Savimbi to recruit mercenaries from Africa,
America and Europe.
We did kill when we had no particular reason to.
We tortured to achieve information that they
probably didn't have,
and this was not captured enemy soldiers:
these were probably just local civilians.
And that atmosphere permeated its way
through the whole unit... we were just a loose band
of bandits with a very dangerous leader and a few associates.
[speaking Portuguese]
Among the mercenaries, there were some very fine soldiers.
Callao, for instance -
I've seldom seen such a good soldier.
He had phenomenal courage.
He was a psychopath, a raving psychopath
and a couple of men right near him were psychopaths.
NARRATION: Thirteen mercenaries were captured by the MPLA
and put on trial.
Callao and three others were executed.
The CIA was still active.
The Congress would have stopped us up front if we had
not successfully lied to them,
putting in putting in arms,
putting in advisers, bringing in South Africa.
We kept it propped up for a while,
but opposition was mounting.
NARRATION: Still shocked by events in Vietnam,
the Congress out off additional CIA funds for Angola.
This abdication of responsibility by a majority
of the Senate will have the gravest consequences
for the long-term position of the United States
and for international order in general;
a great nation cannot escape its responsibilities.
NARRATION: In Angola, America hoped for victory.
Instead hatreds were inflamed.
The civil war outlasted the Cold War itself,
leaving thousands maimed,
dead or homeless.
[ Chanting ]
NARRATION: In 1977 the great powers' attention shifted
to the Horn of Africa.
As regimes changed, so did alliances -
the Soviet Union and the United States switched sides easily.
In Ethiopia the emperor had been ousted
and replaced by Marxists.
Moscow had a new ally: Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.
[speaking Ethiopian ]
When the Soviets moved into Ethiopia to assist
the communist dictator there,
Haile Mariam Mengistu,
I thought that this was a threat to the stability of Africa.
The Soviets at that time were proclaiming over and over again
that the scales of history were tipping in the favor of the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union would outstrip us in economic performance;
the Soviet Union was getting a strategic edge;
the Soviet Union was riding the crest of
the so-called National Liberation struggles.
[ Chants ]
NARRATION: The new regime in Ethiopia turned against America.
Mengistu expelled most of the Americans from Ethiopia
in the following months,
arrogantly terminated the American aid program.
NARRATION: Neighboring Somalia had been a Soviet ally for years.
Somalia's army was equipped with Soviet weapons.
But now that Moscow was also linked with Ethiopia,
the Somalis considered turning to Washington.
PAUL HENZE: They had very little chance of getting American full support.
But they knew that if they tried to present themselves as
anti-Soviet they would improve their chances.
NARRATION: The Somalis turned against the advice of their Soviet ally
and prepared for war with Ethiopia.
But President Carter turned down their appeal for American arms.
I thought that ...that
Somalia should not be permitted to succeed
in trying to take Ethiopian territory,
and I refused to give the Somali government any weapons.
NARRATION: Nevertheless, in July 1977,
the Somalis seized large tracts of the Ogaden desert.
The Soviets tried to stop the advance through diplomacy.
[speaking Russian ]
Gromyko suggested joint mediation with the Americans,
but Brzezinski rejected that,
saying it would have legitimized the
Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa.
Brzezinski felt that the American presence
was legitimate everywhere,
but the Soviet presence wasn't.
NARRATION: Anti-Soviet demonstrations in Somalia greeted the
government's decision to send the Russian advisers
and their families back to Moscow.
All Soviet support was now switched to Ethiopia.
The Soviet Union began shipping in weapons
and 15,000 troops to fight in Ethiopia.
The troops were Cuban.
[mortar fire]
[ Speaking Spanish ]
It was the only operation we conducted in full agreement
with the Soviets.
No such co-operation took place,
even in Latin America.
Quite the opposite!
PETR CHAPLYGIN: [speaking Russian ]
The Cuban troops in Ethiopia played a very important role.
The Ethiopians couldn't have provided the military
organization to destroy the Somali troops in such a
short period of time, even with our help.
NARRATION: With Cuban troops and Soviet support the Ethiopians
drove the Somalis out of the Ogaden.
But Moscow wouldn't let the troops advance into Somalia.
PETR CHAPLYGIN: [speaking Russian ]
Among the Soviet military,
we thought about occupying Somalia.
But the Soviet government was right not to allow this,
because it would have made our relations with countries
like the United States of America,
Great Britain and others more difficult.
[ Chants ]
NARRATION: Mengistu Haile Mariam basked in glory.
The Cubans and Soviets had saved his regime.
In Washington,
some saw the victory as proof that
the Soviets were abusing détente.
The Home of Africa was not important to America
as of itself, but it was important as a measure
and a test of how the Soviets were interpreting détente.
[speaking Russian ]
Quarrels about the Third World
were getting blown out of all proportion.
These disputes about Africa, Angola, Ethiopia and Somalia -
none of them were worth it.
Twenty years later, no-one even remembers who was doing what.
NARRATION: In the hunt for Cold War gains,
the super powers spawned an arms race in the Developing World.
Their solemn promises of restraint
were blown to the winds.
Subtitles ripped and converted by Juan Claudio Epsteyn
E-mail: epsteyn@hotmail.com